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News story entitled "Japanese Press Comments", as set forth on page 6 of The Japan Advertiser, March 17, 1939:

"JAPANESE PRESS COMMENTS"

Price Control Violators Must "Be Punished Much More Severely if Program Is to Be Effective — Japan Should Form Triple Military Alliance with Germany and Italy to Forward Policies of Anti-Comintern Powers — Japan Must Be Prepared to Cope Effectively with Fishery Situation When Season Opens Next Month — "Third Countries Inimical to Japan and Friendly to Chiang Must Be Turned Out of China — Responsibility for Settling the Fishery Issue, or Consequences from Their Failure to Act, Now Rest with Soviets.

PRICE CONTROL "REA"

ASAHI

Japan's domestic situation gains new significance with the assumption of the chairmanship of the Central Price Policy Commission by Mr. Shinji Ikeda, former Finance Minister. Although nothing definite has been announced yet as to a new price policy, it can be imagined that it will develop in three directions.

One is the number of commodities included in the list for which official maximums will be fixed. Prices are likely to rise for commodities which are not curbed by official maximums.

The small number of commodities included in the official price fixing of the past can be seen from the fact that out of approximately 100 commodities selected by the Bank of Japan for formulating indices of retail prices each month, only about 30 are included in it. It is natural that prices of the unaffected articles are likely to increase under the circumstances. It devolves upon the reorganized commission to increase the number of commodities for official control.

All laws and regulations concerning price control should be strengthened to meet the actualities. The maximum punishment for violation is too mild. An offender can be fined only ¥5,000 at the most or receive a prison term of one year, while he can earn profits much greater than his through illegal sales. This fact is inducing traders to transact on unlawful quotations and to lay up huge profits. Not only is the punishment light, but measures designed to prevent violations are inadequate. This has been criticized since the price control law was promulgated, but the Government has remained indifferent to the criticisms.

Violations of economic rules and regulations at this important moment are so serious that they do not merely stop at breaches of faith in commercial transactions, loss of personal credit or troubles to others, affect the national interest alarmingly. Both the Government and people seem to
lack a correct conception of this fact. The results will be so far-reaching, if not checked soon, that even the invocation of Article 19 of the National General Mobilization Law will not be enough to recover losses caused by violation of the control regulations.

These two steps, if adopted, will strengthen the policy the Government has been following thus far against high prices, but they are not appropriate enough to meet the future situation. Mr. Ikeda is advocating the need of unit price formulation and reduction of production costs will suggest the third direction. This is a quite new price policy. For the reduction of costs, the prevention of high prices against materials, labor, wages, freight rates, insurance charges, rental and other costs is necessary. As this is difficult to be executed by the present Export-Import Control Law, the invocation of Article 19 of the National General Mobilization Law is being made a subject for discussion by the Price Policy Commission.

Germany Marches On

Germany's eastward expansion policy is steadily progressing. That Germany has established a protectorate over Czechoslovakia, taking advantage of the independence of Slovakia, speaks the strengthening of this policy. Three ways are now open for Germany to penetrate the Ukraine. One is direct from the Baltic Sea to the Soviet Union. Another is to press through Polish territory. The third is to go across Carpatho-Ukraine, hitherto part of Czechoslovakia. The last-mentioned route is considered the most likely for Germany to take.

If Germany places the whole land of Czechoslovakia under its protection, the action will conflict with a demand of Hungary, which also has secured the region, but it is not likely that Germany will deliver Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary so easily. There is another problem to consider. Hungary already has joined the anti-Comintern alliance in recognition to Germany's eastward advance. Because of this, Germany and Hungary are expected to effect a compromise on the Carpatho-Ukraine question.

It is expected, therefore, that the Czechoslovakia question will be settled without further ado. "He who, then, will come next into the limelight of the diplomatic stage of the world?" is Rumania by general consent. Rumania may shun Germany's pressure, but, considering the fact that Hungary has volunteered to fall in line with Germany and Italy to throw off its glorious isolation, and has joined the anti-Comintern alliance, it easily can be imagined what will happen to Rumania in the future.

Germany's eastward advance thus is active. The Ukraine is known as the treasure land of the Soviet Union. The policy of Reichsfuehrer Adolf Hitler, thus far has been fulfilled without bloodshed, is expected to encounter armed resistance when this land is entered. Japan cannot overlook this opportunity.

The Soviet Union is the real substance of the Comintern. Japan, who is an ally of the anti-Comintern pact, must closely look into the Soviet Union question itself, considering Moscow actions in China's northerwestern provinces and its attitude in the Kamchatka fishery question. In this connection, Japan cannot regard the Czechoslovak matter in an indifferent light.

Japan and Germany are destined to be drawn closer together by Italy's co-operation also is absolutely necessary. Japan must co-operate with Italy for the latter's policy of dominating the Mediterranean. It is Great Britain who confronts Italy. Japan also is under British pressure, due to the latter's
YOMIURI

The Soviet Union violated the spirit of the Khabarovsk agreement for the stabilization of fishery lots in northern waters when it announced that fishing grounds, including those stabilized by the agreement, would be auctioned off on March 15. The action, which was unilateral, was contrary to international justice, and it is feared that it will lead to the aggravation of bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. This country since last fall has been endeavoring to conclude a provisional agreement which would prevent a treatyless fishery situation from arising. Despite the negotiations in progress between Mr. Shigenori Togo, ambassador to Moscow, and the Soviet authorities, the Soviet carried out the auction of fishery lots at Vladivostok on March 15, contrary to what was scheduled. We wish to know whether the lots auctioned off included the stabilized grounds and the special lots held by Japanese operators, on which contracts have expired. If these grounds were included, a serious situation will arise, the responsibility for which will rest with the Soviet side. The Japanese operators seem not to have participated in the auction in accordance with the policy of the Government, and there is every reason to suppose that the lots put up at auction went to private Soviet interests which, as robots of the Moscow Government, have been endeavoring to wrest the fisheries in northern waters from the Japanese. The auction, in substance, was a form of guerilla warfare conducted by the Soviets to oust the Japanese from the northern fisheries. It is easy to imagine that the rental of grounds were fixed at exorbitantly high rates, so that they might form the basis for rentals to be paid by Japanese operators in the future.

Now that the Soviets have adopted an unreasonable attitude toward the fishery issue, it would seem that it will be to no purpose to continue, so long as there is no intention on their part to reflect. Thus it may be argued that all we have got to do is to take firm resolve to adopt whatever measures are considered necessary for the protection of the rights and interests which we gained with the blood of our ancestors. In this connection, Foreign Minister FuMro, in reply to an interpellation in the Diet the other day, declared that the Government will continue the negotiations to the very moment of the departure of fishermen for northern waters, even though settlement could not be reached by the date fixed for the auction. Whereas the settlement of the negotiations the Government will study effective and appropriate measures for the protection of Japan's rights and interests in the northern seas, the Foreign Minister said. Much can be said for the attitude of the Government, which is determined to continue the negotiations to the last. It will be remembered that Japanese interests did not participate in the auction held in December 1929 nor in March 1930 by way of protest against the attitude of the Soviet, which had insisted on the prior right to acquire fisheries for state operation, in the negotiations which had preceded the auctions. In the third auction, held in April 1930, the Soviet made concessions which led to a temporary settlement of the situation.

The fishery situation today is different from that which prevailed in 1929. The advance of the Soviet Union in the Far East and the increase in the desire for the Soviets to recover the
fishery lots which have been held by Japanese for a long time, compel us to shape our course on the basis of past experiences. But there is no reason why efforts to settle the issue by diplomatic negotiations should not be continued to the last. We must see that it goes down in the history of fishery negotiations that this country has made all it could to reach a settlement by diplomatic negotiations. The issue is not a question of the safety of the interests of those engaged in fishing, but an effecting important rights granted this country by the Peace of Portsmouth treaty concluded after the Russo-Japanese war. For we find these important rights threatened by the unwarranted action of the Soviet in auctioning off the fishing lots which have been held by Japan for years and years. We must not be under an illusion regarding the outcome of the negotiations which are to be continued following the auctions. We must be fully prepared to meet the situation to arise from the failure to reach a settlement of the negotiations by the time the operators are ready to depart for the northern waters at the start of the fishing season next month.

Powers Must Be Injected

MIYAKO

The Powers, especially Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, have been hostile toward this country since the Manchurian and China incidents. Mr. Minister Shigehiro Itagaki and Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai had the attitude of these Powers in mind, when, in reply to interpellations in the Diet, they declared that it would be impossible to avoid friction with third countries in the execution of the policy for the creation of a new order in East Asia. In the same statements, they gave expression to the resentment felt by the people over the attitude of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union toward the Sino-Japanese conflict. Evidently they had those same Powers in mind when they argued that unless third countries supporting the Chiang Kaishek regime are ejected, there can be no hope of settling the China incident. If the Powers which are giving aid to the Chiang regime in the struggle against this country do not reform their attitude in time, this country will be compelled to take steps which will lead to a situation, the consequences of which will be serious.

Following its action in making a loan to the Chiang regime, Britain has established a fund to stabilize the Chinese currency. The people consider this step as an act of hostility against Japan and the Provisional Government at Peiping. This impression is confirmed by the representations which have been made by Britain, America, and France, protesting against the exchange control which has been enforced in North China. There is no doubt that these countries deliberately misinterpreted the aims of the step taken by the Provisional Government in order to impede the work of creating a new order in East Asia. The three Powers demarches cause us to anticipate that the Powers will attempt to put further obstacles in Japan's way as the community of interests between Japan and China increases. The service Ministers were quite right when they told the Diet that it was their considered opinion that the China incident will not be brought to a conclusion until Powers supporting the Chiang regime are ejected.

Soviets Responsible

FOCHI

The outcome of the Soviet-Japanese fishery negotiations has been a matter of grave concern to all concerned about the future relations of the two countries. The Japanese have shown
sincerity in their policy of settling the negotiations by amicable means. This attitude has been ignored by the Soviets, however, who are reported to have decided to put up at auction fishing grounds including the so-called stabilized lots, on March 15, as previously announced. Whether the grounds which have been held by Japanese operators for so many years actually were auctioned off is not clear at the time of writing. If they were, the Soviets have violated not only the Fioretto-Karakhan agreement, which stabilized the grounds, but also the Portsmouth treaty, concluded after the Russo-Japanese war.

In the negotiations for the settlement of the fishery issue which have been in progress since last year, the Soviet side has made two proposals, viz., the placing at auction all fishing grounds inclusive of the stabilized lots and the exclusion of 40 grounds from Japanese operation. Apart from the second proposal, which was made for strategic reasons and from the standpoint of conserving fish, the first demand was of a nature, the acceptance of which would have struck at the foundations of the Portsmouth treaty. It was while we were endeavoring to induce them to withdraw the first demand that the Soviets acted unilaterally in announcing the auction of stabilized grounds. Are they aware of the seriousness of the situation their action was causing? Whether the worst for which we are prepared will come or not depends now on the course the Soviet will take in the next few weeks.
CERTIFICATE

I, ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, C.H.C., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That among such documents is a bound volume of "The Japanese Advertiser" newspapers for the months of March and April 1939, which includes the issue for Friday, March 17, 1939.

3. That the attached newspaper article entitled "Japanese Press Comments" is a reproduction of article which appears on page 6 of the issue of March 17, 1939.

/s/ ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY

Dated: 8 January 1947
未知
"ITAGAKI, "ONAI SCOPE" POWERS INTERFERENCE. Warn Nation Must Not Flex in Determination for China Affair Goal.

Unjust interference by third Powers in the execution of Japan's mission of constructing a new order in East Asia must be stamped out, it was said by the Minister Lieutenant-General Seishiro Itagaki and Navy Minister Admiral "Itsumasa Yonal Thursday night on the eve of the second anniversary of the China Affair.

After expressing hearty thanks and condolence to the 60,000 officers and soldiers who sacrificed their lives on the China fronts to construct a new order in the Orient, the War Minister stated:

"The world is well aware of the fact that the invincible Japanese troops of His Majesty the Emperor have gained victories on land and sea and achieved such remarkable success which is unique in the history of the world.

"JAPAN'S THIRD POWERS"

"The stubborn Chiang Kai-shek regime is still continuing resistance against Japan in complicity with third Powers which have ambitions in the Far East. It has now been laid bare that Japan's immediate enemy is not limited to the Chungking Government.

"It is necessary, therefore, to crush the anti-Japanese policy on the part of Third Powers in order to put an end to the resistance campaign by the Chiang's regime against Japan. This must be accomplished at any cost no matter how long the present hostilities continue. Accomplishment of this point is the key to put an end to the current affair.

"At the same time, it must be pointed out that the affair cannot be regarded as ended even if the Chiang Kai-shek's regime collapses tomorrow. In order to make China free from the semi-colonial condition and build up a new order in East Asia, any maneuvers on the part of pro-Chiang countries must be checked and the nation must fully be ready to cope with the possible crisis in the world.

"All the people in the country must express their firm determination that Japan will never abandon her aim of making East Asia for the East Asians. No pains must be spared for the attainment of the goal."

Reviewing the brilliant success of the current Sino-Japanese conflict and also outlining the task assigned to the Navy for th-
coming year, the Navy Minister stated as follows:

YONAI THANKS NATION

"On the occasion of the second anniversary of the outbreak of Japan's crusade in China, I am deeply inspired by the august virtue of His Majesty the Emperor. I also express my deepest sympathy with those who sacrificed their lives or were wounded on the fronts during the past two years for the realization of a new order in East Asia. Furthermore, I on behalf of the naval officers and sailors express profound gratitude to the entire nation behind the gun for their cooperation and support rendered to the Imperial Navy.

The second year of the China Affair, the Japanese forces achieved brilliant success by reducing the Wuhan cities, Canton, Nanchang, Hainan Island and more recently Swatow and a number of islands along the China coast and also blockading the principal Chinese ports. Along with the Japanese military operations, the constructive activities in China consolidated their foundation during the same period.

The third year of the China Affair will see Japan accomplish step by step in concrete manner the mission assigned to her; namely, the building up of a new order in East Asia, in concert with the new China regimes. It goes without saying that the Chiang Kai-shek regime which interferes with the bringing about of a new order will be fundamentally chastised.

Any unjust interference by third Powers with the execution of Japan's mission should be drastically rejected. The Imperial Navy will be ready to cope with such an unseen challenge.

The whole nation must be united and determined to deal with the difficult situations which may arise in the future. In obedience to His Majesty's command, the Imperial Navy will attend to its duties which are increasing in gravity for the defense of the fatherland."
CERTIFICATE

I, ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.C., S.C.I.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That among such documents is a bound volume of "The Japan Times & Mail" newspapers for the month of July 1939, which includes the issue for Friday, July 7, 1939.

3. That the attached newspaper article entitled "Itagaki, Yonoi Score Power's Interference" is a reproduction of article which appears on page 1 of the issue of July 7, 1939.

/s/ Arthur A. Sandusky

Dated: 8 January 1947
日本国の連合国の軍隊は、東亜地域の戦争指導の一環として、日本の集団的自衛権を拡大するための戦略を展開しています。そのため、国際社会への理解と協力の必要性を強調しています。
No3

Doc.2959
The War Ministry invited Manchurian railway authorities to discuss Manchurian-Mongolian problems.

At noon on 30th, UCHIDA, President of the S.K.R., YEGUCEI, Vice-President, KIKURA, KAMIMUCHI, GODO, OKUSA and OKURA (all of them Directors) were invited to luncheon at the War Minister's Official residence.

From the Army side, MINAMI, Minister, KANAYA, Chief of the General Staff, SUGIYAMA and ITO, Vice-ministers, TATSUMA, Chief of the General Staff, KOISO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, TATEKAWA, Chief of the 2nd Section and OKI, Chief of the 3rd Section, were present. They had luncheon together, and after that, they exchanged their outspoken opinions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolian problems.

Minister MINAMI made the following statement after the unofficial military councilors' conference on the 30th:

"The Army has long recognized the necessity of increasing our divisions in Korea and we hope the day will come when more divisions will be dispatched there. However, this question is not dealt with in our draft for the reformation of the Army organization. I must make it clear that this question has not yet been decided upon at the Big Three Conference. Therefore, such things as what division will be dispatched to Korea or where it will be stationed are not discussed at all. In order to avoid unnecessary anxieties on the part of the local people, I state this."

Governor UGAKI in Korea said as follows:

"I have heard nothing about the dispatch of one division to Korea—the Army wants to have it realized from the viewpoint of the prosperity of the local district and from the viewpoint of strategem, it is considered necessary, however, the government of Korea cannot afford to share the expense with the Army. It depends on the financial situation of the Army."
"Biography of General LINAI"

by

YOSUKE, Ken
President of the Japan Liberal Club
in MA Prefecture, in KYOTO

... of the TWIN TAILS INCIDENT

Not many days after the occurrence of the Kenjûwai Incident, a collective statement in a newspaper stated;

"The Prime Minister of Japan sat with arms crossed, Finance Minister LOKUS in small form set in the seat of the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister sat beneath the chair with folded hands. It was an issue of about the middle of October 1935, when the Prime Minister was being spoken of as preparing for the next presidency of the Insto-ko (Democratic Party). It is reflected upon the fact that the Insto-ko Cabinet, after the Kenjûwai incident, was substantially led by General, I.M.I. (p. 115)

General Linai believed from the very beginning in the "strong Ants" policy, that the Kenjûwai issue could be effectively settled by theists alone. To the so-called softists, this was a matter of surprise, but to the general, it is a matter of course. Firm was his determination and solid as a rock. Consistency ruled his beliefs from start to finish. Sooner than that soon after accepting the chair of the Insto-ko, in August of 1931, when the clouds were heavy over Japan and Prime Minister of the assassins of Taro Shintaro (I.M.I.) had been assassinated, that the general in his position as Minister of Finance delivered a speech at the conference of divisional generals saying, "Guard our lifeline Kenjûwai!" The voice of the strongest eventually prevailed and the nation was convinced to accept the cry "Guard the lifeline" as their own voice. (p. 115-116)
"Understand the past and the present you will know," says a Chinese proverb. In obedience to this, I propose to disclose a part of my diary on the 23rd of September to recall the circumstances of those days. This being a diary and not intended for the public, it is written in my friend terms; but being frank it serves conveniently to show the actual facts of the incident. (p. 121)

Officious again. It is they of the League of Nations that have been officious toward Japan ever since the World War. When the war was over they drew a breath of relief, but what they saw was nothing but a miserable war-torn world with the sacrifice of one million and half lives and three hundred billion yen. There was an ardent desire for permanent peace which spread itself as a fire on a plain. This is represented by Wilson's pacific opinion which is based on the love of humanity. Based on this principle, the League of Nations was born. Therefore, the motive which gave birth to the league and its ideal are certainly good and welcome. But whether or not to subscribe to the League should have been determined according to the nationality, geographical circumstances and the domestic state of the nation concerned. Since America whose President initiated the institution did not take part in it as a nation, our country did subscribe aflow from the viewpoint of peace-loving principles. What was our gain as the result? We let perseverance bear the pressure from foreign countries and the incident of the Marco Polo Bridge, these are the only outcome. When the League members considered restoration of their own countries, they distinctly came to notice the image of Japan in her firm outline. Japan was found involuntarily rushed among the five great powers and became one of the three great naval forces of the world. We wonder they were awe-stricken to behold that powerful form of reality. Therefore, if they had been broadminded enough to leave the matter of the Orient with Japan which held the real power of the broad way of peace, nothing might have occurred. Instead they waived it in favor of the side way. This result was manifested in two remarkable forms. One was how rising Japan should be suppressed, and the other was the maintenance of their colonies in the Orient with restoration to pre-war style. As a means to achieve this end a
campaign of propaganda was begun under the euphonic term of "All-Lignty Peace." Unconditionally Japan jumped at it. China danced recklessly with the tune. The League cunningly made use of the unexpected result. This was culminated at the Washington Conference which may represent a portion of their success. They may have been pleased with it, but not the Oriental nations and, in particular, Japan. The fanatical behavior of the Chinese dancing with the tune, led to antagonism without firearms. It was manifested in various forms such as the Nanking Affair, Siamen Incident, and the Shanghai Affair, assassination of Captain NAKAJIMA; the Tokyo Bridge Incident. Nevertheless another period of officiousness passed on. What a nuisance, and how extremely uncomfortable! To make the matter worse there are a "cap of licentious incidents which have accumulated including the sixty cases initiated by a shallow truce on importations, content at armaments, the multitudes of anti-war thoughts which gave vent to the friction between laborer and employers, frequent occurrence of frauds, tightening of money and discord between government officials. Thereupon some patriots gained inspiration from the behavior of the loyal soldiers in the days of the war with China and Russia; they are indignant to see the existing state of the country. Their indignation has come to near exhaustion. Should it once give vent, no one can tell where, when, and how the indignation will come out. At this time again the old officiousness occurred. What a singular nuisance! (pp. 121-124)
Today's statement made by the military authorities has clarified the base of the Government's policy objecting to American participation. War Minister MINAMI stated that: "It is doubtful whether United States intervention would contribute to the settlement of the matter in question, that this matter should be dealt with directly between Japan and China, that we cannot admit the intervention of any third party and that whatever steps the League Council would take with the United States, it is quite evident that Japan would under no circumstances alter her policy in regard to the question that has a bearing upon her national miscellanea. According to the YANGU semi-official press agency, a certain high ranking army officer remarked that the conduct of the United States in MANCHURIA went too far in interfering with particular Japanese interests and if the United States criticizes the CHINCHU incident, then what about the Niigata question? he said that it was a regrettable thing that the League and the United States were showing attitudes of ignoring Japan's special interests in MANCHURIA; that the fundamental policy of the Army is to disapprove third power intervention in settling the matter in question; and that this stand is definite and immovable."

Now it is evident that the matter is proceeding according to what the army cares to propound. The Government's propaganda to the effect that public opinion disfavors United States participation in the League Council does not coincide with the truth. So far no public movement whatever has been witnessed. The editorials in the Japanese press are welcoming United States participation. In other words the military circle has in truth been objecting to United States participation.
CERTIFICATE

I.P.S. No. 1426

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Negaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief, Archives Section -- Foreign Office -- and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 296 pages, dated ________, 19__, and described as follows: Public Opinion and Newspaper Editorials on Manchurian Incident.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section — Foreign Office —

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of October, 1946.

/s/ Negaharu ODO  
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Yemamoto  
Ass’t Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Harsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of October, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Harsh  
2403  
Investigator, I.P.S.

Witness: /s/ T/4 Tekio Toguchi  
Official Capacity
CERTIFICATE

I.P.S. No. 1426

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, CDO Nagaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief, Archives Section — Foreign Office — and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 296 pages, dated _________, 19____, and described as follows: Public Opinion and Newspaper Editorials on Manchurian Incident. — I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Archives Section — Foreign Office —

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of October, 1946.

Witness:

Nagaharu
Signature of Official

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larre, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of October, 1946.

Witness:

Richard H. Larre

Investigator, I.P.S.
RICHARD H. LARSH

INVESTIGATOR, I P.S.

T/4 TAKEO TOGUCHI
A meeting was opened at the office of this Council Building at 1.30 P.M. on Wednesday, 9th December 1931.

In order to concentrate then, one unit was sent to the Chinchow district. Accordingly, an order was issued commanding all units in the said area to receive instructions from the commander of the above force in all their operations and following this an order was issued at 12.40 P.M. on the 27th November that the unit should return to a position east of Hain-Min-Tun. Incidentally, information to the effect that, if Japan so demanded the Chinese would evacuate Chinchow, came into our hands. Thus there was no necessity for any strong offensive action. Perhaps this might have led to the report which appeared in the newspapers, etc., to the effect that the Chief of Staff, the Minister of War, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had come to an agreement that the attack on Chinchow should not be carried out."

(WAR MINISTER MIMAMI): "I shall now report on conditions in the Chinchow district. In the concentration of an army, it is a principle in military tactics to send one unit ahead. Now, as you know, our forces were distributed over Tsitsihar, Shapin-kai, and other places. So, in order to concentrate them, one unit was sent to the Chinchow district. Accordingly, an order was issued commanding all units in the said area to receive instructions from the commander of the above force in all their operations and following this an order was issued at 12.40 P.M. on the 27th November that the unit should return to a position east of Hain-Min-Tun. Incidentally, information to the effect that, if Japan so demanded the Chinese would evacuate Chinchow, came into our hands. Thus there was no necessity for any strong offensive action. Perhaps this might have led to the report which appeared in the newspapers, etc., to the effect that the Chief of Staff, the Minister of War, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had come to an agreement that the attack on Chinchow should not be carried out."

(COUNCILLOR BUT): "Although I think it is reasonable that attack should be made under some pretext on Chinchow where CHANG HOSEI-LIANG has his headquarters, yet great will be our loss of credit with the League of Nations and the great powers. Though it might be very convenient for Japan to have Manchukuo an independent state, I do not believe the great powers would accept it. It might be well for Manchurian people to seek for their independence on their own accord, but are we not losing general confidence as a result of continually taking action under the pretext of self-defence."
WAR MINISTER MIKAMI: "We do not wish to give the impression to foreign countries that we have attacked Manchuria and Mongolia."

COUNCILLOR SUKUMAI: "After our planes bombed Chinchow, our country quickly lost the confidence of the League of Nations which is certainly a matter of regret. Must we all regard this loss as inevitable?"

WAR MINISTER MIKAMI: "I too consider it regrettable. However, apparently Europeans and Americans are mistaken in thinking that we made use of large bombs such as used in the European War. Moreover, the contrast between this incident and the frequent government announcements that the affair would be settled has caused a strong reaction amongst them."

COUNCILLOR SAKAI: "What is meant by the term 'benitai'?"

WAR MINISTER MIKAMI: "Benitai means units which engage in battle wearing plain clothes and not uniform. No small inconvenience has been experienced in fighting them because they make it their practice to indulge in espionage activities."

COUNCILLOR MIYAKAWA: "What do you think are CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's real intentions?"

WAR MINISTER MIKAMI: "As far as my own judgement goes, he intends to go back to his own base so that he might maintain his livelihood. But as it is, he has no means of raising income tax, and it is very likely he is worrying how to carry on. His recent activity against Japan may offer some excuse to the Nanjing Government and partly indicates what might be termed a desperate action."

COUNCILLOR EGI: "Regarding my interpelation the other day when I asked a question regarding the improper action taken by one of the young officers of our Army. It is not at all suitable for the maintenance of military discipline to leave the matter of punishment ambiguous. Once they rebel, is it not a matter of course that they should be punished? I fear some soldiers may rise up in indignation. It is desirable that such matters should be publicly disposed of."

WAR MINISTER MIKAMI: "We thank you for your warning, but the question of punishment is still under consideration. However, the authorities also deem it important to maintain discipline, so please leave the affair to the army."

COUNCILLOR EGI: "I am quite satisfied to hear your answer. I am not at all concerned about the details of the punishment."

CHAIRMAN KURATANI: "We thank the War Minister for his giving us the detailed information he has given us. Today's meeting is now adjourned."

(Adjournment took place at 3.30 P.M.)
CERTIFICATE

I.P.S. no. 821

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Takamine, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 25 pages, dated December 9, 1931, and described as follows: Privy Council Proceedings December 9, 1931.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council.

Signed at Tokyo on this 7th day of October, 1946.

/s/ M. Takamine
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Suzuki
Secretary of Privy Council
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsch, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 7th day of October, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsch
Investigator, IPS

Witness: /s/ Henry Shimada
Official Capacity
国益、独立国として、日本は、絶対に、対立する者に、日本が、自衛のため、決して、譲歩するものではない。
Richard N. Harsh
Investigator

P.S.

< Henry Shimajima
June 7, 1935 (Shown 10)

To the Information Section in the Imperial Embassy of Japan in China

In re: Information of the reported articles about China

We have understood your telegraph dated May 31 concerning this matter. Accordingly, first of all, we will send you the enclosed newspaper cuttings of this district for a week until June 7.

A copy of this sheet will be sent to the Foreign Minister.
"JAPAN THREATENS STRONGER ACTION IN NORTH CHINA
(By a Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor)

TOKYO, May 31 - Sino-Japanese co-operation, carefully nurtured by the Japanese Foreign Ministry during the last months, was somewhat blighted by the drastic action of Japanese military leaders who presented to Chinese authorities in North China a series of demands containing all the features of an ultimatum except a definite time limit.

Accusing Chinese authorities, especially the Governor of Hopei Province, Gen. Yu Hanchun, of violating the Tangku truce by instigating or conniving in political banditry in the demilitarized zone and by the assassination of two Chinese editors who were considered Japanese agents, the Japanese Chief of Staff in North China, Colonel Sakai, stated that if China did not immediately halt all anti-Japanese and anti-Manchoukuo activities and abolish all organizations resorting to terrorist acts, the Japanese Army would take steps to cope with the situation.

A Foreign Office spokesman today intimated that Japanese action, in the event of the Chinese noncompliance, would probably take the form of occupation of the demilitarized zone for the purpose of maintaining order. He expressed doubt whether the occupation would include Tientsin and Peiping. However, inclusion of these cities within a new demilitarized zone is possible if the incident takes a serious or protracted turn.

The present move was not sudden, as Japanese military leaders for some time have expressed growing dissatisfaction over the alleged failure of the Chinese to carry out the letter and spirit of the Tangku truce. So far the Japanese Foreign Office has made no representations to Nanking, the matter being considered exclusively military.

High Japanese Army officers have recently proclaimed dissatisfaction with what they considered a too conciliatory Foreign Office policy toward China, and openly protested against the recent raising of the Japanese Legation at Peiping to the status of an Embassy. Simultaneously with the emergence of a serious crisis in North China, milder differences arose at Shanghai and Hankow, Japan objecting to Chinese action in raising the tariff 10 per cent and in instituting a sugar monopoly.

The present flurry coincides with the period when the Japanese Army and Navy formulated demands for next year's budget appropriations. Military action or the constant threat thereof may conceivably prove a means of inducing China to recognize the independence of Manchoukuo."

(Excerpt from the Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 1935)
SHANGHAI, June 2 (Sunday) - Prince Toh, virtual ruler of Inner Mongolia, asserted to newspaper men in Peking yesterday that there had been renewed Japanese efforts to extend the borders of Manchukuo into Inner Mongolia as a spearhead pointed toward Soviet Russia.

The Prince reported that recently a Japanese airplane landed at Fanchang, in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, bearing a Japanese military representative. This envoy informed Prince Ten that the Japanese desired to build an airdrome in the vicinity of Pan-chang, establish a branch of the special service bureau of the Kwantung (Japanese continental) army there, and also erect a wireless station.

Furthermore, the representative submitted a request by the Japanese military authorities that the Inner Mongolian capital be removed from Paining, 160 miles to the north. Paining is the key to the motor highway between Manchukuo and Mongolia. The Japanese demands indicate, therefore, a desire to extend Manchukuo's borders westward.

Chinese Face Ultimatum

Meanwhile, the North China situation continued today to occupy the attention of the Chinese military and political leaders. Its peaceful solution apparently hinged on Chian's unqualified acceptance of the Japanese military demands. These were summarized here as follows:

1. The removal of General Yu Hsueh-chung, Governor of Hopei Province (whose capital is Tientsin), and of Chang Ting-ao, Mayor of Tientsin.

2. The abolition of the Peking branch of the Chinese military affairs commission.

3. The transfer elsewhere of all troops under direct Nanking or under generals formerly owing allegiance to Marshal Chang Hau-chiang.
The abolition of the Chinese gendarmerie headquarters in Peiping, which are under the direct control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

The maintenance of peace and order in the Peiping-Tientsin area by means of peace preservation corps and militia.

The complete abolition or rigid curtailment of the city branches of the Kuomintang (National People's party, in power in Hankow) in Peiping and Tientsin.

The abolition of political training centers maintained by the Kuomintang, and the removal of the headquarters of all secret terrorist societies, such as the Blue Shirts.

The handing over to the Japanese authorities for punishment, under the terms of the Boxer Protocol of 1901, of the murderers of Fa Yu-yuan and Fu Ken-ku, pro-Japanese editors assassinated in Tientsin last month.

Parallel to Shanghai Cited

The Shanghai "Nichi Nichi," Japanese daily, characterizes the North China situation as not different from that which precipitated the Shanghai and Mukden incidents.

General Chiang Kai-shek will arrive in Hankow from Chungking on June 10 to discuss the situation with Yang Ching-wei, Premier; Huang Fu, minister of interior and chairman of the Peiping Political Readjustment Commission, and Ying Tung, managing director of the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

Yakichiro Suma, Japanese Consul General at Nanking, stated yesterday that Chiang had instructed Karelchun Chiang to "deal adequately" with General Yu, the Hopei Governor, who has incurred the wrath of the Japanese military authorities in North China because of his alleged anti-Japanese activities. General Yu is quoted in Japanese dispatches as saying that he will not resign his post unless specifically ordered to do so by the Hankow authorities.

Yu Seen Slated to Go

Japanese press dispatches from Hankow state that the Chinese government leaders have decided to demand the resignation of General Yu.

Lieutenant General Yoshijiro Umetsu, commander of the Japanese forces in North China, returned to Tientsin yesterday following a hurried visit to Peiping, capital of Manchukuo, where he conferred with General Senjuro Hayashi, Japanese War Minister, and General Hiro Mizuki, commander of the Kwantung army. Their discussion covered alleged Chinese violations of the Tangku peace agreement of 1933.
KWEK, Manchuria, June 5. — General Senjuro Hayashi, Japanese War Minister, in an interview reiterated that the present North China problem was purely a local question to be handled by the Kwantung army.

He declared the demands the Japanese Army had presented to China were "just and reasonable," and that if the Chinese were observant of the spirit of past agreements they would accept.

He said his visit to Manchukuo concerned the solution of several important problems, including the possibility of establishing the Japanese Army in this country on a permanent basis instead of the present expeditionary one.

He emphatically denied that Japan had made any demand on Inner Mongolia regarding establishment of Japanese Army bases in that territory."
JAPAN BOLSTERS FORCES IN CHINA; ACTION IN NEXT DAYS PREDICTED
Home Leaves Cancelled; Replacements Due, with Officers
Planning to Occupy Peiping, Tientsin
(The Times-Picayune Foreign Service)

SHANGHAI, June 6. - Japanese military authorities at Tientsin today
cancelled departure orders for all troops scheduled to return to Japan June 16
upon the expiration of their enlistment terms. Major-General Yasujiro Shiketsu,
chief commander of the Japanese garrison, issued the order. He stated that
the cancellation of home leave was due to "a critical situation existing."

Earlier in the day Japanese army officials in Shanghai announced they
planned to occupy Peiping and Tientsin within three days.

A Japanese transport carrying reinforcements from Osaka was scheduled
to arrive in Tientsin early next week. It will bear detachments of the 61st
regiment from Hakayama, the 76th regiment from Saseyama and the engineering
battalion of the 4th Division from Takatsuki.

To Double Garrison

It was originally announced that the new troops were replacements of the
whom terms had expired, but since the expirations of leaves have been cancell
it means that the Tientsin garrison, normally 5,000 strong, probably will be
doubled.

Further reinforcements from the Japanese garrison at Shanhaikwan have
been streaming into Tientsin daily for the last three weeks.

In addition to the force at Tientsin, the Japanese now have one brigade
stationed within the demilitarized zone northeast of Peiping. In the event
hostilities develop, now anticipated as practically inevitable, all the Japanese
forces of North China will be placed under the command of the Kwangtung army,
which controls the "puppet regime" of Manchukuo. They are commanded by
General Jiro Minami, who serves concurrently as ambassador to the Japanese-
protected state.

Minor Clashes Reported

General Seijuro Harashi, Japanese minister of war, who had been on a
three-week inspection trip to Manchukuo, returned to Mukden today. He said
he would go to Tokyo.

In an unofficial statement Japanese military officials said:

"Hostilities are likely to start within three days."

This caused a panic situation with unconfirmed reports from Chinese
sources tonight that minor clashes already had occurred. The Japanese garrison completed its barricades at street intersections in the Japanese concession of Tientsin and conducted a military demonstration.

Two armored cars were followed by a detachment of 100 infantrymen who marched through the streets of the Chinese city singing war songs.

A report from Peiping published in the Chinese paper, Shun Pao, here, said that 1,000 Japanese troops conducted a demonstration and marched in Taliang and Delonnor, in Eastern Chinese province. This is within area which the Japanese occupied and turned into a military aviation base."
"NIPPON DEADLINE REPORTED SET OF CHINESE DEMANDS

June 11 Is Date, Tokyo Hears; Recognition for Manchukuo Sought
(Excerpt from the Times-Picayune - June 8, 1935)

TOKYO, June 8. - (Saturday) - A definite date - June 11 - has been fixed by which China must yield to Japan's North China demands, vernacular newspaper dispatches from China reported today.

Some asserted the note was handed to General Ho Ying-Ching, Chinese chief of staff, at Peiping Friday, while others asserted the note was to be delivered to Peiping and Nanking Saturday and Sunday.

Some dispatches from Shanghai asserted the Japanese army was ready to start action in North China June 12 if necessary.

Meanwhile, troop-filled transports set sail from Japanese ports Friday as a crisis appeared imminent.

There were official denials that the troop movements were directly connected with the military authorities' activities in China.

Military and diplomatic quarters were active, however. Prince Kotohito Hara, field marshall and chief of the army general staff, submitted a report on the situation to Emperor Hirohito.

Prince Keisuke Okada conferred on the same question with Foreign Minister Koki Hirota and Lieutenant-General Tomonosuke Hashimoto, vice-minister for war.

A foreign office spokesman said "Japan intends to respect China's sovereignty. We have no territorial ambitions in China."

City Evacuated by Chinese Garrison

TIENTSIN, China, June 7. - The drum of Japanese military boots on the pavements of this city emphasized today disclosure of one of the demands the Japanese army is pressing on China - that China recognize the Japanese-sponsored state of Manchukuo.

"We seek a solution of all Sino-Jap problems, including that of the puppet regime. By the latter phrase I mean China's recognition of the new empire," asserted Major-General Rensuke Isogai, Japanese military attaché and spokesman.

While the Japanese military demonstrated in the streets and the war officers of Japan met in solemn council, the French colony feared that North China is on the threshold of a major upheaval.
The 1st army of General Yu-Hueh-Chung, which formed the garrison of the former governor, evacuated the city and moved to Peotingfu, the new seat of government for Honan province, 9 miles to the south of Peiping.

Throughout the day, during the first sessions of the Japanese military conference, business was at a standstill, while the question on the lips of foreigners and Chinese alike was: "What will be the next Japanese move?"

When the conference ended and the Japanese announced no decision had been reached, the tension eased somewhat, the residents feeling there was at least one more day of grace.

Demonstrations Continue

Japanese military demonstrations along the streets outside the foreign areas continued intermittently. It was a common occurrence to see detachments of several hundred Japanese, in full equipment, marching through the crowded native area.

Responsible residents consider these parades of warriors are likely to aggravate the situation shortly, with incidents which may precipitate serious hostilities.

General Sheng Chen, the newly appointed garrison commander for Tientsin, who was formerly stationed at Peiping, is expected to arrive tomorrow with the 32nd army, which will undertake garrison duties in this area.

Charges Evasion

Lieutenant-General Yoshijiro Umezu, commander of the Japanese garrison in North China, said at the close of the day's discussions, that future Japanese action depends upon "the sincerity of the Chinese in dealing with the Japanese requests."

He declared that the removal of Chinese officials in the area to other positions was "evading the issue and that the root of the trouble remains although on the surface it appears that the Japanese demands have been met."

Major-General Isogai, was quoted by Denge (Japanese news agency) as saying China faces the necessity of establishing a new government "capable of cooperating with Japan in maintaining peace in the Far East."

New Japanese troops are expected to arrive June 12."
No. 8 (Ordinary Section)
June 12, 1935 (Showa 10)

The Japanese Consulate in New Orleans

To the Information Section of the Japanese Embassy in China

In re: Sending of newspaper cuttings.

We will send you the enclosed newspaper cuttings of this district.

Copies of this sheet will be sent to the Information Bureau of the Ministry and the Embassy in the United States.
TIENTSIN, China, June 9. - (Sunday) - Japanese forces were expected today to deliver by Monday an ultimatum to the Chinese, failure to comply with which would entail a general Japanese invasion of North China.

General Jiro Minami, commander of the Japanese forces in Kwantung province, was understood by the Nippon Dempo (Japanese) News agency to have issued secret instructions to the effect, details of which were unknown but presumably to hold themselves in readiness for an emergency.

Japanese forces north of the Great Wall thus would be prepared on a moment's notice to pour southwest into China for the occupation of Peiping and Tientsin.

Conciliatory inclinations were shown by the Chinese, however, and whether a Japanese advance will be made was purely a matter of speculation.

The ultimatum, Nippon Dempo understands, will be delivered tomorrow by Colonel Takashi Sakai, chief of staff of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin.

It must be answered by Tuesday and all its demands complied with by June 20. The demands are broadly based on cessation of anti-Japanese activities in North China, especially the trade boycott, suppression of banditry, and the removal of Chinese army headquarters and administration of Hopei province, which contains Peiping and Tientsin, to Pachingfu to the south.

Hopei Small Part

General Kensuke Isogai and Colonel Sakai, who have been attending an important conference of Japanese commanders here to decide the fate of North China, returned to Peiping today and will see Ho Ying-Chin, Chinese war minister during the day.

Isogai said that the so-called Hopei province demands are only a small part of what Japan is asking of China, which he has been pressing at Nanking - seat of the Chinese nationalist government - for a long time.

Fundamentally, he said, Japan requires a reversal of the anti-Japanese attitude which persists beneath the surface of expressions of good-will. Specifically he said, Japan requires the "big boy" - the Chinese generalissimo - to change his attitude and policy.
TIENTSIN, China, June 3. - (Sunday) - Japanese forces were expected today to deliver by Monday an ultimatum to the Chinese, failure to comply with which would entail a general Japanese invasion of North China.

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Ready to Strike

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(Excerpt from the Tribune - June 9, 1935)

"WARNING BY JAPS"

Tell China to Comply
Chiang Kai-Shek has been the chief target of attack in Japanese statements here. He is accused of insincerity and covertly working against the Japanese, and there have been intimations that his withdrawal might be demanded.

Foreigners Uneasy

Foreigners here were uneasy. Troops of the Japanese garrison were much in evidence, and a Japanese military plane skimmed over the roofs of the foreign concessions on Saturday.

General Isogai, in his statement to The United Press, declared that the primary aim of his policy here is to "benefit the populace."

He said he had visited Ho Ying-Chin last February and discussed Japan's position and that tomorrow he would emphasize the main points of his representations, but would not discuss the demands unless Ho "brings the subject up."
CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT TROOPS EVACUATE NORTH CHINA

Background Is Given.

Chinese Nationalist government troops were reported in Japanese press dispatches today to be evacuating North China in fulfillment of the demands presented by the Japanese military authorities May 20. The Japanese reports described the activities as signaling China's complete capitulation to Nippon's requirements in North China.

TOKIO - the Third Army supported by General Sheng-Chen, regarded as persona grata to the Japanese military authorities, was reported to be entering Tientsin to replace the forces of General Yu Hsueh-Ghung as the Hopei Province garrison.

PEIPING - Chinese Nationalist government troops stationed at Fao-tungfu were reported in dispatches to the Rengo (Japanese News Agency) to be assembling their equipment preparatory to leaving the province for the south.

TIENTSIN - Chinese commentators credited an aroused international opinion combined with pressure by the Japanese foreign office with staying the purported plans of the Japanese military authorities to occupy Northern China.

Background

WASHINGTON, June 10. - By ousting the Chinese military and anti-Japanese officials and political agencies from North China, Japan today moved nearer her long dream of mastery of Eastern Asia.

Without even the usual "face saving" threats of resistance, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang government at Nanking lost any claim to control over the province of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Suiyuan and Chahar.

This area, larger than France and Switzerland, has been added to the island empire's domination of Manchoukuo, Korea and Formosa. In addition Chinese Turkestan and Inner Mongolia, covering areas larger than Spain and Portugal, have been cut off from direct contact with the central and Southern China regions remaining nominally under the government of Nanking.

Tanger of Clashes

Belief that the Japanese victory will continue bloodless and not likely to be followed by a military occupation inside the Great Wall may be premature. In the latest phase of Japanese activity on the mainland not a shot has been reported fired. But there will be danger of clashes until Chinese troops now evacuating North China are actually out and until complete compliance by China with Tokio's demands prevents Japanese military action on the familiar grounds that "China shows a lack of sincerity." Also, the events of the week-end will...
leave North China without governing authorities. And the experience of the last five years has shown Japan over-ready to take complete charge in just such a situation.

Pending developments of the next few days it may be expected that Japan now will move to:

1. Wring from Nanking full recognition of Manchoukuo — the new empire carved out of Manchuria and seized from China in 1931. Experts believe that if Nanking won't recognize Manchoukuo Japan will withdraw her recognition of Nanking and set up in its place a "Chinese government" which will. Any patently Chinese recognition of Manchoukuo would nullify the non-recognition policies of the United States and the governments associated with the League of Nations.

2. Take advantage of her recent success in North China to deal a death blow to the anti-Japanese boycott in Central and South China. With Nanking having surrendered in the north this would be easy in Central China. But the effort may bring Japan into the long-expected head of collision with South China which, ruled by the autonomous government at Canton, for five years has defied Tokio as persistently and almost as bitterly as the Cantonese have defied Nanking.

3. Move toward effective Japanese hegemony over Eastern Asia by giving occidental business firms in the Chinese territory just brought under Japanese control the same treatment they have received in Manchoukuo - the gate.

4. Force whatever Chinese government Japan may choose to recognize and support to enter into direct negotiations for treaties giving Japan "most favored nation" trade rights in China in order to assure a stable and orderly market for her goods.

The Big Trader

When Japan has consolidated her latest gains, a procedure traditionally in accordance with her program, Tokio may be expected to seek from foreign nations the same recognition of her might she has won from the Chinese.

That would involve a Japanese navy "second to none," recognition of her determination to keep her mandate over Pacific Islands despite her withdrawal from the League of Nations and international admission of the justness of Japan's claim to special privilege in Eastern Asia.

Before all else Japan may be expected, with no loss of time, to carry on a long-delayed economic development program in North China. It will involve railroad construction westward from Shantung and Hopei Provinces into Shansi to link these areas with the Manchoukuo railway network. That done, the big trader in the vast territory from the Yellow river northward to Siberia will be Japan.
Accepts Demands

PEIPING, China, June 10. - Gen. Ho Ying-Ching, Chinese war minister, has accepted all the demands made by the Japanese, it was announced officially today.

Ho handed a note to the Japanese garrison commander here, accepting all the Japanese demands and expressing a desire for a peaceful solution.
The Imperial Consulate-General in San Francisco

To the Information Section of the Japanese Embassy in China

In re: Sending the newspaper clippings reported by foreign correspondents in China

According to the matters which you requested by telegram to the Embassy in the United States at the end of May, we send you the enclosed clippings dated from May 31st to June 10th.

A copy of this sheet will be sent to the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.

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"CRACK CHINA ARMY DEFIES JAPAN, MOVES ON TIENSIN

General Shang Chen Leads Troops on City to Replace Those That Evacuated

Nipponese Are on "Way To Give Final Warning

Crisis Is Due Tuesday When Sino Soldiers Must Be Out of Territory

SHANGHAI, June 9. - (Sunday - China's 82nd Army, considered among China's best troops, today began moving toward Tientsin, where Sino-Japanese relations apparently are approaching some sort of crisis.

The army, headed by General Shang Chen, newly appointed garrison command for the Tientsin area, will replace the 5th Army of General Yu Kueh-Chung, which evacuated Tientsin and moved to Pekingfu, the new seat of government for Hopei Province, ninety miles south of Peiping.

Zero Hour Nears

TIENSIN (China), June 8 - The zero hour in the latest Sino-Japanese crisis was brought nearer tonight when a group of high Japanese military officers left for Peiping to serve a final warning upon certain Chinese troops to withdraw.

The move was announced by Japanese military headquarters here.

Among those who went to Peiping were General Isogai, Japanese military attache at Shanghai; Colonel Sakai, chief of staff of the Japanese garrison in North China; Major Ohki, a staff officer, and Captain Ohhiran, an officer attached at Nanking.

Tension Increases

LONDON, June 8 - An Exchange Telegraph dispatch from Tientsin today said continued maneuvers of Japanese troops and the departure of Major-General Doihara from Mukden for Tientsin increased fears that an outbreak of hostilities is imminent.

The dispatch said that anti-Japanese activities in the region of the Great Wall also contribute to the increasingly ominous situation.

War Machine is Ready

TOKIO, June 8 - Japan's war machine in Manchoukuo is reported in press dispatches to have been ordered today to prepare for an invasion of China unless the Chinese Government submits to Tokio's ultimatum.

Tuesday is reported to be the day by which China must act.
(Excerpt from the Sacramento Bee - June 9, 1935)

"CRACK CHINA ARMY DEFIES JAPAN, MOVES ON TIEN TSIN"

General Shang Chen Leads Troops on City to Replace Those That Evacuated

Nipponese Are on Way to Give Final Warning

Crisis Is Due Tuesday; Sino Soldiers Must Be Out of Territory

SHANGHAI, June 9. - (Sunday - China's 2nd Army, considered among China's best troops, today began moving toward Tientsin, where Sino-Japanese relations apparently are approaching some sort of crisis.

The army, headed by General Shang Chen, newly appointed garrison commander for the Tientsin area, will replace the 5th Army of General Yu Kao-Chung, which evacuated Tientsin and moved to Peipingfu, the new seat of government for Hopei Province, ninety miles south of Peiping.

Zero Hour Nears

TIEN TSIN (China), June 8 - The zero hour in the latest Sino-Japanese crisis was brought nearer tonight when a group of high Japanese military officers left for Peiping to serve a final warning upon certain Chinese troops to withdraw.

The move was announced by Japanese military headquarters here.

Among those who went to Peiping were General Isogai, Japanese military attache at Shanghai; Colonel Sakai, chief of staff of the Japanese garrison in North China; Major Ohki, a staff officer, and Captain Chihiro, an officer attaché at Nanking.

Tension Increases

LONDON, June 8 - An Exchange Telegraph dispatch from Tientsin today said continued maneuvers of Japanese troops and the departure of Major-General Doihara from Mukden for Tientsin increased fears that an outbreak of hostilities is imminent.

The dispatch said that anti-Japanese activities in the region of the Great Wall also contribute to the increasingly ominous situation.

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Tuesday is reported to be the day by which China must act.
A dispatch from Harbin, Manchoukuo, said that orders to raise Japan's war machine in Manchuria in readiness to roll southward across the Great Wall if China fails to submit to the ultimatum, were issued from the general headquarters of General Jiro Minami, Japanese military chief in Manchoukuo.

Orders Are Given

The dispatch said a midnight council meeting of Minami's staff was held and that afterward Lieutenant General Jiro Mikiho, after consulting with Vice Minister Hayashi, now in Harbin, issued "important orders."

The military authorities agree, the dispatch said, that these orders concerned preparations to "assume the initiative in the unfortunate event that the Chinese fail to display sincerity and good faith," as the Japanese phrase goes.

British Worried

The first tangible evidence of other powers' anxiety over Japan's purpose was soon today when the British ambassador, Sir Robert Clive, visited the foreign office and conferred with Vice Minister Manoru Shigecitau. The Rengo Agency said that the ambassador asked for information regarding the North China crisis and especially the Japanese army's intentions. The vice minister insisted that Japan's position was reasonable.

With the foreign office and the war office both denying Peking dispatches that the Japanese army had demanded the demilitarizing of all Hopei, the actual nature and status of the ultimatum remained obscure. The officials admit only that certain demands concerned disposition of Chinese troops in Hopei.

Headlines in the nationalistic newspaper Kokumin typify the ominous picture of North China displayed in the Japanese press, saying:

"Dark clouds overhanging North China — all preparations completed — it will be decided June 12."
Tokyo Orders All Demands for Clearing Region Be Complied with by June 20

TIENTSIN, China, June 9 - Japanese forces were expected today to deliver by Monday an ultimatum to the Chinese, failure to comply with which would entail a general Japanese invasion of North China.

Gen. Jiro Ninami, commander of the Japanese forces in Kwangtung Province, was understood by the Nippon Dempo (Japanese) News Agency to have issued secret instructions to the army, details of which were unknown but presumably to hold themselves in readiness for any emergency.

Japanese forces north of the Great Wall thus would be prepared on a moment's notice to pour southward into China for the occupation of Peiping and Tientsin.

Conciliation Shown

Conciliatory inclinations were shown by the Chinese, however, and whether a Japanese advance will be made was purely a matter of speculation.

The ultimatum, Nippon Dempo understands, will be delivered tomorrow by Col. Isami Sakai, chief of staff of the Japanese Garrison at Tientsin.

It must be answered by Tuesday and all its demands complied with by June 20. The demands are based on cessation of anti-Japanese activities in North China, especially the trade boycott, suppression of banditry, and the removal of Chinese army headquarters and administration of Hopei Province, which contains Peiping and Tientsin, to Pekingfu to the south.

"Gen. Kenzako Isogai and Col. Sakai, who have been attending the important conference of Japanese commanders here to decide the fate of North China, returned to Peiping today and will see Ching-Chin, Chinese war minister during the day.

Voice Hope of Peace

Nippon Dempo said indications were that the Japanese were hopeful of a peaceful settlement and expected drastic military action would not be necessary, since the Chinese seemed disposed to accede to a majority of the demands.

Foreigners here were uneasy, however. Troops of the Japanese Garrison were much in evidence, and a Japanese military plane skimmed over the roofs of the Foreign Concessions on Saturday.
TIENTSIN, June 13 - The Japanese Kwantung Army is moving 5,000 troops from Mukden to Shenchihwa at the Great Wall. Eleven troop trains have already arrived at the Wall causing great traffic congestion.

These troop movements, coupled with reports of new Japanese demands and apparent Japanese preparations to take over operation of the Shenchihwa-Paiping Railway, have aroused renewed fears of military occupation of the Paiping-Tientsin district and perhaps even a wider area.

The new Japanese demands are reported to include one that China turn over to the Japanese Army one of the railway tracks connecting Chingshengino and Tangshan, a distance of about eighty-five miles.

Six hundred additional South Manchuria Railway operatives arrived today at Shenchihwa, where the station and nearby warehouses have been converted into temporary barracks."
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. _________
I.P.S. No. 1483

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Havashri hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacities:
Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document in the attached consisting of 286 pages, dated May and June 1935, and described as follows: "Foreign Ministry Circular Document Containing Foreign Press Comment on North China Incidents of May and June 1935..."
I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of August, 1946. /s/ K. Havashi Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Kesshara Odo Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Q. "When Vice Chief of Staff at the time the Sainan Incident took place... was quick in action and notable in decision. He adopted a strong attitude when the incident broke out. He once ordered troops to Shantung for the second time... Is that statement true which I have just reported to you from that book?

A. That was under the orders of the Chief of Staff and the TANAKA Cabinet which decided that troops should be sent to Shantung..."

Q. "Do you recall a speech you delivered about the 4th of August 1931 to Army Commanders and Commanding Generals of Divisions at the War Ministry?"

A. Yes.

Q. Did you say in the course of that speech, "Guard Manchuria, our life line!"?

A. I do not recall that statement, but the sentiments are correct."

Q. "On did you take command of the Kwantung Army?"

A. December, 1934.

Q. Are you remained in command of that army for upwards of two years?

A. One year and three months....

Q. How many troops did you have under your command in Manchuria at that time?

A. About 60,000, I believe.

Q. You were concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo while Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, were you not?

A. Yes." (File No. 76, Serial 35, Page 3)

Q. "You had given General FODJO blanket authority to take any action he saw fit in Manchuria just prior to the Mukden incident?"

A. No. The Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army has this privilege and has had it for over twenty-five years.

Q. Then he could take any war-like steps he wanted over there under the prerogative of superior command?"
Q. And did you approve of the action he took?
A. Yes. (File No. 76, Serial 18, Page 11)

Q. General, you stated that you were a member and President of the Greater Japan Political Association?
A. Yes.

Q. How tell me, how long were you a member of this society? I want the dates?
A. From 30 March 1944 until 15 August 1945.

Q. Now you said that one of the principal aims of this society was to extend the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?
A. "Quantitatively that might be termed one of its principal aims..."

Q. "How far did you want to extend this Co-Prosperity Sphere? To what geographical limits?"
A. Exactly as the Government had outlined.

Q. How was that?
A. Asiaties.

Q. To extend it over all Asia?
A. Yes.

Q. Under that you include India, Burma, the Dutch Indies and the Philippines?
A. Yes.

Q. You weren't concerned with how the proper sovereignties felt about India, Burma, the Dutch Indies, China, or the Philippines?
A. Yes, I believed the Asiaties wished to be freed of the yoke of foreign domination.

Q. "Now, you believed then in Asia for Asiaties."
A. Yes. (File No. 76, Serial 16, Page 7-9)
Q. While you were Minister of War in 1931 the Japanese Army went war upon China, did they not?
A. Yes.

Q. We concluded our engagements at the Ryogu River in 1931 and subsequent to that consolidated the territory.
A. "What do you mean by coordinating your position?"

A. (General HIRAI showed on a map he drew that the southern Manchuria railroad ran from Herb to the Chinese border and the Ryogu River cut the territory of Manchuria more or less in half.) At the time I wasWar Minister we were guarding the route of the railway and did not go West of this aforementioned river. Now when I was Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, the whole of Manchuria had been occupied and we now Manchukuo. Certain units of the Army may have crossed over the Chinese border in skirmishes, but the Army as such never took part in any engagements.

Q. As ambassador to Manchukuo, what were your principal duties?
A. To preserve the independence of Manchuria.

Q. Your Army occupied practically all of Manchukuo then, did it not?
A. Yes.

Q. And some of your troops went beyond the Great Wall?
A. Yes.

Q. As ambassador to Manchukuo, what did you have to do with the government of Manchukuo at that time?
A. Essentially I advised them on such matters as agriculture, transportation, education, etc.

Q. And your advice was accepted, I suppose?
A. Yes.

Q. in fact, your advice in substance was no direction, was it not?
A. You might say so. — Yes.
この写真について、以下のような説明文を生成します。

観光客に対して、日本の美しい風景や文化を発信し、彼らを訪れる動機を提供することを目的としています。日本の風景や文化は、自然の美しさと広大な歴史の融合で、観光客に豊かな経験を提供します。観光地を結ぶ交通手段や、宿泊施設も充実しており、訪れる観光客が滞在中に快適に過ごすことができます。また、地域の文化体験も楽しむことができます。この観光地は、自然、文化、歴史が融合した素晴らしい場所で、観光客の興味を引き合い、訪れる動機を提供します。
Declaration issued by the S.YUKAI Party Kess Meeting (20th of January 1937)

Excerpt from Pages 5-8 of "Details Regarding Movements of Rightist Bodies in Connection with Change of Government" Published by Police Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, April 1937.

Owing to the multiplicity of the Government's diplomatic policy, it is not clear where responsibilities rest. Moreover, the Government has persistently adhered to secret diplomacy, originating in bureaucratic self-complacency, thereby failing to carry out national diplomacy characteristic of a Modern State. The purpose of the JAPAN-GERMAN Pact was defiance against Communism, which desires to destroy our State organization through Communism. But the Government bungled the matter so as to cause other Powers to suspect the formation of a rightist, dictatorial State. The Government cannot be absolved from responsibility for diplomatic failure as to procedure, time and method in concluding the Pact. Our Party is very anxious about the matter, and herein lies the reason why we are going to seek thorough clarification of the matter at the Diet.

The Government formulated many plans dogmatically concluding that a semi-war-time organization is necessary. If those plans, however, discourage industrial development and result in a menace to national livelihood, the nation will turn from its present attitude to grudge and resentment against the Government, and laxity of national spirit will be caused thereby. Our Party is determined to subject Government plans to strict examination in the Diet, and rectify their demerits relentlessly.

The present Cabinet calls the State control of electric power and the extension of compulsory education period products of all-out administrative reform. Our Party is willing to agree to the Government's claim in principle. But pure bureaucratic control of economy is harmful without being useful in any way. Autonomous control should be encouraged, with State control exercised when necessary. Only thus may free progress be promoted.

It has long been our desire to elevate the educational level of the nation. Which is more urgent, however, the extension of the period or the repletion of the substance? Moreover, necessity of sweeping reforms in the educational system has for many years been the public opinion of the nation. If the Government disregards it at this time, it will bring discredit on civil administration. Measures adopted by the present
The cabinet are not generally based on the merit, but are influenced by the dogmatic prejudices of the bureaucrats and the military.

The bureaucrats are wedded to self-complacency. The military are conscious of superiority complex. And they want to interfere in every sphere of state function. If this evil grows the will of the people will be prevented from free realization, constitutional government become nominal, and oligarchic tyranny introduced. This, we fear, is contrary to the fundamental principles of our State, which are based, on the whole, upon the national allegiance to the single Sovereign, and betrays the principle that the civil and military services should keep to their respective duties. We hereewith intend to live up to the spirit of the Constitution, strengthen parliamentary politics with solemn determination, to devise a new departure for our Party to forge ahead to regeneration, and to make strenuous efforts day and night, thereby to requite Imperial favour and to serve the State.

- END OF THE 1 -
Under the prevailing atmosphere it is absolutely impossible to discuss an all-out administrative reform with the present-day political parties. The political parties make it their sole business to attack the military authorities all the time without reflecting on their own conduct. The political parties are advocating an all-out administrative reform, but they do not possess any concrete plans. The only plans they have are of a negative nature and are inclined to the maintenance of the status quo. An all-out administrative reform to create a Conservative (Retrogressive) Japan runs completely counter to the loud cry for an all-out administrative reform that arose immediately after the February 26th Incident. Such a reform is like crying wine and selling vinegar, and our 100,000,000 compatriots cannot possibly be satisfied with same. Has not a positive wholesale administrative reform aimed at the existence and expansion of our people, "with the FIRE of T.N. JAPAN's the stabilizing power of EAST ASIA", always been the very cry of our 100,000,000 compatriots? Would not the abandonment of a positive policy imply being cramped up within Insular Japan? Could we thereby ever fulfill the heaven-ordained mission of the YAMATO Race? We agree indeed to a positive all-out administrative reform as the general will of the people, but we cannot agree to a negative all-out administrative reform. Ought we not to get rid of the present state of Parliament that has hitherto given itself up to party interest and party politics and ignored national interests and the welfare of the people, and return to true parliamentary politics conforming to the Constitution, d, hand in hand, clarify the national polity, develop industry, complete national defence, stabilize the living of the people, and steadily dispose of important questions? That was expected to come has /T.M. finally/ come; that is, the collision between the /T.H. advocates of the status quo and /T.N. the advocates of the destruction of the status quo. JAPAN stands now at the turning-point where she should realize a positive all-out administrative policy in order to overcome the present difficulties and tide over the existing international crisis.
"Details Regarding Movements of Rightist Bodies in Connection with Change of Government. (T.M.: Cabinet changes.)"

Peace Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry.

April 30.

(b) Publication of "Mr. Minister T. RAUCHI's Talk. (8:15 M. 23rd)

Because there are letters in the present political situation which differ from my beliefs, I took steps for presenting my resignation yesterday, the 22nd. There are said to be some people who say that M. HAYASHI's speech is the cause of matters having come to this stage, but that is not the reason at all. It is because I have obtained the fact that the views on the present situation by the party which has some members sitting as cabinet members for the purpose of cooperating with the execution of the policy of the present cabinet, differ fundamentally with ours. This is clear in view of the declaration made at their party meeting prior to the opening of the Diet session, the speech of the party leader, the speech of the party representative on the first day when the Diet reconvened after the recess, the atmosphere in the House, etc. I think it is utterly impossible to tide over the present situation by temporizing under compromise between those who fundamentally vary in their cognition of the present situation. In short, under such circumstances, I believe it to be absolutely impossible to enforce military discipline, the completion of national defense, an all-out administrative reform, etc., to which I have exerted my utmost efforts since I took office. This is why I have humbly tendered my resignation /T.M./ to His Majesty/.
Whether General Ugaki would accept the Imperial mandate or not depends upon the attitude of General Ugaki's Office for the Cabinet Formation, and as for the Army it will not call any particular meeting nor take up any measures to check the formation of a cabinet by General Ugaki. As you know the Army is just watching calmly the development of the situation. Rumour is circulating among the public that General Ugaki is persistently trying to continue the work of cabinet formation even by resorting to drastic measures, and because of this the nation is feeling great unrest.

This, however, is an intentional rumour made by those who still do not understand the real intentions of the Army or by those who for certain purposes dare to avoid understanding. The Army firmly believe that such malicious rumour has not been uttered from the mouth of General Ugaki himself and it is clear that a cabinet which has been formed unreasonably is not the best one.

Viewing the objective situation, the formation of a cabinet by General Ugaki is now most difficult, and it can't be imagined that General Ugaki who is supposed to be a great statesman would resort to a temporizing measure even at the expense of sacrificing his dignity. I, therefore, firmly believe that he would respectfully decline, and that his attitude would be such as a great superior Army officer would decline peacefully not leaving the Army in the lurch but obtaining true understanding of the Army's standpoint and sympathizing with their real intentions.

I think that among the public not a few people are doubtful of the Army's real intention since the Army has not published the reasons till today as to why it is so strongly opposed towards General Ugaki, and to my great regret I still cannot disclose openly the true state of affairs.

And yet if you look back upon the Army's determination for the maintenance of discipline through purge which was carried out resolutely at the expense of many victims as well as upon the results gained thereby, the reasons for the general will of the Army having stood against General Ugaki would naturally be understood. Although I cannot disclose the true state of affairs right now, a word may be given to the effect that the objection is a result of full consideration by the whole Army united for the sake of completion of the maintenance of discipline and the control of the circles /T.N. cliques/. Therefore it was against General Ugaki himself that the Army raised an objection and the policy to be announced by General Ugaki was not in question. I firmly believe, without mentioning those who are indifferent to the maintenance of discipline and control of the circles /T.N. cliques/ that anyone who has an ardent wish for these would surely be good enough to understand and approve the Army's present attitude.
OFFICE TO THE EX-CROWN REPRÉÉÉNTATIVES FROM
VICE-ADMIRAL (‘JGA’).

In the further to the measures taken by the Army authorities in connection with the recent political changes.

1) Summary of Developments.

On receipt of the report that the Imperial mandate had been given to General UCHI in the evening of 25th January (Sunday), the Army set off the view that now they are making progress toward the maintenance of military discipline that from an imperial and really fair standpoint thereof might be needed. As the Minister and Minister of the Cabinet headed by General UCMI, he could not beenable of bearing the heavy responsibility of controlling the Army because the formation of the Cabinet by General UCMI who had been alleged to have been concerned with a certain incident which he was occupying the part of an Minister and publicly believed to be a responsible person for the Army; in case the Army would take more difficult to maintain military discipline and moreover there is such fear that the control of the Army would greatly be embarrassed.

In view of the above, the Minister when he received a visit from General UCMI at 4 p.m. on 26th Monday for a conversation of the succeeding for Minister, called the effect that although the Army could not seem to check the formation of the Cabinet by General UCMI, the Army would ask him to fully consider his behavior from the standpoint of the Army maintenance and control.

At 11 a.m. on 26th (Tuesday), the Inspector-General of Military Education Fullen was asked on General UCMI’s question for the consideration giving full consideration of the situation within the Army. In the afternoon of the same day, the three Chief meet were held to decide the choice of candidates for succeeding for Minister in accordance with General UCMI's request for a conversation, but none of the candidates accepted the post in view of the fact that he would not be able to fulfill the duty of the Minister in the present situation, and they came to the conclusion that others besides the candidate would also feel the same. Therefore, the new Minister called on General UCMI at 5:30 a.m. on the next day to comply accordingly.
At about 11 a.m. on 20th (Thursday), the War Minister received a call from Yosuke Umezu but replied according to the above-mentioned point. Thus since nobody was willing to accept the post of War Minister for the Umezu Cabinet, General ITO finally respectfully declined the Imperial mandate.

2) Regarding the Army's attitude for the present political situation.

As explained in the above-mentioned development, the Army's behavior in the present political situation is bound up with its interest in not only to control and maintain the Army in order to display the true character of the Imperial Army, and the manner in which it is led by the eastern war, but also to exist absolutely no such fact as would involve either the Imperial Government or the Army in any way even with every mark of respect and most profound criticism.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kenuei Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Document Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated April, 1933, and described as follows: Typewritten Telegram, Army Manchurian Secret Disbursing Order #413, titled "Disbursement of Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident". I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry, 1st Demobilization Bureau.

Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day of Jan., 1947. /s/ Kenuei Ishibashi SEAL
Non-regular of the Archives and Document Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Shinai Kobayashi

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, O-735000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day of Jan., 1947 Eric W. Fleisher, 2d Lt., USMC

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt., 1st Ind. I. P. S. Investigator, Official Capacity
Riku Non Oiteu /my four hundred Secret/

Doctor Diary

(13th year of Showa/ No. 7)
Doc. No. 646

321. Intendance Section. Transfer of Secret Funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account
13.4.13 /13 April 13th year of SHDA / 13th year of SHDA /
/ c.c. 13 April 1936 /

/ Yen Niteu /Manchurian Secret /

Transfer of Secret Funds from Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account
/ Intendance Section / 5 April, 1936

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<td><strong>Minister</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chief of Competent Bureau and Section</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Minister's Received</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chie of Bureau</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chief of Section</strong></td>
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**Before or after decision:**
- Parliamentary Councillor
- Secretary
- Draft writer

**Names of sections concerned:**
- Military Affairs / seal /
- Intendance Section

**Names of section to which routed after action taken (or decision made):**
- Intendance Section

**Decision route delegated to:**
- Chief of Competent Bureau and Section

- Chief of Bureau

**Executed:**
- 5 April

**Presented:**
- 12 April

**Minister's Received:**
- 5 April

**Chie of Bureau:**
- Chief of Section
Draft of Notification to the Chief of the Extraordinary Army Intendance Section in Tokyo
"Riku Man Mitsu" /Military Manchuria Secret/.

Secret funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account shall be transferred upon disbursement as follows:

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<td>To SITO, Kenzo, the Chief of Staff of the Chosen Army: ¥ 20,000.</td>
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<td>To YOSHII, Yoshihiro, Vice-Minister of War: ¥ 77,500</td>
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Draft: "Man Empire No. 13", 6 April Showa 13/1938

/Army Manchuria Secret/

[Signature] /seal/

[Signature] /seal/
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<td>Army Manchurian Secret Expenditure Receipt No.</td>
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**Title:** Disbursing of Secret Expenditures for the Manchurian Incident

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<td>Adjutant Gen.</td>
<td>Compotent Adjutant</td>
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<td>K. ISHII</td>
<td>K. GOMURA</td>
<td>K. DOI</td>
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<tr>
<th>Section Made by</th>
<th>Commissioned</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Compotent Pureau</td>
<td>Chief of Compotent Section</td>
<td>Clerk of Compotent Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>K. NAGA</td>
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**Rec'd:** 5 July/1932

**Signatures:**
- Kei Natsu No. 22
- Pureau Chief
- Section Chief
- Y. SHITA
- Y. Y. SHITA
- Y. Y. SHITA

**Sealed:** 6 Aug./1932

**Copyist:** YAMASHITA
Draft Note Addressed to the Chief of Finance Section,
Intendance Bureau (Confidential)

Secret Expenditures for the Manchurian Incident be
Disbursed as follows:-

Rikukan Nitsu No. 541 4, July, SHOWA 7
Army Manchurian
Secret Expenditures/

Y 85,000 to HASHI'OTO Terangetsu, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army.
Y 5,000 to KIRUCHI Kadohari, Chief of Staff, Chinese Garrison.
Y 5,000 to KODAI'T Tanoe, Chief of Staff, Chosen Army.
Y 10,000 to MAZAKI Jinzaburu, Vice-Chief of General Staff.
Y 20,000 to KOISO Kuninki, Vice-Minister of War.
Y 1,000 to SHIMIZU Kijïï, Chief of Staff of Formosan Army.
Y 1,500 to HATA Shinji, VP Commander.
CERTIFICATE

I, Kanoo, Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Documents Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 5 July, 1932, and described as follows: Handwritten Telegram, Army Manchurian Disbursing Order #1355 "Disbursing of Secret Expenditures for the Manchurian Incident". I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry, 1st Demobilization Bureau

Signed at Tokyo on this 13 day of Jan 1947 /s/ Kanoo Ishibashi

Witness: Shinaji Kobayashi

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric V. Fleisher 0-935600, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day of Jan, 1947 /s/ Eric V. Fleisher 2d Lt. AUS.

Witness: Henry Shinojima
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<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Phone</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>张三</td>
<td>上海市</td>
<td>123456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>李四</td>
<td>北京市</td>
<td>789012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>王五</td>
<td>广州市</td>
<td>345678</td>
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- Phone: (XXX) XXX-XXXX
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<th>Rec'd No.</th>
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<th>Name of Source</th>
<th>(Section)</th>
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<th>Name of Subject:</th>
<th>Ministry of War Ministry</th>
<th>Related Section</th>
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<tr>
<td>re Delivery of Secret Service Funds of the Manchurian Incident Expenses</td>
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<tr>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Parliamentary Vice-Minister</th>
<th>Parliamentary Councilor</th>
<th>Secreetary</th>
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<th>Senior Administrative Staff</th>
<th>Administrative Staff</th>
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<th>Bureau Section in Charge</th>
<th>Rikumatsu No. 38</th>
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<td>Aug 2</td>
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<th>War Ministry</th>
<th>Aug 11, 1932</th>
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<td>Account Section</td>
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<th>War Ministry</th>
<th>Aug 11, 1932</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Account Section</td>
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</table>
The Draft of Announcement to the Chief of the Accounts Section in the Intendance Department.

(Secret) (Kanrizu)

Deliver Secret Service Funds as follows from the Manchurian Affairs Expenses.

Y85,000 to TORANOSUKE HASHIMOTO, the Chief of Staff to the Kwantung Army.

Y5,000 to KADOYA KIYOSHI, the Chief of Staff to the Japanese Army in China.

Y20,000 to TOYO KODAMA, the Chief of Staff to the Army in Chefoo.

Y10,000 to JUNZABURO KAZUKI, the Assistant Chief of General Staff.

Y18,500 to KUNIHIKO KIYOKO, the Vice-Minister of War.

Y1,000 to YOSHIHISA SHIZU, the Chief of Staff to the Army in Taiwan.

Y1,500 to SHINTARO HATA, the Provost Marshal General.

Y5,000 to TAKENOSUKE OGUNE, the Chief of the Military Police despatched to Shanghai.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kanec Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Documents Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated Aug. 2, 1932, and described as follows: Matter Concerning theGranting of Secret Service Funds for the Manchurian Incident. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

War Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day of Jan., 1947. /s/ Kanec Ishibashi Seal
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Shinji Kebayashi
Non-regular of the Archives and Documents Section of the
1st Demobilization Bureau
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2nd Lt. Eric V. Fleisher O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day of Jan., 1947 /s/ Eric V. Fleisher 2d Lt, AUS'I

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis
2d Lt. HI.

Investigator, I.P.S.
Official Capacity
"Disbursement of Secret Service Funds for the Manchurian Incident"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page No.</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Period to be held in file</th>
<th>Decision authorized by</th>
<th>Action authorized by</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>Authority of Vice-Minister</td>
<td>KUSHIBUCHI/ seal</td>
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</tbody>
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Transmit to:
Parliamentary Vice-Minister
Councillor

Before Decision
Sections
War
Concerned
Affairs

After Decision
Section Distribution
After Action
Decision

Receipt Number
Received by: Tiku-mun-mitsu-uke
War Ministry / T.N. Army-Manchurian Secret-Receipt / No. 268

Originating Office
(Ten Section)

Intendance Section

Subject
Disbursement of Secret Expenditures from the Manchurian Incident Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Vice-Minister</th>
<th>Councillor</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
<th>Draft Recorder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Vice-Minister (KUSHIBUCHI/ seal)

Senior Adjutant (KASHIYAMA/ seal)

Adjutant (KASHIYAMA/ seal)

Intendance officer for the Secretariat (KUSHIBUCHI/ seal)

Chief of Competent Bureau (KUSHIBUCHI/ seal)

Chief of Competent Section

Member of Competent Section

12th day of Jan, 1947

Witness: Henry Shimajima

Fric W. Fincher 2d Lt AUS, MI
NAME

Investigator JPS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
Draft of Instructions to the Chief of the Special Tokyo Army Intendance Corps, Rikumitsu /T.N. Army-Manchuria-Secret/

Disbursement from the MANCHURIAN Incident funds, secret expenditures as follows:

To: Vice-Minister of War Yoshijiro UKEZU

¥ 150,830

Rikumitsu No. 85

/T.N. Army-Manchuria-Secret/

March 8, 1938

Witness: Henry Shima, Jr.

Investigator, JPS

Official Capacity
CERTIFICATE

V. D. C. No. ________
I. P. S. No. 2896

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kanao Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Documents Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 8 March 1938, and described as follows:

"Expenses of Secret Service Funds for the Manchurian Incident"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

War Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 13 day of Jan. 1947

/\/ Kanao Ishibashi

Signature of Official

Witness: Shinji Kobayashi

Non-regular of the Archives and Documents Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher 0-93500, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day of Jan, 1947

/\/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt AUS, MI

NAME

Witness: Henry Shimajima

Investigator IPS

Official Capacity
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>项目</th>
<th>日期</th>
<th>地点</th>
<th>人员</th>
<th>备注</th>
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说明：
1. 项目：具体任务或项目名称。
2. 日期：执行任务或项目的时间。
3. 地点：任务或项目执行的地点。
4. 人员：参与任务或项目的人员。
5. 备注：关于任务或项目的其他相关信息。
Period to be held in file 10 years.

Decision authorized by: Authority of Vice-Minister

Action authorized by: Ushijima

Transmit to: Parliamentary Decision
Vice-Minister Before Action
Councillor After

Transmit to: Section Distribution After Action

Decision (War Affairs)

Receipt No. Received by War Ministry

Aug. 12th, 1932

RIN-MAI-MITSU KEN No. 1725

Office (Section)

Minister

Parliamentary Vice-Minister

Councillor

Secretary

Draft Recorder

Delegated

Vice Minister (Yamagawa)

Senior Adjutant

Adjudant in charge

Yamashita

Intendance Officer for the Secretariat

Kumura

Chief of Competent Bureau (Kawamura)

Chief of Competent Section

Member of Competent Section

Competent Bureau and Section

No. KRI-MITSU KEN No. 3

/T.M. Finance-Secret

Rec'd Joint

Kawamura

Bureau Chief per

Minister's Secretariat

Rec'd Dec. 27 Distribution

Bureau Chief

Section Chief
Dec. No. 2922

Draft of Instructions to Chief of Intendance Section, Intendance Bureau RIKU-HAN-MITSU /T.N. Army-Manchuria Secret/

Disburse from Manchurian Incident Funds, Secret Expenditures as follows: Dec. 27, 1933

TO:

Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army KOISO, Kuniaki ¥1,970,000.00
Chief of Staff, China Garrison KIYUJI, Kinya 15,000.00
Chief of Staff, Korean Army OSHI, Keikichi 15,000.00
Chief of Staff, Formosan Army OTSUKA, Kenzuke 3,000.00
Vice Minister of War YANAGA, Hisuke 110,000.00
Vice Chief of General Staff UDA, Kenichi 291,178.00
Commandant, Gendarmerie HATA, Shinji 4,500.00

RIKU-HAN-MITSU No. 621 /T.N. Army-Manchuria Secret/ Dec. 27, 1933

KASHIA

Draft of Telegram from Vice Minister to Chiefs of Staff, Kwantung Army, China Garrison, Korean Army and Formosan Army. (CIPHER CODE)

Secret Expenditures (¥1,970,000.00) as required by your Armies up to the end of the current year have been disbursed from the Manchurian Incident Funds. /T.N. Parenthesis marked in red on original/

Note: The amount within the red parenthesis on the text should be divided according to the following:

RIKU-HAN #1289 Dec. 27, 1933

TO: CHINA GARRISON ¥15,000.00
KOREAN ARMY 15,000.00
FORMOSAN ARMY 3,000.00

Draft of Notification from Vice Minister to Commandant, Gendarmerie RIKU-HAN-MITSU

We beg to inform you that secret expenditures of ¥4,500.00 as required by your Headquarters up to the end of the current year have been disbursed from the Manchurian Incident Funds. RIKU-HAN-MITSU No. 621 Dec. 27, 1933 KASHIA
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shin'iti Kobayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Archives and Document Section of 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages, dated 27 Dec, 1934, and described as follows: Handwritten and typed Army Manchurian Secret Telegram #1725 "Disbursement of Secret Expenditures for the Manchurian Incident". I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

War Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 14th day of Jan., 1947
/s/ Secretary of the Archives and Document Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Tarekichi Nakamura /s/ Shin'iti Kobayashi

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher C-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 14th day of Jan., 1946
/s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt. AUS.

YAMS MI

Witness: /s/ Edward J. Yoneghan Investigator IPS

Official Capacity
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そ
Tokyo, 3 May. - Douei Radio presents on ITAGAKI-KOISO interview.

War Minister ITAGAKI declared it to be a welcome fact that Germany and Italy had bound themselves through their military alliance still more firmly to the maintenance of peace in their joint efforts to build up a New Order in Europe. Itagaki ascribed the confusion of the European situation to the lack of equilibrium between old and new rising Powers. Asked whether the possibility existed that Japan might enter the Rival-German military alliance, Itagaki declared that the spirit which animated the conclusion of the Tri-lateral Anti-Pact was very deep-rooted and in case for that reason Germany and Italy wanted it it was not impossible that Japan might conclude a military alliance with the Axis Powers.

(continuation on page 2)

Minister of Colonies KOISO stated that apparently negotiations directed toward the conclusion of a military alliance among the three Axis powers were being conducted. As a private observation Koiso stated: "Whether such negotiations lead to the goal or not depends entirely upon whether Germany and Italy understand Japan's point of view and power in East Asia as well as their own position in Europe." He stated further that it would be suitable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of her policies, while it would not only not be suitable but downright dangerous for Germany and Italy to attempt to carry out their policies vis-a-vis the encirclement measures of their opponents without the closest cooperation with Japan, the strongest power in East Asia. The difficulties are constantly causing the lack of mutual understanding, explained Koiso further. Therefore it lay in Japan's interest, as well as Italy's and Germany's, for Germany and Italy to understand not only their own position but also that of Japan and her point of view in the Far East. Nearly all Japanese had more knowledge of Germany and German affairs than the Germans of Japan and Japanese affairs. Japan was convinced, Koiso emphasized, of the "necessity of further strengthening of the Anti-Pact" in view of Japan's earlier experiences and present position in order to be able to face the international situation from "Japan's own standpoint." - As for the
Roosevelt Message. Arita declared that this was a dual-purpose action, namely, first as a domestic political gesture and second as a measure to inflame world public against Germany and Italy. Finally having been directed to the China conflict, Arita emphasized that Japan's historic and racial mission lay in the establishment of a New Order in East Asia in closest cooperation with China and Manchoukuo, although third powers were trying to bring into discredit Japan's military actions in China.

(ENR Representative)

135927
I, J. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a Representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said allied forces to said central documents center, referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ J. F. Cumming
J. F. CUMMINS
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Gerde
Lt. Colonel, AGD
acting Adjutant General

Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.)
For instance, as regards Davao in the Philippines, the population has not decreased so much although approximately over 35 years have elapsed till the present day. Business is reported as flourishing, and the people here are presently engaged in the cultivation of hemp. Moreover it is said that fertilizer has never been used for the past thirty years. For instance, in the Lake Toba/Maran/Penicillium region in Celebes, where rice has been harvested three times annually for more than ten years, it is said that fertilizer, if used even for once, would spoil everything. There are such places as those which are indeed inconceivable from the agricultural viewpoint of the Japanese. Then, how about going ahead and seizing these places? Of course, we cannot do so; nevertheless, the development of the Southern Regions will not necessarily be an impossibility, if we shall be prepared to suffer such hardships as in dealing with Anchoria or Russia, or if we possess an equal amount of determination, effort and financial power as required in overcoming the difficulties of the North China Incident. Such being the case, we believe that Japan will be confronted with considerable difficulties unless the Ministry of State /T.N. Kojio/ will carry out a drastic reform in our future national policy in such a way as to make some three-fold policy— one phase being for defense, and the other for advance, so, as for Taiwan /T.N. for CSA/ or the South Sea Islands Government Office /T.N. "Makino-Chief"/ they were able to become independent shortly after its occupation or its inauguration of government. As regards anchoria and Anchoria -- though Anchoria is an independent nation, Japan is at present obliged to defray enormous sum of money in accordance with armament and other agreements. This may possibly last for scores of years to come. Anchoria, was the first to be annexed to Japan, but she is still unable to become independent, and enormous subsidies have to be granted to her. Such are the conditions even in so nice a place like anchoria. I wish to state that it is all the more unnatural to send farmers -- constituting Japan's higher-class labours -- to Northern Anchoria there even coolies and Koreans are unable to go. The policy that they must
be sent over is all very fine, but, as this unnaturalness is very hard to overcome, I wish you will kindly give your consideration to this point. Our future national policy should be such that we shall have to endure perseverance no matter what difficulties it may lead us to, just as we have in continuing many years of devotion after having initiated the so-called Sino-Japanese Incident of today. Therefore, if we have that determination to go through hardships, we shall find a real treasure chest in the Southern Pacific, where deposits of coal, gold, silver, iron and petroleum will probably amount to 200 times more than those found in the 400 or so provinces in China. If Japan will be in possession of such resources, she shall no loner have to suffer from her present plight of being unable to wage a war as she would like just because of the scarcity of resources. Therefore, we must readjust the aims of establishing the national policy of the State, have a change made, at this juncture, in the principles of the traditional national policy of the past. We are extremely pleased at the fact that Minister of State KOISO has, at Cabinet meetings and the like, expressed his opinion several times fairly strongly in that line, or dwelled upon the policy in that line. So, although things may not go so easily as I say -- although it would be splendid if they did -- things will be difficult. Nevertheless, even if we are to sacrifice a great deal of our national power, what will follow shall not be comparable to the results of the efforts in MANCHU or CHINA."

This is what we have been thinking about. Hence is restored now, it is needless to say that Japan will suffer from over-population. As you have just mentioned, most of our farmers have only five tens of land (T.N. approximately 1.2 acres). As they own only that much of land, let us say five children are born to a farmer, -- four or them, either male or female, must leave the family to get jobs outside, according to the family system among the farming class. The eldest son is left to take over while the rest must be abandoned as unnecessary. The Japanese nation is unable to make a living. This is the phenomenon among the farming class of present-day Japan. This fact alone, I believe, will make you realize that we shall suffer from over-population when peace is restored. What should we do about it? It is quite clear that we shall feed on each other and fall together if we stick to the five ten farming. We must establish a great national policy right now. Herein, lies the basis for our discussion. Therefore, we have been trying to send people over to Manchuria -- we have heard about your ideals of sending 200,000 or 1,000,000 families over there -- but its realization has been very difficult. Much money is spent with no results. Moreover, people are not interested in going inspite of our encouragement to go. I would like to inform you that unless you take into consideration, when establishing our national policy, some places where people will by all means go even if they are told not to go, rather than places where people will go and return, the great task of reviving Japan, of constructing
Japan will never be accomplished. In this respect, the military, so far, has been concentrating too much upon the North. I wonder if this is not slightly mistaken? When I say mistaken, I mean mistaken as Japan's national policy. I do not know what you would say from the viewpoint of national defense, but this is, I think, a little mista

Chairman AOFI: "Mr. FUKUDA, please state the gist of your opinion as we have no more time."

Committeeman FUKUDA: "I hope the State Minister will study further into that direction --

We have become members of the Accounts Committee, and have studied the Ministry for Overseas Affairs' enormous budget for the coming year. As it will be difficult to get any result if you put your efforts to things that will not possibly have any effect, we shall have to take a neutral stand on this point; and I believe I shall have to ask you to put your efforts on the true attainment of an object, even in the execution of this budget. As regards such matters, however, I believe the Ministry for Overseas Affairs has great understanding as to the South; and great efforts have been afforded both the Formosan and the South Seas Governments from which we expect developments in economics and various other fields. Have you any opinion in this line?

"It shall be most obliged if the Minister for Overseas Affairs would inform us with his opinions regarding these national policies.

Minister of State KOISO:

"I fully agree with Mr. FUKUDA's remarks regarding the construction of both the NORTH and the SOUTH. The OVERSEA AFFAIRS Ministry is also advocating the idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SOUTH. There is, however, a slight difference in views in regard to the path to be followed and its substance. I shall give you very roughly the important points of the opinions of the OVERSEA AFFAIRS Ministry which will carry out the idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SOUTH. As towards the CONTINENT, we must enforce the movement of population, which must naturally be accompanied by economic development, and as towards the SOUTH, we must enforce economic
expansion, which must by all means be accompanied by the
movement of population. This is our way of thinking.
Therefore, as regards CONTINENTAL Expansion, we consider
movement of population as of primary importance, and
economic expansion as of secondary importance; whereas, as
for SOUTHERN Expansion, we consider economic expansion as
of primary importance and the movement of population of
secondary importance. This is the idea on which we are
proceeding along. Please note, therefore, that as regards
the idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SOUTH, we
are entirely of the same opinion with M. FUKUDA.
I, SLTO. Tom, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet.

And that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ____ pages, dated ______, 19____, and described as follows: Minutes of the Accounts Committee of the House of Representatives, 75th Diet.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of Jan., 1947
/s/ T. Satow
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis
2nd Lt. W.I.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, J. A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of Jan., 1947
/s/ J. A. Curtis 2nd Lt. W.I.

Witness: Investigator W.I.
"Extraction of Interview of General (Retd) Sadao Araki, 18 January 1946, 1400-1645 hrs, pp. 11 and 12,"

Q. What I mean is that the Kenyce Cabinet, or if the Premier Kenyce was not in favor of aggression in China, how did it happen that the Japanese forces were in process in "advancing"?

A. During wartime that the Cabinet wishes and what the Army does are different things. I believe that the Army and Navy were in favor of aggression in China. Kenyce was not in favor of the aggression. However, since Kenyce was outnumbered two to one I possibly think that the forces took the best of the deal and made the aggression.

Q. What do you mean—outnumbered two to one?

A. The Army and Navy within the Cabinet.

Q. Because General Sugiyama and Itsukuri Yossh was in favor of advancing and they were Army and Navy members that their word went with the Emperor and not Kenyce's.

A. Since forces cannot be sent overseas without the consent of the War, Navy, Finance, Foreign Ministers and the Premier, I believe that it was approved by these Ministries that the Chino affair be carried through.
Q. I understand, also, that after that resignation the General became a member of that in English is called the Cabinet Advisory Council which was established by an ordinance, an Imperial Ordinance of October 14, 1937?
A. I became a member of this Cabinet Advisory Council at request of Prince Konoye who came to me for advice in connection with the China incident.

Q. And that council was set up to advise concerning the situation in China?
A. Yes.

Q. How often did it meet?
A. Once a week.

Q. That was in 1937 that you were appointed, I believe?
A. Yes.

Q. And did you remain a member of that until you were made Minister of Education by Prince Konoye?
A. Yes, I was a member until I was appointed.

Q. Do you remember the date it was you became a member of the Advisory Council?
A. Almost immediately after the formation of the Cabinet Council.

Q. And then after you were Minister of Education you were again appointed to the same council in 1940?
A. I left the Education ministry in 1939.

Q. And then were you made a member of the Advisory Council again?
A. I think in September, 1939, I am not sure.

Q. Did you attend most of these meetings when you were a member of this Council?
A. It was compulsory to attend and I attended all the meetings once a week.
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(内容缺失)
九四〇年二同度間り仰付ケラレタノカ。
Excerpts from ARAI, Sadao Interrogation, 11 February 1946.

Q. When I was here on the 7th of this month, I asked you this question: (Reading) "Then I understand that when you were Minister of War you attended these meetings but when you were Minister of Education later, you did not attend the meetings concerning foreign affairs", and you answered as follows: (Reading) "During my tenure of office as War Minister there were very few of these meetings to the best of my recollection, but during the time I held office as Minister of Education these matters were usually discussed at the usual cabinet meetings held once a week". Do you remember those answers?

A. Yes. When I was Minister of Education, I did not attend these meetings. If a question regarding foreign policy came up, this would be discussed at the usual cabinet meetings.

Q. And you were appointed Minister of Education in May, 1938, and held that position until August 29, 1929, and I understand then that important matters concerning foreign affairs were discussed at full cabinet meetings during that period?

A. At one time the Premier requested SUETSUGU, Nobumasa, to be Home Minister, and myself to confer with him on the China question. It was decided to hold these meetings regularly but as my views and SUETSUGU's views differed so widely and we could not agree, it was decided after the second meeting to hold no more. I do not know whether SUETSUGU was requested to attend this meeting as Home Minister or as an Admiral.

Q. That is SUETSUGU who is dead now, who was Minister for Home Affairs?

A. Yes.

Q. I assume that the Prime Minister was the one who decided that foreign affairs were important enough to discuss in the full cabinet meetings, is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Did the Foreign Minister ever bring up a question as to foreign affairs for the full cabinet meeting to discuss?

A. Yes the foreign minister would also have to bring up the question at full meetings.
Q. And did the War Minister bring up such questions before the full cabinet meetings?

A. As this was during the China incident, and the War and Navy Ministers were deeply concerned, they would also bring up such questions before the full cabinet. However, matters of great importance to the foreign office, the War and Navy and Finance Ministries, were usually not put before the full cabinet meetings as interference by other ministers was not relished and matters were usually discussed by the respective ministers direct with the Prime Minister.

Q. That seems to contradict what you said up to now. Do I understand then that the full cabinet has nothing to do with decisions made?

A. Yes, the full cabinet was concerned with decisions made, but, if the four principal ministers mentioned previously, and the Prime Minister decided on a line of policy, this would be pushed through the cabinet in spite of opposition.

Q. If there was opposition in the cabinet to a decision made by these four would a vote be taken on the question submitted?

A. No, a vote would not be necessary. The Prime Minister would request opinions from the other members, but when he had decided, the measure was put through. If that became impossible, the cabinet would fall; or the member opposing any measure up for discussion would resign.
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Excerpts from ARAKI, Sadao Interrogation, 12 February 1946.

Q. Did the Cabinet, along about this time, in the fall of 1938, when in session, discuss the trouble with the United States over United States rights in China, if you remember?

A. I do not remember any discussions of these things took place. It must have been the Foreign Minister and the War and Navy Ministers.

Q. Well, this is the rejection of the United States' protest. Now, if war had ensued on this account, do you think that the blame would have been entirely on the Foreign Minister and could the Cabinet have said it was not its fault that war took place?

A. No, the Cabinet could be held responsible for the outbreak of the war. If there was actual danger of war breaking out, the matter would be discussed thoroughly in the Cabinet.

Q. I understand then, General, that you were on the cabinet here, and a statement was made for which, under the constitution, the Cabinet ought to be responsible, to a friendly power, and you didn't approve the statement, had nothing to do with its issuance, and yet under the constitution were responsible for that statement and whatever happened by reason of its issuance. Is that correct?

A. As a member of the Cabinet, and according to the Constitution, I could be held responsible. If there had actually been danger of war breaking out as a result of this defiance, the matter would certainly have come up for discussion and judgment in the Cabinet. Around 1938, I had several talks with three British Ambassadors, namely, Lyndley, Clive, and Craigie. Also with Major Pigott, Military Attache to the British Embassy. In my conversations, I always advocated that Japan, the United States, and England should work together and establish the foundations for a peaceful world. With such views, I am certain that if a matter such as the defiance of the United States had come up, I would have had plenty to say. Perhaps it was not considered a very important matter at the time.
Q. Let me ask you, General, if in 1938 or 1939, while you were in the Cabinet there ever was a discussion of the friction between the United States and Japan on account of America's claims that her treaty rights were being violated in China by Japan.

A. No, I do not remember this ever having been discussed, however, my own view is that violations of treaty rights were sometimes unavoidable, and if the matter were referred to me, I would have advocated settling these violations to the satisfaction of all by diplomatic means after the settlement of the incident in China.
After I became War Minister, I discussed the policy of the occupation of General CHANG's four provinces to clear up the Manchurian situation. After I had made the plan up myself with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Finance Minister, all agreed with me. The Prime Minister approached the Privy Council for approval.
The Japanese naval commander ordered the landing of troops in Shanghai on January 21, 1932. I do not remember discussions in the Cabinet. The Cabinet could not recall the troops because the battle was going on. I do not think the attack was to cripple the Chinese boycott. I do not remember that it was discussed in the Cabinet. They did discuss the means of ending the incident. The naval commander in Shanghai reported the landing to the Navy Minister who reported it to the Cabinet, and that was the first time I heard of it. Since the Navy Minister said it could be settled quickly, no one was worried. On February the 2nd or 3rd, the Navy Minister came to me and stated that due to the hard fight, the naval forces might be destroyed and could the army send some forces. I conferred with the Cabinet and it was agreed that the army would send supporting forces quickly. Troops were sent the following day on destroyers to Shanghai.

At the Cabinet meeting, the Foreign, Finance, Prime, War and Navy Ministers at least were there. I think it was agreed to send one and one-half divisions. These were sent. Approximately ten thousand men. It was after the Cabinet approval that I ordered that troops be sent and also that the incident be localized. The troops were sent as support for the Navy, the Navy having a losing war against the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army.

The first division I sent was under General Umea, but since he suffered great losses and was having difficulties, I sent another supporting division and then the Nineteenth Army heard of this, they started to "withdraw" and at that time General Shiina Aka either talked to the Nanking government or with the Nanking Army and urged that fighting cease. Just before the supporting division landed, the battle was concluded. After this conclusion, a representative of the League of Nations, a representative from Japan and from China came to an agreement that Japan should have one Japanese brigade remain in that area, but I thought all troops should be withdrawn from China.
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LXcerpts from ARAKI, Sadao Interrogation, 12 March 1946

Q. Who was present at the special Cabinet meeting of March 17, 1933 at which it was finally agreed in the Cabinet that Japan should withdraw from the League?

A. The Prime Minister (Saito); War Minister (Araki); Navy Minister (Osumi); Finance Minister (Takahashi); Foreign Minister (Uchida); Home Minister (Yamamoto); and Education Minister (Koyama).

Q. All Ministers were present?
A. Yes.

Q. And all agreed that Japan should withdraw from the League of Nations?
A. Yes.

Q. The Foreign Minister went to the Emperor to call the Privy Council for advice as to Japan's withdrawal, is that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. A special committee appeared from the Cabinet before the Privy Council?
A. Yes.

Q. Who were they?
A. SAITO (Prime Minister); OSUMI (Navy Minister); ARAKI (War Minister); UCHIDA (Foreign Minister). I think there was a full Cabinet Conference later.
Excerpts from AMAKI, Sadao Interrogation, 12 March 1946

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Q. Who were they?
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On the Occasion of the 15th Anniversary of the Issuance of the
Imperial Rescript on the Awakening of the
National Spirit.

Minister of Education, Baron
ARAKI Sadao

On 10 November 1920, the Emperor TAISHO, being greatly concerned
about the contemporary condition of our Empire, reverently issued an
Imperial Rescript on the Awakening of the National Spirit.

For the past fifteen years since then our people have observed its
spirit day and night and have endeavored earnestly for its realization.
The 10th of October marks its fifteenth anniversary.

This is just the time when KANTO and three principal cities near
KANTO have been captured in succession by our Imperial Army making one
phase of this incident. We have finally come to a period for actual
activities in the long-term construction. In view of the gravities of the
present situation of our Empire, I believe our people should proceed with
the subjugation of difficulties with a determination much firmer than that
made after the KANTO earthquake disaster.

And now, as we await the anniversary of the issuance of the Rescript,
I believe we must proceed on the path of supporting the Emperor's undertaking
of expanding the Imperial Way by renewing the spirit with which we had
received the Imperial Rescript.

I respectfully think that the Imperial thoughts are very vast and
far-reaching, because, whenever the Empire was in a crisis and the people
were at a loss how to meet the situation, the Emperor was pleased to issue
an Imperial rescript, which was like a light on a dark night to the people,
who were all encouraged to do their duties, were very high-spirited
and had an bright future, and overcome the crisis in every case. The great
earthquake of Kanto gave a great shock to people both at home and abroad;
some went so far as to miscalculate that Japan would never be able to
rank again among the greatest Powers of the world. However, when an Imperial
rescript was issued, the National morale was immediately enhanced and the
areas damaged by the earthquake, such as Tokyo and Yokohama, were reconstructed
in a very short time and prospered greater than before. I cannot think without
deep emotion of the Emperor's eminent virtues.

The Imperial rescript teaches us, first of all, that the prosperity
of the country depends upon the spirit of fortitude and meekness among her
people. All the people have been obedient to this Imperial instruction ever
since, but it is dreadful to find that they have sometimes been predominated
by material profit and the like, and have forgotten the spiritual side. This
results in unexpected failure, or rather, it is regretful that it has caused
the dullness of things. As is shown in the Imperial rescript, spirit is a
basis, and soul is a source. The rescript teaches us that we must depend first of all on education for the cultivation and promotion of this spirit. Those who are engaged in education, feel themselves very responsible in this respect.

In the Imperial Rescript, His Majesty the Emperor admonished us, the nation, to be frugal and stout-hearted, hearty and fair, loyal, filial and brave and to aim at humanity and co-existence, and further taught us about friendship and public virtue, order and responsibility. Above all, His Majesty, the Emperor, repeatedly and strongly gave the counsel that the whole nation should do their duty diligently and manage that fortune in frugality, and should do the utmost for the benefit of the social welfare and, thus, should make efforts for the national prosperity, the people's well-being and the social welfare, without leaning toward self-interest.

Having had the honor of reading this, I am deeply moved and alarmed at the result of the efforts which the nation has made hitherto. There is nothing more important that this for the iron-rules to set up the necessary elements for the mobilization of the national spirit, the reinforcement of armaments and the regimentation of the production power.

The words in the Imperial Rescript, which should especially be kept in our mind are as follow: There is no way to develop and augment the national strength other than to bring about practical results by following strictly the holy instructions by the late Emperor. "What should the nation answer now to these two words 'Practical Results'?" Did the evil manners of frivolity and wantonness, insincerity and violence disappear? Are we not regrettable in doing the utmost for the benefit of the social welfare without leaning to the interest of oneself? With this in mind, we are so deeply alarmed that we cannot help but apologize for having done so little. Fifteen years have passed since the Imperial Rescript was issued. At present we are feeling a significant weight more serious than the time the earthquake disaster. Now at this very moment we should exert ourselves right to bring about practical results in an effort to set up the rational spirit and make double effort to fill up what we have hitherto done insufficiently.

As I have often reprimanded several occasions, the fundamental question of the present situation does not lie in the China Incident but the present situation must be regarded as a sign of the dawn of a new world peace. Therefore, it is a great mistake to think that the occupation of some important strategic points in China will mean the settlement of the present situation. On the contrary, at present, we have only seen the first ray of the dawn of a new world that has been gradually approaching since the close of the World War. It is our country that has been playing a leading part in it as a pioneer, and I believe that Japan is in a position to play an important role in the coming new world. Consequently, we have an important duty imposed upon us, and we must be fully prepared for any emergency. Japan, who has sprung from "Japan in the Orient to Japan in the world, is now placed in such a difficult condition. So we must bear in mind, as the Japanese..."
subjects, the honor and the duty to play an important role on the world's stage in settling the present difficult question. The present condition, I think, will not come to an end in near future. Whatever Chiang Kai Shek or the world may say about us we must be pushing forward slowly but steadily, towards the construction of a new world, ever showing up the national strength, ever reflecting upon our own essence and ever eradicating the roots of evil, as the subjects of a glorious country who is holding a heavy responsibility upon themselves, at this dawn of a new world.

Such being the purpose of this sacred war, it would be difficult to accomplish this great task with our exotic contemplation in the past. Breaking through the hard crust of conventionalism, we must see far into the future, and understand both the great principle of the universal nature and the mission of our country, and entertain a high aspiration to meet with the general situation. It is said that the saint is delivered from everything at the last moment of attaining divine enlightenment; and that the buddhist, being free from Buddhism, and the best master, without slavish adherence to the traditional school or type, grasp the truth directly. Japan, who is to pride herself as master imposed this great mission at this change- ing period of the world, should not rid of the whole past, and have dignity enough to lead others from a higher position. Our national constitution and the teachings bequeathed by our Imperial Ancestors have something incomparably supreme that no other country has to compare with.

Japan, as she is called, "Divine Land Japan", has virtue which enables her to dispose all things and creatures in nature in their right places in accordance with their force of nature. And she has that natural power which in an emergency leads them into great principle in accordance with the natural situation.

Therefore, in order to set our hand to the work of construction at this juncture, it is necessary to bear in mind, like a true Japanese subject, the teachings of our Imperial Ancestors, and to find in them the just and equitable principle of the Universe, thereby rendering service to our country for the object of saving the present situation. As a fundamental attitude of mind for doing this, I believe we should be wise and magnanimous enough to transact business with broad mind and greater ambition. For nearly three thousand years, Japan has been digesting the cream of the Eastern culture; for recent seventy years, she has also absorbed the best of the Western culture; and now she has grasped the fundamental principles of the world civilization. Think over this, and one will come to understand the true meaning of what the Government call, in its declaration, the establishment of international justice, the creation of a new culture, the internal renovation, or what it means by saying, "it derives from the spirit of the foundation of the Empire". Thus, we will be able to realize that the significance of the present China Affair is deep and wide, because its aim is to establish peace in the East and to contribute to the world's peace.
If we can accomplish this, Japan will obtain a fame as "Great Japan of the World", and I believe the glory of the Emperor will shine all over the world. But, if it should happen that the efforts of the nation is insufficient, and our plan is frustrated, the power in the West would be lost, and there would be a terrible confusion on the whole earth. When I think of this, it makes my blood run cold. If such should happen, not only would we be disloyal to the Emperor, but we would be greatly ashamed of ourselves towards our ancestors and descendants.

According to yesterday's declaration by Chiang Kai-shek or what some quarter of the world have to say they are dreaming that we will surrender from financial difficulties or material shortage. As long as we are carrying the war more than a year and a half and still realize the great task of a long term construction we must take exceptional measures and prepare for the emergency, and it is a matter of course to suffer from some difficulties. But, as we are now experiencing we do not have such a dead-lock as they expect, and we can by no means stand at such a position.

Low, when we compare this situation with the one of the powers in the second year of the 1st Great World War, we find a great difference between them, and we can pride ourselves in it. Of course we can't stop even for a moment our efforts and plans, to satisfy everybody helping and ministering to each others want. But it is the true characteristic of the true-hearted Japanese to try his own ability against all the hardships and privations and there is nothing to regret in it. They not only care for it as honour but they must apply to the test and eradicate the deepest root of evil for our prosperity. But the most fundamental point is in the immortality of the strong and healthful soul. Today, we received an Imperial rescript and we are in high spirits. I appeal to our compatriots for efforts to obtain good result with all the tension of spirit.

We are now facing a turning-point of the Incident. At this moment, recognizing the vital importance of our preparedness for protracted construction and of combining national strength, I feel most keenly that the basic requirement for it lies in the strong national spirit. I came to the belief that without that all measures would not be effective. I earnestly hope that, during this awakening of the National Spirit Week which begins today you will bear the Imperial Message in mind; with fresh mind and patience realize the Emperor's wishes shown in the Imperial Rescript; tide over the present difficulties and exhibit the glory of Japan to the whole world, thereby complying with the Imperial intention.

(doc. no. 2155 b)

(list of the broadcast on Nov. 7, 1938)
Instructions at the National Conference of Principals of Agricultural Schools.

I have just been appointed by the Emperor to the post of Education Minister, and am to manage the educational administration. In view of the present situation, I am aware of the extremely heavy responsibility of the task, and expect to exert my utmost in carrying it out dutifully.

At this critical period the most important thing is the strengthening of the national spirit. In other words, it lies in the unification of a billion minds, with everyone discharging their duties faithfully and cooperatively. It is not an exaggeration to say that the only way to weather the present emergency depends entirely upon this attitude of the people. Consequently, at the outbreak of the Incident, the Government immediately launched a movement for the general mobilization of the national spirit in order to have its people become fully aware of the situation, and to cultivate their stability of mind.

Of course, the Government and the people should cooperate so as to steadily bring about the results of this movement; but among others, the educationists must exert their efforts by leading the way of this movement, and at the same time, they must become an example for the people by making reflections on their own daily lives and by putting the spirit of this movement into actual practice.

Needless to say, education is an enterprise which decides the fate of a state for one hundred years to come, and forms the basis of administration. Therefore, its promotion must be planned and we must endeavor to cultivate the foundation of the national power by educating the people so that they can carry out the great mission of the Empire in the future.

It is for this very reason that the Educational Investigation Committee was organized some time ago, and gone to devise ways and means for fundamental reforms by carrying out careful investigations regarding the entire system and quality of Education. Thus, the keynote of the educational reform lies in how to embody the great Imperial Way realistically into education. The import of the previous enactments and reforms which placed morals and civics as principal items of teaching also comes under this category. Therefore, I hope you will also pay careful attention to this point, and after being well acquainted with our national structure, you must concentrate on aiding the everlasting reign of the Emperor by elevating the national spirit.
Since the founding of our nation, agriculture has been called the foundation of our nation, and it still remains so to this day. Not only that, I firmly believe that under the present crisis, its importance as a foundation of the nation is becoming greater.

There are among these brave officers and soldiers who are fighting in the front, many who come from farming districts, and it is these people of the farms who are producing and supplying foodstuffs and other resources in the home front. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to mention what a powerful service the agricultural populace is offering to the country in this critical period.

This is why I am aware of the honour of you men whose work is in agricultural education, and also the importance of your present mission.

In viewing the education which is carried out today in the agricultural schools, I am truly happy to see some suddenly manifesting a steady transformation recently. However, if a close observation should be made, there appear to be still various points which require reforms and improvements. Therefore, I wish to request you all to exert more efforts. From olden times, agricultural schools have been educating men who are to become leaders and the backbone of the local agricultural circles. Consequently, their education must not only consist of theories, but must place emphasis on experiments and actual practices, thereby teaching them fully the real meaning of labour and sweat. Also, I hope to have efforts made to thoroughly cultivate their ability as regards management and administration. In order to keep pace with the progress and intricacies of agriculture, I hope that the sense of application and ingenuity will be cultivated together with creative thought. It is also desired that efforts be made to avoid falling into fixed patterns of education; to teach the students by keeping in touch with the actual world according to the actual conditions of the local agriculture; and strive to develop national agriculture and leadership of local agriculture. Furthermore, under the present situation in our country, we must strive our utmost towards increasing our national strength by striving for an expansion in production power. Therefore, I wish you will be fully aware of the roles of agriculture and agricultural communities in connection with this point, and while fully cooperating with the agricultural policies under the wartime structure, I hope you will especially guide the students on this point.

Next, in view of conditions in our country, I think it is very important to devise the overseas expansion of the people. Especially, in order to carry out the national policy
based on the unity of JAPAN, MANCHUKUO, and CHINA, the most urgent mission is the advancement to the Continent of many youths possessing thorough education and firm faith. I desire everyone of you to fully understand the state of affairs in our country and endeavor to promote the spirit of overseas expansion of the YAMATO /T.N. JAPANESE/ Race.

The next point is that the development of the agricultural districts should not depend only on activities of men, but the part to be played by women is not small. Especially, during the present emergency, I feel this point strongly, when observing the conditions of the families on the home front in farms, forests and fishing villages. However, on viewing the state of agricultural education for girls, I find it truly insufficient, so I believe it is the pressing task of the moment to improve this by its widespread.

I desire earnestly that those of you at this meeting who are fortunate in charge of girls' education, will endeavor to produce satisfactory results in girls' education by further reforming and improving the quality of education. As for the others, I hope you will teach the girls and women of the rural communities to fully understand agriculture and agricultural communities and to make them love labor through methods such as short courses, and lectures, thereby contributing to the training of hardy rural women.

I further wish to speak about the nation-wide mass-labour operations movement which has finally begun to gain momentum recently.

This project is already being carried out in the agricultural schools which you are sponsoring, by practical training at the farms or in reclamation work. Furthermore, ever since the Incident, there are extremely many who are earnestly working for farm families who have someone called off for military service. I am happy to see also that these are bearing satisfactory results. However, not only are further efforts in this field naturally desired but I hope you will fully understand that this movement has an important meaning as an aspect of realistic spiritual education. I hope you will strive for the accomplishment of the aims of this movement by paying attention so as not to fall into sheer formality and by making an example of yourselves as leaders, thus contributing to the elevation of education as a whole.
In conclusion, I wish to expressly add a few words. Heretofore, the education at vocational schools was apt to view material and spirit as two separate and alien things. Therefore, it seems that there were persons who had wrongly thought that vocational training and spiritual education were separate matters. Needless to say, vocational training is an important spiritual education in itself, and its true mission lies in the bringing up of true talent by doggedly aiming at the drilling of a sound body and mind of the student through actual practice. The characteristic feature of education in agricultural schools lies in the so-called cultivating of people's minds. In this meaning, this education aims not only at the training of industrial workers, but is verily also a spiritual education for champions of thought.

This is the very keynote of the agricultural way of Japan, and I firmly believe that only after adopting this spirit will agriculture become to signify the foundation of the nation as mentioned above.

Thus, this is the most important point in education, so I hope you will all consider this thoroughly so that there will be no mistake.

The foregoing is a statement which is just a portion of my opinions concerning problems deemed important as regards agricultural education. I hope you will also seize this opportunity in freely expressing your views so as to bring about satisfactory results through this Conference.

(Synopsis of Instructions. June 9, 1938)
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Chikara Tsujita, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of the Investigation Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document here attached consisting of ___ pages, dated 5 June 1933, and described as follows: Instructions at the National Conference of Principals of Agricultural Schools.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Ministry of Education.

Signed at Tokyo on this ___ day of ___ 1947. /s/ Chikara Tsujita
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Tatsuo Sarut 
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Eric T. Fleischer, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this ___ day of ___ 1947. /s/ Eric T. Fleischer
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ K. H. Ives
Official Capacity
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Chikara Tsujita, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of the Investigation Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of __ Logs, dated __ June, 1933, and described as follows: Instructions at the National Conference of Principals of Agricultural Schools.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Ministry of Education.

Signed at Tokyo on this 15th day of Jan., 1947. /s/ Chikara Tsujita

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Tatsuo Sanada

Director of the Investigation Bureau

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Endorsement

I, Lieut. Eric T. Fleischer, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 15th day of Jan., 1947. /s/ Eric T. Fleischer

Witness: /s/ B. K. Laughr

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Ohikore Tsollte, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of the Investigation Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages, dated 7 May, 1938, and described as follows: Spoken by Motoki Sadao entitled "On the Occasion of the 15th Anniversary of the Emperor's Imperial Despatch on the Awakening of the National Spirit".

I further certify that the attached report and document is an official document of the Japanese Government and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Ministry of Education.

Signed at Tokyo on this 15th day of Jan., 1947.

[Signature of Official]

Witness: [Signature of Witness]

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Irwin R. Fleisher, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 15th day of Jan., 1947.

[Signature of Official]

Witness: [Signature of Witness]
内容不清晰，无法辨认。
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昭和十三年六月九日訓示要

（昭和十三年六月九日訓示文頭）
The Outline of Ten-Year Plan for Block Economy of Japan-Manchoukuo-China

(The Yomiuri, dated Nov. 8, 1940)

The Cabinet Intelligence Bureau announces:-

Our fundamental policy to establish Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia which aims to form New Order in the world, has now entered a new stage, by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy. In order to conform with this situation, our Government decided, at the recent Cabinet meeting, upon the outline of Block Economy of Japan-Manchoukuo-China upon which our future policies will be controlled and carried out. And aim of this policy is to spur the progress of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia which is based upon the synthetic development of new economic order between Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

Now the world economy of free trade in which all countries can trade their resources, is now collapsing before our own eyes. Our economy too, must shake off its old system based upon the old order and set up a new one, which will make it a higher, broader and stronger one, so as to push up the living standard of the nations in Greater East Asia and to enable them to live in contentment and peace -- in other words, "higher" means to give greater productive power to the nation's life; "broader", means to extend the economic sphere of reciprocal dependence, from Japan, Manchoukuo and China to Greater East Asia and to establish a solid Co-Prosperity Sphere; and "stronger", to make the Imperial Economy depend to the least possible degree upon other countries and stand as firm as a rock in any situation.

In order to make our economy thus higher, broader and stronger, the whole nation must combine their efforts and be resolute to overcome those difficulties in the country which arise from the new order and to reject any possible pressure or threats from abroad. In the course of ten years we must complete the new economic order in East Asia with Japan as its leader. Only in this new order can Manchoukuo, China and all other countries in East Asia look forward to a glorious development of their economy.

Main Points of Outline of Establishment of the Economy.

In order to accomplish our mission to establish new order in East Asia and to maintain permanent peace in the world, we must unify and promote the process of reforming our national
system and the process of enlarging the sphere of our existence. Accordingly our basic economic policies must be established on a synthetic plan of the following three big processes:

1. To complete the reorganization of our national economy.

2. To organize and strengthen the Japan—Manchoukuo—China economy.

3. To enlarge the scale of Co-Prosperity Sphere of East Asia.

Basic Policies.

Japan — will devote herself to developing basic manufacturing industries.

Manchoukuo and China — basic industries and resources.

1. The establishment of the Japan—Manchoukuo—China economy aims, in the course of ten years, at obtaining economic independence for the three countries as a whole and promoting the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in East Asia, so as to strengthen the position of East Asia in world economy.

2. The Imperial spirit of guidance in the establishment of the Japan—Manchoukuo—China economy lies in promoting co-existence, co-prosperity and general welfare by means of the joint efforts of Japan, Manchoukuo and China in accordance with the great spirit of "hakkō ichiu"/all peoples under one roof/.

3. In order to promote the establishment of the Japan—Manchoukuo—China economy, Japan will enhance her national morale, reform her internal state of affairs and try to enrich her national power, and will help and support Manchoukuo and China in establishing their economy. For this purpose she will devote herself to promoting an epoch-making development of science, technical skill and pioneer manufacturing industries.

4. Manchoukuo, quite inseparable from Japan, is expected to rapidly arrange and develop her important basic industries.

5. China is expected to cooperate with Japan and Manchoukuo, to develop her resources, to revive her economy, and to devote herself especially to the development of communications, smooth trade of resources, basic industries and resources, and thus to contribute to the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in East Asia.
6. In order to adjust and promote a comprehensive plan for the establishment of Japan-Manchouko-China economy, a structure will be set up for a synthetic plan of the Japan-Manchouko-China economy.

Since they form the backbone of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in East Asia, Japan, Manchouko and China are under an obligation to regulate their economic relations in very close combination. From this point of view, the Government has decided upon the basic policies of industry, labour, finance, trade and communication of Japan, Manchouko and China.

DIVISION OF INDUSTRIES

Japan will promote high-degree precision-tools industry.

Manchouko and China will develop mining, electricity, and salt-manufacturing industries.

Industries should be assigned to Japan, Manchouko and China, according to their respective geographical positions and grades of economic development and on a comprehensive plan which considers the three countries as an organic whole. It is necessary for Japan to promote an epoch-making development of high-degree precision tools industry and mechanical industry and to develop basic industries, such as heavy industry and the chemical and mining industries. Manchouko is expected to promote an epoch-making development of mining and electric works and to give our country necessary support for the development of heavy and chemical industries. China is expected to develop mining and salt-manufacturing industries and to produce in great quantities raw materials for the manufacturing industry, and her geographical positions give her room for a development of heavy and chemical industries, to which we are looking forward. We think it necessary to assist in developing light industry on the continent. Japan must gradually adjust her light industry—especially the fibre industry, and miscellaneous industries—and remove them to the continent. As for the Empire's agriculture, we intend to reform the land regulations, to renovate its management, to stabilize and improve the conditions of farmers, and thus to secure national staple foods and to maintain an adequate village population. We also intend to develop marine products industry and to rationally utilize and conserve forestry resources.

As to Manchouko's agriculture, since Manchouko supplies Japan, Manchouko and China with food and fodders, and also supplies the world with special agricultural products, we expect her to make an enormous increase in her agricultural products; we encourage Japanese colonists to develop her agriculture. As to Chinese agriculture, we think it necessary
For China to secure staple foods for her people and make an increase in the production of cotton and special products.

Labour.

An epoch-making reform will be enforced; good technical experts will be supplied.

In order to secure a dominant position in world economy, national labour and skill become immensely more important. For this reason the Empire's system of labour and technique has to undergo a complete reform. In order that the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere may obtain a dominant position in world economy, we must think of making each country and each area contribute their respective labour capacity to the promotion of the whole. For this purpose Japan will set up a new system of labour and technique, train workers mentally and physically, make scientific education prevail, increase labourers' productive power, train technical experts and skilled workers, and thus give necessary help and support to Manchukuo and China in the reconstruction of their economy; in other words, Japan will supply Manchukuo and China with good technical experts and skilled workers who are ready to develop their industries or to reconstruct their economy. It is also necessary for both countries to train technical experts and skilled workers for themselves in view of the importance of technique. Manchukuo has to make plans, we consider, to bring in North-China labourers and to have them settle down; and at the same time to make plans to supply enough labourers from her own people, and to reform and fix her labour control over her mining and industrial production.

Finance.

Nationalistic Management shall be considered, new financial facilities shall be established.

In order to promote national defence economy, finance must function so as to meet national purposes. It must enable the country to obtain materials of such quality and quantities as it requires. We must decide on a planned distribution of funds and keep such financial facilities as practical. It will be necessary for us, we consider, to establish such a financial system as important resources can be stored in accordance with chances i.e. equipments due to future advances in skill and future allotment of industries. The funds of Japan, Manchukuo and China must, of course, depend upon the amount in reserve, and so they must endeavour to increase and utilize their reserves. And Japan will furnish Manchukuo and China with the funds they need to develop their important industries, and mutual-aid relations between the three countries
will be established in international payments.

Trade.

Commercial-mindedness shall be put right, and mutual relations between the three Powers that form a whole will be established.

The old theory of profit-taking commercialism has to be overhauled in the new order of world economy, that is to say, it must be replaced by the trade that places production first; in other words, Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and all other territories in the Co-Prosperity Sphere must establish such a mutual trade relation as one body, as to obtain from all countries, territories and economic spheres, the resources which they respectively need for their planned production, and to supply others with what they want, and thus arrangement for special settlement will be necessary to promote the close and smooth trade of resources between Japan, Manchoukuo, China and all other territories in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Communications.

Adjustment on a synthetic plan; an increase in shipping; control of aviation.

With closer and intensified trade relations between Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and all other territories in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and for the security of the said Sphere, the communications of the three Powers must be completely equipped and maintained on a synthetic plan. For this purpose the said Powers must promote the mutual interrelation of their arrangements for land and sea transportation; they must increase their shipping rapidly; they must control and interrelate their aviation; and they must completely equip and expand their electric communications.
Did the General Affairs Bureau during the period from 1932 when you were in Manchukuo up to 1936 have to approve the sale of stocks or bonds by private corporations?

A. We rendered assistance when necessary in the sale of stocks and bonds. These were in connection with the sale of shares of electric power companies, telephone companies, and others of that description.
Excerpts from the Interrogation of HOSHIRO, Isoki.


Q. At the time of the China or Marco Polo incident on July 7, 1937, who was Chief of Staff?
A. TOJO was Chief of Staff at that time.

Q. Who was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army?
A. General UEDA.

Q. Prior to July 7, 1937, was there any increase in the number of the soldiers in the Kwantung Army?
A. I do not know.

Q. What part did General TOJO take in the China incident?
A. Under orders for the Kwantung Army to aid, TOJO was sent with a portion of the Kwantung Army to give aid in Manchuria, as acting Commander.
Q. As member of the KONGEI second cabinet, you were chairman of the Cabinet Planning Board?
A. Yes.

Q. After you became Chief of this planning board, did you promulgate or make any economic plans for Japan?
A. The board made rough plans to be determined by the cabinet meeting as I said before.

Q. When did the cabinet first adopt a plan that you had suggested covering the economic situation in Japan?
A. November, 1940.

Q. Will you tell us just what that plan contemplated?
A. It was to form various companies in a given industry into one association, one group, so that they could develop their industry as one group.

Q. Under that plan was it contemplated that the government would appoint the head of the group?
A. The government would nominate one member from among the companies as the head.

Q. And did the government appoint the heads of each of these so-called "control associations"?
A. Yes, the government did appoint the head — usually the most senior member although there was no legal procedure to appoint such a head.

Q. And did the man that the government appoint at the head of each of these control associations have the final say as to how things should be carried on?
A. Within certain limits he ran the control association, the limits being set by the government.

Q. Was the plan that was adopted by the cabinet in November 1940 ever revised?
A. There were no particular modifications.

Q. Did that method of handling the business of Japan continue from November until the end of the war?
A. In general, yes. ........
Excerpts from the Interrogation
of JOS T. L. Kapki.


Q. In what way did the plan constitute a separation of capital from management?
A. This plan imposed certain new limitations on capital, as to the management of the business, but capital still retained certain prerogatives as to hiring and firing and so on, so that you cannot say that capital and management were separated.

Q. In what way did the men that the government put in control at the head of these associations control the method of development of their plants?
A. The plan does not take that into account, but the Minister of Commerce and Industry would hold particular conferences as the need arose with the various control association heads. In relation to a previous question — this rough plan did not go into great detail about the management of the control associations. It only set up the system of control associations.

Q. Was the plan later revised so as to exercise more control?
A. Gradually various laws and decrees were promulgated to exercise this control as the need arose.

Q. In what way in exercising this control was the distribution of raw materials controlled by the government among the members of these associations?
A. As a member of the cabinet planning board I had no access to that — the matter was handled by the minister of Commerce and Industry. The Cabinet planning board set up a grand policy so that the various industries acted more or less under their own authority in carrying out this plan.

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Excerpts from the Interrogation of
Mishima Tadashi.


Q. Did you as minister without portfolio ever attend the Imperial Conferences?
A. Yes, once.

Q. When?
A. October I think, 1940.

Q. What was that conference about?
A. About the Japan-Germany alliance, I think. I do not remember exactly.

Q. Was it the triple alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy?
A. Yes.

Q. And was that Imperial Conference held for the purpose of approving that triple alliance agreement?
A. I do not remember exactly. There was some discussion of the treaty but there were other matters like mobilization which were discussed.

Q. Did you enter into the discussion at that meeting?
A. Yes.

Q. What did you say at the time you took part in that conference?
A. I don't remember but I outlined the condition of various industries at that time.

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Excerpts from the interrogation of
KOHLL & LACKI.

2 February 1946; age 15.

Q. Did you approve the tripartite agreement?
A. Yes, it was settled at the cabinet meeting, so naturally I did not oppose it.
Q. Did you attend the first meeting at Honoye's house of the Imperial Jule Assistance Association?
A. I do not understand.
C. It was the first meeting of the Imperial Jule Assistance Association and I understand it was held at Honoye's house or official residence.
A. Yes, I attended.
Excerpts from the Interrogation
of HOGI T. Kasoki.

2 February 1946, age 75.

Q. Was there an Imperial Conference held in the early part of December?
A. Yes, I think there was.

Q. On what date?
A. I don't remember exactly.

Q. Was it the first day of December?
A. About the 1st or 2nd day of December.

Q. What was under consideration at that meeting?
A. If the negotiations did not succeed during the first part of December, there would be war.

Q. Was there a cabinet meeting held before this Imperial Conference?
A. I think there was.

Q. Were all of the ministers present?
A. Yes.

Q. Were you personally at the cabinet meeting?
A. Yes, as secretary.

Q. Was it at this cabinet meeting that the determination to commence war if negotiations were not completed in the early part of December was decided upon?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you attend the Imperial Conference?
A. Yes.

Q. Was the emperor present at that conference?
A. Yes.
Excerpts from the Interrogation of I. S. I. I. H. H. H. H. H. H.

7 February 1946, Jas 27.

Q. Did you attend every cabinet meeting that took place from the beginning of 100's cabinet until after December 8, 1941.
A. Yes.

Q. When was the Privy Council's meeting held in the Emperor's presence that declared war on the United States - on what date?
A. On December 8th.

Q. At what time?
A. At about 9 o'clock.

Q. Did you attend it?
A. Yes.

Q. Were all of the cabinet members present and were all of the Privy Council there?
A. Yes.
Excerpts from the Interrogation
of H. R. N. S. N. K. L.

7 February 1946, interrogation.

Q. What time of day did you say the meeting of the Privy Council took place on December 8th?
A. At 9 o'clock in the morning.

Q. Was the Emperor present at that meeting?
A. Yes.

Q. So that the Privy Council and all members of the cabinet including those without portfolio were present at this meeting on December 8th at 9 o'clock in the morning, and the Imperor was there?
A. Yes.
7 February 1915

C. When was the formal declaration of war against America made?
A. The Foreign Minister in consultation with military authorities had fixed the time for delivering the declaration of war. No one else knew anything about this decision.

C. I thought you said there could be no declaration of war without the approval of the Privy Council, is that so?
A. Well, yes, for a formal declaration of war, the approval of the Privy Council is necessary.

C. Had they had any meeting of the Privy Council and Cabinet prior to December 8th, at which that matter was considered and decided?
A. No.
Excerpts from the Interrogation of Iokunomotoki.

31 January 1946, Page 15.

Q. Did the General Affairs Bureau have anything to do with the establishment of any of the industries in Hankou after you became Chairman of the Board, I mean chief?
A. There are many cases in which the General Affairs Bureau had connection with industries in Hankou.

Q. Does that mean with the establishment of industries?
A. Yes, in the establishment of industries - not directly, of course.

Q. How were they connected with it?
A. The General Affairs Bureau was consulted in many important matters concerning industry.

Q. Did the General Affairs Bureau interest itself in trying to get capital invested in Hankou for the purpose of developing it?
A. Yes.
11 February, 1946, in re 7-8-9.

Q. Did the Cabinet take any action on the report of this conference between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull and Mr. Mol U.A. and Mr. KU. U.S.A?

A. I believe the Cabinet got the impression that the negotiation was not going to be carried through.

Q. At what meeting? When?

A. I do not recall exactly what Cabinet meeting it was.

Q. Was there any special Cabinet meeting held about that time?

A. I believe there was a Cabinet meeting in early December concerning the negotiation.

Q. Why was it called?

A. I believe the special Cabinet meeting was called because the impression that a treaty would not be arrived at with the United States and in the event that the treaty did not go through well what steps they might take or could take.

Q. What steps did they decide to take if the negotiations did not go along well?

A. That if the negotiation could not be made then Japan would take free action.

Q. Was there any disagreement among the ministers at the meeting about going to war with the United States?

A. No.
Excerpts from the Interrogation
of Hideki Tojo.


Q. When was the declaration of war submitted to the Ivry Council?
A. The morning of the 8th.

Q. And were you present at that meeting?
A. Yes.

Q. At the time of the meeting of the Ivry Council did you know whether or not Pearl Harbor had been attacked?
A. Yes, I had heard.

Q. And did you hear it before the declaration of war was approved by the Ivry Council?
A. I believe that I had learned it.

Q. After the Ivry Council had approved the declaration of war did they send it to the Emperor?
A. Yes.

Q. And what did the Emperor do with it?
A. He signed it as he received this declaration of war.
26 January 1942, pages 8, 9, 10.

Q. I am advised, Mr. Hoshino, that you were the closest man in the Cabinet to General Tojo, how about that?
A. As the Chief Secretary, I was the closest to Tojo, however, I can not say that I was the closest advisor.

Q. When did you first know, Mr. Hoshino, that war had been determined upon by Japan with the United States?
A. On the 26th or 27th of November I had heard that a war with the United States was almost unavoidable. It was stated that an ultimatum by the President of the United States was received on the 26th and this made it almost impossible to better American-Japanese relations according to the Cabinet members.

Q. And who made the statement to the Cabinet that this condition existed as of November 26, 1941?
A. I think Premier Tojo reported that to the Cabinet.

Q. And was the full Cabinet in session at this meeting?
A. I do not remember exactly, but I am quite certain that they all attended and it took place, I think, in the latter part of November or the first of December.

Q. Who were the members of the Cabinet who were present at this meeting at which Premier Tojo made this statement?
A. I do not remember them all, but I am sure they all were in attendance.

Q. Following this meeting at which this statement was made by Premier Tojo, Mr. Hoshino, what he passed them?
A. Following that there was an Imperial Conference in which the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Navy were present as well as the various ministers.

Q. Who was the Chief of Staff of the Army present at the Imperial Conference?
A. The Chief of Staff of the Army was SUGIMOTO, and the Chief of Staff of the Navy was NAGANO.
1. Was any statement made at the Imperial Conference by Premier Tojo or any one else in connection with the probability of war with the United States or the determination to embark upon war?

A. I think Tojo did make a statement, however, I do not recall as to what he said.

Q. In view of the importance of this Imperial Conference, Mr. Hoshino, can you not, from your recollection, state in effect what was said, if not the exact language?

A. I cannot say as to what was stated at that time, but I think he did infer that war with the United States was inevitable and, therefore, he must make all necessary preparation.

Q. Is it not a fact that both the Chief of Staff of the Army General SUGIO and Admiral NAGO stated at this meeting that both the Army and the Navy were preparing to attack the United States and had made all plans to do so in preparation for war?

A. I cannot recall as to what exactly was said, however, I think he did say that preparation had already been made.

Q. And when you say he, whom do you mean?

A. I do not remember exactly, however, I think both of these Chiefs of Staff made that statement.

Q. Was the Emperor present at this Imperial Conference?

A. Yes, he was.

Excerpts from the Interrogation
of R. Nishino.


Q. Is it not a fact, Mr. Nishino, that upon instructions of the Cabinet that you actually wrote up the declaration of war and prepared the same as Secretary of the Cabinet?
A. It is hard to state as to exactly who wrote the document, however, being as it does come out under the name of the Premier I did help compile part of it.
Q. Mr. HOSHINO, when I interrogated you some time ago you stated that you had written some part of the declaration of war. That was correct, was it not?

A. I cannot say I wrote the whole thing but it was compiled by me.

Q. When you spoke of the declaration of war, "Mr. HOSHINO, do you mean the note that was submitted to the United States or the declaration of war that was signed by the Emperor? It is the Imperial Descript and not the note given to the United States on December 7.
"Informal Statement of Foreign Minister, Mr. Koki Hirota, on the Occasion of Japan's Admission to the London Naval Conference. (January 16, 1936.)"

It being the irrevocable policy of the Japanese Government to contribute toward the maintenance and promotion of international peace, we gladly participated in the present Naval Conference at London.

The aim of our Government at the conference was to establish the security of national defense by concluding a fair and equitable agreement on naval disarmament, and simultaneously to lighten the tax burden of the peoples concerned, promoting thereby the peace and amicable intercourse among nations. In order to realize this objective, our delegates made a proposal looking to a reduction of armaments which, without impairing the sense of security of each Power in its national defense, would make it difficult for any Power to attack another but easy to defend itself. For that purpose, our proposal provided for the establishment of a common upper limit for all the navies, to be fixed at the lowest possible level. It also provided for the abolition of the armaments of offensive nature, such as capital ships and aircraft carriers, and for a drastic reduction in the first class cruisers. Thus we hoped to achieve a thorough-going disarmament and to establish the principle of non-menace and non-aggression among nations.

But, in spite of the earnest endeavours of our delegates, these fair and reasonable basic claims of our Government were not accepted by the other Powers; and moreover, the earnest proposal of our Government was also rejected, in which it was proposed to conclude such agreements as might be possible at the conference, and to terminate the conference in an amicable manner after making for the purpose of forestalling naval competition a joint declaration to the effect that the Powers concerned would not enter upon an armament race. In the light of these circumstances, it became unavoidable that our delegates should withdraw from the conference.

However, it is needless to say that our Government, devoted to the principle of non-menace and non-aggression, have not the slightest intention of doing anything to stimulate an armament race, irrespective of whether or not there exists a treaty for disarmament. Furthermore, there is not the slightest change in the cherished desire of our Government to co-operate for the realization of disarmament for the cause of world peace. It is our fervent wish that all the Powers concerned will soon come to appreciate the sincerity of our Government in proposing a thorough-going limitation and reduction in armament.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO NO. YAMA, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:
Assistant Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and as such officer I certify that the following named document, "COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 15," was published by the Foreign Office in February, 1937.
Signed at Tokyo on this 31st day of December, 1946.

/s/ J. A. Curtis, Asst Chief, Archives Section

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, 2d Lt., AUS, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above-named official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.
Signed at Tokyo on this 31st day of December, 1946.

/s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt., AUS

Witness:
/s/ Kazuo Kato

Investigator I.S. 
Official Capacity
1915

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1915

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1915

英国之海军舰队于新兴根环礁（图）

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1915
"Informal Statement of Foreign Minister, Mr. Koki Hirota, on the Occasion of Japan's Secession from the London Naval Conference. (January 16, 1936.)"

It being the irrevocable policy of the Japanese Government to contribute toward the maintenance and promotion of international peace, we gladly participated in the present Naval Conference at London.

The aim of our Government at the conference was to establish the security of national defence by concluding a fair and equitable agreement on naval disarmament, and simultaneously to lighten the tax burden of the peoples concerned, promoting thereby the peace and amicable intercourse among nations. In order to realize this object, our delegates made a proposal looking to a reduction of armaments which, without impairing the sense of security of each Power in its national defence, would make it difficult for any Power to attack another but easy to defend itself. For that purpose, our proposal provided for the establishment of a common upper limit for all the navies, to be fixed at the lowest possible level. It also provided for the abolition of the armaments of offensive nature, such as capital ships and aircraft carriers, and for a drastic reduction in the first class cruisers. Thus we hoped to achieve a thorough-going disarmament and to establish the principle of non-aggression and non-aggression among nations.

But, in spite of the earnest endeavours of our delegates, these fair and reasonable basic claims of our Government were not accepted by the other Powers; and moreover, the earnest proposal of our Government was also rejected, in which it was proposed to conclude such agreements as might be possible at the conference, and to terminate the conference in an amicable manner after making for the purpose of forestalling naval competition a joint declaration to the effect that the Powers concerned would not enter upon an armament race. In the light of these circumstances, it became unavoidable that our delegates should withdraw from the conference.

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CERTIFICATE

Preliminary Statement of Authenticity

I, ODO NAKA, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:
Assistant Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and as such official I certify that the following named document,
"COLLECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS, Vol. 15"
was published by the Foreign Office in February, 1937.

Signed at Tokyo on this
31st day of December, 1940.

/s/ Nakano, 2nd

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Yamamoto

Assistant Chief, Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, 2d Lt., USA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above named official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
31st day of December, 1940.

/s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt., USA

Official

Witness: /s/ Kanno Mako

Investigator

Official Capacity
Doc 915

（四月一日書面）

間歇平和ノ機関ニシテハルヘハ

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OUTLINE OF JAPANESE ARMY'S FIVE YEAR PLAN
10 June 1937

This plan is in short designed to enlarge the production by approximately several times to ten and some odd times during the 16th fiscal year of Showa (1941) concerning automobile, machinery, iron, mineral, pig-iron, steel, petroleum, synthetic petroleum, alcohol, coal, aluminum, magnesium, electric power, ship-building, car, soda, dyestuff, pulp, and gold mining. The necessary construction fund totals 8.5 billion Yen between Japan and Manchukuo (Japan 6 billion Yen, Manchukuo 2.5 billion Yen). The estimated direct and indirect subsidy of the Japanese Government for five years is 1.2 billion Yen, the budget increase for this fiscal year totals 4.2 billion Yen for five years. The total mobilization will be 17 billion Yen. (The above is equal to the amount of savings to be held hereafter by the people.)

The policies for the above are as follows:

(1) Financial Policy.
1. The Bank of Japan should take charge of financing the industries.
2. The amount of Bond issued by the Industrial Bank should be increased thirteen times and the Bank should be granted a monopoly.
3. To start a national savings movement.
4. To enlarge postal savings (collection of money from door to door).
5. To intervene in the investment.
6. Maintenance of a low interest policy.
7. Execution of a sound financial policy.

(2) Trade and Exchange Policy.
1. Enforcement of a trade control act, for the shortage in the balance of trade will reach 500 million Yen.
2. To establish the Ministry of Trade.
3. A governmental trading company which should be engaged in trades of key products for national defence.
4. Encouragement of the export in textile goods.
5. Compulsory formation of the export and import guild.
6. Intensification of the export and credit guarantees.
7. Establishment of trade halls and dispatch of the resident correspondents.
8. Continuance of the import exchange permit system.
9. A power to control the customs duties should be vested in the Minister of Foreign Trade, and a double tax system and a preferential tariff for Japan and Manchukuo should be adopted.
10. Adoption of a regional dispersive buying system in foreign countries.
11. To try to attract foreign tourists.
12. Intensification of the exchange control to maintain the rate of 1 shilling 2 pence.
13. To transfer the Manchurian Central Bank's holding specie to Japan.
14. To ask for a credit of 500 million Yen from the United States, Britain, or Germany.
(3) Price Policy.
1. Maintaining and keeping in check of prices individually at the present level.
2. To examine and keep in check the import prices.
3. To strengthen the anti-profiteering ordinance (A new appointment of the price control official.)
4. To adopt a permit system concerning the rising of staple commodity prices.
5. Production and distribution should be controlled.
6. Importation of old vessels as a means for obtaining a supply of scrap iron.
7. Control of the use of important products (use restricted).
8. House rent, prices of bean paste, soy bean sauce, and meat, and electric light, gas, and water rates, should not be raised.
9. Reduction or exemption of the sugar consumption tax.
10. Governmental officials in general should wear uniforms.

(4) Industry control policy.
1. Private enterprises, as a rule, should be controlled autonomously.
3. To grant subsidies and guarantees against losses or guarantees of profits to the key industries.
4. Important matters of the key industries' business should be carried on by governmental permission.
5. Disposal of profits should be made according to governmental direction.
6. The special companies dealing with iron, petroleum, coal, electric power, aluminum, and magnesium, should be more strictly directed by government supervision.
7. Corporal punishment should be included in the penal regulation for enforcing the important industries' control act.
8. A central economic council should be established.

(5) Measures to be taken toward technicians and laborers.
1. Enlargement of various kinds of schools.
   Subsidy to special training institutes.

(6) Measure for machine tool industry.
1. To create a special corporation built upon the national policy.

(7) Transportation policy.
1. Promotion of rationalization.
2. In railway the main lines in Japan, Korea and Manchuria should be double-tracked, and the freight rates for important products should be reduced.
3. In sea transportation, the importation of old vessels, the construction of superior vessels, and the improvement of harbors should be done.
   The improvement of roads and the standardization of motor truck's
   gauge. Encouragement in using Diesel motor cars.
5. Establishment of the Central Aeronautical Technical Office.
   International air ways should be newly opened. Responsibility of
   keeping a certain number of aeroplanes should be imposed upon large
   aviation companies.
Encouragement and aids in manufacturing Japanese made engines.
Foundation of aviation insurance.

(8)  National life stabilization policy.
1. Equal distribution of the national income to each class of the people.
2. Decentralization of the industries.
3. The burden (taxes) of farmers should be lightened.
   Compulsory establishment of health insurance associations in farm
   villages.
   Natural damages to crops should be compensated
4. Taking peace in the labor problem and revision of the Factory Law.
5. Middle-sized and small industries should be financed. Redegression
   and settlement of their debts.

(9)  Financial Policy.
1. The expenditure and revenue of our empire should be estimated at
   2.9 billion Yen for 1937, 3.6 billion Yen for 1938, 3.9 billion Yen
   for 1939, 4.2 billion Yen for 1940, and 4.3 billion Yen for 1941.
2. These expenditures should be covered by new taxes, transfer from the
   special accounts, and issue of bonds.
3. The budget outside of this plan should be thoroughly eliminated.
4. The war expenditure should be also used in the production field.
5. The administrative and financial readjustment.

(10) Reform of administrative organization.
1. Establishment of the Board of State Affairs (Kokumin).
2. Establishment of the Department of General Affairs (Somucho) (to
   execute this plan).
3. Establishment of the Foreign Trade Ministry.
4. Establishment of the Aviation Ministry.
5. Establishment of the Public Health Ministry.
6. The Official Appointment Regulations should be revised for the purpose
   of appointing civilians into the governmental services.
7. Prohibition of taking governmental officials into the service of the
   special corporations.
Funds required for the enlargement of the important industries of Japan and Manchuria. (In million yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Product</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Enlargement to be started now&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Construction fund&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Total (Japan)</td>
<td>Manchuria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aeroplane</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>375</td>
<td>302</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Automobile</strong></td>
<td>cars</td>
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<td>117000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Machine</strong></td>
<td>yen</td>
<td>137000</td>
<td>107000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Steel</strong></td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>715</td>
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<td><strong>Pig Iron</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cres</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1207</td>
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<td><strong>Synthetic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
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<td><strong>Petroleum</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coal</strong></td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>341</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electric</strong></td>
<td>K.W.</td>
<td>536</td>
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<td><strong>Ship</strong></td>
<td>tons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of Product</td>
<td>Unit</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Locomotive</td>
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<td>88 (691)</td>
<td>3000 (7600)</td>
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<td>Soda</td>
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<td>Dyestuff</td>
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<td>Pulp</td>
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<td>Gold</td>
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<td>Others</td>
<td>ton</td>
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<td>40</td>
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Total required fund: 8536 6092 2444
Yokohama, July 17, 1937.

This report enclosed herewith is an extract from the note shown to me confidentially by the Army side. Every Ministry will set to make a draft through this line. And, as soon as the programs have been drafted, they should be submitted to the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikakuchô) for execution. I am sure you may get a general idea of the future administration of the country. Please keep this report top secret.

P. S. The national productive power of the year 1936 shows an increase of 216.3 per cent in comparison with the basic year 1931.

Yours respectfully,

Secretary

Akiyama.
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(第十一題)

問題：

解答：
For the aforementioned proposal for economic cooperation in China, our government intends, for the economic development of China, to solicit foreign capital which is necessary, on one hand, for such development, and to contribute, on the other hand, to the improvement of international relations. This was already made clear in the policy for the economic development of China, adopted by the cabinet meeting. Especially, as regards the participation of China and Italy, it must mean that special consideration is required from the political point of view as well. However, as a practical question, it is difficult for us to reach a conclusive opinion, unless the general plan for the economic development is set up, and development companies and other business firms have been established, thus enabling us to have some projects for those enterprises and investments.

However, if China, as already mentioned, desires the establishment of general rights concerning the economic development of China before getting into concrete problems, we regard it necessary to make due correction of (i), (ii), and (iii) of the general view. If the Chinese are able to undertake the economic development of China, we cannot allow them a position equal to ours or even inferior, if it gives them a preference which could threaten to cut us out entirely. The economic participation of China and Italy in the economic development of China will be accomplished chiefly by China's cooperative investment in various important industries. The methods are:

(a) Investment in the Development Company and its sub-companies (provided that it does not affect the existing rights of the business.)

(b) Subscription of debentures.

(c) Supply of machinery or credit or by delivery of shares.

(d) Joint management by Italy and China, or by China, Italy, and China, of some kind of enterprise.
Among the above methods, since (a) and (b) will not be considered important by CEMA for the time being, (c) and (d) are those will be chiefly adopted. Moreover (e), in my view, is the most likely union GERMANY for railroad and other transportation utilities, mining and iron-manufacturing machinery, and electrical machinery and materials, etc. Concerning (d), from my point of view, for example, to supply us with patent rights and liquefaction machinery for coal liquefaction technology, to be carried out by the joint engagement of GERMANY and CEMA or of JAPAN, GERMANY and CEMA. The army, also, considers this entirely possible. Furthermore, in view of the necessity of taking into consideration this juncture, the efforts made by CEMA by Foreign Minister M. T. O. , ambassador 2000 will offer the following proposal of an engaged cooperation opportunity: "In view of the fact that GERMANY has consistently shown a firm attitude towards JAPAN in the current incident, the said attitude of GERMANY will not only be continued in the future but will be more strongly strengthened, and that the political and economic cooperation due to the anti-Communist orientation of the two countries, GERMANY and JAPAN, will become closer, the JAPAN GOVERNMENT, on the contrary, that GERMANY will approve. JAPAN's special position in CEMA, will endeavor not to put GERMANY in a position inferior to that of other countries, for or for GERMANY's economic activities in CEMA are engaged. Furthermore, in every case which may happen in the future, JAPAN will try to give her the best way and offer her. Moreover, as the said proposal of GERMANY lays stress not only on her interests in CEMA, but also on securing and increasing her trade in CEMA, the JAPAN government has given instructions to ensure GERMANY to this effect, that "to consider that, in principle, both countries, JAPAN and GERMANY, should stand equal in the Chinese market. Therefore, we will strive to our utmost so that both countries may enjoy equal treatment as far as the Chinese Customs System is concerned. However, as JAPAN is not responsible for the export or of the exchange system in CEMA, it will be inevitable that some special position will occur to her. That is why, in setting up any import and export system, GERMANY's interests will be fully respected and will be given preference over my third country."
Among the above methods, since (c) and (b) will not be considered important by GRIN/PY for the time being, (c) and (d) a thorough adoption of method (c), as may have to be used, in order to avoid DDNY for railroad and other transportation material, mining and iron-manufacturing machinery, and electrical machinery and materials, etc. Hence (d), in my view, may be of use, for example, to supply us with patent rights and liquefaction machinery for coal liquefaction enterprises, to be carried on by the joint management of JAPAN and DDNY or of JPN, CY, DDNY and DDNY. If the JPN, also, considers this entirely possible. Further, I view the necessity of taking into consideration at this juncture the efforts made in DDNY to the great effort in the production of the DJLP, the efforts made in DDNY by Mr. (the) representative of JPN, and the efforts made by the representative of JPN in the present incident, it is necessary for the effort made by the JPN, to give the following proposal at an approach to opportunity: "In view of the fact that DDNY has consistently shown a favorable attitude towards JAPAN in the present incident, that the said attitude of DDNY will not only be continued in the future but will be more and more strengthened, that the political and economic cooperation due to the anti-Communist orientation of the two countries, JPN and DDNY, will become closer, the JPN will overcome, on the contrary the observation of the following: "In view of the fact that DDNY has consistently shown a favorable attitude towards JAPAN in the present incident, that the said attitude of DDNY will not only be continued in the future but will be more and more strengthened, that the political and economic cooperation due to the anti-Communist orientation of the two countries, JPN and DDNY, will become closer, the JPN will overcome, on the contrary the observation of the situation of the two countries, JPN and DDNY, should stand equal in the Chinese market. Therefore, we will strive to our utmost so that both countries may enjoy equal treatment so far as the Chinese Customs System is concerned. However, as the JPN's attitude is reasonable, for the utmost of the Chinese Custom System in the future, it will be important that some special position will accrue to our best interest, in setting up any third country. Therefore, we will strive to our utmost so that both countries may enjoy equal treatment so far as the Chinese Customs System is concerned. However, as the JPN's attitude is reasonable, for the utmost of the Chinese Custom System in the future, it will be important that some special position will accrue to our best interest, in setting up any third country.
MINISTERIAL ADDRESSES OF JANUARY 21, 1939
ADDRESS OF TANKO YOSHIHIRO HIRUXA, PRIME MINISTER

IN the Second New Year under the China Affair when we are confronted with an increasingly grave situation, I received, in my capacity as head of the cabinet, responsibilities for foreign and military affairs. At the same time I consider it the greatest honour for me to attend the seventy-fourth session of the Diet which is to deliberate on the measures for dealing with the initial stage of the construction of a new order in East Asia, and to join with you in expressing our best wishes for the long life of His Majesty and continued prosperity of the Imperial Family, and to have an opportunity of stating the views of the Government upon the State affairs.

His Majesty the Emperor, who is devoting His attention day and night to manifold military as well as other State affairs, especially in relation to the China Affair, was pleased to grant to the Diet on the occasion of its opening ceremony a most gracious message. We are all deeply moved by the Imperial concern with the present situation, and it is my humble but earnest hope that we may in accordance with the Imperial will dedicate ourselves to the service of the State and set His Majesty's mind at ease.

To those officers and men in the services who, fighting for the past one and a half years on various fronts in China, have won brilliant victories, I wish to express our profound gratitude, while we mourn for those heroic dead who lie under the sod in a strange land. Let us pledge ourselves to the fulfilment of the high purpose for which they have given their lives.

As for relief work for soldiers, His Majesty the Emperor was pleased some time ago to grant a generous message together with a generous sum of money from the Imperial Privy Purse. Indeed, the Imperial benevolence known no bounds. The Government, in accordance with the Imperial will, has established the Society for Relief of Soldiers as an Imperial Foundation, which, in conjunction with governmental establishments, is expected to make perfect the work of military relief and relieve the officers and men on the front from all cares and anxieties regarding their families at home.

In regard to the China affair upon which both the Government and the people are concentrating their endeavours, there exists an inevitable policy, for which Imperial sanction has been granted by the present cabinet, and in
In the second half year under the China Affair when we are confronted with an increasingly grave situation, I received, to my arduous task, the imperial command to assume my responsibilities as head of the Cabinet. Responsibilities for so large a limited power and ability. At the same time, I consider it the greatest honour for me to attend the seventy-fourth session of the Diet which is to deliberate on the measures for dealing with the initial stage of the construction of our order in East Asia, and to join with you in expressing our best wishes for the long life of His Majesty and continued prosperity of the Imperial Family, and to have an opportunity of stating the views of the Government thus assuming the Throne in the administration of State affairs.

His Majesty the Emperor, who is devoting His attention day and night to manifold military as well as other State affairs, especially in relation to the China Affair, was pleased to grant to the Diet on the occasion of its opening ceremony, a most gracious message. We are all deeply moved by the Imperial concern with the present situation, and it is my humble but earnest hope that we may in consonance with the Imperial will dedicate ourselves to the service of the State and so set His Majesty's mind at ease.

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In regard to the China Affair upon which both the Government and the people are concentrating their endeavours, there exists an invariable policy, for which Imperial sanction was obtained by the previous Cabinet, and in
accordance with which the necessary steps have been taken in various directions. As the presentGovernment is, of course, committed to the same policy, it is determined to proceed at all costs to the achievement of the final purpose. To lay the foundation of prosperity and progress in East Asia through the political, economic, and cultural cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, with full mutual understanding between the three countries, for the realization of mutual helpfulness, neighbourly unity and a solidarity, is, needless to say, to manifest the very spirit in which our nation was founded. Therein lies Japan's national purpose, which alone can insure the permanent peace of East Asia, and which can contribute to the progress of the world.

Obviously no lasting peace can be hoped for unless Japan, Manchukuo, and China, the three countries responsible for the stability of East Asia, are speedily united in the realization of the above-mentioned common objective—the establishment of a new order to replace the old. "Overthrow the evil ways of the past, and follow the just principles of nature." Here we have, I believe, what must be the basis of government in our country. Here is the ideal which was handed down from time immemorial by the Imperial ancestors, and in accordance with which all the Imperial Successors have ruled the land. To "follow the just principles of nature" means in the last analysis to enable all entities to find their own proper places, and therein lie clear, I believe, the essentials of government. And this principle applies equally to internal politics and international relations. The construction of the new East Asiatic order should proceed on the basis of this ideal.

I hope the above intention of Japan will be understood correctly by Chinese so that they may cooperate with us without the slightest apprehension. Otherwise, the construction of the new order would be impossible. As for those who fail to understand the end and persist even hereafter in their opposition against Japan, we have no other alternative than to exterminate them. On the other hand, those who desire to make of themselves pioneers of a new Chin. and cooperate in the execution of our national policy should be encouraged to take part in this historic task. We should gladly help them to rescue the Chinese masses from misery and distress, and liberate them from the bondage of old prejudices.

Happily in China today, enthusiasm for thestruction is beginning to sweep over the whole country, with a growing number of men and women who fall in line with the movement put into practice by the authorities of the new Government of Peking and Nanking and the autonomous Government of Mongolia. This is a matter for congratulation for the sake of the stabilization of East Asia, and also as the fruit of our country's national purpose.

Since Communism has been so rampant on the Asiatic continent as to threaten to usurp the political power of China, its elimination is absolutely
necessary if truth and righteousness are to prevail. In order to realize this, we must promote understanding with third Powers, and cooperation and collaboration especially with these Powers who fully understand us. Germany and Italy, as you are aware, have, from the beginning of the present conflict, consistently given us whole-hearted support, for which we are profoundly grateful. It is exceedingly gratifying that Japan’s relations with these friendly Powers, with whom we are bound by the Anti-Comintern Agreement are growing more intimate and cordial.

The notable development of Manchukuo is a hopeful sign for the construction of a new East Asia. The measures calculated to maintain the inseparable relationship between Japan and Manchukuo should be further strengthened. On the other hand, allow me to state that it is far from the thought of the Japanese Government to oppress needlessly the economical or cultural activities of third Powers. I earnestly hope that they will approach to the true intentions of Japan and extend cooperation toward the construction of the proposed new order in East Asia.

The statement of the Japanese Government issued by the previous Cabinet which is based upon the basic policy vis-à-vis the China Affair, makes clear the guarantee required of China as a participant in the construction of the new order. The statement provides, from a definite, a principle most suited to the present situation for guiding the Chinese people and for enlightening third Powers. Thanks to the valiant acts in the part of the Japanese forces and the loyal support rendered by our people on the two fronts both in Japan and China, the desired military victories have been won. The Kuomintang Government, still fanatically pursuing its anti-Japanese and pro-Communist policy, has been reduced to the status of a beleaguered regime through its flight to a remote province. However, the final aim of our present campaign in China does not lie simply in military victories, but in the rebirth of China, and in the creation thereby of a new order uniting Japan, Manchukuo and China in a relationship of mutual aid and collaboration. With the recent establishment of the China Affairs Board, it is now expected that all letters relating to China will proceed smoothly. Of course, it is not difficult to see that the way is long and beset with difficulties. In order to surmount them and to make possible a glorious future, we should strive in the footsteps of our forefathers and devote our best efforts to the task in hand, rendering, in the spirit of national solidarity, united service to the Throne. It means the concentration of all the spiritual and material resources of the nation upon the accomplishment of one purpose. This can be done, I am sure, if we will. It should be remembered that the China Affair is not to be ended until and unless we shall have achieved our ultimate aim.

United service to the Throne means the endeavor upon the part of all the subjects to carry out the will of the Throne. In other words, our
people in all walks of life—regardless of whether they are engaged in government, and regardless of whether they are engaged in agriculture, industry, or commerce—should fulfill their respective responsibilities in order that the Imperial benevolence may be realized to enable all things to find their proper places. Accordingly, I believe it is in this spirit that all of us, no matter what our occupation may be, should serve the State and thus assist in the Imperial cause.

We must then, in conformity to the spirit of the Imperial message granted at the opening ceremony of the present session, strive to complete the great task of establishing a new East Asiatic order, and enhance national ideals handed down by our forefathers and manifest the united strength of the nation. In order to deal properly with the China Affair and international developments in the future, therefore, it becomes a matter of urgent necessity to renovate the conventional system at the same time with enhancing national ideals. I believe that it is of prime importance that such measures should have their basis in the spirit of united service to the Throne, and lay emphasis upon actual practice.

Rapid augmentation of the entire strength of the nation, especially of national defence—that is to say, the creation of powerful eminences and economic expansion throughout Japan, Manchukuo and China—constitutes the immediate, essential objective of our country. To meet the requirement of such augmentations and stabilize the entire nation, the administration of the entire action must grasp fully the true significance of the current situation, and unite with strong determination, unitarily continue our investigations and labours in regard to the expansion of productive power, development of foreign trade, adjustment of capital, labour and materials, and regulation of commodity prices. Especially with respect to the expansion of productive power, the Government expects to formulate and execute a comprehensive plan for development which will bring about the desired end.

The Government deems it of urgent importance to develop and reinforce all systems of transportation and communication in accordance with the new conditions in East Asia and is taking appropriate measures.

As for the various central measures carried out hitherto for economic activities, they must, of course, be continued within the bounds necessary for the maximum application of the total strength of the nation.

However, while these measures have until now mostly been economic, to meet the immediate requirements of prosecuting military operations, we must henceforth put into operation, in addition, other central measures which are of a permanent and constructive character. Accordingly it is essential to strengthen the alignment of the national life in general.
mobilization, namely, to invoke in duo order the necessary provisions in the National General Mobilization Law, effecting at the same time various internal reforms, and thereby fully manifest the combined strength of the nation and concentrate it on the objective of our national policy in the spirit of united service to the Throne.

On the other hand, the Government will carefully consider measures to be taken for coping with the problems of the suspension of business, unemployment arising among farmers and manufacturers, who will be affected by the governmental steps already described, as well as general measures for stabilizing the livelihood of the nation on the home front, such as promoting healthy development of the farming and fishing populations. And in order to accomplish this, it is essential to execute through free and native cooperation of the Government and people, unhampered by convention, the measures appropriate to the present situation. In carrying out the various policies there is much, I feel, that depends upon the cooperation of the Government and people.

It is with these considerations in mind that the Government is submitting budgetary and legislative bills in order to carry out its policies. As the present Cabinet was formed only recently, the bills prepared by the previous Cabinet, which have been found after careful study to be suited to the present situation, are being submitted for your consideration. It is in this desire that I join with you in forwarding the glorious task of the Empire.

I earnestly hope that you will, in view of the vital needs of the times, appreciate the aims of the Government and give your prompt approval to the proposed budgetary and legislative bills.

This document is certified under Prosecution Exhibit No. 448, a group certificate covering issues of the Tokyo Gazette from which this document is taken.
第十七条 頃同様 各国政府はより 強化し 相互協力関係を設立するための 条約を締結することを主張するものである。
Berlin, 28 May 1939

Diplomaten Tokyo

Telegram in cipher
(Secret Cipher Processing)

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.
Re your telegrams No. 213 and 217.

1. The formal communication made to you 20 May at the request of your Minister, General Oshima, that the Foreign Ministry there would have us informed at the latest on Sunday, 21 May of the positive and decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference has proved to be without effect. The local Japanese Embassy has up to today not been in a position to make any official communication at all regarding the state of affairs.

2. Oshima reported the following in yesterday's strictly confidential and unofficial conversation: He has received a telegram from Arita, according to which the Japanese Government wishes to reserve entrance into a state of war in case of European conflict. In a very energetic telegram to Arita, Oshima has refused to pass this point of view on to the German Government at all. Thereupon the War Minister requested Oshima by wire to hold off until later against Arita in order not to disturb the discussions among the various factors in Tokyo. The Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a cabinet overthrow.

3. I request you without making use of the aforementioned confidential communications of Oshima's to make it clear to your authorities that the absence of the communication formally announced to you as well as of every other communication has produced great astonishment in us and in the Italians. It is unavoidable that as a result of this silence the Japanese attitude is now beginning to be regarded with distrust. We can no longer understand here that everything is being on in Tokyo and for what reason the Japanese Government at this advanced stage of the negotiations is still evading a clear-cut attitude. Our local skepticism is of course still further heightened by the attitude of the Japanese delegation at the World Postal Congress in Buenos Aires.

G.F.

German Foreign Minister/

/From No. 135951-2/
AFFIDAVIT

I, J. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, deposing and saying:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Karburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said control documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Karburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Karburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ J. F. Cumming

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

Lt. Colonel, AGD

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR CIVILIAN (U.S.)

Acting Adjutant General
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cuming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

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_/s_/ W. P. CUMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

_/s_/ G. H. GARD
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Berlin, 28 May 1939

Diplomatin Tokyo

No. 174

Telegram in cipher
(Secret Cipher Processing)

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.
No your telegrams No. 213 to 217.

1. The formal communication made to you 20 May at the request of your Minister, General Hiroshi, that the Foreign Minister there would have us informed at the latest on Sunday, 21 May of the positive or decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference has proved to be without effect. The local Japanese Embassy has up to today not been in a position to make any official communication at all regarding the state of affairs.

2. Oshino reported the following in yesterday's strictly confidential and unofficial conversation: He has received a telegram from Arita, according to which the Japanese Government wishes to reserve entrance into a state of war in case of European conflict. In a very energetic telegram to Arita Oshino has refused to pass this point of view on to the German Government at all. Thereupon the Foreign Minister requested Oshino by wire to hold off until later against Arita in order not to disturb the discussions among the various factors in Tokyo. The Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a cabinet overthrow.

3. I request you without making use of the aforementioned confidential communications of Oshino's to make it clear to your authorities that the absence of the communication formally announced to you as well as of every other communication has produced great astonishment in us and in the Italians. It is unavoidable that as a result of this silence the Japanese attitude is now beginning to be regarded with distrust. We can no longer understand here what is going on in Tokyo and for what reasons the Japanese Government at this advanced state of the negotiations is still evading a clear-cut attitude. Our local skepticism is of course still further heightened by the attitude of the Japanese delegation at the World Postal Congress in Buenos Aires.

G.F.

/German Foreign Minister/

/From No. 135951-2/
AFFIDAVIT

I, V. P. Cummin, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a military Document Center at Hamburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Hamburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Hamburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ V. P. Cummin

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Grade

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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/s/ W. F. Cumming

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT

17 January 1947

PROCESSING NOTICE

Attach this certificate to Japanese copy of document 4043 H already distributed.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
I have caused the .anchurian Railroad Investigation Bureau to investigate and report the O'AMA's participation in the present question. I am now going to mention only the cardinal points, and the rest I ask you to refer to the document itself. I shall read the headings.

1. His contribution in separating the East Asia Economic Research Bureau from the South .anchuria Railway Co.
2. His exertions in reforming the substance of the Bureau after the separation.
3. Research work.
4. Establishment of policies toward .anchuria and stimulating, guiding and unifying of the people's opinion.
5. His activities after the incident.
6. His contributions in establishing .anchukuo.

The above are the items mentioned. But please keep in mind that this was not investigated by myself, that is, this is the authentic investigation made by the Research Bureau ***.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

THE UNITED STATES, ET AL

vs.

ARAI, Sadao, et al.

AFFIDAVIT.

I, T. N. TO: TISHIGI, make oath and say as follows:

(1) That I am employed as translator by the International Prosecution Section;

(2) That I translated the Document 1918-2 in evidence as Exhibit 2178-2, and that the said document is a true and accurate translation of pages 1246 to 1250, inclusive, of proceedings Tokyo Court of Appeals, Volume 4 of 65, relating to May 15th Incident, and OKA'A, Shuntaro faction, which was filed for identification as Exhibit 2178 and to which is attached a certificate of authentication by T. Uenatsu, Public Prosecutor of Tokyo Court of Appeals;

(3) That Document 111. L-1, attached to this affidavit, is a true and accurate translation of pages 1288, 1311, and 1312, of the said Record of Proceedings of the Tokyo Court of Appeals, and it is part of the recorded remarks addressed to the court by I. FUKUI, counsel for OKA'A.

The foregoing statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ T. N. Tomishige
T. N. TOMISHIGE

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21 day of January 1947 at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ T. D. White
W. D. TITTS 0264083
Capt., AUS

Japanese Ambassador visited me today to inform me that he had now received his expected recall. Expects to depart in about three weeks would particularly welcome /opportunity/ to have detailed talk with German Foreign Minister on homeward trip which he may take via Moscow. He seemed to be of the opinion that with a new Japanese Cabinet there was a well-founded chance for successful continuation of the stalled further rapprochement with the Axis Powers. For this very purpose of being able personally to work more effectively than was possible from here he was going to Tokyo. Ambassador mentioned further that opinion was growing in Japan for a certain settlement with Russia which, if carried through in stages and with economic conversations, might eventuate in a non-aggression pact. Question was for us, too, of considerable significance, for a Japan freed from a Russian threat was in a position to reduce a possible tendency of the United States to intervene in Europe. Ambassador reiterated finally that the ill feeling against us after conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact had improved considerably with the Cabinet change.

Siegfried Mackensen
/Frame No. 302389/
After previous appointment by telephone I visited the local Japanese Ambassador today. After Mr. Shiratori, referring to his conversation with the Ambassador on 2 September, had told me why he wished to speak to me, he stated in the course of the conversation -- which lasted a good half hour -- approximately the following:

As is known to me, the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact came as a severe blow and made a great sensation in Japan. The friends of Germany had since then been laboring to counteract this effect. He himself, who belongs to this circle, had been trying ever so long to induce the Japanese Government to conclude an alliance with us (and presumably also with Italy). This was the aim of his office here. Since this aim was not attained, he requested recall and was now returning to Japan, for he believes he can be of more use in the aforesaid direction there than here.

Mr. Shiratori went on to say /these words crossed through in original/ the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop proposed to him during his (Shiratori's) presence in Berlin on the occasion of the Führer's birthday that Japan should enter into a closer alliance relationship with Germany. He sent this proposal on to Tokyo at the time without, however, receiving a reply from there. Then he again saw the German Foreign Minister on 16 June, the latter told him Germany would now conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia, since Japan had not agreed to our proposals. He reported this to Tokyo, too. The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, Oshira, who as a military man understands naught of these matters, reported to Tokyo at the time that it was out of the question that Germany would conclude a pact with Russia. The Tokyo Government believed the German Foreign Minister had only "bluffed". It had also spread this around Tokyo and informed that he (Shiratori) and Oshira had been led around by the nose. Two months had passed without Tokyo's answering him (Shiratori) and finally he had concluded the pact with Russia. Thereupon the Japanese Government had resigned and he had put in four times for recall until it was finally accepted.

As for the supposed Japanese protest against the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, Mr. Shiratori told me Oshira had doubtless received instructions to protest. He (Shiratori)
had been informed thereof at the same time. He had then got in touch with the Japanese Embassy in Berlin by telephone in order to stop the protest action if possible. Some official -- the embassy counselor, if I am not mistaken -- told him that Oshina had already gone to the Foreign Office. State Secretary von Weizsäcker did not accept the protest there. On his return to the Embassy Oshima found the news of his (Shin'atori's) telephone call and then reported to Tokyo that he considered a protest inopportune. In spite of this he received instructions from Tokyo to carry out the step. This has, however, not yet taken place.

Concerning the present state of Japanese-Russian relations (here I come to the most important part of the conversation) Mr. Shin'itori informed me the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had received instructions a few days ago to make the following proposals to the Russian Government:

1. To settle by diplomatic means the dispute on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo, where for a considerable time a regular battle has been in progress;
2. To appoint a commission for the settlement of the border problems there in general;
3. To conclude a trade treaty. If in the course of the discussions of the trade treaty Russia should make known her desire to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan, Ambassador Togo should enquire first whether Russia were disposed to deny help to Chiang Kai-Shek.

He (Shin'itori) does not consider these instructions to the Ambassador in Moscow fortunate, even /dears them/ dangerous. Russia, indeed, had never of her own accord proposed a non-aggression pact. The proposal for the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, too, had originated with us. In his opinion, the only way to secure a non-aggression pact with Russia -- which he also considered highly desirable -- was with Germany's mediation. He had therefore proposed to General Oshima, on his own, without instructions from Tokyo, to request Germany's good offices. All this had taken place a few days earlier. General Oshima had not yet been able to see the German Foreign Minister, since he /GF/ had had no time to receive him before his departure for the front where he had gone with the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer had received General Oshima before his departure, but that was only because of a very short visit during which the Fuehrer declared Germany wished to maintain the old, friendly relations with Japan, but during which Oshima had no opportunity
Iter 3
to broach the question of German mediation between Japan and Russia. Ho (Oshina) wished to attempt to speak to the German Foreign Minister after his return to Berlin.

Regarding those latest developments Berlin was not yet officially informed. Ho (Shiratori) wanted to keep us informed here and considered it appropriate that we inform Berlin.

To a remark from me that he had, so far as I understood it, the wish to speak to the German Foreign Minister on his return trip to Japan Mr. Shiratori replied that his travel plans were not yet definite. He would presumably return to Japan via Scandinavia and America and would of course be happy to talk to the German Foreign Minister in case the latter wished it. I got the impression that Mr. Shiratori did not wish to ask for a conference on his own initiative, so to speak, probably out of regard for General Oshina. He expressed the view that the letter was to be found in Berlin.

In the course of the conversation Ambassador Shiratori mentioned that in connection with the Anti-Comintern Pact a secret accord was concluded between Germany and Japan to the effect that the two countries were not to conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia. The whole situation had since then completely altered through the developments in Europe and no one could demand from any country that it commit suicide for a treaty's sake. At the time in question Russia appeared the chief enemy to us as well as to Japan. For both countries, however, (as a further development after the Tientsin Incident) England had now become the chief enemy; who absolutely has to be beaten. The advantage to us also, of a cleansing or an amelioration of Russian-Japanese relations was self-evident, for America would in this case decide with much greater difficulty to intervene in the present conflict. The goal of Japanese policy in China remains, now as then, the establishing of a new order there, with which was linked the expulsion of England from China. In order to attain this goal Japan was hoping for financial help from America.

He then came to speak of the present conflict. Mr. Shiratori believed that after the overpowering of Poland the opportunity of an understanding with France and England might present itself. Germany and Italy were not at present in a position, and France and England were not disposed, to wage a war on a truly large scale. If it should come to a general conflict into which Italy, the United States, Russia and Japan would then necessarily be drawn, it would simply be a catastrophe whose extent could not be conceived.
In reply to a question of Mr. Shirato's as to Italy's attitude, I strongly emphasized that Italy was proceeding in closest accord with us and that her attitude corresponded to our intentions in every respect.

/sig./ Plisson

CERTIFICATE

I, ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody, and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That IPS Document No. 4095, consisting of sixteen photostatic pages, was received by the International Prosecution Section from the Office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials.

/s/ ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY

Tokyo, 31 December 1946.
第四条  三木三頭

親交進呈・書

六三九年九月四日

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署名

東京、一九六六年十二月三十日
Section 1.

Taking a general view of the present war situation, we can not only say that the Greater East Asia War is progressing most satisfactorily, but also that the European War is going very well for the Axis nations. It is now simply a matter of time before the malign influence of the United States and Great Britain will be expelled from the territories of Greater East Asia, and Chungking, now gasping her last breath, will no doubt capitulate soon. On the other side of the world, the Axis armies of Germany and Italy can be expected to achieve supremacy in Europe this year. Even the inextricable British Empire must expect her inevitable doom within the following year at the latest. The so-called "Old Powers" of the world will in all probability flee to the American continent, which they plan to use as a base for their final resistance. Meanwhile America, rich in resources, protected by the Atlantic and the Pacific, is desperately expanding her armaments. Thus if we are to bring her completely to her knees, we will need a considerable amount of time. It is for this reason that everyone predicts a long war. Long war though it may be, with the fall of Britain armed hostilities will woven and become chiefly a series of delaying actions, subsequently developing into economic and ideological warfare. Therefore the question becomes: How much force can the Allied Nations bring to bear upon the Axis? In other words, how great is America's internal strength? On the answer to this will depend the outcome of a long war.

In studying the war from this point of view, one can only conclude that the Axis enjoys a decided advantage. The internal structure of Germany and Italy, already tested through many years, is sounder than ever...
Although the strength of these two nations has been eroded in many respects by the war, their successes have given them more than enough in the way of resources. This means that the remainder of their struggle should be considerably easier. As for Japan, her internal unity and the morale of her people are, needless to say, unmatched by any other nation in the world. Furthermore, in the matter of resources, she has the vast and rich territories of Greater East Asia at her disposal. If she progressively develops this source, she need have no concern on this score regardless of how long the war may last. Japan's might will become ever greater, her morale ever higher.

In contrast, what will be the future developments in America's internal conditions? If we study her present trends we see that America, as has ever been the case, is a nation following an irresponsible policy, a nation hardly deserving to be called a "nation" in the true sense of the word. In times of peace and normalcy her people are content, but under the pressures of modern war their strength for resistance is feeble indeed. Today, America's finances are actually on the verge of bankruptcy. Not even the cleverest manipulation by the most able financial experts can extricate her from this condition. Even should the war end today, no makeshift measures could be devised which could save her from bankruptcy. To put it mildly, with her budget ranging into astronomical figures, the burden on her people can only increase, her debt grow larger, and her standard of living become correspondingly lower. In a situation where America has both her oceans blockaded, and finds herself cut off from the rest of the world with her supply of critical materials gradually diminishing, her leaders will be prone to lose whatever confidence they have in their ability to continue the war for any lengthy period. There is no longer any doubt whatsoever that an internal collapse is inevitable. In this light, even should the "old powers" of the world establish themselves behind the walls of America, their power to resist will be inconsequential. The Axis nations have only to continue their steady application of pressure, and calmly wait for America to bring about her own destruction.

Thus, although the consensus of opinion tends to favor a long war, the above factors justify the belief that the war will not last too long. If the present war were anything like wars in the past -- merely a clash of material interests -- peace negotiations could be commenced immediately upon the enemy's capitulation, and with this all armed hostilities should cease. But this war is mankind's last war -- a war to end all wars -- whose objective is the complete eradication of the old Anglo-American world policy, and the establishment of an idealistic world based on a new policy. Any makeshift variety of peace is unthinkable. For these reasons, the war to establish world order and peace will inevitably require a considerable amount of time.

CONFIDENTIAL
Section 2

The immediate objective is to repulse and destroy the enemy and to gain the final victory. Victory alone, however, does not assure the war's end. Only when we have completely realized all our new undertakings along with victory can we rejoice in triumph.

Every citizen accepts the brilliant successes and the heroic efforts of the Imperial armed forces with gratitude and praise. We need not harbor any fear of our armed forces letting us down. Before us, who shouldered the responsibility of exploitation, still lies the important portion of the task. It will demand from us the utmost in effort. We cannot forget that, aside from the important duty of producing and supplying, directly or indirectly, the materials necessary to war, we have the heavy responsibility of establishing the New World Order.

Though the words "New World Order" have been heard frequently enough, it seems that their exact meaning has yet to be authoritatively explained. Up to now it has been generally chorused that the New World Order based on totalitarianism must be introduced in the place of the Anglo-American individualism, but the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War has made this inadequate. The new Italo-German Order in place of the old Anglo-American Order explains only the character of the War in Europe. That Italo-German political principles and economic systems are far superior to those of Anglo-American and are extremely close to Japan's Nationalism, we will for the moment agree. Yet to make this War the War to end all wars, the Italo-German totalitarian ideals in themselves do not provide an adequate foundation. With vast economic spheres in Europe, the American and Greater East Asia existing and opposing each other in the future world, can a permanent peace on this earth be guaranteed? Even though this is a great step forward compared to the world of the past, we must conclude that that is still far from perfect. There is an order in all things. First, to establish the Greater East Asia Sphere, then to strive for its co-prosperity with the European-American economic sphere, is certainly a logical procedure. If there is no other way out, this set-up can be considered temporarily satisfactory. However, an ideal situation will require even more than this.

Section 3

At this point we must re-examine our national polity. KOKUTAI MEIDHO (Clarification of Japanese National Polity) is a phrase that has been quoted in relation only to Japan proper, and used in a very limited sense. The MEIDHO Restoration, which overthrew the TENGU.6. Shogunate, was introduced, as to be expected, by KOKUTAI MEIDHO. The present members of the faction supporting "KOKUTAI MEIDHO" reason that, since in the Japan of today there exists a kind of force quite similar to the TENGU.6. Shogunate, such a force must be eradicated by the clarification of national polity.
If such a force does exist within Japan, it must be eradicated. However, in the SHINWA Restoration, this force does not exist within the nation. It comes from the outside. The American-Jingo Jerich influence is this force. To preach renaissance at this time will only invite public censure, since it is evident that those who preach it do not fully understand the national structure of Japan.

If the Ancient Chronicle (Kojiki) and the Nippon Sengoku (Nippon Shoki) are correctly interpreted and understood, you will probably be able to realize that the rule of the Sun Goddess TUTUSUIWiki was not restricted to the narrow islands of the Japanese Archipelago. Her direct descendants, the Emperors, who are the incarnation of God, extended their just virtues not only to the Japanese nation and the Japanese people but to the universe. The Emperor is deeply concerned about the world for the sake of humanity. He said in his Imperial Rescript at the conclusion of the Axis Agreement, "The world shall be united," and again, "Each nation shall have its place in the sun and all human beings shall live in peace."

We must thoroughly clarify the origin of Japan, the true meaning of the descent to earth of the descendants of the Sun-Goddess, and the true nature of the Emperor, the incarnation of God.

Emperor Jimmu, prior to his departure on an expedition to subjugate Eastern Japan, said, "Since the descent of Prince NINGI about 1,752,470 years ago, we have unobtrusively lived in Eastern Japan, and have there, developed our culture and promoted justice, etc." Since then, for a period of 2,600 years, the history of Japan shows that she has unobtrusively developed her culture and promoted justice only within the Orient Asia Sphere.

In keeping with divine policy, the authority of the Emperor has been restrained while Japan has fully absorbed foreign culture. Throughout this time, she has been earnestly awaiting the fulfillment of her destiny.

If a philosophic view is taken of world conditions today, it is evident that the time for that fulfillment has come. This Holy War can be said to be something greater than the Eastern Expedition of Emperor Jimmu, that is, this is the prelude to the opening of the Rock Cave.

(TN: The opening of the Rock Cave is an allusion taken from Japanese mythology. According to the legendary account, the Sun Goddess hid in a cave after being insulted by her brother. This plunged the whole world into darkness and the evil deities become active. Then she was finally persuaded to come out of the cave by the good deities and the universe was again enlightened. The modern analogy is that the world is again in darkness, and Japan's mission is to bring light once more to a world overcome with evil.) If the Japanese polity is fully interpreted, this is the only possible conclusion.
Today, for this reason, our national polity should be clarified and shown to the world. I firmly believe that the time has come to advocate permanent world peace and world co-prosperity.

This is the real purpose of the present war — the basic idea behind the establishment of the New Order. It is the mission of the Japanese people. "KOKUTAI HITOHO" today is the motivating force of World Restoration.

With this stupendous task confronting the Japanese people, it should be clear to you how you must be prepared to meet any internal or external emergency. It is undoubtedly necessary to undertake a complete reform of our national polity. However, the foreign materialistic reforms of the past cannot accomplish this purpose. Rather, they tend to obscure the national polity.

Section 4

In the past, I have resided in foreign countries for a long time and have associated with all classes of people — intelligentsia, proletariat, students, etc. — and I have found the Japanese to be superior to all foreigners. Physical characteristics such as flat nose and yellow skin matter little, since these are due to the influences of weather, custom and food. They naturally cannot be taken as standards. The value of man lies in his soul. The soul is invisible, but it is in evidence whenever a crisis occurs. On the battle field, where risk of life is great, the existence of the soul is especially evident. In this war, the Japanese spirit has been thoroughly displayed everywhere.

Through numerous praiseworthy deeds and miracles on the field of battle and the homefront the Japanese people have admirably proven they are a superior race unequalled in this world. If the Japanese conform to their inherent nature, they inevitably will be endowed with the divine blessing of Providence. Those who do not believe in Providence are not true Japanese. And if we do not receive the divine blessing, it is because we are acting contrary to the national polity.

"KOKUTAI HITOHO" on the homefront is very important. The duty of the Japanese on the homefront is primarily to clarify the national polity. Lately, there have been many who favor using the Diet to assist the Emperor, and advocate assistance to Imperial Rule. Regrettably, there are still some who do not comprehend the true significance of Imperial Rule. It is Imperial Rule when the Emperor graciously presides over the government. In America, where Roosevelt assumes the reins of government, it is simply politics. The two forms of government differ in essence and significance. There is a basic difference between the essence of foreign governments and the significance of the Imperial Rule of Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL
The benevolent rule of His Majesty, The Emperor, is not only bestowed upon Japan itself, but extends to all mankind. This is the reason why it is defined as "The Divine Mission". You are to assist in this Divine "mission"; so, as Japanese, you must have a superior mental attitude. If you were to employ a foreign political ideology to assist this "Divine Mission," it will be merely an exercise of the privilege of suffrage.

The basic principle of Imperial Rule is that it be extended over the earth. Therefore, since you are to assist in this, it must take on a deeper significance. But comprehending its essence, there are some who have lost their interest in assisting the Imperial Rule.

The present Greater East Asia War is the Divine Will of God. The time has come now to open the Rock Cave on this earth. Japan, during this war, is able to nurture her strength and spirit, while materialistic foreign countries are faced with decline. That is natural since, from a materialistic viewpoint, war exhausts a nation's strength. Therefore, the longer the war is prolonged, the greater will be the difference between the strength of our country and that of foreign countries, until finally the stage will probably be reached where their only hope will be to respectfully request the sovereignty of His Majesty, The Emperor, the Incarnation of God.

The Japanese must not view this war materialistically. This Holy War is not a war of men and materials. If this war is fought on a basis of material strength alone, the attrition of war will exhaust friend and foe alike, and eventually all mankind will be prostrate. But if there should be a race of people who have a true God presiding over them, and who are fighting a holy war in his name, these noble people will inevitably be bestowed with the Divine Blessing of Providence. Therefore, there will be a marked difference in the national strength of countries which are guided by God and those which are not. The race which is fighting under the guidance of God must be Japan. Otherwise, there would be no justification for the sanctification of the Japanese national polity. In this light our national polity should be thoroughly understood by all Japanese.

When Emperor JINSAI went on a punitive expedition to Ida, the rebel resistance was strong. Moreover, many of his soldiers fell ill, and Prince TKHEI was pathetically killed in action. Even the Emperor himself became sick and underwent terrible hardships. At this point he solemnly offered supplication to the Gods of Heaven and Earth, and as a result he was able to successfully conclude the expedition against Ida without having to depend on arms.
In order to conclude the war successfully, we must first follow the historical example of Emperor KAME N and offer supplication.

The Emperor is the incarnation of God, and is the personification of the Sun Goddess, MAKUAKAN. Therefore, if the Japanese people worship their Emperor, they are, in reality, worshipping God.

If the proper state of mind is developed to perfection, the spiritual and materialistic aspects of the war will take care of themselves; the internal structure of Japan will be strengthened and the New World Order will be firmly established. Each nation will have its place under the sun, and for the first time a permanent peace and security will be assured all mankind.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shosaburo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: 2nd Class Secretary of Home Ministry and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 272 pages, dated June, 1942, and described as follows: "GENERAL Magazine"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 7th day of Jan., 1947. /s/ Kosaburo Shibata
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis
2nd Class Secretary of Home Ministry
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, J. A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 7th day of Jan., 1947 /s/ J. A. Curtis 2d. Lt. E,
NAME

Witness: /s/ F. H. Lush
Investigator JPS
Official Capacity
最近の欧米の経済状況は非常に良い。わが国においても、戦時中の急激な経済の発展が続いている。

しかし、戦後の復興に向けた課題も存在する。特に、労働力の不足と原材料の供給問題が懸念されている。

政府は、この問題に対応するために、労働力の増加策を検討している。また、資源の調達も重要である。

一方、欧州における経済成長は停滞している。このため、わが国と欧州の経済関係は今後も重要な課題となるでしょう。


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民衆に申し上げる。全人類のためと民衆の安全を護るために戦場に立てば、日本は平和を求める国同盟締結の意を貫く。全世界に降臨の Anthropic と宣言し、現神皇の再統合と共に従属の日本が再統合の気候を笑顔を包む。環環相乗に降臨の日本を、各日本二十六年九モの問首書に起立を求めて連絡した。新日本との不滅を今こそ。全体に外国の文化を築き起すべき天運循環時節到り。"
No. 7

Dec. 24 27
DIAGNOSIS OF THE
JAPAN-CR: AXIS-ALLIES

by
SHIBA, Toshio
Special advisor to the Foreign Ministry

Nazi Series

Publishers
ARE
I am presenting to my friends these various lectures I have given all over the country and which have appeared in newspapers and magazines since my return to Japan last autumn. They are here organized under one cover for publication.

Seen in today's light, they constitute opinions which might well be revised and since in the light of later facts there are several chapters that are false, I should perhaps be ashamed to offer this to the public as it stands.

However, it required considerable "courage" for me to offer them at the time I returned in an atmosphere in which such ideas were being ridiculed by certain groups saying "Is it not like making a landing in the face of the enemy?" Seen from such an historical viewpoint, this may still have some reference value.

However, now that the Tripartite Alliance has become a reality, we should of course not wander aimlessly over particulars of the past. The worldwide significance of this Alliance, particularly as regards the new view of the world and the New Order which is to govern human society in the future, requires profound explanation. It is hoped through such efforts by constant persons these results will one after another be achieved in the world. I shall be happy if this book results in presenting a small beginning to that end in the future.

SHPATOH, Toshio

November 1940
"DI CISION OF THE
JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY AXIS",

I
The Necessity
of
THE JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY ALLIANCE

(December 1939)
Before we discuss present foreign policies, we must first know the fact that the world is now on the eve of a great revolution. The last world war was not fought as the result of a conflict between new powers and old ones, but countries of similar character determined their attitude toward the war according to old ideas about their respective circumstances and interests. Therefore, countries that were basically unable to cooperate fought on the same side. A conspicuous example is that Japan and Italy took sides with the old powers including Britain, the United States, and France. However, the Versailles Treaty reversed the course of history and returned the order of the world to that of one or two centuries ago, thus stimulating the rise of new powers. Japan's launching of her continental policies, and Italy's and Germany's completion of their totalitarian systems are evidence of this. It first these new powers could not be said to have awakened to their common mission, but, as the old powers, from the instinct of self-preservation, showed a tendency to combination and establishment of a united front, the new powers were inevitably compelled to cooperate with each other. Such is the present situation of the world.

Hitherto, the two sides have been distinguished as have-not nations and have-not nations. This is quite right, for most of the rising nations have poor resources with living space confined to too narrow areas, and are greatly dissatisfied with existing conditions. However, if the desires of these countries were for mere improvement of their economic conditions, there would be no difference between the existing struggle and past international struggles for supremacy. However, I think we can find higher significance in the present opposition in the world.

Now all our people know that JAPAN's advance in the continent is not the result of a desire for mere material gain, but aims at the realization of the Japanese people's sacred ideal established at the time of the foundation of our nation. This is clearly shown in the phrase "the new order in East Asia." As is known, the concept of the national structures of JAPAN and Germany has something in common with the basic principle of the foundation of our empire. It is needless to say that the views of our Utopian Ideal may be called totalitarian notions regarding the universe and the state to form a firm contrast to those of so-called democratic nations, whose keynote is individualism. When we examine the present situation of the world divided into two powers, the new and the old, we must focus our attention on the conflict of these ideas.

For, probably the most controversial problem is the attitude of SOVIET UNION. Communism's view of the universe is on the same plane as that of democracy and is utterly inconsistent with the totalitarian view of the world. Therefore, we can say that the formation of the so-called
popular front will materialize. If the SWIFT '15', however, sticks to the
Russian sphere, close cooperation between it and the totalitarian
countries will be very difficult to achieve. On the other hand, the SWIFT
forces have concluded a sort of alliance and formed a united front against
the old powers. If this cooperation really develops out of common interests, we cannot find much significance in it from
the viewpoint of world history. Very important it is, however, if it
means on the one hand, the SWIFT '15' s conversion of its former
design for world revolution through coercion, and on the other hand, the
ideology which would lead to a gradual transformation into a totalitarian
state with a national structure similar to that of the 'Y' and 'F' >. To
must watch future developments most carefully.

When we stand the matter from the viewpoint of world history, we can
at the same time also view it from a different angle, though it is related
to the foregoing. The growth of human beings shows a consistent trend
towards its more profound. It is, however, that this is due mainly
to economic necessity on the other hand, the totalitarian view of life
naturally must stimulate this tendency. The intention of forming an
'advocacy bloc' of JAPAN, ITALY, and CHINA is caused for

demand for life. For the Italian origin of establishing a great empire on the
Mediterranean Sea will be attributed to the same cause. As is well
known, 'SWIFT' gave up its traditional principle of free trade and
the principle of bloc-cooperation with the contraction of the OTTOMA
agreement. To treat regard the founding of the principle of free trade, or having
by an accepted by economic necessity to adopt in part the utilization
principle of totalitarianism. The fact that while imposing the principle
of bloc-cooperation and self-determination of FRANCE, ENGLAND, and ITALY, POLITICALLY
hierarchy is obviously imposed, it in a national structure when her
position extremely weak.

If SWIFT', 'ENGLAND, 'FRANCE', and others rich to maintain their
imperial economic sphere which they then have, are not prepared to end, if it is not proper for them to impose that a superior race
has no less bare to the inferior, should hold no more country of the same
degree? The birth of a new world cannot be realized without this. This,
I believe, is the immediate problem confronting the world. To bring forth
this new world, such ideals as national rights of men, self-
determination, and sovereign rights of nations must be considered as
enforced and at the same time the so-called 'national isolated' should be
prevented to sacrifice themselves. To cut it short, the world hitherto
has been divided into six old nations, each insisting upon the
absolutes of national rights, which has led all the more to
extinction of the growth and development of human society. Roughly, the
The cooperation between J.P., U.S.A., and Italy, which seemed to have met with a hitch temporarily, still exists in a new form in the world of today, no matter whether it has taken the form of an alliance or not. The Russo-German pact did not exist in this axis, but, on the contrary,
helped strengthen its international position. It is important that the isolation of JAPAN once rumored abroad and which Japanese people themselves were concerned about was after all nothing but the result of an imperfect grasp of the law of history and a lack of confidence.

Therefore, not only is it unnecessary for JAPAN to change any of her program for establishing the new order in East Asia, but now she need not hesitate in extending and completing them.

The new order of East Asia is linked with the new order of the world. The new order cannot be realized in one part of the world alone, if the rest of the world adheres to the old order, or goes back in the opposite direction. It seems that JAPAN is going to withdraw utterly from the problems of EUROPE and make efforts to settle the GATT incident. Unable to understand and explain correctly the phenomena which cropped up one after another throughout EUROPE, she disposed them with the single comment "Complicated and incomprehensible". This amounts to nothing more than seeking refuge in the popular but common policy of devoting herself in the future entirely to the problems of CHINA. Moreover, the present situation of the world does not merit such an evasion. Problems of JAPAN are inevitably those of EUROPE and AMERICA. A bold and brave foreign policy for new JAPAN should be established in a dignified manner and should display understanding of the international political situation which is now at a turning-point in world history.
II

THE EUROPEAN WAR

and

The attitude of JAPAN

In address in November, 1939
Before I started to JAPAN, every one in JAPAN talked of totalitarianism and of an anti-Communist axis. Very people thought that the relationship among JAPAN, JAPAN, and ITALY did not and surely in the anti-Comintern Pact, but that this relationship could be further strengthened. One of the reasons is probably that the people themselves keenly felt, in the light of recent international relations, that the settlement of the CHINA Incident could be of much to JAPAN and ITALY. Before I left JAPAN, I observed a rather widespread feeling among the people that it could, therefore, be said that the anti-Comintern relationship could further be intensified. Further developments into a military alliance. In regard to the conclusion of a generally unconditional military alliance of JAPAN, ITALY, and CHINA, it was distinctly recognized that the people in general desired an "alliance," the type of alliance being a secondary matter. Therefore, I left for ITALY with the thought of doing my utmost part in this matter.

JAPAN, however, seemed to be for the settlement of the CHINA Incident by cooperating with the BALTIC Pact. Such being the attitude of JAPAN, JAPAN, and ITALY began to mistrust JAPAN on this point and, finally giving up JAPAN, cent as far as the 1939 NON-AGGRESSION Pact. As there is not enough time to explain in detail the circumstances which led to this Treaty, and as it also seems somewhat improper to make them all frankly known, I am going to omit this part. However, I can affirm here the indirect fact that JAPAN also seem responsible and should indulge in introspection for the course which led to conclusion of the 1939 NON-AGGRESSION Pact.

It is generally considered that JAPAN betrayed JAPAN, and is treacherous, but in my opinion, JAPAN neither betrayed JAPAN nor was guilty of treachery. Considering the circumstances leading to her action, she cannot be called GERMANY treacherous. For, Germany adhered closely with the SOVIET UNION, contrary to the spirit of the Anti-Communist Pact which was clearly drawn mutually advantageous to both JAPAN and herself. Furthermore, since this was a step nearer to an alliance and not a mere non-aggression treaty, it seems possible that GERMANY's feeling toward ITALY will become cool. However, the truth is quite the opposite. I can state as an absolute fact that GERMANY, in spite of her alliance with the U.S.S.R., is now still offering JAPAN her friendship as profound as ever. Of course ITALY has no reason to change her feeling toward JAPAN, she still feels of exceedingly friendly as ever. Moreover, the relation between ITALY and JAPAN is not at all aggravated by this Non-aggression Pact. The fact is that ITALY preferred a GERMANY-U.S.S.R. Non-aggression, and
The JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Axis, therefore, has not really undergone a change even today. However, JAPAN seems to think GERMANY in some way betrayed her, and that the latter's alliance with the COISTS UNION is suspect. In view of the international situation in which JAPAN stands today, and from practical necessity, it is desirable that JAPAN cooperate with GERMANY and also go hand in hand with ITALY. However, the general sentiment of JAPAN seems to be that she cannot again put out her once-rejected hand to GERMANY. Nevertheless, the bias of JAPAN is such that the relationship between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY can be brought back again to the past not only in form but in fact.

The GERMANY-U.S.S.R. Pact, concluded in this way, is not due to GERMANY's ill will against JAPAN and GERMANY alone must not be denounced for a betrayer. Then, I feel we must consider coolly whether the conclusion of this RUSSO-GERMAN Pact is advantageous to JAPAN or not. The first fruit of the GERMANY-U.S.S.R. Pact is the current BALTIC Pact for against GERMANY. If the GERMANY-U.S.S.R. Pact not been concluded, GERMANY would probably not have adopted such a strong policy. It may be said that the GERMANY-U.S.S.R. Pact was a direct incentive to this war.

I do not blindly consider the present war in EUROPE as being a divine tempest or providential help for JAPAN. However, I firmly believe that the fact that this war has broken out can be developed in favour of JAPAN according to her aims and policies.

Further, it was generally believed that with the conclusion of the RUSSO-CETN Pact, the U.S.S.R. would be able to turn all her energies towards the FRENCH since she would feel secure in the west, and, consequently, JAPAN would be more subjected to her pressure. However, we find the facts to be the contrary. The U.S.S.R. at present desires to adjust the relationship between herself and JAPAN. In fact, the WINTER CONCE-PEACE agreement has already been concluded. It seems that on such matters as the delimitation of the border, or the new commercial treaty, or the problem of concessions, the negotiations are progressing steadily. In one way or another, we can recognize the fact that the sentiment of the U.S.S.R. is becoming favourable towards JAPAN. In all likelihood, they are even ready to conclude a non-aggression treaty, if JAPAN wishes to do so. It is my strong belief that she is even prepared to stop her assistance to CHINA and the CHING K'I-CHEK regime. At present, they are trying to
re the Comintern Party and the CHINESE Communist Party. It seems to be that the U.S.A. lost hope in CHIA FENG HSI and her effort to reunite them is for the purpose of preventing the CHINESE Communist Party from becoming involved in the danger of a common ruin with the National Party.

If it be true, her object is important fact that, as a result of the conclusion of the JAPANESE-CHINESE joint communiqué, the relations between JAPAN and the U.S.A. have been improved. From this point of view, I feel the conclusion of the JAPANESE-CHINESE joint communiqué is definitely not disadvantageous to JAPAN. Furthermore, I think, various advantages will probably accrue to JAPAN from this relationship. For instance, in a result of the increased CHINA's and BRITAIN's influence, due to the conclusion of the JAPANESE-CHINESE joint communiqué, BRITAIN today cannot support CHIANG KAI-SHEK and exert pressure on JAPAN. In short, the disappearance of the U.S.A.'s pressure has greatly relieved JAPAN. The position of JAPAN has become stable. Consequently, we can say that BRITAIN is at her wit's end.

The same thing may be said about AMERICA. I think, AMERICA is not very anxious about JAPAN's rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. With BRITAIN, AMERICA always hopes for deterioration of JAPANESE-AMERICAN relations. This is because she fears JAPAN's position in the Far East will be strengthened. If JAPAN were to fight with the U.S.S.R., she would have to relax her control of construction in CHINA. They hope that JAPAN will find it necessary to give up CHINA. The possibility of a compromise between JAPAN and the SOVIET UNION is truly annoying to them. The reason why AMERICA suddenly recognized the U.S.S.R. after sixteen years' refusal is this: after the outbreak of the MANCHURIAN Incident, JAPAN would not listen to AMERICA in any matter, and, moreover, AMERICA can do hardly anything to JAPAN. The U.S.S.R. is the only country within reach of JAPAN. Therefore, AMERICA adopted a policy of lending money, supplying materials, and furnishing technical exports to the U.S.S.R. in order to make her powerful so that JAPAN could not press JAPAN.

The above policy has worked successfully, and the relation between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R. has been aggravated until today. Since JAPAN has now been exhausting her national strength in the CHINA Incident and her relations with the SOVIET UNION are strained, we may come at any time. BRITAIN's attitude towards JAPAN is as firm as ever. If, in addition, AMERICA should press JAPAN, it is thought that JAPAN would be entirely defeated. It was due to such ideas that AMERICA abandoned the Commercial Treaty.
However, if JAPAN felt secure in her relations with the U.S.S.R., even the abandonment of the Commercial Treaty would not cause her to waver the slightest bit. AMERICA must regret for that her trick proved disappointing. Therefore, she is greatly concerned about the possibility of conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R. when their relationship improves, and she desires to prevent it one way or another. At present, as the public opinion of JAPAN is not yet perfectly united in that respect, AMERICA thinks that by taking a rather firm stand, JAPAN may give up her relationship with the U.S.S.R., so GERMAN will probably follow that course. Therefore, AMERICA will continue to show such an attitude for a while in the Commercial Treaty and in the GERMANY Incident. However, we must not thoughtlessly be taken in by that; whatever attitude they may take, we need not fear. We should carry out our policy independently.

Thus, JAPAN's present diplomatic position in the world is being wholly improved, no anxiety is felt at present in regard to the U.S.S.R., and the pressure from BULGARIA and the UNITED STATES is diminishing. In a word, we owe this to the RUSSO-GERMAN Treaty.

For all that, there prevail expressions and feelings among the JAPANESE people to the effect that AMERICA is suspect for shaking hands with the U.S.S.R., that GERMANY is being dragged round by the U.S.S.R.'s policy and that should the war be prolonged, GERMANY could be beaten for lack of money. I think this must be quite disagreeable to GERMANY. At any rate, such a way of thinking has discerned the path JAPAN should take in the future. It is because they are thus basically wrong in their thinking, that they do not know what to do.

In the first place, regarding the events leading to the conclusion of the RUSSO-GERMAN Treaty, we must not only take many of the conditions of GERMANY into consideration, but from the point of view of world history, the cooperation between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R. was necessary and this would have been similarly achieved, I think, even if an alliance among JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY had been concluded. JAPAN, as well as GERMANY, would have done so. Furthermore, this is not in unison step, for after concluding a JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance, we could further cooperate with the U.S.S.R. I believe it proper that we confront the SOVIET UNION with the power of three countries and cooperate with her under advantageous conditions for JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY, respectively.

At the beginning of July, 1929, I definitely submitted the above opinion to the Government.
In short, it is no wonder that the PERSO-GERMAN Pact was concluded, and
that the Germans prepared for JAPAN. Therefore, JAPAN has no reason
to feel dis affected with GERMANY. I think we must not forget the good
will shown to JAPAN by GERMANY and others during the CHINA Incident.
The present, under present international relationships, the JAPANESE
people must not be so naive as to be mainly guided by sentiment. I
cannot insist that JAPAN be good to us during the CHINA Incident, so should be
duly moved by it and not rely then on narrow discrimination.
If original JAPAN, however, is moved by it, it might be to JAPAN.
However, under the present international conditions, if such totalitarian countries
as GERMANY, ITALY, and others which are trying to crush the old world
order and to construct a new one, were defeated by the democratic
countries of GREAT BRITAIN, UNITED STATES, and others, JAPAN,
would be considered an aggressor. If they win again, the result will
not be as simple as that of the last PERSO-SIBERIAN Conference. I am sure that
they would force JAPAN to withdraw her army from CHINA, to return MANCHURIA and,
furthermore, to get out of R.C.E. and FRANCE. They would probably even
insist that the whole JAPAN may be sunk off OASKA Island. Such
is quite obvious.

However, if GERMANY really is unable to defeat ENGLAND and FRANCE,
it is needless to say that JAPAN must think the matter over deeply.
It would be unfortunate, but we cannot support those who are destined
to be defeated. However, as for my forecast on this war, I simply
cannot believe that GERMANY will be beaten again this time.

In the first place, will GERMANY continue this war by herself to
the last? No, JAPAN will join the war, and, I am quite sure, on the
side of GERMANY. Besides, her relations with the U.S.S.R. are not as
weak and uncertain as people think, and the SOVIET doubters will in
practice give worthless assistance to her, even without declaring war.
In the present situation, such neutral countries as the Balkans will
prefer to take the side of GERMANY after all. Might not others such as TURKEY, coerced by the
joint forces of GERMANY, ITALY and the U.S.S.R.,
be estranged from ENGLAND and FRANCE? ENGLAND will also side with GERMANY.
In short, quite contrary to the time of the last war, I believe, in short, quite contrary to the time of the last war, I believe, in short, quite contrary to the time of the last war, I believe, that no country will be an ally of Britain and France. Just as the ITALIAN people are quick at business, the small countries in Europe are very sensitive to the power of the large powers: countries or to the tone and movements of the big powers, so that their attitudes can be the barometer of the real abilities of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The sure fact that the small countries are observing a strict neutrality, contrary to the time of the last war, illustrates the disadvantages of Britain and France.

Moreover, this time Germany, contrary to the previous time, is avoiding exhaustion as much as possible. It is not three months since the outbreak of the war, and she has not yet engaged in what might be called a war of attrition. This is due to the SHIPPED Line. Shutting themselves up in that fortress, the Germans have an elastic position; that is, whenever the battle is promising, they emerge, but if not, they retreat from their fortress position without using up any materials, no matter how many months and years it may take. Moreover, the back routes of food supply are quite unrestricted today; that is, the backyard has been enlarged. Besides, the materials reserved by Germany this time are quite a great deal more restricted in the last time. She also has a good stock of munitions. If she is not attacked and she has many more supply routes than last time, all these things are advantageous to her. Also, her political and economic structure is just suitable to a prolonged war. She is quite confident of victory whether it be in a war of nerves or of endurance.

In addition to all these, the great development of her air forces greatly restrict the action of the British naval power. Powers of submarines are also greatly improved. It must be pointed out that the old navy is no more invincible in urgent-day EUROPE. If Italy and then Britain should join the war, it would be a serious affair for Britain. There would be great danger of her defeat not only in the mere endurance contest, but also in the actual war.

Under such circumstances, Germany today will never be defeated, even under the worst possible conditions. Therefore, we reach the conclusion that there will be no great danger, if Japan, today, does show good-will to Britain and fights on her side. Furthermore, if the countries that are trying to establish a new order in EUROPE should not be able to win, it would be impossible for the Japanese people to construct a new order in Asia. Generally speaking, the old order in EUROPE and ASIA is represented by Britain and France. If the countries
that are endeavouring to maintain this old order cannot be defeated, a new order cannot be established either in the Occident or in the Orient. JT/IT and IT/IT are all countries whose mission it is to build in cooperation the new world order. Even without concluding a treaty, the aim of the three powers is one.

The GERMANS used to say, "By no means do we ask for IT/IT to come and help us in EUROPE. She has her own mission to carry out. Her obligation to a treaty would be discharged by destroying the old order and establishing a new one in IT/IT. Purging British power from IT/IT by any means is actually what we would expect from IT/IT as her duty in this Treaty. We require nothing more than that." As long as IT/IT carries out that obligation, there is really no need for an alliance and the like. They want IT/IT to fight solely for the establishment of a new order in IT/IT and move on towards the settlement of the CUB Incident with a firm resolve never to compromise with the old powers or make concessions to them.
This is to wit, the position of JAPAN and the duty of JAPAN whether or not GERMANY and JAPAN conclude an alliance. We need not involve ourselves in the war in EUROPE. Japan's rushing forward to a solution in the true sense of the word of the CHINA Incident will result in her helping GERMANY. Furthermore, what GERMANY is doing at present will in effect aid in the settlement of the CHINA Incident. At present no one in JAPAN has any objections to the establishment of a new order in EAST ASIA. Therefore, I believe the only necessary and adequate policy is for JAPAN to exert her utmost to carry it out successfully by embracing it and insisting upon it.

However hard she may exert herself for the establishment of new order in CHINA, there is a limit to JAPAN's power. She has engaged in a war of attrition in the CHINA Incident for more than two years now. JAPAN must avoid as much as possible the waging of an even larger scale war, in order to conserve her national resources and to make provisions for the great efforts to come. Furthermore, I think that only in a war with the SOVIET UNION will JAPAN be liable to a war of attrition. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. wants to compromise with JAPAN and widen her hands of the FAR EAST. There is an opportunity for her again to take part in EUROPE. A chance has come for her to play an active part to the west and south of EUROPE. Under these circumstances, it is ridiculous for her to be hostile with JAPAN and keep large forces in the FAR EAST. She hopes, therefore, to conclude immediately a non-aggression Treaty or the like, and withdraw. For JAPAN, it is an excellent foreign policy which should be begun first of all.

To set the U.S.S.R. at ease in the FAR EAST will be a great factor, I believe, to make the EUROPEAN War more active. The U.S.S.R., with the force to be withdrawn from the FAR EAST, may emerge in the NEAR EAST or the PERSIAN GULF. Probably GERMANY expects it and the U.S.S.R. hopes for it. Furthermore, it would be a great menace to BRITAIN. In such a case, GERMANY would feel secure and ITALY might join the war earlier than we expected at first. Thus the war would become a real one. However, as the situation stands now, when neither GERMANY nor the U.S.S.R. can exert themselves sufficiently in EUROPE, ITALY will remain neutral for the time being.

And some day, if and when BRITAIN finds out that the chances of winning are against her, she might probably propose peace. GERMANY, to the present day, has always been prepared for such a thing. They, if the war should not continue to the last, and if it should end in reconciliation, an international conference would be sure to be held. JAPAN would take part in it, and the U.S.A.
would, too. If in JAPAN's policy toward GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, she neither compromises nor cooperates, and in her policy toward GERMANY, ITALY and the U.S.S.R., she does not make concessions, and if she follows the so-called independent policy and makes no friends, JAPAN will be completely isolated in this peace conference.

Although we do not know when such peace will come, there is no war without reconciliation. We also do not know whether peace will come early or late, but it may come sooner than we expect. It may end in a draw without surrender on either side. In that case, if JAPAN is isolated, the problems of the East will be sacrificed and the settlement of problems of other areas will be accomplished in the sacrifice of ASIA. Therefore, I think that today we should not affirm the autonomous policy of JAPAN's diplomacy or press forward in the CHINA Incident, but should first of all readjust relations with GERMANY and ITALY and build friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. Moreover, there is neither danger nor insecurity for JAPAN by so doing. It is my firm conviction that by this the road to achievement of our mission of establishing the new order in EAST ASIA will be opened.

There are many things which confirm my conclusion, but having no time to explain them in detail, I shall omit them.

In fine, the SOVIET-GERMAN coalition has been achieved. Accordingly, since the European War has broken out, it is certain that JAPAN's international position has become very advantageous, and it would improve increasingly if only the government does not adopt wrong policy. It is necessary to utilize these favourable circumstances, make them better, and establish here on a solid foundation a great and far-sighted policy for the Far East. It is unthinkable that the people do not know what to do, although it is the rarest of opportunities. Above all else, the unification of national views is a pressing need. With that only can JAPANESE diplomacy return to its original course. Making the most of JAPAN's present favorable situation, I think we should exert our utmost for the nation to establish a permanent foundation.
The recent diplomacy of Japan, before I went abroad, was based on the Japan-Germany-Italy Anti-Comintern Axis, which the government constantly proclaimed and which all of the people believed. However, as the China Incident gradually progressed, the people in general realized that German and Italian aid to Japan was extremely effective so that the opinion came to be expressed that a further step should be taken to make it into a military alliance.

I think that the feeling of many people in Japan was in agreement with this. At any rate, I left Japan when praises for the German-Italian Anti-Comintern axis were being sung the loudest. I left for Italy with the feeling that I wanted to render some service in the matter by doing my humble best from abroad. The relationship between the other parties, Germany and Italy, has gradually assumed importance in Europe and they have come to recognize the great importance of tying up with Japan in the Orient. Of course, Germany and Italy also had the same, or stronger, feeling as Japan to strengthen the Japan-Germany-Italy coalition. Since both sides had the same feeling, I, too, had the hope of succeeding without much difficulty in the matter of a Japan-Germany-Italy military alliance. However, I sensed upon my arrival that there was considerable discrepancy between what Germany and Italy wanted and what Japan required. That is, there was a very widespread feeling to shake hands and compromise with Britain and America despite their interference with Japan in the China Incident. The only point upon which national opinion was agreed was that of relations with Soviet Russia. In regard to Russia, a great many people openly said that she was Japan's enemy. Accordingly, the limit to which Japanese Cabinet decisions could agree was a Japan-Germany-Italy military alliance aimed chiefly at the U.S.S.R.
However, upon going to GERMANY and ITALY, I found their views as regards this aim of the treaty were slightly different. For example, ITALY had no clash of interests with RUSSIA, and, moreover, since GERMANY's policy was to compromise with BRITAIN and FRANCE in the west and to turn exclusively to the east at a time when the JAPAN-GERMANY Anti-Comintern Pact had been concluded, GERMANY's eastern policy was gradually making headway. GERMANY made Anschluss with AUSTRIA, dismembered CZECHOSLOVAKIA next, and then, when trying to settle the Polish question, her path was at this point obstructed by BRITAIN and FRANCE. Shall we call it destiny or traditional treacle that not until after western problems are solved, can GERMANY's eastern policy be settled? GERMANY was again confronted with this fact. Therefore, GERMANY may either combine with JAPAN to attack the SOVIET UNION or else her eastern policy of aiming at eliminating the Soviet obstacle will suffer a serious set-back. Accordingly, the desideratum of a German-Italian coalition with JAPAN is not to attack the U.S.S.R., but to use us in dealing with BRITAIN and FRANCE who represent the old European powers. It is in this regard that they desire the cooperation of JAPAN. Since, on one hand, JAPAN desires to compromise with BRITAIN and FRANCE to prevent Soviet aggression in the Orient, there was considerable difference in feeling between them. Of course, in event of the outbreak of war between JAPAN and RUSSIA, both GERMANY and ITALY plan to aid JAPAN, but this was not their chief aim. This fundamental difference, I think, is the reason the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY alliance could not then be concluded.

It cannot be denied that in the CHINA question JAPAN gradually became clearly united against BRITAIN. The anti-British movements throughout the country relative to the TIENTSIN question clearly demonstrate this. Particularly at that time it was JAPAN's disposition to aim exclusively at the SOVIET UNION, but should not JAPAN alter that idea in the course of the CHINA question? In view of the inevitability of a clash between JAPAN and BRITAIN and the aforementioned attitude of GERMANY and ITALY, I felt that perhaps JAPAN should alter basically her former attitude. However, JAPAN's policy was still determined to aim at the U.S.S.R. Since it was the idea of influential quarters to compromise with ENGLAND if possible and in certain cases to be friendly with AMERICA, I thought that it would be extremely difficult to put my ideas into practice.

In short, GERMANY, unlike JAPAN, has BRITAIN and FRANCE as their chief objects instead of U.S.S.R. I could have asserted that although GERMANY would fight the U.S.S.R. if absolutely necessary, she took the old powers of democracy as the greatest hindrance. But since the circumstances within the country were as I have mentioned before, I submitted to the Government my opinion
that Germany would inevitably ally with the U.S.S.R., only if Japan hesitated to contract this alliance. However, a nation-wide anti-British movement broke out with respect to the TIENTSIN problem. And as I saw that this was supported by the whole Japanese nation, I thought that it was no time to hesitate and in early July I notified the Government twice in details as follows:

"Germany and Italy are not contemplating a war against the USSR. If the Government is going to conclude a Treaty on the assumption that war will be waged against USSR, the idea had better be given up. I believe the intention of Germany and Italy is to draw Russia to their side after concluding an Alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy. In order to establish a new order in China today, we must drive out from China the old order which is represented by Britain. Therefore, I believe that Japan should conclude a treaty as soon as possible with Germany and Italy in opposition to Britain and France, and furthermore, for her to confront the USSR with the combined powers of Japan, Germany and Italy; with the aid of Russia we can their hands off of the East; to have USSR stop the aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and to have USSR withdraw the troops from the MANCHURIAN-Soviet border, and gradually effect the solution of the pending problems favorably. I believe that this policy is best suited to the occasion for Japan."

At this moment if we do not conclude an alliance with Germany and Italy, Germany will probably go with USSR. Moreover, it is drawing near. It is not the time for hesitation. If Japan tried to solve the problem between her and USSR after the alliance between Germany and USSR has been concluded, wouldn't things become unfavorable for Japan as the situation will have changed by that time?"

But the Government of course was unable to from the beginning give thought to my opinion, because they had in view a treaty for fighting with USSR, whereas I was in favor of a treaty for making peace with her -- an idea very different from the original one. Moreover, it was in the midst of all that heated public opinion of the whole nation against GREAT BRITAIN on the occasion of the TIENTSIN Incident that the Anglo-Japanese Conference at Tokyo was held. And, strange to say, GREAT BRITAIN made concession to Japan. In the vicinity of TIENTSIN, the Englishmen were subjected to great insults in full view of the world. The old Premier CHAMBERLAIN also made a remark at the Parliament to the effect that his blood was boiling with indignation. The very next moment GREAT BRITAIN made a great concession. What is more, it came to the knowledge of the German Foreign Minister from a reliable source that the Japanese Government promised to GREAT BRITAIN that they
would under no circumstances generalize the Tripartite Treaty, on condition that she should make a concession to JAPAN in CHINA.

Now GERMANY and ITALY were of the opinion that the policy adopted by JAPAN on the continent since the Manchurian Incident had for its object the destruction of the old order in the EAST and the establishment of a new order in its place; in other words, that it was JAPAN's continental policy to overthrow first in the EAST the status quo of the world established by the VERSAILLES Treaty and then the VERSAILLES order which in the East is expressed as the WASHINGTON Order is what JAPAN is trying to overthrow. They believe that the Manchurian Incident, the renunciation of the Naval Disarmament Pact, the establishment of a new order in CHINA now in question are all directed to that object. Therefore, nothing seemed to them to be more natural that JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY should enter into an alliance to overthrow the old order of the world in concert. They little dreamed of difficulty in the negotiation. They looked upon that treaty as all too natural and a matter of course. But the negotiations dragged on, until at last in June they came into possession of a report that JAPAN was going to make terms with GREAT BRITAIN, her enemy nation, greatly to their astonishment. Besides, this situation was brought about immediately after nation-wide anti-British movement. I suppose that JAPAN's actions and her national feelings must have struck them as strange and complex.

Such being the case, an impression grew with the Germans that they could expect little support from JAPAN, that they could not expect JAPAN's help in setting up against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE. On the other hand, in connection with the DANZIG problem, they realized that the relations between GERMANY and GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE were strained to the breaking point. At that time GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE tried to win USSR over to their side by sending their representatives to MOSCOW to negotiate for a treaty of alliance. It is no wonder that at the sight of these negotiations, ITALY felt restless. ITALY has a close treaty of alliance with GERMANY. If GERMANY could not join hands with JAPAN, and USSR should be gained over by GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, her enemies, ITALY would have to struggle between enemies on both sides.

It was natural that ITALY should feel alarmed, who shares the fate with GERMANY. I think it was not unnatural even if ITALY had proposed to GERMANY an interference in the alliance of GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE and USSR. If GERMANY is bound by the promise made with JAPAN, that is, the promise that the two nations must not conclude any non-aggression pact with the SOVIET UNION, and clarify her isolated position by merely looking on the current
European situation with folded arms, it would mean that she would
strange her only ally ITALY from herself. Furthermore, since
GERMANY obtained information that JAPAN was intending to shank hands
with GERMANY'S enemies, it is only proper that she should attempt
to make a speedy compromise with USSR. Moreover, GERMANY seems to
think that although JAPAN frequently speaks of the USSR, that which
was really obstructing the path of JAPAN in the EAST was not the
USSR, but GREAT BRITAIN. We assume that GERMANY may have thought
that if GERMANY should now conclude a non-aggression treaty with
the USSR, then the result will be that BRITAIN'S position in the
EAST will be weakened which JAPAN would eventually realize. Such
being the case, hence, the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact was
concluded at the end of August. This Non-aggression Pact, however,
was not made in a day. As early as 1938, Fuehrer HITLER and others
began to refrain from using malicious language in speaking of the
USSR -- a thing which struck me strange. Therefore, the inner
side of the USSR began to approach GERMANY and ITALY, that is to
say, that the USSR began to hold out her hand to the Anti-Comintern
Axis. Towards April this year, Foreign Minister PIRKENMAYR
positively declared to us that if JAPAN would not enter into
alliances with GERMANY, they must combine with the USSR; and that,
if JAPAN would ally, they could offer 100% cooperation, while, if
not, that she could offer 50% cooperation. Of course, this was
telegraphed to the Government, but, in JAPAN, it was said that we
have been threatened by GERMANY.

Such being the case, the RUSSO-GERMAN Treaty was concluded at
last. At that time the German authorities said that they felt
deply regrettable and that they should have had JAPAN'S understand-
ing beforehand, but if they had said such thing to JAPAN, it would
surely appear in all the papers of the world within 48 hours. But
such cases have been experienced number of times in the past, they
were unable to notify JAPAN beforehand. They entreated us not to
think ill of this action. They violated the pact because they
adhered to legalities and formalities. They pleaded us not to say
that it was a branch of faith. In the pressing situation, it was
necessity that compelled them, so do not think ill of them. They
assured us that their feelings towards JAPAN today have not changed
the least. They still hold expectations of bringing about intime:
of the relations between the two nations. They have often and
repeatedly suggested to JAPAN to compromise with the USSR, and if
JAPAN is in that mood, they will offer their services as mediator.
In short, as I have stated in the beginning this may be enough to
confirm the supposed intention that GERMANY has no thought of
fighting the USSR and when the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY alliance is
found, GERMANY had in mind to attract the USSR into this camp.

Soon after the Russo-German Treaty was concluded, ITALY also
greatly welcomed this treaty, stating that, by this no war will
break out in EUROPE, and that hereafter Russo-Japanese relations will improve and things will turn out very favorable to JAPAN. As to stay there, I could not conceive anything in impression that ITALY was disapproved of the Russo-German rapprochement or that she holds enmity against the USSR.

At any rate, it can be said that, in spite of the fact that the Russo-German Treaty had been concluded, even today, GERMANY and ITALY still attach great importance to the concert with JAPAN. Today, the relations between JAPAN and GERMANY and ITALY are apparently the same as before the conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact. The only thing is that the feelings of the Japanese people are somewhat vague. They have a feeling that they were somewhat betrayed by GERMANY. One of its reasons is as I have just stated that, on the one hand, lack of accurate knowledge on the part of the people in regard to the distribution of the Tripartite Treaty, and, on the other hand, of the various forces both internal and external, that have brought the treaty to a failure, we must admit that these various forces disfavoring the alliance worked to the superfluous power which succeeded in breaking off the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY alliance, further maneuvered to excite antipathy towards GERMANY. We should not forget that dispatches from foreign countries today are chiefly from such sources, and that they are desperately trying to impel Japanese public opinion more towards that direction.

There are some people who state that if the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance had been formed, would not JAPAN have been involved in the war in EUROPE? It is lucky that the alliance had not been formed, for the bare thought makes them shudder. However, I think that this is fundamentally a misconception. If the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance had taken shape, the current war might not have broken out. GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE would make a gradual diplomatic retreat and thus enable JAPAN in CHINA and GERMANY and ITALY in EUROPE, to solve their pending questions in a peaceful manner. GERMANY and ITALY have said from the beginning that the real aim of this treaty was for peace, and that since JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY are originally destined to share the same fate, they would be beaten, if divided, but could never be beaten if the were united. They further said that since the alliance was of a spiritual nature, and that although it shouldn't be said which nation will benefit mostly by it, it is necessary to display to the public the real effect of the Alliance, and so they would bogi by assisting JAPAN now actually fighting in CHINA so as to bring the CHINA Incident to a speedy conclusion. They said that with this they demonstrate the true value and power of the Alliance to the general public.
I believe, therefore, that had the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance been realized by about April this year, the results would have been very favourable to JAPAN. Of course, such as the MUKDEN Incident would not have taken place, nor could have GREAT BRITAIN assumed a bold front concerning the DANZIG problem.

Even if GERMANY should attempt a speedy solution of her problems in EUROPE, and should she go to war against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, it would have been possible for JAPAN to obtain GERMANY's consent to her neutrality, in case her immediate entry into the current war was inconvenient. It had been arranged that in the event a Triple Alliance is formed, the Foreign Ministers of the three powers would simultaneously meet together to discuss the diplomatic politics of the three powers. Probably, on that occasion, they would have discussed the USR, CHINA, DANTZIG and POINTE problems, and JAPAN could have had a great voice in connection with the German and Italian diplomatic politics. Should they undertake to war against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, JAPAN could have declared that they could not offer efficient support soon after the CHIN Incident, and that they can go ahead with it if they are confident of it. There are examples of ITALY maintaining neutrality at present in spite of her military alliance with GERMANY. I believe that it cannot always be said that if the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance had been formed, JAPAN must have entered into the war, whether she had been willing or not.

More than that, it should be more probable that, as previously stated, if the Triple Alliance had been formed, the war between GERMANY and GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE would not have broken out at that time. GERMANY and ITALY still have much to prepare for from diplomatic, economic, financial, and military points of view. In the first place, since it was necessary for JAPAN to have some rest after settling the CHIN Incident, the war would have been postponed as much as possible. The various powers would have decided upon war after complete military armaments had been provided after diplomatic relations have been bettered. I am inclined to say that it is an unfounded opinion to state that if triple Alliance had been formed, we would have been compelled to fight GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE amidst all the difficulties now confronting us.

In regard to the conclusion of the Russo-German Non-aggression Pact, there are not much for the German authorities to be blamed. As I have already mentioned, it had been rather for JAPAN to resist. Then, therefore, as the result of the conclusion of the Russo-German Alliance, I think we must also give consideration as to the influence received of this alliance. Of course, the general public opined that if GERMANY combined with the USR, the latter would likely concentrate all of her armed forces in the E.E. and which JAPAN must extremely suffer. We, also, feared this. However, in actuality, it was on the contrary, for we
believe that USSR's feelings towards JAPAN have turned favorable. The Cease-Fire Agreement at NOFON was readily concluded as if they had been waiting the proposal. In regard to our negotiations concerning the Border Delimiting Committee, Commercial Treaty, and other problems, they are willingly taking this up with JAPAN. Moreover, in my opinion, she is thinking of concluding a non-aggression pact with JAPAN. This, in my opinion, is that they have hitherto been shut out from EUROPE. But now a Non-aggression Pact has been concluded with GERMANY and I look at this Non-aggression Pact as something of a relationship to an alliance. As a result of this concert with GERMANY, it became so that they can now return to the WEST. They can now return to the BALTIC. In other words, this is not the time for them to glare antagonistically with the daring Japanese in the FAR EAST. They can now return to the WEST and SOUTH of EUROPE where they, also as a race, had cherished to go for many years. Moreover, they wish to compromise with JAPAN and be relieved of their anxieties in the FAR EAST. That is their desire. From this point of view, it had become so that one of the great factors which had obstructed JAPAN's settlement of the CHINA problems by rendering support to CHITANG Kai-shak could be removed immediately depending on JAPAN's determination.

Nextly, as a result of the Russo-German Pact, GERMANY attempted a speedy solution of the POLAND problem which caused the outbreak of the European War, but, I think that we cannot say it, unconditionally, that this war was a providential help, or "Divine Wind" for JAPAN. If JAPAN recognizes accurately the new and old forces in EUROPE thinking of it in terms, relating it to her fundamental policy of establishing a New Order in CHINA, and thus shuns her policies, I think the very war in EUROPE seen from JAPAN's standpoint is a providential help. Seeing from this point of view, I think the result of the Russo-German Treaty was favorable to us. And, although indirectly there is no denying that the Russo-German rapprochement improved greatly, JAPAN's position in her relations with GREAT BRITAIN, or with AMERICA.

Hitherto, not only have the UNITED STATES always been antagonistic towards JAPAN on the CHINA problem, but also went so far as to take positive measures, such as the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty between the USA and JAPAN. The reason, if asked, is that they suspected something exists behind the Anti-Comintern Axis, and that JAPAN was not isolated. Negotiations for the Triple Alliance was not successful and the subsequent Russo-German rapprochement completely isolated JAPAN. JAPAN, fighting CHINA is being already exhausted. JAPAN, fighting in
CHINA has no relations whatsoever with GERMANY and ITALY. She is isolated, and the Russo-Japanese relations were strained to the breaking point. The UNITED STATES saw that a rush now would compel JAPAN to withdraw her hands from CHINA. But, as a consequence of the Russo-German Treaty, the USSR began to withdraw her hands from the Far East, and owing to the European war, GREAT BRITAIN also was forced to withdraw her hands, too, and that the USA alone had to deal with JAPAN. What is more, it is probable that the USSR may actually loan with JAPAN. This means that the UNITED STATES had to shoulder a great burden. The UNITED STATES may have thought that she could shoulder such a burden in view of JAPAN's exhausted state, but the Russo-German Treaty which she counted would be against JAPAN's interest, developed in JAPAN's favor. Moreover, the attitude which the UNITED STATES had hitherto taken against the German-Italian was similar to those of GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE. The question of the UNITED STATES entry into the European War may be doubtful, but there is already sufficient proof of its danger. Considering the worst, the USA may be forced to fight against such powerful European powers as GERMANY and ITALY. The UNITED STATES, which possesses such fears, cannot venture to bring pressure upon JAPAN. It is extremely dangerous. I think the UNITED STATES today is repenting her acts of notification on the abrogation of the Japanese Commercial Treaty. It is the appearance of one who is at a loss in disposing of the fist he has raised. This I think is the effect of the Russo-German Treaty. Then, if that is the case, I think it would be incoherent for JAPAN to complain of the Russo-German Treaty. Should the Japanese people have something of a vague feeling towards GERMANY because of that Treaty, should they not cast aside such a feeling? Nay, I think that they should be thankful to GERMANY. There is not a single cause for resentment. That is what I wish to say.

However, GERMANY is now at war. There are some who say that if GERMANY will be defeated soon as propagated by BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and FRANCE, it would be dangerous to be on intimate terms with GERMANY. Although it is an unsatisfactory way of saying things, I do not necessarily object to this. If GERMANY were to be defeated, it would not be in our interest to be friends with her. However, I am sure GERMANY will not be beaten. There are some of those who remember the last war, who state that if the war be protracted, GERMANY will surely be defeated absolutely. But they say it because they do not consider fully the real power of present day GERMANY.
Some in Japan say that it is only six years since HITLER came into power. They say that the economic power and military preparations are still far from being sufficient, but GERMANY today greatly differ from what these people made out of GERMANY. GERMANY of today possesses several times in power compared with 1914. In economics and military preparations, she possesses several times of those compared to 1914. As a whole, in the last European War, not only GERMANY but BRITAIN and FRANCE also suffered blows. BRITAIN'S power was for the most part wealth accumulated in the past, and that had been greatly diminished by the war. The extent of the damage may be seen from the fact that it is still not being compensated until today. GERMANY'S power, however, lies in her people. The damages received were chiefly her human lives. This has been completely restored during the last twenty years. In that war, not a bit of German territory, not mentioning her towns and cities, were being ravaged. Only certain limits were imposed; such as the limitation of her armies to 100,000 men by the VERSAILLES Treaty, and the possession of submarines being objectionable, etc., while that of rehabilitation steadily progressed from the following day of the Truce. Although amount in reparations almost reached astronomical figures, I remember that what GERMANY actually paid was a little more than 300 million yen in money and goods. Moreover, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, especially, loaned sum after sum of money to GERMANY so as to keep GERMANY from collapsing. The UNITED STATES alone loaned GERMANY 400 to 500 million dollars. In results, it seemed as if GERMANY received reparations amounting to 400-500 million dollars instead of paying. Again, some say that GERMANY had been reduced to a state of emptiness by the well-known inflation. It is true the inflation dealt a heavy blow on the German middle classes and brought about a very bad effect on the general social life; but, it was not all adversity, for all the German joint stock companies had their debts cancelled because of that inflation. That is why the German companies had up-to-date machines installed after the war. Consequently, post-war German industrial power became such that BRITAIN and FRANCE could not rival. Due to that industrial power, German rehabilitation saw striking progress, and the merchant marine that was completely wiped out by the war, suddenly found itself to possess 4-5 million tons, almost same in tonnage as JAPAN. Aside from this, the farming villages rehabilitated remarkably. Then HITLER took the reigns of government, GERMANY had already completely restored its national power. Only from the point of formality was she bound by the VERSAILLES Treaty. As HITLER came forward, he scored one by one the yoke of this Treaty. With the severance of each bond, GERMANY'S replenished power leaped upwards, and eventually extricating itself of all restraints enabled her to display her full powers. This is the GERMANY of today.
We must not forget that German restoration was not the fruit of HITLER's six years' rule, but the years and months extending 20 years following the war. Furthermore, it was thought that expulsion of the Jews from the country was ascribed to his nationalism which demanded racial purity. We did disapprove such extremity in the expulsion of alien race, but, the general opinion of the Germans were that the defeat in the last Great War was due to the Jews. The Jews disturbed the home front. They say that unless this parasitic evil is removed completely from the country, they cannot fight. In other words, the expulsion of Jews must be seen as their preparation for war. Now looking at this today, we find the German home front to be greatly strengthened because of that, and moreover, the German people have all harboured, should we say, retaliatory spirit against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, and also a deep dissatisfaction towards the VERSAILLES Treaty. She was much ridiculed by newly-born petty neighbor-states and FRANCE, leading these small nations encircled and oppressed GERMANY. With the advent of HITLER, this dissatisfaction was totally removed. The feelings of the whole populace towards HITLER is amazing. Even great scholars believe him to be a God-sent saviour of the German people. Again, some people say that GERMANY is destitute of resources and that the livelihood of the people is miserable. That it may be so, since huge armaments have been completed in a short space of time, and pressure on national life is heavy and control exhaustive. However, livelihood of the people today greatly differ from what is being told by outsiders. It has been greatly ameliorated when compared to those prior to the Nazi Regime. It can never be said that they are destitute. Internally, all are in good order. Even in unheard of and nameless towns, there are forests of chimneys protruding which emit briskly columns of black smoke. In rural railway stations we find surprisingly many locomotives and freight cars. Only one actually sees it with his own eyes, the German real power is beyond comprehension.

The internal state of affairs in GERMANY are as stated. Her foreign relations also stand remarkably favourable to her. For example, the USSR is now in a state of alliance with GERMANY. During the last war GERMANY allotted two million of her force against RUSSIA for three years. Moreover, aside from fighting GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, she had to fight ITALY, SERBIA, ROMANIA and others. But today, she is able to concentrate her entire strength on a single front in the west. Furthermore, GERMANY has her Siegfried Line here and it is impenetrable. If she defends herself by this line, she can relieve her fears however long the war may prolong. In this section, GERMANY is not risking any war of attrition. If necessary, she can continue fighting at this rate for any length of time. What she had
stocked from the outset now reaches several times of those of the last war. Now, she can receive supplies freely from the USSR and from the BALKANS and SCANDINAVIA. The extent of attrition could be properly adjusted. This is quite favourable for GERMANY. GERMANY is taking utmost caution in this war, saying that the time has now arrived for her to fight decisively in this current war for the supremacy of EUROPE against BRITAIN and FRANCE. GERMANY should have fought a short term war during the last war; that is, she should have beaten FRANCE by an impetuous attack and with the iron sword, attack RUSSIA. In the last war, no well separated FRANCE from GERMANY. GERMANY was forced to wage a war of attrition soon after the commencement of hostilities. Even today if the Siegfried Line did not exist, GERMANY will be forced to fight facing a vast force of British and French troops. If it became thus, ITALY, her ally, would not be able to look on with folded arms. A large-scale war would immediately follow. But now that there is the Siegfried Line, GERMANY is in no haste. She is slowly making preparations as she fights. Consequently, she does not ask for ITALY's assistance. This is why ITALY is observing neutrality.

To begin with the totalitarian system of GERMANY and ITALY is, to them, the representation of the natural progress of history, while the system of liberalistic individualism of the British and French should perish. It would perish even if it is left untouched. I believe they are of the view that mere confrontation by the powerful German-Italian New Order against the declining liberalistic order of GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE will cause BRITAIN and FRANCE to lose faith. It seems that GERMANY will take stand in the Siegfried Line and bent to exhaust the nerves of BRITAIN and FRANCE, while on the other hand, she will aim to deal a finishing blow on them with her air forces and submarines. Of course, in practice matters will not be so simple, but I hold that a confrontation of the old against new forces today will give sufficient chances to the new powers to win this war. Of course, if the USSR, ITALY and JAPAN side with the British and French, it will be of grave consequence to GERMANY; but today, such things will not happen. As to ITALY, the people say that she is again sitting on the fence. She had to side with GREAT BRITAIN in 1914 because of her various weaknesses.

However, with the result of MUSSOLINI's rise, things have assumed a new aspect. Today ITALY possesses enough power that BRITAIN and FRANCE cannot easily say her. The situation has changed so that ITALY of today is not what she had been in the last war, when she was forced to run to the Allies by BRITAIN and FRANCE. ITALY made full developments in her political powers under 17 years of Fascist rule. For further developments, there remains but territorial expansion. As MUSSOLINI puts it,
ITALY must expand or explode. There is no first-class power so destitute of resources as ITALY. Her population shows a yearly increase of 450,000. She must either expand or explode.

The surroundings of the Mediterranean Sea, however, are mostly spheres of influence under BRITAIN and FRANCE. Consequently, ITALY's expansion will oust the British and French influence the Mediterranean Sea. There is no alternative but to achieve this aim at the sacrifice of the British and French. ITALY can never think of riding with BRITAIN and FRANCE unless given a sufficient reward. When the time arrives, I expect ITALY to enter into the War in accordance with her treaty with GERMANY. ITALY's entry into the War will be very favourable to GERMANY, because BRITAIN imports 20 percent of her resources by the Mediterranean route. This importation will be completely stopped. FRANCE, also, will be cut off from AFRICA. It will be a matter of grave concern to BRITAIN and FRANCE. If ITALY joins hands with the USSR and participates in the War while GERMANY is holding her ground against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE using the Siegfried Line as a shield, it will be a matter of grave concern to BRITAIN.

Most Japanese are of the simple opinion that the deciding factor in War is the Navy. Not so in EUROPE of today. To BRITAIN, the loss of her Navy means the instant collapse of her entire Empire. The Navy, therefore, is an absolute necessity to her. Consequently, her Navy is not much effective as a combat weapon in event of a War against GERMANY and ITALY. GERMANY can exist without a Navy and therefore, she can dispense with it freely. Her Navy is lighter than that of GREAT BRITAIN. The treasured British Fleet cannot move actively in too free a manner in the narrow European Theater. It would be too risky for her. BRITAIN dares not expose her to such danger because its loss will affect the very existence of the nation. For instance, the British Navy is at a disadvantage in the Mediterranean Sea. ITALY possess aircraft carriers that will never sink. The small islands dotting the Sea are those carriers. Moreover, she has over 100 submarines at her disposal. It is a great menace to the British Navy in a place so small as a lake.

GREAT BRITAIN cannot be too optimistic of the current War. This is indeed a dangerous. Then why is it that she started this War? It is because that BRITAIN of today although being a democratic nation is in reality under an oligarchy. Among the British statesmen of today, there are many of Jewish descent, which includes C-binet members. Antipathy against HITLER who rejected the Jews is extremely intense. The present attitude of BRITAIN seems much under emotional influence. Hatred against HITLER seems to be the cause of her bringing War recklessly
against GERMANY. In addition, there seems to be a misunderstanding on her part on the actual German strength and the attitude of RUSSIA. In the present state, GREAT BRITAIN may not resolve to fight it out to the last as some think here in JAPAN. Looking at the British diplomacy since the ETHIOPIAN War, we do not know when they change. It goes without saying that if she succeeds in isolating GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN will fight it out to the last.

The most important is the Russo-German relations, and we must acknowledge that GERMANY-URSS relation is much closer than expected. Seeing that GERMANY is desirous of adjusting Russo-Japanese relations, GERMANY seems to feel at ease about the USSR. If JAPAN and the USSR compromise and that there is no fear whatsoever for the USSR to exert its full power on the EUROPEAN Theater, it could be said that GERMANY places a great deal of faith in the USSR. The GERMANY attempt to relieve USSR in the FAR EAST may be accounted for by her desire to have Russian power directed towards the SOUTH of EUROPE. Some say that Russian and ITALIAN interests will clash in the BALKANS, but if the USSR advance to the FAR EAST instead of to the BALKANS, I do not agree with those who claim that due to ITALY's active denunciation of USSR, the friendship between GERMANY and ITALY must have cooled. The relations of GERMANY and ITALY are the relations of HITLER and MUSSOLINI, and that heroes, whether they are in the EAST or the WEST, are the same. They do not easily become friends or enemies. Then I think it would not be so easy for the BRITISH to sever USSR and ITALY from GERMANY.

We were sent on a mission to EUROPE and we did what we were able to form the Triple Alliance. Since an alliance is an important affair affecting the fate of a State, we did our best to investigate and study fully their conditions. As a result, we arrived at the conclusion as we have explained above on the actual strength and attitude of the powers involved. As JAPAN did not join the Alliance and, on the contrary, the Russo-German rapprochement has been brought about, thus leading to the outbreak of the war, the European situation may have more or less changed since my return home. I will not decide to affirm that all future developments will become as what I have stated. What I can say with confidence today is that what JAPAN is doing in the EAST and what GERMANY and ITALY are trying to do in EUROPE bear resemblance on the point that both possess the great historic mission to establish a new order in the EAST which is a national conviction in connection with the CHINA Incident, will help much, in a larger sense, what GERMANY and ITALY are trying to do in EUROPE.

Consequently, should JAPAN compromise with the old forces because of her consideration for resources and others, the spiritual blows that will affect the new rising power of EUROPE such as GERMANY and ITALY will be indeed great. Furthermore, it may tend to weaken their determination. As above explained, it is true that the Russo-German Pact and the current hostilities
have relieved JAPAN's international position for the time being. However, to entertain the idea that JAPAN should neither side with GERMANY and ITALY, nor bind itself with BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, but utilize the present easy position and go on settling the CHINA Incident with the so-called principle of Independence and Self-Reliance will be opportune if they actually go on fighting forever, but there is no such war that has no end. There is always peace with war. JAPAN will surely be asked to participate in that Peace Conference. In such a case, JAPAN’s principle of Independence and Self-Reliance; that is, siding with neither will mean isolation and without assistance at the conference meeting. JAPAN should be most careful that the white people should not form a united front and attempt solution of their problems at the sacrifice of the EAST. Should they suddenly awake and find that it is futile to fight among themselves in EUROPE; and realize whichever side may win, resources are short in EUROPE. Fortunately, there are such resources in the EAST, and that the people are weak. JAPAN is just but a fledgling state. If it becomes such that they come to agree upon carrying out a joint exploitation of the EAST, where BRITAIN has until now made it her domain rejecting other countries and herself not fully utilizing it, and that before JAPAN's power could be maintained, JAPAN must confront an indeed difficult situation. The reason why we advanced the forming of an alliance with the far-away powers of GERMANY and ITALY is because we gave thought to this question.

I believe that this should be the fundamental policy of JAPAN's diplomacy. In practice, our seniors have also taken up such policy. The people and government may have been unconscious of this fact, but for example, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a result of that—in other words, the white man's world was divided into two and we have bound ourselves with one of them. There is no reason why we should let then become one.

Independence and self-reliance is a question that should be considered after JAPAN's power has been fully developed. To JAPAN of today, non-implications to either of them seems, at a glance, most safe but, in fact, it is a most dangerous policy. Never has JAPAN succeeded unaided at an international conference of that style. It was only when she had allies with her assertions went headed. Take the present CHINA problem, JAPAN can never settle it by segregating it as a CHINA problem in itself. JAPAN can never attain a satisfactory solution, unless the ulterior situation develops in JAPAN's favour. Unless the ulterior situation is settled, nothing could really be decided no matter what JAPAN decided with CHINA. It will surely be upset. There are the bitter ordeals which our seniors had time to time experienced.

Such was the case at the time of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. It was the same during the last World War that had been in our custody once will be taken back. The current CHINA Incident will also never allow us to be off our guard. We shall again have to suffer misery if we pursue the policy we had been pursuing. If we don't, it is pleasant, but I don't think that this is over a premature worry of my own.
The Trend of the Great War.

We are told that the German army which invaded BELGIUM and HOLLAND created the Allied armies with irresistible force and has already emerged at the ENGLISH COAST. Reflecting on this, it seems that the Allied forces gathering up a great one of one million on the Belgian Front will not be able to escape annihilation, and the final issue is already certain.

However, would the German army, which has overthrown BELGIUM and assumed control of the SEABOATS of GREECE take an attack on the British mainland without adequate preparation? Germany would probably think seriously about the adventure of crossing the ENGLISH STRaits without disposing of large French forces. She would probably do better to turn to the South and plan to conquer ITALY first by joining forces with ITALY. Judging from the results we取得, the accomplishment of this object must be regarded as involving no great difficulty. By conquering in a short time, the many countries in NORTH starting with FORLY and then HOLLAND, BELGIUM, and FRANCE in succession, might not GERMANY by establishing a continental bloc in cooperation with ITALY deliver in easy fashion a fatal blow to BRITAIN.

We who are not military specialists cannot say definitely that ENGLAND can be conquered by the army. However, it is not at all difficult for the vastly superior German air force to deliver severe attacks on ENGLAND which lies on the far shore of a narrow strip of water. Moreover, even the British navy cannot hide itself behind ENGLAND, alone from the dangers to her home, not even from the German air force no matter what the risk in the critical moment when the country may stand or fall. In such a case, judging from past experience, the British navy will soon suffer loss and be remarkably weakened. Moreover, with the participation of ITALY in the war, her air force and submarines can be used to join the attack on ENGLAND. Therefore, it can be said that ENGLAND’s chance of defeat in the naval battle is short.

So that as it may, the hope of the British and French to conquer GERMANY and ITALY must be considered entirely vain. For the question is will EUROPE with an eye to such a defeat immediately propose peace with GERMANY, and will GERMANY and ITALY accept this? We stated the following bold opinion in the early stages of the war: FUEHRER HITLER claimed that he had no intention of going to war against ITALY and FRANCE; that it was
not necessarily correct, in spite of his proposals for peace, to view that as GERMANY'S true object; that it desires to have been his policy to try to shift the responsibility for war to the British by proposing war, and that GERMANY is so to work falling into his trap. Some people believe that this is the only native view of diplomacy. However, we firmly believe that after the two powers, BRITAIN and ITALY, established the GERMANY-ITALY alliance and begun the re-building of EUROPE, the world will not be satisfied merely with a trivial recovery of lost territories or expansion of their territories.

GERMANY said to his new enemy once, "If war to decide the destiny of the German race for a thousand years in the future has been," a spokesman for ITALY said also, "To decide the destiny of GERMANY for three hundred years in the future has come." From this it is easy to infer that both countries, BRITAIN and ITALY, are thinking of.

As a result of this war, it is not probable that a cruel, rather strictly exact liquidation would take place. Now the question is: will BRITAIN and FRANCE, which have been seeking the favors of the world for centuries past, be permitted to exist as great powers or not? Furthermore, can the former colonial situation wherein the small countries of EUROPE hold absolute sovereignty and stand in the way of the big powers continue, or not?

If the upheaval in Europe should be carried out in EUROPE, it is unavoidable that it will have a great influence on ASIA as a matter of course. How would the colonies of BRITAIN and FRANCE, and those of JAPAN be disposed of? This is a question of great significance from JAPAN's standpoint. The destiny of several hundred million Asiatic populations is now at a great turning-point. Would it be proper for this great problem to be decided in the presence of JAPAN, without listening to JAPAN? What significance does the new order in East ASIA contain, and what significance should it have? Our people must at this time carefully consider this point now.

Since the outbreak of the second European war, JAPAN has adopted a policy of non-participation, which said she will assist exclusively for the solution of the GERMANY-ITALY conflict. However, this is fundamentally a point of view which disregards the trend of world history. Inasmuch as the European war if a war between old and new principles, it must be considered a great mistake for JAPAN, which launched a great undertaking in ASIA to destroy the old order and establish a new one, to think she can stay out of the European war. Moreover, may be said of this, JAPAN is actually involved in the European war. Speaking very briefly, it is not too much to say that the fate of the European war was first attached by the GEIL Incident.

The reason is that the war between the East and the West centered on that common war. The forces which stand in the way of a new order in East ASIA—the powers of GERMANY and ITALY—are these not the powers of the old order in the world? Our advocacy of the alliance
between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY was based upon this point of view.

Moreover for this reason also the assertion is made that in quite of the fact that an alliance has not been concluded and apart from the question of a treaty, JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY stand in an inescapable relationship.

For this reason in particular we have been crying loud that we must not regard the European war with indifference, and that JAPAN must not let GERMANY alone. The inescapable relationship between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY is historically inevitable. Although it looks outwardly as if JAPAN, influenced by the influence of a certain group in the country, is inclined toward ITALY not the U.S.A., rather than toward GERMANY and ITALY, the path of world political trends cannot by this be changed even slightly.

JAPAN, in spite of the opinion of forces of the old order at home, is making a great contribution to GERMANY, which is in an extremely advantageous position, in the latter's prosecution of the war. No one doubts that the Russian-German Pact was a prime requisite for this war. However, the fact that made the EVACUATION shake hands with her old enemy, GERMANY, so closely is the existence of the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY axis, although the process of negotiations for the three power alliance is the main reason.

Furthermore, it cannot be denied that AMERICA's remaining neutral for eight months contrary to pre-war expectation and her war-line with JAPAN over the CHINA Incident has made her unable to participate in the European War. Therefore, although we talk about non-participation, JAPAN has actually played a great role in the European War and it must be said that GERMANY owns JAPAN a great debt.

However, that policy has rather been inclined toward ITALY and the U.S.A. and if the German invasion of POLAND and HOLLAND should be a little delay, JAPAN would be in a position to establish an irrevocable relationship with ITALY. If so, GERMANY would not be able to express her gratitude to JAPAN, even if she so desired. She has brought JAPAN to this unfavorable position in which she will incur ill will even while rendering great services.

The victory of the forces of the new order in the world political situation could probably induce the total retreat of the forces of the old order in JAPAN willy-nilly. There is no alternative but that the downfall of liberalism and capitalism in JAPAN will be inevitably hastened.

In addition, due to the three year's duration of the CHINA Incident, this situation has been regarded as inevitable, but that which has hereby supported the old order on the threshold of collapse was the connection with forces of the old order abroad. A great majority of the people firmly believe that the democratic forces in the background of the CHINA Incident, but we must say that the old powers in the country have tried to compromise and speak secretly with enemy foreign powers, have been supported by schemes of assistance from foreign powers, and have barely kept alive. As a result of the Second European War, this support is even now being withdrawn. For this reason we must say that the recent progress of the war in the West has had an extremely important effect where JAPAN is concerned.

If we understand foreign and domestic problems in this way, it is clear at a glance what course in the future JAPAN's fundamental diplomatic policy must be guided. Moreover, as an antecedent condition, the rebuilding of her domestic organization is required.
THE NEW ORDER IN JAPAN AND JAPAN'S POLITICS.

SHEMOTORI: I called you today because I wish to listen to all of your opinions concerning the international problem.

SHIBASO: Until now, I have done what I could for the renovation of Japanese diplomacy, and in the world situation, what we have advocated in the past have generally become fact. However, since the situation in Europe has changed with such rapidity, we cannot merely boast of our far-sighted views. What we must firstly consider is whether Germany and Italy who have won a great victory may change their attitude. This would be, to a certain degree, unavoidable. The end of the war is now in sight, and I deeply feel that the present is indeed too late for Japan, who has been really limited in the scope of giving assistance.

KOHAYASHI: The situation has become exactly as you have maintained for a long time, but what about the future situation?

SHIBASO: That I have always said to others is that the war will surely reach the conclusion as we had anticipated, and a situation will develop in which we can say, "Didn't we tell you so", but the situation would then be too late, and Japan will be placed in an awkward predicament. However, I am not at all pessimistic, because Germany, Italy, and Japan will eventually stand on common ground even in the future world. Generally speaking, due to the fact that the political leaders of Japan have misconstrued the inevitable course of world history, it is regrettable that Japan has somewhat deviated from this course. Irrespective of what one may say, the course which Japan has followed since the China Incident could not be controlled by a small number of people. We ought to follow the course which we must follow. As long as Japan follows this course, she, as a nation, must necessarily join the course followed by Germany and Italy. For instance, for the reason that that alliance was not established, Japan, of course, has no obligation to assist Germany and Italy. Notwithstanding the fact that the Government has actually stated its policy of non-interference, what Japan is doing is becoming of great help to Germany and Italy. That they wanted of Japan in the alliance between Germany, Germany, and Italy was mainly that Japan weaken British and French positions in the Orient and to check the United States and although Japan was not asked to do this she has, in fact, done so. Now, even if the United States
wishes to participate in the war, she cannot do so. During those nine months, they, being checked by Japan, have neglected Europe. Although diplomatically, they worked all of Germany, and were more or less aided England and France materially, their actual power is concentrated in the Pacific. For Germany, this is a great help. Before the war, it was generally said that America would participate in the early stages of this war, but if that were true the United States would have furnished England and France with very little. Although England has predominant Navy power, it seems that her forces is still insufficient. If the American Navy had cooperated with that of Great Britain, it would probably have been very advantageous for England and France. First of all, it would have been a great spiritual encouragement to England and France. Such a country as Italy would have hesitated to enter the war. If the United States Navy had cooperated together with that of England and France in the Mediterranean Sea, Italy would not have been able to make any moves. If viewed in this manner, the situation would probably have been considerably different from the present. For one thing, America had greatly under-rated Germany's strength. She had thought that Europe was safe if entrusted to England and France. She failure that checking Japan was her chief mission, is now concentrating her real power in the Pacific Ocean. If viewed by Japan it is extremely bothersome, but if viewed by Germany, it is an extreme blessing. It is a great role that Japan has played for the sake of Germany. However since the fact that the concentration of the main power of the U.S. in the Pacific was similar to the political leaders of Japan, in trying to improve relations in some way, and to reach an economical understanding, they have followed a course which is contrary to Germany's intentions. Consequently, although Germany has no longer any reason to be thankful to Japan, actually, Japan has rendered services comparable to that extended by Italy.

2. THE NEW ORDER IN EUROPE AND THE OPPOSITION OF THE U.S.

By the above fact, it can be seen that looking from the standpoint that the position of Japan, Germany, and Italy lies in a mission aiming at the establishment of a new order in the East and the West, what each nation is doing separately is concentrated towards achieving the same goal. What each does independently becomes in effect mutual assistance. I think that the relationship between the three nations lies in such a fundamental relationship. Viewed from that standpoint, it is expected that Japan, Germany, and Italy can continue to cooperate, and even if Germany should expel English and French influence from Europe, it does not mean that from that very moment, a new order in Europe can be established. All the factors belonging to the old order in Europe will assemble in the American continent. The cold Killion, which is most typical of the old order, has already been quickly concentrated in the United States. Of course the Jews, who are the greatest enemy of the new order, have already the intention of moving to the United States, and all the ousted ruling classes of England and France, will also move to the United States. Since these elements have formerly followed individualistic and liberalistic philosophies, they cannot absolutely remain in Europe ruled under totalitarianism. Henceforth, they will move in groups to the United States as the Puritan did in olden times. As a result of this, all the old
elements of the world will be concentrated in the United States. America, which has been called the new world will become the old world, and Europe of the old world will become the new world, and this state of opposition will continue for a considerable period of time. Until the old elements in America are finally driven out, the struggle will continue. On the one hand, if the national system of Japan is abruptly converted to the new order, and proceeds rapidly towards the establishment of the new order in East Asia, it would naturally be unavoidable for her to collaborate and cooperate with Europe's new order. On the other hand, in the Pacific, she will have to stand in opposition with America's old order. Looking at it from its rough outline, it may be said that after all, the coalition of Japan, Germany, and Italy and the relation of mutual aid and communication will continue.

3. THE COMPLETED POWER OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST.

NOTE: Generally speaking, I think that your prediction that the old elements of the world would all be concentrated in the United States is an interesting observation. Since the outbreak of this war, I could not believe that the existing power of England and France could suppress the newly formed Italo-German Axis. In spite of that, the ruling classes of England and France themselves have a strong feeling of fighting against Germany and Italy. Viewed from this aspect, I had the feeling that it was the influence of the Jews, who are the ruling class of England and France, who provoked this bloody war. But only at the dwelling of even a little blow against Jewish countries like Germany and Italy by sacrificing England and France. In the course of later developments, however, the situation is likely to move towards such a direction. For instance, the capital of England and France will flow to the United States. The government would also probably seek shelter in America. Besides, probably, Jewish liberalists will also go. In such a case, what will become of the world? There will continue, for a considerable period of time, a struggle between the newly arisen influence in Europe and the old influence centered in the United States. This time, East Asia will be the scene of the conflict. In all cases, England and France will have to maintain Imperialistic domination of their colonies in the Orient, and the United States which is welcoming and providing shelter to England and France, also cannot disregard Anglo-American domination of these colonies. Thus, all the English and French fleets which escaped damage will assemble in the Pacific. If the United States finds it futile to save Europe, she will concentrate her entire force in the Pacific and will defend Australia, French Indo China, or British India. She will also invade China. It is unmistakable that the United States will take such an action. Since the situation would be such that the forces of Italy and the Soviet Union and American forces which was united to those of England and France will eventually clash in the Far East, the Far East will be forced into the same position as the modern Balkans. In such a case no one can tell in what way the United States, which is suppressing Japan with a firm attitude for the reason that what has been done by Japan since the Manchurian Incident and the Chinese Incident, namely the establishment of the
new order in East Asia, is contrary to America's principles, will alter her Far Eastern policy according to the situation at the crucial moment. In other words, she may change to a policy in which she intends to return Japan to the status of a watchdog at the time of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and to use Japan as advanced guard troops for the democratic countries in the Far East in the same manner as Poland and the little entente countries. In such a case there seems to exist particular danger that the ruling class of Japan would be influenced by the simplicity of the present situation and eventually become so inclined. In the end, the United States will superficially change her policy in such a manner as to formally approve what has been done by Japan since the China Incident. In answer to this, Japan would also change her view relating to the United States and act in concert with the U. S. Actually, there exists a danger that a policy will be adopted that would make Japan a tool. If such a situation develops, the actual movement in Europe and Japan's movement in East Asia are at the present substantially alike at the establishment of the same new world order. However, from that moment, both parties will be contradictory to the movement, and it is feared that Japan would support the maintenance of the old order.
4. ENGLAND AFTER THE DIPLOMATIC AND THE CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES

SPLATOW: If the present political rulers of Japan continue to be in control of Japan's administration, what you have just said may occur. The United States is now taking a very lenient attitude towards Japan. Particularly, the ruling class of Japan is recently hoping for the free importation of American goods, or the establishment of credit and is trying to conclude a new trade treaty. Although there is a tendency among them to cooperate with the United States with complete disregard of the past, in accordance with the sentiment expressed by the great majority of the people of today, this should not be allowed. I cannot possibly imagine that Japan will reverse the course of world history, check the progress of civilization, and check her own development by disregarding her present mission in the Asiatic continent and the role she must take in the vast Asiatic sphere. In this respect, we need not be so pessimistic, but as you have said, England and France who have been expelled from Europe by cooperating with the United States, will make up in Asia what they lost in Europe. It is certain that the Netherlands Indies, French Indo-China, and British India, which they hitherto failed to develop and utilize sufficiently under their spheres of influence, will become more precious to them than before. Consequently, there is likely to exist danger that they will concentrate their influences there.

But I think that it will be a long time before England and France, if they are expelled from Europe, will bear this silently and abandon her return to Europe. Even though the ruling class itself should evacuate to the United States with gold bullions, warships and merchant ships, there would still remain in England 45,000,000 people. There would also remain in France 40,000,000 people. It is impossible for them to take them all with them. They will leave with great reluctance. For instance, who will support the population of 45,000,000 remaining in England? There is only three or four months' supply of food. Hitler has no obligation to support them with materials in Continental Europe. Furthermore, he is unable to do so. They cannot live unless they depend on the Continent of Europe. In any case, the people in England must depend on the American continent. Even if the small number of people who had abandoned everything and fled moved to Canada should cooperate with the United States to manage the colonies in the Orient, much cannot be expected of them. The movement for restoring Europe will be considerable and vigorous for the next five or ten years. During that period, they would not be able to exert their power in the Orient. During that time, the naval power of Germany and Italy will increase rapidly.
Then the continent of America will be in a defensive position. Whatever one may say, the population of Europe is increasing, and one cannot support himself. Germany and Italy will devote themselves solely in exploiting Africa. But even in that case, it is not probable that they have no connection with the American continent lying across the Atlantic Ocean. Their immediate object is South America, which is a branch of Europe. Briefly speaking, aside from the natives, only Spanish, Germans and Italians are there. There are only a few Englishmen. These people don't like the United States. The world has been under absolute Anglo-Saxon domination up to now, and because of this, they were controlled by the United States with reluctance. However, if the world situation should suddenly become such that the Anglo-Saxons are defeated, they would rather favor Europe. America will be in an extremely defensive position. The very foundation of the Monroe Doctrine will crumble. The situation will become very grave for the United States. Since the U.S. herself has riches in excess of her needs, she will not be further tempted by the materials of Asia. If an agitation should break out in South America, which is so close by from the standpoint of self-defense, would not this be of extreme danger to the U.S. herself?

Therefore at this moment it cannot be imagined that the United States alone would increase her power in the Orient as you have now said. Although Canada has a population of only 10,000,000, people who escaped from England will gradually gather there, since Canada alone is not capable of maintaining the power of a great nation, England, the great power escaped from Europe, will consider India, Australia, New Zealand, etc., as becoming of greater value. However, it is questionable as to whether the British Empire, which has lost England and has moved to Canada, can maintain the same power she has held before. Although there is an extreme view that Britain Proper, so to speak, is like the site of office for the British Empire, no matter what one might say, it has been the native power, and the continent was controlled from there. I think that the survival of the influence of the British Empire, which has lost her foot hold in Europe and which has escaped from England Proper, should not be feared by us. At any rate, the dispute between the new influence in Europe and the old influence which escaped to America will be engendered in a fierce struggle for the next five or ten years. During that time, at least, they probably will become extreme obstacles to our pressure in the Pacific Area. This period of from five to ten years is very precious for the Asiatic race. If this period is idled away, it is clear that oppression of various nature will be inflicted upon them. After all, Europe also must depend on Asia. They are desirous of materials from Asia.
Since the British Empire, France, and England herself, who are dependent upon the American continent, will after all endeavor to annex Asia to the old influence, it is necessary for Japan during this period to utilize to the utmost degree the extra time given her. This must be a great subject for the Japanese people. I think that the reason the Japanese people had somewhat felt that we had reached the critical turning point is due to a certain kind of intuition concerning this great significance.

5. THE POSITION OF THE PRO-BRITISH FACTION IN OUR COUNTRY

KOBAYASHI: No one in the political and business world, and also Imperial University professors in the academic world, seems to understand anything in that sense. Still, their views are opposite. First, the opinion that Germany would be defeated was generally prevalent until recently, but now it seems that Germany is likely to win the war. We cannot fightReality. They are saying that victory in war is unimportant; that victory over military power is unimportant; and that it is an enemy of civilization. Their words imply that justice still exists in the democracy of France and England. Actually, the disease is too advanced for remedy. They are a group which should go to the Continent of America. From Japan—

SPIRATORI: There are many persons who should also leave Japan.

NOMURA: The point that the national feeling would not permit Japan to take a course contrary to current history of which you speak is a matter of course, but as Mr. KOBAYASHI just stated, since there are some people who view the progress of history from the opposite point of view—

SPIRATORI: However, it cannot be conceived that such people will govern Japan forever. It should not be allowed.

KOBAYASHI: They appear to be possessed with such ideas.

SPIRATORI: No matter what you say, they are people who have been thoroughly imbued with the marrow of bones with tradition, in bad sense prejudice tradition, or to put it more strongly, with prejudice, which is very difficult to shake off. Under such a world they are maintaining their present position. The change of such a world immediately means the loss of their position. If that situation develops, this would be "self-preservation." There is a pro-British faction in Japan. I think the pro-British feeling will remain even if England is crushed. The pro-British feeling is one which expresses self-love. It is one that shows love for one self.
KOBYASHI: The business world is generally like that.

SUNATOKI: It is not only the business world. Pitherto
they have been imbued in that manner. They are those who
have taught this sentiment to others and those who have
written books on this subject in order to safe-guard their
positions. If the present world collapses their position
will be lost.

KOBYASHI: That is true. Although we, including SUNATOKI,
are looked upon as the pro-German faction by the pro-British
faction, I do not think that our group is particularly
pro-German.

SUNATOKI: Since we call then the pro-British Faction,
they probably call us the Pro-German group.

KOBYASHI: According to them although listening to the
pro-German faction is very interesting, what they hear are
not actually true.

NOMUIA: They say that we are taking a course in the opposite
civilization.

KOBYASHI: After all, the source of the present extent of
Germany's might lies in her positive possession of new
culture, new ideas, and new world outlook.

NOMUIA: Ignoring new developments in present-day Germany,
they are after all, trying to judge Germany according to
the principle of "Night makes right" of the Middle Ages.
I felt just as the Catholics did at the time of the Renaissance,
as they viewed the progressive elements who admired the arts
and literature of Greece and Rome, with a feeling that a
great heresy had arisen, because, although the world was
now progressing towards the country of God, there appeared
heathens who were trying to worship the savage gods of Greece.
I think that it is similar to this.

KOBYASHI: Therefore, the situation will not be clear until
time elapses.

SUNATOKI: Judging from the history of mankind, the
Renaissance is a revival of the culture of Greece, which
is the origin of democracy. However, the new world outlook
of Germany and Italy is a movement which endeavors to go
back to the pre-Greek era. Also in Japan, Restoration
reverses means a revival. However it goes further back to
the mythological era. Totalitarianism, therefore, is a
return to things fundamental and essential when viewed from
cultural history of mankind. The culture to which they
refer is not really culture. They must be speaking about
superficial civilization or something of that nature. Isn't
that various non-true institutions or superficial civilization
that only greet the eye. The German people make a distinction
between culture and civilization. According to the English,
American and Japanese people, it is this superficial civili-
zation that Germany will abolish from this earth if she wins
the war. Culture will not perish, on the contrary it will
flourish. Up to now, what Japan has been told as being
most valuable was this Western civilization based on
liberalism.

6. ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

NOMURA: Concerning that point, I once wrote a short article
in the "National Review." It can generally be said that
modern European civilization originated in Hellenism.
However, Hellenism is a new civilization which originated
in a Greek colony at the time when the Aryans entered
the Greek Peninsula, reached the Mediterranean Sea, and came
in contact with the oceanic civilization of the Mediterranean.
For the Aryans, it was a foreign civilization. What is the
culture of the Mediterranean? The pirates of the Persian
Gulf who entered the Mediterranean and assimilated with
the Phoenicians established one of the metropolitan civiliza-
tions. Is not its origin in the oceanic civilization of
the Archimedes? The oceanic people made their living by
occasionally leaving their barren land and robbing and
exploiting the farmers of fertile Mesopotamia. These people
later established the commercial empire called Babylonia
and also, the militaristic country of Assyria. In either case,
they made their living not by producing anything
themselves, but by exploiting the farmers who were producers.
The religion that developed here was Babylonian and Assyrian
monothelitism; and that was developed into Judaism which in
turn, became Christianity. What is very interesting about
Judaism and Christianity is their contract of faith. This idea
of a mutual and reciprocal contract was inherited by Europe through the
Hellenism and Hellenism that I just mentioned. These are
the modern theories of social contract and the contract of
sovereignty.

In such a society, either commerce or speculation
exists, and in such a way, these two forms appear in economics.
And, in the construction of society since the powers are
in opposition, it takes the form of a democracy if the powers
opposing each other are in balance. However, if this balance
is destroyed and one of these powers becomes very powerful,
an extreme despotism will develop. These tendencies have
appeared in Greece and here. Furthermore, even in inter-
national society, there will develop such unstable interna-
tionalism and pacifism as armed peace or the League of
Nations or such principles of aggression and ideas of the
world as one nation as it did in Macedonion and Rome.
Modern Europe is a world representing conflicting principles in which all of these principles are fixed. As a result, although economically it is called capitalism, it is a refined form of mercantilism. After this mercantilism has exploited domestic agricultural districts to the limit, it will then utilize the utmost the agricultural districts of such overseas countries as India and Australia. Since that would not be sufficient, it will exploit Manchurian and Siberian, or the so-called Heimatkultur. Since imperialistic countries other than England are appearing here and there, disputes and entente will develop concerning the problem of colonies. The situation will be possible as long as crime does not exist, but sooner or later, a situation will develop in which these countries will clash in an imperialistic war struggle for world domination. This is the substance of the European war. Such manner of living, way of existence, or forms of civilization are abnormalities that developed in unsuitable areas such as in deserts and seas which, in essence, cannot maintain human life by labor. The modern world is a product of the remarkable development of this abnormal civilization and the attempt to return to this abnormal civilization is the downfall of the Occident. Enlightenment comes from the East. Nazism, in a certain sense, is return to the Orient and the restoration of agricultural civilization. For instance, even the Nazi national land plan has a tendency toward Japanese and is, after all, trying to return to the special character and nature of human life based on the soil.

7. JAPAN’S LEBENSPRAUM AND THE BLOCK SYSTEM

SUIIZAKI: Indeed, it must be so. In the conversion of the present world it must be so. In short, it is not natural to establish an empire across the seven seas. I think that the future world will necessarily be divided into large spheres. Generally, these zones must be connected together by land. Japan must also consider herself as connected by land to the Asiatic continent instead of considering herself as a sea-bound country. On a map, the Japan-Russian-Mongolian bloc system that Japan is now cultivating, is indeed widespread. But I think that the sphere may be a little small. If the South Seas area is added to this, it will become a splendid Lebensraum. I think that this is not an oceanic empire but a splendid Lebensraum connected by land and which be the basis of the theory of the bloc system of the new world. I think that we must consider the Lebensraum of the Asiatists or the establishment of a bloc from this angle. The existing mercantilism is, on this condition, completely liquidated. It seems to me that activities based on the soil, such as primitive industries, will become fundamental. If this is accomplished, the temptation of waging war will be greatly decreased.

In this sense, the interview given to the American press by Hitler is very interesting. He demanded that since
he does not infringe on the sphere of existence of others, others must not interfere with his own lebenraum. For this purpose, we must generally have the essentials for self-sufficiency. The United States advocates the Monroe Doctrine: [Footnote: It is said that the United States was conceived of being invaded by the old world. It said that it would be tolerated if the United States confined herself to this doctrine, but be reprimanded the United States as being unreasonable in interfering in everything throughout the world.]

KOBAYASHI: Therefore, unless Japan's statesmen either follow England and the U.S. or else believe this course, she cannot accomplish anything on a large scale. A great nation-wide plan concentrated on national defense in the future, must follow such a course.

SHIBATA: We must follow such a course even though it is against our will; we must follow that course rapidly.

8. CHARACTER OF 2ND GERRAN LICE

NEUGEBAUER: I only think that notwithstanding the fact that the situation is actually so, there are great many people who take a different view. It must be taken for granted that interests cause them to take this opposite view. But after all, our minds, which are now controlled by past thoughts and ideas, are influenced in this way. There is also the misconception that world civilization originated in Greece and Rome and that modern civilization was perfected in France and England, and that since this was said to be of the highest level, any improvement in this direction is considered progress. After all, this does not differ fundamentally with the interpretation of history by Marx. In this manner, Europe is considered as the center of all history. However, although Japan speaks of a new order in East Asia, she does not contemplate at all as to the nature of the historical basis on which the new order stands. This is not only a problem of history. The old world outlook perturbs the field of philosophy, and politics, economics, law, and society. As long as things are viewed with such a world outlook, they will be distorted. It seems to me that after all, a new cultural movement is absolutely necessary.

Although the Nazis in Germany have a fine new world outlook, it too did not appear suddenly but arose in Germany after the three great states were unified. For example, they put the cultural struggle of Bismarck which has a deep political significance, and such things as
Hegelianism in the philosophical field, movement of romanticism thinking from the standpoint of literary thought, the historical school of economics, and proponents of ancient German law in the legal school. Therefore, it is said that the movement for the establishment of the new culture, which is based on a very wide scope and which would give the Nazi's world outlook a foundation, arose in Germany from the nineteenth century. Since this movement did not fully attain success, it was defeated by democracy or liberalism at the time of the first world war. However, this time, under Nazi domination, this movement has completely flourished. On the contrary, because of the existence of such a cultural foundation, the Nazi's domination became firm. That is my line of thought.

SPIRATORI: The keynote of the character of the German race varies greatly from that of the Anglo-Saxons. I think that principally, their racial characteristic has a very strong totalitarian tendency. At the same time, since they have accomplished such progress in science they have, of course, a respect for their individuality as one of their strong points. However, totalitarianism is what makes up this foundation. Therefore, the parliamentary government of the Anglo-Saxons cannot possibly take root on that point. I believe that Japan is similar on that point. I am inclined to believe that the instinct of all the races is principally totalitarian. I think that this was distorted and became what it is today. Men differ from animals on the point that man overcomes nature, and although God differentiated between human beings and animals by giving men excellent capabilities, Western civilization, in order to overcome nature, realized one triumph after another in science, and in its process fell victim to temptation. That field was greatly over-emphasized and over-rated. At the present, this evil advanced to the point where it has destroyed the collective livelihood of mankind, and I believe that in the new world outlook of Germany and Italy that emphasized the original collective instincts of mankind to counteract this evil. It is in a relatively short time since the individualistic tendency was introduced in Japan. Therefore, it is not so difficult for Japan, whose racial characteristic was originally based on the familial system and totalitarianism, to return to national policy in its entirety. Consequently, I believe that the awakening of Japan in the period of the present world evolution will be very rapid.

NOMURA: Unless the /T.N. national/ organization is completed by the time of the awakening——

KOBAYASHI: It must be completed as soon as possible. What do you think about this matter, concerning the treatment of this problem?
National Organization and Prince HONUYE.

SHIRATORI: For the problem of the reorganization of the nation, I think that it must be fundamentally a thought movement which aims at returning to the basic principle of Japan's national structure. If we are engaged only in the problem of the form of government, it will result in a distortion. Formerly, divine inspiration and the like were scorned by the intelligentsia, so we must consider methods of persuasion sufficient to gain the consent of the intelligentsia. However, the unlearned will not require such methods. They will understand at once if we merely say that we should do our best to serve the Emperor. If the whole seventy millions of the nation, begin by writing to offer our all to His Majesty, since no one is all to him, and actually practice Shinto in the way of a subject, then the questions of government, economy, education, and leadership of young men will naturally take the proper course. It is also unnecessary to emphasize that when everyone returns to that frame of mind, existing party politicians and partisans will be out. Everyone will have that frame of mind and on such a basis, the government will get along. Accordingly, Japan's social, economic, educational, and other structures will be reformed. Then, Western individualistic or liberalistic and capitalistic structures will, as a matter of course, be completely regulated. That will be favorable. If things are done that way, since we are all children of His Majesty the Emperor, we should not be blamed so severely for what we may have thought, said, and done before. Let us forget the past entirely and together go on with a movement of service to the Emperor. Let us establish an organization in keeping with this. For this all can agree it will be entirely natural to have Prince HONUYE, who is of the noblest family of the seventy millions of the nation, lead and direct the movement. Looking at it that way, there is no one who can take Prince HONUYE's place. In ability, knowledge, and personality there may be many among the seventy millions who surpass him. However, when we consider the new movement, or its organization, which aims to unite all subjects in a return to offering their services to His Majesty the Emperor, Prince HONUYE, by the very position his family holds in Japanese history, is the one we must have to lead it. I say this chiefly because we should build a new Japan by depending upon Prince HONUYE.

KOB.Y.SHI: Then, in short, you mean he is the representative of the whole nation?

SHIRATORI: I mean representative or flagman. Later, all the people will follow him.

KOB.Y.SHI: With that in mind, existing party politicians or former politicians— if such groups then truly perceive their new mission and abandon their former platforms, naturally that will be good.
It may be unreasonable for us to require that of all of them, it may also be unreasonable for the whole seventy millions of the nation to demand it at once. Since we aim at establishing a new organization and effecting a rearrangement of service to the Emperor which will embrace all of the people, it will probably be well to accept for the time being those who venture to join it. It think we should not be so critical as to say that this or that person is objectionable because of his past connections. It is, however, another question who should play the lead in the new organization and by whom in the future the new policies should be made. There have been some people, of course, studying devotedly along this line, so these people, I think, ought to have the leadership. The past was an era of vain strife. Much has been discussed among the members of existing bureaucratic political parties. Therefore, wouldn't it be well if in the future everyone could become, according to congenial spirit, frankly delve into the matter, and cooperate as a body, starting from a new foundation? A nation-wide organization will be useless, if we leave out political parties. After all, we must build a firm organization like that of the Nazis and Fascists. Such arguments will probably arise. As for the formation of the organization, in all probability those which have been worked out by Germany and Italy should be taken into consideration. After many failures, great sacrifices, and much hard work, these have at last shown good results. I think that Japan, however, will be able to make use of their good features without paying that price.

Although there is no need to reject them because they are of western nature, the spirit of Japan's national structure must be based fundamentally and permanently on the view of the world which has been traditional in Japan from time immemorial. Take the problem of economic reorganization for instance, we should of course avoid Fascism, but we should also avoid the Fascist economic theory as far as possible. By dint of the attributes deriving from the basic principle underlying Japan's national structure, I think we shall be able to shake off all the evils of capitalism and liberalism. In the external form by which the reform can be carried out, it is quite probable there will be things resembling those done by Germany and Italy. Nevertheless, I believe the fundamental concept will be different.

Among the arguments which are in vogue these days, while their expression takes the form of constant references to the GOKOKU /SO founding of the country/ spirit and the basic principles of national structure, their content seems still to contain a great many features of the old order. For instance, though they speak of the government of Imperial Japan and emphasize such expressions as, Imperial Rule assistance, actually there are a great many arguments in which democratic features are advocated. Moreover,
they claim it is necessary to liquidate things feudalistic so as to pave the way for assistance to the Imperial Rule. They brand as feudalistic things which rather ought to be in essence Japanese, and thus reject them. In the final analysis, there is a tendency which seems to lean toward things Western.

SHIRATORI: I also believe that there are terms, among those old slogans and expressions, which need scrutiny. For example, there are many people who, by ignoring the Emperor, interpret such phrases as "Ekiden Baiden" (the whole nation under one sovereign) to mean the American idea of natural rights of men and the equality of all men. Moreover, the phrase "Baimu Hooyoku" (assistance of the whole nation) is liable to be interpreted as majority rule. Such things must not be.


SHIRATORI: We must criticize such things closely. Those who advocate clarification of the national structure lay great stress on ideological aspects. They have emphasized only the national structure of Japan and have had little concern for the actual and the economic life of the people. It has been said that the so-called advocates of national structure, have no interest in economy. The group which stress on the immediate evils of Western capitalism tries to correct this by economic theory borrowed chiefly from Europe. This group calls the advocates of national structure unscientific and the latter call the former left-wing or red, so that they reject one another. Actually, however, in order to clarify the national structure, the spiritual and material aspects are correlative, and an economy and a government which are /p. 121/ based on the main principle of rule by the Emperor must be realized. In economics, furthermore, those who advocate socialism, completely forget the national structure and say let us have an reorganization by relying exclusively on Western theory and by referring to Western precedents. I can not admit either of them. These two must be reconciled, I think, if we would lay the foundations of Japan in the proper place. So-called reform factions and powers for reform should be united, provided that they are sincere. On this ground, I think the right path of Japan's government, diplomacy, and economy would become clear. Fundamentally, the emphasis should not be laid only on the material side, nor only on the spiritual side. Mutual hostility and strife among those who aim similarly at reform, I think, is one of the causes that have allowed the so-called advocates of the status quo to survive until now. It is because they offset each other that their strength is nullified. Recently, many who believe in Japanese have begun to advocate something called Imperial Way Economy. It is a good tendency.
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KOBAYASHI: It is extremely difficult to secure their reconciliation. However, we must arrange it without delay. As has been previously discussed it will be possible for us to do it when, in a broad sense, the national reorganization is carried out. For this, as you say, KONOYE is very important. I wish him to make the great decision himself.

SHIRATORI: KONOYE is himself determined, I think. If he does participate this time, he is intelligent enough not to say that he will resolve this vain strife. Since he ought to know what is water and that is oil, he probably won't venture to unite the two. I don't believe he will come out with any superficial determination.

KOBAYASHI: Upon KONOYE's coming out in such a right direction to organize the nation, the present so-called politicians would join him. In such a case, it will mean we must give considerable thought as to their intentions.

12. The Objectives and Form of the New Government.

SHIRATORI: When the politicians join, I do not know what sort of position they will be given, but, after all, the important thing is toward what objectives will the new government advance and what sort of things will it undertake. If these are made perfectly clear, it will be all right to accept those who come with that knowledge. Men of old beliefs perhaps will lack new ideas and will be unable to work out new ones. Men of the old order perhaps can not cope with bold policies of reform. I think, at any rate, so-called new elements may be anticipated. It would be well if those who have formerly aimed for reform in Japan would assist sincerely this movement regardless of newspaper reports, etc., and unanimously participate in it so as to allow Prince KONOYE to discharge fully and without any error the duties that will be his. Furthermore, affiliation by all is the way, I think, for the new organization to achieve the desired results.

KOBAYASHI: This differs greatly from the new party movement as traditionally thought of, doesn't it?

SHIRATORI: The new party movement seems to have undergone a great change compared with the time when Prince KONOYE organized his last cabinet. Then he undertook the formation of his last cabinet, I think, with the prime object of resolving all vain strife, and I believe he thought the emergency could only be weathered through national unity. In an effort to achieve this, he organized a cabinet, and since fortunately or unfortunately the China Incident occurred, national unity was for the time being realized. However, in the duration of war for one year or more, national unity reached its utmost limit. Thus the feeling came about that a national re-
organization in a new sense had to be made. The first thought might have been to unite political parties. However, this would make the cleavage between the new and the old all the greater. He knew that would not be feasible. He might have resigned in order to withdraw and organize his ideas. For this, I think many people criticized him saying that he shunned responsibility for solution of the Incident and that he had resigned without any reason. I suppose the reason why Prince KONOYE retired was that if he had gone on as before, the national reorganization could not possibly have been achieved. Especially, being in a position of authority in the government and hard-pressed with various daily affairs, he could not organize his ideas, and I think he decided to withdraw and wait until circumstances became favorable. As a direct and indirect effect of the war, there arose a situation in which this was no longer feasible. Foreign and European situations have undergone sudden changes, and a powerful impulse has daily been given this. He might have, I think, made up his mind because he may perhaps be successful this time.

KOBAYASHI: Such men as Mr. ARTMA and Mr. KAI, who are now devoting themselves to this by KONOYE's side, should understand the meaning clearly, I think.

SHIRATORI: As for that, I really don't know to what extent Mr. KA'AI acts in Prince KONOYE's behalf, but I doubt that their ideas are in complete agreement. So, those persons say perhaps can not be said to be exactly what Prince KONOYE intends. The most sincere elements of the so-called reform faction are what Prince KONOYE now desires most of all. Probably what he wants most of all is for such elements, even in small numbers, to unite and put themselves at his disposal. It would be well at this time for those who are confident to make themselves known.

KOBAYASHI: Even if numbers are required, by no means ----

SHIRATORI: If there are too many they will not agree, I think.

NODA: If many persons who differ totally in viewpoint come together and agree only superficially, it will be of no value. After all, if the greatest common measure is not called for ----

SHIRATORI: In a parliamentary body, only the supporters, after all, attend meetings. It will be very commonplace and immaterial whether we have it or not. The smaller the number, the better the quality. To speak in the extreme, one is the best.

KOBAYASHI: As for scholars, as previously discussed, when we look for them among the Imperial universities all are of no value, and, consequently, if we examine them too carefully ----

KOBAYASHI: If we do not rebuild the interior of our country, a trouble is imminent. According to the papers, Great Britain and America seem to support Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. How about the information you received?

SHIRATORI: France as well as Great Britain can not afford to attend the problems of Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. America also can not afford to do so, either, for time being. Their minds are full of anxiety of how to combat Hitler's menace.

NOGURA: I heard that Germany's reply concerning Dutch East Indies had raised a serious issue. What was that?

SHIRATORI: Germany is not interested in Dutch East Indies. But she wouldn't like it if Japan, Great Britain, America, and France should play into each other's head on Dutch East Indies. If we should consult about Dutch East Indies, Germany would like to be first informed. I think it is quite natural.

KOBAYASHI: Indeed, I can not help thinking that we must make up our mind as soon as possible.

SHIRATORI: Though Japan's foreign policy must be converted thoroughly; 180-degree turning round can not be made under the present system, and it ought not to be made under the present government system. We can not tolerate, for the sakes of our Emperor's righteous diplomacy, that the present Government adopt a strong policy without changing its constitution. It is not right that we take Dutch East Indies by taking advantage of the bustle simply because Germany won victory. Then we adopt our righteous policy arising from a renovated constitution, it is natural that Japan should collaborate with Germany and Italy, so that Japan may, by the negotiations with them, settle the problems of the colonies in Asia.

KOBAYASHI: After all it is a question of a renovation of governmental system of Japan, or of the interior reconstruction.
That must be the premise.

That will be the extent of America's supply of resources to Great Britain and France?

I think it can not be done sufficiently under the present circumstances. American war industry is spoken about quite in exaggeration. However, the scale of industry which has been developed naturally by dint of activities based upon pursuit of individual profits in the society of capitalism, is not large enough as is supposed, judging from the present day standard. Take the production capacity, for instance, of airplanes or of tanks, America is considerably inferior to Germany. And, America is now rapidly enlarging her armaments- having the budget passed in the Congress. But, that is only because America fears for her own safety. The main object is to defend herself. There is not big enough surplus to supply to Great Britain and France. America seems to have sent old-fashioned weapons which were used in the last war. At any rate, she can not cope with the urgent necessity.

Our Foreign Office has changed quite a bit. Once there were those who said that I was misleading the country.

Even at the present time, there are those who say that I was misleading the country. A man can not convert his thought so suddenly partly because of his feeling. He can hardly say that his prospect was wrong but inclines to think up some pretext or other. He does not want to confess plainly that he was wrong.

The situation is getting on as exactly as foretold by Mr.

Since October last, I have been saying that the British Empire was on the eve of downfall. People at the Foreign Ministry were astonished by my prophecy. That deep blind faith (in Britain) they have!

Younger people, however, seem to be changing in their thought.

What do you think of Ambassador's opinion? Old-fashioned, isn't it?

In the event of Germany's victory, I think our people in general will become much more interested in Germany and some to believe in downfall of democracy.

That will spur the interior renovation of Japan.

In the same sense as the Soviet revolution once had great influence on us.
SHIRATORI: The Communist revolution of Russia has changed greatly in quality. After all, it has been proved that what Marx taught us was impossible in practice. But, that revolution as well as the French Revolution, had undoubtedly great influence on human society. Both Germany and Italy were drastically affected by it. Japan was also influenced. If we wish to suppress it, we can do so as we wish. But, after all, it is an achievement of Marxism that it has pointed out its own illogicality and defects, and at the same time it is a fact that capitalism itself has become impossible. That Bolshevik revolution took place as a direct result of the war. But the real cause of the revolution was the deadlock of capitalism. So, any other country could not escape from this influence.

KOBAYASHI: It accords with the fundamental characters of Japan, and it means to create a totally new character of state. If such a science and systematic thought should be born general public will come to understand gradually, leaving the intelligentsia behind.

SHIRATORI: For instance, the saying of Bolshevism that one who does not work should not eat, does not apply to the conditions of our country. The Japanese people being equally His Majesty the Emperor's children, none of them should starve. We must not have even one person, who has been born as a subject of His Majesty, starved. We must make every one live. I do not necessarily mean that every one should eat equally.

KOBAYASHI: One hundred million people are the same. Not materialistic individualism that we live in.

SHIRATORI: My opinion is that man does not live to eat. But, we eat to fulfill the duty as a subject of His Majesty. His Majesty enables us to eat and live. Some people think they live by their own ability, but /p. 133/ that is wrong, and that is the cause of old evil. Since even those who can not serve His Majesty are supplied with necessity, we can be carefree for living. We do not like such a cold-hearted saying as "One who does not work should not eat."

KOBAYASHI: Even in Soviet Russia, some sort of spiritualism must be aided to their principle. Otherwise, Soviet will come to a deadlock.

KURIA: On a whole, Marxism is an abstract argument thought out with contemplation of capitalistic society purer than England and with a kind of conceptional process. That is, Marxism is a theory thought out with presumption that almost all portion of the nation would become proletariat. And it was clear at the very beginning that, if such one were applied to agricultural country like Russia, certainly unreasonableness will be caused. In other words, as there were no settlement of agricultural problem /p. 134/ should Marxism be applied in accordance with the formula, Leninism found a different thought in connection
with the farmers. This is quite an unnatural theory that the
farmers are considered as the ally of the proletarians.
Furthermore, Marxism cannot solve racial problems. Soviet
Republic was harassed by these, but a more difficult problem
was that she could not make such leaders as engineers and clerges
her friends, and consequently she could not utilize their talents
to the full extent. Then she tried to put the five years plan
into practice, in order to enlarge her productive power, she was
harassed with shortage of engineers and she could do nothing
unless she brought engineers from Germany. These points will be
gradually rectified in the face of reality, and consequently its
class theory will fail.

14. Relations Between Hakko-ichi-u (the ideal which lets all
nations live peaceably under one roof) and Sphere of Livelihood.

Editor: As to Living sphere to which you referred a moment ago, some
people say, for example, that although the aim of the holy war
is said to be Hakko-ichi-u, they can not understand it well be­
cause it is so abstract and covered /p. 135/ with mystical cloud.
On the other hand, some people regard it as Imperialism. On the
contrast, the Germans have a clear insistence of "Living Sphere," so it is easy to understand. Sometimes people say that we had
better have clearer aims of this holy war. "What are the rela-
tions between Hakko-ichi-u and Living Sphere?"

SHIROHORI: I understand that Hakko-ichi-u stands for the ultimate object
that the benevolence of the Imperial rule blesses all the nations
alike. This is because His Majesty, great father of Japanese
people as well as great father of all mankind. It resembles
"Universal Brotherhood" of Christian creed in form, but it is
different in principle. I think it right to deal with China
with this ultimate object. It does not mean affiliation of China
to Japan nor territorial annex of China to Japan. Hakko-ichi-u
has been advocated to make a clear distinction between our ideal
and western imperialism or aggressive policy. The so-called
Japan-Yanchoukuo-China Bloc is, I think, of the same nature with
/p. 136/ Hitler's "Lebensraum". That is, Japan, Yanchoukuo and
China are to have the common "Living Sphere". This is not the
capitalistic exploitation which has been committed by western
people. At the base lies the idea of Hakko-ichi-u, the spirit
of the foundation of Japan. The new order of the Orient must be
of this kind. "That kind of new order could be established with
the old western-type treaties between China with the western-
type prerogative right, Yanchouku with the same prerogative
right, and Japan? The old ideas and the old methods bring nothing
new. These three nations must be united with a new idea with
which the existing international law can not deal."
As a matter of fact, Japan and Manchoukuo recognize each other's independence in the light of international law, but there exist some special relations between them which cannot be explained by international law. This fundamental principle should be applied to China. This scope may be extended to any degree. The question of the concrete relations between China and Japan, we may study in various ways in future and decide the matters gradually also with consent of the Chinese people. It is not necessary to follow the examples of Manchoukuo in every respect. There may be much to be amended in the case of Manchoukuo. The only thing which we have to do is to clear off the old order established by western countries in China as a preamble to build up the new order. This must be done at any cost. If this was successfully done, the New East Asia Order will be established in essence. This does not mean only to sweep away aggressive and exploitative system of western nations out of China. The old order is not referred only to the materialistic conditions, but also to the spiritual conditions. It must also be a preamble to the new order that western ideas be cleaned up out of the Chinese mind. But it should be necessary to sweep away the old order ideas first from the Japanese mind. On account of these I say that the new order of China will not be established unless and until the interior constitution of our country is rebuilt.
15. Forecast of the World War.

Editor: You will please tell us your forecast of the World War in the near future.

SHIRATORI: As I have given an outline a moment ago, France would be disposed of in the very near future. As for Great Britain, she would be subdued shortly if Germany should succeed in her landing operations. There are many difficulties involved in landing operations. If it should be too dangerous to carry out, it would not be necessary for Germany to attack by her land forces. Suppose that Germany should control the sea-coast ranging from Norway to Spain, and establish the bases for air forces and submarines along the said coast and should effect continuous air raids on Great Britain on a large scale. All the harbour facilities and the munition factories would become targets. As Germany has excellent air forces the result will be very effective. Italy, I suppose, will have the command of the Mediterranean and she will, in cooperation with Germany, attack her enemy with submarines in the Atlantic, especially at the mouths of harbours where submarine attack is comparatively easy. Thus Great Britain would be actually blockaded. Being confronted with these, Great Britain would necessarily be stumped. By landing operations, the engagement will come to an end by August, as Hitler said. In any way, Great Britain would not be able to bear her sufferings till the end of this year. The worst conditions on the part of Germany will be that, if Great Britain should make decisive resolution to hold out her resistance at the cost of her whole navy, the term of resistance will be proclaimed. But in spite of this, Great Britain will be hopeless.

The question is whether Great Britain would submit on cruel conditions which will be proposed by Germany or would go on fighting after having drawn back to Canada. In the latter case, however, she would be unable to resist without the cooperation with America. With France destroyed first and with Great Britain in a narrow escape to Canada, would America still venture to declare war upon Germany? In case America should not aid Great Britain the latter would gradually be compelled to bear her unfortunate decline. If so, I think, Germany, Italy and U.S.S.R. would remain as the three big nations in Europe, while Great Britain and France would necessarily be compelled to fall down to the second and third class nations.
peace but without any armaments. In all events, Great Britain possesses so many colonies in every corner of the world, she will keep on resisting for a long period and externally the state of war will not terminate at once. But even if she should wish to keep on resistance, it is beyond imagination that only the Government and the governing class with strategy and gold bullion should desert the realm of England leaving the forty five millions of people behind. Her colonies in Africa will be taken away and in the future India will become independent from Great Britain and these facts will make her quite powerless. Canada is not rich in resources, and is supposed to become naturally a part of the United States. But as this would be unbearable to English people, it is more probable that they would keep resisting bravely to heroic death in defence of their country. In any way, it will be inevitable that, owing to the marked inferiority in military strength, Great Britain will finally submit. The situation, however, will become clearer within next one or two weeks. Suppose Germany should venture landing operations, the war may come to an end earlier than expected. Some military experts are in the opinion that there is little possibility of landing operations. But Germany herself says that she will carry out it without fail.

NOMURA: The forecasts of military experts have often failed. The North European operation had not been imagined. The parachute troops had not been expected to be used till they were employed in Holland and Belgium, and military experts still say that the operation was unsuccessful even after the operation took place in Holland.

Editor: People say the same things in America.

NOMURA: They say that parachute troops were all captured and annihilated.

SHIRATORI: The parachute troops achieved considerable success in Holland. It is in this war that the forecasts of military experts are not reliable.
VII. Comment on Japan's Non-interference.

(The Greater ASIA Magazine, June 1939)

Within ten days since the invasion of German troops into Belgium and Holland, they obtained the same results as in the first one month or two of the First European War. The fall of Paris and the capture of the greatest of German cities at Remagen is considered likely that the German troops may also proceed to the British Isles. This is, literally, world-shaking. To the observers, however, who have witnessed the German's incessant efforts for the last two years and who properly appreciate the characteristics of the German people and the principles and structure of the politics and economy of their totalitarian regime, the present state of affairs is, in fact, only what was to be expected. It is therefore only natural that these who have faithfully observed liberal democracy as the pinnacle of human culture and who believe in the incontestible power of England or the Anglo-Saxon race have come to doubt their own observations.

England and France have compulsorily challenged Germany to fight. Why have they done so? We may, in short, say that the reason for it is that they have underestimated the real strength of Naziist Germany. They thought that Germany may be held down at present, but they became too much for their powers to do as if they let her grow unnoticed several years longer. But, indeed, it was already then too late for them, as the strength of Germany had already become too much to be vanquished. Not only England and France, but also the U.S., in the same way, had been wrongly underestimating the strength of the German and Italian totalitarian Axis countries by believing that the component of all of it that concerned Europe might, in general, be conducted well if entrusted only to England and France, as it appeared to her that Italy and Germany would surely be defeated in the end and her own duty was to try with all her efforts, to suppress Japan, the aggressor, totalitarian state in the Orient. In the first place, the one who had most wished for an outbreak of war in Europe is Roosevelt himself. It is not an exaggeration that, up to the beginning of the War, the efforts of the U.S., as shown by the so-called "White Paper" were directed towards provoking a European war. However, when the war actually broke out, the general opinion of the U.S. turned out in favour of non-interference. She did not modify her policy of cash settlement of trade balance and of not lending her vessels to any belligerent powers, although her government had revised the Neutrality Law, so that the degree of America's aid to England and France was very lukewarm, which gave rise to an atmosphere of considerable discontent in the said two countries. It happened that, as a war without fighting lasted for eight months, not only England and France, but also the U.S., were unaware of the approaching danger. We believe that
it can, however, be said that the North European War finally served to half open their eyes, and only by the recent collapse of the Western Front did they, for the first time, become fully awakened.

It appears, nevertheless, as though they are still possessed of an optimistic view regarding the future. As until now, they seem to still have hopes of success in leading matters to a protracted war by anticipating that the battle-front will fall into a state of stalemate due to the slackening of the German Army’s offensive, as was witnessed in the First European War. But, now that the stronghold of the Maginot line which took four years to construct has been penetrated in no time, no one, not even an amateur, could hardly think of the possibility of a deadlock in the front lines by resulting in mere trench warfare. The only way out of the difficulty for England and France would be to decide upon a large-scale counter-attack, which, however, would no longer seem to be possible inasmuch as there appears to be a marked difference between the respective Air Forces and Mechanized Troops.

Now, as for the U.S., she would by no means be able to render effective military assistance even if she should promptly participate in the War today. As Goering used to always say, there would be no spot for the landing of the U.S. soldiers even if the U.S. were to participate in the present War. His saying seems to have turned out true. The best that could be done by the U.S. would seem to be the granting of an unlimited credit to England and France, the offering of her vessels for the transporting of munitions, and to also ship a large number of more superior planes than in the past. The withdrawal of the U.S. fleet from the Pacific and despatching same to their aid would possibly be fairly effective, but it may be impossible for the U.S. at the present juncture when her relations with Japan have become so aggravated.

If Soviet Russia, a neutral power, should suddenly turn around to aid of England and France and attack Germany from behind in full force, there might possibly be a complete change in the war situation, but this is absolutely inconceivable. Not only must it be considered that there must be some sort of understanding between Soviet Russia and Germany so as to make Germany feel perfectly easy, but Germany would certainly not have withdrawn her mechanized troops entirely from Poland in order to hurl her entire strength into the Western Front unless Germany had felt positively safe in doing so. It must be extremely reassuring to Germany to think of the millions of Italian soldiers who are sufficiently prepared to rise up at a moment’s notice.
As for the future outlook of the present war, astounding developments will doubtlessly have been made by the time this article appears in print. Furthermore, not much actual benefit might be derived from purposely trying to predict the future outcome. However, we may nevertheless safely assert that the present war is destined to bring about a sort of solution unprecedentedly cruel and almost incredibly complete. Feuerer Hitler a few days ago declared that the fate of the German race for a thousand years to come rests upon this war, while it is warned in Italy that the destiny of Europe for three hundred years to come is about to be decided today. At any rate, it is apparent that there is no longer any room left for doubt that what Hitler and Mussolini are winning is the fundamental reconstruction of Europe. When a tendency of defeat on one side of the belligerent countries became clear in any previous war, it was customary for arms to be brought to an end by peace negotiations which defined the ceding of some territory and payment of reparations. However, it cannot be imagined that the present war will be terminated in such a simple manner. In fact there even seems to be the possibility of great powers who have been boasting of their glory for several centuries past coming to a sudden collapse.

It is also extremely doubtful as to whether the minor powers in Europe may be allowed to remain as independent states possessing absolute sovereignty rights. This must be said to be all the more so with the colonies of the minor powers.

We have been advocating since the very beginning of the present war that the world is just on the eve of a gigantic transformation in which the Old Order based upon Democratic Capitalism will be doomed, in lieu whereof the New Order based upon Totalitarianism must be set up. As Japan has, ever since the Manchurian Incident, been assuming the leading role in establishing the New Order throughout the Far East, the Japanese people should realize the New Order and act in close concert with the Axis Powers as Germany and Italy. The supporters of the Old Order in Japan have been reluctant in realizing the true significance of this gigantic world-wide transformation, and in fact the conclusion of the Triple Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy finally fell through due to the Old Order current to both at home and abroad. However, no human power can do anything against the inevitable current of world history. The way for Japan to pursue has already been decided. In fact, Japan has already been treading along the said path for nearly ten years. Those Japanese who do not know well where their way is leading to are looking on the present war in Europe with utter indifference and wrongly think that they can establish the New Order in Eastern Asia by merely continuing to act in a conciliatory manner with
those powers as obliged upon the Old Order. They may be likened to persons who are unaware of a fire in which they are already in the midst. They imagine they can keep themselves free from the world-wide gigantic transformation so long as they are declaring their non-interference policy.

Some of the other Japanese are making similar mistakes. For instance, they think that Japan will not be dragged into the European War if she does not conclude the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy. These persons do not know that the fact that Japan has contributed much towards the attainment made possible by Germany. But for the Alliance between Germany and Soviet Russia, Germany would probably not have been able to make up her mind to start this war; and, in making Soviet Russia friendly towards Germany, the presence of Japan in the East and the fair progress of the negotiations for concluding an Alliance between the Axis countries at Tokyo, Berlin and Rome are factors which have contributed considerably.

If the U.S. had participated in the War at its early stage, not only might it possibly have encouraged the morale of the British and French forces, but their fighting power might also have become actually enhanced. Germany too, might not have been able to acquire her absolute supremacy in the air, and it is likely that the attitude of Italy might also have been greatly affected. Is it not Japan that fastened the U.S. down to the Pacific? Is it not the presence of Japan practically the main reason for this? Germany owes a mint of gratitude to Japan. In defiance of the close relation between Japan and Germany, a certain group of Japanese have sought a certain kind of understanding with Britain at the Tokyo Parley after the Tientsin Affair. This fact was promptly reported to Germany. Of course Japan's attitude too has doubtlessly become clearly understood recently in Berlin. Under such circumstances in, how can we expect Germany to be grateful towards Japan? The Japanese people should not forget the fact that the Japanese diplomacy has done something that does not pertain to Japan, it has done much for Germany and yet lets itself even to incur her wrath.

If the world's map has to be crowned anew as a result of the European War, if the Netherlands, for instance, should become merged as German territory, the Dutch Indies would, as a matter of course, become added to German territory. If Japan continues to behave as she has in the past, Germany will be placed under no obligation whatsoever to Japan in giving the question of the Dutch Indies her special consideration. It must be remembered, however, that the South Seas has become Japan's Life Line economically and strategically. We, in establishing the New Order, do not mean to confine
its area only to China. Japan cannot remain idle as an 
onlooker in the event of a wholesale change of territory 
taking place in the southeast of Asia.

If Japan should devote herself exclusively to 
the solution of the China Problem by adhering merely to 
her non-intervention policy, matters will doubtlessly become 
settled within a short period, and subsequent to this 
European War the Dutch Indies as well as the colonies of 
England and France will have their ownership decided with 
Japan looking on as a mere spectator. Therefore, at this 
important juncture, Japan should realize the ultimate 
significance of this gigantic world-wide reform and should 
not fail to engage in active participation therein.
VII Conclusion of JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY TRIPLE TREATY

September 29, 1939

1. Evacuating Mutual Reliance:

The significance of the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY TRIPLE TREATY concluded last September 27 is extremely important but the contents are simple and clear and do not require much explanation. Ordinarily, a protocol is attached to the treaty but even this is not required in this case. As stipulated in the provisions, details concerning the execution of the treaty are to be decided by a committee which is to be formed later. Since the treaty was not drawn up by specialists, its style differs considerably from the usual form. Viewed from the standpoint of treaty specialists, it may contain many passages that strike them as strange. If analyzed in detail legally, it may give rise to various contentions but since the contents of this treaty is unprecedented in history and bluntly, since the three nations, JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY lodged the coalition with their blood, it is only natural that the wording is simple and plain. If a detailed interpretation is attached beforehand legally or if a psychological hold-over exists in regard to mutual rights and duties, the value of the treaty will be destroyed. In short, I think it ultimately depends on the single phrase "mutual reliance".

Therefore, in regard to the treaty itself, the general situation is clarified by the Government proclamation and there is nothing much that would need adding. In the future, due to this, the problem of what effects will it give rise to or how will the treaty itself, be carried out or how will its consequences be developed can only be judged as time progresses. What I am going to say in the following is entirely within the limits of my personal opinion and observations. It must be remembered that I am not revealing special information regarding any agreements among the three countries nor have I any relation whatsoever in the Japanese Government's intentions and policies.

2. Treaty of the NEW mould order:

This treaty is formally called the "TRIPLE TREATY" but in general, it seems to be called the TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

From the provisions in Article 3 of the treaty, it can be said that it is genuinely a defensive alliance and may be called a "Security Alliance" or a "Mutual Assistance Alliance." In short, it can be
recognition of a free-hand within that sphere is in itself, a sufficient
significance but this will have a taste of a very old era. I do not
wish to regard the present world hostility as merely a contest for
world supremacy or a contest for spheres of influence among the big
powers. It is insipid if the rising countries, Japan, Germany, Italy
and perhaps U.S.A., struggle for power against the old powers,
Great Britain, France and Russia.

It is also too simplistic to regard it as a racial feud between
the Anglo-Saxons and the Teutons or between the yellow race and the
white race. In brief, although this is a hackneyed expression, I believe
it must be regarded as a cultural rivalry or a battle of ideology. In
a word, it is a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism but
viewing it as an opposition of ideology and of culture, it signifies
a great revolution unprecedented in the history of mankind.

The ideology of modernism from the standpoint of cultural history in
the past several thousand years has seen many changes but since the
Greek era up to the present, the fundamental idea of the Occident has
always been based on individualism. The totalitarian idea has been
rejected for a long time during that period. Since such was the case
of the totalitarian movement started in Germany and Italy, it dates
back not only to the Grecian period but to the modern era of Japan. It can be said that it
is a return to the fundamental and healthy ideology of early mankind
which has been preserved and fostered with integrity since the founding
of Japan. It is for this reason that the totalitarianism of Germany
and Italy include much that is Japanese. In advocating the establishment
of the New Order in the Far East through the China Incident, Japan is
strongly emphasizing the ideals of GEMAYUKU, founding of the country/
spirit and H.770 ICHIU, and for this reason, it can be said that it
follows the same line of the New Order movement in Germany and Italy.

In Europe it is retrospective to days before the Grecian age and
in Japan, it is retrospective to the KAYO/T.W. age of 6-sy./
Therefore, I think it can be said that the New Order movement in the
East is a movement to restore the fundamental character of mankind. For this reason, British and European quarters are not
altogether wrong in identifying Japan, Germany and Italy under the
same category and calling them totalitarian countries alike. The
aforementioned coalition of the three countries is only natural when
seen from such a fundamental and ideological standpoint. Now, returning
to the realistic problems, separately, what kind of new culture will
Cruerly and Italy from in Europe? What will Japan do in the Greater East Asia Co-op? Furthermore, in the internal organization of the three countries, will they still take a similar type of political and constitutional path? Is it correct even to the general public and also as in response to Japan, there are evident problems of vital importance.

Recently in Japan, the New Order movement is becoming quite noticeable but today, it is the opinion of everyone that the G8PNOU must be reformed and that the underlying principle of the national structure should be clarified to revivify the structure for NEW-PNOU? (8.8.3, namely support or resistance). Furthermore, the problem is that we should be able to actually carry out the mechanism of politics and society which manifest the principle of national structure. The New Order that Germany and Italy is trying to form in Europe does not include only Germany and Italy, but the actual problem of the greatest importance is that to do with the political and constitutional structure of the other European countries. In regard to this, it is believed that today plans considerably definite have been drawn up by Germany and Italy. On the other hand, what form of New Order is Japan going to construct in the Greater East Asia? I think a clear and definite plan regarding the design of the New Order in Japan, which is to be the backbone of the New Order in Greater East Asia, must first be set forth.

4. Reform of the National Structure.

Now, if the ideological structure of the old order, which remains, are still much in evidence in Japan, at the left street, even the New Order in Greater East Asia ever be established? Assuming that it is possible, can such a New Order in Greater Asia exist in concert with the European New Order of Germany and Italy? I have been advising that the conversion of Foreign policy and the National New Order are indispensable. I therefore predict that under the present conditions, Japan’s alliance with Germany and Italy is irreversible. It is my desire that the people give this careful consideration.

In my opinion, the cause which activated the great world con- vention is clearly in the substantial of Liberalistic society. I have no particular respect for the historical civilizations of NE-X8, but I think that in any case, the necessities of concrete livelihood have been the cause of revolutions in human society. As long as the anti-Liberalistic revolutionary Germany of the Frank type is rampant.
and as long as the bumble accumulation of wealth is permitted to
fall into the hands of a small number of individuals, this earth
will still be the small one if enlarged five times or even ten times.

To make a long story short, a few of forty and fifty million
people control one-fourth of the world's territory and resources
and for the benefit of a small group of nations etc, they are being
exploited and the natural underground resources are lying unutilized,
unwanted from being utilized by others. Under such conditions, it
is inevitable that poverty pervades today in the aristocratic living
standard of mankind. To mitigate this inequality in the European
and Greater Asia countries be the principle contours of the New Order
mentioned in the Tripartite Pact. But if each is the case, the
requirements of the New New Order Treaty by the three powers concerned
must be first, to uphold the territories world wide and second,
based on this idea, to promote the system of exploitation of the
stronger preying upon the weaker. If the tyranny of Great Britain,
France and Italy is overthrown even if they arc overthrown, it
will degenerate to the heartless "Battle for Power" and will not
contribute to the civilization of mankind if the three countries are
going to succeed in doing the new thing. If that is the case, a
permanent world peace can never be gained.

5. Significance of FULF's Declaration.

Recently, Germany's Second Minister FULF stated that in
1921 Germany, the gold standard may not be used hereafter in the new
Europe. This is only not only a financial and economical problem
of the new Europe but also being indicative of the character of the
New Order itself. As I think it is necessary to recognize the significance of extreme
importance. If we consider how important a role gold played in this
to exploit the weak in the world heartless, we cannot over-
capitalize the importance of Mr. FULF's declaration.

If the New Order planed by Germany and Italy would pursue such
characteristics, the Old Order power, an alliance over from the
beginning of the declaration clear, will lose clearly the given
strong in opposition to all rich nations is. Now, with the evolution
of the Tripartite Pact by Japan, she is actually standing at the
crossroads of choosing one party or the other.

Since the HIROSHIMA Incident, in view of the policy Japan has
adopted and approved, out of regard for having advocated the high
ideals of establishing the Greater East New Order, actually Japan
should have nothing to curse her to be at loss as to her course of
action. But it seems that a portion of the people refuse to consider
the problem in that light. With the conclusion of the New Order Treaty,
is it not necessary for the government and the people to renew
their feelings in regard to world problems?
Speech of Sato, the Press Section Chief of the War Ministry

Concerning the Policy for the Disposition of the Incident, and Other Matters

The Outline of speech by Colonel KENRYO SATO, Chief of Press Section of the War Ministry (25 and 29 August 1938 at the 1st Conference Room of the Home Ministry during the extraordinary conference of the Chiefs of Police Departments).

The contents of the speeches by Colonel SATO on both occasion were generally the same, but the order is not necessarily identical. The contents may be somewhat different, but they were assembled and arranged, and the outline is recorded. The words are naturally my own, so notice is hereby given.

KUMAGAI (T.N. Seal)

Concerning the Policy for the Disposition of the Incident, and Other Matters

I believe that you men who are normally in leading positions in connection with the recognition of the aims of the Incident, and the maintenance of peace and order in every district during the present Incident, have questions about the supreme policy of the Government as regards the Incident, and have much dissatisfaction in carrying out your duties. I am in full sympathy with you, but the actual picture is such that even the Government is not sure of its policy for the Incident. I was given the same impressions from Divisional and Brigade commanders, and some of them hope for a clarification of a definite policy in regard to the Incident. However, this is an extremely difficult problem. If this were the case of the SINO-JAPANESE War (T.N. 1894-1895) it would have been sufficient to chase the CHINESE soldiers out of the KOREAN peninsula; and if it were the case of the RUSSO-JAPANESE War (T.N. 1904-1905), the object would be simple in that it would have been enough to sweep out the RUSSIAN influence from Southern MANCHuria and drive out the RUSSIAN troops. However, this Incident is quite different from the above, in that it is of an extremely complicated nature.
First of all the aims of this Incident are complicated, and changeable, and consequently the objects of the military operations are not clear. Even if the objects are clear:

1. The operational tactics on the continent.

2. The abnormal national conditions of CHINA. — She is not provided with a modern form of government. She is like an earthworm, in that she can be cut into parts, and the respective parts still remain alive.

3. CHINA has BRITAIN and SOVIET RUSSIA behind her; both of these nations secretly and openly are aiding CHINA, and are obstructing the progress of our military operations.

In spite of our policy of minimizing and settling locally the incident of the Marco Polo Bridge which caused the Incident in July of last year, the violence of the CHINESE troops did not cease. They successively brought about the PEIPING KUANG-JIN-TEH Incident and the OYAHA Incident in SHANGHAI. As a result our Government was forced to declare openly the intentions of the EMPIRE at 1:30 AM on August 15th. The gist is as follows:

"The EMPIRE has for a long time been hoping for an eternal peace in East Asia, and has long been making efforts for friendly SINO-JAPANESE cooperation. In spite of this, the NANKING Government has overestimated its own power and has underestimated the actual power of the EMPIRE. They have joined forces with the Red influence, opposing JAPAN and holding her in contempt, have become hostile to the EMPIRE. In recent years, they have caused several disgraceful incidents. Recently, they caused the disgraceful event at the YUNG-TING-HO River (the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) and dared to carry out atrocities against many JAPANESE residents in TUNG-CHOU which cannot be forgiven by man or God. They also endangered the lives and properties of the JAPANESE residents in Central and South CHINA, and our residents had to temporarily evacuate their peaceful homes which they built up over a long period of time.

However, the Empire patiently endured this and attempted to peacefully and locally settle the incident with a policy of minimizing the affair. She often advised the NANKING Government to cease its belligerent actions and not to obstruct the local settlement. However, it did not listen, and on the contrary, it prepared for war against us. In SHANGHAI they even planned to bomb our warships.

The situation being such, the EMPIRE's patience reached the limit, and we have been forced to take decisive measures in order
to chastise the violence of the Chinese troops and induce the Nanking Government to reflect upon its actions.

This measure is to exterminate the challenging anti-Japanese movement, and eliminate the causes of disgraceful events such as the ones which took place recently. At the same time, it attempts to realize a harmonious cooperation among the three nations, Japan, Turkey, and China, with no other motives, and it has no territorial designs. Etc.

The above statement may take the place of a declaration of war for the incident. Our aim at the time was not to crush China, but to chastise the tyrannical army, and induce the Nanking Government to make a grave reflection. The operational object is the Chinese Army. This is the important point which is different from the case of the Sino-Japanese War (T. N. 1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (T. N. 1904-1905) which were mentioned previously.

In this way, the aims of the incident were not clear, and were not thoroughly understood from the beginning. Demand that the Nanking Government make a grave reflection. That happens when they stubbornly refuse to reflect over their acts. As means of making them reflect over their acts, it is most important to make them recognize our true power by eliminating the British and Soviet support which are behind them; the British economic support and the Soviet military support. The above two nations could be compared to the SKIA which was behind KU-ISU. (T. N. Ancient Japanese History).

There were opinions to the effect that as an operation at the initial period of the incident, the clearing out of the PEIPING-TIENTSING area (between an all-out war and the minimizing of the affair), and an attack on the 29th Army, driving them south of the YUNG-TI-PHO River will serve to automatically solve the problems of CHI-TUNG (East Hopei) and CHI-PEI (North Hopei). However, the battle situation could not help but become gradually broader, resulting in our taking stepping-stone tactics such as the advance to PEIPING, SHIICHIACHANG, and SHANGHAI, the successive occupation of SHANGHAI and NANKING, and the successful landing at TSINGTIAN by the YAMAGATA Army Group.

I will briefly speak about our Army's war preparations. The ammunition which our Army prepared, with the Soviet Union in mind, was completely expended at the time of the LONCHEN attack during the TIENTSING campaign. In a war, great expenditures are required for operational material, chiefly in ammunition and aircraft. In viewing the capacity of aircraft, they only have a life of approximately one year. It is necessary to always adopt advanced scientific essence and to perfect superior equipments and their capacities. Furthermore, munitions are not only rost
important in combat, they are troublesome in that their effective life is limited. There is no example of any nation launching a war after completing the preparation of munitions. During the fight in SHANGHAI, we were exposed to danger because of a temporary exhaustion of ammunition. However, this was also because the ammunition was distributed to various sectors for operational purposes. At the present time, there is no need to worry, as the productive power of munitions has been increased. However, having started the war, we must always keep the SOVIET UNION in mind. We cannot predict when a full-scale clash against the SOVIET UNION, such as the old CHANGKUTENG Incident, might occur. It is definitely a forbidden thing to be optimistic, by believing the widely rumored SOVIET attitude toward JAPAN of "non-aggression". To consider a war against the SOVIET UNION, our present productive power is extremely insufficient. On the other hand, the conditions are such that we must worry about matters such as money exchange relations and imports of materials.

Next, I will speak about the EMIRE's declaration of January 16th of this year. Foreign Minister HIROT, asked the GERMAN ambassador for mediation in order to make CHING KAI SHEK surrender to JAPAN in accordance with the JAPANESE declaration of August 15th of last year which is mentioned in a previous paragraph. As far as we are concerned, we disclosed our intentions that we will not refuse peace if CHINA agrees to join in an Anti-Comintern agreement with JAPAN and MANCHUKUO. Towards the end of November, there was a question put to HIROT by the GERMAN ambassador as follows: "There is an indication that CHINA desires peace in accordance with the JAPANESE proposal. Is there any change in the former conditions?" It was towards the end of August that our country first carried out negotiations between HIROT and the GERMAN ambassador. This was before the capture of LOTEING. However, at the time towards the end of November, just prior to the capture of NANKING, great changes in the situation had already arisen, and it was evident that it was impossible to negotiate for peace based upon the former conditions.

Therefore, on December 22nd, HIROT answered the GERMAN ambassador as follows: "The conditions which CHINA already accepted can hardly be the basic conditions for peace, now that the situation has seen great changes. If CHINA agrees generally to the following principles, we are prepared for direct SINO-JAPANESE negotiations. If CHINA is opposed to this, we will deal with the Incident from a new standpoint. Etc."

Conditions.

I. That CHINA abandon her Pro-Comintern and Anti-JAPANESE-MANCHEKO policies, and cooperate with both JAPAN and MANCHUKUO on the Anti-Comintern policy.
II. That demilitarized zones be established in necessary areas, and that a special body (a broad autonomous system) be established in these areas.

III. That an intimate economic agreement be concluded between JAPAN, MANCHUKUO, and CHINA.

IV. That CHINA make necessary reparations to the EMPIRE.

We told him (T.N. the GERMANY Ambassador) to inform them (T.N. CHINA) that a reply must be made by the end of the year, and that an envoy be dispatched to JAPAN or SHANGHAI for the purpose of peace negotiations based upon the above conditions. However, the feeling was that the reply may be postponed until around the 10th of January of this year. The details of the aforementioned fundamental conditions which our Government had prepared are as follows:

Details:

I. CHINA must formally recognize MANCHUKUO.

II. CHINA must abandon her Anti-JAPANESE and Anti-MANCHUKUO policies.

III. CHINA must establish special zones in NORTH CHINA, and in INNER MONGOLIA.

(1) That in NORTH CHINA, an appropriate body will be established for the realization of co-existence and co-prosperity of JAPAN, MANCHUKUO, and CHINA. A broad power will be given to this body and economic cooperation will be especially realized.

(2) That in INNER MONGOLIA, an Anti-Conintern Autonomous Government will be established. Its international position will be the same as that of OUTER MONGOLIA.

IV. That CHINA establish an Anti-Conintern policy, and cooperate with both JAPAN and MANCHUKUO in carrying out the said policy.

V. That undefended zones be established in occupied areas in CENTRAL CHINA, and that in the Greater SHANGHAI area, JAPAN and CHINA cooperatively maintain peace and order, and make endeavors for economic progress.

VI. That JAPAN, MANCHUKUO, and CHINA conclude necessary agreements of customs, trade, air defense, and communications, with regard to the development of resources.
VII. That CHIN. make reparations to JAPAN. (There are oppositions even in our country.)

VIII. That the occupation by JAPANESE troops for a necessary period in established zones of NORTH CHIN. and INNER MONGOLIA for the purpose of security be recognized.

IX. That no artistic agreement will be concluded, until after the establishment of the above agreements.
Our Government harboured the secret intention of cancelling the terms relating to the stationing of troops as well as cooperating with and aiding the development of China in the event of the foregoing conditions being faithfully carried out by China. All of you will doubtless be conscious of these mild conditions and terms. There were also those who suspected their disapproval at the Chink Conference.

Not only did China not give any reply to the aforementioned principle on January of this year, but she failed to dispatch any envoy, thereby showing no signs whatsoever of her sincerity. A certain faction of our Government proposed from about the end of the year that a Council should be held in the Imperial Palace, which eventually led to the summoning of same on January 11th, when, I am given to understand, it was decided that, unless China should come forth and raise her hands up, a long-term contracted war should be waged.

It is said, however, that on or about January 14th or 15th, China gave a reply to the following effect: “China is prepared to engage in peace negotiations, but it is impossible to reply to the terms proposed by Japan due to their being too abstract, etc., etc.” As to then showing them the aforementioned detailed terms, such a thing would be inadmissible. The very fact that they are abstract conditions calls for the worth and necessity of negotiations.

The very fact that they are abstract conditions calls for the worth and necessity of negotiations.

The aforementioned above, finally led to the Declaration of January 16th. This Declaration appears to have been somewhat too belated since, roughly speaking, it should have been issued on the day of the Fall of Nanking or by the end of the year at the latest. That the Fall of Nanking—the Fall of the Emperor’s Capital City—did not give much help to the fall of Nanking externally is due to the Army Incident and the failure of issuing of this Declaration. One of the reasons for the failure in the Declaration was the difference of opinion within the Army in regard to the policy toward the T. W. China Incident, and due to the Konoji Incident, having been placed in the critical condition of a military collapse.

In view of China’s showing no signs of sincerity, as mentioned above, the Army people considered that, first of all, it was requisite to the Chink Emperor should be overthrown.

To this end a political campaign should be waged within the occupied territory. Generally speaking, this incident differs from both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars in that it is more of a political war than a war of military operations. Furthermore, as regards the raising of a political campaign in the occupied territory, that is, the building-up of a new regime, it had already been decided last autumn that, in the event of the Fall of Nanking, a new regime was to be set up in North China with Yang Kuo-min as the central figure. However,
This led to the Declaration of January 16th, which was rather poorly worded, and the or 1 announcement made subsequently by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet with the object of explaining the foregoing Declaration was so poor as to make the Declaration still more unclear. As for the original draft of the Declaration, now re-studied for about one month by one representative from each of the Foreign, War and Navy Ministries and clearly indicated our country's countermarch against the likely attitude that Chiang Kai-shek would be taking towards Japan subsequent to our country's non-recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek regime as the control regime. However, the said Declaration turned out to be such a failure as due to a fault of the original draft having been submitted to the Cabinet meeting on the ground that it was too lengthy. The Declaration was as follows:

Declaration

The Imperial Government has, ever since the Fall of Hankow, been patiently waiting until this day in order to give the Kuomintang Government of the free opportunity to reconsider matters. Failing, however, to grasp the Empire's true intentions, the Kuomintang Government is making its people suffer severe hardships by recklessly alarming resisting, and anti-foreign attitude to the whole of Japan. Therefore, the Imperial Government should, hereafter, not take notice of the Kuomintang Government, but will look forward to the formation and development of a new regime sufficiently able to truly cooperate with the Empire, and, by adjusting the diplomatic relations of both countries, shall cooperate in the construction of the re-born New China. There will be no change whatever in the Empire's policy in regards the occupying of Chinese territory and sovereignty as well as the rights and interests of foreign Powers in China. The Empire's responsibility as regards peace in East Asia has become his own all over. The Government cordially desires that the whole
"I'll cause themselves up still further for the end of accomplishing this important task."

The draft of the Declaration of January 16th, the full text of which was as follows:

(1) The non-recognition of the Chinese K'ee-shih regime as the central regime, implying merely that the said regime shall not be considered sufficiently qualified for negotiations in general as well as in local matters.

(2) The setting-up of a new regime, towards which our country shall be moving in order to aid.

However, it is inadvisable that it does not clearly specify our attitude in the event of the present Hanhoir regime, i. e., Ch'ing K'ee-shih, either surrendering to our forces or refusing to rise up or being under any circumstances, as duly notified, these points were deleted in the original draft. Although it would of course not be right to treat the restored Hanhoir regime as the central regime in the event of such surrendering to us, the question still arises as to whether it would be in order to treat it as a pro-Japanese local regime. This is a point that should be studied by the members of the Five-Power Council.

Furthermore, although the wording in the original draft reads: "We shall not deal with the Hanhoir Government hereafter" and "The Hanhoir Government shall not be recognized hereafter", the said portion was cancelled as a result of the opposition by the Foreign Ministry. The draft reads: "As the Hanhoir Government that has been restored from Hanhoir, the central city, is considered to have lost its substance as the Central Government, we shall not deal with it hereafter in the settlement of the Incident."

As for the Chinese reaction towards the Declaration, China expressed her attitude as follows: "Our reply to Japan does not imply the avoidance of any negotiations. Our Government has only altered the terms. In such a matter we consulted in China due to the absence being rights of interests of foreign countries, and merely asked for Japan's concrete terms. Peace with Japan is the desire of the Chinese, etc., etc., but this is considered as a trick on Japan's part in order to hold her future diplomatic vigor firmly."

Or dwelling next upon the future outlook after the fall of Hanhoir, it must be said that there is nothing more difficult than making a reliable forecast of this point. There was nobody about a year ago who, for a moment, had imagined that our army would be advancing their forces for the
Consequently, thou hast not yet call it a forecast, it will probably, any rate, not be in the distant future that the main part time will be spent in the end of my, etc. This, however, does not by any means imply the complete extinction of the incident.

Dr. answer to the question of the attitude to be adopted by us on the occasion of to whether China Kei-shok will surrender or not after the fall of Hankow:

(1) In the event of not surrendering, it would become an anti-Japanese local regime, but it is doubtful as to whether it would be advisable for our forces to give the coup de grace by pursuing, unless to the bitter end.

(2) In case of surrender, something imply that China Kei-shok must resign from his government post unconditionally, at the same time resuming his pro-Government and anti-Japanese policy as well as certain time in our anti-Government post.

In such a case the question will rise as to what means and measures should be taken to unite the present pro-Japanese regime in North and Central China—which are too insignificant for comparison with the Hanko regime—with the so-called pro-Japanese regime to be newly born at Hankow. There may be various suppositions, such as adopting the form of setting-up autonomous governments of the Federal provinces, or the establishment of a regime sufficiently powerful to include all of these, etc. Any rate, the most opportune time for realizing the establishment of a Central Government could be after the fall of Hankow. In doing so, however, a person should endeavor universal popularity in Central and South China should be made the central figure for calling out to the world throughout China, and contrary to the case of Manchoukuo, the Empire /U.S. Resident shall assume a guiding position to the last without having any direct control over the Central Government post. (This represents the wish of China generally decided at a Japanese White Conference at the end of last year).

As for our country's policy towards North and Central China, after placing North China under the complete control of the Empire, the same degree as Manchoukuo—and asking some part of the Japanese-Manchouko-Chinese natural defense worse, it will be necessary to develop the resources for new defense purposes. As for Central China, which is of somewhat larger importance than North China, it will be necessary to make some into an important base mainly for the sake of the development of our economic influence, so as to safeguard our line in North China. It regards Inner Mongolia, as is, similar to North China, a zone for the sake of checking
Comintern, and it shall be necessary to apply the self-governing system to
areas. Furthermore, it is only natural to station troops at necessary places,
who should undertake the task of preserving public order and order together
with the Chinese army police body known as "Ho-ong" (Ho-ong
Preservation Corps), as it is customary in China, for patrols to be held
unerringly by bandits. It goes without saying that, by taking a war against Soviet Russia into consideration, it is necessary to secure
Inner Mongolia, but it would be highly inappropriate for us to suddenly start
a war with Soviet Russia from our side at present in view of the fact that
our forces against China and Soviet Russia would have to be split in two, so
that we would have to choose the right opportunity in the midst of our
becoming forced to fight. Moreover, this must not be until after the war
preparations and productive power have been simplified—after 1942—for the
said purpose.

Coming now to diplomacy, it is most essential to make Britain promptly
off her relations with China Ki-shek by recognizing her rights and
interests to a certain degree, as well as to solidify the Anti-Comintern
 Pact with Germany and Italy still further.

The next most important problem in our domestic policy for the sake
of carrying out the so-called Continental Policy towards China. In order
to carry the designs of the Fourier/1. N. J. San/ who has already started on the movement of manchuria, to get in our hands into the China Continent, requires
the people to become properly armed up. One of the reasons why our colonial
city has been always unsuccessful is due to the lack of the actual
strength, especially the productive power, of the mother country.
One of the recent incidents may be seen in the case of South Manchuria
following the Russo-Japanese War, which was eventually followed by the
Manchurian Incident due to the Empire/1. N. J. San/ not having been able to
manage South Manchuria properly at the time due to our productive
power failing to keep up accordingly. But were the results of the
Siberian Expedition and the advance of our forces to Baikal? These also
not with a similar fate.

The conversion of industrial management—from the free to the control
system—must not be of a temporary nature. For the sake of the development
of our people it is absolutely impossible to attain our object through free
economy. This can be efficiently achieved only by the state of
enforcement of the General Mobilization Law.

It may appear as diverging from the main issue, but if, in connection
with the recent Incident, the General Mobilization Law had been put into
force six months before the commencement of hostilities, the operations could
have been placed in an extremely advantageous position. In reality, of course, this was an impossibility. In regard to the Russo-Japanese War, the people had already set up their minds after the Sino-Japanese War that the war with Soviet Russia is vitally important. General Lieutenant-Colonel (an official in the War Ministry connected with mobilization who did not rise to a major-general), had strongly advocated the need of enacting a bill concerning similar contents of the present General Mobilization Law already in June 1903 (six months before the commencement of hostilities). I think that this was quite so.

As for the recent Incident, an Imperial Ordinance pertaining to the enforcement of part of the General Mobilization Law was promulgated in August last year, but due to the National Intelligence Bureau being imperfect in structure (not an executive institution) as well there being some hitch in its relationship with the Planning Board, a revised structure of the troops eventually organized on October 25. The consequences of things can be furthermore seen from the fact that the Industry Mobilization Law was passed at the Special Diet session in September and it was only in January this year that the Factory Control Ordinance (an Imperial Ordinance) was finally issued.

Coming back to the main issue, there are various domestic problems, such as the questions of political parties and the Central League of National Spiritual General Mobilization that require reform. Together with the political structure, some can be achieved through the medium of a Pan-Asiatic movement (racial movement) the future of our youth is of vital importance.

Furthermore, the news was published in the papers that relief troops would be returning home in about February this year, and although it is true that the news of the troops have returned back to Japan, the fact that there has subsequently been some mobilization in small numbers compared to those that were being emptied out to the widespread of measure among the general public that this mobilization is due to the commencement of hostilities with Soviet Russia. In this connection I wish to report that the sending of some of the first and second reserve troops back to Japan was decided upon due to theArmy opinion that, rather than consistently applying pressure on the Chinese which might possibly have the reverse effect of consolidating their unity, it would, in order to create an opportunity for their internal collapse, be more advisable to report to the strategy of a daily looking on for while after the capture of such called city. This plan, however, died a natural death later on due to the necessity of changing tactics although the setting-up of the Military Order on the Declaration of January 16th also had something to do with this, it so happens that, in
The gross inconveniences caused by the interlinking of the pro-Japanese regimes in North and Central China being obstructed at Suchow, a strategic point on the Tsingtau-Fukien Railway, the attack on Suchow—the capture of which was not originally scheduled—was carried out in order to effect the said junction. However, while on one hand, it was deemed necessary to deal a blow on the Chiang regime by occupying some important strategic point in view of the fact that there was absolutely no cooperation between the pro-Japanese regimes and the Chiang regime, it became, on the other hand, necessary to strengthen the anti-Japanese regime, thereby resulting in the need of a large number of troops, which naturally brought about a change in the question of relief troops as mentioned above.

In conclusion, as regards the rumours regarding peace negotiations, although there are talks that Britain and Germany may venture to act as mediators between Japan and China, the Empire's fundamental attitude towards the incident is, as duly mentioned, indicated by the Declaration of January 16th. The circumstances that led up to the said rumour appear to be that, in view of the necessity of reducing this year's scheduled imports value from 3,000,000,000 to around 2,500,000,000 or 2,600,000,000 due to the trade depression revealed in the statistics for the first quarter of this year—Janurary to March—due to the strengthening of economic control as well as the enforcement thereof, rumours began to float about that the two Cabinet Ministers of ICHIBAN and KIMIZUMI were giving the question of concluding peace negotiations their serious consideration. However, I do not know about the verity of the said report.

I think that our country still has a budget too require enormous expenditures, and, in addition to tiding over the crisis by being prepared for an increase in Army munitions and industries, we should not negotiate about peace from our side.

Chiang Kai-shek had a certain person come to Japan recently in order to spy out on our peace negotiations, and the said party seems to be plotting (planning) something on the strength of the above-mentioned details. Judging from his manner, the attitude of the Chinese is said to be

(1) The anti-Japanese policy shall be abandoned.
(2) Nanking shall be recognized in actuality.
(3) The autonomy of Inner Mongolia shall be recognized.
(4) The establishing of non-fortified zones in North and Central China is opposed.
(5) The stationing of Japanese forces is opposed.

(6) Immediate participation in the Anti-Comintern Pact is opposed.

(7) The anti-Comintern policy is approved.

(8) Severance from the Communist Party is acceptable.

(9) Desire to be excused from reservations.

(10) Economic development is acceptable.

(11) Resignation of Ching K'ei-ch'ik from his governmental post after the conclusion of peace.

The verity of the foregoing cannot, of course, be ascertained, but it is only natural for our Cabinet council not to lend its ear to such an absolutely selfish attitude as to omit the points that Japan is sensibly after and, to make matters worse, to also desire the conclusion of an agreement according to China's wishes as above prior to the capture of Hankow.

In conclusion I beg to again report that the Declaration of January 16th constituting an amendment of the Declaration of August 15th last year--forms the basis of our attitude towards the Incident, and although, depending upon changes in conditions and circumstances, slight changes may possibly be made in the future, I am of the opinion that the point concerning the setting-up of a "neutral" region should on no account be changed.

/3. S. The three Chinese characters in red at the bottom of the right side of the original form imply the END OF TEXT/
C. El. 11 r i C i. 1 È
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i.ivi hentlclty

I, B. H. A. K. N. O. C. (Japanese characters) hereby certify
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in
the following capacity: FLOD CLJ'S OFFICIAL, K.O. L. IN. T. (Japanese characters) and that as such official I have custody
of the document here attached consisting of 62 pages, dated
29 August, 1938, and described as follows - "FLIC No.
100-8, B. L. O. M. C. L. II. (Japanese characters), I further certify
that the attached record and document is an official document
of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official
archives and files of the following named ministry or department
(specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any
other official designation of the regular location of the document
in the archives or files): A. T. I. (Japanese characters)

Signed at TOKYO on this
third day of January, 1947. (fge) ShIp/Ta KOSA'IUOC
(Japanese characters)
Signature of official

Witness: MAUCH MAJ. (Japanese characters) (fge)
Official Capacity

I, I. C. . P. I. L. . . . . (Japanese characters), hereby certify
that I am associated with the
General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from
the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the
course of my official business.

Signed at TOKYO on this
H.L.
Investigator, I. . S.
Official Capacity

Witness: Douglas L. J. (fge)
Chief, Inv. Div.
I. . I. . . .
无
新興政権の成立発展を期待し、是と両国に交渉
整して更生新文部の建設に協力せしめ、元来帝
国が支那、領土及び権益等在支列国間の權益を尊
重するために必要なる事項及び挍の貴重な所為、今々東亜平
和に対する帝国の責任を重ねし政府は国民が此
重大なる仕事遂行を為しる故、發奮を誓証

以上

第一案例石政権を中央政権としての承認
西の講知交渉の相手方とさせる意。
第二案例石政権の建設のに對し我國が援助を唱
まる意。

高等明中之、爾後國民政府同相手とせしの原案
為陸軍案において爾後中央政府と認
明日明中之、爾後國民政府を相手とせずの原案
為陸軍案において爾後中央政府と認

①/1840

No 12
日本では、国産米の製造が非常に重要です。米の製造は、天候に大きく影響され、豊作の年と荒れた年があるため、米の価格は大きく変動します。また、米の品質も地域により異なるため、米の選び方にも注意が必要です。

米の製造には、種の選定、水管理、肥料の管理などが重要です。種の選定は、栽培環境に合った種を選ぶことが大切です。水管理は、適度の水分を保つことが重要であり、肥料の管理は、米の品質を決定する要素の一つです。

米の製造は、日本文化の一部であり、地域の特産品として知られています。米の製造は、日本農業の基盤であり、日本経済の柱の一つです。
是的，很明显。如果您需要，我会在这里等待。
我们正在努力发展现代化农业，努力实现农业现代化的目标。
1840

17
1840.

19
権威者

「えっ、えっ、えっ」。

尾張総領

権威者

名古屋市

1840年

SHIBATA KOSABURO

昭和五十年

尾張総領

権威者

名古屋市

1840年
公文入込図示

2.

Doc. 1840 (cont.)
Excerpts from a statement made by Major General Kenryo Sato, head of the Bureau of Military Affairs and a Government Delegate at the Joint Committee Meeting of the 79th Session of the House of Representatives — February 10th, 1942.

Excerpts from page 137 of "Full Report on Proceedings — Record of Proceedings of the Committee Meeting in the House of Representatives — Volume 8, No. 79".

"I believe that the people must, to a certain degree, be made to thoroughly understand the gist of how this Greater East Asia War is being directed, what the outcome of its progress will be, as well as the concrete perspective of its development, and to thereby consolidate their faith in certain victory arising therefrom."

"The war will be fought through until both the United States and Britain are brought down to their knees."
Source and Authenticity

I, Shichiro Murai, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Cabinet Secretary, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached, and describe as follows: Summary of Minutes in 71 session, the House of Representatives (No. 77, Band 8). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): File 2630177, the House of Representatives.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of December, 1946

/s/ Shichiro Murai
Signature of Official

(Sec. 1)

Witness: K. Hiramatsu
Cabinet Secretary
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, J. H. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above named official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of Dec. 1946

/s/ J. H. Curtis, 2d Lt.
N.W.

Witness: /s/ R. H. Lerm
Investigator, JPS
Official Capacity
Excerpt from Statement Made by Major General Kenryo Sato at Public Committee Meeting of the 81st Session of the Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, February 19, 1943.

Just as the Prime Minister had been stating previously, there is no change in the general policy of dealing, resolutely with anyone who carries on arguments which hinder the execution of the war in any way, regardless of their positions or ranks. However, as you know, recently, various information is a-corning concerning peace talks, ANGLO-GERMAN peace, SOVIET-GERMAN peace, etc., in accordance with the changes in the world situation. I do not have the right to bring up each of these points at the present time, but when we investigate the general source from which they come, we find that they are due to enemy propaganda. Therefore, if there are people who believe such propaganda and repeat them, it is as if they are double-crossing not only the soldiers on the front line, but also the people in the production front at home. They will be resolutely dealt with.
CERTIFICATE

I, Shichiro Murai, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Cabinet Secretary, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached and described as follows: Minutes of Minutes in 81 session, the House of Representatives (X. 81. 3 Bond). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): File 2639181, the House of Representatives.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of December, 1946
/s/ Shichiro Murai
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ K. Hiramatsu
Cabinet Secretary
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, J. A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of December, 1946
/s/ J. A. Curtis
Investigator, DSS
Official Capacity

Witness: Henry Shimijima
2.
File No. 176, Serial 50.

Extracts from Interrogation of
SATO, Kenro

27 April 1946, Para 2.

A. In 1937 I was promoted to Lt. Col., still serving in the War Service Bureau. In August of 1938 I was promoted to Col. and served as the Army spokesman. This duty included the making of news releases. In December 1938 I became Professor in the Army Air Corps School at Hamamatsu. In May of 1939 I became a Staff Officer for the South China Expeditionary Force.

In March of 1941 I returned to the War Department, becoming Chief of the War Service Section of the War Service Bureau, being promoted to the rank of Major General in October of the same year. In April of 1942 I became Chief of the War Service Bureau. In December of 1944 I became Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force. The Chief of Staff were: 1. MATSUM, Takuro, Lt. Gen.; 2. TOYAYASHI, Aramakuro, Lt. Gen. The Commander of the Force was OCMITA, Toji, Gen.

In March of 1945 I was promoted to Lt. Gen.; and in April of 1945 I became Commander of the 57th Division stationed in Indo China. The division subsequently was ordered to Thailand, where I remained until the end of the war.

Q. How long have you known General TOJO?
A. I first met TOJO when I was a student in the Army War College and TOJO became a professor (Lt. Col.). I studied war history under TOJO for one year. Then later I again met TOJO when he was Vice Minister of War and worked around him for a period of five months while I was the Army Spokesman. I have known him quite well. I have judged him to be a very sincere person, which I first realized when I was sent abroad as language officer. TOJO took good care of my family during that period.

Q. Did General TOJO appoint you to the position in the War Ministry as head of the Military Affairs Bureau? (Q. by Interpreter: Of the Bureau or the Section? A. by Interrogator: Bureau.)
A. Yes, in March of the War Minister made the appointments, TOJO appointed me.
Q. Under an ordinance, your Bureau made the plans for all
Prisoner of War Camps in Japan, the construction of
buildings, etc., did they not?
A. The policies regarding prisoners of war were determined in
the Prisoners of War Section. The actual design of the
camps and budget concerns were through my Bureau. The
administration was handled by another Bureau.

Q. The correspondence from protecting powers, for example,
from the State, in connection with United States prisoners
of war held by Japan passed through your Bureau, did it
not?
A. They, after obtaining permission from the Foreign Office,
dealt only with the Prisoners of War Section, Prisoners
of War Information. Only where it concerned me did they
have to contact our office.

Q. I understood you to say that your Bureau handled matters
involving foreign affairs. Is that true?
A. Yes, our Bureau did handle foreign affairs where they con-
cerned the Army directly. For example, when negotiations
were under way with the United States, any replies from
the United States came through the Foreign Office to the
War Minister, and inasmuch as any decisions would affect
the Army we were notified. In cases of prisoners of war,
this matter was specifically set aside for the Prisoners
of War Section. Such things as removal of fortifications
came to us, although they also went to the Kokushikoku
(Military Service Bureau). For instance, when the Red
Cross wanted to speak to us about the prisoners of war,
they went through the Prisoners of War Section, and where
it concerned medicine from there were referred to the
Medical Bureau.

......
Q. Well, you could say, 'could you not, that the Chief of the Military Affaires Bureau is probably the third most important member of the military establishment. There is the Minister of War, the Chief of Staff, and then comes the Chief of the Military Affaires Bureau - that is conceded, is it not?

A. First I would like to explain that according to the Japanese Constitution, the War Ministry and the General Staff are completely independent and subservient to the Emperor. The Chief of the Military Affaires Bureau and the Chief of Operations in the General Staff are equivalent in their respective fields.

Q. Do you recall who was Chief of Staff at the time the determination was made to try by court martial the Doolittle flyers who were apprehended?

A. SUGIYAMA was the Chief of Staff.

Q. Who made the determination that the Doolittle flyers who were apprehended were to be tried by court martial?

A. It was decided, I believe, by the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War in conference. However, I do not remember very clearly.
Extracts from Interrogation of
SATO, KAWYO

29 April 1946, Page 7, C. 9, 10

Q. It is true, is it not, General, that the rules in
connection with the treatment of prisoners of war were
drawn up in conference between the General Staff and the
Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau? (Q. by Gen.
SATO: Are you applying that directly to the Doolittle
flyers? A. by Interrogator: No, just in general.)

A. As I said the other day, matters pertaining to the
prisoners of war come to the various Bureaus concerned;
that is such as something affecting the budget would come
through the office, things involving medical matters would
go through the Medical Affairs Bureau, and so on.

Q. That does not answer my question. (Question repeated.)

A. The rules were drawn up between the General Staff and the
War Ministry, under the War Ministry. The individual rules
were drawn up by the various Bureaus.

Q. And the military affairs bureau had their part in the
drafting of those rules, did they not?
A. Yes, they were involved in a part of those rules.

Q. As a matter of rest, you made the recommendation, did you
not, as Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, to the War
Minister as to what the rules should be?
A. Yes, matters concerning my office. There were also others
which were passed as an order from the War Minister.

Q. General TOJO on the 28th of March this year stated that
the rules regarding the treatment of prisoners of war were
the result of conferences between the Chief of the Military
Affairs Bureau and the General Staff. Is that statement
true or false?
A. That is not true. It must have been mistaken, inasmuch
as positions of equal level would meet directly. The
Chief of Staff would not meet with the Chief of Military
Affairs Bureau, but with the War Minister. A Chief of
Section in the General Staff could meet with a Chief of
Section in the War Ministry.

Q. I did not say that the Chief of Bureau of Military Affairs
met with the Chief of Staff. That was the statement
General TOJO made. The statement that he made was that
the rules regarding treatment of prisoners of war were the
result of conferences between the General Staff and the
Chief of Military Affairs Bureau. Now is that true?
A. That is possible.
Q. Then did you serve, General, in Indo China?
A. From April 1945 until the end of the war.

Q. Had you ever served in that territory before in any capacity?
A. In the summer of 1940 I went to Indo China as Staff Office of the China Expeditionary Force.

Q. You were Assistant Chief of Staff of the Expeditionary Force, were you?
A. Yes, Assistant Chief of Staff.

Q. What did you have to do with a bill known as the National Total Mobilization Act?
A. At that time I was a member of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry. My connection with that came about in the following manner. The General mobilization law first was a matter of the Cabinet; on the side of the military it was the job of the Mobilization Plan Bureau. As the time came for the bill to be presented to the Diet, it became a matter of the Military Affairs Bureau.

Q. You made a report on the bill in behalf of the War Ministry to the Diet, did you not?
A. The actual report was made by the Premier. My capacity was to explain the bill to the Diet. There are three different positions which are involved in the presentation of a bill to the Diet, of which the person giving the explanation is the third in rank.

Q. You had some disagreement at that time with a man named MIYAVATI, Choichi, did you not?
A. Yes.

Q. And in the course of your talk in explanation of the bill you told him to "shut up" did you not?
A. Yes.

Q. They called you "Shut up 3:30" after that, did they not?
A. There were a lot of rifts on that thing, so I would like to give an explanation if you have time.

Q. Go ahead.
A. The General Mobilization Law was presented in February 1936 to the KOKUYO Cabinet. At that time the Diet planned to take the following three measures: 1. Force the resignation of the Cabinet; 2. stop passage of an electric power generation law which was disliked very much by the public; 3. eliminate all existing political parties and
establish new points. Although the objectives of the three movements were different, the brokers of the movements were united in their expectation of a collision between the Diet and the government. The Diet members were in hopes that this collision could first be obtained through the General Mobilization Law.

At that time Japan was in the midst of the China Incident. In December 1937 Japan attempted to obtain peace with Chiang Kai-shek through the Korean ambassador, and in January of 1938 it was realized that there was no hope of a quick settlement. Thus it became obvious that the General Mobilization Law was a necessity. However, the three movements mentioned before were causing undue opposition by the government to the General Mobilization Law. I was in this situation in the Diet, due to the conflict. We were using enormous quantities of petroil, however, we couldn't replace it. The capitalists opposed necessary increase in production facilities, the reason being that the capitalists were expecting a short war. Thus, at the conclusion of the war any investments in increased facilities would be a complete loss. In the last war there was considerable loss incurred on the part of capital, as they had no enormous increase in production facilities. I do not blame the capitalists for their stand. However, they put the Army in a difficult position. The enterprises, who are dependent on capital, would have built plants based on orders from the Army, but at the conclusion of the war, with the lack of orders, all the investments would have been a total loss. It was therefore necessary to protect the enterprises from such danger. Under the General Mobilization Law the government could administer all such war industries, and in case of the sudden cessation of hostilities the government would also take the responsibility of reimbursing any enterprises who would thus be caught short. Therefore, the General Mobilization Law was a necessity not only for the sake of the Army, but also for the capitalists.

The Diet would not look at the General Mobilization Law in this light and, due to the previously mentioned three movements, put up unnecessary objections to the law. Because of this opposition I felt very sad. The government was unable to explain this militarily to the Diet and of those present before the Diet I was the only person capable of explaining the implication of the law. Therefore, I was hoping to be given an adequate chance to explain the bill before the Diet. However, since I was only the "explaining" I did not have the power to go ahead on my own initiative, and finally on the 26th of February I was told by the Diet that I could present my
explanation as the "explainer". It was at this point that I stood up to give my explanation. Of the explanations given up to that time I feel sincerely that mine was the most powerful one given.
Q. In 1940 after TOG became Minister of War he recalled you from South China, did he not, and you were made Chief of the Military Affairs Section?  
A. I became the Chief of the Military Affairs Section in March of 1943.

Q. That was immediately after your recall from South Indo China?  
A. Yes, I was there or I frequently had to go down to Indo China on my own from South China. During my stay with the South China Expeditionary Forces I went to Indo China three or four times, remaining only a week or ten days at a time.

Q. As Chief of the Military Affairs Section and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, you were in accord with the policies of the Minister of War, were you not?  
A. Yes, I was in agreement with the policy of the Minister of War.

Q. When was it that the Japanese troops invaded Indo China?  
A. The first entry was made into North Indo China in September or October of 1940. At that time I was a Staff Officer with the South China Expeditionary Force. The second invasion was made into South Indo China in July of 1941. At that time I was the Chief of the Military Affairs Section.

Q. Did you consider that invasion of South Indo China necessary?  
A. I don't think it could be helped, the reason being that Japan was undergoing hardships in regard to the supply of rubber.

Q. You were familiar with the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the Briand-Kellogg Non-Intervention Pact, were you not?  
A. Yes.

Q. You realize that such invasion was in violation of the provisions of both the Nine Power Treaty and the Briand-Kellogg Non-Intervention Pact, do you not?  
A. I do not consider it as such.
Q. During the time you served in the War Ministry under General TOJO you frequently consulted with him, did you not?
A. Yes, after I became Chief of the Bureau; while Chief of the Section I dealt with the Chief of the Bureau.

Q. Who was the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau before you succeeded to that position?
A. TOJO.

Q. And you and TOJO were in accord on your policies, were you not?
A. Yes and no.

Q. Can you say "yes" or "no"?
A. "TOJO felt that the nominations for candidates for the Diet were proper. However, I disagreed with him on that point."
Q. I am going to read you a statement here and ask you if it is true:

"The rules and regulations regarding prisoners of war were assembled by the Military Affairs Bureau in conference with the Prisoners Information Bureau and Chiefs of Staff and then presented to the 'war' Minister for approval. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the main figure in the promulgation of these rules and regulations. The policy for the handling of prisoners of war emanated from the Military Affairs Bureau and the actual handling of the prisoners of war was performed by the Prisoners Information Bureau on down through to the Field Commanders. Although the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau participated in the making of the policies for the handling of war prisoners, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the higher authority as exemplified by the fact that if the Chief of the Information Bureau came to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau with a plan and it was disapproved by the latter the normal procedure would be to forget the plan there and then because of the position maintained in the Army by the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau plus the fact that he was always in close connection with the 'war' Minister. However, under such circumstances if the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau was insistent that his plan, disapproved by the Military Affairs Chief, be carried through then both parties could present the matter to the 'war' Minister for determination."

A. The statement is in part true, but Chiefs of various other Bureaus concerned are omitted from this record and they actually too part in the conferences depending on the point under discussion. As to the reference of a main figure in the promulgation of rules and regulations, I believe the statement is wrong. The main figure depends only on the matter concerned. You may go through the 'war' Ministry records and notice the signatures. At times the Prisoners Administration Bureau was the main figure, at times the Military Affairs Bureau. However, this all depends on the matter under consideration. I disagree with the statement that the Military Affairs Bureau Chief was a higher authority. The mention that the normal procedure was to forget the plan was only if the Chief of the Information Bureau was in accord finally with the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Also the reference that the Chiefs of both
Bureaucrats could present the matter to the War Minister is incorrect. The Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau had direct access to the War Minister and could see him without the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Final determination rested with the War Minister.

Q. It is true, is it not, General, that the actual promulgation of the rules regarding prisoners of war, the publication of them, was done by the Military Affairs Bureau?

A. The promulgation is done by the Vice Minister of War.

Q. It is further stated, General, that when a complaint was received as to the mistreatment of prisoners of war from the International Red Cross the following procedure was in force: The complaint was received in the Foreign Office and referred to the Military Affairs Section, a division of the Military Affairs Bureau. The head of the Military Affairs Section then took the complaint up with the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau and as a result of this conference a plan was drawn up to meet the alleged complaint. This plan was presented to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and if approved by him in turn taken to the War Minister for approval. The Military Affairs Section was the door through which all outside complaints came to the War Minister. The International Red Cross, however, could have the right to go directly to the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau with a complaint, but in such an instance the Information Bureau Chief could confer with the head of the Military Affairs Section and the procedure which I have just outlined could be followed.

A. First, I am not sure, but I had been under the impression that complaints regarding prisoners first went through the Prisoners Information Bureau. However, the statement may be correct. Any plans which have been drawn up between the Prisoners Information Bureau and the Military Affairs Section could go back to the Minister directly from the Prisoners of War Bureau or the Military Affairs Bureau. It purely depended on the nature of the plan which was drawn up to meet the complaint. I think that a plan had to be approved by the War Minister it must have gone through the Prisoners of War Administrative Bureau, inasmuch as I have never had to take anything to the War Minister.

Q. Do you mean in connection with prisoners of war, or at any time?

A. Yes, in reference to prisoners and complaints by the Red Cross.

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[Handwritten text in Chinese, not legible]
言，

问：

答：

...
2887
 обеспечение пожарной безопасности на производстве.

Все это говорит о том, что вопросы безопасности труда и пожарной безопасности являются приоритетными для руководства предприятия.

На заседании были рассмотрены следующие вопросы:

1. Утверждение нового инструктажа по пожарной безопасности.
2. Осуществление мероприятий по усилению охраны труда.
3. Проведение профилактических осмотров оборудования.
4. Установление сотрудников на работу с повышенными рисками.

Всё вышеперечисленное направлено на обеспечение безопасности труда и охраны жизни персонала предприятия.
Extract from
Interrogation of WURO, Akira
Dated 15 April 1946

Q. Is it not true that LOSHINO and OKA, as well as yourself, supported the decision of the Liaison Conference to wage war against the United States?

A. You can call it that, although it wasn't our position to decide one war or the other.

Q. You did nothing on your part to avert the decision to wage war, did you?

A. I did not oppose it.

Q. Isn't it true that the Military Affairs Bureau is consulted by the Army General Staff for its advice and also consultation in regard to the necessary preparations to wage war?

A. It may be put that way, but what actually happens is that the General Staff says such and such will be necessary and we advise them whether it can be procured or not.

Q. Who was the higher categorical authority in the scheme of things in Japan, the Chief of the General Staff or the War Minister himself?

A. The Chief of the General Staff.

Q. Is it not true that the General Staff always acquainted the War Ministry with any operations in order that the War Ministry could formulate a sound policy?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it not also true that in order to accomplish effectively a given mission, that the Navy Ministry and the War Ministry establish a Liaison in order to coordinate their efforts?
A. Yes.

Q. Was not OKA of the Navy Affairs Bureau and you of the Military Affairs Bureau the Liaison between the army and the navy?

A. Yes, questions by Mr. Lopez:

Q. And precisely OKA and you were present all the time in the Liaison Conference in order to avoid any misunderstanding of action and to coordinate the efforts of both the army and the navy, together with the Minister of Finance, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of State, and the Prime Minister himself?

A. Yes.

Q. And during your incumbency as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, you were closely associated with OKA by the very nature of both of your offices—liaison between the Army and the Navy?

A. Yes.

* * *

Page 20

Q. You had a hand in preparing the declaration of war?

A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact, you collaborated in the preparation of that declaration of war with Mr. Togo and OKA?

A. The Cabinet—that is to say, Minister Togo wrote one up and so did OKA, and I also prepared a draft. The three of them were put together and the final one was decided upon.

Q. How many hours in the way did you give the United States to answer the ultimatum before attacking?

A. The time was decided upon by the Navy General Staff. I do not recall what time limit we gave the United States after the ultimatum.

Q. You mean to say that the Cabinet gave the General Staff that power?
A. The Navy General Staff figured out when their operations would take place and then notified the Liaison Conference of the time in hours at which the United States could be notified.

Q. But the fact of the matter was that you, Mr. Togo and Mr. Oku collaborated in the drafting of the final note?
A. Yes, and the final dispatching of the communication was left to the Foreign Office.

Q. Let us get this straight for the sake of posterity. You prepared your own draft; Mr. Togo also prepared his own draft; and Mr. Oku also prepared his. After each one of you prepared an individual draft, the three of you huddled together and drafted the final draft, is that it?
A. I am sorry. What I thought you meant by declaration of war was the speech which the Emperor gave. This was prepared by me and the others. The actual ultimatum was drafted by the Foreign Office.

Q. You mean to say that the Imperial Despatch was prepared by you and others?
A. Yes. That was the thing that we drew up and brought before the Liaison Conference where changes were made and the final draft was settled upon.

Q. When the document which you terms to be an ultimatum to the United States, which you claim to have been prepared only by the Foreign Ministry, was that document ever shown to the War Ministry or to you for consultation as to whether it was agreeable to your office?
A. Yes.

Q. Of course, it was agreeable to you before it was sent, otherwise it would not have been sent?
A. Yes.

Q. You practically OK'd it?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you offer any suggestion, correction on the draft as submitted to you by the Foreign Ministry?
A. I have no recollection.

Q. But you recall that you approved it?
A. Yes.
1月21日付日付目付日

資料倉庫、調査

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No.1
第6頁

問及陸軍軍務局両者外務大臣日下同宣戦布告作成第四条

署名

第4条

問及陸軍軍務局両者外務大臣日下同宣戦布告作成第四条

署名
No. 3

Doc. 4108

答

内閣にて東郷大臣に通報せられた同様の内容

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問

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海軍軍令部ハノ行動ヲ行ハレキ時ヲ決シタ

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合衆國ヲ通告ヲ速ケヲ差支ヘナイド前何時カ

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貴下ニ東郷氏及同氏が最後通牒ヲ起

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会合ニテ最後ノ草稿ヲ作成ナリ。天皇ヲ演説ノ意味ヲ

答

失礼ハマリテ宣慰ヲ告テ天皇ヲ演説ノ意味ヲ
Extract from Interrogation of TOJO, Admiral

Lated 16 April 1945

Page 1

Q. General, you agreed with TOJO on all his policies since the time that TOJO became Premier in October 1941 and up to the time you resigned as Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, did you not?

A. The Cabinet was unanimous. I only recollect matters up to April 1942. After this date I know nothing because I was sent to the Front.

Q. Then your answer is that you did agree completely with TOJO?

Page 2

A. Yes.

Q. And that is particularly with reference to the relations with the United States and Great Britain?

A. Yes.

Page 4

Q. Going back to the Imperial Rescript which you said you had a hand in its preparation, can you tell us who were the others who helped prepare the Imperial Rescript declaring war against the United States?

A. OKA, HOSHINO and myself prepared the draft of the Imperial Rescript to be handed to the Liaison Conference for approval. This was altered considerably by the Liaison Conference.

Q. OKA, HOSHINO and yourself were the Committee created to make the draft?

A. Yes.

Q. Admiral OKA represented the Navy, in HOSHINO represented the Liaison Conference, and yourself represented the War Ministry?

A. I remember that there was a representative from the Foreign Office who also participated. I think his name was Yama'ito.
"But you represented the Army, Mr. OKA represented the Navy, and Mr. KOSHIKO as Chief Secretary of the Liaison Conference represented the Liaison Conference.

"...

Q. The Committee of which you were a member prepared a draft and submitted the draft to the Liaison Conference.
A. Yes, this was submitted to the Liaison Conference.
考査結果は次の通りです。

1. 甲
2. 乙

現状は

今後は

No. 2
Your forces in Nanking were not being pressed by the Chinese forces in any way—so much so that you were able to celebrate the taking over, is it not?

A. Japanese troops waited outside the city walls, and leaflets were dropped ordering the Chinese to surrender. Such orders were not obeyed; therefore, the Japanese troops entered the city by force.

Q. How long did it take them to do it?

A. Two days, after the actual bombardment commenced.

Q. Do you attribute it to coincidence the fact that you were also the Deputy Chief of Staff of General YAMASHITA when the rape of Manila happened?

A. In the case of Nanking, two or three battalions were to enter the city. However, the whole army entered within the walls, thereby resulting in the rape of Nanking. In the case of Manila, General YAMASHITA desired to avoid fighting within the city. However, certain elements of the navy and the army outside of General YAMASHITA's command remained in the city, thereby forcing American forces to attack the City of Manila.

Q. Is fighting in the City of Manila any justification for raping the women of Manila by your soldiers?

A. Such is not justifiable.

Q. Is fighting in the City of Manila any justification for your soldiers of killing thousands of civilians by burning them with gasoline or by shooting them with machine guns, including women and small children?

A. Such is definitely not justifiable.

Q. Can you explain the behavior of these troops in the light of education given by the army or by the Government of Japan?
1. I regret that you ask such a question. There is no army in the world or government in the world that will instruct their people to shoot or kill children or civilian population.

2. Has it not troubled your conscience to find that so many innocent women and children were either killed or raped, either in China or the Philippines?

3. After the atrocities in Nanking and Manila, and being a member of the General Staff at both incidents, I felt that something was lacking in the Japanese military education.

4. What do you think is lacking in military education?

5. The troops that committed the atrocities in Nanking and Manila were men mobilized in a hurry, and they were not trained properly in military education.

6. Then did you come across that book written by an American on the rape of Nanking?

7. I have not seen the book, but I merely heard that such a book was printed in America.

8. You were told about it in 1937 - 1938?

9. I believe it was in 1938.

10. Were you not ashamed as a professional soldier that such a state of things should find itself in a book indicting against your army?

11. I felt that it was a shame to the Japanese troops.

12. Did not the high ranking Japanese officers discuss the matter and find out in what way you could improve the situation so that similar incidents would not be repeated in the future?

13. There were no formal gatherings just to discuss such matters, but among the officers there were individual discussions.

14. Did you not feel at the time in 1938 that there must be something wrong with the information section of your army? Why was it that in the case of Nanking you only knew about ten or twenty incidents when the book mentioned written by the American, "The Rape of Nanking", the whole civilian population?
Dec. No. 1

1. As I have stated before, I have only heard of between ten to twenty incidents. How many incidents were reported within the two armies I do not know.

* * *

Page 10

2. When you heard in 1938 about the book mentioning about the rape of Nanking, did you not discuss the matter informally with other officers in a higher echelon?

A. There were no discussions.

2. You mentioned about informal discussions about atrocities committed in China. Of what did those discussions consist?

A. There were no discussions concerning the rape of Nanking in regards to the published book. However, because the Japanese troops were misbehaving, there were informal discussions.

2. What remedies were suggested in those discussions?

A. During the China-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese war, such atrocious acts were not known among the Japanese army. It was about 1915 when Japanese troops were sent to Siberia such tendencies toward atrocity came into the limelight, thereby proving that the quality and character of the Japanese is slowly deteriorating. Therefore, education in homes and schools must be changed to correct the situation. Such discussions were held informally.

Q. Many officers like you were worried about such atrocities because it reflected adversely on the honor and prestige of the Japanese Imperial Forces, is it not?

A. They were very much worried.

Q. You were worried yourself so that when the book appeared you tried to investigate what you could do in order to remedy the situation—the book on the rape of Nanking?

A. For a long time I had been associated with the Inspector General Military Training Department, and I was very much interested in the proper education of the army.

Q. What reforms did you introduce in the training and education of the young men who were about to go into the army so that those weaknesses which you noticed in the Siberian expedition in 1915 could be corrected?
Page 11, 12

1. It the time when Japanese troops were sent to Siberia, I was only a Second Lieutenant, so even if I did notice that I couldn't do anything about it.

2. But when you had influence with the office of the Adjutant General who was in charge of military training, what did you do in order to strengthen that weakness which you noticed way back in 1915?

A. Even after I became Lieutenant General I could not do anything as I was not a divisional commander. In order to put anything into force one has to be a divisional commander.

Q. How about when you became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau?

A. The Chief of the Military Bureau is only a staff under the Minister of War, and he has no power to give out orders on such.

Q. If you were a divisional commander or if you had been in charge of the training or education in the schools, you would have given out orders to the schools that that weakness which you noticed since 1915 was strengthened and fortified?

A. Yes. (Witness laughs)

Q. What happened in Siberia which started the deterioration of the character of the Japanese soldier?

A. Confiscation, or rather stealing, rape, robbery, and such.
Dec. No. 2947

"EXCERPT FROM "THE JAPAN TIMES & MAIL"
FOR THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1940, PAGES 1-2.

MUTO PLAYS BUREAUCRATS AND PARTIES

VERS ARMY WANTS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO RECONSIDER ATTITUDES

Tokyo, Wednesday, March 20, 1940

Major-General Akira Muto, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Office, Tuesday afternoon expressed straightforwardly the opinion of the Army favoring dissolution of political parties if they seek to further their interests alone under the current emergency.

General Muto's declaration came in answer to interpellations put to War Minister General Shunroku Hata at a joint meeting of sub-committees of the House of Representatives in charge of discussing settlement of accounts of State budget.

Bunhei Hamachi, Seiyukai Kuhara Faction K.P., put interpellations to War Minister Hata on the following points:

1. What does the Army think of the present social system?

2. Don't you think that the Army commits itself to the field of politics and economy too much?

3. Don't you think that the Army, bureaucrats and political parties ought to proceed hand in hand to accomplish the objective of the 'sacred war'?

MUTO REPLIES

To this, General Muto answered in behalf of War Minister Hata that one guiding principle must be necessary for the nation for attainment of the objective of the sacred war and that now is the time for political parties to shun from seeking furtherance of private interests and parties and parties interest.

General Muto also asserted that now is the time for bureaucrats to extricate themselves from the attitude of "selfimportance."
General Iuto said that the nation should act under one common guiding principle of "nation's interest first," adding "that all liberalism based on individualism must be removed in this case. He believed that the nation's interest must be the first thought of all people.

Speaking of other countries, he said that any country places the nation's interest higher than anything.

"At a time when Japan is confronted with the emergency and the nation must tide itself over the emergency," General Iuto said, "one cannot think of private interests ahead of others in order to display Japan's full power."

Referring to totalitarianism of European conception, General Iuto said that "nationalism" is considered a better name for what is believed to be the guiding principle of the Japanese nation.

In this connection, General Iuto quoted the speech delivered by General Juichi Terasuchi before the Diet when he was War minister that ours should be totalitarianism completely nationalist in principle and faith.

"If the whole nation carried everything before the State," General Iuto further said, "the full power of the State will be displayed."

"The Army must reconsider if it is criticized by the public as being oppressive," General Iuto said.

If political parties, bureaucrats and the Army correct what should be corrected and proceed hand in hand, the current emergency can be overcome, he asserted.

PARTIES JUST RECONSIDER

The general added that political parties should reconsider, if they seek to promote their own interests, and that they should be dissolved if they do not reconsider under the current emergency.

In conclusion, General Iuto said that the Army and political parties should exchange their views frankly to attain the unity of politics and military campaigns.
I, ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.C., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That among such documents is a bound volume of "The Japan Times & Mail" newspapers for the months of March and April 1940, which includes the issue for Thursday, March 21, 1940.

3. That the attached newspaper article entitled "Auto Fails Bureaucrats and Parties" is a reproduction of article which appears on pages 1 and 2 of the issue of March 21, 1940.

/s/ Arthur A. Sandusky

ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY

Dated: 3 January 1947
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国際関係を熟知し、国が平和と発展を図るために協力する必要がある。国際法の遵守が重要で、国際社会の一員としての責任を果たすことが求められる。国同士の対立や紛争を避けて、共同の利益を追求することが求められる。
証明書

三社関係軍最高司令部委員会指揮部
特務

昭和四〇年四月一日作成

昭和四〇年三月三日発行

関係記事

著名 アーニー エイ サンタス キ

附 阿部 一九四〇年三月三日
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.  )  AFFIDAVIT.

against - )

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.  )

I, Shinichi ARAKI, make oath and say as follows:

Q Were you once Chief of the First Section (Operations) of the General Staff of the Japanese Imperial Army?
A Yes, I was such from October 12, 1940 to December, 1942.

Q What was your rank when you assumed office for the first time?
A I was Major, but was promoted to Lieutenant General in October, 1941.

Q Do you know the defendant Ariga HITO?
A Yes. When I was Chief of the First Section (Operations) under General SUGIYAMA, General HITO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. He was one of the liaison men who did most of the work between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff.

Q As liaison man what was the nature of his work?
A At the General Staff office the work was mostly paper work concerning mobilization, organization, operations, strategy and tactics. The Army General Staff has nothing to do with matters involving politics, foreign relations and finance.

Q In the decision to undertake operations on Indo-China in 1941, what had the War Ministry to do with that decision?
A In matters like that, military policies go to the General Staff from the War Ministry, but it does not mean that the War Ministry makes the decision. First of all the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of Navy and the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the Navy General Staff hold a preliminary meeting and arrive at a decision of national policies. The decision of the Cabinet is handed down to the War Ministry which in turn contacts the General Staff on matters which concern the General Staff such as military operations.

Q Who is sent down to the Army General Staff from the War Ministry in order to convey the policy laid down or the decision made?
A In such important matters as the national policy regarding Indo-China, the War Minister would go directly to the Chief of Staff, but in minor details the War Minister approaches the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and he in turn will make connections with the General Staff.

Q Who would follow up the order or the decision arrived at at the conference which is handed down to the War Minister and which is passed on to the General Staff?
A The Chief of the General Staff will carry out that part of national policy as far as operations are concerned. The Chief of General Staff integrates the national policy into operations and strategy.
Q In what way does he carry out the order?
A The Chief of the General Staff had been already included in the preliminary meeting so he knows in general the overall policies and operations. For this reason, it is easier for him to integrate the policies into the operations. After he comes back to the General Staff office, he calls in the Vice Chief of Staff and the four main assistants and he requests the various assistants, after revealing his plans and policies, to bring in various details to conform to his plans. After such materials are gathered the Chief of General Staff gives out the order for the actual carrying out of the operation.

Q Your section is in charge of operations and strategy?
A Yes.

Q As the Chief of the General Staff attends the conference that makes the decision, why is the need for the War Minister to go over to the Chief of Staff and hand him the orders?
A The decisions arrived at the preliminary meetings must be approved by the Cabinet in order to make them legal and binding. Since the Chief of General Staff does not know the decision of the Cabinet, the War Minister contacts the Chief of General Staff.

Q Once you have prepared the plans for operation, to whom do you submit them?
A After the operational plans are completed, they are presented to the Vice Chief of Staff. He makes the necessary corrections and in turn delivers them to the Chief of the General Staff.

Q Once it is received by him, what does the Chief of the General Staff do about it?
A He makes the necessary corrections and important matters are discussed with the War Minister. It is shown to the War Ministry and if approved the Chief of the General Staff will give out the orders and if they are important orders, they are first shown to the War Minister who will sign it if he approves.

Q Following the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 do you recall if you were directed by General SUGIYAMA to make operational study on a campaign against Malaya, Java, Borneo, Bismarck, Dutch East Indies and Philippines?
A Yes.

Q Following the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941 do you remember if you were directed by General SUGIYAMA to begin preparations for operations against those countries?
A Yes, I was ordered to do so following the Imperial conference which was attended by KOMYE, TOJO, OIWA, SUGIYAMA, TOYODA and NAGANO.

Q Can you tell us if Generals TOJO, KIMURA and MUTO had knowledge of these instructions by General SUGIYAMA to you in September 1941?
A Yes, for by the very nature of the rules and practices governing the relationship between the War Ministry and the General Staff at the time, Generals TOJO, KIMURA and MUTO had to know and did know of those instructions. As I stated before, the paper work for the preparation of the operation is done by the General Staff, however, the actual preparation such as supply and strength, etc., was carried on by the War Ministry. Since General TOJO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau
of the War Ministry explanations for the preparation of the operation had to be made to him by the General Staff. He was well informed, especially on supply and money matters.

Q Was it the duty of the General Staff to alert the field commanders about the imminence of hostilities?
A If necessary, the field commanders were alerted by the General Staff. It wasn’t the duty of my Section, it was more the duty of the Intelligence Section.

Q Following the imperial Conference on 1 December 1941 were you directed on the next day by General SUGIYAMA to draft an alert order to all commanding generals of troops in the South Sea areas that war with the United States, England and Holland was imminent and warning them that hostilities should commence on X-Day?
A I was directed by General SUGIYAMA to write the order to the field commanders in the South Seas so that in case war should break out they would be ready. Actually, SUGIYAMA issued the order because his signature was necessary to make the order valid and effective; but before the order could be wired to the various commanders in the South Pacific it also had to have the signatures of approval of Generals TOJO, KITTA and MOTO in their respective capacities as War Minister, Vice Minister of War and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. It was the customary rule in our office to obtain the signatures of the War Minister, the Vice War Minister, and the Chief of the Military Affairs on those important orders before they could be sent out.

Q When were you so directed?
A I am not sure, thought I think it was December 2nd or 1st when I was directed by General SUGIYAMA to write and issue the order in his name.

Q Was the alert order sent by wire to the commanding generals of all troops of the South Sea areas?
A Yes, they were sent that day after it had been signed by General SUGIYAMA.

Q Did General SUGIYAMA tell you what day was X-Day?
A Yes, about 27th or 28th November 1941 he told me that X-Day would be December 8, 1941.

/S/ Shinichi TANAKA
Shinichi TANAKA

Sworn to and subscribed before me at Tokyo, Japan this 22nd day of 1946.

T. D. White, Cnt., AUS-0264093

CERTIFICATE

I, Ogita, Yoshiaki, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages and that I truly and correctly translated from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English the oath administered to TANAKA, Shinichi, the nature and purpose of which oath was fully understood by the said affiant.

/S/ Ogita, Yoshiaki
Ogita, Yoshiaki
NOTE: Translation requested by Legal Section

MILITARY POLICE REPORT No. 352


FROM: Military Police Commander NAKANISHI, Akita

TO: Chief of General Staff SUGIYAMA, Gen.

26 May 1942.

Attached is the report of the investigation of the eight officers and men of the American planes who took part in the raid on JAPAN proper on 13 April and were forced down at MAIKE and KING PO in CENTRAL CHINA.

FORWARD TO: Minister of War, Vice-Minister of War, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Chief of Home Defence. (3).

Chief of General Staff, Vice-Chief of General Staff, Chief of 1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section, Chief of General Affairs Bureau. (3)

Chief of Naval General Staff, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff, Chief of 1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section, Chief of 5th Bureau.

Navy Minister, Vice-Minister of Navy; Chief of Bureau of Naval Affairs (3) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Defence.
CERTIFICATE

I certify that the original document, of which ATIS Document No. 6700 is a translation, was used in the Doolittle fliers case, tried in S. Japan and appears in extract form as Defense Transcript Exhibit No. 14 in Volume IV, of the record of trial.

/s/ Charles A. Reinhard
CHARLES A. REINHARD, Major, FA
Chief, CRD
証 明 書

余は、昭和×年×月×日、指示に従い、次表の如きヒトミントルードラムに鑑み、余が、指示に基づき、次の事項を調査し、以下に記録を示す。

1. 余は、昭和×年×月×日に、指示に基づき、ヒトミントルードラムの調査を行った。
2. 余は、調査の結果、次の事項を確認した。
3. 余は、調査の結果、次の事項を確認した。

以上、調査の結果を記録する。

証 明 人

[署名]

[捺印]
Extract from The Tokyo Nichi Nichi dated Tuesday, July 1, 1941.

CONFERENCE IS HELD BY ARMY MEMBERS OF SUPREME COUNCIL

TOJO EXPLAINING

Candid Views are Exchanged Regarding Fast-Changing Situation

The Army called a conference of Army members of the Supreme War Council on June 30 at 1:30 p.m. at the War Minister's official residence.

War Minister Lieut. General Tojo and related officials explained in detail the present fast-changing international situation, after which candid views were exchanged regarding the attitude to be taken by Japan in the future.

The Army members of the Supreme War Council who attended the conference were T. H. Marshal Prince Kan-in, General Prince Asaki, and General Prince Higashi-Kuni; General Count Hisaichi Terauchi, General Kenji Doihara, and General Yasuji Okamura.

Representing the Army organs were War Minister Tojo; General Gen Sugiyama, Chief of the General Staff; General Otozo Yamada, Inspector-General of the Army Education; War Vice-Minister Kirurai, Vice-Chief Tsukata of the General Staff, and other officials concerned.
FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
ASAI SHIMSHU October 1942

"AWARDING OF DECOETATIONS TO GENERAL SUGIYAMA AND OTHERS FROM FUEHRER HITLER."

Ceremony Held at Embassy Today

"Answering to the decorations which were conferred by His Majesty the Emperor upon military and civil officials of Axis nations residing in Japan on the anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, the ceremony of awarding decorations conferred by Fuehrer Hitler upon Japanese officials was held at the German Embassy, NAGATACHO KOJI MACHI KU TOKYO at 12.30, 1st Oct.ber.

SUGIYAMA, Chief of General Staff, DOHIHARA, Army Air Inspector General, KUURA, Vice War Minister, CAT, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, NINOMIYA, Secretary to the Prime Minister preceded to the Embassy in dignified official military uniform. Ambassador OTT, after handing the "Grand Cross of the German Eagle" to General SUGIYAMA and DOHIHARA and Lieutenant General KUURA, "Order For Merit with Star" to Major General CATO and "First Class Order For Merit" to Colonel NINOMIYA, stated as follow: "We acknowledge your merits in having by your efforts won glorious victories in the joint execution of the war. Representing the others General SUGIYAMA stated as follows: "We pledge that we will march steadily towards the final victory with a firmer belief in the victory of the Axis in order to respond to the honor given by the FUEHRER today."

The decorations conferred by the FUEHRER today are all newly issued war time decorations with swords attached to them.

After the ceremony was over, all the attendance drank a toast. They had dinner with friendly conversation and atmosphere and the meeting was closed at 2 P.M."
I, Yoshiji Nishijima, certify that I am employed by The Asahi Shinbun in the capacity of Chief of Investigation Department and that the attached photograph is an exact and true copy of the article entitled "General Sujiyun and Others Cited by Hitler", which appeared in The Asahi Shinbun of 2 Oct. 1942.

Chief of Investigation Department

/s/ Yoshiji Nishijima

Yoshiji Nishijima

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 9th day of January, 1947.

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher

Eric W. Fleisher, 2nd Lt. AUSI
2241

Evidentiary Doc. 2908

同じ時代の総統の深い感謝の意を含む最も強い形で、我々はこの国を守るために、 ...

[文書の内容が読めないか、または解釈が必要な部分がある場合、それについての詳細な情報を提供してください。]
I am overwhelmed with gratitude for the praises given just now concerning the various naval victories. The question asked, is not a matter which can be decided by the Navy alone. A part of the outline of the basic policy is primarily indicated in the Emperor’s Declaration of War. The Government’s Declaration also extends to this point. Premier Tojo has already repeated at this Diet Session (T.1. 79th Imperial Diet Session) matters which can safely be revealed at this time. As for the Navy, it also has the desire to successively show good results by following the Government’s policy, not to mention the Emperor’s Declaration. I am fully aware of the anxiety which is expressed, that perhaps it is but senseless to have foreigners who already have foundations, grab the economic power despite our occupation, which was no easy task. I believe that this does not apply to the southern regions. I believe that this should apply to the whole of the area which comprises the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. As the J.A.N.a race must be the leading power throughout the whole area of Greater East Asia, however, since Japan is the center of activities, whatever one may say, any element which does not conform to the will of the J.A.N.a race must be eliminated completely. However, those who do not conform on a foundation of righteousness will naturally be recognized. I am also of the conviction that no one should have the sacrifice of lives to have been made in vain. In the future, concrete matters will be decided by the Government and not by the Navy alone. I am also of the opinion that this line of thought should be adopted. For the present, we must win this war at all costs, as the Premier has stated frequently. The opponent is a most enemy who possesses vast amounts of materials, and since the great powers are unitedly opposed, Japan, it is no easy task to defeat them. Occasionally we hear people cry for materials and gasoline just because we have attained a few military victories, but we soldiers do not feel any such freedom from care. Even a drop of gasoline must be used for military purposes, and the car must be run somehow or other. After first winning the war, I would
like to build the foundation while eliminating the point which you have just indicated. (T.N. The last sentence was addressed to Committee Jasper K.S. I have just prior to meeting.) In other words, as regards the great plan of devising various measures for the winning of the war and also the successive building of a foundation which will enable the J.A. race to expand in the future, I believe, as the Prime Minister stated previously in the Diet, that an announcement will be made in the near future since appropriate organs are now ready. I want to progress by striving to the utmost, taking into consideration the people's ideas, and avoiding pitfalls. It is not only two months since the war started, but even if we think far in the future, if we were too much haste, mistakes are more likely to crop up. Therefore, I hope that perfect plans will be devised in order to avoid miscalculations.
这是一段中文文本。
As stated in our frequent cables, there is no hope to get acceptance for the whole of B plan, while we have not much time left. If the condition does not change we must give up the negotiation though it is not desirable at all. We are deeply humiliated at our lack of influence. In this case the only way to bridge over this difficulty is to let President Roosevelt cable to His Majesty first of the hope of Japan and America's cooperation to maintain peace in the Pacific, (we will try our best to do so, if we can get your permission) and in return, to ask His Majesty to answer this message, clearing the air. At the same time, if we can get a little time more, it is possible to take the initiative in proposing the establishment of neutral countries including French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies and Siam, considering that England and America may start protective occupancy (as you know, President Roosevelt suggested to make the Netherlands East Indies and Siam neutral countries in September of this year).

Though there is an opinion that the rupture of this negotiation does not decidedly mean the outbreak of war, after the breakdown of the negotiations, it is possible for them to occupy Netherlands East Indies, as I stated previously and the conflict will inevitably start by our attack. But it is very doubtful whether Germany will take action in accordance with Article Three of the (Tri-Partite) treaty, and the solution of the China incident must be carried over at least to the end of this World War.

As this telegram may become the last one of my suggestions, I wish you to show this at least to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO and answer us by return telegram.

(END)
CERTIFICATE

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated Oct. 26, 1941 and described as follows: No. 1180 despatched Oct. 26, 1941, by Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 14th day of January, 1947 /s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Sato Chief, Archives Section Official Capacity

STATEMENT OF OFFICIAL PROCURMENT

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above named official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 14th day of Jan, 1947 /s/ Henry Shimojima

Witness: Eric W. Fleischer 3d Lt. AUS, MI Investigator IPS Official Capacity
当 $c = 6$ 且 $b = 2$ 时

$$d = \sqrt{c^2 - b^2} = \sqrt{6^2 - 2^2} = \sqrt{36 - 4} = \sqrt{32} \approx 5.66$$
情報提供者: 内閣総理府
発表年度: 2021年
発表期間: 2021年4月1日 - 2021年3月31日

内容:
本報告書は、日本の経済状況を反映した速報データをまとめたものです。...

注: 本文は日本語で書かれています。
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE THIRD KÔNŒ CABINET TENDERED RESIGNATIONS.

Oct. 16, 1941, the Minister KÔNŒ collected the resignations of the Cabinet members and presented them to the Emperor.

According to the announcement of the Information Board, the reason for the resignation en bloc of the Cabinet was the incongruous perspective of opinion in regard to the execution of the present national policy. Consequently, the actual facts of the circumstances leading up to the resignation en bloc are not known at all by the public, and it is not at all such a simple matter.

Of course, this is not unreasonable, because as regards the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence of September 6 which was the cause of the recent political change, not even the fact of the opening of the Council itself was announced; thus, it was hardly possible to know nor in any way to let it be known. Let it slip out, then indeed, one is liable to infringe on the National Defense Preservation Law. However, unless somebody who knows the truth clarify this situation, there is the fear of erroneous judgment by historians at a later date. So the gist of the circumstances has come to be recorded.

1. The Decision of the Council in the Imperial Presence on September 6 and the Developments Thereafter.

The direct cause of the recent political shakeup had its origin in the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence of September 6. Prior to this, however, the government had been pushing, with utmost secrecy, the negotiations in regard to the adjustment of diplomatic relations with America since about April. There are many matters worth recording about these negotiations, but they will be omitted inasmuch as they have no direct connection with the present subject. At any rate, these negotiations had to be temporarily suspended because of the peaceful advance of the Imperial Army into Southern Indo-China and also the resignation en bloc of the Second KÔNŒ Cabinet. But they were again taken up by the Third KÔNŒ Cabinet. As a result the Council in the Imperial presence was opened on September 6, when the following policy was decided, and in line with it, the following important decision was made:

"To utilize every means of diplomacy in regard to America and Britain to fulfill the requirements of Japan, with the determination to open hostilities against America (Britain and the Netherlands) immediately in case our requirements seem unlikely to be realized by some time during the first ten days of October."
The Principle of the Execution of the National Policy of the Empire.

"In view of the present imminent situation, especially the anti-Japanese attitudes taken by the various countries, such as America, Britain and the Netherlands, the situation of Soviet Russia as well as the resiliency of the national strength of the Empire, etc., the Empire will carry out the policy prescribed in regard to the South within the Principles of the National Policy of the Empire in line with Recent Developments of the Situation* in accordance with the following:

1. The Empire will complete war preparations by around the latter part of October, with the determination not to shirk war against America (Britain and Netherlands) if it be for the sake of self-preservation.

2. In line with the aforementioned, the Empire will endeavour to fulfill the requirements of the Empire by utilizing every diplomatic means in regard to America and Britain.

The minimum required items which the Empire must obtain in regard to the negotiations with America (Britain) and the limit of agreements which can be accepted by the Empire in regard to these are on separate sheets (separate sheets omitted).

3. We are resolved to open hostilities against America (Britain and the Netherlands) immediately if, by the diplomatic negotiations of the proceeding paragraphs, there is still no outlook for the realization of our requirements by about the early part of October.

Policies towards areas other than the South shall be in accordance with the established national policy, and particularly, an endeavour shall be made to avoid a combined battle front against the Empire by America and Soviet Russia in the future.*

After that, although the government worked assiduously for the establishment of negotiations with America, the opinions of the two countries did not coincide readily and finally the 10th day of October came and passed.Thorupen, the army repeatedly demanded the execution of the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence, but Prince KONOE remained irresolute. However, as the political situation was such that things could not be put off from day to day, Prince KONOE called the three ministers, the Foreign, Army and Navy, along with President SUZUKI of the Planning Board, to his private residence at OGINUBO on October 12 and held a meeting. From Chief Secretary TÖHTA of the Cabinet, I learned that opinions were divided at the meeting as to the interpretation of the decision reading "in case there is no outlook for realization of our requirements..." The premier was of opinion that there was still hope, whereas the War Minister had already decided that there was no
... and ... advocated a decision to open hostilities. The attitude of the Naval Minister was to await the decision of the premier. Finally, the following decision was made upon the suggestion of the War Minister:

*In the Japanese-American negotiations, Japan should:

Try to obtain confidence regarding diplomatic success on the following two points by about the time desired by the Supreme Command;

a. No changes to be made in the policies regarding the stationing of Japanese troops, and any policies centering around them.

b. Not to undermine the success attained in the China Affair.

Proceed to reach diplomatic agreement according to the above-mentioned conviction.

Stop preparations for military operations, with the decision of proceeding with the above intention.

The Foreign Minister should investigate the possibilities of success of the above points.

2. Developments after the OGUNO Conference.

Although the decision was made as above mentioned, the political situation tightened up each moment and without time for sufficient study of the aforementioned decision and without arriving at any conclusion, the Cabinet rushed into the resignation en bloc which took place on the 16th. I had several occasions to confer informally in regard to the saving of the situation with Premier KONOE, War Minister TOJO and President SUZUKI of the Planning Board, etc., from the 12th to the 16th, inclusive, but the details will be omitted. Mention may be made, however, as to the attempted formation of the Imperial Prince HIKOSHIKIJI Cabinet, which was proposed by War Minister TOJO at that time and which was reportedly agreed upon by Prince KONOE. I expressed my opposition from the following reasons, and had it sent to War Minister TOJO through the medium of President SUZUKI:

"1. The request for the help of an Imperial Prince should be sought only in case of mutual necessity, for instance, a case when the Army and the Navy coincide in opinions, but the circumstances call for
the arbitration by an Imperial Prince. In such a case, there is a possibility of the formation of an Imperial Prince Cabinet. According to the circumstances as represented in the talk of the night before last, difficult problems still remained unsettled. In such a situation, it is absolutely impossible to request an Imperial Prince for the solution of these problems.

1. On the other hand, it may be construed as an indication that there is no ill-will among the subjects, and moreover, if a war should happen between America and Japan with an Imperial Prince Cabinet, it would be a grave matter. In other words, if a member of the Imperial Families should be entrusted with the execution of the policies of such an important nature as even Premier KONO could not carry out according to the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence, and if it should turn out against expectations, then the Imperial Families would be liable to be exposed as a national object of hatred.

On the 16th, an interview was sought by War Minister TÔKÔ, so I received him at 3 p.m. at the office of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The talk was concerned with the extremely pressing political situation. At that meeting, TÔKÔ suggested Prince HAKANEMICHII as the succeeding premier, to which I expressed opposition for the foregoing reasons. Moreover, I expressed my opinion candidly as follows in regard to the saving of the situation:

"In view of the present attitude of the Navy, it is hardly possible to decide on the opening of hostilities against America. On the other hand, without doubt, the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence of September 6 is of the utmost importance. Now, if there should be even a little doubt about the attitude of the Navy or the decision of the Council, I believe it will necessitate a complete reconsideration. In short, without the decisive assurance of the Navy, the utmost precaution must be taken in plunging into an all-out war and gambling the fate of the country.

War Minister TÔKÔ completely agreed with my opinion and went so far as to express the opinion that the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence was a necessity and that this war could not be carried out without the firm confidence of the Navy. Then we exchanged opinions to the effect that, if the War Minister understood the situation to this extent, there should be some means of reaching an understanding with the Premier and of removing the deadlock with success. By this time, however, it was reported that the Premier had been collecting the resignations of the Cabinet members individually, and at 5 p.m. Prince KONO proceeded to the Palace and tendered the resignations to the Throne.
An Imperial order was immediately given to me in regard to the remedial measures following the resignation of the KONOE Cabinet. This time, various difficulties which had never been seen before appeared and I could not come to a decision readily. Firstly, there was no one for the candidacy of premier equal to Prince KONOE, and, secondly, the recent political change had been caused by the interpretation of the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence, even the opening of which had not been made public. Judging from the change of the recent situation, the minimum requisite of today was to withdraw the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence of September 6, but, on the other hand, the so-called "Imperial Standard," that is to say, the decision that in case diplomatic negotiations soon became by the first part of October, we will be determined to open hostilities against America — was in the hands of leading elements of the Army. Thus, in view of the recent situation, the most difficult task was to withdraw the aforementioned decision and start from the very beginning. In other words, the man who was entrusted with the Imperial order at this time, and formed a Cabinet, must comply with the wishes of the Emperor in assuming leadership of the military, especially of the Army, and also in bringing about the complete cooperation of the Army and the Navy. The person who was able to meet these conditions had to be a man who could sufficiently comprehend the development of the situation up to this time, and had sincerely reviewed the circumstances which had brought about the present situation. In this respect, I thought, that a man who had been an outsider to date would not only not be able fully to understand the above-mentioned situation, but would most likely be unable to resist the so-called "Imperial Standard" and would inevitably destroy the significance of the recent political change.

At the Meeting of the Elder Statesmen on the 17th, I recommended the War Minister as the succeeding Premier; for the above mentioned reasons and made a reply to the Throne with the approval of the majority of the members. As such was the actual state of things at that time, even if the Imperial order for the reorganization of a Cabinet were issued, it would be difficult to save the situation. So I requested the Emperor that, at the time of the issue of the Imperial order to the War Minister Togi, the Imperial message should also be bestowed on him as follows, and that, simultaneously, Navy Minister CIKAWA should be specially called and the following message bestowed on him, communicating to him the Imperial request for the eternal close cooperation between the Army and the Navy. Thereafter, I communicated, by order of the Emperor, the following Imperial Message to both Ministers who had returned to the waiting room, and thus, the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence of September 6 was completely withdrawn.
I presume that the Imperial message has just been given to you regarding the cooperative relations between the Army and the Navy. I understand it is the Emperor's wishes that, in deciding the fundamental national policy, it is necessary to investigate the domestic and foreign affairs more broadly and deeply and to carry out an earnest study of things without being bound by the decision of the Council in the Imperial presence of September 6. I communicate this to you by Imperial order.

To War Minister TOJO:

I hereby authorize you to proceed with the organization of a Cabinet. I wish you to conform to the provisions of the constitution. I believe that the present situation is confronted with utmost difficulties.

At this time, I further wish that the Army and the Navy should cooperate more closely.

I will receive the Navy Minister later and tell him about this.

To Navy Minister OKAWA:

I have received War Minister TOJO and ordered the formation of a Cabinet. I believe that the present situation is confronted with utmost difficulties. As I have given words to TOJO that Army and the Navy should cooperate more closely, you also must endeavor to carry out my will.

In the meantime, the argument to restrain the Army and tide over the threatening crisis of war against America and Britain by appointing General OKAJI was considerably and strongly stressed, and there were demands directed to me from various quarters to heed this argument, but as for myself, I estimated it was unsuitable at this time, according to the aforementioned reasons. Consequently, I finally determined to recommend War Minister TOJO to the Throne. Being resolved to take over the whole responsibility upon myself, I submitted the recommendation to the Emperor.

November, 1941.

Recorded by KOKI /KIDO/
文献

1. "日本の歴史," 1986年、東京大学出版会
2. "日本の文化史," 1990年、中央公論新社

参考文献
昭和四十年 十月

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Entry from Marquis IDE's Diary, 26 Jan 32

January 26th, 1932

At 2:00 p.m. today, General Minami delivered a lecture on the latest situation in Manchuria before the Emperor in the Palace. I had the honor to attend the lecture in the Imperial presence.

General Minami told us of his impressions resulting from his inspection of the general situation there. He explained that the brave action of our Japanese troops lay in the Japanese people's overall assistance to them, their firm belief in victory, and their confidence in their own military skill.

His conclusions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolia question:

I. In the matter of our national defense, Japan's relation to the new state and its administration will be to take over its defense and by expediting the completion of the Kirin-Jiamine Railway, make the Sea of Japan into a lake and facilitate Japan's advance into the North Manchuria area. Thus our national defense would be renewed.

II. Japan-Manchuria Joint Management - To take concrete measures against economic blockade from abroad, thereby firmly establishing a method by which Japan can live forever as a power in the world.

III. Solution of the Population Problem - It is not so difficult to solve the population problem provided that we give our emigrants in Manchuria the same protection as that which they receive in South America, and provided that we establish a colonial trooping system there.

Then a new state is established in Manchuria and Mongolia, I think it is advisable to unify the present three or four Japanese organs in Manchuria and Mongolia under one Japanese organ to be placed under a Government-General. The system of this Government-General should be as follows:

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<td>Military</td>
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<td>(National Defence Corps)</td>
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本文未显示自然语言，可能涉及到论文内容。
Doc. 16324 (3)

連絡人名： Employment

連絡事項： "職場でのストレス管理のための具体的な策についての提案"
This entry supersedes all previous reproductions.

Document No. 1632-W-5.
Extract from entry of Yosuke Matsuura's diary, 17th May, 1932.

May 17th, 1932.
(Extract): At noon today I met and had lunch with Prince Konoye, Marquis Inawaya and Lt. Col. Suzuki at General Kurada's residence. We talked about matters concerning measures to cope with the present incident as well as the succeeding cabinet ............ Lt. Col. Suzuki said that if a new Cabinet were organized under the leadership of political parties, a second or third incident would occur ............
It was suggested that a national coalition cabinet might be a solution. Vice Minister Koiso seems to be in favour of a Kiranuma Cabinet. It is thought that the direct stimulation for the incident this time was a declaration in respect to the safeguarding of the political parties........
Extract from Marquis Kido's Diary, 18 April 1933

Attended a party given by Vice-Minister Otani at the Kinsui. In the middle I left to attend a party held for Prince Higashikuni at the residence of Marquis Inoue, and I found there Prince Konoye, Baron Harada, Lieutenant-Colonel Suzuki and Chief of the Information Bureau Shiratori.

The discussion naturally extended to the theory of the Japanese spirit, Viscount Okabe's abolition of the metric system, and the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia.

According to Lt. Col. Suzuki there were two kinds of enemies, an absolute enemy and a relative enemy. As Russia aimed to destroy the national structure of Japan, he pointed out Russia as an absolute enemy. He absolutely opposed a non-aggression pact with Russia because he deemed this as nothing more than utilitarian calculation.
14th July, 1937 - (extract)

1/ISBI call at 8:00 o'clock. I talked on letters such as discontinuing the dispatching of troops to North China, and because indignant.
Extract from Entry from
Marquis KIDO's Diary,
27 October 1937

I attended the extraordinary session of the cabinet, in which we decided on our statement and answer to the invitation to the Council in connection with the Nine Power Pact.
"Entry from Kuriyama KILO's Diary, 3 November 1937"

(Fragment)

Mr. Minister SUGIYAMA visited us at 6:00 o'clock. We freely exchanged views on matters such as saving of the situation, the establishment of the Imperial General Headquarters, the declaration of war, etc.
十一月三日

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At 10 a.m. I called on Prince KONOYE at the Premier's official residence. I urged him as follows: Concerning the matter mentioned yesterday, I thought that the movement would have an adverse influence on financial and other circles, particularly with respect to the rate of exchange. I could not help but gravely fear the bad influence of the fall of the Cabinet on the war situation.

Whatever the case might be in the event of the war changing into a defensive operation, if there were a commotion in the internal politics now when we are on the offensive, the attitude of foreign countries, which had finally taken a turn for the better, would be changed by it. This must be avoided by all means.

In addition, as the Imperial Mandate to form another cabinet would be issued to him by His Majesty the Emperor in all probability in the case of his resignation, if he refused to do so, it would be impossible for me to transmit his views to the Genro and others. I hoped further that if he had to resign that he would consult with Mr. Seihin IKEDA and the Chief of the War Service Bureau, MACHIJIRI, about the future before his resignation. Finally KONOYE resolved that he would accept the Imperial Mandate to form a cabinet.
 nowhere
19th November, 1937

Attended the cabinet session at 10 a.m. We decided the matter respecting the connection between the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government. During the session, I asked whether, as Imperial General Headquarters Regulations state that Headquarters would be established not only in wartime but also in the case of incidents, the degree of the incidents in question had been studied.

The war minister replied though he had never tried to find a definition on the degree of an incident he considered that only in the case of an incident of such an extent as to require a declaration of war, that is, if the mobilization of the army must be ordered, would Imperial Headquarters be established.
Extract from Entry from Marquis I.J.C.'s Diary, 21 Dec 37

21st December, 1937 (Extract)

At 10 a.m. I attended a Cabinet meeting in which we deliberated on the negotiations with China, draft of the answer to the German Ambassador, and counter-measures for the China affair. I urged the necessity of creating cultural measures in North China.
14th January, 1936

At 10:00 a.m. attended the Cabinet meeting held at the Prime Minister's Official Residence. Discussed about our epoch-making announcement concerning the China affair. We continued our discussion till the afternoon.

At the request of the German Ambassador, the Minister of Foreign Affairs asked him at 4:30 p.m. The ambassador said that the German Ambassador in China had handed him the answer of the Chinese Kai-Shek Government to the effect that they wished to know the contents of conditions even at this juncture.

As we thought that it lacked sincerity, we decided to make an announcement of a fixed policy to the effect that we would have nothing to do with the national government, but would negotiate with the new Chinese Government when established and join it in the promotion of the newly rising China and the peace of Asia. Concluded the meeting at 5:30 p.m.
May 19th, 1938 - Extract)

At 4:00 o'clock I conversed with President ROJO. He expressed the following opinion in regard to the preparations after the battle of SUCHOW. I promised to do my best since I agreed generally with his opinion.

It may be difficult to anticipate any striking changes as a result of the battle of SUCHOW so it appears also that a fairly large portion of that army command to run away. However, even in CHINA there is a considerable amount of peace talk. There is information that when WU-PHI-PU protested to TANG-KO-I to the attitude of CHIANG-HUI, TANG replied to the effect that although CHIANG's attitude before the Incident was improper, he approved of CHIANG's attitude and actions since the Incident. It is said that TANG has contacted KAO-SHU-SH, so it could be thought that perhaps there may be some sort of a negotiation from CHINA. Therefore, it is probably necessary to plan an opening by previously considering to some extent the proclamation of ignorance, the CHIANG Pe. Inc.

After the battle of SUCHOW, it is on one hand, necessary to show an attitude of advocacy to HANKOW, but, at the same time, it is essential to take steps to settle the Incident. If things do not turn out as hoped for, I believe it would, by all means, be necessary to establish a close connection also with the Supreme Command and, with the present Reserve Fund of ¥80,000,000 and ¥300,000,000 in gold, enter into protracted warfare, by planning to continue for about three years. Etc.

SECTION IV.
ENTRY FROM MARQUEE SİLO'S LALLY, 9 August 1938.

August 9th, 1938.

I attended the Cabinet meeting held at 10:00 a.m. and heard about the Changkufeng incident from the War Minister and the Foreign Minister. After the meeting I heard from the Premier that the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop made a very important proposal to Ambassador Oshima (Ambassador TOGO was ignorant of this fact). Von Ribbentrop had consulted with Hitler for 4 hours before he made this proposal (Ambassador OIT was also ignorant about it). Lt. Col. KEISHEI returned by airplane with the above message.

The essence of this proposal is to reinforce the relationship between Japan and Germany which contains three clauses.

The third clause provides that in case one nation is attacked by a third country, the other will render military aid. According to von Ribbentrop's explanation, Italy will become a participant in this treaty and his words suggest that the negotiations with Italy have already begun. The Navy objects to this clause. Von Ribbentrop predicts the European political situation as follows: "War with Russia is inevitable; peaceful measures will be taken towards the Czechs; Anglo-French relationship is so intimate that it is impossible to cause disunity between them; America will aid England and France financially but not militarily; Rumania will remain neutral, and Hungary will become an ally."
昭和九年八月九日分

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Extract from Interrogation of General Weiro KUTO

Dated 19 April 1946

Q. General Kuto, would you please give us your official office from 1926 until your appointment as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau?

A. In March 1926 I entered the Department of the Inspector General of Military Education, remaining there until December of 1929. I entered the Department as Captain, and in 1928 became a major. Then until December of 1930, I was a student in the Army War College. I was then with the General Staff, G-2, until March of 1934. I was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1932.

Q. G-2? What is that?

A. Intelligence. I then went to the First Infantry Regiment (Tokyo) and remained there until March of 1935. I was transferred to the War Department Military Affairs Bureau, remaining there until June of 1936. From June of 1936 until March of 1937, I was a member of the staff of the Kwantung Army. In 1936 I was promoted to Colonel. March of 1937 until November of the same year I was attached to G-3 (operations) in the Tokyo General Staff. From November 1937 until July 1938, I was the Adjutant of the General Staff of the Central China Expeditionary Army. From July of 1938 until October of 1939, I was the Adjutant of the General Staff with the North China Area Army. In 1938 I became major general. In October of 1939 I was appointed Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

Q. Then in April 1942 you left your office as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and what was your next position?

A. I became Commander of the Konoe Division (Sumatra).

Q. How long were you there?

A. I remained in Sumatra from 1942 until October of 1944. Then in October 1944 I went to the Philippines as Chief of Staff for the 14th Area Army. In 1942 I became lieutenant general. In October 1944, I was taken prisoner at the surrender.
Q. General, from March 1937 to November 1937, were you Chief of the Operations Section in the General Staff here in Tokyo?

A. Yes, I was not the Chief of operations. I was attached to Operations.

Q. 'Eren't you subsequently appointed Chief of the Operations Section?

A. I was Chief of the Operations Section of G-3 (Operations and Planning) and under that I was Chief of Operations.

Q. General, in any operation by the Army, rather detailed plans have to be made beforehand, do they not?

A. Ordinarily operational plans are drawn up every year, however in case of an emergency, plans are drawn up immediately.

Q. General, what plans were drawn yearly?

A. At that time, the annual plans involved Northern Russia and China.

Q. That part of China, General.

A. North and Central China operations.

Q. What were the plans against Russia?

A. The plans involved defense in case of Russian attack.

Q. At what location would your defense be?

A. Along the Manchurian borders.

Q. Northern Manchuria?

A. Yes.

Q. Manchuria was a pretty good buffer against Russia for Japan?

A. It was intended as a buffer area.

Q. Those plans were drawn yearly, is that correct, General?

A. These plans were reviewed annually, as done by any staff.

Q. You were on the staff in 1931 and 1932, General?

A. Yes.
Q. General, from March 1937 to November 1937, were you Chief of the Operations Section in the General Staff here in Tokyo?

A. Yes. I was not the Chief of operations. I was attached to Operations.

Q. 'Aren't you subsequently appointed Chief of the Operations Section?

A. I was Chief of the Operations Section of G-3 (Operations and Planning) and under that I was Chief of Operations.

Q. General, in any operation by the Army, rather detailed plans have to be made before hand, do they not?

A. Ordinarily operational plans are drawn up every year, however in case of an emergency, plans are drawn up immediately.

Q. General, what plans were drawn yearly?

A. At that time, the annual plans involved Northern Russia and China.

Q. That part of China, General.

A. North and Central China operations.

Q. What were the plans against Russia?

A. The plans involved defense in case of Russian attack.

Q. At what location would your defense be?

A. Along the Manchurian borders.

Q. Northern Manchuria?

A. Yes.

Q. Manchuria was a pretty good buffer against Russia for Japan?

A. It was intended as a buffer area.

Q. Those plans were drawn yearly, is that correct, General?

A. These plans were reviewed annually, as done by any staff.

Q. You were on the staff in 1931 and 1932, General?

A. Yes.
September 7, 1936:

......lined with prince KOFU, Baron HARA, for his TAIJII-tai, and
the widower of TOYODA at 6:30 p.m. and had a friendly talk with prince
KOFU, in a separate room. I learned that the following is in general the
state of affairs in regard to the head of the new political party:

After the fall of KAI, the changes in the situation may cause a
condition which may necessitate our dealing with the new political. Furthermore, there are domestic conditions calling for considerable concern such as unem-
ployment and other matters. From the viewpoint that there is a necessity for
arranging a so-called "one nation-one party" system by incorporating all the
political parties into one body in order to deal with the above problems,
KAI, KIT, JBR, TO, and others are participating in the movement. It
is said that through the mediation of KIIK, I was also met with. Recently, prince KOFU said that he is in an ambiguous answer tending that perhaps
it would be inadvisable to refuse the party leadership, if the political party
merger movement should progress according to the above-mentioned meaning.

Furthermore, prince KOFU revealed his true mind by saying, "I came
up against the outbreak of the Chino incident since the formation of my cab-
net, and have continued to make various painstaking efforts. However, in
viewing the perspective after the fall of KAI, I was not satisfied with the result of the declaration of January 10th, the effects and occurrence of the establish ment of the new regime, etc., there are many cases where matters have been contrary to my expectations.
If, on top of this, things should finally lead to a war with CHINO, I am
sheerly unable to do anything. In the present situation, there is nothing I
can do but resign since the responsibilities thereof would be too heavy". Moreover, he recalled that it could also be surmised that the recent backlash against the leader's policy, etc., by the
KAI circle is being done with the intention of eventually overthrowing this
régime. I therefore stressed the fact that it was essential for the question for the leader to quit at this time was to deal with the new cabinet, with KAI leaders and to
have the new political situation dealt with by Foreign Minister KOFU's policies. I
told him that it would probably result in a disturbance within the country, and
that there was sufficient reason to fear that this could result in our nation's
defeat. I emphasised that it was necessary for him not to think of such a thing
and go ahead, mustering up his courage once more, and for this purpose it might
be unavoidable for him to accept the leadership of the new party if necessary.
He talked further about the form of the new party taking every possible cir-
cumstance into consideration, and we both eventually agreed that the secretary-
general's task of selecting one is extremely difficult. We further promised
each other that we would study this matter more thoroughly.
The opinion is also of the opinion that peace between Jap., CHN, and SUEZ, must be brought about even by dealing with CHN—Jap. K, and TCHI—SUEZ agree to this he said that he was contacted by a SUEZ on the above point.

As for the military, it is said that the General Staff is generally of the above opinion, and that Lt. Col. M., and his Imperial Highness Prince C. are its leaders. At first minister IT. I. was inclined to be opposed to this but lately he has come almost to agree with it. It is said that the situation is at a deadlock because TCHI and Jap., SUEZ, have the opposite opinion.

I returned home at 11.
EXHIBIT  NO. 2262.

Dec 1632 W (21)

昭和十三年九月七日分

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不戸保存

【件】

昭和十三年九月七日分

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不戸保存

【件】
At 10:00 a.m. I attended the conference of the Privy Council. It was decided to cooperate with the various bodies of the League of Nations.
At 1:00 p.m. I called on Baron HIRANUMA at his residence. He expressed his opinion on the resignation of Konoye Cabinet. He insisted that they must carry on. His reason was that it was reported that Wang Chao-ming had escaped from Chungking and that the plot was proceeding steadily. From the viewpoint of responsibility, it is most undesirable that Prince Konoye should resign his post in the present situation.
十二月二十六日（月）

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ENTRY FROM KARUSU KIDO’S DIARY

December 29th, 1938 (Extract)

At 9:00 a.m., Maj. Gen. Teiichi SUZUKI visited me. He insisted that KONOYE's Cabinet should carry on.

At 7:00 p.m., the Prime Minister's Secretary, KISHI, telephoned me and I called on Prince KONOYE at his Ogikubo residence at 8:00 o'clock. Finance Minister INADA also went there. War Minister ISORIKI was already present. The War Minister explained the development of the scheme and the international situation.
Notice:

Exhibit "a" is to be corrected in accordance with Language Board decision as shown on Court record page 744.

Date: [Redacted]
Received an invitation from Baron Hiruma, and called on him at 9:30 a.m. at the official residence of the Minister of Justice. He requested me to take the position of Home Minister on the ground that the nomination was a predetermined condition as the result of his talk with Prince Konoe, and consented on condition that I might dispose of the many difficult pending problems in the Ministry by my discretion. I was requested, at the same time, to take up the post of the Welfare Minister, to which I consented on condition that the full-time Minister should take up his post as soon as possible.

At 1 p.m., I reported the circumstances to Secretary KOMATSU and Vice-Minister HIROSE.

As the result of several negotiations over the telephone with Justice Minister Shiono, Baron Hiruma also approved my proposal to promote Vice Minister Hirose. Hirose was immediately informed and sent to the cabinet organization headquarters.
Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 31 Mar 39

Conferred at 1 p.m. with the Premier on the problems of the Military alliance between Japan and Germany and of the appointment of new cabinet members, etc. At 4 p.m., I went to the Tokyo Club, and met Prince KUNO there. We had not met for some time, but exchanged opinions until 6 p.m. on the political situation and the policy towards the Incident.
长 视频 361 办公 室

小号 工程 10 (号) 部 部

中 员 工

大 图 素 描

小 风 和 美

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小 风 和 美
This is to wit, the position of JAPAN and the duty of JAPAN whether or not GERMANY and JAPAN conclude an alliance. We need not involve ourselves in the war in EUROPE. Japan's pushing forward to a solution in the true sense of the word of the CHINA Incident will result in her helping GERMANY. Furthermore, what GERMANY is doing at present will in effect aid in the settlement of the CHINA Incident. At present no one in JAPAN has any objections to the establishment of a new order in EAST ASIA. Therefore, I believe the only necessary and adequate policy is for JAPAN to exert her utmost to carry it out successfully by embracing it and insisting upon it.

However hard she may exert herself for the establishment of new order in CHINA, there is a limit to JAPAN's power. She has engaged in a war of attrition in the CHINA Incident for more than two years now. JAPAN must avoid as much as possible the waging of an even larger scale war, in order to conserve her national resources and to make provisions for the great efforts to come. Furthermore, I think that only in a war with the SOVIET UNION will JAPAN be liable to a war of attrition. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. wants to compromise with JAPAN and wash her hands of the FAR EAST. There is an opportunity for her again to take part in EUROPE. A chance has come for her to play an active part to the west and south of EUROPE. Under these circumstances, it is ridiculous for her to be hostile with JAPAN and keep large forces in the FAR EAST. She hopes, therefore, to conclude immediately a non-aggression Treaty or the like, and withdraw. For JAPAN, it is an excellent foreign policy which should be begun first of all.

To set the U.S.S.R. at ease in the FAR EAST will be a great factor, I believe, to make the EUROPEAN War more active. The U.S.S.R., with the force to be withdrawn from the FAR EAST, may emerge in the NEAR EAST or the PERSIAN GULF. Probably GERMANY expects it and the U.S.S.R. hopes for it. Furthermore, it would be a great menace to BRITAIN. In such a case, GERMANY would feel secure and ITALY might join the war earlier than we expected at first. Then the war would become a real one. However, as the situation stands now, when neither GERMANY nor the U.S.S.R. can exert themselves sufficiently in EUROPE, ITALY will remain neutral for the time being.

And some day, if and when BRITAIN finds out that the chances of winning are against her, she might probably propose peace. GERMANY, to the present day, has always been prepared for such a thing. They, if the war should not continue to the last, and if it should end in reconciliation, an international conference would be sure to be held. JAPAN would take part in it, and the U.S.A.
would, too. If Japan's policy toward Great Britain and the United States, she neither compromises nor cooperates, and in her policy toward Germany, Italy, and the U.S.S.R., she does not make concessions, and if she follows the so-called independent policy and makes no friends, Japan will be completely isolated in this peace conference.

Although we do not know when such peace will come, there is no war without reconciliation. We also do not know whether peace will come early or late, but it may come sooner than we expect. It may end in a draw without surrender on either side. In that case, if Japan is isolated, the problems of the East will be sacrificed and the settlement of problems of other areas will be accomplished in the sacrifice of Asia. Therefore, I think that today we should not affirm the autonomous policy of Japan's diplomacy or press forward in the China Incident, but should first of all readjust relations with Germany and Italy and build friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. Moreover, there is neither danger nor insecurity for Japan by so doing. It is my firm conviction that by this the road to achievement of our mission of establishing the new order in East Asia will be opened.

There are many things which confirm my conclusion, but having no time to explain them in detail, I shall omit them.

In fine, the Soviet-German coalition has been achieved. Accordingly, since the European War has broken out, it is certain that Japan's international position has become very advantageous, and it would improve increasingly if only the government does not adopt wrong policy. It is necessary to utilize these favorable circumstances, make them better, and establish here on a solid foundation a great and far-sighted policy for the Far East. It is unthinkable that the people do not know what to do, although it is the utmost opportunity. Above all else, the unification of national views is a pressing need. With that only can Japanese diplomacy return to its original course. Making the most of Japan's present favorable situation, I think we should exert our utmost for the nation to establish a permanent foundation.
The recent diplomacy of JAPAN, before I went abroad, was based on the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Anti-Comintern Axis, which the government constantly proclaimed and which all of the people believed. However, as the CHINA Incident gradually progressed, the people in general realized that German and Italian aid to JAPAN was extremely effective so that the opinion came to be expressed that a further step should be taken to make it into a military alliance.

I think that the feeling of many people in JAPAN was in agreement with this. At any rate, I left JAPAN when praises for the German-Italian Anti-Comintern axis were being sung the loudest. I left for ITALY with the feeling that I wanted to render some service in the matter by doing my humble best from abroad. The relationship between the other parties, GERMANY and ITALY, has gradually assumed importance in EUROPE and they have come to recognize the great importance of tying up with JAPAN in the Orient. Of course, GERMANY and ITALY also had the same or stronger feeling as JAPAN to strengthen the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY coalition. Since both sides had the same feeling, I, too, had the hope of succeeding without much difficulty in the matter of a JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY military alliance. However, I sensed upon my arrival that there was considerable discrepancy between what GERMANY and ITALY wanted and what JAPAN required. That is, there was a very widespread feeling to shake hands and compromise with BRITAIN and AMERICA despite their interference with JAPAN in the CHINA Incident. The only point upon which national opinion was agreed was that of relations with SOVIET RUSSIA. In regard to RUSSIA, a great many people openly said that she was JAPAN's enemy. Accordingly, the limit to which Japanese Cabinet decisions could agree was a JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY military alliance aimed chiefly at the U.S.S.R.
However, upon going to Germany and Italy, I found their views as regards this aim of the treaty were slightly different. For example, Italy had no clash of interests with Russia, and, moreover, since Germany's policy was to compromise with Britain and France in the west and to turn exclusively to the east at a time when the Japan-Germany Anti-Comintern Pact had been concluded, Germany's eastern policy was gradually making headway. Germany made Anschluss with Austria, dismembered Czechoslovakia next, and then when trying to settle the Polish question, her path was at this point obstructed by Britain and France. Shall we call it destiny or traditional trouble that not until after western problems are solved can Germany's eastern policy be settled? Germany was again confronted with this fact. Therefore, Germany may either combine with Japan to attack the Soviet Union or else her eastern policy of eliminating the Soviet obstacle will suffer a serious set-back. Accordingly, the desideratum of a German-Italian coalition with Japan is not to attack the U.S.S.R. but to use us in dealing with Britain and France who represent the old European powers. It is in this regard that they desire the cooperation of Japan. Since, on one hand, Japan desires to compromise with Britain and France to prevent Soviet aggression in the Orient, there was considerable difference in feeling between them. Of course, in event of the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia, both Germany and Italy plan to aid Japan, but this was not their chief aim. This fundamental difference, I think, is the reason the Japan-Germany-Italy alliance could not then be concluded.

It cannot be denied that in the China question Japan gradually became clearly pitted against Britain. The anti-British movements throughout the country relative to the Tientsin question clearly demonstrate this. Particularly at that time it was Japan's disposition to aim exclusively at the Soviet Union, but should not Japan alter that idea in the course of the China question? In view of the inevitability of a clash between Japan and Britain and the aforementioned attitude of Germany and Italy, I felt that perhaps Japan should alter basically her former attitude. However, Japan's feeling was still determined to aim at the U.S.S.R. Since it was the idea of influential quarters to compromise with England if possible and in certain cases to be friendly with America, I thought that it would be extremely difficult to put my ideas into practice.

In short, Germany, unlike Japan, has Britain and France as their chief objects instead of U.S.S.R. I could have asserted that although Germany would fight the U.S.S.R. if absolutely necessary, she took the old powers of democracy as the greatest hindrance. But since the circumstances within the country were as I have mentioned before, I submitted to the government my opinion.
that Germany would inevitably ally with the U.S.S.R., only if Japan hesitated to contract this alliance. However, a nation-wide anti-British movement broke out with respect to the Tientsin problem. And as I saw that this was supported by the whole Japanese nation, I thought that it was no time to hesitate and in early July I notified the Government twice in details as follows:

"Germany and Italy are not contemplating a war against the USSR. If the Government is going to conclude a treaty on the assumption that war will be waged against USSR, the idea had better be given up. I believe the intention of Germany and Italy is to draw Russia to their side after concluding an alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy. In order to establish a new order in China today, we must drive out from China the old order which is represented by Britain. Therefore, I believe that Japan should conclude a treaty as soon as possible with Germany and Italy in opposition to Britain and France, and furthermore, for her to confront the USSR with the combined powers of Japan, Germany and Italy; with the aid of Russia, wash their hands off of the East; to have USSR stop the aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and to have USSR withdraw the forces from the Manchurian-Soviet border, and gradually effect the solution of the pending problems favorably. I believe that this policy is best suited to the occasion for Japan.

At this moment if we do not conclude on alliance with Germany and Italy, Germany will probably league with USSR. Moreover, it is drawing near. It is not the time for hesitation. If Japan tried to solve the problem between her and USSR after the alliance between Germany and USSR has been concluded, wouldn't things become unfavorable for Japan as the situation will have changed by then?"

But the Government, of course, was unable to from the beginning give thought to my opinion, because they had in view a treaty for fighting with USSR, whereas I was in favor of a treaty for making peace with her—an idea very different from the original one. Moreover, it was in the midst of all that hated public opinion of the whole nation against Great Britain on the occasion of the Tientsin Incident that the Anglo-Japanese Conference at Tokyo was held. And, strange to say, Great Britain made concession to Japan. In the vicinity of Tientsin, the Englishmen were subjected to great insults in full view of the world. The old Premier Chamberlain also made a remark at the Parliament to the effect that his blood was boiling with indignation. The very next moment Great Britain made a great concession. What is more, it came to the knowledge of the German Foreign Minister as a report from a reliable source that the Japanese Government promised to Great Britain that they
Now GETTY and ITALY were of the opinion that the policy adopted by JAPAN on the continent since the Manchurian Incident had for its object the destruction of the old order in the EAST and the establishment of a new order in its place; in other words, that it was JAPAN'S continental policy to overthrow first in the EAST the status quo of the world established by the VERSAILLES Treaty -- the WASHINGTON Order which in the East is expressed as the WASHINGTON Order is what JAPAN is trying to overthrow. They believed that the Manchurian Incident, the renunciation of the Naval Disarmament Pact, the establishment of a new order in CHINA now in question are all directed to that object. Therefore, nothing seemed to them to be more natural that JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY should enter into an alliance to overthrow the old order of the world in concert. They little dreamed of difficulty in the negotiation. They looked upon the treaty as all too natural and a matter of course. But the negotiations dragged on, until at last in June they came into possession of a report that JAPAN was going to make terms with GREAT BRITAIN, her enemy nation, greatly to their astonishment. Besides, this situation was brought about immediately after nation-wide anti-British movement. I suppose that JAPAN'S actions and her national feelings must have struck them as strange and complex.

Such being the case, an impression grew with the Germans that they could expect little support from JAPAN, that they could not expect JAPAN'S help in setting up against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE. On the other hand, in connection with the DANZIG problem, the European situation grew so acute that the relations between GERMANY and GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE were strained to the breaking point. At that time GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE tried to win USSR over to their side by sending their representatives to MOSCOW to negotiate for a treaty of alliance. It is no wonder that at the sight of these negotiations, ITALY felt restless. ITALY has a close treaty of alliance with GERMANY. If GERMANY could not join hands with JAPAN, and USSR should be gained over by GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, her enemies, ITALY would have to struggle between enemies on both sides.

It was natural that ITALY should feel alarmed, who shares the fate with GERMANY. I think it was not unnatural even if ITALY had proposed to GERMANY an interference in the alliance of GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE and USSR. If GERMANY is bound by the promises made with JAPAN that is, the promise that the two nations must not conclude any non-aggression pact with the SOVIET UNION, and clarify her isolated position by merely looking on the current
European situation with folded arms, it would mean that she would estrange her only ally ITALY from herself. Furthermore, since GERMANY obtained information that JAPAN was intending to make hands with GREAT BRITAIN, it is only proper that she should attempt to mend her ways with USSR. Moreover, GERMANY seems to think that although JAPAN frequently snogs of the USSR, which which was really obstructing the path of JAPAN in the EAST, was not the USSR, but GREAT BRITAIN. We assume that GERMANY may have thought that if GERMANY were now to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the USSR, then the result will be that BRITAIN's position in the EAST will be weakened which JAPAN would eventually realize. Such being the case, hence, the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact was concluded at the end of August. This Non-Aggression Pact, however, was not made in a day. As early as 1938, Fuehrer HITLER and others began to refrain from using malicious language in speaking of the USSR; a thing which struck me as strange. Therefore, the inner side of the USSR began to approach GERMANY and ITALY, that is, the USSR began to hold out her hand to the Anti-Comintern Axis' side. Towards April this year, Foreign MinisterRibbentrop positively declared to us that if JAPAN would not enter into an alliance with GERMANY, they must combine with the USSR; and that, if JAPAN would ally, they could offer 100% cooperation, while, if not, that she could offer 50% cooperation. Of course, this was telegraphed to the Government, but, in JAPAN, it was said that we have been threatened by GERMANY.

Such being the case, the RUSSO-GERMAN Treaty was concluded at last. At that time the German authorities said that they felt deeply regrettable and that they should have had JAPAN's understanding beforehand, but if they had said such thing to JAPAN, it would surely appear in all the papers of the world within 48 hours. Since such cases have been experienced number of times in the past, they were unable to notify JAPAN beforehand. They entreated us not to think ill of this action. They violated the pact because they adhered to legalities and formalities. They pleaded us not to say that it was a breach of faith. In the pressing situation, it was necessity that compelled them, so do not think ill of them. They assured us that their feelings towards JAPAN today have not changed the least. They still hold expectations of bringing about intimate relations between the two nations. They have often and repeatedly suggested to JAPAN to compromise with the USSR, and if JAPAN is in that mood, they will offer their services as mediator. In short, as I have stated in the beginning this may be enough to confirm the supposed intention that GERMANY has no thought of fighting the USSR and when the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY alliance is found, GERMANY had in mind to attract the USSR into this camp.

Soon after the Russo-German Treaty was concluded, ITALY also greatly welcomed this treaty, stating that, by this no war will
break out in EUROPE, and that thereafter Russo-Japanese relations
will improve and things will turn out very favorable to JAPAN.
During my stay there, I could not conceive anything in impression
that ITALY was disapproved of the Russo-German rapprochement or
that she holds enmity against the USSR.

At any rate, it can be said that, in spite of the fact that
the Russo-German Treaty had been concluded, even today, GERMANY
and ITALY still attach great importance to the concert with JAPAN.
Today, the relations between JAPAN and GERMANY and ITALY are
apparently the same as before the conclusion of the Russo-German
Non-Aggression Pact. The only thing is that the feelings of the
Japanese people are somewhat vague. They have a feeling that they
were somewhat betrayed by GERMANY. One of its reasons is as I
have just stated that, on the one hand, lack of accurate knowledge
on the part of the people in regard to the distribution of the
Tripartite Treaty, and, on the other hand, of the various forces
both internal and external, that have brought the treaty to a
failure, we must admit that those various forces disfavoring the
Alliance exercised the supine power which succeeded in breaking
off the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY alliance, further maneuvered to
excite antipathy towards GERMANY. We should not forget that dis-
patches from foreign countries today are chiefly from such
sources, and that they are desperately trying to impel Japanese
public opinion more towards that direction.

There are some people who state that if the JAPAN-GERMANY-
ITALY Alliance had been formed, would not JAPAN have been involved
in the war in EUROPE? It is lucky that the alliance had not been
formed, for the bare thought makes them shudder. However, I think
that this is fundamentally a misconception. If the JAPAN-GERMANY-
ITALY Alliance had taken shape, the current war might not have
broken out. GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE would make a gradual
diplomatic retreat and thus enable JAPAN in CHINA and GERMANY
and ITALY in EUROPE, to solve their pending questions in a peace-
ful manner. GERMANY and ITALY have said from the beginning that
the real aim of this treaty was for peace, and that since JAPAN,
GERMANY and ITALY are originally destined to share the same fate,
they would be beaten, if divided, but could never be beaten if the
were united. They further said that since the alliance was of a
spiritual nature, and that although it shouldn't be said which
nation will benefit mostly by it, it is necessary to display to
the public the real effect of the Alliance, and so they would begi
by assisting JAPAN now actually fighting in CHINA so as to bring
the CHINA Incident to a speedy conclusion. They said that with
this shall they demonstrate the true value and power of the
Alliance to the general public.
I believe, therefore, that had the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance been realized by about April this year, the results would have been very favourable to JAPAN. Of course, such as the CHINA Incident would not have taken place, nor could have GREAT BRITAIN assumed a bold front concerning the DANZIG problem.

Even if GERMANY should attempt a speedy solution of her problems in EUROPE, and should she go to war against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, it would have been possible for JAPAN to obtain GERMANY's consent to her neutrality, in case her immediate entry into the current war was inconvenient. It had been arranged that in the event a Triple Alliance is formed, the Foreign Ministers of the three powers would simultaneously meet together to discuss the diplomatic politics of the three powers. Probably, on that occasion, they would have discussed the USSR, CHINA, DANZIG and POLOGNE problems, and JAPAN could have had a great voice in connection with the German and Italian diplomatic politics. Should they undertake to war against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, JAPAN could have declared that they could not offer efficient support soon after the CHINA Incident, and that they can go ahead with it if they are confident of it. There are examples of ITALY maintaining neutrality at present in spite of her military alliance with GERMANY. I believe that it cannot always be said that if the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance had been formed, JAPAN must have entered into the war, whether she had been willing or not.

More than that, it should be more probable that, as previously stated, if the Triple Alliance had been formed, the war between GERMANY and GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE would not have broken out at that time. GERMANY and ITALY still have much to prepare for from diplomatic, economic, financial, and military points of view. In the first place, since it was necessary for JAPAN to have some rest after settling the CHINA Incident, the war would have been postponed as much as possible. The various powers would have decided upon war after complete military armaments had been provided after diplomatic relations have been bottered. I am inclined to say that it is an unfounded opinion to state that if triple Alliance had been formed, we would have been compelled to fight GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE amidst all the difficulties now confronting us.

In regard to the conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact, there are not much for the German authorities to be blamed. As I have already mentioned, it had been rather for JAPAN to retrospect. Then, therefore, as the result of the conclusion of the Russo-German Alliance, I think we must also give consideration as to the influence received of this alliance. Of course, the general public opined that if GERMANY combined with the UKR, the latter will likely concentrate all of her armed forces in the IMM EAST and which JAPAN must extremely suffer. It, also, scared this. However, in actuality, it was on the contrary, for us
believe that USSR's feelings towards JAPAN have turned favorable. The Cass-Fire Agreement at NOVONIAN was readily concluded as if they had been awaiting the proposal. In regard to our negotiations concerning the Border Delimiting Committee, Commercial Treaty, and other problems, they are willingly taking this up with JAPAN. Moreover, in my opinion, she is thinking of concluding a non-aggression pact with JAPAN. This, in my opinion, is that they have hitherto been shut out from EUROPE. But now a Non-aggression Pact has been concluded with GERMANY and I look at this Non-aggression Pact as something of a relationship to an alliance. As a result of this concert with GERMANY, it became so that they can now return to the WEST. They can now return to the BALTIC. In other words, this is not the time for them to glare antagonistically with the daring Japanese in the FAR EAST. They can now return to the WEST and SOUTH of EUROPE where they, also as a race, had cherished to go for many years. Moreover, they wish to compromise with JAPAN and be relieved of their anxieties in the FAR EAST. That is their desire. From this point of view, it had become so that one of the great factors which had obstructed JAPAN's settlement of the CHINA problems by rendering support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK could be removed immediately depending on JAPAN's determination.

Nextly, as a result of the Russo-German Pact, GERMANY attempted a speedy solution of the POLAND problem which caused the outbreak of the European War, but, I think that we cannot say it, unconditionally, that this war was a providential help, or "Divine Wind" for JAPAN. If JAPAN cognizes accurately the new and old forces in EUROPE thinking of it in terms, relating it to her fundamental policy of establishing a New Order in CHINA, and thus shape her policies, I think the very war in EUROPE seen from JAPAN's standpoint is a providential help. Seeing from this point of view, I think the result of the Russo-German Treaty was favorable to us. And, although indirectly there is no denying that the Russo-German rapprochement improved greatly, JAPAN's position in her relations with GREAT BRITAIN, or with AMERICA.

Hitherto, not only have the UNITED STATES always been antagonistic towards JAPAN on the CHINA problem, but also went so far as to take positive measures, such as the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty between the USA and JAPAN. The reason, if asked, is that they suspected something exists behind the Anti-Comintern Axis, and that JAPAN was not isolated. Negotiations for the Triple Alliance was not successful and the subsequent Russo-German rapprochement completely isolated JAPAN. JAPAN, fighting CHINA is being already exhausted. JAPAN, fighting in
CHINA has no relations whatsoever with GERMANY and ITALY. She is isolated, and the Russo-Japanese relations were strained to the breaking point. The UNITED STATES saw that a push now would comp JAPAN to withdraw her hands from CHINA. But, as a consequence of the Russo-German Treaty, the USSR began to withdraw her hands from the F.P. East, and owing to the European war, GREAT BRITAIN also was forced to withdraw her hands, too, and that the USA alone had to deal with JAPAN. What is more, it is probable that the USSR may actually turn with JAPAN. This means that the UNITED STATES had to shoulder a great burden. The UNITED STATES may have thought that she could shoulder such a burden in view of JAPAN's exhausted state, but the Russo-German Treaty which she counted would be against JAPAN's interest, developed in JAPAN's favor. Moreover, the attitude which the UNITED STATES had hitherto taken against the German-Italian war was similar to those of GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE. The question of the UNITED STATES entry into the European War may be doubtful, but there is already sufficient proof of its danger. Considering the worst, the USA may be forced to fight against such powerful European powers as GERMANY and ITALY. The UNITED STATES, which possess such fears, cannot venture to bring pressure upon JAPAN. It is extremely dangerous. I think the UNITED STATES today is repenting her acts of notification on the abrogation of the Japanese Commercial Treaty. It is the appearance of one who is at a loss in disposing of the fist he has raised. This I think is the effect of the Russo-German Treaty. Then, if that is the case, I think it would be incoherent for JAPAN to complain of the Russo-German Treaty. Should the Japanese people have something of a vague feeling towards GERMANY because of that Treaty, should they not cast aside such a feeling? Why, I think that they should be thankful to GERMANY. There is not a single cause for resentment. That is what I wish to say.

However, GERMANY is now at war. There are some who say that if GERMANY will be defeated soon as propagandized by BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and FRANCE, it would be dangerous to be on intimate terms with GERMANY. Although it is an unpleasant way of saying things, I do not necessarily object to this. If GERMANY were to be defeated, it would be in our interest to be friends with her. However, I am sure GERMANY will not be beaten. There are some of those who remember the last War, who state that if the war be prolonged, GERMANY will surely be defeated economically. But they say it because they do not consider fully the real power of present-day GERMANY.
Some in Japan say that it is only six years since HITLER came into power. They say that the economic power and military preparations are still far from being sufficient, but GERMANY today greatly differs from what these people made out of GERMANY. GERMANY of today possesses several times in power several times in 1914. In economics and military preparations, she possesses several times of those compared to 1914. As a whole, in the last European War, not only GERMANY but BRITAIN and FRANCE also suffered blows. BRITAIN's power was for the most part wealth accumulated in the past, and that had been greatly diminished by the war. The extent of the damage may be seen from the fact that it is still not being compensated until today. GERMANY's power, however, lies in her people. The damages received were chiefly her human lives. This has been completely restored during the last twenty years. In that war, not a bit of German territory, not mentioning her towns and cities, were being ravaged. Only certain limits were imposed; such as the limitation of her armed forces to 100,000 men by the VERSAILLES Treaty, and the possession of submarines being objectionable, etc. While that of rehabilitation steadily progressed from the day of the Truce. Although amount in reparations almost reached astronomical figures, I remember that GERMANY actually paid was a little more than 300 million yen in money and goods. Moreover, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, especially, loaned sum after sum of money to GERMANY so as to keep GERMANY from collapsing. The UNITED STATES alone loaned GERMANY 400 to 500 million dollars. In results, it seemed as if GERMANY received reparations amounting to 400-500 million dollars instead of paying. Again, some say that GERMANY had been reduced to a state of emptiness by the well-known inflation. It is true the inflation dealt a heavy blow on the German middle classes and brought about a very bad effect on the general social life; but, it was not all adversity, for all the German joint stock companies had their debts cancelled because of that inflation. That is why the German companies had up-to-date machines installed after the war. Consequently, post-war German industrial power became such that BRITAIN and FRANCE could not rival. Due to that industrial power, German rehabilitation saw striking progress, and the merchant marine that was completely wiped out by the war, suddenly found itself to possess 4-5 million tons, almost same in tonnage as JAPAN. Aside from this, the farming villages rehabilitated remarkably. Then HITLER took the reins of government, GERMANY had already completely restored its national power. Only from the point of formality was she bound by the VERSAILLES Treaty. As HITLER came forward, he severed one by one the yoke of this Treaty. With the severance of each bond, GERMANY's replenished power leaped upwards, and eventually extricating itself of all restraints enabled her to display her full powers. This is the GERMANY of today.
We must not forget that German restoration was not the fruit of Hitler’s six years’ rule, but the years and months extending 20 years following the war. Furthermore, it was the expulsion of the Jews from the country which is described to his nationalism which demanded racial purity. We did disapprove such extremity i.e. the expulsion of alien race, but, the general opinion of the Germans were that the defeat in the last Great War was due to the Jews. The Jews disturbed the home front. They say that unless this parasitic evil is removed completely from the country, they cannot fight. In other words, the expulsion of Jews must be seen as their preparation for war. Now, looking at this today, we find the German home front to be greatly strengthened because of that, and moreover, the German people have all harboured, should we say, retaliatory spirit against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, and also a deep dissatisfaction towards the VERSAILLES Treaty. She was much ridiculed by nearly-born petty neighbor-states and, FRANCE, leading these small nations encircled and oppressed GERMANY. With the advent of HITLER, this dissatisfaction was totally removed. The feelings of the whole populace towards HITLER is amazing. Even great scholars believe him to be a God-sent saviour of the German people. Again, some people say that GERMANY is destitute of resources and that the livelihood of the people is miserable. That it may be so, since huge armaments have been completed in a short space of time, and pressure on control has been made by outsiders. It has been greatly ameliorated when compared to those prior to the Nazi Regime. It can never be said that they are destitute. Internally, all are in good order. Even in unheard of and nameless terms, there are forests of chimneys protruding which emit briskly columns of black smoke. In rural railway stations, there are surprisingly many locomotives and freight cars. Unless we actually see it with our own eyes, the German real power is beyond comprehension.

The internal state of affairs in GERMANY are as stated. Her foreign relations also stand remarkably favourable to her. For example, the USSR is in a state of alliance with GERMANY. During the last war GERMANY allotted the million of her force against RUSSIA for three years. Moreover, aside from fighting BRITAIN and FRANCE, she had to fight ITALY, SERBIA, ROMANIA and others. But today, she is able to concentrate her entire strength on a single front in the west. Furthermore, GERMANY has her Siegfried Line here and it is impenetrable. If she defends herself by this line, she can relieve her fears however long the war may prolong. In this section, GERMANY is not waging any war of attrition. If necessary, she can continue fighting at this rate for any length of time. That she had
stocked from the outset now reaches several times of those of the last War. Now, she can receive supplies freely from the USSR and from the BALKANS and SCANDINAVIA. The extent of attrition could be properly adjusted. This is quite favourable for GERMANY. GERMANY is taking utmost caution in this War, saying that the time has now arrived for her to fight decisively in this current war for the supremacy of EUROPE against BRITAIN and FRANCE. GERMANY should have fought a short term war during the last War; that is, she should have beaten FRANCE by an impetuous attack and then withdrawn swiftly, attack RUSSIA. In the last War, GERMANY was forced to wage a war of attrition soon after the commencement of hostilities. Even today if the Siegfried Line did not exist, GERMANY will be forced to fight facing a vast force of British and French troops. If it became thus, ITALY, her ally, would not be able to look on with folded arms. A large-scale war would immediately follow. But now that there is the Siegfried Line, GERMANY is in no haste. She is slowly making preparations as she fights. Consequently, she does not ask for ITALY’s assistance. This is why ITALY is observing neutrality.

To begin with the totalitarian system of GERMANY and ITALY is, to then, the representation of the natural progress of history, while the system of liberalistic individualism of the British and French should perish. It will perish even if it is left untouched. I believe they are of the view that mere confrontation by the powerful German-Italian New Order against the declining liberalistic order of GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE will cause BRITAIN and FRANCE to lose faith. It seems that GERMANY will take stand in the Siegfried Line and bent to exhaust the nerves of BRITAIN and FRANCE, while on the other hand, she shall be bent to exhaust her own with her air forces and submarines. Of course, in practice matters will not be so simple, but I hold that a confrontation of the old against new forces today will give sufficient chances to the new powers to win this war. Of course, if the USSR, ITALY and JAPAN side with the British and French, it will be of grave consequence to GERMANY; but today, such things will not happen. As to ITALY, the people say that she is again sitting on the fence. She had to side with GREAT BRITAIN in 1914 because of her various weaknesses.

However, with the result of MUSSOLINI’s rise, things have assumed a new aspect. Today ITALY possesses enough power that BRITAIN and FRANCE cannot easily sly her. The situation has changed so that ITALY is not what she had been in the last War, then she was forced to run to the Allies by BRITAIN and FRANCE. ITALY made full developments in her political powers under 17 years of Fascist rule. For further developments, there remains but territorial expansion. As MUSSOLINI puts it,
ITALY must expand or explode. There is no first-class power so destitute of resources as ITALY. Her population shows a yearly increase of 450,000. She must either expand or explode.

The surroundings of the Mediterranean Sea, however, are mostly spheres of influence under BRITAIN and FRANCE. Consequently, ITALY's expansion will oust the British and French influence in the Mediterranean Sea. There is no alternative but to achieve this aim at the sacrifice of the British and French. ITALY can never think of riding with BRITAIN and FRANCE unless given a sufficient reward. When the time arrives, I expect ITALY to enter into the War in accordance with her treaty with GERMANY. ITALY's entry into the War will be very favourable to GERMANY, because BRITAIN imports 20 percent of her resources by the Mediterranean route. This importation will be completely stopped. FRANCE, also, will be cut off from AFRICA. It will be a matter of grave concern to BRITAIN and FRANCE if ITALY joins hands with the USSR and participate in the War while GERMANY is holding her ground against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE using the Siegfried Line as a shield, it will be a matter of grave concern to BRITAIN.

Most Japanese are of the simple opinion that the deciding factor in War is the Navy. Not so in EUROPE of today. To BRITAIN, the loss of her Navy means the instant collapse of her entire Empire. The Navy, therefore, is an absolute necessity to her. Consequently, her Navy is not much effective as a combat weapon in event of a War against GERMANY and ITALY. GERMANY can exist without a Navy and therefore, she can dispense with it freely. Her Navy is lighter than that of GREAT BRITAIN. The treasured British Fleet cannot move actively in too free manner in the Mediterranean Sea. It would be too risky for her. BRITAIN does not expose her to such danger because its loss will affect the very existence of the nation. For instance, the British Navy is at a disadvantage in the Mediterranean Sea. ITALY possesses aircraft carriers that will never sink. The small islands dotting the Sea are those carriers. Moreover, she has over 100 submarines at her disposal. It is a great menace to the British Navy in a place so small as a lake.

GREAT BRITAIN cannot be too optimistic of the current War. This is indeed a dangerous. Then why is it that she started this War? It is because that BRITAIN of today although being a democratic nation is in reality under an oligarchy. Among the British statesmen of today, there are many of Jewish descent, which includes Cabinet members. Antipathy against HITLER who rejected the Jews is extremely intense. The present attitude of BRITAIN seems much under emotional influence. Hated against HITLER seems to be the cause of her bringing War recklessly.
against GERMANY. In addition, there seems to be a misunderstanding on her part on the actual German strength and the attitude of RUSSIA. In the present state, GREAT BRITAIN may not resolve to fight it out to the last as some think here in JAPAN. Looking at the British diplomacy since the SECOND WORLD WAR, we do not know when they change. It goes without saying that if she succeeds in isolating GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN will fight it out to the last.

The most important is the Russo-German relations, and we must acknowledge that GERMANY-USA relation is much closer than expected. Seeing that GERMANY is desirous of adjusting Russo-Japanese relations, GERMANY seems to feel at ease about the USSR. If JAPAN and the USSR compromise and that there is no fear whatsoever for the USSR to exert its full power on the EUROPEAN Theater, it could be said that GERMANY places a great deal of faith in the USSR. The GERMANY attempt to relieve USSR in the FAR EAST may be accounted for by her desire to have Russian power directed towards the SOUTH of EUROPE. Some say that Russian and ITALIAN interests will clash in the BALKANS, but if the USSR advance to the NORTH instead of to the BALKANS, I do not agree with those who claim that due to ITALY's active denunciation of USSR, the friendship between GERMANY and ITALY must have cooled. The relations of GERMANY and ITALY are the relations of HITLER and MUSSOLINI, and that heroes, whether they are in the EAST or the WEST, are the same. They do not easily become friends or enemies. Then I think it could not be so easy for the BRITISH to sever USSR and ITALY from GERMANY.

We were sent on a mission to EUROPE and we did that we were able to form the Triple Alliance. Since an alliance is an important affair affecting the fate of a State, we did all our best to investigate and study fully their conditions. As a result, we arrived at the conclusion as we have explained above on the actual strength and attitude of the powers involved. As JAPAN did not join the Alliance and, on the contrary, the Russo-German rapprochement has been brought about, thus leading to the outbreak of the war, the European situation may have more or less changed since my return home. I will not decidedly affirm that all future developments will become as what I have stated. Looking with confidence today is the task that GERMANY is doing in the EAST and that GERMANY and ITALY are trying to do in EUROPE bear resemblance on the point that both possess the great historic mission to establish a new order in the EAST which is a national conviction in connection with the CHINA Incident, will help much, in a larger sense, that GERMANY and ITALY are trying to do in EUROPE.

Consequently, should JAPAN compromise with the old forces because of her consideration for resources and others, the spiritual blow that will affect the new rising power of EUROPE such as GERMANY and ITALY will be indeed great. Furthermore, it may tend to weaken their determination. As above explained, it is true that the Russo-German Pact and the current hostilities
have relieved JAPAN's international position for the time being. However, to entertain the idea that JAPAN should neither side with GERMANY and ITALY, nor bind itself with BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, but utilize the present easy position and go on settling the CHINA Incident with the so-called principle of Independence and Self-Reliance "will be opportune if they actually go on fighting forever, but there is no such war that has no end. There is always peace with war. JAPAN will surely be asked to participate in that Peace Conference. In such a case, JAPAN's principle of Independence and Self-Reliance; that is, siding with neither will mean isolation and without assistance at the conference meeting. JAPAN should be most careful that the white people should not form a united front and attempt solution of their problems at the sacrifice of the EAST. Should they suddenly awake and find that it is futile to fight among themselves in EUROPE, and realize whichever side may win, resources are short in EUROPE. Fortunately, there are much resources in the EAST, and that the people are weak. JAPAN is just but a fledgling state. If it becomes such that they come to agree upon carrying out a joint exploitation of the EAST, where BRITAIN has until now made it her domain rejecting other countries and herself not fully utilizing it, and that before JAPAN's power could be maintained, JAPAN must confront an indeed difficult situation. The reason why we advanced the forming of an alliance with the far-away powers of GERMANY and ITALY is because we gave thought to this question.

I believe that this should be the fundamental policy of JAPAN's diplomacy. In practice, our seniors have also taken up such policy. The people and government may have been unconscious of this fact, but for example, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a result of that—in other words, the white man's world was divided into two and we have bound ourselves with one of them. There is no reason why we should let them become one.

Independence and self-reliance is a question that should be considered after JAPAN's power has been fully developed. To JAPAN of today, non-implications to either of them seems, at a glance, most safe but, in fact, it is a most dangerous policy. Never has JAPAN succeeded unaided at an international conference of white people. It was only when she had allies that her assertions were heeded. Take the present CHINA problem, JAPAN can never settle it by segregating it as a CHINA problem in itself. JAPAN can never attain a satisfactory solution, unless the ulterior situation develops in JAPAN's favour. Unless the ulterior situation is settled, nothing could really be decided no matter that JAPAN decided with CHINA. It will surely be upset. There are the bitter ordeals which our seniors had to time to time experienced.

Such was the case at the time of the Sin-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. It was the same during the last World War that had been in our custody once will be taken back. The current CHINA Incident will also never allow us to be off our guard. We shall again have to suffer misery if we pursue the policy we had been pursuing. If we don't, it is pleasant, but I don't think that this is ever a premature worry of my own.
The Trend of the Great War

(DILFOLD Magazine, June 1940)

The Trend of the Great War.

It was told that the German Army which invaded BELGIUM and HOLLAND crushed the Allied forces with irresistible force and has already emerged at the ENGLISH CHANNEL. Reflecting on this, it seems that the Allied forces numbering upwards of one million on the Belgian Front will not be able to escape annihilation, and the final issue is already certain.

However, would the German Army, which has overwhelmed BELGIUM and assumed control of the STRAITS of DOVER make an attack on the British mainland without other preparation? Germany would probably think seriously about the adventure of crossing the DOWER Straits without disposing of the large French Army. She would probably do better to turn to the South and plan to conquer ENGLAND first by joining forces with ITALY. Judging from the results we see the present the accomplishment of this object must be regarded as involving no great difficulty. By conquering in a short while the many countries in EUROPE starting with NORWAY and then HOLLAND, BELGIUM, and FRANCE in successive, might not GERMANY by establishing a continental bloc in co-operation with ITALY deliver in easy fashion a fatal blow to ENGLAND?

He who are not military specialists cannot say definitely that ENGLAND can be conquered by the Army. However, it is not at all difficult for the vastly superior German Airforce to deliver severe attacks on ENGLAND which lies on the far shore of a narrow strip of water. Moreover, even the British Army cannot hide itself behind ICELAND, alone from the danger to her homeland, and must therefore face the German airforce no matter what the risk in this critical moment when the country may stand or fall. In such a case, judging from past experience, the British Army would soon suffer losses and be remarkably weakened. Moreover, with the participation of ITALY in the war, her Airforce and submarines can be used to join the attack on ENGLAND. Therefore, it can be said that ENGLAND's chances of defeat in the naval battle are great.

But that as it may, the hope of the British and French to conquer GERMANY and ITALY must be considered entirely vain. For the question is will ENGLAND with on eye to such a defeat immediately propose peace with GERMANY, and will GERMANY and ITALY accept this? He stated the following bold opinion in the early stages of the war: FURTHUR HITLER claimed that he had no intention of going to war against ENGLAND and FRANCE; that it was
not necessarily correct, in virtue of his proposals for peace, to view
that as BRITAIN's true object that it appears to have been his policy
to try to shift the responsibility for war to the British by proposing
peace; and that BRITAIN is so to speak falling into his trap. No
people mocked at this for being a naive view of diplomacy. However,
we firmly believed that since the two heroes, HITLER and MUSSOLINI,
established the GERMANY-ITALY axis and began the rebuilding of EUROPE,
the would not be satisfied easily with a trivial recovery of lost territories
or expansion of their territories.

HITLER said to his army once ago, "A war to decide the destiny
of the German race for a thousand years in the future has been run." A spokes-
man for MUSSOLINI said. "The time to decide the destiny of EUROPE
for three hundred years in the future has come." From this it is easy to
imagine what both countries, GERMANY and ITALY, are thinking of.

As a result of this war is it not probable that a cruel, rather ghastly
great liquidation would take place? Now the question is: will BRITAIN and
FRANCE, which have been backing in the favors of the world for countless
centuries past, be permitted to exist as great powers or not? Furthermore,
can the former absurd situation wherein the small countries of EUROPE hold
absolute sovereignty and stand in the way of the big powers continue or not?

If the above-mentioned revolution should be carried out in EUROPE, it
is unanswerable that it will have a great influence on ASIA as a matter of
course. How would the colonies of BRITAIN and FRANCE, and those of HOLLAND
be disposed of? This is a question of great significance from JAPAN's
standpoint. The destiny of several hundred million Asiatic compatriots
is now at a great turning-point. Would it be proper for this great
problem to be decided in the presence of JAPAN without listening to JAPAN?
What significance does the new order in East Asia contain, and what signifi-
cance should it have? Our people must at this time carefully consider
this point now.

Since the outbreak of the second European war JAPAN has adopted a
policy of non-participation and has said she will press exclusively for the
solution of the CHINA Incident. However, this is fundamentally a point
of view which defies the trend of world history. Inasmuch as the European
War is a war between old and new principles, it must be considered a great
mistake for JAPAN, which launched a great undertaking in ASIA to destroy
the old order and establish a new one, to think she can stay out of the
European War. However, may he said of this, JAPAN is actually involved
in the European War. Speaking even more briefly, it is not too much to say
that the fuse of the European War was first attached by the CHINA Incident.

The reason is that the war between the East and the West centered on
that common target. The forces which stand in the way of a new order in
East ASIA——the enemies of GERMANY and ITALY — are these not the
powers of the old order in the world? Our advocacy of the alliance
between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY was based upon this point of view.

Moreover for this reason also the assertion is made that in spite of the fact that an alliance has not been concluded and apart from the question of a treaty, JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY stood in an irrevocable relationship. For this reason in particular we have been enjoining loudly that we must not regard the Europeans nor with indifference, and that JAPAN must not let GERMANY lose. The irrevocable relationship between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY is historically inevitable. Although it looks naturally as if JAPAN, misled by the influence of a certain war in the country, is inclined toward the U.S. or toward the U.S. in this case toward GERMANY and ITALY, the path of world political trade current by this be changed even slightly. JAPAN, in spite of the opinion of forces if the old order at home, in making a great contribution to GERMANY, which in it an extremely advantageous position, in the latter's prosecution of the war. We are doubt to the Russo-German Pact was a prime requisite for this war. However, the fact that made the SOVIET UNION shake hands with her old enemy, GERMANY, so easily is the existence of the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY axis, although the presence of negotiations for the three power alliance is the main reason. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that JAPAN's remaining neutral for eight months contrary to pre-war expectation and her warring with JAPAN over the CHINA Incident has made her unable to participate in the European War. Therefore, although we talk about non-participation, JAPAN has actually played a great role in the European War and it must be said that GERMANY and JAPAN a great deal.

However, the policy has rather been inclined towards ENSELL and the U. S. A. and if the German invasion of PORTUGAL should be a little delayed, JAPAN would be in a position to establish an irrevocable relationship with ENSELL. If so, GERMANY would not be able to enounce her attitude to JAPAN, even if she so desired. The war brought JAPAN to this unfavorable position in which she will incur ill will even while rendering services?

The victory of the forces of the new order in the world political situation could probably induce the total retreat of the forces of the old order in JAPAN willy-nilly. There is no alternative but that the downfall of liberalism and capitalism in JAPAN will be inevitably hastened. In addition, due to the three years duration of the CHINA Incident, this situation has been vacated an inevitable, but that which has hardly supported the old order on the threshold of collapse was the connection with forces of the old order abroad. A vast majority of the people firmly believe there is a democratic force in the background of the CHINA Incident, but we must say that the old powers in the country have tried to compromise and speak sweetly with enemy foreign powers, have been supported by schemes of resistance from foreign powers, and have barely kept alive. As a result of the Second European War, this support is even now being withdrawn. For this reason we must say that the recent progress of the war in the East had an extremely important effect where Japan is concerned.

If we understand foreign and domestic problems in this way, it is clear at a glance alone what course in the future JAPAN's fundamental diplomatic policy must be guided. Moreover, as an antecedent condition, the rebuilding of her domestic organization is required.
SHIRATORI: I called on you today because I wish to listen to all of your opinions concerning the international problem.

SHIRATORI: Until now, I have done what I could for the renovation of Japanese diplomacy, and in the world situation, what we have advocated in the past have generally become factual. However, since the situation in Europe has changed with such rapidity, we cannot merely base our far-sighted views. That we must first consider is whether Germany and Italy who have won a great victory may change their attitude. This would be, to a certain degree, unavoidable. The end of the war is now in sight, and I deeply feel that the present is indeed too late for Japan, who has been greatly limited in the scope of giving assistance.

SHIRATORI: The situation has become exactly as you have maintained for a long time, but what about the future situation?

SHIRATORI: What I have always said to others is that the war will surely reach the conclusion as we had anticipated, and a situation will develop in which we can say, "Didn't we tell you so?" But the situation would then be too late, and Japan will be placed in an awkward predicament. However, I am not at all pessimistic, because Germany, Italy, and Japan will essentially stand on common ground even in the future world. Generally speaking, due to the fact that the political leaders of Japan have misconstrued the inevitable course of world history, it is regrettable that Japan has since deviated from this course. Irrespective of what one may say, the course which Japan has taken since the China Incident could not be controlled by a small number of people. We ought to follow the course which we must follow. As long as Japan follows this course, she, as a nation, must necessarily join the course followed by Germany and Italy. For instance, for the reason that the alliance was not established Japan of course, has no obligation to assist Germany and Italy. Notwithstanding the fact that the Government has actually stated its policy of non-interference, what Japan is doing is becoming of great help to Germany and Italy. What they wanted of Japan in the alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy was mainly that Japan weaken British and French positions in the Orient and to check the United States and although Japan was not asked to do this she has, in fact, done so. Now, even if the United States
wishes to participate in the war, she cannot do so. During these nine months, they, being checked by Japan, have neglected Europe. Although diplomatically, they speak ill of Germany, and materially, their actual power is concentrated in the Pacific. For Germany, this is a great help. Before the war, it was generally said that America would participate in the early stages of this war, but if that were true the United States would have furnished England and France with very little. Although England has prominent Navy power, it seems that her forces is still insufficient. If the American Navy had cooperated with that of Great Britain, it would probably have been very advantageous for England and France. Firstly, it would have been a great spiritual encouragement to England and France. Such a country as Italy would have hesitated to enter the war. If the United States Navy had operated together with that of England and France in the Mediterranean Sea, Italy would not have been able to make any moves. If viewed in this manner, the situation would probably have been considerably different from the present. For one thing, America had greatly under-rated Germany's strength. She had thought that Europe was safe if entrusted to England and France. The feeling that checking Japan was her chief mission, is now concentrating her real power in the Pacific Ocean. If viewed by Japan, it is extremely bothersome, but if viewed by Germany, it is an extreme blessing. It is a great role that Japan has played for the sake of Germany. However since the fact that the concentration of the main power of the U. S. in the Pacific was painful to the political leaders of Japan, in trying to improve relations in some way, and to reach an economical understanding, they have followed a course which is contrary to Germany's intentions. Consequently, although Germany has no longer any reason to be thankful to Japan, actually, Japan has rendered services comparable to that extended by Italy.

2. THE NEW ORDER I. EUROPE AND THE OPPOSING OF THE U. S.

By the above fact, it can be seen that looking from the standpoint that the position of Japan, Germany, and Italy lies in a mission aiming at the establishment of a new order in the East and the West, what each nation is doing separately is concentrated towards achieving the same goal. That each does independently becomes in fact mutual assistance. I think that the relationship between the three nations lies in such a fundamental relationship. Viewed from that standpoint, it is expected that Japan, Germany, and Italy can continue to cooperate, and even if Germany should expel English and French influences from Europe, it does not mean that from that very moment, a new order in Europe can be established. All the factors belonging to the old order in Europe will assemble in the American continent. The cold bullshit, which is most typical of the old order, has already been quickly concentrated in the United States. Of course the Jews, who are the greatest enemy of the new order, have already the intention of roving to the United States, and all the counter ruling classes of England and France, will also go to the United States. Since these elements have formerly followed individualistic and liberalistic philosophies, they cannot absolutely remain in Europe ruled under totalitarianism. Henceforth, they will move in groups to the United States as the Puritans did in olden times. As a result of this, all the old
elements of the world will be concentrated in the United States. America, which has been called the new world will become the old world, and Europe of the old world will become the new world, and this state of opposition will continue for a considerable period of time. Until the old elements in America are finally driven out, the struggle will continue. On the one hand, if the national system of Japan is abruptly converted to the new order, and proceeds readily towards the establishment of the new order in East Asia, it would naturally be unavoidable for her to collaborate and cooperate with Europe's new order. On the other hand, in the Pacific, she will have to stand in opposition with America's old order. Looking at it from this rough outline, it may be said that after all, the coalition of Japan, Germany, and Italy and the relation of mutual aid and communication will continue.

3. THE COMING AFTER OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST.

KONNICA: Generally speaking, I think that your prediction that the old elements of the world would all be concentrated in the United States is an interesting observation. Since the outbreak of this war, I could not believe that the existing power of England and France could suppress the newly formed Italo-German axis. In spite of that, the ruling classes of England and France themselves have a strong feeling of floating amidst Germany and Italy. Viewed from this respect, I had the feeling that it was the influence of the Jews, who are the ruling class of England and France, who provoked this homeless war, arising only at the dealing of even a little blow against anti-Jewish countries like Germany and Italy by sacrificing England and France. In the course of later developments, however, the situation is likely to move towards such a direction. For instance, the capital of England and France will flow to the United States. The Government would also probably seek shelter in America. Besides, probably, Jewish liberalists will also go. If such a case, what will become of the world? There will continue, for a considerable period of time, a struggle between the newly arisen influence in Europe and the old influence centered in the United States. This time, East Asia will be the scene of the conflict. In all cases, England and France will have to maintain imperialistic domination of their colonies in the Orient, and the United States which is welcoming and providing shelter to England and France, also cannot disregard Anglo-American domination of these colonies. Thus, all the English and French fleets which escaped danger will assemble in the Pacific. If the United States finds it futile to save Europe, she will concentrate her entire forces in the Pacific and will defend Australia, French Indo China, or British India. She will also invade China. It is unmistakable that the United States will take such an action. Since the situation would be such that the forces of Italy and the Soviet Union and American forces which were united to those of England and France will eventually clash in the Far East, the Far East will be forced into the same position as the modern Balkans. In such a case no one can tell in what way the United States, which is suppressing Japan with a firm attitude for the reason that what has been done by Japan since the Manchurian Incident and the China Incident, namely the establishment of the
new order in East Asia, is contrary to America's principles, will alter her Far Eastern policy according to the situation at the crucial moment. In other words, she may change to a policy in which she intends to return Japan to the status of a watchdog as at the time of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and to use Japan as advanced guard troops for the democratic countries in the Far East in the same manner as Poland and the little entente countries. In such a case there seems to exist particular danger that the ruling class of Japan would be influenced by the simplicity of the present situation and eventually become so inclined. In the end, the United States will superficially change her policy in such a manner as to formally approve what has been done by Japan since the China Incident. In answer to this, Japan would also change her view relating to the United States and not in concert with the U.S. Actually, there exists a danger that a policy will be adopted that would make Japan a tool. If such a situation develops, the actual movement in Europe and Japan's movement in East Asia are at the present substantially aimed at the establishment of the same new world order. However, from that moment, both parties will be contradictory to the movement, and it is feared that Japan would support the maintenance of the old order.
4. **ENGLAND AFTER THE DREIFALT AND THE CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES**

**SPHATOKI:** If the present political rulers of Japan continue to be in control of Japan's administration, what you have just said may occur. The United States is now taking a very lenient attitude towards Japan. Particularly, the ruling class of Japan is ardently hoping for the free importation of American goods, or the establishment of credit and is trying to conclude a new trade treaty. Although there is a tendency among them to cooperate with the United States with complete disregard of the past, in accordance with the sentiment expressed by the great majority of the people of today, this should not be allowed. I cannot possibly imagine that Japan will reverse the course of world history, check the progress of civilization, and check her own development by disregarding her present mission in the Asiatic continent and the role she must take in the vast Asiatic sphere. In this respect, we need not be pessimistic, but as you have said, England and France, who have been expelled from Europe by cooperating with the United States, will make up in Asia what they lost in Europe. It is certain that the Netherlands Indies, French Indo-China and British India, which they hitherto failed to develop and utilize sufficiently under their spheres of influence, will become more precious to them than before. Consequently, there is likely to exist danger that they will concentrate their influences there.

But I think that it will be a long time before England and France, if they are expelled from Europe, will bear this silently and abandon her return to Europe. Even though the ruling class itself should evacuate to the United States with gold bullions, warships and merchant ships, there would still remain in England 45,000,000 people. There would also remain in France 40,000,000 people. It is impossible for them to take their all with them. They will leave with great reluctance. For instance, who will support the population of 45,000,000 remaining in England? There is only three or four months' supply of food. Hitler res no obligation to support them with sister girls in Continental Europe. Furthermore, he is unable to do so. They cannot live unless they depend on the Continent of America. In any case, the people in England must depend on the American continent. Even if the small number of people who had abandoned everything and had moved to Canada should cooperate with the United States to manage the colonies in the Orient, much cannot be expected of them. The movement for restoring Europe will be considerable and vigorous for the next five or ten years. During that period, they would not be able to exert their power in the Orient. During that time, the naval power of Germany and Italy will increase rapidly.
Then the continent of America will be in a defensive position. Whatever one may say, the population of Europe is increasing, and one cannot support himself. Germany and Italy will devote themselves solely in exploiting Africa. But even in that case, it is not probable that they have no connection with the American continent lying across the Atlantic Ocean. Their immediate object is South America, which is a branch of Europe. Briefly speaking, aside from the natives, only Spanish, Germans and Italians are there. There are only a few Anglo-Saxons. These people do not like the United States. The world has been under absolute Anglo-Saxon domination up to now, and because of this, they were controlled by the United States with reluctance. However, if the world situation should suddenly become such that the Anglo-Saxons are defeated, they would rather favor Europe. America will be in an extremely defensive position. The very foundation of the Monroe Doctrine will crumble. The situation will become very grave for the United States. Since the U.S. herself has riches in excess of her needs, she will not be further tempted by the materials of Asia. If an agitation should break out in South America, which is so close from the standpoint of self-defense, would not this be of extreme danger to the U.S. herself?

Therefore at this moment it cannot be imagined that the United States alone would increase her power in the Orient as you have now said. Although Canada has a population of only 10,000,000, people who escaped from England will gradually gather there. Since Canada alone is not capable of maintaining the power of a great nation, England, who has escaped from Europe, will consider India, Australia, New Zealand, etc., as bearing of greater value. However, it is questionable as to whether the British Empire, which has lost England and has moved to Canada, can maintain the same power she has held before. Although there is an extreme view that England Proper, so to speak, is like the site of office for the British Empire, no matter what one might say, it has been the native power, and the continent was controlled from there. I think that the surviving influence of the British Empire, which has lost her seat hold in Europe and which has escaped from England Proper, should not be feared by us. At any rate, the dispute between the new influence in Europe and the old influence which escaped to America will be engaged in a fierce struggle for the next five or ten years. During that time, at least, they probably will be unable to exert much pressure in the Pacific Area. This period of five to ten years is very precious for the Asiatic race. If this period is idled away, it is clear that oppression of various nature will be inflicted upon them. After all, Europe also must depend on Asia. They are desirous of materials from Asia.
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Since the British, France, and England herself, who are dependent upon the American continent, will after all endeavor to reconstitute Asia to the old influence, it is necessary for Japan during this period to utilize to the utmost degree the extra time given by her. This must be a great subject for the Japanese people. I think that the reason the Japanese people had somewhat felt that we had reached the critical turning point is due to a certain kind of intuition concerning this great significance.

5. THE POSITION OF THE PRO-BRITISH FACTION IN OUR COUNTRY

KOBAYASHI: No one in the political and business world, and also Imperial University professors in the academic world, seems to understand anything in that sense. Still, their views are opposite. First, the opinion that Germany would be defeated was generally prevalent until recently, but now it seems that Germany is likely to win the war. We cannot fight reality. They are saying that victory in war is unimportant; that victory over military power is unimportant; and that it is an enemy of civilization. Their words imply that justice still exists in the democracy of France and England. Actually, the discourse is too far advanced for remedy. They are a group which should go to the Continent of America. From Japan—-

SHIRATORI: There are many persons who should also leave Japan.

NOMURA: The point that the national feeling would not permit Japan to take a course contrary to current history of which you speak is a matter of course, but as Mr. KOBAYASHI has just stated, since there are some people who view the progress of history from the opposite point of view—-

SHIRATORI: However, it cannot be conceived that such people will govern Japan forever. It should not be allowed.

KOBAYASHI: They appear to be possessed with such ideas.

SHIRATORI: No matter what you say, they are people who have been thoroughly imbued with the marrow of bones with tradition, in that sense prejudice tradition, or to put it more strongly, with prejudice, which is very difficult to shake off. Under such a world they are maintaining their present position. The change of such a world immediately means the loss of their position. If that situation develops, this would be "self-preservation." There is a pro-British faction in Japan. I think the pro-British feeling will remain even if England is crushed. The pro-British feeling is one which expresses self-love. It is one that shows love for one's self.
KOBAYASHI: The business world is generally like that.

SUNAYO: It is not only the business world. Hitherto they have been inured in that manner. They are those who have taught this sentiment to others and those who have written books on this subject in order to safeguard their positions. If the present world collapses their position will be lost.

KOBAYASHI: That is true. Although we, including SUNAYO, are locked upon as the pro-German faction by the pro-British faction, I do not think that our group is particularly pro-German.

SUNAYO: Since we call then the pro-British faction, they probably call us the pro-German group.

KOBAYASHI: According to them although listening to the pro-German faction is very interesting, what they hear are not actually true.

SUMIYA: They say that we are taking a course in the opposite direction from civilization.

KOBAYASHI: After all, the source of the present extent of Germany's night lies in her positive possession of new culture, new ideas, and new world outlook.

SUMIYA: Ignoring new developments in present day Germany, they are after all, trying to judge Germany according to the principle of "night makes light" of the Middle Ages. I felt just as the Catholics did at the time of the Renaissance, as they viewed the progressive elements who admired the arts and literature of Greece and Rome, with a feeling that a great heresy had risen, because, although the world was now progressing towards the country of God, there appeared people who were trying to worship the savage gods of Greece. I think that it is similar to this.

KOBAYASHI: Therefore, the situation will not be clear until time elapses.

SUNAYO: Judging from the history of mankind, the Renaissance is a revival of the culture of Greece, which is the origin of Germany. However, the new world outlook of Germany and Italy is a movement which endeavors to go back to the pre-Grecian era. Also in Japan, Restoration always means a revival. However it goes further back to the mythical age. Totalitarianism, therefore, is a return to things fundamental and essential when viewed from cultural history of mankind. The culture to which they refer is not really culture. They must be speaking about supercilious civilization or something of that nature. Isn't
that various man-made institutions or superficial civilization that only greets the eye. The German people make a distinction between culture and civilization. According to the English, American, and Japanese people, it is this superficial civilization that Germany will abolish from this earth if she wins the war. Culture will not perish; on the contrary it will flourish. Up to now, what Japan has been told as being most valuable was this Western civilization based on liberalism.

6. ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

NOMINATION: Concerning that point, I once wrote a short article in the "National Review." It can generally be said that modern European civilization originated in Hellenism. However, Hellenism is a new civilization which originated in a Greek colony at the time when the Aryans entered the Greek Peninsula, reached the Mediterranean Sea, and came in contact with the ceramic civilization of the Mediterranean. For the Aryans, it was a foreign civilization. What is the culture of the Mediterranean? The pirates of the Persian Gulf who entered the Mediterranean and assimilated with the Phoenicians established one of the metropolitan civilizations, is not its origin in the ceramic civilization of the Archen desert. The Archeans made their living by occasionally leaving their barren land and robbing and cheating the farmers of fertile Mesopotamia. These people later established the commercial empire called Babylonia and also, the militaristic country of Assyria. In either case, they made their living not by producing anything for themselves, but by exploiting the farmers who were producers. The religion that developed here was Babylonian and Assyrian pantheism, and that was developed into Judaism which in turn, became Christianity. What is very interesting about Judaism and Christianity is that a contract of faith is made between God and mankind. This idea of a reciprocal contract was inherited by Europe through the Hellenic and Hebrew that I just mentioned. These are the modern theories of social contract and the contract of sovereignty.

In such a society, either commerce or spoliation exists, and in such a way, these two forms appear in economics. And, in the construction of society since the powers are in opposition, it takes the form of a democracy if the powers opposing each other are in balance. However, if this balance is destroyed and one of these powers becomes very powerful, an extreme despotism will develop. These tendencies have appeared in Greece and here. Furthermore, even in international society, there will develop such unstable internationalism and pacifism as armed peace or the League of Nations or such principles of aggression and ideas of the world as one nation as it did in Macedonia and here.
Modern Europe is a world representing conflicting principles in which all of these principles are mixed. As a result, although economically it is called capitalism, it is a refined form of mercerism. After this mercerism has exploited domestic agricultural districts to the limit, it will then utilize the utmost the agricultural districts of such overseas countries as India and Australia. Since that would not be sufficient, it will exploit Manchuria and China. This is the so-called mercerism. Since merceristic countries other than England are appearing here and there, disputes and antagonism will develop concerning the principle of colonies. The situation will be possible as long as once peace is maintained, but sooner or later, a situation will develop in which these countries will clash in an merceristic war struggle for world domination. This is the substance of the European war. Such cannot live, or cannot exist, or forms of civilization or abnormalities that developed in unsuitable areas such as in deserts and seas which, in essence, cannot maintain human life by labor. The modern world is a product of the merceristic civilization and the attempt to return to this merceristic civilization is the central of the Occident. Enlightenment comes from the East. Man in a certain sense, is return to the Orient and the restoration of agricultural civilization. For instance, even the Nazi national land plan has a tendency toward mercerism and, after all, trying to return to the special economy and future of human life based on the soil.

7. JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL AND 5TH ECONOMIC THEORY

SUZUKI: Indeed, it must be so. In the conversion of the present world it must be so. In short, it is not natural to establish an empire across the seven seas. I think that the future world will necessarily be divided into large spheres. Generally, these zones must be connected together by land. Japan must also consider herself as connected by land to the Asiatic continent instead of considering herself as a sea-bound country. On a map, the Japan-America-China bloc system that Japan is now operating, is indeed widespread. But I think that the sphere may be a little small. If the South Seas area is added to this, it will become a splendid Lebensraum. I think that this is not an cosmic empire but a splendid Lebensraum connected by land and by sea. I think that the establishment of a bloc from this angle. The existing mercerism must, on this occasion, be completely liquidated. It seems to be that activities based on the soil, such as primitive industries, will become fundamental. If this is accomplished, the temptation of various war will be greatly decreased.

In this sense, the interview given to the American press by Hitler is very interesting. We demanded that since
he does not infringe on the sphere of existence of others, others must not interfere with his own Lebensraum. For this purpose, we must generally have the essentials for self-sufficiency. The United States advocates the Monroe doctrine; the reason is that the United States is not desirous of being invaded by the old world. He said that it would be desirable if the United States confined herself to this doctrine, and be represented the United States as being unreasonable in interfering in everything throughout the world.

KOBAYASHI: Therefore, unless Japan's statesmen either follow England or the U.S., or else abolish this course, she cannot accomplish anything on a large scale. A great nation-wide plan concentrated on national defense, in the future, must follow such a course.

SHIMIZU: We must follow such a course, even though it is against our will; we must follow that course steadily.

8. CHARACTER OF THE GLORIOUS AGE

NOMURA: I only think that notwithstanding the fact that the situation is actually so, there are a great many people who take an opposite view. It must be taken for granted that interests cause them to take this opposite view. But after all, our minds, which are now controlled by past thoughts and ideas, are influenced in this way. There is also the misconception that world civilization originated in Greece and Rome and that modern civilization was perfected in France and England, and that since this was said to be of the highest level, any improvement in this direction is considered progress. After all, this does not differ fundamentally with the interpretation of history by Marx. In this manner, Europe is considered as the center of all history. However, although Japan speaks of a new world in East Asia, she has not contemplated at all as to the nature of the historical basis on which the new order stands. This is not only a problem of history. The old world outlook permeates the field of philosophy, the politics, economics, law, and society. As long as things are viewed with such an outlook, they will be distorted. It seems to me that after all, a new cultural movement is absolutely necessary.

Although the Nazis in Germany have a fine new world outlook, it did not appear suddenly but arose in Germany after the race and state were unified. For example, there was the cultural struggle of Bismark which has a deep political significance, and such things as
Romanticism in the philosophical field, movement of romanticism thinking from the standpoint of literary thought, the historical school of economics, and proponents of ancient German law in the legal school. Therefore, it is said that the movement for the establishment of the new culture, which is based on a very wide scope and which would give the Nazi's world outlook a foundation, arose in Germany from the nineteenth century. Since that movement did not fully attain success, it was defeated by democracy or liberalism at the time of the first world war. However, this time, under Nazi domination, this movement has completely flourished. On the contrary, because of the existence of such a cultural foundation, the Nazi's domination became firm. That is my line of thought.

SPIRATORI: The keynote of the character of the German race varies greatly from that of the Anglo-Saxons. I think that principally, their racial characteristic has a very strong totalitarian tendency. At the same time, since they have accomplished such progress in science they have, of course, a respect for their individuality as one of their strong points. However, totalitarianism is what makes up this foundation. Therefore, the parliamentary government of the Anglo-Saxons cannot possibly take root on that point. I believe that Japan is similar on that point. I am inclined to believe that the wholesome instinct of all the races are principally totalitarian. I think that this was distorted and became what it is today. Men differ from animals on the point that man overcomes nature, and although God differentiated between human beings and animals by giving man excellent capabilities, Western civilization, in order to overcome nature, realized one triumph after another in science, and in a process fell victim to temptation. That field was greatly over-emphasized and over-rated. At the present, this evil advanced to the point where it has destroyed the collective livelihood of mankind, and I believe that it is the new world outlook of Germany and Italy that emphasized the original collective instincts of mankind to counteract this evil. It is a relatively short time since the individualistic tendency was introduced in Japan. Therefore, it is not so difficult for Japan, whose racial characteristic was originally based on the family system and totalitarianism, to return to national polity in its entirety. Consequently, I believe that the awakening of Japan in the period of the present world evolution will be very rapid.

NOMURA: Unless the T.N. national organization is completed by the time of the awakening----

KOBAYASHI: It must be completed as soon as possible. What do you think about this matter, concerning the treatment of this problem?
For the problem of the reorganization of the nation, I think that it must be fundamentally a thought which aims at returning to the basic principles of Japan's national structure. If we are occupied only in the problem of the form of government, it will result in a distortion. Formerly, divine inspiration and the life was scorned by the intelligentsia, so we must consider methods of persuasion sufficient to gain the consent of the intelligentsia. However, the unlearned will not require such methods. They will understand at once if we merely say that we should do our best to serve the Emperor. If we, the whole whole seventy million people in the nation, begin by writing to offer our all to His Majesty, then the question of government, economy, education, and leadership of young men will naturally take the proper course. It is also unnecessary to emphasize that when everyone returns to that frame of mind, existing party affiliations and platforms will be out. Everyone will have the frame of mind and on such a basis, the government will get along. Accordingly, Japan's social, economic, educational, and all other structures will be reformed. Then, western individualistic or liberalistic and capitalistic structures will, as a matter of course, be completely regulated. Thus, when things are done that way, since we are all children of His Majesty the Emperor, we shall not be blamed so severely for what we may have thought, said, and done before. Let us forget the past entirely and together get on with a movement of service to the Emperor. Let us establish an organization in keeping with this. For this all can agree it will be entirely natural to have Prince KOKOYI, who is of the nobility family of the seventy millions of the nation, lead and direct the movement. Looking at the seventy millions of the nation, there is no one who can take Prince KOKOYI's place. In ability, knowledge, or personality there may be many among the seventy millions who surpass him. However, when we consider the new movement, or its organization, which are to unite all subjects in a return to offering their services to His Majesty the Emperor, Prince KOKOYI, by the very position his family holds in Japanese history, is the one we must have to lead it. I say this chiefly because we should build a new Japan by depending upon Prince KOKOYI.

Then, in short, you mean: he is the representative of the whole nation?

I mean representative or flagman. Later, all the people will follow him.

With that in mind, existing political parties or former politicians-if such groups then truly perceive their new mission and abandon their former platforms, naturally that will be good.

SHIRATORI: for the problem of the organization of the nation, I think that it must be fundamentally a thought-organization which aims at returning to the basic principle of Japan's national structure. If we are preoccupied only in the problem of the form of government, it will result in a distortion. Formerly, divine inspiration and the life was secured by the intelligentsia, so we must consider methods of persuasion sufficient to gain the consent of the intelligentsia. However, the unlearned will not require such methods. They will understand at once if we merely say that we should do our best to serve the Emperor. If we, the whole of Japan, seventy million people, begin by writing to offer our all to His Majesty, a sense of duty will arise in them, and actually practice SHIRT 1167/115: the duty of a subject, then the questions of government, economy, education, and leadership of young men will naturally take the proper course. (It is also unnecessary to emphasize that when everyone returns to that frame of mind, existing party politicians and partisans will be out. Everyone will have that frame of mind and on such a basis, the government will get along. Accordingly, Japan's social, economic, educational, and all other structures will be reformed. Then, Western individualistic or liberalistic and capitalistic structures will, as a matter of course, be completely regulated. That will be favorable.

If things are done that way, since we are all children of His Majesty the Emperor, we should not be blamed so severely for what we may have thought, said, and done before. Let us forget the past entirely and together get on with a movement of service to the Emperor. Let us establish an organization in keeping with this. For this all can agree it will be entirely natural to have Prince KONNYUKI, who is of the noble family of the seventy millions of the nation, lead and direct the movement. Looking at p. 116/115 it that way, there is no one who can take Prince KONNYUKI's place. In ability, knowledge, personality there may be many among the seventy millions who surpass him. However, when we consider the new movement, or its organization, which aims to unite all subjects in a return to offering their services to His Majesty the Emperor, Prince KONNYUKI, by the very position his family holds in Japanese history, is the one we must have to lead it. I say this chiefly because we should build a new Japan by depending upon Prince KONNYUKI.

KOBAYASHI: Then, in short, you mean he is the representative of the whole nation?

SHIRATORI: I mean representative or flagman. Later, all the people will follow him.

KOBAYASHI: with that in mind, existing political parties or former politicians—if such groups then truly perceive their new mission and abandon their former platforms, naturally that will be good.
10. Methods of Reform and the National Structure.

It may be unreasonable for us to require that of all of them. It may also be unreasonable for the whole seventy millions of the nation to demand it at once. Since we aim at establishing a new organization and effecting a covenant of service to the Emperor which will embrace all of the people, it will probably be well to accept for the time being those who venture to join it. I think we should not be so critical as to say that this or that person is objectionable because of his past connections. It is, however, another question who should play the lead in the new organization and by whom in the future the new policies should be made. There have been some people, of course, studying devotedly along this line, so these people, I think, ought to have the leadership. The past was an era of vain strife. Such has been discussed among the members of existing bureaucratic political parties. Therefore, wouldn't it be well if in the future everyone could become /l. 118/ of congenial spirit, frankly delve into the matter, and cooperate as a body, starting from a new foundation? A nation-wide organization will be useless, if we leave out political parties. After all we must build a firm organization like that of the Nazis and Fascists. Such arguments will probably arise. As for the formation of the organization, in all probability those which have been worked out by Germany and Italy should be taken into consideration. After many failures, great sacrifices, and much hard work, these have at last shown good results. I think that Japan, however, will be able to make use of their odd features without paying that price.

Although there is no need to reject them because they are of Western nature, the spirit of Japan's national structure must be based fundamentally and permanently on the view of the world which has been traditional in Japan from time immemorial. Take the problem of economic reorganization for instance, we should of course avoid Fascism, but we should also avoid the Fascist economic theory as far as possible. By dint of the attributes deriving from the basic principle underlyng Japan's national structure, I think we shall be able to shake off all the evils of capitalism and liberalism. In the external form by which the reform can be carried out, it is quite probable there will be things resembling /l. 119/ those done by Germany and Italy. Nevertheless, I believe the fundamental concept will be different.

Among the arguments which are in vogue these days, while their expression takes the form of constant references to the CINDOKU /NR: founding of the country/ spirit and the basic principles of national structure, their content seems still to contain a great many features of the old order. For instance, though they speak of the government of Imperial Japan and emphasize such expressions as, Imperial Rule assistance, actually there are a great many arguments in which democratic features are advocated. Moreover,
they claim it is necessary to liquidate things feudalistic so as to pave the way for assistance to the Imperial Rule. They brand as feudalistic things which rather ought to be in essence Japanese, and thus reject them. In the final analysis, there is a tendency which seems to lean toward things Western.

SHIRATORI: I also believe that there are terms, away those old slogans and expressions, which need scrutiny. For example, there are many people who, by ignoring the Emperor, interpret such phrases as BAIKIN BA'HI/THI the whole /p. 120/ nation under one sovereign/ to mean the American idea of natural rights of men and the equality of all men. Moreover, the phrase BAIKIN HOSEI/THI assistance of the whole nation/ is liable to be interpreted as majority rule. Such things must not be.


SHIRATORI: We must criticize such things closely. Those who advocate clarification of the national structure lay great stress on ideological aspects. They have emphasized only the national structure of Japan and have had little concern for the actual and the economic life of the people. It has been said that the so-called advocates of national structure, have no interest in economy. The group which lays so much stress on the immediate evils of Western capitalism tries to correct this by economic theory borrowed chiefly from Europe. This group calls the advocates of national structure unscientific and the latter call the former left-wing or red, so that they reject one another. Actually, however, in order to clarify the national structure, the spiritual and material aspects are correlative, and an economy and a government which are /p. 121/ based on the main principle of rule by the Emperor must be realized. In economics, furthermore, those who advocate socialism, completely forget the national structure and say let us have an economic reorganization by relying exclusively on Western theory and by referring to Western precedents. I can not admit either of them. These two must be reconciled, I think, if we would lay the foundations of Japan in the proper place. So-called reform factions and powers for reform should be united, provided that they are sincere. On this ground, I think the right path of Japan's government, diplomacy, and economy would become clear. Fundamentally, the emphasis should not be laid only on the material side, nor only on the spiritual side. Mutual hostility and strife among those who aim similarly at reform, I think, is one of the causes that have allowed the so-called advocates of the status quo to survive until now. It is because they offset each other that their strength is nullified. Recently, many who believe in Japanese have begun to advocate something called Imperial Way Economy. It is a good tendency.
KOBAYASHI: It is extremely difficult to secure their reconciliation or to make them over, but /p. 122/ we must arrange it without delay. As has been previously discussed it will be possible for us to do this when, in a broad sense, the national reorganization is carried out. For this, as you say, KONOYE is very important. We wish him to make the great decision himself.

SHIRATORI: KONOYE is himself determined, I think. If he does participate this time, he is intelligent enough not to say that he will resolve this vain strife. Since he ought to know what is water and what is oil, he probably won’t venture to unite the two. I don’t believe he will come out with any superficial determination.

KOBAYASHI: Upon KONOYE’s coming out in such a right direction to organize the nation, the present so-called politicians would join him. In such a case, it will mean we must give considerable thought as to their intentions.

12. The Objectives and Form of the New Government.

When the politicians join, I do not know what sort of position they will be given, but, after all, the important thing is toward what objectives will the new government advance and that sort of things will it undertake. If these are made perfectly clear, it will be all right to accept those who come with that knowledge. Men of old beliefs perhaps will lack new ideas and will be unable to work out new ones. Men of the old order perhaps can not cope with bold policies of reform. I think, at any rate, so-called new elements may be anticipated. It would be well if those who have formerly aimed for reform in Japan would assist sincerely this movement regardless of newspaper reports, etc., and unanimously participate in it so as to allow Prince KONOYE to discharge fully and without any error the duties that will be his. Furthermore, affiliation by all is the way, I think, for the new organization to achieve the desired results.

KOBAYASHI: This differs greatly from the new party movement as traditionally thought of, doesn’t it?

SHIRATORI: The new party movement seems to have undergone a great change compared with the time when Prince KONOYE organized his last cabinet. Then he undertook the formation of his last cabinet, it was, I think, /p.124/ with the prime object of resolving all vain strife, and I believe he thought the emergency could only be weathered through national unity. In an effort to achieve this, he organized a cabinet, and since fortunately or unfortunately the China Incident occurred, national unity was for the time being realized. However, in the duration of war for one year or more, national unity reached its utmost limit. Thus the feeling came about that a national re-
organization in a new sense had to be made. The first thought might have been to unite political parties. However, this would make the cleavage between the new and the old all the greater.

He knew that would not be feasible. He might have resigned in order to withdraw and organize his ideas. For this, I think many people criticized him saying that he shunned responsibility for solution of the Incident and that he had resigned without any reason. I suppose the reason why Prince KONOEYI retired was that if he had gone on as before, the national reorganization could not possibly have been achieved. Especially, being in a position of authority in the government and hard-pressed with various daily affairs, he could not organize his ideas, and I think he decided to withdraw and wait until circumstances became favorable. As a direct and indirect effect of the war, there arose in the world a situation in which this was no longer feasible. Foreign and European situations have undergone sudden changes, and a powerful impulse has daily been given this. He might have, I think, made up his mind because he may perhaps be successful this time.

KOBAYASHI: Such men as Mr. ARITA and Mr. KAZAMA, who are now devoting themselves to this by KONOEYI's side, should apprehend the meaning clearly, I think.

SHIRATORI: As for that, I really don't know to what extent Mr. KAZAMA acts in Prince KONOEYI's behalf, but I doubt that their ideas are in complete agreement. So, that those persons say perhaps cannot be said to be exactly what Prince KONOEYI intends. The most sincere elements of the so-called reform faction are what Prince KONOEYI now desires most of all. Probably what he wants most of all is for such elements, even in small numbers, to unite and put themselves at his disposal. It would be well at this time for those who are confident to make themselves known.

KOBAYASHI: Even if numbers are required, by no means -- -

SHIRATORI: If there are too many they will not agree, I think.

NOKIWA: If many persons who differ totally in viewpoint come together and agree only superficially, it will be of no value. After all, if the greatest common measure is not called for -- -

SHIRATORI: In a parliamentary body, only the supporters, after all, attend meetings. It will be very commonplace and immaterial whether we have it or not. The smaller the number, the better the quality. To speak in the extreme, one is the best.

KOBAYASHI: As for scholars, as previously discussed, when we look for them among the Imperial universities all are of no value, and, consequently, if we examine them too carefully -- -
Even if we examine a great many, it will avail nothing as far as the old system of national unity is concerned.

At the beginning of the last European War no one in Germany was opposed to the war for the time being. At any rate, all were united in support of the war. However, the phenomenon appeared that they all differed as to the reason for the war.

When the war was prolonged for so long a time and the situation turned unfavorable, general strikes took place.


If we do not rebuild the interior of our country, a trouble is imminent. According to the papers, Great Britain and America seem to support Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. How about the information you received?

France as well as Great Britain can not afford to attend the problems of Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. America also can not afford to do so, either, for the time being. Their minds are full of anxiety of how to combat Hitler's menace.

I heard that Germany's reply concerning Dutch East Indies had raised a serious issue. What was that?

Germany is not interested in Dutch East Indies. But she wouldn't like it if Japan, Great Britain, America, and France should play into each other's hand on Dutch East Indies. If we should consult about Dutch East Indies, Germany would like to be first informed. I think it is quite natural.

Indeed, I can not help thinking that we must make up our mind as soon as possible.

Though Japan's foreign policy must be converted thoroughly, 180-degree turning round can not be made under the present system, and it ought not to be made under the present government system. We can not tolerate, for the grace of our Emperor's righteous diplomacy, that the present Government adopt a strong policy without changing its constitution. It is not right that we take Dutch East Indies by taking advantage of the bustle simply because Germany won victory. Then we adopt our righteous policy arising from a renovated constitution, it is natural that Japan should collaborate with Germany and Italy, so that Japan may, by the negotiations with them, settle the problems of the colonies in Asia.

After all it is a question of a renovation of governmental system of Japan, or of the interior reconstruction.
That must be the premise.

Editor: What will be the extent of America's supply of resources to Great Britain and France?

SHIRATORI: I think it cannot be done sufficiently under the present circumstances. American war industry is spoken about quite in exaggeration. However, the scale of industry which has been developed naturally by dint of activities based upon pursuit of individual profits in the society of capitalism, is not large enough as is supposed, judging from the present day standard. Take the production capacity, for instance, of airplanes or of tanks, America is considerably inferior to Germany. And, America is now rapidly enlarging her armaments having the budget passed in the Congress. But, that is only because America fears for her own safety. The main object is to defend herself. There is not big enough surplus to supply to Great Britain and France. America seems to have some old-fashioned weapons which were used in the last war. At any rate, she cannot cope with the urgent necessity.

KOBAYASHI: Our Foreign Office has changed quite bit. Once there were those who said that SHIRATORI was misleading the country.

SHIRATORI: Even at the present time, there are those who say that kind of thing. A man cannot convert his thought so suddenly partly because of his feeling. He can hardly say that his prospect was wrong but inclines to think up some pretext or other. He does not want to confess plainly that he was wrong.

KOBAYASHI: The situation is getting on as extraitly as foretold by Mr. SHIRATORI.

SHIRATORI: Since October last, I have been saying that the British Empire was on the eve of downfall. People at the Foreign Ministry were astonished by my prophecy. That deep blind faith (in Britain) they have!

KOBAYASHI: Younger people, however, seem to be changing in their thought.

NGORAI: What do you think of Ambassador KURITAMA's opinion? Old-fashioned, isn't it?

Editor: In the event of Germany's victory, I think our people in general will become much more interested in Germany and come to believe in downfall of democracy.

SHIRATORI: That will spur the interior renovation of Japan.

NGORAI: In the same sense as the Soviet revolution once had great influence on us.
The Communist revolution of Russia has changed greatly in quality. After all, it has been proved that Marx’s thought was impossible in practice. But, that revolution as well as the French Revolution, had undoubtedly great influence on human society. Both Germany and Italy were drastically affected by it. Japan was also influenced. If we wish to suppress it, we can do so as in China. But, after all, it is an achievement of Marxism that it has pointed out its own illogicality and defects, and at the same time it is a fact that capitalism itself has become impossible. That Bolshevik revolution took place as a direct result of the war. But the real cause of the revolution was the deadlock of capitalism. So, any other country could not escape from this influence.

It accords with the fundamental characters of Japan, and it means to create a totally new character of state. If such a science and systematic thought should be born general public will come to understand gradually, leaving the intelligentsia behind.

For instance, the saying of Bolshevism that one who does not work should not eat, does not apply to the conditions of our country. The Japanese people being equally His Majesty the Emperor’s children, none of them should starve. We must not have even one person, who has been born as a subject of His Majesty, starved. We must make every one live. It is not necessarily mean that every one should eat equally.

One hundred million people are the same. Not materialistic individualism that we live in.

My opinion is that man does not live to eat. But, we eat to fulfill the duty as a subject of His Majesty. His Majesty enables us to eat and live. Some people think they live by their own ability, but that is wrong, and that is the cause of old evil. Since even those who can not serve His Majesty are supplied with necessity, we can be careless for living. We do not like such a cold-hearted saying as “One who does not work should not eat.”

Even in Soviet Russia, some sort of spiritualism must be aided to their principle. Otherwise, Soviet will come to a deadlock.

On a whole, Marxism is an abstract argument thought out with contemplation of capitalist society purer than England and with a kind of conceptional process. That is, Marxism is a theory thought out with presumption that almost all portion of the nation would become proletariat. And it was clear at the very beginning that, if such one were applied to agricultural country like Russia, certainly unreasonableness will be caused. In other words, as there were no settlement of agricultural problem, the formula, Leninism found a different thought in connection
with the farmers. This is quite an unnatural theory that the
farmers are considered as the ally of the proletarians.
Furthermore, Marxism cannot solve racial problems. Soviet
Republic was harassed by these, but a more difficult problem
was that she could not make such leaders as engineers and clerks
her friends, and consequently she could not utilize their talents
to the fullest extent. Then she tried to put the five years plan
into practice in order to enlarge her productive power, she was
harassed with shortage of engineers and she could do nothing
unless she brought engineers from Germany. These points will be
gradually rectified in the face of reality, and consequently its
class theory will fail.

14. Relations Between Hakko-ichi-u (the ideal which lets all
nations live peaceably under one roof) and Sphere of Livelihood.

Editor: As to Living sphere to which you referred a moment ago, some
people say, for example, that although the aim of this holy war
is said to be Hakko-ichi-u, they cannot understand it well be­
cause it is so abstract and covered /p. 135/ with mystic cloud.
On the other hand, some people regard it as Imperialism. On the
contrary, the Germans have a clear insistence of "Living Sphere," so
it is easy to understand. Sometimes people say that we had
better have clearer aims of this holy war. What are the rela­
tions between Hakko-ichi-u and Living Sphere?

SHIRAGHI: I understand that Hakko-ichi-u stands for the ultimate object
that the benevolence of the Imperial rule blesses all the nations
alike. This is because His Majesty, great father of Japanese
people as well as great father of all mankind. It resembles
"Universal Brotherhood" of Christian creed in form, but it is
different in principle. I think it right to deal with China
with this ultimate object. It does not mean affiliation of China
to Japan nor territorial annex of China to Japan. Hakko-ichi-u
has been advocated to make a clear distinction between our ideal
and western imperialism or aggressive policy. The so-called
Japan-Manchoukuo-China Pact is, I think, of the same nature with
/p. 136/ Hitler's "Lebensraum". That is, Japan, Manchoukuo and
China are to have the common "Living Sphere". This is not the
capitalistic exploitation which has been committed by western
people. At the base lies the idea of Hakko-ichi-u, the spirit
of the foundation of Japan. The new order of the Orient must be
of this kind. That kind of new order could be established with
the old western-type treaties between China with the western-type
prerogative right, Manchoukuo with the same prerogative
right, and Japan? The old ideas and the old methods bring nothing
new. These three nations must be united with a new idea with
which the existing international law cannot deal.
As a matter of fact, Japan and Manchoukuo recognize each other’s independence in the light of international law, but there exist some special relations between them which can not be explained by international law. This fundamental principle should be applied to China. This scope may be extended to any degree. The question of the concrete relations between China and Japan, we may study in various ways in future and decide the matters gradually also with consent of the Chinese people. It is not necessary to follow the examples of Manchoukuo in every respect. There may be much to be amended in the case of Manchoukuo. The only thing which we have to do is to clear off the old order established by western countries in China as a preamble to build up the new order. This must be done at any cost. If this was successfully done, the New East Asia Order will be established in substance. This does not mean only to sweep away aggressive and exploitative system of western nations out of China. The new order is not referred only to the materialistic conditions, but also to the spiritual conditions. It must also be a preamble to the new order that western ideas be cleaned up out of the Chinese mind. But it should be necessary to sweep away the old order ideas first from the Japanese mind. On account of these I say that the new order of China will not be established unless and until the interior constitution of our country is rebuilt.
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15. Forecast of the World War.

Editor: You will please tell us your forecast of the World War in the near future.

SHIATORI: As I have given an outline a moment ago, France would be disposed of in the very near future. As for Great Britain, she would be subdued shortly if Germany should succeed in her landing operations. There are many difficulties involved in landing operations. If it should be too dangerous to carry out, it would not be necessary for Germany to attack her land forces. Suppose that Germany should control the sea-coast ranging from Norway to Spain, and establish the bases for air forces and submarines along the said coast and should effect continuous air raids on Great Britain on a large scale. All the harbour facilities and the munition factories would become targets. As Germany has excellent air forces the result will be very effective. Italy, I suppose, will have the command of the Mediterranean and she will, in cooperation with Germany, attack her own with submarines in the Atlantic, especially at the mouths of harbours where submarine attack is comparatively easy. Thus Great Britain would be actually blockaded. Being confronted with these, Great Britain would necessarily be stumped. By landing operations, the engagement will come to an end by August, as Hitler said. In any way, Great Britain could not be able to bear her sufferings till the end of this year. The worst conditions on the part of Germany will be that, if Great Britain should make decisive resolution to hold out her resistance at the cost of her whole Navy, the term of resistance will be prolonged. But in spite of this, Great Britain will be hopeless.

The question is whether Great Britain would submit on cruel conditions which will be proposed by Germany or would go on fighting after having drawn back to Canada. In the latter case, however, she will be unable to resist without the cooperation with America. With France destroyed first and Great Britain in a narrow escape to Canada, would America still venture to declare war upon Germany? In case America should not aid Great Britain, the latter would gradually be compelled to bear her unfortunate decline. If so, I think, Germany, Italy and U.S.S.R. would remain as the three big nations in Europe, while Great Britain and France would necessarily be compelled to fall down to the second and third class nations with culture and
peace but without any armaments. In all events, as Great Britain possesses so many colonies in every corner of the world, she will keep on resisting for a long period and externally the state of war will not terminate at once. But even if she should wish to keep on resistance, it is beyond imagination that only the government and the governing class with strategies and gold bullion should desert the realm of England leaving the forty five millions of people behind. Her colonies in Africa will be taken away and in the future India will become independent from Great Britain and these facts will make her quite powerless. Canada is not rich in resources, and is supposed to become naturally a part of the United States. But as this would be unbearable to English people, it is more probable that they would keep resisting bravely to heroic death in defence of their country. In any way, it will be inevitable that, owing to the marked inferiority in military strength, Great Britain will finally submit. The situation, however, will become clearer within next one or two weeks. Suppose Germany should venture landing operations, the war may come to an end earlier than expected. Some military experts are in the opinion that there is little possibility of landing operations. But Germany herself says that she will carry out it without fail.

NOMURA: The forecasts of military experts have often failed. The North European operation had not been imagined. The parachute troops had not been expected to be used till they were employed in Holland and Belgium, and military experts still say that the operation was unsuccessful even after the operation took place in Holland.

Editor: People say the same things in America.

NOMURA: They say that parachute troops were all captured and annihilated.

SHIRATORI: The parachute troops achieved a considerable success in Holland. It is in this war that the forecasts of military experts are not reliable.
VI. Comment on Japan’s Non-Interference.

(The Greater Asiatic Magazine, June 1939)

Within ten days since the invasion of German troops into Belgium and Holland, they obtained the same results as in the first one month or two of the First European War. The fall of Paris and the capture of the seaport of Dover are near at hand, and it is considered likely that the German troops may also proceed to the British Isles. This is, literally, world-shaking. To the observers, however, who have witnessed the German’s incessant efforts for the last seven years, and who appreciate the characteristics of the German people and the principles and structure of their totalitarian regime, the present state of affairs is, in fact, only what may be expected. It is therefore only natural that those who have hitherto been regarding liberalism and democracy as the pinnacle of human culture and who believe in the indivisible power of England or the Anglo-Saxon race have come to doubt their own observations.

England and France have compulsionively challenged Germany to fight. Why have they done so? We may, in short, say that the reason for it is that they have underestimated the real strength of Naziist Germany. They thought that Germany may be held down at present, but may become too much for their powers to do so if they let her grow unnoticed several years longer. But, false! It was already too late for them, as the strength of Germany had already become too much to be vanquished. Not only England and France, but also the U.S.A. in the same way, had been wrongly underestimating the strength of the German and Italian totalitarian Axis countries by believing that the arrangement of all matters that concerned Europe might, in general, be conducted well if entrusted only to England and France, as it appeared to them that Italy and Germany would surely be defeated in the end and their own duty was to try with all her efforts, to suppress Japan, the aggressor, totalitarian state in the Orient. In the first place, the one who had most wished for an outbreak of war in Europe is Roosevelt himself. It is not an exaggeration that, up to the beginning of the war, the efforts of the U.S.A., as shown by the German "White Paper" were directed towards provoking a European war. However, when the war actually broke out, the general opinion of the U.S. turned out in favour of non-interference. She did not modify her policy of erst settlement of trade grievances and of not lending her vessels to any belligerent powers, although her government had revised the Neutrality Law, so that the degree of America’s aid to England and France was very lukewarm, which gave rise to an atmosphere of considerable discontent in the said two countries. It happened that, as a war without fighting lasted for eight months, not only England and France, but also the U.S. were unaware of the approaching danger. We believe that
It can, however, be said that, with the collapse of the Western Front, for the first time, they were fully awakened.

It appears, nevertheless, as though they are still possessed of an optimistic view regarding the future. As until now, they seem to still have hopes of success in leading matters to a protracted war by anticipating that the battle-front will fall into a state of stalemate due to the slackening of the German Army's offensive, as was witnessed in the First European War. But, now that the stronghold of the Maginot Line, which took four years to construct, has been penetrated in no time, no one, not even an amateur, could hardly think of the possibility of a deadlock in the front lines by resulting in mere trench warfare. The only way out of the difficulty for England and France would be to decide upon a large-scale counter-attack, which, however, would no longer seem to be possible inasmuch as there appears to be a marked difference between the respective Air Forces and mechanized Troops.

Now, as for the U.S., she would by no means be able to render effective military assistance even if she should promptly participate in the War today. As Goering used to always say, there would be no spot for the landing of the U.S. soldiers even if the U.S. were to participate in the present War. His saying seems to have turned out true. The best that could be done by the U.S. would seem to be the granting of an unlimited credit to England and France, the offering of her vessels for the transporting of munitions, and to also supply a large number of more superior planes than in the past. The withdrawal of the U.S. fleet from the Pacific and despatching some to their aid would possibly be fairly effective, but it may be impossible for the U.S. at the present juncture when her relations with Japan have become so aggravated.

If Soviet Russia, a neutral power, should suddenly turn around to the aid of England and France and attack Germany from behind in full force, there might possibly be a complete change in the war situation, but this is absolutely inconceivable. Not only must it be considered that there must be some sort of understanding between Soviet Russia and Germany so as to make Germany feel perfectly easy, but Germany would certainly not have withdrawn her mechanized troops entirely from Poland in order to hurl her entire strength into the Western Front unless Germany felt positively safe in doing so. It must be extremely reassuring to Germany to think of the millions of Italian soldiers who are sufficiently prepared to rise up at a moment's notice.
As for the future outlook of the present war, astounding developments will doubtlessly have been made by the time this article appears in print. Furthermore, not much actual benefit might be derived from purposely trying to predict the future outcome. However, we may nevertheless safely assert that the present war is destined to bring about a sort of solution unprecedentedly cruel and almost incredibly complete. Feurier Hitler a few days ago declared that the fate of the German race for a thousand years to come hangs upon this war, while it is warned in Italy that the destiny of Europe for three hundred years to come is about to be decided today. At any rate, it is apparent that there is no longer any room left for doubt that what Hitler and Mussolini are planning is the fundamental reconstruction of Europe. When a tendency of defeat on one side of the belligerent countries became clear in any previous war, it was customary for arms to be brought to an end by peace negotiations which defined the ceding of some territory and payment of reparations. However, it cannot be imagined that the present war will be terminated in such a simple manner. In fact there even seems to be the possibility of Great Powers who have been boasting of their glory for several centuries past coming to a sudden collapse.

It is also extremely doubtful as to whether the minor Powers in Europe may be allowed to remain as independent states possessing absolute sovereignty rights. This must be said to be all the more so with the colonies of the minor Powers.

We have been advocating since the very beginning of the present war that the world is just on the eve of a gigantic transformation in which the Old Order based upon Democratic Capitalism will be doomed, in lieu of the New Order based upon Totalitarianism must be set up. As Japan has, ever since the Manchurian Incident, been assuming the leading role in establishing the New Order throughout the Orient, the Japanese people should realize the New Order in close concert with the Axis Powers as Germany and Italy. The supporters of the Old Order in Japan have been reluctant in realizing the true significance of this gigantic world-wide transformation, and in fact the conclusion of the Triple Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy finally fell through due to the Old Order element to both at home and abroad. However, no human power can do anything against the inevitable current of world history. The way for Japan to pursue its already been decided on. In fact, Japan has already been treading along the said path for nearly ten years. Those Japanese who do not know well where their way is leading to are looking on the present war in Europe with utter indifference and wrongly think that they can establish the New Order in Eastern Asia by merely continuing to act in a conciliatory manner with...
those powers established upon the Old Order. They may be likened to persons who are unaware of a fire in which they are already in the midst. They imagine they can keep themselves free from the world-wide gigantic transformation so long as they are declaring their non-interference policy.

Some of the other Japanese are making similar mistakes. For instance, they think that Japan will not be dragged into the war as she did not conclude the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy. These persons do not know the fact that Japan has contributed much towards the attainment made possible by Germany. But for the Alliance between Germany and Soviet Russia, Germany would probably not have been able to make up her mind to start this war; and, in making Soviet Russia friendly towards Germany, the presence of Japan in the East and the fair progress of the negotiations for concluding an Alliance between the Axis countries at Tokyo, Berlin and Rome are factors which have contributed considerably.

If the U.S. had participated in the War at its early stage, only might it possibly have encouraged the morale of the British and French forces, but their fighting power might also have become actually enhanced. Germany too, might not have been able to acquire her absolute supremacy in the air, and it is likely that the attitude of Italy might also have been greatly affected. Is it not Japan that from the U.S. down to the Pacific? The U.S. has not as yet been able to assume a decisive attitude. Is not the presence of Japan practically the main reason for this? Germany owes a debt of gratitude to Japan. In defiance of this close relation between Japan and Germany, a certain group of Japanese have sought a certain kind of understanding with Britain at the Tokyo Parliament after the Tientsin Affair. This fact was promptly reported to Berlin. Of course Japan's attitude too has doubtlessly become clearly understood recently in Berlin. Under such circumstances, how can we expect Germany to be grateful towards Japan? The Japanese people should not forget the fact that the Japanese diplomacy has done something that does not pay for Japan, it has done much for Germany and yet lets itself open to incur her wrath.

If the world's map were to be drawn anew as a result of the European War, if the Netherlands, for instance, should become merged as German territory, the Dutch Indies would, as a matter of course, become added to German territory. If Japan continues to believe as she has in the past, Germany will be placed under no obligation whatsoever to Japan in giving the question of the Dutch Indies her special consideration. It must be remembered, however, that the South Seas has become Japan's Life Line economically and strategically. We, in establishing the New Order, do not mean to confine
its even only to China. Japan cannot remain idle as an onlooker in the event of a whole scale change of territory taking place in the southeast of Asia.

If Japan should devote herself exclusively to the solution of the China Problem by adhering merely to her non-interference policy, matters will doubtlessly become settled within a short period, and subsequent to this European War, the Dutch Indies as well as the colonies of England and France will have their ownership decided with Japan looking on as a mere spectator. Therefore, at this important juncture, Japan should realize the ultimate significance of this gigantic world-wide reform and should not fail to engage in active participation therein.
1. Evolving Mutual Reliance

The significance of the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY TREATY concluded last September 27 is extremely important, but the contents are simple and clear and do not require much explanation. Ordinarily, a protocol is attached to the treaty but over this is not required in this case. As stipulated in the provisions, details concerning the execution of the treaty are to be decided by a committee which is to be formed later. Since the treaty was not drawn up by specialists, its style differs considerably from the usual form. Viewed from the standpoint of treaty specialists, it may certain many passages that strike them as strange. If examined in details legally, it may give rise to various contentions but since the contents of this treaty is unprecedented in history and bluntly, since the following nations, JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY pledged the coalition with their blood, it is only natural that the wording is simple and plain. If a detailed interpretation is attached beforehand legally or if a psychological hold-over exists in regard to mutual rights and duties, the value of the treaty will be destroyed. In short, I think it ultimately depends on the single phrase "mutual reliance".

Therefore, in regard to the treaty itself, the general situation is clarified by the Government proclamation and there is nothing much that would need adding. In the future, due to this, the problem of that effects will it rise rise to or how will the treaty itself be carried out or how will its characteristic be developed can only be judged as time progresses. What I am going to say in the following is entirely within the limits of my personal opinion and observations. It must be remembered that I am not revealing special information regarding any agreement among the three countries nor have I any relation whatsoever in the Japanese Government's intentions and policies.

2. Treaty of the NEW TOID ORDER

This treaty is formally called the "TRI-PARTITE TREATY" but in general, it seems to be called the TRI-PARTITE ALLIANCE.

From the provisions in Article 3 of the treaty, it can be said that it is genuinely a defensive alliance and may be called a "Security Alliance" or a "Mutual Assistance Alliance". In short, it can be
interpreted as having its aim in preventing further extension of the war in NEPE and APE. Depending upon the transition of international political conditions hereafter, this Article 3 will be applied. Therefore, this article may be considered in some cases to be the substance of the treaty but it is my desire to seek the construction of the New Order as the characteristic of this treaty instead.

Historians of the future generations, I think, will probably call it the Treaty of New World Order. The anti-war treaty driven up in the closing years of the liberalizing era was considered, at that time, to be a new treaty that broke the bonds of tradition. But this New Order Treaty is no less inferior than their treaty from the standpoint of breaking the bonds of convention. Similar to the anti-war treaty which treaty specialists felt it included many points that were very ambiguous, the New Order Treaty is also very untechnical. In the first place, the definition of New Order is not explained. There is no provision concerning the area in Greater East Asia and NEPE where the New Order shall be established. I believe that these matters will gradually be clarified as time goes on but from the development of affairs up to the present, it is not difficult to generally surmise from common sense the significance of the New Order being planned by the three countries and also the area aimed at by the respective countries.

The so-called New Order is not merely a passive aspect to overturn the status quo but is supposed to include a positive progress of how the new world should be. The popular use of the phrase "New Order" seems to have begun with the proclamation coming from "Construction of the New Order in East Asia" by the First KONPJE Cabinet. But beginning with HITLER and other NAZI leaders of Germany, they have taken a fancy to the use of this phrase since long ago.

As far as I know, I do not think a responsible explanation has been made in Japan as to what the import of the New Order in East Asia should be. The New Order advocated by Germany seems also to gradually change with the transition of European political conditions.

3. Accomplishment of the Three Countries' Ideals.

Since the New Order pictured in the minds of the respective countries, Japan, Germany and Italy, are such, it cannot necessarily be said that they are understood by each other clearly. However, is it not extremely important to definitely clarify this point? Of course, as a treaty it will demarcate each other's sphere of influence and the
recognition of a sphere within that sphere is in itself a sufficient significance but this will have a taste of a very old era. I do not wish to regard the present world hostility as merely a contest for world supremacy or a contest for spheres of influence among the big powers. It is instead if the rising countries, Japan, Germany, Italy and perhaps U.S.S.R., struggle for power against the old powers, Great Britain, America and France.

It is also too simplistic to regard it as a duel between the Anglo-Saxons and the Teutons or between the yellow race and the white race. In brief, although this is a hackneyed expression, I believe it must be regarded as a cultural controversy and a battle of ideology. In a word, it is a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism but viewing it as an opposition of ideology and of culture, it signifies a great revolution unprecedented in the history of mankind.

The ideology of war from the standpoint of cultural history in the past several thousand years has seen many changes but since the Greek era up to the present, the fundamental idea of the Occident has always been based on individualism. The totalitarian idea has been asleep for a long time during that period. Since such was the case of the totalitarian movement started in Germany and Italy, it dates back prior to the Greek era. As a result, it can be said that it is a reaction to the fundamental and healthy ideology of early mankind which has been preserved and fostered with integrity since the founding of Japan. It is for this reason that the totalitarianism of Germany and Italy includes much that is Japanese. In advocating the establishment of the New Order in the Far East through the China Incident, Japan is strongly emphasizing the ideals of <em>shokunin</em>, founding of the country/spirit and <em>betsumatsu</em> and for this reason, it can be said that it follows the same line of the New Order movement in Germany and Italy.

In Europe it is retrospective to days before the Greek age and in Japan, it is retrospective to the <em>Kamakura</em> age of God. Therefore, I think it can be said that the New Order movement in the East is not a movement to restore the fundamental character of mankind. For this reason, British and American quarters are not altogether wrong in identifying Japan, Germany and Italy under the same category and calling them totalitarian countries alike. The collaboration elicited by the three countries is only a reaction when seen from such a fundamental and ideological standpoint. For, returning to the realistic problem, concretely, what kind of new culture will
Germany and Italy firms in Europe? what will Japan do in the Greater East Asia code? Furthermore, in the internal organization of the three countries, will they all take a similar type of political and economic path? As it concern over to the general public and also as regards to Japan, there are imminent problems of vital importance.

Recently in Japan, the New Order movement is becoming quite noticeable. But today, it is the opinion of everyone that the Greater East Asia movement should be restored and that the underlying principle of the national structure should be clarified to prevent the structure for EMPIRE-JAPAN.

Furthermore, the problem is that we should be able to actually carry out the mechanisms of politics and economy which manifest the principle of national structure. The New Order that Germany and Italy is trying to form in Europe does not include Japan, and the actual problem of the greatest importance is what to do with the political and economic structure of the other European countries. In regard to this, it is believed that today all are considerably definite have been drawn up by Germany and Italy. On the other hand, what form of New Order is Japan going to construct in the Greater East Asia? I think a clearer and definite plan regarding the disposition of the New Order in Japan, which is to be the embodiment of the New Order in Greater Asia, must first be established.

4. Reformation of the National Structure.

Now, if the idea and structure of the old order, which remains are still much in evidence in Japan, are to be left intact, can the New Order in Greater East Asia ever be established? Assuming that it is impossible, can such a New Order in Greater Asia be set in concert with the European New Order of Germany and Italy? I have been advocating that the current foreign policy and the National New Order are inexplicable. It is my desire that the people give this careful consideration.

In my opinion, the crisis which activated the great world con­

vulsion is chiefly in the student of liberalistic economy. I

have no particular respect for the historical attributes of N. I. S.

but I think that in many cases, the necessities of economic livelihood

have been the cause of revolutions in human society. As long as the

anticipative exploitation economy of the Anglo-Saxon type is rampant
and as long as the boundless accumulation of wealth is permitted to fall into the hands of this small number of individuals, this earth will still be too small even if enlarged five times or even ten times.

To make a long story short, a mere of forty and fifty million people control one-fourth of the world's territory and services and for the benefit of a small group of individuals; they are being exploited and the limited underground resources are lying prostrate, prevented from being utilized by others. Under such conditions, it is ironical that poverty prevails today in the materialistic living standard of mankind. To rectify this irrationality in the European and Greater Order, an emergency be the principle content of the New Order mentioned in the Tripartite Pact. But if such is the case, the acquisition of the New New Order Treaty by the three powers concerned must be first, to uphold the totalitarian world idea and second, based on this idea, to renounce the system of exploitation of the stronger preying upon the weaker. If the tyranny of Great Britain, America and France is abhorred and even if they are overthrown, it will degenerate to the heretofore "battle for power" and will not contribute to the civilization of mankind if the three countries are going to succeed them in doing the same thing. If that is the case, a permanent world peace can never be gained.

5. Significance of FUKUI's Declaration.

Recently, Germany's Economic Minister FUKUI stated that as in 1923 Germany, the gold standard may not be used hereafter in the new Europe. This is clearly not only a financial and economical problem of the new Europe but as being indicative of the character of the New Order itself, I think it possesses a significance of extreme importance. If one considers how important a role gold played as a tool to exploit the weak in the old heretofore, one cannot over-emphasize the importance of Mr. FUKUI's declaration.

If the New Order planned by Germany and Italy would possess such characteristics, the Old Order powers, especially seen from the standpoint of the dominating class, will know clearly what place they must occupy in the new world. Now, with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact by Japan, she is actually standing at the crossroad of choosing one party or the other.

Since the KURUSHIMA Incident, in view of the policy Japan has
adopted and moreover, out of regard for having advocated the high
ideals of establishing the Greater East Asia Order, actually Japan
should have nothing to arouse her to be at ease as to her course of
action. But it seems that a portion of the people refuse to consider
the problem in that light. With the conclusion of the New Order Treaty,
is it not necessary for the government and the people to renew
their feelings in regard to world problems?
Doc. No. 5616

CERTIFICATE

I.D.C. No. 1616
I.F.S. No. 666

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shikito Kosaburo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Second Secretary, Home Ministry.

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 169 pages, dated Dec., 1940, and described as follows: Discussion of the Japan - Italy axis.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this third day of January, 1947
/s/ Shikito Kosaburo
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Richard Ono
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Preparation

I, Richard H. Lurah, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of Jan., 1947
/s/ Richard H. Lurah

Witness: /s/ Douglas L. Yuldorf
Chief, Inv. Div.
IPS

Official Capacity
ENTRY FROM MARQUIS KIDO'S DIARY

2nd May, 1939

Chief Secretary OTA reported at 5 p.m. the points of disagreement between army and navy circles.

At 8 p.m. I called on the Navy Minister to hear of the recent progress in the Military Alliance and we exchanged views.

My opinion is that although there is no reason to force the conclusion of the Military Alliance, as it depends on the will of the other parties, but I fear that it might fail after so much effort. Such a failure would not only have a bad influence on our policy towards the Sino-Japanese Incident, but it would inevitably bring about a feeling of uneasiness and dissatisfaction on the part of the people, especially if the main cause of failure were due to disagreements between the Army and Navy. And so we must do our utmost to unify public opinion as far as possible, even if we should fail to conclude the Treaty. The Navy Minister was of the same opinion and promised me to exert himself to follow the above line. I felt somewhat relieved and returned home at 10 p.m.
午前八時半首相官邸ニ於テ地方長官
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【署名】

【日付】16年2月20日 1632W(24)
23 January 1947

This entry is to replace all previous reproductions.

Entry from Hara Kido's Diary.

4th August 1939. Ext ret.

* * * * *

At noon, I presented the following views to War Minister ITAGAKI on the question of the Military Alliance with Germany and Italy, and on talks of political changes connected with it, and he agreed with them.

According to general rumor the Army has decided to conclude the Military Alliance as soon as possible, and if the proposal is not accepted at the Cabinet meeting, the War Minister is determined to resign, notwithstanding the fact that it will unavoidably result in the resignation of the entire Cabinet. If we observe this from the present state of internal affairs the people appear somewhat tired of the war. They are hoping for a settlement of the Incident, so they have pinned their hopes on the trend which is gradually pushing a settlement of conditions, such as the success of the Tokyo Conference and the establishment of the Wang Regime. This is splendid; but if the reverse should happen, i.e., if the Tokyo Conference does not materialize, and the effort to establish the Wang Regime should fail, a serious situation might develop. It would be unwise to bring the political situation to a head by taking up this matter during the Anglo-Japanese Conference. The last time, shortly after Wang escaped from Chungking, the Konoye Cabinet fell; now this time, it would be extremely bad policy should the Hiranuma Cabinet resign prior to the establishment of the regime, after Wang has taken all the trouble to come to Tokyo to confer with the Cabinet ministers. I believe that it is best, if possible, to have the political change after the Wang Regime is established. It is rumored that Army circles insist on affecting martial law, forcibly in case of political change, and they intend gradually to accept a military administration.

But I think we must resist such methods with all our might, especially so in the present situation. In case of a political change, if the Army and the Navy are permitted to continue to bicker one another, and the Emperor should order the formation of a new Cabinet, it is certain that it would be impossible to form one. Therefore, I think that it is absolutely necessary for the Army and the Navy to find a way to break their deadlock before the political change. So I want you [T.N. ITAGAKI] to get in touch with all concerned if you by any chance make up your mind.

I told the Premier about the result of the above talk, and we exchanged opinions. I also relayed the above talk to the Minister of Justice and to the Chief Cabinet Secretary. * * * * *
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[文面が非常に読めにくいので、正確な翻訳は難しいです]
28th August, 1939

A cabinet meeting was held at the Premier's official residence at 9 a.m. Premier HIÌNAUWA explained about the reasons why the Cabinet should resign en bloc, and requested all the Cabinet Ministers to agree with his opinion. His proposal was unanimously approved and all tendered their resignations. The Premier immediately proceeded to the Imperial Palace, and after being received in audience by the Emperor, presented to the Throne all the resignations of the Cabinet Ministers. But the Emperor requested that all Cabinet Ministers should remain in their present posts until further notice.

At 1:30 p.m. Nazomi NAKAGAWA called on me to express his gratitude for being nominated as a member of the House of Peers.

At 8:00 p.m. Chief KATO of the Gendarmerie visited me. He said there was a rumour that Lieutenant-General TADA was to be appointed War Minister. He added he was very anxious that this might result in Army opposition clique becoming stronger than before, and sought my opinion to prevent it. I answered that, as an outsider, I could do nothing about it.

At 8:50 p.m. General Nobuyuki ABE was summoned by the Emperor and was ordered to organise a new Cabinet.

At 11:30 p.m. Prince KANOYE telephoned me and informed me of the following fact. The Prince seemed to be perplexed and asked my opinion about it.

According to the Prince, he was paid a visit by General ABE and the General told him that he had been ordered by the Emperor to organise a new Cabinet and that the Emperor had given him instructions on the following three points which embarrassed the General very much.

1. Either UMEZU or HATA should be appointed War Minister.
2. Diplomatic policy should follow the line of cooperation with Britain and the United States.
3. ABE should be specially careful in choosing the Home Minister and the Justice Minister, as the maintenance of public order was of supreme importance at the present moment.

After thinking over the matter, I telephoned Prince KANOYE at 0030 a.m. and expressed my opinion to him as follows, with which the Prince agreed.
Points 2 and 3 above could in any case be disposed of at the discretion of General ABE, but as for the nomination of the War Minister by the Emperor, there was a danger, if it were left to take its own course, that it might bring about a clash with military circles. So it was advisable that the Emperor should summon the War Minister and inform him of his intention; or let the Chief Aide-de-camp to his Majesty convey to the Army the Imperial Order given to General ABE as to the selection of the War Minister, and let the Three Chiefs of the Army recommend the War Minister to follow the Imperial nomination.

I requested Prince KONOYE to convey my opinion to General ABE.
長見山田柄

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4. 万引き
10th November, 1939

At 10.00 a.m. Marquis MATSUDAIRA visited me. As I have been contemplating, at the request of Prince KONOYE, the method of recommending the succeeding Premier to the Throne in case of the resignation of the Cabinet, I had a talk over the matter with the Marquis. The gist of my opinion is as follows:

When I had an interview recently with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, his opinion on this question was that no other method except the present one was conceivable for him, because he could not think of any other plan even when the elder statesman was still alive and well. As far as I was concerned, there was no reason to raise any objection to the above opinion, but I thought we ought to consider beforehand the method in question after the retirement of the elder statesman. Besides, judging from the recent atmosphere of political circles, in which the present method was being criticised unfavourably, there was a need for setting up a new method which would be more objective than the present one. The authorised limit of powers of both the offices of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and of the President of the Privy Council were prescribed by the Government Organisation Ordinance, and so there was some doubt as to whether the office of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, which was responsible to the Emperor as his adviser, was really compatible with the act of recommending a Premier to the Throne. Moreover, from the political point of view, it was not desirable that high officials who were so close to the Emperor should hold the reins of political power. So, in the future, the office of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should be strictly confined to that of the adviser to the Emperor, but in the case of an 'en bloc' resignation of the Cabinet, the Emperor would do well to consult with former Prime Ministers as to the succeeding Premier. In case the number of ex-Prime Ministers was too small, ex-Ministers of State might be added to the meeting. Whether the Lord Privy Seal should participate in it by the special order of the Emperor, or whether he should not take part in it at all but only act as adviser to the Emperor when he investigated the matter was a different question. The above principle could be applied to the President of the Privy Council. I believed that both the Lord Privy Seal and the President of the Privy Council should be strictly separated from the function of recommending succeeding Premiers.

In the event of the Emperor asking the opinion of ex-Premiers, they should hold a conference to discuss the question, but it is undesirable that they should decide the matter by a majority. They should report to the Throne all the details of the conference together with the minority opinion as material for the judgment of the Emperor.
10th November, 1939 (contd)

I expressed my opinions as above, to which the Marquis assented, and we promised each other to discuss the matter further.

At 1.30 p.m. I called on Prince KONOYE at his residence at Ogikubo. After having a talk on the general situation both at home and abroad, I told him about my opinions which I had told Marquis KASUGAIKA in the morning. Prince KONOYE gave his full assent to my opinions. He even hoped to carry out the plan at the first opportunity, and requested me to take proper measures as soon as possible. But I wanted him to make a further study on this problem, since it was difficult to carry it out while the elder statesman is still active. Then Prince KONOYE asked me whether my opinion meant, in the end, the abolition of the office of the Lord Privy Seal. I answered to the effect that it might seem so from the logical point of view, but in fact I did not favour the abolition, for there would be many important affairs of State left for him as the advisor to the Emperor. We parted at 3 p.m.
长冈弘之

1992.8.27

(33)
At 9:00 a.m. Mr. IKEZAKI called and sounded out my opinion in regard to the new political party of which Prince KONOYE is to be President, with me as Vice-President, and with regard to the formation of a Cabinet. I frankly expressed my opinion that as long as Prince KONOYE stays in the political field, I would like to have him take the leadership and that I would support him to the last. I had no intention of forming any other new political party.
26th May, 1940 - (Extract)

Dined with Prince KONOYE and Count ARIKA at Kioicho Kinsui at 6:00 p.m.; we discussed the problem of the new political party and agreed upon the following:

1. The formation of a new political party should not be carried out positively prior to the acceptance of the Imperial Mandate. Consideration, however, shall be given to this point when the movement for the establishment of a new party is commenced by the political parties themselves.

2. When the Imperial Mandate is issued the following should be considered:

(a) A supreme national defence conference is to be established between the Chiefs of General-Staff of both the Army and Navy, the Premier, and the War and Navy Ministers.

(b) The desires of the Army and Navy concerning foreign affairs and finance shall be considered.

(c) By announcing the resolution for the establishment of a new political party, the dissolution of all political parties shall be requested.

3. The Cabinet shall be composed of only the Premier, the War Minister and the Navy Minister, while other posts shall be held additionally by them. According to circumstances, however, two or three members of the Cabinet (for instance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, etc.) shall be appointed separately.

4. The remainder of the cabinet shall be selected from the most able members of the new party after its formation. The ministers already appointed prior to the establishment of the new party shall be made to join the party.
"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 1 June 40"

1st June - (Extract)
1940.

By request of the Imperial Household Minister I called at his official residence at 10:30 a.m. and was asked to accept the appointment of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I was not fitted to the post but understood that it was an unanimous recommendation of all the higher officials, including Prince KONOYE, Lord Keeper YUASA, Premier YONAI and Prince SAIONJI. Under the circumstances, I wished to withhold my answer until I had consulted about the matter with Prince KONOYE. I went to KONOYE's residence at Otsukubo at 11:30 a.m. After lunch we exchanged views freely. After arriving at the conclusion that there was no alternative but to accept the office, I reported my acceptance by telephone to the Imperial Household Minister.

This morning at 8:30, Mr. Tadateke IKEZAKI came and told me how important my position was in connection with the new Party. He strongly urged me to refuse the offer of the post of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.
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Doc. No. 1632W (43)  
"Extract from Kido's Diary, 21 Sept. 1940"

21st September, 1940 - (Extract)

The Chief Sec.-De-Corp called at 10:30, and stated that French Indo-China authorities were showing signs of concessions in regard to the question of our penetration into French Indo-China.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA reported over the telephone that telegraphic instructions had reached the Gillian side since this morning.

I reported the above to His Majesty. With regard to the solution of the Chinese Incident, I expressed my opinion to His Majesty to the effect that we would eventually oppose both England and the United States if we conclude a military alliance with Germany and Italy. We should therefore make necessary adjustments regarding our relations with China as soon as possible.
九月十一日（仮）

昭和十七年四月二十一日

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From 2:00 p.m. until 2:45 p.m., I was granted an audience and was asked for my opinion regarding the settlement of the China Incident. His Majesty wanted to know what kind of policy we should take if the incident were prolonged by the failure of Chungking negotiations, and we are forced to conclude a treaty with the "Ang Government.

In reply to His Majesty's query, I said: "As Your Majesty says, the incident will be a prolonged war and yet it would be difficult for us to defeat Chungking completely at this time, in view of the present exhausted state of our power. Under the circumstances, we should be fully prepared to complete our national strength, while securing key points. Today, we should exercise the utmost caution in compromising with positive action proponents for it will cause inability to bring about the submission of the enemy and also the completion of our national strength. It is indeed alarming to think of the future of the country".
A01778

長崎出張局

昭和十七年十二月二日

(作成

日付

御意見件名

在住者

震災報告書

長崎出張局

昭和十七年十二月二日（作成）
"Extract from Entry from Marquis Kido's Diary, 25 Sept 41.*"

September 29th, 1941 - (Extract)

Ambassador SHIGEMITSU visited me at 9 a.m. to talk about the negotiations between the U.S.A. and this country...

The Chief of the Army General Staff visited me at 1 p.m. and told me about the report of the Chief of the Army General Staff to be submitted to the Throne.
"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 1 Oct 41."

October 1st, 1941 - (Extract)

SUIZIKI, President of the Planning Board, visited me at 9 A.M. to have an informal talk about our national policy towards the U.S.A.
ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CHINA INCIDENT
PP\TED IN THE "EDUCATION MINISTRY REVIEW"
DATED JULY 1, 1933.

Baron \N\KI, Sadao
Minister of Education

One year has passed since the outbreak of this Incident which was started by the violent firing of Chinese armed force at the Marco Polo Bridge and the day of July 7 which is never to be forgotten by the Japanese people has come around again. Upon the outbreak of the Incident, strenuous and patient efforts were exerted by our side not to extend the trouble, aiming at an early solution on the spot. Thus reconsideration of the Chinese Government was sought for the maintenance of the peace of the Orient. (T.N. This attitude of Japan), however, was answered by an insulting oppression over her subjects in China. Besides (T.N. the Chinese Government) infringed upon international justice by going hand in hand with communists and arrogant challenges were made on us.

Such being the case, the Imperial Japan took the decisive steps in returning the fire in order to sweep away the enemy of peace from the territories of East Asia.

For the last one year, Chiang Kai-shek has given free play to tyranny for the maintenance of his influential power, sacrificing the welfare of the people, while the war has spread to whole China and the main points of strategic advantages have fallen to the hand of Japanese troops. It has become clear that
the fall of Hankow, the second capitol so to speak, is a question of time.

Yet Chiang's bigoted thought has not shown any symptom of changes and his unspeakable acts of tyranny can never be stopped before he comes to the end of his devil's luck. Our Imperial Japan, who is entrusted by God, took the arm and stood up for justice and humanity, will, of course, inflict chastening blows persistently against CHANG's Regime and it is our policy that we will not lag down arms until anti-Japanese China is completely crushed to the extent that they can not stand up again. As we announced many times previously the Chinese people are not the eneny of our Imperial Japan.

Furthermore, the peoples under the CHANG Kai-shhek's regime have suffered for many years from the misgovernent and they are still wandering on the brink of starvation.

For the Chinese people of four hundred thousand are now under the protection of Japanese Army and they are receiving our Army's warm sympathy.

In the area of North and Central China the lively look has appeared already, promising the reconstruction of the China of tomorrow.

Originally, China, as the senior nation of East Asia has long been in close relations with Japan throughout her history, and this relationship should not be changed forever. Consequently the mission on the part of Japan is to expel from Chinese
 territory the Communistic devils, the enemy of humanity, as well as the Chiang Government persisting in their anti-Japanese policies, and save China from the present conflicts and poverty, at the same time speaking her cooperation for the establishment of co-prosperity and the eternal friendship of the two nations. We are now in the situation that the closer cooperation between Japan and China, which is the impelling force for the security of the East Asia, is about to be realized with the growth of the two regimes -- the Temporal Government and the Renovation Government.

The development of this new tendency reveals that Japanese Empire holds the actual power as the real leader of East Asia, and that the existence of China, as a power in East Asia, will fall into a delicate situation without the assistance of our country. And furthermore, this fact proves here clearly that our country takes consistently action with the actual intention to contribute to the establishment of peace relations in East Asia or all over the world and to the promotion of the welfare of mankind. I believe that every country in the world, facing this stern and fixed fact, will be obliged to recognize the Spirit of Japan and its true value. However, as the trend of the international political situations will be intricate and delicate owing to the influence of the Incident, direct or indirect, so we must be prepared for many difficulties in the future in the way of our Empire.
We, the people of Japan therefore, must not be puffed up with victories in the past and must not halloo till we are out of the wood. We must make up our minds to overcome all the difficulties which we may face and not to stop till our object is completely achieved, sacrificing ourselves for the sake of the country.

So in this sense, the spiritual mobilization of the nation should be strongly advocated and understood by all.

With the outbreak of the Incident last summer, the self-awakening of the nation was realized and the aspiration and enthusiasm for surmounting the national crises were pervaded to the whole country, which brought about the solid unification of the people. This awakening and enthusiasm of the people have been embodied as meritorious service in battlefield and as heroic deeds on the home front.

This is the true picture of Japan and it is due to the virtuous merits of successive emperors and to the earnestness of loyalty and patriotism, which runs through the bloodvessels of our people that Japan has won her present prosperity by having surmounted her critical moments in her long history and by protecting infinite national structure. The spiritual mobilization of the nation was realized by the power of inevitability and the work is
steadily bearing fruits under the complete unification of the one hundred million fellow-countrymen. It is a matter of reassuring that the situation is showing the unmovable perfection by cherishing the iron wall on the home front. As the situation will become more serious with the development of the war, it is beyond the question whether the substance of the system of this movement has to be perfected further or not.

We the people even though we shall engage in various occupations according to our divine duties — such as cultivation of rice-fields, wood-cutting in the forests, fishing along the coasts, beating hammers in the factories, teaching on the platforms, or keeping the homes, we must — keeping in mind that each of us is one of the elements of the strong motive power in this spiritual movement — show our sincerity of loyalty and patriotism: assist and encourage each other, old or young and men or women, fill up the storehouses with products by making industries prosperous, endeavor to strengthen finance and economy by performing thrift and savings and moreover, we must be prepared for the aggrandizement of national strength required to wage long-period war.

With deep understanding of the national thought, we should clarify the absolute superiority of our national constitution and the thought of HAKKO ICHTU or the unification of the world under one roof should be prevailed to the whole world.
National Mobilization must be achieved both in the material and spiritual sense, which will promote the conspicuous ever-progressing prosperity of the nation, who must not be left as a power in East Asia only but must be promoted to the world's Japan as the leader of the new era and the proper magnanimity and full vigour of her people should be cultivated so that the mission given to her may be thoroughly fulfilled.

Educators and others who are in the leading position of this movement must take special care to keep this point in their mind, and must set good examples of themselves to the people of the nation. In this sense, the Imperial Rescript on Education should be observed before everything as the fundamental creed of daily life and the path that should be followed by loyal subjects.

The great spirit of the Imperial Way which is free from mistakes throughout all ages and countries is the light shining all over the world forever. In facing the great turning point of the world history and when the cultivation of the nation which will work as impellent force for fulfilling the mission of Japan is in an urgent necessity, the strenuous efforts of the educators and other leaders of cultural fields are strongly aspired.

On the day of the first anniversary of the China Incident, I have stated parts of my opinion demanding the firm resolution of the nation and at the same time, I like to express my heartiest gratitude to the members of the Imperial armed forces in the front who are fighting persistently by overcoming all difficulties and also to those who sacrificed their lives for the ideals of our nation.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No._________
I.P.S. No. 2155-C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Chikara Tsvuila, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of the Investigation Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages, dated 1 July, 1938, and described as follows: The first anniversary of the China Incident speech by ARAKI, Sadac, Minister of Education. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Ministry of Education.

Signed at Tokyo on this 21st day of January, 1947
/s/ Chikara Tsvuila
Signature of Official

Director of the Investigation Bureau

Witness: /s/ Isao Anagri
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2nd Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, O-917000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this 23rd day of January, 1947. /s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2nd Lt., AUS, MI

NAME

Investigator, IPS

Witness: /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf
Official Capacity

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS.
THIS COPY OF DOCUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE FRAME AND FILE OF EXHIBIT IN THE 115 DOCUMENT DIVISION VAULT AND IS ABSOLUTELY NOT TO BE LOANED OUT. THIS BANK DOES NOT SAY.
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石トナルレシ敬多ノ英雄ノ衷心ヨリ敬弔ノ願ヲ
文書

発音

図表

資料

なお、文書の内容については、日本語を理解する能力が不足しているため、具体的な翻訳を提供することはできません。なお、文書の内容は適切な文脈が欠けているため、正確な解釈は難しいです。
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<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Period</th>
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<tr>
<td>14th Division</td>
<td>1937 - March - July</td>
<td>Usunogawa</td>
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<td>1937 - August</td>
<td>After Peiping</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Hankow Campaign in North China</td>
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<td>stationed near Hsinlung</td>
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<td>Area around TCHIHN, East</td>
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<td>5th Army</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 June 1938</td>
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<td>5th Army</td>
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<td>5th Army</td>
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<td>9 June 1941</td>
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<td>Eastern District</td>
<td>Area around Tokyo</td>
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<td>Army</td>
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<td>22 March 1944</td>
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<td>7th Area Army</td>
<td>Saipai, Sumatra, Java, Borneo</td>
<td>22 Mar. 1944</td>
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<td>Area around Tokyo</td>
<td>25 Aug. 1945</td>
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<td>14 Sept. 1945</td>
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<td>2nd Heavy Field Artillery</td>
<td>HiKiHa</td>
<td>1 Aug. 1934</td>
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<td>1 Aug. 1936</td>
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<td>13th Heavy Field Artillery</td>
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<td>Nov. 1937</td>
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<td>9 March 1939</td>
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<tr>
<td>22nd Field Artillery</td>
<td>KYuShu</td>
<td>1 Aug. 1931</td>
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<td>8 Aug. 1932</td>
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| 32nd Division            | Organized on 1st April 1939 | Stationed at Yenchou (60 km. south of Chian) | 1945
|                          |                       | 19 Mar. 1939                      |
| 5th Division             | Area around Hiroshima | 7 Mar. 1935                        |
| 11th Division            | Sumatra               | 1 Aug. 1929                        |
|                          |                       | 1 Oct. 1931                        |
| 14th Area Army           | PHILIPPINE Area       | 5 Oct. 1944                        |
|                          |                       | 2 Sept. 1945                      |
| 37th Division            | Area around Hanko (in course of being transferred from Northern French Indo-China) | 17 Apr. 1945 |
|                          |                       | 12 Sept. 1945                     |
| 24th Infantry Brigade    | Northern Kyushu       | 1 Aug. 1934                        |
|                          |                       | 7 Sept. 1935                      |
| 1st Army                 |                       | 7-30 May 1939                     |
|                          |                       | 13 Sept. 1938                     |
|                          |                       | 18 Sept. 1938                     |
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Yozo Itivama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, and that as such official I have custody of the document here attached consisting of 1 page.

I further certify that the attached record and document was compiled by the lst Demobilization Bureau and gives the locations of the 14th Division, the 5th Army, the Eastern District Army, the 7th Area Army, the 12th Area Army, the 2nd Heavy Field Artillery, the 13th Heavy Field Artillery, the 22nd Field Artillery, the 32nd Division, the 5th Division, the 11th Division, the 14th Area Army, the 37th Division, the 24th Infantry Brigade and the 1st Army to the best of the knowledge and belief of this bureau.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23rd day of January, 1947. Yozo Itivama (signed) ___________ Signatures of Official SEAL

Witness: Torakichi Nakamura /s/ Chief of the Archives Section Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleishar C-91500 hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 20th day of January, 1947 /s/ Eric W. Fleishar 2d Lt. USAINT NFE

Witness: J. A. Curtis /s/ Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
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<td>第1軍</td>
<td>1938年5月〜11月</td>
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### Document Content

The content of the document appears to be handwritten text. Without the ability to transcribe handwritten Chinese text accurately, a precise representation of the content is not possible within the constraints of this task.
SHIMONOSEKI TREATY

Signed at Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895.
Ratified April 20, 1895.
Ratifications exchanged at Chefoo, May 8, 1895.
Promulgated May 13, 1895.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and subjects and to remove all cause for future complications, have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Count Ito HIROYOSHI, junior Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paulownia, Minister President of State, and Viscount MEBU MIBU, junior, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Throne, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, LI HUNG-CHANG, Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State, Minister Superintendant of Trade for the Northern Ports of China, Viceroy of the Province of Chihli and Earl of the First Rank, and LI CHING-CHONG, Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank;

Who, after having exchanged their Full Powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the following Articles:

ARTICLE 1.

China recognizes definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.
ARTICLE 2.

China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the following territories together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property thereon:

a) The southern portion of the Province of Feng-Tien within the following boundaries:

The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River An-ping; from thence the line runs to Feng-Hnar; from thence to Hai-Chang, from thence to Ying-Kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Linz at Ying-Kow it follows the course of that stream to its mouth where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Linz shall be taken as the line of demarcation.

This cession also includes all Islands appertaining or belonging to the Province of Feng-Tien situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Lia-Tung and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.

b) The Island of Formosa together with all Islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.

c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all Islands lying between the 119th and 120th degree of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.

ARTICLE 3.

The alignments of the frontiers described in the preceding Article and shown on the annexed Map, shall be subject to verification and demarcation on the spot, by a Joint Commission of Delimitation, consisting of two or more Japanese and two or more
DEF. DOC. #74

Chinese Delegates to be appointed immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the Act. In case the boundaries laid down in this Act are found to be defective at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration of good administration, it shall also be the duty of the Delimitation Commission to rectify the same.

The Delimitation Commission will enter upon its duties as soon as possible and will bring its labors to a conclusion within the period of one year after appointment.

The alignments laid down in this Act shall, however be maintained until the ratifications of the Delimitation Commission, if any are made, shall have received the approval of the Governments of Japan and China.

ARTICLE 4.

China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity, the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping Taels. The said sum to be paid in eight instalments. The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels, to be paid within six months, and the second instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within twelve months, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. The remaining sum to be paid in six equal annual instalments as follows: The first of such equal annual instalments to be paid within two years; the second within three years; the third within four years; the fourth within five years; the fifth within six years, and the sixth within seven years, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first instalment falls due.

China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation
at any time any or all of said instruments. In case the whole
amount of the said instruments be paid within three years after the
exchange of the ratifications of the present Act, all interest shall
be waived and the interest for the years one and a half or for any loss
period, if theretofore paid, shall be included as a part of the
principal amount of the indemnity.

ARTICLE 5.

The inhabitants of the provinces ceded to Japan, who wish
to take up their residence outside the said districts, shall be
at liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose
a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the ratifi-
cations of the present Act shall be granted. At the expiration of
that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such
territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese
subjects.

Each of the two Governments shall immediately, upon the ex-
change of the ratifications of the present Act, send one or more
Commissioners to Formosa to effect a final transfer of that Province,
and, within the space of two months after the exchange of the ratifi-
cations of this Act, such transfer shall be completed.

ARTICLE 6.

All Treaties between Japan and China having come to an end in
consequence of war, China engages, immediately upon the exchange
of the ratifications of this Act, to appoint Plenipotentiaries to
conclude with the Japanese Plenipotentiaries a Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation and a Convention to regulate Frontier Intercourse
and Trade. The Treaties, Conventions and Regulations now subsisting
between China and European Powers shall serve as a basis for the
said Treaty and Convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Act until the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual operation, the Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade; industries; ships and subjects, shall, in every respect, be accorded by China most favored nation treatment.

China makes in addition the following concessions, to take effect six months after the date of the present Act:

1st. The following cities, towns and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade residence, industries and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns and ports of China:

1. Shashih in the Province of Hupoh.
2. Chung-King in the Province of Szechuan.
3. Suchow in the Province of Kiang-Su.

The Japanese Government shall have the right to station Consuls at any or all of the above-named places.

2nd. Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag for the conveyance of passengers and cargo, shall be extended to the following places:

1. On the Upper Yangtse River, From Ichang to Chung-King.
2. On the Wusung River and the Canal, from Shanghai to Suchow and Hanghai.

The Rules and Regulations which now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by foreign vessels, shall, so far as applicable, be enforced in respect of the above-named routes, until
said Treaty and Convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Act until the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual operation, the Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade, industries, ships and subjects, shall, in every respect, be accorded by China most favored nation treatment.

China makes in addition the following concessions, to take effect six months after the date of the present Act:

1st The following cities, towns, and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade residence, industries and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns and ports of China:

1. Shashih in the Province of Hopeh.
2. Chung-King in the Province of Szechuan.
3. Suchow in the Province of Kiang-Su.
4. Hangchow in the Province of Chokiang.

The Japanese Government shall have the right to station Consuls at any or all of the above-named places.

2nd Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag for the conveyance of passengers and cargo, shall be extended to the following places:

1. On the Upper Yangtsze River, from Ichang to Chung-King.
2. On the Wusuang River and the Canal, from Shanghai to Suchow and Hangchow.

The Rules and Regulations which now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by foreign vessels, shall, so far as applicable, be enforced in respect of the above-named routes, until
new Rules and Regulations are conjointly agreed to.

3rd. Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China or transporting imported merchandise into the interior of China shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so purchased or transported, without the payment of any taxes or exactions whatever.

4th. Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns and ports of China and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated import duties thereon.

All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall, in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges and exactions of all kinds and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.

In the event additional Rules and Regulations are necessary in connection with these concessions, they shall be embodied in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation provided for by this Article.

Article 7.

Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Article, the evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely effected within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act.

ARTICLE 8.

As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act, China consents to the temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of Wei-hai wei in the Province of Shantung.
Upon the payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for and the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the said indemnity shall be evacuated by the Japanese Power, provided the Chinese Government consents to pledge, upon suitable and sufficient arrangements, the Customs Revenue of China in security for the payment of the principal and interest of the remaining instalments of said indemnity. In the event no such arrangement is concluded, such evacuation shall only take place upon the payment of the final instalment of said indemnity.

It is however, expressly understood that so such evacuation shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

ARTICLE 9.

Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, all prisoners of war then held shall be restored and China undertakes not to ill-treat or punish prisoners of war so restored to her by Japan. China also engages to at once release all Japanese subjects accused of being military spies or charged with any other military offences. China further engages not to punish in any manner nor to allow to be punished those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in their relations with the Japanese army during the war.

ARTICLE 10.

All offensive military operations shall cease upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act.

ARTICLE 11.

The present Act shall be ratified by Their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China, and the ratifications
shall be exchanged at Chefoo, on the 8th day of the 5th month of the
28th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 14th day of the 4th month of
the 21st year of Kuang Hsu.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Shimonoseki, in duplicate, this 17th day of the 4th
month of the 28th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 23rd day of
the 3rd month of the 21st year of Kuang Hsu.

(L. S.) Count Ito HIROBUNI.
Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paulownia, Minister
President of State, Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of
Japan.

(L. S.) Viscount MUTSU MUHOKI.
Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Plenipotentiary of His
Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

(L. S.) LI HUNG-CHANG
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China Senior
Tutor to the Heir-Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State,
Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China,
Viceroy of the Province of Chihli and Earl of the First Rank.

(L. S.) LI CHING-POO.
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China, Ex-
Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of source and authenticity

I, SHIKODA Takeso, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that the document in English hereto attached consisting of 40 pages and entitled "SHIKOROFKI TREATY" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Signed at Tokyo on this
10th day of August, 1946

T. Shimode
Signature of Official

Witness: Megaharu Odic
明 治 二 十 八 年
下 八 九 九 五 年
四 月 二 七 日
於 両 帝

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テニナレル

大日本帝国全権外交大臣

伊藤博文（記名）印

外務大臣従二位勲一等子爵

井原宗光（記名）印

日本國全権外交大臣

內閣總理大臣兼二位勲一等伯爵

樺山資紀
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHINOMURA Takeshi, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese hereto attached consisting of 11 pages and entitled "Shimonoseki Treaty" is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japanese foreign office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of August, 1946

T. Shinoda
Signature of Official

Witness: Naoharu ODA
SEPARATE ARTICLES OF SHIMONOSEKI TREATY

Signed at Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895
Ratified April 26, 1895.
Ratifications exchanged at Chefoo, May 8, 1895.
Promulgated May 13, 1895.

ARTICLE I,

The Japanese Military Forces which are, under Article 6 of the Treaty of Peace signed this day, to temporarily occupy Wei-hai-wei, shall not exceed one Brigade and from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the said Treaty of Peace, China shall pay annually, one-fourth of the amount of the expenses of such temporary occupation that is to say, at the rate of 500,000 Kunging Taels per annum.

ARTICLE 2.

The territory occupied at Wei-hai-wei shall comprise the Island of Liu Kung and a belt of land 5 Japanese Ri wide along the entire coast line of the Bay of Wei-hai-wei.

No Chinese Troops shall be permitted to approach or occupy any places within a zone 5 Japanese Ri wide beyond the boundaries of the occupied territory.

ARTICLE 3.

The Civil administration of the occupied territory shall remain in the hands of the Chinese authorities. But such Authorities shall at all Times be obliged to conform to the orders which the Commander of the Japanese Army of occupations may deem it necessary to give in the interest of the health, maintenance, safety, distribution or discipline of the troops.

All military offices committed within the occupied territory shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Japanese Military
The foregoing Separate Articles shall have the same force, value and effect as if they had been word for word, inserted in the Treaty of Peace signed this day.

In Witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Shimoda, in duplicate, this 17th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 23rd day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of Kwang Hau.

(L. S.) Count ED TÔROUHITO,
Minister President of State, Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

(L. S.) Viscount MITSU HUNEMITSU,
Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

(L. S.) LI HUNG CHANG,
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China, Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State; Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China; Viceroy of the Province of Chihli and Earl of the First Rank.

(L. S.) LI CHING FONG,
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China, Ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIMODA Takeso, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby that the document in English hereto attached consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Separate Articles of Shimomeki Treaty" is an exact and true copy of an official document Japanese Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of August, 1946

T. Shimoda
Signature of Official

Witness: Naoharu Cdo
明治二十八年五月一日所訂約

同月二〇日北本日印シルコード及経約第十條ノ規定ニ依リテ一時威海ノ占領ス

本日印ノ日本駐箚ノ京口ヲ通過シルヘルヘネリテ附約ヲ批准交換

略ノ支持フヘ

第一条

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一時占領地ノ行政事務ハ仍ト逓国官吏ノ管理ヲ仍トスルニ、従ハ日本国占領軍司令官ガ其ノ範囲ニ於ケル安全規律ヲ定ヘリ。裁判ヲ関シテハ日本国占領軍司令官ヲ第一号ト黒田少将ト黒田少将ノ命令ヲ仮斷フスルニ、第ニ号ヲ従フスルニ於テ百・条作ル。
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIRODA Takeco, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby that the document in Japanese hereto attached consisting of ___3___ pages and entitled "Separate Agreement of Shiromoseki Treat" is an exact and true copy of an official document Japanese Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo

on this ___10th___ day of August, 1946

(Signed) Te. Shiroda

witness: (Signed) Haraharu Kyo
Signed at Shimonoseki, April 17, the 20th year of Meiji (1895)
Promulgated May 16, the 29th year of Meiji (1895)

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of China have, through their respective Plenipotentiary Ministers, agreed upon the following stipulation with the object of avoiding future misunderstanding on the meaning and intention of the Treaty of Peace signed this day:

First. It is agreed that the translated English text to be appended to the Treaty of Peace signed this day shall have the same meaning and intention as the original Japanese and Chinese texts of the Treaty.

Second. It is agreed that in case of any divergence of interpretation between the Japanese and Chinese texts of the Treaty, such differences shall be decided by reference to the English text above-mentioned.

Third. It is agreed that the undersigned Plenipotentiary Ministers shall submit this Protocol to their respective Imperial Government together with the Treaty of Peace signed this day and that when the Treaty is ratified, the stipulation inserted in this Protocol shall also be considered as approved by the respect Imperial Government without any formal ratification.
In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiary Ministers have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Shimosaoki, in duplicate, this 17th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of Kōki, corresponding to the 23rd day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of Kuang Hui.

Count ITOSHIRO, Hirobumi
Junior Grade of the Second Count Rank, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Paulownia, Prime Minister, Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.
Signature _________ Seal

Viscount KITSU, Munemitsu.
Junior Grade of the Second Count Rank, Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure First Class, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.
Signature _________ Seal

Li HUNG-CHANG.
Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China, Senior Tutor to the Heir-Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State, Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China, Viceroy of the Province of Chihli and Earl of the First Rank.
Signature _________ Seal

Li Ching-Fong.
Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China, Ex-Minister of Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank.
Signature _________ Seal.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SaIKO, Takeso, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, here certify that the document in Japanese hereto attached consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Protocol of Shimanesaki Treaty is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japanese foreign office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of August, 1946

(signed) 5. SHIMODA
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Magaharu OTO

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct and true translation as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 17 January 1947
下関條約議定書

明治二十八年（一八九五年）四月七日下ノ関＝於テ署名

日本国宣皇帝陛下ノ政府及大清国皇帝陛下ノ政府ハ本日調印シタ

ル緩和条約ノ意義ヲ付将来誤解ヲ生スルコトヲ避ケムト欲スル

目的ヲ以テ彼方ノ全権大臣ハ左ノ約定＝同意セリ

本文ヲ又＝論文ヲ同ノ意義ヲ有スルモノタルコトヲ約

第二条：若該條約ノ日本本文及論本文ノ間＝異ニシ

第三条：左＝記名スキルノ全権大臣ハ本議定書ハ本日調印シタルノヲ

タルトキハ本議定書＝榴スキルノ旨約定モ別＝正式ノ批

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
大日本帝国全権大使大臣
伊藤博文（記名）印

大日本帝国全権公使大臣
陸奥宗光（記名）印

大清帝国全権大使大臣
李鴻章（記名）印

二品頂規前出使大臣

明治二十八年四月十七日即光緒二十一年三月二十三日下ノ聞ニ於
テニ通ラせル

內閣總裁大臣従二位國一等伯爵
大日本帝国全権公使大臣
陸奥宗光（記名）印

大臣直隷總督等専派

太子太傅文華殿大學士北洋
李鴻章（記名）印
Kyoto, May 6th, 1905.

Addressed to Ambassador NISHI in Russia by Foreign Minister MITSU.

Translate the following memorandum into French and submit it to the Russian Government:

The Imperial Japanese Government promises to abandon permanent occupation of the Mukden Peninsula on the friendly advice of the Russian, French and German Government.

In submitting the above memorandum, state as follows:

It is due to the desire to bring the present situation promptly to an end that the Japanese Government thus faithfully follows the advice of the Three Powers.

Submit both or either of the following two items if you believe that there is no fear of these proposals arousing protests by the Russian Government:

I. The Japanese Government will hold the right to claim compensation from China for the territory which Japan has abandoned.

III. The Japanese Government will hold the right to occupy the afore-mentioned Peninsula for a length of time as a security for China's fulfilment of her treaty-obligations to Japan.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "Telegram from Mutsu, Foreign Minister, to Nishi, Minister to Russia, despatched on May 5, 1895." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 17th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

Translation Certificate

I, WILLIAM F. CLARKE, of the Defence Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 1 January, 1947
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "Telegram from Yutu, Foreign Minister, to Nishi, Minister to Russia, despatched on May 5, 1895." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 17th day of January, 1941.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo
Telegram despatched from 'Miho', Minister at Saint Petersburg, to Mutsu, Foreign Minister, May 3, 1895.

On the 1st of this month, I submitted our memorandum to the Russian Government and tried strenuously to persuade the Government to agree to our proposal.

On the 3rd of this month, the Foreign Minister of Russia declared that the Russian Government was dissatisfied with our memorandum, and furthermore, in the preceding day's council, the Cabinet had decided unanimously to persist in the first advice and not to change their position for fear that there should be an obstruction if the Japs took possession of the harbor of Port Arthur. Also, he told me that this decision had been sanctioned by the Russian Emperor.

I deeply regret that in spite of all my efforts in negotiating with the Russian Foreign Minister, I was unable to persuade the Russian Government to propose another plan for disposition of this matter.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authority

In "HAYASHI Kozo", Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of _ _ pages and entitled " militar despatch from Field Minister at St. Petersburg, to Imperial Foreign Minister, May 3, 1865," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 20th day of December, 1976.

K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness f Negoro, 200

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\ Charles D. Sheldon.
Tokyo, Japan
Date 7 January, 1947
TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA, MAY, 1896

Note: This secret treaty was concluded in May 1896 at Saint Petersburg, Capital of Russia, between Prince Robabov (T.F. Phonetic) and Li Kuei-chang who attended the coronation ceremony of the Czar.

Later, after the expiration of its term of validity, it was published in the 'Daily Telegraph' in London by the then Chinese Minister to Britain Li Ching-mei, the son of Li Kuei-chang. As for the detailed circumstances, refer to notes attached to the foreign versions.

Art I. Any act of aggression on the part of Japan, whether it be contemplated against Russian territories in East Asia, China, or Korea, shall not fail to call forth a prompt application of this treaty.

In the above case, the two Signatory Powers have agreed to support one another with their whole military and naval forces available at that time and to afford to one another the greatest possible assistance in the way of supplying provisions for the above forces.
Art II. After the two Powers have taken joint actions neither of them shall be permitted to conclude any peace treaty separately with the enemy without the consent of the other.

Art III. In the course of military actions, all the ports in China shall be, if necessary, open to Russian warships, which will be furnished there with all necessary assistance by the Chinese Government.

Art IV. The Chinese Government has agreed to construct a railway towards Vladivostok, traversing the two Chinese Districts of Amur (heilungkiang) and Fulin, with a view to facilitating the approach of the Russian army to areas which are likely to be attacked and to securing the means by which to resist such attacks. The junction of the above railway to the Russian railway shall not be used as a pretext for infringing the integrity of the Chinese Empire or the dignity of the Chinese Emperor. The construction and administration of the above railway shall be entrusted to the Russo-Chinese Bank. The stipulations in contracts to be concluded for the above purposes shall be negotiated between the Chinese Minister to Russia and the Russo-Chinese Bank.

(2)
Art VII. In time of war, 

Russia shall be entitled to utilize without restriction the railway prescribed in Art I., for the purpose of transporting her army forces and provision for the above forces in accordance to Art I. In time of peace, Russia shall possess the same right for the purpose of transporting her army forces and munitions, on condition that the trains do not stop on the way except for necessities of transportation business.

Art VI. This Treaty shall take effect from the day on which the Chinese Empire ratifies the contracts prescribed in Art IV., and shall be valid for 15 years beginning with the above date. More than 6 months prior to the expiration of the term, the two powers shall hold a negotiation regarding the revision of this Treaty.
STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICITY

I, (Name), Chief of the Foreign Section, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of (Number) and entitled "..." is an exact and true copy of an original translation of the Japanese foreign office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this (Date) day of (Month), 1947.

Witness: ______________________

[Stamp]

Chief of Official

STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICITY

I, (Name), Chief of the Defense Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

[Signature]

Charles D. Slinson

Tokyo, Japan

Date: 17 January 1947
Sir:- Referring to our recent conversation, in which I informed Your Excellency that I had received telegraphic information from my Government that, on the 13th ultimo, there had been mailed to me a communication for the information of Your Excellency's Government, containing the representations of the United States in respect to their commercial interests in China, as presented in notes to Russia, Germany and Great Britain, which information Your Excellency had expressed a desire to obtain, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have now received the communication containing the information desired, which I am instructed to submit to Your Excellency's Government, and which reads as follows:

'The United States Government, animated by a sincere desire to insure to the commerce and industry of the United States and of all other nations perfect equality of treatment within the limits of the Chinese Empire for their trade and navigation, especially within the so-called spheres of influence claimed by certain European Powers in China, has deemed the present and opportune moment to make representations in this direction to Germany, Great Britain and Russia.

To attain the object it has in view and to remove possible causes of international irritation and reestablish confidence so essential to commerce, it has seemed to this Government highly desirable that the various Powers claiming 'spheres of interest or influence' in China should give formal assurances that:-

1st. They will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory they may have in China.

2nd. The Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said 'sphere of interest' unless they be 'free ports',

December 20, 1899

His Excellency
Viscount Aoki Shuzo,
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

December 20, 1899
no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

3rd. They will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than shall be levied on vessels of their own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within that 'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to their own nationals transported over equal distances.

The policy pursued by His Imperial German Majesty in declaring Tsing-tao (P'ao-chao) a free port and in aiding the Chinese Government in establishing there a custom house, and the Ukase of His Imperial Russian Majesty of August 11th last in erecting a free port at Dalny (Ta-Jion-Wan) are thought to be proof that these Powers are not disposed to view unfavorably the proposition to recognize that they contemplate nothing which will interfere in any way with the enjoyment by the commerce of all nations of the rights and privileges guaranteed to them by existing treaties with China.

Repeated assurances from the British Government of its fixed policy to maintain throughout China freedom of trade for the whole world, insure, it is believed, the ready assent of that Power to our proposals. It is no less confidently believed that the commercial interests of Japan would be greatly served by the above mentioned declarations, which harmonize with the assurance conveyed to this Government at various times by His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Diplomatic Representative at this capital.

You are therefore instructed to submit to His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Government the above considerations, and to invite their early attention to them, and to express the earnest hope of your Government that they will accept them and aid in securing their acceptance by the other interested Powers.

Having to receive a favorable response from Your Excellency's Government, I avail myself of the occasion to extend to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(L. S.) A. E. BUCK
His Excellency
A. E. Buck,
etc., etc., etc.,

Monsieur le Ministre:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note No. 176 of the 20th instant, in which, pursuing the instructions of the United States Government, Your Excellency was so good as to communicate to the Imperial Government the representations of the United States as presented in notes to Russia, Germany and Great Britain on the subject of commercial interests of the United States in China.

I have the happy duty of assuring Your Excellency that the Imperial Government will have no hesitation to give their assent to so just and fair a proposal of the United States, provided that all the other Powers concerned shall accept the same.

I avail myself, etc.

(L. S.) Viscount AOKI SHUZO,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
在支四面経交保を調する日米交換記録

開明三十二年十二月二十日及二十六日

於東京
明治三十二年十二月二十日

大日本帝国

外務大臣 青木端

書簡

過日閣下並人會談の際、小官の荷熱受領せる本意政府よりの箇文によれば、

本関係決定去月十三日貴国政府に通知させるべき箇信を小官宛に送付せら

由来るととの所、之をGoingその箇信が到着、提要及び見通に対する態度を含んであるを

とを閣下に御報せられたと知り、閣下は右箇信を到着た旨の御希望を代

い貴國政府に報文知すべく閣下の申し増したので、同様に報りました

お上ります。その内容は次の如くであります。

一、来稿書簡範囲内、院中院外交関係、他の各務の事項に関して、貴国政府に

これに照し当該範囲内、院中院外交関係の事項が含まれた一致を受けております

何れに於いても、貴国政府に対して、何れに於いても、貴国政府に対して、

力図又は座間閣下内に於て完全に平等なる取扱を受けしめんことを希望

し、且つこの点に照し當該観点及び意見に照し提願をせずに居る現在が最
も適当なる時機をすることを信ずるものなり。右の目的を達成し、国際的摩擦の危険を防止し、且つ商売のため誠に
べからざる誤解を招くべき所論「総会議内」内
その一努力して又は総会議を再開しつつある議題が次の如し。正式保証を
なすこと切に請願するものなり。
第一、これらの議題が総会議にて有することあるべき所謂「総会議内」内
又は租界地内に於ける議題又は既に議会に決して干渉せざること。
第二、議題の政治的意義又は環境させるべく一切の港に於てその国
連の如何も間はず照用させるべきこと。而してかいる関係の撤収は議題
の内に於て建設又は継続せるべく一刻に於てして議題
第三、議題はかくの一国単に内港に寄せるか又は総会議内に於て議題
又は租界地内に於て議題又は既に議会に決して干渉せざること。又は租

1. 今後借館内に於て議題又は既に議会に決して干渉せざること。
青島（膠州）の自由港宣言及び清国政府による同地防護設備に対する援助小提歩兵四百名にかわる形で、従属于皇族、臣下の御政経並にダルニエ（大連港）の自由港設置に関する条約、八月十一日の騒乱、皇帝陸下詔令等は、これらの条約が海軍及び陸軍の関係者に受け入れられた際、先に述べたとおり、信用に相当するものであると仮定してみることなく、あらゆる問題に際し、余りすぎた旨の政府の存念に照らして、小官は閣下が前記函を審議政府に示して達かれ、右の次第に、小官は閣下が前記処分を審議政府に示して達かに、遂にその注意を発起し、以て審議政府がこれに函を審議し、更にはその処分を敬意を示すべき協力せんことを望する一方、やにいうるほど、
公便

明治三十二年十二月二十六日
於東京

外務大臣
子爵
木村
周三

直

合衆国政府の訓令に従い同下が帝国政府に御通信下さった所の敬言、関

件として、合衆国によってこの公平且つ適正なる慣習を受領するに容かで

いところ、この決議を御通知申上ぐることを欣快に存ずる次第であります。
The Peace Protocol

(Signed at Peking on the 7th of September, 1901.)

The Plenipotentiaries:

Of Germany:
His H.R. A. Kune von Schwarzenstein.

Of Austria-Hungary:
" Cziburn de Weilborn.

Of Belgium:
" M. Joostens.

Of Spain:
" M. B. J. de Cologen.

Of United States of America:
" Hon. W. A. Rockhill.

Of France:
" M. P. Beau.

Of Great Britain:
" Sir Ernest Satow.

Of Italy:
" Marquis Selvago Raggi.

Of Japan:
" M. Jiutaro Komura.

Of Holland:
" M. F. M. Knobel.

Of Russia:
" M. M. de Gier.

Of China: His Highness I-Kuang, Prince of the first rank Ching, President of the Board of Foreign Affairs; and His Excellency Li Hung-chang, Count of the first rank, Tutor of the Heir Presumptive, Grand Secretary of the Von-hua Tien Hall, Minister of Commerce, Superintendent of Northern Trade, Governor-General of Chihli, have met in order to establish that China has announced her agreement to the satisfaction of the Powers, with the conditions which are set forth in the note of 22nd December, 1900, which were accepted as a whole by His Majesty the Emperor of China by an Edict of 27th December, 1900 (annex 1).

Art. I.—By an Imperial Edict of 30th June of this year (annex 2) Tsar Feng, Prince of first rank Ching, has been appointed Ambassador of H.M. the Emperor of China, and in this capacity has been commanded to express to H.M. the German Emperor the respect of H.M. the Emperor of China and the Chinese Government for the death of the German Ambassador, His Excellency Baron von Ketteler.
Prince Chun left Peking on the 12th July of this year to carry out the mission entrusted to him.

Art. lb.- The Chinese Government has announced that it will erect, on the spot of the murder of His Excellency Baron von Ketteler, a Memorial Monument corresponding to the rank of the deceased, with an inscription in Latin, German and Chinese, which shall express the regret of H.M. the Emperor of China for the murder done.

Their Excellencies the Chinese Plenipotentiaries have informed His Excellency the German Plenipotentiary by a letter of 22nd July of this year (annex 3) that an obelisk will be erected across the entire breadth of the street on the spot mentioned and that the work was begun on the 25th June of this year.

Art. lir.- Imperial Edicts of the 15th and 21st February, 1901 (annexes 4, 5 and 6) pronounce the following punishments upon the culprits for the attacks and crimes which took place against the friendly Governments and their subjects.

Tsoi Yi, Prince Tuan, and Tsoi Lon, Duke Fu Koo, have been condemned to death at the autumn assizes, and it is further determined that if the Emperor thinks their lives should be spared, they shall be banished to Turkestan and there shall be imprisoned for life, with no possibility that the punishment shall ever be commuted.

Tsoi Hsiu, Prince Chang, Ying Hien, President of the Censorship and Chao Shu-chiao, President of the Board of Punishments, shall be condemned to commit suicide.

Yu Hai, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hui, President of the Board of Ceremonies, Hsu Ch'eng-yu, formerly Director in the Board of Punishments, shall be condemned to death.

Degradation after death has been pronounced against King Yi, assistant member of the Grand Secretariat and President of the Board of Civil Office, Hsu Ch'ing-ch'ang, the Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Secretariat, Lieyuen, and the Director of the Court of Sacrifice Yuen Cheng, who were executed because they protested against the unscrupulous offences against international rights which took place during the last year.
Prince Chun left Peking on the 12th July of this year to carry out the mission entrusted to him.

Art. Ib.- The Chinese Government has announced that it will erect, on the spot of the murder of His Excellency Baron von Ketteler, a Memorial Monument corresponding to the rank of the deceased, with an inscription in Latin, German, and Chinese, which shall express the regret of H.M. the Emperor of China for the murder done.

Their Excellencies the Chinese Plenipotentiaries have informed His Excellency the Great Plenipotentiary by a letter of 22nd July of this year (annex 3) that an arch will be erected across the entire breadth of the street on the spot mentioned and that the work was begun on the 25th June of this year.

Art. IIC. - Imperial Edicts of the 1st and 31st February, 1901 (annexes 4, 5 and 6) pronounce the following punishments upon the Chinese perpetrators of the attacks and crimes which took place against the friendly Governments and their subjects:

Tseu Yi, Prince Yuan, and Tsuei Lu, Duke Yu Koo, have been condemned to death at the autumn assizes, and it is further determined that if the Emperor thinks their lives should be spared, they shall be banished to Turkestan and there shall be imprisoned for life, with no possibility that the punishment shall ever be commuted.

Tsai Hsin, Prince Ch'ing, Ying Hien, President of the Censorship and Ch'ou Shu-chien, President of the Board of Punishments, shall be condemned to commit suicide.

Yu Ho, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hsiu, President of the Board of Ceremonies, Hsu Ch'ing-yi, Formerly Director in the Board of Punishments, shall be condemned to death.

Depredation after death has been pronounced against King Yi, assistant member of the Grand Secretariat and President of the Board of Civil Office, Hsi Tung, member of the Grand Secretariat, and Li Ying-hung, formerly Governor General of Chekiang.

An Imperial Edict of 15th February, 1901 (annex 7), has rehabilitated the memory of the President of the Board of War, Hau Yung-ye, the President of the Board of Revenue, Li Shan, the Director of the Board of Civil Office, Hau Ch'ing-ch'ung, the Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Secretariat, Lien-yuen, and the Director of the Court of Sacrifice Yuen Ch'ung, who were executed because they protested against the unbridled offenses against international rights which took place during the last year.
Prince Chuang has committed suicide on the 21st February, 1901; Ying Nien and Chao Shu-chiao on the 24th; Yu Hsien has been executed on the 22nd February, 1901; Ch'í Hái and Hsu Cheng-Yu on the 26th.

The General of Kansu, Tung Fu-hsiang, has been deprived of his office by Imperial Edict of 13th February, 1901, until it shall be decided what final punishment shall be pronounced against him.

Imperial Edicts of 29th April, and of 19th August, 1901, have pronounced suitable punishments against Provincial authorities who confessedly have been guilty of crimes or murder during the course of last summer.

Art. IIb.—An Imperial Edict which was promulgated on the 19th August, 1901 (annex 8), has ordered the suspension of the official examinations during five years, in all towns where foreigners were murdered or were subjected to harsh treatment.

Art. III—In order to make suitable amends for the murder of Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, H.M. the Emperor of China, by an Imperial Edict of 16th June, 1901 (annex 9), has appointed the Vice-President of the Ministry of Finance, Na Tung, an Extraordinary Ambassador, and commanded him in particular to convey to H.M. the Emperor of Japan the expression of the regret of H.M. the Emperor of China and his Government for the murder of Mr. Sugiyama.

Art. IV.—The Chinese Government has undertaken to erect an expiatory monument in each of the foreign or international cemeteries which has been desecrated or in which grave monuments have been destroyed.

To this end it has been arranged with the representatives of the Powers that the Legations concerned will indicate what is necessary for the erection of these monuments, with the undertaking on the part of China to bear all the costs, which are fixed at 10,000 taels for the cemeteries in Peking and its neighbourhood, and 5,000 in the provinces. These sums have been paid, and the list of these cemeteries is herewith affixed (annex 10).

Art. V.—China has agreed to forbid the importation of arms and ammunition as well as of all material exclusively employed for the manufacture of arms and of ammunition.

An Imperial Edict was published on 25th August, 1901 (annex 11), which forbids such importations for two years.
Further fdicts may be promulgated in the future in order to extend this period every two years, in case the Powers deem it necessary.

Art. VI.- In an Imperial Edict of 22nd May, 1901, H.I.M. the Emperor of China has undertaken to pay the Powers an indemnity of 450 millions Halkun Taels. This sum represents the total of the indemnity for the States, Societies, Individuals and Chinese, which are mentioned in Article 6 of the Note of 22nd December, 1900.

(a) - These 450 million taels form a debt in gold, in which the rate of the Halkun Tael is calculated in the gold currency of each country in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Currency</th>
<th>Exchange Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halkun Tael</td>
<td>3.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Dollars</td>
<td>3.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian Kronen</td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francs</td>
<td>3.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pound Sterling,</td>
<td>3s. 0d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuan</td>
<td>1.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Gulden</td>
<td>1.796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Ruble</td>
<td>1.412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(at the rate of $1 = 10 taels)

This sum in gold shall bear interest at the rate of 4 per cent. a year and the principal is to be reimbursed by China in thirty-nine years on the conditions indicated in the plan of amortisation annexed hereto (annex no. 19). The capital and interest will be payable in gold or at the rate of exchange corresponding to the different dates of maturity.

The operation of the amortisation will commence on the 1st January, 1902, and end at the expiration of the year 1940. The amortisations will be payable annually, the first date of maturity being fixed as the 1st January, 1902.

The interest will be calculated to begin from the 1st July, 1901, but the Chinese Government will have the privilege of paying itself in a period of three years, commencing on 1st January, 1902, on the condition, however, of paying interest at four per cent per annum on the sums of which the payments will have been thus deferred. The interest will be payable half-yearly, the first maturity being fixed for the 1st July, 1902.
The service of the debt will be effected at Shanghai in the following manner:-

Each Power will be represented by a delegate in a commission of bankers, which will be charged with the collection of the amount of the interest and the amortizations, which will be paid to the said commission by the Chinese authorities designated for that purpose, to divide this among those interested and to give a receipt.

The Chinese Government will remit to the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking a lump coupon which will be subsequently transformed into notes provided with the signatures of the delegates of the Chinese Government designated for that purpose. Each operation, and all those which are connected with the establishment of the title will be effected by the aforesaid commission conformably to the instructions which the Powers will send to their delegates.

The product of the resources to be devoted to the payment of the coupons will be paid monthly into the hands of the commission.

The resources to be devoted to the guarantee of the coupons are enumerated hereafter:

1. - The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime Customs after payment of the interest and the amortization of the previous loans pledged on those revenues, augmented by the product of the raising to an effective five per cent of the actual tariff on maritime imports, including articles which have hitherto entered free with the exception of foreign rice, cereals and flour, as well as gold and silver, coined or uncoined.

2. - The total of the revenue of the gabelle, and reserve of the fraction previously devoted to other foreign loans.

The raising of the actual tariff on imports to an effective five per cent is consented to on the following conditions:-

The putting in operation of that increase will commence two months after the date of the signature of the present protocol, and there will be only exceptions for merchandise in route at the latest ten days after that date.

1. - All the duties on imports levied ad valorem will be converted into specific duties as far as it is possible to do so and with the least delay. This conversion will be established as follows: The average value at the time of their disembarkation during the three years, 1897, 1898, 1899, will be taken as the basis of the valuation - that is to say, the value on the market, deduction being made of the
Import duties and the accessory expenses.

Until the result of that conversion is known, the duties will be imposed ad valorem.

2.- The course of the Peihao and the Huangpu will be improved with the financial participation of China.

Art. VII.- The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the Legations shall be considered as a quarter specially reserved to their usage and placed under their exclusive police, where the Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be put into a state of defence. The limits of the quarter have been thus fixed on the plan annexed (annex No. 14):

I. - To the west, lines 1, 2, 3, 4, 5;
II. - To the north, lines 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10;
III. - To the east, Ketteler Street, lines 10, 11, 12;
IV. - To the south, lines 12-1; drawn along the foot of the exterior of the Tartar wall, in following the bastions.

By the protocol annexed to the letter of 16th January, 1901, China has recognised that each Power has the right to retain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defence of its Legation.

Art. VIII.- The Chinese Government has consented to have the Taku forts razed, and those which could prevent free communication between Peking and the sea.

Dispositions have been taken to this effect.

Art. IX.- The Chinese Government has recognised that the Powers, by the protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, have the right to occupy certain points to be determined by agreement between them, in order to maintain free communication between the capital and the sea.

The points occupied by the Powers are - Huangtsun, Langfong, Yangtsun, Tientsin, Ch'engliangch'eng, Tungku, Lutai, Tangshan, Lanchow, Changli, Chinhungtan, Shanhaikuan.
Art. X. - The Chinese Government has engaged to post and publish during the years in all the district towns the following Imperial Edicts (Annex No. 15):-

(a.) Edict of the 1st February, 1901, perpetually forbidding, under pain of death, membership of an anti-foreign society.

(b.) Edicts of the 15th and 21st February, 21st April, and 19th August, 1901, containing the enumeration of the punishments which have been inflicted on the guilty.

(c.) Edicts of 1st February, 1901, suppressing the examinations in all the towns where foreigners have been massacred or have been subjected to harsh treatment.

(d.) Edicts of 1st February, 1901 (Annex No. 16), declaring that all the Governors-General, Governors and functionaries, provincial or local, are responsible for order in their districts and that in case of a renewal of anti-foreign troubles, or even of other infractions of the treaties, which are not immediately repressed, and of which those guilty shall not have been punished, those functionaries will be immediately dismissed, and shall not be appointed to new positions nor receive new honours.

The posting of these Edicts is done consistently throughout the whole Empire.

Art. XI. - The Chinese Government has engaged to negotiate amendments judged useful by the Foreign Governments to the treaties of commerce and navigation, and other subjects touching commercial relations, with the view of facilitating those.

From now and in consequence of the stipulations inscribed in Article VI on the subject of the indemnities, the Chinese Government has engaged to co-operate in the amelioration of the course of the rivers Felho and Huangpu, as set out below:-

(a.) The work of improving and making properly navigable the Huangpu, commenced in 1898, with the co-operation of the Chinese Government, has been recommenced under the direction of an international commission.

As soon after as the administration of Tientsin shall have been restored to the Chinese Government, that government may be represented in that commission, and shall pay each year a sum of sixty thousand Kukuan taels for the upkeep of the works.
There is created a River Council charged with the direction and control of the works of the Huangpu and of the improvement of the course of the river.

This council is composed of members representing the interest of the Chinese Government and those of foreigners in the maritime commerce of Shanghai.

The expense necessitated by the works and the general administration of the enterprise has been estimated at the sum of 460,000 Heikuan taels during the first twenty years.

This sum will be furnished, half by the Chinese Government and half by the foreigners interested.

The details of the stimulations in connection with the composition, the attributions and the revenues of the fluvial council are the subject of the annex No. 17.

Art. XII. - An Imperial Edict of 24th July, 1901 (annex No. 10), has reconstructed the Office of Foreign Affairs (Tsungli Yamen) in the direction indicated by the powers, that is to say has transformed it into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hsi-wa-pu), which takes rank before the other six Ministries of State.

The same edict has named the principal members of this ministry.

An accord is equally established on the subject of the modification of the ceremonial of the Court relative to the reception of the foreign representatives, and has been the subject of several notes of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries annexed in a memorandum herewith annexed (annex No. 19).

Finally, it is expressly understood that, for the declarations above named and the documents attached emanating from the Foreign Plenipotentiaries, the French text is alone authentic.

The Chinese Government having thus conformed, to the satisfaction of the Powers, to the conditions enumerated in the aforesaid Note of 22nd December, 1900, the Powers have acceded to the desire of China to see the situation created by the disorders of the summer of 1900 come to an end. In consequence the Foreign Plenipotentiaries have authorised the declaration, in the name of their Governments, that, with the exception of the Legation Guards mentioned in Article VII, the international troops will completely evacuate the town of Peking, the 17th September, 1901, and with the exception of the places mentioned in Article IX, will retire from the province of Chihli, on the 22nd of September, 1901.
The present final protocol has been established in twelve identical copies and signed by all the plenipotentiaries of the contracting countries. Each copy will be remitted to each of the foreign plenipotentiaries and a copy will be remitted to the Chinese plenipotentiaries.

Certified copy:

(Signed)

[Signatures of plenipotentiaries]

Secretaries:

[Signatures of secretaries]
第一 新税関ノ収入ヲ抵當トシタル箇外国憑ノ利子及元金ヲ除ヒタ

ル上存スル仮収入ヲ猶余金ニ海路輸入品ニ對シ現行税率ヲ現行五

分知ヲ引上クヨリ生スヘキ収入ヲ加へタルモノヲ除クノ外従来無税ニ

入ノ米類ヲ除キ税ヲ徴スルヲ関品ハ線テ五分税ヲ徴フヘシ

第二

開港場ニ於テハ新税関ノ管理ヲ除スル仮税ledonノノ収入

トノノヲ徴フヘシ

第三

監税ノ収入ヲ徴フヘシ

タリ

此ノ税率ヲ引上ハ本関定書ヲ附ノノ日ヨリニ割月後ニ之ヲ實施シ而シテ右

ルルコトヲ得サルモノストス

第一 従前ニテ既収シ来レル仮入税ヲ減却シ得ルモノヲ除ウリ且減ルヘク遙ニ

九七箇年ニ千八九十八年及千八九十九年ノ三箇年ニ於ケル各
The Governments of Japan and Great Britain, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the
Extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE I.

The High Contracting Parties having Mutually recognized the independence of China and of Corea declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, to their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan in addition to the interests which she possesses in China is interested in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially and industrially, in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests, if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power or by disturbances arising in China or Corea and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its Subjects.
ARTICLE II.

If either Japan or Great Britain, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its Ally.

ARTICLE III.

If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that Ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE IV.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangement with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

ARTICLE V.

Whenever, in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, the above mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

ARTICLE VI.

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature and remain in force for five years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration
ARTICLE II.

If either Japan or Great Britain, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its Ally.

ARTICLE III.

If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that Ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE IV.

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ARTICLE V.

Whenever, in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, the above mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

ARTICLE VI.

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature and remain in force for five years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration
of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall
remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day
on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have
denounced it, but if when the date fixed for its expiration
arrives either Ally is actually engaged in war the Alliance
shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the undersigned duly authorized by their
respective Governments have signed this Agreement, and have
affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in London, the 30th January, 1902.

(L. S.) (Signed) HAYACHI,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty
the Emperor of Japan at the
Court of St. James.

(L. S.) (Signed) LANSDOWN,
His Britannic Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIMODA Takeso, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English consisting of 3 pages and entitled "CONCERT OF ALLIANCE OF 1902 BETWEEN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 5th day of August, 1946

(Signed) T. Shimoda

Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagaharu, ODO
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

J. SHIMODA Takeshi, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese consisting of 4 pages and entitled "FIRST AGREEMENT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 9th day of August, 1946.

T. Shimoda
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo
The Governments of Japan and Great Britain, being Desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object;

(a.) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b.) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c.) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special interests in the said regions;

Article I.

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.
ARTICLE II.

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III.

Japan possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

ARTICLE IV.

Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

ARTICLE V.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrange-
ments with another Power to the prejudice of the objects
described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI.

As regards the present war between Japan and Russia,
Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless
some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against
Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance
of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace
in mutual agreement with Japan.

ARTICLE VII.

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded
by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned
in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assis-
tance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval
and Military authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will
from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon
all questions of mutual interest.

ARTICLE VIII.

The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of
Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its
signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have
notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten
years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.

(L. S.) (Signed) TADASHI HAYASHI
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

(L. S.) (Signed) LANSDON, NE.
His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, N/YASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "AGREEMENT OF ALLIANCE OF 1905 BETWEEN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 21 Sept. 1946.

(signed) N. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Wagaharu ODO
第 一 
條

日本国又大不破附於本条約前文記述セル効力及制約ノ中

第二

條

日本国又大不破附於本条約前文記述セル効力及制約ノ中

第二

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日本国又大不破附於本条約前文記述セル効力及制約ノ中

第三

條

日本国又大不破附於本条約前文記述セル効力及制約ノ中

355.
D.L.F. D.D.C. 風

スルフ以テ大不列顛イハ日本國カ改利経ョ倫セムカ爲正當

且必要ト認ムル措置ハ常ニ列詞ノ前工業ニ封スル機會均等ヲ主導ニ

反セサルコトヲ要ス

大不列顛ハ印度鹹遼ノ安全ニシテル一切ノ事項ニ臨シ各条

在スルフ以テ日本ハ前記制限ヲ附近ニ於キ未大不列顛國対スノ印

同調地論評セムカ為必要ト認ムル措置ヲヲ依トヲ承認ス

記録セル目的ヲ於テハ預約ヲヲサルヘチコトヲ約定ス

現時ノ日英論爭ヲ對シテハ大不列顛國ハ引領ニ至正中立ヲ認

若シ他ノ一例若ハ彼トハ日本國ニ封シセム加ハルテハ大不列
第七条

国防及び海上自衛隊活動の一助として、海上自衛隊及び陸上自衛隊の活動に関する情報及び統合指揮に関する情報の提供等、相互の協力及び連携の増進を図るため、本条に定める事項に基づき、相互情報を提供し合うものとすること。
ルモノナリ

一千九百五年八月十二日懲懲ニ於テ本條ニ通テ作ル

大不列顛國皇帝陛下ノ特命全権公使

大不列顛國皇帝陛下ノ外務大臣

ランスダウン

印
The Government of Japan and the Government of Great Britain, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, 1902, and believing that a revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and peace, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all powers in China by insuring the independence and the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the various Countries in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions.
ARTICLE I.

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE II.

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV.

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom
ARTICLE I.

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either France or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE II.

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV.

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom
such treaty of arbitration is in force.

**ARTICLE V.**

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

**ARTICLE VI.**

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their Seals.
Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1891.

(L. S.) (Signature) TAMAKI KATO,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court
of St. James.

(L. S.) (Signature) E. GREY,
His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.
Certificate

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, S. SHIMODA, Takeso, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "STATEMENT OF ALLIANCE OF 1511 BETWEEN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 8th day of August, 1946.

(signed) T. SHIMODA
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Fagaharu Do
目的: スル左ノ輪歯ナ約定スル

日本同又ハ不列颠所定ハ本輪歯ナ約定ヲ配布セル利益及利益ノ中
何レカ前条ニ廃ルモノナルテスハルキハ日本同政府ハ相互ノ充分ニ

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New

York

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Tokyo

Paris

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Mexico

San Francisco

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日本国とハ不列颠国ニ於テテ本条約ニ於テハ相互間ニ於テハ利益ヲ希テスルノヲ互補セリ

第一条

日仏条約ニ於テハ日本ノ利益ヲ求メルノヲ専有スルヲハ獨力アリ

第二条

日仏条約ニ於テハ日本ノ利益ヲ求メルノヲ専有スルヲハ獨力アリ
デプド DOCUMENT #56

日本とイギリス間の植物保護に関する条約

第1条

日本・イギリス両国は、両国間の植物保護に関する条約を締結することを決定した。

第2条

本条約は、両国間の植物保護に関する条約を定め、両国間の植物保護のための措置を講じることを目的とする。

第3条

本条約は、両国間の植物保護に関する条約を定め、両国間の植物保護のための措置を講じることを目的とする。
同盟ハ済ノ成立ニ至ルニ於テ切支那政府ニ委任スルタテ

大不列顛國卿伊等日本政府ニ委任スルノ等命全権大使

御印

イノ

加藤 明
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIMODA Takeso, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese consisting of _ pages and entitled "Third AGREEMENT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN" is an exact true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 9th day of August, 1946.

(signed) T. SHIMODA
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu ODO
Ultimatum against Germany

Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

1st. To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

2nd. To deliver on a date not later than September 16th 1914, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochau with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announces, at the same time, that, in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23, 1914 the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying an unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIMODA Takosa, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English attached hereto consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Ultimatum against Germany" is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
7th day of August, 1946

(signed) T. SHIMODA
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) T. SATO
THE IMPERIAL REScript DECLARING WAR ON GERMANY

"We, by grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon ye, our loyal and brave subjects:

"We hereby declare war on the Empire of Germany. Our Army and Navy shall do their utmost in prosecuting the war. Our public servants of all departments shall faithfully and diligently perform their appointed tasks in winning the cause of the nation at war; and all measures within the scope of the provisions of International Law shall be taken, and nothing will miscarry in the attainment of that aim.

We, entertaining fear for the evils of the present European war, have thus far constantly laid it to heart to maintain peace in the Far East. However, the actions taken by the Empire of Germany of late have at last compelled Great Britain, our ally, to cross swords with that empire. Also, in KIAOCHOW Bay, the leased territory of that empire, military preparations are daily increased, and war vessels of that empire, lurking in the seas of East Asia, threaten the commerce of our empire and our allies, and thereby the peace of the Far East is gravely menaced. Therefore, our government and the government of the Emperor of Great Britain arrived at a complete agreement to take action necessary for protecting the general interests foreseen in the Treaty of Alliance. Meantime, in order
to attain this aim, we ordered our government to make sincere representations to the government of the German Empire in the hope of taking every possible pacific measure. Our government, however, had not received a reply at the expiration of the time limit.

Not many years have elapsed since we assumed the throne, and we are still in mourning for the late Empress Dowager. It is with deepest regret that it has become necessary to declare war, as peace is what we have always cherished.

We rely upon the loyalty and courage of our subjects in confident expectation that peace will be restored as soon as possible, adding thereby new glory to our Empire.

The Imperial sign manual and seal.

August 23, 1914 (the third year of Taisho)

Count OKUMA, Shigenobu,
Prime Minister and Home Minister

Viscount ŌURA, Kanetake,
Agriculture and Commerce Minister

Baron KATO, Takaaki,
Foreign Minister

OKA, Ichinosuke,
War Minister

YASHIRO, Rokuro,
Navy Minister.
"AKATSUKI, Rojiro,
Finance Minister

ICHIKI, Kikutaro
Education Minister

OZAKI, Yukio,
Justice Minister

TAKETOMI, Tokitoshi,
Communications Minister
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H.Y. SHI, Koro, chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereeto attached is 11-56 consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Imperial Proclamation Declaring War against Germany, August 23, 1941," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo.

on this 5th day of December, 1946.

(signed) I, H.Y. SHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagahara, ODO

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charles B. Sheldon, chief of the English Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\/
Charles B. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date: 4 February 1947
一九一八、八、三日（大阪三日）
武尾一若八謂加大
富翁木現代藤浦
時行善禮六市之高長
敏雄邱彰邱邱助明武
DEF. DOC. #132

ANGLO-JAPANESE DECLARATION TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, RELATIVE TO THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT OF JULY 13TH, 1911.

Dated at Spa July 8, 1920 (9th year of Taisho). Published July 23, 1920.

The Governments of Japan and Great Britain have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of July 13th, 1911, now existing between the two countries, though in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant, which both Governments earnestly desire to respect. They accordingly have the honour jointly to inform the League that they recognise the principle that if the said Agreement be continued after July 13th 1921, it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with that Covenant.

(Signed) CHINDA.

(Signed) CURZON OF KIDLESTON.

Spa, July 8, 1920.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

T. SHIRO, Tokesa, Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Anglo-Japanese Declaration to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement Relative to the Japanese Agreement of July 13, 1911" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 9th day of August, 1946

T. SHIRO
Signature of Official

Witness: YOSHIHARA, ODO
CERTIFICATE

Statement of source and authenticity

I, Akihiko Takeo, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Japanese Declaration to the effect of Nations, relative to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of July 15th, 1911" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 5th day of August, 1943.

[Signature of Official]

Witness: [Signature of Official]
ADDITIONAL ARTICLES.

Signed at Portsmouth, September 5, 1905.
Promulgated October 16, 1905.

In conformity with the provisions of Articles 3 and 9 of the Treaty of peace between Japan and Russia of this date, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional Articles:

1. TO ARTICLES 3.

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia Mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the Treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of eighteen months from that date, the Armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula.

The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall be first withdrawn.

The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre and within that maximum number, the commanders of the Japanese and Russian Armies shall, by common accord, fix the number of such guards to be employed, as small as possible having in view the actual requirements.

The Commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in
conformity with the above principles, and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible and in any case not later than the period of eighteen months.

11. TO ARTICLES 9.

As soon as possible after the present Treaty comes into force, a Commission for Delimitation, composed of an equal number of members to be appointed respectively by the two High contracting Parties, shall on the spot, mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Sakhaline. The Commission shall be bound, so far as topographical considerations permit, to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at any points are found to be necessary, compensation will also be the duty of the said Commission to prepare a list and description of the adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the Commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the Commission shall be subject to approval of the High contracting Parties.

The foregoing additional Articles are to be considered as ratified with the ratification of the Treaty of Peace to which they are annexed.
Portsmouth, the 6th day, 8th month, 38th year of Meiji, cor-
responding the 23rd August 5th September, 1905.

(Signed) JUTARO KOMURA.
(Signed) K. TAKAHIRA.
(Signed) SUGIKO WITTP.
(Signed) ROSEN.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity.

1. HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English consisting of 3 pages and entitled "ADDITIONAL ARTICLES, Signed at Portsmouth, September 5, 1905." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo

on this 21 day of Aug. at, 1946.

(signed) HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu ODO
追 加

条 約

明治三十八年（一九○五年）九月五日「ポーツマス」ニ於テ記名

本 日汐日本国及琉西亞四國群區領地條約第三條及第九條ノ規定ニ従ヒ下ガノ

発行委員ハ左ノ追加条約ヲ締結セリ

第一 条

日本帝國政府及琉西亞四國群區領地條約ハ同時＝且テ補釈條約＝实施後＝従ヒ下ガノ

ノ地域ヨリ各該ノ軍隊ヲ撤退ヲ通告スヘキトヲ互＝約ス而シテ當

後ノ撤退ヲヨリ全然撤退スペシ

外ノ撤退ノヨリ十八箇月ノ期間内＝戦闘ノ軍隊ハ遠東及＝島租借地以

前ノ防地ヲ占領スルヲ除キ外＝於テ各ノ軍隊ヲ撤退スヘシ

於テ時＝除キ外＝於テ各ノ軍隊ヲ撤退スヘシ
第二条 九条以下に付
国締約國之於各任命スヘキ同然ノ人員ヨリ成ル境界創定委員ハ本條
約實施後成ルヘク連ニ置キハルノ如ノ場合ニ於テ
南境界ヲ永久ノ方法ヲ以テ境界線ヲ創定スヘシ
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尼於テ同様ヲヨリ信テスルノ必要ヲ認識ムルトハ他ノ地域ニ於ケル為ベタル
ノ僅クニ依リテ之ヲ調定スヘシ
該委員ハ明細書ヲ配製スルノ任ニ置ケリ且該等地域ノ
境界ヲ表示スラルトリハ附近島
地ノ表及明細書ヲ配製スルノ任ニ置ケリ且該等地域ノ
境界ヲ表示スラルトリハ附近島

- 2 -
CONVENTION.


(Translation.)

The Governments of Japan and Corea, desiring to strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have with that object in view agreed upon and concluded the following stipulations to serve until the moment arrives when it is recognized that Corea has attained national strength:

Article I.

The Government of Japan, through the Department of Foreign Affairs at Tokyo, will henceforth have control and direction of the external relations and interests of Corea, and the diplomatic and consular representatives of Japan will have the charge of the subjects and interests of Corea in foreign countries.

Article II.

The Government of Japan undertaking to see to the execution of the treaty actually entered into between Japan and other Powers, and the Government of Corea being not to engage henceforth in any act or engagement having an international character except through the authority of the Government of Japan.

Article III.

The Government of Japan shall be represented at the Court of the King of Corea by a Resident General, who shall reside at Seoul, having as his principal and exclusive charge of and directing matters relating to Corea. He shall have the right of private and personal intercourse with His Majesty the King of Corea. The Japanese Government shall also have the right to station representatives at the principal seaports and other places of Corea as may be necessary. Such representatives shall, after thelin of the Corean General, execute the powers of the other diplomatic agents in Corea and shall perform such duties as may be required in order to carry into full effect the provisions of this Agreement.
Article IV.

The stipulations of all Treaties and Agreements existing between Japan and Korea, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, shall continue in force.

Article V.

The Government of Japan undertake to maintain the welfare and dignity of the Japanese Races in Korea.

In faith whereof, the undersigned duly authorized by their Government and affixed their seals.

HAVASHI GoShiKo, (Seal)
Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary.
The 17th day of the 11th month of the 36th year of Rei-Chu.

PAK CH’E-SOON, (Seal)
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.
The 17th day of the 11th month of the 9th year of Kwang-Mu.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of source and authenticity

I, H. Yashii, Kaoru, Chief of the archive section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Convention (Signed at Seoul, November 17, 1945)" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this ___ day of December, 1945.

Signature of Official

Witness: [Signature]
日本国政府

明治三十八年十一月十七日

日

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CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, A. Kyo, Chief of the Archives Section,
Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document
encoded attached in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and
entitled "Convention (Joined by China, November 17, 1903)",
is an exact and true copy of an official document of the
Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 11th day of December 1903.

[Signature]

WITNESS: [Signature]

[Official]
DECLARATIONS AS TO THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA TO THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN.

Published August 29, 1910 (43rd year of 元治).

DECLARATION TO GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BELGIUM, CHINA, DENMARK, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY AND RUSSIA, WHICH HAVE HAD TREATIES WITH KOREA OR HAVE BEEN EnjoyING THE MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT IN KOREA.

Notwithstanding the earnest and laborious work of reforms in the administration of Korea, in which the Governments of Japan and Korea have been engaged for more than four years since the conclusion of the Agreement of 1905, the existing system of government in that country has not proved entirely equal to the duty of preserving public order and tranquillity, and in addition a spirit of suspicion and misgiving dominates the whole Peninsula. In order to maintain peace and stability in Korea, to promote the prosperity and welfare of Koreans, and at the same time to ensure the safety and repose of foreign residents, it has been made abundantly clear that fundamental changes in the actual regime of government are absolutely essential.

The Governments of Japan and Korea, being convinced of the urgent necessity of introducing reforms responsive to the requirements of the situation, and of furnishing sufficient guarantees for the future, have, with the approval of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of Korea, concluded, through Their respective Plenipotentiaries, a Treaty providing for the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan.
By virtue of that important Act which shall take effect on its promulgation on the 29th August the Imperial Government of Japan undertake the entire government and administration of Korea, and they hereby declare that the matters relating to foreigners and foreign trade in Korea shall be conducted in accordance with the following rules:

(1) The Treaties hitherto concluded by Korea with foreign Powers ceasing to be operative, Japan's existing Treaties will, so far as practicable, be applied to Korea.

Foreigners resident in Korea, if so far as conditions permit, enjoy the same rights and immunities as in Japan proper, and the protection of their legally acquired rights, subject in all cases to the jurisdiction of Japan.

The Imperial Government of Japan is ready to consent that the jurisdiction in respect of cases actually pending in any foreign Consular Courts in Korea at the time the Treaty of Annexation takes effect shall remain in such Courts until final decision.

(2) Independently of any conventional engagements formerly existing on the subject, the Imperial Government of Japan will, for a period of ten years, levy upon goods imported into Korea from foreign countries or exported from Korea to foreign countries, and upon foreign vessels entering any of the open ports of Korea, the same import or export duties and the same tonnage dues as under the existing schedules.

The same import or export duties and tonnage dues as those to be levied upon the aforesaid goods and vessels will also, for a period of ten years, be applied in respect of goods imported...
into Korea from Japan or exported from Korea to Japan, and Japanese vessels entering any of the open ports of Korea.

(3) The Imperial Government of Japan will also permit, for a period of ten years, vessels under the flags of Powers having Treaties with Japan, to engage in the coast trade between the open ports of Korea and any open ports of Japan.

(4) The existing open ports of Korea, with the exception of Masampo, will be continued as open ports and, in addition, Shinjuku will be newly opened, so that vessels, foreign as well as Japanese, will then be admitted and goods may be imported into and exported from those ports.

DECLARATION TO ARGENTINE, BRAZIL, CHILE; COLOMBIA, SPAIN, GREECE, MEXICO, NORWAY, THE NETHERLANDS, PERU PORTUGAL, SIAM, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND.

By virtue of a Treaty concluded between Japan and Korea, dated the 22nd August, 1910, Korea has been annexed to Japan and from this date forms an integral part of the Empire of Japan.

Japan's existing Treaties will, so far as practicable, be applied to Korea, and the subjects and citizens of the powers having such existing Treaties will, so far as conditions permit, enjoy in Korea the same rights and immunities as in Japan proper.
Certification

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, [Name], [Title] of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office,
hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Declaration as to the Annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 1st day of December, 1940.

[Signature of Official]

Witness: [Name]
明治二十八年四月二十八日観光議会第一回議決

(10)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of source and authenticity

I, 

JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE, hereby certify that the document

hereto attached in JAPANESE consisting of _4_ pages and

entitled "Declaration as to the annexation of Korea to the

advise of Japan"

is an exact and true copy of an official document of the

Japanese foreign office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 11th day of December, 1946.


witness: Nakaharu Udo

Signature of Official
TREATY REGARDING THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA TO THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN.

Signed at Seoul, August 22, 1910 (43rd year of Meiji).
Promulgated August 26, 1910.

(Translation)

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of Korea, having in view the special and close relations between Their respective countries, desiring to promote the common weal of the two nations and to assure permanent peace in the Far East, and being convinced that these objects can be best attained by the annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of such annexation, and have for that purpose appointed as Their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Viscount Yasakata Terauchi, His Resident-General,

and His Majesty the Emperor of Korea, Ye Wan Yong, His Minister President of State,

who, upon mutual conference and deliberation, have agreed to the following Articles.

Article I.

His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes complete and permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea.

Article II.
Article VII.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding Article, and consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan.

Article VII.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will accord to Their Majesties the Emperor and ex-Emperor and His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince of Korea and Their Consorts and Heirs such titles, dignity and honour as are appropriate to their respective ranks, and sufficient annual grants will be made for the maintenance of such titles, dignity and honour.

Article IV.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will also accord appropriate honour and treatment to the members of the Imperial House of Korea and their heirs, other than those mentioned in the preceding Article, and the funds necessary for the maintenance of such honour and treatment will be granted.

Article V.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will confer peerages and monetary grants upon those Koreans who, on account of meritorious services, are regarded as deserving such special recognition.
Article VI.

In consequence of the aforesaid annexation, the Government of Japan assume the entire government and administration of Korea and undertake to afford full protection for the persons and property of Koreans obeying the laws there in force, and to promote the welfare of all such Koreans.

Article VII.

The Government of Japan will, so far as circumstances permit, employ in the public service of Japan in Korea those Koreans who accept the new regime loyally and in good faith and who are duly qualified for such service.

Article VIII.

This Treaty, having been approved by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of Korea, shall take effect from the date of its promulgation.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.
Viscount Yasakata Toranoki,
President-General.

The 22nd day of the 6th month of the 4th year of Yung-hui.

YF YANG,
Minister President of State.

The 22nd day of the 6th month of the 4th year of Yung-hui.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHINODA Takeso, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English hereto attached consisting of 4 pages and entitled "TREATY REGARDING ANNEXATION OF KOREA TO THE LEPIRE OF JAPAN" is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of August, 1946.

(Signed) T. Shinoda
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Moroharu Oda
名称

件名：【電気設備の保守サービス契約案】

内容：

当社は既に貴社の電気設備の保守サービスを提供しており、今後もその補償として以下のような案を提示させていただきます。

1. サービス内容
   - 保守作業の実施
   - 異常発生時の迅速対応
   - 保守定期点検

2. 保守料金
   - 月次：30,000円+
   - 年間：360,000円+

3. 保守期間
   - 1年間

以上のような内容で、貴社のご検討のほどよろしくお願い申し上げます。

[署名]

[日付]
The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to obviate for the future all causes of friction or misunderstanding with respect to certain questions relating to Manchuria, Korea, and Mongolia, have agreed upon the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

Having in view the natural gravitation of interests and of political and economic activity in Manchuria, and desiring to avoid all complications which might arise from competition, Japan and Russia not to seek to obtain on its own account, or for the benefit of Japanese or other subjects, any concession in the way of railways or telegraphs in Manchuria to the north of a line defined in the Additional Article of the present Convention, and not to obstruct, either directly or indirectly, any initiatives supported by the Russian Government with a view to concessions of that sort in those regions; and Russia, on its part, inspired by the same pacific motive, undertakes not to seek to obtain on its own account, or for the benefit of Russian or other subjects, any concession in the way of railways or telegraphs in Manchuria to the south of the above-mentioned line, and not to obstruct, either directly or indirectly, any initiatives supported by the Japanese Government with a view to concessions of
that sort in those regions.

It is fully understood that all the rights and privileges belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company by virtue of the contracts for the construction of this railway, dated August 16/28, 1896, and June 13/25, 1897, "will remain in force on the section of the railway lying to the south of the line of demarcation defined in the Additional Article.

ARTICLE II

Russia, recognizing the relations of political solidarity between Japan and Korea resulting from the conventions and arrangements present in force between them, copies of which have been communicated to the Russian Government by the Japanese Government, undertakes not to interfere with nor to place any obstacle in the way of the further development of those relations; and Japan, on its part, undertakes to extend in all respects most-favored-nation treatment to the Russian Government, consular officers, subjects, commerce, industry and navigation in Korea, rendering the conclusion of a definitive treaty.

ARTICLE III

The Imperial Government of Japan, recognizing the special interests of Russia in Outer Mongolia, undertakes to refrain from any interference which might prejudice those interests.
ARTICLE V

The present Convention shall be strictly confidential between the two High Contracting Parties.

In faith of which, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at St. Petersburg July 17/30, 1907, corresponding to the thirtieth day of the seventh month of the fortieth year of Meiji.

(Signed) TSK OLDSKY
(SEAL)

(Signed) MOTOHO
(SEAL)

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE

The line of demarcation between North Manchuria and South Manchuria mentioned in Article I of the present Convention is established as follows:

Starting from the northeastern point of the Russo-Korean frontier, and forming a succession of straight lines, the line runs, by way of Hunchun and the northern extremity of Lake Firtak, to Shushichan; thence it follows the Songari to the mouth of the Hunkiang, thence ascending the course of that river to the confluence of the Tola River. From that point, the line follows the course of that river to its intersection with Meridian 122° East of Greenwich.

(Signed) TSK OLDSKY
(SEAL)

(Signed) MOTOHO
(SEAL)
TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT IN REGARD TO OUTER MONGOLIA BETWEEN RUSSIA, MONGOLIA AND CHINA.

Signed at Pechora, June 7, 1915.

The President of the Republic of China,

His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russians,

and

His Holiness the Boydo (Great) Cheptaun (Venerable) Derbe (Reincarnated) Men (Soul) of Outer Mongolia,

moved by a sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement various questions created by a new state of things in Outer Mongolia, have named for that purpose their Plenipotentiary Delegates, that is to say:

The President of the Republic of China, General Yi Musifen, and

Monsieur Ch'an Lu, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China to Mexico;

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, His Councillor of State Alexandre Miller, Diplomatic Agent and Consul General in Mongolia; and

His Holiness the Boydo Cheptaun Derbe Put'ukht'u Men of Outer Mongolia, 워허-치-ni 伤-nyang -di-tzu So-long-ten, Vice-Chief of Justice, and み-wüsicht'-u Ch'un Yen Ch'io-t'o-shi-che-pu, Chief of Finance,

who having verified their respective full powers found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1. - Outer Mongolia recognizes the Sino-Russian Convention and the notes exchanged between China and Russia of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (29 October 1913).
ARTICLE II - Outer Mongolia recognizes China's supremacy. China and Russia recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia forming part of Chinese territory.

ARTICLE III - Autonomous Mongolia has no right to conclude international treaties with foreign powers respecting political and territorial questions.

As respects questions of a political and territorial nature in Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government engages to conform to Article II of the Note exchanged between China and Russia on the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China. (23rd October 1913).

ARTICLE IV. - The title: "Nogdo Cheptsun Pemba Putukhtu Khan of Outer Mongolia" is conferred by the President of the Republic of China. The calendar of the Republic as well as the Mongol calendar of cyclical signs are to be used in official documents.

ARTICLE V. - China and Russia, conformably to Article II and III of the Sino-Russian Declaration of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (23rd October 1913), recognize the exclusive right of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia to attend to all the effs of its internal administration and to conclude with foreign powers international treaties and agreements respecting all questions of commercial and industrial nature concerning autonomous Mongolia.

ARTICLE VI. - Conformably to the same Article III of the Declaration, China and Russia engage not to interfere in the system of autonomous internal administration existing in Outer Mongolia.

ARTICLE VII. - The military escort of the Chinese Diplomate at Urga provided for by Article III of the above-mentioned Declaration is not to exceed two hundred men. The military escorts of his Assistants at
Ulissutri, et Mondi, and at Mongolia-Khute are not to exceed fifty men each. If, by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, Assistants of the Chinese Dignitary are appointed in other localities of Outer Mongolia, their military escorts are not to exceed fifty men each.

**ARTICLE VIII.** - The Imperial Government of Russia is not to send more than one hundred and fifty men as consular guard for its representative at Urga. The military escorts of the Imperial consulate and viceconsulates of Russia, which have already been established or which may be established by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, are not to exceed fifty men each.

**ARTICLE IX.** - On all ceremonial or official occasions the first place of honor is due to the Chinese Dignitary. He has the right, if necessary, to present himself in private audience with His Excellency Mogdo Chiptreun Denbi Mut'uch'ut' of Outer Mongolia.

The Imperial representative of Russia enjoys the same right of private audience.

**ARTICLE X.** - The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants in the different localities of Outer Mongolia provided for by Article VII of this agreement are to exercise general control lest the acts of the autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia and its subordinate authorities may impair the suzerainty right and the interests of China and her subjects in Autonomous Mongolia.

**ARTICLE XI.** - Conformably to Article IV of the Notes exchanged between China and Russia on the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd Year of the Republic of China (23rd October 1913), the territory of the autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the region which were under the jurisdiction
of the Chinese, when at Urga, of the Post-General at Urga, and
of the Chinese when at Urga, and connects with the boundary of China
by the limits of the branch of the four rivers of the west end of the
district of Urga, bound by the district of Poulounbour (i.e., Wolker)
on the west, by Inner Mongolia on the south, by the Province of Sinkiang
on the south-west, and by the district of Altai on the west.

The formal delimitation between China and autonomous Mongolia is to be
established by a special commission of delegations of China, Russia, and
autonomous Outer Mongolia, which shall act itself to the work of delimitation
within a period of two years from the date of signature of the
present Agreement.

ARTICLE XII. It is understood that customs duties are not to be
established for goods of foreign origin they may be imported by Chinese
merchants into autonomous Outer Mongolia. Nevertheless, Chinese merchants
shall pay all the taxes on internal trade which have been established in
autonomous Outer Mongolia and which may be established therein in the
future, payable by the Mongols of autonomous Outer Mongolia. Similarly
the merchants of autonomous Outer Mongolia when importing any kind of
goods of local production into Inner China, shall pay all the taxes on
trade which have been established in Inner China and which may be
established therein in the future, payable by Chinese merchants. Goods of
foreign origin imported from autonomous Outer Mongolia into Inner China
shall be subject to the customs duties stipulated in the regulations for
land trade of the 7th year of the Reign of Kung-hui (1911).

ARTICLE XIII. Civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese subjects
residing in autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be examined and adjudicated
by the Chinese Diplomatic at Urga and by his assistants in the other.
ARTICLE XIV. — Civil and criminal actions arising between Mongols of autonomous Outer Mongolia and Chinese subjects residing therein are to be examined and adjudicated conjointly by the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants in the other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia, or their delegates, and the Mongolian authorities. If the defendant or the accused is a Chinese subject and the complainant or the complainant is a Mongol of autonomous Outer Mongolia, the joint examination and decision of the case are to be held at the Chinese Dignitary's place at Urga and at that of his assistant in the other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia; if the defendant or the accused is a Mongol of autonomous Outer Mongolia and the complainant or the complainant is a Chinese subject, the case is to be examined and decided in the same manner in the Mongolian year. The guilty are to be punished according to their own laws. The interested parties are free to arrange their disputes amicably means of arbiters chosen by themselves.

ARTICLE XV. — Civil and criminal actions arising between Mongols of autonomous Outer Mongolia and Russian subjects residing therein are to be examined and decided conformably to the stipulations of Article XVI of the Russo-Mongolian Commercial Protocol of 21st October 1912.

ARTICLE XVI. — Civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese and Russian subject in autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be examined and decided in the following manner: in an action wherein the plaintiff or the complainant is a Russian subject and the defendant or the accused is a Chinese subject, the Russian Consul personally or through his delegate participates in the judicial trial, enjoying the same rights as the Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his delegate or his assistant in the other localities.
of Autonomous Outer Mongolia. The Russian Consul or his delegate proceeds to the hearing of the witness and the Russian witness in the court in session, and interrogates the defendant and the Chinese witness through the medium of the Chinese Dignitary at Urg, or his delegate, or his assistant in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia; the Russian Consul or his delegate or of his assistant in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia; the Russian Consul or his delegate examine the witness presented, create security for 'evidences' and his resources to the opinion of experts, if he considers such expert opinion necessary for the elucidation of the rights of the parties, etc.; he takes part in deciding and in the drafting of the judgment, which he sign, with the Chinese Dignitary at Urg, or his delegate, or his assistant in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia. The execution of the judgment constitutes a duty of the Chinese authorities. The Chinese Dignitary at Urg and his assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia may likewise personally or through their delegates be present at the hearing of a section in the Consulate of Russia wherein the defendant or the accused is a Russian subject and the client or the complainant is a Chinese subject. The execution of the judgment constitutes a duty of the Russian authorities.

ARTICLE XVII. - Since a section of the Nancha-Urga Relten telegraph line lies in the territory of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, it is agreed that the said section of the said telegraph line constitutes the complete property of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia.

The Articles respecting the establishment of the borders of that country and Inner Mongolia of a station to be administered by Chinese and Mongolian employees for the transmission of telegrams, as well as the
questions of the tariff for telegrams transmitted and of the apportionment of the receipts, etc., or to be examined and settled by a special commission of the Chinese delegation of China, Purnia, and autonomous Outer Mongolia.

ARTICLE XVIII - The Chinese postal institutions at Urga and Mongolian-Norther remain in force on the old basis.

ARTICLE XIX - The autonomous government of Outer Mongolia will place at the disposal of the Chinese Post office at Urga and of his representatives at Merretui, Khabdo and Mongolian-Norther as well as of their staff the necessary housing, which shall constitute the complete property of the Government of the Republic of China. Similarly necessary grounds in the vicinity of the residence of the said staff are to be granted for their service purposes.

ARTICLE XX - The Chinese Post office at Urga and his representatives in the other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia and also their staff are to enjoy the right to use the courier stations of the autonomous Mongolia. Government conformably to the stipulation of Article 1 of the Puno-Mongolian Protocol of 21 October 1913.

ARTICLE XXI - The stipulations of the Sino-Punjon delegation and the Notes exchanged between China and Purnia of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (23 October 1913) as well as those of the Puno-Mongolian Commercial Protocol of the 21 October 1912, Purnia in full force.

ARTICLE XXII - The present agreement drawn up in triplicate in Chinese, Puno-Mongolian and French comes into force from the day of its signature.

Of the four texts which have been duly compared and found to agree, the French text shall be authoritative in the interpretation of the present
Agreement.

Done at Peking the 7th day of the Sixth Month of the Fourth Year of the Republic of China corresponding to the Twenty-sixth of June (seventy of June), One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifteen.

VI.Oct., Vol 25/June 7, 1915

The undersigned Delegate Plenipotentiary of our late to the tripartite negotiations at Peking has the honor to acknowledge to their Excellencies Mr. Nuri-Khang and Chien Ju, Delegate Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to the tripartite negotiations at Peking, the receipt of the following note of this date.

The undersigned Delegate Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to the tripartite negotiations at Peking, duly authorized for this purpose, have the honor, on proceeding to sign the tripartite agreement of this date relating to "Autonomous Outer Mongolia", to declare in the name of their Government to His Excellency, Mr. Nuri, Imperial Delegate Plenipotentiary of our late to the tripartite negotiations at Peking, as follows: From the day of signature of the present Sino-Fusso-Mongolian agreement the Government of the Republic of China grants a full remedy to all the Mongols who submitted to the "Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia"; it leaves to all the Mongols of Outer Mongolia or of Inner Mongolia the freedom before of residence and travel in the said regions. The Government of the Republic of China will not place any restraint upon Mongols going in pilgrimage to Urga to testify their veneration to His Holiness Bogdo Chojeur Nahe Put'ughtin Urga of Outer Mongolia.

The undersigned seize this occasion to renew to the Delegate Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China the assurance of his very high esteem.

- 8 -
The undersigned Imperial Delegate Plenipotentiary of Russia to the
tripartite negotiations at Kirchir duly authorized for this purpose, her
the honor, on proceeding to sign the tripartite agreement of this day's
date relating to Autonomous Outer Mongolia, to declare in the name of his
Government to Their Excellencies Messrs. Mi Kui-Fen and Chien-Lu,
Delegate Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to the tripartite
negotiations at Kirchir as follows:

It is agreed that all the telegraph offices which are situated along the
section of the Kolya-Ung-Kirchir line which lies within Outer Mongolia
and of which mention is made in Article XVII of the agreement of Kirchir,
are to be handed over by the Chinese officials to the Mongolian officials
within a period of at most six months after the signing of the agreement;
and that the point of junction of the Chinese and Mongolian lines is to be
fixed by the Technical Commission provided for in the aforesaid article.

The above is at the same time brought to the knowledge of the Delegate
Plenipotentiary of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia.

- 9 -
To
Mr. General Pi Mudi Feng,
and
Ch'en Lu,
Chinese Delegator Plenipotentiary.

( A note of identical tenor was simultaneously addressed to the
Mongolian delegate; and replies embodying the same declaration were
addressed by both Chinese and Mongolian delegates to the Russian delegate
under the same date. )
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

Y. K. T., Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 10 pages and entitled "Tripartite Agreement in regard to Outer Mongolia between Russia, China and Japan" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on the 24th day of December, 1946.

[Signature]

H. Nomura
Signature of Official

Witness: T. S. To
外務省電電案二年十一月三日（九月十三年十月三十三日）附寄支官書

外務部告布野造部長

自明政治上改正上

外務部告布野造部長

十一月三日（九月十三年十月三十三日）

公文図二條乙控於支官書

外務部告布野造部長

十一月三日（九月十三年十月三十三日）

公文図二條乙控於支官書

外務部告布野造部長

十一月三日（九月十三年十月三十三日）

公文図二條乙控於支官書
第十一條

昭和二年十一月五日（一千九百十三年十月二十五日）前支部団及前支部団

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交換公文

下記喜平間三国協商支部会議決定を報告以下の事項に附

1. 金帳代表・長物芳樹下及興業閣下より本日附記書類類以

敬具

下記喜平間三国協商支部会議決定を報告以下の事項に附

1. 金帳代表・長物芳樹下及興業閣下より本日附記書類類以

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千九百十五年五月二十五日（六月七日）

アーマルレル

署名
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HIROSHI, Chief of the Intelligence Section
Japanez Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached is genuine, consisting of
1 page and entitled "Primer. The event in
record to enter into-Line between Russia, Mongolia and
China," is an exact and true copy of an official
translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.
Certified at Tokyo,
on this 21st day of December, 1946.

[Signature]

Witness: [Signature]
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERATION SOVIET REPUBLIC AND THE POPULAR GOVERNMENT OF MONGOLIA ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND MONGOLIA.

Signed at Moscow, November 5, 1921.
In force from November 5, 1921.

"Whereas all former treaties and agreements concluded between the Tsarist Government of Russia and the former Autonomous Government of Mongolia compelled thereto by the insidious and encroaching policy of the above mentioned Government of Russia, have as a result of the new situation created in both countries lost their validity, now therefore the Popular Government of Mongolia on the one part, and the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic on the other part, moved by sincere aspirations towards free friendship and collaboration between the two neighbouring peoples, have with this aim resolved to enter into negotiations and for that purpose appointed their plenipotentiaries:
The Popular Government of Mongolia:

Danzan,
Juhe-Bator,
Tseren-Dorchi,
Erdeni-Chonon, Van-Shirnin, Dandin.

and the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic:
Sergei Ivanovich Duhovskii,
Boris Filtsovich Getz;
who, after exchanging their full powers recognized to be
drawn up in proper form and due order, have agreed as under:

Article 1.

The Government of the Russian Socialistic Federative
Soviet Republic recognizes the Popular Government of Mongolia
as the sole lawful Government of Mongolia.

Article 2.

The Popular Government of Mongolia recognizes the Govern-
ment of the Russian Socialistic Federative Soviet Republic
as the sole lawful authority of Russia.

Article 3.

The two contracting parties mutually bind themselves:

1. Not to allow on their territory the formation or
residence of governments, organizations, groups or individual
persons aiming at struggling against the other party or over-
throwing its government or governments of its allied states,
neither to allow on their territory the mobilization or free
recruiting, either of its own citizens or citizens of other
states, into an army hostile to the other party.
2. To forbid and to take all measures for preventing, the importation into points within each one's territory and into territories of states in alliance with them, or the transportation through such territories, of arms belonging to or destined for any organization directly or indirectly struggling against one of the parties and likely to be used for such struggle.

Article 4.

The Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic sends its Plenipotentiary Representativa to the Capital of Mongolia and its Consuls to the cities, Koko, Uliassutai and Altan-Balak (Amchikin), as well as others by agreement with the Popular Government of Mongolia.

Article 5.

The Popular Government of Mongolia sends its Plenipotentiary Representative to the Capital of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, as well as its consuls to the frontier districts of Russian by agreement with the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

Article 6.

The state boundary between Russia and Mongolia
is to be determined by a special Commission to be appointed by special agreement between the Government of the Russian Socialistic Federative Soviet Republic and the Popular Government of Mongolia, such agreement to be concluded within the nearest possible future.

Article 7.

The citizens of each of the Contracting Parties, residing on the territory of the other party, enjoy the same rights and are subject to the same duties as the resident citizens of the most favoured country.

Article 8.

The judicial authority of each of the Contracting Parties shall extend, in civil as well as in criminal matters, over the citizens of the other Contracting Party residing in its territory, and the Parties, guided by the high principles of civilization and humanity, renounce the application by their judicial, inquiring and other organs of any punitive or inquiring measures causing physical pain or degrading moral human state.

Both Parties, at the same time, recognize that in case one of the Parties should grant to the citizens of any third state special privileges and advantages in the domain of criminal jurisdiction, judicial procedure or execution of judicial decisions, such privileges and advantages shall automatically extend to the citizens of the other Contracting Party as well.
Citizens of both contracting Parties, when importing into or exporting from the limits of the other country goods destined for trade, pay such duties as established by the laws of the country, such duties being not to exceed, however, similar duties levied on the import and export of similar goods from citizens of the most favoured country.

The Russian Soviet Government going to meet the wise measures of the Popular Government of Mongolia in the matter of organizing a postal and telegraphic exchange independent from encroaching tendencies of world imperialism so necessary for the cultural development of the labouring masses of Mongolia, gratuitously hands over into full ownership of the Mongolian people the buildings of telegraph offices with telegraphic equipment therein contained belonging to the Russian Republic and situated within the limits of Mongolia.

In consideration of the paramount importance of regulating the questions of postal and telegraphic relations between Russia and Mongolia, as well as transmission of telegraphic correspondence in transit through Mongolia, with the aim of strengthening the cultural and economic mutual relations springing up between the peoples of both countries, the Parties agree that there will be concluded on this subject a special agreement within
the soonest possible time.

**Article 12.**

The Popular Government of Mongolia declares to recognise in regard to Russian citizens owning lands or buildings in Mongolia, the same rights of ownership, lease and occupation of lots for buildings, and to apply the same means of collecting taxes, rents and other payments, as are recognized and applied, or shall be recognized and applied in regard to the citizens of the most favoured state.

**Article 13.**

The present agreement, made in two copies in the Russian and the Mongolian languages, enters into force from the moment of its signature.

Made in Moscow the 5th November, 1921, according to the European calendar, and by the Mongolian calendar on the 6th day of the tenth moon of the eleventh year of the Uplifted by Multitudes.

Original signed by:
S. DUHOVSKII.
BORIS GETZ.
DANZAM.
SUNE-PATOR.
TSEREP-DORCHI.
ERDENI-ChONON, VAN-SPINNIN, DAMDIN.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

1, JAYE I, Yeex, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Agreement between the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and the People's Government of Mongolia on the establishment of friendly relations between Russia and Mongolia," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 21st day of December, 1946.

(signed) E. [illegible]
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) T. SATO
第三

一

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ヲスル
AN ACT TO limit the immigration of aliens into the United States, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this act may be cited as the "Immigration Act of 1924." (Sec. 201)

IMMIGRATION VISAS

SEC. 2 (a) A consular officer upon the application of any immigrant (as defined in section 5) may, under the conditions hereinafter prescribed and subject to the limitations prescribed in this act or regulations made thereunder as to the number of immigration visas which may be issued by such officer, issue to such immigrant an immigration visa which shall consist of one copy of the application provided for in section 7, vised by such consular officer. Such visa shall specify (1) the nationality of the immigrant; (2) whether he is a quota immigrant (as defined in section 5) or a non-quota immigrant (as defined in section 4); (3) the date on which the validity of the immigration visa shall expire; and (4) such additional information necessary to the proper enforcement of the immigration law and the naturalization laws as may be by regulations prescribed.

(b) The immigrant shall furnish two copies of his photograph to the consular officer. One copy shall be permanently attached by the consular officer to the immigration visa and the other copy shall be disposed of as may be by regulations prescribed.

(c) The validity of an immigration visa shall expire at the end of such period, specified in the immigration visa, not exceeding four months, as shall be by regulations prescribed. In the case of an immigrant arriving in the United States by water, or arriving by water in foreign contiguous territory on a continuous voyage to the United States, if the vessel, before the expiration of the validity of his immigration visa, departed from the last port outside the United States and outside foreign contiguous territory at which the immigrant embarked, and if the immigrant proceeds on a continuous voyage to the United States, then, regardless of the time of his arrival in the United States the validity of his immigration visa shall not be considered to have expired.

(d) If an immigrant is required by any law, or regulation or orders made pursuant to law, to secure the visa of his pass-
port by a consular officer before being permitted to enter the United States, such immigrant shall not be required to secure any other visa of his passport than the immigration visa issued under this act; but a record of the number and date of his immigration visa shall be noted on his passport without charge therefor. This subdivision shall not apply to an immigrant who is relieved, under subdivision (b) of section 13, from obtaining an immigration visa.

(e) The manifest or list of passengers required by the immigration laws shall contain a place for entering therein the date, place of issuance, and number of the immigration visa of each immigrant. The immigrant shall surrender his immigration visa to the immigration officer at the port of inspection, who shall at the time of inspection insert in the immigration visa the date, the port of entry, and the name of the vessel, if any, on which the immigrant arrived. The immigration visa shall be transmitted forthwith by the immigration officer in charge at the port of inspection to the department of labor under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor.

(f) No immigration visa shall be issued to an immigrant if it appears to the consular officer, from statements in the application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that the immigrant is inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws, nor shall such immigration visa be issued if the application fails to comply with the provisions of this act, nor shall such immigration visa be issued if the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that the immigrant is inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws.

(g) Nothing in this act shall be construed to entitle an immigrant, to whom an immigration visa has been issued, to enter the United States, if, upon arrival in the United States, he is found to be inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws. The substance of this subdivision shall be printed conspicuously upon every immigration visa.

(h) A fee of 9 shall be charged for the issuance of each immigration visa, which shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

(See 202.)

DEFINITION OF "IMMIGRANT"

Sec. 2. When used in this act the term "immigrant" means
any alien departing from any place outside the United States destined for the United States, except (1) a Government official, his family, attendants, servants, and employees, (2) an alien visiting the United States temporarily as a tourist or temporarily for business or pleasure, (3) an alien in continuous transit through the United States, (4) an alien lawfully admitted to the United States who later goes in transit from one part of the United States to another through foreign contiguous territory, (5) a bona fide alien seaman serving as such on a vessel arriving at a port of the United States and seeking to enter temporarily the United States solely in the pursuit of his calling as a seaman, and (6) an alien entitled to enter the United States solely to carry on trade under and in pursuance of the provisions of a present existing treaty of commerce and navigation.

(Sec. 205.)

NON-QUOTA IMMIGRANTS

SBC. 4. (as amended by sections 1 and 2 of joint resolution approved May 23, 1928, 45 Stat. 1009). When used in this act the term "non-quota immigrant" means -

(a) An immigrant who is the unmarried child under twenty-one years of age, or the wife, of a citizen of the United States, or the husband of a citizen of the United States by a marriage occurring prior to June 1, 1928;

(b) An immigrant previously lawfully admitted to the United States who is returning from a temporary visit abroad;

(c) An immigrant who was born in the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Republic of Mexico, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent country of Central or South America, and his wife, and his unmarried children under eighteen years of age, if accompanying or following to join him;

(d) An immigrant who continuously for at least two years immediately preceding the time of his application for admission to the United States has been, and who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose of, carrying on the vocation of minister of any religious denomination, or professor of a college, academy, seminary, or university, and his wife, and his unmarried children under eighteen years of age, if accompanying or following to join him;

(e) An immigrant who is a bona fide student at least fifteen years of age who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose of study at an accredited school, college, academy, seminary, or university, particularly designated by
him and approved by the Secretary of Labor, which shall have agreed to report to the Secretary of Labor the termination of attendance of each immigrant student, and if any such institution of learning fails to make such reports promptly the approval shall be withdrawn; or

(f) A woman who was a citizen of the United States and who prior to September 2, 1921, lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien, but at the time of application for an immigration visa is unmarried.

(Sec. 204.)

**QUOTA IMMIGRANTS**

S.C. 5. When used in this act the term "quota immigrant" means any immigrant who is not a non-quota immigrant, an alien who is not particularly specified in this act as a non-quota immigrant or a nonimmigrant shall not be admitted as a non-quota immigrant or a nonimmigrant by reason of relationship to any individual who is so specified or by reason of being excepted from the operation of any other act regulating or forbidding immigration.

(Sec. 205.)

**PREFERENCES WITHIN QUOTAS**

S.C. 6, (as amended by section 3 of joint resolution, approved May 29, 1928; 45 Stat.: 1009; this section became effective on July 1, 1928).

(a) Immigration visas to quota immigrants shall be issued in each fiscal year as follows:

(1) Fifty per centum of the quota of each nationality for such year shall be made available in such year for the issuance of immigration visas to the following classes of immigrants, without priority of preference as between such classes: (a) Quota immigrants who are the fathers or the mothers, or the husbands by marriage occurring after May 21, 1928, of citizens of the United States who are twenty-one years of age or over; and (b) in the case of any nationality the quota for which is three hundred or more, quota immigrants who are skilled in agriculture, and the wives, and the dependent children under the age of eighteen years, of such immigrants skilled in agriculture, if accompanying or following to join them.

(2) The remainder of the quota of each nationality for such year, plus any portion of the 50 per centum referred to in paragraph (1) not required in such year for the issuance of immi-

- 4 -
migration visas to the classes specified in such paragraph, shall be made available in such year for the issuance of immigration visas to quota immigrants of such nationality who are the unmarried children under twenty-one years of age, or the wives of alien residents of the United States who were lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.

(3) Any portion of the quota of such nationality for such year not required for the issuance of immigration visas to the classes specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be made available in such year for the issuance of immigration visas to other quota immigrants of such nationality.

(b) The preference provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) shall, in the case of quota immigrants of any nationality, be given in the calendar month in which the right to preference is established, if the number of immigration visas which may be issued in such month to quota immigrants of such nationality has not already been issued; otherwise, in the next calendar month.

(Sec. 206.)

APPLICATION FOR IMMIGRATION VISA

Sec. 7. (a) Every immigrant applying for an immigration visa shall make application therefor in duplicate in such form as shall be by regulations prescribed.

(b) In the application the immigrant shall state (1) the immigrant's full and true name; age, sex, and race; the date and place of birth; places of residence for the five years immediately preceding his application; whether he is single, and the names and places of residence of wife or husband and minor children, if any; calling or occupation; personal description (including height, complexion, color of hair and eyes, and marks of identification); ability to speak, read, and write; names and addresses of parents, and if neither parent living, then the name and address of his nearest relative in the country from which he comes; port of entry into the United States; final destination, if any, beyond the port of entry; whether he has a ticket through to such final destination; whether going to join a relative or friend, and, if so what relative or friend and his name and complete address; the purposes for which he is going to the United States; the length of time he intends to remain in the United States; whether ever in prison or almshouse; whether he or either of his parents has ever been in an institution or hospital for the care and treatment of the insane; (2) if he claims to be a non-quota immigrant, the facts on which he bases such claim; and (3) such additional information necessary to the proper enforcement of the immigration laws and the naturalization laws, as may be by regulations prescribed.
(c) The immigrant shall furnish, if available, to the consular officer, with his application, two copies of his "dossier" and prison record and military record, two certified copies of his birth certificate and two copies of all other available public records concerning him kept by the government to which he owes allegiance. One copy of the documents so furnished shall be permanently attached to each copy of the application and become a part thereof. An immigrant having an unexpired permit issued under the provisions of section 10 shall not be subject to this subdivision. In the case of an application made before September 1, 1924, if it appears to the satisfaction of the consular officer that the immigrant has obtained a visa of his passport before the enactment of this act, and is unable to obtain the documents referred to in this subdivision without undue expense and delay, owing to absence from the country from which such documents should be obtained, the consular officer may relieve such immigrant from the requirements of this subdivision.

(d) In the application the immigrant shall also state (to such extent as shall be by regulations prescribed) whether or not he is a member of each class of individuals excluded from admission to the United States under the immigration laws, and such classes shall be stated on the blank in such form as shall be by regulations prescribed, and the immigrant shall answer separately as to each class.

(e) If the immigrant is unable to state that he does not come within any of the excluded classes, but claims to be for any legal reason exempt from exclusion, he shall state fully in the application the grounds for such alleged exemption.

(f) Each copy of the application shall be signed by the immigrant in the presence of the consular officer and verified by the oath of the immigrant administered by the consular officer. One copy of the application, when verified by the consular officer, shall become the immigration visa, and the other copy shall be disposed of as may be by regulations prescribed.

(g) In the case of an immigrant under 18 years of age the application may be made and verified by such individual as shall be by regulations prescribed.

(h) A fee of $1 shall be charged for the furnishing and verification of each application, which shall include the furnishing and verification of the duplicate, and shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

(Sec. 207.)
ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRATION VISAS TO RELATIVES

Sec. 9. (a) In case of any immigrant claiming in his application for an immigration visa to be a non-quota immigrant by reason of relationship under the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 4, or to be entitled to preference by reason of relationship to a citizen of the United States under the provisions of section 6, the consular officer shall not issue such immigration visa or grant such preference until he has been authorized to do so as hereinafter in this section provided.

(b) Any citizen of the United States claiming that any immigrant is his relative, and that such immigrant is properly admissible to the United States as a non-quota immigrant under the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 4 or is entitled to preference as a relative under section 6, may file with the Commissioner General a petition in such form as may be by regulations prescribed, stating (1) the petitioner's name and address; (2) if a citizen by birth, the date and place of his birth; (3) if a naturalized citizen, the date and place of his admission to citizenship and the number of his certificate, if any; (4) the name and address of his employer or the address of his place of business or occupation if he is not an employee; (5) the degree of the relationship of the immigrant for whom such petition is made, and the names of all the places where such immigrant has resided prior to and at the time when the petition is filed; (6) that the petitioner is able to and will support the immigrant if necessary to prevent such immigrant from becoming a public charge; and (7) such additional information necessary to the proper enforcement of the immigration laws and the naturalization laws as may be by regulations prescribed.

(c) The petition shall be made under oath administered by any individual having power to administer oaths, if executed in the United States, but, if executed outside the United States, administered by a consular officer. The petition shall be supported by any documentary evidence required by regulations prescribed under this act. Application may be made in the same petition for admission of more than one individual.

(d) The petition shall be accompanied by the statements of two or more responsible citizens of the United States, to whom
the petitioner has been personally known for at least one year, that to the best of their knowledge and belief the statements made in the petition are true and that the petitioner is a responsible individual able to support the immigrant or immigrants for whose admission application is made. These statements shall be attested in the same way as the petition.

(e) If the Commissioner General finds the facts stated in the petition to be true, and that the immigrant in respect of whom the petition is made is entitled to be admitted to the United States as a non-quota immigrant under subdivision (a) of section 4 or in entitled to preference as a relative under section 6, he shall, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, inform the Secretary of State of his decision, and the Secretary of State shall then authorize the consular officer with whom the application for the immigration visa, has been filed to issue the immigration visa or grant the preference.

(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle an immigrant, in respect of whom a petition under this section is granted, to enter the United States as a non-quota immigrant, if, upon arrival in the United States, he is found not to be a non-quota immigrant.

(see. 209.)

PERMIT TO ENTER UNITED STATES AFTER TEMPORARY ABSENCE

SIC. 10. (a) Any alien about to depart temporarily from the United States may make application to the Commissioner General for a permit to reenter the United States, stating the length of his intended absence, and the reasons therefor. Such application shall be made under oath, and shall be in such form and contain such information as may be by regulations prescribed, and shall be accompanied by two copies of the applicant’s photograph.

(b) If the Commissioner General finds that the alien, has been legally admitted to the United States, and that the application is made in good faith, he shall, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, issue the permit, specifying therein the length of time, not exceeding one year, during which it shall be valid. The permit shall be in such form as shall be by regulations prescribed and shall have permanently attached thereto the photograph of the alien to whom issued, together with such other matter as may be deemed necessary for the complete identification of the alien.

(c) On good cause shown the validity of the permit may be extended for such period or periods, not exceeding six months each, and under such conditions, as shall be by regulations prescribed.

(d) For the issuance of the permit, and for each extension
thereof, there shall be paid a fee of $3, which shall be covered
into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

(e) Upon the return of the alien to the United States the
permit shall be surrendered to the immigration officer at the
port of inspection.

(f) A permit issued under this section shall have no effect
under the immigration laws, except to show that the alien to whom
it is issued is returning from a temporary visit abroad; but
nothing in this section shall be construed as making such permit
the exclusive means of establishing that the alien is so return-
ing.

(see. 210.)

SLC. 11. (a) The annual quota of any nationality shall be
2 per centum of the number of foreign-born individuals of such
nationality resident in continental United States as determined
by the United States census of 1890, but the minimum quota of
any nationality shall be 100.

(b) The annual quota of any nationality for the fiscal year
beginning July 1, 1927, and for each fiscal year thereafter, shall
be a number which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as the number
of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 having that
national origin (ascertained as hereinafter provided in this
section) bears to the number of inhabitants in continental
United States in 1920, but the minimum quota of any nationality
shall be 100.

(c) For the purpose of subdivision (b) national origin shall
be ascertained by determining as nearly as may be, in respect of
each geographical area which under section 11 is to be treated
as a separate country (except the geographical areas specified
in subdivision (c) of section 4) the number of inhabitants in
continental United States in 1920 having origin by birth or an-
cesty is attributable to such geographical area. Such deter-
mination shall not be made by tracing the ancestors or descend-
ents of particular individuals, but shall be based upon statistics
of immigration and emigration, together with rates of increase
of population as shown by successive decennial United States
censuses, and such other data as may be found to be reliable.

(d) For the purpose of subdivisions (b) and (c) the term
"inhabitants in continental United States in 1920" does not
include (1) immigrants from the geographical areas specified in
subdivision (c) of section 4 or their descend ents, (2) aliens
ineligible to citizenship or their descendants, (3) the des-
cendants of slave immigrants, or (4) the descendants of American
aborigines.

(e) The determination provided for in subdivision (c) of this
section shall be made by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor, jointly. In making such determination such officials may call for information and expert assistance from the Bureau of the Census. Such officials shall, jointly, report to the President the quota of each nationality, determined as provided in subdivision (b), and the President shall proclaim and make known the quotas so reported. Such proclamation shall be made on or before April 1, 1927. If the proclamation is not made on or before such date, quotas proclaimed therein shall not be in effect for any fiscal year beginning before the expiration of 90 days after the date of the proclamation. After the making of a proclamation under this subdivision the quotas proclaimed therein shall continue with the same effect as if specifically stated herein, and shall be final and conclusive for every purpose except (1) in so far as it is made to appear to the satisfaction of such officials and proclaimed by the President, that an error of fact has occurred in such determination or in such proclamation, or (2) in the case provided for in subdivision (c) of section 12. If for any reason quotas proclaimed under this subdivision are not in effect for any fiscal year, quotas for such year shall be determined under subdivision (a) of this section.

(f) There shall be issued to quota immigrants of any nationality (1) no more immigration visas in any fiscal year than the quota for such nationality, and (2) in any calendar month of any fiscal year no more immigration visas than 10 per centum of the quota for such nationality, except that if such quota is less than 300 the number to be issued in any calendar month shall be prescribed by the Commissioner General, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, but the total number to be issued during the fiscal year shall not be in excess of the quota for such nationality.

(g) Nothing in this act shall prevent the issuance (without increasing the total number of immigration visas which may be issued) of an immigration visa to an immigrant as a quota immigrant even though he is a non-quota immigrant.

(See 221.)

NATIONALITY

SEC. 12. (a) For the purposes of this act nationality shall be determined by country of birth, treating as separate countries the colonies, dependencies, or self-governing dominions, for which separate enumeration was made in the United States census of 1890; except that (1) the nationality of a child under 21 years of age not born in the United States, accompanied by its alien parent not born in the United States, shall be determined by the country of birth of such parent if such parent is entitled
to an immigration visa, and the nativity of a child under
21 years of age not born in the United States, accompanied by
both alien parents not born in the United States, shall be deter-
mined by the country of birth of the father if the father is
entitled to an immigration visa; and (2) if a wife is of a
different nativity from her alien husband and the entire num-
ber of immigration visas which may be issued to quota immi-grants
of her nativity for the calendar month has already been
issued, her nativity may be determined by the country of birth
of her husband if she is accompanying him and he is entitled to an
immigration visa, unless the total number of immigration visas
which may be issued to quota immigrants of the nativity of the
husband for the calendar month has already been issued. An immi-
grant born in the United States who has lost his United States
citizenship shall be considered as having been born in the coun-
try of which he is a citizen or subject, or if he is not a citizen
or subject of any country, then in the country from which he comes.

(b) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and
the Secretary of Labor, jointly, shall, as soon as feasible after
the enactment of this Act, prepare a statement showing the number
of individuals of the various nationalities resident in continental
United States as determined by the United States census of 1890,
which statement shall be the population basis for the purposes of
subdivision (a) of section 11. In the case of a country recog-
nized by the United States, but for which a separate enumeration
was not made in the census of 1890, the number of individuals born
in such country and resident in continental United States in 1890,
as estimated by such officials jointly, shall be considered for the
purposes of subdivision (a) of section 11 as having been determined
by the United States census of 1890. In the case of a colony or
dependency existing before 1890, but for which a separate enumer-
ation was not made in the census of 1890 and which was not included
in the enumeration for the country to which such colony or depen-
dency belonged, or in the case of territory administered under
a protectorate, the number of individuals born in such colony,
dependency or territory, and resident in continental United
States in 1890, as estimated by such officials jointly, shall
be considered for the purposes of subdivision (a) of section 11
as having been determined by the United States census of 1890
to have been born in the country to which such colony or dependency
belonged or which administers such protectorate.

(c) In case of changes in political boundaries in foreign
countries occurring subsequent to 1890 and resulting in the

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The following provisions shall be observed in determining the number of individuals residing in the continental United States in 1890 who were born within the area included in such new countries or self-governing dominions, or in such territory transferred or surrendered or administered under a mandate, and revise (for the purposes of sub-section (c)) such computations.

Such officials, jointly, shall estimate the population basis for the purpose of determining the nationality of each immigrant, (1)persons born in the territory included in any such new country or self-governing dominion shall be considered as having been born in such country or dominion, and persons born in any territory so transferred shall be considered as having been born in the country to which such territory was transferred, and

(b) territory so surrendered or administered under a mandate shall be treated as a separate country, such treatment of territory administered under a mandate shall be consistent with the United States' obligations under the proposed mandate where the United States has not consented by the United States to the proposed mandate, and shall be final and conclusive for all purposes.

Such officials shall, jointly, report annually to the President of the United States, at such time and place as may be prescribed by the President, the quotas for each nationality under sub-section (c) of this section, together with the statements, estimates, and revisions provided for in this section. The President shall proclaim and make known the quotas as prescribed and thereafter such quotas shall continue, with the same effect as if specifically stated herein, for all fiscal years except those years for which quotas are in effect as prescribed under sub-section (c) of section 11, and shall be final and conclusive for all purposes.

(See 212).
SEC. 13. (a) No immigrant shall be admitted to the United States unless he (1) has an unexpired immigration visa or was born subsequent to the issuance of the immigration visa of the accompanying parent, (2) is of the nationality specified in the visa in the immigration visa, (3) is a non-queota immigrant if specified in the visa in the immigration visa as such, and (4) is otherwise admissible under the immigration laws.

(b) In such classes of cases and under such conditions as may be by regulations prescribed, immigrants who have been legally admitted to the United States on whom depart therefrom temporarily may be admitted to the United States without being required to obtain an immigration visa.

(c) No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States unless such alien (1) is admissible as a non-queota immigrant under the provisions of subdivisions (b), (a), or (e) of section 4, or (2) is the wife, or the unmarried child under 16 years of age, of an immigrant admissible under such subdivision (a), and is accompanying or following to join him, or (3) is not an immigrant as defined in section 3.

(d) The Secretary of Labor may admit to the United States any otherwise admissible immigrant not admissible under clause (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) of this section, if satisfied that such admissibility was not known to, and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence by such immigrant prior to the departure of the vessel from the last port outside the United States and outside foreign contiguous territory, or, in the case of an immigrant coming from foreign contiguous territory, prior to the application of the immigrant for admission.

(e) No quota immigrant shall be admitted under subdivision (a) if the entire number of immigration visas which may be issued to quota immigrants of the same nationality for the fiscal year has already been issued. If such entire number of immigration visas has not been issued, then the Secretary of State, upon the admission of a quota immigrant under subdivision (a), shall reduce by one the number of immigration visas which may be issued to quota immigrants of the same nationality during the fiscal year in which such immigrants is admitted; but if the Secretary of State finds that it will not be practicable to make such reduction before the end of such fiscal year, then such immigrant shall not be admitted.

(f) Nothing in this section shall authorize the remission
DEPORTATION

SEC. 14. Any alien who at any time after entering the United States is found to have been at the time of entry not entitled under this act to enter the United States, or to have remained therein for a longer time than permitted under the act or regulations made thereunder, shall be taken into custody and deported in the same manner, as provided for in sections 19 and 20 of the immigration act of 1917: Provided, that the Secretary of Labor may, under such conditions and restrictions as to support and care as he may deem necessary, permit permanently to remain in the United States, any alien child who, when under 16 years of age was hereby temporarily admitted to the United States and who is now within the United States and either of whose parents is a citizen of the United States.

SEC. 15. The admission to the United States of an alien excepted from the class of immigrants by clause (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of section 3, or declared to be a non-quota immigrant by subdivision (e) of section 4, shall be for such time as may be by regulations prescribed, and under such conditions as may be by regulations prescribed (including when deemed necessary for the classes contained in clause (2), (3), (4), or (6) of section 3, the giving of bond with sufficient surety, in such sum and containing such conditions as may be by regulations prescribed) to insure that, at the expiration of such time or upon failure to maintain the status under which admitted, he will depart from the United States.

SEC. 16. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person, including any transportation company, or the owner, master, agent, charteror, or consignee of any vessel, to bring to the United States by water from any place outside thereof (other than foreign contiguous territory) (1) any immigrant who does not have an unexpired immigration visa, or (2) any quota immigrant having an immigration visa the visa in which specifies him as a non-quotan immigrant.

(b) If it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of labor that any immigrant has been so brought, such person,
or transportation company, or the master, agent, owner, charterer,
or consignee of any such vessel, shall pay to the collector of
customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival
is located the sum of $1,000 for each immigrant so brought, and
in addition a sum equal to that paid by such immigrant for his
transportation from the initial port of departure, indicated
in his ticket, to the port of arrival, such latter sum to be
reimburse to the collector of customs in whose
account assessed. No vessel shall be granted clearance pending
the determination of the liability to the payment of such sums,
or while such sums remain unpaid, except that clearance may be
granted prior to the determination of such question upon the
deposit of an amount sufficient to cover such sums, or in
bond with sufficient security to secure the payment thereof
approved by the collector of customs.

(a) Such sums shall not be remitted or refunded, unless it
appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Labor that such
person, and the master, agent, owner, charterer, and consignee
of the vessel, prior to the departure of the vessel from the
port outside the United States, did not know, and could not have
ascertained, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, (1) that the
individual transported was an immigrant, if the fine was imposed
for bringing an immigrant without an unexpired immigration visa,
or (2) that the individual transported was a quota immigrant, if
the fine was imposed for bringing a quota immigrant the visa in
whose immigration visa specified him as being a non-quota immi-
grant.

SEC. 216.
ENTRY FROM FOREIGN CONTIGUOUS TERRITORY

SEC. 17. The Commissioner General, with the approval of the
Secretary of Labor, shall have power to enter into contracts with
transportation lines for the entry and inspection of aliens coming
to the United States from or through foreign contiguous territory.
In prescribing rules and regulations and making contracts for the
entry and inspection of aliens applying for admission from or
through foreign contiguous territory due care shall be exercised
to avoid any discriminatory action in favor of transportation
companies transporting to such territory aliens destined to the
United States, and all such transportation companies shall be
required, as a condition precedent to the inspection or examination
under such rules and contracts at the ports of such contiguous
territory of aliens brought thereto by them, to submit to and
comply with all the requirements of this act which would apply
were they bringing such aliens directly to ports of the United
States. After this section takes effect no alien applying for
admission from or through foreign continental territory (except an alien previously lawfully admitted to the United States who is returning from a temporary visit to such territory) shall be permitted to enter the United States unless upon proving that he was brought to such territory by a transportation company which he submitted to and complied with all the requirements of this act, or that he entered, or has resided in such territory more than two years prior to the time of his application for admission to the United States. (Sec. 217.)

UNIVERSAL IMMIGRATION VISAS

Sec. 19. If a quota immigrant of any nationality having an immigration visa is excluded from admission to the United States under the immigration laws and deported, or does not apply for admission to the United States before the expiration of the validity of the immigration visa, or if an alien of any nationality having an immigration visa issued to him as a quota immigrant is found not to be a quota immigrant, no additional immigration visa shall be issued in lieu thereof to any other immigrant. (Sec. 216.)

ALIEN SEAMEN

Sec. 20. (a) The owner, charterer, agent, consignee, or master of any vessel arriving in the United States from any place outside thereof, shall be required to land in the United States, except temporarily for medical treatment, or pursuant to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe for the ultimate departure, removal, or deportation of such alien from the United States. (Sec. 166.)
to the payment of such fine, or while the fine remains unpaid, except that allowance may be granted prior to the determination of such question upon the deposit of a sufficient sum to cover such fine, or of a bond with sufficient surety to secure the payment thereof approved by the collector of customs,

(b) Proof that an alien seaman did not appear upon the outgoing manifest of the vessel on which he arrived in the United States from any place outside thereof, or that he was reported by the master of such vessel as a desertor, will be prima facie evidence of a failure to comply or report after requirement by the immigration officer or the Secretary of Labor.

(c) If the Secretary of Labor finds that deportation of the alien seaman on the vessel on which he arrived would cause undue hardship to such seaman, he may cause him to be deported on another vessel at the expense of the vessel on which he arrived, and such vessel shall not be granted allowance until such expense has been paid or its payment guaranteed to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Labor.

(sec. 167)

(d) Section 32 of the Immigration Act of 1917 is repealed, but shall remain in force as to all vessels, their owners, agents, consignees, and masters, and as to all seamen, arriving in the United States prior to the enactment of this act.

SEC. 21. (a) Permits issued under section 10 shall be printed on distinctive safety paper and shall be prepared and issued under regulations prescribed under this act.

(sec. 214.)

(b) The Public Printer is authorized to print for sale to the public by the Superintendent of Documents, upon payment, additional copies of blank forms of manifests and crew lists to be prescribed by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the provisions of sections 12, 13, 14 and 30 of the Immigration Act of 1917.

(sec. 179.)

DEFENDERS IN CONNECTION WITH DOCUMENTS

SEC. 22. (a) Any person who knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to have been produced by means of any false claim or statement, or to have been otherwise
pursue by fraud or unlawfully obtained; or who, except under
direction of the Secretary of Labor or other public officer,
knowingly (5) possesses any blank permit, (6) engraves, sells,
brings into the United States, or has in his control or possession
any plate in the likeness of a plate designed for the printing
of permits, (5) makes any print, photograph, or impression in
the likeness of any inscription visa or permit, or (6) has in his
possession a distinctive paper which are used adopted by the
Secretary of Labor for the printing of immigration visas or per­
mits, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

(b) Any individual who (1) when applying for an immigration
visa or permit, or for admission to the United States, represents
another or falsely appears in the name of a deceased individual,
or utters or attempts to evade the immigration laws by appearing
under an assumed or fictitious name, or (2) sells or otherwise
disposes of, or refers to sell or otherwise dispose of, or utters,
an immigration visa or permit, to any person not authorized by
law to receive such document, shall, upon conviction thereof, be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both.

(c) Whoever knowingly makes under oath any false statement in
any application, affidavit, or other document required by the
immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, shall,
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or im­
prisoned for not more than five years, or both.

(see, 220.)

RULES AND REGULATIONS

SEC. 221. The Commissioner General, with the approval of the
Secretary of Labor, shall prescribe rules and regulations for the
enforcement of the provisions of this act; but all such rules

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and regulations, in so far as they relate to the administration
of this act by annually appointing, holding in office, and enacting by the
Secretary of State on the recommendation of the Secretary of Labor
(par. 222.)

NOT TO BE HOUSED TO I. J. B. H. I.

SEC. 25. The provisions of this act are in addition to any
not in substitution for the provisions of the Indictment laws,
and shall be enforced as part of such laws, and all the penal
or other provisions of such laws, not included in, shall apply
to and be construed in connection with the provisions of this act.

SEC. 26. (Amends sec. 9 of Indictment act of 1917.)

SEC. 27. (Amends sec. 10 of Indictment act of 1917.)

SEC. 28. As used in this act —

(a) The term "United States", when used in a geographical
sense, means the States, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii,
the District of Columbia, Porto Rico, and the Virgin Islands;
and the term "continental United States" means the States and
the District of Columbia;

(b) The term "Alien" includes any individual not a native-
born or naturalized citizen of the United States, but this defini-
tion shall not be held to include Indians of the United States
not taxed, nor citizens of the Islands under the jurisdiction of
the United States;

(c) The term "ineligible to citizenship," when used in
reference to any individual, includes an individual who is de-
barred from becoming a citizen of the United States under section
2149 of the Revised Statutes, or under section 10 of the act enti-
tled "an act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to
Chinese," approved May 6, 1882, or under section 1066, 1937, or
1998 of the Revised Statutes, or section 5, or section 2
of the act entitled "an act to authorize the President to increase
temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States," approved May 16, 1917, amended, or under law essential to, supplementary to, or in substitution for, any of such sections;

(a) The term "immigration visa" means an immigration visa issued by a consular officer under the provisions of this act;

(b) The term "consular officer" means any consular or diplomatic officer of the United States designated, under regulations prescribed under this act, for the purpose of issuing immigration visas under this act. In case of the Consul "or and the consular relations of the United States the term "consular officer" (except as used in section 24) means an officer designated by the President, or by his authority, for the purpose of issuing immigration visas under this act;

(c) The term "immigration law of 1917" means the act of February 5, 1917, entitled "An act to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States";

(d) The term "immigration laws" includes such act, this act, and all laws, conventions, and treaties of the United States relating to the immigration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens;

(e) The term "person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations;

(f) The term "Commissioner General" means the Commissioner General of Immigration;

(g) The term "application for admission" has reference to the application for admission to the United States and not to the application for the issuance of the immigration visa;

(h) The term "permit" means a permit issued under section 10;

(i) The term "unmarried," when used in reference to any individual at any time, means an individual who at such time is not married, whether or not previously married;

(j) The terms "child," "father," and "mother," do not include a child or parent by adoption unless the adoption took place prior to January 1, 1924;

(k) The terms "wife" and "husband" do not include a wife or husband by reason of a proxy or picture marriage.

(see p. 22.)
AUTHORIZATION & APPROPRIATION

SEC. 29. The appropriation of such sum as may be necessary for the enforcement of this act is hereby authorized.

(Act of May 10, 1921)

SEC. 30. The act entitled "An act to limit the immigration of aliens into the United States," approved May 19, 1921, as amended and extended, shall, notwithstanding its expiration on June 30, 1924, remain in force and effect for the immigration, emigration, and enforcement of all provisions that may have accrued thereunder, and any alien who prior to July 1, 1924, may have entered the United States in violation of such act or regulations under thereunder may be deported in the same manner as if such act had not expired.

(Act of May 10, 1921)

TIMES OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 31. (a) Sections 2, 8, 13, 14, 15 and 16, and subdivision (f) of section 11, shall take effect on July 1, 1924, except that immigration visas and permits may be issued prior to that date, which shall not be valid for admission to the United States before July 1, 1924. In the case of quota immigrants of any nationality, the number of immigration visas to be issued prior to July 1, 1924, shall not be in excess of 10 per cent of the quota for such nationality, and the number of immigration visas so issued shall be deducted from the number which may be issued during the month of July, 1924. In the case of immigration visas issued before July 1, 1924, the four-month period referred to in subdivision (g) of section 2 shall begin to run on July 1, 1924, instead of at the time of the issuance of the immigration visa.

(b) The remainder of this act shall take effect upon its enactment.

(g) If any alien arrives in the United States before July 1, 1924, his right to admission shall be determined without regard to the provisions of this act, except section 25.
HAVING CLAUSE IN EVENT OF INCONSTITUTENESS

SEC. 32. If any provision of this act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the act, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Passed, May 26, 1921.
(Ch. 226.)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity


Signed at Tokyo,

on this 26th day of August, 1946.

(signed) Hayashi Koju

Signature of Chief Official

Witness: (signature) Mochihara Yūsuke
第十条
(1) 一時国外滞在認可者、勞働者及び常住外國人ハノ及ナル部分ヲ許ず。申請ハ、許可ヲ得ラル、ノサラルタルコトヲ認メルトキハ、際ノ承認ヲ得タヒ、年以内ノ有効
期間ヲ訂セル許可ヲ発行スベシ。此ノ許可ヲ認メル可ハ規則ヲ定ムル書式ヲ
添付スベシ
(2) 一時国外滞在認可者、勞働者及び常住外國人ノ書類ヲ認メルトキハ、際ノ承認ヲ
得タニ必要ト認メル。
第十一條

(1) 各國年度度當ハ八九○年米國國勢調査ニヨリ決定セル米本

国居住外僑出生ノ當該國人數ノ一分トシ、ノ最小限割當ハ百名トス。

(2) 一九二七年七月一日ニタル個計年度並ニ其以後ノ各計年度ニ對スル

本条ニ定ミル如ク確認セル、民族的系統ヲ有スルモノノ同年同国籍人
八九〇年未に薩摩国三波を発し、セルベルを経て、徳川吉宗
二十一歳未に満母 новогоセルベルを経て、ハノリを発し、海界
二十一歳末に満母がセルベルを経て、ハノリを発し、八九〇年
十二歳末に満母がセルベルを経て、ハノリを発し、八九〇年

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19
第十五条
見廻に基づく特例

第十六条
見廻に基づく特例（第二百十四条）

第十七条
見廻に基づく特例

第十八条
見廻に基づく特例（第二百十三條）

第十九條
見廻に基づく特例
日本語

日本語

日本語
第三百三十六条

外国人入国に送らセントスルトキハノノ移民法中ノ何ナルノ

規定ヲ何ナルヲ除クレザル監圏スルキハノノ移民ノ為務ヲ父ア

又外山入
第三十八條
本法令中ニ用ヒラタルトキハハ私民ノ実施ヲ要スノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルハ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲヲアラザルノヲ除キハ全州ヲisclosed
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改正法令第二十六九条、及一九八八年五月六日成立一実民法官規則

第一九九六条、及一九九八条又一修正令一修正法一

改正法令第二十六九条、及一九九七条又一改正令一修正法一

改正法令第二十六九条、及一九九八条又一修正令一改正法一
AN ACT TO LIMIT THE IMMIGRATION OF ALIENS INTO THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this act may be cited as the "Immigration act of 1924."

(SEC. 201)

Immigration VIsas

Sec. 2 (a) A consular officer upon the application of any immigrant (as defined in section 3) may (under the conditions hereinafter prescribed and subject to the limitations prescribed in this act or regulations made thereunder as to the number of immigration visas which may be issued by such officer) issue to such immigrant an immigration visa which shall consist of one copy of the application provided for in section 7, visaed by such consular officer. Such visa shall specify (1) the nationality of the immigrant; (2) whether he is a quota immigrant (as defined in section 5) or a non-quota immigrant (as defined in section 4); (3) the date on which the validity of the immigration visa shall expire; and (4) such additional information necessary to the proper enforcement of the immigration laws and the naturalization laws as may be by regulations prescribed.

(b) The immigrant shall furnish two copies of his photograph to the consular officer. One copy shall be permanently attached by the consular officer to the immigration visa and the other copy shall be disposed of as may be by regulations prescribed.

(c) The validity of an immigration visa shall expire at the end of such period, specified in the immigration visa, not exceeding four months, as shall be by regulations prescribed. In the case of an immigrant arriving in the United States by water, or arriving by water in foreign contiguous territory on a continuous voyage to the United States, if the vessel, before the expiration of the validity of his immigration visa, departed from the last port outside the United States and outside foreign contiguous territory at which the immigrant embarked, and if the immigrant proceeds on a continuous voyage to the United States, then, regardless of the time of his arrival in the United States the validity of his immigration visa shall not be considered to have expired.

(d) If an immigrant is required by any law, or regulations or orders made pursuant to law, to secure the visa of his pass-
port by a consular officer before being permitted to enter the United States, such immigrant shall not be required to secure any other visa of his passport than the immigration visa issued under this act. But a record of the number and date of his immigration visa shall be noted on his passport without charge therefor. This subdivision shall not apply to an immigrant who is relieved, under subdivision (b) of section 13, from obtaining an immigration visa.

(e) The manifest or list of passengers required by the immigration laws shall contain a place for entering thereon the date, place of issuance, and number of the immigration visa of each immigrant. The immigrant shall surrender his immigration visa to the immigration officer at the port of inspection, who shall at the time of inspection indorse on the immigration visa the date, the port of entry, and the name of the vessel, if any, on which the immigrant arrived. The immigration visa shall be transmitted forthwith by the immigration officer in charge at the port of inspection to the Department of Labor under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor.

(f) No immigration visa shall be issued to an immigrant if it appears to the consular officer, from statements in the application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that the immigrant is inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws, nor shall such immigration visa be issued if the application fails to comply with the provisions of this act, nor shall such immigration visa be issued if the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that the immigrant is inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws.

(g) Nothing in this act shall be construed to entitle an immigrant, to whom an immigration visa has been issued, to enter the United States if, upon arrival in the United States, he is found to be inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws. The substance of this subdivision shall be printed conspicuously upon every immigration visa.

(h) A fee of $0.9 shall be charged for the issuance of each immigration visa, which shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

(See 202.)

DEFINITION OF "IMMIGRANT"

SEC. 3. When used in this act the term "immigrant" means
any alien departing from any place outside the United States destined for the United States, except (1) a Government official, his family, attendants, servants, and employees, (2) an alien visiting the United States temporarily as a tourist or temporarily for business or pleasure, (3) an alien in continuous transit through the United States, (4) an alien lawfully admitted to the United States who later goes in transit from one part of the United States to another through foreign contiguous territory, (5) a bona fide alien seaman serving as such on a vessel arriving at a port of the United States and seeking to enter temporarily the United States solely in the pursuit of his calling as a seaman, and (6) an alien entitled to enter the United States solely to carry on trade under and in pursuance of the provisions of a present existing treaty of commerce and navigation.

(Sec. 205.)

Non-Quota Immigrants

Sec. 4. As amended by sections 1 and 2 of joint resolution approved May 28, 1928, 45 Stat. 1009. When used in this act the term "non-quota immigrant" means -

(a) An immigrant who is the unmarried child under twenty-one years of age, or the wife, of a citizen of the United States, or the husband of a citizen of the United States by a marriage occurring prior to June 1, 1928;

(b) An immigrant previously lawfully admitted to the United States who is returning from a temporary visit abroad;

(c) An immigrant who was born in the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Republic of Mexico, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent country of Central or South America, and his wife, and his unmarried children under eighteen years of age, if accompanying or following to join him;

(d) An immigrant who continuously for at least two years immediately preceding the time of his application for admission to the United States has been, and who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of minister of any religious denomination, or professor of a college, academy, seminary, or university, and his wife, and his unmarried children under eighteen years of age, if accompanying or following to join him;

(e) An immigrant who is a bona fide student at least fifteen years of age and who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose of study at an accredited school, college, academy, seminary, or university, particularly designated by
him and approved by the Secretary of Labor, which shall have agreed to report to the Secretary of Labor the termination of attendance of each immigrant student, and if any such institution of learning fails to make such reports promptly the approval shall be withdrawn.

(f) A woman who was a citizen of the United States and who prior to September 30, 1921, lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien, but at the time of application for an immigration visa is unmarried.

Quota Immigrants

SEC. 5. When used in this act the term "quota immigrant" means any immigrant who is not a non-quota immigrant. An alien who is not particularly specified in this act as a non-quota immigrant or a nonimmigrant shall not be admitted as a non-quota immigrant or a nonimmigrant by reason of relationship to any individual who is so specified or by reason of being excepted from the operation of any other law regulating or forbidding immigration.

PREFERENCE TO IMMIGRANTS

SEC. 6, as amended by section 3 of joint resolution, approved May 29, 1928; 45 Stat. 1009; this section became effective on July 1, 1928.

(a) Immigration visas to quota immigrants shall be issued in each fiscal year as follows:

1. Fifty per centum of the quota of each nationality for such year shall be made available in such year for the issuance of immigration visas to the following classes of immigrants, without priority of preference as between such classes: (a) quota immigrants who are the fathers or the mothers, or the husbands by marriage occurring after May 31, 1928, of citizens of the United States who are twenty-one years of age or over, and (b) in the case of any nationality the quota for which is three hundred or more, quota immigrants who are skilled in agriculture, and the wives and the dependent children under the age of eighteen years, of such immigrants skilled in agriculture, if accompanying or following to join them.

2. The remainder of the quota of each nationality for such year, plus any portion of the 50 per centum referred to in paragraph (1) not required in such year for the issuance of immi-
migration visas to the classes specified in such paragraph, shall be made available in such year for the issuance of immigration visas to quota immigrants of such nationality who are the unmarried children under twenty-one years of age, or the wives, of alien residents of the United States who were lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.

(3) Any portion of the quota of each nationality for such year not required for the issuance of immigration visas to the classes specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be made available in such year for the issuance of immigration visas to other quota immigrants of such nationality.

(b) The preference provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) shall, in the case of quota immigrants of any nationality, be given in the calendar month in which the right to preference is established, if the number of immigration visas which may be issued in such month to quota immigrants of such nationality has not already been issued; otherwise, in the next calendar month.

(Se&. 206.)

APPLICATION FOR IMMIGRATION VISAS.

Sec. 7. (a) Every immigrant applying for an immigration visa shall make application therefor in duplicate in such form as shall be by regulations prescribed.

(b) In the application the immigrant shall state: (1) the immigrant's full and true name; age, sex, and race; the date and place of birth; places of residence for the five years immediately preceding his application; whether married or single, and the names and places of residence of wife or husband and minor children if any; calling or occupation; personal description (including height, complexion, color of hair and eyes, and marks of identification); ability to speak, read, and write; names and addresses of parents, and if neither parent living, then the name and address of his nearest relative in the country from which he comes; port of entry into the United States; final destination, if any, beyond the port of entry; whether space was purchased through to such final destination; whether going to join a relative or friend, and, if so what relative or friend and his name and complete address; the purposes for which he is going to the United States; the length of time he intends to remain in the United States; whether ever in prison or almshouse; whether he or either of his parents has ever been in an institution or hospital for the care and treatment of the insane; (c) if he claims to be a non-quota immigrant, the facts on which he bases such claim; and (3) such additional information necessary to the proper enforcement of the immigration laws and the naturalization laws, as may be by regulations prescribed.
(c) The immigrant shall furnish, if available, to the consular officer, with his application, two copies of his "dossier" and prison record and military record, two certified copies of his birth certificate and two copies of all other available public records concerning him kept by the government to which he owes allegiance. One copy of the documents so furnished shall be permanently attached to each copy of the application and become a part thereof. An immigrant having an unexpired permit issued under the provisions of section 10 shall not be subject to this subdivision. In the case of an application made before September 1, 1924, if it appears to the satisfaction of the consular officer that the immigrant has obtained a visa of his passport before the enactment of this act, and is unable to obtain the documents referred to in this subdivision without undue expense and delay, owing to absence from the country from which such documents should be obtained, the consular officer may relieve such immigrant from the requirements of this subdivision.

(d) In the application the immigrant shall also state (to such extent as shall be by regulations prescribed) whether or not he is a member of each class of individuals excluded from admission to the United States under the immigration laws, and such classes shall be stated on the blank in such form as shall be by regulations prescribed, and the immigrant shall answer separately as to each class.

(e) If the immigrant is unable to state that he does not come within any of the excluded classes, but claims to be for any legal reason exempt from exclusion, he shall state fully in the application the grounds for such alleged exemption.

(f) Each copy of the application shall be signed by the immigrant in the presence of the consular officer and verified by the oath of the immigrant administered by the consular officer. One copy of the application, when signed by the consular officer, shall become the immigration visa, and the other copy shall be disposed of as may be by regulations prescribed.

(g) In the case of an immigrant under 18 years of age the application may be made and verified by such individual as shall be by regulations prescribed.

(h) A fee of $1 shall be charged for the furnishing and verification of each application, which shall include the furnishing and verification of the duplicate, and shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

(see. 607.)
ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRATION VISA TO IMMIGRANT

SEC. 8. A consular officer may, subject to the limitations provided in sections 2 and 3, issue an immigration visa to a non-quota immigrant as such upon satisfactory proof, under regulations prescribed under this act, that the applicant is entitled to be regarded as a non-quota immigrant.

(See 208.)

ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRATION VISA TO IMMIGRANT

SEC. 9. (a) In case of any immigrant claiming in his application for an immigration visa to be a non-quota immigrant by reason of relationship under the provisions of subdivision (e) of section 4, or to be entitled to preference by reason of relationship to a citizen of the United States under the provisions of section 6, the consular officer shall not issue such immigration visa or grant such preference until he has been authorized to do so as hereinafter in this section provided.

(b) Any citizen of the United States claiming that any immigrant is his relative, and that such immigrant is properly admissible to the United States as a non-quota immigrant under the provisions of subdivision (e) of section 4, or is entitled to preference as a relative under section 6, may file with the Commissioner General a petition in such form as may be by regulations prescribed, stating (1) the petitioner's name and address; (2) if a citizen by birth, the date and place of his birth; (3) if a naturalized citizen, the date and place of his admission to citizenship and the number of his certificate, if any; (4) the name and address of his employer or the address of his place of business or occupation if he is not an employee, (5) the degree of the relationship of the immigrant for whom such petition is made, and the names of all the places where such immigrant has resided prior to and at the time when the petition is filed; (6) that the petitioner is able to and will support the immigrant, if necessary to prevent such immigrant from becoming a public charge; and (7) such additional information necessary to the proper enforcement of the immigration laws and the naturalization laws as may be by regulations prescribed.

(c) The petition shall be made under oath administered by any individual having power to administer oaths, if executed in the United States, but, if executed outside the United States, administered by a consular officer. The petition shall be supported by any documentary evidence required by regulations prescribed under this act. Application may be made in the same petition for admission of more than one individual.

(d) The petition shall be accompanied by the statements of two or more responsible citizens of the United States, to whom
the petitioner has been personally known for at least one year, that to the best of their knowledge and belief the statements made in the petition are true and that the petitioner is a responsible individual able to support the immigrant or immigrants for whose admission application is made. These statements shall be attested in the same way as the petition.

(e) If the Commissioner General finds the facts stated in the petition to be true, and that the immigrant in respect of whom the petition is made is entitled to be admitted to the United States as a non-quota immigrant under subdivision (a) of section 4 or in entitled to preference as a relative under section 6, he shall, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, inform the Secretary of State of his decision, and the Secretary of State shall then authorize the consular officer with whom the application for the immigration visa, has been filed to issue the immigration visa or grant the preference.

(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle an immigrant, in respect of whom a petition under this section is granted, to enter the United States as a non-quota immigrant, if, upon arrival in the United States, he is found not to be a non-quota immigrant.

[Sec. 209.]

PART II TO REENTAR UNITED STATES AFTER TEMPORARY ABSENCE

S.I.C. 10. (a) Any alien about to depart temporarily from the United States may make application to the Commissioner General for a permit to reenter the United States, stating the length of his intended absence, and the reasons therefor. Such application shall be made under oath, and shall be in such form and contain such information as may be by regulations prescribed, and shall be accompanied by two copies of the applicant's photograph.

(b) If the Commissioner General finds that the alien, has been legally admitted to the United States, and that the application is made in good faith, he shall, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, issue the permit, specifying therein the length of time, not exceeding one year, during which it shall be valid. The permit shall be in such form as shall be by regulations prescribed and shall have permanently attached thereto the photograph of the alien to whom issued, together with such other matter as may be deemed necessary for the complete identification of the alien.

(c) On good cause shown the validity of the permit may be extended for such period or periods, not exceeding six months each, and under such conditions, as shall be by regulations prescribed.

(d) For the issuance of the permit, and for each extension
thereof, there shall be paid a fee of $3, which shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

(e) Upon the return of the alien to the United States the permit shall be surrendered to the immigration officer at the port of inspection.

(f) A permit issued under this section shall have no effect under the immigration laws, except to show that the alien to whom it is issued is returning from a temporary visit abroad; but nothing in this section shall be construed as making such permit the exclusive means of establishing that the alien is so returning.

(sec. 210.)

SIC. 11. (a) The annual quota of any nationality shall be 2 per centum of the number of foreign-born individuals of such nationality resident in continental United States as determined by the United States census of 1900, but the minimum quota of any nationality shall be 100.

(b) The annual quota of any nationality for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1927, and for each fiscal year thereafter, shall be a number which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 having that national origin (ascertained as hereinafter provided in this section) bears to the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920, but the minimum quota of any nationality shall be 100.

(c) For the purpose of subdivision (b) national origin shall be ascertained by determining as nearly as may be, in respect of each geographical area which under section 12 is to be treated as a separate country (except the geographical areas specified in subdivision (c) of section 4) the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 whose origin by birth or ancestry is attributable to such geographical area. Such determination shall not be made by tracing the ancestors or descendants of particular individuals, but shall be based upon statistics of immigration and emigration, together with rates of increase of population as shown by successive decennial United States censuses, and such other data as may be found to be reliable.

(d) For the purposes of subdivisions (b) and (c) the term "inhabitants in continental United States in 1920" does not include (1) immigrants from the geographical areas specified in subdivision (c) of section 4 or their descendants, (2) aliens ineligible to citizenship or their descendants, (3) the descendants of slave immigrants, or (4) the descendants of American aborigines.

(e) The determination provided for in subdivision (c) of this
Section shall be made by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor, jointly. In making such determination such officials may call for information and expert assistance from the Bureau of the Census. Such officials shall, jointly, report to the President the quota of such nationality, determined as provided in subdivision (b), and the President shall proclaim and make known the quotas so reported. Such proclamation shall be made on or before April 1, 1927. If the proclamation is not made on or before such date, quotas proclaimed therein shall not be in effect for any fiscal year beginning before the expiration of 90 days after the date of the proclamation. After the making of a proclamation under this subdivision the quotas proclaimed therein shall continue with the same effect as if specifically stated herein, and shall be final and conclusive for every purpose except (1) in so far as it is made to appear to the satisfaction of such officials and proclaimed by the President, that an error of fact has occurred in such determination or in such proclamation, or (2) in the case provided for in subdivision (c) of section 12. If for any reason quotas proclaimed under this subdivision are not in effect for any fiscal year, quotas for such year shall be determined under subdivision (c) of this section.

(f) There shall be issued to quota immigrants of any nationality (1) no more immigration visas in any fiscal year than the quota for such nationality, and (2) in any calendar month of any fiscal year no more immigration visas than 10 per centum of the quota for such nationality, except that if such quota is less than 300 the number to be issued in any calendar month shall be prescribed by the Commissioner General, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, but the total number to be issued during the fiscal year shall not be in excess of the quota for such nationality.

(g) Nothing in this act shall prevent the issuance (without increasing the total number of immigration visas which may be issued) of an immigration visa to an immigrant as a quota immigrant even though he is a non-quota immigrant.

( Sec. 221.)

NATIONALITY

SEC. 12. (a) For the purposes of this act nationality shall be determined by country of birth, treating as separate countries the colonies, dependencies, or self-governing dominions, for which separate enumeration was made in the United States census of 1890; except that (1) the nationality of a child under 21 years of age not born in the United States, accompanied by its alien parent not born in the United States, shall be determined by the country of birth of such parent if such parent is entitled
to an immigration visa, and the nationality of a child under 21 years of age not born in the United States, accompanied by each of whose parents not born in the United States, shall be determined by the country of birth of the father, if the father is entitled to an immigration visa; and (2) if a wife is of a different nationality from her alien husband and the entire number of immigration visas which may be issued to quota immigrants of her nationality for the calendar month has already been issued, her nationality may be determined by the country of birth of her husband if she is accompanying him and he is entitled to an immigration visa, unless the total number of immigration visas which may be issued to quota immigrants of the nationality of the husband for the calendar month has already been issued. An immigrant born in the United States who has lost his United States citizenship shall be considered as having been born in the country of which he is a citizen or subject, or if he is not a citizen or subject of any country, then in the country from which he comes.

(b) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor, jointly, shall, as soon as practicable after the enactment of this act, provide a statement showing the number of individuals of the various nationalities resident in continental United States as determined by the United States Census of 1890, which statement shall be the basis for the purpose of subdivision (a) of section 11 of the act of a country recognized by the United States, but for which a separate enumeration was not made in the Census of 1890, the number of individuals born in such country and resident in continental United States in 1890, as estimated by such officials jointly, shall be considered for the purposes of subdivision (a) of section 11 as having been determined by the United States Census of 1890. In the case of a colony or dependency existing before 1890, but for which a separate enumeration was not made in the Census of 1890 and which was not included in the enumeration for the country to which such colony or dependency belonged, or in the case of territory administered under a protectorate, the number of individuals born in such colony, dependency or territory, and resident in continental United States in 1890, as estimated by such officials jointly, shall be considered for the purposes of subdivision (a) of section 11 as having been determined by the United States Census of 1890 to have been born in the country to which such colony or dependency belongs, or which administered such protectorate.

(a) In case of changes in political boundaries in foreign countries occurring subsequent to 1890 and resulting in the
creation of new countries, the governments of which are recognized by the United States, or in the establishment of self-governing dominions, or in the transfer of territory from one country to another, such transfer being recognized by the United States, or in the surrender by one country of territory, the transfer of which to another country has not been recognized by the United States, or in the administration of territories under mandate, (1) such officials, jointly, shall estimate the number of individuals resident in continental United States in 1890 who were born within the area included in such new countries, or self-governing dominions, or in such territory as transferred or surrounded or administered under a mandate, and revise (for the purposes of subdivision (a) of section 11) the population basis as to each country involved in such change of political boundary, and (2) if such changes in political boundaries occur after the determination provided for in subdivision (a) of section 11 has been proclaimed, such officials, jointly, shall revise such determination, but only as far as necessary to allot the quotas among the countries involved in such change of political boundary. For the purpose of such revision and for the purpose of determining the nationality of an immigrant, (a) aliens born in the area included in any such new country or self-governing dominion shall be considered as having been born in such country or dominion, and aliens born in any territory as transferred shall be considered as having been born in the country to which such territory was transferred, and (b) territory as surrounded or administered under a mandate shall be treated as a separate country. Such treatment of territory administered under a mandate shall not constitute consent by the United States to the proposed mandate where the United States has not consented in a treaty to the administration of the territory by a mandatory power.

(a) The statements, estimates, and revisions provided in this section shall be made annually, but for any fiscal year for which quotas are in effect as proclaimed under subdivision (a) of section 11, shall be made only (1) for the purpose of determining the nationality of immigrants seeking admission to the United States during such year, or (2) for the purposes of clause (2) of subdivision (c) of this section.

(b) Such officials shall, jointly, report annually to the President the quotas of each nationality under subdivision (a) of section 11, together with the statements, estimates, and revisions provided for in this section. The President, shall proclaim and make known the quotas as reported and thereafter such quotas shall continue, with the same effect as if specifically stated herein, for all fiscal years except those years for which such quotas are in effect as proclaimed under subdivision (a) of section 11, and shall be final and conclusive for every purpose.

(902, 212).
832. 13. (a) No immigrant shall be admitted to the United States unless he (1) has an unexpired immigration visa or was born subsequent to the issuance of the immigration visa of the accompanying parent, (2) is of the nationality specified in the visa in the immigration visa, (3) is a non-quota immigrant if specified in the visa in the immigration visa as such, and (4) is otherwise admissible under the immigration laws.

(b) In such classes of cases and under such conditions as may be by regulations prescribed immigrants who have been locally admitted to the United States or who depart therefrom temporarily may be admitted to the United States without being required to obtain an immigration visa.

(c) No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States unless such alien (1) is admissible as a non-quota immigrant under the provisions of subdivisions (b), (a), or (a) of section 4, or (2) is the wife, or the unmarried child under 16 years of age, of an immigrant admissible under such subdivision (a), and is accompanying or following to join him, or (3) is not an immigrant as defined in section 3.

(d) The Secretary of Labor may admit to the United States any otherwise admissible immigrant not admissible under clauses (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) of this section, if satisfied that such inadmissibility was not known to, and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence by such immigrant prior to the departure of the vessel from the last port outside the United States and outside foreign contiguous territory, or, in the case of an immigrant coming from foreign contiguous territory, prior to the application for the immigrant for admission.

(e) No quota immigrant shall be admitted under subdivision (a) if the entire number of immigration visas which may be issued to quota immigrants of the same nationality for the fiscal year has already been issued. If such entire number of immigration visas has not been issued, then the Secretary of State, upon the admission of a quota immigrant under subdivision (a), shall reduce by one the number of immigration visas which may be issued to quota immigrants of the same nationality during the fiscal year in which such immigrant is admitted; but if the Secretary of State finds that it will not be practicable to make such reduction before the end of such fiscal year, then such immigrant shall not be admitted.

(f) Nothing in this section shall authorize the remission
Refunding of a fine, liability to which has occurred under Section 16.

Section 213.

DEPORTATION

330. 11. Any alien who at any time after entering the United States is found to have been at the time of entry not entitled under this act to enter the United States, or to have remained therein for a longer time than permitted under this act or regulations made thereunder, shall be taken into custody and deported in the same manner as provided for in Sections 19 and 20 of the Immigration Act of 1917. Provided, that the Secretary of Labor may, under such conditions and restrictions as to support and care as he may deem necessary, permit permanently to remain in the United States, any alien child who, when under 16 years of age was herefore temporarily admitted to the United States or who is now within the United States as either of whose parents is a citizen of the United States.

Section 214.

MAINTENANCE OF EXEMPT STATUS

330. 15. The admission to the United States of an alien exempt from the class of immigrants by clause (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of Section 3, or excluded to be a non-quota immigrant by subdivision (e) of Section 4, shall be for such time as may be by regulations prescribed, and under such conditions as may be by regulations prescribed (including, when deemed necessary for the classes mentioned in clause (2), (3), (4), or (6) of Section 3, the giving of bond with sufficient surety, in such sum and containing such conditions as may be by regulations prescribed) to insure that, at the expiration of such time or upon failure to maintain the status under which admitted, he will depart from the United States.

Section 215.

PENALTY FOR ILLEGAL TRANSPORTATION

330. 16. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person, including any transportation company, or the owner, agent, charterer, or consignee of any vessel, to bring to the United States by water from any place outside thereof (other than foreign contiguous territory) (1) any immigrant who does not have an unexpired immigration visa, or (2) any quota immigrant having an immigration visa the visa in which specifies him as a non-quota immigrant.

(b) If it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of labor that any immigrant has been as brought, such person, or transportation company, or the master, agent, owner, charterer, or consignee of any such vessel, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located the sum of $1,000 for each immigrant as brought, and in addition a sum equal to that paid by such immigrant for his transportation from the initial point of departure, indicated in his ticket, to the port of arrival, such latter sum to be delivered by the collector of customs to the immigrant whose account assessed. No vessel shall be granted clearance pending the determination of the liability to the payment of such sums, or while such sums remain unpaid, except that clearance may be granted prior to the determination of such question upon the deposit of an amount sufficient to cover such sums, or of a bond with sufficient security to assure the payment thereof approved by the collector of customs.

(o) Such sums shall not be remitted or refunded, unless it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Labor that such person, and the owner, master, agent, charterer, and consignee of the vessel, prior to the departure of the vessel from the port outside the United States, did not know, and could not have ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence, (1) that the individual transported was an immigrant, if the fine was imposed for bringing an immigrant without an unexpired immigration visa, or (2) that the individual transported was a quota immigrant, if the fine was imposed for bringing a quota immigrant the visa in whose immigration visa specified him as being a non-quota immigrant.

SEC. 17. The Commissioner General, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, shall have power to enter into contracts with transportation lines for the entry and inspection of aliens coming to the United States from or through foreign contiguous territory. In prescribing rules and regulations and making contracts for the entry and inspection of aliens applying for admission from or through foreign contiguous territory due care shall be exercised to avoid any discriminatory action in favor of transportation companies transporting to such territory aliens destined to the United States, and all such transportation companies shall be required, as a condition precedent to the inspection or examination under such rules and contracts, at the ports of such contiguous territory of aliens brought thereto by them, to submit to and comply with all the requirements of this act which would apply were they bringing such aliens directly to ports of the United States. After this section takes effect no alien applying for

ENTRY FROM FOREIGN CONTIGUOUS TERRITORY

SEC. 17. The Commissioner General, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, shall have power to enter into contracts with transportation lines for the entry and inspection of aliens coming to the United States from or through foreign contiguous territory. In prescribing rules and regulations and making contracts for the entry and inspection of aliens applying for admission from or through foreign contiguous territory due care shall be exercised to avoid any discriminatory action in favor of transportation companies transporting to such territory aliens destined to the United States, and all such transportation companies shall be required, as a condition precedent to the inspection or examination under such rules and contracts, at the ports of such contiguous territory of aliens brought thereto by them, to submit to and comply with all the requirements of this act which would apply were they bringing such aliens directly to ports of the United States. After this section takes effect no alien applying for

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admission from or through foreign contiguous territory (except an alien previously lawfully admitted to the United States who is returning from a temporary visit to such territory) shall be permitted to enter the United States unless upon proving that he was brought to such territory by a transportation company which had submitted to the consular an all the requirements of this act, or that he entered, or has resided, in such territory for more than two years prior to the time of his application for admission to the United States.

(See. 217.)

UNUSUAL IMMIGRATION VISAS

330. 18. If a quota immigrant of any nationality having an immigration visa is excluded from admission to the United States under the immigration laws and deported, or does not apply for admission to the United States before the expiration of the validity of the immigration visa, or if an alien of any nationality having an immigration visa issues to him as a quota immigrant is found not to be a quota immigrant, no additional immigration visa shall be issued in lieu thereof to any other immigrant.

(See. 218.)

ALIEN SEAMEN

SEC. 19. No alien seaman excluded from admission into the United States under the immigration laws and employed on board any vessel arriving in the United States from any place outside thereof shall be permitted to land in the United States, except temporarily for medical treatment, or pursuant to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe for the ultimate departure, removal, or deportation of such alien from the United States.

(See. 166.)

SEC. 20. (a) The owner, charterer, agent, consignee, or master of any vessel arriving in the United States from any place outside thereof shall fail to detain on board any alien seaman employed on such vessel until the immigration officer in charge of the port of arrival has inspected such seaman (which inspection in all cases shall include a personal physical examination by the medical examiner), or shall fail to detain such seaman on board after such inspection to deport such seaman if required by such immigration officer or the Secretary of Labor to do so, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located the sum of $1,000 for each alien seaman in respect of whom such failure occurs. No vessel shall be granted clearance pending the determination of the liability.
admission from or through foreign contiguous territory (except an alien previously lawfully admitted to the United States who is returning from a temporary visit to such territory) shall be permitted to enter the United States unless upon proving that he was brought to such territory by a transportation company which had submitted to and complied with all the requirements of this Act, or that he entered, or has resided in such territory more than two years prior to the time of his application for admission to the United States. 
(See, Sec. 217.)

**UNUSUAL ADMISSION VISAS**

330. 18. If a quota immigrant of any nationality having an immigration visa is excluded from admission to the United States under the immigration laws and departures, or does not apply for admission to the United States before the expiration of the validity of the immigration visa, or if an alien of any nationality having an immigration visa issued to him as a quota immigrant is found not to be a quota immigrant, no additional immigration visa shall be issued in lieu thereof to any other immigrant. 
(See, Sec. 218.)

**ALIEN SEAMEN**

Sec. 19. No alien seaman excluded from admission into the United States under the immigration laws and employed on board any vessel arriving in the United States from any place outside thereof, shall be permitted to land in the United States, except temporarily for medical treatment, or pursuant to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe for the ultimate departure, removal, or deportation of such alien from the United States. 
(See, Sec. 166.)

Sec. 20. (a) The owner, charterer, agent, consignee, or master of any vessel arriving in the United States from any place outside thereof who fails to detain on board any alien seaman, employed on such vessel until the immigration officer in charge of the port of arrival has inspected such seaman (which inspection in all cases shall include a personal physical examination by the medical examiners), or who fails to deliver such seaman on board after such inspection or to deport such seaman if required by such immigration officer or the Secretary of Labor, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located the sum of $1,000 for each alien seaman in respect of whom such failure occurs. No vessel shall be granted clearance pending the determination of the liability
to the payment of such fine, or while the fine remains unpaid, except that clearance may be granted prior to the determination of such question upon the deposit of a sufficiency to cover such fine, or in bonds with sufficient surety to secure the payment thereof approved by the collector of customs.

(b) That an alien cannot appear upon the outgoing manifest of the vessel on which he arrived in the United States from any place outside thereof, or that he was reported by the master of such vessel as a deserter, shall be prima facie evidence of a failure to obtain or depart after requirement by the immigration officer or the Secretary of Labor.

(c) If the Secretary of Labor finds that deportation of the alien seaman on the vessel on which he arrived would cause undue hardship to such seaman, he may cause him to be deported on another vessel at the expense of the vessel on which he arrived, and such vessel shall not be granted clearance until such expenses have been paid or its payment guaranteed to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Labor.

(d) Section 32 of the Immigration Act of 1917 is repealed, but shall remain in force as to all vessels, their owners, agents, consignees, and masters, and as to all seamen arriving in the United States prior to the enactment of this act.

Sect. 21. (a) Permits issued under section 10 shall be printed on distinctive safety paper and shall be prepared and issued under regulations prescribed under this act.

(b) The Public Printer is authorized to print for sale to the public by the Superintendent of Documents, upon payment, additional copies of blank forms of manifests and crew lists to be prescribed by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the provisions of sections 12, 13, 14 and 36 of the Immigration Act of 1917.

Sect. 22. (a) Any person who knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to have been procured by means of any false claim or statement, or to have been otherwise
prosecuted for fraud or unlawfully obtained; or who, except under direction of the Secretary of Labor or his proper officer, knowingly (3) possesses any blank visa, (4) makes, sells, brings, into the United States, or has in his control or possession any plate in the likeness of a plate designed for the printing of permits, (5) makes any print, photostat, or impression in the likeness of any immigration visa or permit, or (6) has in his possession a distinctive paper which has been adopted by the Secretary of Labor for the printing of immigration visas or permits, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

(h) Any individual who (1) when applying for an immigration visa or permit, or for admission to the United States, represents another or falsifies appears in the name of a deceased individual, or attempts or attempts to evade the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed or fictitious name, or (2) sells or otherwise disposes of, or .frees to sell or otherwise dispose of, or utter, an immigration visa or permit, to any person not authorized by law to receive such document, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

(o) Whoever knowingly makes under oath any false statement in any application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

(see, 220.)

BURDEN OF PROOF

Sec. 25. Whenever any alien attempts to enter the United States the burden of proof shall be upon such alien to establish that he is not subject to exclusion under any provision of the immigration laws; and in any deportation proceeding against any alien the burden of proof shall be upon such alien to show that he entered the United States lawfully, and the time, place, and manner of such entry into the United States, but in presenting such proof he shall be entitled to the production of his immigration visa, if any, or of other documents concerning such entry, in the custody of the Department of Labor.

(see, 221)

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Sec. 24. The Commissioner General, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, shall prescribe rules and regulations for the enforcement of the provisions of this act; but all such rules
and regulations, in so far as they relate to the administration of this act (by an order issued, shall be prescribed by the Secretary of State, on the recommendation of the Secretary of Labor. (sec. 222.)

Sec. 25. The provisions of this act are in addition to and not in substitution for the provisions of the immigration laws, and shall be enforced as a part of such laws, and all the terms or other provisions of such laws, not inconsistent, shall apply to and be enforced in connection with the provisions of this act. In alien, although admitted under the provisions of this act, shall not be admitted to the United States if he is excluded by any provision of the immigration laws other than this act, and an alien, although admitted under the provisions of the immigration laws other than this act, shall not be admitted to the United States if he is excluded by any provision of this act. (sec. 225.)

EMERGENCY IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1917 ACT

Sec. 26. (Amends sec. 9 of immigration act of 1917.) (sec. 115.)

Sec. 27. (Amends sec. 10 of immigration act of 1917.) (sec. 116.)

GENERAL DEFINITIONS

Sec. 28. As used in this act—

(a) The term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, means the States, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Porto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and the term "continental United States" means the States and the District of Columbia;

(b) The term "alien" includes any individual not a native-born or naturalized citizen of the United States, but this definition shall not be held to include Indians of the United States not taxed, nor citizens or the islands under the jurisdiction of the United States;

(c) The term "ineligible to citizenship", when used in reference to any individual, includes a individual who is disqualified from becoming a citizen of the United States under section 2169 of the Revised Statutes, or under section 1 of the act entitled "in act to execute certain treaty stipulations relative to Chinese," approved May 6, 1882, or under section 1996, 1997, or 1998 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, or under section 2 of the act entitled "in act to authorize the President to increase ..."
Section 25. The provisions of this act are in addition to and not in substitution for the provisions of the immigration laws, and shall be enforced as a part of such laws, and all other provisions of such laws, not inconsistent, shall apply to and be construed in connection with the provisions of this act. An alien, although admitted under the provisions of this act, shall not be admitted to the United States if he is excluded by any provision of the immigration laws other than this act, and an alien, although admitted under the provisions of the immigration laws other than this act, shall not be admitted to the United States if he is excluded by any provision of this act.

Section 26. (Amends sec. 9 of immigration act of 1917.)

Section 27. (Amends sec. 10 of immigration act of 1917.)

Section 28. As used in this act —

(a) The term "United States," when used in a geographical sense, means the states, the territories of Alaska and Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Porto Rico, and the Virgin Islands; and the term "continental United States" means the states and the District of Columbia;

(b) The term "alien" includes any individual not a native-born or naturalized citizen of the United States, but this definition shall not be held to include Indians of the United States, nor citizens of the islands under the jurisdiction of the United States;

(c) The term "ineligible to citizenship," when used in reference to any individual, includes an individual who is disqualified from becoming a citizen of the United States under section 2169 of the Revised Statutes, or under section 1 of the act entitled "an act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to China," approved May 6, 1882, or under section 1996, 1907, or 1998 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, or under section 2 of the act entitled "an act to authorize the President to increase
to amend the Military Establishment of the United States," approved May 18, 1917, amended, or under law supplementary of, supplementary to, or in substitution for, any of such sections;

(a) The term "immi. ration visa" means an immigration visa issued by a consular officer under the provisions of this act;

(b) The term "consular officer" means any consular or diplomatic officer of the United States designated, under regulations prescribed under this act, for the purpose of issuing immigration visas under this act. In case of the Canal Zone and the Insular Possessions of the United States the term "consular officer" (as used in section 20) means an officer designated by the President, or by his authority, for the purpose of issuing immigration visas under this act;

(c) The term "immigration act of 1917" means the act of February 5, 1917, entitled "An act to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States";

(d) The term "immigration law" includes such act, this act, and all laws, conventions, and treaties of the United States relating to the immigration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens;

(e) The term "person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations;

(f) The term "Commissioner General" means the Commissioner General of Immigration;

(g) The term "application for admission" has reference to the application for admission to the United States and not to the application for the issuance of the immigration visa;

(h) The term "permit" means a permit issued under section 10;

(i) The term "unmarried," when used in reference to any individual as of any time, means an individual who at such time is not married, whether or not previously married;

(j) The terms "child," "father," and "mother," do not include a child or parent by adoption unless the adoption took place prior to January 1, 1924;

(k) The terms "wife" and "husband" do not include a wife or husband by reason of a proxy or picture marriage.

(see, 224,)
AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION

SEC. 29. The appropriation of such sums as may be necessary for the enforcement of this act is hereby authorized.

(See 225.)

Act on May 10, 1921

SEC. 30. The act entitled "An act to limit the immigration of aliens into the United States, approved May 19, 1921, as amended and extended, shall, notwithstanding its expiration on June 30, 1924, remain in force thereafter for the immigration, collection, and enforcement of all penalties that may have accrued theretofore, and any alien who prior to July 1, 1924, may have entered the United States in violation of such act or regulations made thereunder may be deported in the same manner as if such act had not expired.

(See 229.)

TIME OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 31. (a) Sections 2, 8, 13, 14, 15 and 16, and subdivision (d) of section 11, shall take effect on July 1, 1924, except that immigration visas and permits may be issued prior to that date, which shall not be valid for admission to the United States on or after July 1, 1924. In the case of quotas for immigrants of any nationality, the number of immigration visas to be issued prior to July 1, 1924, shall not be in excess of 10 per centum of the quota for such nationality, and the number of immigration visas as issued shall be deducted from the number which may be issued during the month of July, 1924. In the case of immigration visas issued before July 1, 1924, the four-month period referred to in subdivision (a) of section 2 shall begin to run on July 1, 1924, instead of at the time of the issuance of the immigration visa.

(b) The remainder of this act shall take effect upon its enactment,

(c) If any alien arrives in the United States before July 1, 1924, his right to admission shall be determined without regard to the provisions of this act, except section 23.
Sect. 32. If any provision of this act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the act, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Approved, May 26, 1921.
(39a, 226.)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity


Signed at Tokyo,

on this 26th day of August, 1946.

(signed) Y. Yosai
Chief Archivist

Witness: (signature) Japanese Official
January 27, 1935

The Bishop Reifsniders, Just returned from America, and the "alter Edges, on their way around the world, came to tea. Reifsnider told me of his talks with Hull, Castle, and others, chiefly with regard to a repeal of the discriminatory provisions of the Exclusion Act of 1924. He tried to see Hearst in California to ascertain his attitude, but Hearst was ill and couldn't see him. I do not think that this is the time to approach the question; of course the Act always rankles and always will, but to repeal the discriminatory provisions now would be interpreted by many as an indication of weakness and as a desire to placate the martial spirit of Japan, and while lovely editorials would be written about our graceful action in recognizing Japan as an equal, it would not in the slightest degree alter Japanese policy or tone down the military propaganda. On the contrary I can see some Japanese writers arguing that having recognized Japan as an equal on the immigration issue, it would now be all the more appropriate and logical for us to recognize her as an equal on the naval issue. Besides, who can ever predict with certainty that any bill will pass the Senate? We thought our Lausanne Treaty with Turkey secure, and, so far as I am aware, the administration thought the World Court Protocol would pass, yet both were defeated. To bring up the repeal of the discriminatory provisions of the Exclusion Act and to have the effort fail would be disastrous. Better let things lie for the present.
承認スル米国ノ寛大ナ措置ニ付テハ美耐何ザレバ彼ノ條件ヲ検討スルル

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第一五三長

-2-
EXCHANGE OF NOTES.

Dated at Peking, January 20, 1925.
Published February 27, 1925.

Peking, January 20th, 1925.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour on behalf of my Government to declare that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the work which is now being carried on by the Japanese in Northern Sakhalin both in the oil and the coal fields, as stated in the Memorandum handed to the Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the Japanese Plenipotentiary on August 29th, 1924, be continued until the conclusion of the Concession Contracts to be effected within five months from the date of the complete evacuation of Northern Sakhalin by the Japanese troops, provided the following conditions be abided by by the Japanese:

1) The work must be continued in strict accordance with the date of the said Memorandum of August 29th, 1924, as regards the area, the number of workers and experts employed, the machinery and other conditions provided in the Memorandum.

2) The produce such as oil and coal cannot be exported or sold and may only be applied to the use of the staff and equipment connected with the said work.

3) The permission granted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the continuation of the work shall in no way affect the stipulations of the future concession contract.
The question of operation of the Japanese wireless stations in Northern Sakhalin is reserved for future arrangement, and will be adjusted in a manner consistent with the existing laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prohibiting private and foreign establishment of the wireless stations.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you, Monsieur le Ministre, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) L. YANAYAN.

His Excellency
Mr. KENKICHI YOSHIZAKI,
Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary
of Japan.
Féking, January 20th, 1925.

Monsieur l'ambassadeur,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the following Note from Your Excellency, under this date:

"Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour on behalf of my Government to declare that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the work which is now being carried on by the Japanese in Northern Sakhalin both in the oil and the coal fields, as stated in the memorandum handed to the Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the Japanese Plenipotentiary on August 28th, 1924, be continued until the conclusion of the Concession Contracts to be effected within five months from the date of the complete evacuation of Northern Sakhalin by the Japanese troops, provided the following conditions be abided by by the Japanese:

1. The work must be continued in strict accordance with the data of the said memorandum of August 28th, 1924, as regards the area, the number of workers and experts employed, the machinery and other conditions provided in the memorandum.

2. The produce such as oil and coal cannot be exported or sold and may only be applied to the use of the staff and equipment connected with the said work.

3. The permission granted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the continuation
of the work shall in no way affect the stipulations of the future Concession Contract.

4. The question of operation of the Japanese wireless stations in Northern Sakhalin is reserved for future arrangement, and will be adjusted in manner consistent with the existing laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prohibiting private and foreign establishment of wireless stations."

On behalf of my Government, I have the honour to state that the Japanese Imperial Government agrees entirely with the said Note.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) K. YOSHIZAWA.

His Excellency

Mr. LVY MIKHAILOVITCH KARAKHAN,
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity


Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of Sept., 1946

(Signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

witness: (Signed) Nagaharu OD0
行文

北野八幡宮

北野神社

北野大社

北野坐敷

北野照市場

北野天満宮

北野天神

北野御霊神社

北野本宮

北野天満宮

北野天照大神

北野天満宮

北野天照大神

北野天満宮
PROTOCOL (A)

Signed at Peking, January 20, 1925.
Promulgated February 27, 1925.

Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in proceeding this day to the signature of the Convention embodying Basic Rules of the relations between them, have deemed it advisable to regulate certain questions in relation to the said Convention, and have, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agreed upon the following stipulations:

ARTICLE 1.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to place in the possession of the other Party the movable and immovable property belonging to the Embassy and Consulates of such other party and actually existing within its own territories.

In case it is found that the land occupied by the former Russian Government at Tokyo is so situated as to cause difficulties to the town planning of Tokyo or to the service of the public purposes, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be willing to consider the proposals which may be made by the Japanese Government looking to the removal of such difficulties.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall accord to the Government of Japan all reasonable facilities in the selection of suitable sites and buildings for the Japanese Embassy and Consulates to be established in the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
ARTICLE 2.

It is agreed that all questions of the debts due to the Government or subjects of Japan on account of public loans and treasury bills issued by the former Russian Governments, to wit by the Imperial Governments of Russia and the provisional Government which succeeded it, are reserved for adjustment at subsequent negotiations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Provided that in the adjustment of such questions, the Government or subjects of Japan shall not, all other conditions being equal, be placed in any position less favourable than that which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may accord to the Government or nationals of any other country on similar questions.

It is also agreed that all questions relating to claims of the Government of either Party to the Government of the other, or of the nationals of either Party to the Government of the other, are reserved for adjustment at subsequent negotiations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE 3.

In view of climatic conditions in Northern Sakhalin preventing the immediate homeward transportation of Japanese troops now stationed there, these troops shall be completely withdrawn from the said region by May 15, 1925.

Such withdrawal shall be commenced as soon as climatic conditions will permit it and any and all districts in Northern Sakhalin so evacuated by Japanese troops shall immediately thereupon be restored in full
sovereignty to the proper authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The detail pertaining to the transfer of administration and to the termination of the occupation shall be arranged at Alexandrovsk between the Commander of the Japanese Occupation Army and the Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE 4.

The High Contracting Parties mutually declare that there actually exists no treaty or agreement of military alliance nor any other secret agreement which either of them has entered into with any third party and which constitutes an infringement upon, or a menace to, the sovereignty, territorial rights or national safety of the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 5.

The present Protocol is to be considered as ratified with the ratification of the Convention embodying Basic Rules of the Relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed under the same date.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol in duplicate in the English language, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Peking, this Twenty-first Day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Five.

K. YOSHIZAWA.                      L. KARAKHAN.
(L.S.)                             (L.S.)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity


Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of Sept., 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Na.charu Odo
日本側所承認及びハチ個々ノ航海命令ヲmandoハノクハノ元ノ如シテ日本側ハスノハハノ
日本側ハトノ交渉ヲ始シタル日本語及ハソウイエート社会主
3
3
PROTOCOL (B)

Signed at Peking January 20, 1925,
Proc.ul_etc. February 27, 1925.

The High Contracting Parties have agreed upon the following as the basis for the Concession Contracts to be concluded within five months from the date of the complete evacuation of Northern Sakhalen by Japanese troops, as provided for in Article 3 of Protocol (A) signed this day between the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to grant to Japanese concerns recommended by the Government of Japan the concession for the exploitation of 50% in area, of each of the oil fields in Northern Sakhalen which are mentioned in the Memorandum submitted to the Representative of the Union by the Japanese Representative on August 29th, 1924.

For the purpose of determining the area to be leased to the Japanese concerns for such exploitation, each of the said oil fields shall be divided into checker-board squares of from fifteen to forty desiatines each, and a number of these squares representing 50% of the whole area shall be allotted to the Japanese, it being understood that the squares to be so leased to the Japanese are, as a rule, to be non-contiguous to one another, but shall include all the wells now being drilled or worked by the Japanese. With regard to the remaining unleased lots of the oil fields mentioned in the said Memorandum, it is agreed that should the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decide to offer such lots, wholly or in part, for foreign conces-
2. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also agrees to authorize Japanese concerns recommended by the Government of Japan to prospect oil fields, for a period of from five to ten years, on the Eastern coast of Northern Sakhalien over an area of one thousand square versts to be selected within one year after the conclusion of Concession Contracts, and in case oil fields shall have been established in consequence of such prospecting by the Japanese, the Concession for the exploitation of 50%, in area, of the oil fields so established shall be granted to the Japanese.

3. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to grant to Japanese concerns recommended by the Government of Japan the concession for the exploitation of coal fields on the Western coast of Northern Sakhalien over a specific area which shall be determined in the Concession Contracts. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics further agrees to grant to such Japanese concerns the concession regarding coal fields in the Dvina district over a specific area to be determined in the Concession Contracts. With regard to the coal fields outside the specific area mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs, it is also agreed that should the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decide to offer them for foreign concession, Japanese concerns shall be afforded equal opportunity in the matter of such concession.
4. The period of the concession for the exploitation of oil and coal fields stipulated in the preceding paragraphs shall be from forty to fifty years.

5. As royalty for the said concessions, the Japanese concessionnaires shall make over annually to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in case of coal fields, from 5 to 8 percent of their gross output, and, in case of oil fields, from 5 to 15 percent of their gross output; provided that in the case of a gusher, the royalty may be raised up to 45 percent of its gross output.

The percentage of output thus to be made over as royalty shall be definitively fixed in the Concession Contracts and it may be graduated according to the scale of annual output in a manner to be defined in such Contracts.

6. The said Japanese concerns shall be permitted to fell trees needed for purpose of the enterprises and to set up various undertakings with a view to facilitating communication and transportation of materials and products. Details connected therewith shall be arranged in the Concession Contracts.

7. In consideration of the royalty abovementioned and taking also into account the disadvantages under which the enterprises are to be placed by reason of the geographical position and other general conditions of the districts affected it is agreed that the importation and exportation of any articles, materials or products needed for or obtained from such enterprises shall be permitted free of duty, and that the enterprises shall not be subjected to any such taxation or restriction as may in fact render their remunerative working impossible.
8. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall accord all reasonable protection and facilities to the said enterprises.

9. Details connected with the foregoing Articles shall be arranged in the Concession Contracts.

The present Protocol is to be considered as ratified with the ratification of the Convention embodying Basic Rules of the Relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed under the same date.

In witness thereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol in duplicate in the English Language, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Peking, this Twentieth Day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Five.

K. YOSHIZAWA. L. KARAKHAN.
(L. S.) (L. S.)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAYASHI, Kacru, Chief of archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English hereto attached, consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Protocol (B) relations to Concussion Contracts between Japan & S.C.R. Signed at Peking; Jan. 20, 1925 Promulgated Feb. 27, 1925" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 19th day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) K.K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Naoharu Odo
 documento el cual no puede ser leído de manera natural.
第1節　既往検診結果

患者は、過去の健康診断において、何ら重大な疾患を有していないとの診断がなされており、特に肺結核、肝炎、肝硬変、糖尿病、高血圧、動脈硬化症、心筋症、慢性閉塞性肺疾患、精神障害、腫瘍、結核などにいたるまで、何ら問題は認められていません。

第2節　現病歴

患者は、約1週間前から低熱、喉頭痛、乾咳を主訴とし、自宅でのゆっくりとしたリラクゼーションを送っていたが、症状が悪化し、発熱範囲が増大し、また、痰の産生が増加し、息切れ、心拍数の増加を伴っていた。

第3節　現症

患者の現在の症状を確認すると、発熱、頭痛、喉頭痛、乾咳、痰の産生、息切れ、心拍数の増加を認めた。}

(DSF. DOC. #47)
DECLARATION

Dated at Peking, January 20, 1925.
Published February 27, 1925.

In proceeding this day to the signature of the Convention embodying the Basic Rules of the Relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the undersigned Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honour to declare that the recognition by his Government of the validity of the treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905, does not in any way signify that the Government of the Union shares with the former Tsarist Government the Political responsibility for the conclusion of the said Treaty.

L. KARAKHAN.
(L. S.)

Peking.
January 20, 1925.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English hereto attached, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Declaration of L. Karakhan of U.S.S.R. concerning Convention between Japan & U.S.S.R. Dated at Peking Jan. 20, 1925. Published Feb. 27, 1925." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of Sept., 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo
Dated at Peking, January 20, 1925.
Published February 27, 1925.

In proceeding this day to the signature of the Convention embodying Basic Rules of the Relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the undersigned Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honour to tender hereby to the Government of Japan an expression of sincere regrets for the Nikolaievsk incident of 1920.

L. KARAKHAN.
(L. S.)

Peking.
January 20th, 1925.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I. Hayashi, Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English hereto attached, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Annexed Note (to Convention between Japan and U.S.S.R.), signed L. Kerakhen, Dated at Peking Jan. 20, 1925. Published Feb. 27, 1925," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
2nd day of Sept., 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

witness: Numaharu Odo
PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE.
Signed at Peking, January 20, 1925,
Published February 27, 1925.

Kenkichi Yoshizawa, His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China, and Lev Mikhailovitch Karakhan, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to China, authorized under their respective full powers found in due and good form, met this day at Peking, and closely examined the following documents:

2. Two Protocols.
3. One Declaration.
4. One set of Notes.
5. One annexed Note.

Having agreed upon every term and stipulation contained therein, the Plenipotentiaries have officially signed and sealed the respective documents.

The Two Plenipotentiaries further agreed that there should be appended to the present Protocol the Memorandum, handed by the Japanese Plenipotentiary to the Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on August 29th, 1924, and embodying a statement on the conditions of oil and coal fields worked by the Japanese in Northern Sakhalin.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Two High Contracting Parties have signed the present Protocol
in the English language, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Peking this Twentieth Day of January One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five.

K. YOSHIZAWA, L. KARAFHAW
( L. S. ) ( L. S. )
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

T. HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese
Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English
hereto attached, consisting of 2 pages and entitled
"Protocol of Signature between L. Korukhan of U. S. S. R.
and Kenkichi Yoshisawa of Japan. Signed at Peking Jan 20, 1925.
Published Feb. 27, 1925."
is an exact and true copy of an official document of the
Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
2nd day of Sept., 1946

(Signed) T. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Kiyoharu ODO
FISHING CONVENTION BETWEEN JAPAN AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

Signed at Moscow, January 23, 1928.
Pallified May 22, 1928.
Notifications exchanged at Tokyo, May 23, 1928.
Promulgated May 25, 1928.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the purpose of concluding a Fishery Convention in conformity with the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention embodying 'basic rules of the Relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded at Peking on January 20th, 1926, have named their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:
TOKICHI TANAKA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Shōzō, a member of the First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
LEV MIKHAILOVICH KARA'ITAN, People's Deputy Commissary for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics grants to Japanese subjects, in conformity with the stipulations of the present Convention, the right to catch, to take and to prepare all kinds of fish and aquatic products, except fur-seals and sea-otters along the coasts of the possessions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas, with the exception of rivers and inlets. The inlets comprised in this exception are enumerated in Article 1 of the Protocol (A) attached to the present Convention.

Japanese subjects are at liberty to engage in catching, taking and preparing fish and aquatic products in the fishery lots, both in the sea and on shore, which are specifically designated for that purpose. The lease of the said fishery lots shall be granted by public auction, without any discrimination being made between Japanese subjects and citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
It is understood, however, that, as an exception to the foregoing, those fishery lots for which the Governments of the two High Contracting Parties have so agreed may be leased without auction.

The auction of fishery lots shall take place at Vladivostok in February every year, and the date and locality designated for this purpose, as well as the necessary details relating to the lease of various fishery lots to be sold, shall be officially notified to the Japanese Consular officer at Vladivostok at least two months before the auction.

With regard to fishery lots for which there shall have been no successful bidder, they shall again be put up to auction within fifteen days, but not earlier than five days, after the preceding auction.

The catching of whales and codfish, as well as of all the fish and aquatic products which can not be caught or taken in specific lots is permitted to Japanese subjects on board sea-going vessels furnished with a special licence.

ARTICLE 2.

The Japanese subjects who have obtained the lease of fishery lots in conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the present Convention shall have, within the limits of those fishery lots, the right to free use of the littoral.
They may there carry out necessary repairs to their boats and
nets, haul them ashore, and land, prepare and reserve their
catches and collections. For these purposes they shall be at
liberty to erect there buildings, warehouses, huts and drying-
sheds or to remove the same.

ARTICLE 4.

With regard to taxes, imposts and fees to be levied in
connection with the fishing industry, Japanese subjects shall
be subject to the following conditions and shall under no
circumstances be subject to any treatment less favourable than
that accorded to citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.

(1) The amount of the business tax chargeable to Japanese
subjects having fishery rights shall not exceed three
per cent of the price on the fishery grounds of fish
and aquatic products caught, taken or prepared by them.

(2) The said Japanese subjects shall be exempted from all
kinds of taxes, imposts and fees, except the business
tax and the taxes, imposts and fees mentioned in
Article 9 of the Protocol (A) attached to the present
Convention.

(3) The payment of the business tax and other taxes, im-
posts and fees may be arranged by a special agreement
between the two Governments.

(4) No taxes or imposts shall be levied on the income
of Japanese employees having their domicile in Japan and engaged in seasonal labour on fishery grounds leased to Japanese subjects.

ARTICLE 5.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall levy no duties on fish and aquatic products caught or taken in the Far Eastern waters of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whether such fish and aquatic products have or have not undergone a process of manufacture, when they are destined for export from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Japan.

ARTICLE 6.

No restriction shall be established with regard to the nationality of the employees of Japanese subjects engaged in catching, taking and preparing fish and aquatic products in the districts specified in Article 1 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 7.

So far as concerns methods of preparation of fish and aquatic products, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics engages not to impose upon the Japanese subjects who have obtained fishery rights in the districts specified in Article 1 of the present Convention any restriction from which the citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who have obtained fishery rights in the said districts are exempt.
ARTICLE 8.

The Japanese subjects who have obtained fishing rights may make use of seagoing vessels furnished with a navigation certificate issued in Japan by the competent Consular officer of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as also with a health certificate issued by the Japanese authorities, for the direct navigation from Japan to their fishery grounds, from one of their fishery grounds to another, as well as from their fishery grounds to Japan; the said vessels may also proceed from the fishery grounds direct to a third state, provided they conform to the formalities required for the exportation to the said state of the fish and aquatic products on board, caught or taken in the Far Eastern waters of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above-mentioned vessels shall be at liberty to transport, free of imposts and taxation, the persons and things necessary for the fishing industry, as also catches and collections.

The Japanese subjects who have obtained fishing rights may, free of imposts and taxation, transport by land, along shore or by sea, on board fishing boats the above-mentioned persons, things, catches and collections between their own fishing lots or vessels furnished with the license mentioned in the last paragraph of Article 2 of the present Convention.

The provisions of the present Article shall equally apply to the case when the respective holders of separate fishery lots
or licences make use of a vessel or a fishing boat jointly.

The provisions of the present Article shall apply to the removal of remaining properties in the fishery lots, the lease term of which has expired, to other fishery lots or to Japan.

The above-mentioned vessels and boats must in all other respects comply with the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which are or may be enacted respecting the coasting trade.

ARTICLE 5.

The Japanese subjects who have obtained fishery rights may freely export to Japan fish and aquatic products caught or taken by Japanese subjects, without any export-licence. They may also export such fish and aquatic products to a third state, conforming to the formalities required for the exportation thereof.

For the exportation of fish and aquatic products "own" from the state or other enterprises or citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the said Japanese subjects shall conform to the formalities required for the exportation thereof.

The said Japanese subjects are at liberty to export the necessaries solely intended for use for their fishing industry, as well as for themselves or their employers, without any import-licence.

No duties or imposts shall be levied on the importation of the goods above mentioned; the said goods as well as their quantity will be defined in the list, which shall be formulated every year in due time by the competent local authorities subject to
the approval of the central authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE 10.

With regard to the entry, stay, removal and departure of the Japanese subjects who have obtained fishing rights, as well as of their employees who are not citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the summary regulations which are or may be enacted by the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be applied in the districts specified in Article 1 of the present Convention; in all other cases, Japanese subjects shall conform to the laws and regulations which are or may be enacted concerning the entry and stay in, and departure from, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the summary regulations which are or may be enacted by the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be applied in the districts specified in Article 1 of the present Convention; in all other cases, Japanese subjects shall conform to the laws and regulations which are or may be enacted concerning the entry and stay in, and departure from, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of foreigners.

The Japanese subjects and the citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who have obtained fishing rights in the districts above mentioned shall be placed on a footing of equality as regards the laws, regulations and ordinances which are or may be enacted concerning pisciculture and the
protection of fish and aquatic products, the control of industry
and all other matters relating to fishing.

Information of newly enacted laws and regulations, applicable
to the fishing industry in the far eastern waters of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be furnished to the Japanese Government at least three months before they are put in
force; information of ordinances of the same nature newly issued
by the local authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be furnished to the Japanese Consular Office at
Khaborovsk at least two months before they are put in force.

ARTICLE 11.

Japanese subjects are at liberty to engage in the prepara-
tion of fish and aquatic products in the leased lots leased
to them outside the limits of the districts specified in
Article 1 of the present Convention, always complying with the
laws, regulations and ordinances which are or may be enacted
and applicable to all foreigners in the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.

ARTICLE 12.

The Japanese Government, in consideration of fishery rights
 accorded by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Japanese
subjects in virtue of the present Convention, engages not to
impose any import duties on fish and aquatic products caught or
taken in the far eastern waters of the Union of Soviet Socialist

- 9 -
ARTICLE 13.

Recognizing that Japanese employees, with their place of habitation in Japan, are engaged there and return there after carrying on labour in the seasonal industry of fisheries; that their habits and customs are characteristic of Japanese nationality; that free passage between Japan and fishery grounds and free rations during the whole term of engagement are granted; that a share of catches and collections is given them in addition to regular wages, and that medical aid and other means of relief are provided for free of charge;

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to conform to the above-mentioned facts in the application of its laws and regulations regarding the protection and regulation of labour, which are or may be enacted, to the labour of Japanese employees in the fishery grounds leased to Japanese subjects in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 14.

So far as concerns matters not specially dealt with in the present Convention, but yet relating to the fishery industry in the districts specified in Article 7 of the present Convention, Japanese subjects shall be entitled to the same treatment as accorded to the citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Rep-
ARTICLE 15.

The present Convention shall remain in force for eight years and shall be revised or renewed at the end of the said period; thenceforth the Convention shall be revised or renewed at the end of every twelve years.

Either of the High Contracting Parties may give notice to the other of its desire to revise the present Convention, twelve months before the termination of the Convention. Negotiations for the revision shall be concluded within the said twelve months.

Should neither of the High Contracting Parties give notice for such revision, the present Convention shall remain in force for a further period of twelve years.

ARTICLE 16.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Tokyo at as early a date as possible and in any case not later than four months after its signature.

The Convention shall come into force on the fifth day following the date of the exchange of its ratifications.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.
DOJ # 145

Done in the City of Moscow, this 33rd day of January, 1896.

I. TARA'AN (L. S.)

T. TARA'AN (L. S.)

M. LACIS (L. S.)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Naoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "FISHERY CONVENTION BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 15 November 19-6.

K. Hayashi
Signature of official

Witness: T. Sato
第三条

本条の第二条の規定に従て、漁業に於て受タル日本公民の許

日本国公民は、日本国に対し、前条に於て受タル日本国公民の許

第四条

本条の第二条の規定に従て、漁業に於て受タル日本国公民の許

日本国公民は、日本国に対し、前条に於て受タル日本国公民の許

第五条

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日本国公民は、日本国に対し、前条に於て受タル日本国公民の許
日本国産果物、野菜、漁獲品及び水産物に関する一覧表

第2条
日本国の行政官庁、地方公共団体、企業団体及び個人は、前条の規定に違反するときは、これに従って処理されるものとする。

第3条
日本国政府は、前条の規定に違反した者は、これに従って処理されるものとする。

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CERTIFICATE

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Yashiro, Azuma, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese entitled "FEDERAL COVENANT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 15 November 1950.

G. Seki
signature of official

WITNESS: T. Sato
Note of the Government of the United States to the Governments of Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan, Delivered at the Respective Foreign Offices April 13, 1928

As Your Excellency is aware, there has recently been exchanged between the Governments of France and the United States a series of notes dealing with the question of a possible international renunciation of war. The views of the two Governments have been clearly set forth in the correspondence between them.

The Government of the United States, as stated in its note of February 27, 1928, desires to see the institution of war abolished and stands ready to conclude with the French, British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments a single multilateral treaty open to subsequent adherence by any and all other Governments binding the parties thereto not to resort to war with one another.

The Government of the French Republic, while no less eager to promote the cause of world peace and to cooperate with other nations in any practical movement towards that end, has pointed out certain considerations which in its opinion must be borne in mind by those Powers which are members of the League of Nations, parties to the Treaties of Locarno, or parties to other treaties guaranteeing neutrality. By Government has not conceded that such considerations necessitate any modification of its proposal for a multilateral treaty, and is of the opinion that every nation in the world can, with a proper regard for its own interests, as well as for the interests of the entire family of nations, join in such a treaty. It believes, moreover, that the execution by France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States of a treaty solemnly renouncing war in favor of the peaceful settlement of international controversy would have tremendous moral effect and ultimately lead to the adherence of all the other governments of the world.

The discussions which have taken place between France and the United States have thus reached a point where it seems essential, if ultimate success is to be attained, that the British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments should each have an opportunity formally to decide to what extent, if any, its existing commitments constitute a bar to its participation with the United States in an unqualified renunciation of war.

In these circumstances the Government of the United States, having reached complete agreement with the Government of the French Republic as to this procedure, has instructed me formally to transmit herewith the text of M. Briand's original proposal of last June, together with copies of the notes subsequently exchanged between France and the United States on the subject of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war.
Excerpt from "Treaty for the Renunciation of War"

United States Government Printing Office

Page 194

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In these circumstances the Government of the United States, having reached complete agreement with the Government of the French Republic as to this procedure, has instructed me formally to transmit herewith for the consideration of your Government the text of M. Briand's original proposal of last June, together with copies of the notes subsequently exchanged between France and the United States on the subject of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war.
I have also been instructed by my Government to transmit herewith for consideration a preliminary draft of a treaty representing in a general way the form of treaty which the Government of the United States is prepared to sign with the French, British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments and any other Governments similarly disposed. It will be observed that the language of articles I and II of this draft treaty is practically identical with that of the corresponding articles in the treaty which M. Briand proposed to the United States.

The Government of the United States would be pleased to be informed as promptly as may be convenient whether Your Excellency's Government is in a position to give favorable consideration to the conclusion of a treaty such as that transmitted herewith, and if not, what specific modifications in the text thereof would make it acceptable.

F. 43

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Chamberlain) to the American Ambassador (Houghton) (London) May 19, 1928.

Your Excellency: Your note of the 13th April, containing the text of a draft treaty for the renunciation of war, together with copies of the correspondence between the United States and French Governments on the subject of this treaty, has been receiving sympathetic consideration at the hands of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain. A note has also been received from the French Government containing certain suggestions for discussion in connexion with the proposed treaty, and the German Government were good enough to send me a copy of the reply which has been made by them to the proposals of the United States Government.

F. 44

4. After studying the wording of article I of the United States draft, His Majesty's Government do not think that its terms exclude action which a State may be forced to take in self-defence. Mr. Kellogg has made it clear in the speech to which I have referred above that he regards the right of self-defence as inalienable, and His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that on this question no addition to the text is necessary.

F. 45

10. The language of article 1, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy renders it desirable that I should remind Your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government
in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable interests any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government.

P. 46

I have (etc.)

Austen Chamberlain

P. 51

Monsieur l'Ami, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note No. 336 of April 13th last, transmitting to me, under instructions from the Government of the United States, the preliminary draft of a proposed multilateral treaty representing in a general way a form of treaty which the Government of the United States is prepared to sign with the French, British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments and any other Governments similarly disposed, with the object of securing the renunciation of war. At the same time Your Excellency enclosed a copy of the correspondence recently exchanged between the Governments of the United States and the French Republic commencing with a proposal put forward by M. Briand in June, 1927; and you intimated that the Government of the United States desired to be informed whether the Japanese Government were in a position to give favourable consideration to the conclusion of such a treaty as that of which you enclosed a draft -- and if not, what specific modifications in the text would make it acceptable.

I beg to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Japan sympathize warmly with the high and beneficent aims of the proposal now made by the United States, which they take to imply the entire abolition of the institution of war, and that they will be glad to render their most cordial cooperation towards the attainment of that end.

The proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self defence, and nothing which is incompatible with the obligations of a series of treaties for the maintenance of the public peace, such as are embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Treaties. Accordingly the Imperial Government firmly believe that unanimous agreement on a mutually acceptable text for such a treaty as is contained in the proposal is essentially capable of realization by discussion between the six Powers referred to, and they would be happy to collaborate with cordial goodwill in the discussions with the purpose of securing what they are persuaded is the common desire of all the peoples of the world -- namely, the cessation of wars and the definite establishment among the nations cf an era of permanent and universal peace.

I await (etc.)

Bunshichi Tazawa
Minister for Foreign Affairs
The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Chamberlain) to the American Charge (Atherton)

(London,) July 18, 1928

As regards the passage in my note of the 19th May relating to certain regions of which the welfare and integrity constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety, I need only repeat that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect.

I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of the 26th April that the proposed treaty does not restrict or impair in any way the right of self-defense, as also with his opinion that each State alone is competent to decide when circumstances necessitate recourse to war for that purpose.

In the light of the foregoing explanations, His Majesty's Government in Great Britain are glad to join with the United States and with all other Governments similarly disposed in signing a definitive treaty for the renunciation of war in the form transmitted in your note of the 23rd June. They rejoice to be associated with the Government of the United States of America and the other parties to the proposed treaty in a further and signal advance in the outlawry of war.

I have (etc.)

Austen Chamberlain

(Translation)

Mr. 12050

Mexico, September 14, 1928

Mr. Ambassador, I have received note No. 52541 of August 27 last, in which Your Excellency was pleased to inform me that on that day the Governments of Germany, the United States of America, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia signed in Paris a treaty binding them to renounce war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another and to seek only by peaceful means the settlement or solution of all disputes which might arise among them.

Mexico defined its attitude still further when its Delegation, in connection with article 13 of the same project, relative to the intervention on the part of a state responsible for the execution of a treaty, against one of the parties, declared that said article was not acceptable to this country because it could not admit the possibility of intervention, stating in addition that Mexico only admitted war in self-defense. And in signing the convention in question, the Mexican Delegation made the reservation that under no circumstances did it accept said article 13.
Gentlemen: I am fully conscious that silence would best befit such a solemn occasion. What I should like, without any further words, would be to let each of you simply rise to affix his signature, in the name of his own country, to the greatest collective act born of peace. But I should be failing in my duty to my country if I did not tell you how deeply it feels the honor of welcoming the first signatories of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War.

It may be objected that this pact is not practicable; that it lacks sanctions. But does true practicability consist in excluding from the realm of facts the moral forces, amongst which is that of public opinion? In fact, the state which would risk incurring the reprobation of all its associates in the pact would run the positive risk of seeing a kind of general solidarity, gradually and spontaneously directed against it, with the redoubtable consequences which it would soon feel. And where is the country, signatory to the pact, which its leaders would assume the responsibility of exposing to such a danger? The modern law of interdependence between nations makes it incumbent upon every statesman to take for himself those memorable words of President Coolidge: "An act of war, in any part of the world, is an act that injures the interests of my country."
不破条約

英外相（ロンドン）及米大使（ハロートン）宛

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戦争ノ廃止及各國之為ハ世界全人類ノ共通ノ願望ヲ確実ナリ支

以テ右政論ヲ於テ誠意協議スルノを如く

外務大臣男爵

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英外相、(ロンドン)に於て、(一九二八年七月二十八日付、(三頁添筆))

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（摘录第四章）
譯注 本十八年八月二十八日パリ調印式第ニ条
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ヲ有リマセウ。然シナガ拉痛ノ質験性トイフモノハ與験ノカタモ包含

デアリマショウカ。実際本條約ノ凡テノ締盟国ノ非験ヲ畏ル事ヲ敢テ意
REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE FROM THE
SECOND COMMISSION ON OPENING OF
HOSTILITIES

(Reporter, Mr. Louis Renault)

The Russian programme contains the following topic:

Additions to be made to the provisions
of the Convention of 1899 relative to the
laws and customs of war on land—besides
others, those concerning: the opening of
hostilities, and the rights of neutrals on
land.

It was the duty of the Second Commission to study this
part of the programme; the present report, however, deals
only with 'the opening of hostilities'.

The question whether there is an obligation upon a
Government intending to make war to give notice to its adver­
sary before beginning hostilities has been discussed for
years and has given rise not only to lengthy theoretical ex­
positions but also to frequent recriminations between bellig­
erents. It would be a vain task, from the point of view that
we must take here, to review the practice in the various wars
since the beginning of the last century in an effort to de­
termined whether there is, according to positive international
law, any rule on this subject. We have only to ask ourselves
whether it is advisable to lay one down, and if so, in what
terms.

As to the first point, there can be no doubt. It is
clearly desirable that the uncertainty seen in various quar­
ers should cease. Everybody is in favour of an affirmative
answer to the first question placed before us by the presi­
dent of the second subcommission, his Excellency Mr. Asser,
in his questionnaire.1

1 The report was presented to the Second Commission in
the name of a committee of examination thus made up: presi­
dent, his Excellency Mr. Asser; members: Major-General von
Gundell, Brigadier-General Davis, Major-General Baron Giesl
von Gieslingen, his Excellency Mr. A. Beernaert, his Excell­
cy Mr. van den Heuvel, his Excellency Mr. de Bustamante,
his Excellency Mr. Brun, Mr. Louis Renault, reporter; his
Excellency Lord Reay, Lieutenant-General Sir Edmond R. Elles,
his Excellency Mr. Tadzuuki, his Excellency Mr. Eyschon, his
Excellency Lieutenant-General Jonkhoeer den Beer Portugal, his
Excellency Samad Khan, Montaub-Saltane, his Excellency Mr.
Baldman, his Excellency Mr. Carlin, Colonel Borel. Actes
et documents, vol. 1, p. 131.

2 Post, p. 507.
The subcommission has had before it a proposition of the French delegation,\(^1\) and an amendment thereto offered by the Netherlands delegation.\(^2\) The proposition and its amendment were alike in requiring a warning to be given before opening hostilities and also a notification to neutrals. The difference between them lay in the interval between the warning and hostilities, which the Netherlands delegation proposed to fix definitely. Some special questions have also been raised regarding the notification to neutrals. We shall give you an explanatory statement on these several points.

The French proposition was worded as follows:

**ARTICLE 1**

The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without a previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.

**ARTICLE 2**

The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay.

The main provision of this proposal, which was inspired by a resolution passed by the Institute of International Law at its meeting at Ghent in September, 1906, is easily justified. Two distinct cases are provided for. When a dispute occurs between two States, it will ordinarily lead to diplomatic negotiations more or less lengthy, in which each party attempts to have its pretensions recognized, or at least to secure partial satisfaction. If an agreement is not reached, one of the Powers may set forth in an ultimatum the conditions which it requires and from which it declares it will not recede. At the same time it fixes an interval within which a reply may be made and declares that, in the absence of a satisfactory answer, it will have recourse to armed force. In this case there is no surprise and no equivocation. The Power to which such an ultimatum is addressed can come to a decision with a full knowledge of the circumstances; it may give satisfaction to its adversary or it may fight.

Again, a dispute may arise suddenly, and a Power may desire to have recourse to arms without entering upon or prolonging diplomatic negotiations that it considers useless. It ought in that case to give a direct warning of its intention to its adversary, and this warning ought to be explicit.

\(^{1}\) *Actes et Documents*, vol. iii, p. 254, annex 20.

\(^{2}\) P. 908.

When an intention to have recourse to armed force is stated conditionally in an ultimatum, a reason is expressed, since war is to be the consequence of a refusal to give the satisfaction demanded. This is, however, not necessarily the case when the intention to make war is made manifest directly and without a previous ultimatum. The proposal set out above requires that reasons be assigned in this case also. A Government ought not to employ so extreme a measure as a resort to arms without giving reasons. Every one, both in the countries about to become belligerents, and also in neutral countries, should know what the war is about in order to form a judgment on the conduct of the two adversaries. Of course this does not mean that we are to cherish the illusion that the real reasons for a war will always be given; but the difficulty of definitely stating reasons, and the necessity of advancing reasons not well substantiated or out of proportion to the gravity of war itself, will naturally arrest the attention of neutral Powers and enlighten public opinion.

The warning should be previous in the sense of preceding hostilities. Shall a given length of time elapse between the receipt of the warning and the beginning of hostilities? The French proposition specifies no interval, which implies that hostilities may begin as soon as the warning has reached the adversary. The time limitation before war is begun is thus less determinable than in the case of an ultimatum. In the opinion of the French delegation the necessities of modern warfare do not allow of a requirement that the party desiring to take the aggressive should grant further time than what is absolutely indispensable to let its adversary know that force is to be employed against it.

The principle of the French proposal met with no objection and the text was voted almost unanimously by the subcommission, after the delegations of Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia had expressly declared themselves in accord with it.

The delegation of the Netherlands desired to supplement the principle as follows:

The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence until the lapse of twenty-four hours after an explicit warning, having the form of a reasoned declaration of war, or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war, has officially come to the attention of the adversary's Government.

The difference between this and the French proposal lies in requiring a fixed interval between the receipt of the warning and the opening of hostilities. The need for this delay was
explained by Colonel Michelson, speaking for the Russian delegation, in these words:

The problem of such a delay is intimately connected with the relationship which exists between the peace and war establishments of every country. Consequently a result of its adoption would be a more or less considerable reduction of expenditures. The time may not be so far distant after all when we shall be able to distinguish between the troops and other preparations for war which every country in its own sovereign judgment deems requisite in its political situation and those that it is compelled to maintain solely through the necessity of being constantly in readiness for fighting. By establishing a certain interval between the rupture of peaceful relations and the beginning of hostilities, an opportunity would be afforded to such countries as may desire it to realize certain economies during times of peace. It is undeniable that these economies would be beneficial in every way, and could not fail to bring about a great relief from the burden of peace armies, a relief all the more acceptable because it would in no way affect the right of each nation to fix its own forces and armament solely in accordance with its own views and needs.

There is still another advantage to be derived from the proposed delay. It would leave to friendly and neutral Powers some precious time which they could use in making efforts to bring about a reconciliation, or to persuade the disputants to submit their causes of difference to the High Court of Arbitration here. But, while speaking of this subject of a delay, we must not lose sight of what is at present possible.

The idea of any considerable delay is not yet developed in the consciences of the people of the nations. Consequently it would perhaps not be wise to go too far with our desires, in order that we may not get beyond what is really possible in practice at the present day. So let us content ourselves with accepting the delay of twenty-four hours which has been proposed by the delegation of the Netherlands. Let us leave to the future the task of the future, and merely express our hope that in the future the benefits of a still longer delay will be secured.

While the force of this reasoning is undeniable, it did not convince the majority of the commission. It did not appear consistent with military exigencies, or to give such an interval; a great advance is gained, however, in securing the admission of the need of a previous warning. Let us hope that in the future we shall make a further advance; but let us not proceed too rapidly. It is noteworthy that
the Institute of International Law,\(^\text{1}\) in its resolution referred to o\textsuperscript{circledast}, considered that it could not go so far as to suggest a definite interval, although in such a matter as this an assembly of jurists might be expected to be less conservative than an assembly of diplomats and military and naval men. It limited itself to saying: 'Hostilities shall not commence before the expiration of a delay sufficient to make it certain that the rule of previous and explicit notice cannot be considered as evaded.'\(^\text{1}\)

An obligation to make a declaration of war include the reasons therefor awakened some scruples as being contrary to provisions in some constitutions. Thus the Cuben delegates made the following statement: 'In view of the fact that paragraph 12 of Article 59 of the constitution of Cuba mentions among the powers of Congress that of declaring war, it is not possible for the delegation to subscribe to any act that does not reserve to our Congress the right to determine the form and conditions of such a declaration.' On the other hand, General Porter declared that the French proposal was not inconsistent with the provisions of the American federal constitution, under which Congress has the power to declare war. Indeed, there seems to be some misunderstanding on this point. We should make a distinction between two acts that are often confused because the same expression is used to describe both: namely, the act of deciding on war and the act of communicating this decision to the adversary. According to the constitutions the decision belongs to the sovereign or head of the State, either acting alone or in conjunction with the representatives of the people; but the notification is essentially for the executive. Since the notification closely follows the decision, they are combined under the term 'declaration', and this is especially the understanding where there is externally only one sovereign act. Bearing this in mind, it is easily shown that the French proposition voted by the subcommission is not at all inconsistent with constitutional provisions of the kind indicated. The liberty of a congress to decide on war in whatever way it chooses is not touched. Can it be supposed that war will be determined upon lightly, even though the formal resolution may not indicate the reasons, and is it too much to ask of a Government which, in execution of such a decision, declares war that it give its reasons therefor? We do not think so.

According to the second article of the French proposal, 'the existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay.' As a matter of fact, war not only modifies the relations existing between belligerents, but it also seriously affects neutral States and their citizens; it is therefore important that these be given the earliest possible notice. It is hardly to be supposed that, with the present

\(^1\)Resolutions of the Institute of International Law (New York, 1916), p. 164
rapid spread of news, much time will elapse before it is everywhere known that a war has broken out, or that a State will be able to invoke its ignorance of the existence of a war in order to evade all responsibility. But as it is possible, in spite of telegraph and cable lines and radiotelegraphy, that the news might not of itself reach those concerned, precautions must be taken. Accordingly two amendments were offered. The first, from the Belgian delegation, was as follows: 'The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers. This notification, which may be given even by telegraph, shall not take effect in regard to them until forty-eight hours after its receipt.' The other, offered by the British delegation, in an article contained in a proposal submitted to the Third Commission and referred to this subcommission, said: 'A neutral State is bound to take measures to preserve its neutrality only when it has received from one of the belligerents a notification of the commencement of the war.'

The Belgian amendment was intended merely to put neutral States in a position to discharge their obligations, but as it might be differently interpreted, if taken literally it was modified. It did not, however, even as amended, receive the approval of the Commission.

The view which has been adopted is that it is impracticable to fix any delay. The governing idea is a very simple one. A State can be held to duties of neutrality only when it is aware of the existence of the war creating such duties. From the moment when it is informed, no matter by what means (provided there is no doubt of the fact), it must not do anything inconsistent with neutrality. Is it at the same time obliged to prevent acts contrary to neutrality that might be committed on its territory? The obligation to do so presupposes the ability. What can be required of a neutral Government is that it take the necessary measures without delay. The interval within which the measures can be taken will vary, naturally, according to circumstances, extent of territory, and facility of communication. The interval of forty-eight hours, as was proposed, might be, in a given case, too long or too short. There is no need of establishing a legal presumption that the neutral is or is not responsible. It is a question of fact which can be determined usually with but little difficulty.

The subcommission therefore confined itself to the following draft:

The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by telegraph.

1 Actes et documents, vol. iii, p. 254, annexe 21
2 Ibid., p. 695, annexe 44; post, p. 870.
In the committee of examination it was pointed out that the rule phrased in this way is too positive, since it implies that a neutral Government which through some circumstance or other had not received the notification provided for, even though it is unquestionably aware of the existence of a war, could evade all responsibility for its acts, simply by relying on the absence of a notification. The essential point would seem to be that a Government must be aware of the existence of a state of war in order to take necessary measures. Proof is easy when a notification is given; but if there has been no notification, theelligent who concludes of a violation of neutrality must clearly establish that the existence of the war was with certainty known in the country where the alleged unlawful acts took place.

After a discussion the majority of the committee decided to add the following clause:

However, it is understood that neutral Powers cannot rely on the absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war.

This text was accepted by the Commission and seems to take all interests sufficiently into account.

It has been asked what form ought to be given to the provisions thus adopted. Shall they be placed in a special convention or declaration? Or shall they be enodied in the Regulations of 1899 on the laws and customs of war on land? Without wishing to trespass on the field of the drafting committee, it is proper to say that the latter mode may be dismissed from consideration since the provisions are of a general character applying to naval war as well as to war on land. Besides, provisions respecting the duties of neutrals do not ordinarily fall within the scope of regulations intended to serve as instructions for troops. We might consider combining the provisions concerning neutrals adopted by the Second and Third Commissions; but it should be borne in mind that Article 2 is closely related to Article 1 and ought not to be separated from it. The drafting committee, however, will have the final decision.

We have the honour, therefore, to submit to the Conference the two following propositions:

ANNEX 1

DRAFT OF REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES

1) Actes et documents, vol. 1, p. 136, appendix C. This project was accepted unanimously by the Conference, September 7. For its subsequent history in the Drafting Committee, see ante, p. 223.
ARTICLE 1

The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without a previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.

ARTICLE 2

The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by telegraph. Moreover, it is understood that neutral Powers cannot rely on the absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war.

ANNEX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE PREPARED BY HIS EXCELLENCY MR. T.M. C. ASSER,
PRESIDENT OF THE SECOND SUBCOMMISSION OF THE SECOND COMMISSION,
TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

1

Is it desirable to establish an international understanding relative to the opening of hostilities:

(On the supposition of an affirmative response to this question:)

2

Is it best to require that the opening of hostilities be preceded by a declaration of war or an equivalent act?

3

Is it best to fix upon a time which must elapse between the notification of such an act and the opening of hostilities?

4

Should it be stipulated that the declaration of war or equivalent act be notified to neutrals? And by whom?

5

What should be the consequences of a failure to observe the preceding rules?

6

What is the diplomatic form in which it is best to set out the understanding?

1 Ibid., vol. iii, p. 253, annexe 19
ANNEX 3

PROPOSAL OF THE NETHERLAND DELEGATION. ACCOMPANIED TO THE PROPOSAL
OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION

ARTICLE 1

The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence until the lapse of twenty-four hours after an explicit warning, having the form of a reasoned declaration of war, or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war, has officially come to the attention of the adversary’s Government.

ARTICLE 2

The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay and shall not begin with regard to them until after the notification thereof has officially come to their attention.

1 Actes et documents, vol. iii, p. 254, annexe 22.
ANNEX 3

PROPOSAL OF THE NETHERLAND DELEGATION. COMMENTARY TO THE PROPOSAL OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION

ARTICLE 1

The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence until the lapse of twenty-four hours after an explicit warning, having the form of a reasoned declaration of war, or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war, has officially come to the attention of the adversary's Government.

ARTICLE 2

The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay and shall not begin with regard to them until after the notification thereof has officially come to their attention.

1 Actes et documents, vol. iii, p. 254, annexe 22.
ロシア法規及び勧告に基づくスルおよびハーラー八九年条約違反規定、就中該行行為

開開特別団

ルコテアツタ。但し本報告証於テハ隔行行為ノ開始以前ニ拘ナリ。黒ノ裁判ヲ

進行フナス Hoffnung ケナタ出米テハノ行行為ヲ開始ノ前ニ拘ナリ。隔行行為ノ

期待ヲ順デダノナラデス。観々交渉ヲ相営ニ於ケル責任ヲ確実ニ行フノ際

於テ、ソレハ、ソレニテコノ問題ニ関スル法令ハ、ソレシテソロスレハ如何ナル条件ノモトニ於テソレヲ

確実スベキカノ検討スベキノナール。
右分科委員会「スランガー」代表ノ提案並多レニ怼スル=オラン

サー代表ノ修正案ガ上程サレテ。コノ提案及修正案ニ通ナテハ、双方共

ノ協定行為ヲ開始以前ニ於ケル通告並ニ中立ヲ願スル通告ノ必要ヲ認メキ

ル合意ヲ示スルテアル。両者ノ差異ハ通告ト通告行為トノ間ノ時間の間隔ニ関

ルマナラ中立通告ニ对スル通告ヲ通ナテシテモ若干ノ技術的院難ガ生ジタ。
この画像は、日本語の文書の1ページを含んでいるが、テキストを直接読み取ることは困難です。文書は非常に細かいスクリプトと、おそらく複雑な日本語の文法と、一部は難解な言語を混ぜているように見えます。一般的に、文書は複数の行に分かれているが、具体的な文の意味や内容を完全に理解することが難しいです。
ロシヤ側タタール弁解者大佐ニシノカタレハマケルソソノ大佐ニヨリノ如ク説明サレタ。
ロジャーニー・メイカルセン

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度見失テハナリマセン。相当ナ期似期間メルトヨノ考へた未だ各
民ニ明施ニ意味さらニ至ヲナリマセン。従テ余リ望ヲ大タモノヲ
ハ得策テハナリテアリマセン。從テ我々ハオランダー代表ノ提案ニカ
ルニ願ハ未来ニ委セ、現在トシテハ一切ハ利益ヲ将来享受サ
レルコトヲ単ニ希望スルニ止メテオキテイ考ヘルノテリマスレー。
ノノ說ハ理由ニハ陸海軍ニ首脳スペキモノデアツガ、結果ノク類考ヘテリタカ
多數ノ説得シテズニ終ツタ。諫議会議議ト直立シナイヤヲ考ヘテレタカ
レアテフノ、シナソレモノヲフズ。ノン說ハ大キヤー歩前進ヲモタフン
方ヲ外交官及び陸海軍ニナヲ台合ョリモ多少進歩テデアルヲナリテフ
ナマリヲ納サルガ如キハ行キ過ギテリソトヲサルトコ
定セレタ猶揽檔ヲ提案スルガ如キハ行キ過ギテリソトヲサルトコ
シカソレモノヲフズ。陸海軍ハノモノヲタクセテハナリ
ノテアルトナシ蟹トハ、一般ニモノノ問題ニ関シテハ法学者ノ合ノ
ロデアルトナシ蟹トハ、一般ニモノノ問題ニ関シテハ法学者ノ合ノ
但し戦争状態が存在し、実質的に戦争状態が続・中へ中

第三章

第二部分は第二部分の委員会議長テイニエ・ハミン・アッヘル氏ニヨリ

議論スラテテ作製センレス状問書

徹底行進ノ賛言ノ問題ノ関係テ国际ナル了解ノ健全センルガ希マシマニ

キマリ

申設行進ヲ開認ニ至ルヲ宣戦ヲハノノヲ計ノ為ノスル行進ノ要求センルガ希マシ

キマリ

不戦ノ規定ヲ遵守セルレルヲ時ハ如何ナル如何ニスルベキヤ

又上ノ如キ了解ヲ設定スルニ如何ナル外交文書ノ形式ヲ最善トリ亞
第一條 約定国相互間於於核の戦行為理由事由附則ルタル宣戦又は條件

第二條 戦争態現存在ハ通告ナク中立国ニ通告セラルベクノ通告ガ中立国

開始スルコトナシ。
TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION.

Signed at Washington, in English, February 21, 1911 (44th Year of Meiji).
Ratified March 30, 1911.
Ratifications exchanged at Tokio, April 4, 1911.
Promulgated April 4, 1911.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the President of the United States of America, being desirous to strengthen the relations of amity and good understanding which happily exist between the two nations, and believing that the fixation in a manner clear and positive of the rules which are hereafter to govern the commercial intercourse between their respective countries will contribute to the accomplishment of this most desirable result, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation for that purpose, and to that end have named their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Yosuya Uchida, Jusammi, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, His Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America; and
The President of the United States of America, Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State of the United States; who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE 1.

The subjects or citizens of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incidental to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native subjects or citizens, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established.

They shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatever, to pay any charges or taxes other or higher than those that are or may be paid by native subjects or citizens.
The subjects or citizens of each of the High Contracting Parties shall receive, in the territories of the other, the most constant protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and privileges as are or may be granted to native subjects or citizens, on their submitting themselves to the conditions imposed upon the native subjects or citizens.

They shall, however, be exempt in the territories of the other from compulsory military service either on land or sea, in the regular forces, or in the national guard, or in the militia; from all contributions raised in lieu of personal service, and from all forced loans or military exactations or contributions.

ARTICLE 2.

The dwellings, warehouses, manufactories and shops of the subjects or citizens of each of the High Contracting Parties in the territories of the other, and all premises appertaining thereto used for purposes of residence or commerce, shall be respected. It shall not be allowable to proceed to make a domiciliary visit to, or a search of, any such buildings and premises, or to examine or inspect books, papers or accounts, except under the conditions and with the forms prescribed by the laws, ordinances and regulations for nationals.

ARTICLE 3.

Each of the High Contracting Parties may appoint Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls, Deputy Consuls, and Consular Agents in all ports, cities and places of the other, except in those where it may not be convenient to recognize such officers. This exception, however, shall not be made in regard to one of the Contracting Parties without being made likewise in regard to all other Ports.

Such Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls, Deputy Consuls and Consular Agents, having received exequaturs or other sufficient authorizations from the Government of the country to which they are appointed, shall, on condition of reciprocity, have the right to exercise the functions and to enjoy the exemptions and immunities which are or may hereafter be granted to the consular officers of the same rank of the most favored nation. The Government issuing exequaturs or other authorizations may in its discretion cancel the same on communicating the reasons for which it thought proper to do so.

ARTICLE 4.

There shall be between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties reciprocal freedom of commerce and navigation. The subjects or citizens of each of the Contracting Parties, equally with the subjects or citizens of
the most favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other, which are or may be opened to foreign commerce, subject always to the laws of the country to which they thus come.

**ARTICLE 5.**

The import duties on articles, the produce or manufacture of the territories of one of the High Contracting Parties, upon importation into the territories of the other, shall henceforth be regulated either by special arrangements between the two countries or by the internal legislation of each.

Neither Contracting Party shall impose any other or higher duties or charges on the exportation of any article to the territories of the other than are or may be payable on the exportation of the like article to any other foreign country.

Nor shall any prohibition be imposed by either country on the importation or exportation of any article from or to the territories of the other which is not equally extended to the like article imported from or exported to any other country. The last provision is not, however, applicable to prohibitions or restrictions maintained or imposed as sanitary measures or for purposes of protecting animals and useful plants.

**ARTICLE 6.**

The subjects or citizens of each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other exemption from all transit duties and a perfect equality of treatment with native subjects or citizens in all that relates to war-making, bounties, facilities and drawbacks.

**ARTICLE 7.**

Limited-liability and other companies and associations, commercial, industrial, and financial, already or hereafter to be organized in accordance with the laws of either High Contracting Party and domiciled in the territories of such Party, are authorized, in the territories of the other, to exercise their rights and appear in the courts either as plaintiffs or defendants, subject to the laws of such other Party.
The foregoing stipulation has no bearing upon the question whether a company or association organized in one of the two countries will or will not be permitted to transact its business or industry in the other, this permission remaining always subject to the laws and regulations enacted or established in the respective countries or in any part thereof.

ARTICLE 8

All articles which are or may be legally imported into the ports of one of the Contracting Party from foreign countries in national vessels may likewise be imported into those ports in vessels of the other Contracting Party, without being liable to any other or higher duties or charges of whatever denomination than if such articles were imported in national vessels. Such reciprocal equality of treatment shall take effect without distinction, whether such articles come directly from the place of origin or from any other foreign place.

In the same manner, there shall be perfect equality of treatment in regard to exportation, so that the same export duties shall be paid, and the same bounties and drawbacks allowed, in the territories of each of the Contracting Parties on the exportation of any article which is or may be legally exported therefrom, whether such exportation shall take place in Japanese vessels or in vessels of the United States, and whatever may be the place of destination, whether a port of the other Party or of any third Power.

ARTICLE 9.

In all that regards the stationing, loading and unloading of vessels in the ports of the territories of the two Contracting Parties, no privileges shall be granted by either Party to national vessels which are not equally, in like cases, granted to the vessels of the other country; the intention of the Contracting Parties being that in these respects the respective vessels shall be treated on the footing of perfect equality.

ARTICLE 10.

Merchant vessels navigating under the flag of Japan or that of the United States and carrying the papers required by their national laws to prove their nationality shall in the United States and in Japan be deemed to be vessels of Japan or of the United States, respectively.
ARTICLE 11.

No duties of tonnage, harbor, pilotage, light-house, quarantine, or other similar or corresponding duties of whatever denomination, levied in the name or for the profit of Government, public functionaries, private individuals, corporations or establishments or any kind shall be imposed in the ports of the territories of either country upon the vessels of the other which shall not equally, under the same conditions, be imposed on national vessels in general, or on vessels of the most favored nation. Such equality of treatment shall apply reciprocally to the respective vessels from whatever place they may arrive and whatever may be their place of destination.

ARTICLE 12.

Vessels charged with performance of regular scheduled postal service of one of the High Contracting Parties, whether belonging to the State or subsidized by it for the purpose, shall enjoy, in the ports of the territories of the other, the same facilities, privileges and immunities as are granted to like vessels of the most favored nation.

ARTICLE 13.

The coasting trade of the High Contracting Parties is excepted from the provisions of the present Treaty and shall be regulated according to the laws of Japan and the United States, respectively. It is, however, understood that the subjects or citizens of either Contracting Party shall enjoy in this respect most-favored-nation treatment in the territories of the other.

A vessel of one of the Contracting Parties, laden in a foreign country with cargo destined for two or more ports of entry in the territories of the other, may discharge a portion of her cargo at one of the said ports, and, continuing her voyage to the other port or ports of destination, there discharge the remainder of her cargo, subject always to the laws, tariffs and customs regulations of the country of destination; and, in like manner and under the same reservation, the vessels of one of the Contracting Parties shall be permitted to load at several ports of the other for the same outward voyages.

ARTICLE 14.

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that, in all that concerns
commerce and navigation, any privilege, favor or immunity which either Contracting Party has actually granted, or may hereafter grant, to the subjects or citizens of any other State shall be extended to the subjects or citizens of the other Contracting Party gratuitously, if the concession in favor of that other State shall have been gratuitous, and on the same or equivalent conditions, if the concession shall have been conditional.

ARTICLE 15.

The subjects or citizens of each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other the same protection as native subjects or citizens in regard to patents, trademarks and designs, upon fulfillment of the formalities prescribed by law.

ARTICLE 16.

The present Treaty shall, from the date on which it enters into operation, supersede the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation dated the 22nd day of November, 1894, and from the same date the last-named Treaty shall cease to be binding.

ARTICLE 17.

The present Treaty shall enter into operation on the 17th of July, 1911, and shall remain in force twelve years or until the expiration of six months from the date on which either of the Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other of its intention to terminate the Treaty.

In case neither of the Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other six months before the expiration of the said period of twelve years of its intention to terminate the Treaty, it shall continue operative until the expiration of six months from the date on which either Party shall have given such notice.

ARTICLE 18.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Tokyo as soon as possible and not later than three months from the present date.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done at Washington the 21st day of the 2nd month of the 44th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 21st day of February in the nineteen hundred and eleventh year of the Christian era.

(Signed) Y. UCHIDA. (L.S.)
(Signed) PH. MABER C. KNOX. (L.S.)

- 6 -
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America have, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agreed upon the following stipulation in regard to Article V of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States signed this day to replace on the 17th of July, 1911, the Treaty of the 22nd of November, 1894:

Pending the conclusion of a special arrangement relating to tariff, the provisions relating to tariff in the Treaty of the 22nd of November, 1894, shall be maintained.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done at Washington the 21st day of the 2nd month of the 44th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 21st day of February, in the nineteenth hundred and eleventh year of the Christian era.

(Signed) Y. UCHIDA. (L.S.)
(Signed) PHILIP C. KNOX. (L.S.)
1. Strike out, in the first paragraph of Article V of the Treaty, the words "special arrangements," and substitute there for the word "treaty," so that the clause shall read "shall henceforth be regulated either by treaty between the two countries or by the internal legislation of each."

2. Strike out, in the first line of the second paragraph of the Protocol, the words "special arrangement," and substitute there for the word "treaty," so that the phrase shall read "pending the conclusion of a treaty relating to tariff."
通商航海條約

一九一一年（明治四十四年）二月二十一日
英文にてワシントンに於て立約
一九一一年三月三十日批准
一九一一年四月四日東京にて批文並交付

日本天皇陛下及びアメリカ合衆国大統領は両国間の通商及び航海関係を整備させるため、互に同意の上、次の条約を締結する次の通りである。

1．通商条約

日本天皇陛下は、上述の如き日本及び大英帝国政府間の通商条約を批准し、条約の規定を遵守することを約じてゐる。
第二条

内閣総理大臣の何れもは相手方の諸法、諸都市及び各地に就く者に、親族の為に相手方の国民の法令の定める条項に依って相互的観察の下に仕職を行う且つ彼等の自己と同地位の親族諸君に許可された

第三条

内閣総理大臣の何れもは相手方の諸法、諸都市及び各地に就く者に、親族の為に相手方の国民の法令の定める条項に依って相互的観察の下に仕職を行う且つ彼等の自己と同地位の親族諸君に許可された
又は今日許許されざるあるべき諸々の犯
除及犯発を受くるる故剣を有す

認可状又はその他の携帯を於したる政府は其任意の判断に依り
理由を

発達の上、同意可状又は携帯を取消す事を得。
第四条

両国間の領土間には通商及び航海の相互の自由が保たれる。締結両国の各自の国民又は居住に於ける可及びの場所、海面及び河川に於ける貿易の為に閉ざられる又は開かれる可及びの場所、港湾及び河川に於ける貿易の為に閉ざされる所の蓄入及蓄出の自由を有する。
第6條

識別門各自の臣民又は公民は、相手国の領土に於いて一切の制限または禁制を除くさ
れ、倉庫の利用、貿易駕船、関税便宜及輸送手段並びに於て各生来
の臣民又は公民と全く同様の待遇を享有するものとす。
何れにかの係統の法律に従じて既に組織されたる又は今申し組ずるべし

第七条

組織の解体に於ては、相互関係の特有の利益に於て、常にの利益に服して、自己の利益を害し、且つ、被告又は被告として承認しない許可を受けずるか否かの間題は、何等関係なく、この許可自を解約するか否かの解約の為に於て発行するの利益に於て解約又は解約

自国の所有に於て外局より解約の一方の利益に合致的に入る可き商品は存し、同様に解約の他方の利益に存じて、自国の利益に依り解約せる利益を一切なし、従って解約せらるべきを解約せらるべし。
かの原則なく、実施せらるべき。相手の進物に同行完全なる平準待発が行れるべきである。それ故出発が
日本郵船船又は来航船船の例れによりて行はるべくを問はず、又目的倉が
手回の進物と第三原則の進物を問はず合法的に輸出させるべく商品に
載し、各非卸の領土内にて同一の出出倉が支払はれ、同一の発労
金、現金金が認められるとその目的とするものである。

第十五條
総括卸領土の港商於ける協約の作成、貿易及び進卸しの全額に買り合
協約の範囲の範囲に同一の場合に、平準に問へらわれる特機社自製の船
船に対しても買へてはならない。貿易協約の目的はこれ倉の進に問し、
完全なる平准の立場に於て取扱はんとするに存ず。
第十一條
政府・官公署・私法人又はその経営を同様に凡ゆる雑費の

条項の下に一般自用の船舶及び最寄国の船舶に対し卸し、陸際しない

何を問はず相互的に行はるものす。

同条第一項
締結国の沿岸貿易は本締約の範囲外除き除外せられ、谷倉日本国

この點に誠は締結国の他方の領土に於ては最寄国船及び同様の取扱を

10
締約国の他方の領土の二箇所に二箇所以上の港に向け、一外国に於ての航路を設けて航行する締約国の他方の航路は、その他の何れかの港に於て
その機荷の一部を荷卸し、更に目的港へ向っての航行を続け、且ち目的港へ到着した後に於て残餘の機荷を荷卸し得することを約定する。又同様に且同一条件の下に締約国の
一方の船売は他方の港に於て同様の外向け航行の為に荷卸をすることが
得。

第十五条
締約国の各の国々の臣民又は市民は、他の国の国々の領土に於て共

第十六條 本條約はそれが施行される日以後は、千八百九十四年十一月二十二日の交際二締結条約に代わり、その旨条約はその日より拘束力を失ふものです。

第十七條 本條約は千九百七一年七月十七日に施行され向、十二年間又は局締結条約の一方が本締結条約の意志を告げる場合には、その圍の間に、十二年間が経過する六領月以前に本締結条約の意志を認めた団は有効たるものです。

12
日本政府は、アメリカ合衆国政府はその防衛のための、千二百三十一
年に声明された日本政府の声明に基づくものに同じである。

以上の声明は、千二百三十一年に声明されたものに同じである。

内閣官房長官

アイランダー・ミー・ノックス

昭和三十四年三月一日
EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING CHINA

between F. ISHIT and ROBERT JACOBI,
November 2, 1917

From the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington,
November 2, 1917.

Excellency:

I have the honor to communicate herewith my understanding
of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations
touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments
relating to the Republic of China.

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from
time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public
announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by
our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize
that territorial proximity creates special relations between
countries, and, consequently the Government of the United States
recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly
in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains
unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every
confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese
Government that while geographical position gives Japan such
special interests they have no desire to discriminate against
the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial
rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other
Powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that
they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence
or territorial integrity of China and they declare furthermore
that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open
door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to
the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or
privileges that would affect the independence or territorial
integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or
citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity
in the commerce and industry of China.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this
understanding of the agreement reached by us.

Accept, Excellency, etc., etc., etc.

ROBERT LANSING.
D.F. Doc. # 58.

Exchange of Notes Regarding China
between K. Tōjū and ROBERT LANSING,
November 2, 1917

From Viscount Ichii to the Secretary of State.

Japanese Embassy,
Washington,
November 2, 1917.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, communicating to me your understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of my Government, the understanding in question set forth in the following terms:

In order to allay mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Government of Japan and the United States recognize that territorial proximity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains
unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have neither to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

The Governments of Japan and the United States deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare furthermore that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I take etc., etc., etc.

K. TSUI
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

T. SHIMODA Takesao, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Exchange of Notes Regarding China between Dr. SHI and ROBERT LANSING, November 2, 1917" is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo

on this ___ day of August, 1946

(Signed) T. SHIMODA
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Megaharu ODC
CERTIFICATE

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, 丸尾 佐作, Chief of the Archives Section, Japan's Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereunto attached consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Memorandum on Notes Regarding China between a, Japan and Russia During November 1, 1917" is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japan's Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo
on this 6th day of August, 1940

T. 丸尾佐作
Signature of Official

Witness: 玉座敬之助
AGREEMENT EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES CANCELING THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1917.

Dated at Washington, April 14, 1923 (12th year of Taisho) Published April 16, 1923.

From the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador.

Department of State,

Washington,

April 14, 1923.

Excellency:

I have the honor to communicate to Your Excellency my understanding of the views developed by the discussions which I had recently with your Embassy in reference to the status of the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes of November 2, 1917.

The discussions between the two Governments have disclosed an identity of views and, in the light of the understandings arrived at by the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, the American and Japanese Governments are agreed to consider the Lansing-Ishii correspondence of November 2, 1917, as cancelled and of no further force of effect.

I shall be glad to have your confirmation of the accord that is reached.

Accept, Excellency, etc., etc., etc.

(Signed) CHARLES E. HUGHES.
From Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State.

Japanese Embassy,
Washington,
April 14, 1923.

Sir:—

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today's date, communicating to me your understanding of the views developed by the discussions which you have recently had with this Embassy in reference to the status of the Ishii-Lansing exchange of notes of November 2, 1917.

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under instructions from my Government, your understanding of the views thus developed, as set forth in the following terms:

The discussions between the two Governments have disclosed an identity of views and, in the light of the understandings arrived at by the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, the Japanese and American Government are agreed to consider the Ishii-Lansing correspondence of November 2, 1917, as cancelled and of no further force of effect.

Accord, Sir, etc., etc., etc.

(Signed) M. HANIHARA.
CERTIFYING

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, [Signature], acting in the capacity of [Position], of the [Japanese Foreign Office], hereby certify that the document hereof is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 17th day of December, 1940.

[Signature]

[Name]

witness: [Name]
Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions
Third Meeting, Monday, November 21, 1921, 1 p.m.
Columbus Room, Pan American Building
Present:

UNITED STATES: Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Senator Underwood, Mr. Root. Accompanied by Dr. Trumbull, Mr. Field.

FEDERATION: Baron de Cortier. Accompanied by Mr. Silvercray, Mr. Cortier.

BRITISH EMPIRE: Mr. Palfour, Lord Luo, Sir Auckland Goddes, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada); Senator Pearce (for Australia); Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand); Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Mr. Bonar

CHINA: Mr. Tao, Mr. Keo, Mr. Yang. Accompanied by Mr. Tsu, Mr. Cho, Mr. Lo.

FRANCE: Mr. Freund, Mr. Viviani, Mr. Truit, Mr. Jusscron. Accompanied by Mr. Yousouf, Mr. Massigli.

ITALY: Senator Schmeir, Senator Roland Ricci, Senator Albertini. Accompanied by Marquis Vincenzi-Wenato, Mr. Cori.

GERMANY: Admiral Rozen Kato, Prince Tokuyama. Accompanied by Mr. Hanhara, Mr. Sobir, Mr. Ichihashi.

THE NIE BELGIUMS: Baron van Karnebcak, Jocksma Blockland, Mr. Sol.


The Secretary-General, Assisted by Mr. Pierrepont.

Interpreter, Mr. Courcelle.

BONEN RISON Kato asked the meaning of the phrase "administrative integrity" as used in the proposed Resolution. He desired to know if this referred to political independence, and was not intended to touch upon interests or privileges which in the past had been granted to various countries.

Mr. Root took the inquiry of Baron Kato to refer to the meaning of the words "administrative integrity" with reference to their effect upon privileges that had already been granted. He replied that this phrase certainly did not affect any privileges accorded by valid or effective grants; that, on the contrary, respect for the administrative integrity of a country required respect for the things that were done in the exercise of its full sovereignty by an independent State.
Mr. HANDA, speaking on behalf of the Japanese Delegation to state briefly the position of Japan regarding this matter, did so by reading a statement as follows:

"JAPAN'S ATTITUDE IN REGARD TO THE FOREIGN GARRISONS IN CHINA.

"The Japanese Delegation wishes to explain, as succinctly as possible, why it has been able to continue the Japanese garrisons in various parts of China which have from time to time been stationed there. At the outset, however, I desire to disclaim most emphatically that Japan has ever entertained any aggressive purposes or any desire to encroach illegitimately upon Chinese sovereignty in establishing or maintaining these garrisons in China.

"(1) Japanese railway guards are actually maintained along the South Manchurian Railway and the Shantung Railway.

"With regard to the Shantung Railway guards, Japan believes that she has on more than one occasion made her position sufficiently clear. She has declared and now reiterates her intention of withdrawing such guards as soon as China shall have notified her that she is willing to take over the charge of the railway protection.

"The maintenance of troops along the South Manchurian Railway stands on a different footing. This is conceded and recognized by China under the Treaty of Peking of 1907. (Addendum, Art. II). It is a measure of absolute necessity under the existing state of affairs in Manchuria—a region which has been made notorious by the activity of mounted bandits. Even in the presence of Japanese troops, these bandits have not ceased their attempts to raid the railway zone. In a large number of cases they have cut telegraph lines and committed other acts of ravage. Their licentious activity on an extended scale has, however, been effectively checked by Japanese railway guards, and general security has been maintained for civilian residence in and around the railway zone. The efficiency of such guards will be made all the more significant by a comparison of the conditions prevailing in the railway zone with those prevailing in the districts remote from the railway. The withdrawal of railway guards from the zone of the South Manchurian Railway will no doubt leave those districts at the mercy of bandits, and
The new conditions of unrest will require, as well as in remote corners of Manchuria. In such a situation, it is not possible for Japan to forego the right or rather the duty, of maintaining military garrisons in Manchuria, whose presence is only recognized by treaty.

(2) Formerly, at the end of 1911 the first Revolution broke out in China, and there was complete disorder in the North district which formed the base of the revolutionary operations. As the lives and property of foreigners were exposed, Japan together with Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and other principal Powers, clarrified their way to Hankow for the protection of their people. This is how a small number of troops were sent to be stationed at Hankow. The situation has since been the scene of frequent disturbances; there was recently a clash between the North and South at Changsha, pillage by troops at Ichung, and a mutiny of soldiers at Hankow. Such conditions of unrest have naturally retarded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Hankow.

It has never been intended that these troops should remain permanently at Hankow, and the Japanese Government has been looking forward to an early complete withdrawal of the Hankow garrison. This must be secured, however, that China will immediately take effective measures for the maintenance of peace and order and for the protection of foreigners, and that she will fully assume the responsibility for the dangers that may be or may have been due to foreigners.

(3) The stationing of the garrisons of foreign countries in North China is recognized by the China's Government under the Protocol relating to the Boxer Revolution of 1900. Provided that is no objection from the other countries concerned, Japan will be ready, acting in unison with them, to withdraw her garrison as soon as the actual conditions warrant it.

(4) In Japan, troops scattered along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway have been stationed in connection with an Inter-allied Agreement concluded in 1918. Their duty is to maintain order on the Russian settlements in Sibiria and South Manchuria. It does not signify, therefore, that these troops will be withdrawn as soon as the evacuation of Sibiria by the Japanese troops is effected.

Mr. Havila read the following report:

"JAPAN'S INTERESTS QUOTED TO MAINTENANCE OF JAPANESE POLICE IN MANCHURIA AND TRAFFIC ROUTES OF CHINA."

In considering the question of Japan as Consular police in China, two points must be taken into account.

(1) Such police do not interfere with Chinese or other foreign nationals. Their functions are strictly confined to the protection and control of Japanese subjects.

(2) The most important duties with which the Japanese police are charged are, first, to prevent the excision of crimes by Japanese, and, second, to find and prosecute Japanese criminals when crimes are committed.

In view of the geographical proximity of the two countries, it is natural that certain disorderly elements in Japan should move to China, and, taking advantage of the present conditions in that country, should there undertake unlawful activities. They would, in fact, as persons are caught in the act of crime by the Chinese police, it is not difficult for that police force to deal with the case. If the culprits are handed over as early as possible to the Japanese authorities for prosecution and trial. But when the criminals flee from the scene of their acts, it is in many cases hard to discover who committed the crimes and what were the causes and circumstances that led up to their commission. This is now difficult for the Chinese authorities, as they have no power to make domiciliary visits to the homes of foreigners who enjoy extraterritorial rights, or to obtain judicial testimony in due form from such foreigners.

Without the full cooperation of the Japanese police, therefore, the punishment of crimes is, in a great many cases, an impossibility, and those who are responsible for investigating due trial and punishment.

This tendency is especially evident in Manchuria, in which region hundreds of thousands of Japanese are resident. In places where the Japanese police are stationed, there are far fewer criminal cases among Japanese than
in places without Japanese police. Lawless elements constantly move to dis-

tricts beyond the reach of Japanese police supervision.

"Apart from the theoretical side of the question it will thus be ob-
served that the stationing of Japanese police in the interior of China has
proved to be of much practical usefulness in the prevention of crimes among
Japanese residents, without interfering with the daily life of Chinese or of
other foreign nationals. The Japanese policing provides a protection for the
Chinese communities which it present their own organization fails to provide.

"The Japanese conception is in possession of knowledge and information
as to the actual conditions prevailing in China and especially in Manchuria.
However, it is unnecessary to go into details at the present stage."
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ベニ氏所持、次に四国方面を崩壊した。

中華民国内の要を不屈に保つことを決して諦めず、これをしめしめに約束するものである。ニ日東效道守備隊は現在南方東総道並に山東総道を練習し、又は中華民国内にこれを守備隊にしたが告げて居る。中華民国内の苦労をなさるとするが如き欲望を、贷して置けることがあった

山東效道守備隊は現在南方東総道並に山東総道を練習し、又は中華民国内にこれを守備隊にしたが告げて居る。中華民国内の苦労をなさるとするが如き欲望を、貸して置けることがあった

中華民国内の苦労をなさるとするが如き欲望を、貸して置けることがあった。
日本にとり不可避である。

唯一九一一年の事件中華民団に初期革命が勃発し、同革命の役原地
をなした河口などの地方に大戦があったが、外人人の生命及び財産が危険に
曝されたのであるが、日本は大英米ロシアドイツ及びその協力者列国に共
に懸念するところであったと云はむを掲述した。これに対し日本政府は、
各在外公使の指示並びに外人保護の必要に有る外人保護に於
ては兵士の暴動があった。かかる不安全の状態は當然に日本軍の河口
卸の撤退を促進せしめた。

これらは日本が長年次に至るか之を未だ仮に借国させる
れたいとさせなく、且日本政府は権利の有り次第河口守夜改の完全なる撤
退の遂行を期待して居ったのである。然しながら日本政府は、中華民団
が即刻安保安全維持の為及外人保護の為に有効なる手続を採用し

- 67 -
在文日本領事官の職務は段階に課せられた最も重要なる任務は第一に日本人犯罪者を捜し出
するに寄る。

両国の地理的関係によって、日本民強分子が日本民強に演じる犯罪を犯すことは、国
際的に困るところである。このために、犯人が犯行現場より逃走した際には、犯人を
追及して裁判の処に到る必要がある。
及び犯行に導いた源流を除き一と見ることを含め、攻撃的に多くの場合困難である。中華民国内は外人出勤者に治外法権を持たず、中国人の家宅搜査を許さず極めて少く、そのことが中華民国内局に一層困難となる。

この傾向は数万人の日本人の居住者の居住者を除く多数に於て特に重要である。日本警察の存在はその責任は裁判所及び所管を越えるべきである。中華民国人内に於ける犯罪事件が近かに確少である。又分子は日本警察の取扱いの及ぼす表現に於て日本人の劣等性格を示すことになる。
日本書簡の現在は、日本民団書簡の現に興へ持つる Lupを中華民国に
所有して居るが、今後の段階では詳細に申述るべきことは必要である。
Defense Document 200-C

Extracts from
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1921
February 6, 1922

Pages 1059, 1064, 1066, 1070

Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions
Twelfth Meeting, Saturday, December 3, 1921, 11 A.M.
Columbus Room, Pan American Building.

Present.

UNITED STATES: Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Senator Underwood, Mr. Root. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. MacMurray.
BELGIUM: Baron de Cartier. Accompanied by Mr. Silverberg, Mr. Jadot, Mr. Cattier.
BRITISH EMPIRE: Mr. Balfour, Lord Lore, Sir Auckland Geddes, Sir Robert Borden, (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand). Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Mr. Lampson.
CHINA: Mr. Si-zao, Mr. Koo, Mr. Tang. Accompanied by Mr. Tsao, Mr. Chao, Mr. Zee.
FRANCE: Mr. Viviani, Mr. Sarrut, Mr. Jussiaud. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Haissilgi, Mr. Duchene, Mr. Garnier.
ITALY: Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi Ricci, Senator Albertini. Accompanied by Mr. Core, Mr. Pilch.
JAPAN: Prince Tokuawa, Mr. Sanfuura. Accompanied by Mr. Sakurai, Mr. Kimura.
THE NETHERLANDS: Jonkheer van Karnebeek, Jonkheer Boelaerts van Blokland, Mr. Horasco. Accompanied by Jonkheer van Harsma de Nith, Mr. de Kat Angolino.
PORTUGAL: Viscount d'Alte, Captain Vasconcellos.
The Secretary General. Assisted by Mr. Florzensept.
Interpreters, Mr. Camelyes, Mr. Talmon.

MR. HANIHARA, on behalf of the Japanese Delegation, submitted a statement in writing, as follows:

"The leased territories held by Japan at present are Kiaochow and Kwantung Province, namely, Port Arthur and Dairen. It is characteristic of Japan's leased territories that she obtained them, not directly from China, but as successor to other Powers at considerable sacrifice in men and treasure. She succeeded Russia in the leasehold of Kwantung Province with the express consent of China, and she succeeded Germany in the leasehold of Kiaochow under the Treaty of Versailles.

"As to Kiaochow, the Japanese Government have already declared on several occasions that they would restore that leased territory to China. We are prepared to come to an agreement with China on this basis. In fact, there are now going on conversations between representatives of Japan and China regarding this question, initiated through the good offices of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour, the result of which, it is hoped, will be a happy solution of the problem. Therefore, the question of the leased territory of Kiaochow is one which properly calls for separate treatment."
Defence Document 200-C

Excerpts from
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1921
February 6, 1922

Pages 1063, 1064, 1066, 1070.

Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions
Twelfth Meeting, Saturday, December 3, 1921, 11 A.M.
Columbus Room, Pan American Building.

Present.

UNITED STATES: Hr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Senator Underwood, Mr. Root. Accompanied by Mr. Bright, Mr. MacMurray.
BELGIUM: Baron de Cartier. Accompanied by Mr. Silvercruys, Mr. Jacot, Mr. Cottier.
BRITISH EMPIRE: Mr. Balfour, Lord Loce, Sir Auckland Geddes, Sir Robert Borden, (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankay, Mr. Lampson.
CHINA: Dr. Sze, Dr. Koo, Dr. Tang. Accompanied by Dr. Tsau, Dr. Chao, Dr. Zee.
FRANCE: Mr. Viviani, Mr. Sarrut, Mr. Jusserreund. Accompanied by Mr. Farmoror, Mr. Hassigli, Mr. Duchesme, Mr. Garnier.
ITALY: Senator Schanzor, Senator Rolandi Ricci, Senator Albertini. Accompanied by Mr. Cora, Mr. Piatiti.
JAPAN: Prince Tokyawa, Mr. Hattura. Accompanied by Dr. Saburi, Dr. Kitoro.
THE NETHERLANDS: Jonkheer van Karnebeck, Jonkheer Beulacarta van Bokland, Mr. Morace. Accompanied by Jonkheer van Haarsma de Wit, Mr. de Kat Angelino.
PORTUGAL: Viscount D'Alta, Captain Vasconcellos.
The Secretary General. Assisted by Mr. Picrepont.
Interpreters, Mr. Camerlynn, Mr. Talacson.

MR. HATTURA, on behalf of the Japanese Delegation, submitted a statement in writing, as follows:

"The leased territories held by Japan at present are Kiaochow and Kwantung Province, namely, Port Arthur and Dairen. It is characteristic of Japan's leased territories that she obtained them, not directly from China, but as successor to other Powers at considerable sacrifice in men and treasure. She succeeded Russia in the leasehold of Kwantung Province with the express consent of China, and she succeeded Germany in the leasehold of Kiaochow under the Treaty of Versailles.

As to Kiaochow, the Japanese Government have already declared on several occasions that they would restore that leased territory to China. To be prepared to come to an agreement with China on this basis. In fact, there are now going on conversations between representatives of Japan and China regarding this question, initiated through the good offices of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour, the result of which, it is hoped, will be a happy solution of the problem. Therefore, the question of the leased territory of Kiaochow is one which properly calls for separate treatment.

The only leased territory, therefore, which remains to be discussed at the Conference, so far as Japan is concerned is Kwantung Province, namely, Port Arthur and Dairen. As to that territory, the Japanese delegates desire to make it clear that Japan has no intention at present to relinquish the important rights she has lawfully acquired and at no small sacrifice. The territory in question forms a part of Manchuria—a region where, by reason of its close propinquity to Japan's territory, more than anything else, she has vital interests in that which relates to her economic life and national safety. This fact was recognized and assurance was given by the American, British and French Governments at the time of the formation of the International Consortium, that these vital interests of Japan in the region in question shall be safeguarded.

"In the leased territory of Kwantung Province there reside no less than 65,000 Japanese, and the commercial and industrial interests they have established there are of such importance and magnitude to Japan that they are regarded as an essential part of her economic life.

"It is believed that this attitude of the Japanese Delegation toward the leased territory of Kwantung is not against the principle of the Resolution adopted on November 21st."

Mr. Hartwell for Japan had stated that, as had already been known, the matter of Shantung was being dealt with in the course of conversations outside of the conference, and that he hoped for a happy result. On the other hand, he had pointed out the difference between the status of Japan's rights in Port Arthur and Dalny and those in Tsingtau, and that he stated that Japan had no intention of relinquishing the rights acquired in Port Arthur and Dalny.

Mr. Balfour had illustrated the difference between the British leasehold at Kowloon and Tientsin and, with regard to the latter, had shown a willingness on the part of Great Britain to relinquish her rights under conditions similar to those set forth by France, but had pointed out the importance of retaining Kowloon.

Continuing, the Chairman observed that in view of the definite statements by Japan with regard to the retention of her rights in Port Arthur and Dalny, and by Great Britain with regard to her inability to relinquish Kowloon, it was necessary to inquire whether the French proposal to return Tsingtau and the British offer to relinquish Tientsin might be considered without the proviso which required that all other leases be relinquished. He desired to inquire whether consideration of the Shantung matter could be set aside and whether other leases could be treated on a separate basis, and whether in view of the position taken with regard to the maintenance of Japanese rights in Shantung Province and British rights in Kowloon, France and Great Britain would make more definite statements.

Mr. Balfour replied that this was a very specific question which his former statement, had it been clearer, would have answered; that he had never intended to imply that any action Great Britain might take with regard to Tientsin would be determined or guided by the disposition of the Manchurian question; that he had not had Dalny in mind at all, but had been thinking of the Shantung peninsula, in which Tientsin is situated. He then declared that the British Government's policy was to make use of the surrender of Tientsin to assist in securing a settlement of the question of Shantung and that, if agreement could be reached on this question, the British Government would not hesitate to do their best to procure a general settlement by restoring Tientsin to the central Government of China.
日本代表団が一円に代わり事前には次の如き宣告を提出した。

現在日大日有する租借地は膠州即ち旅順及大遼である。日本代表団の特有な租借地の特性を挙げた後に、国際団の承認を直指中華民国よりでなく、人間的に相営な犠牲を挙げ、他国の承認者として手入れの貼である。我

結果この問題の間満な解決が期待されている。何れも租借地の面倒らしい交渉はハーヴェ・パ

的に、然も少からざる犠牲を挙げ得させる重要な機会を放棄する如ければ現

した。
それぞれの相談を指摘し、旅順及び大連に獲得せられた権益を放棄する意

to表明した。

パルファン氏は九龍及び威海衛の英領租借地の相談を説明し、後者に

関しては、仮に改めて示されたと類似せる条件の下にその権益を放棄す

る意義は確実に見出せた。

の他については、別個の根拠に立ちながら、傍観者ともするべきもの

を述べ、彼は和睦に至る日本国租借地、又九龍において八国に於ける英

領租借地の維持に関し、各に関

に於ける態度に鑑み、傍観及英団がより明確なる証明を為す意志ありて

付検討し庶は旨を進べた。
パルフォン氏は之が著だ特定的な質問であり、彼の前に残した聲明がより明瞭であったならば既に回答してみたらろうことを、英国外交官が威海衛に付取るべく如何なる行方は満洲問題の処置に依り決定され、或は不導引かれることを意味する趣りは決してなかったこと、答に彼が大連の如きは何等念頭に居かず唯威海衛の位置する東北半島のことを考へて居た旨回答した。更に彼は英国政府の政策は威海衛の放棄を以て東北問題解決の一助たらしむるに在り、問題に付協定が締め得るならば威海衛を中華民国中央政府に返還し、簡易以て全般的解決を促進する為最善を図すに躊躇せざるべし旨を言した。
The statement of Mr. Hanihara was as follows:

"It does not necessarily follow that because a certain principle is accepted, it should be applied in all cases immediately and without qualification. In proceeding to its practical application we must not lose sight of particular facts and circumstances that surround each individual case. While constantly keeping the accepted principle in view, we should go forward step by step toward its complete realization, in such a manner as will maintain due harmony with the actual situation prevailing in each instance.

"I should state in all frankness that the stationing of our troops and police in some parts of China is solely due to our instinct for self-protection. It is admittedly a costly and thankless undertaking to maintain our troops and police in a foreign land. We should only be too glad to be relieved of that responsibility, if the efficient system of protection and control over our nationals resident in China were in operation.

"In this connection, I can only repeat the significant fact that there exists a state of affairs in China, which, apart from the question of treaty rights, renders necessary the presence of foreign troops in the very capital of China.

"Turning to the subject of the South Manchurian Railway guards, Mr. Sag's observation on the interpretation of the Additional Agreement to the Treaty of 1905 seems to us hardly convincing. The fact pointed out by the Chinese Delegation that Russia has withdrawn her troops from Manchuria apparently refers to the condition of things created by the existing anomalous situation in Russia. It does not prove that Russia has definitely agreed to the withdrawal of her troops as is contemplated in the Sino-Japanese Agreement of 1905.

"That Agreement also provides that when tranquility shall have been re-established in Manchuria and when China shall have become herself capable of affording full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia. Referring to that provision, I would like to invite the attention of the Committee to the..."
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actual conditions described in the written statement which I shall presently lay before you. (See Appendix I.)

"As for the contention that China should be given an opportunity of proving her ability to maintain peace and order in Manchuria, the reply is obvious: Japanese interests and Japanese security are matters of such importance that she (Japan) can not afford to take obvious risks. By taking such chances as are suggested we should do no good either to China or to ourselves. We should not pander to a sentimental idea at the risk of creating grave international difficulties in a region which has already been the source of a life-and-death struggle on the part of Japan, in a war which did more to preserve the integrity and independence of China than perhaps any other that has ever been fought.

"With regard to the stationing of Japanese troops at Hankow, I believe that I have made our position sufficiently clear at a previous meeting of the Committee, and I shall not attempt to repeat it. I would only add that in many cases of local disturbances in and around Hankow the menace to the security of foreign communities in general assumed so serious a proportion that those various communities organized volunteer corps for their self-protection, and that the Japanese garrison was called upon to extend active assistance and cooperation to the foreign volunteer corps.

"It may not be out of place to give here a short account of the deplorable condition of disorder and lawlessness in China proper. (See Appendix II.)

"In connection with the subject of Japanese troops stationed along the Chinese Eastern Railway, criticisms have been made by the Chinese Delegation on the continued presence of Japanese expeditionary forces in Siberia. The Japanese Delegation desires to reserve the discussion of this question for a suitable opportunity which will later on be afforded by the Conference. For the present, I shall content myself by pointing out that the stationing of Japanese troops along the Chinese Eastern Railway is due to the Interallied Agreement of 1919, in which China participated, and that those troops will be withdrawn immediately upon the evacuation of the Maritime Province by Japanese forces.

"Appendix I.

"Regarding the present situation in Manchuria, even in and around the South Manchurian Railway Zone, where peace and order are well maintained, the Chinese bandits have often made raids, having evaded the supervision of the Japanese railway guards.

"The facts above mentioned are clearly shown in the attached lists No. A and No. C.

"The condition of lawlessness and unrest prevailing in the interior of Manchuria far from the Railway Zone is beyond description. The attached list No. B shows the number of cases of attacks made on the Japanese by the Chinese bandits while the Japanese were traveling through those parts of Manchuria.

"The actual cases of attacks made by them have been far more than we have shown here, because in the attached list we have mentioned only the ones which were reported to the Japanese authorities.

"The number of cases of attacks made by them on the Koreans might be still greater. But most of the Koreans' cases are not reported to the Japanese authorities for fear of a retaliation by the bandits.

"The condition is worse in North Manchuria.

"In the region along the Chinese Eastern Railway where they have the Chinese railway guards we are informed that there were 50 cases of attacks made by the bandits during the months of April and May, 1921.

"The forces of the bandits numbered from 50 to 100 men in each case and they committed every kind of ravage.

"The outrages committed by the Chinese bandits in Chien-Tao last year well demonstrate the fact that lawlessness and disorder are prevailing in that part of Manchuria.

"In the worst case, the Chinese bandits made three attacks in the daytime on the city of Hungchung, near the Japanese border line, regardless of the fact that the Chinese troops were stationed in that city, and not only the Japanese Consulate was burned but also a number of the Japanese were massacred by them.

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No. A.

Cases of attacks by Chinese bandits within the South Manchurian Railway Zone beyond the Kwantung leased territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. B.

Cases of the Japanese attacked by the Chinese bandits while traveling in South Manchuria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>No. of Victims</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Seriously Wounded</th>
<th>Slightly Wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within Railway Zones</td>
<td>Outside Railway Zones</td>
<td></td>
<td>Within Railway Zones</td>
<td>Outside Railway Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. C.

Number of the Chinese criminals arrested within the South Manchurian Railway Zone by the Japanese authorities and handed over to the Chinese authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Thieves</th>
<th>Bandits</th>
<th>Burglars</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>1,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>1,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>1,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>1,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>1,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>1,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>1,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>1,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>2,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>2,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>3,030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 13,172
"Appendix II.

The utterly unstable condition of China can be visioned at once from even a cursory review of the persistent and flagrant manner in which the bandits commit crimes, even in open daylight and the incessant disorders caused by military elements there. A peculiar significance attaches to the incidents cited below because they have taken place in China proper, and they arose largely from the non-payment of soldiers’ wages and their hatred and grudge against the grafting officers, who too often fatten themselves at the expense of the privates. If the denigrations and robbery committed by the defeated soldiers following the battle between the factions of the two Kuan Provinces (South China) and the uprising in Yunnan and Kweichow and the battle of Shanxi and in the uprisings in Manchuria and Harmon and other border disturbances were taken into account, the number of such incidents would assume a tremendous scope, and it is no exaggeration at all to say that there scarcely passes a day when China is free from such political disorder. Even the major uprisings of this type which came to pass in the eleven months between October, 1920, and August, 1921, amounted to 53, as follows:

1. Chungking, Szechuan Province (October 14, 1920). Skirmishes took place between two factions of Chinese troops in urban districts. Pillage was committed and one Englishman was killed. The British warship in port had to fire.

2. Hochien, Chihli Province (October 31, 1920). Disturbances took place in the city, and 50 stores were attacked by soldiers.

3. Kao-yang, Chihli Province (November 17, 1920). Disturbances continued six days, troops pillaged 30 villages. More than 100 persons were injured.


5. Hsiaochou, Hunan Province (November 10, 1920). As a result of disorder and pillage more than 50 persons were killed or injured, and more than 1,300 houses were attacked and pillaged. Damages amounted to several million taels.

6. Ta-ch'ang, Kweichow Province (November 10, 1920). Massacre was committed by the troops. From 80 to 90 persons were slaughtered.

7. Ping-fu, Hunan Province (November 11, 1920). Disturbances between two different sections of the Chinese army took place, in which the commander of the army was murdered.


10. Tienmen, Yungchow Province (November 24, 1920); Linhsiang, Hunan Province (November 25, 1920). Uprising of troops during which houses and stores were looted.

11. Yenhsien, Hunan Province (November 25, 1920); Fuch'i-kow, Hupeh Province (November 25, 1922). Chinese troops mutinied and attacked the Customs Office and stores.

12. Ichih, Hupeh Province (November 29, 1920). Skirmishes took place in the city, causing lives; Chinese troops pillaged 14 Japanese stores. Other Japanese stores and stores of Japanese steamship company were burned down. The British Foreign Office and several other foreign firms were all burned down.

13. Ta-yeh, Hupeh Province (November 30, 1920). Disturbances were caused by troops, all the stores in the city sustaining heavy damages.


15. Shueh, Hupeh Province (December 10, 1920). Threatening situation reported on account of non-payment of soldiers’ salaries.


17. Changsha, Hunan Province (December 5, 1920). Uprising of Chinese troops during which the city was looted, anarchic conditions continuing for three days.

18. Yuch'ow, Hunan Province (January 25, 1921). Wholesale pillage of stores in the city and railway traffic blocked for several days.

19. Hsinchou, Kiangsi Province (January 20, 1921). Fractional fights among soldiers accompanied by desolation of stores and houses.


22. Tsin-hai, Hupeh Province (February 23, 1921). Mutiny of troops, many of them killed. They set fire to the stores and pillaged...
Appendix II.

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1. Chungking, Szechuan Province (October 6, 1920). Skirmishes took place between factions of Chinese troops in urban districts. Pillage was committed and one Englishman was killed. The British warship in port had to fire.

2. Jehol, Chihli Province (October 31, 1920). Disturbances took place in the city, and 50 stores were attacked by soldiers.

3. Kaoyang, Chihli Province (November 17, 1920). Disturbances continued six days, troops pillaged 30 villages. More than 100 persons were injured.


5. Hsiaoyang, Honan Province (November 10, 1920). A result of disorder and pillage more than 60 persons were killed or injured, and more than 1,300 houses were attacked and pillaged. Damages amounted to several million taels.

6. Weiyang, Kwangtung Province (November 10, 1920). Massacre was committed by the troops. From 80 to 90 persons were slaughtered.

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10. Tienmen, Yünnan Province (November 24, 1920); Linhsiang, Hunan Province (November 25, 1920). Uprising of troops during which houses and stores were looted.

11. Yangchau, Hunan Province (November 25, 1920); Fuchikow, Hupeh Province (November 27, 1920). Chinese troops ritually and attacked the Customs Office and stores.

12. Tientsin, Hupeh Province (November 29, 1920). Skirmishes took place in the city, causing; 11 Chinese troops pillaged 12 Japanese stores. Other Japanese stores and stores of Japanese steamship company were burned down. The British Americana Company and several other foreign trading firms were all burned down.

13. Yenchow, Hupeh Province (November 30, 1920). Disturbances were caused by troops, all the stores in the city sustaining heavy damages.


15. Hongkiang, Hupeh Province (December 10, 1920). Threatening situation reported on account of non-payment of soldiers' salaries.


17. Changsha, Hunan Province (December 5, 1920). Uprising of Chinese troops during which the city was looted, anarchic conditions continuing for three days.

18. Yushanow, Hunan Province (January 25, 1921). Wholesale pillage of stores in the city and railway traffic blocked for several days.


20. Peking, Chihli Province (February 13, 1921). Mutiny of soldiers 3,000 houses and stores isolated.


22. Sushih, Hupeh Province (February 23, 1921). Mutiny of troops, because of non-payment for ten months. They set fire to the stores and pillaged...
them. Damages amounted to more than ten million taels.


"26. Yichang, Hupeh Province (June 8, 1921). Soldiers joined by local bandits, committed ravage and incendiarism, seven or eight hundred lives lost.

"27. Wuchang, Hupeh province (June 8, 1921). Troops pillaged stores and destroyed the mint. Banks and all the principal firms and stores were burned down. The same soldiers, led by their commander, restored order in the town the following day.

"28. Fuchihkow, Hupeh Province (June 20, 1921). Troops caused trouble. Many were injured and much damage done to property.

"29. Wu-fu, Anhui Province (June 2, 1921). Disturbances caused by troops. Merchants' guilds forced to make pecuniary contribution.

"30. Nanchang, Kiangsi Province (latter part of June, 1921). Chinese troops pillaged the village; an officer was murdered.

"31. Hsiao-can, Hupeh Province (August 24, 1921). Chinese troops damaged railroads, railroad trucks, cut telephone wires, and committed pillage.

"32. Wu-hsu-ho, Hupeh Province (August 15, 1921). Pillage by soldiers lasted for 21 days in and around the town.

"33. Wuchang, Hupeh Province (August 24, 1921). Insurrection of troops."
ソビエト戦争ハ＝貴＝中間ノ保全ヲ独立トナ維持スル＝為＝恐慌ヲ防ジテ戦

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兵士・商人同業組合三等附子野原。

一八湘南省長沙（一九二二年一月）。

市中商店ノ大規模ノ破壊。数日間経過不動。

兵士門ノ反乱ノ三等ノ民家及商店破壊ヲ起。

兵士ノ反乱シ商店ヲ脅。

兵士ノ反乱ヲ防火シ破壊。被害千萬兩ヲ

約。
二、河南省告急（九二一八四六）

二、湖南省危急（九二一八四六）

二、兵士等逃亡争时，因故重大火灾起。

三、兵士市中火乱起。

二、湖南省告急（九二一八四六）

二、兵士等逃亡争时，因故重大火灾起。

三、兵士市中火乱起。

二、湖南省告急（九二一八四六）

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三、兵士市中火乱起。

二、湖南省告急（九二一八四六）

二、兵士等逃亡争时，因故重大火灾起。

三、兵士市中火乱起。
Baron Shidehara said there was a question he wished to raise in connection with the matters discussed relating to the open door. He then made the following statement:

"The Japanese Delegation understands that one of the primary objects which the present Conference on Far Eastern questions has in view is to promote the general welfare of the Chinese people and, at the same time, of all nations interested in China. For the realization of that desirable end, nothing is of greater importance than the development and utilization of the unlimited natural resources of China.

"It is agreed on all sides that China is a country with immense potentialities. She is richly endowed by nature with arable soil, with mines and with raw materials of various kinds. But these natural resources are of little practical value, so long as they remain undeveloped and unutilized. In order to make full use of them, it is essential that China shall open her own door to foreign capital and to foreign trade and enterprise."

"Touching on this subject, Mr. Sze, on behalf of the Chinese Delegation, made an important statement to the full Committee on November 16th, declaring that 'China wishes to make her vast natural resources available to all peoples who need them.' That statement evidently represents the wisdom and foresight of China, and the Japanese Delegation is confident that the principle which it enunciated will be carried out to its full extent.

"It is to be hoped that, in the application of that principle, China may be disposed to extend to foreigners, as far as possible, the opportunity of cooperation in the development and utilization of China's natural resources. Any spontaneous declaration by China of her policy in that direction will be received with much satisfaction by Japan and also, no doubt, by all other nations interested in China. Resolutions which have hitherto been adopted by this Committee have been uniformly guided by the spirit of self-denial and self-sacrifice on the part of foreign Powers in favor of China. The Japanese Delegation trusts that China, on her part, will not be unwilling to formulate a policy which will prove of considerable benefit no less to China herself than to all nations."
Def. Doc. 200-E

Excerpts From

CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1921
February 6, 1922

Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions.
Twentieth Meeting, Wednesday, January 18, 1922, 11 A.M.
Columbus Room, Pan American Building

Pages: 134th, 1271, 12

Present

UNITED STATES: Hr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Senator Underwood, Mr. Root. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. MacCurry.

BELGIUM: Baron de Courtier. Accompanied by Mr. Tilmont, Mr. de Warzee.

BRITISH EMPIRE: Mr. Balfour, Lord Iddes, Sir Auckland Edes, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Simon (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Mr. Larmor, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith.

CHINA: Mr. Sze, Mr. Koo, Mr. Yang. Accompanied by Mr. Yen, Mr. King, Mr. Zee, Mr. Tyau.

FRANCE: Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jemond. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano.

JAPAN: Admiral Earon Kato, Baron Shidehara, Mr. Hanihara. Accompanied by Mr. Saburi, Mr. Kinzawa, Mr. Sato.


INTERPRETER: Mr. Camerlynck.

THE NETHERLANDS: Jonkheer Debeers Van Eikland, Jonkheer Van Beaufort. Accompanied by Jonkheer Van Stocohenbergh, Mr. de Kat Angelino.

PORTUGAL: Viscount D'Alva, Captain Vasconcellos.

The Secretary General. Assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Osborne, Mr. Wilson.

BARON SHIDEHARA said there was a question he wished to raise in connection with the matters discussed relating to the open door. He then made the following statement:

"The Japanese Delegation understands that one of the primary objects which the present Conference on Far Eastern questions has in view is to promote the general welfare of the Chinese people and, at the same time, of all nations interested in China. For the accomplishment of that desirable end, nothing is of greater importance than the development and utilization of the unlimited natural resources of China.

"It is agreed on all sides that China is a country with immense potentialities. She is richly endowed by nature with arable soil, with mines and with raw materials of various kinds. But those natural resources are of little practical value, so long as they remain undeveloped and unutilized. In order to make full use of them, it seems essential that China shall open her own door to foreign capital and to foreign trade and enterprise.

"Touching on this subject, Mr. Sze, on behalf of the Chinese Delegation, made an important statement to the full Committee on November 16th, declaring that China wishes to make her vast natural resources available to all peoples who need them. That statement evidently represents the wisdom and foresight of China, and the Japanese Delegation is confident that the principle which it enunciated will be carried out to its full extent.

"It is to be hoped that, in the application of that principle, China may be disposed to extend to foreigners, as far as possible, the opportunity of cooperation in the development and utilization of China's natural resources. Any spontaneous declaration by China of her policy in that direction will be received with much gratification by Japan and also, no doubt, by all other nations interested in China. Declarations which have hitherto been adopted by this Committee have been uniformly guided by the spirit of self-denial and self-sacrifice on the part of foreign Powers in favor of China. The Japanese Delegation trusts that China, on her part, will not be unwilling to formulate a policy which will prove of considerable benefit no less to China herself than to all nations."
日本の代表の採用するものにようば、この役を推進する主な目的の一つとして、中華民國民並びに中華民国に別名日本を有するすべての贓国家の一般の通訳の選手を企図して居るのである。比の設立し目的實現の為何等の重大なる自然の力によって是が背、中華民國は常在の用の港を有するため、特に重要な中華民國の為、何等の役を任ばざるを得る。

凡の方面で誠めたる知く中華民國は巨大な自然力のもつた国である。しかも力の自力に於ては、中華民國は當然の立場に於ては、中華民國は常在の港を有するため、特に重要な中華民國の為、何等の役を任ばざるを得る。
BARON SHIDEHARA said that, if the discussion on the Siberian problem was to be proceeded with, it might be of interest for the Committee to know exactly the intentions and aims of Japan in regard to Siberia, and, with the permission of the Chairman and of the Committee, he would make a concise statement in this respect.

He then read as follows:

"The Military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in cooperation with the United States in 1918. It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops who in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces, together with other Allied troops, fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the Trans-Baikal Provinces to protect the railway lines which afforded the sole means of transportation of the Czecho-Slovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in their operations in the severe cold winter of Siberia were immense.

"In January, 1920, the United States decided to terminate its military undertaking in Siberia, and ordered the withdrawal of its forces. For some time thereafter, Japanese troops continued alone to carry out the duty of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railway in fulfillment of interallied arrangements, and of affording facilities to the returning Czecho-Slovens.

"The last column of Czecho-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostok in September, 1920. Ever since then, Japan has been looking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia. The maintenance of such troops in a foreign 'arm' is for her a costly and thankless undertaking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacuated is the southern portion of the Maritime Provinces around Vladivostok and Nikol' sk."
Excerpts From
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1921
February 6, 1922

Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions
Twenty-Fourth Meeting, Monday, January 23, 1922, 11 A.M.
Columbus Room, Pan American Building

Baron Shidehara said that, if the discussion on the Siberian problem was to be proceeded with, it might be of interest for the Committee to know exactly the intentions and aims of Japan in regard to Siberia, and, with the permission of the Chairman and of the Committee, he would make a concise statement in this respect.

He then read as follows:

"The Military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in cooperation with the United States in 1918. It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops who in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces, together with other Allied troops, fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the Trans-Baikal Provinces to protect the railway lines which afforded the sole means of transportation of the Czecho-Slovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in the severe cold winter of Siberia were immense.

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"The last column of Czecho-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostok in September, 1920. Ever since, the Japan has been looking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia. The maintenance of such troops in a foreign land is far from a costly and thankless undertaking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacuated is the southern portion of the Maritime Province around Vladivostock and Nikolsk."
It will be appreciated that for Japan to question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied powers. In the first place, there are a considerable number of Japanese residents who had lawfully and under guaranties of treaty established themselves in Siberia long before the Bolshevik eruption, and were therefore welcomed. In 1917, prior to the joint American-Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already in excess of 35,000. In the actual situation prevailing there, these Japanese residents can hardly be expected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other authorities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts these troops have evacuated in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically all Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they have been obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. While the hardships and losses this caused the Japanese in the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces have been serious enough, more extensive damages are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostok in which a much larger number of Japanese have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested.

There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime Province. Due to geographical praeinclities the general situation in the districts around Vladivostok and Nikola is bound to affect the security of the Korean frontier. In particular it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan. Those hostile Koreans, joining hands with lawless elements in Russia, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chientao. They set fire to the Japanese Consulate at Hunchun and committed indiscriminate acts of murder and pillage. At the present time they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime Province, but they will no doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that may present itself.

Having regard to these considerations, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exercise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacuation of the Maritime Province. Should they take hasty action without adequate provision for the future they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question and of maintaining order and security in Korea.

It should be made clear that no part of the Maritime Province is under Japan's military occupation. Japanese troops are still stationed in the southern portion of that Province, but they have not set up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities. Their activity is confined to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are not in occupation of those districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they were formerly stationed.

The Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily reestablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. It was in this spirit that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolchak. They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for promoting the reconciliation of various political groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully refrained from supporting any faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they withheld all assistance from General Rozanov amidst the revolutionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1920. They maintained an attitude of strict neutrality and refused to interfere in these movements, which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress if they had so desired.

In relation to this matter of evacuation, it may be useful to refer briefly to the past relations between the Japanese and Ataman Semenoff, which seem to lose some of their historic interest in speculation. It will be remembered that the primary responsibilit for the Germans and the Bolshevik Government in Russia in the early part of 1917 naturally gave rise to apprehensions in the Allied countries of the United States. Supply of munitions was already in excess of 90,000. In Vladivostok might be removed by the Bolsheviks to European Russia, for the use of the Germans. Ataman Semenoff was then in Siberia and was organizing a movement to shord such Bolshevist activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. It was in this situation that
It will be appreciated that for Japan the question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied powers. In the first place, there are a considerable number of Japanese residents who had lawfully and under guarantees of treaty established themselves in Siberia long before the Bolshevik eruption, and were there not only welcomed. In 1917, prior to the joint American-Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already over 50,000. In the actual situation prevailing there, these Japanese residents can hardly be expected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other authorities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts these troops have evacuated in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically all Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they have been obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. While the hardships and losses thus caused the Japanese in the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces have been serious enough, more extensive damages are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostok in which a larger number of Japanese have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested.

There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime Province. Due to geographical proximity the general situation in the districts around Vladivostok and Nikolai is bound to affect the security of the Korean frontier. In particular it is known that these districts have formed the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan. Those hostile Koreans, joining hands with lawless elements in Russia, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chientao. They set fire to the Japanese Consulate at Hungchun and committed indiscriminately acts of murder and pillage. At the present time they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime Province, but they will not doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that any present itself.

Having regard to these considerations, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exercise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacuation of the Maritime Province. Should they take hasty action without adequate provision for the future they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question and of maintaining order and security in Korea.

It should be made clear that no part of the Maritime Province is under Japan's military occupation. Japanese troops are still stationed in the southern portion of that province, but they have not set up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities. Their activity is confined to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are not in occupation of those districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they were formerly stationed.

The Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily reestablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. It was in this spirit that they manifested keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolchak. They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for prompting the reconciliation of various political groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully restrained from supporting one faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they withheld all assistance from General Rozanov against the revolutionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1920. They maintained an attitude of strict neutrality and refused to interfere in the internal affairs of the Russian Republic. It would have been quite easy for them to suppress if they had wished.

In relation to this policy of non-interference, it is useful to refer briefly to the past relations between the Koreans on the one hand and Ataman Somonoff, which seem to lend a certain color of realism to an otherwise visionary speculation. It will be remembered that the progress of the Korean revolution in the hands of the Bolsheviks naturally gave rise to apprehension in Tokyo that the Koreans might use the munitions supplied by the Japanese and stored in Vladivostok might be removed by the Bolsheviks to European Russia, for the use of the Germans. Ataman Somonoff was then in Siberia and was organizing a movement to check such Bolshevik activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. It was in this situation that
Japan, as well as some of the Allies, began to give support to the Cossack chief. After a few months, such support by the other Powers was discontinued, but the Japanese were reluctant to abandon their friend, whose efforts in the Allied cause they had originally encouraged, and they maintained for some time their connection with Ataman Semenoff. They had, however, no intention whatever of interfering in the domestic affairs of Russia, and when it was found that the assistance rendered to the Ataman was likely to complicate the internal situation in Siberia, they terminated all relations with him and no support of any kind has since been extended to him by the Japanese authorities.

"The Japanese Government are now seriously considering plans which would justify them in carrying out their decision of the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province with reasonable precaution for the security of Japanese residents and of the Korean frontier regions. It is for this purpose that negotiations were opened some time ago at Darien between the Japanese representatives and the agents of the Chita Government.

"Those negotiations at Darien are in no way intended to secure for Japan any right or advantage of an exclusive nature. They have been solely actuated by a desire to adjust some of the pressing questions with which Japan is confronted in relation to Siberia. They have essentially in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and property of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, the provision of guarantees for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region, and the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda over the Siberian border. Should adequate provisions be arranged on the line indicated, the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province.

"The occupation of certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin is wholly different both in nature and in origin, from the stationing of troops in the Maritime Province. History affords few instances similar to the incident of 1920 at Nikolaievsk, where more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognized Japanese Consul and his family and his official staff, were cruelly tortured and massacred. No nation worthy of respect will possibly remain forbearing under such a strain of provocation. Nor was it possible for the Japanese Government to disregard the just popular indignation aroused in Japan by the incident. Under the actual condition of things, Japan found no alternative but to occupy, as a measure of reprisal, certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom she can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction.

"Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than to take advantage of the present helpless condition of Russia for prosecuting selfish designs. Japan recalls with deep gratitude and appreciation the brilliant role which Russia played in the interest of civilization during the earlier stage of the Great War. The Japanese people have shown and will continue to show every sympathetic interest in the efforts of patriotic Russians aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of their country. The military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin is only a temporary measure, and will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government.

"In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions."
中

日

仏

イタリア

オランダ

ポルトガル

全時佐

カマリンク氏
帝原男爵曰く「チペリアの間に関じて日本の有する意義及び目的を正しく認識する事は利益のある事である。自分は政策並びに委員会の許可を得てこの議につき同
識に申述願いと。折々同局は次の如く朗議した。

一曰ちチペリア出兵は元来、アメリカと一致せる意見に即き又之と
協力して一九一八年（大正七年）行はれたものである。それはトリア形
時 Kulgo サッパリ見を敬愛する目的でなされたものである。それは末来必
敵軍の手中にあり重大且つ緊急の危険に晒してゐるたのである。日本軍は当
時向よりチペリアを研究して本日へ當面の途次、ドイツの指導下にあく
軍は進の集中軍を共にウラジオストックより遠く且ち長江流域及びバイカ
ル以西の各州まで油田砲陣等の為め戦いつ、進んだ。その戦はチェッコ
スロバキア軍及びチペリア内部より、面を襲しては逆に発する唯一の手段で
面しなければならなかつた。
一九二〇年（大正九年）一月、米原はシベリアに於けるその軍事行動を斂止する決意をなし、自軍軍の撤退を命じた。其後即時日本軍のみ引揚げ場合、間の取扱を果たす為めにシベリア軍が撤退沿線の蒼地勢を守備し、且つ遣中のテッコ・スロバキア軍に便宜を與へんとする任務を遂行してゐたのである。

チェッコ・スロバキア軍の最後尾は一九二〇年（大正九年）九月断事、途中より撤退した。其の時以来日本はなるべく早くシベリアより撤兵せんと企画せる計画あり。撤退の手順に於て、現在撤退すべき唯一の地域は満洲及びニュルスク附近の沿海州南部のみで、現現在撤退すべき場合の如く単独をなすに足りないと考える。第一にシベリアには

（"IF: 126 B 205 F"")
相原設の日本滞留民が通訳の居留前に、久しく合法的に且つ謝罪の保護の下に居住して居り、そこにあって全く総合されて来たのである。一九一七年八月大正六年一日米共同出兵以前に於て日本滞留民の為に九月二十日七名に及んだのである。現地に於ける為日的に関係しして此等滞留民は彼等の生命財産の保護を日本滞留民以外如何なる官兵にも殆ど期待することは出策なかったが、日本滞留民の数多した地方は如何なる地方に於ても従来混雑に隠れた、そして賠償に全日本滞留民は急激引揚げ自分等の身体の安全を求めるなければならないなかったのである。現の如く従来するに於ては彼等の為に従来の財政をは放延し、何の保護もはき誠に及ばざるを得なかった、は大部分の賠償をは放延し、何の賠償もはき誠に及ばざるを得なかった、は大部分の賠償をは放延し、何の賠償もはき誠に及ばざるを得なかった、は大部分の賠償をは放延し、何の賠償もはき誠に及ばざるを得なかった、は大部分の賠償をは放延し、何の賠償もはき誠に及ばざるを得なかった。
日本についても一つの国際法は近寄州よりの宣伝布告の陸路である。地
理的に支配しているので遠隔及びニコリスケ周辺の地方に於ける一般的
事情は宣伝布告の影響せざるを得ないのである。特に知られてゐ
ることは此箇の地方が知い程、宣伝人の返日出陣の実態であつたこと
である。故に近寄州近辺人等は上記の不適分子と嫌憎し、九三二年（大正
九年）支那事変、四日を経て前線へ倭軍を金てたのである。

彼等は前線の日に何かに於て放火し手配り次第警備状態を退うした。目
下の彼、彼等は近寄州に於てする日本軍に完全に押へらしてゐるが、

彼等は旋ひなくなり次第再び前線へ倭軍を金てたのである。

行くの如き可成に激しく行つた日には周辺の警備を解さざる可く、無数に
倭軍すら行くを妨げするものである。遠寄州近辺の日本国民を保護し、
宣伝に於ける秩序

及安全を維持すべき準備を忘るるものでゐる。
ご指摘下に承る次にいうべし。日本政府は昔の民政とは異なり、危険のない時代への戻りが見られる。その行は民自作の協力に限られ、自らの安全に対して依頼して居るのである。これは余りも著しい変化を来すにあたって、日本政府は革命的な行動をとるべきであると諭されるべきである。日本政府は革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をとるべきである。革命的な行動をと都应该
立の発達を懸念し、この理由を抑圧せんと欲するなら、 выпусしてきた容易に出戻るのであった。これが不平不満に傾注して日本政府にアタマン、セミヨンフの過去の問題を問うた、その意図は一応理解される。また、この形式は、不平不満を早くに頭を凸ぼうとするも、それは日本政府の不平不満に歴史があるのと考えた。アタマン、セミヨンフは昨年のように日本軍の活動を抑へ、同地に於ける日人政府の安定を保持せんとする運動を組織して来たのである。近二代に於ては、広いの改めの改め、このコソックの領軍において支持を興へ始めた。
この国アダマン・セミヨーフの間係を問うのである。 päは日本

日本政府が日下真一に示唆してあるのは、日本軍民の安全並びに朝

鮮国境地域の保険に対する合理的なる事前の措置を整えよつて日本

政府は彼が朝鮮国に居を営む着を送るのを許可しないのであ

て居らないのである。
その方が本質的に目的とする名は、否定的退縮制度の姿；日本の安全並びに
東部ペリリアにおける日本帝国軍民の生命財産に対する保護を策定する
同地区における害法的処理の停止である。若しこの指示されるとる議における事
況の完全収に着手するであろう。

投棄された或は影響はその内容及び起因につき沿岸州におけるは
女子を命じ七百名以上の日本科学並びに正直に残る衆をいかなる形
の在地化は一旦異なるのである。従ってこれに至っても二〇〇年（大正九年）の
ニコライスクにおける事件の如き例は全くあつて、同地における婦
家族並びに同様が関係に沿岸州におけるは何処である。一般民
家が懸念の念を解明することも不可能であった。

所の如き現実に

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Statement of source and authenticity

I, [Name], acting Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 26 pages and entitled "Memorandum from Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921, and June 6, 1922" is an exact and true extract from the book entitled "Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921, and June 6, 1922" in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of January 1947.

[Signature]

Witness: [Signature]
Baron Shidehara read the following statement:

"At a previous session of this Committee, the Chinese Delegation presented a statement urging that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 be reconsidered and cancelled. The Japanese Delegation, while appreciating the difficult position of the Chinese Delegation, does not feel at liberty to concur in the procedure now resorted to by China with a view to cancellation of international engagements which she entered into as a free sovereign nation.

"It is presumed that the Chinese Delegation has no intention of calling in question the legal validity of the conventions of 1915, which were formally signed and sealed by the duly authorized representatives of the two Governments, and for which the exchange of ratifications was effected in conformity with established international usages. The assistance by China on the cancellation of those instruments would in itself indicate that she shares the view that the compacts actually remain in force and will continue to be effective, unless and until they are cancelled.

"It is evident that no nation can have given ready consent to cessions of its territorial or other rights of importance. If it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere.

"The statement of the Chinese Delegation under review declares that China accepted the Japanese demands in 1915, hoping that a day would come when she should have the opportunity of bringing them up for reconsideration and cancellation. It is, however, difficult to understand the meaning of this assertion. It
Excerpts From
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS
"WASHING r0\nNovember 12, 1921
February 6, 1922
Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions
Twelfth Eighth Meeting; Tuesday, January 31, 1922, 5:10 p.m.
Columbus Room, Pan American Building

Present

Page 11/2

U.S.A. Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Senator Underwood, Mr. Root. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Mack Murray.
BELGIUM Baron de Cartier. Accompanied by Dr. de Varese.
BRITISH EMPIRE: Mr. Dalhousie, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Mr. Saty (for India). Accompanied by Mr. Christie, Mr. Talbot, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, Mr. Bajpai.
CYPRUS: Mr. Hax, Mr. Kos, Mr. Chang. Accompanied by Mr. Hawkbrand Yen, Mr. Yau, Mr. Lee, Mr. Ko.
FRANCE: Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Juissainand. Accompanied by Mr. Dennant, Mr. Ponsot.
JAPAN: Admiral Baron Ito, Baron Shidehara, Mr. Nanibara. Accompanied by Mr. Kobori, Mr. Ebuchi, Mr. Kimura, Mr. Sada.
NETHERLANDS: Jonkheer Van Mi Lanter, Jonkheer de Beaufort. Accompanied by Jonkheer van Starkenburg, Mr. de "at Angelino.
PORTUGAL: Viscount d’Ors, Captain Visconcellos.
The Secretary General. Assisted by Mr. Herro, Mr. Cresson.
Interpreters: Mr. Camerlynk, Mr. Talaman.

Page 1 10/ 1 112

The Chairman then said that he understood that the next subject to be brought up was the matter which had been generally called the "Twenty-one Demands," and he believed an opportunity had been reserved for the Japanese Delegation to speak upon that subject.

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"It is presumed that the Chinese Delegation has no intention of calling in question the legal validity of the compacts of 1915, which were formally signed and sealed by the duly authorized representatives of the two Governments, and for which the exchange of ratifications was effected in conformity with established international usages. The insistence by China on the cancellation of those instruments would in itself indicate that she shares the view that the compacts actually remain in force and will continue to be effective, unless and until they are cancelled.

"It is evident that no nation can have given ready consent to cessions of its territorial or other rights of importance if it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere.

"The statement of the Chinese Delegation under review declares that China accepted the Japanese demands in 1915, hoping that a day would come when she should have the opportunity of bringing them up for reconsideration and cancellation. It is, however, difficult to understand the meaning of this assertion. It
cannot be the intention of the Chinese Delegation to intimate that China may conclude a treaty with any thought in mind of breaking it at the first opportunity.

"The Chinese Delegation maintains that the Treaties and Notes in question are derogatory to the principles adopted by the Conference with regard to China’s sovereignty and independence. It has, however, been held by the Conference on more than one occasion that concessions made by China ex contractu, in the exercise of her own sovereign rights, cannot be regarded as inconsistent with her sovereignty and independence.

"It should also be pointed out that the term "Twenty-One demands," often used to denote the Treaties and Notes of 1915, is inaccurate and grossly misleading. It may give rise to an erroneous impression that the whole original proposals of Japan had been pressed by Japan and accepted in toto by China. As a matter of fact, not only "Group V" but also several other matters contained in Japan’s first proposals were eliminated entirely or modified considerably, in deference to the wishes of the Chinese Government, when the final formula was presented to China for acceptance. Official records published by the two Governments relating to these negotiations will further show that the most important terms of the Treaties and Notes, as signed, had already been virtually agreed to by the Chinese negotiators before the delivery of the ultimatum, which then seemed to the Japanese Government the only way of bringing the protracted negotiations to a speedy close.

"The Japanese Delegation cannot bring itself to the conclusion that any useful purpose will be served by research and re-examination at this Conference of old grievances which one of the nations represented here may have against another. It will be more in line with the high aim of the Conference to look forward to the future with hope and with confidence.

"Having, in view, however, the changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, the Japanese Delegation is happy to avail itself of the present occasion to make the following declaration:

"1. Japan is ready to throw open to the joint activity of the International Financial Consortium recently organized, the right of option granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital, with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and, second, to loans secured on taxes in that region; it being understood that nothing in the present declaration shall be held to imply any modification or annulment of the understanding recorded in the officially announced notes and memoranda which were exchanged among the Governments of the countries represented in the Consortium and also among the national financial groups composing the Consortium, in relation to the scope of the joint activity of that organization.

"2. Japan has no intention of insisting on her preferential right under the Sino-Japanese arrangements in question concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisors or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters in South Manchuria.

"3. Japan is further ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in proceeding to the signature of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, to the effect that Group V of the original proposals of the Japanese Government would be postponed for future negotiations.

"It would be needless to add that all matters relating to Shantung contained in those Treaties and Notes have now been definitely adjusted and disposed of.

"In coming to this decision, which I have had the honor to announce, Japan has been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China's sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity."
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前言：本委员会的会议上，中华民国代表提出了关于争议的提案。本委员会认为，中华民国代表的提案应予审议。由于本会议的宗旨在于促进国际理解与合作，因此，本委员会认为，应将中华民国代表的提案提交给有关国家，以便各方进行讨论和审议。
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差し引き協力をするか否かを決める見解に賛成していること物語っている。}

「如何なる者もその価値あるものとしての価値あるものである。」


「それは中華民国の代表はこれを承認されたこと、次の理由を以て、何時行ってかかる。」

「そのアルペ・ローマーの代表はしか最大である。」

「今含まれ中の中華民国代表の約束を同国が一九五五年日本国との要求を受審したのは彼者における再考の上停止する程度のないか。」

「中華民国の代表は彼者を見つける次第破棄する考を内面に設け、中華民国の約束された範に至っては、中華民国の代表は彼者に関する程度のないか。」

「今含まれ中の中華民国代表は彼者の代表の代表は中華民国の代表を」とある。中華民国代表は彼者の代表は中華民国の代表を「中華民国の代表を」とある。
到達し得ない。それらを参照し信頼をもって将来に期待を込める方が、実に

今後の重要な目的により日々の業をある。

昭和二年八月の大阪市長を務められ

二月一日の改定に因む。

昭和二年八月

増益に資する。日本国は第一に必要に際し、第二

にその地域の税金を拠支する資本に於て日本国資本の為に特き、その於

これを有する。但し此の宣誓中の如何なる字句も日本国資本家連合の共

同活動の範囲に限って、同連合により代表させられる、故国に於く

に於て為に為されべき

際及び為すべき連合の解散事項には、如何なる意味あるか否は意義をも意味するもので

ないことを除され度い。
日本国は、渡辺中日邦連合事情下における政治、経済、軍事、
The Sixth Plenary Session of the Conference of the Limitation of Armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, was held at Washington on Saturday, February 4, 1922, at 10:30 o'clock a.m., in Memorial Continental Hall. The chairman, the Honorable Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State of the United States of America, presided.

THE CHAIRMAN (speaking in English): At the last Plenary Session of the Conference, I had the pleasure of stating that the Chinese and Japanese Delegations had informed me that they had agreed upon a settlement of the controversy relating to Shantung. I now have the pleasure of stating that I am informed by the Chinese and Japanese representatives that the proposed Treaty on the question of Shantung has been agreed upon, the form of text approved, and the Treaty is ready for signature. (Applause.)

I am directed by the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions to read, for the purpose of having the statements formally placed upon the records of the Conference, the following declarations with respect to the so-called Twenty-one Demands or the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915:

The first statement that I shall read is the statement made in the Committee by Mr. Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government. It is as follows:

"At a previous session of this Committee, the Chinese Delegation presented a statement urging that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 be reconsidered and cancelled. The Japanese Delegation, while appreciating the difficult position of the Chinese Delegation, does not feel at liberty to concur in the procedure now resorted to by China with a view to cancellation of international engagements which she entered into as a free sovereign nation.

"It is presumed that the Chinese Delegation has no intention of calling in question the legal validity of the compacts of 1915, which were formally signed and sealed by the duly authorized representatives of the two Governments and for which the exchange of ratifications was effected in conformity with established international usages. The insistence by China on the cancellation of these instruments would in itself indicate that she shares the view that the compacts actually remain in force and will continue to be effective, unless and until they are cancelled.

"It is evident that no nation can have given ready consent to cessions of its territorial or other rights of importance. If it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere."
"The statement of the Chinese Delegation under review declares that China accepted the Japanese demands in 1919, hoping that a day would come when she should have the opportunity of bringing the same up for reconsideration and cancellation. It is, however, difficult to understand the meaning of this assertion. It can not be the intention of the Chinese Delegation to intimate that China may conclude a treaty with any thought of breaking it at the first opportunity.

The Chinese Delegation maintains that the Treaties and Notes in question are derogatory to the principles adopted by the Conference with regard to China's sovereignty and independence. It has, however, been held by the Conference on more than one occasion that concessions made by China are contrary, in the exercise of her own sovereign rights, and not be regarded as inconsistent with her sovereignty and independence.

"It should also be pointed out that the term 'Twenty-one Demands,' often used to denote the Treaties and Notes of 1919, is inaccurate and grossly misleading. It may give rise to an erroneous impression that the whole original proposals of Japan had been pressed by Japan and accepted in toto by China. As a matter of fact, not only 'Group V,' but also several other matters contained in Japan's first proposals, were eliminated entirely or modified considerably, in deference to the wishes of the Chinese Government, when the final formula was presented to China for acceptance. Official records published by the two Governments relating to these negotiations will further show that the most important terms of the Treaties and Notes, as such, had already been virtually agreed to by the Chinese negotiators before the delivery of the ultimatum, which the acceptance of the Japanese Government the only way of bringing the protracted negotiations to a speedy close.

"The Japanese Delegation cannot bring itself to the conclusion that any useful purpose will be served by research and re-examination of this conference of old grievances which one or the nations represented here may have against another. It will be more in line with the high aim of the Conference to look forward to the future with hope and confidence.

"Having in view, however, the changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1919, the Japanese Delegation is happy to avail itself of the present occasion to make the following declaration:

"1. Japan is ready to throw open to the joint activity of the International Financial Consortium recently organized, the right of option granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital, with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Western Inner Mongolia, and, second, to loans to be secured on taxes in that region; it being understood that nothing in the present declaration shall be held to imply any modification or amendment of the understanding recorded in the officially announced notes and memoranda which were exchanged among the Governments of the countries represented in the Consortium, and also among the national financial groups composing the Consortium, in relation to the scope of the joint activity of that organization.

"2. Japan has no intention of insisting on her preferential right under the Sino-Japanese arrangements in question concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisors or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters in South Manchuria."
"Japan is further ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in proceeding to the signature of the Sino-Japanese Treaties of 1915, to the effect that Group V of the original program of the Japanese Government would be postponed for future negotiations.

"It would be needless to add that all matters relating to Shantung contained in these Treaties and Notes have now been definitely adjusted and disposed of.

"In coming to this decision, which I have had the honor to announce, I have been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation having always in view China sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity."

In response to that statement made on behalf of the Japanese Government, Mr. Wang, made to the Committee the following statement on behalf of the Chinese Delegation:

"The Chinese Delegation has taken note of the statement of Mr. Shidehara made at yesterday's session of the Committee (30th meeting Feb. 2, 1922) with reference to the Sino-Japanese Treaties and notes of May 2, 1915.

"The Chinese Delegation learns with satisfaction that Japan is now ready to throw open to the joint activity of the banking interests of other Powers the right of option granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and, second, to loans secured on taxes in that region; and that Japan has no intention of insisting upon a preferential right concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters in South Manchuria; also that Japan withdraws the reservation which she made to the effect that Group V of her original demands upon China should be postponed for future negotiation.

"The Chinese Delegation greatly regrets that the Government of Japan should not have been led to renounce the other claims predicated upon the Treaties and Notes of 1915.

"The Japanese Delegation expressed the opinion that abrogation of these agreements would constitute an exceedingly dangerous precedent, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and elsewhere.

"The Chinese Delegation has the honor to say that a still more dangerous precedent will be established with consequences upon the stability of international relations which cannot be estimated, if without rebuke or protest from other Powers, one nation can obtain from a friendly, but in a military sense, weaker neighbor, and under circumstances such as attended the negotiation and signing of the Treaties of 1915, valuable concessions which were not in satisfaction of pending controversies and for which no good purpose was offered. These Treaties and Notes stand out, indeed, unique in the annals of international relations. History records scarcely another instance in which demands of such a serious character as those which Japan presented to China in 1915, have, without even pretense of provocation, been suddenly presented by one nation to another nation.
with which it was at the time in friendly relations.

"No apprehension need be entertained that the abrogation of the agreements of 1915 will serve as a precedent for the annulment of other agreements, since it is confidently hoped that the future will furnish no such similar occurrence.

"So exceptional were the conditions under which the agreements of 1915 were negotiated, that the Government of the United States felt justified in referring to them in the identical note of May 13, 1915, which it sent to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. That note began with the statement that 'in view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States had the honor to notify the Government of (the Chinese Republic-Japan) that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan involving the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy.

"Conscious of her obligations to the other Powers, the Chinese Government, immediately after signing the agreements, published a formal statement protesting against the agreements which she had been compelled to sign, and disclaiming responsibility for consequent violations of treaty rights of the other Powers. In the statement thus issued, the Chinese Government declared that although they were 'constrained to comply in full with the terms of the (Japanese) ultimatum' they nevertheless 'disclaim any desire to associat[e] themselves with any revision, which may be thus effected, of the various conventions and agreements concluded between other Powers in respect of the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the status quo, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

"Because of the essential injustice of these provisions, the Chinese Delegation, acting in behalf of the Chinese Government and of the Chinese people, has felt itself in duty bound to present to this Conference, representing the Powers with substantial interests in the Far East, the question as to the equity and justice of these agreements and therefore as to their fundamental validity.

"If Japan is disposed to rely solely upon a claim to the technical or juristic validity of the agreements of 1915, as having been actually signed in due form by the two Governments, it may be said that, so far as this Conference is concerned, the contention is largely irrelevant, for this gathering of the representatives of the nine Powers has not had for its purpose the maintenance of the legal status quo. Upon the contrary, the purpose has been, if possible, to bring about such changes in existing conditions upon the Pacific and in the Far East as might be expected to promote that enduring friendship among the nations of which the treas-
dent of the United States spoke in his letter of invitation to the Powers to participate in this Conference.

"For the following reasons, therefore, the Chinese Delegation is of the opinion that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Exchange of Notes of "by 25, 1915, should form the subject of impartial examination with a view to their abrogation:

1. In exchange for the concessions demanded of China, Japan offered no quid pro quo. The benefits derived from the agreements were wholly unilateral.

2. The agreements, in important respects, are in violation of treaties between China and the other Powers.

3. The agreements are inconsistent with the principles relating to China which have been adopted by the Conference.

4. The agreements have engendered constant misunderstandings between China and Japan, and, if not abrogated, will necessarily tend, in the future, to disturb friendly relations between the two countries, and will thus constitute an obstacle in the way of realizing the purpose for the attainment of which this Conference was convened. As to this, the Chinese delegation, by way of conclusion, can, perhaps, do no better than quote from a Resolution introduced in the Japanese Parliament, in June, 1915, by Mr. Haru, later premier of Japan, a Resolution which received the support of some 130 of the members of the Parliament.

"The Resolution reads:

"'Resolve', that the negotiations carried on with China by the present Government have been inappropriate in every respect; that they are detrimental to the amicable relationship between the two countries, and provocative of suspicions on the part of the Powers; that they have the effect of lowering the prestige of the Japanese Empire; and that, while far from capable of establishing the foundation of peace in the Far East, they will form the source of future trouble'.

"The foregoing declaration has been made in order that the Chinese Government may have upon record the views which it takes and will continue to take, regarding the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Exchange of Notes of 'by 25, 1915.'"

Thereupon, on behalf of the American Government, I stated to the Committee the position of the Government of the United States:

"The important statement made by Mr. Shishido on behalf of the Japanese Government makes it appropriate that I should refer to the position of the Government of the United States as it was set forth in identical notes addressed by that Government to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government on 'by 13, 1915.'
"The note to the Chinese Government was as follows:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan respecting the treaty rights of the United States and the civilian in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Province of Shantung, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy.

"An identical note has been transmitted to the Imperial Japanese Government."

"That statement was in accord with the historic policy of the United States in its relation to China, and its position as thus stated has been, and still is, consistently maintained.

"It has been gratifying to learn that the matters concerning Shantung, which formed the substance of Group I of the original demands, and more the subject of the Treaty and Exchange of Notes with respect to the Province of Shantung, have been settled to the mutual satisfaction of the two parties by negotiations conducted collaboratively with this conference, as reported to the Plenary Session on February 1st.

"It is also gratifying to be advised by the statement made by Baron Shidehara, on behalf of the Japanese Government, that Japan is now ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in proceeding to the signature of the Treaty and Notes of 1925, to the effect that Group V of the Original proposals of the Japanese Government--namely, those concerning the employment of influential Japanese as political, financial and military advisors; land for schools and hospitals; certain railways in South China, the supply of arms, and the right of preaching—could be postponed for future negotiations. This definite withdrawal of the outstanding questions under Group V removes that has been an occasion for considerable apprehension on the part alike of China and of foreign nations, which felt that the renewal of these demands could not but prejudice the principles of the integrity of China end of the open door.

"With respect to the Treaty and the Notes concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, Baron Shidehara has made the reassuring statement that Japan has no intention of insisting on a preferential right concerning the engagement of Chinese of Japanese advisors or instructors in political, financial, military or police matters in South Manchuria.

"Baron Shidehara has likewise indicated the readiness of Japan not to insist upon the right of option granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Western Inner Mongolia; and, second, with regard to loans secured on the taxes of those regions; but that Japan will throw them open to the joint activity of the Interna-"
As to this, I may say that it is doubtless the fact that any enterprise of the character contemplated, which may be undertaken in these regions, though outside the 1915 Treaties, would in all probability be undertaken by the Governments. But it should be observed that existing treaties would leave the community for such enterprises open on terms of equality to the citizens of all nations. It can scarcely be assumed that this general right of the treaty parties in China can be effectively restricted to the nationals of those countries which are participants in the work of the Government, as that any of the Governments which have taken part in the organization of the government could feel themselves to be in a position to do other than in the mode to any save the members of the respective organizing group to that organization. I therefore trust that it is in this sense that we may properly interpret the Japanese Government's declaration of willingness to relinquish its call under the 1915 Treaties to any exclusive position with respect to railway construction and financial operations secured upon local revenues, in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

It is further to be pointed out that by Articles II, III and IV of the Treaty of May 25, 1915, with respect to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Government granted to Japanese subjects the right to lease land for building purposes, for trade and manufacture, and for agricultural purposes in South Manchuria, to reside and travel in South Manchuria, and to engage in any kind of business and manufacture there, and to enter into joint undertakings with Chinese citizens in agriculture and similar industries in Eastern Inner Mongolia.

With respect to this grant, the Government of the United States will, of course, regard it as not intended to be exclusive, and, as in the past, will claim from the Chinese Government for American citizens the exclusive accruing to them by virtue of the most favored nation clauses in the treaties between the United States and China.

I may pause here to remark that the question of the validity of treaties as between Japan and China is distinct from the question of the treaty rights of the United States under its treaties with China; these rights have been emphasized and consistently asserted by the United States.

In this, as in all matters similarly affecting the general right of its citizens to engage in commercial and industrial enterprises in China, it's the traditional policy of the American Government to insist upon the doctrine of equality for the nationals of all countries, in this policy, together with the other policies mentioned in the note of May 13, 1915, which I have quoted, are consistently emphasized by this Government. I may say that it is with especial pleasure that the Government of the United States finds itself now engaged in the act of reaffirming and defining, and I hope that I may add, revitalizing, by the proposed Nine Power Treaty, these policies with respect to China.
forence to be spread upon its record. In the course of the vote Mr. Koo stated in the Committee that "his colleagues and he himself desired to indorse the Chairman's suggestion that all of the statements on this very important question should be spread upon the records of the Conference, it being understood of course that the Chinese Delegation reserved their right to seek a solution on all future appropriate occasions concerning those portions of the Treaties and Notes of 1915 which did not appear to have been expressly relinquished by the Japanese Government. The Chairman stated:

"Of course it is understood that the rights of all Powers are reserved with respect to the matters mentioned by Mr. Koo."

The question now is upon the approval of the resolution that these statements be spread upon the minutes of the Conference as a part of its permanent record. Do you desire to discuss it?

The United States of America assented.
Belgium?
Baron de Cartier assented.
The Chairman: The British Empire?
Mr. Balfour assented.
The Chairman: China?
Mr. Sun assented.
The Chairman: France?
Mr. Pourrat assented.
The Chairman: Italy?
Senator Schanz assented.
The Chairman: Japan?
Admiral Baron Kato assented.
The Chairman: The Netherlands?
Jonkhoeir Bodnerts van Bokland assented.
The Chairman: Portugal?
Viscount d'Alcote assented.
The Chairman: It is so ordered.

- 8 -
したからとて何等有益な目的を達するに役立つとは総じて考えられない。

そこで一九五四年度の大改年一の日聯協定を得た際以降、実際着手したところ、
その本質的な成果を踏まえ、日本代表団は次のようにこの機会を利用して次のように答えてある。

一、日本が国際経済協力の共同活動に対し日本政府の積極的に行なわれる延命設に對於する借款。第二に該地方に於ける税金を独断とした借
款に関するものである。而して本協定中には政府の公式に於て出した通
報の文の記載する如き条項を該協議会が顧問を担当する国家的財政委員会に於て交渉され
たもので、余国の共同活動の範囲に関するものである。

二、日本は問題の日聯協定に関する事情を國務大臣が答える文中はいらないと答いている。

本協定は
日本の共同活動に於し、

中国代表官は次のことを知り鈍足に思う。即も日本は列強の進行利益

の相次で互に於ける銀行設立の為の利益

と、又日本は外務省に於ける政治財政、軍事、司法の日本人大為は

政官の中国領による影響に際して特に支那は又支那の有する利益

を委ねる旨の略保を数に従ってするための要気があると云ふことである。

中国代表官のもとに於いて特に支那は又支那の有する利益

の為に是筆に於ける他の要約を廃棄するに至らなかったと云ふこと

とである。
文書の段落は、現状関係の安定に及ぶことは、次のように影響は一層広い範囲を及ぼす。今般の列強に依る軍隊と抗戦がなければ、一国が友好的関係をとるにはあるが、軍事上の弱者である弱小の силが対抗する力は、未だの論争の模様でもなかった。比の列強が渔业に関するものでなく、國民生活に重要な役割を果たすものである。日本の一九一五年（大正五年）の協定を、調和と記録のためのものである。一九一五年（大正五年）の協定が他国の協定礦業との関係に至った一国から他国に突きつけられたと云ふのと希望して局外ならkea。
代表官は、次の如き理由により、一九一五年五月二十五日の日華条約及び協約、又は、これと各々を目的とする公正なる接労の題目たるべくものの、と
考える。

一、日本は、中国に要求させる諸利益及び交換に、なんらの代償も申出なかつ
た。これら協定より生ずる利益は全く一方的であった。

二、これら協定は、意義ある点に於て、中国及び他列国間の諸条約を侵害す
る。

三、これら協定は、日本に於て、とりに、関東の友好関係を損なわせし、若し協定さ
れなければ、将来に於ても、当然两国の友好関係を損なうには、延いては、波の会議
の事なき、事が最善であろう。

四、これ協定は、日本国産、特に於て、中国産の利益を損なわせ、かつ、若し協定さ
れなければ，将来に於て、結果的に、中国産の利益を損なうには、延いては、波の会議
の事なき、事なき最善であろう。

六月、日本国産に於て、長官が、約百三十名の支持を受けた決議を引用する

同決議に日光、
現政府が中国を手として行へる交渉は、いかなる結果よりも安協を
求くものであった。右交渉は両国間の親善関係を阻害し、列国の猜疑を
招くものにしていた。また日本帝國の威信を失窃せしむる效果を有し、併せ
て、極東に平和の礎を築かんよりは寧れ将来の禍根を残すものである。

以上の宣言は一九一五年五月二十五日の日華條約及び覚書交換に際し、中
国政府が現在は勿論将来も採らんとする自国の見解を記録に残らぬのが
なされたのである。

斯原明財が日本政府を代表して行つた重要なる聲明の結果、一九一五年
五月十三日合楽国政府より中華民国政府及日本政府に宛てた同文覚書中に
は、同国政府の立場が述べられたら故を以て、余がこれに言及すること
は妥當である。

中華民国政府及日本政府間に行はれ、目下無論中の交渉の状況及びこれが交渉
日本の結果として成立された交渉規定に従い、合衆国政府に於ては日英
両政府に於て既に締結せられた条約上の利益、中華民国の政治的領土利益は一概に
門戸開放政策として存する中華民国の利益を保証するの光わせる。同一覚書が日本帝国
政府に於て既に締結せられた条約上の利益、中華民国の政治的領土利益を保証するものでに

同条約は合衆国の門戸開放政策に通じる。山東問戸に関する論議は要求原案の一科目を
関する条約及び覚書交換の題目であったが、該議案を並行して行はれた

事は日本政府を代表せる明治政府の声明により、日本は一九一五年の条約
及覚書の調印以前に於て、日本政府提出の原案第五款即ち政治的財

13
政的軍事的顧問として有力なる日本人の居著、学習及び影響力の効果を考慮するため、国に於ける諸子の鉄道、武器の供給又は敷設の縮制等に属する諸条項は、これに附して於ける留保の存する旨明かにした。
問題は今や、比等縫明を締結の呈久書記の一部として会議議事録に記載す

ベルギーは

米国合衆国は寛成

デカルテイール見出しは寛成

英帝國は

カール・ボア氏は寛成
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT AT WASHINGTON, 1921-1922

NO. 3. RESOLUTION REGARDING A BOARD OF REFERENCE FOR THE FAR EASTERN QUESTION.

The representatives of the Powers assembled at the present Conference at Washington, to wit:

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Portugal;

Desiring to provide a procedure for dealing with questions that may arise in connection with the execution of the provisions of Articles III and V of the Treaty to be signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922, with reference to their general policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity;

Resolve that there shall be established in China a Board of Reference to which any questions arising in connection with the execution of the aforesaid Articles may be referred for investigation and report.

The Special Conference provided for in Article II of the Treaty to be signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922, with reference to the Chinese Customs Tariff, shall formulate, for the approval of the Powers concerned a detailed plan for the constitution of the Board.

Adopted by the Conference on the Limitation of Armament at the Sixth Plenary Session February 6th, 1922.
NO. 9. RESOLUTION REGARDED THE REDUCTION OF CHINESE MILITARY FORCES.

Whereas the Forces attending this Conference have been deeply impressed with the severe drain on the public revenue of China through the maintenance in various parts of the country, of military forces, excessive in number and controlled by the military chiefs of the provinces without coordination,

And whereas the continued maintenance of those forces appears to be mainly responsible for China's present unsettled political conditions,

And whereas it is felt that large and prompt reductions of these forces will not only advance the cause of China's political unity and economic development but will hasten her financial rehabilitation;

Therefore, without any intention to interfere in the internal problems of China, but actuated by the sincere desire to see China develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government alike in her own interest and in the general interest of trade;

And being inspired by the spirit of this Conference whose aim is to reduce, through the limitation of armament, the enormous disbursements which manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity;

It is resolved: That this Conference expresses to China the earnest hope that immediate and effective steps may be taken by the Chinese Government to reduce the excessive military forces and expenditures.

Adopted by the Conference on the Limitation of Armament at the Fifth Plenary Session, February 1st, 1922.
Certificate concerning authenticity of the document

I, Yasui, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby that the booklet hereto attached, consisting of 57 pages, written in Japanese and entitled "The Washington Conference Treaties and Resolutions" is one of the documents which were compiled and edited by the Japanese Government (the Foreign Office).

On this 9th day of December in 1946
at Tokyo

(Signed) Yasui, Kaoru (Seal)

I, Odo, Nagaharu, certify that the above seal affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,
at the same place

Witness: (Signed) Odo, Nagaharu (Seal)
条約集第一巻
一八九一年四月議定
（大正十八年三月議定）
外務省編

(自列五至五列六頁)

千九百二十二年二月三日

条約

（中）

(自列五至五列六頁)

条約

(中)
And now to return to the subject of the Conference:

After considerable thought the State Department finally decided to invite the Chinese to send a delegation. It was the first time China had ever sat in an international conference as a "free and independent Power." This element aroused so much enthusiasm in China that the Government sent a delegation of about three hundred persons, including secretaries, stenographers, and assistants; so many in fact that Dr. Sze, the Minister, had difficulty in feeding and housing them.

Since the State Department's invitation was sent to the Peking Government, the Kuomintang regime at Canton immediately raised a tremendous howl and sent a rival delegation which sniped at the Peking delegates throughout the meeting. There was even an attempt to assassinate Dr. Sun at Canton during the conference.

The Japanese were not enthusiastic about the Washington Conference, and approached the meeting somewhat in the mood of a naughty child called to the teacher's desk for a reprimand. They were suspicious of the conference because they knew it was designed primarily to obstruct their schemes for China. But with their potential ally, Germany, out of the running and with Russia involved in a communist revolution at her very back door, the Japanese felt it would be better to attend than stay out. Japan's acceptance of the invitation was actually not received until two weeks after all the other official acceptances were in; and it was widely reported that Japan's decision to attend the conference resulted from assurances from British sources that Japan "would not be treated badly" at the meeting. However, any assurances from British circles could hardly have carried much weight, in view of the fact that one of the chief objectives of the conference, though not stated in the formal invitation, was to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Although strong opposition to the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had developed in the United States during the war, it was the opposition of the Dominion of Canada that forced Great Britain to give serious consideration to the matter of discontinuing the pact. The Canadians felt, as did Americans, that the belligerent clauses in the alliance imposed dangerous obligations on Great Britain in the event of an outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. The Canadians, due to the geographical situation of the two countries, also had experienced complications with Japan over immigration questions. Immigration complications which the United States had experienced with Japan in California in 1906 were paralleled in Canada. Thus, when American-Japanese relations became acute in 1921, the Dominion of Canada was more affected by the so-called "North American" point of view as opposed to the London "imperial" viewpoint. In consequence there developed in Canada a national demand for termination of the alliance.
Arthur Meighen, the Canadian Premier, urged the substitution of a four-Power conference on Pacific affairs, to be participated in by the United States, Britain, China, and Japan. But at the Imperial Conference in London Meighen's efforts met strong opposition not only from Lloyd George, but from Canada, Australia, and Italy, all of whom feared the menace of an antagonistic Japan toward India and Britain's other territorial and economic stakes in Eastern Asia and the Pacific. In the hot debate which ensued the delegates from Australia, New Zealand, and India sided with Britain, while South Africa favored revision rather than negotiation. But Meighen stood his ground, and ultimately brought the Imperial Conference around to his point of view. It was this discussion in the Imperial Conference, plus England's desire to reach an understanding with the United States on the limitation of naval construction, that paved the way for the calling of the Washington Conference.

Aside from France and Italy, which possessed naval strengths of considerable strength, and also held concessions in China, the other European Powers invited to the conference—Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal—held other concessions in China or colonial territories in the region of the Pacific.

The conference in many ways was of unusual significance; it was America's initial attempt to invoke an international conference for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of questions which had long threatened war in the Pacific. Attendance was entirely voluntary in the sense that the conference was not made up of delegates representing victorious and vanquished nations, as had been the case at Versailles. The British delegation was made up of representatives not only of Great Britain but of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

European and Japanese delegates were astonished when Charles E. Hughes, chairman of the American delegation, announced at the opening session that the United States was prepared to stop its naval building program and, more, was prepared to scrap a number of warships which were in an advanced stage of construction. The American proposal was so contrary to professional diplomatic practice that the delegates stared at each other in wonderment, but it was a proposal which the British could hardly afford to contest, since the British Admiralty was already concerned by the American naval construction program.

It was finally agreed that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be abandoned, and America was persuaded to accept a 5:5:3 naval ratio with the United States and Great Britain. A compensation for Japan was the agreement that the United States would not increase or continue its construction of fortifications on naval and military positions west of the 160th meridian. American naval exports did their best in private to prevent the limiting of our fortifications on naval positions in the western Pacific, and also to prevent the curtailment of the United States naval building program, but they fought a losing battle.

All of the agreements, resolutions, and proposals at the conference were more or less linked together around the central document, which was the Nine-Power Treaty with China, upon which all commitments depended, including the major issue of limitation of naval armament and curtailment of construction on naval bases in the Pacific area. The Nine-Power Treaty came to be known as the "Chinese Charter of Liberty," because it put an end to the old sphere-of-influence doctrine which had beset Europe and Japan, and for more than a quarter of a century had threatened
Reoccupation of China. Aside from the Nine-Power Treaty, the Washington Conference also adopted other measures concerned with the future development of China as a unified state. The Japanese were forced to withdraw their troops from Shantung Province and restore the former German interests at Tsingtao, including control of the port and railway running into the interior of the province, to Chinese control. The conference also approved a resolution to send a delegation to China to investigate the relinquishment of extraterritoriality, which had impeded the development of modern Chinese courts and had infringed upon the sovereignty of the country. It also was recommended that steps be taken to assist China in modernizing her currency and her fiscal system, and finally the Powers agreed to withdraw their postal agencies from China and consented to the calling of a conference to revise the Chinese tariff, leading in the direction of tariff autonomy. Also of importance from the standpoint of Russian interests in the Far East, the Japanese were forced to withdraw their troops from Siberia, where they had been stationed since World War I.
DECLARATION UPON WHICH FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY, JAPAN AND RUSSIA AGREE NOT TO CONCLUDE A SEPARATE PEACE

Signed in London in French
30 November 1915 (4th year of Taisho)

Declaration upon which France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia agree not to conclude a separate peace during the course of the present war.

The Italian Government having decided to adhere to the Declaration made in London on the 5th of September 1914 by the French, British and Russian Governments, a declaration to which the Japanese Government equally adhered dated the 19th of October 1915, the undersigned duly authorized by their respective governments, made the following declaration:

The French, British, Italian, Japanese and Russian Governments mutually agree not to conclude a separate peace during the course of the present war. The five Governments agree that when the occasion arises to discuss peace terms none of the allied powers will be able to lay down peace conditions without previous accord with each one of the other allies. The undersigned in this faith have signed the present declaration and have placed their seals on it.

Made at London in quintuple original the 30th of November 1915.

/s/ W. INCHE
/s/ E. COUTO
/s/ PAUL CAMENON
/s/ E. ORBY
/z/ IMPRIALI
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Declaration of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia not to conclude separate peace, November 30, 1915," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 15th day of February, 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/K. Urabe

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

T. William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation (from the French) described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ T. William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 20 February 1947
DECLARATION UPON WHICH FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY, JAPAN AND RUSSIA AGREE NOT TO CONCLUDE A SEPARATE PEACE

Signed in London in French
30 November 1915 (4th war of Taiho)

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The undersigned in this faith have signed the present declaration and have placed their seals on it.

Made at London in quintuple original the 30th of November 1915.

/s/ K. INOUE
/s/ BENCKENDORFF
/s/ PAUL CAPEON
/s/ F. ORFY
/s/ IMPPRIALI
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

MAYASHI, Kajoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office ___________________________, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Declaration of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Persia not to conclude separate peace, November 20, 1915." is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office. ______________

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 15th day of February, 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/K. Urabe

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

T. William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation (from the French) described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ T. William E. Clarke
/s/ T. William S. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 20 February 1947

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN FRANCE,
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND TURKEY.

Signed at Angor, October 19, 1939.

TREATY.

The President of the French Republic: His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of Indir (in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), and the President of the Turkish Republic:

Desiring to conclude a treaty of a reciprocal character in the interests of their national security, and to provide for mutual assistance in resistance to aggression,

H ave appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, namely:

The President of the French Republic:

M. Rene Cassigli, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Commissary of the Legion of Honour;

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of Indir (in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

Sir Hugo Montgomerie Dartmouth-Pusey, K.C.B.,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary;

The President of the Turkish Republic:

Dr. Rofik Seydem, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs ed. int., Deputy for Istanbul.
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1.

In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European power in consequence of aggression by that power against Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom will cooperate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in their power.

ARTICLE 2.

(1) In the event of an act of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power.

(2) In the event of an act of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved, the Government of the United Kingdom and the French Government will cooperate effectively with the Turkish Government and will lend it all aid and assistance in their power.

ARTICLE 3.

So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Romania by their respective declarations of the 13th April, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees.
ARTICLE 4.

In the event of France and the United Kingdom being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression committed by that Power against either of those States without the provisions of Articles 2 or 3 being applicable, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together.

It is nevertheless agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey will observe at least a benevolent neutrality towards France and the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE 5.

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3 above, in the event of either:

(1) aggression by a European Power against another European State which the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties had, with the approval of that State, undertaken to assist in maintaining its independence or neutrality against such aggression, or

(2) aggression by a European Power which, while directed against another European State, constituted, in the opinion of the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties, a menace to its own security,

the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together with a view to such common action as might be considered effective.
ARTICLE 6.

The present Treaty is not directed against any country, but is designed to assure France, the United Kingdom and Turkey of mutual aid and assistance in resistance to aggression should the necessity arise.

ARTICLE 7.

The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding as bilateral obligations between Turkey and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 8.

If the High Contracting Parties are engaged in hostilities in consequence of the operation of the present Treaty, they will not conclude an armistice or a peace except by common agreement.

ARTICLE 9.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited simultaneously at London as soon as possible. It shall enter into force on the date of this deposit.

The present Treaty is concluded for a period of fifteen years. If none of the High Contracting Parties has notified the two others of its intention to terminate it six months before the expiration of the said period, the Treaty will be renewed by tacit consent for a further period of five years, and so on.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at London, in triplicate, the 19th October, 1939.

(L.S.) R. MELCHI.

(L.S.) H. M. KELICIFUL-HUSSAIN.

(L.S.) D. R. SYD.

- 4 -
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries state that their respective Governments agree that the Treaty of mutual assistance dated this day shall be put into force from the moment of its signature.

Done at Londría, in triplicate, the 19th October, 1939.

R. M. S.,
H. M. M. T.,
DR. R. E.

PROTOCOL NO. 2.

At the moment of signature of the Treaty between the United Kingdom, France and Turkey, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to this effect, have agreed as follows:

The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the U.S. S. R.

The present Protocol of Signature shall be considered as an integral part of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance concluded to-day between the United Kingdom, France and Turkey.

Done at 'Ajam, in triplicate, the 19th October 1939.

R. M. S.,
H. M. M. T.,
DR. R. E.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Tooru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here to attached in English, consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Treaty of Mutual Assistance between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 13th day of December 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

witness: Masaharu Odo
AGREEMENT OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND POLAND.


The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Polish Government:

Desiring to place on a permanent basis the collaboration be­
tween their respective countries resulting from the assurance of
mutual assistance of a defensive character which they have already
exchanged;

Have resolved to conclude an Agreement for that purpose and
have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland:
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
The Polish Government:
His Excellency Count Edward Raczynski, Ambassador Ex­
teroitary and Plenipotentiary of the Polish
Republic in London;

Who, having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good and due
form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1.

Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hosti­
ilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the
latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party
will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all
the support and assistance in its power.
Article 2.

(1) The provisions of Article 1 will also apply in the event of any action by a European Power which clearly threatened, directly or indirectly, the independence of one of the Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature that the Party in question considered it vital to resist it with its armed forces.

(2) Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of action by that Power which threatened the independence or neutrality of another European State in such a way as to constitute a clear menace to the security of that Contracting Party, the provisions of Article 1 will apply, without prejudice, however, to the rights of the other European State concerned.

Article 3.

Should a European Power attempt to undermine the independence of one of the Contracting Parties by processes of economic penetration or in any other way, the Contracting Parties will support each other in resistance to such attempts. Should the European Power concerned thereupon embark on hostilities against one of the Contracting Provisions of Article 1 will apply.

Article 4.

The methods of applying the undertakings of mutual assistance provided for by the present Agreement are established between the competent naval, military and air authorities of the Contracting Parties.

Article 5.

Without prejudice to the foregoing undertakings of the
Contrary to each other mutual support and assistance immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, they will exchange complete and speedy information concerning any development which might threaten their independence and, in particular, concerning any development which threatened to call the said undertakings into operation.

Article 6.

(1) The Contracting Parties will communicate to each other the terms of any undertakings of assistance against aggression which they have already given or may in future give to other States.

(2) Should either of the Contracting Parties intend to give such an undertaking after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the other Contracting Party shall, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement, be informed thereof.

(3) Any new undertaking which the Contracting Parties may enter into in future shall neither limit their obligations under the present Agreement nor indirectly create new obligations between the Contracting Party not participating in these undertakings and the third State concerned.

Article 7.

Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in consequence of the application of the present Agreement they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

Article 8.

(1) The present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years.

(2) Unless denounced six months before the expiry of this
period it shall continue in force, each Contracting Party having
thereafter the right to denounce it at any time by giving six
months' notice to that effect.

(3) The present Agreement shall come into force on signature.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have
signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in English in duplicate, at London, the 25th August,
1939. A Polish text shall subsequently be agreed upon between the
Contracting Parties and both texts will then be authentic.

(L.S.) HALIFAX.
(L.S.) EDWARD O'ZYFSKI.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Koryu, Chief of the Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Nations and Poland," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of December 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu (Co)
EXHIBIT

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common programme of purposes and principles embodied in the joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence, and religious freedom and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands, as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, declare:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the tripartite pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.
The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

Done at Washington, January 1, 1942.

(Signed) The United States of America; Franklin D. Roosevelt;
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Winston Churchill; the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Maxim Litvinoff, ambassador; National Government of the Republic of China; T. V. Soong, minister for foreign affairs;
The Commonwealth of Australia; H. G. Casey; The Kingdom of Belgium; Cte. R. Stratton; Canada; Leighton McCartht;
The republic of Costa Rica; Luis Fernandez; The Republic of Cuba; Aurelio F. Concheo; The Czechoslovak Republic; V.C.inarb; The Dominican Republic; J. M. Troncoso;
The Republic of El Salvador; C.A. Alfaro; The Kingdom of Greece; Cimon P. Diamantopulos; The Republic of Guatemala;
The Republic of Haiti; Fornand Dennis; The Republic of Honduras; R. Guottes; India; Girja Shankar Bajpai; The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; Hugues le Gallois; The Kingdom of the Netherlands; . . . Lawson; The Dominion of New Zealand; Frank Langston; The Republic of Nicaragua; Leon Debyie;
The Kingdom of Norway; I. Munthe de Mergaustierns; The Republic of Panama; Juan Guardia; The Republic Poland; Jan Ciechanowski; The Union of South Africa; Ralph W. Close;
The Kingdom of Yougoslavia; Constantin A. Potitch.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity


Certified at Tokyo,

on this 6th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Signed at London, May 26, 1942.
Ratifications exchanged at Moscow, July 4, 1942.
in force from July 4, 1942.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India, and the President of Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union  of Soviet Socialist Republics for joint action in the war against Germany, signed at Moscow on July 12, 1941, and to replace them by a formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe;

Desiring moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the bases of the principles enunciated in the declaration made on August 14th, 1941, by the declaration made on August 14th, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered;

Desiring, finally, to provide for mutual assistance in the event of an attack upon either High Contracting Party by Germany or any of the States.
associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe,

Have decided to conclude a treaty for that purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India,

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

The Right Honourable Anthony Eden, M.P., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The President of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

V. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows;—

PART ONE

Article 1.

In virtue of the Alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other Government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.
Article 3.

(1) The High Contracting Parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period.

(2) Pending the adoption of such proposals, they will after the termination of hostilities take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article 4.

Should one of the High Contracting Parties during the post-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article 3 (2) in consequence of an attack by that State against that Party, the other High Contracting Party will at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance in his power.

This Article shall remain in force until the High Contracting Parties, by mutual agreement, shall recognize that it is superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in Article 3 (1). In default of the adoption of such proposal, it shall remain in force for a period of twenty years, and thereafter until terminated by either High Contracting Party, as provided in Article 8.

Article 5.

The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the reestablishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests
of the United Nations in these objects, and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

Article 6.

The High Contracting Parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

Article 7.

Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directly against the other High Contracting Party.

Article 8.

The present treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time, and the instrument of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of the instrument of ratification, and shall thereafter replace the agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, signed at Moscow on July 12th, 1941.

Part One of the present treaty shall remain in force until the establishment of peace between the High Contracting Parties and Germany and the Powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part Two of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years. Thereafter, unless twelve months' notice has been given by either party to terminate the treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until twelve months after either High Contracting Party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

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CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. NAGAHARU, Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Treaty of Union in the War against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and of Collaboration and Mutual assistance thereafter between the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, May 26, 1942," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. NAGAHARU
Signature of Official

Witness: (Hieroglyph) NAGAHARU ODO
AGREEMENT FOR JOINT ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM IN THE WAR
AGAINST GERMANY.

Signed at Moscow, July 12, 1941.
In force from July 12, 1941.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have concluded the present
agreement and declare as follows: (1) The two Governments mutually
undertake to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in
the present war against Hitlerite Germany; (2) They further undertake
that during the war, they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice
or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

The present agreement has been concluded in the Russian and English
languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, 12th July, 1941.

V. Molotov
Deputy President of the Council of People's
Commissars and People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

H. Stafford Cripps
His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary
And Plenipotentiary in the U.S.S.R.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAYASHI, Kazuo, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Agreement for Joint Action by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the War against Germany, July 21, 1941," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nanao, Ry. Oto
Upon the conclusion of the agreement for joint action by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.S.R. in the war against Germany, the Contracting Parties have agreed that the aforesaid agreement enters into force immediately upon signature and is not subject to ratification.

The present Protocol has been drawn up in duplicate in the English and Russian Languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, 12th July, 1941.

H. S. Cripps
V. Molotov
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Katsu, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Proceedings to the Agreement for Joint Action, 13th July 1941," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagahara, Odo
DEF DOC No. 183

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Takeshi, Head of the Translation Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereon attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Joint Declaration," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office. Certified at Tokyo, on this 23rd day of December, 1946.

(Signed) HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: [Signature]
IX. LETTER, DATED DECEMBER 9th, 1939, FROM THE DELEGATE OF FINLAND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

(Translation) Geneva, December 9, 1939

(From League of Nations Official Journal November-December 1939)

I beg to send you herewith the following document:

1. Aide-memoire;

1. Aide-memoire

(Translation) The Frontiers of Finland

By the Treaties of Peace and Non-aggression, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressly, and of its own free will, recognized the political frontiers of Finland. The territorial composition of Finland has, moreover, been fixed for centuries past.

The western section of the frontier crossing the Isthmus of Karelia goes back to the year 1323; and the eastern section, to 1618. As regards the frontier running north from Lake Ladoga, the southern section (as far as Nurmes) goes back to 1618; and the northern section, to 1595. The modifications of the frontier on the Arctic coast took place in 1920, when, in accordance with a promise made in 1864, the U.S.S.R. ceded the Petsamo region to Finland in compensation for a territory which was then incorporated in Russia. This arrangement was also intended to compensate Finland for the loss of free access to the Arctic Ocean in 1826, when the territory
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previously regarded as belonging jointly to Russia, Finland and Norway was partitioned between Russia and Norway. From 1809 to 191 during which period Finland was united to Russia as a Grand-Duchy enjoying complete internal autonomy; her frontiers with Russia were exactly delimited.

Negotiations between Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

In the course of the negotiations in October-November 1939, to which the Government of the U.S.S.R. invited the Government of Finland on October 5th last, the U.S.S.R. made detailed proposals prejudicial to the territorial integrity of Finland.

The majority of the proposals of the U.S.S.R. were actuated by strategic considerations which it was attempted to justify by a desire to guarantee the security of Leningrad. In point of fact, these considerations had already been taken into account in the Treaty of Peace of Tartu, whereby the outer islands in the Gulf of Finland and the Island of Suursaari were demilitarised. The treaty further provided that certain fortifications on the Finnish side of the Isthmus of Karelia were to be destroyed and that freedom of military action on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Finland was to be subject to certain restrictions. Finland has scrupulously observed all her undertakings. Now the U.S.S.R. has made proposals regarding the cession of certain territories by Finland by grant of lease or by exchange. In order to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R., Finland has adopted the most conciliatory
attitude possible. The limit of the concessions beyond which Finland has thought it impossible to go was determined by the two following considerations:

1. Compliance with the considerations of security advanced by the U.S.S.R. must not be allowed to prejudice Finland's security or her possibilities of defence;

2. The policy of neutrality followed by Finland and recognized even by the U.S.S.R. must not be jeopardized.

The proposals to which the U.S.S.R. firmly adhered were for the cession of a naval base at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland and a modification of the frontier on the Isthmus of Karelia. They would have meant the renunciation of the above-mentioned principle.

In the counter-proposals, whereby Finland endeavoured to discover new means of satisfying the demands of the U.S.S.R., there was finally contemplated -- in addition to partial acceptance of the territorial demands of the U.S.S.R. on the coast of the Arctic Ocean -- the cession to the U.S.S.R. of five of the outer islands in the Gulf of Finland and the southern part of the Island of Suurseaari, together with the removal of the line of demarcation to a distance of approximately 20-25 kilometres from the very ancient frontiers in the Isthmus of Karelia in the north-eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The cession of these territories, which from the remotest times have been inhabited by a Finnish population, would have meant the renunciation of the principles of nationality.
recognized by the founders of the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the Government of Finland was ready to make this heavy sacrifice, in order to meet the demands of her great neighbour.

There was a limit beyond which the Government of Finland considered it impossible to go in making concessions. The principle that its importance or the size of one of its towns entitles a State to require the cession of territory from a smaller State is unknown in the political life of the West. A large country is protected by its very size. To require a small State to renounce its means of defence is tantamount to destroying that State's liberty. By giving up its means of defence, the small State either falls under the domination of the great Power by which the demands were presented or becomes the battlefield of great Powers. The U.S.S.R. is not exposed to any danger of indirect aggression by a great Power through Finnish territory. The most effective way of guaranteeing it against such a danger for all time is to allow the Finnish people the possibility of ensuring -- as it is firmly determined to do -- the application of its policy of neutrality by effective defence designed to maintain the independence of its country, and not to deprive it of that possibility.

The negotiations conducted at Moscow were broken off by the U.S.S.R. on November 13th. In Finland, however, the hope was explicitly expressed that negotiations would be continued and conducted to a successful conclusion. The Soviet allegation that the "intransigent" attitude of Finland towards the territorial demands
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of the U.S.S.R. was prompted by certain foreign Powers is devoid of all foundation. Indeed, the fundamental instinct of self-preservation obliges every State to organize its defence and independence on solid foundations. The same instinct of self-preservation also obliges the small States to hold aloof from the conflicts of the great Powers and scrupulously to maintain their neutrality. The allegation that in the negotiations Finland gave evidence of intransigence and of a hostile attitude towards the U.S.S.R. is untrue, as Finland advanced no demands and preferred no threats against the U.S.S.R. Far from threatening, she was prepared to make to her neighbour concessions in the national and military spheres which should have afforded a sufficient guarantee for the security of Leningrad.

Even during the negotiations at Moscow, the air forces of the U.S.S.R. committed several violations of the territorial integrity of Finland. Between October 10th and November 14th some thirty such violations were recorded. Finland drew the attention of the U.S.S.R. to this fact through the diplomatic channel, but she was careful not to exaggerate its importance, so as to avoid tension in the relations of the two countries and also in order to facilitate the negotiations then in progress. After the negotiations were broken off, the U.S.S.R. embarked upon a systematic campaign of wireless and Press propaganda against Finland, but it was not until November 26th that the anti-Finnish measures began to take on a more aggressive and cynical tone. This last phase continued until

- 5 -
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November 30th, on which date the aggression of the U.S.S.R. against Finland took place.

It was on the first-mentioned date -- that is, November 26th -- that the U.S.S.R. launched an accusation against Finland to the effect that Finnish troops had opened fire with cannon on the Soviet troops lying on the other side of the frontier in the neighbourhood of the village of 'ainilli, in the Karelian Isthmus. The Government of the U.S.S.R. professed to conclude from this that the concentration of Finnish troops in the vicinity of the frontier threatened the city of Leningrad and constituted a hostile act against the U.S.S.R. It proposed that the Government of Finland should, without delay, withdraw its troops on the Isthmus of Karelia to a distance of 20-25 kilometres from the frontier to preclude the possibility, as it alleged, of the renewal of such provocation.

Finland, being ready to prove her innocence and desiring to avoid any possible misunderstanding, proposed, on November 27th a joint enquiry to elucidate the circumstances in which the alleged incident had taken place, and declared, inter alia, that there was no artillery in the immediate vicinity of the frontier. She further proposed negotiations with a view to the withdrawal of the troops on both sides of the frontier. In reply, the Government of the U.S.S.R., on November 29th, unilaterally denounced the Treaty of Non-Aggression, in flagrant contradiction to the treaty's express provisions.
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Finland then proposed the conciliation procedure laid down in the treaty, which was to be employed more particularly to ascertain whether the non-aggression obligation had been violated. Alternatively, she declared herself willing to submit the dispute to neutral arbitration, in order to furnish conclusive proof of her desire to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. and to rebut the latter's allegations. Finland declared herself willing to come to an agreement with the U.S.S.R. for the withdrawal of her defence troops in the Isthmus of Karelia to such a distance from Leningrad that any possibility of a threat to the safety of that city would be eliminated.

Outbreak of Hostilities

But before the Minister of Finland in Moscow had an opportunity of transmitting Finland's reply to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the U.S.S.R., on the evening of November 29th, broke off diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the Finnish reply to the notification of the U.S.S.R. regarding the denunciation of the Non-aggression Treaty was handed to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs immediately after 12 o'clock on the night of November 29th-30th. The note should have fully convinced the Government of the U.S.S.R. of Finland's unwavering desire to reach an agreement regarding the movement of her troops in the Isthmus of Karelia away from the U.S.S.R.; but on November 30th, the latter nevertheless began its aggression against Finland.
The wireless propaganda of the U.S.S.R. against Finland reached its climax on the evening of November 29th and during the following night as Finland was, without foundation, accused of several violations of the frontier, although, to avoid any possibility of incidents, the Finnish troops and frontier-guards had been withdrawn to a stated distance from the frontier, and therefore unquestionably remained throughout in Finnish territory, refraining from all military action. The Soviet troops, on the other hand, crossed the frontier near Fumanski, to the north-east of Petsamo, as early as the evening of November 29th and took prisoner three Finnish frontier-guards.

The above-mentioned Soviet allegations were denied by Finland the same evening, and the serious violation of the frontier was concisely reported. Little by little, however, it became clear that the U.S.S.R. had decided to open hostilities against Finland, though the latter could not expect them to begin so soon -- the following day in fact -- particularly as no declaration of war or even ultimatum had been sent. Still less was it to be imagined that the U.S.S.R. would open hostilities, even against the civil population.

On November 30th, Soviet aeroplanes appeared above Helsinki about 9 a.m. and bombarded the city and the neighbouring aerodrome. The attack was repeated the same day about 2:30 p.m., and on this occasion dozens of civilians, chiefly women and children, were killed. The bombs destroyed several private houses and caused
numerous fires. The same day, Soviet aeroplanes also bombarded other towns, such as Viipuri, Turku, Lahti and Lotka, together with various places in the interior of the country -- e.g., Enso, a large State factory. The destruction and material damage caused by these bombardments chiefly affected the civil population. The bombardments did not even spare the buildings specially protected by Article 27 of the Convention forming part of the Fourth General Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war on land. A church in Helsinki and a hospital in Enso were, for example, set on fire by bombs. Altogether, 85 persons, including 65 at Helsinki, were killed during the bombardments carried out on the first day. The following day there was a further bombardment of several towns and other centres of population; there were several dozen casualties and much damage was done. The sole purpose of these air attacks was, without doubt, to annihilate the civil population and cause material damage. It may perhaps be suggested that the bombs fell accidentally on objectives other than those aimed at. But low-flying aeroplanes were seen to turn the fire of their machine-guns directly against private houses, schools, and women and children rushing to take shelter.

The land and naval forces have shown the same cruelty and the same flagrant disregard for the elementary laws of warfare; they have spared neither women, children, nor even shipwrecked civilians.
Hostilities in general began on the morning of November 30th, when the troops of the U.S.S.R. crossed the frontier and attacked the Finnish troops at several points in the Karelian Isthmus and on the eastern frontier from Lake Ladoga to Petsamo. Hitherto, the Soviet troops have occupied part of Petsamo and certain other districts in the Karelian Isthmus and on the eastern frontier, the defence of which was abandoned for military reasons. Furthermore, a Soviet warship bombarded the Finnish coast in the neighbourhood of the Island of Russaro, but was obliged to withdraw after sustaining losses. Certain islands in the Gulf of Finland, which were demilitarised at the demand of the U.S.S.R. under the Treaty of Peace concluded at Tartu in 1920, have now been occupied by the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., which have taken advantage of the position. Hostilities are still proceeding throughout the length of the country's frontiers.

It is clear from the foregoing that the U.S.S.R. has unquestionably undertaken action within the meaning of Article II, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the International Convention for the Definition of the Aggressor, concluded in London on July 3rd, 1933, on the initiative of the U.S.S.R.; Finland acceded to the Convention in 1934. Hence the U.S.S.R., even in its own view should be regarded as an aggressor.

As early as the day following the opening of hostilities, the U.S.S.R. broadcast the intimation that it had set up a new "democratic" Government for Finland in the village of Terijoki in
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Finnish territory in the Isthmus of Karelia. near the Finnish-Soviet frontier. This Government is composed of Finnish Communists who almost all fled to Russia twenty years ago and who had been guilty of high treason and rebellion, of which offences some of them have even been convicted by the courts. Such a body, set up by a foreign Power, Finland presumably, like any foreign state regards as devoid of all importance and entirely without standing. The legal Government of Finland is still in the capital of the country, notwithstanding the allegations of the U.S.S.R.

On the day on which the troops of the U.S.S.R. attacked the territory of Finland, the United States offered their good offices with a view to the pacific settlement of the dispute. This offer was arrogantly rejected by the U.S.S.R., whereas Finland, though the injured party, gratefully accepted it. Finland has even gone further in her efforts in favour of peace in the North, and general peace. Attempting to forget the great injustice she had suffered and her irreparable losses of both human lives and property, on December 4th she approached the Government of the U.S.S.R., through the Minister of Sweden in Moscow, with a proposal for the reopening of negotiations. At the same time, she declared her willingness to make new proposals with a view to the satisfactory settlement of the questions pending between herself and the U.S.S.R. This proposal was also rejected by the latter, which disputed the Swedish Minister's right to represent the interests of Finland, and replied that it was only prepared to negotiate with the above
六四〇年の条約に従い、ソヴェーティョは部族を下に地帯をフィンランドに割り当てる。このようにしてフィンランドは一帯整個の地域をロシアに譲渡することで、フィンランドの領土を喪失したことは対し補償をなすことであった。この当時、フィンランドは領土をロシアに譲渡されたのであった。

フィンランドは完全な内部の自治を損なわれることがあり、ソヴェーティョへの支持を促進し、フィンランドはソヴェーティョの間で分割された。一八九〇年より一九一一七年に至る間に、フィンランドは完全な内部の自治を保持することができた。この結果、ソヴェーティョとの前線領土に割り当てられた領土をロシアに譲渡したのである。
たのである。フィンランド国内の外務省及びスウェーデン島の武装解除
を促し、日中連合平和条約の中に此等政治上の成算は其の既に考
慮に入れられたある答である。本条約は更にカリオ通りのフィンランド側の成約暗に、之を凌越
してある。フィンランド及び東方軍事行効の自由は完成度制限を受く可しと規定
される。ノルウェーと協定に到達せずが為、フィンランド側に於て出家得る限り効
性的態度を持って巻に嘗った。フィンランド側に於て出家得る限り折れ
弱化させることが
ソウェート同盟が前通き図した提案はフィンランド及びロの海軍並びの
ソヴェート同盟が前通き図した提案はフィンランド及びロの海軍並びの
この写真は、前記原則

は、カリリャ地方の領土修正を求めるものである。之は前記原则

の鏡音を反映するものである。あらゆるソビエト連邦の領土の要求を一部受認す

が、都に対してソビエト連邦に於けるソビエト連邦の領土の要求を一部受認す

に於ては、北高壓地に対するソビエト連邦の領土の要求を一部受認する

の南部をソビエト連邦に於けるソビエト連邦の領土の要求を一部受認す

に於ては、北高壓地に対するソビエト連邦の領土の要求を一部受認する。
小国に防衞手段を構築させようとする要求することはあまりなさそうそのような意味を受けることがである。防衞手段を構築することに必要な小国は必要な経済の発展を求めるものである。ソビエト聯邦はフイランと同様の経済的発展に必要とするが、ソビエト聯邦のように経済の発展を求める国家は必要とされる。ソビエト聯邦の経済発展のために必要な経済的発展は、ソビエト聯邦がフイランに必要とされることである。
その前線を既存軍を支える安定した軍事的態勢の構築を必要とするためである。この目的を達成するためには、まずソビエト連邦の承認と協力が必要となる。ソビエト連邦は、欧州の平和を確保するための重要な役割を果たしており、各国の立場に応じて対応することが求められる。

ソビエト連邦の承認と協力のためには、まずソビエト連邦の政府との直接の交渉を行うことが必要である。ソビエト連邦は、欧州の平和を確保するための重要な役割を果たしており、各国の立場に応じて対応することが求められる。
-def. L.C. 475 B

ソヴィエト連邦のペリカン方針について

ソヴィエトと東方諸国間の協力関係は、ソヴィエト連邦が東欧諸国を支持し、東欧各国がソヴィエト連邦の利益を保護するという形で構築される。この関係は、ソヴィエト連邦の安全保障にとって重要である。

ソヴィエト連邦は、東欧諸国を含む東方諸国との関係を強化するために、様々な手段を講じている。これらの手段には、経済援助、軍事支援、政治的影響力の利用などが含まれる。

ソヴィエト連邦は、この関係をさらに強化するため、東欧諸国との交流を促進しており、また、東欧諸国とソヴィエト連邦の間の経済交流も増加している。

ソヴィエト連邦と東方諸国間の関係は、今後も続き、両国間の協力関係がますます強まることが期待されている。
そこでフィンランドは最後まで中立を保つ願望をもって日本やソビエト軍の圧力を受けて、詳細な交渉を行った。しかしフィンランドの代表者は、ソビエト軍の圧力に屈せず、断固として中立を堅持する意を表明した。
人はヘルシンキの六十名を含む会師で八十名であった。即日更に各
つの物資及び他の人口周常住民に接近があり、防防の死傷者を出しそ
の照会する以前の目的に将下せりと云ふかも知れない。然し仮空を飛
ぶ飛行機が前後して家家同に住家を射度を向けては、防空員に向けあつある
子及幼児に射し厳重なる射霧を向けては、防空員に向けあつある
も見逃しはしなかったのである。
ソヴェート発調が急激し、カレリア地帯よりラドカ湖よりベサモに至る
東部の防衛を建設された。今迄にソヴェート軍はベサモの一部、
全面的に防衛においてものである。
当に復活をフインラン
ダ民国を討議したが政権を破り台を
築いた。
被告はそのことをソビエト連邦に自ら報告させ、上記の箇条に従って、
ソビエト連邦が自ら人権侵害を止め、モロットフが上訴させた事件のため、
被告がソビエト連邦の死刑を宣告し、その後に被告は自殺を試みた。
APPEAL BY THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT.

The President — The Assembly has today adopted, in virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant, its report on the appeal by the Finnish Government. At the end of this report, there are two resolutions, the second containing a recommendation by the Assembly to the Council. I should like to remind you of the text of this second resolution:

*Whereas, notwithstanding an invitation extended to it on two occasions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has refused to be present at the examination of its dispute with Finland before the Council and the Assembly;

*And whereas, by thus refusing to recognize the duty of the Council and the Assembly as regards the execution of Article 15 of the Covenant, it has failed to observe one of the League's most essential covenants for the safeguarding of peace and the security of nations;

*And whereas it has vainly attempted to justify its refusal on the ground of the relations which it has established with an alleged government which is neither de jure nor de facto.
the government recognized by the people of Finland in accordance with the free working of their institutions;

and whereas the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not merely violated a covenant of the League, but has by its own action placed itself outside the Covenant;

and whereas the Council is competent under Article 16 of the Covenant to consider what consequences should follow from this situation;

recommends the Council to pronounce upon the question.

As, in this second resolution, the Assembly has stated that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not merely violated a covenant of the League but has by its own action placed itself outside the Covenant, and as it has recommended the Council to pronounce upon the question, I would remind you of the provisions of Article 16, paragraph 4:

"Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by vote of the Council concurred in by the representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon."

Article 16, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, which I have just read to you, provides for a vote by the Member of the League represented on the Council. I accordingly submit for the Council's approval the following draft resolution:

"The Council,
Having taken cognizance of the resolution adopted by the Assembly on December 14th, 1939, regarding the appeal of the Finnish Government;

1. Associated itself with the condemnation of the action of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against the Finnish State; and

2. For the reasons set forth in the resolution of the Assembly,

In virtue of Article 16, paragraph 4, of the Covenant,

I finds, that, by its act, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has placed itself outside the League of Nations. It follows that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is no longer a member of the League.*

I now invite you to discuss this draft resolution.

......

Excerpt from page 508

The president — The Council will take note of the statements that have just been made and, as abstentions do not count in establishing unanimity, if there are no other observations I shall take it that the draft resolution has been adopted.

The resolution was adopted.
国際連盟公報

第百七百四號

一九三九年十二月十四日

(五〇五〇〇六年四月四日

総会

フアン・フレデ MOV-MOKAN

本日総会ハ聯盟規約第十五條ニ基キ、フアン・フレデ　

府ヨリノ提訴ニ関スルヲノ報告ヲ採擧シマニタ。コノ報告ヲノ末尾ニハ

ニツノ解決ガ附サレタルリ、ソノヲテ第二ノ解決ハ総会ヨリ理ゼルヘノ懺

告ヲ含フレリマス。次ニテノ第二ノ解決ノ文書ヲ引用シシイントシヒマ

ス。
The Germans were, of course, busy betimes in Persia and were using their usual tricks. German tourists, technicians, and diplomats were busy suborning the people and the Government of Persia with the object of creating a fifth column, which would dominate the Government at Tehran, and not only seize or destroy the oil fields, which are of the highest consequence, but a fact to which I attach extreme importance--close the surest and shortest route by which we could reach Russia. I thought it necessary, therefore, to make sure that these machinations did not succeed. Accordingly, I demanded from the Persian Government the immediate expulsion of their Teutonic visitors. When under local duress the Persian Government failed to comply with our request, British and Russian forces entered Persia from the south and from the north in sufficient and, indeed, overwhelming strength.

The Persian Government having made such resistance as they thought fit, agreed for peace. I must have the surrender into our hands of all the Germans and Italians who are on the premises; I must have the expulsion of the German and Italian legations, whose diplomatic status we of course respect; and I must have the unquestioned control and maintenance of the through communication from the warm water port of Basra to the Caspian Sea.

It is from this point particularly that American supplies can be carried into the centre of Russia in an ever-widening flow--and British supplies as well--and naturally, every effort will be made, and is being made, to improve the railway communications and expand the volume of supplies which can be transported over the existing British gauge railway, which has hardly only recently been completed, and now required only large accretions of rolling stock and locomotives to expand it greatly as a line of supply.

The House will, I have no doubt, approve the somewhat drastic measures we thought it right to take to achieve those important objects, and the further measures we may have to take. The occupation of Persia car-bons us to join hands with the southern flank of the Russian armies and to bring into action there both military and air forces. It also serves important British objects in presenting a shield which should bar the eastward advance of the German raider. In this the armies of India, whose military quality has become shiningly apparent, will play an increasing part, and in so doing will keep the scourge of war a thousand miles or more from the homes of the peoples of India. One must therefore expect that very considerable deployments of British and Indian forces, and Australian forces probably, or Dominion forces, will gradually manifest themselves in this enormous and desolate or ill-developed region.
インスティンクト、チャーチル氏ノ演説抜萃

昭和十六年九月九日下院ニ於テ

ドイツ人は早くよりベルシアに於て活動を開始しつつもの策略を張し、所を敎唆して第五列となさんと居心しておりました。彼等はかくする

官民を教唆して第五列となさんと居心しておりましたが、彼等はかくする

大なことには我々がロシアに至るための最短且つ最短のルートを探り、更に重

と企んであったのであります。従って我々はかいる為謀を絶する

に到し在留ドイツ人の即時放逐を要求致しました。そこで我々はベルシア政府

に対し在留ドイツ人の即時放逐を要求致しました。その時我々はベルシア政府

にに対するベルシア政府が我が方の要請を換行しなかったときイギリス軍及

びロシア軍は北及び北から充分な、否迄独の兵力を以てベルシア

に進撃したのであります。

ベルシア政府はその適当と考えるべき程度の対策をなし、戦を踏ふに
ドイツ及びイタリア公使館の外交上の地位を尊重すべきでは勿論でありません。但しその場
合両国公使館員の外交上の地位を尊重すべきでは勿論でありません。但しその場
ばはバスラの暖水港よりカスピ海に至る運通交通の完全に拡張し維持せ
ばなりませぬ。
活動をしつつ得るものであります。同時にこれはドイツ侵略軍の東進を阻止することにより、我が国の重要拡大を計画的の進に著するのであります。

軍隊としての価値あるものは示したインド軍はこの作戦に於てもあらゆる軍隊を役割を演じ、それでついて砲火をインド人民の居住地より一千米

イル以上も遠方及び近い止めるからであろうと恐られますが、従つて英印同盟軍

更には恐らく聖戦軍線を自衛軍線を含めての大作戦がこの敵を不毛

の地域に次第に避難されるであります。

未始の地域に次第に避難されるであります。

Relating to the Baltic States

From p. 210

September 20, 1939. Estonia signed 10-year mutual assistance pact with Russia, giving latter material, air bases, and military rights. ("Being desirous of promoting the friendly relations which were established by the Treaty of Peace concluded on February 2, 1920, and which are founded upon independent political existence and non-interference in internal affairs of the other contracting party; recognizing that the Treaty of Peace of February 2, 1920 and the Pact of Non-Intervention and Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts of May 4, 1922, continue to form the foundation of their mutual relations; being convinced that it is in the interests of both of the contracting parties to determine the exact terms of insuring their mutual security.... Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 20, p. 515.)

From p. 219

October 5, 1939. Latvia signed 10-year mutual aid treaty (giving Russia naval and air bases on Baltic). ("For the purpose of developing the friendly relations created by the peace treaty of August 11, 1920, which were based on the recognition of the independent statehood and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other party;...." Ibid., No. 20, p. 512; Latvia, p. 103.) Russia invited Finland to political discussion... (Finnish No. 10, p. 42: "Now that the international situation has altered on account of the war")

From p. 220

October 19, 1939. Russia concluded 15-year mutual assistance pact with Lithuania for military and air bases to fortify Lithuanian-German frontier." (Ibid., No. 25, p. 705)

From p. 221

October 19, 1939. Poland protested to Lithuania the acceptance of territory ceded by Russia. ("...which does not belong to said Union" Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 17, p. 403.)
June 12, 1940. Russia accused Lithuania of military alliance against her. (Bulletin, Latvia, p. 112.)

June 15, 1940. Russian troops marched into Lithuania. (After acceptance of ultimatum by Lithuania, June 16, 1940)

June 16, 1940. Russia delivered ultimatum to Latvia. ("...To achieve the historic and legal recognition of the Latvian-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance."

June 17, 1940. Russia announced Estonia and Latvia had agreed to free passage of Russian troops and to formation of new governments. (Following ultimatums. "On the basis of factual data at the disposal of the Soviet government, and also on the basis of an exchange of views lately held in Moscow between Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. Molotov and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Markys, the Soviet government considers as an established fact that the Latvian government not only did not cancel the military alliance with Estonia created prior to the conclusion of the Soviet-Latvian mutual-assistance pact and directed against the U.S.S.R., but extended it by drawing Lithuania also into this alliance, and by attempts to draw Finland into it also..." Latvia, p. 107.)

July 21, 1940. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania asked incorporation into Russia. (By resolution of newly elected Communist-dominated parliaments which proclaimed them Soviet republics. Times, July 22, 1940, p. 1.)

II. PROTOCOL OF 1934 RENewing THE ABOVE-NAmed TREATY.
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I. Treaty of Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. ..................... 1

II. Protocol renewing the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of May 4th, 1932, between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ......................... 2
TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN ESTONIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Signed at Moscow, May 4, 1932 (7th year of Showa). Notifications exchanged at Tallinn, August 17, 1932. In force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE ESTONIAN REPUBLIC, of the one part, and THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, of the other part,

Being convinced that it is in the interests of the two High Contracting Parties to lay down definite conditions contributing to strengthen the friendly relations existing between them,

Animated by the desire to contribute in that manner to the maintenance of universal peace,

Considering that the Peace Treaty of February 2, 1920, constitutes, now as heretofore, the unshakable foundation of their mutual relations and obligations,

Declaring that none of the international obligations assumed by either of the High Contracting Parties is incompatible

Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

- 3 -
with the peaceful development of their mutual relations or
in contradiction with the present Treaty,

Being desirous of supporting and guaranteeing, so far as
concerns their mutual relations, the Pact for the Renuncia-
tion of War signed at Paris on August 27, 1928,

Have decided to conclude the present Treaty, and to this
end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Mr. Julius SEMENIA, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics;

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. Maxim Maximovitch LITVINOV, People's Commissary
for Foreign Affairs, Member of the
Central Executive Committee of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good
and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1.

Each of the High Contracting Parties guarantees to the
other Party the inviolability of the existing frontiers be-
tween them, as defined by the Peace Treaty signed on February
2, 1920, and undertakes to refrain from any act of aggression
or any violent measures directed against the integrity and
inviolability of the territory or against the political in-
dependence of the other Contracting Party, whether such acts
of aggression or such violent measures are undertaken separ-
ately or in conjunction with other Powers, with or without a
declaration of war.
ARTICLE 2.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to take part in political agreements manifestly directed in an aggressive sense against the other Party, nor in coalitions of the same nature having as their object to subject the other Party to an economic or financial boycott.

ARTICLE 3.

The obligations mentioned in the preceding Articles of the present Treaty shall in no case affect or modify the rights and international obligations devolving on the High Contracting Parties from treaties concluded or obligations assumed prior to the entry into force of the present Treaty, so far as the said rights and obligations contain no elements of aggression within the meaning of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 4.

Taking into consideration the obligations assumed in virtue of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit all disputes, whatever their nature or origin, which may arise between them subsequent to the coming into force of the present Treaty, and which it may not have been possible to settle within a reasonable time through the ordinary diplomatic channel, to a procedure of conciliation in a mixed Conciliation Commission, whose composition, powers, and procedure shall be fixed by a separate Convention, which the two Parties undertake to conclude within the shortest possible time, and which shall come into force simultaneously with the present Treaty.
ARTICLE 5.

The present Treaty is drawn up in duplicate in Estonian and Russian, both texts being authentic. It shall be ratified within the shortest possible time, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the High Contracting Parties at Tallinn within forty-five days of the date of the ratification of the present Treaty by Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE 6.

The present Treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, and shall remain in force for three years from that date.

Either of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to denounced the Treaty by notifying the other Party of its intention six months before the expiry of the said period, or without giving such notice in the event of an act of aggression being committed by the other High Contracting Party against any third Power whatsoever.

If the Treaty is not denounced by one or other of the High Contracting Parties, its validity shall be tacitly prolonged for a period of two years; similarly, the Treaty shall be deemed to be prolonged on each subsequent occasion for a further period of two years provided it has not been denounced by one or other of the High Contracting Parties,
according to the procedure laid down in the present Article.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have thereunto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow, in duplicate, May 6, 1732

(L. S.) N. Litvinov.
Daf. Doc. No. 563

[Text not legible due to image quality]

(参考文献：

国际货币基金组织

世界银行

联合国[国际劳工组织]

（编者注：

该文件可能涉及国际经济组织或金融机构的报告或文件，但由于图像质量限制，具体内容无法准确翻译。）
デル・ポスト・ノール

原稿

千九百三十二年五月四日ノラウス放送

世界平和ノ為スノ為スヘテモ、ソ連ナレルナレル、ヘントノヨリ

世界平和ノ為スヘテモ、ソ連ナレル、ヘントノヨリ

デル・ポスト・ノール

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デル・ポスト・ノール

II. PROTOCOL OF 1934 RENEWING THE ABOVE-NAMED TREATY.
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TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
BETWEEN ESTONIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Signed at Moscow, May 4, 1932 (7th year of Showe). Ratifications exchanged at Tallinn, August 18, 1932. In force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE ESTONIAN REPUBLIC, of the one part,

and

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, of the other part,

Being convinced that it is in the interests of the two

High Contracting Parties to lay down definite conditions contributing to strengthen the friendly relations existing between them,

Animated by the desire to contribute in that manner to the maintenance of universal peace,

Considering that the Peace Treaty of February 2, 1920, constitutes, now as heretofore, the unshakable foundation of their mutual relations and obligations,

Declaring that none of the international obligations assumed by either of the High Contracting Parties is incompatible

1 Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.
with the peaceful development of their mutual relations or in contradiction with the present Treaty,

Being desirous of supplementing and defining, so far as concerns their mutual relations, the Pact for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris on August 27, 1928,

Have decided to conclude the present Treaty, and to this end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Mr. Julius Schimmelpenninck, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

- M. Maxim Maximovitch Litvinov, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1.

Each of the High Contracting Parties guarantees to the other Party the inviolability of the existing frontiers between them, as defined by the Peace Treaty signed on February 2, 1920, and undertakes to refrain from any act of aggression or any violent measures directed against the integrity and inviolability of the territory or against the political independence of the other Contracting Party, whether such acts of aggression or such violent measures are undertaken separately or in conjunction with other Powers, with or without a declaration of war.
ARTICLE 2.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to take part in political agreements manifestly directed in an aggressive sense against the other Party, nor in coalitions of the same nature having as their object to subject the other Party to an economic or financial boycott.

ARTICLE 3.

The obligations mentioned in the preceding Articles of the present Treaty shall in no case affect or modify the rights and international obligations devolving on the High Contracting Parties from treaties concluded or obligations assumed prior to the entry into force of the present Treaty, so far as the said rights and obligations contain no elements of aggression within the meaning of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 4.

Taking into consideration the obligations assumed in virtue of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit all disputes, whatever their nature or origin, which may arise between them subsequent to the coming into force of the present Treaty, and which it may not have been possible to settle within a reasonable time through the ordinary diplomatic channel, to a procedure of conciliation in a mixed Conciliation Commission, whose composition, powers, and procedure shall be fixed by a separate Convention, which the two Parties undertake to conclude within the shortest possible time, and which shall come into force simultaneously with the present Treaty.
ARTICLE 5.

The present Treaty is drawn up in duplicate in Estonian and Russian, both texts being authentic. It shall be ratified within the shortest possible time, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the High Contracting Parties at Tallinn within forty-five days of the date of the ratification of the present Treaty by Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE 6.

The present Treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, and shall remain in force for three years from that date.

Either of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to denounce the Treaty by notifying the other Party of its intention six months before the expiry of the said period, or without giving such notice in the event of an act of aggression being committed by the other High Contracting Party against any third Power whatsoever.

If the Treaty is not denounced by one or other of the High Contracting Parties, its validity shall be tacitly prolonged for a period of two years; similarly, the Treaty shall be deemed to be prolonged on each subsequent occasion for a further period of two years provided it has not been denounced by one or other of the High Contracting Parties,
Def. Doc. 563

according to the procedure laid down in the present Article.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow, in duplicate, May 6, 1932

(L. S.) Jul. SELIMAJI. (L. S.) M. LITVINOV.

Retaining to Poland

From pp. 216-17

September 17, 1939. Russia invaded Poland from the East..."Events arising out of the Polish-German war has revealed the intern insolvency and obvious impotence of the Polish State. Polish ruling circles have suffered bankruptcy... Warsaw as the Polish State no longer exists. No one knows the whereabouts of the Polish Government. The population of Poland have been abandoned by their ill-starred leaders to their fate. The Polish State and its government have virtually ceased to exist. In view of this state of affairs, treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and Poland have ceased to operate. A situation has arisen in Poland which demands of the Soviet Government especial concern for the security of its state. Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency that may create a menace to the Soviet Union... Nor can it be demanded of the Soviet Government that it be indifferent to the fate of Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians (White Russians) inhabiting Poland, who even formerly were without rights and who now have been abandoned entirely to their fate. The Soviet Government deems it its sacred duty to extend the hand of assistance to its brothers Ukrainians and brother Byelo-Russians inhabiting Poland." (Izotov, quoted in Times Sept. 18, 1939, p. 5.)

September 18, 1939. German and Polish troops agreed provisional on partition of Poland at Brest-Litovsk. (Two armies met as campaign approached end. Times, Sept. 19, 1939, p. 1.)

From p. 218

September 21, 1939. Germany and Russia partitioned Poland in border and friendship treaty. ("The German Reich Government and the Government of Soviet Russia, after the disintegration of the former Polish state, consider it their task to restore in this region law and order and to insure nationals living there an existence corresponding to their national character." Times, Sept. 29, 1939, p. 1.)

From p. 223

November 3, 1939. Russia incorporated Polish Western Ukraine and Western White Russia. ("...owing to collapse of the Polish State and the successful operations of the Red Army..." Times, Nov. 7, 1939, p. 5.)
クライツ人及自系婦人が従来何時ノ福利ヲ有せず今又完全ヲ破局ノ昭外レ
昭和十四年十一月三日
帝軽・日摂川領ウクライナ南部及西部白系領西

昭和十四年十一月三日
帝軽・日摂川領ウクライナ南部及西部白系領西

昭和十四年十一月三日
帝軽・日摂川領ウクライナ南部及西部白系領西

Relating to Rumania

From p. 247

June 26, 1940. Russian ultimatum to Rumania. ("In 1918, taking advantage of Russia's military weakness, Rumania forcibly wrested from the Soviet Union part of its territory--Bessarabia--and thus broke the 179-old unity of Bessarabia, populated chiefly by Ukrainians, with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

"The Soviet Union never reconciled itself to the forcible wresting of Bessarabia, which the U.S.S.R. Government more than once openly declared for the whole world to hear.

"Now, when the military weakness of the U.S.S.R. has become a thing of the past, while the present international situation demands the speediest solution of outstanding issues inherited from the past in order to lay at last the foundations of a durable peace between countries, the Soviet Union considers it necessary and timely in the interests of the restoration of justice to take up jointly with Rumania the immediate settlement of the question of the restoration of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union.

"The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers that the question of the restoration of Bessarabia is organically bound with the question of transfer to the Soviet Union of that part of Bukovina of which the population in its overwhelming majority is bound to the Soviet Ukraine by the unity of historic destinies as well as by unity of language and national composition." Times, June 29, 1940, p. 8. Cf. June 21, supra.)

From p. 248

June 28, 1940. Rumania transferred Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Russia. ("To preserve the possibility of avoiding serious consequences which would result from the application of force and the outbreak of hostilities in this part of Europe,..." Times, June 29, 1940, p. 8.)
Convention of Definition of Aggression

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1. Convention of Definition of Aggression ............................... Page 1
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CONVENTION OF DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

Signed at London, 4 July 1933 (8th year of Showa)
Ratifications deposited 17 February 1934 (9th Year of Showa)
by the four Powers other than Turkey
Entered into force 17 February 1934 for the above mentioned Powers

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Majesty the King of Rumania, the President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, the President of the Republic of Turkey and His Majesty, the King of Jugoslavia.

Desiring to reinforce the peace existing among their countries;

Considering that the Kellogg-Briand Pact, of which they are signatories, forbids all aggression;

Deeming it necessary, in the interests of the general security to define aggression in as precise a manner as possible in order to forestall any pretext for its justification;

Recognizing that all States have equally the right to independence, to security, to the defense of their territories and to the free development of their institutions;

Animated by the desire, in the interests of general peace, to assure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries;

Judging it useful, in the interests of general peace, to put into force among their countries precise rules of defining aggression, while awaiting their becoming universal;

Have decided, toward these ends, to conclude the present Convention and have duly authorized to that effect:

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. Lev Litvinoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of Rumania: Mr. Nicholas Titulosco, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia: Mr. Jan Garrigue Masaryk, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at London;

His Majesty the King of Jugoslavia: Dr. George Dimitroff, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at London;

Who have agreed upon the following provisions:
Article I

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with each of the others, from the day of the coming into effect of the present Convention, the definition of aggression as it has been explained in the Report of the Committee on Questions of Security under date of 24 May 1933 (Political Report) to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, a report made in accordance with the proposal of the Soviet Delegation.

Article II

In consequence, subject to agreements in force between the parties in conflict, that State shall be recognized as an aggressor which shall have first committed any of the following acts:

1. Declaration of War on another State;
2. Invasion by its armed forces, even without declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
3. Attack by its land, naval or air forces, even without declaration of war, upon the territory, the ships or the aircraft of another State;
4. Naval blockade of the coasts or the ports of another State;
5. Assistance given to armed bands which, formed on its territory, shall have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, despite the demand of the State invaded, to take on its own territory all measures in its power to deprive such bands of any aid or protection.

Article III

No consideration of a political, military, economic or other nature shall serve as excuse or justification for the aggression contemplated by Article II. (For examples see the Annex)

Article IV

The present Convention is open for the adherence of all other nations. Adherence will confer the same rights and impose the same obligations as original signature. Adherence shall be communicated to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall at once inform all other signatories thereof.
Article V

The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with the laws of each.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

So soon as the instruments of ratification shall have been deposited by two High Contracting Parties, the present Convention shall enter into force between those two Parties. It shall enter into force for all the other High Contracting Parties as they deposit in turn their instruments of ratification.

Each deposit of instruments of ratification shall be immediately notified by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to all signatories of the present Convention.

Article VI

The present Convention has been signed in five copies, of which each of the High Contracting Parties has received one.

In faith of which the Plenipotentiaries listed above have signed the present Convention and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at London, 4 July 1933.

Signatures

Maxim Litvinoff          Mohmeda Jamir
H. Titulesco              G. Douritsh
Jan ihsaryk

**Addendum**

to Article III of the Convention
relative to the Definition of Aggression

The High Contracting Parties signatory to the Convention relative to the definition of aggression,

Desiring, upon the express condition of in no way restricting the absolute force of the rule laid down in Article III of the said Convention, to provide certain indications of a nature for determining the aggressor.
Recognizing that no act of aggression in the sense of Article II of the said Convention can be justified by, among others, any of the following circumstances:

A. The internal condition of a State, for example, its political, economic or social structure; alleged shortcomings of its administration, troubles originating in strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions or civil war.

D. The international conduct of a State for example the violation or the danger of violation of material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; measures of economic or financial boycott; differences relating to economic, financial or other obligations toward foreign States; frontier incidents not included within the cases of aggression indicated in Article II.

The High Contracting Parties are otherwise agreed in recognizing that the present Convention must never serve to legitimize violations of international law which might be involved in the circumstances comprised in the enumeration above.

SIGNATURES

Maxim Litvinoff  Mohstem Muhir
N. Titulescu  G. Diouritch
Jan Pascryk

Translated by Zl-Koncy
Translation Certificate

I, Ben Bruce Blakeney, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of CONVENTION OF DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Ben Bruce Blakeney

Tokyo, Japan

Date 28 Feb 47
外交信函

外務省通牒

昭和九年四月二十三日

(212)
言語学における発声の研究は、言語の発生と発展の理解を深めるために不可欠です。この分野では、基本的な発声の原理、音韻学、話者間の音声学などのさまざまな観点から研究が行われています。

発声の研究は、音の発生、伝播、感知の過程に焦点を当てます。音声学の観点から、発声の種類、音の構成要素、音の時間的・空間的特性などについての詳細な解析がなされます。また、言語の発声がどうして進化してきたか、言語の発声が文化的な要素にどのように影響を及ぼしているか、などの問いに対しても、発声の研究が重要な役割を果たしています。

発声の研究は、言語学の中では非常に重要な位置を占めています。言語学を学び、研究する段階で、発声の研究を通じて、発声の科学的な理解を深めることができます。
Excerpt from *The New York Times*, 19 December 1941

**Portugal Bids the Allies 'Quit Timor'; They Say 'No' as Axis Warns Lisbon**

By DANIEL T. BRIGHAM

PORTUGAL SIDES THE ALLIES 'QUIT TIMOR'; THEY SAY 'NO' AS AXIS WARNS LISBON

BERNE, Switzerland, Dec. 19--Portugal demands that Britain and the Netherlands withdraw their occupation forces from Portuguese Timor immediately, Premier and Foreign Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar told a special session of the National Assembly in Lisbon today.

(In London a spokesman asserted that "we won't budge", The United Press reported.)

Dr. Salazar acknowledged that the island, which lies between Australia and the Netherlands Indies, was of "greatest importance to the defense of Australia", but asserted that a Japanese attack there could not be regarded as "probable".

Pending the allied reply to the Portuguese protest, the Premier said, the government is studying "the necessity of increasing the small garrison on the island".

Immediately after the closing of the special session, Dr. Salazar, in a mysterious move attributed to Axis pressure, ordered the Portuguese Ambassador in Madrid to inform Foreign Minister Serrano Suner of the steps the Lisbon government had decided to take. Some diplomats here believed this evening that Portugal had taken the first step toward lining up with the Axis.

In opening his speech the Premier told Parliament that "I am not here to make a speech, but to put before the National Assembly an exposition, a simple exposition, of the facts." He continued:

"Wednesday morning two armed contingents that appear to have been of Australian and Dutch nationality disembarked forcibly at Dili, invoking as their reason the defense of the colony from an imminent Japanese aggression. (In Batavia it was said the occupation was carried out Thursday.) I pass over in silence certain campaigns carried on in the world press during recent weeks on the subject of Timor and on the subject of Portuguese foreign policy--ridiculous and interested campaigns in which the presence of fourteen Japanese on the island was taken as the pretext for fears of Japanese infiltration."
On Dec. 4 last the British Foreign Secretary, in a conversation with the Portuguese Ambassador to London, mentioned the strategic position of Timor, which is essential to the defense of Australia and on the subject of which the British General Staff has been obliged to preoccupy itself. The British Government, he said, had three questions to ask. These were:

1. What would be the attitude of the Portuguese Government in case of a Japanese attack on Timor?

2. Would the Portuguese Government be disposed to accept British aid if the island was attacked?

3. If the answer is in the affirmative, would there not be an advantage in studying now a plan for joint occupation?

"It is our conviction that a Japanese attack against the Portuguese possession of Timor can under no circumstances be considered as probable.

"However, as a prudent measure of foresight and owing to the existence of our alliance with Great Britain, the government did not hesitate to answer in the following manner: First, we would resist with force any Japanese aggression against Timor—as we would against any other Portuguese possession or against any aggressor; second, given our intention to resist, we would not only accept British aid, we would expect it under the treaty of alliance, the more so since there exists no reason why the Japanese should attack our possession, and the attack, should it come, would come only as a result of our alliance with Great Britain or as a prelude to subsequent attacks against British possessions.

"On Dec. 7 the British Government acknowledged receipt of this communication in the warmest terms, and, after consultation with the Australian Government, suggested that a Portuguese officer be sent immediately to Singapore to confer with the British Command there.

Says Officer was accepted

The Premier and Foreign Minister—and Minister of War—told his listeners that his government had accepted this offer and had sent the Governor of Timor instructions to this effect:

"The aid to be studied is in the same measure as that which is due to the Portuguese under the treaty this country has with the British. This will come in the form of British and Netherlands troops under British command. The hypothesis to be envisaged is solely that of a Japanese aggression against Timor. This record does not come into effect merely on the basis of simple menace or fears thereof, more or less well founded. The collabo-
ration of foreign troops is not reciprocal except that through
Japanese attack on our possessions we have already lost our neu-
trality, and that, finally, all foreign troops will be withdrawn
once their presence is no longer required.

British and Netherland representations, however, became in-
creasingly insistent, the Premier went on, as Allied fears of a
Japanese attack increased. But while the British ambassador in
Lisbon was trying to convince the Portuguese Government of the
necessity of immediate measures, those forces were being debark-
on the island of Timor and these troops did not land with the
object of negotiation, but to call upon the Governor to grant im-
mediate permission.

"Naturally the modest police garrison on the island could do
nothing to resist," Dr. Salazar said.

The Premier added that "the colony remains calm" and that
"we are at present studying the means of increasing the garrison
there as the simplest manner of bringing peace back to that island
exposed as it is to the convulsions of war."

A formal note of protest demanding that the allies immedi-
ately withdraw from Timor was being prepared in the Foreign Office lat-
tonight. It is to be handed to the British ambassador early to-
morrow.

**Axis Diplomats Active**

Axis representatives, including the Japanese Charge d'Affaires,
called at the Lisbon Foreign Office during the afternoon to pre-
sent the attitude of their governments. The Axis attitude left
little to the imagination.

The Rome press adopted the line that "a passive attitude by
Lisbon at this juncture could be interpreted only as confirming
the existence of an entente between Portugal and Britain in
future war policy." "Such a conclusion can have but one conse-
quence," it was said. "The repercussions of this 'favoring of the
British initiatives' would rebound on the vast and complex
Portuguese colonial system."

Berlin comment was similar, though somewhat more subtle. It
stressed that the Reich had noted that "on previous occasions in
the not so distant past Portuguese neutrality has shown consider-
able tolerance for British pretensions and desires."

The note of warning could scarcely be overlooked. Leaving
nothing to the imagination, however, as soon as Spain's declara-
tion of "non-belligerency" in the Pacific was known, the Axis
representatives called again at the Foreign Office in Lisbon—
they are reported to have been calling four to five times daily.
during the last four days—to inform the Portuguese of this move, while simultaneously the Axis rumor factories throughout Europe began turning on inspired smokescreens.

Rumors of troop concentrations on the southern French frontiers began pouring over the wires to "neutral" sources with such emphasis being laid on their implications toward "Portuguese protection" that seasoned observers "consulted the stars" and looked toward Morocco, for it is there, according to information leaking out of Vichy this evening, that the Vichy government expects the next move. Portugal is regarded as only a "secondary objective."

With the British fleet occupied in the Mediterranean, with the Libyan campaign, with the Americans not yet ready and already with their hands full in the Pacific, the Axis reasons, Portugal can be conquered with a telephone call provided that sufficient troops appear at sufficient places along her eastern frontiers at the right time.
Def. Doc. No. 516

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 14 pages and entitled "PORTUGAL BIDS THE ALLIES QUIT TIMOR; THEY SAY 'NO' AS AXIS WAR NS LISBON" is an exact and true copy of an article in "NEW YORK TIMES" dated December 19, 1941 in the custody of Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 21st day of February 1947

/s/ K. Havashi
Signature of Officer

Witness: /s/ T. Sato
ない旨書簡した。

苦境の益田に携する会合における回答を得たとき、益田は事態を検討中であると答えた。

結果、同様に取り扱う不可避の状況に備え、サラダ Bols博士は次のように答えた。

したる措置を取るべき大臣セラノ・ネール氏に照会してリプレン政府が決定した措置を、当面の判断の下に、...

首長は対等に設けている役割の目的に於ては必要とされるものであり、妥当の判断、経過の説明を要する場合、...

二度の要請する分については、合併する日本の関係の手により、...

デリイに要請をした。

パラダイスでは、原寸大は、仮定日に申し出されたと答えて答る一言、最終版に於いては、...

の際に従事の者数が、マツモロ島の船端に申し、...

益田の要請の件に関して、
し敗北の––––を蒙した。

本島に十四人の日本人が居る。時に木島俊人の口占りである

ある。といふのが知として居るのを想定して舞い立てるものを

は多い。もしこの島に常駐しているとすれば、かかる小国にとっては

である。而してこの島に常駐しているとすれば、かかる小国にとっては

いる。
最近まで翻訳家の中立は英語の要求並びに希望に対して非常に抵抗感を示した。漢の翻訳家公式の通過させられた部分をそのまま使用するという、自らの翻訳家方式を主張する米語の要求及び希望に対し、非常な抵抗意識を示し、米系翻訳家はその要求を認めず、自らの翻訳家方式を主張するという、自らの翻訳家方式を主張するという。
Excerpt from *The New York Times*, 11 April 1941

**AGREEMENT MADE: UNITED STATES BECOMES PROTECTOR OF GREENLAND**

**AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE DEFENSE OF GREENLAND**

1. After the invasion and occupation of Denmark on April 9, 1940, by foreign military forces, the United Greenland Councils at their meeting at Godhavn on May 5, 1940, adopted in the name of the people of Greenland a resolution reiterating their oath of allegiance to King Christian X of Denmark and expressing the hope that, for as long as Greenland remains cut off from the mother country, the Government of the United States of America will continue to hold in mind the exposed position of the Danish flag in Greenland of the native Greenland and Danish population and of established public order; and

2. The governments of all of the American republics have agreed that the status of regions in the Western Hemisphere belonging to European powers is a subject of deep concern to the American nations, and that the course of military events in Europe and the changes resulting from them may create the grave danger that European territorial possessions in America may be converted into strategic centers of aggression against nations of the American continent; and

3. Defense of Greenland against attack by a non-American power is essential to the preservation of the peace and security of the American continent and is a subject of vital concern to the United States of America and also to the Kingdom of Denmark; and

4. Although the sovereignty of Denmark over Greenland is fully recognized, the present circumstances for the time being prevent the government in Denmark from exercising its powers in respect of Greenland. Therefore,
The undersigned, to wit: Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America, acting on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Henrik de Kauffmann, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Denmark at Washington, acting on behalf of His Majesty the King of Denmark in his capacity as sovereign of Greenland, whose authorities in Greenland have concurred herein, have agreed as follows:

**Article I**

The Government of the United States of America reiterates its recognition of and respect for the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark over Greenland. Recognizing that as a result of the present European war there is a danger that Greenland may be converted into a point of aggression against nations of the American continent, the Government of the United States of America, having in mind its obligations under the Act of Havana signed on July 30, 1940, accepts the responsibility of assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its present status.

**Article II**

It is agreed that the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to construct, maintain and operate such landing fields, seaplane facilities and radio and meteorological installations as may be necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article I.

**Article III**

The grants of the rights specified in Article II shall also include the right to improve and deepen harbors and anchorages and the approaches thereto, to install aids to navigation by air and by water, and to construct roads, communication services, fortifications, repair and storage facilities, and housing for personnel, and generally, the right to do any and all things necessary to insure the efficient operation, maintenance and protection of such defense facilities as may be established.

**Article IV**

The landing fields, seaplane, harbor and other defense facilities that may be constructed and operated by the Government of the United States of America under Articles II and III will be made available to the airplanes and vessels of all the American nations for purposes connected with the common defense of the Western Hemisphere.
Article V

It is agreed that the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to lease for such period of time as this agreement may remain in force such areas of land and water as may be necessary for the construction, operation and protection of the defense facilities specified in Articles II and III.

In locating the aforesaid defense areas, the fullest consideration consistent with military necessity shall be given to the welfare, health and economic needs of the native population of Greenland.

It is agreed, however, that since the paramount objective sought is the early attainment of an adequate defense establishment in Greenland, the utilization of any area deemed by the Government of the United States of America to be needed for this purpose shall not be delayed pending the reaching of an agreement upon the precise terms of a formal lease.

A description of such areas, by metes and bounds, and a statement of the purpose for which they are needed shall in each case be communicated to the Danish authorities in Greenland as soon as practicable, and the negotiation of a formal lease shall be undertaken within a reasonable period of time thereafter.

Article VI

The Kingdom of Denmark retains sovereignty over the defense areas mentioned in the preceding articles.

So long as this agreement shall remain in force, the Government of the United States of America shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such defense areas in Greenland and over military and civilian personnel of the United States, and their families, as well as over all other persons within such areas except Danish citizens and native Greenlanders, it being understood, however, that the Government of the United States may turn over to the Danish authorities in Greenland for trial and punishment any person committing an offense within a defense area, if the Government of the United States shall decide not to exercise jurisdiction in such case.

The Danish authorities in Greenland will take adequate measures to assure the prosecution and punishment in case of convictions of all Danish citizens, native Greenlanders and other persons who may be turned over to them by the authorities of the United States for offenses committed within the said defense areas.
It is agreed that the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to establish and maintain postal facilities and commissary stores to be used solely by military and civilian personnel of the United States, and their families, maintained in Greenland in connection with the Greenland establishment. If requested by the Danish authorities in Greenland, arrangements will be made to enable persons other than those mentioned to purchase necessary supplies at such commissary stores as may be established.

All materials, supplies and equipment for the construction, use and operation of the defense establishment and for the personal needs of military and civilian personnel of the United States, and their families, shall be permitted entry into Greenland free of customs duties, excise taxes or other charges, and the said personnel, and their families, shall also be exempt from all forms of taxation, assessments or other levies by the Danish authorities in Greenland.

The Government of the United States of America will respect all legitimate interests in Greenland as well as all the laws, regulations and customs pertaining to the native population and the internal administration of Greenland. In exercising the rights derived from this agreement the Government of the United States will give sympathetic consideration to all representations made by the Danish authorities in Greenland with respect to the welfare of the inhabitants of Greenland.

This agreement shall remain in force until it is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and security of the American Continent have passed. At that time the modification or termination of the agreement will be the subject of consultation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Denmark.

After due consultation has taken place, each party shall have the right to give the other party notice of its intention to terminate the agreement, and it is hereby agreed, that at the expiration of twelve months after such notice shall have been received by either party from the other this agreement shall cease to be in force.
Def. Doc. # 517

Signed at Washington in duplicate, in the English and Danish languages, both texts having equal force, this 9th day of April, nineteen hundred and forty-one.

Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.

Hnéik de Kaufmann,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Denmark at Washington.
Hull to Danish Minister

Secretary Hull's letter to Minister de Kauffmann read:

April 7, 1941

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the informal conversations which you have had with officers of the Department of State during which the concern of the Government of the United States was expressed over the effect of recent military developments, particularly affecting Greenland, upon the maintenance of the peace and security of the United States and the rest of the American Continent.

You are also aware of the interest of the Government of the United States in maintaining unimpaired the safety of Greenland and the sovereignty of Denmark over that island.

My government has continuously had in mind the desire expressed by the United Greenland councils at their meeting at Godhavn on May 3, 1940, that the Government of the United States of America would continue to hold in mind the exposed position of the Danish flag in Greenland and of the native Greenland and Danish population of the island.

My government has taken note of the unusual situation in which Greenland now finds itself. The Kingdom of Denmark is at present under occupation by a foreign army. The Government of the United States has condemned that invasion as a violation of Danish sovereign rights, and had repeatedly expressed its friendly concern and its most earnest hope for the complete and speedy liberation of Denmark.

Although the Government of the United States fully recognizes the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark over Greenland, it is unhappily clear that the Government in Denmark is not in a position to exercise sovereign power over Greenland so long as the present military occupation continues.

Greenland is within the area embraced by the Monroe Doctrine and by the Act of Havana, with which you are familiar, and its defense against attack by a non-American power is plainly essential to the preservation of the peace and security of the American...
Continental, and of the traditional policies of this Government respecting the Western Hemisphere.

My government has consequently proposed measures for the adequate defense of Greenland consistent with the obligations of the United States under the act of Havana signed on July 30, 1940. In doing so it is animated by sentiments of the closest friendship for Denmark, and believes that by taking these steps it is safeguarding the eventual reestablishment of the normal relationship between Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark.

I have the honor to enclose a draft of the proposed agreement relating to the defense of Greenland, which I believe embodies the ideas agreed upon in the course of our various conversations.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Cordell Hull.

Reply of Danish Minister
April 9, 1941

Sir:

I have received your note of the seventh instant concerning the defense of Greenland, together with a draft of a proposed agreement regarding the same subject.

It is with appreciation that I note your renewed assurance that, although the present circumstances prevent the government in Denmark for the time being from exercising its powers in respect of Greenland, your government fully recognizes the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark over the island.

At the same time I wish to convey to you my feelings of gratitude for the expression of friendly concern of your government and its earnest hope for the complete and speedy liberation of Denmark.

I share your view that the proposed agreement, arrived at after an open and friendly exchange of views, is, under the singularly unusual circumstances, the best measure to assure both Greenland's present safety and the future of the island under Danish sovereignty.

Furthermore, I am of the opinion that the terms of the agreement protect, as far as possible, the interests of the native
Def. Doc. # 517

population of Greenland, whose welfare traditionally has been the paramount aim of Denmark's policy in Greenland.

I, therefore, shall accept and sign the agreement proposed, acting on behalf of His Majesty, the King of Denmark, in his capacity of sovereign over Greenland, whose authorities in Greenland have concurred herein.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Henrik Kauffmann.
CERTIFICATE
.Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of _ pages and entitled "AGREEMENT WHEREBY UNITED STATES B.O. ES PROTECTOR OF GREENLAND" is an exact and true copy of an article in "NEW YORK TIMES" dated April 11, 1941, in the custody of Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 22nd day of February 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ H. Suzuki
米国をグリーンランドの保護国とする協定

一九四一年四月十日発行ニューヨークタイムズ紙掲載

米国をグリーンランドの保護国とする協定

一九四〇年四月九日デンマーク本図は外歯軍隊の侵入占領する所と
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了る限り、アメリカ合衆国政府に於てグリーンランドに於けるデンマーク

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13
April 12, 1941. Denmark repudiated agreement of April 9.
("...without authorization from here, and contrary to the
constitution,..." Bulletin, Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 471.)
Excerpt from The New York Times, 9 July 1941

I am transmitting herewith for the information of the Congress a message I received from the Prime Minister of Iceland on July 1 and the reply I addressed on the same day to the Prime Minister of Iceland in response to this message.

In accordance with the understanding so reached, forces of the United States Navy have today arrived in Iceland in order to supplement, and eventually to replace, the British forces which have until now been stationed in Iceland in order to insure the adequate defense of that country.

As I stated in my message to the Congress of September 3 last regarding the acquisition of certain naval and air bases from Great Britain in exchange for certain convoy destroyers, considerations of safety from overseas attack are fundamental.

The United States cannot permit the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere. We have no desire to see any change in the present sovereignty of those regions.

Assurance that such outposts in our defense frontier remain in friendly hands is the very foundation of our national security and of the national security of every one of the independent nations of the New World.

For the same reason substantial forces of the United States have now been sent to the bases acquired last year from Great Britain in Trinidad and in British Guiana, in the south, in order to forestall any pincers movement undertaken by Germany against the Western Hemisphere. It is essential that Germany should not be able successfully to employ such tactics through sudden seizure of strategic points in the South Atlantic and in the North Atlantic.

Three-Dimensional Threat

The occupation of Iceland by Germany would constitute a serious threat in three dimensions:

The threat against Greenland and the northern portion of the North American continent, including the islands which lie off it.

The threat against all shipping in the North Atlantic.
The threat against the steady flow of munitions to Britain—which is a matter of broad policy clearly approved by the Congress—it is, therefore, imperative that the approaches between the Americas and those strategic outposts, the safety of which this country regards as essential to its national security and which it must therefore defend, shall remain open and free from all hostilities or threat thereof.

As Commander-in-Chief I have consequently issued orders to the Navy that all necessary steps be taken to insure the safety of communications in the approaches between Iceland and the United States, as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts.

This government will insure the adequate defense of Iceland with full recognition of the independence of Iceland as a sovereign state.

In my message to the Prime Minister of Iceland I have given the people of Iceland the assurance that the American forces sent there would in no way interfere with the internal and domestic affairs of that country, and that immediately upon the termination of the present international emergency all American forces will be at once withdrawn, leaving the people of Iceland and their government in full and sovereign control of their own territory.

Prime Minister's Message

In a conversation of June 21, the British Minister explained that British forces in Iceland are required elsewhere. At the same time he stressed the immense importance of adequate defense of Iceland. He also called my attention to the declaration of the President of the United States to the effect that he must take all necessary measures to insure the safety of the Western Hemisphere—one of the President's measures is to assist in the defense of Iceland—and that the President is therefore prepared to send here immediately United States troops to supplement and eventually to replace the British forces here, but that he does not consider that he can take this course except at the invitation of the Iceland Government.

After careful consideration of all circumstances the Iceland Government, in view of the present state of affairs, admit that this measure is in accordance with the interest of Iceland, and therefore are ready to entrust the protection of Iceland to United States on the following conditions:
Def. Doc. 7 518

1. United States promise to withdraw all their military forces land, air and sea from Iceland immediately on conclusion of present war.

2. United States further promise to recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland and to exercise their best efforts with those Powers which will negotiate the peace treaty at the conclusion of the present war in order that such treaty shall likewise recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland.

3. United States promise not to interfere with Government of Iceland neither while their armed forces remain in this country nor afterward.

picketed Troops Requested

4. United States promise to organize the defense of the country in such a way as to insure the greatest possible safety for the inhabitants themselves and to assure that they suffer minimum disturbance from military activities; these activities being carried out in consultation with Iceland authorities as far as possible. Also because of small population of Iceland and consequent danger to nation from presence of a numerous army, great care must be taken that only picked troops are sent here. Military authorities should be also instructed to keep in mind that Icelanders have been unarmed for centuries and are entirely unaccustomed to military discipline, and conduct of troops toward the inhabitants of the country should be ordered accordingly.

5. United States undertake defense of the country without expense to Iceland and promise compensation for all damage occasioned to the inhabitants by their military activities.

6. United States promise to further interests of Iceland in every way in their power, including that of supplying the country with sufficient necessities, of securing necessary shipping to and from the country and of making in other respects favorable commercial and trade agreements with it.

7. Iceland Government expects that declaration made by President in this connection will be in agreement with these promises on part of Iceland, and Government would much appreciate its being given the opportunity of being cognizant with word of this declaration before it is published.

8. On part of Iceland, it is considered obvious that if United States undertake defense of the country it must be strong enough to meet every eventuality and particularly in the beginning it is expected that as far as possible effort will be made to prevent any special danger in connection with change-over. Iceland
Government lays special stress on there being sufficient airplanes for defensive purposes wherever they are required and they can be used as soon as decision is made for United States to undertake the defense of the country.

This decision is made on the part of Iceland as an absolutely free and sovereign state and it is considered as a matter of course that United States will from the beginning recognize this legal status of the country, both states immediately exchanging diplomatic representatives.

The President's Reply

I have received your message in which you have informed me that after careful consideration of all the circumstances the Iceland Government, in view of the present state of affairs, admits that the sending to Iceland of United States troops to supplement and eventually to replace the present British forces there would be in accordance with the interests of Iceland and that, therefore, the Iceland Government is ready to entrust the protection of Iceland to the United States on the following considerations:

(it this point the message repeated verbatim the eight conditions set forth in the message of the Prime Minister.)

You further state that this decision is made on the part of Iceland as an absolutely free and sovereign State and that it is considered as a matter of course that the United States will from the beginning recognize the legal status of Iceland, both States immediately exchanging diplomatic representatives.

I take pleasure in confirming to you hereby that the conditions set forth in your communication now under acknowledgement are fully acceptable to the Government of the United States and that these conditions will be observed in the relations between the United States and Iceland. I may further say that it will give me pleasure to request of the Congress its agreement in order that diplomatic representatives may be exchanged between our two countries.

It is the announced policy of the Government of the United States to undertake to join with the other nations of the Western Hemisphere in the defense of the New World against any attempt of aggression. In the opinion of this Government, it is imperative that the integrity and independence of Iceland should be preserved because of the fact that any occupation of Iceland by a power whose only too clearly apparent plans for world conquest include the domination of the peoples of the New World would at once directly menace the security of the entire Western Hemisphere.
Praise for Iceland

It is for that reason that in response to your message, the Government of the United States will send immediately troops to supplement and eventually to replace the British forces now there.

The steps so taken by the Government of the United States are taken in full recognition of the sovereignty and independency of Iceland and with the clear understanding that American military or naval forces sent to Iceland will in no wise interfere in the slightest degree with the internal and domestic affairs of the Icelandic people; and with the further understanding that immediately upon the termination of the present international emergency, all such military and naval forces will be at once withdrawn, leaving the people of Iceland and their Government in full control of their own territory.

The people of Iceland hold a proud position among the democracies of the world, with a historic tradition of freedom and individual liberty which is more than a thousand years old. It is, therefore, all the more appropriate that in response to your message, the Government of the United States, while undertaking this defensive measure for the preservation of the independence and security of the democracies of the New World should at the same time be afforded the privilege of cooperating in this manner with our Government in the defense of the historic democracy of Iceland.

I am communicating this message, for their information, to the governments of all of the other nations of the Western Hemisphere.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HIYACHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 5 pages and entitled "MESSAGE TO CONGRESS" is an exact and true copy of an article in "NEW YORK TIMES" dated July 7, 1941, in the custody of Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 21st day of February 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ H. Suzuki
我々ノ国家安全及新世界ノ独立臨全邦ノ国家安全ノ規定デアル。

同ノ理由ニヨツテ、独占ガ西半球ニ對シテ全邦ノ勢ヲ制スルタメ、
ノ有力ナ部隊ヲ現在派遣サレテイル。独占ガ南部太西洋及北部太西洋ニ於
ケル戦略的拠点ヲ突然占領シテカラル戦術ヲ用ヒテ好結果ヲ挙ゲル所ガ出
来ナイウミスルコトガ大切デアル。

三 方 面 ノ 畏

独占ガイニハラントヲ占領スルコトハ三方面ニ於テ重大ナル務威ヲ構成スル

ノアラル活動ヲハソノ懸威カラヲ放ガルコトガ當然ニ必要デアル。故ニ合衆国及ソノ
家安全ヲ自分ノ國家安全ニ不可鍵卜考ヘル、故ニ防備シテスラルナリ。ニ此等戦略ヲ
前哨地點ヲ取セテソノ進路ヲ開クルテイテ

謄会ガ明確ニ認可シタ騒義外交ノ問題デアル英ヘノ軍需品ノ間断ヲナキ

ダルヲ約束ハルニ對スル懸威。
首 相

日本

七月二十一日 会談は於テ英公使ハハイスラングドニ胜町スルル英国軍ハ他ノ
方面ニ必要デアルコトヲ説明シタ。同時ニ公使ハハイスラングドノلحقナ防備
ノ極メテ重要デアルコトヲ強調シタ。合衆国大統領ハ西部半球ニ安全ヲ確

保スルノニ必要ナタスル措置ヲ詰スルコト及ビ大統領ハヘン地ニ英国軍ヲ補充ヲ
ナシ結局ハ合

防備ヲ授助スルコト並ビ大統領ハヘン地ニ英国軍ヲ補充ヲナシ結局ハ合

衆国大統

軍ヲ補充ヲナシ結局ハ合

衆国大統
選抜部隊派遣要請

合衆国ハ、アイスランド国ノ防衛ニ寄りテハ、ソノ住民ヲハ、ソテヘ、自ノ対シテ

ハ、出来得ル限リノ安全ヲ保険シ、軍事行動ニヨッテ住民ガ難ル障害ハ、

最少限度ヲ止メヲシテニ指示ヲ附スルコトヲ約束スル。斯ル軍事行動ハ、

出来得ル限リアイスランド国皆局ト合議ノ上遂行サレルコト。且又、アイ

スランド住民ノ少キコト、コトハ、対シ多數軍隊ノ駐屯ニヨッテ、自然

ヲ見ル発生ノ懸念ヲ消スル。又軍事常局ニヨリ、選抜セラレタル部隊ノミヲ派遣スル

ヨウ細心ノ注意ヲ要スル。又軍事常局ニヨリ、対シテハ、アイスランド人ガ

水年ノ幣リ武裂セルコトナク、且軍規ニハ念念仮レザルコト、従ツテ住

民ニ對スル軍隊ノ行動ハ、右ヲ奉承ニ即シテ命ぜラルベキヲデアルコトニ留意

スルヲ指揮スルコト。

五、合衆国ハ、アイスランド國防衛ニ寄りテハ、アイスランド国ノ経営

ニ要スル昭和ノ確保ヲ確保スル他のアイスランド国ニヨリシテハ、充分ナル必需品ノ供給ヲ作スル

入ニヨテアイスランド住民ニヨレタシテ、相模テ友ハ、ナル通商貿易協
定など、ソノ可能ナル範囲ニ於テ、アイスランド国ノ利益増進ヲ図ルコトヲ約束スル。
アイスラント国政府は何れの場所においても防衛のため必要な充份なる形
行なわねばならぬ。この頃は絶対自由にして主権国とな
りアイスラント側において行なわれた。として合衆国
外交代表者を間に交換すべきことは勿論の事として考え
た上、アイスラント国政府は現在の情勢に鑑み、現在アイスラント国
に駐屯する英軍を補充し、最後にはこれに交代すべき合衆国兵員をアイ
スラント国政府は次に如き考慮の下に、アイスラントの利益に一致し、従ってアイ
スラント国に委任する用意あることを認める旨余に告げた。
（この部分書簡は当時大臣の書簡に於て述べられたる八ケ条の訳文を文
字語より読んだ）
貴官は、この決定は総対自由にして主権国であるイラン国の法律的地位を承認し、両国は東に外交代表者を交換すべきこととは、勿論の事と想
余はここに今回入手の貴重に述べられた諸条件は今や承認され、合衆国政
府により全く受理可能にして、且つこれ等條件は、合衆国及びイラン
間の関係に於て、実行されるべきことを、貴官に対し確言する

余は外交代表者若国等の両国間に交換されため、国會に承認を要

余は外交代表者若国等の両国間に交換されため、国會に承認を要

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アイスランド戦における話

以上の理由より貴下のメッセージに答えて、合衆国政府は自下観地院

屯中の軍隊を増強し且つ最後にはそれと交代せんがたため仮時軍隊を派遣

するものである。

合衆国政府がこの手段をとるのは、アイスランドの主権並びに独立を

完全に承認し、且つアイスランド国内部の国内問題に断じてはさような干渉するものでな

いとの説明のものに行はれる。尚更に、これは現下の国際危機が終末を

見るや否や、この派遣陸海軍部隊は全部引揚げを行いアイスランド国民

並びに同国政府をして自国領土を完全に統治としめることがより説解しての

上である。

アイスランド国民は一千年以上に亘る自由と個人的無束とこの歴史的

伝統を有し、世界的民主主義国家間の誇るべき地位を占めてある。それ

の独立と安全を保存せんがため、今回防衛手段を講ずると共に、歴史
"Step Was America's Least Abhorrent Choice. . .
It Also Made It Wholly Clear We Must Never Have another War"

(Nippon Times Magazine, February 20, 1947)

In his own words, former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson tells the inside firsthand story of how the United States reached its momentous decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan. Mr. Stimson, who was more closely associated with the development and final decision to use the atomic weapon than any other member of the Roosevelt and Truman cabinets, discloses that the bombs dropped on Japan were the only two then completed by the United States. This article is condensed by special permission from the original which was published in the February issue of Harper's Magazine.

It was the Fall of 1941 that the question of atomic energy was first brought directly to my attention. At that time President Roosevelt appointed a committee consisting of Vice President Wallace, General Marshall, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. James B. Conant, and myself to advise the President on questions of policy relating to the study of nuclear fission.

For nearly four years thereafter I was directly connected with all major decisions of policy on the development and use of atomic energy, and from May 1, 1943, until my resignation as Secretary of War on September 21, 1945, I was directly responsible to the President for the administration of the entire undertaking.

At the same time I was the President's senior adviser on the military employment of atomic energy.

The policy adopted and steadily pursued by President Roosevelt and his advisers was a simple one. It was to spare no effort in securing the earliest possible successful development of an atomic weapon. The reason for this policy was equally simple. The original experimental achievement of atomic fission had occurred in Germany in 1938, and it was known that the Germans had continued their experiments.

To Shorten Warfare

In 1941 and 1942 they were believed to be ahead of us, and it was vital that they should not be the first to bring atomic weapons into the field of battle. Furthermore, if we should be the first to develop the weapon, we should have the great new instrument for shortening the war and minimizing destruction.

At no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President or by any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war.

All of us of course understood the terrible responsibility involved in our attempt to unlock the doors to such a devastating weapon; President Roosevelt particularly spoke to me many times of his own awareness of the catastrophic potentialities of our work.

But we were at war, and the work must be done, I therefore emphasized that it was our common objective throughout the war, to be the first to produce an atomic weapon and use it . . .
On March 15, 1945, I had my last talk with President Roosevelt. My diary record of this conversation gives a fairly clear picture of the state of our thinking at that time . . .

"I went over with him the two schools of thought that exist in respect to the future control after the war of this project, in case it is successful, one of them being the secret close-in attempted control of the project by those who control it now, and the other being the international control based upon freedom both of science and of access. I told him that those things must be settled before the first projectile is used and that he must be ready with a statement to come out to the people on it just as soon as that is done. He agreed to that . . ."

I did not see Franklin Roosevelt again (Roosevelt died April 12th).

The next time I went to the White House to discuss atomic energy was April 25, 1945, and I went to explain the nature of the problem to a man whose only previous knowledge of our activities was that of a Senator who had loyally accepted our assurance that the matter must be kept a secret from him.

Now he was President and Commander-in-Chief, and the final responsibility in this as in so many other matters will be his. President Truman accepted this responsibility with the same fine spirit that Senator Truman had shown before in accepting our refusal to inform him.

I discussed with him the whole history of the project. We had with us General Groves, who explained in detail the progress which had been made and the probable future course of the work. I also discussed with President Truman the broader aspects of the subject and the memorandum which I used in this discussion is again a fair sample of the state of our thinking at the time.

Memorandum Discussed with President Truman

April 25, 1945

1. Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.

2. Although we have shared its development with the U. K. (Great Britain) physically the U. S. is at present in the position of controlling the resources with which to construct and use it and no other nation could reach this position for some years.

3. Nevertheless it is practically certain that we could not remain in this position indefinitely.

A. Various segments of its discovery and production are widely known among many scientists in many countries, although few scientists are now acquainted with the whole process which we have developed.

B. Although its construction under present methods requires great scientific and industrial effort and raw materials, which are temporarily mainly within the possession and knowledge of U. S. and U. K., it is extremely probable that much easier and cheaper methods of production will be discovered.
by scientists in the future, together with the use of materials of much wider distribution. As a result, it is extremely probable that the future will make it possible for atomic bombs to be constructed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a larger nation in a much shorter time.

4. As a result, it is indicated that the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one . . .

5. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared with its technical development would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed.

6. To approach any world peace organization of any pattern now likely to be considered, without an appreciation by the leaders of our country of the power of this new weapon, would seem to be unrealistic. No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any particular country, and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thorough-going rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never heretofore contemplated.

7. Furthermore, in the list of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and if so shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations. Also our leadership in the war and in the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further.

8. On the other hand, if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved.

The next step in our preparations was the appointment . . . of the interim committee, charged with advising the President the various questions raised by our apparently imminent success in developing an atomic weapon. I was its chairman . . .

Use of Bombs Decided

On June 1, after its discussions with the scientific panel, the interim committee unanimously adopted the following recommendations:

(1) The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.

(2) It should be used on a duel target — that is, a military installation or war plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage, and

(3) It should be used without prior warning of the nature of the weapon.
One member of the committee, Mr. (Ralph A.) Bard, Under-Secretary of the Navy, later changed his view and dissented from recommendation.

In reaching these conclusions the interim committee carefully considered such alternatives as a detailed advance warning or a demonstration in some inhabited area. Both of these suggestions were discarded as impractical.

They were not regarded as likely to be effective in compelling a surrender of Japan, and both of them involved serious risks. Even the New Mexico test would not give final proof that any given bomb was certain to explode when dropped from an airplane.

Quite apart from the generally unfamiliar nature of atomic explosives, there was the whole problem of explodino a bomb at a predetermined height in the air by a complicated mechanism which could not be tested in the static test of New Mexico.

Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain surrender than a warning or a demonstration followed by a dud—and this was real possibility. Furthermore, we had no bombs to waste. It was vital that a sufficient effect be quickly obtained with the few we had... 

The principal political, social and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her military power could open the way to lasting peace.

Japan, in July 1945, had been seriously weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. It was known to us that she had gone so far as to make tentative proposals to the Soviet government, hoping to use the Russians as meditators in a negotiated peace.

These vague proposals contemplated the retention by Japan of important conquered areas and were therefore not considered seriously. There was as yet no indication of any weakening in the Japanese determination to fight rather than accept unconditional surrender. If she should persist in her fight to the end, she had still a great military force.

Might Resist to End

As we understood it in July, there was a very strong possibility that the Japanese government might determine upon resistance to the end, in all the areas of the Far East under its control...

We were planning an intensified sea and air blockade, and greatly intensified strategic air bombing through the summer and early fall, to be followed on November 1 by an invasion of the Southern island of Kyushu.

This would be followed in turn by an invasion of the main island of Honshu in the Spring of 1946. The total U.S. military and naval force involved in this grand design was of the order of 5,000,000 men; if all those indirectly concerned are included, it was larger still.

We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest.

I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone. Additional large losses might be expected among our Allies, and, of
course if our campaign were successful and if we could judge by previous experience, enemy casualties would be much larger than our own.

With these considerations in mind, I wrote a memorandum for the President, on July 2, which I believe fairly represents the thinking of the American Government as it finally took shape in action.

This memorandum was prepared after discussion and general agreement with Joseph C. Grew, then Secretary of State, and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and when I discussed it with the President, he expressed his general approval...

The adoption of the policy outlined in the memorandum of July 2 was a decision of high politics; once it was accepted by the President the position of the atomic bomb in our plans became quite clear...

I find that I stated in my diary as early as July 19 that "the last chance warning...must be given before actual landing of the ground forces in Japan, and fortunately the plans provide for enough time to bring in the sanctions to our warning in the shape of heavy ordinary bombing attack and an attack of 3-1. 3-1 was a code name for the atomic bomb.

Warning From Potsdam

There was much discussion in Washington about the timing of the warning to Japan. The controlling factor in the end was the date already set for the Potsdam meeting of the Big Three. It was President Truman's decision that such a warning should be solemnly issued by the U.S. and the U.K. (Great Britain) from this meeting, with the concurrence of the head of the Chinese government, so that it would be plain that all of Japan's principal enemies were in entire unity.

This was done in the Potsdam ultimatum of July 26, which very closely followed the memorandum of July 2, with the exception that it made no mention of the Japanese Emperor.

In July 26, the Premier of Japan, SUZUKI, rejected the Potsdam ultimatum by announcing that it was "unworthy of public notice." In the face of this rejection we could only proceed to demonstrate that the ultimatum had meant exactly what it said...

Because of the importance of the atomic mission against Japan, the detailed plans were brought to me by the military staff for approval.

With President Truman's warm support I struck off the list of suggested targets the city of Kyoto. Although it was a target of considerable military importance, it had been the ancient capital of Japan and was a shrine of Japanese art and culture. We determined that it should be spared.

I approved four other targets including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Hiroshima was bombed on August 6, and Nagasaki on August 9.

We waited for a result. We waited one day.

A-Bomb Is Effective

Many accounts have been written about the Japanese surrender. After a prolonged Japanese Cabinet session in which
the deadlock was broken by the Emperor himself, the offer to surrender was made on August 10.

Our great objective was thus achieved, and all the evidence I have seen indicates that the controlling factor in the final Japanese decision to accept our terms of surrender was the atomic bomb.

The two atomic bombs which we had dropped were the only ones we had ready, and our rate of production at the time was very small.

Had the war continued until the projected invasion on November 1, additional fire raids of B-29's would have been more destructive of life and property than the very limited number of atomic raids which we could have executed in the same period.

But the atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon.

So far as the Japanese could know, our ability to execute atomic attacks, if necessary by many planes at a time, was unlimited.

As Dr. Earl Compton has said: "It was not one atomic bomb, or two, which brought surrender, it was the experience of what an atomic bomb will actually do to a community, plus the dread of many more, that was effective."

As I read over what I have written, I am aware that much of it, in this year of peace, may have a harsh and unfeeling sound. It would perhaps be possible to say the same things and say them more gently. But I do not think it would be wise.

As I look back over the five years of my service as Secretary of War, I see too many stern and heartrending decisions to be willing to pretend that war is anything else than what it is.

The face of war is the face of death; death is an inevitable part of every order that a wartime leader gives. The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand Japanese.

No explanation can change that fact and I do not wish to gloss it over. But this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice.

The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Japanese war.

It stopped the fire raids, and the strangling blockade, it ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land armies.

In this last great act of the Second World War we were given final proof that war is death.

War in the twentieth century has grown more barbarous, more destructive, more debased in all its aspects. Now, with the release of atomic energy, man's ability to destroy himself is very nearly complete.

The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended a war. They also made it wholly clear that we must never have another war.

This is the lesson men and leaders everywhere must learn, and I believe that when they learn it they will find a way to lasting peace.

There is no other choice.
From "Report Presented To The Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on The Responsibility of The Authors of The War and on Enforcement of Penalties", March 29, 1919

ANNEX II

Memorandum of Reservations presented by the Representatives of the United States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, April 4, 1919.

The American members of the Commission on Responsibilities, in presenting their reservations to the report of the Commission, declare that they are earnestly desirous as the other members of the Commission that those persons responsible for causing the Great War and those responsible for violations of the laws and customs of war should be punished for their crimes, moral and legal. The differences which have arisen between them and their colleagues lie in the means of accomplishing this common desire. The American members therefore submit to the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace a memorandum of the reasons for their dissent from the report of the Commission and from certain provisions for insertion in Treaties with enemy countries, as stated in Annex IV, and suggestions as to the course of action which they consider should be adopted in dealing with the subjects upon which the Commission on Responsibilities was directed to report.

Preliminary to a consideration of the points at issue and the irreconcilable differences which have developed and which make this dissenting report necessary, we desire to express our high appreciation of the conciliatory and considerate spirit manifested by our colleagues throughout the many and protracted sessions of the Commission. From the first of these, held on February 3, 1919, there was an earnest purpose shown to compose the differences which existed, to find a formula acceptable to all, and to render, if possible, an unanimous report. That this purpose failed was not because of want of effort on the part of any member of the Commission. It failed because, after all the proposed means of adjustment had been tested with frank and open minds, no practicable way could be found to harmonize the differences without an abandonment of principles which were fundamental. The representatives of the United States could not do and they could not expect it of others.

In the early meetings of the Commission and the three Sub-Commissions appointed to consider various phases of the subject submitted to the Commission, the American members declared that there were two classes of responsibilities, those of a legal nature and those of a moral nature; that legal offenses were justiciable and liable to trial and punishment by appropriate tribunals, but that moral offenses, however iniquitous and infamous and however terrible in their results, were beyond the reach of judicial procedure, and subject only to moral sanctions.
While this principle seems to have been adopted by the Commission in the report as far as the responsibility for the authorship of the war is concerned, the Commission appeared unwilling to apply it in the case of indirect responsibility for violations of the laws and customs of war committed after the outbreak of the war and during its course. It is respectfully submitted that this inconsistency was due in large measure to a determination on the part of certain members, high in authority, particularly the heads of enemy states, even though heads of states were not hitherto legally responsible for the atrocious acts committed by subordinate authorities. To such an inconsistency the American members of the Commission were unwilling to assent, and from the time it developed that this was the unchangeable determination of certain members of the Commission they doubted the possibility of a unanimous report. Nevertheless, they continued their efforts on behalf of the adoption of a consistent basis of principle, respecting the desirability of unanimity if it could be attained. That their efforts were futile they deeply regret.

With the manifest purpose of trying and punishing those persons to whom reference has been made, it was proposed to create a high tribunal with an international character, and to bring before it those who had been marked as responsible, not only for directly ordering illegal acts of war, but for having abstained from preventing such illegal acts.

Appreciating the importance of a judicial proceeding of this nature, as well as its novelty, the American representatives laid before the Commission a memorandum upon the constitution and procedure of a tribunal of an international character which, in their opinion, should be formed by the union of existing national military tribunals or commissions of admitted competence in the premises. And in view of the fact that "customs" as well as "laws" were to be considered, they filed another memorandum, attached hereto, as to the principles which should, in their opinion, guide the Commission in considering and reporting on this subject.

The practice proposed in the memorandum as to the military commissions was in part accepted, but the purpose of constituting a high tribunal for the trial of persons exercising sovereign rights was persisted in, and the abstention from preventing violations of the laws and customs of war and of humanity was insisted upon. It was frankly stated that the purpose was to bring before this tribunal the ex-Kaiser of Germany, and that the jurisdiction of the tribunal must be broad enough to include him even if he had not directly ordered the violations.

To the unprecedented proposal of creating an international criminal tribunal and to the doctrine of negative criminality the American members refused to give their assent.

On January 25, 1919, the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace in plenary session recommended the appointment of a Commission to examine and to report to the Conference upon the following five points:
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1. The responsibility of the authors of the war.
2. The facts as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the Central Powers and its allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.
3. The degree of responsibility for these crimes attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the Central States, and other individuals, however highly placed.
4. The application and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offenses.
5. Any other matters connected or auxiliary to the above which may arise in the course of the inquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.

The conclusions reached by the Commission as to the responsibility of the authors of the war, with which the representatives of the United States agree, are thus stated:

The war was premeditated by the Central Powers, together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable.

Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their renewed efforts to avoid war.

The American representatives are happy to declare that they not only concur in these conclusions, but also in the process of reasoning by which they are reached and justified. However, in addition to the evidence adduced by the Commission, based for the most part upon official memoranda issued by the various governments in justification of their respective attitudes towards the Serbian question and the war which resulted because of the unauthorized determination of Austria-Hungary and Germany to crush that small but valiant little country which blocked the way to the Dardanelles and to the realization of their larger ambitions, the American representatives will attention to four documents, three of which have been made known by His Excellency Mileenko R. Vencich, Serbian Minister at Paris. Of the three, the first is reproduced for the first time, one of the others was only published during the sessions of the commission.

The first of these documents is a report of von Wimmer, the Austro-Hungarian agent sent to Sarajevo to investigate the assassination at that place on June 28, 1914, of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and the Duchess of Hohenberg, his morganatic wife.

The material portion of this report, in the form of a telegram, is as follows:

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Herr von Wiesner, to the Foreign Ministry, Vienna

Sarajevo, July 13, 1914, 1:10 a.m.

Cognizance of the part of the Serbian Government, participation in the murderous assault, or in its preparation, and supplying the weapons, proved by nothing, nor even to be suspected. On the contrary there are indications which cause this to be rejected.

The second is likewise a telegram, received 12:30 a.m., from Count Broeck, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, and reads as follows:

Here it is generally taken for granted that in case of a possible refusal on the part of Serbia, our immediate declaration of war will be coincident with military operations.

Delay in beginning military operations is here considered as a great danger because of the intervention of other powers.

We are urgently advised to proceed at once and to confront the world with a fait accompli.

The third, likewise a telegram in cipher, marked "strictly confidential," and dated Berlin, July 27, 1914, two days after the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum and the day before the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war upon that devoted kingdom, was from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna. The material portion of this document is as follows:

"The Secretary of State informed me very definitely and in the strictest confidence that in the near future possible proposals for mediation on the part of England would be brought to Your Excellency's knowledge by the German Government.

"The German Government gives its most binding assurance that it does not in any way associate itself with the proposals; on the contrary, it is absolutely opposed to their consideration and only transmits them in compliance with the English request."

Of the English propositions, to which reference is made in the above telegram, the following may be quoted, which, under date July 30, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin:

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately."

While comment upon these telegrams would only tend to weaken
their force and effect, it may nevertheless be observed that the last of them was dated two days before the declaration of war by Germany against Russia, which might have been prevented, had not Germany, flushed with the sense of certain victory and of the fruits of conquest, determined to force the war.

The report of the Commission treats separately the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg, and reaches the conclusion, in which the American representatives concur, that the neutrality of both of these countries was deliberately violated. The American representatives believe, however, that it is not enough to state or to hold with the Commission that "the war was unilaterally declared by Germany, in accordance with the mandates of the Central Powers, made in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the friendly propositions made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war," and to declare that the neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by the treaty of the 30th of April, 1839, and that of Luxemburg guaranteed by the treaty of the 11th of May, 1906, were deliberately violated by Germany and Austria-Hungary. In their opinion that these acts should be condemned in no uncertain terms and that their perpetrators should be held up to the execration of mankind.

II.

The second question submitted by the Conference to the Commission requires an investigation of and report upon "the facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air, during the present war." It has been deemed advisable to quote again the exact language of the submission in that it is at once the authority for and the limitation of the investigation and report to be made by the Commission. Facts were to be ascertained, but these facts were to be not of a general but of a very specific kind, and were to relate to the violations of "breaches of the laws and customs of war." The duty of the Commission was, therefore, to determine whether the facts found were violations of the laws and customs of war. It was not asked whether these facts were violations of the laws or of the principles of humanity. Nevertheless, the report of the Commission does not, as in the opinion of the American representatives it should, confine itself to the statement of the facts and to their violation of the laws and customs of war, but, going beyond the terms of the mandate, declares that the facts found and acts committed were in violation of the laws and of the elementary principles of humanity. The laws and customs of war are a standard certain, to be found in books of authority and in the practice of nations. The laws and principles of humanity vary with the individual, which, for no other reason, would exclude them from consideration in a court of justice, especially one charged with the administration of civil and criminal law. It is, however, the duty of the Commission, in the references to the laws and principles of humanity, to be found in the report, or, in what they believe was meant to be a judicial proceeding, as, in their opinion, the facts found were to be violations or breaches of the laws and customs of war, and the
persons singled out for trial and punishment for acts committed during the war were only to be those persons guilty of acts which should have been committed in violation of the laws and customs of war. With this reservation as to the invocation of the principles of humanity, the American representatives are in substantial accord with the conclusions reached by the Commission on this head that:

1. The war was carried on by the Central Empires, together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, by barbarous or illegitimate methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and the elementary principles of humanity.

2. A Commission should be created for the purpose of collecting and classifying systematically all the information already had or to be obtained, in order to prepare as complete a list of facts as possible concerning the violations of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the Germany Empire and its Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air, in the course of the present war.

However, in view of the recommendation that a Commission be appointed to collect further information, the American representatives believe that they should content themselves with a mere expression of concurrence as to the statements contained in the report upon which these conclusions are based.

III.

The third question submitted to the Commission on Responsibilities requires an expression of opinion concerning "the degree of responsibility for these offenses attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, and other individuals, however highly placed." The conclusions which the Commission reached, and which is stated in the report, is to the effect that "all persons belonging to enemy countries, without distinction of rank, including chiefs of states, who have been guilty of offenses against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution." The American representatives are unable to agree with this conclusion, insofar as it subjects to criminal, and, therefore, to legal prosecution, persons accused of offenses against "the laws of humanity," and insofar as it subjects chiefs of states to a degree of responsibility hitherto unknown to municipal or international law, for which no precedents are to be found in the modern practice of nations.

Omitting for the present the question of criminal liability for offenses against the laws of humanity, which will be considered in connection with the law to be administered in the national tribunals and the high court, whose constitution is recommended by the Commission, and likewise reserving for discussion in connection with the high court the question of the liability of a chief of state to
criminal prosecution, a reference may properly be made in this place to the mastery and hitherto undiscerned notion of Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Schooner Adventure v. McFadden and Others (7 Cranch, 110), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1832, in which the reasons are given for the exercise of the sovereign and of the sovereign power of a state in a judicial process. This does not mean that the head of the state, whether he be called emperor, king, or chief executive, is not responsible for breaches of the law, but that he is responsible not to the judicial but to the political authority of his country. His act may not foreclose his country and render it responsible for the acts which he has committed in its name and in behalf of its authority, or under cover of its authority; but he is, and it is submitted that he should be, only responsible to his country, as otherwise to hold would be to subject to foreign countries, a chief executive, thus withdrawing him from the laws of his country, even its organic law, to which he owes obedience, and subordinating him to foreign jurisdictions to which neither he nor his country owes allegiance or obedience, thus denying the very conception of sovereignty.

But the law to which the head of the state is responsible is the law of his country, not the law of a foreign country or group of countries; the tribunal to which he is responsible is the tribunal of his country, not of a foreign country or group of countries; and the punishment to be inflicted is the punishment prescribed by the law in force at the time of the commission of the act, not a punishment created after the commission of the act.

These observations the American representatives believe to be applicable to a head of a state actually in office and engaged in the performance of his duties. They do not apply to a head of a state who has abdicated or has been repudiated by his people. Proceedings against him must be wise or unwise, but in any event they would be against an individual out of office and not against an individual in office and thus in effect against the state.

The American representatives also believe that the above observations apply to liability of the head of a state for violations of positive law in the strict and local sense of the term. They are not intended to apply to what may be called political offenses and to political sanctions.

These are matters for statesmen, not for judges, and it is for them to determine whether or not the violators of the treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg should be subjected to a political sanction.

However, as questions of this kind seem to be beyond the mandate of the Conference, the American representatives consider it unnecessary to enter upon their discussion.
The fourth question calls for an investigation of and a report upon "the constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences." Apparently the Conference had in mind the violations of the laws and customs of war, inasmuch as the Commission is required by the third submission to report upon "the degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staff and other individuals, however highly placed." The fourth point relates to the constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the investigation of these crimes, and to the trial and sentencing of the persons accused of their commission, should they be found guilty. The Commission seems to have been of the opinion that the tribunal referred to in the fourth point was to deal with the crimes specified in the second and third submissions, not with the responsibility of the authors of the war, as appears from the following statement taken from the report:

"On the whole case, including both the acts which brought about the war and those which accompanied its inception, particularly the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and of Belgium, the Commission is of the opinion that it would be right for the Peace Conference, in a matter so unprecedented, to adopt special measures and even to create a special organ in order to deal as they deserve with the authors of such acts.

This section of the report, however, deals not only with the laws and customs of war - improperly adding 'and of the laws of humanity' - but also with the 'acts which provoked the war and accompanied its inception,' which either in whole or in part would appear to fall more appropriately under the first submission relating to the 'responsibility of the authors of the war.'

Of the acts which provoked the war and accompanied its inception, the Commission, with special reference to the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and of Belgium, says: 'We therefore do not advise that the acts which provoked the war should be charged against their authors and made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal.' And a little later in the same section the report continues: 'The Commission is nevertheless of opinion that no criminal charge can be made against the responsible authorities or individuals, not notably the ex-Kaiser, on the special head of these breaches of neutrality, but the gravity of these crimes outranges even the law of nations and international good faith in such a manner that the Commission thinks they should be the subject of a special condemnation by the Conference.'

The American representatives are in thorough accord with these views, which are thus formally stated in the first two of the four conclusions under this heading:

The acts which brought about the war should not be charged against their authors or made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal.
On the special head of the breaches of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, the gravity of these outrages upon the principles of the law of nations and upon international good faith is such that they should be made the subject of a formal condemnation by the Conference.

If the report had stopped here, the American representatives would be able to concur in the conclusions under this heading and the reasoning by which they were justified, for hitherto the authors of war, however unjust it may be in the forum of morals, have not been brought before a court of justice upon a criminal charge for trial and punishment. The report specifically states (1) that "a war of aggression may not be considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can be successfully brought before a tribunal such as the Commission is authorized to consider under its terms of reference"; the Commission refused to advise (2) "that the acts which provoked the war should be charged against their authors and made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal"; it further holds (3) that "no criminal charge can be made against the responsible authorities or individuals, and notably the ex-Kaiser, on the special head of these breaches of neutrality." The American representatives, accepting each of these statements as sound and unanswerable, are nevertheless unable to agree with the third of the conclusions based upon them.

On the whole case, including both the acts which brought about the war and those which accompanied its inception, particularly the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, it would be right for the Peace Conference, in a matter so unprecedented, to adopt special measures, and even to create a special organ in order to deal with the authors of such acts.

The American representatives believe that this conclusion is inconsistent both with the reasoning of the section and with the first and second conclusions, and that "in a matter so unprecedented," to quote the exact language of the third conclusion, they are relieved from comment and criticism. However, they observe that, if the acts in question are criminal in the sense that they are punishable under law, they do not understand why the report should not advise that these acts be punished in accordance with the terms of the law. If, on the other hand, there is no law making these crimes or affixing a penalty for their commission, they are moral, not legal, crimes, and the American representatives feel to see the advisability or instead the appropriateness of creating a special organ to deal with the authors of such acts. In any event, the organ in question should not be a judicial tribunal.

In order to meet the evident desire of the Commission that a special organ be created, without ever doing violence to their own scruples in the premises, the American representatives propose:

The Commission on Responsibilities recommends that...
1. A Commission of Inquiry be established to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course.

2. The Commission of Inquiry to consist of two members of the five following Powers: United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan; and one member from each of the five following Powers: Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Roumania, and Serbia.

3. The enemy be required to place their archives at the disposal of the Commission, which shall forthwith enter upon its duties and report jointly and separately to their respective governments on the 11th November, 1919, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

The Commission, however, failed to adopt this proposal.

The fourth and final conclusion under this heading declares it to be "desirable that for the future penal sanctions should be provided for such grave outrages against the elementary principles of international law." With this conclusion the American representatives find themselves to be in substantial accord. They believe that any nation going to war assumes a grave responsibility, and that a nation engaging in a war of aggression commits a crime. They hold that the neutrality of nations should be observed, especially when it is guaranteed by a treaty to which the nations violating it are parties, and that the enlightened mind and the good faith of nations should be faithfully observed in this as in all other respects. At the same time, given the difficulty of determining whether an act is in reality one of aggression or of defence, and given also the difficulty of framing penal sanctions, where the consequences are so great or may be so grave as to be incalculable, they hesitate as to the feasibility of this conclusion, from which, however, they are unwilling formally to dissent.

With the section of the report devoted to the "constitution and procedure of a tribunal competent for the trial of these offenses," the American representatives are unable to agree, and their views differ so fundamentally and so radically from those of the Commission that they found themselves obliged to oppose the views of their colleagues in the Commission and to dissent from the statement of those views recorded in the report. The American representatives, however, agree with the introductory paragraph of this section, in which it is stated that "every belligerent has, according to international law, the power and authority to try the individuals alleged to be guilty of the crimes constituting violations of the laws and customs of war," if such persons have been taken prisoners or have otherwise fallen into its power. The American representatives are
likewise in thorough accord with the further provisions that each belligerent has, or has power to set up, pursuant to its own legislation, an appropriate tribunal military or civil, for the trial of such cases. The American representatives concur in the view that "these courts would be able to try the incriminated persons according to their own procedure," and also in the conclusion that "much complication and consequent delay would be avoided which would arise if all such cases were to be brought before a single tribunal," supposing that the single tribunal could and should be created. In fact, these statements are not only in accord with but are based upon the memorandum submitted by the American representatives, advocating the utilization of the military commission or tribunals either existing or which could be created in each of the belligerent countries, with jurisdiction to pass upon offenses against the laws and customs of war committed by the respective enemies.

This memorandum already referred to in an earlier paragraph is as follows:

1. That the military authorities, being charged with the interpretation of the laws and customs of war, possess jurisdiction to determine and punish violations thereof;

2. That the military jurisdiction for the trial of persons accused of violations of the laws and customs of war and for the punishment of persons found guilty of such offenses is exercised by military tribunals;

3. That the jurisdiction of a military tribunal over a person accused of the violation of a law or custom of war is acquired when the offense was committed on the territory of the nation creating the military tribunal or when the person or property injured by the offense is of the same nationality as the military tribunal;

4. That the law and procedure to be applied and followed in determining and punishing violations of the laws and customs of war are the law and the procedure for determining and punishing such violations established by the military law of the country against which the offense is committed;

5. That in case of acts violating the laws and customs of war involving more than one country, the military tribunals of the countries affected may be united, thus forming an international tribunal for the trial and punishment of persons charged with the commission of such offenses.

In a matter of such importance affecting not one but many countries and calculated to influence their future conduct, the American representatives believed that the nations should use the
machinery at hand, which had been tried and found competent, with a law and a procedure framed and therefore known in advance, rather than to create an international tribunal with a criminal jurisdiction for which there is no precedent, present, practice, or procedure. They further believed that, if an act violating the laws and customs of war committed by the enemy affected more than one country, a tribunal could be formed of the countries affected by uniting the national commissions or courts thereof, in which event the tribunal would be formed by the mere assembly of the members, bringing with them the law to be applied, namely, the laws and customs of war, and the procedure, namely, the procedure of the national commissions or courts. The American representatives had especially in mind the case of Henry Wirz, commandant of the Confederate prison at Andersonville, Georgia, during the war between the States, who, after that war, was tried by a military commission, sitting in the city of Washington, for crimes contrary to the laws and customs of war, convicted thereof, sentenced to be executed, and actually executed on the 11th November, 1865.

While the American representatives would have preferred a national military commission or court in each country, for which the Wirz case furnished ample precedent, they were willing to concede that it might be advisable to have a commission of representatives of the competent national tribunals to pass upon the charges, as stated in the report:

(a) Against persons belonging to enemy countries who have committed outrages against a number of civilians and soldiers of several Allied nations, such as outrages committed in prison camps where prisoners of war of several nations were congregate or the crimes of forced labor in mines where prisoners of more than one nationality were forced to work.

(b) Against persons of authority, belonging to enemy countries, whose orders were executed not only in one area or on one battle front, but whose orders affected the conduct towards several of the Allied armies.

The American representatives are, however, unable to agree that a mixed commission thus composed should, in the language of the report, entertain charges:

(c) Against all authorities, civil or military, belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including the heads of states, who ordered, or, with knowledge thereof and with power to intervene, obtained from preventing or taking measures to prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war, it being understood that no such abstention shall constitute a defense for the actual perpetrators.
In an earlier stage of the central report, indeed, until its final revision, such persons were declared liable because they "abstained from preventing, putting an end to, or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war." To this criterion of liability the American representatives were unalterably opposed. It is one thing to punish a person who committed, or, possessing the authority, ordered others to commit a crime; it is another matter to punish a person who failed to prevent, to put an end to, or to repress, violations of the laws or customs of war. In one case the individual acts or orders others to act, and in the other consents to a positive offense. In the other he is to be punished for the acts of others without proof being given that he knew of the commission of the acts in question or that, knowing them, he could have prevented their commission. To establish responsibility merely on the basis that the individual ought to have prevented, to put an end to, or repressed them, neither knowledge of commission nor ability to prevent is alone sufficient. The duty or obligation to act is essential. They must exist in conjunction, and a standard of liability which does not include them all is to be rejected. The difficulty in the matter of abstention was felt by the Commission, so to have abstention punishable might tend to exonerate the person actually committing the act. Therefore the standard of liability to which the American representatives objected was modified in the last sessions of the Commission, and the much less objectionable text, as stated above, was adopted and substituted for the earlier and wholly inadmissible one.

There remain, however, two reasons, which, if others were lacking, would prevent the American representatives from consenting to the tribunal recommended by the Commission. The first of these is the uncertainty of the law to be administered, in that liability is made to depend not only upon violations of the laws and customs of war, but also upon violations of the laws of humanity. The second of these reasons is that heads of states are included within the civil and military authorities of the enemy countries to be tried and punished for violations of the laws and customs of war and of the laws of humanity. The American representatives believe that the Commission has exceeded its mandate in extending liability to violations of the laws of humanity, inasmuch as the facts to be examined are solely violations of the laws and customs of war. They also believe that the commission is committing to subject heads of states to trial and punishment by a tribunal to whose jurisdiction they were not subject when the alleged offenses were committed.

As pointed out by the American representatives on more than one occasion, war was and is by its very nature inhuman, but acts consistent with the laws and customs of war, although these acts are inhuman, are nevertheless not the object of punishment by a court of justice. A judicial tribunal only deals with existing law and only administers
existing law, leaving to another forum infractions of the moral law and actions contrary to the laws and principles of humanity. A
further objection lies in the fact that the laws and principles of
humanity are not certain, varying with time, place, and circumstance,
and according, it may be, to the conscience of the individual judge.
There is no fixed and universal standard of humanity. The law of
humanity, or the principle of humanity, is much like equity, whereas
John Selden, as wise and cautious as he was learned, aptly said:

Equity is a rough thing. For law we have a measure, knowledge to trust to; Equity is according to the conscience of him that
is Chancellor, and so that is larger or narrower, as is Equity. This
all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call
a "foot" a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure should this
be! One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third
an indifferent foot. This the same in the Chancellor's conscience.

While recognizing that offences against the laws and customs of
war might be tried before and the perpetrators punished by national
tribunals, the Commission was of the opinion that the graver charges
and those involving more than one country should be tried before an
international body, to be called the High Tribunal, which "shall be
composed of three persons appointed by each of the following govern­
ments: The United States of America, the British Empire, France,
Italy, and Japan, and one person appointed by each of the following
governments: Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia,
and Czecho-Slovakia; the members of this tribunal to be selected
by each country "from among" the members of their national courts or
tribunals, civil or military, and now in existence or created as
indicated above." The law to be applied is declared by the Commiss­
on to be "the principles of the law of nations as they result from
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." The punishment
to be inflicted is that which may be imposed "for such an offence
or offences by any court in any country represented on the tribunal
or in the country of the convicted person." The cases selected for
trial are to be determined and the prosecutions directed by a
prosecuting commission composed of a representative of the United
States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, to
be assisted by a representative of one of the other governments,
preumably a party to the creation of the court or represented in it.

The American representatives felt very strongly that too great
attention could not be devoted to the creation of an international
criminal court for the trial of individuals, for which a precedent is
lacking, and which appears to be unknown in the practice of nations.
They were of the opinion that an act could not be a crime in the
local sense of the word, unless it were made so by law, and that the
commission of an act declared to be a crime by law could not be
punished unless the law prescribed the penalty to be inflicted. They
were perhaps more conscious than their colleagues of the difficulties involved, inasmuch as this question was one that had arisen in the American Union composed of States, and where it had been held in the leading case of United States v. Hudson (7 Cranch, 32), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1812, that "the legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offense." What is true of the American States must be true of this looser union which we call the Society of Nations. The American representatives knew of no international statute of convention making a violation of the laws and customs of war— not to speak of the laws or principles of humanity—an international crime, affixing a punishment to it, and declaring the court which has jurisdiction over the offense. They felt, however, that the difficulty, however great, was not insurmountable, inasmuch as the various States have declared certain acts violating the laws and customs of war to be crimes, affixing punishments to their commission, and providing military courts or commissions within the respective States possessing jurisdiction over such offenses. They were advised that each of the Allied and Associated States could create such a tribunal, if it had not already done so, upon the basis of existing tribunals or tribunals that could lawfully be settled into existence in each of the Allied or Associated States by the exercise of their sovereign powers, appropriate for the trial and punishment within their respective jurisdictions of persons of enemy nationality, who during the war committed acts contrary to the laws and customs of war, inflicting on such acts affected the persons or property of their subjects or citizens, whether such acts were committed within portions of their territory occupied by the enemy or by the enemy within its own jurisdiction.

The American representatives therefore advised that acts affecting the persons or property of one of the Allied or Associated Governments should be tried by a military tribunal of that country; that acts involving more than one country, such as treatment by Germany of neutrals contrary to the usages and customs of war, could be tried by a tribunal either made up of the competent tribunals of the countries affected or of a commission thereto possessing their authority. In this way existing national tribunals or national commissions which could legally be called into being would be utilized, and no, only the laws and the penalty would be already declared, but the procedure would be settled.

It seemed elementary to the American representatives that a country could not take part in the trial and punishment of a violation of the laws and customs of war committed by Germany and her Allies before the particular country in question had become a party to the war against Germany and her Allies; that consequently the United States could not institute a military tribunal within its own jurisdiction to hear upon violations of the laws and customs of war,
unless such violations were committed upon American persons or
American property, and that the United States could not properly
take part in the trial and punishment of persons accused of violations
of the laws and customs of war committed by the military or civil
authorities of Bulgaria or Turkey.

Under these conditions and with these limitations the American
representatives considered that the United States might be a party
to a high tribunal, which they would have preferred to call, because
of its composition, the Mixed or United Tribunal or Commission. They
were adverse to the creation of a new tribunal, of a new law, of a
new penalty, which would be in conflict with nature, and thus contrary
to an express clause of the Constitution of the United States and
in conflict with the law and practice of civilized communities. They
believed, however, that the United States could co-operate to this
extent by the utilization of existing tribunals, existing laws, and
existing penalties. However, the possibility of co-operation was
frustrated by the insistence on the part of the allies that criminal
liability should, in excess of the mandate of the Conference, attach
to the laws and customs of humanity, in addition to the laws and
customs of war, and that the jurisdiction of the high court should
be specifically extended to "the heads of states."

In regard to the latter point, it will be observed that the
American representatives did not deny the responsibility of the heads of
states for acts which they may have committed in violation of law,
including, so far as their country is concerned, the laws and customs
of war, but they held that heads of states are, in fact, the people,
in whom the sovereignty of any states resides, responsible to the
people for the illegal acts which they may have committed, and that
they are not and that they should not be made responsible to any other
sovereignty.

The American representatives assumed, in debating this question,
that from a moral point of view the people of every independent
country are possessed of sovereignty, and that that sovereignty is
not held in that sense by states, that sovereignty which is thus
possessed can, sooner be in any person, not matter how high his
estate, and call upon him to render an account of his official
service; that the exercise of sovereignty consists in the fact that it is
not responsible to any foreign sovereignty; that in the exercise of
sovereign power which have been committed upon him by the people, a
monarch or head of state acts as their agent; that he is only
responsible to them; and that he is responsible to no other people or
group of people in the world.

The American representatives admitted that from the moral point
of view the heads of states, be he termed emperor, king, or chief
executive, is responsible to mankind, but that from the legal point
of view they expressed themselves as unable to see how any member of the Commission could claim that the head of a state exercising sovereign rights is responsible to any but those who have confided those rights to him by consent expressed or implied.

The majority of the Commission, however, was not influenced by the local argument. They appeared to be fixed in their determination to try and punish by judicial process the "Reichskanzler" of Germany. That there might be no doubt about their meaning, they insisted that the jurisdiction of the high tribunal whose constitution they recommended should include the heads of states, and they therefore inserted a provision to this effect in express words in the clause dealing with the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

In view of their objections to the uncertain law to be applied, varying according to the conception of the members of the high court, as to the laws and principles of humanity, and in view also of their objections to the extent of the proposed jurisdiction of that tribunal, the American representatives were constrained to decline to be a party to its creation. Necessarily they declined the offer on behalf of the Commission that the United States should take part in the proceedings before the tribunal, or to have the United States represented in the prosecuting commission charged with the "duty of selecting the cases for trial before the tribunal and of directing and conducting prosecutions before it." They therefore refrained from taking further part either in the discussion of the constitution or of the procedure of the tribunal.

It was an unconscionable task for the American representatives to oppose the views of their colleagues in the matter of the trial and punishment of heads of states, when they believed as sincerely and as profoundly as any other member that the particular heads of states in question were morally guilty, even if they were not punishable before an international tribunal, such as the one proposed, for the acts which they themselves had committed or with whose commission by others they could be justly taxed. It was a matter of great regret to the American representatives that they found themselves subjected to criticism, owing to their objection to declaring the laws and principles of humanity as a standard whereby the acts of their enemies should be measured and punished by a judicial tribunal. Their adherence for the acts of the heads of states of enemy countries is no less genuine and deep than that of their colleagues, and their conception of the laws and principles of humanity is, they believe, not less enlightened than that of their colleagues. They considered that they were dealing solely with violations of the laws and customs of war, and that they were governed under the mandate of the conference in creating a tribunal in which violations of the laws and customs of war should be tried and punished. They therefore confined themselves to law in its local sense, believing that in so doing they
accorded with the mandate of submission, and that to have permitted
semblance or specular indication to effect their judgment would have
been violative of their duty as members of the Commission on Respon-
sibilities.

They submit their views, rejected by the Commission, to the
Conference, in full confidence that it is only through the administra-
tion of law, enacted and known before it is violated, that justice
may ultimately prevail internationally, as it actually does between indi-
viduals in all civilized nations.

MEMORANDUM ON THE PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD DETERMINE INHUMAN AND
IMPROPER ACTS OF WAR

To determine the principles which should be the standard of
justice in measuring the charge of inhuman or atrocious conduct
during the prosecution of a war, the following propositions should be
considered:

1. Slaying and maiming men in accordance with generally accepted
rules of war are from their nature cruel and contrary to the modern
conception of humanity.

2. The methods of destruction of life and property in conformity
with the accepted rules of war are admitted by civilized nations to
be justifiable and no charge of cruelty, inhumanity, or impropriety
lies against a party employing such methods.

3. The principle underlying the accepted rules of war is the
necessity of exercising physical force to protect national safety or to
maintain national rights.

4. Reprehensible cruelty is a matter of degree which cannot be
justly determined by a fixed line of distinction, but one which
fluctuates in accordance with the facts in each case, but the manifest
departure from accepted rules and customs of war imposes upon the
one so departing the burden of justifying his conduct, as he in crime
feels guilt of a criminal act.

5. The test of guilt in the perpetration of an act, which would
be inhuman or otherwise reprehensible under normal conditions, is the
necessity of that act to the protection of national safety or
national rights measured chiefly by actual military advantage.

6. The assertion by the perpetrator of an act that it is necessary
for military reasons does not exonerate him from guilt if the facts
and circumstances present reasonably strong grounds for establishing
the needlessness of the act or if believing that the assertion is not
made in good faith.

7. While an act may be essentially reprehensible and the perpetrator
entirely unwarranted in assuming it to be necessary from a military
point of view, he must not be considered as willfully violating the laws
and customs of war or the principles of humanity unless it can be
shown that the act was venial and without reasonable excuse.
8. A wanton act which causes no class suffering (and this includes such causes of suffering as destruction of property, deprivation of necessaries of life, enforced labor, etc.) is cruel and criminal. The full measure of guilt attaches to a party who without adequate reason perpetrates a needless act of cruelty. Such an act is a crime against civilization, which is without adulation.

9. It would appear, therefore, in determining the criminality of an act, that there should be considered the wantonness or malice of the perpetrator, the needlessness of the act from a military point of view, the penetration of a justifiable act in a needlessly harsh or cruel manner, and the improper motive which inspired it.

ROBERT LANSING

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.
ANNEX III.

Reservations by the Japanese Delegation.

The Japanese Delegates on the Commission on Responsibilities are convinced that many crimes have been committed by the enemy in the course of the present war in violation of the fundamental principles of international law, and recognize that the principal responsibility rests upon individual enemies in high places. They are consequently of opinion that, in order to re-establish for the future the force of the principles thus infringed, it is important to discover practical means for the punishment of the persons responsible for such violations.

A question may be raised whether it can be admitted as a principle of the law of nations that a high tribunal constituted by belligerents can, after a war is over, try an individual belonging to the opposite side, who may be presumed to be guilty of a crime against the laws and customs of war. It may further be asked whether international law recognizes a penal law as applicable to those who are guilty.

In any event, it seems to us important to consider the consequences which would be created in the history of international law by the prosecution for breaches of the laws and customs of war of enemy heads of states before a tribunal constituted by the opposite party.

Our scruples become still greater when it is a question of indicting before a tribunal thus constituted highly placed enemies on the sole ground that they abstained from preventing, putting an end to, or repressing acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, as is provided in clause (c) of section (b) of Chapter IV.

It is to be observed that to satisfy public opinion of the justice of the decision of the appropriate tribunal, it would be better to rely upon a strict interpretation of the principles of penal liability, and consequently not to make cases of abstention the basis of such responsibility.

In these circumstances the Japanese Delegates thought it possible to adhere, in the course of the discussions in the Commission, to a test which would eliminate from clause (c) of section (b) of Chapter IV both the words "including the heads of states," and the provision covering cases of abstention, but they feel some hesitation in supporting the amended form which admits a criminal liability where the accused, with knowledge and with power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to prevent, putting an end to, or repressing acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.

The Japanese Delegates desire to make clear that, subject to the above reservations, they are disposed to consider with the greatest care every suggestion calculated to bring about unanimity in the Commission.

M. ADACHI
S. TACHI

April 4, 1919
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, KAORU, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 20 pages and entitled "Report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties" is an exact and true copy of an excerpt of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 17th day of February 1947.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. URABE
日本スペイン戦争
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必要ヲアッタカ如何カト言ヲ點ニナルノトナリ。
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.
CHAPTER 7
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

ARTICLE 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefit resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
CHAPTER III

MEMBERSHIP

ARTICLE 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 10, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

ARTICLE 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

ARTICLE 5

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

ARTICLE 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
CHAPTER III
ORGANS
ARTICLE 7

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

ARTICLE 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.
The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

ARTICLE 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

ARTICLE 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

ARTICLE 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly of each question of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.
CHAPTER IV

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

COMPOSITION

ARTICLE 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

ARTICLE 10

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ARTICLE 13
1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
   a. promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;
   b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions, and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph I (b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

ARTICLE 14
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 15
1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 16
The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.

ARTICLE 17
1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.

2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

VOTING

ARTICLE 18
1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph I (c) of Article 96, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expul-
sion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

ARTICLE 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrearage equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

PROCEDURE

ARTICLE 20

The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 21

The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session.

ARTICLE 22

The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

COMPOSITION

ARTICLE 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

ARTICLE 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

ARTICLE 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

ARTICLE 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committees referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

VOTING

ARTICLE 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Provided that, in decisions under Chapter V, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

PROCEDURE

ARTICLE 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

ARTICLE 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

ARTICLE 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

ARTICLE 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

ARTICLE 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

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CHAPTER VII
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

ARTICLE 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purpose of the dispute, the obligation of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 31 and 32.

ARTICLE 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

ARTICLE 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
ARTICLE 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendation to the parties with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute.
CHAPTER VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE
PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS
OF AGGRESSION

ARTICLE 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, act of aggression and shall make recommenda-
tions, or decide, that measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

ARTICLE 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security
Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures
provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with
such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisio-
nal measures are to be taken in accordance with Article 19. Such provisional measures
shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties
concerned. The Security Council may only take account of failure to comply
with such provisional measures.

ARTICLE 41

The Security Council may decide that measures not involving the use
of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
employ the forces of the United Nations to carry out such measures. These
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of
mail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations.

ARTICLE 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstra-
tions, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members
of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 42

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available
to the Security Council, on its request and in accordance with a special agree-
ment or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including
rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the
facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible
on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the
Security Council and Members or among the Security Council and groups of
Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in
accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

ARTICLE 43

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before:
calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations incurred under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national armed contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreement referred to in Article 42, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the
Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
CHAPTER VII
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

ARTICLE 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of peaceful settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

ARTICLE 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against general or aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term "enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

ARTICLE 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
CHAPTER IX
International Economic and Social Cooperation

Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57

1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

ARTICLE 58

The Organization shall make recommendations for the coordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.

ARTICLE 59

The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

ARTICLE 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.
CHAPTER X
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
COMPOSITION

ARTICLE 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of eighteen Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. At the first election, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be chosen. The term of office of six members so chosen shall expire at the end of one year, and of six other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

ARTICLE 62

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.

4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

ARTICLE 63

1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

2. It may coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 64

1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.

2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.
ARTICLE 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

ARTICLE 66

1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of Specialized agencies.

3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

NOTE

1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

PROCEDURE

ARTICLE 68

The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.

ARTICLE 69

The Economic and Social Council may invite any Member of the United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that Member.

ARTICLE 70

The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the Specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the Specialized agencies.

ARTICLE 71

The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

ARTICLE 72

1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings at the request of a majority of its members.
ARTICLE 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

ARTICLE 66

I. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.

3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

ARTICLE 67

1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

PROCEDURE

ARTICLE 68

The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.

ARTICLE 69

The Economic and Social Council may invite any Member of the United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to it.

ARTICLE 70

The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies.

ARTICLE 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

ARTICLE 72

1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; or

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for informational purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of the metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good neighborhood due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world in social, economic, and commercial matters.
CHAPTER XIII
International
Trusteeship System

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;

b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 30.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. territories now held under mandate;

b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and

c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship.
system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, retaining the trusteeship power in the case of territories held under mandate by a member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 63 and 65.

Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 80, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any respect the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 83.

Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship...
Agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out those functions.
CHAPTER XIII
THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL
COMPOSITION

Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

a. Those Members administering trust territories;

b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and

c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it thereon.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;

b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and

d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

VOTING

Article 89

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

PROCEDURE

Article 90

1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.
2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the Specialized Agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.
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CHAPTER XII

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Article 92

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

Article 93

1. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94

1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

Article 95

Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96

1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialised agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of their activities.
CHAPTER XV
THE SECRETARIAT

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall not in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on a wide geographical basis as possible.
CHAPTER XV

'ESCAPSILEUS PROVISIONS'

Article 102

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretary-General and published by it.

2. No party to any such treaty or agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

Article 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Article 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.

Article 105

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.

2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.
CHAPTER XVI

Transitional Security

Arrangements

Article 10

Pursuant to the terms of the peace agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Article 107

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.
Amendments

Artículo 108

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Artículo 109

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.
CHAPTER XIX
RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE

Article 110

1. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

2. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the Organization when he has been appointed.

3. The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the People's Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the ratifications deposited shall thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of America which shall communicate copies thereof to all the signatory states.

4. The states signatory to the present Charter which ratify it after it has come into force shall become original Members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective ratifications.

Article 111

The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. All certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatory states.

IN FUTHER VERBO the representatives of the Governments of the United Nations have signed the present Charter.

DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.
Def. Doc. No. 314


TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, AND JAPAN RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF THE LIVES OF NEUTRALS AND NONCOMBATANTS AT SEA IN TIME OF WAR AND TO PREVENT THE USE IN WAR OF NOXIOUS GASES AND CHEMICALS.

Signed at Washington February 6, 1922; ratification advised by the Senate March 29, 1922 (legislative day of March 16).

(Not in force on March 4, 1923.)

ARTICLES.

I. Declares rules for protection of neutrals and noncombatants.

II. Invites all other civilized States to accept foregoing.

III. Declares violation of said rules punishable as a piratical act in any jurisdiction.

IV. Prohibits submarines as commerce destroyers.

V. Reaffirms prohibition of gases and all analogous substances.

VI. Ratification; effect; deposit.

VII. Invitation to adhere; adhesions.

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, hereinafter referred to as the Signatory Powers, desiring to make more effective the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, and to prevent the use in war of noxious gases and chemicals, have determined to conclude a Treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:
Charles Evans Hughes,
Henry Cabot Lodge,
Oscar W. Underwood,
Elihu Root,
citizens of the United States;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India;
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, AND JAPAN RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF THE LIVES OF NEUTRALS AND NONCOMBATANTS AT SEA IN TIME OF WAR AND TO PREVENT THE USE IN WAR OF NOXIOUS GASES AND CHEMICALS.

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VII. Invitations to others; adhesions.

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His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India;
Def. Doc. No. 314

The Right Honourable Arthur James Balfour, O. M., M. P., Lord President of His Privy Council;
The Right Honourable Baron Lea of Farvham, G. B. E., K. C. B., First Lord of His Admiralty;
The Right Honourable Sir Auckland Campbell Geddes, K. C. B., His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America;
and
for the Dominion of Canada:
The Right Honourable Sir Robert Laird Borden, G. C. M. G., K. C.;
for the Commonwealth of Australia:
Senator, the Right Honourable George Foster Pearce, Minister for Home and Territories;
for the Dominion of New Zealand:
The Honourable Sir John William Salmond, K. C., Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand;
for the Union of South Africa:
The Right Honourable Arthur James Balfour, O. M., M. P.;
for India:
The Right Honourable Valinginan Sankaranarayaya Srinivasasastri, Member of the Indian Council of State;
The President of the French Republic:
Mr. Albert Sarraut, Deputy, Minister of the Colonies;
Mr. Jules J. Jusserand, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, Grand Cross of the National Order of the Legion of Honour;
His Majesty the King of Italy:
The Honourable Carlo Schanzor, Senator of the Kingdom;
The Honourable Vittorio Rolandi Ricci, Senator of the Kingdom, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington;
The Honourable Luigi Albertini, Senator of the Kingdom;
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:
Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Minister for the Navy, Junii, a member of the First Class of the Imperial Order of the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun with the Paulownia Flower;
Baron Kijuro Shidehara, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington, Joshii, a member of the First Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun;
Mr. Masanao Hemiha, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joshii, a member of the Second Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun;

Who, having communicated their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I.

The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, the following are to be deemed an established part of international law:

(1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine its character before it can be seized.
(2) A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure.
(3) A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety.

(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.

ARTICLE II.

The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to express their assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents.

ARTICLE III.

The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy, and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found.

ARTICLE IV.

The Signatory Powers recognize the practical imposibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as part of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto.
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties.

The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereunder between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.

ARTICLE VI.

The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the Signatory Powers and shall take effect on the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington.

The Government of the United States will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treatie, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the Signatory Powers.

ARTICLE VII.

The Government of the United States will further transmit to each of the Non-Signatory Powers a duly certified copy of the present Treaty and invite its adherence thereto.

Any Non-Signatory Power may adhere to the present Treaty by communicating an instrument of Adherence to the Government of the United States, which will thereupon transmit to each of the Signatory and Adhering Powers a certified copy of each Instrument of Adherence. In faith whereof, the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

[Signatures]
The use in war of poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, rights, or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties.

The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.

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In faith whereof, the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.
会衆四川大統領

【チャールズ・エヴァンス・ヒューズ】

オスカー、ダブリュー、アンダウッド

ハロルド、ルート

ロバート、レッド、ポーダン

加奈

ノブ

ロバート、ウィリアム・サルモンド

内閣大臣上院議員「ジョージ・ファスター、ピアス」

米利堅加合衆国副総理命全館大使「サーティ、オーキャラード、キャンブル

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日本最高法院裁判「サーティ・ジョン、ウィリアム・サルモンド」
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«14
THF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

v.

ARAKI SADAC, et al.,
Defendants

AFFIDAVIT

HAYASHI KAORU, being first duly sworn according to the formalities prevailing in Japan, upon oath deposes and says:

That I am Chief of the Archives Section of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

That the Archives Section has custody of all treaties and ratifications thereof to which Japan is a party;

That the treaty entitled TREATY BETWEEN THE FIVE POWERS CONCERNING THE USE OF SUBMARINES AND NOISY CRAFTS IN TIME OF WAR, signed at Washington on the 6th of February, 1922, is on deposit in the Archives Section;

That notice has been received from the Department of State of the United States of America, the official depository of ratifications of this treaty, of the ratification thereof by the following countries:

The United States of America,
The British Empire,
Italy,
Japan.

Dates at Tokyo on this 20th day of February, 1947.

K. Hayashi

Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authority, on this 20th day of February, 1947.

H. Mishi
日本直示日本政府ハルル方式ニ従ヒ先ず宣戦ヲ為シタル上ノ次ノ如ク供述シタルノナリ

自分ハ日本政府官制ノ文書課長デアルマス。當文書課ハ日本政府関係テテ

ルール条約及ビ之ヲ批準ヲ保管シテ居リマス。一戰時ニ於ケル潜水艦及毒ガス使用ヲ關スル五ケ国条約ト呼バレ、一

二二年（大正十一年）二月六日、ワシントンニ於テ調印セラレタ條約

ハ、當文書課ヲ保管サレテ居リマス。右条約ノ批検ヲ公式保管者デアル、アメリカ合衆國政府ヲカラ、右条約

亞米利加合衆國政府及ビ之ヲ批検ヲ保管シテ居リマス。
アメリカ合衆国
大英帝國
イタリア
日本

右ハ當立合人ノ親ノ子ヲ承印シタルコトヲ証明ス。
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RUMANIA

VANAS, V. TELLA

Professor of Criminal Law of the University of Iasi
Member of the National Constitutional Diet of Rumania
Member of the Council of the Interparliamentary Union

THE

COLLECTIVE CRIMINALITY OF STATES

AND THE

CRIMINAL LAW OF THE FUTURE

PUBLISHED AT BUCAREST
1925
THE CRIMINALITY OF WARS OF AGGRESSION AND THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL REPRESSIVE MEASURES

Reporters: M.V.V. Pella, Professor at the University of Bucharest, Member of the Romanian Parliament.

The XXIIIrd Inter-Parliamentary Conference, having heard the report of M.V.V. Pella, realizing the possibility of a collective criminality of States and believing that that criminality should be studied from a scientific standpoint in order to determine the natural laws governing it and to decide upon methods for its prevention and suppression, resolves, to institute a permanent sub-committee within the Committee for the Study of Juridical Questions.

a. to undertake the study of all the social, political, economic and moral causes of wars of aggression and to find practical solutions for the prevention of that crime;

b. to draw up a preliminary draft of an International Legal Code.

For this purpose the Conference calls the attention of the sub-committee to the principles laid down by M.V.V. Pella in his report and summarized in the annex to the present resolution.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CODE FOR THE REPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

1. The International Legal Code must apply to all nations.

2. Measures of repression should apply not only to the act of declaring a war of aggression, but also to all acts on the part of individuals or of bodies of persons with a view to the preparation or the setting in motion of a war of aggression.

3. The principle should be recognized that individuals, independently of the responsibility of States, are answerable for offences against public international order and the law of nations.

4. The offences committed by States or by individuals should be laid down and penalties provided for in advance in enactments drawn in precise terms. International repression should be founded on the principle nulla poena sine lege.

5. It would be desirable to indicate clearly in the general part of the preliminary draft of the International Legal Code the material, moral and unjust elements in an international offence, and in that way to determine the conditions of constraint and lawful defence in the sphere of international law.

6. Causes which may aggravate or diminish the responsibility of States must similarly be determined with special reference to the case of provocation, reparation of injury, repetition of the offence and premeditation.

7. In the event of there being two or more criminal States, special provision should be made for repressive measures in the case of complicity or partnership in a criminal design revealed by the conclusion of offensive alliances.

8. The sanctions imposed should be of two kinds:
A. Sanctions applicable to States:

a) Diplomatic sanctions: warning that diplomatic relations will be broken off; revocation of the exequatur granted to the consuls of the guilty State; withdrawal of the right to benefit by international agreements;

b) Legal sanctions; sequestration of property belonging to nationals of the guilty State in the territory of the other States; withdrawal from these nationals of the rights of industrial, literary, artistic, scientific and other property; prohibition to appear as a party in the Courts of the associated States; deprivation of civil rights;

c) Economic sanctions: application to the guilty States of measures depriving it of the advantages resulting from the economic solidarity of the nations and severing it from the economic life of the world by means of blockade, boycott, embargo, refusal to furnish foodstuffs or raw materials, increased customs duties on products coming from the guilty State, refusal to grant loans, refusal to allow the securities of the delinquent State to be quoted on the Stock Exchanges, prohibition to use means of communication;

d) Resort to armed force.

B. Sanctions applicable to individuals:

a) Warning.
b) Fine.
c) Admonition.
d) Prohibition of residence.
e) Incapacity in the future to hold diplomatic functions abroad.
f) Imprisonment.
g) Exile.

9. Provision must be made in the special part of the preliminary draft of the International Legal Code for all positive or negative acts which are regarded as prejudicial to international public order.

Penalties will thus have to be provided for the following offences:

A. Offences committed by States:

a) The international crime of aggressive war.
b) Violation of demilitarised zones.
c) Non-fulfilment of the obligation to submit serious disputes to the Permanent Court of International Justice in cases in which that Court has compulsory jurisdiction.
d) Military, naval, air, industrial and economic mobilization in the event of a dispute arising.
e) Preparing or permitting to be prepared on its territory attacks directed against the internal security of another State, or aiding or abetting bands of evil-doers making raids on the territories of other States.
f) Interference by one State in the internal political struggles of another by supplying grants of money or giving support of any kind to political parties.
g) The mere unjustified threat of a war of aggression, a procedure which in the past took the form of an "ultimatum.
h) Raising effective or arming beyond the limits laid down in conventions or treaties.
I) Manoeuvres or mobilizations carried out for purposes of military demonstration or preparation for war.

j) Violation of the diplomatic immunity of foreign representatives.

k) Counterfeiting of money and bank notes and any other disloyal acts committed or connived at by one State for the purpose of injuring the financial credit of another State.

B. Offences committed by individuals:

a) Declaration by a sovereign of a war of aggression.

b) Abuse of his privileges by a diplomatic agent for the purpose of committing acts which are in flagrant contradiction to the fundamental principles of international public order, or which constitute acts preparatory to a war of aggression.

c) International military offences and all other acts performed in time of war which are contrary to the rules and customs of international law.

d) Ordinary common law offences committed by foreign armies in occupied territories (massacre, pillage, rape, theft, etc.).

e) Dissemination of false news liable to endanger peace.

10. The Permanent Court of International Justice must have power to adjudicate upon all international crimes and offences.

11. With a view to the proper working of the International Legal Code, provision should be made at the Permanent Court for an International Public Prosecutor's Department and a Chamber before which offenders can be arraigned.

12. The preliminary investigations and the preparation of the evidence should be entrusted to ad hoc commissions of inquiry set up to discharge legal political duties.

13. Offences committed by States shall be heard and determined by the Chambers of the Permanent Court in combined session.

14. Cases in which individuals are the responsible parties should be dealt with in a special criminal Chamber set up in accordance with article 26 of the Statute of the Court. This Chamber would have jurisdiction over all international offences committed by individuals and all offences which by their nature would not come within the jurisdiction of the national Courts.

15. The Court shall pronounce judgment both on the public accusation and on the claims for compensation filed by the injured States prejudiced by the international offence.

16. In the case of violent aggression, the Council of the League of Nations will take urgent counter police measures.

The Council of the League of Nations shall also have jurisdiction in regard to the execution of the decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

It will indicate the methods by which these decisions are to be executed.

17. In order to reconcile the idea of general security with the special needs of individual States, all States Members of the League of Nations should be declared to be under a virtual obligation to take part in carrying out sanctions.
This obligation would become operative in the case of each State only from the moment that the Council of the League of Nations called upon it to take part in repressive measures, and indicated to it the sanctions which it was bound to apply.

The part which each State will take in the carrying out of sanctions will be decided by the Council, which will have regard to the geographical, political and economic position of each State. The Council will decide, by reference to the nature of the dispute, which States are to intervene immediately. Should the necessity arise, other States would also be called upon to apply the sanctions.

18. States which have been called upon by the Council of the League of Nations to apply sanctions and which have refused to participate or do not participate loyally in putting the sanctions into effect shall also be liable under the International Legal Code.
報告者

ルーマニア國会議員

ハ科学的見地より研究サレタル可カラストレスム・ヴィ・ヴィ・ベルラ氏報告ニ接シタニ司法問題要観会内ニ常設分科委員會ヲ設立スルニ決

(3) 佐藤法典改備草案ヲ起草ス。
第一条 直接告発

第二条 原告

第三条 令状

第四条 令状

第五条 令状

第六条 令状
第六、当該事件に対する外交的制裁

第十八、テヘラン条約に違反した国に対する制裁

法的制裁

他国内の犯罪に対し、当該国人民の財産を没収すること

当該国人民の工業、文学、彫刻、科学等の他の財産に対する法的制裁

第十八、テヘラン条約に違反した国に対する制裁
国際的な経済関係を保つために、戦時下の経済を効果的にサポートすることが必要です。

経済活動を制限し、必要以上の製品を供給し続けるための方法を模索し、その成果を図る。戦時経済を支えるための戦略を策定し、実行する。

製品の供給を制限し、必要以上の製品を供給し続けるための方法を模索し、その成果を図る。戦時経済を支えるための戦略を策定し、実行する。

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(1) 门外の政治的影響が下位の影響を授与する場合、法または政治的影響を授与することには罪が発生する。

(2) 外国使節の財政的影響を授与することが法または政治的影響を授与することには罪が発生する。

(3) 外国使節の影響を授与することが法または政治的影響を授与することには罪が発生する。

(4) 他の国際の影響を授与することが法または政治的影響を授与することには罪が発生する。

(5) 国際的な軍事の影響を授与することが法または政治的影響を授与することには罪が発生する。
凡ラレル行フ
(占領軍内ニ於テ占領軍ニヨリ行ハルル) 犯法ノ起當ノ時（犯殺）

第十二条　犯罪者ヲ審問スベキ場合法律ヲ適用スルヲル

第十二条　犯罪者ヲ審問スベキ場合法律ヲ適用スルヲル
Excerpt from "Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression", in The American Journal of International Law, October 1939, pp. 825-26.

At the meeting of the International Law Association in Budapest, September, 1934, the legal consequences of the effect of a breach of the Pact of Paris were discussed. As a result of that discussion there were drawn up what are known as the "Budapest Articles of Interpretation".

The form in which the Budapest Articles were cast indicates that they sought to state an existing legal situation; that the legal consequences they describe would on that date have followed a breach of the Pact.

1. "Whereas the Pact is a multilateral law-making treaty wherein each of the High Contracting Parties makes binding agreements with each other and all of the other High Contracting Parties, whereas by their participation in the fact sixty-three States have abolished the conception of war as a legitimate means of exerting pressure on another State in the pursuit of national policy and have also renounced any recourse to armed force for the solution of international disputes or conflicts:

(a) A Signatory State ceases by declaration or non-observance of the Pact, released itself from its obligations thereunder:

(2) A Signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact:

(3) A Signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself violates the Pact.

(4) In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by one Signatory State against another, the other States may, without thereby committing a breach of the Pact or of any rule of International Law, do all or any of the following things:

(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of belligerent rights, such as visit and search, or block bar, etc.;
(b) Decline to observe toward the State violating the Pact duties prescribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral in relation to a belligerent;
(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, including munitions of war;
(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked.

(5) The Signatory States are not entitled to recognize as acquired or transferred any territorial or other advantages acquired by facts by means of a violation of the Pact.

(6) A violating State is liable to pay compensation for all damage caused by a violation of the Pact to any signatory State or to its nationals.

(7) The Pact does not affect such humanitarian obligations as are contained in general treaties, such as The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1906, 1929, and 1929, and the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1929." International Law Association, Report of the 38th Conference, p. 64.
調印国は条約の規定違反又は違反によりて条約下の義務を免るいを除く。その条約内に於て、調印国に於ける者、条約内に対する該犯の訴を有する。四、調印国が他の調印国に対し援助を與える者は条約を犯すものなり。の条約に違反する者に於て、その他の調印国関係、左の一又は全項相當の行為を為し得るものに非ず。

違犯国家に対し、交渉、捜査、又は対等の交渉因措置行使の承認を拒否すべし。若国が違反国に対し武力の援助を行うべし。
五、緊密（諸）関係は、右条約等の手段によりて、帝国上獲得せる領土の

若くは他の、時と、法的に契約させられたもののと認むるを得ず。

六、被犯国は右条約の見返りによりて、他の門戸に支はその間錯人に對して

與へたる損害は、完全に賠償するの義務を有す。

七、右条約は、一九九九年及一九〇〇年年の条條約、一九六四年、一

九〇六年及一九二九年のジュネーブ條約並に一九二九年の俘虜取扱い規

則條約等の一接条約に含まれる人道的義務に影響を及ぼすものの

非ず。

（閣僚注略）

第三十八回合議報告書十六頁）
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

Washington, December 13, 1937

Please communicate promptly to Hirota a note as follows:

"The Government and people of the United States have been deeply shocked by the facts of the bombardment and sinking of the U.S.S. Panay and the sinking or burning of the American steamers Hoisington, Iloian and Jeisan (Aolisha) by Japanese aircraft.

The essential facts are that these American vessels were in the Yangtze River by uncontested and incontestable right; that they were flying the American flag; that they were engaged in their legitimate and appropriate business; that they were at the moment conveying American official and private personnel away from points where danger had developed; that they had several times changed their position, moving upstream, in order to avoid danger; and that they were attacked by Japanese bombing planes. With regard to the attack, a responsible Japanese naval officer at Shanghai has informed the Commander-in-Chief of the American Asiatic Fleet that the four vessels were proceeding upstream; that a Japanese plane endeavored to ascertain their nationality, flying at an altitude of three hundred meters, but was unable to distinguish the flags; that three Japanese bombing planes, six Japanese fighting planes, eight Japanese bombing planes, and two Japanese bombing planes, in succession, made attacks which resulted in the damaging of one of the American steamers, and the sinking of the U.S.S. Panay and the other two steamers.

Since the beginning of the present unfortunate hostilities between Japan and China, the Japanese Government and various Japanese authorities at various points have repeatedly assured the Government and authorities of the United States that it is the intention and purpose of the Japanese Government and the Japanese armed forces to respect fully the rights and interests of other powers. On several occasions, however, acts of Japanese armed forces have violated the rights of the United States, have seriously endangered the lives of American nationals, and have destroyed American property. In several instances, the Japanese Government has admitted the facts, has expressed regrets, and has given assurances that every precaution will be taken against recurrence of such incidents. In the present case, acts of Japanese armed forces have taken place in complete disregard of American rights, have taken American lives, and have destroyed American property both public and private.
Def. Doc. No. 536

In those circumstances, the Government of the United States requests and expects of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, an undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications, and an assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken which will ensure that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatsoever.

Before seeing Pirotz inform your British colleague of intended action and text, but do not thereafter await action by him.

We are informing British Government of this instruction to you.

HULL
ルハ日本総領事ハリリト。

責任位置ナル上海日本海軍ノ長島

司令長官ニ歸ジト。

即テ以上ノ四望ノ敵艦ハ富子江ヲ上流ニ向テ行クテシテソノ敵艦ヲ確

定ヲ得シルモノノ飛行セルモ敌機ヲ捕別セシリシト。日本軍艦ノ三ノ

隊ハ斯ノ後ノ三ノ隊ヲ順次ノ快攻ヲ行ツテ其結果トテ米

國軍艦ノ内ノ八損管ヲ受ケ軍艦ハ一ノ

浮水ヲ附セリト。

今回ノコノ不幸ナルノ支武力間争ニて初以来ノ日本政府及ビ一切ノ事務

ハ米國政府及ビ日本國軍ノ意志ヲ奉行スルノガ日本國政府ハ米國

國民ノ財政ヲ破壊スルガ如何ノ行動ニ出テ。日本政

府ハ右ノ事實ヲ認メ遺憾ノ意ヲ表シ右ノ如ク件ノ再

発ヲ防グコメ
有ル注意ヲ拂フ旨ノ保証ヲ與ヘ更コトヲ数同アル。今次ノ場合ニ於テ

官有又ハ私有ヲヨリノカル財産ヲ破壊スルノヲ挙ニ出ヲテデアル。

斯ノ如シ私有ヲヨリノ財産ヲ破壊スルノヲ挙ニ出ヲテデアル。
Letter from Pu-Yi to Gen. MINEI.

The Government of the Chinese Republic, by adopting wrong measures in regard to the recent incident in the Eastern Provinces, has opened hostilities against a friendly country, victimizing the people, on whom we take great pity. Hence, we dispatch TAKEO Takeo, tutor of the Royal household, to Japan to give our regrets and convey our message of sympathy to the War Minister, General MINAMI.

To our regret, twenty long years have elapsed since our dynasty, not having the heart to witness the misery of the people, turned over the reigns of government to the Han race. It was not the wish of our dynasty that the chaos should increase with the passage of time.

In order to establish stability in East Asia, it is imperative for China and Japan to collaborate and assume in common this responsibility. If we should be half-hearted in our attempts to remove the obstacles confronting us, no end of alarming events would arise to deprive us of the enjoyment of peace. As a result, such a state of affairs will surely bring the Communists into a position of influence, and the evils arising therefrom will be of perpetual nature. Day and night we feel grave concern for this situation, we are at present faced with many difficult problems and greater difficulties are in store for the future.

Consequently, we hope that we and our peoples will unite and strive to cope with the situation.
Letter from Pu-Yi to Gen. Mi

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Consequently, we hope that we and our peoples will unite and strive to cope with the situation.
DLF DOC 728
Exh 7278
First day of the 9th month of the hsIN-...li year (Nov. 1, 1931)
(The Imperial official manual) hsUANTUNG
Under the emperor's hand.

Chang hsiao Hsu
20th day of the 2nd month of the Cola new year (yr. 3, 1934).
Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation of the letter from Pu-Yi to Gen. MacArthur is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the Japanese translation of the Chinese original and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date 17 March 1947
CERTIFICATE

It is hereby certified that the record attached hereto, written in Japanese and entitled "Cabinet Chart" was studied and prepared by this House and is identical with an appendix in the Handbook of the House of Representatives (1947 Edition), an appendix to the House of Representatives' Official Report.

At Tokyo
This Fourth Day of March 1947
Chief of General Affairs Section,
House of Representatives

/s/ Yamazaki, Takashi (Seal)

I hereby certify that the above was signed and sealed before me

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: /s/ Takei, Tsugio (Seal)
<p>| No | Date of Organization | Prime Minister | Foreign Minister | Home Minister | Finance Minister | War Minister | Naval Minister | Judicial Minister | Education Minister | Agriculture, Forestry and Industry Minister | Commerce and Industry Minister | Communication Minister | Railways Minister | Welfare Minister | Greater Asia Minister | Note |
|----|----------------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------|-----|
| 20 | 20. Apr. 1927        | Kihara         | Kihara           | Kihara       | Kihara          | Kihara       | Kihara        | Kihara          | Kihara           | Kihara                                                      | Kihara                      | Kihara          | Kihara          | Kihara               |     |
| 21 | 2. Jul. 1929         | Kihara         | Kihara           | Kihara       | Kihara          | Kihara       | Kihara        | Kihara          | Kihara           | Kihara                                                      | Kihara                      | Kihara          | Kihara          | Kihara               |     |
| 24 | 25. May 1932         | Kihara         | Kihara           | Kihara       | Kihara          | Kihara       | Kihara        | Kihara          | Kihara           | Kihara                                                      | Kihara                      | Kihara          | Kihara          | Kihara               |     |
| 27 | 2. Feb. 1937         | Kihara         | Kihara           | Kihara       | Kihara          | Kihara       | Kihara        | Kihara          | Kihara           | Kihara                                                      | Kihara                      | Kihara          | Kihara          | Kihara               |     |
| 32 | 22. Jul. 1940        | Kihara         | Kihara           | Kihara       | Kihara          | Kihara       | Kihara        | Kihara          | Kihara           | Kihara                                                      | Kihara                      | Kihara          | Kihara          | Kihara               |     |</p>
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Did you urge the Army's views on the cabinet?

A. The cabinet meetings were the scene of a great deal of heated discussion relative to the signing of the Three-Power Pact; however, I do not recall that there was very much urging of the Army's views in the cabinet meetings themselves. However, the Chief of Staff of course kept the Foreign Minister and Premier similarly informed. At that time Prince KAN-IN (Ken-in no iya Donko) was Chief of Staff. Matters of secondary importance were transmitted by the Assistant Chief of Staff (Jicho) to the Foreign Minister or to the Assistant Foreign Minister.
Def. Doc. No. 626 A-5

Extract from
Interrogation of Ideki TOJO
6 February 1946
p. 5-6

A. Yes, Imperial Conferences /Cozen Kaigi/ were held with important Ministers of State, depending on the problem to be discussed. In cases involving the prerogative of military command, the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff also attended; also the President of the Privy Council.

Q. How often were these held during a year?
A. Some years there were none. On years when important matters had to be decided, sometimes there were two or three.

Q. Was there any provision in the constitution or in the laws authorizing these to be held?
A. No.

Q. Then they were only a matter of custom?
A. Yes, when some important matter had to be decided. The Imperial Conferences, however, had no responsibility as such. Those who attended, the Chiefs of Staff, the Cabinet Ministers, President of the Privy Council, each had responsibility in his capacity of Chief of Staff, Cabinet Member, or President of the Privy Council but not in his capacity as a member of the Imperial Conference.

Q. How long had this custom existed?
A. For a long time back - since the Russo-Japanese War, I suppose. It was a gathering of individuals holding positions of responsibility to effect an interchange of views.
2. Who called these Imperial Conferences?

A. They could be requested of the Emperor by one of the Chiefs of Staff, or by the Prime Minister, or by any other Minister of State if the matter were important enough. The Imperial Conferences theoretically had no presiding officer but in fact the Prime Minister acted as presiding officer. Of course matters were not officially decided here. After discussion they were again brought up at the cabinet meeting where official action was taken. The Emperor, although he attended, did not officially approve or disapprove or order the actions taken.
東條英機 暫間の政権
昭和十六年二月六日
五頁 11 大頁
答
さうです。前問言議に際に緊急の問題如何に至って当社を任せる場合に
何を命ずべきか等 Dane で出居して居りましたか。

答
現在では一切もありませぬ。前問言議に際して三個人ありました。
夫々政務長々が決定されるべきなら

答
それではそれは普通例にすぎないのですね。
何が重要事項を決定させるべきなら今時です。

答
いま申し上げたが前問言議の決定を
何を任せるか何の責任ある

答
答
答
答
審査会、総合演習の担当長、秘書長、技師院議長たるその資格に倣して責任を果たしたのでありまして、審査官が出席者の資格に於て責任を果たしたのであります。
Monsieur le Président, Your Excellencies,

His Majesty's Government have been happy to accept the invitation extended by the Japanese Government to take part in the present Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations, because His Majesty's Government are convinced that this Assembly will produce results most beneficial to the Prosecution of the War of Greater East Asia to its final conclusion as desired as well as to the permanent and ever-prosperous establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. His Excellency Field-Marshal P. Phibun-Songkhram, His Majesty's President of the Council of Ministers, however, greatly regrets that he is unable to attend the Assembly in person, since the state of his health does not at present permit such a long journey to Tokyo. He has therefore entrusted me with the duty of representing him in this Assembly.

The views of His Majesty's Government concerning the conduct of the War of Greater East Asia and the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere are that the lines of conduct already practised, particularly those following upon the principles of Japanese-Thai
relationships, are already well-suited. The task to be undertaken is to promote the friendship, the mutual cooperation and the good understanding that already happily exist to a closer degree so as to form one single mental and physical force for bringing to their successful conclusion the prosecution of the war and the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia.

The reasons, which I would like to bring to the support of what I have stated, are those which I would bring from the history of the development of Greater East Asia. The continent of Asia was the source of human development and had attained the highest degree of development and had attained the highest degree of development from olden times. Such development is the pure light that shines in the heart of humanity, that urges humanity to look for peace and happiness and is composed of friendship and good-will firmly based on the principle of righteousness. This is the principle of development inherent in the Thai nation that worships Buddhism as the national religion, and such principle of development is also the principle of culture traditionally held by Asiatic nations in general, or to put it in another way, development according to Asiatic traditions is culture. This is recognised by the people of the West as borne out by the saying "ex occidente lux, ex oriente lux", from the West, law, from the East, light.

European development takes another form, namely that of a civilisation, which has as its aim the promotion of worldly development — that is to say, the promotion
of State and economic power. For this reason, in the modern period of world history, various European nations have expanded from Europe, and more particularly since over a hundred years ago, Great Britain and United States of America have extended their power to Greater East Asia by taking territories in this region, partly as colonies, partly as their exclusive field of exploitation for the acquisition of raw materials for production into manufactured goods and partly as markets for the distribution of their manufactured goods. Consequently, various nations in Greater East Asia had either to lose their independence and their sovereignty, or were subject to limitations placed upon their independence and sovereignty by the regime of extraterritoriality and by unequal treaties, having no reciprocity in accordance with international law. Instead of being a continent composed of political solidarity, Asia had become a mere geographical name.

The distress arising out of such a situation remains fixed in the sentiment and memory of the Greater East-Asian nations in general. With profound foresight, the Japanese Empire has to depend on the methods of Western civilization, but with reliance on the cultural principle of the East. She has, therefore, modified her form of development to conform to the modern pattern, did away with extraterritoriality and advanced with rapidity to the status of a Great Power. Thailand, for her part, has also proceeded in the same manner, and even if it has
taken several years, she has, with untiring endeavour, thrown off extraterritoriality and successfully regained her independence and sovereignty. But there are several sister peoples in Asia, who still have to fight to recover their independence or regain their sovereignty, and economically speaking, even with the attainment of complete independence and sovereignty, they have still in practice no liberty to proceed in accordance with the proper requirements of their nations.

In truth, Greater East Asia is a territory abundant in wealth; it has natural resources and industrial localities capable of development so as to make this sphere co-prosperous in accordance with the principle of self-sufficiency. The Japanese Empire had, accordingly, followed the policy of establishing a Co-Prosperity Sphere, abiding by the ideal of Hekko-Icho, the union into one family on the basis of justice, righteousness and peace, and had adopted peaceful means in the execution of this policy, such as in the case of the dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand, in which, in order to establish the friendship between the two countries on a basis free from resentment due to the loss of national territory, Thailand had requested the return from France of certain part of the lost territory, the Japanese Government kindly consented to mediate so that an agreement based on justice was reached. The Thai people will never forget this favour on the part of Japan.
The pursuit by Japan of her policy by peaceful means did not, however, meet with success because of various obstructive obstacles put up by the United States of America and Great Britain. Consequently, the War of Greater East Asia had to break out, and the great and glorious victories achieved by the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces fill the peoples throughout Asia with joy, for therein lies the hope of the peoples of Greater East Asia to be able to establish on a solid basis the Co-Prosperity Sphere in this region.

Thailand, a country which had maintained close relationship with Japan for several hundred years with ties of friendship that have progressively grown tighter and firmer, has well understood the high purpose of Japan, and His Majesty's Government, under the leadership of His Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers, have immediately co-operated as ally of Japan, as shown by the Pact of Alliance concluded with one another with as its important object, the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia and the total elimination of the evil influences which stand as obstacles in the achievement of this aim. The principles laid down in that Pact are: 1) the establishment of an Alliance on the basis of mutual respect of each other's independence and sovereignty, and 2) the rendering of mutual assistance with all the political, economic and military means at each other's command.

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Def Doc. 664

Militarily, the Thai armed forces have joined with the Japanese armies in fighting with bravery and stubborn endurance, achieving the desired success. They are now prepared to make sacrifices for the further conduct of the war till final success is attained. Economically, Thailand is already co-operating fully with Japan, and any request she makes of Japan for assistance in this respect is limited only to what is necessary for the maintenance of her economic power in order to conduct the war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, Thailand has also promoted her national culture so that the Thai people may be inspired with a united and vigorous strength of mind for the benefit of the prosecution of the war, and has concluded a Cultural Agreement with Japan so that the spirit of the two nations may be bound in close co-ordination. This spirit is the special feature inherent in the culture of Asia, and it is this strength of mind that will constitute one of the most important factors in bringing about victory in the war.

Politically, the friendly relations between Thailand and Japan are in a condition of the closest cordiality, having mutually a good understanding of each other. The Japanese Government are large-hearted in sympathising with Thailand in her aspirations to recover her lost territories and to unite the strength of people of Thai race. The Japanese Government have, therefore, concluded a treaty recognising the incorporation into Thailand of the four States in Malai and the two States in the Shan region. This bears witness to the fact that Japan does not only respect the independence and sovereignty of Thailand, but also promotes the solidarity as well as the increased power of Thailand. The Thai Government and the
Thai people are most deeply and sincerely grateful to the Japanese Government and the Japanese people.

The goodwill, such as Japan has shown towards Thailand, she has also shown towards the other countries in Greater East Asia as befits each one of them; for instance, she has assisted in the restoration of complete sovereignty to China, has helped in the establishment of the independence of Manchoukuo, Burma and the Philippines as well as in the establishment of the Provisional Government of Free Indochina for the purpose of realizing the independence of Indochina. Thailand rejoices at these achievements, and whole-heartedly gives her support, since she has had for a long time past cordial friendly relations as well as cultural ties and good neighbourly relations with all these countries.

Now that Greater East Asia is no longer a geographical name but a Co-Prosperity Sphere on a firm basis, the great task before all the Greater East-Asian nations is to co-operate with one another in the conduct of the war till absolute success is achieved, each nation contributing all the strength at its command for the permanent establishment in the joint interest of all of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The principle that will keep this region in continued prosperity is the promotion to the highest degree of the power of each country, including material, moral and spiritual power, through respect of each other's independence and sovereignty, through development of economic relations with one another on the basis of reciprocity and through close co-operation and assistance with one another in conformity with the principles of righteousness and of justice, so as to insure peace, happiness and prosperity of each country.
The Japanesse Empire is the nation that leads the way in the development of Asiatic culture as a factor of progress by making use of scientific knowledge in the methods of organization of modern civilization. Thus across the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia. In the name, therefore, of His Majesty's Government, I beg here to express our appreciation and gratitude.

In conclusion, I beg, in the name of His Excellency Field-Marshall P. Phibun-Somkhram, President of the Council of Ministers of Thai, to express the very best wishes for the success of the deliberations of this historic assembly, that by further increasing the security and prosperity of Greater East Asia.

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検討ヲ

何ヲ言ノヲバ
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Mr. Chairman, Your Excellencies:

It is with some diffidence that I am addressing the Assembly. On an occasion like this it is only natural that there should be just one thought in our minds. Our words may be many, but our thought is one, one thought arising from one mind, one will, one objective. Therefore, it will be equally natural that in my speech I shall be often repeating thoughts, emotions, facts, which have already been expressed. But I consider it worthwhile to do so, for Burma, too, must express the same thoughts.

In a sense I have come from my country to speak the same words others have spoken here, to convey the same message, for, after all, there can be only one message. As I look around now, my thoughts go back to the meetings which political circumstances forced me to attend in the West. There, people met together, were polite to each other, laughed, discussed the weather among many other things. But always I felt there like a stranger among strangers, like a Greek slave in ancient Rome.
It is impossible to exaggerate the feelings which are born out of an occasion like this. For years in Burma I dreamt of samurai dreams. My samurai blood has always called to other samurais. In my dreams, both sleeping and waking, I have always heard the voice of samurai calling to her children. Today, for the first time, I hear samurai's voice calling again but this time not in a dream. We have come together, samurais, in answer to the call, to the voice of our mother. I have listened with the greatest emotion to all the speeches delivered around this table. All these speeches have been admirable, moving, and --- I may be exaggerating, but you must forgive me --- I seem to hear in them the same voice of samurai gathering her children together. Somehow or other, whatever the different representatives may say, whatever local color they may add, the undertone, the voice, is the same. There is always unity of design and purpose and kind which, I say, is the call of our samurai blood. This is not the time to think with our minds; this is the time to think with our blood, and it is this thinking with the blood that has brought me all the way from Burma to Japan.

Among the speeches made, the most memorable has been the speech of His Excellency the Chairman. His Excellency the Chairman has, as always, delivered a fighting speech --- indeed, today, more than a fighting speech, it is a working speech. His Excellency has chosen every word of his as a true samurai chooses his weapon. He has streamlined and
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orientated every word to one assuming purpose; and for this I join the other representatives in expressing my profound gratitude to him.

The world is indeed moving very swiftly. Before the war, it seemed that such a meeting as this would be inconceivable. It would have been impossible then for Asiatics to gather together like this. Yet now we are here. I see with my mind's eye a new world being created. I see in the speech of His Excellency the Chairman a new world structure actually organized, an Asiatic world for Asiatics.

Only a very few years back, the Asiatic peoples seemed to have lived in another world, even in different worlds, divided, estranged, and not knowing each other or even caring to know each other. As if a homeland did not exist a few years ago. As if was not one then, but many, as many as the enemies which kept her divided, large parts of her following like a shadow one or another of these enemy powers.

In the past, which now seems to be a very long time ago, it was inconceivable that the Asiatic peoples should meet together as we are meeting here today. Well, the impossible has happened. It has happened in a way which outstrips the boldest fantasy or dream of the boldest dreamer among us.
Today, an Indo-European assembly is meeting in the capital of East Asia. Thus, a new world has come into existence, a new order, a new citizenship. For the first time in history, the Indo-European peoples are meeting together as members of a free and equal brotherhood which is founded upon and consecrated to the truth that East Asia is one and indivisible.

Today's gathering of the Indo-European peoples has not appeared out of nothing, out of an empty hat, as it were. It is only the climax of a long sequence of happenings which have destroyed one world and created another in East Asia. These happenings, as I have said, have been great and very far-reaching: Japan's assumption of Asiatic leadership; the swift march of her invincible forces across Asia and the equally swift destruction of the Anti-Asiatic Powers; the great rally, unique in all history, of the Indo-European peoples 'round Japan against the common enemy; and then, as another great turning point in our progress, the independence of Burma and the Philippines. Nothing greater or more important has ever happened to the East.

Before I proceed further, I wish to express a thought which has already been expressed by all the other representatives. But Burma also must have the honor of expressing it.

These events which I have described as having changed the East so completely could never have happened without
Japan. It is Japan, as the leader of the East, who has led us out of the long wilderness, in which so many of us have for so long wandered, lost and unredeemed. To her all East Asia owes much and all East Asia, I am perfectly certain, will gladly repay her ever.

I say that today's meeting is a great symbolic act. As His Excellency the Chairman has said, we are truly creating a new world based upon justice, equality and reciprocity, upon the great principle of live and let live. From every point of view, East Asia is a world in itself; materially self-sufficient and even rich to overflowing; strategically strong as a rock which can defy all enemies; spiritually, one and complete representing an entire world of its own. We, Asians, forgot this fact for long centuries and paid heavily for it, for as a result the Asians lost Asia. Now that we have once more, thanks to Japan, re-captured this truth and acted upon it, the Asians will certainly recover Asia. In that simple truth lies the entire destiny of Asia.

I am speaking now as one coming from a country which has learned this lesson at a great price. Many countries and peoples have paid this bitter price for the lesson. Burma paid the price heavily to an enemy who never knew either mercy or justice. We are still paying the price with death and destruction in every form. When we were only sixteen million Burmese, although we struggled for our birthright, it was in vain. For generations our patriots rose, led the people against the British army,
but because we never realized that we were a part of it, that what sixteen million Burmese cannot succeed in doing, a thousand million Asiatics can easily do, and because we never realized those basic facts, every revolt of ours against the enemy was mercilessly crushed. Thus, some twenty years ago in a national revolt Burmese villages went up in flames, Burmese women were massacred, Burmese patriots were imprisoned, hanged, exiled. But, although the revolt ended in defeat, the flame, the Asiatic flame, kept burning in every Burmese heart. One revolt was followed by another and in this way the struggle went on. The day has at last come when our strength is not only the strength of sixteen million Burmese but of a thousand million East Asians, when so long as East Asia is strong, Burma is strong and invincible.

I have spoken of East Asia as a whole, but the fact is East Asia is not yet a whole. We must admit that the circle still remains incomplete; there are still gaps in it here and there. At this moment I am thinking particularly of India. No one can think of the East without thinking of India. There is no need at all for me to give reasons for this. I have often said that there cannot be a free Burma without a free India. I will go further now and boldly declare that there cannot be a free Asia without a free India.

India is the armory and treasure-house, the foothold of anti-Asiatic aggression in Asia. The aggressors
must therefore be driven out of India with her endless treasures and resources, her manpower and material power; these resources of India must be wrested from the hands of the enemy. That is why I am confident that you will join me in expressing quite definitely the view that Indian independence is an integral part of Asiatic independ-ence and, therefore, India's struggle is Asia's struggle, our struggle, our war.

Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose will, I am sure, know that I am speaking quite literally and with absolute conviction.

I now come to the present Indo-Asian war and Indo-Asian order. There is hardly anything I can add to what has already been said by the other representatives. I will however put it quite categorically. For us, this war cannot be anything else than imperative. Either Indo-Asia wins this war and lives, or she loses and dies. It is quite literally a matter of life or death. There is no other alternative. It is a war for the very existence of Indo-Asia and her peoples, for her independence and peace and prosperity for a thousand years.

Let us face facts squarely. Burma is facing facts in a terrible way and therefore I am speaking boldly. I am sure I am also speaking for all other Indo-Asian countries represented here. Everything is possible to Indo-Asia if she is united, strong and self-sufficient. A thousand million Indo-Asians standing together can win any war or any peace.

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As for the new Eastern order and economy, I said, as I have said, profoundly grateful to His Excellency the Chairman for his clear and unequivocal statement on it. He has declared with his characteristic courage and declared its basic principles to be justice, reciprocity, and mutual respect for one another's independence and sovereignty. These are clear, reassuring words. These will be forever an East-Asianic Charter, a charter which will last as long as the new East-Asianic order will last. Founded upon these principles the new Eastern Order will stand like a rock forever. This new East-Asianic world has already the material conditions necessary for stability. Nature has as I have said, provided those material riches richly for this new world of ours. Materially, we lack nothing to make our world stable and strong against our enemies. But this decidedly is not enough. Together with this material unity there must be a spiritual unity based upon understanding and tolerance, upon the fundamental proposition of one for all and all for one. Together with our different nationalism there must be a wider nationalism. Together with our territorial horizons there must be a single East-Asianic world horizon. These are not mere sentiments or phrases but a deadly task which we must accomplish or perish in the attempt.

This is a general perspective of the whole question which is now before us. As all the representatives have emphasized, each one of us, all the individual nations must also travel their own way, move in their own orbit, and make themselves strong in their own countries. We must make ourselves good Asiatics, good neighbours, by primarily being good citizens of our own countries, as I have said
more than once & strong Burma is Burma's best contribution to East Asia. Burma's strength will be the strength of East Asia and so also the strength of China, Thailand, Manchoukuo, the Philippines and, last but not least, India. And the strength of East Asia must be the united strength of all these separate countries, working together, and cooperating in a free and equal world of their own.

I will now try to apply this East-Asianic principle to actual happenings. I will speak of my own country, Burma. She is, as you all know, on the very front line of the East-Asianic war. You know what that means, the hardships, the terror, the loss of lives and homes—lives existing one day and destroyed the next day. As I have said, Burma is facing these perils not only for herself but for all East Asia; by guarding the common front line she is guarding the other parts of East Asia. I can assure you that Burma will continue to maintain the front line to the end. I wish however to ask the other East-Asianic countries to remember that the war which is now actually raging in Burma is also their war, that this war must be fought on the principle of one for all and all for one, that it must be fought with the strength of all East Asia. There must be a pooling together of all our war strength and resources in order to use them in the defense of the whole of East Asia, in any country, on any front. In other words, just as East Asia is one its
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Efforts and economy and planning must be exact. There must be material as well as spiritual changes. The isolationist policy of every man for himself would be the grossest act of betrayal and would destroy all of us, sooner or later, above all the isolationists themselves. Burma, as I have said, will continue to be an East-Asianic front line and to fight this war as East-Asianic for East-Asianics. She, at the same time, naturally expects the other East-Asianic countries to do the same.

You must pardon me if I am speaking so much about war conditions in Burma. You will understand that I have come as the representative of a people actually engaged in a total war in their own country. You will understand me if I say that the people of Burma are living today in front line conditions. Their homes and lives, their property, everything that life means for them is daily exposed to enemy action. That is the reason why I have come, frankly, with a firing-line complex in my mind. The Burmese in history have always proved themselves to be great fighters. I can assure you that they still possess great fighting qualities. Two years ago, our Burmese boys fought without arms. They had to kill an enemy to get a gun and they did it. Today, the war morale in Burma is strong and unbroken. Nothing will ever break it, for every Burmese knows he is fighting for everything he holds dear.

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I have spoken sufficiently of East-Asiatic oneness and the need to fight this war together as East Asiatics and to construct a world together as East Asiatics. We have started this work in the right way at this Assembly. It is, however, necessary to continue the present work; further than this, much further, to extend the work we have begun so well today so that it should cover the whole area of the present war and the future peace. In other words, there must be a permanent East-Asiatic central organization which will guide the common destiny of East Asia in a planned collective way. This alone will make our unity real and effective, a weapon indeed for both war and peace. Needless to say, the council will represent the free and equal nations of Greater East Asia. The road before us therefore is clear. We are only at the beginning of it now, but we shall march forward. Past history shows that whenever the Asiatic peoples came together, whenever they found unity and leadership, they were able to march anywhere, even to the world's end.

Again and again in history the East has marched against its enemies and destroyed them. It was only in times when Asiatics forgot Asia that they broke before the enemy. But now, thanks to the great Nippon Empire, we have discovered once more that we are Asiatics, discovered our Asiatic blood, and it is this Asiatic blood which will redeem us and give us back Asia. Let us, therefore, march ahead to the end of our road, a thousand million East
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As nations marching into a new world where East and West nations will be forever free, prosperous and will find at last their abiding home,
(十一年五月一日)

【ピルマー】関代叙「パラーマー」內閣総理大臣閣下ノ所見

関長京下致ニ各代表関下ノ代表見ノ際ニ言ノデアリマス、私ハ該座ノ
メラヒヲ賛へニテハソモテアリマス。彼シ本命論ノ如ク誤合ニ於テハ、我々一同
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各代表ニ依リ開臨セラレマシテ幻想ナリ、感情ナリ、尊貴ナリ、良々鏡返サ
ルウノラウコトモ是亦當然ノコトデアリマスソシ、ソレデモノ私ハ其ノヨハ
レアルマスノ。
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公式の総集がナケパナマイノテアリマス、門智、若者ノ国家主義ニ至

ンアノモリマス、事々ハ改革ニ至ル発端ナシテアリマス、

ハ参考ハナク、彼々ハ制度ニ至ル改革ナケレバナラである。

以下八戸ノ市ノ面スル国家写ルノ主宰ノ見解アリマス、

彼々ノ代表ノ農場ヲナニルヌシテアリ、若者ノ代表ニ至ル

ノ農場ヲ選挙シ、各自ノ自力ヲ透シスルソノ者ニガあり、

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このページは日本語で書かれた内容を含む。
"The New Order in East Asia"

No one can epitomize Japan's fundamental desiderata perhaps better than many Japanese can. They desire:

1. Strategic protection against a future attack by Soviet Russia, particularly an attack on Manchuria.

2. Economic security through control of the raw materials in China which Japan herself does not adequately possess. Japan is economically vulnerable.

3. Eradication of both anti-Japanese and Communist activities and propaganda in China, especially in North China.

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Excerpt from "Memoir of Former U.S. Ambassador Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
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四川国川

「いふつえ とし」

観光地の四川国川

「四川国川」

四川国川の観光地

「四川国川」
GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN
Recent Trends In Its Scope and Operation

By
CHARLES R. PHAYS
Assistant Professor of Oriental Affairs

PUBLICATIONS OFFICE, 129 East 52nd Street, New York
1940

PART II
PUBLIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

C. Reorganization of Executive Departments

2. LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE

No cabinet composed primarily of members of a party in the House of Representatives has held office in Japan since May 1932. Although the importance of this fact can be easily exaggerated, no survey of modern Japanese governmental changes would be complete without consideration of its causes. That the Japanese cabinet must be a coalition between different groups and that the influence of each group depends to a considerable measure on public opinion has already been suggested. For a few years following the promulgation of the Japanese Constitution the major parties in the House of Representatives were excluded from representation in the cabinet. It was soon discovered,
however, that this prevented effective operation of the constitutional system, and since about 1896 every cabinet, with one or two unsuccessful exceptions, has sought a working agreement with the Diet. This did not mean that the Diet was given control of either the composition or the policies of the cabinet; it was merely admitted to participation in the coalition. Such an arrangement is consistent with the provisions in the Japanese Constitution and with Japanese precedent. The parties, like other groups, sought to extend their influence and found support for their efforts in Western theories of constitutional government which assume, probably uncritically, that development toward full parliamentary control is a necessary or at least the "normal" path of political evolution. Post-war trends in other parts of the world were conducive to such opinions and, for a few years, principally from 1924 to 1932, party cabinets ruled Japan. Their control was never complete, however, for the traditional position of the civil and military services, the Privy Council, and the House of Peers could not be violated without recrimination and retaliation.

The course of Japanese politics during the late 1920's was punctuated by a series of clashes between the cabinet and the other organs of the government, ostensibly over such questions as financial aid to banks in the panic of 1927, the issuance of amendments to the Peace Reservation Law (Gijin Iji Ho) in the guise of an emergency ordinance, certain phrases in the Fact for the Renunciation of war, or the ratification of the London Naval Treaty. Each also represented a protest against the attempt to alter radically the political balance of power in favor of the parties in the House of Representatives at the expense of the peers, the Privy Council, the civil and military services and the jushin. The parties might have carried the day had they enjoyed genuine popular confidence. Instead it was common knowledge that bribery in elections was the rule rather than the exception and that party leaders depended on big business for the millions of yen necessary for each political campaign. Interference with elections through the party-controlled Department of Home Affairs was so common that it was said the government in power never lost an election. Corrupt deals between government officials and
assassinations of Inoue Junnosuke (February 9, 1932) and Baron Doi (March 5, 1932). A reform program would perhaps not have stemmed the tide, but even this the Seiyukai Cabinet did not have. When the premier was assassinated on May 15, 1932, forty cabinets, which had ruled at best for but a decade or so, came to an end, and Japan returned again to the earlier system of a coalition wider in scope than the groups in the House of Representatives.

The parties were still recognized, however. Since 1932 the major parties have been openly condemned only by the short-lived Hayashi Cabinet. All other cabinets have released party co-operation and limited party representation. Yonai has welcomed the president of the Jinsaito into his cabinet. At the same time each cabinet has urged political reforms to aid in the rehabilitation of the Diet in public opinion.

3/ Only two of the eleven cabinets which Japan has had during the last ten years have been headed by generals -- those of Hayashi in 1937 and Abe in 1939. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the China policy of the Hayashi Cabinet was somewhat more liberal than that of its predecessors and that the Cabinet also sought a rapprochement with Great Britain. See Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1937, London, 1938, Vol. I, pp. 162-8.

4/ For a useful summary of proposals for reform of the Diet see Yobo Tadaharu, "Chikai Seido" (The Diet System), Kokka Chikai Zassi, LIII, 9, September 1939, pp. 1161-94.

Excerpt from "Government in Japan" by Fehs. Pages 71-73
行政部の再編

一九四〇年発行

太平洋協会資料誌

太平洋協会資料誌

東亜研究

立法院

二、立法と行政

一九三二年五月以降日本に於ては、衆議院に於ける一政庁の職員が主

三、立法院
院の完全な盛況に向って力を発揮しうる事は政治的展観への必要

又は少くとも「死学なる」道である。恐らく経済的と親密して

一九三四年から一九三五年までの政局は内紛内乱が日々を支効したのであった。主として

本部分につけば西勢の軍歌がどのようなるに至るかなるか、交渉の局柄を励興したのであった。主として

少くとも教育確信が事態を占むる僅かな局柄は、交渉の局柄を励興したのであった。主として

人材不足が内外の変革を占むる僅かな局柄は、交渉の局柄を励興したのであった。主として

一九二六・九月の木戸の約束に応じる日本の政局を極めて進展を来たしたからである。主として

政治的局柄には一九二六年十月の内閣の存在を極めて進展を来たしたからである。主として

ロンドン.""局柄、議案、武人、要人、政治、及至これの勢を囲って衆議院における成
西欧の進展に立脚して立法技術の優先を確立した日本は今異の所詮が行き違った西欧に法を立て Wants the legislative reform to be taken hold of as a matter of priority. The success of the legislative reform in the West is...
復に何等の革新計画が Antar かつてこの風潮を阻止することを試み
不可認である。一九三二年五月半門日首相が辞職されることに
政敵内閣政権は内外の生命を絞り、かくして日本は極端に解決
やるが解体的分裂の名を成る音々たちの逮捕内閣政権に復帰したのであり
る。しかしその内閣政権の륙は、自然にしてられた。一九三二年以後大政
議の内閣により、新長辞職された派は政府経済のに一円をひったのみ
国 שלישיを迎へたる。一方本土の内部内閣は死命に於ける府の地脈の政
意のために音々の面潮を遮蔽した。
the new law radically limits election expenses (to about ten thousand yen per candidate but varying somewhat with the size of the constituency) and the size campaign organizations. It provides for free distribution by the post office of one statement of qualifications and platform by each candidate to every elector in his constituency but prohibits further canvassing by rail. It greatly increases the penalties for irregular use of election funds. By providing a limited degree of proportional representation and curtailing the advantages of wealth in election campaigns, the revised election law has been primarily responsible for the increased number of proletarian and independent members in the Diet. If American election laws equally favorable to minorities, there would probably be both socialists and communists in Congress today. Recent governments have also stopped partisan police interference with elections and have sponsored a national campaign for election reform and for education designed further to check bribery and to increase the ratio of voters to those holding the franchise.

The election law does not directly diminish party influence. In fact, in some ways it gives the established parties an added advantage, for it places no limitations on party campaigns as long as they are general in nature and not specifically directed toward aiding a single candidate. This is typical of the policy of recent governments which have never fully succumbed to the many demands for the establishment of a single official party as in Italy, Germany, or the Soviet Union. Such a single party was advocated by Adachi in 1931, by Hatao in 1933, by Toyama Hatsu and his associates in December 1938, and by the Shakai Taisho-to and the Techo-ai (proletarian parties) on various occasions from 1937 to 1939. It has been repeatedly discussed by individual cabinet ministers. General Hayashi seemed on the verge of undertaking its organization in the spring of 1937 but thought better of the project. In spite of such widespread demand for a single official party and the example of the Kyosei-ai, or Concord Society, in Manchukuo, it now appears unlikely that such an organization will be sponsored by the government.
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Mr. Tsurui, Home Minister, recently stated that the government has no intention of destroying the parties and that it recognizes them as an essential part of the operation of an elective legislature. There seems to be a growing emphasis on the constitution in discussions of the kokutai, or national polity, and such emphasis is inimical to drastic parliamentary reorganization.

The upper chamber of the Japanese Diet, as well, has been similarly criticized. Its statute (the Himin-inrei) had already been revised in 1925, but the results accomplished at that time were disappointing to their sponsors. During the so-called era of party cabinets there was a sustained campaign for emasculation of the House of Peers as part of the struggle by the House of Representatives for supremacy in the government. (The two houses of the Japanese Diet, like the House of Representatives and the Senate in the United States, enjoy approximately equal legislative and budgetary powers.) This campaign failed for reasons already suggested, and since 1932 attention has been directed to changes in the composition and organization of the upper chamber rather than in its powers. The chief proposals have been a reduction in the number of hereditary seats, a compulsory age of retirement, the abolition of the group of members new elected from among the highest taxpayers in each prefecture, and the substitution of some form of occupational representation. Behind these, usually unexpressed for political reasons, there has also been a desire to perform the internal unofficial political organization through which the House is dominated by a single clique — the Kankyu-Kai. These proposals have been directed toward meeting the charges of superannuation and oligarchical central and against the peers, toward an increase in the value of the upper house in the consideration of new national legislation, and toward the rehabilitation in public opinion of this half of the legislature.

See, for example, Satomi Irie, "Ikkoku Itto no Kokutai-gaku-teki Hihan" (Criticism of the Principle of a Single Party from the Point of View of Study of the National Policy), in Chuo Kyokan (Central Review), LIV, 1, January, 1939, pp. 76-84; Soasa Hiroo, "Kokumin Seikoku Rondai no Kentei" (Study of the Problem of National Organization), ibid., pp. 30-40.
The campaign for reform of the House of Peers has been continuous since 1925. The need for reform has been urged by groups both outside and inside the House itself. Prince Nomo actively sponsored the reform movement while first a member and later president of the House of Peers. When he became premier, he made reform of the House a major plank in his platform.

Committees and commissions for the study of reform measures are almost too numerous to mention. In spite of all this agitation, nothing has been accomplished beyond something greater circumspection in the exercise of their influence by the directors of the Honshu-ko. The Ordinance of the House of Peers has not been touched. The most natural time for effective reforms was prior to the new elections to the House of Peers which took place in July 1939 and, as members enjoy seven-year terms, it now appears as though reform would be indefinitely delayed.

The government and the Diet System Inquiry Commission (appointed in June 1928), having thus far failed in any notable reform of the composition of either the upper or lower chamber, have turned their attention instead to minor modifications in the law of the House (Gin-ko) which provides for the convocation, term, dissolution or adjournment, and procedure of the Diet.

Only one change has been accomplished. This extends the fixed period allowed for discussion of the budget from twenty-five to twenty-five days in each house. This change, as far as it goes, increases the possibility of effective Diet supervision over the government. The Hayashi Cabinet announced in March 1937 that subsequent regular sessions of the Diet would, when practicable, be convoked in November instead of in December in order to permit fuller consideration of legislation, but this innovation has not yet been put into practice.

In addition, proposals have been made for the establishment of standing committees of the two houses which could meet between sessions of the Diet and thus make continuous the new intermittent participation of the legislature in governmental activities. This system has been opposed by the government and has not as yet become a reality.

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Excerpt from "Government in Japan" by Fehs.
Pages 73-77
政府は大規模な電気設備の建設と開発に注力しており、日本に対する影響力は強化されている。日本では日本の電気設備は非常に強力で、政府は日本の政府に対して強い影響力を有している。これにより、日本は強力な影響力を有することが示される。
首相はそれに多大な労力と精力を費やし、政治上の重要課題に取り組むことを命じられた。一九三一年十二月の文部省内閣（内閣略図）は内閣の内閣略図を掲載することを認め、内閣略図を編集し、内閣略図を編集した。首相は内閣の内閣略図を掲載することを命じ、内閣略図を編集し、内閣略図を編集した。

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之に加えるに、武力（軍事）外交又は利益外交及び他の外部政策に関する
ごく重要な位置を占め、国際社会に於て大いなる影響を及ぼし、
日本の国際的立場を強化させることとなる。
この文書は、日本語で書かれています。その内容は、特定の情報を含め、日本語の文法や文脈により理解することは難しく、具体的な内容を自然に読み取ることはできません。
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The Diet has obviously been able to check every move for any radical change in its composition or powers. One of its chief weapons has been a counterattack on weak points in the civil and military services. Thanks to the acumen and political ability of Field Marshal Yamagata, Japan has for some forty years enjoyed most of the features of a modern administrative civil service which have recently been advocated for the United States by President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Reorganization. Lately, however, there has been a trend in England, the United States, and Japan to question some aspects of the civil service program, particularly the effects on efficiency and initiative of rigid civil service guarantees of tenure. The unusual influence of civil servants in Japan has given such arguments added
cogency, and they have recently been exploited to the full in the Japanese dictatorship. Administrative reforms were promised by the Kiyuzi Cabinet and studied during the spring, summer, and fall of 1938. After the installation of the Hirumura Cabinet, the Seiyushii and Kinsuido threatened to adopt a resolution providing for civil service reforms (in the direction of curtailment of civil service privileges) but were finally dissuaded from doing so. Hirumura defended the civil servants, (he was one himself) and needed to Diet demands only to the extent of addressing a memorandum to all civil servants, admonishing them to greater endeavor, impartiality, and humility. Criticism of the civil service has, however, stimulated cabinet ministers to make continuous efforts in the direction of improvement of personnel administration in the various departments, notably in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The army and navy present a special problem although they are, of course, in much the same situation as the civil services. The tenure of military officers is even more protected than that of other state officials. Their political influence has increased more markedly during the last decade, and their record has been marred by a number of instances of participation by active or reserve officers in assassinations or in conspiracies against important statesmen. The military services are still extremely jealous of their independent position under the supreme command and their freedom from political influences. Test-world-war each is on the wider meaning of

For a discussion of the popular grounds for criticism see Kengoke Ryuichiro, "Kenri Seido no Kenso ni kansuru kenkon" (Cabinet Reform in the Civil Service System), Chuo Koron, LIV, 3, March 1939, pp. 151-9. See also Shimmiz Muto, "Kenri Seido no K Jensai ni Kansuru Kenkon" (Cabinet Reform of the Civil Service System), Kokke Gakko Zasshi, LII, 10, pp. 1252-9; Yoneso Yoneoka, "Kenri Seido" (Civil Service), ibid., LIII, 9, September 1939, pp. 1229-60.

The text of this circular will be found in Tokyo Asahi, February 25, 1939, p. 332.
national defense has, however, led officers to concern themselves with an ever wider range of political questions. The resultant increase in internal disputes over policy coincided with a decrease in the unity of principles and control due to the deaths of the Gen. Yamanaka and Ozawa and to the displacement of clan leadership by new men trained since the Sino-Japanese War.

Theoretically, the army and navy are under direct imperial command, but their actual administration has been divided among several officers each of whom enjoys the privilege of direct resort to the sovereign. This situation was tolerable as long as unity was maintained by the authority of the Emperor, but caused trouble when that authority disappeared. A conflict in 1931 within the army "big three" -- the minister of the army, the chief of staff, and the inspector-general of military education -- led to the appointment in 1932 of a member of the Imperial Family, Princx Hiden-in, as chief of staff to serve as an arbiter. Friction between Minister of the Army Hara and Inspector-General of Military Education Hata over personnel policies led to the forced resignation of the latter in 1933 and was indirectly connected with the assassination of Gen.-Gen. Ito in August of that year and with the assassinations of February 26, 1936 (of which the new inspector-general of military education, Hata, was a victim). A somewhat similar problem in the navy was evident in 1929 when the minister and the chief of staff disagreed over the ratification of the London Naval Treaty. There was thus a double problem for both the army and the navy -- a proper adjustment of relations with the cabinet and the Diet and unification of internal control. Neither respect of the problem could be solved except by a process of political adjustment: no formula was immediately applicable. As a result, the recent course of the army and navy in "peace politics" has not been entirely consistent. Nevertheless, the main lines are tolerably clear. The development in the navy has been less spectacular than that in the army, which may be taken as an example for both. Army leadership has, particularly since 1936, been concentrated increasingly in the hands of the minister of the army who has assumed
Continuity in the personnel and political policies of the Department has been strengthened by a return to the earlier limitation of the position of minister to generals or lieutenant-generals in active service, excluding those on the reserve list like General Ueki. Army officers have been prohibited from publicly expressing views on political affairs, and since February 26, 1936, those involved in illegal activities have been dealt with most severely. The Reservists' Association (Yaso Gunjin Kai) has also been brought under the control of the Department. The army has thus recognized that irresponsible political agitation by military officers cannot be permitted. The converse of this recognition is that the political voice of the army is concentrated in the minister of the army whose influence in the cabinet has consequently increased.

What then is the legitimate sphere of influence of the service ministers? The position which General Terauchi and subsequent ministers of the army have tried to maintain is that while the army, under modern conditions of national defense, cannot be indifferent to general economic and political problems, will express its views through the minister of the army, and reserves the right to refuse to cooperate with any cabinet not showing a proper understanding of such problems, the army will, nevertheless, not attempt to dictate either specific policies or the details of their application. These are the proper functions of the civilian branches. This distinction between readiness

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9/ Ibid., May 18, 1936, p. 250. The change was purely precautionary since no officer not in active service had ever served as minister of the army or navy, even though their appointment had been possible since 1913.

10/ By ordinances promulgated on September 25, 1936. Ibid., September 20, 1936, p. 279; September 26, 1936, p. 359.
to block cabinets in which it lacks confidence and avoidance of interference with non-military legislation and administration is a very narrow one, and its practical application leaves much room for dissatisfaction on both sides. It amounts, however, only to reaffirmation of the customary share of the services in the Japanese political coalition. During recent years the minister of the army has advocated many types of legislation -- control of the sugar industry, agrarian relief, organization of a national welfare department, reform of the House of Peers, and a general mobilization act, to mention only a few. Yet none of these has been dictated. Some remain unaccomplished; others have been accepted only after formulation and debate by the civilian ministries, extended discussion in the 'diet,' and frequent amendments. The influence of the army and navy departments on domestic legislation and administration has increased during the last decade, but not to the point of dictatorship.

Army influence on continental policy is a different problem and one which cannot be fully examined here. Obviously the army controls Japanese activities in Manchuria and in China to a far greater extent than it does domestic affairs. This power on the continent is based on various factors: the right of direct appeal to the Throne, the special position of the Manchurian Army under the South Manchuria Railway Concession and the Manchuria Peninsula lease, the regulation of Sino-Japanese affairs since 1932 and 1933 by military truce instead of diplomatic treaty, and the existence of military hostilities since 1937. The beginnings of a compromise similar to that in Japan proper can, however, be seen in the growing integration of domestic and overseas policies discussed above and in the establishment of such organs as the Manchurian Affairs Bureau and the China Board.

Altogether the Japanese political coalition -- the House of Representatives, House of Peers, Privy Council, ministers close to the Throne, army, navy, civil services -- has not been radically altered during the last decade. The House of Representatives has lost influence but has retained all
of its legal powers and has benefited from some reforms. Its influence would probably grow once more if its major parties could iron out their own domestic disputes which have recently made a very bad impression. The Privy Council continues as before an important check on cabinet actions between sessions of the Diet. The House of Peers remains approximately unchanged in both legal powers and influence. The ministers close to the Throne have probably somewhat declined in day-by-day influence, but they retain a voice in the appointment of new cabinets, and so continue to furnish indirect guidance of political developments. The army and navy have increased their influence but have also carried out internal reforms which seem to assure somewhat more responsible exercise of their powers than during the early 1930's. The civil services, too, have gained in strength but not decisively. In general, the power of the administrative branch of the government has increased while that of the legislature has decreased, but this is a universal phenomenon. The increasing role of national defense considerations in governmental decisions is not peculiar to Japan.

11/ The Seiyukai in particular has been torn by petty factional disputes. During 1939 the police on several occasions had to intervene to prevent physical violence between two factions barricaded on separate floors of the party headquarters in Tokyo.

行政の改革は近隣内閣に依り約束され、一九三八年春、夏、秋に渡って研究された。平沼内閣の成立後、向葉内閣及び民政党は行政改革に関する論読を陳懸されてこれを行なった。平沼は官吏を練斬し、彼自身官吏であったが、局外者としての官吏の職務を理じ、

官吏制度改革に関する論読を陳懸するに至ったのも、全官吏に授けられた一層の努力が及ぼし、彼自身官吏であるからと局外者としての官吏の職務を理じ、

省直等は勿論、各省内外の人事行政改革に更に努力を経けしめる若訳を内閣を函ずる者に依る。

以人の地位は他の官吏の地位よりも一層よく続続されてゐる。

以人の政権は過去十年間に於て目立つて増大し、また重要な政治家に対訳する暗の影響は若訳を残してゐる。若訳は可懸に於ける彼等の独立する地位及び政治的影響よりの自由を今日は欄断に求めてゐる。
本告示文は一九三九年三月二十五日東京朝日三三二頁に所載

然し乍ら世界大戦後一時廃置せる国際協約なを復活させられ

いつに入一局廢砕国の

証によって代つたおに生じた国際の不統一及び統制の減少に一致した。
上は、国海軍は国際戦争の命令下にあるが、その命令の内容は敵
人の協力によって分断されて来たのである。彼等は各々面接下に
上る機会をもって来た。故に始き勢力元々の力が旺まつたのに際しを
ある故にそれでとったのである。一九三六年（昭和六年）に、議會が政
府、元々の力が旺まつた方に回って居ると申ぜたのである。一九三七年
（昭和七年）に、談判下に於て、議會が政府、元々の力が旺まつた方に回って
居ると申ぜたのである。一九三六年（昭和六年）に、議會が政
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府、元々の力が旺まつた方に回って居ると申ぜたのである。一九三七年
（昭和七年）に、談判下に於て、議會が政府、元々の力が旺まつた方に回って
居ると申ぜたのである。
いふ政治的橋梁方法によらなければ、解決出来ないものをであった。

その結果、国際観の日本政府に於ける近年の進歩の絶えずの増進と巨大な努力は、人を感動、かつもし易いのである。一九三六年（昭和十一年）以来

大数の経験を経て大数の即く観念に於て脱言を改めて、現実の大、

甲府に限ると言ふ官員の側面に復興したことにより、本當の人を応

行ゆる過去の永遠性は黙化させられた（註九）

（昭和十一年二月二十六日以降、非合法的活動に隠蔽せる者に於て

国際に訴えられた。在日無人党も又平和の観念の下に成られた。）
注十一

仮に在任されていた政治活動の許可されるのがないと国政

了承のためのであろう。国政がかかる数のもので覚えた。一国政の近代的状況

の下においては一般的の経済政治間で無能心である。一国政の近代的状況

を含む内容にも努力を経営する役割を信頼する。然し一方限定の政体

の不当を監憲する余地を多分に設けてある。
断の符をつけるに際して、日本の政治的局立に於ける後顧には在来から定まった範
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定に依る一九二六年（昭和二年）及一九三三年（昭和八年）以来の日職
間内の民政及一九二七年（昭和二年）以来の軍事紛争の存続に於ける
内政対の次第に完成し行く遂局に々又外務省外局及び陸海軍武官局
日本の政治的外交的調整に貴重な経験を積むためには日職間の
関係を之に代ふと云しを得る

陸海軍武官局文官の
關係は近幾年間には根本的な改革を為す
たのである。
（六条政）

衆議院はその勢力を失速したけれども、尚実の法的範囲はすべて者を有つて居り面も改善正にって更に得る所のものがあった。衆議院の勢力は、若し一の多数が出来常めは、最近非常に思はるかりる盛り上りぐへすべきである。保官院は依然として政府の議会との間に於ける事務に大々欠落を興へてである。天皇近御の大臣に面有の力も保有して居り面も尚政治上の態度に於いては間接的指導を進めである。

それらはその労力を強化せしとし、もしかし又国内政策をも実行した。

それをそれは一九三〇年の始めよりはいくらか責任をもつて権力行使が未だ明確なものではない。護して政府の行政面に於ける権力は、立法面のそれ方や一乗へたのに對し増加せしけれどもこれも一般的を現象

11
Transcribed by the
Defense Language Branch

Records (Stenographic)
of
Budget Committee Session,
House of Representatives,
76th Imperial Diet
No XXII

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
The meeting opened at 1:07 P.M. Saturday, 8 Feb. 1941.

(chief commissioner MASUDA:)

Chief Commissioner MASUDA:

The Premier wishes to speak.

The Premier:

(cheritted)

(later)

State Minister KURIE:

I wish here to make clear the opinion on the part of the Government as to the nature of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

As for the movement for an Imperial rule assistance, I think you are already acquainted with its general outline through the statement which I made in the Preliminary Conference for the Establishment of a New Organization in August last year. But it will not be unnecessary to explain the aims of the movement on this occasion.

Japan is now confronted with the greatest crisis in her history. At this juncture it is needless to say that, in order to take adequate measures aiming at a broad leap in our national progress, it is necessary to unify the power of the whole nation into one harmonious whole by consolidating the national defense organization of the state, and to exert the national power thus unified to the fullest extent. And the basis for this so-called 'strong national defense organization of the state' consists in establishing an effective system within the nation. And in my opinion this in turn is possible only on the basis of a national
organization which will enable the whole population to participate effectively in the Imperial rule assistance. The aim of such a national organization is to unify the power of the whole nation in order that all the subjects of the Emperor may discharge their respective duties in organic unity, thus participating in the Imperial rule assistance. This aim requires that all the people participate in this great task effectively by discharging their respective everyday duties in their various tasks. It is only under such a national system that policies of the Government can be expected to permeate the remotest corners of national life to be realized there infallibly and promptly, and that the real conditions of the people's life can be reflected vividly upon the mirror of politics. I believe that only in this way can the power of the whole nation be concentrated upon affairs of the state.

Now, the Imperial rule assistance movement is one which is to be carried on by the whole nation, and which aims, in cooperation with the Government, to establish a national organization which will enable the whole population to participate effectively in the Imperial rule assistance to facilitate its working and thus to afford a basis for faithful discharge of the duties of the subjects. This movement has sprung up out of the necessity of establishing a strong national defense organization of the state. It is a movement which, standing aloof from any special interests of political parties, aims to remove all internal strife in all fields of national life and to concentrate all the activities of the nation upon faithful discharge.
of national action. It is a truly totalitarian national movement based on mutual cooperation between the Government and the people.

The Imperial Hilo Assistance Association is a body organized for the purpose of pushing forward such a national movement. Its proper mission as the nucleus of this movement is to lead the van and to become the propelling force in the right and effective discharge of national duties. In order to fulfill this mission I believe it is necessary to strengthen the organization of the association as well as to consolidate its spiritual unity and thus to make it exert its power to the full in the discharge of its function to cooperate with the Government Organizations in deciding upon and carrying out national policies, by communicating the will of the Government to the people and revealing the real condition of the people's life to the Government. As is clear in the above, the activities of the Association are quite different, both in function and in aim, from those of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement or of various movements carried on by political factions. Its highly political character can also be ascribed to the same circumstances.

It is needless to say that in the actual working of the Association the purpose for which it has been organized should always be kept in view. Therefore, as for the relation of the Association to the Government, the former should cooperate with the latter in making the spirit of national policies fully understood by the people and in facilitating their adequate enforcement. Its mission of communicating the will of the Government to the people and revealing the real conditions of the people's
to the Government means nothing but to furnish the authorities with necessary materials to be referred to by them in deciding upon various measures. Consequently the Association has no intention to enforce a certain set of principles of their own independently of the Government. It is of course needless to say that it has nothing to do with any movements struggling for political power.

To summarize the foregoing, the nature of the Imperial Rule Association is not compatible with struggles between mutually opposing parties in the political arena nor with any activities aiming to enforce a particular set of political doctrines independently of the Government. And this is precisely the reason why the Government exempts the association from the application of some provisions in the Peace Police Act, on the ground that it does not fall within the category of 'associations concerning political affairs' as described in that Act. But, inasmuch as it is a kind of association, those articles in the Act which provide for associations in general and associations concerning public affairs except political affairs should of course be applied to it. Further, it goes, without saying that any act on the part of the Association should be governed by relevant regulations.

The War Minister and the Navy Minister have stated that, considering the spirit of the foundation of our army members of the army or navy on the active list would not be permitted to enter the Association except when those who occupy special posts, such
as the minister, the vice-minister, the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, etc., enter it to handle liaison with the army or navy. But this does not mean that soldiers on the active list should not enter it, because it falls within the category of "associations concerning political affairs" prescribed in the Peace Pledge Act. This only means that it would be incompatible with the idea of unity and discipline of the army for individual soldiers on the active list to enter directly such an association.

It is but very recently that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was organized. And although therefore its nature and aims have not yet been understood well enough by the public, and its activities are as yet unsatisfactory in many respects, we wish to do our best to get the hoped-for results by driving home to the people's mind its true nature and aims on the one hand, while on the other hand using every care for the betterment of its organization and working.

In connection with this, it is necessary for us to see to it that the Association should not involve itself in any acts outside the scope of its aim and mission.

Now the situation within and without requires urgently the fire and harmonious unity of the whole Japanese nation. The movement of Imperial rule assistance has sprung up out of this urgent necessity. Without an effective development of this movement, it would be extremely difficult to tide over the impending crisis. I have already stated in my opening speech at the Diet that the Government desires a rapid and active development of this movement. Indeed, the Government is firmly determined to exert utmost efforts in encouraging this movement of Imperial rule assistance. We sincerely ask your cooperation.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, YAMAZAKI, Ko, Chief of General Affairs Section, House of Representatives, hereby certify that the document hara attached in Japanese consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Report of the Budget Committee, House of Representatives 76th Imperial Diet, opened on 8 Feb., 1941" is an exact and true copy of that document (taken down in shorthand, from page 260 to 261).

Certified at the House of Representatives, on the 6th of December, 1946.

(signed) YAMAZAKI, Ko (soal)
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) YOSHIDA, Ichizo (soal)

Translation Certificate.

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

(signed) C. D. Sheldon
/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 7 Jun. 1947.
昭和十六年二月八日（土曜日）午後一時七分開議

内閣総理大臣

大政翼翔会　内閣総理大臣　宮本隆一

大政翼翔会　参謀本部長　中村公望

內閣総理大臣　財政政策監　森喜朗

財政政策監　大藏長　大塚恒

大政翼翔会　外務大臣　重光葵

内閣総理大臣　財政政策監　森喜朗

大政翼翔会　内閣総理大臣　宮本隆一
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都庁（地域計画局）, 1965年10月に発足した地域計画局の設立について。

(略述)

2. 会計に関する事項

この会計に関する事項は、本計画の概要を含むもので、特に計画の実行に関するものが多い。

3. 諸問題に関する事項

この会計に関する諸問題は、計画の実行に関するもので、特に計画の実行に関するものが多い。
第5章

研究方法与结果分析

通过详细的实验设计和数据收集，我们得出了以下结论：

1. 实验I表明，...
2. 实验II显示，...
3. 实验III证实，...

这些结果有力地支持了我们的假设，并为未来的研究提供了新的方向。
No6

def doc 580

[Written text in Chinese characters]
日本帝国主義の軍国主義体制下における様々な問題を含む、政治的、経済的、社会的、文化的方針、目標を決定するための全国的な会議である。会議は日本の内閣府によって開催され、その目的は国家政策の決定、行政の改善、経済の発展、社会の安定、文化の発展を促進することであった。また、国際関係の調整や外交策定も含まれていた。
昭和三年（1928年）十月廿日於東協同議所

立會人

[署名]

[日文内容]

[印章]
Excerpt from the Minutes of the Budget Committee Meeting, House of Representatives, 76th Session of the Diet (shorthand record) No. 7. The meeting opened at 10.12 A.M., January 28th (Tuesday), 1941 (16th year of Shōwa).

(Portion omitted)

Member of the Committee, HIRAKUKI: A:

I have understood that the Premier explained. I should like to put a question to the Home Minister about one point. This point has already been raised at the Co-ordination Conference (T. F. KYÔRYÔKU KAIGI) and is whether or not the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is a political association coming under the Public Peace Police Laws. In regard to this question, I am of the opinion that it is evident that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is in no way a public organization, but a private organization; and there can be no doubt that it is a political association. That being the case, I believe it naturally comes under the category of political associations prescribed in the Public Peace Police Laws. Furthermore there are many amongst the people who also believe that is so. Concerning this point, I saw a press report to the effect that there had been a contention at the Central Co-ordination Conference by Mr. Funada, Head of the Internal Affairs Department, that although the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is an association, the said law is not applicable to such an association. As prescribed in the said law means an association which necessitates...
governmental supervision from a standpoint of preserving public peace, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is not included in the organizations of such kind. I think the purport of his contention may probably be that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is an organization working in unison with the government, that it is neither a secret association nor one detrimental to the public peace and order, and that it should not be subjected to governmental supervision. But what are his grounds for regarding it as working in unison with the government? It is the Imperial Rule Assistance Association itself which insists that it works in unison with the government. There is no legal ground at all. It may be said that it does not disturb public peace and order. However, whether or not its activities disturb public peace and order should be determined by the government responsible for the supervision of organizations of such kind. I think it is decidedly unjustifiable that a certain organization standing under the supervision of the government should determine for itself that it does no harm to the public peace and order, and in consequence, the Public Peace Police Laws are not applicable to it. The said law admits no exception. Should that law not be applicable to such an organization as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, it might lead to the unreasonable conclusion that, when a certain organization with similar nature and purpose to those of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is newly organized, it need not be subject to the said law. If the said law is not applicable to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, we cannot be sure that another organization of the same kind to
which the said law is not applicable would not be organized.
This is a very serious problem. So I should like to hear the Home
Minister's opinion about this point.
State Minister, HIRAMURA:

I will answer your question. I have previously expressed
my opinion that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is not
an organization which carries out its activities in accordance
with any political view of its own. The purpose of the Imperial
Rule Assistance Association is that it shall make our nation
thoroughly understand and cooperate with the state policies fixed
by the government. It does not fall under the category of poli­
tical association prescribed in the public peace police law, so
far as it is not an organization which may determine and propa­
gate its own political views. However, there is no doubt that
it is an organization, and therefore an association. It may come
under the category of public association prescribed in the Public
Peace Police Laws. Accordingly, as a public association, it must
be subject to the said law. At present, we have no intention to
supervise the Imperial Rule Assistance Association as a political
association according to the Public Peace Police Laws.
Certificate

I, YAMAZAKI, Takashi, as the chief of General Affairs Section of the House of Representatives, hereby certify that the Japanese document consisting of 4 sheets of paper enclosed herewith is a copy of the 161st page of the Minutes of the Budget Committee Meeting in the House of Representatives of the 76th Session of the Diet (shorthand record), held on January 9, 1941 (16th year of Shōwa), which I have officially in my charge.

January 6, 1941 (16th year of Shōwa),

At the House of Representatives,
YAMAZAKI, Takashi.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed by YAMAZAKI, Takashi to the above statement in my presence.

On the same day, at the same place,
Observer YOKOMURA, Ichizō.

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date January 1847
Meeting opened at 10:40 a.m. January 24th (Tuesday), the 14th year of SHOWA (TN:1939)

Omitted......

Committee member AZUMA:
Omitted......

Next I should like to ask Premier HIROHIMA a few questions but as to the spirit of the Imperial Way, or that of all the people assisting the Imperial rule, I am one of those who are somewhat acquainted with Premier HIROHIMA's attitude towards this matter and have listened earnestly to your repeated explanations in the plenary sessions of the Diet that it was an ancient phrase, but politically a new one, and that it meant concentrating the total strength of our country on national policy and realizing the policy with the so-called spirit of the Imperial Way, or that of the entire people assisting the Imperial rule. I should like to request you to explain a little more explicitly, however, as to the difference between parliamentarism and the spirit of national assistance for the Imperial rule. Up to this time, I think, Premier HIROHIMA has been misunderstood by the public more than once. It has been suspected if he weren't trying to enforce a Fascist policy. At the time of the investiture of Premier HIROHIMA the stocks at KABUTO-GHO (TN: name of the stock market in TOKYO) went down, because the public feared that Fascism would be enforced and
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that everything would become terrrible. But our people, I am sure, understood your true meaning by your successful speech. In this House we attach importance to the Diet and to promote parliamentarism. There are leftists and rightists in the world in fact, however, even among my fellow Members. Among the rightists many are liable to insist upon totalitarianism and the denial of parliamentarism at the slightest provocation. Your Excellency the Premier, I think, knows about this matter better than I. Totalitarianism and the doctrine of the Imperial Way are often confused but in regards to this point I have heard the Premier's declaration in this House of the necessity to observe the provisions of the Constitution and to emphasize parliamentarism. Consequently, political parties would naturally rise, and it would be wrong to negate this. But, I think, the spirit of "one sovereign for the whole people" or totalitarianism considerably differs from parliamentarism in the way of methods of realization. There are some who - y opposing parliamentarism is often acting contrarily to the spirit of assisting the Imperial Way. And although totalitarianism is like assisting the Imperial Way it has certain points in which it differs entirely. As a result of your explanation in this House, we understand that what Premier HIRHNUMA calls the spirit of assisting the Imperial Way consists in stressing parliamentarism increasingly on the basis of a constitutional government. But we are not enlightened to Premier HIRHNUMA's view on totalitarianism, the doctrine of the Imperial Way, and constitutional government. If possible, therefore, I should like to have you explain them to us once more.
Minister of State, HIRJNIKA:

Mr. ZUMA's question is, in a sense, very difficult to answer, and I doubt whether I can satisfy you. I understand that totalitarianism is a word used in opposition to the so-called individualism of the western countries, and I think it means that its object is not the individual, but the whole, or that, for the sake of the whole, the individual must obey the whole irrespective of whether it be advantageous or not to one's own interest. The doctrine of the Imperial Way in our country has no such meaning I believe. The soul of the doctrine of the Imperial Way in our country is, I believe, to enable all people to find their own places and not leave anyone without his own place. When viewed in this light, we must think about the whole and we must think about the individual also and is quite different from the absolute idea of sacrificing the individual for the whole. This from the viewpoint of the doctrine of the Imperial Way, becomes the entire nation's assistance to the Imperial rule. In other words with everyone observing the purport of the Imperial Benevolence not one person shall be denied gaining his rightful place and concentrating on this fundamental is what I believe to be the so called assistance of the entire nation to the Imperial rule. In our country, therefore, it follows that in obedience to this great spirit enabling every person or thing to have his or its own place, constituting political institutes first and last of course but also the others irrespective of what occupation they pursue, all should concentrate themselves on this point. This is my understanding. Consequently I believe that there is a fundamental difference between the idea of totalitarianism which was developed in the western countries and our doctrine of the Imperial Way.
CERTIFICATE

I, YAMAZAKI, Takaahi, Chief Secretary of the General Affairs Section of the House of Representatives certify that the Japanese document of four separate sheets does not differ from the 25 pagod certified copy of the minutes of the Budget Committee Meeting of January 24th, the 14th year of SHO-UN (M. 1939) included in the minutes of the Committee Meetings of the House of Representatives, of the 74th Session of the Imperial Diet which I have in my official charge.

In the above-mentioned minutes, the one called Committeeman 450g is Mr. AYANAGI, Takoshi, Member of the House of Representatives, and the one called minister of State HIRANO is Baron HIRANO, KIJIRO, Premier.

November 27th, (TM: 1946) the 21st year of SHO-UN
YAMAZAKI, Takashi (sealed)
At the House of Representatives.

on the same day and at the same place
Witness, MATSUMI, Tokuhito

I certify that, in my presence, the said person signed and affixed his seal.

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, YUKIO KAWAMOTO, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

YUKIO KAWAMOTO
Tokyo, Japan
Date 5 Feb, 1947

Record of the Second Budget Committee Meeting of the House of Representatives of the 74th Session of the Imperial Diet.
Sworn Deposition

Deponent: TSUGITA, Daisaburo

Having first duly sworn on oath as an attached agent and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

On this 15th day of Jan., 1947, at Tokyo.

TSUGITA, Daisaburo (seal)

I, TSUGITA, Daisaburo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: HANAI, Tadashi (seal)

I was the chief of the Bureau of Legislation in the HIROTA Cabinet from March, 1936 to February, 1937.

The HIROTA Cabinet which came into existence following the 'February 26 affair', had as its mission a rigid enforcement of military discipline; the calming down of the people's mind and the establishment of a peaceful diplomacy, Premier HIROTA adhered to this policy consistently. At the first Cabinet conference held soon after the inaugural ceremony in March 9, 1936, he made an important statement as follows: When I presented the
Cabinet members list today, the Emperor told me firstly to conduct civil administration in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, secondly, not to conduct diplomacy forcibly and thirdly to avoid any sudden change in the financial situation. I am going to render my services to the State obedient to the Imperial Intention, so I hope therefore every one of you will cooperate with me.* All Ministers respectfully agreed. In this connection, in my diary of March 5, 17th Year of Showa 1937 I wrote the following description:

*March 9

about 9 a.m. Mr. Las ASAKI, Takahashi rang me up. Secretly asked if I would accept the directorship of the Bureau of Legislation and consented. At 9.30 I was summoned, went to the Premier's official residence and paid respects to each minister. Went into the Cabinet room. The Imperial opinion confided to the Premier then he presented the list of Cabinet members: Firstly to govern according to the articles and chapters of the Constitution. Secondly not to conduct foreign policy by force. Thirdly avoid a sudden change in the financial situation. Each minister understood the point of the Finance Minister's talk. The War Minister said he was sorry for the Incident and he would take care that such an event should not occur again in future.* The part of the said diary referring to the War Minister's talk shows a firm resolution declared by him to enforce military discipline considering the February 26 Incident.

The reason why the Kōtō Cabinet reformed the Army and Navy ministries official organization was to enforce military discipline. It was at the extraordinary session of the Diet in May 1936 that this reform bill was
introduced into the Cabinet from the Army and Navy Ministries. The military
and naval authorities explained, "The Army and Navy Ministers have the
duties of supervising troops belonging to the supreme command, of maintaining
military discipline and of strengthening the unity of the army; therefore
equally they themselves must be soldiers belonging to the supreme command,
that is, on the active list. Indeed this is brought out by the fact that
all of the War and Navy Ministers were soldiers on the active list since
the reform of the government organization in the second year of Taisho
(T.N. 1913) (i.e. the reform in which generals and lieutenant-generals on
the reserve list were also allowed to become Ministers). Now, soon after
the Incident, keenly feeling the necessity of restricting the Ministers to
officers on the active list in order to strengthen the power of the Ministers,
to enforce military discipline and to solidly preserve unity, we intend to
make the system correspond with actuality by reforming the government or-
ganization." When I asked them the meaning of, "Soon after the Incident
we keenly feel the necessity of restricting the Ministers to the officers
on the active list," they answered as follows: "We will place several
generals and lieutenant-generals who are responsible for the Incident on
the reserve list but under the existing system none of them could become
War Minister in future and could bring about such a disgraceful event as
the February 26 Incident or an even more serious one than that. In order
to prevent such a calamity, we intend to make the system one under which
generals and lieutenant-generals on the reserve list cannot become Ministers."

Moreover the Vice-Ministers of War and Navy said, "As the Premier has
already consented to this bill, we want it to be passed quickly." After I
asked the Premier about that. I prepared a Cabinet bill and submitted it to the Cabinet conference.

In the conference Premier HIROTA asked TERAOCHI, the Army Minister, and next NAGANO, the Navy Minister, "Will this reform not lead to a situation in which those commanded to form the Cabinet will find it difficult to appoint future War and Navy Ministers?" They both answered, "There is no fear that such a situation will arise." With this exception, no special utterance was made and the bill was passed in its original form.

I did not ascertain how each Minister thought about the bill and why he consented to it. Only Mr. BABA, the Finance Minister, expressed his opinion directly to me when I spoke with him about it before the conference.

"Enforcement of military discipline is a serious question in hand and a very difficult task, but the War Minister is resolved to take it upon himself and carry it out at any cost. Now that he eagerly desires this reform in order to perform the task, the Cabinet reforms the government organization to save his face but in return for that, he shall enforce military discipline thoroughly. That is the best course for the Cabinet to take, I think."

Thus he indicated his consent to the original bill.

There are some who hold that the reform caused the Army to participate in politics afterwards. I will relate one or two facts as material for judging whether this observation is right or wrong. The formation of the HIROTA Cabinet naturally took place before the reform of the Army and Navy Ministries and to choose ministers from generals and lieutenant-generals on the reserve list was still permissible from the legislative point of view. Informing his Cabinet however, HIROTA met with several demands from
the Army concerning the selection of the Ministers and if he rejected those demands, it was feared that he would be unable to get an Army Minister. His attempt to form the Cabinet met with great difficulty; he continued negotiations for about a week after he had received the Imperial mandate and during that time the formation was several times in danger of aborting, but finally, after acceding to most of those demands, he succeeded. In this case the system under which Ministers could be selected from generals and lieutenant-generals on the reserve list was of no use in preventing the Army from participating in politics.

Next, when the AdISO Cabinet was formed in July, 19th Year of Showa (T.1. 1944), the War and Navy Ministers were required to be generals and lieutenant-generals on the active list in accordance with the government organization of the War and Navy Ministries; but Admiral YONAI who was on the reserve list was appointed Navy Minister. In order not to conflict with the rules of the government organization however, Admiral YONAI was placed on the active list just before he was inaugurated, with the special consideration of the Emperor. In this case even the reform could not prevent a general officer on the reserve list from becoming Navy Minister.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/\S/ TSUGIT., Daizaburo (seal)
I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 27 Jan., 1947
ナク原基ノ通決定マシタ

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立テテ先々ハ改正スル其代リ陸軍ノ賛正ヲ徹底ヲニ於テフナ

テニノ遂合内局ヲ期セヒ期デニカナカレマシ

明カニサラミタ

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ナクハ陸軍
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）一月十三日於東京小石川自宅

供述者
次田 大三郎

右ハ當立言人ノ面ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ聴録シ

同日
於東京郊小石川區大森町西一供述者宅

立會人
塙健士

井

ふ
Translation

Report on the Examination of the Revision of Imperial Ordinance on the Organization of the War Ministry and One Other Subject.

We have been appointed members of the Committee of Examination with regard to revisions in the Organization of the War Ministry and of the Navy Ministry which have been referred to the Privy Council for deliberation. We held a committee meeting on the thirtieth of last month and listened to explanations given by the Ministers of State and the government officials concerned and have made a thorough examination of the subject matter.

The two points in question have for their purpose to revise the stipulations with regard to qualifications in the appointment of Ministers and Vice-Ministers for the War Ministry and the Navy Ministry. It is to be noted that the stipulations in the organizations of the War and Navy Ministers prescribing that those who are appointed Ministers (full general or lieutenant-general in the case of Minister of War and full admiral or vice-admiral in the case of Minister of the Navy) or Vice-Ministers (at one time was called secretary-general) (lieutenant-general or major-general in the case of Vice-Minister of War and vice-admiral or rear-admiral in the case of Vice-Minister of the Navy) that would limit them to generals or admirals on active service originated in the thirty-third year of Meiji (T.N. 1900) (vide remark No. 1 of the attached list to the revised Organization of the War Ministry by Imperial
Ordinance No. 194 of the thirty-third year of Meiji and remark No. 1 of the separate list to the revised organization of the Navy Ministry by Imperial Ordinance No. 194 of the same year). Later, in the second year of Taisho (T.N. 1913) the above-mentioned limitations were rescinded by Imperial Ordinance No. 165 of the second year of Taisho (T.N. 1913) relative to the revision of the Organization of the War Ministry. Remark No. 1 of the attached list was rescinded and by Imperial Ordinance No. 169 of the same year relative to the revision of the Organization of the Navy Ministry remark No. 1 of the separate list was rescinded), thereby making it clear that those to be appointed Ministers or Vice-Ministers of War and of the Navy were not to be limited to generals or admirals on active service. These have been effective up to the present day. It is further to be noted that all these revisions of the organizations were not referred to the Privy Council for deliberation. According to explanations given by the Ministers concerned with the revisions now proposed, the following points are pointed out: Ministers of War and of the Navy come under the system of the Supreme Command and bear the heavy responsibility of directing and controlling the officers and men of the Army and the Navy who are subject to the Supreme Command, of maintaining strict military discipline and of keeping up a solid unity of the entire Army and the Navy. Vice-Ministers assist their Ministers, put departmental affairs in order and supervise the work done by
the bureaus and the Divisions. Therefore it is actually essenti-1 that both the Ministers and the Vice-Ministers be officers on active service who are under the system of the Supreme Command and have powers of command under the Supreme Command. Moreover, in the case of the Army, the results, following the above-mentioned revision of organization in the second year of Taisho (T.N.: 1913) procedure of handling affairs in the War Ministry, the General Staff Office and the Department of Military Education brought about duplication of work and waste of personnel causing great inconvenience. In addition, the Army has come to feel an urgent necessity, for remedial measures to be taken with regard to the unfortunate incident recently having taken place not only to establish command authority, to enforce military discipline, and to strengthen the unity of the Army, but also to try to carry out improvements in the existing system in order to bring about economy in personnel and to expedite the work handled. For these reasons, it should be requisite that Ministers and Vice-Ministers be limited to general officers on active service. Moreover since the above-mentioned revision of organizations in the second year of Taisho (1913) and up to the present day, there has not been on instance of a general or an admiral other than those on active service having been appointed Minister or Vice-Minister of War or of the Navy. Reflecting on this fact, it is appropriate to have matter express by stipulated in provision and make things correct with the fact both in name and reality For these reasons and in order to revert to the old system which
was in force prior to the second year of Taisho (1913) to limit the qualifications for appointment for Ministers and Vice-
Ministers of War or of the Navy to generals or admirals on active
service that it is proposed to introduce the two points in
question to carry out partial revision in the existing organiz­
atons of the War Ministry and of the Navy Ministry respectively
by adding the clause, "Those who are appointed Ministers or
Vice-Ministers shall be generals or admirals on active service"
to the beginning of the remarks of the attached and separate
lists of the respective Organizations.

After giving due consideration, it is clear that the two
points in question have for their object to restore the old
system with regard to qualifications in the appointment of
Ministers and Vice-Ministers of War or of the Navy and to limit
them to generals or admirals on active service by stipulations
in the Organization. And although at the present time there
may still be some concern regarding the reason why the said
limitation stipulated in the Organization was removed in the
past, the revisions now proposed can be recognized as a timely
measure in bringing the control of the Army and the "Navy to
perfection taking all things of the present into consideration.
Therefore, the Committee of Examination has unanimously decided
that the two matters in question shall be approved exactly as
they are.
We have the honor to report the above as the result of examination.

The 6th day of May of the eleventh year of Showa (TN: 1936)

To the President of the Privy Council,

Baron, HIRO-NUMA,

Chairman of the Committee of Examination

Privy Councillor, KAWAI, Misa

Members of the Committee of Examination

Privy Councillor, Viscount, ISHII, Kikujiro
Privy Councillor, ARIMA, Ryokitsu
Privy Councillor, H. RA, Kadô
Privy Councillor, MUTODA, Hajime
Privy Councillor, SUZUKI, So roku
Privy Councillor, FUJISAWA, Akunosuke
Privy Councillor, ISHIKAWA, Hizo
Privy Councillor, S. TANU, Toru
STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY


/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: He Haru, Ydo

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 10 Feb. '47
陸軍省官制改正ノ件ニ付本院及
審査委員ヲ命ゼラレノ月三十一日委員合ヲ開キ職務大臣及當局諸官ノ說明
ヲ聴ヒタルノヲスヲ以テ之ヲ書ヲ送ルヲ命令スルヲ付

従来ノ於テハ陸軍省及海軍省ノ官制中大臣及び次官ノ任用資格ヲ限定スル規
定ヲ改正ヲ加ヘントスルモノナルガ仰々陸海軍省ノ官制中大臣及び次官ノ任用資
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年間内ニ於テ改正ノ件ヲ治ルノヲ付

陸海軍ノ大臣ハ統帥ノ系統ニ属シ統帥ヲ作ヲ

前条ノ件ヲ以テ今日ニ及ベリ而シテ此等ノ官制改正ハ靴レモ本院ノ御

案ヲ寫ムヲ付

前條ノ件ヲ以テ今日ニ及ベリ而シテ此等ノ官制改正ハ靴レモ本院ノ御

案ヲ寫ムヲ付
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al.

Against

Araki, Sadao et al.

STORNI DEPOSITION (translation)

DEPONENT YOSI'ITO, Shinji

Having duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

On this 14th day of February 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT YOSI'ITO, Shinji (seal)

I certify that I am the duly assigned Administrative Officer for the Defense Section of the Major War Crimes Trial, and I was present on 11th February 1947 at the office of Yoshino, Shinji in Tokyo, Japan. I further certify that the foregoing affidavit was interpreted and translated to me by Hongo, Tomco. Sworn and subscribed to before me this 11th day of February 1947.

Bernard A. Hargadon
1st Lt., Inf.
Administrative Officer

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YOSIITO, Shinji (seal)
Statement Refuting Mr. Liebert's Testimony

I entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1913 as a junior clerk. (Later, in 1925, this ministry was remodelled into two independent departments, namely, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Ministry of Commerce and Industry). Since then, I had been continuously in charge of administrative affairs in the Commerce and Industry Ministry until I resigned in 1936, as vice-minister of Commerce and Industry. In 1937, I was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry and, as such, was responsible for formulating and executing war-time economic policies of our country for one year at the outset of the China Incident. Therefore, I can safely state that I was concerned either directly or indirectly with almost all of the various economic policies touched upon by Mr. Liebert in his testimony. I understand that Mr. Liebert regards those policies as acts preparatory for an aggressive war. Upon my part, I will try to explain briefly the reasons pointing to the contrary from the viewpoint of one of the government officials of that period.

I shall refrain from speaking here of the matters subsequent to the outbreak of the China Incident, because of the fact that economic measures adopted after the out-
break of the Incident are indicative of genuine wartime economy rather than reparations. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts made by the government then to check the aggravation of the Incident, the situation turned unfortunately from bad to worse. Thus, it was only natural that the control of various fields of domestic economy was being tightened from day to day. Furthermore, having retired from the service in 1933, I had no relation whatsoever with the events which occurred thereafter. I will explain the points raised by Mr. Liebert with regard to our commercial and industrial policies prior to the China Incident, dividing them for convenience’s sake, into two separate chapters.

(1) Policy for the Establishment of Basic Industries.

With World War I as the turning point, great changes had taken place in the relationship between war and economy both in theory and practice. Even previous to that, war was not wholly unrelated with the economic power of a country especially in such matters as food supplies, arms, munitions and military expenditures. However, it was usual for a major belligerent power to be able by itself to cater to all its needs within the limits of its own economic power, in as much as the scale of a war was smaller and efficiency and quality of arms undeveloped. Had
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There had been shortages in some particular articles, it could always avail itself of supplies from neutral countries as there had never been a case of the entire world being involved in the same war. For instance, Japan fought the Russo-Japanese War relying on her loans from the United States and Great Britain; in other words, she fought on while importing materials necessary for the prosecution of war. However, international trade was completely interrupted in World War I as the major powers of the world were practically all involved in the tumult of the war. Battles which were waged on an enormous scale called for the exhaustion of all economic resources. Especially, the advent of high explosives, aircraft and chemical arms such as poison gas proved the existence of grave deficiencies in the past military and naval armaments as a means of national defence. Therefore, it became a matter of common sense in formulating economic policies of a country to strive at all costs for the building-up of necessary industries in order to guarantee its independence and security. This practice which started during war time remained as an important factor even in the management of the post-war economy in every country. One would readily understand the inevitability and reasonableness of the facts pointed out by Mr. Liebert, if one recalled that the economic thought prevalent and the policies adopted after World War I were reflected in the practical measures taken by the powers since that time.
I shall try to explain a few instances on the basis of Mr. Libert's statement.

a) Dyes and Glycerine

It was shown by the German dye industry in the course of World War I that high explosives and poison gases could be manufactured in the process of making dyes. Prior to the war dye manufacturing was monopolized by Germany, the rest of the world depending on her for its supplies. Therefore, a decision was adopted in 1917 at a conference among the allied powers in Paris recommending the development of the dye industry in various countries for the reason that, although it was a belated step to be of any use in that stage of the war, a monopoly of the world's dyes market by the German dye industry could not be allowed to continue as it would remain a menace to the world peace. The powers suffered from a famine of dyes due to the stoppage of the imports of German dyes while the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan frantically pushed ahead their respective dye industries. Established then in England was the Government supported British Dye-stuff Corporation which, if my memory serves me right, later was merged with the Imperial Chemical Company. In the United States companies such as Dupont and the National Aniline Co. were set up. Also in our country, which was then in need of dyes as well as glycerine enacted in 1917 a law called the
"Law for the promotion of the manufacture of dyes and medicines." On the strength of this law the government set up two companies, one for the manufacture of dyes and the other of glycerine, which it guaranteed against all losses and for the payment of an 8 per cent dividend on their paid up capital. This method of guarantee was continued until after the war, even after the expiration of the term of ten years of governmental support, subsidies per unit were paid to the dyes produced. It is a well-known fact that both the United States and Japan enforced the import license system when they again imported German dyes after the termination of the war. For its inception the Japanese dye manufacture is indebted to the policies of protection and encouragement, however lukewarm they may have been. That it would be turned into an arsenal of chemical arms in case of war was a foregone conclusion since the time of its establishment. The same applies to the case of glycerine. The production of glycerine was negligible before the war since it was made only as a by-product of the manufacture of soap and the bulk of the demand was met by imports from abroad. Hence the manufacture of glycerine had to be started by dissolving fatty acids using as the basis beef tallow imported from Australia. This was easily done as the process was not so difficult technically as compared with the manufacture of dyes, so much so that the payment
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of government subsidies was discontinued before the expiration of the ten-year term. However, consular fish oil was later used as the raw material for manufacturing fatty acids, as it was considered prejudicial to national defence to depend on the supply of beef tallow from abroad. Since fish oil could be obtained in large quantities from inshore fisheries, it was decided to export it abroad in peace time and use it as the basis for the manufacture of glycerine in case of an emergency. Therefore, it was only natural that the production of glycerine was boosted following the outbreak of the China Incident as the war-time economy developed in Japan.

b) Iron Production.

The establishment of the iron industry was a pending question in our country since the restoration of 1868, as it is an industry so basically important among the industries of a nation that the modern period following Industrial Revolution, has also been called the "era of iron and coal." This, however, was a difficult task for our country which had little iron ore and coal resources for the manufacture of iron. The Japanese iron industry went through successive changes from the time of the inauguration of the Yawata Iron Works after the Sino-Japanese War to 1933 when the Japan Steel Manufacture Co. was established. It would suffice to mention here the fact that the Japan Steel Manufacture Co. was not found in a single day, as I cannot afford to recount here in detail the history of the iron industry in Japan. The Law for the Promotion of
Iron Manufacture, providing for special privileges and the power for compulsory use of land to protect the iron industry, has been enacted since 1917 when a dearth of iron occurred due to World War I. As early as in 1916, the government instructed the Board of Investigation of Iron Manufacture to coordinate the governmental and civilian iron productions despite the fact that the development of the civilian iron industry was still negligible as yet. A report was made by the Board of Investigation of Emergency Financial and Economic Affairs, during the period of the financial depression, brought about as an aftermath of World War I, recommending that large-scale joint-management of the governmental and civilian iron foundries should be made with the Nippon Iron Works as its nucleus. In the meantime, the government's basic policy towards the iron industry changed. Utmost importance was first attached by the government to iron manufacture relying on pig iron imported from the Chinese Hen Yeh Pin Corporation. Later, a complete process of steel manufacture was adopted in view of economizing fuel and obtaining by-products such as gas and tar.

It was not a long time ago that a well-rounded iron industry was firmly established in Japan when arrangements had been made to import coal and coke from China and iron-ore from Korea, China and the South Seas. The Extraordinary Industrial Council, which met in 1939 to discuss measures to overcome the prevalent economic depression, decided in con-
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Oclusion to set up a single iron manufacturing company by consolidating the government-owned Yamato Iron Company and civilian iron foundries mainly manufacturing mild iron or ordinary steel materials. It was thus that the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company came into being.

c) Petroleum

The output of petroleum in our country during the period between World War I and the beginning of the Showa Era (1926 and later years) was only about 300,000 kilolitres. Even so, the demand for petroleum in our country in 1910-1920 was not so great that until 1920 Japan could meet half of her domestic demands with her home production. However, the demands for petroleum, especially benzine, increased considerably along with the popularization of automobiles and the development of the manufacture of rubber and process with the production of petroleum at home remaining on the former level, its proportion against the domestic demands became nothing but a trifle in recent years. Therefore, the government conducted, after World War I, various studies and investigations of measures for obtaining an adequate supply of petroleum and had the necessary installations made. Subsidies paid for encouraging the prospection of oil deposits since 1900 than a geological survey was conducted and, with a view to making studies in liquid fuels, the Fuel Research Institute was set up as a governmental organization whose
mission was to conduct researches in low temperature carbonization and coal liquefaction. No way was found, however, to alter the fact that the main portion of the oil supplies had to be imported from abroad in order to satisfy the domestic demands. But the importation of gasoline particularly was controlled practically by the American Standard Oil Company and the British Rising Sun Petroleum Company.

There have also been established recently petroleum refineries which rely on imported crude oil. A strange phenomenon was presented in about 1932, when the retail price of gasoline in Japan became cheaper than in any other market in the whole world, as both Japanese oil refineries and the American and British companies held large stocks of gasoline and competed intensely among each other.

Competition between the Japanese and foreign companies soon ended following the conclusion of a mutual agreement between them. But in 1933, there appeared again signs of excessive competition among oil dealers, as the importation of gasoline from Soviet Russia was started anew. Although a cheap price of gasoline was welcome, it would ultimately have proven disadvantageous to the consumers if the market were plunged in confusion due to extreme over-stocking and competition. The Law for the Petroleum Industry was therefore enacted in 1934 with a view to stabilizing the oil market. This law stipulated, on one hand, that the govern-
ment would guarantee to the existing oil refineries and importers the protection of their vested business interests but, on the other hand, it made them bear certain obligations towards the government, one of them being that of keeping stocks. Originally dealers held, as a rule, stocks of oil sufficient to cover about three months in order to ensure smooth operation of their business. However, it was ordered that this be increased to a six-months supply, but there was not a single reason given that it was for military purposes. The purpose was to ensure a sufficient supply for the domestic industries. To order the dealers to retain a certain fixed quantity under certain specified conditions followed the example of French legislation. At any rate, in as much as our petroleum market was under the control of foreign petroleum, if, in case our supply is cut off by some circumstances, it would place our country into very great difficulties. Although possession in stock of a six-month supply does not necessarily mean that the stock would ensure security, the idea was nothing more than that in the meantime further supplies could be obtained. As it was thought by the legislative authorities that the importation of Soviet gasoline would make the two Anglo-American companies momentarily feel uneasy, the policy would be to permit, in principle, importers to monopolize the importation of petroleum in the future which would induce them to gladly keep a three-month stock.
However, upon the enforcement of the law, it became clear that the two Anglo-American companies would not agree to keep stocks over and above what they already had from the standpoint of their business requirements. Thus the dilemma was confronted that the law would be ignored and that furthermore if we could not have the two companies import oil, we would face difficulty. Thereupon, representatives were sent by the head offices of the Anglo-American companies to Tokyo where frequent negotiations were conducted. As a result, a compromise was reached whereby the two companies also would keep a six-month supply in stock as provided by the law but the government would pay, in return, the cost of the petroleum, cost for the construction of oil tanks, cost of depreciation of the oil during the said period, cost of insurance, interest, etc. Even in case of negotiations with the Ministry of Finance in connection with the payment of the costs, the purpose of stocks referred to above would be based upon industrial requirements. If the purpose were military, then the request would be made out of the Army and Navy expenditures. It was the opinion of the then Finance Minister the late Takahashi, Morokito that a request for funds under the guise that it would be used for national defence, hiding behind the government department in charge of the industrial matters, cannot be permitted. That was the reason why the costs referred to were included in the appropriations assigned to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
d) Construction of good ships.

I was connected with the program for dismantling old ships and building superior vessels enforced in 1932 as a member of the committee formed for that purpose, although the matter was principally under the charge of the Communications Ministry. Prior to this and during the time of depression after 1929, investigations had been made by the Commerce and Industry Ministry with a view to rationalizing the shipbuilding industry. In my understanding, the shipbuilding industry does not limit itself only to the construction of the ship itself but is also linked with numerous other industries because of the necessity of installing various equipments in the ship's interior, which fact makes it a composite industry. Therefore, the rise or fall of the shipbuilding industry affects, needless to say, shipyards as well as a number of other industries, particularly hard hit among them being medium and small-scale industries. According to the result of the special studies conducted in those days, it became known that more than half of the shipping charges were being spent for the benefit of industries other than shipbuilding. Therefore, the problem whether or not there is work in the shipyards is closely related with the problem of unemployment in other industries. It was from this point of view that the program for dismantling old ships and building modern and superior
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vessels was formulated in 1932. It was only natural that the policy of building modern and superior vessels was adopted in as much as the shipping charges constituted an important element for maintaining our international trade balance as a source of revenue other than from ordinary trade. The same explanation can be given to the case of the enforcement by England of the Trade Facility Act in 1921. The said law provided from the viewpoint of the prevention of unemployment, for the government's guarantee of payment covering both the principal and interest of the loans raised by the shipbuilding companies. Before the law was abolished in 1927, the government had guaranteed for the loans totalling £74,251,780, of which more than 21,500,000 pounds or about 30% were raised by civilian shipyards, ranking first among the companies. I believe that this example is ample proof of the importance attached to the shipbuilding industry as a means to cope with the depression and to give relief to unemployment.


The movement for the rationalization of the industries was started in our country in 1930-1931 following the worldwide depression of 1929. In those days, it was not a problem which merely concerned our country but was an economic policy common to all the countries in the world including Britain, the United States, Germany, France and Italy. Our
country was rather late in following suit and the measures which we enforced were modelled after those of other countries. I cannot afford to idle away time here in explaining fully the basic ideology of industrial rationalization, suffice to say, it was a problem of readjusting industries which had sprung up in all countries like so many mushrooms after the rain during World War I. All the belligerent powers had not only expanded their existing industries but also had set up new industries, as best they could, in order to produce various articles for the supply of which they had depended on other countries prior to the war. This tendency was not limited only to the belligerent powers, but neutral powers and also to adopt economic policies of self-sufficiency as the result of the complete paralysis of international trade. As a result, world economy was confronted when the war ended, with extremely excessive supplies as compared with the demands. In addition to it, the purchasing power of the countries had been decreased tremendously due to war-time dissipation.

Therefore, it was incumbent upon the world powers then to adopt new economic policies whereby to readjust and wind up war industries. The execution of such policies however, would have given rise to severe unemployment in various fields of industries. It was something that the statesmen of a country were utterly unable to do at a time when the current of labour unrest was sweeping all over the world. Hence, efforts to maintain industrial equipments and installations, expanded
or commenced during the time of the war, were made at unreasonable costs. The universal economic principle of "Give and Take" was not observed any more by the powers which now followed the policy of "Take and Take." One would readily understand the situation which prevailed if one recalled measures taken by the countries at that time in order to encourage the use of domestic products. In England, even postage stamps bore a slogan discouraging foreign products and which branded those using foreign articles as "traitors." Our country also followed suit by starting in the late 1920's, a movement for the promotion of the domestic industries and use of home products. It was then that we realized afresh the necessity for firmly establishing the manufacturing industries which would become the foundation of all the industries of a country.

Discussions were made of the measures aimed at establishing such industries as iron manufacturing, air nitrogen fixation, ball bearing, soda ash and petroleum. In spite of desperate efforts, however, there appeared no prospects of recovery, as it was a case of economic depression resulting from a disparity between demand and supply, excessive supply, and over-capitalization of the industries. Especially the peculiar feature of our industry was that it largely depended on the numerous medium- and small-scale manufacturers for the production of articles for export.
It is a well-known fact that some overseas markets were once plunged into such confusion due to reckless competition that vigorous complaints were made by the dealers of Japanese goods abroad. Although it seemed superficially true that the cheaper the articles importers buy, the greater would be their profits, it was not necessarily so, for the Japanese articles, which the importers thought were bought at a cheap price, would be undersold by still cheaper articles that would flow into the market a short while later, thus incurring ultimate loss to the earlier importers.

Japan was flooded then with complaints, coming from all over the world, for tagging unnecessarily low prices to her goods and with requests to give even if higher, more stable prices to her export articles. Japan was thus confronted with the necessity to maintain order at least among those of the medium- and small-scale industrialists who were manufacturing important export items and to suppress reckless and excessive competition among them. However, we were reluctant to allow the government's authority to interfere wantonly with popular economic activities, in as much as our successive cabinets, since the Meiji era, had been observing the principle of Free Industry as their golden rule. As a result, the system of the industrialists' associations was devised with a view to maintaining order in the same line of trade. Nevertheless, even when the majority of the industrialists had reached an agreement of
views, there always remained a handful or perverse heretics, who, far from opposing the agreement itself of the association, hoped inwardly for the materialization of the agreement among the members of the association to act freely as "outsiders" and reap unreasonable profits by taking advantage of the control enforced by the associations. It may be said that they formed a sort of "parasitic industry." Therefore, it became unavoidable to exercise the government's authority to cope with such practices, for, had it been left unrestrained, order could not be maintained in the fields of medium- and small-scale industries nor their wholesome development expected.

It was purely in this sense that control was enforced on the association system. It aimed, namely, at compelling the minority that has not joined the association to comply with the agreement of the association, in cases where the majority of the members autonomously concluded an agreement in order to maintain order and stability within the field of their own industry. Simultaneously, a policy was adopted whereby the state supported the community institutions of the association so that the industrialists would benefit by joining the association also in respect to their individual business arrangements. At the outset, this policy was applied exclusively to the medium- and small-scale manufacturers of important export articles. However, shortly after the enforcement of the said system, it became known...
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that the distinction between the products for domestic use and those for export purposes was not necessarily clear, and that excessive competition among medium- and small-scale manufacturers of the articles for domestic use also tended to bring about harmful confusion in the field concerned. The law was, therefore, revised so as to make it applicable without distinction to all medium- and small-scale industries. Meanwhile, the government assumed in the beginning, an attitude of laissez-faire towards comparatively large-scale industrialists, as it took the view that they would be different from the medium- and small-scale industrialists who had little culture, technique and experience and that, if they wished to avoid the harms of wanton competition, the large-scale industrialists should and would arrange their matters by their own hands. While the worldwide economic depression was being aggravated with the year 1929 as the turning point, Japan, on her part, adopted a number of counter-measures including the lifting of the gold embargo, which however, resulted momentarily in a complete suffocation of our industrial activities. Just then, the government was going ahead with its efforts for industrial rationalization and assisting in various ways the large-scale industries such as shipbuilding, fertilizer, electricity, machines, iron and cement, in effecting their liquidation, joint-management or merger. But none of such efforts brought about a satisfactory settlement owing to diverse reasons. It was then that
the government came to take the view that the state should exercise its authority also on the large-scale industries at the time of an economic crisis. Under those circumstances, the Law For The Control of Vital Industries was enforced in 1931. Judging from its name, the said law seems to be strongly tinted with the ideology of Totalitarian economy, but, by examining its content, one finds that it is not so in the least.

This law aimed, as a whole, at the controlling of medium- and small-scale industries and at voluntary agreement among the industrialists in the same line of trade. It was based upon the principle that the state would intervene with its authority to control the minority of the industrialists only when it did not comply with the desires of the majority. It was, therefore, purported to allow the wielding of the authority of the government in order to satisfy the needs of the national policies against the desires of the majority of the industrialists. It was, it may also be said, a measure for promoting cartels. Opinions are divided as to whether cartels should be supported or discouraged and every country has its own practical policy which may differ from that of any other country. Whereas the United States government placed the trusts under a strict control since the enactment of the Sherman Act prohibiting the trusts, The National Industry Recovery Act enforced by President Roosevelt openly announced the government's support.
and protection of the trusts and cartels as a means to overcome the emergency. The European countries are generally prepared both for supporting and controlling them according to the circumstances.

With respect to the cartel question, the Japanese government drafted cartel legislation generally using as reference studies made and published by the League of Nations. Among the stipulations in the law for the control of vital industries, there are stipulations for the control of cartels in addition to those for their promotion. The order for the registration of control agreements are in line with the idea of giving them due publicity. It appears as to be nothing more than registration, but as a matter of fact it follows the principle of the Clayton Act in the United States which seeks to expose such matters widely to public opinion and criticism by giving publicity to the contents of such measures, etc. which is considered to be more preferable than control of penalties. Plan for industrial rationalization in our country, especially the various plans in connection with the control of enterprises, follows the orthodox methods practiced by the various countries since the World War I and does not, in any way, deviate from those methods. The establishment of the Special Measures Law of 1937 concerning import and export restrictions falls into an entirely different category. This is a basic law for the enforcement of war-time economy. A number of war-
time economic laws were created on the basis of the fore-
goingly law, but this is a measure adopted by other countries
as well out of the compelling necessities of the war and
requires no explanation.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, TOSOBARA, Tokisaburo, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Sworn Deposition of YOSHINO, Shinji is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ TOKISABURO SETOBARA

Tokyo, Japan
Date March 4
事には全く関知しなかったからである。支那事変後の我國工政策においてニリールトー氏の指導した所に付して仰

に講義工業イギリスを解体して、進路及政策の上に非常な変化を来した。従来

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第一次大韓民族思想及び韓国外交政策に限らず、他にもこの問題を論じたものである。リーレルトのグリセリンの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。リーレルトの出荷に対する一言二語の意義を論じたものである。
兵器の工場化するころは当初よりの圍城であった。グリセリンに付した技術が格別困難でなかったので容易に目的を達することが出来た。政府の援助も半分の期間話題に打つった位であった。従って技術が進化した為に前回の結果の為に現状の成果に至っても當然の結果である。

これに塩の紹介の為にグリセリンの成否を計る為に経過に伴ってグリセリンの強弱が増大したこ
石油や電力などでは、石油のエネルギーは大分違う。

石油を原料とし、いわゆる石油化学工業が行われる。石油化学工業は、石油から炭素を含む化合物を製造する。

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足らのもので最近にはなってある。さて第一次大戦後政府に於
ても石油の資源に係る方策に付けて色々な開発研究をし、又施設
される所があった。既に石油資源の開発の方法には昭和三十三年の
地質調査以降、試験発動の器の補助金と大出した液体燃料の研究
の反に一本二〇年政府成立として燃料研究所を設け、低圧発動
ガソリン化工業の研究を進めた。當時国内の炭田の大部分は外油
の供給に待たされる傾向を来たし、石油の研究を進むことを
を左右していた。尤も原油を外国から輸入して石油業を賑わせ
にガソリン市場は世界のどの市場よりも早く安価で雲々富沢による
に防止策を打つ必要に迫られたが、一九三〇年には已に石油の
躍進が見られ、又過言な製造が進むに近づかつて来た。安部
はよいが短縮した交通機動力に於いてより高める力が必要である
も、現在のところはまだ早目ではない。
油商の目的を以て一九三四年石油業法の制定を見たのである。之は一方、政府に就して成る負担及業務の減少の為に、政府の指示があらたに六ケ月分に随分することを命じたのである。元来金商をしては其業者を過激に為すの態度であったが六月分に随分することを命令したのである。政府に出るに一九三四年の石油の保有は政府出ることを油商の立会に硬ったのである。何れの石油を調達して来たかを調査することを必要とすることであるから、調査は著しく困っている。月分の石油を調達して来たかを調査することであるから、調査は著しく困っている。
ある都会の建造、一九三二年の都庁議事録の建造、計画について述べた。それより前一九二九年以後の不確実時代に造られた工事の合理化方策を講じて論じたことはあった。その都合の建築家の意見に基づく方策を講じて論じた。その都合の建築家の意見に基づく方策を講じて論じた。
九一一年のTrade Facility Act の適用についての流れ。この法案は失
失の防止の観点から日本政府が元村支那の世界を
したのであるが、一九二七年の本法改正にあたり、七千四百三十円
を占めていた。以降五年にまた数度の改正を経て定
案を造起したが、次第に足を踏む。
ルフノは、頃より今日非常に奨励で仕入れたと思わぬ、日本商
品の進出は昨日冬に安値で切崩されるから、経済団体に思ふのが高い
 DEAL DOC y 690

と云ふのは、倭国に今日非常に奨励で仕入れたと思わぬ、日本商
品の進出は昨冬に安値で切崩されるから、経済団体に思ふのが高い

進歩を発動することは已むと待たない。組織圏度の結果はこの意外に外を

しめしとする場合に、之に加入させざる大数者を強制して組織の安定に

しても直しくあるのと同一の結果を発達せしめんとする場所であった。同時

に組織の共同運行に對して組織の安定に

助し組織に加入することに結局前者の私経済的利害に一応合致する政策を

によっても直しくあるので、政策を改正して発生品のみでなく一般の中小工業に

も直しく用するに至ったのである。比喩の大義を工業に関しても政府

は當然自由改進の課題を課す。然しその底線は勿論その底線に踏み入れなければ

中小工業者の知く政策、技術、訓練のない道中とは絶えず、大工業者に

自分進で自分等の命は末至してゆくべきであり、又又進でであろうとの見

方である。然も二十九年を契機とする世界恐慌の不況を救済策として

他方の救出政策等の著者はとも結んで、我國の発展結果は一時火の消えた

15
工業の発展、発達、セメント等の大工業に対する政府の助長、助成が問題に挙げられた。この政府の助長、助成のためには、工業をより大きく、より高度に発展させ、国家の経済的発展を図るための措置が必要である。このためには、工業の発展を図るための法律、制度が必要である。このことは、政府の助長、助成のためには、工業の発展を図るための措置が必要である。このためには、工業の発展を図るための法律、制度が必要である。このことは、政府の助長、助成のためには、工業の発展を図るための措置が必要である。このためには、工業の発展を図るための法律、制度が必要である。このことは、政府の助長、助成のためには、工業の発展を図るための措置が必要である。このためには、工業の発展を図るための法律、制度が必要である。このことは、政府の助長、助成のためには、工業の発展を図るための措置が必要である。
助愛し、一方それが弊を取る用ををしてある。カルテル問題に付て
は新組織の出版にかかる五五年もあって、日本政府としては大体を
るとして哉を退革した。それば事務組織効果法の態度中にはカルテ
ル助長の退却が列挙を以て適むよりはその内容を公表して、歴く異論の
非議に収まるべきは米国のクレートン法によります。レーバー大統
理の訂定に関する組織会合に於てはこのとりも外に加える所をきるものである。若し夫れ一九三七年段
入の関連制に臨する臨時経済法の制定に至ってはこのとりよく遂を果にす
が制定せられたがこれ戦争の必要に何れの時代にも、何れの国に於ても
己たちを要する方策であつて、彼此相談を要する所であろう。
The United States of America, et. al.,

against

N.N. et. al.

Sworn

Deponent:  J.N., Takeshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
1. My name is ONO, Takeshi. I was born at TAKATA-MACHI, NISHI KUNIYA-GUN, OITA Prefecture on April 18, 1890. My present address is No. 2380, SAKUFAYAMA, ZU3HI-KACHI, YOKOSUKA City. I was graduated from the Law College of the Tokyo Imperial University in May, 1915, and entered the Ministry of Communications in November of the same year. I was Post Master of FUKUSHI and OKAYAMA; Chief of the Supervision Section of the Mercantile Marine Bureau and Director of the FUKAKOTO Communications Bureau before I became Director of the Mercantile Marine Bureau in July, 1935. I was appointed Vice Minister of Communications in January, 1938, and left the same post in March, 1939.

2. I should like to testify herewith as to the fact that Japan's recent policy for marine transportation and ship building had absolutely no war purpose but it was planned and carried out for purely economic purposes.

It is a well known fact that Japan, ever since the MEIJI Restoration, adopted a policy of encouragement and promotion of every phase of her industry in order to catch up, in some way or other, with the advanced countries in Europe and America. Being surrounded by sea on all sides and favored with other suitable conditions, Japan had special advantage for developing her marine transportation and ship building. However, due to her national
isolation during the TOUKUGAWA period, a policy was adopted to prohibit the building of larger-type sea going vessels and foreign navigation so that Japan held the lowest rank in this respect. In other words, there was almost nothing in existence with respect to this field which was worthy of mention. It is only natural, therefore, that the Japanese Government should have paid special efforts for the new establishment and encouragement of these enterprises. It was after 1887 that laws concerning these efforts were promulgated and the Ship-Building Encouragement Law and the Ocean Navigation Subsidy Law came into being. These two laws were enforced throughout the TAJIKO and the early part of the SHOWA periods, which encouraged and subsidized the building and commissioning of larger type vessels which were considered superior at that time. During this period, such events as the Sino-Japanese War, The Russo-Japanese War and the First World War took place; but it is beyond any doubt whatever that the policies above mentioned were planned for the preparation of these wars; on the contrary, they were simply motivated by the purely economic object as stated above, of elevating the standard of Japan's marine transportation as well as ship-building so that Japan's international trade would flourish among the powers in Europe and America. As a result of such measures these enterprises developed remarkably and the total gross tonnage of vessels at the beginning of SHOWA (1926) amounted to 4,000,000 tons and the volume of foreign goods obtained by these means was
so good as to come next to the export volume of raw silk and raw cotton.

Under the circumstances as mentioned above, the subsidy was put into effect in the promotion of the development of Japan's industries which had far continued to develop from the previous period.

3. Measures to Encourage the Improvement of Grades of Ships

The worldwide economic depression after World War I affected Japan by degrees. Japan's shipping and ship-building industries met with extremely adverse circumstances from the end of the Taisho era till the beginning of the Showa era.

Since the early days, Japan's shipping industry was developed by importing old ships from abroad until her shipping came to rank third in the world. The majority of these ships, however, were either outmoded ships or inferior vessels hastily constructed during wartime. Japan was then called a country next to Greece in the ownership of outmoded ships (see the appended Table I).

This fact not only interfered considerably with the efficient operation of her shipping, but also gave rise to frequent disasters at sea (see the appended Table II) around the end of the Taisho era or at the beginning of the Showa era. An unusually great loss of human lives involved in these disasters brought about severe criticisms against the Governmental policy of employing old ships.
Thus the financial depression dealt a severe blow on Japan's shipping, till the coal freight between Moji and Yokohama was reduced to an unprecedentedly low rate of 75 sen, and the lumber freight to North America to 46. The number of laid-up ships increased to such an extent (see the appended Table III) that no dock accommodation could be found.

In the last analysis the excessive ship-bottom and inferior quality of ships brought about this condition. Public opinion demanded, accordingly, that the Government should at once carry out a thoroughgoing re-adjustment of ship-bottoms and improvement in the grade of ships employed, thereby improving the condition of the shipping trade and eradicating the very cause of disasters at sea.

Because of excess ship-bottoms, ship builders received no orders for the construction of new vessels. This caused ship building facilities to remain permanently idle. The ship builders were strongly urged to rationalize the industry. They were obliged to resort to such temporizing measures as the construction of steel bridges, or in extreme cases, the manufacturing of daily necessaries such as furniture, wooden clogs, and other articles. A large number of workers lost employment in the ship building and affiliated industries, and to give them relief became an urgent necessity.

The measure in question was proposed and put into effect in view of such circumstances, after due consultation with national ship owners' association, ship builders association, as well as
labor organizations including seamen's unions

The measure aims at:

(a) improvement of the condition of the shipping trade;
(b) rationalization of shipping and the prevention of disasters at sea by the employment of ships of better grade;
(c) development of the ship building industry and giving relief to the unemployed by additional construction of ships.

When the measures were put into effect, the economic objectives were attained and shipping and ship building industries gradually recovered from the depression. The attention of the powers was drawn to Japan's success and both England and Norway adopted similar measures.

If the measure in question were a wartime measure, it is not conceivable that peace-loving nations such as England and Norway should have followed Japan's example.

It is our belief that such suspicion would undoubtedly be dispelled, if the following facts are taken into consideration.

A. A policy aiming at the reduction of ship bottom is rather contrary to war objectives. In fact, at the outset, the military was opposed to it. The measure resulted in scrapping 500,000 gross tons of old ships and building 300,000 gross tons of new ones. In addition to this, importation of foreign vessels was banned in May, 1933.
Def. Doc. 708

These facts demonstrate clearly that what Government had intended was an out and out economic measure to improve the ship trade by getting rid of surplus ship bottoms. That Japan's ship bottoms were actually reduced by the operation of the measure in question is shown in the appended Table IV.

B. The measure aimed at the improvement of the grade of ships owned by Japan. However, what the Government intended was superior economic performances of individual ships according to the manner of their employment and speed. For instance, the Government-required full speed for ships of 4,000 gross tons or over was usually but 13.5 knots. It is clear, therefore, that the Government did not have high grade ships of specially high-speed built in anticipation of a war. In certain quarters it has been alleged that Japan constructed ships for war purposes, because a considerable number of the newly built ships were of comparatively high speed in comparison with the cargo boats of other countries.

The fact is that Japanese ships carrying silk directly to New York via the Panama Canal were required to have high speeds in order to compete with the American trans-continental railways. Th their having high speed was an economic requirement. That a majority of ships built in conformity with this policy were commissioned for the New York route should clarify this point.

C. The measure in question stipulated that ships should be built at domestic yards, using domestically produced materials.
This is the natural result of the fact that the policy was a measure to relieve unemployment and does not warrant the criticism that it was formulated in anticipation of a war.

4. As a result, the shipping business was improved, excess of ship space remedied and building enterprises well under way to recovery. Therefore, after the 12th year of Showa (1937) this was abolished, and the construction of up-to-date ships was resumed. This, however, was but the materialization, with a limited amount of subsidies, of the long sustained wishes of those concerned which had not been realized. Competition for the Atlantic shipping among Great Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Italy and others, which vied with each other in building ultra-modern ships was of common knowledge to the world and had been the envy of the Japanese shipping concerns. It was quite natural for Japan which was the third shipping nation in the world to attempt the building of ships which surpassed them.

5. Policy of subsidizing ship building under the Iron Manufacturing Enterprises Law.

Steel used for ship building in Japan was imported first but later the imported steel was replaced by home manufactured steel as iron manufacturing industries developed in Japan. At the time imported steel was used, ship builders were requested to use steel of approximately the same price as that used by foreign ship builders; imported steel was excepted from import duty to prevent the
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comparatively high cost of ships, and simultaneously home manufactured steel was given a subsidy of a sum corresponding to the import duty. This policy was enforced from the twenties and this was stipulated in the Iron Manufacturing Encouragement Law. In 1937 this law was abolished to be replaced by the Iron Manufacturing Enterprises Law, when the remaining provisions were transferred to the new law and the same stipulations were enforced. Therefore, it is entirely out of place to consider the enactment of the Iron Manufacturing Enterprises Law as a measure for war purposes, because it was nothing more than the outcome of an economic demand to lower ship building costs to the level prevailing in Europe and the United States.

6. The Iron Manufacturing Enterprise Law

The Iron Manufacturing Enterprise Law which was enacted and enforced at the end of 1939 was passed over the objections of the Navy for the purpose of preventing the supervision of ship building yards by the Navy. It stipulates the license system of ship building, etc., in conformance with the general rule of supervision of other important industries. This is a matter to be placed, because of its nature, under control and aims at preventing unnecessary competition and confusion among the ship building concerns. Upon the enforcement of this law, the existing ship building yards were given licenses and thus the status quo was maintained. Although the provision for the grant of subsidies
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remained in the law, no subsidy was given under this law. In conclusion, it is not to the point to consider the enactment of the law as an act to make preparations for war.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**

*Note: The table above represents the distribution of certain data across different divisions, as indicated by the columns A, B, and E.*

---

In the 1921-30 edition of the given register book, and according to certain divisions of data, certain divisions of gross tonnage were recorded. Showing the number of steamers and passengers accordingly to certain divisions of gross tonnage.
Table II - A

Table showing loss of human lives (dead and missing) due to disasters at sea for the eight years between 1924 and 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Year</th>
<th>Passengers Steamers + Sailers</th>
<th>Total Steamers + Sailers</th>
<th>Crew Steamers + Sailers</th>
<th>Total Steamers + Sailers</th>
<th>Total Steamers + Sailers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>893</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>1449</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average 128   2    129         207        86         293         335         88         422
Table II - B

Percentage of total loss of Japanese vessels of over 100 tons.

(Investigation carried out by Lloyd's Underwriters' Association)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total No. of Ship Losses</th>
<th>Percentage against No. of Ships owned</th>
<th>Japan's total tonnage losses</th>
<th>Percentage against tonnage owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.96%</td>
<td>43,829</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>41,958</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
<td>51,156</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3.16%</td>
<td>54,158</td>
<td>1.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.65%</td>
<td>50,548</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
<td>70,333</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.82%</td>
<td>42,700</td>
<td>1.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>44,576</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>76,212</td>
<td>1.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>66,418</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>67,032</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
<td>64,070</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
<td>57.12%</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table III

Table showing tonnage of vessels laid up
(Only 1,000 tons gross and above)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1932</td>
<td>237,322 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1933</td>
<td>139,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1934</td>
<td>52,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1935</td>
<td>26,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1936</td>
<td>7,930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks: It amounted to 330,000 tons during the period between the end of 1930 and the beginning of 1931.
Table IV

Japanese Merchant Vessels (Steel Ships Only)

Over 100 g/t

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>G/t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,065,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,087,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,139,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,248,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,242,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,079,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4,044,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,073,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4,658,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5,343,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5,703,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6,051,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6,376,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5,942,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4,944,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2,564,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>20 (Aug.)</td>
<td>1,525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>21 (March)</td>
<td>1,294,778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On this 7th day of March, 1947

At No. 2330, Sakurayama, Yushi-cho, Yokosuka-shi

Deponent UNO, Takeshi (seal)

I, UNO, Takeshi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness: (signed) KIUCHI, Tatsuo (seal)

Witness: (signed) KIUCHI, Tatsuo (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

[Signature]

(Takeshi)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

[Signature]

(Seal)
Translation Certificate

I, SUGAI, Toshiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of the sworn deposition of OKE, Takeshi is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Toshiko Sugai

Tokyo, Japan

Date 11th March 1947
大道港ノ浚進ヲ栄ヲ振動シタルモノナルカニ此際日頃ノ戦線ノ為ノ計画セ
欧州大同盟ノ事業ヲ前記リタルモノ右ノ誤張ヲ之ノ観望ヲ最難ノ為ニ計画セ
ラレニ非サルコトハ滅に明瞭ニシテ前記ノ如ク数ニ戦線ノ海運ヲ造成結
ノ目的ニ由テタルコトハ毎日ノ実現ヲ余儀ナク其ノ結果ヲ國家ノ経済上
ク昭和ノ初ニハ昭和七年十月ヨリ実施サレタル結願改善ヲ進展退
右ノ政治ヲ終ヲ前期ヨリノ内シタル退ノ日本産業ノ進歩ヲ助长ヲ主
トシタルモノニ通ギズ
シテモルモレノ・ノ大分ハ時代ノ世界ノ体育ヲ多くノ小説ヲ書ケルノヲ望ムニシテハレール（別書ニ於テノミナラズ大正ノ後ノ物ヲ書ケルヲ願シ）

（別書第一）

シテモルモレノ・ノ大分ハ時代ノ世界ノ体育ヲ多くノ小説ヲ書ケルノヲ望ムニシテハレール（別書ニ於テノミナラズ大正ノ後ノ物ヲ書ケルヲ願シ）

トップモルモレノ・ノ大分ハ時代ノ世界ノ体育ヲ多くノ小説ヲ書ケルノヲ望ムニシテハレール（別書ニ於テノミナラズ大正ノ後ノ物ヲ書ケルヲ願シ）
日本政府は新造船舶での内地製船舶所の製造を優先し、船舶品質の向上に努める。その結果、船舶の安全性と航法性が大幅に向上し、国際市場での競争力が強化された。このため、国内の船舶産業は飛躍的な発展を遂げ、世界的に認知されるようになる。
五、補助の実施方法一覧

補助は次の三種類に大別される。

1. 前期補助
2. 中期補助
3. 後期補助

補助の額は、申請の内容及び実施の状況により、最高で60%を限度とするが、これ以上は支給しない。
斯ノノ際、立規ヲ防フ出ネル次第ナルノヲ言フノヲ要スルノニ於テ、シテハ寄席ヲ作スルヲ許可スルノヲ規則ノ定ハ存在スルモ定ハテハスペリテ、テテ言ハルノヲトスハ寄席ヲ作スルヲ許可スルノヲテテ、ナニヲ言ハルノニ於テハラレタルノヲナシテノ言ハルノヲ訂定スルヲ以テ斯ノニ於テハ寄席ヲ作スルヲ許可スルノヲ訂定スルヲ
以上
Showing the number of Steamers and Motorships according to certain divisions of Gross Tonnage, and according to certain divisions of Age, owned in Japan as recorded in the 1939-40 edition of Lloyd’s Register Book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country in which owned</th>
<th>Divisions of Tonnage</th>
<th>Divisions of Age</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>100 and under 500</td>
<td>1,091</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500 - 1,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,345</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,000 - 2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,000 - 6,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,000 - 8,000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>76,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,000 - 10,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,000 - 15,000</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>15,000 - 20,000</td>
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<td>33,600</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,000 and above</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>331,482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows the number of steamers and motorships according to certain divisions of gross tonnage and age, owned in Japan as recorded in the 1939-40 edition of Lloyd’s Register Book.
Showing the number of Steamers and Motorships according to certain divisions of Gross Tonnage,
and according to certain divisions of Age, owned in Japan as recorded
in the 1929-30 edition of Lloyd's Register Book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY IN WHICH OWNED</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF TONNAGE</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF</th>
<th>AGE</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDER 5 YEARS</td>
<td>10 AND UNDER 15 YEARS</td>
<td>15 AND UNDER 20 YEARS</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - 500</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>500 - 1,000</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>98,659</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>331,482</td>
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</table>

(Appendix No. 2)
Showing the number of Steamers and Motorships according to certain divisions of Gross Tonnage, and according to certain divisions of Age, owned in Japan as recorded in the 1929-30 edition of Lloyd's Register Book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY IN WHICH OWNED</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF TONNAGE</th>
<th>5 YEARS UNDER 10 YEARS</th>
<th>10 AND UNDER 15 YEARS</th>
<th>15 AND UNDER 25 YEARS</th>
<th>25 YEARS AND OVER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<td>33,600</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20,000 and above</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>331,462</td>
<td>915,373</td>
<td>1,330,073</td>
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935,638,130
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<th>昭和五年</th>
<th>昭和六年</th>
<th>昭和七年</th>
<th>昭和八年</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>七年</td>
<td>八年</td>
<td>九年</td>
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</tr>
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<td>合計</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>日本</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>総計</td>
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</tr>
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<td>区別合計</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Table IV**

Japanese Merchant Vessels (Steel Ships Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>G/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2,005,000</td>
<td>4,005,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>2,087,000</td>
<td>4,087,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1,876,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,660,000</td>
<td>4,248,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,624,000</td>
<td>4,242,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,785,000</td>
<td>4,177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
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<td>4,073,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1,924,000</td>
<td>4,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
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<td>4,358,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2,249,000</td>
<td>5,343,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,354,000</td>
<td>5,703,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2,573,000</td>
<td>6,051,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,626,000</td>
<td>6,376,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>2,445,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>2,025,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,539,000</td>
<td>2,564,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>1,294,778</td>
</tr>
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</table>

I have the honour today of addressing you on the foreign policy of Japan and presenting an outline of the recent developments.

As I stated last May at the Extraordinary Session of the Diet, the national policy of Japan aims at ensuring the stability of East Asia, to contribute thereby to the cause of world peace, as well as promoting the welfare and happiness of mankind by upholding international justice. And we have been striving earnestly and unremittingly toward the achievement of those aims.

In surveying the conditions of the world it is to be noted that the international political situation is still lacking in stability. In fact, it appears to be growing worse than ever owing especially to the activities of the Communist International, or the Comintern. In these circumstances, it is truly significant that there was concluded on November 25 last year an agreement between Japan and Germany concerning the Communist International. This agreement is intended for a common defence against the activities of the Comintern, whose tenets are not only incompatible with the national policy of our country but inconsistent with human nature itself.

The Japanese Government have always been endeavouring to suppress the Communist movement, which long since made its way all into this country. In China, subsequent to the adoption by the Kuomintang of a policy of toleration toward the Communist party, movement spread widely so that were established a few years ago "soviet Areas" in various parts of Kwangtung and Fukien, and the so-called "Communist-bandit armies" increased numerous.
localities. It was with grave concern that Japan watched the developments in China under the Red invasion. Then, in the summer of the year before last, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, convened at Moscow, passed a resolution and declared openly that certain countries including Japan and Germany were to be the major objects of its future operations. At the same time the Comintern adopted new tactics of campaign based upon the formation of the so-called "people's front," which has proved successful in several countries of Europe, especially in Spain where it has brought on a civil war which is raging even now attended with terrible scenes of fratricide. In East Asia the Comintern commenced skilfully to sovietize China while damaging the Sino-Japanese relations through a movement called "the Anti-Japanese People's Front" organized throughout that country. In Manchoukuo and also in Japan there appeared signs of the growth of Communist manoeuvres.

In the face of the operations of the Comintern, tenacious as they are ingenious, our Government were obliged to devise more stringent measures of defence and formulate an adequate policy for the protection of our national polity and the preservation of the stability of East Asia. Of course, we are seeking to achieve the purpose of defence and of detection and investigation through our domestic organs. But the Comintern is an international organization with a large number of branches scattered all over the globe, which maintain close contact between one another, and conduct their campaigns under directions from headquarters, each exploiting the peculiar conditions of its own territory. Therefore, measures for guarding against such operations should necessary be extended to an international scale. That is why Japan has concluded with Germany the present agreement providing for the exchange of information and the study of the necessary steps to be taken.
The object of this agreement is a joint defense against the Comintern and we should be glad to enter into agreement with any other country within the scope of that aim. Needless to say, the Japanese Government are not bound in any way outside the scope of the above-mentioned aim. It seems there have been those who entertained misunderstandings or misgivings regarding the character of the agreement. But I wish to state definitely that the conclusion of the agreement, which was dictated by the need of protecting our national polity and preserving the stability of East Asia, does not affect in the slightest degree our policy of promoting friendly relations with all Powers in the spirit of universal concord and harmony.

The Japanese Government are endeavouring to further the unity and solidarity between the peoples of Japan and Manchoukuo and to consolidate the neighbourly and inseparable relationship between the two countries. And for that purpose, we decided, as I stated at the previous session of the Diet, upon the abolition of our extraterritorial rights and the adjustment and transfer of our administrative rights in the South Manchuria Railway Zone. Under this policy, and as the first step, there was signed on June 10 last year a treaty concerning partial abolition of our extraterritorial rights and adjustment of our administrative rights in the South Manchuria Railway Zone. The conclusion of this treaty was hailed by the people of Manchoukuo with profound satisfaction, and its operation has since proved eminently successful. It is gratifying to us all to note that Manchoukuo is making steady and healthy progress along all lines, and the economic and commercial relation between that country and ours are growing more and more intimate.

It was some time ago that the Japanese Government proposed to China three
basic principles, hoping to effect thereby the much needed adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. However, in August last there occurred the Chongtu Incident, which was followed by a series of unfortunate incidents at Fakhoi and elsewhere. From an examination into the nature of these incidents we could see clearly that every one of them was not merely an ordinary case of murder or assault, but that they were all traceable to the anti-Japanese policy of China. While it was necessary to obtain settlements of individual cases as such, it was evident that unless we eliminated their underlying causes we could not possibly prevent the recurrence of similar incidents, nor could we protect the lives and property of our nationals and safeguard our rights and interests in China, and consequently we could never hope for a friendly and harmonious intercourse between our two nations. Therefore, in order to forestall the recurrence of any untoward incidents at their very source, the Japanese Government, while demanding utmost sincerity in the exercise of the control of all anti-Japanese agitations, invited the Nanking Government to discuss various questions, upon the solution of which depended the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. In other words, we desired that the Nanking Government, instead of stopping short at the negative policy of merely controlling the anti-Japanese movement, should go a step further and alter their attitude toward Japan which was one of the chief causes of anti-Japanese agitations; and we urged upon that Government to prove their sincerity on various concrete issues having to do with the rehabilitation of Sino-Japanese relations. Negotiations were begun at Nanking between the representatives of the two countries early September, and continued for over three months. Believing that in view of the Chinese attitude, indefinite prolongation of the negotiations would
only serve to bring on fresh complication, we demanded that the
Nanking Government put into practice those points on which both
sides had so far reached an agreement of view, leaving the
remaining questions to later conversations. Thereupon the Cheng-4
and Pakhoo Incident as such were settled on December 30.

As you may gather from what has been said, our negotiations v
China, having failed to produce as yet the anticipated results, h-
sumed to a standstill for the present. However, I am convinced th-
ese negotiations are of significant value in that they will serv-
as a stage in the progress of the further negotiations. Since our
fundamental policy toward China is directed most certainly toward
the collaboration and the friendship and the common prosperity of
the two countries, the renewal of the endeavours for the adjustme-
of Sino-Japanese relations with a fresh resolve and determination
not only an obligation of the two Governments but also a common

desire, I believe, of both nations.

As regards the incident at Sian, our Government took a fair
impartial attitude and watched the course of events calmly but wi-
grave concern. It is most fortunate for China that the affair is
being brought to an end without entailing serious consequences.
However, in view of the fact that Chiang Hseuh-liang came out for a
pro-Communist and anti-Japanese policy at the initial stage of the
incident, and that its final outcome is bound to have a far-reach-
effect upon the general situation of East Asia, our Government
are paying careful attention to further developments.

The policy of Japan toward the U.S.S.R. lies, as a matter of
course, in the maintenance and insurance of normal relations. In
order to enhance friendly
relations between the two countries through the solution of pending issues, our Government have continued to conduct negotiations during the past year regarding the revision of the fishery treaty, and the problems of border demarcation and settlement of disputes between the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo, and also have assisted in the negotiations between the Soviet authorities and the representatives of Japanese interests on the matter of extension of the period of oil prospecting in North Sakhalin. As regards this oil question, a contract was concluded in October extending the prospecting period by five years. The text of a new fishery convention was also drawn up in the middle of last November after deliberations lasting for one and a half years. But at the very moment when the instrument was to be signed, the Soviet Government asked for a postponement of the signature on the grounds of non-completion of the necessary domestic procedure, and thereafter persistently refused to sign. We called the attention of the Soviet Government repeatedly to the basic nature of Japan's fishery right in the northern waters and to the perpetuity required of the treaty intended to regulate the exercise of the said right. As the result of these later conversations a provisional arrangement was concluded at last on the 28th of December, which will permit our fishery enterprise to go unobstructed for the coming session. Our Government intend of course to continue negotiations regarding the signing of the above-mentioned new convention and expect to arrive at a settlement at an early date.

The establishment of Commissions for the Manchoukuo-Soviet border demarcation and settlement of disputes was proposed by our Government in the belief that such bodies would contribute substantially toward the prevention of disputes between Japan, Manchoukuo and the Soviet Union, and the harmonization of the tripartite relations. I may say that an agreement of views has been reached on all the basic
questions involved, excepting one or two points. And our Government hope to see this question settled as soon as possible.

Thus we are doing everything to establish peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. It is to be greatly regretted, therefore, that the Soviet Union only maintains disproportionately large armaments along the Manchoukuo frontier, but goes so far at times as to circulate rumours of aggressive actions on the part of this country. Should the Soviet Government appreciate the pacific intentions of Japan, reflect upon their own past attitude and seek to solve pending issues between the two countries, I believe that Soviet-Japanese relations would be soon put upon a normal footing.

Toward Great Britain our policy to strengthen the traditional relations remains unchanged. When the two countries, taking a broad view, give full and sympathetic consideration to each other's position, there can be no doubt that a way will be found of adjusting their interests. It is the intention of our Government to exert further efforts in that direction.

Japan's relations with the United States are of late happily improving, owing, I believe, as well to our consistent policy of contributing, in cooperation with that Power, to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, as to a deeper understanding on the part of the American people regarding the situation in East Asia. The Japanese Government will continue to spare no efforts in the cultivation and improvement of the cordial relations already existing between the two nations.

The naval limitation treaty among the world's three major sea powers, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, has expired with the past year.
Our Government, adhering as faithfully as ever to the principle of non-menace and non-aggression, have certainly no desire to initiate a race for naval construction. Indeed, we have seized every oppor
tunity to express our sincere aspirations for naval limitation and it is still the cherished hope of the Japanese Government that there will be concluded as soon as possible a just and fair treaty of limitation among the Powers concerned, to contribute to the cause of world peace.

Recently, we notified the Italian Government of our decision withdraw our legation in Ethiopia and to establish a consulate in stead. At the same time, the Italian Government assured us that they would give favourable consideration concerning the protection of our commercial and other interests in Ethiopia. Negotiations on that basis are now in progress. I should say that we have only taken what seemed to be the proper step in view of the actual situation and also in consideration of the friendly relations between our country and Italy.

Our Government are also desirous of establishing closer economic relations with the countries in the South Seas. Although there are those who misunderstand, or even attempt to discredit our intentions, we entertain no aggressive designs, but only seek to promote our trade and join efforts with those countries in the development of the natural resources through the furtherance of peaceful and friendly relations.

I am happy to say that Japan’s foreign trade, despite the numerous measures of restriction adopted by many countries, rose to an unprecedented volume last year, demonstrating the vigour and vitality of our nation’s economic and industrial life. As for the trade restrictions of other lands, they are of such character that there is no way to have them removed save through diplomatic negotiations. Our Government are doing their best in that regard. To cite a conspicuous
instance, some time ago our Government were compelled to invoke the Trade Protection Law against Australia in order to counter the measures of the Australian Government to restrict the importation of Japanese goods. Thereafter we initiated trade negotiations which were continued for seven months until toward the end of last year, when an amicable understanding was reached, and the relations between Japan and Australia have been restored to a normal basis.

As for the Netherlands Indies, through the intermediation of Governments of that country and of our own the shipping interests of the two countries concluded an agreement in the course of the past year. The conclusion of this agreement, which had been claimed by the Netherlands Indies as a postulate for any discussion on trade, paved the way to the trade negotiations between the Governments, which have been carried on with tangible results. Our trade negotiations with British India are also making satisfactory progress.

While carrying on these negotiations, our Government are also devoting their best efforts to the work of opening up new and promising markets everywhere, today nothing of preserving and enlarging the old, so as to bring about the expansion of our foreign trade as a whole.

At the Extraordinary Session last spring I stated that the growing trend toward the extension of international trade barriers was a matter of serious concern to a country like Japan, which could not secure the nation's economic existence except through ensuring the supply of raw materials and the markets for manufactured products. Since then there have arisen certain circumstances warranting a hope for the moderation of restrictive measures. However, despite this hope, generally speaking, the various trade barriers are being kept intact as they were. What is needed most this time, I believe, is that with a view
to restoring freedom of trade, the Powers should treat their colonial markets in the spirit which marks the provisions of the Congo Basin Treaty. This, side by side with the solution of the now seriously discussed problem of the redistribution of natural resources, should go far toward dispelling the atmosphere of universal unrest, and prove a most effective and timely contribution to the cause of world peace.

Finally, I wish to speak a few words on our international cultural work. The culture of a nation is none other than an expression of its national traits and a true appreciation of it leads to a basic understanding of that nation. The upholding of international justice and the realization of genuine co-operation among the nations of the world will only then be possible. Especially for Japan, the diffusion of her ancient and unique culture in foreign countries is of the utmost importance, since it will serve as a means to make the world understand the spirit underlying our national activities. With this point in view, our Government are intending to make further endeavours in the field of international cultural work.

Such is a brief outline of Japan's foreign policy and the progress of events in the diplomatic field. In conclusion, let me say that in the present complex and delicate circumstances, internal and external, the utmost care and caution are required of both our people and our Government in order to surmount the difficulties that confront Japan. The whole nation should be united in the determination and share in the efforts to carry out our national policy. From my heart, I appeal to you all for your ungrudging co-operation and collaboration.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 10 pages and entitled "The Address of Mr. Hachiro Arita, Minister for Foreign Affairs, of the Seventieth Session of the Diet, January 21, 1937." is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 13th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato
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以上ハ政府ノ外交方針及び政府ノ外交政策ノ大要テアリマス。
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaooru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 14 pages and entitled "The Address of Mr. Hachiro Arita. Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Seventieth Session of the Diet January 21, 1934." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 13th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato
GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN
Recent Trends In Its Scope and Operation

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International Secretariat
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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1940

PART II
"CLINICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION"

C. Reorganization of Executive Departments

2. LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE

No cabinet composed primarily of members of a party in the House of Representatives has held office in Japan since May 1932. Although the importance of this fact can be easily exaggerated, no survey of modern Japanese governmental changes would be complete without consideration of its causes. That the Japanese cabinet must be a coalition between different groups and that the influence of each group depends to a considerable measure on public opinion has already been suggested. For a few years following the promulgation of the Japanese Constitution the major parties in the House of Representatives were excluded from representation in the cabinet. It was soon discovered,
however, that this prevented effective operation of the constitutional system, and since about 1896 every cabinet, with one or two unsuccessful exceptions, has sought a working agreement with the Diet. This did not mean that the Diet was given control of either the composition or the policies of the cabinet; it was merely admitted to participation in the coalition. Such an arrangement is consistent with the provisions in the Japanese Constitution and with Japanese precedent. The parties, like other groups, sought to extend their influence and found support for their efforts in Western theories of constitutional government which assume, probably uncritically, that development toward full parliamentary control is a necessary or at least the "normal" path of political evolution. Post-war trends in other parts of the world were conducive to such opinions and, for a few years, principally from 1924 to 1932, party cabinets ruled Japan. Their control was never complete, however, for the traditional position of the civil and military services, the Privy Council, and the House of Peers could not be violated without recrimination and retaliation.

The course of Japanese politics during the late 1920's was punctuated by a series of clashes between the cabinet and the other organs of the government, ostensibly over such questions as financial aid to banks in the panic of 1927, the issuance of amendments to the Peace Preservation Law (Chiban Tsjit Ho) in the guise of an emergency ordinance, certain phrases in the Fact for the Renunciation of War, or the ratification of the London Naval Treaty. Each also represented a protest against the attempt to alter radically the political balance of power in favor of the parties in the House of Representatives at the expense of the peers, the Privy Council, the civil and military services and the jushin. The parties might have carried the day had they enjoyed genuine popular confidence. Instead it was common knowledge that bribery in elections was the rule rather than the exception and that party leaders depended on big business for the millions of yen necessary for each political campaign. Interference with elections through the party-controlled Department of Home Affairs was so common that it was said the government in power never lost an election. Corrupt deals between government officials and
private interests were frequently ruffled and occasionally exposed. The parties were therefore vulnerable to the countercharges of the non-elected organs whose share in cabinet control they were attempting to reduce.

The world depression and events connected therewith spelled failure for the party campaign, at least for the present. Economic collapse weakened the prestige of Western social theories. Japanese who had advocated greater powers for the legislature on the strength of Western experience found their arguments contradicted by a Western swing toward greater executive powers. Nationalism, resurgent in Japan as everywhere else, reinforced the arguments of those who wished to preserve the customary balance in political life. Growing recognition of the economic character of national defense and the anchorage incident increased the prestige and widened the legitimate concern of the professional military services. Crisis conditions, both economic and diplomatic, plus European precedents, led to demands for a parlorium on partisan strife and for the establishment of a coalition cabinet. In short, everything conspired to weaken the party campaign against the prerogatives of the other governmental organs. When the tottering 'Hakokou' Cabinet fell in December 1931 as a result of the advocacy of a coalition by one of its own members, it was already clear that, in the absence of far-reaching political reforms, no new party cabinet would have much hope for long life. It was reported that the prince, Prince Sionji, before nominating Inukai for the premiership, had warned the latter of the serious situation and had inquired whether he was confident of his ability to control it. Inukai was similarly warned by the usually liberal Asahi newspaper. 1/ The Seiyukai Cabinet, born under the cloud of exchange speculation, was criticized for failure to resign in acceptance of responsibility for an attempt on the life of the Emperor (the Sosho-danmen affair of January 6, 1932), 2/ and lost prestige with the

1/ Tokyo Asahi, January 3, 1932, p. 3.

2/ The Tokyo Asahi (January 10, 1932, 10-17) scathingly denounced the Seiyukai's "not yet satiated lust for power."
assassinations of Inoue Junnosuke (February 9, 1932) and Baron Don (March 5, 1932). A reform program would perhaps not have stemmed the tide, but even this the Seiyukai Cabinet did not have. When the premier was assassinated on May 15, 1932, party cabinets, which had ruled at best for but a decade or so, came to an end, and Japan returned again to the earlier system of a coalition wider in scope than the groups in the House of Representatives.

The parties were still recognized, however. Since 1932 the major parties have been openly condemned only by the short-lived Hayashi Cabinet. All other cabinets have welcomed party cooperation and limited party representation. Yonai has welcomed the president of the Iinseito into his cabinet. At the same time each cabinet has urged political reforms to aid in the rehabilitation of the Diet in public opinion.

2/ Only two of the eleven cabinets which Japan has had during the last ten years have been headed by generals -- those of Hayashi in 1937 and Abe in 1939. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the China policy of the Hayashi Cabinet was somewhat more liberal than that of its predecessors and that the Cabinet also sought a rapprochement with Great Britain. See Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1937, London, 1938, Vol. I, pp. 162-8.

4/ For a useful summary of proposals for reform of the Diet see Yobo Toshinari, "Cikai Seido" (The Diet System), Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, LIII, 9, September 1939, pp. 1161-94.
(三)

行政部の再編

一九三二年五月初日本に於ては、行政部の再編

二、立法と行政

太平洋協会関本委員

東洋協会関本委員

行政所実行委員

一九四○年発行

チャールズ・フーヴァーズ

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FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
近代日本の思想的特質に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したければ、先ず日本の思想史の思想史に於けるものであるから、日本の思想の原因を考察したれば、
欧州の完全な民主主義に対する影響を示したのは、政治的変容への必要性の説明であり、それは、欧州の友邦の間で行われる新しい文化的な交流の一部であり、それは、欧州の社会のための新しい形の建設的外交政策をもたらす可能性があるとされる。
有数の在閑に立脚して立法相間の優先を唱導した日本は今後の所詮が行う
優先の面での数百件と著者するのを見た。

世界各団は今日同じくして日中にも尚活したに寡助之は絵画上の在来の換
行に但存せんとする人々の顕昭に力が消へた。而して陸軍及び海軍等の絵
形の本として講演の来件を経るに至った。然故、外勢上の徴信状況に加へ
て是等の役形を呈つて新質の依頼が DFDA され絵画内閣の発足が求める
されるに至った。既述に幅を張るものに於て、

赤誠閣之名がその一・三五月に於て立内閣の設立以来一切に十二月文書を
つた件。に荷重は絵画及び議会の給料なるべき所において、故に赤誠閣が其の
の議論を束縛し得る絵画があるかを問うた後である。赤誠は亦通常自由
の副局に従事し得る絵画が有るかを問うた後である。赤誠は亦通常自由

赤誠閣に従事し得る絵画があるかを問うた後である。赤誠は亦通常自由

赤誠閣に従事し得る絵画があるかを問うた後である。赤誠は亦通常自由
（東京四日）
（一九三二年一月三日）
（東京）
（一九三二年一月八日、田門に件）（註案）の案を読って停戦させることに
とって起立せられ戦、井上課之助（一九三二年二月九日）山男師（一九三
二年三月五日）の政戦によりて威信を失連した。
（註案）一九三二年一月十日〇一〇一三東京四日
自友を略歴数タリトレアた激を攻にしたる。
the new law radically limits election expenses (to about ten thousand yen per candidate but varying somewhat with the size of the constituency) and the size campaign organizations. It provides for free distribution by the post office of one statement of qualifications and platform by each candidate to every elector in his constituency but prohibits further canvassing by mail. It greatly increases the penalties for irregular use of election funds. By providing a limited degree of proportional representation and curtailing the advantages of wealth in election campaigns, the revised election law has been primarily responsible for the increased number of proletarian and independent members in the Diet. Where American election laws equally favorable to minorities, there would probably be both socialists and communists in Congress today. Recent governments have also stopped partisan police interference with elections and have sponsored a national campaign for election reform and for education designed further to check bribery and to increase the ratio of voters to those holding the franchise.

The election law does not directly diminish party influence. In fact, in some ways it gives the established parties an added advantage, for it places no limitations on party campaigns as long as they are general in nature and not specifically directed toward aiding a single candidate. This is typical of the policy of recent governments which have never fully succumbed to the many demands for the establishment of a single official party as in Italy, Germany, or the Soviet Union. Such a single party was advocated by Adachi in 1931, by Natsuoka in 1933, by Toyama Kitsuura and his associates in December 1938, and by the Shuppy Toisha-to and the Toho-kai (proletarian parties) on various occasions from 1937 to 1939. It has been repeatedly discussed by individual cabinet ministers. General Hayashi scoured on the verge of undertaking its organization in the spring of 1937 but thought better of the project. In spite of such widespread demand for a single official party and the example of the Kyowa-kai, or Concord Society, in Manchukuo, it now appears unlikely that such an organization will be sponsored by the government.
It appears that Mr. Einar Jonsson recently stated that the government has no intention of destroying the parties and that it recognizes them as an essential part of the operation of an elective legislature. There seems to be a growing emphasis on the Constitution in discussions of the kokutai, or national polity, and such emphasis is indicative of drastic parliamentary reorganization.

The upper chamber of the Japanese Diet, as well, has been similarly criticized. Its statute (the Mise-ei-ritsu) had already been revised in 1925, but the reforms accomplished at that time were disappointing to their sponsors. During the so-called era of party cabinets there was a sustained campaign for amendment of the House of Peers as part of the struggle by the House of Representatives for supremacy in the government. (The two houses of the Japanese Diet, like the House of Representatives and the Senate in the United States, enjoy approximately equal legislative and budgetary powers.) This campaign failed for reasons already suggested, and since 1932 attention has been directed to changes in the composition and organization of the upper chamber rather than in its powers. The chief proposals have been a reduction in the number of hereditary seats, a compulsory age of retirement, the abolition of the group of members now elected from among the highest taxpayers in each prefecture, and the substitution of some form of occupational representation. Behind these, usually unexpressed for political reasons, there has also been a desire to reform the internal unofficial political organization through which the House is dominated by a single clique—the Kankyu-kai. These proposals have been directed toward meeting the charges of superannuation and oligarchical central rule against the peers, toward an increase in the value of the upper house in the consideration of new national legislation, and toward the rehabilitation in public opinion of this half of the legislature.

For example, Setomi Inoue, "Ikkoku Itto no Kokutai-gaku-toki Hihan" (Criticism of the Principle of a Single Party from the Point of View of Study of the National Policy), in Chuo Koorin (Central Review), LIV, i, January, 1939, pp. 76-84; Sasa Hiroo, "Kokumin Schikiki Kendai no Kante" (Study of the Problem of National Organization), ibid., pp. 30-40.
The campaign for reform of the House of Peers has been continuous since 1925. The need for reform has been urged by groups both outside and inside the House itself. Prince Irie actively sponsored the reform movement while first a member and later president of the House of Peers. When he became premier, he made reform of the House a major plank in his platform. Committees and commissions for the study of reform measures are almost too numerous to name. In spite of all this agitation, nothing has been accomplished beyond some greater circumspection in the exercise of their influence by the directors of the Honkoku-ka. The ordinance of the House of Peers has not been touched. The most natural time for effective reforms was prior to the new elections to the House of Peers which took place in July 1939 and, as members enjoy seven-year terms, it now appears as though reform would be indefinitely delayed.

The government and the Diet System Inquiry Commission (appointed in June 1938), having thus far failed in any notable reform of the composition of either the upper or lower chamber, have turned their attention instead to minor modifications in the Law of the Houses (Chin-ho) which provides for the convocation, term, dissolution or adjournment, and procedure of the Diet. Only one change has been accomplished. This extends the fixed period allowed for discussion of the budget from twenty-five to twenty-five days in each house. This change, as far as it goes, increases the possibility of effective Diet supervision over the government. The Hayashi Cabinet announced in March 1937 that subsequent regular sessions of the Diet would, when practicable, be convoked in November instead of December in order to permit fuller consideration of legislation, but this innovation has not yet been put into practice. In addition, proposals have been made for the establishment of standing committees of the two houses which could meet between sessions of the Diet and thus make continuous the new intermittent participation of the legislature in governmental activities. This system has been opposed by the government and has not as yet become a reality.

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Excerpt from "Government in Japan" by Fahs, Pages 73-77.
The most successful of these has been the revision of the election law. Women suffrage was granted in 1925. Some suffrage is still remote although it is likely to be hastened by the increasing employment of women in business and industry during the present war. Accordingly, extension of the franchise has not been a primary issue during the last decade. The election law revision of 1930 was planned instead to curtail bribery and, by reducing the cost of elections, to facilitate the representation of minorities and the poorer classes. At one time the government favored full-fledged proportional representation, but, as a result of opposition in the Diet, it compromised instead on the system of the single vote in plural-member constituencies. While this system does not result in full proportionality, it does assure representation in the Diet to any group which can poll about one-fifth of a vote in a given constituency and which has the unity and good sense to insist it represents a proportionate vote strength. In addition,
が発足後、派系上のご指摘の文書で行われた影響は著しい。したがって、内閣はその
観点での提供される情報に基づく判断を下すことが必要である。この点、内閣の政策の
部分を説明するのも、そのことが可成ならしめている。

首相はこれほど多くないグループの間に役目を勤め続けることから、言語を支える政
策の内容については、何らかの条件を設けたものとならないから、何なら

内閣の各員は、発足上天皇によって任命される、天皇に配下して、天皇に直接

に関連する内閣や他の内閣の要職を務めることが、首相の責任を果たすため
に必要な内閣の要職を務めることが、首相は内閣の要職を務めることが伴
ないことから、内閣の要職を務めることが、内部の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることが、内閣の要職を務めることがある。
ことには言えぬに、事務（既定経済乃至は平時兵力及び後の外軍を含め）を応じて総合的の婆娑大第の位置を決め、婆娑大第乃至は軍隊に、故にして婆娑大第の地位を小角に強化さしてゆる、戦力の発展の発展を佐能さして中絶に限局してゐる古くからの磐鉄に反って一層の文化さしてゐる、内閣大第は既定を維持するに耐えとしては自分のもとに於ける信望を詮得す

人物を出現する高は固有である。此の為に過去数年間の改訳はなから、及にて今日はかかる要求を詮得す人物を読む筆であるかそれ以上の又しばしば不適に必要なる方策の採用を可に多分たらすものである。かかる身近は個人的の知覚を現実に不適（）を読む筆であるかそれ以上の又しばしば不適に必要なる方策の採用を可に多分たらすものである。かかる身近は個人的の知覚を現実

たか倉家一九三五年十月内閣調査局は当時の事情を熟知するかの問題が常に起こつ
処理方法は必ずしも、元首を問題とするか否かを問わず、仮に問題が発生した場合も、通常の手続きに従って処理し、問題を解決するものである。かかる措置は、個別的な問題を含める範囲很小であることを認識し、必要に応じて対策を講じる必要がある。
元に戻っていたこの事であった。一九三九年春の法度は、議案発表の際の
社会党全国の資源系の書を傾聴する中で政府の人選は首
相の選挙を催大するのに合致していたこの事であった（註一）
ソビエトミンスキーなどはスターリンの大斷罪を以て行動する政体を公
然と公開して政府に覚悟から遠去されたことを悲しめるよう、政府懐い事で
る（註二）。
今日も三つの解決法が合意されたが、皆生過くとして只一部的な有效
であったに過ぎない。その第一は無任所大臣の任命の一つ、在日
無任所大臣を一人若しくはそれ以上任免することについても、無任所
大臣が一九三九年一月平沼内閣が近衛内閣の危機に至り近衛公が権威務要を
たる平沼の前職に任命された際近衛公に依然無任所大臣として近衛内閣に留
る無任所大臣の数参照の際の危機に任命された際近衛公に依然無任所大臣として
無任所大臣の数参照の際の危機に任命された際近衛公に依然無任所大
日本水産の「和」

日本の水産業は、「和」の文化を応援しています。"和"は、日本人の生活の中で重要な役割を果たしています。日本の料理は、食材の自然の風味を大切にし、適度な調味料を使用して、色、香り、和の美しさを追求しています。

日本の水産業は、海の幸を大切にし、海の恵みを生かして、美味しい物を提供しています。水産業は、日本の経済に大きな影響を与えています。水産業の発展は、就職機会の増加や地域経済の活性化に寄与しています。

日本の水産業は、持続可能な漁業の実践を続けることで、海の資源を守り続けています。"和"の文化は、日本の水産業が持続可能な発展を遂げる鍵を握っています。
GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN

Recent Trends In Its Scope and Operation

By

CHARLES E. PAMS
Assistant Professor of Oriental Affairs

I. I. I. INQUIRY SERIES

International Secretariat
I. S TATURE OF PACIFIC R.ATIONS

Publications Office, 129 East 52nd Street, New York
1940

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2. LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE

* * * * *

The Diet has obviously been able to check every move for any radical change in its composition or powers. One of its chief weapons has been a counterattack on weak points in the civil and military services. Thanks to the acumen and political ability of Field Marshal Yamagata, Japan has for some forty years enjoyed most of the features of a modern administrative civil service which have recently been advocated for the United States by President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Reorganization. Lately, however, there has been a trend in England, the United States, and Japan to question some aspects of the civil service program, particularly the effects on efficiency and initiative of rigid civil service guarantees of tenure. The unusual influence of civil servants in Japan has given such arguments added
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cogency, and they have recently been exploited to the full in the Japanese
Diet.\footnote{1} Administrative reforms were promised by the \textit{Kenzu} Cabinet and studied
during the spring, summer, and fall of 1938. After the installation of the
Hirumura Cabinet, the Seiyu and Kinsito threatened to adopt a resolution
providing for civil service reforms (in the direction of curtailment of civil
service privileges) but were finally dissuaded from doing so. Hirumura de­
defended the civil servants, (he was one himself) and "needed to Diet demands
only to the extent of addressing a memorandum to all civil servants, ad-
monishing them to greater endeavor, impartiality, and humility.\footnote{2} Criticism
of the civil service has, however, stimulated cabinet ministers to more con­
tinuous efforts in the direction of improvement of personnel administration
in the various departments, notably in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The army and navy present a special problem although they are, of

\begin{flushright}
\textit{The text of this circular will be found in Tokyo \textit{Asahi}, February 25, 1939, p. 332.}
\end{flushright}
national defense has, however, led officers to concern themselves with an ever wider range of political questions. The resultant increase in internal disputes over policy coincided with a decrease in the unity of principles and control due to the deaths of the genro Yossgita and Tsuno and to the displacement of clan leadership by men trained since the Sino-Japanese War.

Theoretically, the army and navy are under direct imperial command, but their actual administration has been divided among several officers each of whom enjoys the privilege of direct resort to the sovereign. This situation was tolerable as long as unity was maintained by the authority of the genro, but caused trouble when that authority disappeared. A conflict in 1931 within the army "big three" -- the minister of the army, the chief of staff, and the inspector-general of military education -- led to the appointment in 1932 of a member of the Imperial Family, Prince fumio, as chief of staff to serve as an arbiter. Friction between minister of the Army Hayashi and Inspector-General of Military Education Tazaki over personnel policies led to the forced resignation of the latter in 1935 and was indirectly connected with the assassination of Major-General Igoita in August of that year and with the assassinations of February 26, 1936 (of which the new inspector-general of military education, Matsumoto, was a victim). A somewhat similar problem in the navy was evident in 1929 when the minister and the chief of staff disagreed over the ratification of the London Naval Treaty. There was thus a double problem for both the army and navy -- a proper adjustment of relations with the cabinet and the Diet and unification of internal control. Neither aspect of the problem could be solved except by a process of political adjustment: no formula was immediately applicable. As a result, the recent course of the army and navy in "politic-politics" has not been entirely consistent. Nevertheless, the main lines are tolerably clear. The development in the navy has been less spectacular than that in the army, which may be taken as an example for both. Army leadership has, particularly since 1936, been concentrated increasingly in the hands of the minister of the army who has
full control of personnel shifts. Continuity in the personnel and political policies of the Department has been strengthened by a return to the earlier limitation of the position of minister to generals or lieutenant-generals in active service, excluding those on the reserve list like General Ugaki.

Army officers have been prohibited from publicly expressing views on political affairs, and since February 26, 1936, those involved in illegal activities have been dealt with most severely. The Reservists' Association (Zekkiga) has also been brought under the control of the Department. The army has thus recognized that irresponsible political agitation by military officers cannot be permitted. The converse of this recognition is that the political voice of the army is concentrated in the minister of the army whose influence in the cabinet has consequently increased.

What then is the legitimate sphere of influence of the service ministers? The position which General Teruuchi and subsequent ministers of the army have tried to maintain is that while the army, under modern conditions of rational defense, cannot be indifferent to general economic and political problems, will express its views through the minister of the army, and reserves the right to refuse to cooperate with any cabinet not showing a proper understanding of such problems, the army will, nevertheless, not attempt to dictate either specific policies or the details of their application. These are the proper functions of the civilian branches. This distinction between readiness

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Footnotes:


9/ *Ibid.*, May 18, 1936, p. 250. The change was purely precautionary since no officer not in active service had ever served as minister of the army or navy, even though their appointment had been possible since 1913.

to block cabinets in which it lacks confidence and avoidance of interference
with non-military legislation and administration is a very narrow one, and
its practical application leaves much room for dissatisfaction on both sides.
It amounts, however, only to reaffirmation of the customary share of the
services in the Japanese political coalition. During recent years the
minister of the army has advocated many types of legislation -- control of
the power industry, agrarian relief, organization of a national welfare
department, reform of the House of Peers, and a general mobilization act, to
mention only a few. Yet none of these has been dictated. Some remain un-
accomplished; others have been adopted only after formulation and debate by
the civilian ministries, extended discussion in the Diet, and frequent amend-
ments. The influence of the army and navy departments on domestic legisla-
tion and administration has increased during the last decade, but not to the
point of dictatorship.

Army influence in continental policy is a different problem and
one which cannot be fully examined here. Obviously the army controls
Japanese activities in Manchuria and in China to a far greater extent than
it does domestic affairs. This power on the continent is based on various
factors: the right of direct appeal to the Throne, the special position of
the Manchuria Army under the South Manchuria Railway Concession and the
Manchurian Peninsula lease, the regulation of Sino-Japanese affairs since 1932
and 1933 by military truce instead of diplomatic treaty, and the existence
of military hostilities since 1937. The beginnings of a compromise similar to
that in Japan proper can, however, be seen in the growing integration of
domestic and overseas policies discussed above and in the establishment of
such organs as the Manchurian Affairs Bureau and the China Board.

Altogether the Japanese political coalition -- the House of Repre-
sentatives, House of Peers, Privy Council, ministers close to the Throne,
army, navy, civil services -- has not been radically altered during the last
decade. The House of Representatives has lost influence but has retained all
of its legal powers and has benefited from some reforms. Its influence would
probably grow once more if its major parties could iron out their own
domestic disputes which have recently made a very bad impression. The
Privy Council continues as before an important check on cabinet actions be-
tween sessions of the Diet. The House of Peers remains approximately un-
changed in both legal powers and influence. The ministers close to the Throne
have probably somewhat declined in day-by-day influence, but they retain a
voice in the appointment of new cabinets, and so continue to furnish indirect
guidance of political developments. The army and navy have increased their
influence but have also carried out internal reforms which seem to assure
somewhat more responsible exercise of their powers than during the early
1930's. The civil services, too, have gained in strength but not decisively.
In general, the power of the administrative branch of the government has in-
creased while that of the legislature has decreased, but this is a universal
phenomenon. The increasing role of national defense considerations in govern-
mental decisions is not peculiar to Japan.

11/ The Seiyukai in particular has been torn by petty factional disputes.
During 1939 the police on several occasions had to intervene to prevent
physical violence between two factions barricaded on separate floors of the
party headquarters in Tokyo.

12/ The best discussion of the Privy Council in English is in Kenneth Colegrove,
"The Japanese Privy Council," American Political Science Review, XIV, 3 and
4, August and November 1931.

Excerpt from "Government in Japan" by Fahs.
Pages 77-81
点に関する反対であった。山城に於ての行政組織は、近世の行政組織に近いものである。行政機関は、徳川時代の行政組織に近いものであった。

近代的行政改革の一環として、文部省が行った行政改革に踏みけて、日本は、徳川幕府時代の行政組織に近いものである。行政の規模は、徳川時代の行政組織に近いものであった。
近代的行政文官制度のつれてある多くの特色を、他国に比べて日本はその傾向があつた。日本に於ける文官の常常なる勢力は新卒者派の所立と

力を説へ、こして近時日本の政治に於て容分に影響させんと為つた。
十一月十一日九百長岡降一郎官僚の今昔を観る。また国書五十一巻八

時一〇三〇三九月廿三日＝三九月廿三日官史年編の改正によることを見一〇三九月九

月同書五十三巻九月一〇三八一〇月閣庫文書官史年編を見よ。
无
この一覧に示すように、前後の論文を基に比較検討を行った。したがって、彼は本格的に批判的に取り組むことを許可されないと考えられる。政治的立場については、彼は論文を読む際には、論文自体が重要であると認識している。
明らかに変するに日本の政治的孤立に於ける影響には在来から定めた政策の存する。これを故に改めて断言したに止まる。農民救急、厚生省の組織、貴幹部の改組及び戦略統制局法等であるが、之はそのことわざれたに過ぎない。然しながら此の中づれの一つも命令は立憲大目に依り系統立てられ、調査され、研磨の対極に於て、彼同調でなく朝鮮の勢力は最近十年間に増大したものである。国内の立法行為に対する誤の承認をなす政策は様々あるが、保全の上顧慮、南清絶交好邦及し東州河備下にある関東軍の特殊なる地位、外交的協定に依らずして軍事協
（六頁以下）

衆議院はその政力を失墜したけれども、尚其の法的権限はすべて之を有つて居り、又も改革に次ぎ更に得る所のものがある。衆議院の勢力を遺すこそ、戦後の擴張をも強固に保つるに足りる。衆議院は依然として政府の議会との関係に於ては極めて重要である。衆議院は政府の政策を保証して居り、も政府政治上の推進に於ては間接的指導権を有するものである。
である。政府は決定を乍らに付国防を増強すると云ふ役職の増したこと
は日本に特有なものではない。

（33）菅友会は旧東京の衆本部の星三九九年
は政府は時々東京の衆本部の各階に陣営を設けて三重派間の暴力行為
防圧を険介入しなければならぬ進歩である。

(12) 福富院の決に関じて英語で著者よく之を断定してゐるの片筆論テメ

リカ政治学評論の第二十五卷の三偶及び四偶及の一九三一年八月號
及びテメー論のケニンコリグローブの「日本の福富院トハム論文デ

ファース著「日本の政治」七七頁ヨリ八十一頁迄の抄存

12
Records (steno-graphic)
of
Budget Committee Session,
House of Representatives,
76th Imperial Diet
No XXII
Láfico meeting opened at 1:07 P.M. Saturday, 8 Feb. 1941.

(Part of speech omitted)

Chief Commissioner KAGUDA:

The Premier wishes to speak.

The Premier:

(Part of speech omitted)

State Minister INUI:

I wish here to take clear the opinion on the part of the Government as to the nature of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

As for the movement for an Imperial rule assistance, I think you are already acquainted with its general outline through the statement which I made in the Preliminary Conference for the Establishment of a New Organization in August last year. But it will not be unnecessary to explain the aims of the movement on this occasion.

Japan is now confronted with the greatest crisis in her history. At this juncture it is needless to say that, in order to take adequate measures aiming at a broad leap in our national progress, it is necessary to unify the power of the whole nation into one harmonious whole by consolidating the national defense organization of the state, and to exert the national power thus unified to the fullest extent. And the basis for this so-called 'strong national defense organization of the state' consists in establishing an effective system within the nation. And in my opinion this in turn is possible only on the basis of a national
organization which will enable the whole population to participate effectively in the Imperial rule assistance. The aim of such a national organization is to unify the power of the whole nation in order that all the subjects of the Emperor may discharge their respective duties in organic unity, thus participating in the Imperial rule assistance. This aim requires that all the people participate in this great task effectively by discharging their respective everyday duties in their various tasks. It is only under such a national system that policies of the Government can be expected to permeate the remotest corners of national life to be realized there infallibly and promptly, and that the real conditions of the people's life can be reflected vividly upon the mirror of politics. I believe that only in this way can the power of the whole nation be concentrated upon affairs of the state.

Now, the Imperial rule assistance movement is one which is to be carried on by the whole nation, and which aims, in cooperation with the Government, to establish a national organization which will enable the whole population to participate effectively in the Imperial rule assistance to facilitate its working and thus to afford a basis for faithful discharge of the duties of the subjects. This movement has sprung up out of the necessity of establishing a strong national defense organization of the state. It is a movement which, standing aloof from any social interests of political parties, aims to remove all internal strifes in all fields of national life and to concentrate all the activities of the nation upon faithful discharge
of national action. It is a truly totalitarian national movement based on mutual cooperation between the Government and the people.

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association is a body organized for the purpose of pushing forward such a national movement. Its proper mission as the nucleus of this movement is to lead the van and to become the propelling force in the right and effective discharge of national duties. In order to fulfill this mission I believe it is necessary to strengthen the organization of the association as well as to consolidate its spiritual unity and thus to make it exert its power to the full in the discharge of its function to cooperate with the Government organizations in deciding upon and carrying out national policies, by communicating the will of the Government to the people and revealing the real condition of the people’s life to the Government. As is clear in the above, the activities of the Association are quite different, both in function and in aim, from those of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement or of various movements carried on by political parties. Its highly political character can also be ascribed to the same circumstances.

It is needless to say that in the actual working of the Association the purpose for which it has been organized should always be kept in view. Therefore, as for the relation of the Association to the Government, the former should cooperate with the latter in making the spirit of national policies fully understood by the people and in facilitating their adequate enforcement. Its mission of communicating the will of the Government to the people and revealing the real conditions of the people’s
to the Government means nothing but to furnish the authorities with necessary materials to be referred to by them in deciding upon various measures. Consequently, the association has no intention to enforce a certain set of principles of their own independently of the Government. It is of course needless to say that it has nothing to do with any movements struggling for political power.

To summarize the foregoing, the nature of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is not compatible with struggles between mutually opposing parties in the political arena nor with any activities aiming to enforce a particular set of political doctrines independently of the Government. And this is precisely the reason why the Government exempts the association from the application of some provisions in the Peace Police Act, on the ground that it does not fall within the category of 'associations concerning political affairs' as described in that Act. But, inasmuch as it is a kind of association, those articles in the Act which provide for associations in general and associations concerning public affairs except political affairs should of course be applied to it. Further, it goes, without saying that any act on the part of the Association should be governed by relevant regulations.

The War Minister and the Navy Minister have stated that, considering the spirit of the Foundation of our army members of the army or navy on the active list would not be permitted to enter the Association except when those who occupy special posts, such
The Government means nothing but to burnish the authorities with necessary materials to be referred to by them in dividing upon various measures. Consequently the Association has no intention to enforce a certain set of principles of their own independently of the Government. It is of course needless to say that it has nothing to do with any movements struggling for political power.

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The War Minister and the Navy Minister have stated that, considering the spirit of the foundation of our army members of the army or navy on the active list would not be permitted to enter the Association except when those who occupy special posts, such
as the minister, the vice-minister, the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, etc., enter it to handle liaison with the army or navy. But this does not mean that soldiers on the active list should not enter it, because it falls within the category of "associations concerning political affairs" prescribed in the Peace Police Act. This only means that it would be incompatible with the idea of unity and discipline of the army for individual soldiers on the active list to enter directly such an association.

It is but very recently that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was organized. And although therefore its nature and aims have not yet been understood well enough by the public, and its activities are as yet unsatisfactory in many respects, we wish to do our best to get the hoped-for results by driving home to the people's mind its true nature and aims on the one hand, while on the other hand using every care for the betterment of its organization and working.

In connection with this, it is necessary for us to see to it that the association should not involve itself in any acts outside the scope of its aim and mission.

Now the situation within and without requires urgently the firm and harmonious unity of the whole Japanese nation. The movement of Imperial rule assistance has sprung up out of this urgent necessity. Without an effective development of this movement, it would be extremely difficult to tide over the impending crisis. I have already stated in my opening speech at the Diet that the Government desires a rapid and active development of this movement. Indeed, the Government is firmly determined to exert utmost efforts in encouraging this movement of Imperial rule assistance. We sincerely ask your cooperation.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, YAMAZAKI, Ko, Chief of General Affairs Section, House of Representatives, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Proceedings of the Budget Committee, House of Representatives, 76th Imperial Diet, opened on 6 Feb., 1941" is an exact and true copy of that document (taken down in shorthand, from page 260 to 261).

Certified at the House of Representatives, on the 6th of December, 1946.

(signed) YAMAZAKI, Ko (soal)
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) WATANABE, Ichizo (soal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

(signed) C. D. Sheldon
/3/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 7 Jan. 1947.
昭和十六年二月八日（土曜日）午後一时十分開議

内閣総理大臣
大隈重信

近衛外務大臣
大隈重信

この会合には広島原爆投下後、政府の所見を明確に示すため、大隈重信内閣総理大臣が出席した。
クノキ大政翼賢会ノ活動ハ、其ノ役務＝於テ、其ノ目的＝於テ、在来ノ精神及ビ政策運動トハ大イニ其ノ達キチヲ異シテ居リマス。政治的ニ有スルキヲ所以＝亦故＝存スルノデアルマス。而シテ大政翼賢会ノ現実ノ運営＝於キマシテモ、常ニヲ卒来ノ目的及ビ邁進＝雖シスペキハ事理ノ當然デアルマシテ、共ノ政府トノ関係＝於テモ、政府＝協力シテ、政策＝適切＝於キノ関係＝於テモ、政府＝適切＝於キ、国民生活ニ資清ノ公安局＝反映シテ、共ノ施策＝資清ニ資セントスルモノデアルマス。政府＝別途＝独自ノ政策＝視＝テガ資清ノ資セントスルモノデアルマス。カナダルコト＝言ハズシテ明カデアルマス。
大不検会へ其ノ役範を発揮モ十分デナイ點モアルト存デラスガ。今後従ガ
モアリニ戦シテ所期ノ効果ヲ挙ルヲ目指シテ存デラス
向ニ又大不検会ノ活動ニシテ属ニモ本来ノ目的及ビ使命ヲ遂
加ヘテ追リ、所期ノ効果ヲ挙ルヲ目指シテ存デラス
スルガ如キニミソユノ嚴重ヲ戒メ、過誤ナキヲ期シテ存デラス
ジマス。
文档内容无法辨认。
民権運動とこれに伴う外交政策変化に対する影響は、日本国民の認識を変えることが必要である。したがって、特に重要であるのは、民権運動の歴史を正確に伝えることで、その意義を理解し、将来の国際関係に役立つよう、教育の場での指導も重要である。
No. 5

 Clydoc 588

...
未找到有效的文本内容。
By Dec 5-86

Judith Kawamoto
U.S. War Dept
Civilian Employee
Excerpt from the Minutes of the Budget Committee Meeting, House of Representatives, 76th Session of the Diet (shorthand record) No. 7. The meeting opened at 10.22 A.M., January 30th (Tuesday), 1941 (16th year of Shōwa).

(Portion omitted)

Member of the Committee, HIRAKAWA:

I have understood that the Premier explained. I should like to put a question to the Home Minister about one point. This point has already been raised at the Co-ordination Conference (T. N. KYÔRYÔHÔ KAIGI) and is whether or not the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is a political association coming under the Public Peace Police Laws. In regard to this question, I am of opinion that it is evident that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is in no way a public organization, but a private organization; and there can be no doubt that it is a political association. That being the case, I believe it naturally comes under the category of political associations prescribed in the Public Peace Police Laws. Furthermore there are many amongst the people who also believe that is so. Concerning this point, I saw a press report to the effect that there had been a contention at the Central Co-ordination Conference by Mr. Funada, Head of the Internal Affairs Department, that although the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is an association, the said law is not applicable to a political association prescribed in the said law means either a trade association or one which necessitates...
governmental supervision from a standpoint of preserving public peace, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is not included in the organizations of such kind. I think the purport of his contention may probably be that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is an organization working in unison with the government, that it is neither a secret association nor one detrimental to the public peace and order, and that it should not be subjected to governmental supervision. But what are his grounds for regarding it as working in unison with the government? It is the Imperial Rule Assistance Association itself which insists that it works in unison with the government. There is no legal ground at all. It may be said that it does not disturb public peace and order. However, whether or not its activities disturb public peace and order should be determined by the government responsible for the supervision of organizations of such kind. I think it is decidedly unjustifiable that a certain organization standing under the supervision of the government should determine for itself that it does no harm to the public peace and order, and in consequence, the Public Peace Police Laws are not applicable to it. The said law admits no exception. Should that law not be applicable to such an organization as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, it might lead to the unreasonable conclusion that, when a certain organization with similar nature and purpose to those of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is newly organized, it need not be subject to the said law. If the said law is not applicable to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, we cannot be sure that another organization of the same kind to
which the said law is not applicable could not be organized.
This is a very serious problem. So I should like to hear the Home
Minister's opinion about this point.
State Minister, HIRATUMA:
I will answer your question. I have previously expressed
my opinion that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is not an organization which carries out its activities in accordance
with any political view of its own. The purpose of the Imperial
Rule Assistance Association is that it shall make our nation
thoroughly understand and cooperate with the state policies fixed
by the government. It does not fall under the category of politi­
cal association prescribed in the public peace police law, so
far as it is not an organization which may determine and propa­
gate its own political views. However, there is no doubt that
it is an organization, and therefore an association. It may come
under the category of public association prescribed in the Public
Peace Police Laws. Accordingly, as a public association, it must
be subject to the said law. At present, we have no intention to
supervise the Imperial Rule Assistance Association as a political
association according to the Public Peace Police Laws.
Certificate

I, YAMAZAKI, Takashi, as the chief of General Affairs Section of the House of Representatives, hereby certify that the Japanese document consisting of 4 sheets of paper enclosed herewith is a copy of the 161st page of the Minutes of the Budget Committee Meeting in the House of Representatives of the 75th Session of the Diet (shorthand record), held on January 9, 1941 (16th year of Shōwa), which I have officially in my charge.

January 6, 1941 (16th year of Shōwa),

At the House of Representatives,

YAMAZAKI, Takashi.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed by YAMAZAKI, Takashi to the above statement in my presence.

On the same day, at the same place,

Observer YOKOMURA, Ichizō.

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan

Dato — January 1947
Record of the 2nd Budget Committee Meeting
of the House of Representatives, of the
74th Session of the Imperial Diet
(Short hand record)

Meeting opened at 10:25 a.m., January 24th (Tuesday), the 14th year of SHOWA (TN:1939)

Omitted......

Committeeman AZUMA:
Omitted......

Next I should like to ask Premier HIRANUMA a few questions but as to the spirit of the Imperial Way, or that of all the people assisting the Imperial rule, I am one of those who are somewhat acquainted with Premier HIRANUMA's attitude towards this matter and have listened earnestly to your repeated explanations in the plenary sessions of the Diet that it was an ancient phrase, but politically a new one, and that it meant concentrating the total strength of our country on national policy and realizing the policy with the so-called spirit of the Imperial Way, or that of the entire people assisting the Imperial rule. I should like to request you to explain a little more explicitly, however, as to the difference between parliamentarism and the spirit of national assistance for the Imperial rule. Up to this time, I think, Premier HIRANUMA has been misunderstood by the public more than once. It has been suspected if he weren't trying to enforce a Fascist policy. At the time of the investiture of Premier HIRANUMA the stocks at KABUTO-CHO (TN: name of the stock market in TOKYO) went down, because the public feared that Fascism would be enforced and
that everything would become torn up. But our people, I believe, understood your true meaning by your successful state. I believe we should attach importance to the Diet and to promote parliamentarism. There are leftists and rightists in the world in fact, however, even among my fellow Members. Among the rightists many are liable to insist upon totalitarianism and the denial of parliamentarism at the slightest provocation. Your Excellency the Premier, I think, knows about this matter better than I. Totalitarianism and the doctrine of the Imperial Way are often confused but in regards to this point I have heard the Premier's declaration in this House of the necessity to observe the provisions of the Constitution and to emphasize parliamentarism. Consequently, political parties would naturally rise, and it would be wrong to negate this. But, I think, the spirit of "one sovereign for the whole people" or totalitarianism considerably differs from parliamentarism in the way of methods of realization. There are some who say opposing parliamentarism is often acting contrary to the spirit of assisting the Imperial Way. And although totalitarianism is like assisting the Imperial Way it has certain points in which it differs entirely. As a result of your explanation in this House, we understand that what Premier HIRANUMA calls the spirit of assisting the Imperial Way consists in stressing parliamentarism increasingly on the basis of a constitutional government. But we are not enlightened as to Premier HIRANUMA's view on totalitarianism, the doctrine of the Imperial Way, and constitutional government. If possible, therefore, I should like to have you explain them to us once more.
Mr. ZUMI's question is, in a sense, very difficult to answer, and I doubt whether I can satisfy you. I understand that totalitarianism is a word used in opposition to the so-called individualism of the Western countries, and I think it means that its object is not the individual, but the whole, or that, for the sake of the whole, the individual must obey the whole irrespective of whether it be advantageous or not to one's own interest. The doctrine of the Imperial Way in our country has no such meaning I believe. The soul of the doctrine of the Imperial Way in our country is, I believe, to enable all people to find their own places and not leave anyone without his own place. When viewed in this light, we must think about the whole and we must think about the individual also and is quite different from the absolute idea of sacrificing the individual for the whole. This from the viewpoint of the doctrine of the Imperial Way, becomes the entire nation's assistance to the Imperial rule. In other words with everyone observing the purport of the Imperial Benevolence not one person shall be denied gaining his rightful place and concentrating on this fundamental is what I believe to be the so-called assistance of the entire nation to the Imperial rule. In our country, therefore, it follows that in obedience to this great spirit enabling every person or thing to have his or its own place, constituting political institutes first and last of course but also the others irrespective of what occupation they pursue, all should concentrate themselves on this point. This is my understanding. Consequently I believe that there is a fundamental difference between the idea of totalitarianism which was developed in the Western countries and our doctrine of the Imperial Way.
CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the forgoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/3/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 6 Feb. 1947

Record of the Second Committee Meeting of the House of Representatives of the 74th Session of the Imperial Diet.
昭和十四年一月二十日（火曜日） 午前十一時二十五分開議

平沼 首相ノ長尾ノ心ヨリニ指示ハラシテハ造戦経済ニ適応セリ

デアリマスルガ

ニ於テテアテノ成ガデアリマス

ノデアルカ

今日マデ平沼首相ハデアリノ所ナタハ・ハテリリツテコトヲ聞ヒ且ト

デアリマス

ノ德テアテノコトヲ申シテアリノ所ナタハ

ハテリリツテコトヲ聞ヒ且ト

デアリマス

ノデアルカ

今日マデ平沼首相ハデアリノ所ナタハ・ハテリリツテコトヲ聞ヒ且ト
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

VS.

TSUGITA, Daisaburo, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: TSUGITA, Daisaburo

Having first duly sworn on oath as an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

On this 15th day of January, 1947, at Tokyo.

I, TSUGITA, Daisaburo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ HANAI, Tadashi (seal)

I was the chief of the Bureau of Legislation in the HIROTA Cabinet from March, 1936 to February, 1937.

The HIROTA Cabinet which came into existence following the 'February 26 affair', had as its mission a rigid enforcement of military discipline, the calming down of the people's mind and the establishment of a peaceful diplomacy. Premier HIROTA adhered to this policy consistently. At the first Cabinet conference held soon after the inaugural ceremony in March 9, 1936, he made an important statement as follows: "When I presented the
Cabinet members list today, the Emperor told me firstly to conduct civil administration in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, secondly, not to conduct diplomacy forcibly and thirdly to avoid any sudden change in the financial situation. I am going to render my services to the State and my service to the Emperor, so I hope therefore every one of you will cooperate with me. All Ministers respectfully agreed. In this connection, in my diary of March 7, 1st Year of Showa, I wrote the following description:

"March 9

About 9 a.m. Mr. Asaoka, Takakichi rang me up. Secretly asked if I would accept the directorship of the Bureau of Legislation and consented. At 9:30 I was summoned, went to the Premier's official residence and paid respects to each minister. Went into the Cabinet room. The Imperial opinion confided to the Premier then he presented the list of Cabinet members: Firstly to govern according to the articles and chapters of the Constitution. Secondly not to conduct foreign policy by force. Thirdly avoid a sudden change in the financial situation. Each minister understood the point of the Finance Minister's talk. The War Minister said he was sorry for the Incident and he would take care such an event should not occur again in future." The part of the said diary referring to the War Minister's talk shows a firm resolution declared by him to enforce military discipline considering the February 26 Incident.

The reason why the KITÔA Cabinet reformed the Army and Navy ministries official organization was to enforce military discipline. It was at the extraordinary session of the Diet in May 1936 that this reform bill was
introduced into the Cabinet from the Army and Navy Ministries. The military
and naval authorities explained, "The Army and Navy Ministers have the
duties of supervising troops belonging to the supreme command, of maintaining
military discipline and of strengthening the unity of the army; therefore
equally they themselves must be sold in belonging to the supreme command,
that is, on the active list. Indeed this is brought out by the fact that
all of the War and Navy Ministers were soldiers on the active list since
the reform of the government organization in the second year of Taisho
(T.N. 1913) (i.e. the reform in which generals and lieutenant-generals on
the reserve list were also allowed to become Ministers). Now, soon after
the Incident, keenly feeling the necessity of restricting the Ministers to
officers on the active list in order to strengthen the power of the Ministers,
to enforce military discipline and to solidly preserve unity, we intend to
make the system correspond with actuality by reforming the government or-
organization." When I asked them the meaning of, "Soon after the Incident
we keenly feel the necessity of restricting the Ministers to the officers
on the active list," they answered as follows: "We will place several
generals and lieutenant-generals who are responsible for the Incident on
the reserve list but under the existing system none of them could become
war Minister in future and could bring about such a disgraceful event as
the February 26 Incident or an even more serious one than that. In order
to prevent such a calamity, we intend to make the system one under which
generals and lieutenant-generals on the reserve list cannot become Ministers.

Moreover the Vice-Ministers of War and Navy said, "As the Premier has
already consented to this bill, we want it to be passed quickly." After I
asked the Premier about that. I prepared a Cabinet bill and submitted it to the Cabinet conference.

In the conference Premier HIROTA asked TERAOCHI, the Army Minister, and next NAGANO, the Navy Minister, "Will this reform not lead to a situation in which those commanded to form the Cabinet will find it difficult to appoint future War and Navy Ministers?" They both answered, "There is no fear that such a situation will arise." With this exception, no special utterance was made and the bill was passed in its original form.

I did not ascertain how each Minister thought about the bill and why he consented to it. Only Mr. BABA, the Finance Minister, expressed his opinion directly to me when I spoke with him about it before the conference. "Enforcement of military discipline is a serious question in hand and a very difficult task, but the War Minister is resolved to take it upon himself and carry it out at any cost. Now that he eagerly desires this reform in order to perform the task, the Cabinet reforms the government organization to save his face but in return for that, he shall enforce military discipline thoroughly. That is the best course for the Cabinet to take, I think." Thus he indicated his consent to the original bill.

There are some who hold that the reform caused the Army to participate in politics afterwards. I will relate one or two facts as material for judging whether this observation is right or wrong. The formation of the HIROTA Cabinet naturally took place before the reform of the Army and Navy Ministries and to choose ministers from generals and lieutenant-generals on the reserve list was still permissible from the legislative point of view. Informing his Cabinet however, HIROTA met with several demands from
the Army concerning the selection of the Ministers and if he rejected those demands, it was feared that he would be unable to get an Army Minister. His attempt to form the Cabinet met with great difficulty; he continued negotiations for about a week after he had received the imperial mandate and during that time the formation was several times in danger of aborting, but finally, after acceding to most of those demands, he succeeded. In this case the system under which Ministers could be selected from generals and lieutenant-generals on the reserve list was of no use in preventing the Army from participating in politics.

Next, when the 21st Cabinet was formed in July, 1914, the War and Navy Ministers were required to be generals and lieutenant-generals on the active list in accordance with the government organization of the War and Navy Ministries; but Admiral YONAI who was on the reserve list was appointed Navy Minister. In order not to conflict with the rules of the government organization however, Admiral YONAI was placed on the active list just before he was inaugurated, with the special consideration of the Emperor. In this case even the reform could not prevent a general officer on the reserve list from becoming Navy Minister.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TSUGIT. Daizaburo (seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the enc. certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 27 Jan., 1967
大臣がルコトが出来ナタナルガアゲツノデニヨサンノ問題工作ハ中
ノタナノアリマス。裁判トンアリマスガ総局監督ノ要請ノ大部分ニド
從シテ内閣ノラテルスルコトガ出来ルト云フ第 Rabbit
ルコトは監督ハ監督ノ政治関係ヲ防ヨ、役立タナカツ
ヲアリマス。
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）一月十三日於東京小石川自宅

之八當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣示シ且ツ署名ヲ捺印シタルコトヲ證明シ

同日

於東京都小石川區大仲町四丁目会場者宅

立会人

鈴木士花

等
Report on the Examination of the
Revision of Imperial Ordinance on
the Organization of the War Ministry
and One Other Subject.

We have been appointed members of the Committee of Examination
with regard to revisions in the organization of the War
Ministry and of the Navy Ministry which have been referred to
the Privy Council for deliberation. We held a committee meeting
on the thirtieth of last month and listened to explanations
given by the Ministers of State and the government officials con­
cerned and have made a thorough examination of the subject matter.

The two points in question have for their purpose to revise
the stipulations with regard to qualifications in the appointment
of Ministers and Vice-Ministers for the War Ministry and the Navy
Ministry. It is to be noted that the stipulations in the organiza­
tions of the War and Navy Ministers prescribing that those who
are appointed ministers (full general or lieutenant-general in the
case of Minister of War and full admiral or vice-admiral in the
case of Minister of the "Navy") or Vice-Ministers (at one time was
called secretary-general) (lieutenant-general or major-general in
the case of Vice-Minister of War and vice-admiral or rear-admiral
in the case of Vice-Minister of the "Navy") that would limit them to
generals or admirals on active service originated in the thirty­
third year of Meiji (T.N. 1900) (vide remark No. 1 of the attached
list to the revised Organization of the War Ministry by Imperial
Ordinance No. 194 of the thirty-third year of Heiji and remark No. 1 of the separate list to the revised organization of the Navy Ministry by Imperial Ordinance No. 194 of the same year.

Later, in the second year of Taisho (T.H. 1913) the above-mentioned limitations were rescinded by Imperial Ordinance No. 166 of the second year of Taisho (T.H. 1913) relative to the revision of the Organization of the War Ministry, remark No. 1 of the attached list was rescinded and by Imperial Ordinance No. 169 of the same year relative to the revision of the Organization of the Navy Ministry, remark No. 1 of the separate list was rescinded), thereby making it clear that those to be appointed Ministers or Vice-Ministers of War and of the Navy were not to be limited to generals or admirals on active service. These have been effective up to the present day. It is further to be noted that all these revisions of the Organizations were not referred to the Privy Council for deliberation. According to explanations given by the Ministers concerned with the revisions now proposed, the following points are pointed out: Ministers of War and of the Navy come under the system of the Supreme Command and bear the heavy responsibility of directing and controlling the officers and men of the Army and the Navy who are subject to the Supreme Command, of maintaining strict military discipline, and of keeping up a solid unity of the entire Army and the Navy. Vice-Ministers assist their Ministers, put departmental affairs in order and supervise the work done by
the Surplus and the Divisions. Therefore it is actually essen-
tial that both the Ministers and the Vice-Ministers be officers
on active service who come under the system of the Supreme Com-
mand and have powers of command the under the Supreme Command.
Moreover, in the case of the Army, the results, following the
above-mentioned revision of organization in the second year of
Taisho (T.H.: 1913) procedure of handling affairs in the War
Ministry, the General Staff Office and the Department of Military
Education brought about duplication of work and waste of person-
nel causing great inconvenience. In addition, the Army has come
to feel an urgent necessity, for remedial measures to be taken
with regard to the unfortunate incident recently having taken
place since the unfortunate incident recently having taken
not only to establish command authority, to enforce military
discipline, and to strengthen the unity of the Army, but also to
try to carry out improvements in the existing system in order to
bring about economy in personnel and to expedite the work handled.
For these reasons, it should be prerequisite that Ministers and
Vice-Ministers be limited to general officers on active service.
Moreover since the above-mentioned revision of organizations in
the second year of Taisho (1913) and up to the present day, there
has not been an instance of a general or an admiral other than
those on active service having been appointed Minister or Vice-
Minister of War or of the Navy. Reflecting on this fact, it is
appropriate to have matter express by stipulated in provision
and make things correct with the fact both in name and reality.
For these reasons and in order to revert to the old system which
was in force prior to the second year of Teisho (1913) to limit the qualifications for appointment for Ministers and Vice-
Ministers of War or of the Navy to generals or admirals on active
service that it is proposed to introduce the two points in
question to carry out partial revision in the existing organiz­
atations of the War Ministry and of the Navy Ministry respectively
by adding the clause, "Those who are appointed Ministers or
Vice-Ministers shall be generals, admirals on active service"
to the beginning of the remarks of the attached and separate
lists of the respective Organizations.

After giving due consideration, it is clear that the two
points in question have for their object to restore the old
system with regard to qualifications in the appointment of
Ministers and Vice-Ministers of War or of the Navy and to limit
them to generals or admirals on active service by stipulations
in the Organization. And although at the present time there
may still be some concern regarding the reason why the said
limitation stipulated in the Organization was removed in the
past, the revisions now proposed can be recognized as a timely
measure in bringing the control of the Army and the Navy to
perfection taking all things of the present into consideration.
Therefore, the Committee of Examination has unanimously decided
that the two matters in question shall be approved exactly as
they are.
We have the honor to report the above as the result of examination.

The 6th day of May of the eleventh year of Showa (TN: 1936)

To the President of the Privy Council,

Baron, HIP. NUMA,

Chairman of the Committee of Examination

Privy Councillor, KUMA, Hisao

Members of the Committee of Examination

Privy Councillor, Viscount, ISHII, Kikujiro
Privy Councillor, ARIMA, Ryokitsu
Privy Councillor, H.Ra, Kazuo
Privy Councillor, MUTO, Hajime
Privy Councillor, SUZUKI, Sōroku
Privy Councillor, FUJITSU, Rokusuke
Privy Councillor, ISHIZUKI, Hisao
Privy Councillor, Toru
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Shorm, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached in Japanese consisting of 5 pages and entitled "REPORT ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE REVISED ORGANIZATION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY AND HOME MINISTRY" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 19 November, 1946.

/\Y. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Mr. Naru Udo

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Yukio Kawamoto

Date 19 Feb. '47
DATE

The United States of America et. al.

Against

Araki, Sadao et. al.

STORN DEPOSIT ON (translation)

DEPONENT YOSHIKO, Shinji

Having duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

On this 14th day of February 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT YOSHIKO, Shinji (seal)

I certify that I am the duly assigned Administrative Officer for the Defense Section of the Major War Crimes Trial, and I was present on 1st February 1947 at the office of Yosho, Shinji in Tokyo, Japan. I further certify that the foregoing affidavit was interpreted and translated to me by Hongo, Tomoo, Sworn and subscribed to before me this 14th day of February 1947.

Bernard A. Hargadon
1st Lt., Inf.,
Administrative Officer

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YOSHIKO, Shinji (seal)
Statement Refuting Mr. Liebert's Testimony

I entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1913 as a junior clerk. (Later, in 1925, this ministry was remodelled into two independent departments, namely, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Ministry of Commerce and Industry). Since then, I had been continuously in charge of administrative affairs in the Commerce and Industry Ministry until I resigned in 1936, as vice-minister of Commerce and Industry. In 1937, I was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry and, as such, was responsible for formulating and executing war-time economic policies of our country for one year at the outset of the China Incident. Therefore, I can safely state that I was concerned either directly or indirectly with almost all of the various economic policies touched upon by Mr. Liebert in his testimony. I understand that Mr. Liebert regards these policies as acts preparatory for an aggressive war. Upon my part, I will try to explain briefly the reasons pointing to the contrary from the viewpoint of one of the government officials of that period.

I shall refrain from speaking here of the matters subsequent to the outbreak of the China Incident, because of the fact that economic measures adopted after the out-
break of the Incident are indicative of genuine war-time economy rather than of war reparations. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts made by the Government then to check the aggravation of the Incident, the situation turned unfortunately from bad to worse. Thus, it was only natural that the control of various fields of domestic economy was being tightened from day to day. Furthermore, having retired from the service in 1933, I had no relation whatsoever with the events which occurred thereafter. I will explain the points raised by Mr. Liebert with regard to our commercial and industrial policies prior to the China Incident, dividing them for convenience's sake, into two separate chapters.

(1) Policy for the Establishment of Basic Industries.

With World War I as the turning point, great changes had taken place in the relationship between war and economy both in theory and practice. Even previous to that, war was not wholly unrelated with the economic power of a country especially in such matters as food supplies, arms, munitions and military expenditures. However, it was usual for a major belligerent power to be able by itself to cater to all its needs within the limits of its own economic power, in as much as the scale of a war was smaller and efficiency and quality of arms undeveloped. Had
there been shortages in some particular articles, it could always avail itself of supplies from neutral countries as there had never been a case of the entire world being involved in the same war. For instance, Japan fought the Russo-Japanese War relying on her loans from the United States and Great Britain; in other words, she fought on while importing materials necessary for the prosecution of war. However, international trade was completely interrupted in World War I as the major powers of the world were practically all involved in the turmoil of the war. Battles which were waged on an enormous scale called for the exhaustion of all economic resources. Especially, the advent of high explosives, aircraft and chemical arms such as poison gas proved the existence of grave deficiencies in the past military and naval armaments as a means of national defence. Therefore, it became a matter of common sense in formulating economic policies of a country to strive at all costs for the building-up of necessary industries in order to guarantee its independence and security. This practice which started during war time remained as an important factor even in the management of the post-war economy in every country. One would readily understand the inevitability and reasonableness of the facts pointed out by Mr. Liebert, if one recalled that the economic thought prevalent and the policies adopted after World War I were reflected in the practical measures taken by the powers since that time.

- 3 -
I shall try to explain a few instances on the basis of Mr. Libert's statement.

a) Dyes and Glycerine

It was shown by the German dye industry in the course of World War I that high explosives and poison gases could be manufactured in the process of making dyes. Prior to the war dye manufacturing was monopolized by Germany, the rest of the world depending on her for its supplies. Therefore, a decision was adopted in 1917 at a conference among the allied powers in Paris recommending the development of the dye industry in various countries for the reason that, although it was a belated step to be of any use in that stage of the war, a monopoly of the world's dyes market by the German dye industry could not be allowed to continue as it would remain a menace to the world peace. The powers suffered from a famine of dyes due to the stoppage of the imports of German dyes while the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan frantically pushed ahead their respective dye industries. Established then in England was the Government supported British Dye-tuff Corporation which, if my memory serves me right, later was merged with the Imperial Chemical Company. In the United States companies such as Dupont and the National Aniline Co. were set up. Also in our country, which was then in need of dyes as well as glycerine enacted in 1917 a law called the
"Law for the promotion of the manufacture of dyes and medicines." On the strength of this law the government set up two companies, one for the manufacture of dyes and the other of glycerine, which it guaranteed against all losses and for the payment of an 8 per cent dividend on their paid-up capital. This method of guarantee was continued until after the war. Even after the expiration of the term of ten years of governmental support, subsidies per unit were paid to the dyes produced. It is a well-known fact that both the United States and Japan enforced the import license system when they again imported German dyes after the termination of the war. For its inception the Japanese dye manufacture is indebted to the policies of protection and encouragement, however lukewarm they may have been. That it would be turned into an arsenal of chemical arms in case of war was a foregone conclusion since the time of its establishment. The same applies to the case of glycerine. The production of glycerine was negligible before the war since it was made only as a by-product of the manufacture of soap and the bulk of the demand was met by imports from abroad. Hence the manufacture of glycerine had to be started by dissolving fatty acids using as the basis beef tallow imported from Australia. This was easily done as the process was not so difficult technically as compared with the manufacture of dyes, so much so that the payment
Def. Doc. No. 650

of government subsidies was discontinued before the expiration of the ten-year term. However, consigned fish oil was later used as the raw material for manufacturing fatty acids, as it was considered prejudicial to national defense to depend on the supply of beef tallow from abroad. Since fish oil could be obtained in large quantities from inshore fisheries, it was decided to export it abroad in peace time and use it as the basis for the manufacture of glycerine in case of an emergency. Therefore, it was only natural that the production of glycerine was boosted following the outbreak of the China Incident as the war-time economy developed in Japan.

b) Iron Production.

The establishment of the iron industry was a pending question in our country since the restoration of 1868, as it is an industry so basically important among the industries of a nation that the modern period following Industrial Revolution, has also been called the "era of iron and coal." This, however, was a difficult task for our country which had little iron ore and coal resources for the manufacture of iron. The Japanese iron industry went through successive changes from the time of the inauguration of the Yawata Iron Works after the Sino-Japanese War to 1933 when the Japan Steel Manufacturing Co. was established. It would suffice to mention here the fact that the Japan Steel Manufacturing Co. was not found in a single day; as I cannot afford to recount here in detail the history of the iron industry in Japan. The Law for the Promotion of
Iron Manufacture, providing for special privileges and the power for compulsory use of land to protect the iron industry, has been enacted since 1917 when a dearth of iron occurred due to World War I. As early as in 1916, the government instructed the Board of Investigation of Iron Manufacture to coordinate the governmental and civilian iron productions despite the fact that the development of the civilian iron industry was still negligible as yet. A report was made by the Board of Investigation of Emergency Financial and Economic Affairs, during the period of the financial depression, brought about as an aftermath of World War I, recommending that large-scale joint-management of the governmental and civilian iron foundries should be made with the Yawata Iron Works as its nucleus. In the meantime, the government's basic policy towards the iron industry changed. Utmost importance was first attached by the government to iron manufacture relying on pig iron imported from the Chinese Hon Yeh Tin Corporation. Later, a complete process of steel manufacture was adopted in view of economizing fuel and obtaining by-products such as gas and tar. It was not a long time that a full-fledged iron industry was finally established in Japan when arrangements had been made to import coal and coke from China and iron-ore from Korea, China and the South Seas. The Extraordinary Industrial Council, which met in 1930 to devise measures to overcome the prevalent economic depression, decided in con-
elusion to set up a single iron manufacturing company by creating the government-owned Yamato Iron Foundry and civilian iron foundries mainly manufacturing pig iron or ordinary steel materials. It was thus that the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company came into being.

(c) Petroleum

The output of petroleum in our country during the period between World War I and the beginning of the Showa Era (TN. 1926 and later years) was only about 300,000 kilolitres. Even so, the demand for petroleum in our country in 1910-1920 was not so great that until 1920 Japan could meet half of her domestic demands with her home production. However, the demands for petroleum, especially benzine, increased considerably along with the popularization of automobiles and the development of the manufacture of rubber and grease. With the production of petroleum at home remaining on the former level, its proportion against the domestic demands became nothing but a trifle, in recent years. Therefore, the government conducted, after World War I, various studies and investigations of measures for obtaining an adequate supply of petroleum and had the necessary installations made. Subsidies paid for encouraging the prospecting of oil deposits since 1900 then a geological survey was conducted and, with a view to making studies in liquid fuels, the Fuel Research Institute was set up as a governmental organization whose
mission was to conduct researches in low temperature carbonization and coal liquefaction. No way was found, however, to alter the fact that the main portion of the oil supplies had to be imported from abroad in order to satisfy the domestic demand. But the importation of gasoline particularly was controlled practically by the American Standard Oil Company and the British Rising Sun Petroleum Company.

There have also been established recently petroleum refineries which rely on imported crude oil. A strange phenomenon was presented in about 1932, when the retail price of gasoline in Japan became cheaper than in any other market in the whole world, as both Japanese oil refineries and the American and British companies held large stocks of gasoline and competed intensely among each other.

Competition between the Japanese and foreign companies soon ended following the conclusion of a mutual agreement between them. But in 1933, there appeared again signs of excessive competition among oil dealers, as the importation of gasoline from Soviet Russia was started anew. Although a cheap price of gasoline was welcome, it would ultimately have proven disadvantageous to the consumers if the market were plunged in confusion due to extreme over-stocking and competition. The Law for the Petroleum Industry was therefore enacted in 1934 with a view to stabilizing the oil market. This law stipulated, on one hand, that the govern-
Def. Doc. No. 890
ment would guarantee to the existing oil refineries and importers the protection of their vested business interests but, on the other hand, it made them bear certain obligations towards the government, one of them being that of keeping stocks. Originally dealers held, as a rule, stocks of oil sufficient to cover about three months in order to ensure smooth operation of their business. However, it was ordered that this be increased to a six-months supply, but there was not a single reason given that it was for military purposes. The purpose was to ensure a sufficient supply for the domestic industries. To order the dealers to retain a certain fixed quantity under certain specified conditions followed the example of French legislation. At any rate, in as much as our petroleum market was under the control of foreign petroleum, if, in case our supply is cut off by some circumstances, it would place our country into very great difficulties. Although possession in stock of a six-month supply does not necessarily mean that the stock would ensure security, the idea was nothing more than that in the meantime further supplies could be obtained. As it was thought by the legislative authorities that the importation of Soviet gasoline would make the two Anglo-American companies momentarily feel uneasy, the policy would be to permit, in principle, importers to monopolize the importation of petroleum in the future which would induce them to gladly keep a three-month stock.
Def. Doc. No. 690

However, upon the enforcement of the law, it became clear that the two Anglo-American companies would not agree to keep stocks over and above what they already had from the standpoint of their business requirements. Thus the dilemma was confronted that the law would be ignored and that furthermore if we could not have the two companies import oil, we would face difficulty. Thereupon, representatives were sent by the head offices of the Anglo-American companies to Tokyo where frequent negotiations were conducted. As a result, a compromise was reached whereby the two companies also would keep a six-month supply in stock as provided by the law but the government would pay, in return, the cost of the petroleum, cost for the construction of oil tanks, cost of depreciation of the oil during the said period, cost of insurance, interest, etc. Even in case of negotiations with the Ministry of Finance in connection with the payment of the costs, the purpose of stocks referred to above would be based upon industrial requirements. If the purpose were military, then the request would be made out of the Army and Navy expenditures. It was the opinion of the then Finance Minister the late Takahashi, Horekiyo that a request for funds under the guise that it would be used for national defence, hiding behind the government department in charge of the industrial matters, cannot be permitted. That was the reason why the costs referred to were included in the appropriations assigned to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

- 11 -
d) Construction of good ships.

I was connected with the program for dismantling old ships and building superior vessels enforced in 1932 as a member of the committee formed for that purpose, although the matter was principally under the charge of the Communications Ministry. Prior to this and during the time of depression after 1929, investigations had been made by the Commerce and Industry Ministry with a view to rationalizing the shipbuilding industry. In my understanding, the shipbuilding industry does not limit itself only to the construction of the ship itself but is also linked with numerous other industries because of the necessity of installing various equipments in the ship's interior, which fact makes it a composite industry. Therefore, the rise or fall of the shipbuilding industry affects, needless to say, shipyards as well as a number of other industries, particularly hard hit among them being medium and small-scale industries. According to the result of the special studies conducted in those days, it became known that more than half of the shipping charges were being spent for the benefit of industries other than shipbuilding. Therefore, the problem whether or not there is work in the shipyards is closely related with the problem of unemployment in other industries. It was from this point of view that the program for dismantling old ships and building modern and superior...
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Vessels was formulated in 1932. It was only natural that the policy of building modern and superior vessels was adopted in as much as the shipping charges constituted an important element for maintaining our international trade balance as a source of revenue other than from ordinary trade. The same explanation can be given to the case of the enforcement by England of the Trade Facility Act in 1921. The said law provided from the viewpoint of the prevention of unemployment, for the government's guarantee of payment covering both the principal and interest of the loans raised by the shipbuilding companies. Before the law was abolished in 1927, the government had guaranteed for the loans totaling £74,251,780, of which more than 21,500,000 pounds or about 30% were raised by civilian shipyards, ranking first among the companies. I believe that this example is ample proof of the importance attached to the shipbuilding industry as a means to cope with the depression and to give relief to unemployment.


The movement for the rationalization of the industries was started in our country in 1930-1931 following the worldwide depression of 1929. In those days, it was not a problem which merely concerned our country but was an economic policy common to all the countries in the world including Britain, the United States, Germany, France and Italy. Our
country was rather late in following suit and the measures which we enforced were modeled after those of other countries. I cannot afford to idle away time here in explaining fully the basic ideology of industrial rationalization, suffice to say, it was a problem of readjusting industries which had sprung up in all countries like so many mushrooms after the rain during World War I. All the belligerent powers had not only expanded their existing industries but also had set up new industries, as best they could, in order to produce various articles for the supply of which they had depended on other countries prior to the war. This tendency was not limited only to the belligerent powers, but neutral powers and also to adopt economic policies of self-sufficiency as the result of the complete paralysis of international trade. As a result, world economy was confronted when the war ended, with extremely excessive supplies as compared with the demands. In addition to it, the purchasing power of the countries had been decreased tremendously due to war-time dissipations.

Therefore, it was incumbent upon the world powers then to adopt new economic policies whereby to readjust and wind up war industries. The execution of such policies however, would have given rise to severe unemployment in various fields of industries. It was something that the statesmen of a country were utterly unable to do at a time when the current of labour unrest was sweeping all over the world. Hence, efforts to maintain industrial equipments and installations, expanded
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or commenced during the time of the war, were made at unreasonable costs. The universal economic principle of "Give and Take" was not observed any more by the powers which now followed the policy of "Take and Take." One would readily understand the situation which prevailed if one recalled measures taken by the countries at that time in order to encourage the use of domestic products. In England, even postage stamps bore a slogan discouraging foreign products and which branded those using foreign articles as "traitors." Our country also followed suit by starting in the late 1920's, a movement for the promotion of the domestic industries and use of home products. It was then that we realized afresh the necessity for firmly establishing the manufacturing industries which would become the foundation of all the industries of a country. Discussions were made of the measures aimed at establishing such industries as iron manufacturing, air nitrogen fixation, ball bearing, soda ash and petroleum. In spite of desperate efforts, however, there appeared no prospects of recovery, as it was a case of economic depression resulting from a disparity between demand and supply, excessive supply, and over-capitalization of the industries. Especially the peculiar feature of our industry was that it largely depended on the numerous medium- and small-scale manufacturers for the production of articles for export.
It is a well-known fact that some overseas markets were once plunged into such confusion due to reckless competition that vigorous complaints were made by the dealers of Japanese goods abroad. Although it seemed superficially true that the cheaper the articles importers buy, the greater would be their profits, it was not necessarily so, for the Japanese articles, which the importers thought were bought at a cheap price, would be undersold by still cheaper articles that would flow into the market a short while later, thus incurring ultimate loss to the earlier importers. Japan was flooded then with complaints, coming from all over the world, for tagging unnecessarily low prices to her goods and with requests to give even if higher, more stable prices to her export articles. Japan was thus confronted with the necessity to maintain order at least among those of the medium- and small-scale industrialists who were manufacturing important export items and to suppress reckless and excessive competition among them. However, we were reluctant to allow the government's authority to interfere wantonly with popular economic activities, in as much as our successive cabinets, since the Meiji era, had been observing the principle of Free Industry as their golden rule. As a result, the system of the industrialists' associations was devised with a view to maintaining order in the same line of trade. Nevertheless, even when the majority of the industrialists had reached an agreement of
views, there always remained a handful of perverts heretics, who, far from opposing the agreement itself of the association, hoped inwardly for the materialization of the agreement among the members of the association to act freely as "outsiders" and reap unreasonable profits by taking advantage of the control enforced by the associations. It may be said that they formed a sort of "parasitic industry." Therefore, it became unavoidable to exercise the government's authority to cope with such practices, for, had it been left unrestrained, order could not be maintained in the fields of medium- and small-scale industries nor their wholesome development expected.

It was purely in this sense that control was enforced on the association system. It aimed, namely, at compelling the minority that has not joined the association to comply with the agreement of the association, in cases where the majority of the members autonomously concluded an agreement in order to maintain order and stability within the field of their own industry. Simultaneously, a policy was adopted whereby the state supported the community institutions of the association so that the industrialists would benefit by joining the association also in respect to their individual business arrangements. At the outset, this policy was applied exclusively to the medium- and small-scale manufacturers of important export articles. However, shortly after the enforcement of the said system, it became known
that the distinction between the products for domestic use and those for export purposes was not necessarily clear and that excessive competition among medium- and small-scale manufacturers of the articles for domestic use also tended to bring about harmful confusion in the field concerned. The law was, therefore, revised so as to make it applicable without distinction to all medium- and small-scale industries. Meanwhile, the government assumed in the beginning, an attitude of laissez-faire towards comparatively large-scale industrialists, as it took the view that they would be different from the medium- and small-scale industrialists who had little culture, technique and experience and that, if they wished to avoid the horrors of wanton competition, the large-scale industrialists should and would arrange their matters by their own hands. While the worldwide economic depression was being aggravated with the year 1929 as the turning point, Japan, on her part, adopted a number of counter-measures including the lifting of the gold embargo, which however, resulted momentarily in a complete suffocation of our industrial activities. Just then, the government was going ahead with its efforts for industrial rationalization and assisting in various ways the large-scale industries such as shipbuilding, fertilizer, electricity, machines, iron and cement, in effecting their liquidation, joint-management or merger. But none of such efforts brought about a satisfactory settlement owing to diverse reasons. It was then that
the government came to take the view that the state should exercise its authority also on the large-scale industries at the time of an economic crisis. Under those circumstances, the Law For The Control of Vital Industries was enforced in 1931. Judging from its name, the said law seems to be strongly tinted with the ideology of Totalitarian economy, but, by examining its content, one finds that it is not so in the least.

This law aimed, as a whole, at the controlling of medium- and small-scale industries and at voluntary agreement among the industrialists in the same line of trade. It was based upon the principle that the state would intervene with its authority to control the minority of the industrialists only when it did not comply with the desires of the majority. It was not, therefore, purported to allow the wielding of the authority of the government in order to satisfy the needs of the national policies against the desires of the majority of the industrialists. It was, it may also be said, a measure for promoting cartels. Opinions are divided as to whether cartels should be supported or discouraged and every country has its own practical policy which may differ from that of any other country. Whereas the United States government placed the trusts under a strict control since the enactment of the Sherman Act prohibiting the trusts, The National Industry Recovery Act enforced by President Roosevelt openly announced the government's support
and protection of the trusts and cartels as a means to overcome the emergency. The European countries are generally prepared both for supporting and controlling them according to the circumstances.

With respect to the cartel question, the Japanese government drafted cartel legislation generally using as reference studies made and published by the League of Nations. Among the stipulations in the law for the control of vital industries, there are stipulations for the control of cartels in addition to those for their promotion. The order for the registration of control agreements are in line with the idea of giving them due publicity. It appears as to be nothing more than registration, but as a matter of fact it follows the principle of the Clayton Act in the United States which seeks to expose such matters widely to public opinion and criticism by giving publicity to the contents of such measures, a step which is considered to be more preferable than control of penalties. Plan for industrial rationalization in our country, especially the various plans in connection with the control of enterprises, follows the orthodox methods practiced by the various countries since the World War I and does not, in any way, deviate from those methods. The establishment of the Special Measures Law of 1937 concerning import and export restrictions falls into an entirely different category. This is a basic law for the enforcement of war-time economy. A number of war-
time economic laws were created on the basis of the fore-
going law, but this is a measure adopted by other countries
as well out of the compelling necessities of the war and
requires no explanation.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, TOKISABURO, Tokisaburo, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Sworn Deposition of YOSHINO, Shinja is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ TOKISABURO TOKISABURO

Tokyo, Japan
Date March 4
なお、百忙中宜しくお願い申上げます。
リーベルト氏口供に対しての難題

私は一九三三年にベルギーの金融機関の監督に対して指揮していた。一九三六年に商工省指導課に移り、一九三七年に商工省商務課に移り、一九三八年に商務課課長に任じられた。一九三八年には商務課課長に昇進し、一九三九年には商務課副課長に昇進した。一九四〇年には商務課課長に昇進し、一九四一年には商務課課長に昇進した。

之は一九三三年一月から一月にかけて、その後、一九三七年に商務課課長に昇進し、一九三九年に商務課課長に昇進した。一九四〇年には商務課課長に昇進し、一九四一年には商務課課長に昇進した。一九四二年には商務課課長に昇進し、一九四三年には商務課課長に昇進した。一九四四年には商務課課長に昇進し、一九四五年には商務課課長に昇進した。
日本は全く知らなかったからである。

支那戦争前の我邦政策に対してリーベルト氏の指摘した所に付けは頂

次世界大戦を模倣として、戦闘及政策の上に非常に変化を来した。従来
大なる関係を有していたが、戦争の模倣が小で兵器が疎薄しなかったから、
交渉の一方の影響力を示すものである。今後自衛の模倣は文字通りに駆逐した。

西に至る戦争の時の大本は米兵から借金をしあつ

特に本級砲撃、毒瓦斯の如き化学兵器、航空爆撃の出現のもとに従来の軍火
電報のギリセリーノに依り一二の事情に対して興味を示す者を演ずるに至つた。電報を送るに至るるる略給政庁の局は電報政庁の局に次ぎて述べられたる事情は次の通りである。

第一次世界大戦の経済情勢及び経済政策に依り一二の事情に対して興味を示す者を演ずるに至つた。電報を送るに至るるる略給政庁の局は電報政庁の局に次ぎて述べられたる事情は次の通りである。

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案は一言改変の點をなしてゐるから之が設立の関係では我曰に若干の誤解のある我とさしては著問題であった。之は別し何せ農業石炭農業用石炭も殆ど見られぬに於て八幡に官設の農業所を創立以来、三三三五年日本農業株式會社の設立を見る点に於て幾多の意思を集めてゐる。故に之を詳細する時は不必要でなさうか、日本農業株式會社の設立を見る点に於て幾多の意思を集めてゐる。故に之を詳細する時は不必要でない。
足らねものさ近辺にはなっていない。それは第一次大戦後政府に於て石油の発見期待の方策に付ては色々な観念研究し、又施設上の布置決定を基礎として、石油の発見・発見については、一九二三年政府の議論を以って研究を行った。特に、石油発見の際には、石油発見の発見論文の意見を以て研で研究を進めることがあった。従って、石油発見の発見論文の意見を以て研究を進めることがあった。
感じたところで、それから従来者に賄賂は石両の入を認めさせて
承知した旨であるところ、殊に許可しない方針をとるから三ケ月分の油を余分に
保有するときは保有することを背ししない。それでは法令を無視することができる
ないが、デイレンマに困った。そこで従来者の方から代議員、政見を
示して貢献することを安いた、その配当を又賛辞を交渉する場合にも、石分の
保有すべき、保有の目的を計上することを許さぬなど今日の
賛辞を数え上げべきである。保有のクランの油が下にかかって
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られた次第である。
九一八事変の防止の見解から立場の姿勢に対して政府が元来持つべき姿に合わない。
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頭著を発動することは已むを得ない。組合制度の統一はこの意味に外
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やる状況であった。坊誇も議案合議化に誤解してみた政府は議論、記
事、選挙都築、採用、セメント等の大工業に対しても誤解、誤会又は合
事による色々の判断の必要を要した。この方法は論争の下に於て大工業に対し
も時に同業協力の発達を必要とすることは明かに見解を抱くようになり、一九
三一年重金競業法の制定を定めるに至った。この方法は名前は金倶
小工業の制定と同業者等の自立的論点を重視とされる。準備以上に実態
欲する所、之に従はずる少数者を圧して自立を以て強制せんとする措前
をなす。議者の大半倶が欲せらるのを聞くとして論点を必要上の協力の発達
である。議者の多数倶が欲せる所を圧して自立を必要上協力の発達
せんとするものでない。

カルテルに對しては之を助長すべきか抑圧すべきか、論点の有無も
もの。論点の有無も

カルテルの助長保護を含々不明している。これを解釈として一方へ

のトラスト架造法（ノノノ）は非常時需要の一手段として的トラスト・カフルテ
ルの助長保護を含々不明している。この問題では大体に於て一方を

17
カルテルの政策は、前報を以て通じ、今後はその内容を公表して、更に異論のないを正し、仮に認定する場合方策は云々、第一次大戦以来の各業者政策の常識を破り、出入の関係に属する臨時値段法の決定に至っては法とこれを並べす

が誠定され、がはは在争の必要上何れの時代でも何物の国に於ても

己む要請する方法であって、彼等の necesitaを要請する所でありある。
署

氏

（署名）

吉野

信

次

署
In the civil case of The United States of America et. al.,
against
Latin American et. al.

Sworn deposition (translation)

Deponent: OND, Taken.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
1. My name is OHC, Takeshi. I was born at TAKATA-MACHI, NISHI FUKISAKI-GUN, OITA Prefecture on April 18, 1890. My present address is No. 2380, SHIBAYAMA, ZUSHI-MACHI, YOKOSUKA City. I was graduated from the Law College of the Tokyo Imperial University in May, 1915, and entered the Ministry of Communications in November of the same year. I was Post Master of FUKUMI and OhYAMA; Chief of the Supervision Section of the Mercantile Marine Bureau and Director of the KUMAMOTO Communications Bureau before I became Director of the Mercantile Marine Bureau in July, 1935. I was appointed Vice Minister of Communications in January, 1938, and left the same post in March, 1939.

2. I should like to testify herewith as to the fact that Japan's recent policy for marine transportation and ship building had absolutely no war purpose but it was planned and carried out for purely economic purposes.

It is a well known fact that Japan, ever since the MEIJI Restoration, adopted a policy of encouragement and promotion of every phase of her industry in order to catch up, in some way or other, with the advanced countries in Europe and America. Being surrounded by sea on all sides and favored with other suitable conditions, Japan had special advantage for developing her marine transportation and ship building. However, due to her national
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isolation during the TOKUGAWA period, a policy was adopted to prohibit the building of larger-type sea going vessels and foreign navigation so that Japan held the lowest rank in this respect. In other words, there was almost nothing in existence with respect to this field which was worthy of mention. It is only natural, therefore, that the Japanese Government should have paid special efforts for the new establishment and encouragement of these enterprises. It was after 1887 that laws concerning these efforts were promulgated and the Ship-Building Encouragement Law and the Ocean Navigation Subsidy Law came into being. These two laws were enforced throughout the Taisho and the early part of the SHOWA periods, which encouraged and subsidized the building and commissioning of larger type vessels which were considered superior at that time. During this period, such events as the Sino-Japanese War, The Russo-Japanese War and the First World War took place; but it is beyond any doubt whatever that the policies above mentioned were planned for the preparation of these wars; on the contrary, they were simply motivated by the purely economic object as stated above, of elevating the standard of Japan's marine transportation as well as ship-building so that Japan's international trade would flourish among the powers in Europe and America. As a result of such measures these enterprises developed remarkably and the total gross tonnage of vessels at the beginning of SHOWA (1926) amounted to 4,000,000 tons and the volume of foreign goods obtained by these means was
so good as to come next to the export volume of raw silk and raw cotton.

Under the circumstances as mentioned above, the subsidy measures for the improvement of vessels which was put into effect in October, 1932, and other similar measures were aimed primarily at the promotion of the development of Japan's industries which had far continued to develop from the previous period.

3. Measures to Encourage the Improvement of Grades of Ships

The worldwide economic depression after World War I affected Japan by degrees. Japan's shipping and ship-building industries met with extremely adverse circumstances from the end of the Taisho era till the beginning of the Showa era.

Since the early days, Japan's shipping industry was developed by importing old ships from abroad until her shipping came to rank third in the world. The majority of these ships, however, were either outmoded ships or inferior vessels hastily constructed during wartime. Japan was then called a country next to Greece in the ownership of outmoded ships (see the appended Table I).

This fact not only interfered considerably with the efficient operation of her shipping, but also gave rise to frequent disasters at sea (see the appended Table II) around the end of the Taisho era or at the beginning of the Showa era. An unusually great loss of human lives involved in these disasters brought about severe criticisms against the Governmental policy of employing old ships.
Thus the financial depression dealt a severe blow on Japan's shipping, till the coal freight between Moji and Yokohama was reduced to an unprecedentedly low rate of 75 sen, and the lumber freight to North America to 46. The number of laid-up ships increased to such an extent (see the appended Table III) that no dock accommodation could be found.

In the last analysis the excessive ship-bottom and inferior quality of ships brought about this condition. Public opinion demanded, accordingly, that the Government should at once carry out a thoroughgoing re-adjustment of ship-bottoms and improvement in the grade of ships employed, thereby improving the condition of the shipping trade and eradicating the very cause of disasters at sea.

Because of excess ship-bottoms, ship builders received no orders for the construction of new vessels. This caused ship building facilities to remain permanently idle. The ship builders were strongly urged to rationalize the industry. They were obliged to resort to such temporizing measures as the construction of steel bridges, or in extreme cases, the manufacturing of daily necessaries such as furniture, wooden clogs, and other articles. A large number of workers lost employment in the ship building and affiliated industries, and to give them relief became an urgent necessity.

The measure in question was proposed and put into effect in view of such circumstances, after due consultation with national ship owners' association, ship builders association, as well as
Def. Doc. 708

labor organizations including seamen's unions

The measure aims at:

(a) improvement of the condition of the shipping trade;
(b) rationalization of shipping and the prevention of disasters at sea by the employment of ships of better grade;
(c) development of the ship building industry and giving relief to the unemployed by additional construction of ships.

When the measures were put into effect, the economic objectives were attained and shipping and ship building industries gradually recovered from the depression. The attention of the powers was drawn to Japan's success and both England and Norway adopted similar measures.

If the measure in question were a wartime measure, it is not conceivable that peace-loving nations such as England and Norway should have followed Japan's example.

It is our belief that such suspicion would undoubtedly be dispelled, if the following facts are taken into consideration.

A policy aiming at the reduction of ship bottom is rather contrary to war objectives. In fact, at the outset, the military was opposed to it. The measure resulted in scrapping 500,000 gross tons of old ships and building 300,000 gross tons of new ones. In addition to this, importation of foreign vessels was banned in May, 1933.
Def. Doc. 708

These facts demonstrate clearly that what Government had intended was an out and out economic measure to improve the ship trade by getting rid of surplus ship bottoms. That Japan's ship bottoms were actually reduced by the operation of the measure in question is shown in the appended table IV.

B. The measure aimed at the improvement of the grade of ship owned by Japan. However, what the Government intended was superior economic performances of individual ships according to the manner their employment and speed. For instance, the Government-required full speed for ships of 4,000 gross tons or over was usually but 13.5 knots. It is clear, therefore, that the Government did not have high grade ships of specially high-speed built in anticipation of a war. In certain quarters it has been alleged that Japan constructed ships for war purposes, because a considerable number of the newly built ships were of comparatively high speed in comparison with the cargo boats of other countries.

The fact is that Japanese ships carrying silk directly to New York via the Panama Canal were required to have high speeds in order to compete with the American trans-continental railways. Their having high speed was an economic requirement. That a majority of ships built in conformity with this policy were commissioned for the New York route should clarify this point.

C. The measure in question stipulated that ships should be built at domestic yards, using domestically produced materials.
This is the natural result of the fact that the policy was a measure to relieve unemployment and does not warrant the criticism that it was formulated in anticipation of a war.

4. As a result, the shipping business was improved, excess of ship space remedied and building enterprises well under way to recovery.

Therefore, after the 12th year of Showa (1937) this was abolished, and the construction of up-to-date ships was resumed. This, however, was but the materialization, with a limited amount of subsidies, of the long sustained wishes of those concerned which had not been realized. Competition for the Atlantic shipping among Great Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Italy and others, which vied with each other in building ultra-modern ships was of common knowledge to the world and had been the envy of the Japanese shipping concerns. It was quite natural for Japan which was the third shipping nation in the world to attempt the building of ships which surpassed them.

5. Policy of subsidizing ship building under the Iron Manufacturing Enterprises Law.

Steel used for ship building in Japan was imported first but later the imported steel was replaced by home manufactured steel as iron manufacturing industries developed in Japan. At the time imported steel was used, ship builders were requested to use steel of approximately the same price as that used by foreign ship builders; imported steel was excepted from import duty to prevent the
comparatively high cost of ships, the simultaneously home manufactured steel was given a subsidy of a sum corresponding to the import duty. This policy was enforced from the twenties and this was stipulated in the Iron Manufacturing Encouragement Law. In 1937 this law was abolished to be replaced by the Iron Manufacturing Enterprises Law, whose following provisions were transferred to the new law and the same stipulations were enforced. Therefore, it is entirely out of place to consider the enactment of the Iron Manufacturing Enterprises Law as a measure for war purposes, because it was nothing more than the outcome of an economic demand to lower ship building costs to the level prevailing in Europe and the United States.

6. The Iron Manufacturing Enterprise Law

The Iron Manufacturing Enterprise Law which was enacted and enforced at the end of 1939 was passed over the objections of the Navy for the purpose of preventing the supervision of ship building yards by the Navy. It stipulates the license system of ship building, etc., in conformance with the general rule of supervision of other important industries. This is a matter to be placed, because of its nature, under control and aims at preventing unnecessary competition and confusion among the ship building concerns. Upon the enforcement of this law, the existing ship building yards were given licenses and thus the status quo was maintained. Although the provision for the grant of subsidies
remained in the law, no subsidy was given under this law. In
conclusion, it is not to the point to consider the enactment of this
law as an act to make preparations for war.
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Showing the number of Steamers and Motorships according to certain divisions of Gross Tonnage, and according to certain divisions of Age, owned in Japan as recorded in the 1929-30 edition of Lloyd's Register Book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS OF TONNAGE</th>
<th>UNDER 5 YEARS</th>
<th>5 AND UNDER 10 YEARS</th>
<th>10 AND UNDER 15 YEARS</th>
<th>15 AND UNDER 20 YEARS</th>
<th>20 AND UNDER 25 YEARS</th>
<th>25 YEARS AND OVER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 - 500</td>
<td>12,091</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>34,473</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>57,008</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>22,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 1,000</td>
<td>16,395</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21,875</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76,329</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 2,000</td>
<td>28,414</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49,580</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>159,164</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 - 4,000</td>
<td>86,659</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>223,335</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>72,427</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000 - 6,000</td>
<td>77,330</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>294,057</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>443,558</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000 - 8,000</td>
<td>76,713</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>226,201</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>216,737</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000 - 10,000</td>
<td>5,488</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>71,978</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>51,160</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 - 15,000</td>
<td>4,413</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41,234</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49,091</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 - 20,000</td>
<td>33,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 and above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>331,482</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>915,373</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>1,350,073</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>94,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Chart) appendix No. 2.
Showing the number of Steamers and Motorships according to certain divisions of Gross Tonnage, and according to certain divisions of Age, owned in Japan as recorded in the 1929-30 edition of Lloyd's Register Book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY IN WHICH OWNED</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF TONNAGE</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDER 5 YEARS</td>
<td>UNDER 10 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 to 500</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 to 1,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 to 2,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 to 4,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>4,000 to 6,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,000 to 8,000</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,000 to 10,000</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,000 to 15,000</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,000 to 20,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,000 and above</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>161</td>
<td>331,482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Showing the number of Steamers and Motorships according to certain divisions of Gross Tonnage, and according to certain divisions of Age, owned in Japan as recorded in the 1929-30 edition of Lloyd's Register Book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY IN WHICH OWNED</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF TONNAGE</th>
<th>AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDER 5 YEARS</td>
<td>5 AND UNDER 10 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 and under 500</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 1,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 2,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 - 4,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>86,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000 - 6,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000 - 8,000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>76,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000 - 10,000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>45,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 - 15,000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>41,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 - 20,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 and above</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 141 331,482 336 915,373 694 1,330,073 170 336,633 180 347,614 458 925,477 2,097 4,186,6
Showing the number of Steamers and Motorships according to certain divisions of Gross Tonnage, and according to certain divisions of Age, owned in Japan as recorded in the 1929-30 edition of Lloyd's Register Book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country in Which Owned</th>
<th>Divisions of Tonnage</th>
<th>Under 5 Years</th>
<th>5 AND UNDER 10 YEARS</th>
<th>10 AND UNDER 15 YEARS</th>
<th>15 AND UNDER 20 YEARS</th>
<th>20 AND UNDER 25 YEARS</th>
<th>25 YEARS AND OVER</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>100 and under 500</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12,091</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>59,008</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22,228</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500 - 1,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14,393</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21,875</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76,322</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,000 - 2,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28,414</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49,580</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>159,164</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000 - 4,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56,159</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>181,258</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>283,383</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,000 - 6,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>77,350</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>234,057</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>443,558</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,000 - 8,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>96,113</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>246,010</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>216,717</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,000 - 10,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>76,104</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45,886</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>71,978</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,000 - 15,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>75,091</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41,134</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13,401</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>15,000 - 20,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33,600</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,000 and above</td>
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<td>\ldots</td>
<td>\ldots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>161</td>
<td>331,432</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>915,373</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>1,330,073</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The table lists the number of steamers and motorships owned in Japan, categorized by tonnage and age, as recorded in Lloyd's Register Book for the years 1929-30.
Table II - A

Table showing loss of human lives (dead and missing) due to disasters at sea for the eight years between 1924 and 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Steam-Total</th>
<th>Sail-Total</th>
<th>Steam-Total</th>
<th>Sail-Total</th>
<th>Steam-Total</th>
<th>Sail-Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steamers</td>
<td>Sailers</td>
<td>Steamers</td>
<td>Sailers</td>
<td>Steamers</td>
<td>Sailers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2342</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 2955 | Average: 422
Table II-B

Percentage of total loss of Japanese vessels of over 100 tons.

(Investigation carried out by Lloyd's Underwriters' association)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total No. of Ship Losses</th>
<th>Percentage against No. of Ships owned</th>
<th>Japan's total tonnage losses</th>
<th>Percentage against tonnage owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.96%</td>
<td>43,829</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.49%</td>
<td>41,956</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.42%</td>
<td>51,105</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3.16%</td>
<td>54,156</td>
<td>1.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.64%</td>
<td>58,548</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>70,933</td>
<td>1.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.37%</td>
<td>58,703</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>44,576</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>70,412</td>
<td>1.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>69,418</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>67,332</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
<td>64,670</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
<td>57.12%</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table III
Table showing tonnage of vessels laid up
(only 1,000 tons gross and above)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1932</td>
<td>237,322 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1933</td>
<td>139,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1934</td>
<td>52,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1935</td>
<td>26,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1936</td>
<td>7,930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks: It amounted to 330,000 tons during the period between the end of 1930 and the beginning of 1931.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>G/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>20 (Aug.)</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>21 (March)</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On this 7th day of March, 1947

At No. 2380, Sakuraya, Kushi-cho,
Yokosuka-shi

Deponent: ONO, Takeshi (seal)

I, ONO, Takeshi hereby certify that the
above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed
his signature and seal thereto in the presence of
this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness: (signed) SUIJUBARA, Tokisaburo (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(O.K., Takeshi) (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, SUGUI, Toshiko, of the defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of sworn deposition of ONG, Takeshi is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Toshiko Suzuki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 11th March 1947
漢字による日本語文書の内容を自然な形式で提供する。
Showing the number of Steamers and Motorships according to certain divisions of Gross Tonnage, and according to certain divisions of Age, owned in Japan as recorded in the 1934-36 edition of Lloyd's Register Book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY IN WHICH OWNED</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF TONNAGE</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDER 5 YEARS</td>
<td>5-10 UNDER 15 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>100-500</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500-1,000</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,000-2,000</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000-4,000</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,000-6,000</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,000-8,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,000-10,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,000-15,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,000-20,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,000-and above</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL | 731 | 133 | 482 | 386 | 915,373 | 644 | 1,330,073 | 170 | 321,838,180 | 347,114 | 446 | 925,397 | 2,087 | 4,162,017 | 1,073 |
Showing the number of Steamers and Motorships according to certain divisions of Gross Tonnage, and according to certain divisions of Age, owned in Japan as recorded in the 1929-30 edition of Lloyd's Register Book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY IN WHICH OWNED</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF TONNAGE</th>
<th>DIVISIONS OF</th>
<th>AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDER 5 YEARS</td>
<td>5 AND UNDER 10 YEARS</td>
<td>10 AND UNDER 15 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 and under 500</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12,091</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 1,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16,395</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 2,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28,414</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 - 4,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>86,659</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000 - 6,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77,350</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>6,000 - 8,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,000 - 12,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,000 - 15,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,000 - 20,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 and above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>331,482</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>项目</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>项目</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>项目</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>项目</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>项目</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>项目</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>项目</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table IV
Japanese Merchant Vessels (Steel Ships Only)

Over 100 G/T

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>G/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2,869</td>
<td>4,087,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>3,764</td>
<td>4,139,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>5,660</td>
<td>4,248,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4,333</td>
<td>4,242,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3,785</td>
<td>4,177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>7,747</td>
<td>4,079,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>9,758</td>
<td>4,044,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>11,845</td>
<td>4,073,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>4,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>2,047</td>
<td>4,358,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>5,343,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2,354</td>
<td>5,703,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,573</td>
<td>6,051,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2,626</td>
<td>6,376,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,445</td>
<td>5,942,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>4,944,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,339</td>
<td>2,564,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,523,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>1,294,778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I have the honour today of addressing you on the foreign policy of Japan and presenting an outline of the recent developments.

As I stated last May at the Extraordinary Session of the Diet, the national policy of Japan aims at ensuring the stability of Asia, to contribute thereby to the cause of world peace, as well as promoting the welfare and happiness of mankind by upholding international justice. And we have been striving earnestly and unremittingly toward the achievement of those aims.

In surveying the conditions of the world it is to be noted that the international political situation is still lacking in stability. In fact, it appears to be growing worse than ever owing especially to the activities of the Communist International, or the Comintern. In these circumstances, it is truly significant that there was concluded on November 25 last year an agreement between Japan and Germany concerning the Communist International. This agreement is intended for a common defence against the activities of the Comintern, whose tenets are not only incompatible with the national policy of our country but inconsistent with human nature itself.

The Japanese Government have always been endeavouring to suppress the Communist movement, which long since made its way into this country. In China, subsequent to the adoption by the Kuomintang of a policy of toleration toward the Communist party, movement spread widely so that were established a few years ago in various parts of Kiangsi and Fukien, and the so-called "Communist-bandit armies" multiplied numerous.
localities. It was with grave concern that Japan watched the developments in China under the Red invasion. Then, in the summer of the year before last, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, convened at Moscow, passed a resolution and declared openly that certain countries including Japan and Germany were to be the major objects of its future operations. At the same time the Comintern adopted new tactics of campaign based upon the formation of the so-called "people's front," which has proved successful in several countries of Europe, especially in Spain where it has brought on a civil war which is raging even now attended with terrible scenes of fratricide. In East Asia the Comintern commenced skilfully to sovietize China while damaging the Sino-Japanese relations through movement called "the Anti-Japanese People's Front" organized throughout that country. In Manchoukuo and also in Japan there appeared signs of the growth of Communist manoeuvres.

In the face of the operations of the Comintern, tenacious as they are ingenious, our Government were obliged to devise more stringent measures of defence and formulate an adequate policy for the protection of our national polity and the preservation of the stability of East Asia. Of course, we are seeking to achieve the purpose of defence and of detection and investigation through our domestic organs. But the Comintern is an international organization with a large number of branches scattered all over the globe, which maintain close contact between one another, and conduct their campaigns under directions from headquarters, each exploiting the peculiar conditions of its own territory. Therefore, measures for guarding against such operations should necessarily be extended to an international scale. That is why Japan has concluded with Germany the present agreement providing for the exchange of information and the study of the necessary steps to be taken.
The object of this agreement is a joint defence against the Comintern and we should be glad to enter into agreement with any other country within the scope of that aim. Needless to say, the Japanese Government are not bound in any way outside the scope of the above-mentioned aim. It seems there have been those who entertained misunderstandings or misgivings regarding the character of the agreement. But I wish to state definitely that the conclusion of the agreement, which was dictated by the need of protecting our national polity and preserving the stability of East Asia, does not affect in the slightest degree our policy of promoting friendly relations with all Powers in the spirit of universal concord and harmony.

The Japanese Government are endeavouring to further the unity and solidarity between the peoples of Japan and Manchoukuo and to consolidate the neighbourly and inseparable relationship between the two countries. And for that purpose, we decided, as I stated at the previous session of the Diet, upon the abolition of our extraterritorial rights and the adjustment and transfer of our administrative rights in the South Manchuria Railway Zone. Under this policy, and as the first step, there was signed on June 10 last year a treaty concerning partial abolition of our extraterritorial rights and adjustment of our administrative rights in the South Manchuria Railway Zone. The conclusion of this treaty was hailed by the people of Manchoukuo with profound satisfaction, and its operation has since proved eminently successful. It is gratifying to us all to note that Manchoukuo is making steady and healthy progress along all lines, and the economic and commercial relation between that country and ours are growing more and more intimate.

It was some time ago that the Japanese Government proposed to China three
basic principles, hoping to effect thereby the much needed
adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. However, in August last
there occurred the Chongtu Incident, which was followed by a
series of unfortunate incidents at Fakhoi and elsewhere. From an
examination into the nature of these incidents we could see clearly
that every one of them was not merely an ordinary case of murder or
assault, but that they were all traceable to the anti-Japanese
policy of China. While it was necessary to obtain settlements of
individual cases as such, it was evident that unless we eliminated
their underlying causes we could not possibly prevent the recurrence
of similar incidents, nor could we protect the lives and property
of our nationals and safeguard our rights and interests in China,
and consequently we could never hope for a friendly and harmonious
intercourse between our two nations. Therefore, in order to fore­
stall the recurrence of any untoward incidents at their very source
the Japanese Government, while demanding utmost sincerity in the
exercise of the control of all anti-Japanese agitations, invited the
Nanking Government to discuss various questions, upon the solution
of which depended the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. In
other words, we desired that the Nanking Government, instead of
stopping short at the negative policy of merely controlling the
anti-Japanese movement, should go a step further and alter their own
attitude toward Japan which was one of the chief causes of anti-
Japanese agitations; and we urged upon that Government to prove their
sincerity on various concrete issues having to do with the
rehabilitation of Sino-Japanese relations. Negotiations were begun at
Nanking between the representatives of the two countries early
September, and continued for over three months. Believing that in
view of the Chinese attitude, indefinite prolongation of the
negotiations would
only serve to bring on fresh complication, we demanded that the Nanking Government put into practice those points on which both sides had so far reached an agreement of view, leaving the remaining questions to later conversations. Thereupon the Chengt' and Pakhoh Incident as such were settled on December 30.

As you may gather from what has been said, our negotiations with China, having failed to produce as yet the anticipated results, hit a standstill for the present. However, I am convinced that these negotiations are of significant value in that they will serve as a stage in the progress of the further negotiations. Since our fundamental policy toward China is directed most certainly toward the collaboration and the friendship and the common prosperity of the two countries, the renewal of the endeavours for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations with a fresh resolve and determination not only an obligation of the two Governments but also a common desire, I believe, of both nations.

As regards the incident at Sian, our Government took a fair, impartial attitude and watched the course of events calmly but with grave concern. It is most fortunate for China that the affair is being brought to an end without entailing serious consequences. However, in view of the fact that Chung K'ueh-li was come out for a pro-Communist and anti-Japanese policy at the initial stage of the incident, and that its final outcome is bound to have a far-reaching effect upon the general situation of East Asia, our Government are paying careful attention to further developments.

The policy of Japan toward the U.S.S.R. lies, as a matter of course, in the maintenance and insurance of normal relations. In order to enhance friendly
relations between the two countries through the solution of pending issues, our Government have continued to conduct negotiations during the past year regarding the revision of the fishery treaty, and the problems of border demarcation and settlement of disputes between the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo, and also have assisted in the negotiations between the Soviet authorities and the representatives of Japanese interests on the matter of extension of the period of oil prospecting in North Sakhalin. As regards this oil question, a contract was concluded in October extending the prospecting period by five years. The text of a new fishery convention was also drawn up in the middle of last November after deliberations lasting for one and a half years. But at the very moment when the instrument was to be signed, the Soviet Government asked for a postponement of the signature on the grounds of non-completion of the necessary domestic procedure, and thereafter persistently refused to sign. We called the attention of the Soviet Government repeatedly to the basic nature of Japan's fishery right in the northern waters and to the perpetuity required of the treaty intended to regulate the exercise of the said right. As the result of these later conversations a provisional arrangement was concluded at last on the 28th of December, which will permit our fishery enterprise to go unobstructed for the coming session. Our Government intend of course to continue negotiations regarding the signing of the above-mentioned new convention and expect to arrive at a settlement at an early date.

The establishment of Commissions for the Manchoukuo-Soviet border demarcation and settlement of disputes was proposed by our Government in the belief that such bodies would contribute substantially toward the prevention of disputes between Japan, Manchoukuo and the Soviet Union, and the harmonization of the tripartite relations. I may say that an agreement of views has been reached on all the basic
questions involved, excepting one or two points. And our Government hope to see this question settled as soon as possible.

Thus we are doing everything to establish peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. It is to be greatly regretted, therefore, that the Soviet Union only maintains disproportionately large armaments along the Manchoukuo frontier, but goes so far at times as to circulate rumours of aggressive actions on the part of this country. Should the Soviet Government appreciate the pacific intentions of Japan, reflect upon their own past attitude and seek to solve pending issues between the two countries, I believe that Soviet-Japanese relations would be soon put upon a normal footing.

Toward Great Britain our policy to strengthen the traditional relations remains unchanged. When the two countries, taking a broad view, give full and sympathetic consideration to each other's position, there can be no doubt that a way will be found of adjusting their interests. It is the intention of our Government to exert further efforts in that direction.

Japan's relations with the United States are of late happily improving, owing, I believe, as well to our consistent policy of contributing, in cooperation with that Power, to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, as to a deeper understanding on the part of the American people regarding the situation in East Asia. The Japanese Government will continue to spare no efforts in the cultivation and improvement of the cordial relations already existing between the two nations.

The naval limitation treaty among the world's three major sea powers, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, has expired with the past year.
Our Government, adhering as faithfully as ever to the principle of non-menace and non-aggression, have certainly no desire to initiate a race for naval construction. Indeed, we have seized every opportunity to express our sincere aspirations for naval limitation and it is still the cherished hope of the Japanese Government that there will be concluded as soon as possible a just and fair treaty of limitation among the Powers concerned, to contribute to the cause of world peace.

Recently, we notified the Italian Government of our decision to withdraw our legation in Ethiopia and to establish a consulate instead. At the same time, the Italian Government assured us that they would give favorable consideration concerning the protection of our commercial and other interests in Ethiopia. Negotiations on that basis are now in progress. I should say that we have only taken what seemed to be the proper step in view of the actual situation and also in consideration of the friendly relations between our country and Italy.

Our Government are also desirous of establishing closer economic relations with the countries in the South Seas. Although there are those who misunderstand, or even attempt to discredit our intentions, we entertain no aggressive designs, but only seek to promote our trade and join efforts with those countries in the development of the natural resources through the furtherance of peaceful and friendly relations.

I am happy to say that Japan's foreign trade, despite the numerous measures of restriction adopted by many countries, rose to an unprecedented volume last year, demonstrating the vigour and vitality of our national economic and industrial life. As for the trade restrictions of other lands, they are of such character that there is no way to have them removed except through diplomatic negotiations. Our Government are doing their best in that regard. To cite a conspicuous
instance, some time ago our Government were compelled to invoke the Trade Protection Law against Australia in order to counter the measures of the Australian Government to restrict the importation of Japanese goods. Therewith we initiated trade negotiations which were continued for several months until toward the end of last year, when an amicable understanding was reached, and the relations between Japan and Australia have been restored to a normal basis.

As for the Netherlands Indies, through the intermediation of Governments of that country and of our own the shipping interests of the two countries concluded an agreement in the course of the past year. The conclusion of this agreement, which had been claimed by the Netherlands Indies as a postulate for any discussion on trade, paved the way to the trade negotiations between the Governments, which have been carried on with tangible results. Our trade negotiations with British India are also making satisfactory progress.

While carrying on these negotiations, our Government are also devoting their best efforts to the work of opening up new and promising markets everywhere, to say nothing of preserving and enlarging the old, so as to bring about the expansion of our foreign trade as a whole.

At the Extraordinary Session last spring I stated that the growing trend toward the extension of international trade barriers was a matter of serious concern to a country like Japan, which cannot secure the nation's economic existence except through ensuring the supply of raw materials and the markets for manufactured products. Since then there have arisen certain circumstances warranting a hope for the moderation of restrictive measures. However, despite this hope, generally speaking, the various trade barriers are being kept intact as they were. What is needed most this time, I believe, is that with a view
to restoring freedom of trade, the Powers should treat their colon\'s markets in the spirit which marks the provisions of the Congo Basin Treaty. This, side by side with the solution of the now seriously discussed problem of the redistribution of natural resources, should go far toward dispelling the atmosphere of universal unrest, and prove a most effective and timely contribution to the cause of world peace.

Finally, I wish to speak a few words on our international cultural work. The culture of a nation is none other than an expression of its national traits and a true appreciation of it leads to a basic understanding of that nation. The upholding of international justice and the realization of genuine co-operation among the nations of the world will only then be possible. Especially for Japan, the diffusion of her ancient and unique culture in foreign countries is of the utmost importance, since it will serve as means to make the world understand the spirit underlying our national activities. With this point in view, our Government are intending to make further endeavours in the field of international cultural work.

Such is a brief outline of Japan's foreign policy and the progress of events in the diplomatic field. In conclusion, let me say that in the present complex and delicate circumstances, internal and external, the utmost care and caution are required of both our people and our Government in order to surmount the difficulties that confront Japan. The whole nation should be united in the determination and share in the efforts to carry out our national policy. From my heart, I appeal to you all for your ungrudging co-operation and collaboration.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 10 pages and entitled "The Address of Mr. Hachiro Arita, Minister for Foreign Affairs, of the Seventieth Session of the Diet, January 21, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato


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I, HAYASHI, Faoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 14 pages and entitled "The Address of Mr. Nacjro Arte, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Seventieth Session of the 21st January 21, 1935." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato
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