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全「土木計画…」依頼を念頭に

（1）土木計画

全「土木計画…」依頼を念頭に
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Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODC, Nagacharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese entitled 'STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE REGARDING THE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL' is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 30 September 1946.

Nagacharu ODC
Signature of Official

Witness: T. S. to
Month after month during the year 1929, and on into the early part of 1930, disturbing news came from the southern and south-central portions of China. Communist bands, during this period, captured city after city and county after county, and the strength of what came to be known as the "Red" forces was obviously rapidly on the increase.

In case after case the local and even the provincial authorities reported to the central government that the Communists had become so strong that further resistance had become hopeless. As the area under Communist control spread, it became a no-man's-land. News from the districts held by the Communists was scarce, but now and then Shanghai, Canton, or Hongkong learned from refugees of bloody massacres, of lootings, of burnings, and of the destruction of even the meager degree of law and order that had previously existed.

* * * * * * *
Anti-Russian sentiment which developed in Central and South China following a split in the Kuomintang Party in 1927 quickly spread to North China. Here the Japanese found their bitterest opponents in Marshal Chang Tso-lin, dictator of Manchuria and leader of the Northern military faction opposed to General Chiang Kai-shek (who became Generalissimo in 1932).

On April 6, 1927, Marshal Chang Tso-lin's police, assisted by guards from the Legation quarter, which was controlled by the American, British, Japanese, French, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese Ministries, raided the offices of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, raids from the Chinese charge that the Russians were using the Diplomatic Quarter as a center for the propagation of communist ideas, the foreign legations had their own grievances against the Russians through the discovery of a plot supposedly hatched in the office of the Soviet military attaché to secure access to the British Embassy compound. The Soviet Embassy occupied quarters adjoining the British Legation, from which it was separated by a high wall, and it was alleged that an entrance was being made through the wall from the Soviet side, with the aim of attacking the British guards and precipitating an incident. The Soviet Ambassador, then home on leave, was L. K. Karakhan, first diplomatic emissary sent to China by the USSR. A year previously, Marshal Chang Tso-lin had demanded Karakhan's recall.

Large quantities of communist propaganda literature and documents were seized in the raid, and several Russians and Chinese found on the premises were arrested. The Soviet Government denounced the raid as an unprecedented violation of the elementary rules of international law, but Marshal Chang ignored the protests and circulated to the press and the diplomats of the other Powers photographic reproductions of documents proving the existence of a widespread plot to communize China. The documents also indicated that members of the Soviet Embassy's staff were involved in the plot. This was a serious matter, as it constituted a violation of the stipulations of the Peking agreement of 1924, by which the Soviet Government bound itself not to disseminate communist propaganda in China. As a result of the disclosures the Soviet chargé d'affaires was recalled, and after a brief court martial the Chinese ring leaders arrested in the raid were shot.

China's attitude toward the Soviet Russians was increased by the discovery of documents showing that the Russians were using the revenues and facilities of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which crosses North Manchuria, for the purpose of spreading communism throughout China. Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Soviet Government offered to restore the Chinese Eastern Railway and other Czarist Russian interests in North Manchuria to Chinese control. Later Moscow withdrew this offer, and after the relinquishment of Allied administration of the railway at the end of World War I, the Poles took over complete control of the railway. In 1924 the USSR signed an agreement with China for the joint control and operation of the railway, but this agreement was not carried out, according to the Chinese, as alleged that the Russian general manager refused to consult with the Chinese co-manager of the board on matters of important policy.
Recently large numbers of Russian agents had been sent to Harbin under the guise of engineers and railway technicians, who were devoting their time and energies to the furtherance of communism. Schools operated by the educational department of the railway in Harbin and other cities inside the ten-mile-wide railway "zone" were used to disseminate communist propaganda in violation of the 1924 agreement.

A further cause of Marshal Chang's animosity was the knowledge that his arch enemy Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang was receiving both arms and financial supplies from Russia. Marshal Pang Yu-hsian, well known Northern military leader, formerly affiliated with Marshal Wu Pei-fu in the KMT Party, went to Russia in 1926, and studied military tactics for a year. When he returned to China in 1927 he established himself in Kansu Province, adjacent to the area now occupied by the Chinese Communists. With money and arms supplied by the Soviets he built up the so-called Kuominchun or "National" army, and joined the Nationalists at Nanking. Shortly afterward he broke with General Chiang Kai-shek and organized a coalition against Nanking. He was deposed by General Chiang, and after a period of retirement again rejoined the National Government. Curiously, the rifles which the Soviets supplied to Fang's troops bore the trademark of the Remington Arms Company. These rifles had been manufactured in the United States for the Czarist forces in World War I and had been taken over by the Bolsheviks after the revolution of 1917.

Although General Chiang Kai-shek had established his nationalist capital at Nanking, foreign ministers, including our own, were still accredited to the Peking Government and maintained their headquarters there. They were reluctant to give up the comfort and protection of the old legation quarters, although some of their legations had sent unofficial representatives to Shanghai in order to maintain contact with the new government.

After the death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, in June, 1928, his son, the "Young Archduke" Chang Hsueh-liang, took command and soon announced his adherence to the nationalist Government at Nanking. The Young Marshal also continued the anti-communist activities in North China and Manchuria which had been initiated by his father.

Shortly after he assumed office in Mukden the Young Marshal learned that the Communist International had called a secret regional conference to be held in Harbin, North Manchuria, on May 27, 1929. While the meeting was in progress the Chinese police staged a raid and arrested some forty Russian consular officials and practically the same number of Chinese Communists from various parts of Manchuria. The Chinese also seized two truckloads of papers and documents. Claiming that the documents confirmed their suspicions that officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway were taking an active part in the propagation of Bolshevist ideas, the Chinese took drastic action.

On July 10 they seized the railway, dissolved all Soviet unions of railway workers and arrested some 1,200 railway officials and union leaders, whom they interned in abandoned railway buildings several miles from Harbin. It was the first time the Chinese Government had ever acted so energetically and decisively against a foreign Power.
Accompanied by a number of other correspondents, including Wilbur Forrest of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, Jim Varo, Associated Press, and William Philip Simms of the Scripps-Ho elder newspapers, I arrived in Harbin about a week later. We found that the Chinese had seized the military telegraph system and all offices of the Soviet Fa, Western Trading Corporation, the Seraph Trust, and the Soviet Mercantile Flota owned a number of large paddle-wheel steamers which operated on the Sungari and Amur rivers, reminiscent of steamboat days on the Mississippi and Missouri rivers.

The Soviet Government acted with equal energy. Minister Kirdin, the head of the wartime and appointed Assistant Foreign Minister in Moscow, denounced the Chinese action as a "gross violation of treaties" and gave China an ultimatum of three days to return all warships and facilities of the Soviet-owned companies. Fighting soon broke out along the Chinese Eastern Railway at both the eastern and western borders of Manchuria, resulting in heavy casualties to the Chinese forces at the town of Lenschou, where some 3,000 Chinese soldiers were killed. The Chinese town of Fupunichou, at the eastern end of the railway, was badly shelled by Soviet artillery fire and airbombs. A Chinese town known as Lohasu at the mouth of the Sungari River, opposite Khabarovsk on the Amur, was bomb and burned, and two Chinese gunboats stationed there were sunk by Soviet planes.

The country about the junction of the Sungari and Amur rivers interested me very much, as there are numerous villages in the vicinity inhabited by some of the most primitive races of Northeastern Asia. I visited a village inhabited by a tribe of Tatars, most of whose clothing was made from the skin of the sturgeon, the fish which also produces the famous Russian "black" caviar. This particular tribe was locally known as "Fish-skin" Tatars.

I covered the battle of Lohasu from the deck of an ancient Chinese paddle-wheel steamboat upon which I had traveled down the river from Harbin for about 600 miles. I was accompanied on the trip by Nel Wright of the CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, and Baron Taube, a Swedish nobleman, who represented Reuters. By this time the weather was getting cold and ice had begun to form in the river. We wondered whether we would be caught by the river ice and captured by the Soviet troops. We were anchored at a little river town called Fuchin when a courier arrived stating the Russians were coming after having captured and turned Lohasu the preceding night. The captain hurriedly got up steam and we started upstream only five hours before the Reds arrived. The Chinese told us that the Russians always followed the practice, on capturing a Chinese town, of opening all the stores and granaries and distributing their contents free to the populace as a "communist" gesture. Another boat, carrying Chinese officials, which followed us, was badly shot up by Soviet planes. We managed to reach Harbin safely, but with the paddle-wheel and rudder of our steamer so covered with ice that we had difficulty in moving against the current.
使館街内に入らんとするソヴィエト陸軍武官の官邸で計らいとされたと認むる警備を発見して露西亜人に対する苦情を申立てたのであるソヴィエト大脇館は英館大使館に接続し高い塀で区切られて居た。それは当時のソヴィエト館より支那に派せられた数人の露西亜人及び支那人が折難さされたソヴィエト館が支那の露西亜人を抑圧しつつ支那の館を無視して支那館の外に居た数人の露西亜人及び支那人が被害されられてソヴィエト館は侵略を伴う事件を重ねた。

カルハンが最初の外交防備としてソヴィエト館より支那に派せられた数人の露西亜人及び支那人が折難され、ソヴィエト館は侵略を伴う事件を重ねた。
本図に昭和三十七年の電信状の発檢別表の後右倒入の素案記された

電信状の発検別表の発檢別表が発見されると、電信状の発檢別表を電信状の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及び電信状の発検別表の発検別表に於て、電信状の発検別表に於て、有段程大検の乗り物及
九二四年的協約に反して共産主義の宣伝を為す為使用とされた居た。

尚張作霖の恩親は彼の第一の敵たる関玉祥元帥が張作霖より武備及財政的援助を受けて居たと云ふことを知ったからであるが、関玉祥元帥は以前佐藤政の例を予言せんと申せんと武備及び財政を有して居たのであるが、張作霖は、関玉祥元帥に於て一九二六年露軍に行軍し、関玉祥元帥と相互に協力することを約束した。関玉祥元帥は張作霖の統制を受けて居たのであるが、張作霖は関玉祥元帥の所領を一九二六年に張作霖が彼に於て製造されたものを一九二七年の革命後後左翼より引領を受けて居たのであるが、関玉祥元帥は張作霖より武備及び財政的援助を為す為使用とされた居た。
私は一概にハラルド・レィデンänderのウィルハーフ＝フエルスト＝アソシェ

イードーのジムネー・サクリファリス、ハーフェンのウィリアーニ＝ブリッフ

...'
の手配に従い、兵を配置した。すぐに失敗し、ソビエト政府はその合法的な権利を撤廃した。

やがて、アムール河の北西部に於いて、支那西部地方に沿ひ数ヶ月間続き、厳しもく勤務した兵の本営を築き、支那西部地方に於けるソビエト軍の支配下にあるラファ郡や、ラファ郡はソビエト軍の支配下であると知らされた。アムール河の沿流の村々は空襲に訪れたが、満洲国は同所に於ても同様の観光楽しむ者を訪れた。ソビエト軍の支配下であるラファ郡は、支那西部地方に於けるソビエト軍の支配下であると知らされた。アムール河の沿流の村々は空襲に訪れたが、満洲国は同所に於ても同様の観光楽しむ者を訪れた。ソビエト軍の支配下であるラファ郡は、支那西部地方に於ける
私は古めかしい支那の水郷のついた蒸気船ハルピンから大東亜河
を下って旅行したがその途次甲板上からハマースの顧問を目覚した。私は
エーランの東方ブド・エンゲと共に旅行した。その頃には入土も厳しくなり
始め河には水が強くなり始め来ておられた。我々は河水の色を近くにコ
に着ればさわるかと心願した。我々がフランツ川上河沿いの小さな町に碇
泊していった時、従兵がやって来て、ロシア人が前夜ハマースを占領し

をかけ我々は河をより来たのだが、それは赤色ロシア人達が前夜ハマースを占領し


をかけてこちらの方に向って来てあると告げた。船長は慌たしき蒸気

を追い出されようの前に向って来た、あると告げた。船長は慌たしき蒸気

を追い出されようの前に向って来た、あると告げた。船長は慌たしき蒸気

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を追い出されようの前に向って来た、あると告げた。船長は慌たしき蒸気
Excerpts from
Prosecution Witness JOHN B. FO"ELL's Book
"MY THIRTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"

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(New York, MacMillan Company, 1945)

The Sian Incident

Pages: 256 and 257

China had experienced many crises since the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, but none which had more repercussions, domestic and international, than the Sian Incident of December 12, 1936. I was still in the Philippines, but, realizing the seriousness of the crisis, hurried back to China. Excitement was running high both at Shanghai and at the national capital at Nanking when I arrived there a few days before Christmas.

The kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, commander-in-chief of the Nationalist armies and head of the National Government, practically paralyzed the Nanking Administration and provided an opportunity for political dissension and intrigue, which had been held in check only by the firm hand of the Generalissimo.

The confusion in the Government was aggravated by the critical political situation prevailing throughout the Far East. The countries most deeply concerned, aside from China, were Japan and the Soviet Union. Germany and Italy were also involved, as they were signatories, with Japan, of the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact which preceded the later Japanese-German-Italian military alliance. The Anti-Comintern Pact, directed at the activities of Soviet Russia and the Third International, had been signed in Berlin on November 25, 1936, less than a month previously, hence played its part in precipitating the Sian Incident as the three Powers, Japan, Germany, and Italy, had been exerting strong pressure on China to become a member of the anti-communist accord.

The relations between Japan and China, and between Japan and Russia, were already at the breaking point, due to Japan's occupation of Manchuria and the extension of Japan's military activities westward into Inner Mongolia, which bordered on Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia.

The terms "Inner" and "Outer" as applied to the northern and southern sections of Mongolia did not come into general use on Chinese maps until after Soviet Russia's occupation of the northern or undeveloped section of the territory, shortly after the Soviet Revolution in 1917. Inner, or Southern Mongolia, had already been cut up into the frontier Chinese provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ningsin, and were settled largely by Chinese farmers.
Outer, or Northern Mongolia, which was still populated by nomadic Mongolian tribes, had been organized by the Soviet Russians into the "Mongolian People's Republic" and incorporated into the Soviet Union.

The Russians, long apprehensive, were becoming increasingly restless because the Japanese in their advance westward would shortly be in a position to cut the overland routes through Suiyuan and Sinkiang which connected China and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union had already begun to take steps to counteract Japan's invasion of Inner Mongolia by sending troops into Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan. The Soviet troops were dispatched from the Outer Mongolian province of Altai, which the Russians had occupied in 1918 and renamed Tannu Tuva. The troops were originally stationed in eastern Sinkiang directly on the overland trail and motor road leading from Lanchow, Kansu Province, to Urumchi (Tihwa), capital of Sinkiang, and thence to the Russian border.
政府の混乱は当時の混乱を覆った政治的危機によって徐々に悪化させられ
たのであった。当時の赤旗は日本に最も寄り懐くのを日本とソビエト
軍事同盟の間で考慮した。所谓赤共革命の署名印されたのは日本とソ
ビエトが互いに支持するようになったからである。

1926年十一月二一日ベルリンにおける調印されたのはソビエト日本と
間の関係及び日露関の関係は日本とソビエトの間で考えられた防共協定の一
部である。しかし、ソビエト軍民が定住していた外敵部も北部ソビエト
との間には既に切り離されて支那の領土に普通徴用されられて居らなければ
なかった。他の内蒙を別に北海ソビエトの部分を占領する。
Moscow in '35

I was greatly impressed on my eleven-day trip across Russia by the great number of soldiers and officers, usually in new uniforms, who crowded the railway stations and trains and were seen in large numbers on the streets in every city and town I visited. I naturally was curious to know the size of the Russian army, and made frequent inquiries of Russian officials whom I met, as to the number of men under arms. I was always given the standard number, 600,000, which Russia supplied officially to the League of Nations when the League collected statistics on this subject from all countries. It seemed obvious to me that this number was a gross understatement, because the large numbers of men in new uniforms indicated that recruiting on a large scale had been going on for some time. Before I left Russia the truth was out. An official statement indicated that the army had been expanded to well over a million men. The expansion was apparent at the November Seventh Celebration in Red Square, where contingents from the various military branches, including light and giant tanks, were displayed. The same was true of the aviation corps.

A notable feature of the celebration in Red Square was an exhibition flight of the giant plane named Maxim Gorky, said to be the largest plane constructed up to that time. The plane was equipped with a radio and a giant amplifier for disseminating Government propaganda. The parade of military forces through Red Square lasted from 10 o'clock in the morning to late afternoon. Stalin and members of the cabinet stood behind a stone balcony on the top of Lenin's tomb, only their heads and shoulders being visible from the diplomatic reviewing stand, which was only about fifty yards distant. I was told that the Russian infantry units which marched through Red Square that day were among the best drilled and equipped soldiers in Europe of the time. No one who observed the exhibition could leave without the impression that the Russian revolution had taken on a pronounced military complexion. The parade of civilian workers through Red Square that day was enlivened by numerous caricatures of Germans and Japanese. The various unions of workers, including women, also marched with a military precision that indicated widespread military training.
In addition to the military development which was obvious on all sides, the country seemed to be undergoing a rapid industrialization, and the personal comfort of the people was being sacrificed to the development of heavy industry. The only luxury article I was able to discover was a cheap brand of perfume which seemed to be on sale everywhere.
Excerpts from
Prosecution Witness JOHN B. POWELL’s Book
"MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"

(NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, 1945)

Vladivostok

Pages 211

One day I visited a parade ground, and was surprised to see a regiment of
Korean troops drilling and maneuvering under Soviet officers. I was told that the
Korean regiment was part of the Soviet border-defense force. Later, in the vicinity
of Lake Baikal, I observed even larger bodies of Oriental troops wearing the
uniform of the Soviet army.
八五頁

一晩夜支一五五年一挙卒

五角が・防

ウラデオ・トック

或る日私は線兵場に行くと朝鮮人の警備がソヴィエト将校に

を下に訓練し、演習をさせられるのを見て帰った。朝鮮

人の訓練はソヴィエト防衛の一部だったが、朝鮮人に

・パリカルク湖の近くでソヴィエト陸軍の問題で

者であるもっと大きな国際の東洋人軍団をされ此の口で見た。
I, a

The United States of America et al.

Against

Armel, Sano et al.

Cham Direction

Defendant: Yoshida, Akio

having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
I, YOSHTDA, AKIO, ex-Colonel, was born on November 21, 1894. My present address is TAMCHU village, Kamoi District, Tsuruoka Prefecture. From March, 1930 to December, 1935, I was attached to the HQ. of the 16th Division serving as an officer in charge of school training. In those days I was an infantry Captain not long afterwards being promoted to Major.

From August, 1937 to March, 1941 I served in a section of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, and then in a section of the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry and took charge of school training. At that time I was a Major, later being promoted to Lieut. Colonel.

The following statement includes what I learned about school training during my tenure of office and what I investigated in connection with school training in making this affidavit. I was not directly concerned with youth training. But it has much to do with school training, so that my statement will include what I know of it.

1. The reason why the system of school training and youth training was adopted.

National training, especially the training of youths, which had been carried out by leading powers since the close of World War I had characteristics and developments of their own according to their respective internal
conditions. Those countries had striven for the realization of a common ideal towards the development of these trainings, based on the lessons they had learned from World War I. On the other hand, Japan was the only country that did not have such systems and institutions. Not only had the young men and boys of the labouring class of Japan who formed the greater part of the youths, no definite educational institution after finishing compulsory education, but they were left to be infected with the evil ways of the world in pre-war and post-war times. Such being the case, men of intelligence feared that this might cast a gloomy shadow over the future of the state. The investigation of the youth training which had been carried out by leading powers showed that, if let alone, Japan alone would be far behind the progress of leading powers. In short, this world-wide tendency, especially national training, which was being carried out assiduously by other powers, compared with that of Japan, made the Japanese Government and people awake to the necessity of carrying out this training. After all, the deficiency of civic training revealed at the time of the great earthquake in 1923, prompted Japan to adopt the system of school training in 1925 and subsequently the system of youth training in 1926. The conditions of youth training in leading powers are described in the added material entitled, "The Condition of Youth Training in Europe and America."
Why and how these systems came to be adopted are clear from the note of the speech delivered by Colonel Patria, the then chief of the Enlistment Section of the War Ministry, which is included in the added material. According to this note, a large section of public opinion was for the adoption of these systems in those days and the bill was carried unanimously in both Houses of Parliament. This note shows how the popular feeling, especially the spirit of the youths were deplorably bad in those days. The above is an explanation of the manner in which these systems were adopted. Especially the purpose of adopting these systems is clear from the instructions of the Education Ministry and from the recent speeches delivered by the Minister of Education and the War Minister at that time. For instance, the Instruction No. 5 of the Education Ministry, which was issued on April 19, 1925, explained the purpose in adopting training in schools as follows:

"The training in schools has for its object the physical and mental discipline of the students and elevation of character; in other words, it aims at fostering patriotic feeling, the spirit of self-sacrifice, independence and self-reliance and cultivating the habit of discharging their responsibility well, with moderation, obeying orders and developing physically."
Further, it aims at fostering an indomitable spirit. As for youth training, its aim was made clear by the speeches delivered by the Minister of Education and the War Minister at the meeting of Major Generals attached to the Headquarters of the Divisions, which was held in December, 1925. "I realized keenly the necessity for youth training, development of sound mind and body and elevating of character. Therefore, I am planning to put these systems into effect." The War Minister stated, "The object of youth training is exactly the same as that of training in schools; its aim is physical and mental discipline, fostering of esprit de corps and elevation of character. This training falls into the category of national education and not, as is generally misunderstood, training for military purposes. Once this training is universally propagated, the character and constitution of the youths who are to join the Army will be improved and this in turn will lead to the improvement of character and constitution of other youths. In that case, this training will do much towards the strengthening of national defense."

At the meeting of some members of the House of Peers which was held in 1930, Colonel TAMURA, the then chief of the Enlistment Section of the War Ministry explained the condition of national training in Europe and America and the reason why these two systems came to be adopted in Japan. At the same time, he stated the aims of this training as follows: (see attached sheet 3)
"As is clear from all circumstances under which these systems were adopted, we believed that it would be most simple and effective to adopt military drill as a course of the school in order to foster the spirit of fortitude, and to cultivate the habit of observing discipline and decorum, valuing labour, as well as to develop physical education and thus to elevate the nation's character. The military authorities had not the slightest intention of forcing this military training to be adopted. Now, I shall explain why officers on the active list were to be attached to the schools: Military drill which had been adopted as a school course as early as 1894 by "Chō, the then Minister of Education, became existent in name only since the end of the Meiji era. The main reason why it had no beneficial effect on the discipline of the students was that the students ceased to place confidence in the retired officers in charge of this training. In view of this fact, we concluded that, if school training was to be developed, officers on the active list had to be attached to the schools. Therefore, the military authorities believed that physical and mental discipline of the students through training in schools and youth training would result in at the same time, the strengthening of national defense. On the basis of the above forecast, they arrived at the conclusion that the reduction of the period of active service could not adversely affect the education in the Army. Thus, the military authorities were willing to agree to the proposals of the Education Ministry. This trai
ing was essentially to be carried out under the guidance and control of the school directors, and at the same time it comprises a social education under the control of the departments responsible in the Education Ministry as well as the prefectural authorities. The military authorities maintained an attitude of utmost cooperation in this program and assistance to it."

Thus, the chief aim of this system was to discipline physically and mentally the students and the youth at large. It goes without saying that the enforcement of this training would result in strengthening national defense. The military authorities gave hearty approval to the establishment of these systems and were willing to cooperate in realizing the anticipated results. This was because the military authorities were anxious to save our country from moral decadence and to maintain the lasting peace and welfare of our country in view of the post-war international situation and the chaotic trend of thought in our country. Therefore, the military authorities had not the slightest intention of militarizing our nation which some who opposed them feared. We used to be extremely cautious in warning the officers attached to the schools to be careful not to give rise to public misunderstanding. The Instructions No. 5 of the Education Ministry, April 13, 1925 (see attached sheet 1), the excerpt from the speeches delivered by the Minister of Education and the War Minister at the meeting of Major Generals attached to the Headquarters of the Divisions which was held in December, 1925 (see attached
sheet 2) and, the excerpt from the speech delivered by Colonel IMA, the then chief of the Enrollment Section of the War Ministry, at the meeting of some members of the House of Peers which was held in 1930, (also attached).

2. Development of training in schools and youth training.
   (1) Spirit directed toward a definite aim - its inauguration.

As was stated in the preceding chapter, the main object of school training and youth training was to discipline physically and mentally the students and youths at large. The acquisition of knowledge of fighting technique was so to speak, nothing more than a by-product of the enforcement of training.

At the meetings of the officials concerned, which were held annually by the central administrative agencies, they would direct their attention to this object. In this connection at the meeting of Major Generals attached to the Headquarters of the Divisions which was held in 1925, the War Minister and others stated in their speeches that school training should be carried out for purely educational purposes and not for military purposes. At the same meeting, they stated, "Indeed, one of the objects of school training is to strengthen national defense, but this is not the immediate object. It is contrary to its true aim to be eager to acquire military technique in the extremely concrete sense. Thus, I hope you will understand that the true spirit of this system aims at bringing up a healthy man, both physically and mentally."
As for the strengthening of national defense, the War Minister stated in his speech delivered at the conference of prefectural governors held in 1936, "Once youth training is universally inculcated and the education of the character of our youth is accomplished, the Army, a part of the national organization will derive much benefit from it, because, in that case, many physically and mentally healthy youths will join the Army. This will raise efficiency of training in peacetime and will increase the fighting strength of the Army in case of emergency.

"Once the youth is disciplined physically and mentally and improvement in character brought about, the Army will be sure to derive much benefit from it. Therefore, we arrived at the conclusion that, so long as there are sufficient establishments in the barracks, the reduction of the period of active service will not affect national defense adversely." Thus, he regarded training as leading to the strengthening of national defense.

(2) After the China Incident

In view of the war situation after the outbreak of the China Incident, the nation at large, especially the teachers and students, naturally took to the importance of national defense. As the war situation developed and due to its suddenness, these two types of training inevitably came to be carried out. On the other hand, the number of officers attached to the schools, training teachers and of teachers of the youth training schools who were called to the colors increased gradually. As a result, teachers
in charge of training became scarce, which prevented training from being carried out smoothly.

Nevertheless, in order to meet the demands of the times and comply with the wishes of the prefectural offices, the military authorities placed the Special Volunteer Officers in charge of training of the schools and at the same time ordered officers who had been attached to the schools to assist the youth training schools in their training. Thus, the military authorities did everything in their power to overcome difficulties encountered in carrying out training.

In addition, in view of the lessons we had learned from the fighting at the outset of the China Incident, we were obliged to reorganize the military cadet system; that is, one year system was extended to two years, the privilege of the reduction of the period of active service which had been enjoyed by those who had passed the examination of the youth training schools was abolished. In 1939 "the youth training school" was renamed "the youth school" and it became compulsory course. In order to carry out actively the training of the students of the universities which had been inactive, the training became a compulsory instead of an optional course. In addition, the circumstances caused the students to take much more interest in military affairs than ever before. In view of the fact that the war situation demanded the replenishment of armaments and from fifteen years experience since the establishment of this system, the military authorities consulted
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with the Educational Minister about the system. As a result, the outlined program of instruction in the schools to which officers on the active list were attached was amended and the Instructions No. 5 of the Educational Ministry was issued.
The true spirit of this amendment remained essentially the same as before. The object of training was made clear in the revised outlined program of instruction as follows:

"The object of training is to give basic military training to students and to cultivate the spirit of sincerity and loyalty and to carry out the physical and mental training, thereby raising the standard of character and strengthening national defense."

Thus, the rule was laid down by which students were to be guided in training. Since in the past we had made it a practice to warn the students not to be restricted to the non-important details of military techniques, the students were apt to neglect the most simple matters which formed the basis of training. Therefore, this trend seemed likely to produce a harmful effect on the mental training which should be carried out side by side with physical training. Thus, we realized the necessity of pursuing the basic training in a strict and orderly manner and disciplining the students physically and mentally.

(2) Persons in Charge of Training

As for the officers attached to the schools, the authorities endeavored to select capable officers. In addition, preliminary education was given to officers who were expected to be attached to the schools to take the place of other officers. In the War Ministry, the section in charge of this training was established. In the Headquarters of the Divisions, Major Generals attached to them were placed in sole charge of school training. In the Headquarters of the Regimental Districts, the section in charge of youth training had been well organized. Therefore, they strove to establish this system. Nevertheless, because of the fact that a large number of
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officers on the active list went to the front after the outbreak of the China "incident, the principle "one school, one officer" had to be replaced by the principle "Several schools, one officer". In order to fill up vacancies, we appointed retired officers and special volunteer officers. But this did not sufficiently relieve the situation. At length, we were obliged to attach one officer to several schools. That was worse, the abilities of these officers showed a marked decline, which became the cause of the stagnation of training in schools.

(3) Training Curriculum

1. Teaching materials of training in schools.

Teaching materials were individual drill, force drill, marksmanship, field duty, semaphore signalling, distance-surveying, cartography and lectures on military affairs. There had been some alterations since the establishment of the system. I had already stated in the foregoing chapter that the training by means of these teaching materials chiefly aims at disciplining students physically and mentally instead of aiming at acquisition of military technique. In order to make this aim clear, the military authorities repeatedly explained this point to officers attached to the schools, the divisional commanders, major generals attached to the Headquarters of the Divisions and regimental commanders who were directly concerned with school training. Excerpts from these speeches are given on attached sheet 4.
2. Hours of drill in a week and days of field exercises in a year.

As for the hours of drill in a year, two to three hours in the case of the middle schools, one and a half hour in the colleges and high schools, and military training was an optional course in universities. In addition, it was stipulated that field exercises should be carried out for four to six days annually and that the students of the normal schools should take a short course in military affairs for three weeks before their graduation. This provision was amended under the Instructions No. 12 and No. 20 of the Education Ministry which were issued respectively in 1931 and 1941, but there was no extensive amendment.

According to the Instructions No. 20 of the Education Ministry, the schools were classified into three -- the middle schools, the higher schools and universities. The training hours in a week were different according to the standard of the school. But training hours in a week and a year were equal in the school of the same standard.

Field exercises and the course of military affairs had been carried out for three weeks in the last grade in the normal school. But this was amended so that field exercises were carried out for five days annually from the first grade to the third grade and for seven days by the fourth grade and the course of military affairs were to be held for ten days in the fifth grade. It was also amended so that in the high schools and the colleges the course of military affairs were held for seven days in the last grade. As military training became the compulsory course in the universities, hours of training in week and field-exercise days in a year were added.
Training hours amended in 1941, which were longest, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Level</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Teaching Hours in a Week</th>
<th>Teaching Hours in a Year</th>
<th>Field Exercise in a Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>1st Grade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Grade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Grade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th Grade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th Grade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School and College</td>
<td>1st Grade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Grade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Grade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1st Grade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Grade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Grade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The parenthesized passages show the hours of the course of military affairs.

3. The training curriculum of the youth school.

The Youth Training School was renamed "The Youth School" and training became a compulsory course. But I cannot dwell upon it, because materials are not available.

4. Creation of exceptions to school training in the form of special training and glider training.

Training in machine guns, infantry guns, field guns, mountain guns, tanks and aviation had been carried out in compliance with the wishes of individual students since 1936 through the assistance of military units in various districts in which their schools were situated. This system was newly established as an exception to school training in 1941, and thus the students were enabled to receive this training in place of general training.
(3) Responsibility for Carrying out the System

1 School Military Training

1. School training was a part of school education. (It first it belonged to the gymnastics course, but the school training course was created independently of gymnastics in 1939.) The directors of the schools were responsible for the enforcement of it under the control and guidance of the Education Ministry, the same as for the enforcement of other education.

2. Regarding the enforcement of such matters as the outlined program of instruction which were directly concerned with both the Education Ministry and the War Ministry, it was customary that, after agreement was reached between them, the Education Ministry issued the notifications concerning them to various schools. (There were differences in importance according to Ordinances of the Education Ministry, instructions and notifications, as the case may be.)

3. On the other hand, the War Ministry held itself responsible for the inspection and authorization of school training, the enforcement of which was based on "the regulation concerning training: inspection of the schools to which the officers on the active list are attached" and "the regulation concerning the authorization of school training".

4. Based on the ordinance concerning the service of the officers on the active list in the school (Imperial Ordinance No. 135, April 13, 1925), officers on the active list were attached to the schools according to the ordinance concerning the service of officers on the active list in the school (Ordinance of the Education Ministry and the War Ministry, April 13, 1925). Therefore, according to the provision of Article 1 of the regulation relative to the application of the
In 1931, the Education Ministry collected the inspection reports and written applications of various schools which were presented by directors or founders of these schools, and presented them together with its own written opinion to the War Ministry every April and consulted with it. After agreement was reached between them, the War Ministry notified the public of the schools to which officers on the active list should be attached for the year. Therefore, the War Ministry never decided on these schools on its own authority or forced others to comply with its decisions.

3. The War Ministry took charge of personnel affairs and the education of officers attached to the schools. Similarly, it took charge of the appointment and dismissal of these officers and from time to time gave detailed instructions to the schools under the guidance of the Army concerning the enforcement of training from its own special standpoint. Above all, for the purpose of improving the technical skill which is essentially necessary for the officers, education was carried out by the units to which they belonged at some appropriate period in the year.

6. The War Ministry bore only the personnel expenses of those officers attached to the schools and the Education Ministry or the schools bore the expenses of the school training.

As for the sale of rifles and ammunition used in training, the War Ministry sold them at cost price according to the provision of the Weapons Sale Regulation. However, as weapons had been in great demand since the outbreak of the China Incident, many schools bought and used infantry rifles of the N.A.J.U type and light machine guns of the N.A.E.U type which were manufactured by private companies.
2 Youth Training

Youth training was under the jurisdiction of the Education Ministry and the prefectural government offices. Therefore, the military authorities merely cooperated and assisted from the side lines.

(4) Relation of these Two Types of Training to Military Service

There had been a cry for the reduction of the period of active service of those who finished the middle school course, but it was stated in the speeches at the time of the adoption of this system that the privilege of the reduction of the period of active service was not compensation for the completion of the course of training. The following list testifies to this fact:

1. Those who passed the examination of school training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Outline of System and Year of Execution</th>
<th>The Qualifications and the Period of School Training</th>
<th>The Outline of the Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The execution of school training and the reduction of the period of active service in 1925.</td>
<td>Persons who graduated from the school to which officers on the active list are attached and who passed the examination of the training which was carried out by those officers shall be reduced their period of active service.</td>
<td>It was admitted that as the result of the execution of school training, the reduction of the period of active service would not affect adversely the education in the Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision in the Regulation relative to the application of the Military Service Law.</td>
<td>1. Infantrymen and Medical-man. --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The period of active service shall be reduced by six months.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. One Year Volunteer. (Those who paid the money)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in 1925

The regulation concerning the attachment of officers on the active list to the schools in 1925:

1. Those who finish the course of the middle school grade:

   (a) Those who graduate after 2 years.
   (b) Those who graduate after 1 year.

2. Those who graduated from the school above the higher school grade:

   (a) Those who graduate after 1 year.
   (b) Those who graduate after 6 months.

The one-year volunteer regulation and the regulation relative to the application of the one-year volunteer regulation were repealed and the system of reserve officer candidates was established in 1926.

Revision in the regulation relative to the application of the military service ordinance:

Revision in army replacement ordinance:

One year volunteer system, precedent of reserve officer candidate, was inaugurated in order to meet the demand to foster a number of managing officers on the reserve list which were essential at wartime as well as to develop education.

Such volunteers were qualified to be appointed officers on the reserve list after one year of military training. Enforcement of this system for many years, however, gave rise to various abuses. Hence, to ameliorate the system to clarify the purport of the system which meant to replace military officers corresponding to officers candidates by enacting the basic principle and to elevate the quality of officers on the reserve list, a course of study has been prolonged.
Abolishing money payment of reserve officer candidates, stipulated pick up system. (Heretofore all those who paid money had been adopted as reserve officer candidates, but the new method of pick up system was classified into two kinds: A Grade for officers and B Grade for non-commissioned officers.)

1933. (Revision in Army Replacement Ordinance)

1. Qualification and the Period of active service are the same as before.

2. Priority is given to those who passed the examination of training in appointment of reserve officer candidates. In appointment of reserve officer candidates, importance was attached to the report of attached officer and results of training.

3. In appointment of reserve officer candidates, importance was attached to the report of attached officer and results of training. In addition, it was directed to adopt A Grade candidates positively from among the graduates of higher schools.

Because of ineligibility of candidates to be appointed by means of school careers and money payment, abolished this system and applied pick up system. Substantially the quality of graduates of lower than higher schools was generally superior; so it was directed to pay special attention in appointment of A Grade candidates.
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Prolonged terms (active list) at army of candidates. 1938 (Revision in Army Replacement Ordinance)

1. Qualification: In view of the situation in general and past experience, it was regarded to be necessary to elevate their quality, make terms at army same as ordinary ranks.

2. Terms at army; same as above.

2. For those who finished curriculum of youth school.

Qualification and Terms

Outline of system and the year enforced

Reduction of terms at army for those who finished curriculum of youth training school, 1925 (Revision in Military Service Enforcement Ordinance) 1926; Youth Training School Ordinance (Imperial Edict No. 70)

Reduction of terms at army could be granted to those who finished the curriculum of youth training school or those not lower than such school and who are well-behaved and are superior in school and duty, according to Article No. 34 of Military Service Enforcement Law. The term of which is generally being 6 months.

2.
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Revised youth training school to Youth School, at army by six months has been abolished. However, the reduction was not practically enforced at such units which deemed the reduction inadequate in order to meet the situation after the outbreak of the China Incident, according to the provision that the term may be prolonged at war time.

It was due to the recognition of necessity in connection with the war situation.
5. The effect which this system produced on the students.

1. The effect which this system produced on the cultivation of moral character of the students.

The rigorous enforcement of training had remarkably beneficial effect on the physical and mental discipline of the students. For example, when the students of a certain higher commercial school inspected a factory, the factory praised them for their conduct which was far more orderly and disciplined than ever before. Similarly, the railway authorities praised the students for their manners in the trains, which were entirely changed and which had a beneficial effect on public morals. Virtues exhibited by the students, such as courtesy, respect for the old, simplicity, indefatigable assiduity, strong sense of responsibility and cooperation, came to be regarded by men of intelligence as resulting from school training. In the case of the students of high schools, colleges and universities, however, the results fell far short of expectations.

2. The effect which this training exerted on school morals and school discipline.

In connection with this system, many prefectural and school authorities attempted to organize the educational organs well so the school training might produce a beneficial effect on the students.

The result was that training had a remarkably beneficial effect on the students, such as the enhancement of esprit de corps.
of the school, enforcement of strict school discipline. However, as stated above, while some high schools, colleges and universities realized the anticipated results under the guidance of their directors, in most schools the results fell short of our expectations. Especially, the applicants for training from universities were few, because training was an optional course up to 1939. Therefore, except students who took the course of training in earnest, most students were as indifferent to training as before.

3. The improvement of health and the effect of physical training.

We had been concerned about the fact that, as shown by the physical examinations for conscription, the health of the students had been by far inferior to those of the youths in general. However, during ten years since the enforcement of training, the health of the students had gradually improved.
The Instructions concerning the service of military officers on the active list in the schools

(The Instruction No. 5 of the Educational Ministry issued on April 15, 1945)

The ordinance concerning the service of military officers on the active list in the school; that is, the Imperial Ordinance No. 135, has recently been enacted and the Regulation relative to the application of the Ordinance concerning the service of military officers on the active list in the school was promulgated.

It is the matter for urgency that, in view of the present domestic and foreign situation, we should strive for the physical and mental development of the nation, elevation of their qualities and development of national power and prosperity. We had to depend upon education for the realization of these objects. Therefore, the educational system had been gradually established since the Meiji Restoration in order to realize these objects. With the amendment of the Education Law as of 1889, military training was adopted as a school course. Both teachers and students took the course of training so enthusiastically that the object of education was realized to a remarkable degree. As time went on, however, they were apt to lose sight of the original object of training, adhering too much to form at the expense of spirit. In view of this trend, the government and the public came to realize keenly the necessity of developing physical and moral education and strengthening national defense.
And now, turning to the trend of international affairs, the so-called national training or military preliminary education had made remarkable progress in Europe and America since World War I. These countries looked to this training for the cultivation of the spirit of fortitude of the nation, the proper guidance of public thought and for the inculcation of the idea of national defense in the minds of the nation.

It is a matter for regret that, in spite of the fact that our country had adopted military drill as a school course and that she had thus translated national training into action before leading powers followed suit, she fell behind them in more recent times. Such being the case, the authorities concerned framed a plan to make school training more effective. For this purpose, they believed that it would be effective to make officers on the active list undertake the task of teaching. Therefore, they inquired into ways and means to put this into effect. Thus, this system of school training has recently been established. The object of school training is to discipline physically and mentally the students and to raise the standard of character. In other words, it aims at fostering patriotic feeling and a sense of responsibility, cultivating the spirit of self-sacrifice, independence and self-reliance and cultivating the habit of observing regulations, using moderation, obeying orders. It goes without saying that these disciplines in turn will lead to the strengthening of national defense.
This system of the service of officers on the active list in the school aims at raising the efficiency of teaching and training by carrying out training more effectively, instead of aiming at making them take the place of teachers who had taken charge of training to far. Therefore, the officers on the active list are required, under the control and guidance of the school directors, to undertake the task of teaching, based on the detailed program of instruction of the Education Ministry. At the same time, they are required, in training students, to consider the degree to which students had been disciplined physically and mentally.

The prefectural governors and the school authorities should, in compliance with these objects, strive to complete the equipment of the schools and to achieve the anticipated results.

Attached Sheet No. 2

The excerpts from the speeches delivered by the Education Minister and the War Minister at the conference of Major Generals attached to the Headquarters of the Divisions, which was held in December, 1925.

1. The excerpt from the speech delivered by the Education Minister:

"In view of the domestic and foreign situations, the government authorities realized the necessity for the physical and mental training of young men generally other than students for the
purpose of raising the standards of character. Therefore, they are planning to put this system into effect -- a system that has already been under investigation. School training may be regarded as the forerunner of this training. The organization of youth training aims at disciplining physically and mentally, and raising the standards of character of the youths from the age of 16 to the age of conscription. This school shall be called "the youth training school". Unlike the Young Men's Association whose admission and secession had been voluntary, this school shall be a public institute under the control of the local bodies and shall be subsidized by the government. Its curriculum is morals, civics, general subjects of study and professional courses. The directors and teachers of this school and of the technical continuation school and the reservists shall undertake the task of teaching. Training is to be carried out in appropriate season in various districts. Those who finish the course of the youth training school are entitled to the reduction of the period of their active service in the Army. This school, I think, will play an important part in building up the standards of character of the healthy nation and good subject and in developing national power."

2. Excerpt from the speech delivered by the War Minister.

"School training has for its object the discipline of the limited numbers of boys and youths who will form the backbone of the nation in the future. The system of youth training will become
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perfect only when the training of all youths, which is expected to be carried out shortly, is materialized.

Therefore, the object of youth training in general is exactly the same as that of school training; it aims at disciplining physically and mentally boys and youths and fostering their esprit de corps; elevating the nation's qualities and strengthening national defense. However, the major portions of this training were given to the youths in general other than students, and lessons necessary for the vocational guidance were taught along with the above in order to train them as a useful people. Therefore, this education falls in the category of national education, and not military education as sometimes misunderstood by the public. Once this training is universally inculcated, the health of youths who are to join the army will be improved to a remarkable degree and this in turn will lead to mental and physical improvement of our youth, thereby doing much towards the strengthening of national defense. I ardently hope that, in compliance with the above-mentioned object, you will strive for its speedy materialization and for the realization of the anticipated results."

Attached Sheet No. 3

Excerpt from the speech delivered by Colonel I'AMURA, the then Chief of the Enlistment Section of the War Ministry, at the meeting of some members of House of Peers held in 1932.

"Pacifism and internationalism, on the one hand, prevailed immediately after the close of the World War I, but on the other
The Boy Scout movement, school training and citizens' field-exercise in America and Great Britain, military preliminary training in France and Italy, the Athletic Association movement in Germany and compulsory preliminary military training in Soviet Russia were very popular. These two tendencies of the times are apparently contradictory, but I think that these were, so to speak, the precautions against future events taken by leading powers, who had experienced the disastrous effects brought about by World War I. In other words, the peace movement was one that aimed at putting an end to war by inculcating the idea of the evils of war in the minds of the nation, while youth training was the means of exercising control over the nation, thereby enabling the nation to avoid the disastrous effects brought about by such a protracted war as World War I. Above all, it was natural that each nation should have come to recognize training as the most effective way to cultivate a respect for labor and esprit de corps of the youths and to discipline them physically in such a way as to enable them to cope with productive competition for the recovery of national power -- competition which ensued after World War I. These two movements are, in a way, similar to the propaganda for prevention of fire and the preparation of fire-fighting organizations to deal with the fires.

Man of intelligence viewed with concern the ideological trends who, without having had the experience of disastrous effects brought about by World War I, fished in troubled waters.
Therefore, the Provisional Education Council composed of recognized authorities in educational circles introduced the proposition concerning the school training to the then Prime Minister in October 1917, urging him to establish the system of school training which should be guided by officers on the active list. Early in 1923, at the Regular Vice Minister's conference, they discussed how to brace up the spirit of men who had been given to self-indulgence. Some suggested that Japan should follow the example of Europe and America in carrying out a program of youth training. As a result, it was agreed between them that they should make it the subject of discussion at the Cabinet Council after the Education Ministry drew up a concrete plan. However, because of the fact that all these materials for research were burned at the time of the earthquake of September, 1923, and because of the pressure of business of the Education Ministry, the program for the training of youths was suspended for the time being.

In view of the disorderly conduct on the part of undisciplined common people revealed in the Great Earthquake of September and to implement the Imperial Rescript on Rousing of National Spirit which was promulgated in November of the same year, Education Minister UZAKI inquired into ways and means to rouse the national spirit. Then he consulted with General UZAKI, the then War Minister, about the enforcement of this training and General UZAKI gave his hearty approval to it. As a result, it was decided that the
committee members of both the Education Ministry and the War Ministry should work out a concrete plan. Thus, the system of the service of officers on the active list in the school was established in 1925 and the system of the youth training in April, 1926. This is how these two systems were adopted. A large section of public opinion was in favor of them in those days. As you know, the said bill was carried unanimously in both houses as well as the Education Investigation Commission. Any enterprise is sure to meet with some opposition at the start. A section of the nation, especially some journalists, scholars and students, who were imbued by the radical ideas of Marxism, regarded these two training systems as the infringement of education by militarism and expressed fairly strong opposition to them. But opposition gradually became weaker. Fortunately, the general public came to understand the aim of these two systems of training and therefore we steadily realized good results. However, even today some persons attempt to distort the aim of training, sometimes by means of leaflets and sometimes by inserting exaggerated articles in the newspapers, etc. What those opposed to it stressed is substantially as follows: "School training and youth training are, after all, neither more nor less than preliminary military education in the interests of the military authorities. By the same token, school training and youth training are carried out by officers on the active list and by the reservists, and moreover, both are inspected by officers on the
active list every year or every other year. In this way, young men pursuing their studies are militarized year after year." In this connection, I should like to direct your attention to what I have already pointed out; that is, these two systems were adopted in order to cultivate the habit of observing discipline and decorum through physical and mental discipline of the young students and to develop health and raise the standards of character of the nation. Thus, the military authorities had not the slightest intention of forcing civilians high handedly to adopt them. Now, I shall explain why officers on the active list came to be attached to schools. Military drill which had been adopted as a school course as early as 1894 by MORI, the Minister of Education, had existed only in name ever since the end of the Meiji era, because it had produced no beneficial effect on the discipline of the students. Consequently, the students ceased to place confidence in the retired officers in charge of this training. In view of this fact, we concluded that, if school training was to be developed, officers on the active list had to be attached to the schools. Therefore, the military authorities believed that physical and mental discipline of the students through school training and youth training would result in strengthening national defense. At the same time, we arrived at the conclusion that the reduction of the period of active service would not adversely affect the education in the Army. Thus, the military authorities were willing to agree to the proposals on the part of
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the Education Ministry. This training was essentially to be carried out under the guidance and control of the school directors and at the same time it comprises a social education under the control of the departments responsible in the Education Ministry as well as the prefectural authorities. The military authorities maintained an attitude of utmost cooperation in this program and assistance to it. Those who are impatient to realize the expected results of the youth training and those who advocate the merger of the technical continuation school with the youth training school often say; "Morels and Civics should be assigned to the courses of the technical continuation school, and training should be carried out under the control of the military authorities as pure military education. This is the case with Soviet Union. If this was materialized, training would be separated from Morels and Civics and it would be practically impossible to translate the class room moral education into action and to cultivate a respect for labor. Moreover, unless the education of the technical continuation school becomes compulsory, the enforcement of training will be confined to a small section of our youth and therefore we cannot hope to raise the standards of character of the nation. Therefore, the military authorities have not the slightest intention of doing this. The object of the inspection by officers on the active list is to determine whether or not students or non-students who have finished the course of training, are qualified to enjoy the privilege of the
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reduction of the period of active service. Therefore, those officers have no power whatever to interfere with the curriculum of this training by over-stepping their jurisdiction. It is customary in various districts in Japan that the inspection officers state the views on the results of the inspection to the persons concerned at the local bodies' request and with the consent of the Education Ministry to help develop the training. In short, these two systems of training aim at raising the nation's standards of character.

To say that this training system is in compensation for the privilege of the reduction of the period of active service or it is for the extension of the education in the Army is far from true purpose. This training is really an undertaking with the long-range view of future national prosperity. Therefore, the Education Ministry and the Military authorities are cooperating with each other in attaining the expected result."

Attached Sheet No. 4

Excerpt from the speech delivered by the War Minister at the conference of the Divisional Commanders which was held on June, 1925.

"The object of school training is naturally different from that of the Army. If the inspection officers, who are in close contact with soldiers in the barracks, inspect the school training as professional soldiers, I am afraid that they may not be able to guide students properly."
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Excerpt from the speech delivered by the War Minister at the conference of the Major Generals attached to the Headquarters of the Divisions which was held in December, 1925

"As was reiterated, the object of school training is different from that of the education in the Army. It is hardly necessary to say that, if the inspection officers pay chief attention to technical military matters at the time of inspection and if the inspection is carried out in the same way as in the Army, it will be incompatible with the actual condition of the schools, and the general public will misunderstand the object of training."...

"The inspection officers should lay stress on the following points: the degree to which students are disciplined mentally and mentally, especially the degree to which virtues such as discipline, moderation, cooperation, union and perseverance are cultivated and to what degree do they bear the national defense in mind."

Excerpt from the speech delivered by the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry at the conference of the Units' Commanders which was held in April, 1926

"As you are well aware, the aim of school training is to discipline mentally and physically the students and not to acquire military technique."
"It is not proper to lay stress on individual military technique and on outward trifles without examining the degree to which the students are disciplined physically and mentally."

Extract from the speech delivered by the Director of the Military Affairs Branch of the War Ministry at the conference regarding the choice of officers attached to the schools.

Held in February, 1928

"The object of school training is to discipline the student physically and mentally. The technical results of training are, so to speak, a by-product of the enforcement of training."

He referred to the method of teaching as follows: "As stated above, the chief object of school training is not to acquire knowledge of military technique. However, you should not hold the extreme views that you may choose an original method of teaching so that the end justifies the means. You must follow the established method of teaching which was adopted as the means of training. This is stated in the outline of instruction of military training, in the Instructions of the Educational Ministry."
on this 13th day of January, 1947

[signature]

I, Bando, Jun'ichi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness,

on the same date

at Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) Bando, Jun'ichi (seal)
In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell
the whole truth, withholding nothing and saying nothing.

_Yealum shi_ (sec:1)
荒木貞夫
其他

仏

様

return to room 361
私吉田萃茂は元皇華大佐であります。昭和二十七年十一月二十一日（一
八九四年）生まれで現在静岡県高設郡富士町に住んでおります。昭和五年三
月（一九三〇年）より同十年十二月（一九三五年）迄京都の第十六師団
司令部勤として勤務し学校教練に帰する事項を担当しております。
昭和十二年八月（一九三七年）より同十六年三月（一九四一年）迄陸軍
省人事局課員で兵務局課員として何れも学校教練に帰する事項を担当
してまいりました。當時私は陸軍歩兵少佐でありましたが、その間中征に遠征し
来ました。
以下述べますことは私の服務を進し学校教練に帰し知りしめること及び
従を直接指導しているものかが学校教練とも関連がありましたので
してあることを併せて述べます。
第一・学務改革・青年訓練採用の理由

米国に於ける軍事規範教育の状況の如くである。大正十五年

列国と並び列国に於いて之が進歩した理由には、不該した

即ち青年訓練の為に於ては、好間の学務改革の為に於て、

講師等は国務立役者全員が、彼等の特色と変化の過程を

米国に於ける軍事規範教育の状況を模倣したのであって、連

大正十一年（九二六年）至二五月一に至り、始めて學務改革

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講師等は国務立役者全員が、彼等の特色と変化の過程を
軍部とし、ましては衆議院乃至参議院による學生、生徒の心身鍛錬の結果が国防能力に寄与する影響を既に考えようとすることを研究し、進んで文部省の策を発表するにあたります。と見定して至る所は、学生、生徒、一般青年の心身の鍛錬に関する立場に留めて置くのです。まず、御院の管轄下にある学問教育において、我在学を含めて学生、生徒の心身の鍛錬の結果が国防能力に寄与する影響を進んで文部省の策を発表するにあたります。と見定して至る所は、学生、生徒、一般青年の心身の鍛錬に関する立場に留めて置くのです。
第一期の反対者を含め、会で居た衆議院議員を巻き込むとする経験的企画は、
一部の反対者を巻き込んで居た衆議院議員を巻き込むとする経験的企画は、
一方を含めたのである。従って、本制度の制定に際して議論が盛んに行なわれた
ため、本制度に於ても従来の顧問の権限を認めざる後遺金の役心を加える
大正十四年（一九二五年）四月十四日内務省訓令第一號（局紙）に
文章大正十四年（一九二五年）四月十四日内務省訓令第一號（局紙）に
文中の労働者、監察大正ニニに顧問監察（別紙）に
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文中の労働者、監察大正ニニに顧問監察（別紙）に
文中の労働者、監察大正ニニに顧問監察（別紙）に
一、学校の経緯

ながゆる経験の教料が各校に与えられる教育者に、射撃、鍛冶、鉱山、産業に関する術である本間延則段以来若干の成績をもってのないことはないが、この経験の教料を通じての進歩が心身の発展を顧みる事が必要である。射撃の研究を目的とする射撃技術の教育をたてて、この射撃の指導のための環境を整え、射撃の目的を顧みる事が必要である。

毎年四月一日より、射撃を行うことに規定される射撃学校では卒業生が射撃を学び、射撃の目的をもって射撃の技術を学ぶ。
二、差年級
興部総合
来年開設
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日
昭和十一年二二月（一九三六年七月）から学校及び学校の教員の教育に関する事項の整理をなした。このため、文部省の下に甚大な役割を負う事務部を設けられた。この文部省は、その後、教育省と改称し、教育に関する全ての業務を担うようになった。
三、改修案の検討及び検討に出席しない者就任の要望であり案の提案は

四、現在の高等学校教員令（大正十五年正月三日勅令第百三七号）

について案の審議を要望し教員令改正に同意することに決定しては実現し、現行令改正に

関する意見を尊重することに決定したので案を示した。
は毎年学校の授業に実際を示し、学びを深め、所要の知識にまた实施した。

六、記念教授の重要は人材育のため、敷居者の資質であるが、記念教授の

ための発表について、文献学の役立に学習資格の中、発表の敬意にあわせた全体

下記に掲げる教官より言及で発表があがり、ベースの都下は兵生師

より発表が多いので、学校の多くは基調製作の実績歩兵師、同県

青年団長は文部省、東方協の所で同し、西部協会系により能通効力援助の

立場に在った。
在当年間の短縮に就いては本幹度剣設当時既に昭和模様の当時卒業を
了せるものにあっては承認の関係上より操練として要請されてきた又
在行年間の短縮が本幹度剣設当時既に募集模様の中等教育を

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大正十四年（一九二五）

現役と非現役の区別を定め、現役と非現役の区別を強調する。

| 年次 | 審査方式 | 改正
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| 二八 | 日本化 | 改正一

二八、在籍期間は二年六月

(1) 中等学校卒業者、非現役
(2) 次等職員非現役、非現役
(3) 中等学校卒業者、非現役
(4) 高等職員非現役、非現役

就業に必要な時間である。
下面の図は、試験における導入部分の結果を示しています。実績データを基に、今後の導入における強みや課題を検討するため、以下の表を用意しました。

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では昭和七年まで授業科であった為際にその志願者数が高くであり出

るものがあった

し著しく低下してので短縮に端へなかったが教員実施十年に及ぶ

程
文部大臣口演抜萃
自今内外ノ情勢ノ為政府ハ更ニ進念テ営校ニ在在サルノ青年
更ニ考究中ニ震モノレ△校改業ノ振作ノ為ニ其ノ第一
目的ノ青年ヨリ人類ノ顕著ナル顕著ノ青年
テ其ノ資質ヲ向うノルノトモノソノヲ
十六歳ヨリ微兵進除去ニテ入醫ニ至ル迄ノ青年
ノ子ノ心身ヲ鍛鍊ノ校長
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皆トレハ校長
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校長
无法识别内容
育のための教育ニ関スルハノニレテ世上にあらかじめハテナ

普及に資スル目的ヲ諸ル教育ヲハテナリ除レタル斯き

青年ノ心狀体力亦面目ヲ改ムへク仍テ以テ時ヲ防上ニ及バニ善

ノ努力ヲ各マレサッメ Turk熱験ル
合せたのでありますが九月の震災で文部省に於ける普通研究資料が全

然るに訓練なら市民の行動か大災害の起った場合如何なる状態を呈す

のかと言ふことを世災によって如何に目覚し而も同年十一月に至り

訓練の実施に對する指揮を述べられ當時の昭相宇太郎大將に於し此

於訓練の盛を表されれたは昭和三年文部及共部の双方より参員を出して具

的方法を運ぶに於て揃い進み之を制度となつて表れたものが大正十四

年以降の戦役辺境の変化に対及大正十五年四月からの青年訓練所であるい

（昭和六年）
一部又は大部の事象を現れないのでありまして、昔創始の事業には必ず

1. 现役将校により青年訓練在籍軍人による青年訓練を受けて居るによっても明かである斯く

2. 现役将校により青年訓練を受けて居るによっても明かである斯く

3. 现役将校により青年訓練を受けて居るによっても明かである斯く
この文書の内容を自然に読むためのテキストは以下の通りです。

この文書は、明治十九年（1886年）の憲政改革を歴史的背景として、その影響を受けた文部省の組織と人事に関する考察を含むものであります。その内容は、特に憲政改革の影響を受けていた文部省の組織について、その変更の背景についての解説が含まれています。文部省の組織変更の背景には、憲政改革の影響が大きく、特に憲政改革の下で文部省が行った組織改正の内容とその背景についての詳細が述べられています。
ある教育の普及が進む下にある故にであり又は先の書局及び地方教官の努力を
て居るのは明らかに濁るに過ぎぬ人々等から又は
下にある絵画教育であっても部は何れも之に努力して
之を解説し所と合弁者から一青年講師中の学生公民等
は之を解説解説に解せ得る就業を講義著者とし之を解説の手に一
方によい一つの誠をきくのであります之を解説解説に解せ
りますのが一青年一青年のにしにしましたならば彼等は解説解説とし之を解説解説を講
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何れにせよ差別的な顧客の差別的な配列形式を導入することに旗帜が

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Affidavit (Translation)

Deponent: IWAMATSU, Goro

I, Goro IWAMATSU, being duly sworn, depose and say;

That I presently reside in Tokyo; and that I also received my education in Tokyo, to wit, three years at the Higher School and from 1918 to 1921 I attended the Tokyo Imperial University in the Literature Department, and from 1921 to 1924 I attended the Law Department of the aforementioned Tokyo Imperial University;

That from 1919 to 1924 I taught history at the Middle School; that from 1926 to 1930 I taught history and international law at the Naval Academy; that from 1934 to 1937 I taught history at the To. o Higher Agricultural College, and educational administration at the Agricultural Educational Special College.

I have worked with the Minister of Education from 1925 to 1945. When Marquis KIDO was the Education Minister I was the Chief of the Documentary Section, and when Baron KUNA was Education Minister I served under him as Chief Secretary, as well as confidential secretary to the Minister.

From the Fifth Year of Meiji it became compulsory for all the male youths of Japan to serve several years in the military service of their country. The inception of military training in schools dates back to the time of MORI, Education Minister, in December 1895. He placed the essen-
essential points of education in three virtues: dignity, public confidence, and obedience, and in order to nourish these virtues he adopted the system of military billeting for dormitory and also military drill. After that, in accordance with changes in the military system such as curtailment of terms of service and changes brought about as a result of disarmament policies, etc., means were taken by the Minister to cope with those situations. Assignment of officers in active military service to different schools, establishment of young men's training camps and also establishment of Youth's Schools at a later date were the result of, and the execution of the principle set forth by Minister MORI which, as heretofore mentioned, were definitely not for the purpose of militarizing the country.

The system in effect in 1932 was as follows: When a young man became of age he was obliged to render several years of military service to his country. However, if he became of age while attending school, he was permitted a period of grace to complete his education. At that time military drill and lectures were included in the curriculum of studies, however, it was not necessary for students to include this training in their schedule if they did not care to do so. If they did not, however, they could not become candidates for an officer's commission when they entered the service of their country after graduation. Hence, the military training could be classified as an extra subject in the list of studies in the schools to be taken or not to be taken by the student, depending upon whether or not he desired to become an officer at some future time when he would enter his period of military service.

It was after August 1941 that the military education in the schools was readjusted and enforced more strongly.
then ever and it was due to the strong request of the military authorities to cope with the change of the international situation. It was at that time that the military education in the University Division of the Universities was made compulsory; before that it was just as explained by President HIRAGA, that it was left to the discretion of the students.

During all the years of my service with the Minister of Education, up until 1941 I never felt that military education was a compulsory task or strongly enforced.

In 1942 I was appointed director of the Naresaki Higher Commercial College and I noticed that the military education carried out by the military officers was quite different from that which I experienced in my aforementioned years but there was never such an incident as would hamper the graduation of a student on account of his negligence or failure to take the military education, nor was there any interference on the part of the officers with the administrative matters of the college.

When the Kongo Cabinet was reshuffled in 1938 there was a rumor that a military man would become the Minister of Education and this rumor caused no little comment among the staff of the Ministry. The members of the staff were of the opinion that more military personnel would be appointed functionaries of the Ministry and the Ministry would become militarized if such a selection were made.

In the meantime it was made public that General ARAKI would be appointed the Education Minister. However, as time went on, not only I but many others, and particularly those who came in contact with Minister ARAKI learned that their fears were not well founded. General ARAKI made his position clear upon his very first visit to the Educational
Office, about which I should like to cite the following experience:

When he arrived at the office I asked him why he did not wear a military uniform. He very frankly told me that he was no more a military man in the military service, but was a civilian appointed to serve in a civil administrative capacity.

Minister ARAKI applied himself rather diligently to the tasks of his office, as a result of which he spent many nights at his official residence. He further renovated my official residence so that I could stay there also. Consequently, this afforded me ample opportunity to be with him frequently. In fact, I was with him for the greater part of my time, either on official occasions or unofficially.

When Minister ARAKI first went to the Imperial University I heard the President of the University, Mr. HIRAGA, tell the Minister that the students had started to attend the military drill which was scheduled according to the existing regulation, quite voluntarily and without being requested to do so. When I heard this I thought, and I still think, it was due to the influence caused by the current situation, for I know that during the year and several months Minister ARAKI served as Education Minister, he never took any new measures concerning military education. He never issued even a single instruction with regard to this matter, nor did he enforce in any way its execution. It was the same with his predecessor, KIYOSUKE KIDO. It was after these two Ministers just mentioned that the military education system was organized in a complete form. Both Minister KIDO and Minister ARAKI never ordered
the educational instructors to carry out military drills or lectures.

At this point I should like to state some of my experiences concerning General ARAKI personally.

Before the General became Educational Minister there was an attempt by the Japanese Government to promote an exchange of goodwill between Germany and Japan. This program was carried out to the extent of sending young men to Germany, and Germany in return would send some of her young men to Japan. When Baron ARAKI became Education Minister the group of Japanese youths who had left previously for Germany returned. ARAKI, as Education Minister, met them eventually and he expressed this opinion to me:

"I regret that these young men returned home with Nazi influence. I do not like our young men being imbued with Nazi principles. If this program is to continue in the future it will be my suggestion that these young men going to Europe again should visit not only Germany but England and France as well."

On the occasion when the German-Japanese Culture Agreement was signed, Minister ARAKI wanted me to devise some plan or means to conclude this agreement to cover not only Germany but as many other nations who might express some interest in the program.

When Baron ARAKI was the Education Minister he stated to me on one occasion an opinion that if a nation became a first class country by strength of armed forces it would not last long. A nation to become a first class country had to do so by virtue of culture. He encouraged the study of science and personally negotiated with the Finance Ministry to obtain an extra allowance of 3,000,000 Yen annually.
for the study of basic sciences in colleges and universities.
He respected technical education and on all occasions listened to the opinion of business men. It was his desire to carry out vocational education to a great extent and in this respect he looked toward business circles.

During the China incident, a few of his interests, expressions and actions vividly remain with me. On one occasion there was public clamor to the effect that the art exhibition and the teaching of the English language in schools should be abolished. He was definitely opposed to this suggested restriction and stated that the culture of a nation is not the kind to be temporarily stopped.

Concerning the suggestion of the abolition of the English language teaching, he was of the opinion that it might have originated from an anti-foreign principle and he expressed the opinion to me quoting one of the Emperor Meiji's five orths, that Japan should not indulge in a superior complex of its own, nor flatter itself that it is superior to others. The Japanese public, he said, must become such as to be admired, loved and respected by all without asking other people to do so; and that the study of English not only should it not be abolished but it should be encouraged and that students should have the determination to learn more languages if possible. He brought to the attention of the students that Britain and the United States were studious enough to study the Japanese language and he suggested that if this were the attitude of great nations, Japan must follow them.

Minister ARAKI, when he was Munition Minister advocated most sincerely the policies of the late Emperor Meiji, first that Japan should not be a nation of Fracism, then in that Japan should apply itself more diligently to the
study of Western civilization. Further, the Japanese people should nourish the power of unbiased judgment and attain above all things the culture of a nation which has been in existence for 2600 years.

While he was Education Minister he advocated and encouraged the education of the deaf and blind, referring frequently to the case of Dr. Helen Keller. He was an ardent champion of loyalty. On one occasion I remember a group of Niseis visited him and requested his opinion as to what action should be taken by them in the event of a future struggle between Japan and other countries. He advised them that their first duty was to the country of their birth. However, he further stated that if they felt reluctant to engage in any conflict with the country of their ancestors, that they should do all that they possibly can to prevent any such unfortunate happening and to try to iron out any misunderstanding which might arise. I was deeply impressed and respected him sincerely for this opinion.

While he was Education Minister he further advocated freedom of religion and referred frequently to Constitution Article No. 28.

Since the inception of military training in the schools in 1882 I shall briefly outline a list of all the important ordinances and regulations and changes concerning military training from that date until 1944. The list of these ordinances and regulations are as follows:

1882 - By Education Ministry Order - Song and Gymnastic and regular curriculum at the Primary School.
1856 (April) -  
- Military Drill made an item of curriculum at Normal and Middle School.

1925 (April 11) -  
- Order for assignment of army officers in active service to schools.  
(Premier KATO, Takaaki, U.G/I, War Minister, OJDA, Education Minister.)

1926 (April 20) - Imperial Ordinance  
- Order for establishment of Young Men's Training Camp.

1926 (April 20) - Education Ministry Order  
- Regulations relative to the application of the above.

1935 (April 1) - Imperial Ordinance  
- Order for establishment of Youths' School.

1935 (April 1) - Education Ministry Order  
- Regulations relative to the application of above.

1935 (August) - Imperial Ordinance  
- Order for Inspection of Military Drill at the Youths' School.

1941 (Sept. 5) - War Ministry Order  
- Regulations relative to the application of order for assignment of Army Officers in active service to schools.

1. Military Drill in University Division of University made compulsory,
2. Red Justment of items of training of military drill.

1941 (Nov. 27) - Education Ministry Instruction  
- Items of training of military drill at schools where army officers in active service are assigned.

1926 (Sept. 27) - War Ministry Order:  
- Regulation for inspection of military drill at schools where army officers in active service were assigned.  
(This was modified in 1927, 1934, 1937 and 1942.)
1943 (June 25) - Decision at Cabinet Meeting

- Essential point for establishing system of Student War Time Mobilization

1943 (Sept.)

- Notification of items of training of military drill at schools

1944 (Feb., 2)

- Essential point of enforcing military education of students to keep pace with the wartime emergency measures relative to education

This list is offered for the purpose of substantiating my statement that while Minister ARAKI was Education Minister during parts of the years 1938 and 1939 not one important ordinance or regulation was effectuated by him.

On this 24th day of February 1947
At the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan

Deponent: TURUZU, Goro (monogram)

I, TURUZU, Hiroyuki, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and monogram thereon in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,

At the same place.

Witness (signed) TURUZU, Hiroyuki

Oath

I, TURUZU, Hiroyuki, in accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Turuzu, monogram)
Translation Certificate

I, Hiroyuki Fukuda, of the defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Mr. Goro Inoue's affidavit is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Hiroyuki Fukuda

Tokyo, Japan

Date March 5th, 1947
TWO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.  
vs  
ARAI, Sadeo, et al.

Affidavit (Translation)

Deponent: IJAMATSU, Goro

I, Goro IAMATSU, being duly sworn, depose and say:

That I presently reside in Tokyo; and that I also received my education in Tokyo, to wit, three years at the Higher School and from 1918 to 1921 I attended the Tokyo Imperial University in the Literature Department, and from 1921 to 1924 I attended the Law Department of the aforementioned Tokyo Imperial University;

That from 1919 to 1924 I taught history at the Middle School; that from 1926 to 1930 I taught history and international law at the Naval Academy; that from 1934 to 1937 I taught history at the Tokyo Higher Agricultural College, and educational administration at the Agricultural Educational Special College.

I have worked with the Minister of Education from 1925 to 1945. When Marquis KIDO was the Education Minister I was the Chief of the Documentary Section, and when Baron AKIYAMA was Education Minister I served under him as Chief Secretary, as well as confidential secretary to the Minister.

From the Fifth Year of Showa it became compulsory for all the male youths of Japan to serve several years in the military service of their country. The inception of military training in schools dates back to the time of MORI, Education Minister, in December 1895. He placed the essen-
tial points of education in three virtues: dignity, public confidence, and obedience, and in order to nourish these virtues he accepted the system of military billeting for dormitory and also military drill. After that, in accordance with changes in the military system such as curtailment of terms of service and changes brought about as a result of disarmament policies, etc., means were taken by the Minister to cope with those situations. Assignment of officers in active military service to different schools, establishment of young men's training camps and also establishment of Youth's Schools at a later date were the result of, and the execution of the principle set forth by Minister MORI which, as heretofore mentioned, were definitely not for the purpose of militarizing the country.

The system in effect in 1932 was as follows: When a young man became of age he was obliged to render several years of military service to his country. However, if he became of age while attending school, he was permitted a period of grace to complete his education. At that time military drill and lectures were included in the curriculum of studies, however, it was not necessary for students to include this training in their schedule if they did not care to do so. If they did not, however, they could not become candidates for an officer's commission when they entered the service of their country after graduation. Hence, the military training could be classified as an extra subject in the list of studies in the schools to be taken or not to be taken by the student, depending upon whether or not he desired to become an officer at some future time when he would enter his period of military service.

It was after August 1941 that the military education in the schools was readjusted and enforced more strongly
then over and it was due to the strong request of the military authorities to cope with the change of the international situation. It was at that time that the military education in the University Division of the Universities was made compulsory; before that it was just as explained by President HIRAGA, that it was left to the discretion of the students.

During all the years of my service with the Minister of Education, up until 1941 I never felt that military education was a compulsory task or strongly enforced.

In 1942 I was appointed director of the Nagasaki Higher Commercial College and I noticed that the military education carried out by the military officer was quite different from that which I experienced in my aforementioned years but there was never such an incident as would hamper the graduation of a student on account of his negligence or failure to take the military education, nor was there any interference on the part of the officers with the administrative matters of the college.

When the Konoyo Cabinet was reshuffled in 1938 there was a rumor that a military man would become the Minister of Education and this rumor caused no little comment among the staff of the Ministry. The members of the staff were of the opinion that more military personnel would be appointed functionaries of the Ministry and the Ministry would become militarized if such a selection were made.

In the meantime it was made public that General ARAKI would be appointed the Education Minister. However, as time went on, not only I but many others, and particularly those who came in contact with Minister ARAKI learned that their fears were not well founded. General ARAKI made his position clear upon his very first visit to the Educational
Office, about which I should like to cite the following experience:

When he arrived at the office I asked him why he did not wear a military uniform. He very frankly told me that he was no more a military man in the military service, but was a civilian appointed to serve in a civil administrative capacity.

Minister ARAKI applied himself rather diligently to the tasks of his office, as a result of which he spent many nights at his official residence. He further renovated my official residence so that I could stay there also. Consequently, this afforded me ample opportunity to be with him frequently. In fact, I was with him for the greater part of my time, either on official occasions or unofficially.

When Minister ARAKI first went to the Imperial University I heard the President of the University, Mr. HIRAGA, tell the Minister that the students had started to attend the military drill which was scheduled according to the existing regulation, quite voluntarily and without being requested to do so. When I heard this I thought, and I still think, it was due to the influence caused by the current situation, for I know that during the year and several months Minister ARAKI served as Education Minister, he never took any new measures concerning military education. He never issued even a single instruction with regard to this matter, nor did he enforce in any way its execution. It was the same with his predecessor, Isequis KIDO. It was after these two ministers just mentioned that the military education system was organized in a complete form. Both Minister KIDO and Minister ARAKI never ordered
the educational instructors to carry out military drills
or lectures.

At this point I should like to state some of my ex-
periences concerning General ARAI personally.

Before the General became Educational Minister there
was an attempt by the Japanese Government to promote an
exchange of goodwill between Germany and Japan. This pro-
gram was carried out to the extent of sending young men to
Germany, and Germany in return would send some of her young
men to Japan. When Baron ARAI became Education Minister
the group of Japanese youths who had left previously for
Germany returned. ARAI, as Education Minister, met them
eventually and he expressed this opinion to me:

"I regret that these young men returned home with
Nazi influence. I do not like our young men being imbued
with Nazi principles. If this program is to continue in
the future it will be my suggestion that these young men
going to Europe again should visit not only Germany but
England and France as well."

On the occasion when the German-Japanese Culture Agree-
ment was signed, Minister ARAI wanted me to devise some
plan or means to conclude this agreement to cover not only
Germany but any other nations who might express some
interest in the program.

When Baron ARAI was the Education Minister he stated
to me on one occasion his opinion that if a nation became a
first class country by strength of armed forces it would not
last long. A nation to become a first class country had to
do so by virtue of culture. He encouraged the study of
science and personally negotiated with the Finance Ministry
to obtain an extra allowance of 3,000,000 Yen annually
for the study of basic science in colleges and universities. He respected technical education and on all occasions listened to the opinion of business men. It was his desire to carry out vocational education to a great extent and in this respect he looked toward business circles.

During the China Incident, a few of his interests, expressions and actions vividly remain with me. On one occasion there was public clamor to the effect that the art exhibition and the teaching of the English language in schools should be abolished. He was definitely opposed to this suggested restriction and stated that the culture of a nation is not the kind to be temporarily stopped.

Concerning the suggestion of the abolition of the English language teaching, he was of the opinion that it might have originated from an anti-foreign principle and he expressed the opinion to me quoting one of the Emperor Meiji’s five oaths, that Japan should not indulge in a superior complex of its own, nor flatter itself that it is superior to others. The Japanese public, he said, must become such as to be admired, loved and respected by all without asking other people to do so; and that the study of English not only should it not be abolished but it should be encouraged and that students should have the determination to learn more languages if possible. He brought to the attention of the students that Britain and the United States were studious enough to study the Japanese language and he suggested that if this were the attitude of great nations, Japan must follow then.

Minister ANAMI, when he was Education Minister advocated most sincerely the policies of the late Emperor Meiji, first that Japan should not be a nation of Fascism, then again that Japan should apply itself more diligently to the
study of Western civilization. Further that the Japanese people should nourish the power of unbiased judgment and attain above all things the culture of a nation which has been in existence for 2600 years.

While he was Education Minister he advocated and encouraged the education of the deaf and blind, referring frequently to the case of Indian Helen Keller. He was an ardent champion of loyalty. On one occasion I remember a group of Niseis visited him and requested his opinion as to what action should be taken by them in the event of a future struggle between Japan and other countries. He advised them that their first duty was to the country of their birth. However, he further stated that if they felt reluctant to engage in any conflict with the country of their ancestors, that they should do all that they possibly can to prevent any such unfortunate happening and to try to iron out any misunderstanding which might arise. I was deeply impressed and respected him sincerely for this opinion.

While he was Education Minister he further advocated freedom of religion and referred frequently to Constitution Article No. 28.

Since the inception of military training in the schools in 1882 I shall briefly outline a list of all the important ordinances and regulations and changes concerning military training from that date until 1944. The list of these ordinances and regulations are as follow:

1882 - By Education Ministry Order - Song and Gymnastics made Regular curriculum at the Primary School
Military Drill made an item of curriculum at Normal and Middle School.

- Ord. for assignment of army officers in active service to schools. (Premier JATO, Takasaki, UGILI, War Minister, G&DA, Education Minister;)

- Order for establishment of Young Men's Training Camp.

- Regulations relative to the application of the above.

- Order for establishment of Youths' School.

- Regulations relative to the application of above.

- Order for Inspection of Military Drill at the Youths' School.

- Regulations relative to the application of order for assignment of Army Officers in active service to schools.

1. Military Drill in University Division of University made compulsory,

2. Readjustment of items of training of military drill

- Items of training of military drill at schools where army officers in active service are assigned

- Regulation for inspection of military drill at schools where army officers in active service were assigned (This was modified in 1937, 1934, 1937 and 1942)
1943 (June 25) - Decision at Cabinet Meeting

Essential point for establishing system of Student War Time Mobilization

1943 (Sep. 1) - Notification of items of training of military drill at schools

1944 (Feb. 2) - Notification of items of training of military drill at schools

This list is offered for the purpose of substantiating my statement that while Minister ARIMI was Education Minister during parts of the years 1938 and 1939 not one important ordinance or regulation was effectuated by him.

On this 24th day of February 1947

At the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan

Deponent: FUJIMATSU, Goro (monogram)

I, FUJIMATSU, Hiroyuki, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and concurred thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,

At the same place.

Witness (signed) FUJIMATSU, Hiroyuki

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth without hiding anything and adding nothing,

(signed) FUJIMATSU, Goro (monogram)
Translation Certificate

I, Hiroyuki Furuya, of the defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Mr. Goro Inagaki's Affidavit is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\/ Hiroyuki Furuya

Tokyo, Japan
Date March 3rd, 1947
した現役将校の就任記念に青年訓練所設立の後も青年学校の設立を見
また前にも述べたのも講義の改良のための講義の改良とその役行の為めであり
もらう男子が丁年に到すると言葉は青年学校の兵役に服する事を誓うから
し作り講義の演習中も丁年に到した時は講義を授ける事を誓うから
毒生を破き講義を守りたかったが解り流せるものは必要であったりし
た独り講義を守りたかったのでありまして従つて兵式訓練は未定期中既
外の兵式の変更も受けて生がこれを守るものか否かに設けて決定する為に到って居りません
た
為講義に於ける軍事教育が既定され一旦進化させたのは昭和九年八月以
講義の為でありまして訓練目的の理論に習つて革部の威力を軍界に譲い
た
大戰の為の部の軍事教育が必為に至ったのも此の時の為であり其れまでは
平賤論を説明して居るよう、学問の自発に優れたものでありました。

私は一九三一年大正文部省勤務の分年で、各官庁通じて職務務興が強制され、

昭和三年に私は長崎高等商業学校教授を兼務した時期の高校時代のものと

は無理に行えば、読みは新しい時代が来ます。外

一九二十年に私は長崎高等商業学校教授を兼務し、その時の担当職官の単身

が書かれた私生が学校行政に干渉する事は少しもありませんでした。

九三八年近に内閣の改組が行なわれました時、文部大臣に職人が就任する

と云ふ事が立ちます文部職員の間でも急速に改組され重視して居る事を感じました。

選挙すると云ふ事で居ました時、文部文書に就任した者は、共の学問を

文官と文官無しの者、共の学問で居る事を感じました。文部文書は文部省に

発表され、文部文書によって、文部文書に任命される職人

文官と文官無しの者、共の学問で居る事を感じました。文部文書は文部省に

発表され、文部文書によって、文部文書に任命される職人

にかならないかと思わせしましたなら、文部文書は卒業に支えて職務を遂行

する職人
では、荒木文部は文部大臣の職に非常に熱心に勤務され、その報告書を常に入力して Furious であると云われた。、

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で、荒木文部は文部大臣の職に非常に熱心に勤務され、その報告書を常に入力して Furious であると云われた。、
お手伝いするにはまず、日本語に通じる文章が重要です。日本語の文は、日本の文化や習慣、言葉の文脈に基づいています。それぞれの文脈に応じて、新しい表現や文脈を見つけ出すことが求められます。また、読者に応じて、言葉の選択や表現を工夫することも重要です。
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关于
The German Minister's Advice on the Retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula, April 23rd, 29th year of Meiji (1895)

Telegram sent No. 348.
Dispatched 9:45 p.m. April 23rd, 29th year of Meiji (TN: 1895)

To: Foreign Minister MUTHU, at MAIKO
Urgent, Code

From: Vice Foreign Minister HAYASHI

Telegram sent No. 349
Dispatched 8:45, p.m. April 23rd, 29th year of Meiji.
To Count ITO (through Sato Secretary to the Foreign Minister, at Hiroshima)

The German Minister, in an interview with me, read aloud a note in Japanese to the following effect:

"In accordance with instructions of the Government I represent I make the following declaration:

The Government of Germany has found she has had to reach the conclusion on studying the terms of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, that the possession of Liaotung by Japan as demanded would be an obstacle to permanent peace in the Orient, forever placing the capitol of China in an unstable position and also
inducing the independence of Korea to come to naught. Our government, therefore, wishes to advise your government to abandon the permanent possession of Liaotung.

Concerning this declaration I have been instructed to relate to you the following:

We beg you to acknowledge that, since the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese Incident, my government has often shown evidence of our sincere goodwill towards your country. As Your Excellency is aware of, the British Government proposed to the European countries on October 7th, of last year, to intervene in the Sino-Japanese Incident. Germany, however, refused to join the intervention, at that time, because of her goodwill towards Japan. On March 8th, of this year, furthermore, the present minister advised your government, under the instruction of my government, to make peace as early as possible without making excessive demands. At that time, I made a suggestion that it would be more advantageous to Japan if you made an early peace without making excessive demands, as the European countries might intervene at the request of China. I related furthermore that, if Japan demanded partial cession of the continent, it would easily provoke the intervention of the Powers. Your government, however, did not comply with this unselfish advice.

We find the terms of the present Sino-Japanese "treaty" to be so excessive that they are not only against the interests of the European countries but also, even though less so to
Germany's interests. At this stage, therefore, the Imperial Government of His Majesty the German Emperor has to make a protest against your Government and if necessary may even have to take measures to make it effective. We know that your government has no reason for refusing concession in this case as after all I do not believe Japan would care to involve herself in a war against three countries. I have also received private instructions to dispatch telegrams to my home government in case the Japanese government wishes to have a conference held in order to find a way to recede from her present position without impairing her honor.
I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Recommendation of German Minister for Retrocession of the Liaotung peninsula, April 23, 1905" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 3rd day of February, 1947

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 Feb. 47
Reply to the Memorandum Presented by the German, Russian, and French Ministers.

Despatched from KYOTO, April 30, 1895.

To: Minister to Russia NISHI
Minister to Germany AOKI
Minister to France SONE

From: Foreign Minister MUTSU

You are requested to have the following memorandum, which is the reply to the memorandum presented by the German, Russian and French Ministers to Japan, translated into French and German and presented to the German, French and Russian Governments.

The Imperial Government of Japan has most carefully perused the memorandum presented to it by the Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary of their Majesties the Emperors of Germany and of Russia, and of His Excellency the President of the French Republic in the names of their respective home governments.

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, after having deliberated on the friendly advice of the Governments of their Majesties the Emperors of Germany and of Russia and of His Excellency the President of the French Republic, and being desirous to give proofs again of its laying stress on the importance of friendly relations maintained between the
two countries (T.N.- Sic), agrees to have the following modifications made in the Treaty of SHIONOSEKI by means of a special supplementary agreement to be drawn up only after the ratifications of the said Treaty have been exchanged to the complete honour and dignity of the State of Japan:

I. Our Imperial Government agrees to renounce all rights of permanent occupation in the Tengtien Peninsula excepting those concerning the Kin-chow district. The State of Japan, however, may, on consultation with the State of China, fix an adequate sum to be paid in compensation for the renounced territory.

II. It should be known, however, that until China has completely discharged her obligations to Japan prescribed by the Treaty, our Imperial Government retains as security therefore the right of occupation of the territory above-mentioned.

On the delivery of this memorandum to the German, Russian and French Governments, a prompt answer should be demanded.

In case the German, Russian and French Governments appear to be still dissatisfied with the above, you are requested to inquire, as if for your own personal information, whether their original memorandum can in no way be modified or whether they have some other propositions to make in the way of mediation in this case.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Keoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Reply to the Memorandum presented by the German, Russian and French Ministers — Telegram from Mutsu, Foreign Minister, to Ministers to Russia, Germany and France, despatched on April 30, 1895." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 3rd day of February, 1947.

(signed) K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu Oto

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 February 1947
(The year 1895)

Kyoto, May 5, 1895

Telex

To: Minister AKI, Germany.

Minister SONE, France.

From: Minister of Foreign Affairs, JAPAN.

Your Excellencies are kindly requested to translate the following
FRENCH

German

German, Russian, and

French

German governments, the Japanese Government agrees to renounce permanently
the occupation of the Mukden peninsula*.

In presenting this memorandum, Your Excellencies are also requested
to express the following:

"Because of the inadmissibility of the proposition of the Japanese
Government on the part of Russian Government, and because of our earnest
desire to terminate the present situation, we consider it to be the
best policy to follow the first advice of the three nations without
awaiting a reply from the French Governments to the memorandum which
we previously delivered."

For your Excellencies' reference, the following is also added:

I. The Japanese Government retains the right to claim reparation from
China for the land which she renounced.

II. The Japanese Government retains the right to occupy the said peninsula
for security as a security measure for China's fulfillment of its treaty
obligations to Japan.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. YUZAWA, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese entitled: "Telegram from MURSU, Foreign Minister, to AKI, Minister to Germany, and SONE, Minister to France, despatched on May 5, 1895," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 3rd day of February, 1947.

[Signature]

Witness: [Signature]

Translation Certificate

I, Yukio Kawanoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\ Yukio Kawanoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 7 Feb. 1947

"Telegram from MURSU, Foreign Minister, to AKI, Minister to Germany, and SONE, Minister to France, despatched on May 5, 1895."
FIGURE NO. 2

EX. 282

FAN PRESENTED TO THE AUTHOR BY THE EMPEROR WITH AUTOGRAPH COPY OF A CHINESE FON OF FARMER.
FIGURE NO. 4

AUTOGRAPH

此次東省事變及歐洲政府閲察

南緬產蜜蜜遠山猛猛風他

實所料欲保東亞提請不受

斷我朝得大恩大德越念

此為責難之理應為所備

未將可複報者而此日良積

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FIGURE NO. 7

EX. 278

EX. 282

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FIGURE NO. 17

EX. 278

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EX. 282

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FIGURE NO. 26

EX. 278

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EX. 278

EX. 285

A

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Kyoto, May 5, 1895

To: Minister of Foreign Affairs, France.

From: Minister of Foreign Affairs, JAPAN.

Your Excellencies are kindly requested to translate the following
French memorandum into German and to submit it to the French governments:

"In accordance with the friendly advice of the French, Russian and
French

German governments, the Japanese Government agrees to renounce permanently
the occupation of the Haiden Peninsula".

In presenting this memorandum, Your Excellencies are also requested
to express the following:

"Because of the inadmissibility of the proposition of the Japanese
Government on the part of Russian Government, and because of our earnest
desire to terminate the present situation, we consider it to be the
best policy to follow the first advice of the three nations without
awaiting a reply from the French Governments to the memorandum which
we previously delivered."

For your Excellencies' reference, the following is also added:

I. The Japanese Government retains the right to claim compensation from
China for the land which she has renounced.

II. The Japanese Government retains the right to occupy the said peninsula
for some time as a security measure for China's fulfillment of its treaty
obligations to Japan.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. KAWAKAMI, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Telegram from Mutsu, Foreign Minister, to Aoki, Minister to Germany, and Sone, Minister to France, despatched on May 5, 1895." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 3rd day of February, 1947.

Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Tokyo, Japan

Date: 7 Feb. 1947

Signature of Official

Translation Certificate:

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/3/ Yukio Kawamoto

"Telegram from Mutsu, Foreign Minister, to Aoki, Minister to Germany, and Sone, Minister to France, despatched on May 5, 1895."
THAT RESPECTING SOUTH MANCHU, AND EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, having resolved to conclude
a Treaty with a view to developing their economic relations in
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, have for that
purpose named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Lhou
Tao-te-hsiung, Chiao-chia, First Class Chiao-ho Decoration, and
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and His Majesty the Emperor of
Japan, Hiro Hito, Susu, Second Class of the Imperial Order
of the Sacred Treasure, Minister plenipotentiary and Envoy
Extraordinary;

Who, after having communicated to each other their full
powers, and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed
upon and concluded the following articles: --
Article 1. -- The two High Contracting Parties agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Sudden Railway, shall be extended to 99 years.

Article 2. -- Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Article 3. -- Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4. -- In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its permission.

Article 5. -- The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding three articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation of China.

Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese authorities. In either case an officer
may be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations jointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage.

When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law courts.

Article 6. — The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as Commercial Ports.

Article 7. — The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Wangchun Railway Loan Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan agreements made heretofore between China and foreign financiers.

When in future, more advantageous terms than those in existing railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with Japan’s wishes.

Article 8. — All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Treaty, remain in force.

Article 9. — The present Treaty shall come into force on the date of its signature. The present Treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Tokyo as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting Parties have signed and sealed the present Treaty, two copies in the Chinese language and two in Japanese.

Done at Peking this twenty-fifth day of the fifth month of the fourth year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the same day of the same month of the fourth year of Taisho. (TR: 1915)
STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, M. S. Moro, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Fukuoka,

on this 27th day of February, 1947.

[Signature]

Witness: T. Otsu

- 5 -
To Consul General Kato at Tientsin

From Foreign Minister Baron TANAKA, Giichi

Subject: Trip of the Emperor Hsüantung to Japan, Port Arthur, and Dairen

A gist of the above mentioned matter has already been communicated to you by telegram. For your reference we are forwarding the protocol, "Trip of the Emperor Hsüantung to Japan, Port Arthur, and Dairen attached hereto." Please keep yourself fully informed on the subject.

Copy sent to The Minister in China

Trip of the Emperor Hsüantung to Japan, Port Arthur, and Dairen

I. Circumstances concerning this matter to date

(1) In November 1924 when the Emperor Hsüantung took refuge in our Legation in China, we communicated by telegram to Minister YOSHIIZAWA in China as follows:

"If the Emperor comes to Japan or goes to the Kwantung Province, he may be utilized by the Tsungsche Party, or it may give rise to various
movements around him. This may cause a situation disadvantageous not only to us but also to the Emperor himself. Such a matter, therefore, must be avoided."

In December of the same year, while staying in our Legation, the Emperor told Minister YOSHIWARA that he wished to visit Japan.

The Minister, considering it proper for Japan to agree to the Emperor's visit to Japan for the following reasons, requested instructions for reply to the Emperor's proposal, taking the following factors into consideration:

(a) The Emperor Kāsing, to whom our Imperial House is dear, holds an ardent desire to pay respects to our Imperial House.

(b) While there is a prospect in future of many Chinese political refugees visiting Japan, it will not be reasonable if we give permission to those people and not to the Emperor.

(c) If the Emperor takes refuge in another country as a result of our not committing him to come to Japan, it may affect our prestige.

To this request instructions were dispatched by the Foreign Minister that the Emperor's taking refuge in Japan should be avoided, in view of our policy heretofore pursued, particularly for three reasons:

(a) Although our government deeply sympathizes with the Emperor's situation, it is difficult for us to arrange
for his visit to our Imperial House at this time.

(b) Being different from a visit to Japan by other ordinary political refugees, the Emperor’s visit to Japan requires very delicate considerations in view of his status and his connection with the Tsungsha Party.

(c) Even if the Emperor does take refuge in another country, there is no need of considering it as a question of our prestige.

(2) In February 1925 the Emperor Hsüantung moved to Tientsin and has been staying there ever since. We, however, have followed a consistent policy as pursued heretofore in regard to the Emperor’s visit to Japan or his moving to Kwantung Province. Recently, however, those close to the Emperor, driven by apprehensions for the safety of the Emperor as over, fear that he will not be safe considering the present situation, and are plotting a movement secretly to remove the Emperor to Japan or the Fort Arthur-Dairen area. However, at the same time as far as, the time seems to have been reached when a sympathetic consideration should be given to the desire of these close to the Emperor mentioned previously; Councillor ARITA; former Consul General in Tientsin who returned recently, is of the same opinion.

Minister YOSHIZAWA in China, however, forwarded his view by telegram stating that the Emperor’s removal to Japan is more advantageous both to Japan and to the Emperor himself for two reasons;
(a) Under the present political situation in China, especially today when Tuan Chi-Jui and many other Chinese political leaders are taking refuge in the Port Arthur-Dairen district, the moving of the Emperor in that direction will not attract the attention of the people so much, nor will it give rise to evil propaganda about the Emperor's relationship with Japan.

(b) From the standpoint of the Emperor's finance also, it will be advantageous for him to plan for his future living by investing money in real estate today while prices in the Port Arthur-Dairen area are not yet raised.

(a) The removal of Emperor Huantung to Kwantung Province will add date anew to the question of China's claim for recovering Port Arthur and Dairen which will perhaps arise when the southern influence reaches the whole North China area.

(b) It will be natural even if the Emperor moves to Kwantung Province that it will more or less attract the people's attention.

The telegram also stated that Minister Yoshizawa had no special objection to the Emperor's removal to Kwantung Province, and that in any event the Emperor's residence in the Tientsin concession would become dangerous judging from recent conditions.

II. Plan for the steps to be taken concerning this case.

It is recalled in this connection that, when the question of the Emperor Huantung's visit to Japan came up some years
arg, those related to the Imperial Household stressed the argument that the presentation of the miserable appearance of an abdicated emperor to the general public of Japan would result in showing a living example to some people who have dangerous ideas and the effect would not be good. As it was considered necessary to know the opinion of the Imperial Household Department previously concerning the Emperor Hsüantung's intended visit to Japan at this time, Foreign Minister Tanaka sounded the view of the said Department. It was found that no objection would be raised if the Emperor comes to Japan as a political refugee, but it would be difficult for Japan to extend him special treatment as an abdicated Emperor of a large neighboring nation, as those close to the Emperor expected. It was mentioned, for instance, that, even if the Emperor wished to visit our Imperial Family or come to take refuge in Japan or board our warship, such a request would not be acceptable.

In short, if the Emperor Hsüantung would be satisfied with the same treatment as that given to ordinary political refugees of China, without requesting special treatment as an abdicated Emperor, we have no objection to his coming to Japan or to the Port Arthur-Dairen region. It is considered desirable to instruct the Consul General in Tientsin at this time that the above consideration shall be explained to those close to the Emperor at an appropriate time.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaku, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document herein attached in Japanese consisting of [number] pages and entitled "EMPEROR SHUAN TUNG'S VISIT TO JAPAN, PORT ARTHUR AND Dairen" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 27th day of December 1946.

(Signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) T. SATO

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the following translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 5 Feb. 1947

Emperor Kuang Tung's Visit to Japan, Port Arthur, and Dairen.
(1) 大正十三年十一月宜統帝在支帝國公使館=は指揮= chiefly 今方は於テハ
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(ル)苔ササルカ如キ著ハ如何カト思考スルコト

(イ) 宜統帝ニ於テハ
(ニ)他国ニ亡命ヲ

(ラ)何ヲメヲ如何ヲ

(ウ)何ヲメヲ如何ヲ

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(エ)何ヲメヲ如何ヲ

(ロ)何ヲメヲ如何ヲ
在天浮遊領

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懸念ニ於テ

常幅

可然ト

思考セラル
To: Chief of Colonial Bureau of the Cabinet
Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
Vice Foreign Minister
Chief of Public Safety Bureau
Consul General of Harbin
Secretaries in China
Chief of General Staff of Kwantung Army
Chief of Gendarmerie of Kwantung Province
Naval Attache in Kwantung Province
Chief of Information Section, South Manchuria Railway Company.

From: Chief of Public Safety Bureau of Kwantung Government.

Subject: Plan to Support Kung Chin-Wang.

The movement for supporting Kung Chin-Wang has been tried many times in the past. No concrete development, however, has been seen yet because of the lack of funds and other reasons. Recent information reveals that connection between the bandits in North Manchuria and the dissatisfied elements in Mukden has been established. It is also reported that Pa, Commander of Heihochen and concurrently Commander of the Second Cavalry Division, came to a secret agreement with Cheng, Commander of Heihochi First Division. Moreover, they came to some sort of understanding with Chang Hai-Peng. Through these hands a considerable number of supporters have been secured in various parts. Recently they started organization of the Three Eastern Provinces Independence army, which is divided into three parts, viz; Dragon Army (organized in Three Eastern Provinces), Ching Army (organized by bandits in Jehol area) and the Fly Army (organized in Shantung and Chihli area). Keeping contact with each other they are planning to raise the Yellow Dragon Flag in the Three Eastern Provinces at a certain time and hoist the signal for independence. Until such time comes, these independence armies will attack local wealthy families to raise funds. At the same time, efforts will be made to seek understanding by persuasion with the local provincial governors. All preparations are made by Pa, Commander of Heihochen, and Cheng, Commander of the First Division. They distributed secretly the following propaganda bills to urge the cause of Kung Chin-Wang. Developments are being carefully watched.

In Praise of Kung Chin-Wang.

Proclamation: The Three Eastern Provinces are Prince Kung’s the former seat of Chin-Wang. Chin-Wang is the master of Three Eastern Provinces and our fathers and children are his intimate friends. Our forefathers shared pleasure and pain with his ancestors for three hundred years as one day. Since Chang Tso-Lin captured the Three Eastern Provinces, however, good people have suffered from his evil government and neighboring powers have interfered in our domestic affairs. For this reason, heavenly punishment was inflicted upon him and he fell under a bomb. His son, Chang Hsuieh Liang who succeeded him, is worse than his father to such an extent that the land has been turned red and the sufferings of the people are beyond description. Chin-Wang adores the country, thinks of his native land and loves his people. Leading half a million soldiers, he will raise armies to save the people in distress, driving our enemy Chang Hsuieh Liang away, and rehabilitating the Three Eastern Provinces. He considers the welfare of the people to be his religion, will improve government, promote friendship with good neighbors and make the termination of the war as his prime object. He will make the Three Eastern
Provinces an independent land, and will not interfere with anything south of the Great Wall. He takes the Yellow Dragon Flag as the national flag of the Three Eastern Provinces, and corrects the evils of the soldiery. Those who follow him will survive, but those hostile to him will perish. All the people will enjoy work. The Prince will protect all localities alike. All civil and military officials who surrender voluntarily will be well treated. Those who are opposed will be killed and their properties confiscated. Ten Rules are hereby proclaimed for everybody to observe.

Ten Rules

1. Chin Wang will maintain independence of the Three Eastern Provinces, and will not interfere with anything south of the Great Wall. He will make the people's welfare his religion, improve government, promote friendship with neighboring nations, make the termination of war his ultimate object, will eradicate the results of the evil acts of Chang, father and son, and make the Yellow Dragon Flag the national flag of the Three Eastern Provinces.

2. China and Japan are old civilized countries, and the Three Eastern Provinces are specially related to Japan. The Prince will establish all government policies on the basis of sincere friendship with Japan so that both countries may enjoy the same profits.

3. The economic relations between Europe-America and China being satisfactory, all properties of the people in the Three Eastern Provinces will be protected as far as possible, and all affairs disposed of in accordance with the past usage.

4. The railway treaties will be observed as in the past.

5. The people in the Three Eastern Provinces will be protected by the local civil and military officials. Whenever they receive unreasonable treatment, their claims will be heard.

6. Various princes in Mongolia having the same custom as, and being friendly with, the Manchurian and Han races, they will be protected as far as possible.

7. If civil or military officials surrender, they will be allowed to hold offices as in the past, and will be well treated. If they are opposed, they will be punished without mercy.

8. If the armies in the Three Eastern Provinces surrender, they will be well treated and promoted by merits. If they do not, they will be arrested and punished by death, and their families will be treated likewise and their properties confiscated.

9. Though the bandits in the Three Eastern Provinces came from good families, they fell into the present plight because of ill-treatment of Chang, father and son. If they repent their past errors, they will be employed by the government in the uniform way.

10. As all public affairs are too complicated, they will be simplified by Chin Wang, and good government will be instituted gradually leading to peaceful life.

Seventeenth Year of the Chinese Republic.
CERTIFICATE
STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of five (5) pages and entitled "Movements to Support Kung-Chin-Wang", January 11, 1929, is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 27th day of December, 1946.

Witness: T. Sato

Signature of Official

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, WILLIAM E. CLARKE, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

WILLIAM E. CLARKE

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 27 January 1947
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Official Note from Mori, Yoohito, Charge d'Affaires ad interim to China, to Baron T.N.K., Giichi, Foreign Minister, dated February 5, 1929

February 5, 1929.

Appendix Enclosure

To: Baron T.N.K., Giichi, Foreign Minister.

From: Mori, Yoohito, Charge d'Affaires ad interim to China.

Subject: Concerning Promulgation of the Regulations for Confiscation of Japanese Goods.

It has been reported that the Anti-Japanese Society note issued under date of 2nd inst. that they call the Regulations for Confiscation of Japanese Goods, the text of which was published in the papers, I hereby submit for your information the translation of the same as per enclosure.
Regulations for the Confiscation of Japanese Goods

Article 1. Such Japanese goods held in stock by merchants in this city as have not been registered after lapse of the time-limit of registration, i.e., November 26, 1928, shall all be confiscated.

Article 2. Such Japanese goods ordered before November 26, 1928, and not yet arrived, as have not been registered at this Society according to written orders within the term of registration, shall be confiscated upon their arrival at Shanghai.

Article 3. Japanese goods ordered on and after December 1, 1928 shall all be confiscated, provided, however, that this is limited to goods under the absolute ban.

Article 4. With regard to Japanese goods under the relative ban, contributions towards the Save-the-nation Fund shall still be collected in accordance with the Registration Regulations established by the National Anti-Japanese Society.

(Intermediate articles omitted)

Article 7. In case a commercial house has registered Japanese goods and received Save-the-nation Fund slips, but has failed to affix the same to the goods, or in case the number on an affixed slip does not tally with that on the register, such goods shall all be confiscated.

Article 8. In case, with regard to Japanese goods to be confiscated according to the provisions of the present Regulations, the
treacherous merchant has resisted confiscation, or has by other means made confiscation impossible, the said merchant shall be taken to this Society and handed over to the Judgement Committee, which will try him and punish him.

(The following articles omitted)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kenru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 4 pages and entitled 'Note from Envoy, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim to China, to Tanaka, Foreign Minister, dated February 5, 1929.' is an exact and true extract of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 20th day of February, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urago

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 3 March 1947
在支那臨時代理公使館領事外務大臣男爵山田中徳一宛

昭和四年二月五日

日貨未收件公布ノ件

【COPY】

RETURN TO LIBRARY
公第一一号
昭和四年二月五日
在支那臨時代理公使
畑
日貨倉庫條例公布ノ件

外務大臣男爵
田中義一

別紙添附

地反日會＝於ヲハ本月二日份＝ニテ日貨倉庫條例ナルモノヲ公布シタル

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第三章
十八年十二月ニ於テ

第四章
依リつ国税ヲ没収ス

第五章
セサルカ又ハ貼付セルモ

第六章
セサルモノハ

第七章
商家ニ於テ

(訳文)

日貸没収例

第一章
本市所持ノ日貸ヲシテ

第二章
十七年十二月ニ於テ

第三章
十八年十二月ニ於テ

第四章
依リつ国税ヲ没収ス

第五章
セサルカ又ハ貼付セルモ

第六章
セサルモノハ

第七章
商家ニ於テ

£
Confidential No. 159.

April 24, the fourth Year of Showa, (1929) at TIELI

From : KONDÔ, Shinichi, Consul at TIELI (Manchuria).
To : BARON TAMAKA, Gichli, Foreign Minister.
Subject : On the Secret Order issued by the Chinese Authorities. Strictly prohibiting the Lease of House-sites to the Japanese.

As already stated in our Report, Confidential No. 150, dated April 20, the Governor of TIELIN-MSIE!(TH hsien is a prefectural unite of local government) issued a proclamation prohibiting private lease or sale of land to a foreigner, under the instruction of the Provincial Government which was transmitted by the circular issued by the General Headquarters of Border Garrison. Having kept a watch on the matter, we found that it was probably a fact that the Prefectural Government issued a secret circular to all civil organs, large and small, to ensure thorough enforcement of the previous proclamation. It says that all leases of house-sites to Japanese residents outside the S.R. Rly. Zone at TIELIN shall be strictly prohibited and those in existence shall be recovered as soon as
possible with the view to prevent possible disputes, any act contrary to the regulation being severely punished.

A comparatively large number of Japanese have leased land outside the Railway Zone, namely, in the Ocean-port Quarter and within the City-wall, some of them being confronted with the expiration of the terms during this year. In such a time and circumstance, it is rather difficult to foresee what an attitude the Chinese landlords might take in the future, but I will take a firm stand and timely action in making a strong protest against such an anti-Japanese action in order to check further undesirable effect whenever it might happen without justifiable reasons in the town adjoining to the railway zone. Judging from present status of our country men here, I am afraid that the Chinese side would take advantage of this opportunity in trying to recover the land when the term of lease expires this summer, and rather complicated questions might arise in succession. Some Japanese may be delinquent in payment of rent, while others may be in default of obligations, owing to the depression which made them difficult to meet their debts owed to the Chinese during the boom in the past.

Such cases a non-payment of rent pending for many years, will surely, I fear, good excuse to the Chinese side to recover the land and unpleasant circumstances must be taken into consideration when we start negotiations on the questions arising from the failure of payment. The Chinese side seems to be taking a cautious attitude in avoiding to come in contact with Japanese, and the Chinese officials are guiding the people on this line.
Accordingly the Chinese official attitude is expected to be more meddlesome not only in the lease of house or lands but also in the general commercial transactions.

Reporting with respect.

(Copies sent to Peiping and Nukden)
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, YASU, Koro, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Note No. 130 from Tokyo, Joint Chiefs at Ministry, to Yanaka, Foreign Minister, dated July 24, 1942" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of January, 1947

/S/ K. Arashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagahara Ydo

Translation Certificate

I, ________________________, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of ________________________________

___________________________________________ is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Tokyo, Japan,

Date __________________________
Translation Certificate

I, Toshio Okamoto, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Note No. 159 from Kondo, Chief at Tashkent, to Tatsuki, Foreign Minister, dated April 24, 1929 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Toshio Okamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date 17 March 1947
April 24, the fourth Year of Showa, (1929) at TIELI

From : KONDO, Shinichi, Consul at TIELIN (Manchuria).
To : BARON TANAKA, Giichi, Foreign Minister.
Subject : On the Secret Order issued by the Chinese Authorities.

Strictly prohibiting the Lease of House-sites to the Japanese.

As already stated in our Report, Confidential No. 150, dated April 30, the Governor of TIELIN-Hsieh (TH hsein is a prefectural unite of local government) issued a proclamation prohibiting private lease or sale of land to a foreigner, under the instruction of the Provincial Government which was transmitted by the circular issued by the General headquarter of Border Garrison. Having kept a watch on the matter, we found that it was probably a fact that the Prefectural Government issued a secret circular to all civil organs, large and small, to ensure thorough enforcement of the previous proclamation. It says that all leases of house-sites to Japanese residents outside the S.R. Rly. Zone at TIELIN shall be strictly prohibited and those in existence shall be recovered as soon as
possible with the view to prevent possible disputes, any act contrary to the regulation being severely punished.

A comparatively large number of Japanese have leased land outside the Railway Zone, namely, in the Ooen-port quarter and within the City-wall, some of them being confronted with the expiration of the terms during this year. In such a time and circumstance, it is rather difficult to foresee what an attitude the Chinese landlords might take in the future, but I will take a firm stand and timely action in making a strong protest against such an anti-Japanese action in order to check further undesirable effect whenever it might happen without justifiable reasons in the town adjoining to the railway zone. Judging from present status of our country, even here, I am afraid that the Chinese side would take advantage of this opportunity in trying to recover the land when the term of lease expires this summer, and rather complicated questions might arise in succession. Some Japanese may be delinquent in payment of rent, while others may be in default of obligations, owing to the depression which made them difficult to meet their debts owed to the Chinese during the boom in the past.

Such cases of non-payment of rent pending for many years, will surely, I fear, good excuse to the Chinese side to recover the land and unpleasant circumstances must be taken into consideration when we start negotiations on the questions arising from the failure of payment. The Chinese side seems to be taking a cautious attitude in avoiding to come in contact with Japanese, and the Chinese officials are guiding the people on this line.
Accordingly the Chinese official attitude is expected to be
to be more meddlesome not only in the lease of house or lands but also
in the general commercial transactions.

Reporting with respect.

(Copies sent to Peiping and Mukden)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAMA, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Note to the Special Envoy of the British Government from London, to May 29, 1942" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 27th day of January, 1947

/S/ T. Iwakoshi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaahari Udo

Translation Certificate

I, _______________________, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of ____________________________ to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Tokyo, Japan,

Date ________________
Translation Certificate

I, Toshio Okamoto, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Note No. 159 from Kondo, Chief at Tiching, to Tanaka, Foreign Minister, dated April 24, 1929 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Toshio Okamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Late 17 March 1947
(Record of the Foreign Office; Foreign Land Regulations; miscellaneous, China, G310, 1-1)

(KWANTUN, CONFIDENTIAL, HIGH, RECEIVED) Eon-Ki-Ko-Shu No. 22021-2.

From: Director of the Bureau of Police Affairs, Government-general of KWANTUN.

To: Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs.
Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Director of Police Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs.
Chief, Staff, KWANTUN Army.
Chief, KWANTUN Gendarmerie.
Naval Resident Officer of KWANTUN Leased Territory.
Chief, Information Section of S.M.A.Ry. Co.

Subject: An act prohibiting Unlawful Sale or Disposition of National Lands.

Having been irritated by the case of Chikun Taipao Industrial Company's farm at Hsinmintun, Lia-chin province and the question of cutting-off the peasant railway etc., the Chinese authorities decided to prohibit unlawful sale of land with the death penalty and drafted an act for the purpose of preventing the loss of national lands and interests.

The act was passed at the 40th Conference of the Provincial (T.N. Executive) Council held on 24 inst. The North Eastern Political Council has sent the act to the Central Government in NANKING for sanction.

The act reads as follows:
Provisional Act to prohibit with penalty

Unlawful Sale or Disposition of National Lands.

Article 1 A person who sells, mortgages or leases to foreigners lands, houses, hill-wastes, forests, or mines owned by himself, third persons or by the public or the state, without permission of the authorities concerned shall be condemned as guilty of unlawful sale of national lands (TN: The term 'national land' here simply means all sorts of real estate) and be punished in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Article 2 Any act of acceptance by a foreigner, of whatever nationality he may be, of national lands designated in the foregoing Article and sold unlawfully by Chinese shall be regarded to be null and void by the Provincial Government.

Article 3 A person who unlawfully disposes of national lands shall be punished with the following penalty:

1) A person who disposes unlawfully of land owned either by the State, the public or a third person shall be punished by death.

2) A person who disposes unlawfully of national lands owned by himself, shall be punished either by death or by penal servitude for life.

A person who committed the crimes mentioned in the foregoing items shall be fined up to the amount of the sale in addition to the execution of the penalty, and a whole or part of his property shall be seized and confiscated.

Article 4 A person who has become a nominal owner in order to purchase stolen (TN: Unlawfully disposed) national lands designated
in the Article One of this act receiving supply of fund
from foreigners for the purpose shall be punished according
to the Provision Two of the Article Three of this act with
a possible mitigation.

Article 5
Middleman and consignatories in the case of unlawful disposi-
tion of national lands shall be regarded as accomplices and
punished with the severity of one on two grades lighter than
that for the principal offender.

(Further Articles omitted)
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Watsui, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Note No. 22021-2 from the Chief of Police Affairs Bureau of Kwantung Government-General to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and others, dated August 2, 1929." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of January, 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /S/ Nagaharu Ode
Translation Certificate

I, Toshio Okamoto, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Note No. 2102-2 from the Chief of Police Affairs Bureau of Kwangtung Government General to the Vice-minister for Foreign Affairs and others, dated August 2, 1929 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\ / Toshio Okamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date 17 March 1929
LEF DEC 482

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(未签名)

G. B. B.
August 19, the Fourth Year of Shova, at CHIENTAO.

From: OKADA, Kenichi, Consul-General at Chientao.
To: BARON SHIDENARA, Fijure, Foreign Minister.
Subject: On the Proclamation of and the Instruction to Enforce the Regulation on the Lease of Arable Waste Land to Korean Farmers enacted by Chinese Authorities.

Regarding to the subject, CHANG-Tsohs iang, Chief of the Provincial Government of KIRIN, is said to have enacted and proclaimed Regulations on the Lease of Arable Waste Land to Korean Farmers dated the 2nd day of August and given the following instruction to the Governors of all Hsions (TNs Prefecture). The gist of the regulation transmitted by the Governor of HUNCHUN-Hsien to all village-heads under his jurisdiction reads as follows: As it aims at restricting ownership of land by Koreans, its enforcement is expected to have a considerable influence.
We are carefully watching the trend of the situation.

Remarks:

In view of the tendency of gradual increase of Korean farmers immigrating into our Province from KOREA, the Provincial Government enacted a Regulation on the Lease of arable waste land to Korean farmers in order to secure the living conditions of the local inhabitants and the poor immigrants pouring in from these localities as SHANTUNG, HOPEI etc. as well as to check rapid increase of Koreans. We hope that all Prefectural Authorities do their best in enforcing the regulation by supervising the organs under their jurisdiction.

Article 1. This Regulation shall be applied to Korean residents within the Province of KIRIN.

Article 2. All Korean residents within the Province shall, whether they are nationalized or not, have no right to acquire arable waste lands.

Article 5. Koreans are prohibited to apply to the competent authorities for the lease of arable waste lands.

Article 4. This Regulation shall be applied to the Koreans who have already received the permission of the Reclamation Office with the object to possess the arable waste land before the proclamation of the Regulation and are already in the act of reclaiming it.

Article 5. Any Korean who has received the foregoing permission and cultivating the waste land made it matured shall be entitled to the right of its possession.
Article 6. Farmers to be employed in the reclamation work of waste land shall be mainly Chinese, whether it is managed by the authorities or by the civilians, provided that this article shall not be applied to the cultivation of rice-fields.

(Copies sent: Omitted)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Note No. 952 from Okada, Consul-General at Chientou, to Shidahara, Foreign Minister, dated August 19, 1929," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of January, 1947.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu ODC
Translation Certificate

I, Toshio Okamoto, of the defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Note No. 952 from Okada, Consul General at Chiontao, to Shidehara, Foreign minister, dated August 19, 1929 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Toshio Okamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 17 March 1947
Translated by
Defense Language Branch

(Record of the Foreign Office; Foreign Land Regulations; Miscellaneous, China, G310, 1-1)

Official, No. 731. (Translation)

November 8, the Fourth Year of Showa,
at Kirin

From: ISHII, Itaro, Consul-General at Kirin

To: SHIDEHARA, Kijuro, Foreign Minister

Subject: On the Provisional Regulation concerning the Control of Rice-field Irrigation, enacted by the Board of Construction, Provincial Government of KIRIN

(Middle part omitted)

Provisional Regulation concerning the Control of Rice-field Irrigation, enacted by the Board of Construction, Provincial Government of KIRIN.

Chapter One, General Rule

Article 1 The present regulation is enacted with the object of controlling rice-field irrigation throughout the whole Province and the Board of Construction is in charge of this matter.

Article 2 & 3 Omitted.

Chapter Two, Research

Article 4, 5, 6 & 7 Omitted.

Chapter Three, Control

Article 8 Only Chinese nationals are allowed to reclaim and cultivate rice-fields.
In the case of large scale enterprises foreigners are allowed to be employed only when technical knowledge is needed. In such a case, one who employs a foreigner shall report to that effect to the competent Prefectural Government which is bound to transmit the matter further to the Board of Construction for its consideration.

Article 9 etc. Omitted.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "Note No. 731 from Ishii, Counsel-General at Kirin, to Shidehara, Foreign Minister, dated November 8, 1929" is an exact and true extract of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of January, 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

Translation Certificate

I, Charles L. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charles L. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 March 1947
(Record of Foreign Office; Foreign Land Regulations; Miscellaneous, China G310, 1-1)

Korea, I No. 1337

9, June 1931.

From: The Director of the Department of Korea Affairs, Ministry of Oversea Affairs.
To: The Director of Asiatic affairs Bureau, Foreign Office.

Subject: Enforcement of the Disciplinary Law against the Unlawful Sale of Land.

A dispatch from the Chief Civil Administrator of the Government-General in Korea, reveals that according to recent information, the Governor of the Liaoning province, upon the advice of Executive Committee, the Negotiations Committee, and the Board of Civil Administration, has formulated a Liaoning Province Special Law entitled "the Disciplinary Law against the Unlawful Sale of Land" a copy of which is herein inclosed, and has decided that the same shall be enforced on and after 1 May of this year. I have the honour of submitting this information for your reference.

The Disciplinary Law against the Unlawful Sale of Land.

Article 1. Whoever leases Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than one mu (TN: One mu or mou- 6,144 acres, 0.15 acres,) and less than five, sentenced to a penal servitude for a term of five years and land shall be confiscated.

Whoever sells Chinese land to a foreigner shall be if the lot is more than one mu and less than five be sentenced to
a penal servitude for a term of ten years and his property shall be confiscated for the purpose of raising money sufficient to redeem the land.

Article 2. Whoever leases Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than five mu and less than ten, sentenced to a penal servitude for a term of ten years, and the land shall be confiscated. Whoever sells Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than five mu and less than ten, sentenced to a penal servitude for a term of twenty years, and his property shall be confiscated to raise money sufficient to redeem the land.

Article 3. Whoever leases Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than ten mu and less than twenty, sentenced to a penal servitude for a term of twenty years, and the land shall be confiscated. Whoever sells Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than ten mu and less than twenty, sentenced to a penal servitude for a term of forty years, and his property shall be confiscated to raise money sufficient to redeem the land.

Article 4. One who leases or sells Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than twenty and less than fifty, sentenced to a penal servitude for life and the land shall be confiscated. His property, however, shall be exempted.

Article 5. Whoever leases or sells Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than fifty mu and less than one hundred, sentenced to death and the land shall be confiscated.
Article 6. Whoever leases or sells Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than one hundred mu and less than two hundred, sentenced to death, and the middle-man to a penal servitude for a term of five years.

Article 7. Whoever leases or sells Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than two hundred mu and less than five hundred, sentenced to death and the middle-man to a penal servitude for a term of more than ten years and less than thirty.

Article 8. Whoever leases or sells Chinese land to a foreigner shall be, if the lot is more than five hundred mu and less than one thousand, sentenced to death and the middle-man to a penal servitude for life.

Article 9. The foregoing eight items shall be transmitted to 58 hsien (TN: prefectures, local units of administration) of the whole province and shall be enforced on and after the First day of May in the 20th Year of the Republic of China.

(The rest omitted)
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. YASHI, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Note No. 1157 from the Minister of Department of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Director of Asiatic Affairs Bureau, Foreign Office, dated June 2, 1931," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of January, 1947.

/S/ E. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /S/ Negaharu Odo
Translation Certificate

I, Toshio Okamoto, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Note No. 1857 from the Director of Department of Korea, Ministry of Oversea Affairs, to the Director of Asiatic Affairs Bureau, Foreign Office, dated June 9, 1931 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\/ Toshio Okamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 17 March 1947
朝一格

昭和六年

朝一格

八三七号

最近入手セル件数=依レバ選検省主催ハ政治委員会及び交涉委員並＝民政省

＝隠り選検省省行法トヘテ別署ヲ如キ＝選検省省行法ヲ決定ヘタル＝朝鮮殖務官＝決定レルニ保有＝

月一日ヨリ施行スルコトヲ決定シタ

朝鮮殖務官等＝付何等検考ノ事＝案観請也

營土殖務官法

朝鮮殖務官法

陸地及土地ヲ保有シテ外人ヲ租セレル者＝於テ五万ハ有效二年ハ有効ヲ statically 五年ハ有効ヲ

土地保有者　財産ヲ顕シテ租セル＝於テ八万ハ有効ヲ statics 五年ハ有効ヲ
Making a full-dress speech at Akita on Sunday, Baron Wakatsuki the Premier, said that there had lately been some talk of the need for establishing a "fundamental" China policy so that the problems of Manchuria and Mongolia might be definitely settled. The Premier, however, said that his Government saw the matter on which it is based have always had a fundamental policy, and that there is therefore no need to emulate a new one.

He was very plain on the subject that Japan has certain rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia which are essential to her existence, and that these can in no circumstances be abandoned, no matter who demands their abandonment. This pronouncement, made at the present time, is a revival of a contention that has long existed and which makes a clear distinction between these northern regions and the rest of China. Japan has already, by treaty right, the privilege of residence and landholding. It has constantly been complained that she is unable to exercise it because the Chinese are determined to keep Japanese off the land. It is obvious, however, that there are some notable exceptions. The "Japanese farm" at Mukden and the Wanpao Shan estate are notable instances in which land in large tracts has become available, and the late Baron Okura's Mongolian holdings (still in the firm or the family) are supposed to be very extensive indeed. In fact, the Wanpao Shan estate, the cause of all the recent trouble, is an instance of where the Japanese accomplishment of land has been successfully accomplished but without successfully overcoming the local opposition. It will be remembered that, when the Chino Consortium was formed, or revived with Messrs. J.P. Morgan & Co. in a leading position, there was a long tussle over the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia, which ended in the Consortium agreement including those regions but, though they offered the most promising outlet for capital, never even considering a loan for their development. The nearest that Morgan & Co. got to developing Manchuria was some eight years afterwards, when the firm (not the Consortium) was to make a loan to the South Manchuria Railway, but was deterred by the noise that the Chinese made about the alliance of American capitalism and Japanese imperialism.

Paron Wakatsuki expressly repudiated any imperialistic schemes and all desires for territorial aggrandisment; but he affirmed Japan's rights and the resolve never to abandon them. The chief of those rights are, of course, the control of the leased territory of Lintong and of the Manchurian railway zone. Very important also are the right to protest against the construction of any line of railway deliberately designed to parallel the South Manchuria Railway and the right to be invited to furnish any development loans. As Baron Wakatsuki said, neighbours are apt to have their little tiffs in all parts of the world, and there have been some over this question.

The Premier was very discreet concerning the most serious trouble that has arisen lately between neighbours whose very closeness sometimes led to friction. He said that the Japanese authorities must make steps to protect Korean interests, but he avoided any comment on the degree to which such protection has led
to the ill-feeling that has been manifested at Wanpaoshian and other places.

The chief importance of the Premier's statement lies in the broad hint that it gives that, in dealings between the Powers and China, with regard to abolition of extraterritoriality or the abrogation of "unilateral" treaties, Manchuria and Mongolia stand outside the scope of common action and, whatever Japan may consent in common with the Powers, to abandon south of the Great Wall, she has no intention of abandoning anything to the north. For the rest, her prospects in Manchuria are full of promise. She has missed, it is true, the opportunity which once seemed to exist of settling her surplus population on the land there; but the hard-working and frugal Chinese who have entered the country during the past decade are both providing a market for Japanese goods and pouring wealth into the Japanese enterprises in South Manchuria. The Premier said that the first and abiding consideration in Manchuria was that Japanese and Chinese, in spite of occasional friction, must get along together in a friendly and neighbourly manner.
住及び土地所有の特権を有している。したがって、日本人は日本人を同囲に寄せつけぬこと決心してるもので日本はこの方面で行使し得ないということである。このため、一日本人農業関至及び興築山所有地は、従来の土地が利用し得るものである。然し作ら顕著な例外があるとは明かである。最近の紛争の原因である、富貴山所有地は、日本の土地所有が成功したにも拘らず、なお地方の反対を克服し得ない例である。また、借用回が組織（或は復活）された近環境及び殷古を除き、これに含まれる借用は全く無視しないといまここで多々に省略したことで読者に感謝の意を表する。
そのような日本人の情熱は、日本人は日本人の持つ特有の文化や、何らかの価値観を反映していると、多くの学者が指摘している。かつての日清戦争の時などは、日本人の情熱は、その国の権威や、その国の存亡を守るために、戦争に明け暮れを行っていた。そのような情熱は、他の国の人々に深く印象を与えたものである。

しかし、日本人の情熱は、ただ一方向に走ることで、他方では、冷静さを欠いている。それは、日本人の情熱が、他の国の人々に影響を与えることを、日本の国際的観点から、考慮していないからである。
ADDRESSING the conference of the Commanders of the Army Divisions yesterday (4th instant), General Momi, Minister of War, said that the Imperial Army calls for improvement in point of organisation and equipment. Reform is also required in many directions. Owing, however, to the strained financial circumstances of the State, it is impossible for the Army to ask the national treasury for the money. The military authorities are therefore obliged to defer complete improvement to the time when business prosperity returns to the country, in the meantime contenting themselves with such measures as are more urgently needed. For financing such measures, they have contrived to find the money by retrenching war expenditure in other directions.

In such circumstances, the abolition or reduction of some institutions and bodies is inevitable. It is a matter of deep regret that under this reform plan, some talented and able officers will have to retire, but in existing circumstances such sacrifices must be made for the sake of the general efficiency of the Army.

Notwithstanding the fact that the army reform plan, drawn up by the military authorities, provides for minimum needs, and that the Army is going to make heavy sacrifices in its execution, irresponsible outsiders criticise the Army as though it were bent upon exorbitant demands. The Minister exhorted his hearers to cooperate with the military authorities in correcting this erroneous impression. They must make positive endeavours to convince the troops under their respective orders of the merits of this contemplated reform and of its propriety. They must further endeavour to promote understanding and harmony between the troops and the public.

Referring to the Manchurian and Mongolian problem, the Minister said that the situation in Manchuria and Mongolia has lately been developing a more serious phase. The development of unfavourable phenomena is evidently not accidental, as it is presumably based partly on the decline of Japan's prestige due to changes in international politics, and partly to the growth of the anti-foreign sentiment and the rights-recovery ideas among the Chinese and also of the new economic influence in those regions. All in the military service must have a stronger sense of loyalty and public service.

Turning to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the speaker said that to make preparations for the forthcoming assembly, the Army appointed a preparatory committee in April. This committee has since been earnestly studying the just and proper claims to be put forward by the Japanese delegates. When they are definitely decided after consultation with all quarters concerned, they will be made public at the right moment so as to enlist the public support.

In connection with the Disarmament Conference, the Minister proceeded many people are urging the need of the reduction of armaments but a survey of the attitude of the Powers shows that no country is...
willing to take the initiative. It is regrettable that these people fail to face facts or deliberately misinterpret them, and proceed to stir up at home a general desire for disarmament by plotting the widespread sense of political and economic instability. The speaker asked his hearers to see that the public generally understand the nature of the Conference as well as the attitude of the Powers towards it correctly, so that public opinion at home may be formed justly and judiciously.

FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY

The Minister reminded his honours that this is the fiftieth anniversary of the grant of the celebrated Imperial Edict to the army, and urged on them the necessity of the precepts set forth in this Edict should be more scrupulously observed by the troops so that the Imperial prestige may be enhanced and the foundations of the State be established more firmly.
此页内容无法自然阅读。
軍縮条約閣内に属する者には、という
ますます、閣内に於ける政策を正しく理解し、それに
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Mr. Tsukamoto, Governor of Kwantung province (leased territory), arrived in Kobe yesterday from Dairen, by the C.S.K. steamer Harbin-maru. His present visit to Tokyo is to report to the Government on the anti-Japanese situation in Manchuria and Mongolia, with special reference to the persecution of Korean residents.

In a Press interview at Moji, Mr. Tsukamoto said that despite the prevalence of anti-Japanism, he was accorded a warm reception by Chinese officials during his recent inspection tour in Manchuria and Mongolia. It is like the Chinese not to allow official etiquette to be marred by anti-Japanism. He observed that the leaders of the Mukden Government are persuaded that the anti-Japanese movement does not redound to Chinese interests and that consequently they are doing their best to control it. Unfortunately, however, their orders are not always obeyed by the local authorities who, for the preservation of their own position, are lending support to the agitation. Mr. Tsukamoto particularly regrets the systematic method widely used of stamping anti-Japanese ideas on the plastic minds of school children.

Whereas the Chinese population in Manchuria and Mongolia totals 30,000,000, the Koreans who have settled there do not exceed a million, Mr. Tsukamoto said. There should be no conflict of interests between them, especially when it is remembered that the cultivation of paddy fields is a speciality of Korean peasants, of which the Chinese farmer is incapable. The present persecution of Koreans is unaccountable.
At any rate, he thinks that the question of nationality calls for a speedy solution.

Referring to the criticism in some Japanese quarters that Japan's attitude towards Manchuria and Mongolia is too weak and negative, the Governor of Kwantung province declared that these critics are apt to denounce any policy which is not pugnacious, as a weak policy. If Japan grew excited and petulant whenever anti-Japanism arose, and persecution of Koreans took place, it could but lead to a collision. It is due to the well-considered attitude of the Japanese Government in the face of provocation that relations between Japan and China are not hopelessly estranged.

He expressed himself strongly opposed to China's attempts to levy taxes in the South Manchuria Railway zone.
一九三一年（昭和六年）八月十六日『ジャパンクロニクル』紙（大蔵）の

東州長官、解決急を要する朝鮮人問題

開東州長官、解決急を要する朝鮮人問題

報告

東州長官、解決急を要する朝鮮人問題

事情

反日感情に依り左寄せられざる様にするさへ唯天政憲の指導者連ば、反日運動は中
国側に有利ならざる故に抑圧を盗してゐるとは信じてゐる由。然し
ながら不幸にして、その命令は、自己の保身の為慎重の運動を援助してゐ
る地方同局の従ふさぎろさなつてゐる。
A general meeting of Minseito members in the Hokuriku district was held at Toyama yesterday (5th instant), there being present over 4,000 members. The speech of Baron Wakatsuki, the President, was the feature of the meeting.

Baron Wakatsuki and that present-day diplomacy must be based on international justice and must aim at the promotion of the common prosperity of all nations. The foreign policy of the present Cabinet and the Minseito is shaped on this guiding principle. While safeguarding the existence of the State, it seeks to promote the happiness of mankind. The speaker has lately heard many adverse criticisms of the China policy of the present Cabinet, but it would be wrong to depart from the above mentioned guiding spirit in shaping the country's policy towards China. This guiding spirit does not run counter to the firm determination to uphold the country's vested rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. In the light of international justice, there is no reason whatever why Japan should abandon these rights. If anybody attempts to ignore them, such attempts must be resisted resolutely. If must, however, always be kept in mind that the only strong foreign policy which can be pursued fearlessly is one based on international justice and on the principle of the common prosperity of all nations. In order to reap the full fruit of such a strong policy, the nation must not show impatience. It must not allow its judgement to be misled by over-nervousness, but pursue a settled course steadily and calmly. The speaker had no doubt that a China policy framed and pursued in this way will prove effectual.

The Kokumin's Lament

The Kokumin laments a lack of energy and spirit in the Japanese nation, and wonders whether it has entirely lost its sensitiveness to insults which was very strong twenty-six years ago. The Tokyo Journal recalls that September 5th was the anniversary of the historic mass meeting in Hibiya park, held to demonstrate the popular indignation at the Portsmouth Treaty concluded at the end of the Russo-Japanese war. The intense indignation which was regarded as a humiliating peace treaty drove the more impulsive of the crowds to rioting, and incendiary attacks were made everywhere in Tokyo. Twenty-six years have passed since that time, and during that interval national ideas have undergone a complete change.
A series of unpleasant incidents have recently occurred in Shino-Japanese relation, the Kokumin proceeds, the more notable being the Wanpaoshan affair, the boycott of Japanese goods and the murder of Captain Nakamura. Japan's protests are scornfully treated by the Chinese authorities, who refuse to accept the obvious facts, and persist in denying the truth of Japan's accusations. Such provocative attitude is not apparently moving the large majority of the Japanese people to righteous indignation. It may be unreasonable to expect the Japanese nation to work itself up to the same heat of indignation at the murder of a military officer as it once did when an unsatisfactory peace treaty was concluded, but it must be remembered that the murder of Captain Nakamura is only one instance of many. Had it occurred twenty years ago, the whole country would be seething.

The Kokumin says that it is by no means an apostle of force. It is not blind to the general trend of the world. Ideas, but no matter how precious the ideals of international peace and international co-operation may be, a nation must have energy and spirit. Our Tokyo contemporary seriously doubt whether the Japanese people to-day have the necessary spirit or energy.
若槻男回答

「不良外務官の対策をとる必要がある」理由

性急者非難される

北陸地方民政部員約会は昨年9月伝来の若槻男の演説は・書状であった。若槻男は次の如く語った。（今日の外交は国際正義に基づいて形を作ることがある）

現内閣の現内閣の対支政策を型作る上に於て敵上の指導精神を規範に於ける既得利益を確保せんとする卑下なる決意を有する。国際正義に照らしても日本は何が故に此等の利益を背反するものでない。国際正義に照らしても日本は何が故に此等の利益を背反するものでない。国際正義に照らしても日本は何が故に此等の利益を背反するものでない。
国民新聞は日本国民の元気と意気に関係させるために戦さんのために日本国民の反日を示唆する為に日比谷公園に於て暴行に対する抗議を試みた。
この変化において、東京の到達に合わせて新しい都市計画が行われた。
General Chiang Kai-shek, Premier of the Nanking Government, made an extremely inflammatory speech against Japan at to-day's weekly memorial service. He denounced Japan for her alleged activities behind the scenes in connection with the Canton revolt. He continued: "When Mr. Hayashi, Foreign Minister of the Canton Government, visited Tokyo some time ago, the Japanese Government placed facilities at his disposal, including a big supply of arms and munitions. The result is the recent advance of the Cantonese in Hunan province. In consequence, the National Government is constrained to resort to force in settling the Canton problem."

Turning to the disturbances in Korea, the General declared that Japan had butchered more than a hundred Chinese in Korea, and had occupied Wanpsusan in Manchuria.

He emphasised that Japan had forfeited her claim to the comity of nations, through aiding and abetting civil war in neighbouring countries.

It is feared that the General's inflammatory address will add fuel to the anti-Japanese agitation now going on in various parts of China.

CABINET DISCUSSION

At the Cabinet Council yesterday (8th instant) the Nakamura murder case was taken up for discussion. Baron Shidenara, the Foreign Minister, reported that the result of the investigation made by the Chinese first party of inquiry had been very unsatisfactory. The party could make no further report than that at a certain place it heard a rumour that a Japanese national or nationals had been carried away by Chinese
soldiers or that they had been murdered, but that on the spot
the rumour had not been confirmed. The Chinese authorities
had dispatched another party of inquiry, including among its
members officials who correspond to Japanese judges. The
Foreign Minister understood that General Chang Haush-liang
intends to carry out inquiries in all sincerity. With regard
to the reported denial of the truth of Japan's accusation by th
Nanking Government, the Minister said, his Department had
received no official report.

General Mina, Minister of War, also reporting, said
that he had a Mongolian witness in regard to the murder of
Captain Nakamura. One of the murderers is in possession of
the watch belonging to the Captain. The commander of the
Chinese soldiers who committed the murder possessed himself
of the articles and money of the murdered officer, and dis-
tributed a part of this money among the murderers at the rate
of ¥20 per head. The War Minister feared that the Chinese
authorities might refuse to admit these facts, and said that
further efforts are being by the army to collect more evidence.

After an exchange of views among the Ministers present,
it was agreed that the measures to be taken in the event of
China's refusal to admit the charge after the return of the
second party of inquiry should be studied between the authori-
ties of the Foreign Office and the War Department.
EXCERPT FROM "THE JAPAN CHRONICLE"
SEPTEMBER 16, 1931 (Page 4)

CHIANG REPEATS HIS CHARGES

DID JAPAN SUPPLY CANTON WITH 100,000
RIFLES?

GRAVE ACCUSATIONS

As already reported, the Foreign Office instructed Mr. Shigemitsu, the Minister to China, to make inquiries into the truth of the report that in the course of his speech at the weekly memorial service on the 7th instant, General Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Nationalist Government, openly charged Japan with instigating civil disturbances in China, alleging that the Japanese Government supplied arms and ammunition to the Canton Government, had instigated the massacre of over 100 Chinese merchants in Korea and occupied Wanpaoshan.

A report just received from Mr. Shigemitsu having made it clear that General Chiang actually spoke to that effect, the Foreign Office has decided to demand an explanation from the head of the Nationalist Government of his conduct. The Japanese Minister will be ordered to ask General Chiang to substantiate his accusations, especially in regard to the allegation that Japan has supplied arms to the Canton Government.

A Mansion telegram to the Asahi says that in another speech at the weekly memorial service on the 14th instant, General Chiang repeated his charges against Japan.

Referring to the invasion of Hunan, he said that on their own showing the rebels have Japan's help, and that they purchased 100,000 rifles from Japan.

He was now sure that Mr. Eugen Chen's recent visit to Japan was for the purpose of buying arms from Japan, and conferring with Russian friends at Hongkong. In Tokyo, he may have arranged for co-operation with Russian Communists through the Soviet Embassy there.
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昭和四年（大正三年）九月十六日付ニバ・クロニクラ
非難を受けることを求めるやう命令を受けるであります、特に日本が

都東政府に配して武器を供給したといふ主張に月して断然する

る様命令を受けるであります。

朝日新聞に到着した東京要人に依れば、今月十四日の調例述懐令に於

ける事は経過に於て、蔵前には撤退して日本に対して非難した。

関東協力人に関して彼の云ふに依て、関係者者に於て有故に

日本に於て彼に同調ソル大使館を即して、ロシア共同宗教との殊力の

手配をしたであります。
Excerpt from the "Manchuria Year Book 1931 (p. 273-278)

2. INVESTMENTS

Outline. - Japanese investments in Manchuria as mentioned above totalled more than ¥1,510,000,000 at the end of 1926 and they may be classified as follows according to the enterprises:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>356,316,000</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(loans)</td>
<td>102,021,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbours</td>
<td>63,081,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>28,036,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Mining and Forestry</td>
<td>241,045,000</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(loans)</td>
<td>60,562,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>110,121,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>117,753,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and Gas</td>
<td>37,283,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(loans)</td>
<td>1,155,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>106,705,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Trust Business</td>
<td>97,634,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Institutions</td>
<td>302,569,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>150,159,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,510,754,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figures for the South Manchuria Railway Company are for the fiscal year 1927-1928; those for the Bennington Government are for the fiscal year 1928-1929, and others are those at the end of 1926.)
The South Manchurian Railway Company which represents more than 50% of the total Japanese investment in Manchuria (54% at the end of 1926) has distributed its investments in the following fields of enterprise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Investment</th>
<th>March 1, 1929</th>
<th>March 1, 1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>¥261,682,378</td>
<td>¥261,682,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>¥69,203,716</td>
<td>¥69,203,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbour</td>
<td>¥112,276,860</td>
<td>¥112,276,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>¥8,961,173</td>
<td>¥8,961,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron works</td>
<td>¥27,127,158</td>
<td>¥27,127,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public institutions</td>
<td>¥177,015,057</td>
<td>¥177,015,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Direct Investment</td>
<td>¥716,201,513</td>
<td>¥716,201,513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Indirect Investment |  |
|---------------------|  |
| Investment in bonds and stocks | ¥94,226,837 | ¥94,226,837 |
| Investment in loans to Chinese railway and other loans | ¥69,265,704 | ¥69,265,704 |
| Grand Total          | ¥163,492,541| ¥163,492,541 |

These Japanese investments may be again classified by the form of investments as follows (Classification for the year 1926 is the latest available):
Japanese Investments, June 1935, According to the Form of Investment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain / Activity</th>
<th>Amount in 000s of Yen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Forestry</td>
<td>60,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>1,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraphs, etc.</td>
<td>7,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>71,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing and Trust Business</td>
<td>50,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>270,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance and Trust Business</td>
<td>1,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>2,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>5,117,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Forestry</td>
<td>1,450,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>22,487,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>17,922,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17,149,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>1,402,033,685(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Investments made in Russian gold and silver currencies are included in the above figures.
2. The figures in this table represent the actual amounts of Japanese investments excluding other foreign investments.
3. In this table, the investment by the South Manchurian Railway Co. is included under the item of transport in the first category, only excluding the amount which is invested outside of the company's direct business and overlap with other investments, as well as such invested outside of Manchuria and Mongolia.
Investments in the Form of Loans. — The total amount and classification of
Japanese investments in the form of loans have already been given, but the historical
development of such loans may be seen from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Loans</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>No. of Loans</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>No. of Loans</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>No. of Loans</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1906</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>¥300,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>¥4,300,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>¥1,350,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥5,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>¥5,400,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>¥2,150,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>¥6,500,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>¥2,900,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥12,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>¥7,600,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>¥3,600,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥16,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>¥8,700,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>¥4,300,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥20,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>¥9,800,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>¥5,000,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥21,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>¥10,900,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>¥5,700,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥27,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>¥12,00,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>¥6,400,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥30,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>¥13,10,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>¥7,100,000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥34,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>¥14,20,000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>¥7,800,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥39,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>¥15,30,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>¥8,500,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>¥1,500,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥44,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The difference between the amounts for 1926 and 1927 represents the accumulated
unpaid interest. The "number of loans" for 1927 indicates the number of loan
applications; in other cases it indicates the number of actual loans.)
The greater part of these loans (¥97,743,823 including unpaid interest) is made by the Japanese Government, and the remainder (¥15,239,116 including unpaid interest) by the Japanese public. In most of these loans, the interest agreed upon is not paid satisfactorily; for instance, the total amount of interest to be paid on these loans in 1926 was ¥11,396,000 but the amount actually paid was only ¥13,000 or less than 10% of the amount due. This unpaid interest is added to the capital of the loan, so that although in some loans certain payments were made to redeem capital, the total amount unredeemed at the end of 1926 (¥156,112,547) was larger than the original total capital (¥149,638,766).

Direct Investments. — The amount of Japanese direct investment in enterprises in Manchuria reached ¥1,500,000,000 in 1928, comprising more than 86.6% of the total Japanese investment. No detailed information is, however, available about the nature of the enterprises involved by these investments; only the amount of capital engaged in the various branches of enterprises, is given.
## CAPITAL OF JAPANESE COMPANIES IN MANCHURIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital &amp; invested amount</td>
<td>(1.3)</td>
<td>(5.3)</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>(1.4)</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Products:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital &amp; invested amount</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mining:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital &amp; invested amount</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td>(2.3)</td>
<td>(2.5)</td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manufacture:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital &amp; invested amount</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td>(17.1)</td>
<td>(12.1)</td>
<td>(13.6)</td>
<td>(14.2)</td>
<td>(15.7)</td>
<td>(16.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commerce:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
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<td>195</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>551</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td>(19.1)</td>
<td>(21.6)</td>
<td>(21.1)</td>
<td>(19.2)</td>
<td>(19.6)</td>
<td>(16.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital &amp; invested amount</td>
<td>316,692,000</td>
<td>330,197,700</td>
<td>330,770,000</td>
<td>235,866,000</td>
<td>355,295,000</td>
<td>375,003,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td>(56.2)</td>
<td>(61.0)</td>
<td>(60.3)</td>
<td>(58.0)</td>
<td>(57.7)</td>
<td>(61.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
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<td>612</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital &amp; invested amount</td>
<td>532,071</td>
<td>51,115,511,659</td>
<td>51,063,663</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
<td>1,053,000</td>
<td>1,053,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td>(56.2)</td>
<td>(61.0)</td>
<td>(60.3)</td>
<td>(58.0)</td>
<td>(57.7)</td>
<td>(61.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(at the end of 1926, the total paid-up capital was 506,320,762, but the amount of actual investments made by the companies reached 1,135,351,929 or almost twice the total paid-up capital.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital or invested amount</td>
<td>17,767,500</td>
<td>17,792,500</td>
<td>18,332,500</td>
<td>7,927,500</td>
<td>7,422,500</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td>(1.3)</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>(1.4)</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital or invested amount</td>
<td>1,487,000</td>
<td>1,309,100</td>
<td>1,456,600</td>
<td>799,600</td>
<td>793,600</td>
<td>792,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
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<td>270</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital or invested amount</td>
<td>1,162,730</td>
<td>65,562,322</td>
<td>74,628,127</td>
<td>99,320,657</td>
<td>99,203,557</td>
<td>101,261,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td>(17.1)</td>
<td>(12.1)</td>
<td>(17.6)</td>
<td>(17.2)</td>
<td>(16.7)</td>
<td>(16.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital or invested amount</td>
<td>105,567,155</td>
<td>189,295,712</td>
<td>115,854,467</td>
<td>111,116,627</td>
<td>176,019,717</td>
<td>116,143,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
<td>(19.2)</td>
<td>(21.5)</td>
<td>(17.1)</td>
<td>(19.2)</td>
<td>(19.6)</td>
<td>(18.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital or invested amount</td>
<td>316,603,000</td>
<td>330,107,000</td>
<td>330,770,000</td>
<td>335,866,000</td>
<td>355,258,000</td>
<td>379,009,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of whole (per cent)</td>
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<td>(61.0)</td>
<td>(66.3)</td>
<td>(57.0)</td>
<td>(57.7)</td>
<td>(61.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of companies</td>
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<td>812</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-up capital or invested amount</td>
<td>532,071,655</td>
<td>511,511,654</td>
<td>515,662,654</td>
<td>566,555,654</td>
<td>569,161,654</td>
<td>620,755,161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(At the end of 1926, the total paid-up capital was 586,320,762, but the amount of actual investments made by the companies reached 1,135,351,929 or almost twice the total paid-up capital.)
Reviewing the yield of these investments, it can be seen that, with the exception of the South Manchurian Railway Company, these enterprises are showing much poorer results than similar enterprises in Japan proper. Particularly is this so with Sino-Japanese joint enterprises, not a few of which are actually showing losses; they are handicapped by having a double supervision and superfluous employees, and their operating expenses are generally very high. Moreover, as most of them are based on concessions, their activities have been greatly hindered by the recent Chinese movement for regaining lost rights and privileges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Marine</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Railroad</th>
<th>Commerce</th>
<th>Banking</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Average Dividend, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918-1st half</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd half</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.32</td>
<td>22.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1st half</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>20.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd half</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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（注）以上の金額は未対応額を含まず、対応額のみを示しています。
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(以下略)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST


Swoin Deposition

Deponent: KANAI, Shoji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

Name: KANAI, Shoji.
Date of Birth: Dec. 1, 1886.
Address: No. 4376 Baba-cho, Ueda City, Chiisaagata-gun, Nagano Prefecture.
Title: Doctor of Medicine
(Personal history:
1. From 1911 to 1912, A class member of the Health Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations in Geneva.
2. In 1923, Professor of bacteria pathology at the Keio-gijuku University.
3. From 1924 to 1931, Chief of the Board of Health and
Concurrently Chief of the Hygienic Laboratory of the South Manchuria Railway Company.

4. From July to Sept. 1931, Executive member of the Yangtze River Flood Relief Committee of Nanking Government (Chief of the Committee Sung tzu-wen).

5. Nov. 1931, Adviser to the Peace Reservation Committee of the Liaoning Province.


7. 1932, Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of Mukden Province.


9. 1935, Governor of Chientao Province.

Before and after the Mukden Incident, I was one of the executive members of the Yangtze River Flood Relief Committee of China in Shanghai and was engaged in the relief work of flood sufferers. (It was estimated that the number of flood sufferers amounted to fifteen millions at that time.)

On the night of September 18, when I returned from Shanghai to Dairen to make arrangements with the head office of S.M.R. Co. concerning the flood relief work, I was informed of the outbreak of the Incident.

Doctor MORITA, Fukumatsu of Mukden informed me of it by long-distance telephone.

On the next day I presented myself to the head office of
DEF. DOC. 883
S.M.R. Co. where I reported to the President on the conditions of flood relief in Shanghai and, upon completion of arrangements with the authorities concerned, I again left for Shanghai on the 21st.

I came back to Shanghai to find that the outbreak of the Mukden Incident aggravated anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shanghai. Finding it rather difficult for me to continue my work, I returned to Dairen from Shanghai in the early part of October and I continued in the service as Chief of the Sanitary Section of S.M.R.

I remember that it was about October 11 or 12. I was asked by Mr. YAMAGUCHI, Juji, the then resident of Mukden, to visit him as he said he had something to consult with me, and I went there, taking 2 days furlough from the Company.

In Mukden at that time railway traffic other than S.M.R. was suspended, communications were interrupted, factories and government offices were closed and there were a large number of unemployed and vagabonds.

Among the native population within the walled city of Mukden, which was said to number 280,000, 70,000 were unemployed and vagabonds who were no better than beggars in their actual living conditions.

I felt that in order to relieve these afflicted people, it was absolutely necessary, to provide them with employments by restoring various economic mechanisms and to promote circulation of goods by restoring communications. I did my best in following on this line. Moreover, I endeavored to arrange free food...
to those who had nothing to eat.

My relation to the South Manchuria Railway Company was as follows:

Upon my arrival at Mukden, I came to the conclusion that the situation there, as mentioned above, could not be settled by a few days' efforts and would drag. So I requested the Company for my resignation twice by telegram, but it was not accepted after all.

Since I came to Manchuria, I have had two occasions to engage in relief works of the Chinese:

In 1924, when Chang Tsuo-lin fought with some fordes of the Peking district, I invited Dr. Motegi, professor of surgery at the Keiō-University, from Japan and dispatched a rescue party in order to treat the injured on both sides.

In 1925, a rebellion occurred in Chang Tsuo-lin's Army (Kuo Sung-ling's rebellion). As the battle fronts were near the track of the South Manchuria Railway, I made preparation to admit those who were injured in the battle, both soldiers and civilians for treatment at some of the hospitals attached to S.M.R. in the area from Mukden to Tashiichiao.

As the adviser to the Peace Preservation Committee of Liaoning Province, I was never present personally at the committee meetings involving myself in its actual business. My chief
task was to form a connecting link between the Japanese and foreigners in connection with the measures to be taken following the outbreak of the Incident.

Main works of the committee was to preserve public peace, to put people’s mind at rest and to stabilize currency.

The aim of the Committee’s works was to restore everything to pre-Incident conditions.

Then, when the Government of Mukden Province was set up in November, 1931, I was cordially invited by that Government to be the Supreme Advisor.

The duty of the Supreme Adviser was almost the same as that of the position I held under the Peace Preservation Committee.

The principal works of the Provincial Government were maintenance of public peace, rearrangement of prefectural governments, repayment of internal and external debts of the former Government of Mukden Province, settlement of accounts for purchased articles, price stabilization of staple food, relief of the poor in the Province etc.

As for the question of the Self-Government Guidance Organization, I had no direct connection with it. But I know that the Organization was presided by Mr. YU Chung-han who was deeply interested in local autonomy; its principal positions were occupied by Manchurian natives; some promising Japanese Young-men took part in it; and it was vigorously carrying on its main task of promoting self-government in each local prefecture.

I know neither its internal structure nor its actual activities.
As to the Concordia Association, I know neither the events leading to its foundation nor the details of its actual activities, for I had no direct connection with it as in the case of the Self-Government Guidance Organization. At the early stage of its existence, I had an occasion to advise that the Association should be a group of exclusively interested civilians with the purpose of promoting concord of the five races and removing difficulties of the people at large.

The Manchuria Youngman's League was a purely civilian organization formed in 1928 by interested Japanese and Korean young people staying in Manchuria.

The activities of the League was primarily directed to such ethical and social movements among young people, as the dedication of one sen per day movement, the movement against mah-jong, the movement for wider use of bicycles, the travelling performance of excellent movies, the encouragement of land cultivation, the flourishing of Manchurian industry, and so on.

As the negotiations between Japan and Manchuria grew critical, the League started to conduct its own investigation and to publish its own findings. This was because the League desired to clarify the real truth of the situation and to guide young people in making correct judgements on the situation.

It is shown in the statement made by the chief of the board of directors, that the Youngman's League was not a political organization.
While I was in the service of the League of Nations, I was deeply impressed by the complete unity of the four racial peoples, viz. Germans, Italians, French and Romans in Switzerland as well as the international cooperation in the League of Nations. Therefore I could not see the troubles existing between Japan and Manchuria without feeling the absolute necessity of two principles, viz. self-determination and cooperation among peoples. So while I was in the posts of the adviser and then the chief director of the Manchurian Young Men's League, I inspired the Japanese young men in Manchuria with these two principles, which were widely supported by the majority of the Japanese young men in Manchuria.

The members of the Manchuria Young Men's League were as many as 5,000 in Manchuria. They were found even among the members of Concordia Association and the Self-Government Guidance Organization.

The Manchurian Young Men's League was voluntarily dissolved soon after the foundation of Manchukuo.

So far as I know, I heard nothing about the creation of a new state at the beginning of the incident.

But it is a fact that the members of the civilian party in Manchuria, Mr. YAN Yun-chiang, Yu Chung-han and YUAN Chin-kai entertained such an idea as "securing borderlines and putting people's mind at rest", which is the counterpart of the idea held by the militarist party headed by CHIANG
Tsuo-lin. The reason for this idea was as follows. Whenever
the head of the militarist party, CHIANG Tsuo-lin sent his
army to the Peking districts with the ambition to gain
control of the central areas, the war expenses were always
burdens on the local people. With a view to this fact, the
people in the three Eastern Provinces united to keep
themselves away from the influence of political changes in
the central areas.

As for the establishment of Manchukuo, I, being an
adviser to the Provincial Government, had nothing to do
with the movement.

I devoted myself to the maintenance of public peace in
the Province and the others as I mentioned before.

In connection with the movement to create a new state
which was conducted by the North-Eastern Administrative
Committee I know nothing but the reports appeared on the
newspapers.

Concerning the opium problem:

During my stay in Europe from 1920 to 1922 I served as
an assistant to Dr. MIYAJIMA, Mikanosuke, a member of the
suite of the Japanese Delegate to the League of Nations Opium
Conference. Accordingly, I, as a local official in Manchuria,
discharged my duty of controlling opium in strict conformity
with the spirit of International Conscience.
The detection and control of secret cultivation of opium in far remote districts were carried out by using planes. Secret smoking, traffic and transportation of opium were rigidly controlled.

I am of the opinion that the monopoly system is quite a suitable measure in order to realize gradual decrease of opium smokers if it is accompanied with thorough administrative control.

It is evidently the result of the opium control in Manchuria that the number of opium-smokers not only among the higher officials but also among the younger ones has so remarkably decreased.

On this 25th day of March, 1947,
at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ KANAI, Shoji (seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KANAI, Shoji (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, T. SasaM'A, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Sworn Deposition of KANAI, Shoji is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/T. SasaM'A

Tokyo, Japan
Date 29 March 1947
奉天事変のあった前後は、上海にあった中国側の揚子江水災救済委員会の執行委員として事務水災のきめ方、事務の起きたことを知りました。

奉天の師範佐田福松氏から長距離電話で通知を受けました。

奉天事変の発生によって、上海の排空気気が激化しました。

奉天に来てみますと、奉天事変の発生によって、上海には来れないであります。
私は奉天事変のあった前後は、上海にあった中国側の揚子江水災救済委員会の執行委員として事変後の水災救助に当たって、海から大連に帰り来て来た。事変の起きたことを知りました。九月一日、海から大連に帰り来て来た夜、事変の起きたことを知りました。奉天の衞署森田の福松氏から長距離電話で通知を受けました。奉天は満鉄本社に出頭し総裁に上海の水災救助の状況報告し、事務局長と事務の打合せをしました。二十一日に再び上海に来ました。上海に来てみますと、奉天事変の発生によって、上海の雰囲気が激化しました。
その當時の奉天は、満鉄以外の鉄道の運営は止まり、交通は阻絶し、工場や官衙は閉鎖される。多數の失業者が満洲人を非難していると言われる。

満天城内の現地人三十八万と言われるもので、そのうちの七万人は軍で、これらの人々の生活を支えるには、是非共、各種の経済機構を復興して、就職の道を求める。交通の復興を計って物資の交流を計る必要があると思じ。

満鉄会社の関係は、奉天に来て見ますと、奉天の以上申し上げるような現状は、要言を以て、二回辞職を願ひまじのに念にうかがうに甘くない。
そのうち一回は一九三五年、張作霖が北東方面の軍隊と戦った時。両軍の負傷者の収容と治療の準備を終了したことがありました。

次の一回は一九三五年、張作霖軍隊のうち、叛乱のあった時、戦傷した者を収容と治療の準備を致したことがありました。

彼の機関治安維持会の顧問として、直接に委員会に出して曾勢に関係したと、いうようなことは一度もありました。主なる仕事は事変の発生に伴う秩序を保つことがありました。
5

文字内容为多行中文，但具体句子无法辨认。
图 9.44 对于高分辨率的图像，

目的是为了更好地呈现细节，

以及有助于理解图像的结构和内容。

在图中，我们可以看到不同区域的

增强效果，这有助于我们更清晰地

识别出图像中的重要元素。

此外，通过对不同区域的对比，

我们可以更好地理解图像的层次

以及它们之间的相互关系。

这一方法在许多领域都有着广泛的应用，

包括医学影像学、计算机视觉等。

通过这种方式，我们可以更准确地

进行图像分析和处理，从而实现更准确的

结果。

在实际应用中，我们还可以结合

其他技术手段，如深度学习等，

进一步提高图像分析的准确度和效率。

总的来说，图 9.44 为我们提供了一个

非常好的案例，展示了如何通过技术手段

来改善和优化图像质量，这对于很多

领域都是非常有价值的。
\[ G_{148} = \frac{1}{10} \]

这看起来像是一个数学表达式，可能涉及到分数或比例关系。由于图像的清晰度和部分缺失，具体细节不太清楚。
アフリカ問題について私は一九二零年から三二三年間、
英仏合意に対する日本の代表としてアフリカを取締るために
取るさる決定を下し行いました。

政府の地方官としてアフリカを取締るにしても、
この国際政府に対して
敬と存じます。

これは国のアフリカ取締の重要を、
大官の間に吸煙者を減少せしめたことかな
敬と存じます。
International Military Tribunal for the Far East

The United States of America, et al.

- Against -

ARAKI, Sadao. et al.

Affidavit of HONJO, Kazuo

I, HONJO, Kazuo, being first duly sworn according to the customary formality in this country depose as follows:

1. I am the eldest son of the late HONJO, Shigeru. I lived in the city of Urawa in order to serve at the Urawa Army Provisions Branch Depot at Kita-Urawa, Urawa City, November, 1945. As November, 20 1945 was a holiday, I happened to be at my father's residence at No. 8, Ueno-hara Nakano-ku, Tokyo-to.

2. My father reported at the Occupation Guidance Institute within the ex-Army General Staff College building at Iyogana Ichoume, Akasaka-ku, Tokyo-to early in the morning on that day. Upon receipt of the information from the Institute that my father committed suicide at about 10:00 a.m. I hastened to the place and I confirmed my father's death, on the spot, in the Chief Manager's room.

- 1 -
3. There were two testaments on the table in that room, the one was addressed to KAWAMURA, Kyoichi, his secretary and the other was to Lieutenant General NUKAD. As it was mentioned in the testament addressed to the secretary that his will would be found in his black leather satchel kept in the air raid shelter at the residence, upon returning later, I opened the bag in question and found his will in it. It was the document, as attached, written in 24 lines on rolled letter-paper of "hosho", paper. I affirm the complete text of the letter, the seal and the written signature to be my father’s handwriting in every particular.

This 26th day of November, 1946, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,

HONJO, Kazuo, deponent.

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above mentioned date and at the above mentioned place.

Sgd. & Sealed: KORETSUNE, Tatsumi.

Witness.
OATH

I hereby swear according to my conscience to state the whole truth, adding nothing and withholding nothing.

Signed and sealed: HONJO, Kazuo
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the text of the original document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 20 Jan. 1941
書

本

雄

心は、従って連対の意へ何時も移動せね、又何時も移動せねと加加せしめる。
Testament

Though retired, I, who for years held important military positions, feel utterly overawed for having led the Empire to today's unprecedented state of near ruin. I can only atone for my sin by dying ten thousand deaths.

The railway explosion at the height of the anti-Japanese movement led to the Manchurian Incident and the Manchuria Army had no choice except to take action from the standpoint of self-defense. No instructions of any sort were received from the Government or the Military High Command. I, then commander of the Manchuria Army, am solely responsible for the action.

In leaving this world bearing full responsibility, I, hereby, pray from the bottom of my heart for the health and longevity of the Emperor, for the protection of our national constitution and for the restoration of the Empire.

Sept. 1945

KOJO Shigeru

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan

Date 27 Jan. 1947.
Translated by Defense Language Branch

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and Others

I, SADAO and Others

Deponent: (seg.) KAWAMURA, Kyoichi

Having sworn an oath as attached in accordance with the custom of my country, I make the following deposition.

The late Ex-general HONJO, Shigeru was president of the Vocational Guiding Association in the autumn of 1945, and I worked as his secretary.

I confirm that the appended booklaid entitled "The Truth of the Manchurian Incident", which covers sixteen sheets of Japanese paper is what I recorded, based upon the manuscript which had gradually been dictated to me by himself from about the middle of September to the early part of October 1945 and then was corrected several times and was finally approved by him.

Nov. 26, 1946 (the 21th of Showa)

In the Building of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Deponent: Sgd.: KAWAMURA, Kyoichi

I hereby testify that the above made an oath and set his hand and seal in the presence of the witness.

Date: the same as above.
Place: the same as above.

Witness Sig.: KORETSUNE, Tatsumi

COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361
AFFIDAVIT

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Sig.: K mur., Kyoichi (seal)
I, M.I.J. Clark, of the firm B. & J. Clark, hereby certify that the foregoing translation appears, in the attached certificate, to be the best or my own belief, correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ M.I.J. Clark

vagro, John

date 15 February 1857
I, [Name], the [title or position], hereby certify that the following translation attached in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, correct in meaning and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ [Name]

[Signature]

Date: [Date]

[City or Location]
Translated by Defense Language Branch

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and Others

v

ARAKI, Sadio and Others

Deponent: (seg.) KAWAMURA, Kyoichi (seal)

Having sworn an oath as attached in accordance with the custom of my country, I make the following deposition.

The late Ex-general KÔNOJO, Shigeru was president of the Vocational Guiding Association in the autumn of 1945, and I worked as his secretary.

I confirm that the appended booklet entitled "The Truth of the Manchurian Incident", which covers sixteen sheets of Japanese paper is what I recorded, based upon the manuscript which had gradually been dictated to me by himself from about the middle of September to the early part of October 1945 and then was corrected several times and was finally approved by him.

Nov. 26, 1946 (the 21th of Showa)

In the Building of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Deponent: Sig.: KAWAMURA, Kyoichi (seal)

I hereby testify that the above made an oath and set his hand and seal in the presence of the witness.

Date: the same as above.
Place: the same as above.

Witness Sig.: KORETSUNE, Tatsumi (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Sig.: K.M. SUR., Kyoichi (seal)
I, [name], do hereby certify that the following translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ [Name]

Tokyo, Japan
[Date: February 1947]
The True Nature of the Manchurian Incident

written by HONJO, Shigeru

Introduction

All the records and materials of my own in regard to the Manchurian Incident were incinerated during the air raids. I am obliged, therefore, in writing these notes, to rely on my memory. Moreover, as the Incident happened some fourteen years ago I cannot claim that the dates, places, sequence and other minor points are infallible. I am very sure, however, that there is no mistake in the true nature of the Incident and the quality of my conviction at the time I encountered it.

Chapter 1

General Situation Before the Outbreak of the Incident

I was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army in August of the 6th year of Shoua (1931) when anti-Japanese movements in China which had steadily become aggravated were getting much worse in spite of Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA's (the present Premier) earnest co-operative policy. This tendency was especially strong in Manchuria, and unhappy incidents occurred day by day. Just before my arrival at the new post, moreover, serious incidents occurred one on top of another and remained unsettled. There were such incidents as the slaughter by the Jun-Ken unit of Captain NAKAMURA and Sergeant-Major ISUGI, who held proper visas, and the ill-treatment of Korean farmers at 'Wan-pao-shan through the joint action of Manchuria Army, officials and people. I was in great anxiety over such a serious situation in Manchuria.

My anxiety was deepened all the more by my first inspection of the units under my command which was made just after my arrival. There is no doubt that according to the Commercial Lease which was acquired during Foreign Minister NOMURA's tenure of office subjects of the Japanese Empire had the right to dwell and trade not only in the areas belonging to the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMRC will be used in the following text) and commercial ports but also in the interior. Nevertheless I saw with my own eyes that even those who were engaged in the medical profession, a cultural work, dealing with inhabitants in Manchuria were unable to reside in the interior because they were subjects of the Japanese Empire. Such being the case, the Japanese residents in Manchuria were forced to assemble and to be cooped up in the above mentioned areas belonging to SMRC and commercial ports which were nothing but points and a line. As the insults and persecutions of Imperial subjects, moreover, spread to these areas, military protection was required even for boys and girls of primary schools on their way to and from school, and in the areas where no troops were stationed schools could not help being closed indefinitely or abolished. Accordingly, Imperial subjects in Manchuria comprising the Japanese and Koreans, who amounted to 1,200,000 or 1,300,000 several years before that time, went back to the homeland in succession. Consequently they amounted to less than 1,000,000 at the time when the Incident broke out, and most of them were second generation people who had no professions or homes to go back to.
According to the Imperial government's policy of avoiding friction with the Manchurian side as much as possible, our Kwantung army exhausted every means in order to use caution in order to soften the feeling. For instance, our soldiers did not go out from the areas belonging to SMRC or commercial ports except when military maneuvers were held, and moreover, even during military maneuvers they did not carry ammunition. Nevertheless, when Japanese Army held maneuvers the Manchurian military authorities demanded to be notified in advance of the place and the date for maneuver ignoring the agreement regarding the right of non-notification. When we announced them in advance complying with this demand, they held maneuvers at the same time and place using our notification to their advantage and making our maneuver difficult or impossible to hold. There were, moreover, even some soldiers who conducted demonstrations and made threats to us taking advantage of our not carrying ammunition, and so they caused further trouble. They even prohibited us list from holding maneuvers in the places which were not in areas belonging to SMRC or the commercial ports, and refused, furthermore, our request for the loan or transfer of specified places for maneuvers in place of the prohibited ones. Thus our drill upon which the Army itself depends was practically checked. In the meantime, violence and insults to Imperial subjects and soldiers were intensified everywhere. As these untoward troubles and breaches of the law arose in great numbers every moment was a crisis full of dynamite at the time I arrived at the post.

Chapter 2
Outline of the Incident

On the 18th of September (1931), the month after my arrival at the post, Manchurian troops who were stationed at Peitaiying in the suburbs of Mukden destroyed with explosives in the neighborhood of Rintiaokou, the South Manchurian Railway tracks which ran through the western border of that camp. Thus the crisis full of dynamite exploded at last.

At that time some of our forces which were practicing railway defense drill at a place not far from the spot hastily went there and drove out the hostile troops who were committing the outrage. At the same time we returned the attack of enemy forces that were covering the retreat of those who had committed the outrage, and with the assistance of units from the rear our army finally succeeded in bottling them up in Peitaiying.

Receiving an urgent dispatch concerning the above, I immediately issued the necessary order to the forces under my command stationed at various points to use force. This was done without having enough time to ask instructions from headquarters. Among forces under my control, however, there were some which started action before the arrival of my orders, and there were some that started attacks previous to the enemy's offensive.

In this way, the Kwantung Army took the offensive all along the line. Now, why did I arbitrarily issue orders to use force to the forces under my control? Why were there some forces which started activities before the arrival of my orders, and why were there some units which started attacks previous to the enemy's offensive?
It is needless to say that the first duty of the Kwantung Army was to protect the railway belonging to SMRC. And this Army was one which, stationed overseas, had also the duties of protecting the residents' lives and property, the interests of its own country and of defending the Army itself. These duties were not inferior to the first duty in importance. According to regulations, the responsibility and right of performing these duties were entrusted to not only me but to all successive Commanders-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. The situation at that time, moreover, was so critical that we could not help believing that any new occurrence caused by the Manchurian side as mentioned above suggested Pan-Manchurian planned activity.

What further stirred up trouble was the blowing up of the railway line. As Rintiackou was located near Peitaiying, Manchurian soldiers in that camp stole along the railway and frequently attempted to overturn trains by placing obstructions on the lines. But this was the first time that they had committed such an action as a blowing up. Japanese residents in Manchuria, decreased in number as they were, amounted to at that time about one million including Koreans, and the Imperial interests in Manchuria at that time really constituted a matter which would seal the fate of the Empire.

The military strength of the Kwantung Army which should protect not only all the lines of SMR but also the above mentioned interests and had to defend the Army itself was composed of one peace-footing division and six Independent Defence Battalions and numbered only 15,000 or 16,000. On the other side the military strength of the Manchurian side numbered as many as 200,000, and so it was evident that not only SMR but also our army, residents and interests would have been ruined if the army had idly hesitated. This was the reason why I issued to the units under my control orders to use force without asking for instructions from headquarters with the responsibility and the right which had been naturally given to me. This is why there were some forces which started activities before the arrival of my orders, and why there were some forces which started attacks previous to the enemy's offensive. At the same time, I believe that no matter what country it may belong to this is in keeping with the character of any army called upon to defend itself against a large force with far smaller numbers.

Since then the affair assumed increasing proportions and extended to such areas as Chinchow, Nonkiang, Harbin and Chichihar which were isolated from the areas along the SMR. Although this matter became the target of adverse criticism from all quarters, it could not be helped for an army, especially for an army inferior in strength, to try to defeat enemy forces previous to its attack, since the Manchurian Military occupied important positions, having a big army at its command and directed its attacking pivot toward the areas along SMR and districts of important interests or attempted to harass these areas persistently and, moreover, lives and properties of Imperial residents in the interior who had not been able to take refuge in the areas belonging to SMRC were at stake and petitions for aid had arrived frequently. It is still fresh in my memory that the military representative of the Lytton Investigation Committee truly understood this point very well when the committee made its field investigation.

In this way I did not avoid the use of force so far as it was unavoidable, but I did not hesitate to make efforts to avoid the use of force so far as it was avoidable. The peaceful settlement of the affair in Kilin province by persuading General Hsi Chia, Chief of the Staff of the Kilin
province army and the prevention from counter-attack of General Chang Hai-peng and Yu Chih-shan in Mukden province and General Chang Ching-hui, Commander-in-Chief of the Heilungkiang army and General Ma Chang-shan (rose in revolt later) in Heilungkiang province were the results of these efforts of mine.

In spite of these efforts on my part troubles spread all over Manchuria. Really inevitable as it was, the actual holder of power in Manchuria, General Chang Hsueh-liang's stay in Peking at that time deepened this inevitability. I had been with Jsu-o-lin, Hsueh-liang's father, for three years as his military advisor. During this period of time I had rather close relations with him through seeing him all the time and was well acquainted with his sagacity. If General Hsueh-liang had been in Manchuria at that time, or if such a man as General Yang Yu-ting, who very well understood Sino-Japanese relations, had been in Manchuria, even though General Hsueh-liang was absent, the Incident would not have assumed such serious proportions even if we might not have nipped its outbreak in the bud, and on the contrary we could have made the Incident a stepping stone to restoring normal general relations between Japan and China changing evil for good. It is really a matter for regret whenever one considers the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations since that time.

Chapter 3

Establishment of Manchukuo and Afterwards

As mentioned above, the Fwantung Army rose only in self-defence and took action only in self-defence. At first we did not, therefore, consider any aspect of the problem of Manchuria's future status. These activities of ours, however, did not fail to result in destruction of the Manchurian army as well as the status of Manchuria. We were unable to hope for the stabilization of life and public peace there when there was no order. How could we have expected the safety of our resident nationals' lives and property and of Japanese interests but by the stabilization of life and the public peace? For this reason I supported not only the district self-governing committee which was voluntarily organized by Yuan Ching-kai and others in Mukden within ten days after the outbreak of the Incident, but also the self-governing committees of various localities and thus gave impetus to self-government. In addition to this, I supported the Self-Government Direction Department which was organized by Yu Chung-han and others in Mukden in order to direct self-governing committees all over Manchuria and tried very hard to maintain and improve public peace and life.

Nevertheless as these organizations were only makeshift and temporary, some permanent organization had to be established. Indeed, a cry for this arose promptly and suddenly among the Self-Governing Direction Department, district self-governing committee circles, and military and civil notables and prominent men in all quarters who knew our activities well. It was, of course, a matter which we were longing for and so was quickly developed. I should like to speak here about our desire concerning Manchuria at that time. Co-existence and co-prosperity of Japan and China were absolute necessities for the defense of the Japanese Empire and China or Greater East Asia. At the same time they were the absolute necessities from the point of view of the existence for the Japanese Empire and this has been, I am sure, our true ideal towards China since
The Russo-Japanese War in spite of the warping of the original intention and the very opposite result reached because of the intervention of miscellaneous untoward events, etc. It is further recollected that since the period of the Ching Dynasty Japanese including ourselves took part in the efforts made for the self-stabilization of China though we were only their assistants. It is also recollected that those who most earnestly supported the reform movement since the time of Sun Yen and Hung Hsing were Japanese public-spirited men and that all the prominent figures in the reform movement were pro-Japanese notables or old civil and military government students to Japan. This applied to Manchuria most conspicuously and the Russo-Japanese War was fought only on this ground. Accordingly all that we expected of Manchuria after the outbreak of the Incident was not a matter of form, but nothing else than the permanent security and co-existence and prosperity of Japan and China based on the everlasting foundation of normal and harmonious relations between Japan and Manchuria which presupposed the stabilization and prosperity of Manchuria.

What concrete plan should we adopt? Should we desire General Chang Hsueh-liang's return? The motives which produced the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident existed during General Hsueh-liang's administration. Besides, after things had reached such a pass that the Japanese national feeling would not receive the General's return warmly. And even if they had welcomed his return, General Hsueh-liang's pride would no longer have made it endurable to accept this welcome. The Chang family was alienated from the people for the abundant reasons that the Chang family's misadministration for two generations since General Tsuo-lin's time and the enormous increase of expenses accompanying their policy of military and administrative advance into the areas inside the Great Wall etc. naturally made the extortionate taxation of Manchurian inhabitants inevitable. The Chang family's return to Manchuria was, therefore, impossible. How about then handing over Manchuria to the Nanking Government? Nothing could have been better than that from the point of view of the importance of Manchuria and the fundamental ideal as to relations between Japan and China. But the original cause of the Manchurian Incident truly existed in the Nanking Government's policy against Japan. Besides, the Nanking Government was still in the course of bringing about and continuing a state of confusion. Consequently judging from the situation at that time handing over Manchuria to the Nanking Government would have only meant giving impetus to the anti-Japanese movement and confusion in Manchuria. In the same as the former alternative, therefore, this case was not worth considering as an actual possibility.

The opinions of notables and interested persons on the Manchurian side were similar to our own opinion mentioned above. Then Mr. Yu Chung-han and others finally boldly advocated the establishment of a new state. This proposal was unanimously supported on the instant and I, of course, also agreed to it.

In history China has never occupied Manchuria substantially, notwithstanding the fact that Manchuria once occupied China completely. The majority of the inhabitants in Manchuria are, it is true, of the Chinese race, but most of these people have settled in Manchuria for several or more than ten generations and so, they are rather more Manchurian than Chinese in their life and sentiment. As the topography of Manchuria is, moreover, a basin surrounded by great ranges of mountains and great rivers, it is naturally suitable to build as a state.
If such a state could be built, then the ideal would be carried out for the first time. In this way on 1st of March of the 7th year of Showa (1932?) the independence of Manchukuo was declared, which placed its basis on the way of the King, as its skeleton, as this is the essence of Oriental morality, and racial co-operation, as its flesh, as this advocated the equality of all the inhabitants rejecting the conception sense of the superiority of the strong, and the conception of oppressing the weak and racial discrimination.

This being so I expected independent Manchukuo, as mentioned above, to develop peacefully and soundly. Also expected, of course, that the profound relations between Japan and Manchuria, existing from the time before the Middle Kingdom was established as a state, to become normal and unshakable. I expected not only this but also that, having this foundation, Manchukuo would become outwardly an impregnable fortress for the defence of the Orient and inwardly a wedge and model for the co-existence and co-prosperity between Japan and China, and at the same time it would become a modern state worthy of praise from the whole world, not to speak of the whole Orient. In order to accomplish this purpose, it was my belief that the people of Manchuria should not fail to cope with the difficulties of the time of transition and that the Japanese Empire also should not spare sacrifices no matter how great they might be.

Just after the declaration of the establishment of the state, on the 9th of March, Pu Yi, the former Emperor Hsuan Tung of the Tsing dynasty, was installed in office as Administrator of Manchukuo. From the very fact that the foundation of the establishment of the state was based upon the co-operation of races, it is clear that Pu Yi's installation did not mean the restoration of the Tsing dynasty but, on the contrary, it rather precluded the restoration, both legally and in sentiment. In fact, Pu Yi was called and installed in the office of Administrator because of his personal character and the Manchu-Roman people's retrospective sentiment for Manchukuo because he was a descendant of the Tsing dynasty which came from Manchuria.

After one year's tenure of office I resigned from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. Consequently all major affairs in Manchukuo, not to speak of the execution of the monarchical rule, happened after my resignation. For this reason I am not qualified to write about the situation in Manchukuo after that time. It is a matter for regret that conditions in Manchukuo since then up to now have diverged so greatly from my hopes and expectations and so definitely from the true idea of the original Japanese policy toward Manchuria and China. This was owing to the gradual increase in the number of Japanese Manchukuoan officials, the lack of harmony with Manchukuoan officials caused thereby and the frequent changes in the executions of our policy toward Manchukuo, etc.

(Written in early October, 20th year of Showa. (T.N. 1945))
Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached affidavit is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15 Dec 1947
地外に出ず、且つ演習に際しては賓包を携帯せしめざる等、省和のため
には百方整心に努めたのであった。然にのみ拘らず、満洲側軍当局は、我
が方の演習に際して、使用演習地所、使用日時等無通報自由の約定なら
て、これを適用し、同時、同所に演習を挙行して、我が方がこれに従い、
の違我若くは官庁の要求を拒否して、事實上軍の生命なる訓練を我が方
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に加げられた当時。に於ては一間と謎に一間の部隊の危険ならざるはなかっ
たのである

 stub

一 事案の経過

前日任じた當月の九月十八日（一九三一年一月）奉天郊外

北軍営等在営す

る満洲側軍隊が、同営営の西辺を通じる我家流々道線路を、柳條溝附近

3
知る所より絶好の地點に於て、築城は成し、築城の役を克せしのが一時、
先に行兵を進めたが、直ちに現地に急行して奉行敵兵を回攻するため、我
方の南に於て、近の急報を待つに、これを北貫内に急迫したのである。
右の急報を待つに、余は中央部の指揮を仰くの故なく直ちに各地にあら
管下部隊に対して、武力行使上所要の命令を下し、合計したのである。
中には余の命令到達に先んじて行動を開始した部隊もあつた。かくて南
戦局は全くに直ぐに攻勢に出たのであるが、何故に余が軍曹官
下部隊に武力行使を下し、合計したか、また何故に余の命令到達に先んじて行動
を開始した部隊があつたか、更にまた、何故に敵の攻勢に先んじて攻勢に出
た部隊もあつたのであろうか。関東軍の第一任務は、いふまでもなく、満鉄
所屬鉄道線路の保全である。また荷くも外地に駐屯する軍隊のである以上、
在省の生命、財産並に自国、権益の保全及び軍隊自体の自衛の任務を
するものではない。而しては第日任務遂行の責任と権限は、定める所によ
るものではない。
先に述べた攻撃に対する対策の主な趣旨は、敵の児童兵を民衆を以て防衛する任にあたる戦本体の性格である、と同時に敵に捉えられたを固めに、撃破に対し直面した地域に発展させて、これも断然非難的たためであるが、満満の軍隊が大軍を揮して要衝の陣地に揃り、攻撃重点を

当面の戦線並に重要箇所地区に指向上し、既に既に役割にこれに乱離を企図しつつあるのみならず、未だに野戦地等へ向かって後退をたたえすに至った奥地在留守国

代表の流石に、この点をよく理解せられたことは、今だに余の意見に附会した所である。

折橋、余は反くべからざる武力行使は避けなかったが、避けるに足らず、本機の戦略に最も努力を至らなかった。吉林省軍政調査局長林長治将軍に対する提出の結果に、遅得による吉林省の平和解決を天省に於ける張海鴻、千葉山将軍、黒龍江省警備隊長谷長治、将軍に対する記念に附会した幕、諸々はその成果であった。
底辺、事態は終に至るに至るに至るもののため、この不可避性を以て一層深刻ならしめたものか、満洲の難局者であった故学良将軍が、當時北京に在ったことである。平沼はその後、満洲の事の観を以て、学良将軍とも常に接近して私交を密かに進めめた。...

上流の如く関東軍は自衛のためにのみ行動したのである。従って野戦の満洲が、いかにあらゆるべきかに於て、當初何等の関係を全面的に正常化する事は短いたかも知れないとしたたために、結果に於て満洲側の軍隊の意向を全く了解が得られぬとして、満洲の秩序をも破壊せずに従来の関係を延々と存ずるのみならず、満洲の安定はあり得ない。民生や治安の安定はあらかじめあり得ない。
在留帝國臣民の生命財産並びに帝國の權益等の安固がり得、故に
於て余は更に奮発後旬日ならずして自發的に奉天に組織させられた賣金僑民
による地方自治委員会を初め、各地の地方自治委員会を助成して自治を促
進し、更に全篇に亘る地方自治委員会を指導するため、于沖漢民等に依つ
て奉天に組織させた、自治指導部を設置して、極力治安、民生の維持向上
に努める所があった

さらに、かかる組織は所詮皆為私底の處置に過ぎぬかは恒久的な
体制を確立しなければならぬ、来せるかは、自治指導部、地方自治委員
会方面並に余が方の行動を理解しつつあった。文武両の他各界要人有志方
面から、遅早くも期せずして、その話が挙った、素よりこの事は我が方も
切望する所であり従って誠は焦繁に進展したが、兹に於て余は先ず當時に於
て中華の不純な機械物の介入などにより結局に於ては反対となったが、
日俄戦争以来の余が對敵理念は今日に至ってもこれを西洋化する一
事態関係の共
存共榮は帝國及中華乃至大東細亜防衛の絶対条件でもある

貢獻氏以来の革命運動に対し、最も真剣に援助したものは貢名士達であ
たこと、革命運動の中心人物が急ぐ知要人や帝国への文武留学生出身者であったことなど、今更の如く想起される——而して満洲とは、その尖端であって、日露戦争もこれのがために外ならなかった。従って事変勃発後の満洲に期待するものは綱縄の如何ではなくて、満洲の安定と華化を前提とする。正常にして圓滿な日滿關係の恒久的確立を基礎とする日華永久の安蔵と共存共榮の以外にあり得なかったのである。

然らばそれは具体観覧如何、學良将軍の復職を期待するか、満洲事態をし
て不可避のもとらしかった基礎は何としても學良将軍の施政にあり、しか
て事変に至っては帝国的国民的基礎何としても學良將軍的施政にあら
大なる出発の基礎が然に決して満洲住民に対する苛酷幾次を余儀なくす。然に學良将軍

以来二代に亘る張家の家政と、軍、政面に於ける関内進出政略に伴ふ為

の山積に於り、民心は張家の下を去って居る。故に張家の満洲復観は不可

是非南京政府の政策に於て、これに勝るものはないのであるが、仰も満洲事態の運因

把を縫けて居る。故に當時の実情に於て満洲を南京政府に引継ぐことは、
Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

1. My name is HIRATA, Yukihiro.
2. My present address is No. 51, Tairachō, Meguro-ku, Tokyo.
3. It was as the Colonel commanding the 29th Infantry Regiment, which belonged to the 2nd division, that I was dispatched in April, 1931 to Manchuria together with the H.Q. of the same division. My regiment was stationed in Mukden on 16 April and the H.Q. of the division (the divisional commander being Lieutenant General Takeichi) was stationed at Liaoyang. Since then I served in Manchuria until August, 1932, when, as the result of the regular change of personnel, I was transferred to Japan to serve with the H.Q. of the
9th division in the City of Kanazawa. I retired from the active service in 1933. My rank then was Major General.

4. It was while I was thus serving in Manchuria that the Luitiaokou Incident (Mukden Incident) broke out and by and by developed into the Manchurian Incident.

5. In those days in Mukden, were stationed the 29th Infantry Regiment under my command and the 2nd Infantry Battalion (the commander being Lieut. Colonel SHIMAMOTO, Shôichi) of the Independent Railway Guards. The former was charged with the ordinary duty of the Manchurian service, that is, the safeguarding of Japanese rights and interests and the protection of the lines and properties of the Japanese residents around Mukden, while the latter was charged with the duty of guarding the South Manchurian Railway within the assigned area. Since their duties were in different directions, there was some difference in the schemes of operation between the two units. However, for the purpose of effectual cooperation in case of emergency, we often practised joint exercises such as emergency call drills and so on. Being the senior officer in Mukden, I was in a position to control and direct, as the commander of the garrison area around Mukden. In other words so far as the guarding of the railway was concerned, the commander of the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Independent Guards was under the direct command of, and acted upon the orders of, the Independent Guards Commander so that in no way did I
The Manchurian Incident broke out more than five months after my arrival in Manchuria with my regiment. Before the outbreak of the Incident, however, there had never been any plot either by myself or by any of my subordinates, either among themselves or in league with civilians to create incidents. The situation in Manchuria had been so aggravated in those days that the lawful rights and interests of Japan were unlawfully infringed upon, while anti-Japanese and insulting words and acts prevailed all over Manchuria. Stimulated by such, my soldiers were in a highly strained state of mind. In view of the situation as I had watched it since my arrival in the Mukden Province, and in view of my own experiences in the Russo-Japanese War in which I served as a Second Lieutenant, I not only cautioned my subordinates never to smear the honour of our predecessors but also enforced strict military discipline to prevent any disorderly conducts. About a month before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, I was approached by the Manager of the Mukden Branch-Office of the South Manchurian Railway Company, the President of the Japanese Residents' Association, and the President of the Japanese Society, who complained that many Japanese school
children living in the walled-city of Mukden were prevented from attending school because of Manchurians who stoned at them on their way to and from school, and requested me to make a demonstration march in the city. So that this kind of thing would be stopped once and for all. However, I was so meticulous as to refuse to comply with this request on the ground that such action might create unnecessary misunderstanding.

7. Just before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the North-Eastern Chinese Army, or the Chang Hsueh-Liang's Army, stationed around Mukden, side by side with steady increase in its number, had begun to form encirclement around Japanese barracks in the South Manchurian Railway zone. They consisted of one mixed Brigade, about 10,000 strong, at the North Barrack; one training Regiment of infantry and artillery mixed at the East Barrack; in the north-west and south-west districts outside the wall, three battalions belonging to the Escort Unit (one of the battalions being in Peiping with Chang Hsueh-Liang, and another being stationed in two places as the nucleus units in preparation for the reinforcement of the Escort Unit into a regiment), and one battalion with infantry, guns, and machine guns; inside the walled city, one guards battalion and a corps of soldiers armed with hand spears; and to the west at Ko-Ku-Ton, one battalion detached from the North Barrack. The total of the regular force was about
15 to 16 thousand. Besides, a police unit, more than 3,000 strong, which was said to surpass soldiers in respect of training and equipment, was stationed over various strategic positions east of the business section. The equipment of these units were the most excellent in whole Manchuria. They were equipped with four light tanks, many trench motors and heavy machine guns, and even with aeroplanes. In addition, a large quantity of weapons and ammunition were being manufactured and stored in the arsenals and the trench motor arsenals. Even gas bombs were being manufactured. On the other hand, the Japanese forces consisted of my regiment, about 1,000 strong, (two battalions of three companies each and a machine gun unit) and one infantry battalion of the Independent Railway Guards, about 400 strong (of four companies, two were stationed away from Mukden). Our armament consisted of no more than two armoured cars, some infantry guns, mountain guns, and heavy machine guns, all of which were inferior to those of the Chinese, and we had no military aeroplanes at all. Under these circumstances, not only in their quantity but also in their quality were we constantly conscious of our inferiority and the threat of the Chinese Army.

Thus, the spirit of Chang Hsueh-Liang's soldiers was very high. In fact, General YEI CHAI, chief of staff, once happened to tell me that while high-ranking officers were mutually understanding, some younger officers were expressing such
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strong views that he could hardly control them.

9. In those days there were about 20,000 Japanese residents in and around Mukden. Because of Chang Hsueh-Liang's pressure, some of them found it so difficult to carry on their business, that they went back to their home country. Atrocities against the Japanese, such as in the Manpusan Incident, frequently occurred. Besides, there were frequent disturbances to our railways. By and by, the Chinese came to assume such anti-Japanese and insulting attitudes also towards the Japanese army.

10. Whenever we intended to conduct manoeuvres, either with blank or with ball cartridges, or to carry out night manoeuvres, we notified them several days beforehand to the Chinese officials through the Japanese Consulate. In spite of our previous notification, however, it happened in the course of night manoeuvres towards the end of June, 1931, that some soldiers attached to the Chinese Peace Preservation Unit fired ball-cartridges at Japanese patrols. Again, in the latter part of August, 1931, when a party from my regiment held a shooting practice on the outskirts of Mukden, it happened that some Chinese bandits violently attacked a Japanese sentry in an effort to rob him of his revolver, and was arrested after a combat. The pilots of the North-Eastern Army were being instructed and trained by Japanese officers. These Japanese instructors, however, their term of office expiring on August 31, returned to
Japan on the morning of the 1st of September.
From that very day onwards, planes of the North-Eastern Army began to fly low over the Japanese barracks in a threatening manner, almost every day. Greatly menaced, we were obliged to construct anti-aircraft establishments in the command of our barracks. Besides, the Captain NAKAMURA Incident, which became more and more complicated, greatly excited officers and men under my command.

11. In view of these circumstances, General HONJO, newly appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army, issued instructions that in case of necessity, we should take positive action, and should endeavour not to impair the prestige of our army. In compliance with his instructions, I told my men, as described above, to muster up their courage and not to impair the honour of their predecessors.

12. Such being the case, I ordered the soldiers in my regiment early in September, that when going out of our barracks for manoeuvres they should carry ball-cartridges in the back ammunition pouch (containing 15 rounds) attached to the belt; that they should always wear gaiters when going out; that no soldiers should go outside the railway zone alone; and that wherever going into the walled city, they should all go in groups and inform their goings.

13. Consequently, more and more intense drills and practices were carried on. Terrain exercises were held night and day, while frequent night manoeuvres were conducted, often two
or three times a week. Emergency call drills were also frequently carried out.

Besides, manoeuvres for the defence of the railway zone were conducted night and day. All these were so frequently and intensely carried on that the citizens at large finally became accustomed to them and came to regard them as nothing extraordinary.

14. On the night of the 18th of September, 1931, I was at my official residence at Aoi-Chō, Mukden, listening to the report of a certain lieutenant colonel attached to my regiment who had returned that afternoon from the topographical investigation of the district where the autumnal manoeuvres were expected to be held. At about 10:40 p.m. Lieut. Colonel SHIMAMOTO, commander of the Second Battalion of the Independent Garrison, reported to me over the telephone "As the Soldiers of Chang Hsueh-Liang's army stationed at the North barracks have blasted the railway and attacked our patrol, the platoon to which the patrol belongs is returning fire now. My battalion is going to reinforce it at once in response to an emergency call."

"All right!" I replied, "I will send out an emergency call to our regiment and myself go to the barracks. Let's arrange for particulars there." Hanging off, I at once called up the officer of the day and ordered him to make the emergency call. After dressing up, I hurried to the barracks. On arriving there, I called together the battalion commanders
and was about to explain the situation, when Lieut. Col. SHIMAMOTO with arms arrived at the barracks on horseback.

He said, "I will attack the enemy troops in the North Barracks with all the strength of my battalion." "All right!" I replied. "I will attack the enemy in the walled city of Mukden."

"Let's do our utmost." After exchanging these words we parted.

According to what we were instructed prior to this, the operational plan of the Kwantung Army was that, because of strained relations in Manchuria, in case of an emergency the Army should concentrate its main force around Mukden to attack the walled city as occasion demanded. Therefore my regiment had been exerting itself in daily drills and other practices that it might be equal to any emergency. Anti-Japanese sentiments were already prevailing in those days and Chang Hsueh-Liang's Army came to take increasingly provocative attitudes towards the Japanese forces. In view of this we who were stationed in Mukden thought that an emergency might crop up at any moment. Under these circumstances, we should be in danger of annihilation by superior number, if we relied merely on the concentration of our main force. In other words, our chief concern was how to fulfill our duties with the troops at hand in Mukden in case of emergency.

The situation at that time was that Chang Hsueh-Liang's Army, 20,000 strong, was so disposed as to encircle the railway zone of Mukden. Suppose our units, totalling less than 1,500 which were stationed at the positions in the railway zone...
extending over 4 kilometres, were attacked by the enemy, it would take at least five or six hours for the garrison unit at Liroyang, which was closest to Mukden, to reinforce us, even if transported by railway undamaged and in perfect working order. Therefore, we concluded that to stick to the defense positions would mean our annihilation; hence we should somehow blunt the point of the probable enemy attack by taking positive action and so gain time till the arrival of our main force. Figuratively speaking, the enemy was constantly menacing us with his fist clenched, so that we believed that the enemy shook that fist at us, who had just a weak little body we had no choice but to get inside his guard and bit his vital spot before he could strike our head with his fist.

16. There had been frequent cases of disturbance to the railway, and in response to such reports we had twice sent out emergency calls and prepared for action. But this was the first time that Chang Hsueh-Liang's troops attacked Japanese units by firing ball-cartridges. Therefore, the moment Lieutenant Colonel SHIAMOTO reported to me about the outbreak of the incident, I perceived that just as I had expected Chang Hsueh-Liang's army has taken the offensive against us according to a definite plan. I judged that at last they had lifted their fist to strike us. Thus, when Lieutenant Colonel SHIAMOTO reported to me, "The entire garrison battalion will reinforce my men who are fighting back,"
I agreed and gave my approval.

17. By Itagaki, a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, who happened to be at the Mukden Special Service Office, we were informed of the Kwantung Army intention along similar lines. This made us much elated. However, in order to attack the enemy at their vital spot, I thought we should not be successful unless we took at least the west wall of the strongly fortified inner wall. I therefore asked ITAGAKI to approve of my operational plan stating, "It is natural that if we rout Chang Hsueh-Liang's troops within the outer walls, we should rush by momentum the west wall of the inner castle. To occupy and hold the west wall to-night will be most advantageous for our attack tomorrow. I request your approval of our occupying the enemy's positions as far as the west wall." He gave his approval. Thereupon, I went back to the barracks and gave the following orders to the Lieutenant Colonel attached to my regiment, the Commanders of battalions and the Commanders of machine gun units.

1. The attacking units:

(a) The First Battalion (less the First Company but reinforced by one platoon each of infantry guns and heavy machine guns) shall attack and occupy the first and third barracks of the guards and the trench motor arsenal.

(b) The Second Battalion (less the Seventh Company but reinforced by the main force of the machine gun unit)
shall seize the west wall of the inner castle immediately after capturing the second barracks of the guards and the barracks of the machine gun unit.

(c) The Seventh Company shall keep watch over the Peace Preservation Unit (the police unit) in the business section and if necessary, shall disarm them.

(d) The First Company shall remain as reserve for the regiment, but one platoon shall join the main force after disrupting main communication lines leading from the walled city of Mukden.

2. Guard corps:

One squad from each company shall remain and organize a unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel INAMI for maintaining peace and order in the railway zone and protect the lives and properties of Japanese residents, specially the unit should keep strict watch over the enemy stationed at Huangkutun. Then, under the regimental colors, I gave instructions to the battalions one by one as they lined up. I cautioned them particularly that "our enemy is Cheng Hsueh-Liang's army and not the Chinese people. The people should be given assurance."

After that, I made all march off one after another. The First Battalion, the first to set out, left at about 12:40 a.m. on the 19th, and I started last from the barracks with the reserve force at a little past 1:00 a.m.
after Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO's telephone report and the time I started from the barracks.

19. On their way to the objectives our units were fired upon by detachments of the Chinese police force, but they marched on, either disregarding them or after disarming them. The First Battalion, as ordered, occupied the barracks and trench motor arsenal by 3:00 a.m. by crushing the resistance made by the Guards. By crushing the resistance of the second unit of the Guards and in defiance of machine gun fire, the Second Battalion occupied the wall at the north-west corner of the inner castle at about 2:30 a.m. on the 19th. Then it seized the south-west wall and so on, until at last it captured the west wall completely by about 3:00 a.m. During these clashes, one officer and six soldiers were wounded, two of whom were wounded in the attack by the police unit and the other five in the attack by the regular army, whereas the enemy left about thirty regular soldiers dead.

20. I asked the Special Service Office to report the action of my regiment to the headquarters of the Second Division. As soon as my regiment occupied the west wall, I ordered an officer to go to Mukden Station to report it to the Divisional Commander who was expected to arrive there. I was at the office of the Japanese Residents' Association outside the Hsinohsiopiermen gate at about 5:00 a.m. on the 19th, when a staff officer of the Division came along to transmit the purport of the order of the Division. He told
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me that the units under the Commander of the 15th Brigade were expected to march along the south side of the Mukden Castle keeping in touch with my regiment, so that my regiment should advance as far as the east wall of the inner castle at once. So I ordered the units of my regiment to advance as far as the streets within the outer walls north of the east wall of the inner castle, where those units were expected to keep in touch with one another. Pursuant to the order, the Second Battalion advanced, and after accepting the surrender of the Direct Guards unit stationed in the inner castle and disarming it, the battalion occupied also the barracks of the spear unit who had all run away, and then occupied the east wall completely at about 6:00 a.m. The First Battalion occupied the streets in the north area of the outer castle in cooperation with the Second Battalion. Together with the reserve force, I arrived at the Hsiapeimen gate of the inner castle where we came under the command of the Division Commander.

21. On the other hand, the small unit which had remained behind as guards in the railway zone was, under difficult conditions, prepared for the attack of the enemy stationed at Huangkutun in cooperation with the police unit and an emergency unit composed of military police and members of the Reservists' Association. These units could thoroughly fulfil their duties, such as maintenance of public order in the railway zone and protection of the lives and properties of the
Japanese residents.

22. I have already referred to the heavy guns which had been mounted in Mukden. I knew of them, but as they belonged to the Independent Garrison, I had had no time to learn about them in detail. Thus the action of my regiment had nothing to do with them.

23. "Then the members of the China Inquiry Commission of the League of Nations came to Mukden, I -- as a participant in the Manchurian Incident -- explained to them the situation at the time of its outbreak, the gist of which was much the same as that which I have stated above. As might be expected of military men, soldier members of the Committee, Major-General McCoy and General Claudel, apparently understood the actual situation quite well.

On this 28th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ HIRATA Yukihiro (sealed)

I, BANNO Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ BANNO Junkichi (sealed)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ HIRATA Yukihiro (sealed)

Translation Certificate

I, Tomoji Sasagawa, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Affidavit of HIRATA Yukihiro is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ T. Sasagawa

Tokyo, Japan
Date 14 March, 1947
cf. loc. 237

ハ、原道守備師なに南洋観道ノ担任区域ノ守備ニ任じテ居マシテ、

其任務ノ相違上作戦ノ通常ニモ多少ノ差違ガアリマスガ且望アル

場合八協力一致シテ行動スルコトニナッテ平常ノ演習ニ於テモ非常

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al
against
ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Defendant: TAKEDA, Hisashi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby deprecate as follows.
I, ex-Lieutenant General Takeda, Harashi, live at No. 9,215 Ina, Ina-Machi, Kami-Ina-Gun, Nagano Prefecture. I was on the staff of the Kwantung Army from December the 5th year of Showa (1930) till April the 7th year of Showa (1932) (at first as Captain and later as Major), chiefly dealing with matters concerning military operations. I herein after make a statement concerning the military movements of the Kwantung Army at the earlier stage of the Manchurian Incident.

XI. THE SITUATION BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE INCIDENT

Towards the latter part of August in the 6th year of Showa (1931) Lieutenant General Honjo, the newly appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army, arrived at his post. At the beginning of September he started his first tour of inspection and review. I was then in his suite. The reports submitted to the new Commander of the Kwantung Army by the unit commanders at the time were filled with righteous indignation at the contemptuous attitude of the Chinese authorities toward our army, the recent repeated interruptions to the traffic on the South Manchurian Railway line and the oppressive and insulting treatment of our nationals in the districts. Alarmingly rumors were current among the local officials and people, which somehow foreshadowed the coming evils. The new Commander always remained calm and serene, and warned his men and the local officials and nationals against hasty and illconsidered
acts, cordially concerning them to you the difficulties with patience. On Sep. 13 when the new Commander inspected the Independent Garrison at Kungsbulin, the commander of the Garrison submitted a report to the effect that the anti-Japanese movement of the Chinese officials and people had been remarkable systematized, with the result that bandits had begun to dominate the districts so romantically that there were signs that their outlaws, ignoring our army, were going to disturb the South Manchurian Railway as well as the zone attached to it. The railway guards of the Independent garrison had been ordered strictly to be most patient so as to refrain from taking positive action outside the railway zone. Imposing upon such an attitude of our army, who forging fetters for its own bondage, restrained itself from positive movements, the outlaws grew more and more systematic and active in assuming a defiant attitude towards, and established the bases of operations alongside the Railway Zone. At last it was thought to be impossible for the garrison to discharge its duties unless it adopted measures outside the ordinary. On the 13th, the day after the inspection of the Independent Garrison at Kungsbulin, Commander FONZO gave the commander of the garrison an instruction to the following effect:

"Of late bandits are showing such violent activity that they often attempt to obstruct traffic on the South Manchurian Railway and at times penetrate even into the Railway Zone. This really fills us with apprehension. At this time you will make every effort towards the performance of your duty.
of guarding the railway and relieving our nationals of their 
uneasiness, taking positive and decisive steps against those 
outsiders who make light of the power and force of our Army".

II. OUTBREAK OF THE INCIDENT AND THE CALLING OUT OF OUR ARMY

Completing the inspection tour of the Army, Lt-Gen. Hiyoshi, 
accompanied by his staff, returned to Port Arthur shortly after 10, 
3 a.m. on Sep. 18.

I was so exhausted from the week's inspection tour that I soon 
fell asleep. I had scarcely slept for an hour when a loud clanging 
of the bell woke me. I got up, wondering what was the matter. Katakru, 
my fellow staff officer, who was my neighbour, told me that something 
serious had happened and that we were all to meet at Chief of Staff 
Hatake's official residence. When I reached the residence, I found 
the Chief of the Staff sitting with Hitakuro and Katakru, another 
staff officer. Katakru, without uttering a word, handed me the 
message of which we spoke, and here is the first news:

"Receiving a report that frenzied Chinese soldiers, at about 
3 a.m. on the 18th destroyed part of the South Manchurian 
Railway line on the east of Port Arthur, which lies to the north 
of Mukden, and attacked our garrison, the 1st Inf. Infantry 
Battalion of the Independent Garrison at Mukden has been 
despatched to the spot."
I, remained silent for a while as the realisation dawned that what was to happen had at last come to pass. After a while all the other staff officers came to join us, and we moved to the main office of the headquarters about 100 metres away and studied measures to cope with the situation. It was all so sudden and coming as it did upon the completion of the Army Commander's important annual inspection, both officers and men were relieved of strain and had probably been resting. The fact is, I myself was one of those who were caught off their guard. All that came to my mind at that moment were visions of the confused scene at Mukden and my earnest hope for the success of our troops. Meanwhile the second report reached us, the gist of which read as follows:

"An enemy unit of the Peitaying Barracks has blown part of the South Manchurian Railway line. The strength of the one is as three or four infantry companies. Our company despatched from Harbiel after 11 o'clock is now fighting the 500 or 600 enemy troops. A corner of the enemy barracks has been taken by our troops. The enemy is now reinforcing with a machine-gun and infantry guns. Our company is fighting desperately. Lt. NODA seriously wounded."

Thus challenge was given by the Chinese troops. The situation was led to its most serious stage through this challenge. At last we had reached the end of our patience. In fact battles were going on between both sides, and it was now impossible to disperse the troops. No one had opposed the opinion that at this juncture the matter should be settled in the shortest time possible by making a lightning
attack upon the centre of the enemy based on the plan provided in peace times for every emergency. But all of the staff felt uncertainty and could not help feeling some hesitation about carrying out such a drastic step which might decide the fate of the nation.

It was at this time that Commander of the army HOJJO arrived at the headquarters and entered his office room, speechless, and looking sad. Major General NIKAIH, and ISHIKAR, staff-officer in charge of operations, followed him into the room. A few minutes later, staff officer ISHIKAR came back with his lips firmly set. (The staff officer told us), that the Commander had made a firm resolution after deep meditation, and had solemnly declared, "Well, I will carry it out on my responsibility." At these word, which cleared the air, I was freed from the feeling of uncertainty, which had occupied my mind for a while, and reached a confident belief that the only way for me to follow was to make my utmost efforts in accordance with the Commander's solemn and decisive resolution.

Between 1:30 A.M. and 1:00 A.M. on the 19th orders were given to each unit. A change was made in the plan of operations already provided in peace time concerning the movement of the unit stationed at Changchun. According to our original plan that unit was also to go to Mukden. But Commander HOJJO ordered that it should not do so, thinking it adequate for the corps to be standing by at Changchun, preparing for actions as it was too early for it to advance on Mukden in accordance with the scanty information they had obtained.
at that time. It is understood that such orders were given because Commander NOMIO sought to settle the matter at the earliest stage.

A report was made to the Central authorities, and a telegram requesting the despatch of additional troops was sent to the Commander of the Korean army according to the definite agreement made in normal times. The gist of the telegram ran as follows:

About (10:30 p.m.) on the 16th the Chinese troops at Mukden made a sudden attack on our garrison. All our forces are fighting desperately with the enemy. The Army has decided to attack Mukden with full strength. You will please despatch reinforcement as soon as possible.

As it was feared that the Chinese troops stationed near Kouzantzu, Chinchou, might make a rear-attack upon us while our troops were fighting alongside the South Manchurian Railway Line, the Army asked Rear Admiral TSUJI, the Commander of the Second Despatched Fleet, which was then near Taingtau, to collaborate by despatching part of the squadron to the offing of Yingkao. But Commander TSUJI assuring that he would take adequate measures according to the development of the situation declined to help us then because there was danger that the disturbances might extend to the Shantung district.
Colonel ITAGAKI, a senior staff officer of the Army, was then at Mukden by order of Commander HONJO after the inspection at Liaoyang on the 18th. As he was well aware of the intention of the Commander of the Army as well as the plan of operations, he gave necessary instructions to Colonel FIRATA, the Commander of the 29th Regiment of Infantry and Commander of the Garrison at Mukden, and Lt. Colonel SHIMIZU, the Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the Independent Garrison, and agreed with their determination to attack the barracks at Mukden and Poitaying. The determination of these front-line commanders was reported to Army headquarters about 2:00 a.m. on the 19th, and Commander HONJO gave his assent. Commander HONJO with full confidence in Colonel ITAGAKI, a stout-hearted man with conscientious scruples, appeared to feel quite secure when he was told that the colonel had happened to be at Mukden, the centre of the event, at the time. Reports telling of the favorable progress of the battles reached us about the same time. Smiles appeared on the faces of the staff officers as well as mine which had been strained with anxiety till that time.

III. ADJUTANT IN HEADQUARTERS, TO
MUKDEN POLICY OF LOCALIZATION OF THE
INCIDENT, REINFORCED FROM
THE KOREAN ARMY.

The Commander of the Army, accompanied by the minimum necessary number of men leaving Port Arthur at 3:30 a.m. arrived at Mukden
about noon on the 19th, after having issued the first order. Chief of Staff H.Y.K.Z and I remained for some time to arrange some unsettled affairs. Leaving there at 7:25 a.m. we arrived at Mukden past 4 o'clock that afternoon, when we saw columns of smoke rising up somewhere in the direction of Poitaying, now and then hearing the reports of guns from the direction of Tungtaying far away. On arriving there we were told of the development of the battle. As such swift and successful operations had never been dreamed of, the more we were grateful for the desperate efforts of our brave and loyal officers and soldiers.

The progress of the battle at Changchun had not yet been reported. Although, after my departure from Port Arthur, I had heard on the train of the outbreak of hostilities at Changchun, I did not pay so much attention to it judging from the situation at Mukden. But on my arrival at Mukden, the staff officers there told us that seemingly a fierce battle was going on at Changchun, and the reports of the development of the battle was not so favorable until six o'clock. At last toward the evening we received reports about the occupation of the town of ‘Menchengtzu and the barracks at Hanling. This report was delivered to us so late on account of the crippled military communication -- the military communication between Changchun and Mukden had been maintained radio of the South Manchurian Railway at the time -- due to the sudden increase in telegrams concerning railway traffic caused
by the congestion arising from the transportation of troops.

Prior to this, Commander NO.2 at 3:40 on the 19th received
a telegram from the Commander of the Korean army when he was pass-
ing Tashihcun. It reported that five infantry battalions, two
artillery battalions, one cavalry company and one engineer com-
pany together with two squadrons of airplanes were to be despatched.
On receiving this telegram we were given fresh heart, feeling
as if we had got a million reinforcements. At the time there
were reports of bitter fighting at Changchun and increasing
unquietness in Kilin and Harbin, and ISIIHR, who was in charge
of operations, was deliberating with other staff officers on
a plan for the period after the arrival at Mukden. Shortly aft-
5 o’clock on the 19th, information from some quarters of the South
Manchurian Railway was received as to the reinforcements from
Korea which, it seems, were waiting at Shingishu by orders from
above. About 11 o’clock that night we had an official telegram
from the Commander of the Korean army to the same effect. About
6 that afternoon an instruction by wire from the War Minister,
closely followed by a telegram from the Chief of the General
Staff, reached us. Their purpose was as follows:
The instruction from the War Minister:

The present issue between the troops of Japan and China
was caused by the attempt at the part of the Chinese troops to
blow up the railroad of the South Manchurian Railway, and it is
obvious that the blame should be placed upon China, but we have
definitly adopted a policy of localizing the affair to a minimum. You will therefore deal with this affair with due consideration of the above.

The instruction from the Chief of the General Staff:
1. The resolution and steps taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army after Sept. 15 were adequate, and are believed to have been effective in upholding the dignity of our Army.
2. It has been decided at a Cabinet meeting that in view of the attitude of China since the outset of the affair we should not go farther than necessity drives us, as measures adopted for the settlement of the issue. Your operations, therefore, will be carried out in accordance with that decision.

Corso der POWO always bore in mind the localization of the affair and endeavored to settle it in the shortest time possible. He made a detailed report on the situation since the night before and watched the development of the affair. Meanwhile discord unrest prevailed in the districts of Kifin and Harbin, and at 3 o’clock on the morning of the 20th he issued an order to concentrate the main force of the Second Division near Chanshan leaving some troops near Juliden.
IV. SECOND DIVISION DESPATCHED TO KILIN, AND
KOREAN ARMY REINFORCEMENTS

From the outset Kilin was the centre of the anti-Japanese
Movement in Manchuria. The report of the clash between
of China and Japan caused further aggravation of the anti-Japanese
sentiment among the Chinese people near Kilin. On the 15th inst.
Haixia, the Deputy Chief of Kilin Province, declared that he could
not take the responsibility thereafter as to the protection of
Japanese nationals. According to the information we obtained
from the authorities of the Kilin-Changchun Railway, the main
force of the Kilin Army had already been called out (its strength
and the direction of its movement were not clear). Toward the
evening of the 20th, we were furnished with information by St.
Col. Oseko, the Military adviser to the Kilin Army, to the effect
that the Kilin Army had crossed the border on the 20th, and we
thought that these troops would advance in the direction of
Changchun, or come down along the Mudan-Railway to the
south up to Fushun for the purpose of countering our movement
and reinforcing the enemy main force.

At 9:45 that night we received a telegram (sent at 11:40 p.m.
from the President of the Japanese nationals in Kilin.
The gist was as follows:

"The situation in the Kilin area is tense. The residences
of some Japanese nationals have already been fired upon."
Therefore, a section of the women and children here has
already been evacuated. The remainder however not only
find evacuation impossible but the danger grows
hourly imminent. As a decision on the part of this So-
ciety, we beg you to adopt swift and complete measures to
protect this place.

At the time the situation in the Kweilin area was also con-
siderable aggravated. and the Japanese nationals there were
preparing to evacuate. In the vicinity of Laiden, things
were all in a state of confusion, a considerable number of the
remnants of the defeated enemy troops being seen prowling
thereabout. Under the condition, if troops were to be des-
patched to Kowilin for the purpose of protecting our nationals
there, considering the strength of the enemy force stationed
near Kowilin it would be necessary to despatch the complete stron-
t of the 2nd Division at Chingchun. This, however, would re-
the defence of a long stretch of the railway line and much
danger was apprehended that the remnants of the defeated enemy
troops taking a rally, might attempt to destroy the rail road,
out our army into two parts and keeping them some four hun-
dred and fifty miles apart, one in the south and the other in the
north. But now that the Government had definitely adopted the
policy of localizing the affair, the Commander of the Army had
to be most deliberate in making decisions. And yet he, who had the heavy responsibility for the protection of our nationals, could not find it within himself to leave in imminent danger the nationals whose only hope lay upon that single track of railway. Moreover, a passive measure taken in fear of the danger of separation of strength might prove to be an incentive to the one reaction and cause a state of hopeless confusion. At last we reached a conclusion that there was no other way left for us but to deliver such a crushing blow to the enemy at Kilin that it would be thoroughly cowed and, at the same time, to take firm measures for safeguarding the South Manchurian Railway line. Commander H0 JI and H1Y.KI, the Chief of the Staff deliberated upon the matter for about an hour, and later again fully discussed it with all the staff-officers. At 3 a.m. on the 21st a decision to despatch troops was given by the Commander.

The main force of the Second Division left Changchun for Kilin on the morning of the 21st.

According to information from our secret agents, the Kilin army were taking up positions all around the city of Kilin. We waited for the first report, being prepared for a heavy battle. On account of the defective means of communication, however, we could not make contact with the despatched troops, until a report of the bloodless occupation of the city reached us after 9 o'clock that evening. Such news was really a surprise — a pleasant surprise which put our mind at ease. When commander
HONJO decided to send to troops to Kilin, he reported by wire the details of the despatch of the troops to the Commander of the Korean Army as well as the military authorities at Tokyo and eagerly waited for the answer, which did not come so soon. Somehow it was felt that the atmosphere in the headquarters of the Army was rather gloomy. Shortly after 1 p.m. we obtained information from the authorities of the South Manchurian Railway to the effect that the 39th Mixed Brigade had begun to cross the Yalu River. This report was closely followed by a telegram from the Brigade Commander, the gist of which was as follows:

"The 39th Mixed Brigade crossed the frontier at 1:00 p.m. on the 21st and is coming up to Mukden under Your Excellency's command."

Commander HONJO and all the other members of the Army were grateful for the friendship of the Korean Army in such a difficult situation.

Shortly after this the Chief of the General Staff sent a telegram from Tokyo recognising that the despatch to Kilin of our troops was the outcome of necessity.

Upon this Commander HONJO ordered the 39th Mixed Brigade to garrison the Mukden area and the whole strength of the Second Division to concentrate near Changchun.
As our occupation of Kilin relieved the South Manchurian Railway Zone of its fear of attack, Commander Ho was determined to call back the main force of the Army immediately to their posts alongside the Railway line, and watch the development of the situation, taking advantage of the occasion of the arrival of the 39th Mixed Brigade. On Sept. 20 he made a speech to his men, in which he admired their valor and instructed them to maintain complete defence of the Zone under strict discipline. On the 24th, the following day, the main force of the Second Division was ordered to guard the vicinity of Changiun, coming back from Kilin, the 39th Mixed Brigade the vicinity of Hsinmin, and part of the Independent Garrison was stationed at Kilin (the core stationed at Tunghua left the post on Oct. 10.) and near the crossing point of the Liao River east of Hsinmin, and charge of maintaining peace in the district. Chang Hauhliang, who was staying at Peiping, established the headquarters of the Northern Frontier Army and the Government of Manchur Province at Inchon. High officials, military and civil, including Chang Tsohsing, the former Chief of Kilin Province were given their posts. Gradually the Headquarters and the Army was opened. As he attempted to harass our rear inciting mounted brigands and soldier
bandits to guerrilla warfare. Not a few Japanese nationals, especially Koreans, were victims of their looting and violence.

In spite of the efforts made by our army uneasiness seemed to prevail wider and wider.

It was natural that the attention of the Kwantung Army should be called to those Chinese assertions at Chinchou.

First the flying units were ordered to reconnoitre the Chinchou area. According to their reports, our planes appeared above the city of Chinchou, on Oct. 3 when the enemy displayed its hostility firing at the planes, which then bombed the military establishments including the enemy barracks and the College of Communications where the enemy headquarters had been established. But at that time these planes attached to the army had no bombing equipment and were fitted with temporary gear and the bombs were also very crude ones. So we learned the bombing made on that day did not cause any material damage to the enemy.

VI. BATTLE IN THE CHINCHOU VICINITY

SITUATION BEFORE BATTLE

Since May, 1951, because of the precarious political situation in North China, Fan Pulin, the Chief of Heilung-kian Province and Vice-Commander of the Northern Frontier army, had been staying at Peiping by or er of Chiang "suchling with their infantry brigades and an artillery corps, the pick of the
Heilungkiang Army. 'an Kuo, his eldest son, remained in his father's place during his absence, and Chief of the Staff Haieh H'o was in charge of military affairs in place of the Vice-Commander. Faced with a grave situation in Heilungkiang Province, where signs of drastic change were seen after the outbreak of the incident, 'an Kuo was too young to have any strong control over the people, and Haieh H'o was a mere colonel and not competent enough to decide major important matters, which were all conducted according to the instructions of Wn Fulin who was then at Peking. More than once 'an Fulin, worried about the inconvenience, and requested his return to his post of Chung Haiding, who refused him permission each time. (The above information was obtained through Chinese telegrams which were intercepted and deciphered by us.) Chang Haiding, the Commander of the Border Garrison of Tuman-Liaosi District, seemingly with the intention of expanding his influence toward the north at this opportune time, made a declaration of independence on Oct. 10, and set forth to advance into Heilungkiang Province. Thereupon 'an Kuo inquired for instructions from his father on the one hand, while a messenger was sent to Chang Haiding to accuse him. Every time Chang Haiding's advance was reported to Wn Fulin, he was utterly taken aback and did not know what to do, being either isolated or depressed according to the situation. Later on Oct. 4, as it was revealed that our army had no intention of helping Chang Haiding, Wn Fulin sent tele-
graphic instructions to the following effect:

"The Japanese Army will never advance into North Manchuria. Chan Haiseng seeks to take over Heilungkiang Province by threat so, rather than indulging in futile maneuver you should resist him with determination. You will see to it that, as the Japanese army has no intention of violating Manchuria, the people should set their minds at ease, and be careful not to be deluded by false reports." (The above is the translation of an intercepted telegraphic instruction sent on Oct. 4. The following information of the enemy's movements was also obtained from the enemy's telegrams intercepted by us. The code-book of the Chinese Army was obtained by us when we entered Mukden.) Then the troops of Heilungkiang Province were concentrated near Taitsihar, and Ma Chanshan, the Commander of the 3rd Brigade of Infantry at Neiho was summoned to Taitsihar and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Province Army and concurrently Deputy Governor of Heilungkiang Province.

On the other hand Chang Hapeng, although he had designs on Heilungkiang Province, still remained irresolute, and was continuing negotiations with the Heilungkiang Provincial Government (according to the reports from 199, Chief of the branch office of the South Manchurian Railway Company at Tianan), and seemed to be trying to take the area by means of diplomatic tactics. On the part of the Heilungkiang authorities the minds of the
leaders were still agitated. Some days went by and it was understood that they were waiting for Mr. Chanshan's arrival at Heiho, and at the same time setting forth to fortify the vicini of Tashing. At last Chang Haipeng made a decision and left Tuonan on Oct. 15 (according to the reports from KONO, the Chief of the Branch Office of the Manchurian Railway Company at Tuonan) and began to march northward. Thereupon the Heilungkiang Army resisted the pressing force, burning up a railway bridge across the Nonni River, which caused interruption of traffic on the Tuonan--angangchi Railway line. The railway, was not only part of the main line of international communication but was built on our loan and at the time it was the only security for the loan as neither principal nor interest had been paid by China. Faced with the season of transportation of 2,500,000 tons of special products in North Manchuria, the South Manchurian Railway suffered a serious loss through the destruction of the railway bridge, and economic life of the people in North Manchuria was also considerably affected. Therefore, on Oct. 20 T.KEMURA, Katsukiyo, an engineer of the Tuonan--angangchi Railway Bureau, accompanied by fifteen persons were sent by the South Manchurian Railway Company to the spot for actual inspection. When T.KEMURA's party arrived there they were illegally fired on at close range by the troops of the Heilungkiang Army who were full aware of their being non-combatants.

After this KURAKI, a director of the South Manchurian
Railway, together with the consul-general at Mukden made a demand upon the Kwantung Army and the central circles at Tokyo for the repairs. Concerning this the Army had negotiations with Ma Chenshan through Consul Shi of Tsitsihar, and with Kuznetsov, the Vice-President of the Board of Directors of the East-China Railway through the consul-general at Harbin. We made most reasonable representations, but all in vain. It was absolutely necessary to complete the repairs before the freeze set in. At the last talk on Oct. 27 we gave them notice that the repairs should be complete by Nov. 3, a week later than that day, and added that if they should not agree with us we must carry out the repairs on our part by using force. The Heilungkiang Government promised to start repairing on Oct. 30, but it was not sincere in its promise, and right from the start no attempt at repairing was made.

NIYI RIVER DETACHMENT DESPATCHED

As no sincerity was shown by the Heilungkiang Provincial Government the Trans-Manchurian Railway Bureau and the South Manchurian Railway Company determined to start the repairs and made a request to the Army to sending troops to protect the working party at the destroyed bridge. It was thought that the main force of the Heilungkiang Army massed on the northern bank of the Nonni River consisted of about 2,000.

As the bridge was situated more than 500 kilometres away from the Manchurian Railway Zone where the mainforce of our army
was stationed, it was quite difficult to send reinforcements at an adequate time in case of emergency. What was worse, the Nonni River ran there isolating from us the working party and the covering force. Under such circumstance, it was obvious that in case of emergency at least one regiment of infantry was absolutely necessary. But Commander HONJO, honestly observing the localizing policy, determined to send the necessary minimum of men so as not to provoke the people of Heilungkiang Province, and ordered the dispatch of the Nonni River Detachment (one infantry battalion, one artillery battalion and an engineer company) under the command of Colonel HAMAOTO, the Commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment. Commander HONJO gave special instructions to Colonel HAMAOTO to use prudence and caution in conducting the despatched troops, for instance, first he was to negotiate with Heilungkiang Army and then send a unit to protect the working party after having ascertained the complete withdrawal of the Heilungkiang Army. He made every effort possible to avoid trouble, to the spot sending ISEIHARA, staff officer in charge of planning military operations. The Nonni River Detachment, starting from Changchun, arrived at the vicinity of Chengchiatuh on Nov. 1. and the next day advanced to the vicinity of Tailai, and then commenced various preparations.

On that day Commander HONJO notified Ma Chanshan and Chang Haiqeng to the following effect: --

As the Taonlfc-Angangchi Railway Bureau and the South Manchurian Railway Company are now going to repair the railway
bridge near Honni River. Bridge under cover of our forces;

1. It will not be permitted to use the bridge for military purposes.

2. The troops of both armies should be withdrawn farther than 10 kilometres from the bridge. They are not to be permitted to enter an area within 10 kilometres of the bridge until the completion of the repairs.

We had received no information whatever about the state of things after Nov. 3. On the 4th, the day for the repairs to be started, Commander [name] and other staff officers waited for information from the detachment. They were kept in suspense until a telegram sent by Kow, the Chief of the Branch Office of the South Manchurian Railway at Taonan, reached them at 1:30 a.m. The purport of the telegram was as follows:

An officer patrol left Tailai on the 2nd and arrived at the 2nd bridge on the Honni River at 4:00 a.m. on the 3rd, when a unit of the Heilungkiang Army at T-haing fired a volley at them. There were no casualties on our part.

About the same time the army signal squad commander of the, received a telegram from the chief of the wireless station at longchino. It was to the following effect:

Hostilities Started. Please observe signal schedule.

We therefore thought that hostilities had commenced but at about 2 o'clock that afternoon we received a telegram to the following:

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effect:

"Staff officer ISHIMAA will return from Tailai on the 5th. You will please send a passenger plane to Tailai as soon as possible."

We concluded that since ISHIMA was returning the situation there was not so serious. At 6:00 a.m. we learned that the commander of the air unit at Mukden had received from the commander of the airplanes assisting the detachment a telegram to the following effect:

It seems that the enemy has retired without offering any resistance. The Nonni Detachment advanced up to Tansing at 11:00 a.m.

At this report we felt easier, thinking that the enemy might have conceded to our demand, but as we had not yet received any report from the commander of the detachment, there still remained a feeling of uncertainty in our minds.

From that night until the afternoon of the following day, we received several reports on the progress of the battle. The conditions at the outset of the battle were reported as follows:

"On the night of Nov. 3, our engineer corps repaired the destroyed bridge so that infantry on foot might be able to cross it. At 5:00 a.m. on the 4th, Captain HAMAI, the Company Commander, and part of his men occupied the 5th Bridge about 3 kilomètres south of Tansing Station and took up their posts protecting the working party. At 3:30 a.m. the Chief of Staff of the Heilungkiang Army,
accompanied by SHINIU, the General at Tientsin, came to the spot and declared that the Heilungkiang Army had no intention of resistance, and promised to withdraw his troops from the first line by noon that day, and notified:

On that morning it had a dense fog which prevented us from ascertaining the enemy's position in face of our troops.

The 9th company of the 15th Infantry Regiment left the 5th bridge at noon, trusting in the words of the Chief of Staff of that Heilungkiang Army. They marched with a big column at the head of the column and each member carried a small one. When they reached a point some distance to the south of Tientsin Station, they were suddenly fired on from several directions with rifles and guns. In an instant they had 15 casualties and the company had to retire to the 5th Bridge to wait for the arrival of the main force.

Hearing the reports of guns, the main force then staying near Kianghsun Station, suddenly began to press forward and hostilities began at earnest at dawn on the 6th. The enemy, which had taken up a position and were superior in numbers to us made an enveloping attack upon the detachment, which soon found itself in a most difficult situation.

Each report which reached us successively brought unfavorable news of the progress of the battle.

One after another our reinforcements reached the firing line after the daybreak of the 6th. It took them from 25 to 30 hours.
to reach there. The enemy at first made light of our forces which were much inferior in number to the enemy, and repeatedly made heavy attacks upon us. But with the arrival of our reinforcements they were compelled to fall back with heavy losses. Commander HONJO in accordance with the policy of the central authorities in Tokyo, ordered his troops to stand by near Tahsing Station so as to protect the working party at the bridge under repair. Those who were in the first line could not understand the true intent of Commander HONJO who ordered them to refrain from pursuing the enemy. They were burning with revenge as they had been suffering extremely under the siege of the enemy for a whole tv days and nights since the evening of the 4th, during which some of their comrades were killed and they themselves suffered with no supply of food or water. It is said the commanders in the first line, sharing the suffering of their men who were in a fury of excitement, persuaded them with bitter tears.

VII. BATTLE NEAR ANGANGCHI

The strength of our army, massed near Tahsing before Nov. 1, was 5 infantry battalions, 5 artillery companies, 1 engineer company, and 2 flying companies. It would have been very easy for us to take Tsitsihar, the capital of the province, with these forces. The soldiers in the first line wanted to carry it out,
but they were ordered to stand by near Tahsing. The only reason for this was the policy of localizing the affair and peaceful settlement of the issue.

Our successful attitude, however, caused the enemy to make light of our army. Soon some enemy troops were stationed at the Painshsingtun-Sanchiushang area, which was situated on the south of the East China Railway line, and the main force was concentrated near Angangchi. They spread propaganda that the Japanese forces had been defeated and their attitude was getting more and more arrogant and defiant.

On the other hand the enemy at Chinchou also gradually assumed activity in cooperation with the Heilungkiang Army. About 10,000 armed bandits instigated by the enemy, crossed the Liao River, threatening to come down to the South Manchurian Railway line.

M. Chenshan, who had won great renown as the hero of the day, boosted by Chang Kaishiang and various other circles with admiration and encouragement, triumphantly declared that he would have a decisive battle with the Japanese Army. He concentrated about 20,000 troops, including the Heilungkiang Army (T.N. Not Clear) in the area between Tsitsihar and Angangchi before Nov. 10. His cavalry took a position so as to encircle us on the right flank. Thus the movement of the enemy troops became remarkably active. The situation was so keen that hostilities might be opened at any moment by a challenge on the part of the enemy.
The Kwantung Army made a report to the central authorities at Tokyo on the tense situation, and was prepared both for war and peace, gradually concentrating the main force of the Army (mainly including the 2nd Division) near Taihsing.

Even at this time HONJO, the Commander, did not abandon the idea of peaceful settlement, and he demanded that Ma Chan-shan finally reflect giving him the following conditions on the 14th

(a) to withdraw his forces north of the Chinese Western Railway and not to send them south of it again
(b) not to check the traffic of the Taonan-Anyangchi Railway
(c) the Japanese forces will withdraw south of Chengkiatun after ascertaining that the above two conditions are being carried out.

Ma Chan-shan however, not only took no notice of those conditions, but also destroyed the Taonan-Anyangchi Railway, thus disturbing the Japanese forces in the rear and became more and more challenging.

In such a critical condition the 4th Mixed Brigade and some aid support were coming to aid us from Japan and they were expected to reach the battlefield about the 22nd. Therefore we were making preparations to deliver a blow after uniting those forces, but on the 16th and 17th the enemy threatened us in the right rear with numerically superior cavalry and the enemy in front also became more active, so that the 2nd Division confronted them with small strength and occupied Tsitsihar at one blow.
Of course our plan was to withdraw our forces as soon as possible if our object was attained; in accordance with that plan we sent no troops into Tsitsihar, stationing our main force at Nantuying and a part at Poituying and chiefly entrusted China with the preservation of peace. About the 13th it snowed and it was bitterly cold; nevertheless the heating apparatus was entirely destroyed in the barracks and clothes etc. had not arrived as yet. Thus the Japanese officers and men had bitter experiences beyond description. The fact that in this battle no less than 1,000 soldiers were frost bitten among 14,000 who were killed and wounded shows what hardship they underwent.

VIII. THE DESPATCH OF JAPANESE FORCES TO CHINCHOU

The Chinese forces at and around Chinchou, co-operating with the Manchukuo's forces in the Heilungkiang Province, played an active part about the beginning of November. They advanced a corps to the neighbourhood of Tahushan and Koupantzu and drove forward a newly organized volunteer force, a detached one, east of the Li River; consequently the disturbance of public peace along the South Manchurian Railway became systematic and large scale. We were exhausted with ceaseless activity as if we were continually driving away summer flies. The conclusion was that so long as we did not capture the base of enemy operations near Chinchow, we
would find it difficult to preserve peace in our district.

In the meanwhile the Chinese people who were indignant at
the defeat of Ku Chü-shen once entailed as the greatest hero of
the age attributed responsibility to Chang Hauch-ling and Chiang
Kai-shek who looked on with folded arms and they became active in
the anti-Chiang and Chang movement in connection with the com-
plexed internal problems.

It was expected, therefore, that Chiang Kai-shek and Chang
Hauch-ling would take positive actions to some extent to keep
themselves in countenance, no matter how they felt in their hearts
about this time all over Liantsi, with Chinchow as its centre,
the rumour was prevalent that China would open hostilities against
Japan and the people either danced for joy or began to take re-
serve for fear of the disasters of war. Then the situation in
North China was very uneasy and the Tientsin expeditionary force
suffered great hardships with very small strength (estimated less
than 1,000). If an incident should breakout in that district,
the Kwantung Army must save our comrades force (i.e. the Tientsin
force) from crisis and clear the neighbourhood of Chinchow of
Chinese forces; and we felt that need.

Then the Kwantung Army was in an atmosphere of such unrest, on the
night of November 28th the commander of the Tientsin force unexpec-
tedly reported that hostilities had erupted between Japanese and
Chinese forces in the neighbourhood of Tientsin and that they were
spreading all over the district. Receiving the demand for rein-

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forcemments, the Kwantung Army were resolved to save the Tientsin force from the crisis. The 4th Mixed Brigade which had been newly reinforced from Japan and had been stationed near Mukden was ordered on the 27th to start from the line of the Liao River and advance at first to near Aoupantzu in order to cover the gathering of the Army's main force and begin its operation. Room however that the serious situation in the Tientsin dist was somewhat relieved and concurrently receiving the order of the Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo to stop the operation, we withdrew the above-mentioned forces to the line of the South Manchurian Railway.

Prior to this, the Banking government which had expected the imminent attack on Chinchow by Japanese forces implored the British, American and French ambassadors to establish a neutral zone in the neighbourhood of Chinchow on November 24. But once we withdrew our forces east of the Liao River, the Banking government declared that it was opposed to the establishment of the neutral zone and even issued a false statement that the proposal had been offered by the Japanese forces. That was judged to have been a cunning trick characteristic of China to mitigate the attack on Chinchow and the cessation of our operations raised the morale of the Chinese as usual and they grew more and more presumptuous. Knowing that, the officers and men of the Kwantung Army became very incensed and public opinion stiffened, too.

In the middle of December the positions near Chinchow were
and, strong as the Chinese strength which gathered in the vicinity of the city reached 35,000 and the number of volunteer bandits, detached forces, incited by the Chinese forces ranged from 50,000 to 60,000; disturbances plotted east of the Liao River gave direct threats to the South Manchurian Railway and the bandits along the Antung-Fengtien Railway seemed to be co-operating. The destruction of railroad and stoppages of traffic occurred in rapid succession. Though we adopted the policy of localizing the affair, the situation soon became so serious that we could not tolerate the Chinese insults any longer, and from the point of view of securing the self-defense of the Japanese army and the welfare of the Japanese residents in Manchurian and Korea it was a pressing need to capture the base of their operations. The Antung Army reported the above situation to the central authorities of the army. The Japanese Government took measures to make the League of Nations have a clear understanding of this situation and reserved the right to suppress the bandits. Then as the bandits in Liaodong were clearly supported by the Chinese regular forces, their suppression made it inevitable that we should have an encounter with the Chinese force. The Japanese Government, therefore, issued necessary attentions and opened negotiations in Hankou, Peiping and other places demanding the withdrawal of the Chinese forces from the inside of the Wall. But the latter's activity became such that by commission of the central authorities of the army the 2nd Division advanced along the Yingshe branch-line starting from the
line of the Liao River on December 23th in order to drive away the enemy from the neighbourhood of Tienchungtai and Fushan which was the strongest base of operations of the volunteer force, a detached one, in Liaosi. Just as we had expected, near Tienchungtai the Chinese regular forces reinforced the volunteers with armoured trains and in Fushan the bandits mixed with powerful regular forces made a night attack upon us; in other places we had encounter with such mixed forces. Therefore Honjo, the 30th on he began to suppress the enemy along the Fongtien-Shanhaikwan Railway, but the enemy unexpectedly retreated without fighting. The consequence was that Chinchow and district was in a state of anarchy for a while and the peace was disturbed so that the 2nd Division was moved there and the other main force of was withdrawn to the South Manchurian Railway.

IX. THE DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO HARBIN

Hai Hsin, acting-chief of Kirin Province, took the lead of the other provinces in the establishment of a new regime late in September of 1901, and broke off relations with Chang Ksuch-ling and Chang Tso-hsia, while the military caste of the Chang Tso-hsia, action betook themselves to Harbin and its south-eastern vicinity and established a regime in Pingshan (about sixty kilometres north-east of Harbin) in opposition to this move.
(Hsi Hsia's regime will be called the "Kilin Regime", the other
the "Anti-Kilin Regime" in the following.)

The Kilin Regime, seeing that there was no way to solve the
matter except by force, set about forming new forces, and their
strength was computed at nine thousand towards December of at year.
Hsi Hsia left the neighbourhood of Kilin on Jan. 5 of the 7th
year of Showa (1932), and started on a suppression mission. Pressin
the Anti-Kilin forces he reached the suburbs of Harbin, and a
battle between the two main forces took place from Jan. 27.
About that time some quarters of the Anti-Kilin forces entered
Harbin and began to pillage, so the whole city was thrown into
an uproar, and the inhabitants filled with alarm. About 5,500
Japanese residents (4,000 Japanese and 1,500 Koreans) were there.
They urgently demanded that troops be despatched. Though the
Kwantung Army also foresaw the aggravation of the situation, it
kept observing the situation impartially and carefully, for it
was not desirable to be involved in a conflict between Chinese
factions. But it was reported on the night of Jan. 27 that
four Japanese had been killed and many Koreans arrested. Further-
more, Captain SHIMIZU, a pilot of a Japanese aeroplane, was murdered
by the anti-Kilin army when he made a forced landing in the
suburbs of Harbin while he was reconnoitering the city on the
same day, so that the army decided to dispatch two infantry
battalions in order to protect the residents, having communicated
with the central military authorities and having given both of
the two forces notice that there was no intention but that of
protecting the Japanese residents.

At that time there were 4 locomotives and 400 carriages and
wagons at the Eastern Chinese Railway's Wanchingtsu station,
and the consent of the Eastern Chinese Railway had already been
obtained for the transportation of our troops. It was therefore
optimistically considered that things would be easy. In the
case of the transportation, however, as most of the workers of
the Eastern Chinese Railway had already fled, workers of the
South Manchuri Railway had to be dispatched promptly from
Changchun. Furthermore, as those workers did not know well the
condition of the stations and railway-line of the Eastern Chinese
Railway and the construction of its cars was different from those
of the South Manchuri Railway, unexpected hitch occurred.
That with wasting time in assembling trains and a derailment the
preparation of the trains was much delayed, and the first train
started about 11 p.m. of the 23th. But the trains met on the
way with resistance from a part of the anti-Hilin Army and destruction
of the railway, so progress was very slow, and it was
5 p.m. of Jan. 30 when the trains reached Shuangching station.

The Kwantung Army feared that the opportunity of protecting
the residents should be lost, as the progress of the trains was
so slow, but nothing could be done. Furthermore it was reported
that the anti-Hilin Army was ill-disposed toward us at that time,
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so the Kwantung Army feared that unexpected accidents would occur due to the independent advance of small units. And indeed some two thousand Anti-Kilin troops set for Shuangcheng before dawn of Jan. 31, and there broke out a confused fight. At this report also the Kwantung Army was very alarmed, for the four available locomotives were all at Shuangcheng and there was no means of reinforcement. Commander HONJO specially, would have suffered in his mind, because we could not have been able to force, although knowing of its critical situation. For the above mentioned reasons it proved to be dangerous to small units advance solely, by so the main force of the 2nd Division was added to the two battalions.

Reaching Harbin on Feb. 4, the 2nd Division was challenged by the Anti-Kilin force which had occupied a position near there and was compelled to fight back, then entered Harbin on the 5th.

Of course Commander HONJO troubled himself with the policy of localizing the affair and of withdrawing the 2nd Division promptly to Manchuria district in order to avoid the occurrence of useless trouble with Soviet Russia, because Harbin heavily involved her rights and interests. But once a severe battle with the Anti-Kilin army had been fought, unrest could not be dissolved easily, and the division also could not evacuate there immediately.

(End)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

NISHI, Hirosi (swl)
On this 10th day of January, 1947
at Tokyo

DEponent TAKED, Hiashi (seal)

I, TAKED, Hiashi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at the same place

Witness: (signed) BAIJO, Junkichi (seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 20th March 1947
高級部隊

板垣大佐は十八日電報を送って

「命令は依り奉天進行するが、居リマシンク。同大佐ハ厳命ノ作戦計画ハ勿論、

軍司令官ノ時ヘ、十分注意シテ居リマシン。」

同大佐ハ軍司令官ヲ指揮ハテ

步兵第十九聯隊長平田大佐ヲ

同大佐ハ軍司令官ヲ指揮ハテ

城ノへノ反面頭頭居リマシン。

之等ヲ一線部隊長ニ決定ハ居リ

告ハ軍司令官ヲ承認シマシテ

関係拝呈、同大佐ヲ指揮ハテ

事件ノ中心ハ、居リマシンク。

報告ヲ同時頒受ヲサシマシテ

ツァルノ時ニ力ヲ囲むシテ

居リマシンク。

官トシテ

居リマシンク。

ナルヲ

居リマシンク。

ラールヲ

居リマシンク。

戦況ヲ

居リマシンク。

居リマシンク。
不適当な部分を削除します。
「誰かが必要とするかと思うと、もう少しあなたの力が必要になることを覚えておいてください。」

「うむ。それができるなら、いつでもお手伝いする。」

「では、お先に。がんばってください。」

「はい、守りましょう。」
菩提寺

2023年

仏頭

大仏

仏像

仏壇

仏教

仏具

仏教史

仏法

仏門

仏教文化

仏教建築

仏教美術

仏教思想

仏教法典

仏教教義

仏教教育

仏教哲学

仏教史学

仏教法医学

仏教社会学

仏教経済学

仏教文学

仏教美術

仏教史学

仏教法医学

仏教社会学

仏教経済学

仏教文学
十一月三日以来何等報告と部隊行動に関する手紙を日朝本庄司令官以下

同役者派 партиейに

同役者派 партиейに

安心ハシタノノ未収支隊長カル何等報告ニ接シ次ノ如ク

天敵中隊長宛ニハノトロウヲ思テ居リハノ報告ヲ

その他大抵ニ確信シタノカヲ知リテ

十一時大抵ニ確信シタニ支隊長何等報告ニ接シ

レタルノラント判断ヲ

次ノ如ク

現場支隊ハ

22
シダ

「昭和二十一年一月三日、夜後、デフランス陸軍隊は、五日未明に到着。」

ラ・ド・ヴェリラスに於て、第二師団は、前進し、五日未明に到着。}

包囲攻撃シ支隊、ノ戦時、ト・ツタノ・テラマスガ陣地、破り。且、優勢ナル敵ハ、ボロロ、ノッ
四月一日迄近に大規模な集結を繰り返し、兵力を増強したわずかな守備を進め、敵の認識を誤らせようとした。しかし、敵の攻撃はまもなく到達し、地図に描かれた防沿線を越え、城砦の集結部を突撃するものである。

何時彼ノ挑戦ヲ依リ戦斗ヲ起シナレトモ限ラ約戦ヲ指摘スルノ警戒ヲ示ヘル所謂之ノ地図ヲ集団ヲ構成スルヲ期スノデナリシマス。
之が為寺介石。「張學良ハ内心ノ如何ニ拘ラズ面目上看リルモノニ对

之ガ為寺介石。張學良ハ内ハ如何ニ拘ラズ面目上看リルモノニ对

寸中心トシ西征ニ对ノ関戦説流布セルレ民衆ハ之ヲ顕り或ハ戦鬪ヲ

恐怖ヲ遮難ヲ開始スルト云フ状況ヲハリマシタ。當時北支那方面ノ情報ハ

著ダ不安ヲハリマシテ我ガ天津軍ハ極メテ微弱ナル兵力（千名以下）ヲ

以テハ非常ニ苦労シテ居ルマシタ。若シ同方面ニ破片発生シ彼我交戦スル

如ノヲ私設トナツム場合戦東軍ハ友軍（天津軍ノ危急ヲ知）ニ次テ

珊瑚附近ノ支那軍ヲ援スルヲ必要ヲ挙ガレマシタノデ

司令ヲヨリ天津附近ニ於テハ同じ軍ノ間ニ戦端開タレ全面ニ於テ

之ヲ指示ニ依ク下シ行動ヲ開始シタレマシテ

命令ニ接シマシタノデ該部ヲ直ニ進むヲ命令ヲ復書セシメマス。
十四日英米仏大使等に対し述べて、南支事態の実態を説明し、南京政府がハ十一月ニ

我軍一帯整河以来仏様過致シルト彼ハ中立地帯ノ設定ヲ反對ナル旨ヲ宣言シ且該提議ハハロ日本據ヨリ提議セリトノ不信ノ有ヲ露シマ

ンガ既ノ来州攻撃ヲ緩和シテセルスルヲ望シテ第ハハノ作戦行動ノ中止ハ例ニヨリ支那側ノ志気ヲ鼓舞シ

カノ增長シテ来タノデアルマス。之ヲ知タル東軍將兵ハ催告シテ南臨亦

械ヲ歳長スルコトハ急マノ急トナッタノデアルマス。軍ハ以上ニ於フ、

據ヲ歳長スルコトハ焦眉ノ急トナッタノデアルマス。軍ハ以上ニ於フ、

据ヲ歳長スルコトハ焦眉ノ急トナッタノデアルマス。軍ハ以上ニ於フ、
九月、哈爾濱激戦

吉林省主席代理兼駐在本省三等先鋭審部、九月ニ再び新殊ヲ麾

方地監ニ配リ授期北陸ヲ四、ニ政務機器ヲ樹立シニ対抗シテノデアルマス。
From Consul-General HAYASHI in Puk' en to Foreign Minister SHIBEHARA.

Dispatched: T'UK'EN, p.m. October 13, 1931.
Received: m.m. October 14, 1931.

Telegram No: 963 (Code)

Telegram addressed to me, dispatched from CHENG CHIATUN, No. YU-16.

1. With reference to the independence movement of MONGOLIA, it is as reported previously, but according to an information from Mongolian source, Chief PAO of TIANGTZU is expected to proceed in a day or two to TUNGALIAO with 1500 young Mongols who are all equipped with arms, and formed into a cavalry unit, and also with 25 horse carts fully loaded with war materials. It is also reported that there is a private commitment whereby up to 10,000 pieces of arms will be supplied by the Japanese Army. Forty some odd persons, including the families PAO and his staff left for T'UK'EN on the 9th.

2. Our armoured coaches accompanied by 50 infantrymen of this place left here for TUNGALIAO on the 9th, carrying the residents who intend to return to TUNGALIAO. The troops came back in the evening of the 9th. According to a fellow traveler, he states that almost all shops in the entire town of TUNGALIAO have been closed, in fear of the invasion of the Mongolian troops and that no military police were in sight and the situation is one of terror. A small unit of engineers, who were with the above mentioned move, completely destroyed with explosives the junction point of the SS'TIENGTZU-TAOHAI and the TIENSHAN-TUNGALIAO Railways at the TUNGALIAO station. This demolition job, it is reported, was directed by Captain OTA, a staff officer of the Army Headquarters.

3. According to KIKUTAKE, Chief of the South Manchurian Railway's local office, he says that our Army supplied CHANG AIPENG of TAOHAI with 5,000 rifles in order to give him independence; that CHANG, however, asked for further assistance to the extent of two hundred thousand yen as a war fund; that it is rumored that the South Manchurian Railway, in connection with the recent incident, will advance about three million yen of secret military fund, but that when this is realized, our Army will probably lay out its plan with the above fund.
Request that message be relayed by wire to the Foreign Minister, to the Minister and to PEIPING.

The above has been sent to HARBIN, KILIN, CHANG CHUN and TSITSIHAR in code.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. 17674-14
I.P.S. No.

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO, Takegoro, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of Archives Section of Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of two pages, dated 13 Oct. 1931, and described as follows: Telegram #963 from HAYASHI of Mukden to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947. /s/ T. Sato

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ W. Suzuki ____________ Staff, Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947. /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Name

Witness: /s/ James Liu ____________ Investigator, I.P.G

Official Capacity
From Consul-general HAYASHI in MUKDEN to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA
Dispatched, Mukden, P. M. 17, Oct., 1931.
Received, A. M. 18, Oct., 1931.

Telegram No. 1013 (Code, very secret)

According to HSIEN Chieh-Shik (he had been in TAIWAN since the end of September at the request of CHANG Kai-peng) who came back to MUKDEN on the 16th from TAIWAN, he says that CHANG Kai-Pong telephoned his family in TAIWAN from a station on TAIWAN-ANGCHI Railway on the morning of the 15th, telling them that his entry into TSITSIHAR would be a little delayed because a bridge was destroyed on the way. At any rate HSIEN said to me, "there was a condition that CHANG Kai-peng was to be supplied with 10,000 rifles, 200,000 yuan in silver, field guns and planes by a certain quarter for entering HEILUNGKIANG Province, declare the independence, and then proceed with the Restoration of the Monarchy. In reality, however, he received only 3,000 rifles and 200,000 yuan in silver. CHANG's troop strength is some 3,000 at present and although he is planning to increase it to more than 5,000, training is insufficient.

In my opinion, even if he succeeds in occupying TSITSIHAR peacefully, I cannot help but doubt that he could maintain his position since there are not a few soldiers in various parts in the province who possesses troop strength. It must be said that it would be still more difficult to support Emperor HSIAO-HUNG for the throne. Therefore, the success or failure of CHANG Kai-peng depends wholly upon the amount of support given by a certain quarter. CHANG wants me to endeavor for him since he has no able person around him, but I cannot be very enthusiastic about it. Etc."

Cable relayed to China, PEIPING, TSITSIHAR, HARBIN, CHANGCHUN, TIENTSIN, KIRIN and CHENGKINIAN.

RETURN TO ROOT 361
CERTIFICATE

W.O.C. No. ________
I.P.S. No. 1767 4-15

Statement of Source and Authenticity

1. S.M.O. Takeshige hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of Archives Section of Japanese Foreign Ministry and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 17 Oct, 1931, and described as follows: Telegram #1013 from Mukden to Foreign Ministry

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947.

Signature of Official

Witness: W. Suzuki /s/

Staff, Archives Sect

Statement of Official Procurement

1. Richard H. Larsh hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947

Signature of Official

Witness: Yseed Lim /s/

Investigator, I.P.S

Official Capacity
ファイル

TURN TO ROUGH OAK
I, Akabe, Torashiro, being first duly sworn according to the customary formality in this country...

TRANSLATED BY DEFENSE LANGUAGE BRANCH
I, KAWABE, Torashiro, was a member of the Second (operations) Section of the General Staff from December, 1922 (11th year of Taisho) till 1925 (14th year of Taisho) I was again a member of the same Section from April, 1929 (4th year of Showa) till January, 1932 (7th year of Showa) and during this period, encountered the outbreak of the Mukden Incident in September, 1931 (6th year of Showa). Later my duties were changed to those of troop disposition at the Central Command, so I shall make a statement about matters concerning troop disposition at the Central Command from the time previous to the incident to the time of my leaving office, according to what I remembrance.

I. Outlook of the Central Command on a world-wide basis on the international situation prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

The Central Command, due to its appointed task of working out of troop disposition for national defense, had to keep constant observation of the current international situation in order to decide upon their national defense outlook. Moreover, since there was a military and naval disarmament problem of world-wide scope, at the time I was on duty with the General Staff, the Central Command was keenly investigating the international situation to determine a basis for Japanese armaments.

The general outlook of the Central Command on the world situation around 1930 (5th year of Showa) was as follows:

1.) The competition for world-domination among the Western peoples, especially the European powers, was brought to a conclusion with the First World War. As a result of this, their energy which had been directed towards East Asia on a world-wide policy basis, whether by pushing forward through the continent or along the coast, had largely diminished, at least
2.) Among the western peoples, this one group which crossed the Atlantic and established a strong solid foundation in North America, has been strengthening by leaps and bounds its world-controlling activities, as a result of the First World War, towards the Asiatic mainland crossing the Pacific, and moreover is continuing to do so more and more.

3.) China, who from the middle of the 19th century, had been forced to place the greater part of her national rights at the disposal of foreign countries with slight or almost no resistance, is now disposed, in response to the actual situation mentioned in (1), to resist foreign advance and is developing an enthusiastic tendency to recover her national rights. Although she is now abstaining from such unqualified anti-foreign activities as were resorted to in some areas of Middle and South China in 1926, this tendency is by no means diminishing, but is increasing especially in Manchuria, where it is being followed by the local war-lords.

4.) Japan, who gained a powerful position in the International scene at comparatively small cost in the First World War, is now laboring under active reactionary pressure from the respective powers.

II. The Central Command's National Defense Outlook at the time.

The Central Command, taking a general view of the international situation as previously mentioned, took consideration of Japan's national defense outlook and position based on this as follows:

1.) As indicated in #1 of the previous section, there was no danger of a direct clash between Japan and Russia in the immediate future in connection with the latter's policy towards East Asia, which has traditionally
been a great threat to Japanese national defense.

2.) The inter-relation of (3) and (4) of the previously given estimation would have made it probable that Japan would be reduced to a passive status difficult to bear. If, however, relations between Japan and China were to become complicated and if Japan's position were to affect too adversely the policy of the United States towards China or in the Pacific, there would be a possibility of this developing into a war with both China and the United States.

3.) If such a war as the above were to break out, Japan, from the standpoint of national strength, would have very little prospect of seeing it through.

4.) The Soviet Union of the time was a young nation and was maintaining a passive attitude in her foreign policy, but it was necessary to consider the possibility that such a war as mentioned above should break out and bring Japan to bay, Soviet Russia might participate in the war with the opposite side in order to gain international prominence with the least effort and at the slightest costs. This is evidenced in the history of the development of the Russian race and again from the standpoint of her national feeling, one can think of the probability of her having not gotten rid of her spirit of vengeance for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 - 1905. If, in this manner, it becomes a war where we have these three nations as opponents, Japan's chance prospects of seeing the war through would become increasingly slim.

5.) That above conclusions having been reached, we had to anticipate a war which would spread without a doubt to several nations, leading to a situation beyond our control if a large-scale military clash should arise.
DEP. DOC. #266

between Japan and China.

As the Central Command had arrived at the above conclusion, we made plans for national defense aiming at the maintenance of our existing rights and put the minimum of our defense power on the continent of Asia. Moreover, within the limits of my knowledge, I can not recollect a single person in a responsible position in the Central Command who advocated positively the adoption of active militaristic measures against other countries or to claim any new rights from China. On the contrary, every one had a restrained attitude even towards the fervent trend on the part of China to recover her rights.

III. Troop Disposition lines of the Central Command at the time.

As the Central Command had taken a national defense outlook, as stated in the previous section, their troop disposition plans were fundamentally passive. They did not have any plans made to fight against several countries at the same time, but only a plan of troop disposition to fight singly with China, the U.S., or with the U.S.S.R. respectively, based on the fact that if, in the event that war should break out for one reason or another, they had expected their opponents to be limited to but one nation by the use of political or diplomatic measures.

And the so-called war plans against China were but plans for a temporary expedition to China to meet the situations arising from special relations between China and Japan and were not plans based on an idea of total war.

As for the U.S. war, although it is true that we made a tentative plan of tactical offensive movements against the Philippines and Guam to be carried out by a part of our armed forces for the purpose of strategic defense, we co.
Consider it necessary that we make a strategic defense stand in various other areas. For this reason I planned General Staff maneuvers in order to study realistically a way of defense to stop U.S. troops from invading Formosa and HOKKAIDO and this was carried out in May, 1930 (5th year of Showa) and June, 1931 (6th year of Showa) with the then Chief of the 1st Section, Major General HATA, Shunroku as Commander-in-Chief. And as for the operations planned against Russia, these were of a very abstract nature in those days. We planned only a basic plan in anticipation of encounters on the frontiers of South and North Manchuria and we were thinking of making a defensive stand in northern Korea.

IV. The Outbreak of the So-Called "Manchurian Incident" and the Central Command's Counter-Measures. Not long after my taking office for the second time with General Staff Headquarters, it was a fact that circumstances in Manchuria had developed to a situation where they were gradually arousing the concern of the Central Command. The anti-Japanese policy in Manchuria, the center of which was the Mukden Regime, was getting more and more open and this situation made us fear that our acquired rights in Manchuria might disappear and our minimum defensive means on the continent might become destroyed. What especially strongly irritated the Central Command was the true existence of complications between the Soviet Union and the Mukden Regime since the summer of 1929 (4th year of Showa). Accordingly, this fact gave the Central Command an uneasy feeling that the Mukden Regime might, imposing upon the patient attitude of other parties (T.N. i.e., Japan), take up some direct steps and might not hesitate to even resort to arms. Thereupon the Central Command
did strengthen their attention and vigilance towards Manchuria than heretofore, but this neither included any amendments in their troop disposition plans against Japan nor in their relations towards Manchuria too did it differ from heretofore, but to protect the rights of the South Manchurian Railway and those in the adjoining areas, and to safeguard the Japanese residents in those and other important areas such as the Chinanto district or the city of Harbin, where many Japanese resided, and in order to fulfill this program, the Central Command set a basic plan to the Kwantung and Krosn areas, and ordered the two armies to make detailed plans according to it. There was included the consideration of reinforcing the latter army by the latter.

V. Duties Imposed Upon the Kwantung Army and Its Troop Strength etc.

The duty given the Kwantung Army by the Central Command at the time was "to defend our leased territory of Kwantung-Chow and to protect the South Manchurian Railroad which belonged to our country." The Central Command from the days of peace had ordered the Commander of the Kwantung Army to set up a plan to cope with any emergencies, and to have our troops occupy and defend the important areas along the South Manchurian Railroad, in the event that it becomes necessary for Japan to resort to arms in Manchuria. However, it is said that for the purpose of protecting the South Manchurian Railroad 15 men per 1 kilometer were allowed for disposition. This right which Russia previously held was succeeded to by Japan on the basis of the Sino-Japanese treaty, and for protection of the approximate 1000 kilometer length of the railway Japan had the right to station 15,000 men. In 1931, however, our troop strength in Manchuria was the "Independent Garrison Force" under
major-General IGOAI, which was exclusively assigned to guarding of the railway, having the strength of 6 battalions totalling 4 thousand and several hundred men, and also the 2nd Division having approximately 5,500 men under Lieutenant-General TAKEN which was stationed in Kwangtung-Chow, south of Liaoyang. The total of these two, amounting to an approximate strength of 10,000, was under the command of Lieutenant-General HONJO, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Army.

VI. The Situation in the Central Command at the Time of the Outbreak of the LUSHEN Incident.

From spring to autumn of 1931 (the 6th year of Shōwa), disagreeable incidents between Japan and China such as the LUSHEN Incident and the Captain MUKIUR Incident had occurred one after another in Manchuria and the Central Command foresaw that the situation was going from bad to worse, but they did not have a presentiment that in the near future such a great incident would break out as would require momentous activity on the part of the Central Command. On the night of Sept. 13 however the LUSHEN Incident suddenly broke out.

I shall mention the situation that existed in the Central Command (for three or four days about the time of the outbreak of this incident) based on my memory and according mainly with my own activities as follows:

(1) Early in the morning of Sept. 13, I myself learned of the outbreak of the incident in the vicinity of LUSHEN from the morning newspapers at home at the time. I had no telephone at home and living in the suburbs of Tokyo I was not able to catch a taxi so early in the morning, so I went
to the office by ten or the same as usual only somewhat earlier. It was a little past 7 o'clock when I arrived at General Staff Headquarters. The office was quiet as there were few persons who had arrived but I know that my Section Chief, Colonel IMAEDA, had already come but was not able to find him. A little later since, I learned that the chief was conferring with some person in the reception room for the use of the Chief of the General Staff. I knocked at the door of the room to see him, but he came out and said, "Wait awhile" and then closed the door, without listening to what I had to say. I returned to my room and was preparing for urgent business but we were short-handed as some of my junior officers were absent on leave for personal reasons. Around 9 o'clock Section Chief IMAMURA came to me with a happy look and showed me a slip of paper on which several lines of characters were written in pencil and said, "The Vice-Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.-General NISHIDA, Harushige), Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army (Lieut.-General KOISO, Kuniaki) and others reached this resolution after a deliberate investigation from this morning." The slip of paper read: actuated by this incident, the army expects to solve the Manchurian problem by "solving the Manchurian problem" it is meant that CHIANG Kaishek-lung shall be expected to fulfill present treaties to the letter.

At this time Colonel IMAMURA explained to me that at the foregoing conference, the leaders fell in with the view that the actions of the Kwantung army were admissible as exercising the right of self-defence, but utmost care should be taken not to spread out to the extreme within the realm of exercise of military power. He told me further that since Lieut.-General
SUGIYAMA, Gen, the Vice War Minister, was absent due to temporary illness. Lt.-General KOISO had come in his place.

(2) At the time Section Chief HAMAMOTO came out of the Conference room, I think at about 9 o'clock, I read the telegraphic report addressed to the Chief of the General Staff from General H.T. SHI, Sonjuro, Commander of the Korean Army, and learned that a stop had been taken to dispatch to Manchuria a unit led by a brigade commander chiefly consisting of 5 infantry battalions in order to relieve the KWANTUNG army near MUKDEN. I personally knew that the KWANTUNG Unit near MUKDEN was a small force and felt that the stop taken by the commander of the Korean Army should be approved and expressed my opinion regarding this to my senior officer, but by the leaders of the General Staff, reinforcement of troops in Manchuria was looked upon as an immediate occasion to widen the incident and it was decided to order the Commander of the Korean Army to stop such action. They immediately took measures to send a telegram to that effect. Moreover, taking into account the time that would be required for the commander's new order to be transmitted to the troops under his command, acting on the intention of the Central Command, the Vice Chief of the General Staff issued the following order by telegram to the Commander of the Military Police Unit at HSIINICHOW on the south bank of the Yalu River: If any Korean army units should attempt to cross the Yalu River, not knowing the orders prohibiting the expedition, the intention of the Central Command shall be conveyed in order to prevent any advance to the north of HSIINICHOW.
of the Central Command, the dispatch of expeditionary forces from Korea to Manchuria was prohibited.

(3) As stated above the Central Command was determined to prevent the incident from spreading. Moreover at 10:00 a.m. the Government held an emergency cabinet council and decided on a policy of not allowing the incident to spread beyond its present proportions. The evening of the same day, the 19th, the Central Command issued an order to stop the spreading of the incident to the Commanders of the Kwantung and Korean Armies.

(4) On Sept. 20, the Central Command was watching the situation without taking any special steps. In the evening of the 21st, however, the Kwantung Army reported that they had dispatched a part of their force to Kirin in order to rescue our nationals resident there who were being suddenly oppressed by the Chinese authorities there and were in imminent danger. At the time, another report came from the Commander of the Korean Army that as he knew that the force near Mukden was close to nothing with the dispatch of forces to Kirin, he judged that he should help the Kwantung Army out of danger as soon as possible, and ordered the detachment which had been ordered to stay put, to be transported to Mukden at his own discretion crossing the frontier.

The Central Command recognized the steps taken by the two armies in view of the actual state of affairs in the districts affected as unavoidable and requested the War Minister to have the expenditure for the Korean Army's expedition sanctioned by the Cabinet Council on the following day, the 22nd. On the 22nd, since the Cabinet under Premier Wakatsuki at its morning session, approved the expenditure, the Chief of the General Staff submitted it to the Emperor for ex post facto approval. I remember this petitioning to the Emperor by the Chief of the General Staff as to have been made at about 10:30 a.m. of the 22nd and I heard it was to have taken place.
place immediately after Premier KIMURA’S report to the Emperor on the Cabinet’s decision.

(5) Thus this problem of dispatching troops from Korea was settled for the time being and the Central Command deemed that this action of the KWANTUNG Army of sending troops to KIRIN had brought military actions in Manchuria to a close. They further ordered that the military force dispatched to KIRIN should be evacuated to the zone along the lines of the South Manchurian Railway as soon as the situation subsided. In order to check any further action of the KWANTUNG Army, on the evening of Sept. 22, they sent the following telegram to the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army: “We now deem military action in Manchuria to have for the most part fulfilled its purpose and to have now reached a conclusion. Any further action will have a close relationship with our domestic and foreign policies, so be careful in considering matters and do not start new actions until instructions from the Central Command are received and then execute them.”

VII. The Relationship of the Central Command with the Intermittent Military Movements in Manchuria. From the Above Time to the End of January 1932 (7th year of Showa).

I resigned my position with General Staff Headquarters at the end of January, 1932 (7th year of Showa). I shall relate the relationship of the Central Command with the military movements within Manchuria up to that time.

(1) Following the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, the situation was threatening in the territories of Chientao and Harbin, where many Japanese people lived. The head of the Japanese Residents Association in Chientao...
and the Chief of Special Service Agencies in Harbin telegraphed to the
Chief of the General Staff Commanding the dispatch of troops for their self-
defence several times, but the latter did not respond to the above request
for troops, holding fast to the principle of not utilizing military force
on a wide spread basis outside of the adjoining areas of the Manchurian
Railway. At the same time, the Commanders of the Kwantung and Korean armies
were notified of this main point. Regarding Harbin and the urgent demands
of the Vice-consul there, the Commander of the Kwantung Army who was then
preparing to dispatch troops theretofore severely restrained and put a stop to
the matter.

(2) Around the beginning of October, Generals Ma Chan-Shan and Chang
Hai-Ping of Manchuria and China began to dispute over the rights of the Liaot
River Province. Their forces confronted one another along the Tao-Anhonhi
Railway over which we possess influential rights. Ma's army then destroyed
the railway bridge at Nonni-River to stop Chang's northward advance. For
this reason the Manchurian Railway Company commanded repairs on the bridge
under the protection of a small unit from the Kwantung Army. At this
time our troops received a sudden attack from Ma's army and our troops had
to fight bitterly in the vicinity of Tahin. Thereafter the two armies took
the position of squaring off. The Central Command gave the Kwantung Army
certain concrete stipulations and began peaceful negotiations to have Ma's
army withdraw within a 10 day deadline but learning that General Ma Chan-
Shan was not willing to consent, on Nov. 17th the Central Command ordered
the Commander of the Kwantung Army to destroy Ma's army and on accomplishing
this mission to quickly withdraw to the south. Accordingly after November 15th, several battles took place in the vicinity of Tsitsihar and all's troops were swept away.

(3) After the conclusion of the above hostilities and while the Kwantung Army was assuming a course of pacific action, several clashes occurred between Sino-Japanese forces around Tientsin in North China from around the 20th of Nov. and on the night of the 26th the two forces clashed again. The garrison troops in China were extremely few in number, and lacking in strength to defend itself, requested reinforcements from the Kwantung Army.

The Commander of the Kwantung Army who received this request fortunately felt inclined to take this opportunity to settle the matter in the vicinity of Tsitsihar and decided to rescue our troops in distress and took the course of having troops who were in South Manchuria, advance to a position west of the Liao River, and, also, of having the troops in the vicinity of Tsitsihar sent west of the Liao River. The Central Command, however, who deemed the situation at Tientsin as not so important and at the same time in accordance with the policy of not allowing incidents to spread, gave strict orders to the Commander of the Kwantung Army on the afternoon of 27 November. “Irrespective of however the immediate situation may be, withdraw completely the unit advanced to west of the Liao River to a point east of the same river.”

Complying with these orders, the Commander of the Kwantung Army had the entire strength of the dispatched troops returned and assembled at Mukden during the night of the 23th.

(4) Prior to this and after the outbreak of the Mukden incident,
General Chang Houel-liang, who was in North China and his military base set up in Chinshou, had established many bases. In October, the Provisional Government of Mukden-Province successively concentrated his troops in the same area. The Kwantung Army who received this information had the air reconnaissance unit attached to them reconnoiter this area on October 6th. In the midst of their reconnoitering action, however, they received fire from the ground and the air unit which was carrying bombs of 20 kilograms or thoroughs (about the caliber of mountain artillery shells) for self-defense purposes, dropped several scores of those bombs on the Chinese military barrack, the buildings of the Chinese Provisional Government, and the like.

Receiving the report relating to this incident, the Central Command gave strict warning to the Commander of the Kwantung Army, "Even though it may have been an inevitable action of self-defense at the instant, extreme care shall be required in aircraft activity at least over unarmed residential areas."

(5) After the actions in the vicinity of Tsitsihar and the withdrawal of the dispatched unit from the western side of the Liao-River, the Kwantung Army was concentrating its efforts for securing peace and order in all South Manchuria. For the reason that the Chinshou bombing incident of the previous section was propagated way beyond actual facts to the world, the military Government of Chinshou gained power from this and begun active operations, and, furthermore, successively concentrated large member of troops in Chinshou. It became quite clear that they were
utilizing bandits incessantly in South Manchuria scheming to disrupt peace and order along the Manchurian Railway.

When I actually went to Manchuria in the latter part of December, I heard at the Headquarters of the Kwangtung Army that the Commander and his staff-officers were extremely concerned by the repeated violence along the South Manchurian railroad by bandits who maintained their base at Chinchou.

I heard that the Japanese Government was negotiating with the Nanking Government and also with the administrative authority of Chang Hauh-Liang through diplomatic channels at Peking to have the Military Government at Chinchou withdraw to within the Great Wall, but did not see the results of this revealed.

Furthermore, since the middle of December, the regular army (TN: of Chang) came out of the vicinity of Chinchou to place near the South Manchurian Railroad and took a course of action in cooperation with the bandits. With this, the Central Command, in order effectively to carry out the subjugation of bandits which was recognized as necessary at a conference of directors of the League of Nations on December 10 previously, had the Kwantung Army reinforced with the basic troop strength of two brigades under the command of the Division Commander of the 20th Division newly arrived from Korea from mid-December to later December, and allowed the Kwantung Army to carry out the thorough subjugation of bandits from all South Manchuria to the west of the Liao River.

Thereupon the Kwantung Army dispatched forces to subjugate the bandits.
west of the Liao-River. This punitive force began its operations on December 23 and on the 31st was advancing to an area eastward of Chinshou and on the left bank of the Taling river when the Chinshou Military Government evacuated this same area and our army entered the City of Chinshou on January 3, 1932 (7th year of Showa) truly without bloodshed. Thereafter the Kwantung-army deployed its forces far and wide from the vicinity of Chinshou to all of South Manchuria and gave its undivided attention to the securing and maintenance of peace and order.

(6) In the manner indicated above, conditions in South Manchuria now indicated stability. In the north, however, in the vicinity of Kirin and Harbin from around the beginning of 1932 (7th year of Showa) dissension in ranks of the troops (TN: Chinese) in Kirin occurred and the anti-Japanese elements among them plundered Harbin; committed outrageous acts such as killing a Japanese and three Koreans, putting under arrest a great number of Koreans etc. Thus a total of 5,500 Japanese and Korean residents were exposed to extreme danger. At this time, on January 27, an incident occurred, where a military plane of ours which was reconnoitering this area, received fire from the anti-Japanese forces and had to make an emergency landing. Furthermore, the officer on board was killed and the plane burned. Thereupon the Kwantung-army, for the purpose of protecting the residents in Harbin and deeming it necessary for some forces to be dispatched to this area, sought permission from the Central Command. The Central Command approved this. According to this, our forces entered Harbin at the beginning of February, 1932 (2nd year of Showa) and pursued their task of maintaining peace and order in the area.
The above are the general highlights of the relation of our military movements within Manchuria with the Central Command over a period of four months from the time following the Mukden Incident up to the time I left General Staff Headquarters towards the end of January, 1932 (7th year of Showa). During this period following the Mukden Incident, our military movements were not consistent with a plan but unavoidable to meet successive occurring incidental circumstances despite the Central Command's policy of not allowing incidents to spread. Giving new orders for military movements to the Kwantung army could not be avoided.

VIII. Change of Personnel in key positions of the Central Command.

From around December, 1931 (6th year of Showa), as to military movements in Manchuria, it was no longer expected that any new movements would be required and we saw successive changes of personnel in the key positions of the Central Command. From my position at the time I did not know of the reasons for these changes of personnel in the key positions. All I knew is that at the time of my leaving General Staff Headquarters at the end of January, 1932 the changes were as follows:

1. General K.N.I., Kaze left the position of the Chief of the General Staff, and Prince KOTOHIKO assumed the post.

2. Lt.-General MIIOY•, Juji left the position of assistant Chief of the General Staff and Lt.-General MIYAKI, Jinzaburo assumed the position.

3. Major-General TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu left the position of Chief of the First Section of the General Staff, and Major-General FURUSHO, Mikio assumed the position.

4. Colonel MIYAMOTO, Hitoshi left the position of Chief of the second Branch of the General Staff, and Colonel OBIZU, Toshishiro assumed
Because of this, on December 11th, the AIKATSUKI Cabinet resigned, and
General MINAMI, Jiro who was the War Minister left his position. On the
13th of the same month the INUKAI Cabinet which was formed had Lt.-General
MINAMI, Sadao assuming the position of War Minister.
Because of this, on December 11th, the MATSUMI Cabinet resigned, and General MINAMI, Jiro who was the War Minister left his position. On the 13th of the same month the MINAMI Cabinet which was formed had Lt.-General ARAI, Sadao assuming the position of War Minister.
This 12th day of November, 1946, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,

Torashiro, deponent sworn to and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned date and at the above-mentioned place.

Signed and sealed:

Junkichi, witness

I hereby swear according to my conscience to state the whole truth, adding nothing.

Signed and sealed:

Torashiro

Translation Certificate

I, Yukio Nakamoto, of the Defense Intelligence Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Nakamoto

Tokyo, Japan

cce 28 December 1946
ファイルコピー

RETURN TO ROOM 361
中央統帥部は当時の世界情勢に照し次の如く総括を下して居りました。

1. 西洋の民族観中、歐洲列強の世界市場の競争は第一次世界大戦を以て一段落を割し、其の結果よりして、彼等が陸地陣戦に、又は岸壁に東亜に指向した世界政策のエネルギーは大に衰退した。

2. 西洋の民族中、欧州より大西洋を渡り北米大陸に弱固不拔なる基盤を築きたる一分派が更に太平洋を超えて亜細亜大陸に指向する

両国の世界政策のエネルギーは第一次世界大戦の結果、飛騨的に其の弱きを増し得るに至り且つそれを増しつつある。

3. 諸国が第十九世紀の中葉より殆ど無抵抗に又は軽易なる抵抗を以て其の方針を示し一九二六年に中、南支に行行った如く狭外直接作戦は未だその形態に至らずに於て居り、欧米方面
rことを目途として間防的策を述べ、居りました。従って私の知つ
て居る限り中央統帥部の責任的地位に在る者にして務給的なる对外主
戦略とか、支那に対する新らしい権参を求めることを主張したものをな
く彼等は支部の活潑なる国権同復熱の動興に就ても冷観之を見守るの
態度を執って居りました。
第三章

中央統制部は前項に述べました如く、国防の上に立ちその用兵計画に始し得るものを日常との経過の下に、戦交、後戦、戦争、各一ビの為に戦争に備ずる用兵計画を立案し、於数的戦争に備ずる計画は作

而して対支作戦計画を編し、之は日支間の関連関係から起る一時的出兵の為の計画でありました。対米戦争に応ずるものは戦略的防衛的目的を以て全策案に取る。他方この計画を立てる必要に於て松原、長谷川等に一部の兵力を以てする戦略的防衛の目的を立て

したければならぬことを考慮して居りました。然し他の方針には於て戦略的防衛の目的に於ては、米国軍の東進を防止する方策を具体的に研究する上での参謀演習を私

に於て中央部の作戦を防止する方策を具體的に研究するための参謀演習を私

に於て米国軍の東進を防止する方策を具體的に研究するための参謀演習を私
昭和五年五月及一九三一年（昭和六年）六月に实行致しますし、

而して對ソ一作戦計画に至りましては當時猶めて特別のものであ
りまして在北滿洲の領土地域に於ける会戦を想定して其の基本的の
想を立て北部朝鮮に於て防勢に立つことを考へ居りました。

第四条所調一満洲問題に於ける勃興と中央統制部の対策

一九三九年（昭和四年）四月私か第三号に参照本部に勤務致すこと
になりましてから間もなく、満洲に於ける要緊は次第に中央統制部の
関心を弱める状況となりましたことを対策して在満洲に於
ける我が既に得た解答を消滅しつか大陸上に保有する國防上の
最少限度の態勢を保有しすることがを策定せしむるに至りました。特に中央
統制部を弱く刺激しましたことは、かの一九三九年（昭和四年）夏以
降に於けるソ一奉（ソ一非）邦主導権天政権に於て経験せるものに於

それ直接手段を経じ武力交戦をも散て除去するの如に出るかを知れぬ。
立楽しめてもありました。

而して南砲洲線域附属の為に配置し得る兵力は一キロメートルあたり二
五名迄と云ふ。書の際西亞が持って居た保利を日支間の条約上に綱
承して居るものとありまして、艦道の延長約一千キロメートルの保領の
為、一萬五千名を配兵し得るのでありますか、一九三一年に於て我か
在の兵力は陸海軍兵員合計四千数百名であり、外に多門中将の率める第二
師が約五千五百の兵力を以て旅順以南関東州内に駐屯し、此の合計約
一萬の兵力が當時関東軍司令官本庄中将の鰲下に在つたのであります。
第六
即天事件発破時における中央統制部の状況
一九三一年（昭和六年）春から夏に亘る間、万竜山事件、中村
大尉事件等中枢に於て日支間の不快なる事件が相次いで起こり、
中央統制部としては形勢著々悪化の傾向にあるを感知して居りまし
たが、中央統制部の大活動を要する如き大事件か近づくと存じ居り
事は発破を知り、以下此の事件発破當時の三、四日間に於ける中央統
制部の状況を私の行動を中心として記録に基づいて申し述べます。

尚は出勤者少く静寂であまりましたのが、時時観察のため、事務所
外に住んで居りましたから、時々新聞の出版を求めておりました。又、
自己の経験、感じ、感じして居ることを知りましたので、結論を示す
</s>
暫くにして私は課長が参謀長用の气候室に於て誰かと談話中で
あることを聴き知り得ましたので、私は彼れに何為にその部屋
をノック致しました所、彼れは扉の外に出て来て、一暫く待ってると
云ひ、私の云はんと云ったことも聴かず扉を締めてしまいましたが、
私は自室に歸り略緊急の要務を準備して居りましたので、下級の同僚
を除き私の許に来り鉛筆を以て数行の文字を書きたったが、下級の同僚
は軍の騒乱に至り騒乱を以て数行の文字を書きたったが、下級の同僚
中私事の髪形休暇中のものもありまして私の援助者にも手不足の
狀態でありました。九時近い時刻となり、今村課長（二官治中将）小軍
警備局長（小殿君）が今朝から様々研究して渇く前の様に決意したと云
下村大佐は此の時又私に於て前記の首領者達の会談に於て一問
東京の行動は其の任務に基づく自衛権の発動として之を是認するか
朝鮮軍司令官は清国軍と対峙しているとし、その事実を認めることを口実にして、朝鮮軍司令官を诱致するために命令を出した。しかし、朝鮮軍司令官は命令を拒否して、部下を率いてその場を去った。これにより、朝鮮軍司令官は清国軍に対して宣戦布告の状態となった。
第二章
一九三二年（昭和七年）一月末に至る間に於ける満洲

（2）若天経常の事態を medidaに於ける軍事的行動と中央総督部との関係。我々に於ける満洲内の軍事行動と中央統帥部との関係に於いて略述致し

（8）十月に入りましてから、満洲支那側の二将軍馬占山と張海鈞とか黒龍江省の曹錕を争ふ、その両勢力は我が有力なる糧袋箇道たる洮昂
（3）
右の速戦せずに、関東軍が進撃の行動を停止せば、採取すべき対策を命じました。斯くて十一月十日以降、東軍司令官は自衛力に至り、関東軍に援軍を要求しました。此の要請を受けた関東軍司令官は、十二月二十一日より北支軍に於て、支那軍の攻撃に備え、極めて寡兵の支那軍に攻撃を加える。
観を救ふべしと決し二十七日差當り南満に在つた部隊を以て遼河以西に進出させしめ従ひ其雑常の増大を遼くら

方針より十一月二十七日午後關東軍司令官に対し前當面の状況如何に願ず遼河以西に進出した部隊を悉く同河以東に撤退としむべし

派遣部隊の全力を奉天に善用集結と申めました。之より先者天事件発生の北支に在つた張學良将軍は此の命令に従ひ翌十八日夜迄に右の

錦州に置き同地に奉天省警政府を設置して居たのであります。此の事情を

月に入つてから倉衣同地に兵力を集中々でありました。此の事情を

遼に従つた関東軍は十月八日所属の倉察飛行隊を以て同地附近を倉察とし

国用に接行して居た十町内外（口徑山砲発程度）の発電を支配軍兵

(1) 及支那個省政府建物等に合計數十発投下したのであります。
居るとは聞きましたがその效果の顕はる」を認められません

でも十二月中旬以来於ては正規軍も錦州附近から南部

道に近く出て来て匪賊と協同する行動をなすに至りました。是に於

て中央統部隊は在に十二月十一日國際聯盟軍司令に於て認められた戦

段の時常行動の成果を確実ならしむる為に、十二月中旬以降下旬に

亘り師部隊は新に第三十師団長の率ひる二旅団基幹の兵力を錦東軍

に増加し、向東軍は南部一帯から遼河以西にかけて徹底的に匪賊計

に追討することを容認したのであります。そこで観注軍は遼河以

西の匪賊を討伐する為め兵力を出し、此の防衛部隊が十二月十八

日行動を起こし三十一日錦州東方大凌河左岸地域に進出させられ

するや、錦州駱政治局は同地を捜退し我軍は一九三二年（昭和七年）

一月三日錦州に全く無血の進入を行ひました。而して爾後間違軍は

錦州附近から南部一帯に分散配置を持ち治安の確立維持に凝念する
居らと私は聞かれましたのがその程度の表示を認め得られません
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居らと私は聞かれましたのがその程度の表示を認め得られるものを認められました
居らと私は聞いたのでありませんでした。
第八 中央統帥部首脳者の更迭。

一九三一年（昭和六年）十二月頃となりましては最早満洲に於ける軍事行動はこれより新に起り得る想像も無くなりましたが、中央統帥部の首脳者は逐次更迭を見ました。私はそれ等首脳者の更迭の理由に読ては私の當時の地位から承知する所はありませんが、唯私その參謀本部を除任致しまする一九三二年一月末に於ては次の如く更迭されて居りました。

次郷大将去り、同月十三日成立した犬養内閣が辞職しその解散大臣には荒木貞夫
中将が就任しました。
Instructions concerning Stratagem.

1. You shall receive delegated orders from the Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in France, and take charge of the execution of the stratagem.

2. You shall read the instructions for stratagem given to the Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in France, which Lt. Col. DÔBASHI in your country will show you.

3. In order to let Major KAWATA inspect the document in Warsaw, you shall communicate with Lt. Col. DÔBASHI and inform Major KAWATA of the date he is to come to Warsaw.

October 5, 1932

'AZAKI, Jinzaburo,
Assistant Chief of Staff

To: KAWATA, Torashiro

Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in the U.S.S.R.
This is a photostatic copy of the instructions which I received in 1932 from MAZAKI Jinzaburo, Assistant Chief of Staff. This document was delivered to me by Lt. Col. DORASHI.

/Signed/ KAWASE Terashiro

September 4, 1946
Instructions pertaining to Stratagem given to the Military Attache of the Imperial Embassy in France.

(1) In regard to this Stratagem, the Military Attaches of the Imperial Embassy in France shall be given delegated command of the organs /agency/ in Europe and Turkey.

(2) The Military Attaches of the Imperial Embassy in France shall determine the necessary plans, which is to be based upon the appended Essentials of Stratagem, and have it reported by 10 April 1934.

(3) Those which seem relatively important in your plans must be reported simultaneously with the precedent item /TN. item 2/.

3 October 1932

the Chief of the General Staff
Prince KOTOHTO

To: KASAI, Heijuro

Military Attache of the Embassy in France.

This is a photostat of my transcription made after my reading of the original Instruction, dated 8 October 1932, which was given to KASAI, Heijuro, Military Attache of the Imperial Embassy in France, by Prince KOTOHTO, Chief of General Staff.

4 Sept. 1946 KAWBE, Torashiro.
1. In peace-time, the actual state of communization in the Far East carried out by the USSR and the Third 'Inters', /Comintern/ shall be propagandized and the Empire's /TN: JAPAN's/ situation against the USSR's communizing policy shall be recognized, and thus the basis for reason of a righteous path for war with the USSR will be understood.

2. In order to make the USSR's resources of war impotent as soon as possible after the opening hostilities, the following measures will be carried out.

   (1) Independence movement of UKRAINE, GEORGIA, and AZERBAIJAN shall be supported and those areas shall be disturbed.

   (2) Organizations of anti-SOVIET RUSSIANS who took refuge from the USSR will make contacts with their fellow-men in the USSR, and will breed riots in the various areas, stir up feeling against war, and plot the destruction of the government of the USSR.

3. If friendly relation with FRANCE, POLAND, the Little ENTENTE, and the states along the coast of BALTIC S.L. and TURKEY will be maintained, these countries will enforce the measures in the fore-mentioned article, and will inevitably accord facilities in the enforcement of our stratagem.

II. War with CHIN.

4. By exposing the dark side of atrocities which is contrary to internationalism, and humanitarian, and is peculiar to the CHINESE from peace-time, and at the same time by making propaganda of such actual matters as debouchment of the communist army, plots and activities of the communist party, the inevitable conditions for protection of interest by arms will be recognized.

5. In order to restrain USSR from participating in war, the measures in Article will be enforced if necessary.
III. War with US

6. In regards to war with US, Article 5 will be applicable.

IV. Supplementary Provisions

7. As soon as the opportunity of opening hostilities has become perceptible, the stratagem and intelligence organs in EUROPE and TURKEY are to be enlarged as in supplementary chart.

8. Regarding the enforcement of this plan excepting Articles 1 and 4, only its preparations are to be made in so far as special instructions are not given.

TN: Translation of writing on the reverse of page 3/
This is a photographed copy of the original document on the Essentials of Stratagem. The essentials of stratagem is what was added to the instructions of Prince TAKUHITO, Chief of the General Staff. The copy was made in MI05 by YAMADA, who was my assistant. The first page has my signature signed in 1932. 4 Sept 1946.
Chart showing Disposition of Strategic and Intelligence Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediary Guidance</th>
<th>Name of Organ</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>War with SOVIET</th>
<th>War with CHINA</th>
<th>War with U.S.</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BRITAIN</td>
<td>LONDON</td>
<td>BRITAIN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>PARIS</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>In regard to Intelligence, Intermediary Guidance Organ will be omitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>attaches of the Embassy</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>BERLIN</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHILE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Organ</td>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>VIBIA</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FLANDERS</td>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESTONIA</td>
<td>TALLIN</td>
<td>SOVIET</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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REFERENCE: SOVIET, CHINA, etc. indicate well-informed knowledge of SOVIET, CHINA, etc.
CERTIFICATE

I, A.AURIL, Chief of the Russian Document Room of I.F.S. in the I.K.T. for the Far East, hereby certify that the photocopy of the documents entitled:

1. Essentials of stratagem,
2. Instructions pertaining to the plan of stratagem,
3. Instructions to the Military Attache in France concerning the plan of stratagem (containing 6 sheets of paper) was delivered to me by the General Staff of the Red Army in Moscow on the 21st of March 1946.

A.AURIL,
Chief of the Russian Document Room of I.F.S.

Tokyo, Japan
September 20, 1946.
FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361
之六私に参謀次長真崎甚三郎ノラ丸三年

河辺虎四郎

昭和二年九月日

Doc. 2979
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N°4

Date 29.7.9

by Commander, 2nd Infantry Battalion, Independent Garrison, SHIMIKO, Massachi

As I was told that the Commander-in-Chief had already given the said party a general explanation and an English translation of a note on the facts of the matter, I explained to them, in the train up to the point of the explosion the locations of the land bridge on the PEILING-MINDED Railway and of LIVILAKOU etc. Referring to books and posters, I told them how China was making efforts to foster and stir up anti-alien ideas; particularly, I pointed out that China was instructing her people that Britain, the United States of America, France, Germany and Russia were all imperialistic and aggressive powers, that as Christianity teaches non-resistance, they first made the Chinese non-resistant and then they invaded China, and that all education given by foreigners had this same aim. Their questions and my answers after that were as follows:

Q. Why did the Japanese forces remove rails at the crossing of the PEILING-MINDED Railway?
A. Because it was necessary for our defence.
Q. And it was used for this explosion.
A. As it was done by the enemy, we do not know. There was no residue. Judging from the result, probably it was not very strong.
Q. You say that the explosion took place at 10:30 a.m. Was this before the express train for Dairen passed or after?
A. On such a sudden occurrence, who would look at his watch? But it is certain that it happened between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., and the express train passed this point after the explosion.
Q. Did the train pass this point in spite of the explosion?
A. Because the degree of the explosion was slight, the train passed without being derailed. According to the statement of soldiers who witnessed it, the train passed leaning to one side.
Q. After the explosion were any steps taken by Japanese troops in regard to the train's progress?
A. They tried to stop the train with a detonation signal, but it passed without stopping.
Q. I heard that, when the 3rd Company was attacked by the enemy in a Kaoliang field, they returned fire. Was there any damage sustained by the Japanese at that time?
A. No, there was none.
Q. If the Japanese force had not pursued the challengers when most of them ran away into their camp, probably this battle would not have occurred.
A. Once a Japanese force is challenged, and an action undertaken, it has to win it. If we had done nothing with them when the enemy escaped, it was certain that the Chinese army would again have attacked us. And furthermore it is impossible to ascertain whether there are casualties or not during a battle; Moreover, at that time, it was pitch dark. (This question was a particularly foolish
one, but as they were not military men it seemed difficult for them to this point. They persistently repeated, questions on this point. Fortunately, however, these foreigners understood Japanese so I explained the matter in detail and made them understand.

Q. When did the Japanese artillery open fire?
A. I do not know the time. One does not estimate the time a battle takes by consulting one's watch. But it is certain that they opened fire after the hard fighting of the 3rd Company was reported. Shells had already been seen flying before the arrival of the main force of our battalion.

Q. Did the shells hit the target?
A. As it was night fire without proper preparation, they seemed not to hit the object.

Q. Was there no danger from this fire to the attacking Japanese army?
A. As it was dangerous, our battalion requested that fire be suspended.

Q. Was the artillery fire requested by your battalion?
A. No. It opened fire, on its own decision. In the Japanese forces any information is immediately reported to the whole army, and each unit, if need be, must exert itself to win the battle according to its own decision. The fire on the part of the artillery was in accordance with this.

Q. What were the strengths of both armies?
A. The Chinese was about 10,000 and our battalion a little more than 600.
Q. What were the casualties of the Chinese and the Japanese in that battle?

A. On the Chinese side there were probably 400 killed in total; for 320 were buried by the Japanese and some were found in the Kaoling field. On the Japanese side, there were 2 killed and 22 wounded.

Q. Doesn't this comparison of these casualties indicate that the Chinese army offered no resistance?

A. Your observations on the scene will clearly show that that battle was planned by the Chinese side and what kind of fire they crossed. And the great difference in the casualties indicate the efficiency of the Japanese army; furthermore, when the Chinese were so foolish as to fight with electric light turned on in a night battle, the Japanese, approaching the enemy from dark and shelled them, and broke into their rooms and fought hand to hand with them; close combat is the strongest point of the Japanese army; moreover most of the Chinese shells fly high.

If this battle had continued into the daytime, our casualties would have been greatly increased. This was what I tried hardest to avert. If another battle should be caused in the future, we will exterminate the Chinese unit of 10,000 strength to the last man and with no casualties on our side. Now are there no more questions about this incident? If there are, I shall be glad to explain any number of them. As they said there were no more questions, we started on our way back about 5:30 p.m.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity of a Document

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "A general Account of Guiding the American Hanson Foreign Investigation Committee to the Scene of the Explosion" is a copy of the document which I drafted on the detail of my guiding of the said party on the afternoon of the 18th day of October, 1931, (the 6th Year of Shōwa) and caused to be mimeographed and bound by my subordinates.

Certified at HYOGO Pref.,
on this 20th day of January, 1947

/S/ SHIKAMOTO, Masaichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on the same date.

Witness: /S/ BANNNO, Junkichi (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 3 March 1947
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Certificate concerning source of the document

I, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of one page and entitled "The Essential Map of Disposition of the Independent Defense Army" was received by me in the course of duty when I was commander of the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Independent Defense Army stationed in Manchuria from the Independent Defense Army G.m.g. around September 1931, (the 6th year of SHINWA) and has been in my custody since that time.

Certified at Hyogo Prefecture
on this 10th day of January, 1947.

/\ SHIMOOTO, Shoji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /\ BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Tomoji Sasagawa, of the Defense, hereby certify that the above translation of The Essential Map of Disposition of Independent Defense Army is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\ Tomoji Sasagawa

Tokyo, Japan
Date 4 March 1947
The Essential Map of disposition of the Independent Defence

(After October 31, 1930 - the 5th year of Shōwa)

Key:

* Independent Defense Army G.H.Q.
* Independent Defense Infantry battalion H.Q.
* Independent Defense Infantry company.
* to be stationed after May, 1931. (the 6th year of Shōwa)

Detachments.

Defensive division of a battalion

Defensive division of a company

(1) Arabic figures show in kilometers the defense areas of the battalions and companies.

(2) Arabic figures in round brackets at each defense area boundary line show distance in kilometers from the starting points of Dairen and Antung according to the map of the South Manchurian Railway which was published in 1928. (SHOWA3)
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Certified at Hyogo Prefecture
on this 10th day of January, 1947,

/b/ SHIMIZU, Shoichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed in the presence of this witness.

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Witness: /b/ BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

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Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. My name is ENDO Saburo and I live now at Irimagawa-machi, Irima-gun, Saitama Prefecture.

2. I was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army and was in charge of operations from August, the 7th Year of Shôwa (1932) to August the 9th Year of Shôwa (1934). My rank was Major at first and I was promoted to Lieut.-Colonel in March the 9th Year of Shôwa (1934).

3. The following are the principal military operations undertaken by the Kwantung Army, when I was chief of operations.

4. The restoration of peace and order at Hulunpeireh.

As a result of the conclusion of the Japanese-Manchoukuo Agreement on the 15th of September the 7th Year of Shôwa (1932), Japan made a co-defense Agreement with Manchoukuo and shared
the important responsibility for the co-defense of Manchoukuo.

In view of the fact that it was not long since Manchoukuo had been established, nothing was more urgent from the viewpoint of national welfare than to restore and maintain its peace and order, as well as to prevent the destruction and disturbance in the country. First of all, therefore, the Kwantung Army planned the restoration of peace and order in the eastern parts of Mukden Province, and chiefs of army groups were summoned for this purpose.

All of a sudden on the 28th September of the same year (1932), when the plan of operation was being explained to them, a telegram stating "Su Ping-wen has betrayed us. Request assistance." was received by the Headquarter of the Kwantung Army through the Special Agency at Harbin from Capt. OHARA of the Special Agency stationed at Manchuli, and further communication was interrupted. One day previously that is, on the 27th September, nothing was heard from Maj. INOUYE and WATANABE who were on their way to Hailar by plane from Harbin (afterwards it was confirmed that they were killed by Su Ping-wen's troops, when the plane made a forced landing in the vicinity of Tientzushan). Inasmuch as we harboured gloomy forebodings and in the latter part of September perceived, through the interception of telegrams, that Su Ping-wen and Chang Tien-chiu had been plotting, it was learned that the plots had actually been carried out. Extraordinary measures, therefore, had to be taken in order to rescue the several hundred Japanese residents at Hailar and Manchuli, as well as some Japanese residents at Hulunpeirh (totaling about 1,000).
Under these circumstances, the Kwantung Army decided to change part of the above mentioned peace restoring plan in the eastern parts of Mukden Province, and rescue the Japanese residents who were thought to have been arrested at Hulunpeirh, but this was certain to give rise to various difficulties. Because, for the rescue of the Japanese residents there was not al little fear in respect of the temperature and our military strength, and especially of stimulating Soviet Russia. Nevertheless it could by means be permitted, not only from the viewpoint of humanity, but also from that of the duty of the Kwantung Army, that we leave fellow-countrymen faced with imminent danger to their fate without rescuing them. Therefore, the Kwantung Army decided to effect the rescue for the humanity's sake despite the difficulty of operation and its inferior military strength. First of all, in order to obtain the understanding of Soviet Russia, our frontier commission with Col. KOMATSUBARA, chief of the Special Agency at Harbin as leader, were sent to MATVEFSKAYA (T.N. Phonetic: next station to MANCHULI) with the consent of the Soviet authorities, and requested the Soviet's favourable treatment for the rescue and defense of the Japanese escaping to the territory of Soviet. Fortunately the request was complied with, the Kwantung Army suddenly made various preparations and started operation in the latter part of November. As it was reported that Su Ping-wen's troops had by that time marched on Chalantun and Fulaerhchi, west of Nunchiang, the Kwantung Army, availing themselves of this favourable opportunity for advancing, decided to rescue the Japanese at Hulunpeirh soon after seizing and exterminating the
enemy on the east side of the great Hsingen mountain ranges. But as Su Ping-ven and Chang Tien-chiu fled from the front line on the 26th of November, our forward elements pursued the remaining enemy, and after passing through the tunnel of the Hsingen mountain ranges arrived at Hulanseirh, and succeeded at last in rescuing the Japanese there. The Japanese who had previously escaped to Soviet territory were transferred by its courtesy to Vladivostock by the Heilungkiang railway, and thence sent to Japan by sea.

5. The restoration of peace and order in Jehol Province.

The above-described restoration of peace at Hulanseirh was completed in January the next year, 6th Year of Shōwa (1933) and peace since prevailed there. In the northern parts of Kirin Province there was still the wriggling of Li Tu and Ting Chao, but it ceased by Ting Chao's submission in January the 6th Year of Shōwa (1933) and peace restoration in the eastern parts of Huakdo Province also made great progress. Thus, peace and order in Manchoukuo were generally maintained. With this restoration of peace the majority of bandits in Manchoukuo escaped to Jehol Province and joined Chang Hsien-jiang's troops that had invaded the province before, and their number, it was thought, amounted to as many as 200 thousand under the banner of Tang Yu-lin, Inspector-General of Jehol Province. In reality they often disturbed peace and order in the districts of the Liao-Ho river either with small units of their own or by instigating the remaining bandits there. Since the establishment of Manchoukuo, Tang Yu-lin tried to face both ways and his attitude was irresolute,
but he suddenly and blithely resorted to anti-Japanese and Man-
choukuo measures. Under these circumstances, peace and order in
Manchoukuo which had fortunately been restored began to be disturbed
again. This situation could not by any means be left to take its
own course even in view of the Japanese and Manchoukuo Co-
defense Agreement, in consequence of which it became necessary to subdue
such banditry. It was evident that, as they could not possibly
operate on a large scale during the cold season, but began to
operate when it became warm after winter retirement, it was there-
fore necessary to subjugate them before they begin to operate.
Besides, as the roads in Jehol Province are very muddy and most
of them river-beds, the operations of our troops, if begun at the
time of the thaw, will be confronted with much difficulty. Hence,
the subjugation of bandits had to be begun before that time thus,
in the latter part of February in the 8th Year of Shōwa (1933)
our operation was started despite our inferiority in military
strength. Inasmuch as our military operation was nothing but
to restore peace and order in Manchoukuo and it was necessary to
observe strictly a general principle that it should not be extended
beyond the territory of Manchoukuo, strict instructions were given
to our troops so as to limit their operation to the line of the
Great Wall, and not beyond that line. The Central Supreme Command
Headquarter, too taking a serious view of this point, I, being
in charge of operations, was summoned to Tokyo in January and gave
instructions accordingly.

In view of the importance and complexity of the matter,
Gen. MUTO, Commander of the Kwantung Army, gave the following
instructions to his troops prior to the start of the operation:

1) As the situation in Jehol Province is very imminent, the peace and order of all Manchoukuo will be disturbed, if it is left to take its own course;

2) In order to avoid international misunderstanding, our operation should be limited to the interior of Jehol Province;

3) The restoration of order should be completed in as short a time as possible

In the latter part of February our operation was started and mountain "Blitzkrieg" was carried out under the co-operation of Japanese and Manchoukuo troops. With the security of Kupeikou and the line of the Great Wall, as well as the frontier line, our operation was brought to a close on the 10th of March, and our troops stayed in the interior of Jehol Province, not passing a step beyond these lines.

6. The Advance on Hopei Province and the TANGKU Truce.

The Great Wall was originally constructed in defense against enemies from north, and its south side was very easy of access from east to west, and was favourable to free operation, but on the contrary, on its north side (Jehol Province side) facilities were very bad and there was little freedom of operation. There were some hundred escape holes in the Great Wall, and it was therefore very easy to disturb Jehol Province by advancing from this barrier. If disturbances are carried out in that province,ailing oneself of the inconvenience of communications from east to west within the province, will not know what to do and became quite bewildered. Seeing that the Japanese and Manchoukuo troops
stayed in that province, as has been stated above, without passing beyond the line of the Great Wall, the invading enemy, within the barrier set up their headquarters at Peking after obtaining reinforcement from Chang Hsueh-liang in the latter part of April, and harassed our troops, and what is worse, made an obstinate challenge from the line of the Great Wall. Under these circumstances, in order to maintain the self-defense of our army from the viewpoints of the topography and its numerical strength, our troops had to fight reluctantly to repulse the recalcitrant challenge of the enemy and to chase them, passing temporarily to some extent beyond the line of the Great Wall. Thus, after having repulsed the enemy, we retreated momentarily to that line, but they used this fact to claim to have conquered us and began to attack again. Thereupon, on the 3rd of May in the 8th Year of Shôwa (1933) we had to repulse them challenging again and further chased them. Succeeding in this chase, we reached the line of the Soo-Ho river at last and were within hailing distance of Peking and Tientsin. In view of the fact that the advance of our troops upon Peking and Tientsin might cause the aggravation of the situation, our Commander strictly enjoined his troops to stay at the line east of that river. For the purpose of putting to an end to disturbance as soon as possible, in accordance with the principle hitherto pursued by the central military authorities, a statement was issued on the 15th of May to the enemy, that if they immediately renounced their challenging attitude, our troops were willing to retreat instantly to the line of the Great Wall. I remember that such a liberal attitude on the part of the Kwantung
Army and the maintenance of its military discipline, in that despite its troops advance toward Peking, it made them stay there and tried to save the old capital of Peking from the calamity of war and to minimize the disturbance, won great admiration from foreign pressmen at that time.

On 25th May, at about 4 p.m. Ho Yin-chin, Deputy Chief of the Peking Branch of the Military Commission of the Kuomintang Government sent as a messenger Hsu Yen-Mou, staff officer and Colonel of that Peking branch to our Headquarter of the 8th Division at Mayun at that time, and proposed a formal cease-fire agreement. Accepting this proposition and exchanging a memorandum, the Kwantung Army made out a draft cease-fire agreement based upon it. In Peking Lieu-Col. NAGATSU Sahiji, Military Attaché of the Japanese Legation opened negotiations with the representative of Ho Yin-chin. They examined the draft cease-fire agreement. The representatives of both parties met at TANGKU, and after free discussion the agreement was signed.

The Japanese representatives were besides Maj-Gen. OKAMURA Neiji, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, who was invested with plenary powers by Commander MUTÔ; Col. KITA, Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army, Attaché; Lieut. Col. NAGATSU, Military Attaché of the Japanese Legation and Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army; Maj. KAWANO, Staff Officer of the 8th Division; Maj. ENDO (myself), Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army; Maj. FUJIMO; ditto; and Capt. OKABE, Staff Officer of the 6th Division. The Chinese representatives were besides Hsiung Pin, Councillor General of Peking Military branch, who was invested with plenary
powers by Ho Yin-chin; Chien Tsung-tse, Attaché, Councillor of the same branch; Li Tsei-i, ditto; Yin Ju-keng, ditto; Lei Shou-jung, ditto; Hsu Yen-mou, High Staff Officer of the Peking branch; and Chang Hsi-kuang, Chief Staff Officer of the 1st Division. After both delegates exchanged commission of full powers, negotiations were made on the 30th and 31st of May with frank conversations in consequence of which a compromise was reached upon between the two parties, and their representatives signed the cease-fire agreement on the 31st of May, at 11.11 p.m., and at 4 p.m. of the same day the both parties simultaneously made public the whole text of the agreement.

This is the so-called TANGKU Truce and its original was draft by m order. The contents of the agreement are, as have already been known, the mere military cease-fire agreement based upon the viewpoint of pure strategy and do not contain any political points at all.

Moreover, it goes without saying that this agreement was concluded after close arrangement between the Kwantung Army and the Central Supreme Command Headquarter.

This cease-fire agreement is omitted herein, as it was formally made public.

7. The Subsequent Restoration of Peace and Order in Manchoukuo.

With the conclusion of the TANGKU Truce, the so-called Manchurian Incident was actually brought to an end. The remaining bandits in Manchoukuo had then to be cleared out. For this purpose the Japanese and Manchoukuo military police decided upon deliberation to make a concrete plan and put it into practice.
First of all, steps were taken for collecting on one hand arms which were being used in many sources, in order to eradicate the root of disturbances, and applying on the other (proposed) control (self-government system of towns and villages) to secure peace and order. Simultaneously with this, it was decided that it was incumbent upon the military police of Manchoukuo to maintain peace and order at first hand, while the Kwantung Army was to co-operate with them as support, and that the deployed disposition to a high degree of forces would be carried out, in consideration of the menace of the Soviet troops in the Far East, but that this, however, was of secondary importance, while the most important consideration was to clear out the bandits to the last man. For this purpose each Division was allocated some district (generally one province or more) under its control, and each unit of that Division had its own area in its charge, too. Thus, the deployed disposition of every company or sometimes section (its leader was an officer) was carried out in important localities.

In August of the 9th Year of Showa (1934) I finally retired from the post of staff officer in the Kwantung Army.

On this 24th day of January, 1947 at Tokyo

DEFendant /S/ [Signature] (seal)
I, BANNO Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness: /S/ BANNO Junkichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ ENDO Saburo (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 10 February 1947
長岡市に接して新設する新岩木町の住民に、岩木町の老朽化を防ぐための新築住宅の推進を図る。新築住宅は、機能の充実と環境の美化を兼ねたもので、住民の生活をより快適にするための施設を設けることである。新築住宅の施設については、以下の項目を考慮し、設計されている。

1. 適正な規模と機能：住民の生活を支えるための基本的な生活機能を充実させることが求められる。これには、浴室、トイレ、洗面所、飲食室などの基本的な設備を設けることが求められる。
2. 環境の美化：自然と人の生活が調和するための環境を整備する。これには、緑地の整備や自然光を利用した照明などの取り入れが必要である。
3. 老朽化防止：長年の使用により老朽化が進行している部分を元通りに回復する。これには、耐震補強や外装の修繕などの取り入れが必要である。

以上のように、新築住宅の設計は、住民の生活を快適にするための施設を考慮し、環境の美化を図ることを目的としている。
Translated by
Defense Language Branch.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS

IN THE HOUSE OF PEERS AT THE 60TH, 61ST,
62ND AND 63RD SESSIONS OF THE IMPERIAL DIET

SPEECH DELIVERED BY
MINISTER OF STATE YOSHIWA

(pp. 6 - 7)

RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF PEERS
AT THE 60TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET, NO. 2,
EXTRA OF OFFICIAL GAZETTE, JANUARY 22ND, 1932
Gentlemen, it gives me a great pleasure to have an opportunity to set forth my views on some of the more important matters in the foreign relations of our country. Needless to say, the Manchurian Incident is one of the most serious diplomatic problems and has startled the whole world. As our immediate neighbor, China has from former times had very important relations with our country, socially, politically and economically. Especially with regard to Manchuria, serious political consideration is required in view of her past history as well as her contiguity to Japan. It is also beyond question that whether public peace and order in Manchuria is maintained or not matters a great deal to our country. Moreover, Japan has more than a million Japanese residents in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, also, numerous rights and interests under treaties and contracts in regard to leased territories, railways, and coal mines.

In recent years, however, the Chinese Government authorities have come to regard lightly the fact that Manchuria is what she is today thru the efforts of Japan. Having become over-familiar with the magnanimous attitude of Japan, they persecuted our national and demanded upon our treaty and contract rights and interests. Such cases have occurred one after another. Frequent protests were filed and repeated warnings were given by our country concerning this, but they proved almost of no avail. As a result, not only were our political relations with those regions made insecure, but our rights and interests were obviously jeopardized. Thus, the feelings of both our government and people were gradually
wounded, when on the night of September 18 a railway blasting incident suddenly broke out, followed by clashes between Japanese and Chinese Army units. The subsequent developments of the matter which at length led to a complete change in the political situation of Manchuria are as you are all well aware.

Manchuria may properly be said to be the key to the maintenance of peace and order in the Far East. It was so even before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, and we feel it all the more so at present. Especially because our country holds vast rights and interests in the region, we have always been making strenuous efforts to prevent Manchuria from being affected by civil wars that broke out within China Proper. It was solely because the maintenance of peace and order in the territory was of absolute necessity to our country. Fortunately, owing to endeavors on our part, Manchuria has in the past been kept from the effects of civil strifes in China Proper as if it were a different world. Had it not been for the unlawful acts on the part of China, and had our treaty and contractual rights been duly respected, I believe the affairs in Manchuria would never have been so entangled as they are today, notwithstanding such occurrence as the September 18 incident.

As may be seen from what I have stated, peace and order in Manchuria has hitherto been largely maintained by our efforts. And in the future too the responsibility of Japan in this respect would rather become weightier than lightened. In connection with Japan's position in Manchuria, I must add that Japan has no
territorial design in Manchuria. Of course she abides by the principles of open door and equal opportunity, not to speak of existing treaties. What Japan desires in Manchuria is that by securing public order and effecting economic development the region be made a place of peaceful living both for the natives and aliens.

Now, let me turn to the present state of affairs in China proper. For many years past the anti-Japanese movement there has been continuously carried on. Sometimes it showed relaxation, but soon it regained strength and became vigorous again. It was not a mere movement for the severance of economic relations by boycotting Japanese goods and other similar means, but had its spiritual side such as adopting in school books materials calculated to inspire anti-Japanism. There is much corroborative evidence that the movement has been conducted against the free will of Chinese tradesmen in general under the pressure and coercion of such private organizations as the Anti-Japanese Association and have been encouraged or directed by the Chinese Government authorities. There were even those who made anti-Japanese agitation their occupation, and very lucrative one for that matter.

Since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair last autumn, the movement has again showed a turn for the worse and to our regret innumerable cases of outrage to our nationals have occurred. It is a very sharp contrast that while the Chinese residents here in Japan are placed under perfect protection, the Japanese nationals in China are being subjected to indescribably harsh treatment.
In China civil wars and factional strifes have been almost incessantly going on in recent years, and those internal disturbances have often produced serious effects on her foreign relations. It is needless to say that the anti-Japanese movement may also be attributed to the internal political affairs, and I believe the anti-Japanese attitude of the local government authorities in Manchuria before the outbreak of the Manchurian Affair may likewise be accounted for. In fine, it is an undeniable fact that civil wars and factional strifes in China have had far-reaching effects on her foreign relations, and as one of her immediate neighbors Japan has always been the greatest sufferer from such internal disturbances.

Unfortunately the Sino-Japanese relations are thus affected largely by the intricate circumstances arising from China's internal affairs and foreign relations. It may consequently require considerable time to better the relations and restore the two nations to their normal friendship. The cause of the Manchurian Affair is attributable to self-defense on the part of Japan and that of the anti-Japanese movement to erroneous ideas on the part of China. It is therefore imperative that the Chinese should reflect on their own conduct and radically reform their attitude towards the Japanese. Of course the Chinese populace and intellectual classes are not altogether hostile to Japan. I believe they are rather friendly to us at heart. So we need not necessarily be pessimistic about the restoration of Sino-Japanese relations to normalcy. The two nations ought to respect and like each other
and to be in principle bound in close friendship, regarding untoward occurrences rather as exceptions.

The outbreak of the Manchurian Affair gave a considerable shock to the general assembly and Council of the League of Nations then in session at Geneva, and on September 21, 1931, the Chinese representative formally appealed to the Council under Article 11 of the Covenant to deliberate on the matter. Thus the affair was formally brought before the Council of the League of Nations. After holding three sessions for the deliberation of this matter, it adopted two resolutions as is well known to everybody. On the other hand, the United States, though not a member of the League, has acted on the whole in concert with the League, apparently because she was as a signatory to the Anti-war Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty deeply concerned about the situation in the Far East. To both the League of Nations and the United States our Government has always been making clear our position in regard to the Manchurian Affair. In the course of the Affair there have sometimes been delicate developments in our relations with the United States as well as the League. However, carrying on negotiations with cordiality and scrupulousness, we have clarified our position and made our rights and interests recognized by them, so that they have gradually understood our attitude. It is also gratifying that the Soviet Union has assumed an attitude of strict neutrality throughout the progress of the Manchurian Affair.

As regards the Disarmament Conference to be opened on February 2, our Government has already decided on its policy and given
instructions to our delegates about it. As the conference is the first large-scale one to discuss the land, sea and air arms, there is no doubt that it will be looked upon with great anticipation by the whole world. While of course endeavoring to carry through our purpose, it is our earnest desire that the conference may bring about fair and rational results and contribute to the establishment of lasting peace of the world. It has been the constant spirit of the Japanese since the Meiji Restoration to keep open our country to foreign intercourse and promote rational progress. To "seek for knowledge far and wide throughout the world", as set forth in the Great Emperor Meiji's Covenant of Five Articles, has ever been our aim and object. It is therefore the ideal of our diplomatic policy that while guarding our rights and interests, we would act in cooperation with other nations of the world, so that we may share in the benefits of civilization, and I am resolved to further the enhancement of our national prosperity and the welfare of our people under this ideal.
Statement of Source and Authenticity


Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of January, 1917.


I, T., J., D., further certify that the above document was sworn by the opponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same day at the same place.

Witness: (signature)
T., J., D. (Incl.)

Translation of the Above

I, Miller, J. Glass, of the Defense Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation attached to the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\ Miller, J. Glass

Tokyo, Japan

Date: 10 February, 1917
請族院司事速備款

官銀庫外。圈字七年一月二十一日

附呈副本。大臣實院

（自大頁一至第七頁）
第一四回（芳賀観音）附言：时下ノ外交関係ノ中テ観覧ナル交
THE PRELIMINARY REPORT
OF THE
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(despatched from Mukden to the Council of the League on April 29th, 1924)
1.

The Commission of Inquiry, appointed in conformity with Paragraph 5 of the Council Resolution of December 10th, arrived in Mukden on April 1st, and is now occupied with its investigations on the spot. Since its arrival in the far East the Commission has investigated the general conditions prevailing in Japan and China, in so far as these may affect its work. It visited Tokyo, Osaka, Shanghai, Nanjing, Hankow, Tientsin and Peiping, conferred with leaders of both governments and interviewed representatives of any interested groups and classes in both countries. In Peiping it met representatives of the authorities who had been in charge of the Three North-Eastern Provinces prior to September 19th. Since arriving in Mukden the Commission has interviewed, amongst others, the Acting Consul-General of Japan and General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in Manchuria.

The declaration of the President of the Council with reference to the Resolution of December 10th, directed the Commission to submit to the Council as soon as possible after its arrival on the spot a preliminary report on the existing situation in so far as this affects the fulfillment or otherwise by the Governments of China and Japan of certain undertakings embodied in the Resolution of September 29th, 1924, and referred to in
the Resolution of December 10th. These undertakings are:

(a) that the Japanese Government "will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured."

(b) that the Chinese Government "will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police are re-established."

(c) that both Governments "will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation."

The Commission is not yet in a position to submit full information on these three points. It must reserve for a later report the consideration of the undertakings of both parties "to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation," but as the Council is awaiting an early report on the existing situation in so far as it bears on the undertakings of Japan and China reference to above under (a) and (b), the following information is now transmitted.

Actual Situation in Henan...

Information regarding the military situation in the three North-Western provinces has been received by the Japanese military authorities. It is given under 3 heads, the first three relating to the Japanese troops and other forces co-operating with them, the last two relating to forces co-operated to them. Information
with regard to 4) has also been obtained from a Chinese source.

It will be noted that in the classification adopted a new feature appears which was not contemplated by the Council in September last. In the course of the events which are the subject of the present enquiry the local administration was transformed. "Committees for the Preservation of Peace and Order" were first established with Japanese help in the last months of 1931. These were subsequently superseded by an authority which was established on March 9, 1932, as the "Manchoukuo Government". This explanation is necessary in order to account for the use of the expression "Manchoukuo Army" by the Japanese military authorities.

1) Japanese Regular Forces.

On September 18th the number of Japanese troops in the South Manchuria Railway Zone is stated to have been 10,590.

The numbers given for the first part of December are:

4,000 inside and 6,900 outside the South Manchuria Railway Zone, making a total of 10,900.

For the latter part of April the numbers are given as 5,600 inside and 15,800 outside the South Manchuria Railway Zone in the regions of Tientsin, the Tungli-Liao railway, the Mukden-Shahalikwan Railway, the Chinese Eastern Railway east of Harbin, and the northern section of the Kirin-Tumen railway, making a total of 21,400.

2) "Manchoukuo Army"

The troops designated by the Japanese military authorities as the "Manchoukuo Army" are said to have been partly of Chinese regular troops stationed in Manchuria before September 18th and subsequently reorganised, and partly of freshy recruits.
soldiers. This force has been created with the help of the Japanese military authorities. Many Japanese officers, either retired or still belonging to the Japanese army, have been engaged as military advisers and their number is increasing. Contracts with some of these officers have been made for one year. A Japanese staff officer has been appointed adviser to the "Department of Defence of the Manchoukuo Government" at Changchun.

These troops are stationed or operating chiefly in the regions of Mukden, Changchun, Tumen, Tatsui, Tumen, and along the Chinese Eastern Railway, particularly on the eastern branch, where they are engaged against forces not recognizing the authority of the "Manchoukuo Government". The total number of the "Manchoukuo Army" is stated to have been 60,000 men at the end of March.

This number is not reliable owing to the uncertainty of the information regarding these troops at the present time.

3) Local police force.

The number of this force is given as about 129,000 of whom 60,000 are local guards. This police force is stated to be in the main in a continuation of that existing before September 16th. Its reorganization is taking place with the help of Japanese officials.

4) Forces opposed to the Japanese troops and the "Manchoukuo Army".

The Commission was informed in Paoting by Marshal Chiang Kaishek that his forces outside the Great Wall on September 18 included the non-Liaotung regiment numbered 50,000 for Liaotung Province, 60,000 for Kairin Province, and 50,000 for Hailamtung, making a total of 160,000, of which about 50,000
from Henan Province were subsequently withdrawn inside
the wall. This would leave 110,000 outside the wall.

The Japanese military authorities give the number of
troops not remaining outside the wall as 110,000 of which they
state that 60,000 joined the "Manchoukuo Army", 50,000 remained
in the north-east of Kirin in opposition to the Japanese troops.

In the "Manchoukuo Army" and about 60,000 may have joined
the so-called Volunteer Corps. The situation is described by
them as the following:

(a) Portions of the former Chinese Army not recognizing the
authority of the "Manchoukuo Government";

(1) Force north-west of Kirin, estimated at 30,000
(officially by the Chinese to be composed of the Kirin
Self-Defence Army under the command of General Li Tu and of the
Chinese Eastern Railway Guards under the command of General
Ting Chito);

(2) Force under General Li Hai-chung in the region
north-west of Huksan, estimated at 10,000;

(3) Remains of the 9th Army, estimated (on the north-
eastern frontier of Jehol), estimated at 0,000;

(b) Volunteers;

(1) The so-called North-Eastern Army of anti-Japanese
volunteers in the eastern part of Henan Province, mainly
south of Chinchou, estimated at between 10,000 and 25,000 men.

(2) The so-called National Volunteer Army of the North-
East, under the command of Hu Chih-min, mainly operating around
Huksan. The present strength of this force, which has had
several encounters with the Japanese troops, is unknown.
The Volunteer Army of Jehol.

This comparatively well-disciplined body of some 8,000 men of under the command of Tan Chao Wu-chen, which comprises remnants of the cavalry of Chang Hau-chiao's 1st and 2nd Army, is reported to be active on the border of Jehol and Fengtien provinces;

(4) Several minor Volunteer Corps operating, partly in the Shantung region, partly between Tarma and Zhegha. The Japanese say that they are in touch with regular forces hostile to the "Manchoukuo Government".

The total strength of these irregular forces under Paragraph (1) to (4) is said to be about 40,000 men.

5) Bandits.

The bandits, who are not organized primarily for political purposes, appear to have increased in number, due to the disturbed conditions. They are reported by the Japanese to be scattered throughout Manchuria, especially in the part south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Japanese estimate their total number as 40,000. In addition to these, a special bandit force of 12,000 north and east of the town of Kirin is said to be co-operating with the Chinese forces north-east of Harbin mentioned under 4) (1).

armed conflicts between these various forces are frequent. There are bandit raids; attempts of the Japanese soldiers and of the "Manchoukuo" troops to suppress these, and fighting between the various military forces attempting to maintain the new regime and those opposed to it. The result is loss of life, destruction
of property, and a general sense of insecurity.

The Commission purposely refrains from comment, at this stage on the facts and figures above recorded. The Japanese authorities maintain that they cannot at present withdraw their troops without endangering "the safety of the lives and property of their nationals" outside the railway zone. They appear to consider that this withdrawal must depend on the progress of the reorganisation of the troops described as the "Kwantung Army". The Chinese Government does not now exercise authority in any parts of Manchuria, and as events have developed recently the practical question of the fulfilment of its responsibility has not risen. The possible and equitable measures which may restore peace and security and create a reasonable measure of goodwill throughout Manchuria will be considered by the Commission in its final report.

The Commission will visit Chinkiang next week, and will continue its investigation in other parts of Manchuria.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAWAI, Akihiko, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Final Report of the Commission on History of the Invasion of Manchuria" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certific at Tokyo 28 November, 1920.

[Signature of Official]

Witness: Keizan OHO
十一四二四

E81 2x 1
十日ノ決議中ニ反對シテハ居ル一定ノ約束テ日支間軍政府力ヘ履行

（1）日本政府ハ＝日本臣民ノ生命財産ノ安全ヲ確保スルためフ

（2）日本政府ハ＝日本臣民ノ生命財産ノ安全ヲ確保スルためフ

（3）日本政府ハ＝日本臣民ノ生命財産ノ安全ヲ確保スルためフ

（4）日本政府ハ＝日本臣民ノ生命財産ノ安全ヲ確保スルためフ
红龙，”龙在天空飞翔，龙在水中游弋，龙在山间咆哮，龙在沙漠驰骋。

龙是中华民族的象征，代表着力量与智慧。龙在我们心中的地位，就像在西方神话中的龙一样高大。

龙的形象在古代文献中被广泛描述，例如《周易》中就有“龙马相依”之说。龙在艺术作品中也常常出现，无论是陶瓷、玉器、刺绣，还是建筑、服饰，都能见到龙的身影。

龙的传说在民间流传甚广，有龙生九子之说，龙的各个部位都有特殊的象征意义。例如，龙的龙头代表着智慧，龙的龙尾代表着力量，龙的鳞片代表着财富。

龙在中国文化中具有深远的影响，它不仅是一种动物，更是一种精神的象征。龙的传说和故事，让我们对自然充满了敬畏，对生命充满尊重。
京兵三省ノイニ計画特ニ八門ノ要旨ニ付近週報ヲ供献スルモノナリ

第二 朝鮮ノ現状

京兵三省ノニ計画ニ付近週報ヲ供献スルモノナリ
略写文字内容，具体含义不明。
日本陸海軍及び中国軍は、黒龍江省に攻勢を増し、奉天・遼海・吉林三省に侵入する。
日本語

1. 1950年代に国体改正のため、日本の国体は「名実の国体」に変更された。この改正により、日本の国体は「君主制」から「共和制」に変更された。

2. 日本では、昭和天皇が退位した後、天皇制が廃止され、日本の国体は「日本国」に変更された。

3. 国体改正は、日本社会の変革に大きな影響を与え、日本は新たな政治体制を築くことができた。
平和卜安全ヲ図ヒテハ自害ハ其ノ次第報告ニ於テ之ヲ考究スヘシ

ノナル手数ニ付テハ緩衝ヲ採用シ得ヘキ可可能且衛平

ヘシ

両国密接ニ移行ヲ国政府責任ヲ行ヒテハ自害ヲ招来シ得ヘキ可能且衛平
Statement of source and authenticity


is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 23rd day of December, 1940

[Signature]

In charge of official

witness: [Signature]
The Kwantung Army Headquarters Regulations.

April 11, 1919
(Military Order Army No. 12)

Article 1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army shall be appointed by His Majesty the Emperor from among the generals and lieutenant generals of the Imperial Army and placed under the direct control of the Emperor, and shall command all the army forces in Kwantung Province and South Manchuria and also be responsible for the protection of the railways in Kwantung Province and South Manchuria.

Article 2. The Commander shall be under the delegated command of the War Minister in the matters of military administration and personnel affairs and under the same command of the Chief of the Army General Staff in the matters of military operations and mobilization plan and similarly under the Inspector-General of the Military Education in the matters of military education.

Article 3. The Commander may resort to force when he deems it necessary for the defense of Kwantung Province and for the protection of the railways.

The Commander may comply with the request of the governor-general of Kwantung Province for the despatch of troops from the necessity for the maintenance of order and tranquility in his jurisdiction and for the policing necessities in the South Manchurian Zone.

The Commander, however, in case of urgency, without waiting for the Kwantung governor's request, may act with force at his discretion.

In cases designated in the preceding sections, reports thereon must be immediately made to the War Minister and the Chief of the Army General Staff.

Article 4. The Commander shall from time to time inspect the forces under his command and shall report on the general conditions of the military affairs.
and his views thereon to the Emperor, the War Minister, the Chief of Army General Staff and the Inspector-General of the Military Education generally at the end of the term of the military education, every year.

Article 5. The Headquarters of the Army consists of the following departments:

1. Staff Department.
2. Adjutant's Department.
3. Ordnance Department.
4. Intendance Department.
5. Medical Affairs Department.
6. Veterinary Department.
7. Judicial Affairs Department.

The Staff and the Adjutants Departments put together constitute the "Staff.

The organizations and duties of the Departments for Intendance, Medical Affairs, Veterinary and Judicial Affairs are prescribed elsewhere.

Article 6. The Chief of the Staff shall assist the Commander, participate in ceremonies, supervise the preparation and enforcement of orders, and shall be responsible for adjustment of business.

Article 7. The officers and officials of the "Staff", under the direction of the Chief of the Staff, shall attend on their respective duties allotted.

Article 8. Non-commissioned officers, under the direction of their superior officers, shall administer their respective duties.

Article 9. Views to be submitted to the Commander by the various Departmental Chiefs shall first be submitted to the Chief of the Staff for his approval of the same.
Supplementary Rules

The present regulations are enforced on and from April 12, 1919.

The military department regulations of the Kwantung government-general are abolished on April 12, 1919.
(No. 65) Sept. 15, 21st year of Showa (1946)

I hereby certify that the present document, containing two sheets of paper, consists none other than the Regulations of the Mentung Army Headquarters.

MIYATA, Yuzo (No.1)
Chief of the Archives and Documents Section of the First Demobilization Bureau.

Translation Certificate

I, Charles L. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles L. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date 13 March 1946
前各項ノ場合ニ於テハ目隠軍大臣及參謀総長ニ報告スヘシ

第四條 軍司令官ハ随時部下各部隊ヲ徴用シ毎年展開軍隊教育期ノ終ニ於テ

報告スヘシノ概要及意見ヲ奏上シ且隠軍大臣及參謀総長及教育総監ニ

報告スヘシ

第六條 參謀長ハ軍司令官関シ補佐ノ諸務ニ監督スヘシ命令ノ旨実施ヲ監督

＝依ル

第一條 参謀部及隠官部合計參謀本部

第二條 軍司令部ノ組織ヲ限ハ別ニ定ムル所
言語学の視点からの日本語の構造について。

日本語の文法は、主に句順と役名の配列で構成される。

役名の配列は、主語、述語、補語の順で構成される。

句順は、主語、述語、補語の順で構成される。

例：

「彼は彼の本を書いた。」

「彼の本を彼が書いた。」

日本語の文法は、句順と役名の配列で構成される。
On Jan. 23 the Japanese Government made public the following statement concerning the Shanghai Incident:

1) In the memorandum dated Oct. 29th. of last year, the Japanese Government pointed out to the Chinese national Government that the tyrannical anti-Japanese movements in various parts of China are considered "hostilites" without named action, and such animosity is being used as a means to carry out the national policies under the direct and indirect instructions of the officials of the Kuomintang whose organizations and functions can hardly be distinguished in reality from those of the Chinese National Government.

It was requested that the sending of the officials of the Kuomintang and the various anti-Japanese organizations which receive instructions from the Kuomintang be stopped, and that the necessary and effective steps be taken to check other anti-Japanese movements as well as to protect the lives, properties and interests of the Japanese residents. Since then similar requests were made repeatedly to the Chinese central and local authorities in order to bring their attention to the matter.

2) Moreover, the Chinese National Government made no sincere effort to comply with the above mentioned requests of the Japanese Government. In extreme cases, the Chinese National Government regarded the illegal actions taken against Japan and the Japanese subject by the Chinese officials and people as being patriotic.
and, if anythin, encouraged such actions. As a result of this, the anti-Japanese activities intensified. Not only did incidents such as murdering of Japanese subjects and acts of insult upon the Japanese officials at Harbin, Tianjin, and Fuchou happen, but also the Chinese newspapers were no less to print disrespect articles concerning our Imperial household.

5) Especially, in Shanghai, the headquarters of the Resident Japan Society and various other anti-Japanese organizations were extra ely active. The situation became particularly serious after the Leve Majesty article appeared in the Jiyun and Kuo-lien (i.e. a Japanese Buddhist sect) priests were wounded and murdered. Therefore, the Japanese consul-general in Shanghai made a request to the local Chinese authorities to check the anti-Japanese activities, etc.

Notwithstanding this firm and reasonable request, the Chinese authorities deferred their reply and, in the meantime, concentrated their troops around Shanghai as if to intimidate us. Thus, our residents were greatly alarmed.

4) The Chinese authorities, however, accepted our request by 3:00 P.M., on the 29th, but in view of the prior conduct of the Chinese authorities, we kept close observation to see whether they complied with our request and increased precautions against any acts of hoodlums. as the case that, in view of the three times acts of the Chinese troops in the vicinity of the International Settlement, martial law was enforced by the Municipal Bureau at 4:00 P.M. on the same day. Consequently, according to the mutual defense plan, the garrison troops of all nations were disposed at their respective positions. at 6:00 hour on the 29th, when our
Liu's units commenced to take positions along both sides of north-south road which the Chinese regular army units suddenly opened fire. Thus, our units were forced to return the fire. At present, we are still continuing to negotiate with the Chinese authorities to have her troops removed from the vicinity of the Japanese settlement area.

2) Our Navy's action in and around Shanghai at this time is similar to "local police" actions which very often in the past by the leading countries in the same society. The only purpose was to protect the lives and properties of the Japanese residents and to defend our rights. Therefore, compared to the garrison troops of Britain, the U.S., France, etc., in Shanghai, the number of our marine units there was small, which accounts for our dispatch of troops. Needless to say, we maintain a policy of cooperation with other nations. At present our local authorities are keeping close contact with the consuls of various nations, the Municipal Bureau of the International Settlement, and the garrison troops of other nations.

We do not have any political ambitions in the Shanghai area, and we certainly do not intend to infringe upon the rights and interests of other nations in the same area.
C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, OLO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese entitled "STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE COVARIANT CONCLUDING THE SHO GUN INCIDENT" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 4 October 1946.

Nagaharu Olo
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato

Translation Certificate...

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 18th Sept. 1946.

/c/ Charles D. Sheldon.
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財産其

1. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure by all means in their power the tranquillity of the Far East and to contribute to the peaceful progress of the world. Unfortunately of late years the internal discord and unsettled political conditions prevailing in China, coupled with rampant anti-foreign agitation, have given cause for serious concern to all the other Powers - especially to Japan, which because of her geographical proximity and the vast interests of hers which are involved, has been made to suffer in a far greater degree than any other. While the Japanese Government, in their solicitude for neighborly amity, and international good understanding, have exerted every effort to maintain a conciliatory attitude, China, taking advantage of our moderation, has resorted to frequent infringements of our rights and interests, to various acts of violence towards Japanese residents and to an intensification of the vicious anti-Japanese movement, which is without a parallel elsewhere, as it is under the direct or indirect guidance of the Nationalist Party, which is identified with the Nationalist Government itself.

2. It is in these circumstances that the Shanghai Incident has broken out. It is similar to the numerous outrages and insults that had previously been perpetrated at Tsingtao, Foochow, Canton, Amoy and elsewhere, in that they are all characterized by Chinese contempt for Japan and the Japanese and by acts of physical violence. The Shanghai Incident only happens to be the most flagrant case. On the 9th of January last a vernacular
journal, the "Minkuo Daily News", published an article, insulting the honor of our Imperial House. Shortly afterwards, on the 18th, a party of Japanese priests and their companions, five persons in all, were the subjects of an unprovoked attack by Chinese desperadoes. As a result, three of the victims were severely wounded and one was killed. The shock of these events was sufficient to explode the long pent-up indignation felt by the Japanese residents in Shanghai, who had suffered for many years past from increasing Chinese atrocities and affronts.

3. Noting the extreme gravity of the situation, the Japanese Consul General, under the instructions of the Government, and in order to do all that was possible to prevent, by a local solution of the question, any aggravation of the case, presented to the Mayor of Shanghai on January 21st a set of four demands including one for the dissolution of anti-Japanese societies. At three o'clock in the afternoon of January 28th, the Mayor's reply acceding to the above demands was received. The Japanese authorities, hoping that the tension might then relax, decided to wait and watch the performance of their promise on the part of the Chinese. However, soldiers belonging to the 18th Army, then concentrated in the vicinity of Shanghai, began, for reasons connected with internal politics, to display signs of recalcitrance towards the Nanking authorities, and appeared to be making hostile preparations in spite of the Mayor's acceptance of our terms, thus creating a new source of danger. In the meantime Chinese soldiers in civilian costume and various lawless elements had stolen into the International Settlement, creating a source of danger to the
quarter in the vicinity of the Municipal Offices. Many alarming rumors were in circulation and the residents were plunged into an agony of terror, the police of the Chapei district having taken flight. Thereupon, on the 29th, at 4 o'clock, the authorities of the Settlement proclaimed a state of siege, and the armed forces of the Powers were ordered out to duty in accordance with a plan that had been previously agreed upon. It was when the Japanese Marines were proceeding to their assigned sector in Chapei that the Chinese opened fire upon them, precipitating a conflict between Chinese and Japanese armed forces, of which the present situation is the outcome.

4. As is clear from what has been said, the incident of the Chinese assault upon Japanese priests and the Incident of the armed Sino-Japanese conflict were entirely separate affairs. With regard to the armed collision, as it was entirely contrary to every intention of ours, and as the British and American Consuls General offered a tender of their good offices, the Japanese authorities sought to effect a cessation of hostilities, and, in fact, succeeded on the 29th in arriving at an agreement for a truce. But on the following day the Chinese, in contravention of their pledge, opened fire once more. At a conference summoned on the 31st, it was agreed that the opposing forces should cease from all hostile action during the progress of negotiations for the establishment of a neutral zone. However, the Chinese, resuming the offensive, are continuing the concentration of troops in the neighborhood of Shanghai. So far, the Japanese navy, desiring, in view of the international character of Shanghai, not to aggravate the situation, has refrained from taking any drastic action,
while the Chinese, spreading news of Japanese doings, are manifesting even greater vehemence in their actions.

5. In the existing state of affairs in China, uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and in view of historical precedents in such cases, we can have no assurance as to the possible behavior of the vast armies congregated in the Shanghai area, should unscrupulous politicians care to incite them. Our marines, opposed to Chinese forces outnumbering them by more than ten to one, are being weary of exhaustion, while the predilection of the Japanese residents, facing imminent danger as they do, is beyond description. In order to meet the absolute necessity of at once dispatching adequate military reinforcements, (as there are obvious limitations to the naval units which can be landed), so as to put an end to the menace of the Chinese armies, to restore Shanghai to normal conditions and to relieve the inhabitants of all nationalities from the strain of fear and disquiet, the decision was taken to order the necessary military forces to Shanghai.

6. It should be stated that this dispatch of military forces carries no more significance than the dispatch of marines in accordance with the practice on several previous occasions, and that the Japanese Government are prompted by no other motive than that of discharging their international duty and of safeguarding the large number of Japanese nationals, and the Japanese property worth many hundreds of millions, involved in the affair.

The expeditionary force has been therefore limited to the strength absolutely required for the above purposes, and its action will be guided solely by the policy of protecting the common interests of all the Powers. Unless the Chinese, by
continuing hostilities or by obstructing our army in attaining the above ends, compels it to take necessary action, there is of course no intention whatever that it should enter upon an aggressive campaign. The Japanese Government have already declared that they cherish no political ambitions in the region of Shanghai, nor any thought of encroaching there upon the rights and interests of any other Powers. What they desire is to promote the safety and prosperity of that region by cooperation with other Powers and mutual assistance, and so to contribute to the peace and well-being of the Far East.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE SHANGHAI INCIDENT AND THE DESPATCH OF MILITARY FORCES, FEBRUARY 7, 1932." is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 4 October 1946.

(signed) Nagaharu, ODO
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) T. SATO
ノ派克已成为依在部軍の尊い去る一日を達ニ上海ノ常態ヲ恢复シ列国氏
ノ派克已成为依在部軍の尊い去る一日を達ニ上海ノ常態ヲ恢复シ列国氏

六、

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実ノ要軍力ト協力シメラルコトナレズ南
LANGUAGE CORRECTIONS

ERRATA Sheet for Defense Document No. 253

Last paragraph, 5th line, insert "no" between "have" and "territorial". Same paragraph, last line, change "the" to "be".
An Extract from the Shorthand Notes of the Proceedings of the House of Peers in the 60th, 61st, 62nd and 63rd Imperial Diet Sessions.

An Extra of the Official Gazette issued on March 24, Shown 7 (1932).


Minister of State INUKAI’s Speech. (6th page)

Minister of State (Mr. INUKAI, Tsuyoshi):

Gentlemen: Concerning the present conditions of the country, especially ...... wish to obtain in each case your 'post-facto consent. (17 lines omitted.) Beginning with the 17th line:

Respecting the China Incident, our Empire has no other intentions whatsoever than to secure lasting peace in the East, to defend our rights and interests, and to protect the lives and properties of our nationals. As we have often declared, we not only have territorial ambition, but shall strictly respect the open-door and equal opportunity principles. It is true that Japan and China are at present involved in a complicated situation. But if only China gets into a sincerely self-critical mood, a solution thereof will never be difficult. The Government earnestly wishes that our relations with China will be quickly restored to normalcy and that our neighbourly friendship with her be further promoted.

(The rest omitted)
STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I,钢筋, Jie, Chief Librarian of the House of Puer, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "Stenographic Records of the Proceedings in the House of Peers" is a true and correct copy of extracts from the official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (the House of Peers).

Signed at Tokyo on this third day of January, 1947.

I, 钢筋, Jie, Chief Librarian of the House of Puer, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at the same place,

Witness: (signed)

I, 钢筋, Jie, Chief Librarian of the House of Puer, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William L. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 10 February 1947
(期 付 3)
AGREEMENT FOR THE CESSATION
OF HOSTILITIES AROUND
SHANGHAI.

ARTICLE I.
The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already given
the cease fire order, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities
is rendered definite as from May 5th, 1932. The forces of the two
sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all
and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in re­
gard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect
will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating
friendly powers.

ARTICLE II.
The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending
later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal condi­
tions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid
positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

ARTICLE III.
The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement
and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the
incident of January 28th, 1932. It is, however, understood that in
view of the number of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will
have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above
mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex II to
this Agreement.

- 1 -
ARTICLE IV.

A Joint Commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as devised in Annex III to this Agreement.

ARTICLE V.

The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Japanese and Chinese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Japanese and Chinese and English texts, the English texts shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai, this fifth day of May, nineteen hundred and thirty two.

(Signed) K. Uyeda, Lieutenant-General.
(Signed) Shigemitsu, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.
(Signed) S. Shimada, Rear-Admiral.
(Signed) K. Tashiro, Major-General.
(Signed) Quo Taichi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Signed) Tui Chi (CHI), Lieutenant-General.
(Signed) Huang Chiang (TW), Lieutenant-General.
In the presence of:

(Signed) H. B. M. Minister in China.

(Signed) American Minister in China.

(Signed) Minister de France on China.

(Signed) Charge D'Affaires for Italy in China.

Representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th, 1932.

ANNEX I.

The following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in Article II of this Agreement.

Reference the attached postal map of the Shanghai District, scale 1/150,000.

From a point on the Soochow creek due south of Anting village north along the west bank of a creek immediately east of Anting village to Wang-hsien-ch'iao, thence north across a creek to a point four kilometres east of Shartow, and thence north-west up to and including Hu-p'ei-k'ou on the Yangtze River.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers, members of the Joint Commission.

ANNEX II.

The following are the localities as provided in Article III of this Agreement.
The aforesaid localities are outlined on the attached maps marked A., B., C. and D. They are referred to as areas 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Area 1 is shown on Map "A". It is agreed (I) that this area excludes Woosung Village; (II) that the Japanese will not interfere with the operation of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway or its workshops.

Area 2 is shown on Map "B". It is agreed that the Chinese cemetery about one mile more or less to the Northeast of the International race track is excluded from the area to be used by the Japanese troops.

Area 3 is shown on Map "C". It is agreed that this area excludes the Chinese village Te's'ao Chai Chai and the Sanyu Cloth Factory.

Area 4 is shown on Map "D". It is agreed that the area to be used includes the Japanese cemetery and eastward approaches thereto.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated above will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the Agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation.

These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.
ANNEX III.

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: The Japanese and Chinese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian Heads of Mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters or procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement, and is authorised to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three Articles mentioned above.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIMODA Takeo, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English hereto attached consisting of _S_ pages and entitled "AGREEMENT FOR THE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES AROUND SHANGHAI" is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of August, 1946.

(signed) T. Shimoda
Signature of Official

Withness: (signed) Negaharu Odo
AGREEMENT FOR THE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES AROUND SHANGHAI.

ARTICLE 1.

The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already given the cease fire order, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definitive as from May 5th, 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers.

ARTICLE II.

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

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The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932. It is, however, understood that in view of the number of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex II to this Agreement.
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Done at Shanghai, this fifth day of May, nineteen hundred and thirty two.

(Signed) T. Uyeda,
Lieutenant-General.
(Signed) Shigomitsu,
Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary.
(Signed) S. Shimada,
Rear-Admiral.
(Signed) K. Tashiro,
Major-General.
(Signed) Quo Taichi,
Vice Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
(Signed) Tai Chi (TW)
Lieutenant-General.
(Signed) Huang Chiang (TW)
Lieutenant-General.
In the presence of:
(Signed) Hilos W. Lamson
H.E.K. Minister in China.
(Signed) elson Trusler Johnson
American Minister in China.
(Signed) Wilden
Minister du France on Chine.
(Signed) Calzasszo Ciano
Chargo D' Affaires for Italy
in China.
Representatives of the friendly powers
assisting in the negotiations in accordan-
to with the resolution of the Assembly
of the League of nations of March 4th,
1932.

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north along the westbank of a creek immediately east of Antinge
village to Wang-hsien-ch'iao, thence north across a creek to a point
four kilometres east of Shartow, and thence north-west up to and
including Hu-poi-K'ou on the Yangtze River.

In the event of doubts arising in regard to the positions
in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be
ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly
powers, members of the Joint Commission.

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All matters or procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement, and is authorised to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three Articles mentioned above.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIMODA Takeo, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English hereto attached consisting of ___ pages and entitled "AGREEMENT FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AROUND SHANGHAI" is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of August, 1946.

(signed) T. Shimoda
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nogaharu Odo
四月二年五月五日より停戦が確定せるるを合意せるる。我方の軍は敵対の及ぶ限り一切の且ちめをとりつけるものなるべし。停戦に違反し戦を再開するときは、右方の軍は我方の軍を同条約の規定に基づき行動し取るべし。第二条　中国軍隊は本条約に依り取扱うるに於ける一切の軍事的行動に止まるべし。前記条項は本条約第一条付則に記載せらる。第三条　本条約発効日昭和七年一月二十八日より条項前記に於けるが如く、共軍軍員及び軍口方所に於ける非外務省指定地に依收すべき。場所及天候の附則の地方に常備の耐庁を示しめらるべし。場所及天候の附則の場所及天候を示しめらるべし。
同懇親会を設くべし。右後懇親会は又増改日本口事より交
代申請書類への引添の取扱に努力すべし。右申請書類は日本国
防相の承認するとき直に引発を受くべし。右申請書類は日本国
防相の承認するとき直に引発を受くべし。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

SWEORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: S. M. JIN, Tooshige

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was formerly a Vice-admiral in the Navy. On 1 December 1931, when I was a Captain, I was appointed Commander of the Shanghai Naval Special Landing Party. On 6 December 1932, when Rear Admiral Uematsu was appointed as new Commander of the Shanghai Naval Special Landing Party, I was appointed as Chief-of-Staff of the same unit. I held the post till January 1933. At the time when I was appointed Commander of the Shanghai Naval Special Landing Party, the permanent strength of the unit consisted of approximately 900 men.

The Shanghai Naval Special Landing Party was under the
overall command of Rear Admiral Shiozawa Koichi, Commander of the First Overseas Fleet. This fleet was dispatched abroad for the purpose of protecting the Japanese residents along the banks of the Yangtze River.

2. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident anti-Japanese activities and acts involving insult to Japan on the part of the Chinese in Shanghai had become particularly violent and even threatened to turn into riots. For instance, when the Japanese primary school children of Shanghai were on their way to school, they were frequently stoned or subjected to other outrages by Chinese nationals. Therefore, members of the special landing party were sent to protect them, but even so, the local primary school was finally compelled to close down.

Furthermore, an untoward incident, in which a certain Korean threw a bomb against the Imperial cortège, occurred in Tokyo on 3 January 1932. Reporting on the event the next day (9th) the Chinese Daily News in Shanghai published an article to the effect that "unfortunately no injuries were inflicted upon the Emperor" which showed an attitude too irreverent to be tolerated by the Japanese. Again, on 19 January in Shanghai, when a party of Japanese priests were passing by the Sanyu Industrial Company's factory which is situated near the settlements, they were attacked by Chinese laborers employed by the above mentioned factory. Three of them were seriously injured of whom one died on 24 January.
The anti-Japanese parties formed bands and robbed those who possessed Japanese currency. Anti-Japanese students, numbering several thousand, and various anti-Japanese organizations advocated a strong anti-Japanese policy and frequently staged demonstrations. Rumours were circulated that all Japanese would be annihilated, and the situation came to assume extremely serious proportions.

The Chinese police force was too weak to control the situation. Moreover, due to the concentration of armed 19th Route army forces in the vicinity of the International Settlement, the Chinese policemen in that area, especially those in the Bund district, had fled, and the International Settlement was in a state of turmoil, as refugees came pouring in. The lives and property of the Japanese as well as of other foreign nationals were exposed to danger and, therefore, the Shanghai Municipality proclaimed martial law, on the afternoon of 23 January 1932 at 1600 hours. An agreement was reached whereby the garrison forces of all foreign powers were to take positions at 1700 hours (on the same day) in the areas placed in their charge.

Commander Shiozawa issued a statement at 2000 hours on the same day, announcing that the Japanese would also take the defense positions in their charge and delivered this statement to the Chinese authorities. In compliance with orders
from Commander of the Naval Special Lending Party Shiozawa:

the unit under my command was to take its position at 0000 hours 29 January. Before commencing our action, in accordance with my commander's order I instructed my men to the following effect.

"The objective of this operation is to protect the life and property of the residents. Therefore, our side must refrain from attacking unless they first open attack upon us." I strictly warned against any wanton use of military force and gave orders "not to cross the predetermined line of defense."

However, when units of our Naval Special Lending Party left the gates of its headquarters, to take their positions, they were fired upon by snipers who appeared to be Chinese plain clothes men, from two-story buildings along the eastern side of North Szechuan Road and various other places. Then when we approached the road leading to the Chinese side at 0145, we were suddenly attacked fiercely by Chinese troops carrying machine guns, hand grenades, etc., and suffered many casualties in an instant. Our units repelled this attack and, at about 0600 hours on the 29th reached the positions falling under their charge according to the aforementioned agreement.

The Chinese troops however continued to provoke us. Therefore, in self-defense we at last responded to their attack.
and fighting broke out. When fighting began, the Chinese troops fired on us with large guns mounted on trains or in established artillery positions along the railroad track. They also constructed a position in the Commercial Press (printing office) building in Changi and other buildings and attacked us. As our numerically inferior units of the Landing Party were exposed to imminent danger, aircraft took off from the worship НОТО to support our land forces and bombed enemy positions at the above mentioned Commercial Press (printing office) building. As the Commander had strictly warned not to bomb anything but military installations, the crew members of the aircraft visited Headquarters where I was at the time of the Naval Special Landing Party and checked their targets on maps. So far as I personally observe could flights were repeatedly made over the targets to avoid mistakes. I also witnessed other efforts which were being made to ensure bombing accuracy in order to avoid hitting non-military objectives.

3. At the time of the outbreak of the said incident, the whole strength of the Japanese Naval Landing Party was not more than 1700 or 1800 men was entirely insufficient for the protection of approximately 30 thousand Japanese residents scattered over a wide area. Opposing this force was the Chinese 19th Route Army which then reported to have been roughly 35,000 strong. As I recall, the strength of the
various countries' garrison troops stationed in Shanghai at that time consisted of approximately 7000. British troops, about 1000 each of the United States and French troops, and a small Italian force.

Moreover, there were in Shanghai permanent volunteer corps organized by various foreign powers including Japan under the overall command of a reserve British Colonel. These corps took up guard duties in accordance with the Joint Defense Agreement.

4. Later, reinforcements arrived successively from Japan and hostilities were carried on until March when fighting was virtually suspended. On May 5, a truce agreement was concluded.

The Japanese side originally had no intention of starting a war and the said incident was an entirely unforeseen incident caused by provocation on the part of the Chinese. Therefore, our preparations for fighting were found lacking in many respects. The landing party was hastily reinforced but, as the Navy had few weapons for land warfare, they had to be borrowed from the army and shipped to us. Also we were not familiar with the methods of handling such weapons. Steel helmets were also borrowed from the army but since were not enough to distribute among all hands, a number of men had to do without them. We were thus faced with extreme difficulties.

The enemy units against which our naval landing party, so tho
Japanese fought belonged to the 19th Route Army which, as far as I know, was a local force and not a part of Central Army of China.

On this ___ day of ______ , 1947

DEPUTY S.M. NJIN, Tomoshige (seal)

I, S.M. NJIN, Tomoshige, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depuy, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

at TOKYO

Witness: (signed) SOMIY, Shinji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

S.M. NJIN, Tomoshige
Certificate of... Sue

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

vs.

Shinto, Sadao, et al.

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: --KIN!UR., Toyoo
No. 230, 3-Chome,
Harajuku, SHIBUYA.
2nd, Tokyo.
Born: December 19, 1395

- 1 -
Sworn Deposition of Kitada, Tokyo

1. I was formerly a staff officer. I took part in the first Shanghai Incident, as staff officer, second in seniority, of First Overseas Fleet. The Commander of the Fleet was Rear-Admiral Shigemori, Kichi.

2. Following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the movements to exclude, resist, and insult the Japanese as well as to boycott Japanese goods in the areas south of the YangTze River, especially around Shanghai, were intensified to the extreme. As I remember, around October, 1931, I went to recover some bran (husks of wheat normally fed to livestock) from a band of anti-Japanese terrorists who had seized the said bran on the pretext of prohibiting transactions with the Japanese. The Japanese had bought the bran from the Chinese and had loaded it aboard a ship on the Huangpu River. This is only a single instance, but cases of outrageous acts by the Chinese against the Japanese increased daily. Finally, since the lives and property of all Japanese in general were gravely endangered a strong protest was lodged with the Mayor of the City of Shanghai through our Consul General.

The Mayor of Shanghai, on the 27th of January, 1932, issued orders to the Chinese Public Peace Maintenance Bureau to disband all anti-Japanese associations to release seized Japanese goods, and to suspend anti-Japanese movements.

However, there were no indications that the Mayor's order was obser-
On the contrary, on the following day (23rd) an "urgent" anti-Japanese grand rally was held and a mob of approximately 5000 Chinese surrounded the Municipal Government Building creating great confusion and disorder.

The members of the Chinese police force in the Chapei and Honkiang districts deserted their posts and Chinese evacuees kept pouring into the settlements. When finally rumors of "an attack upon the concessions by Chinese troops" were heard the Municipality proclaimed martial law.

On the morning of the 27th of January, the commanding officers of the respective garrison forces of the Powers assembled and agreed that in an emergency, the respective forces of the Powers should jointly guard the settlements by taking up positions already allotted to them according to the plan for joint defense of the Shanghai Concessions.

Therefore, with the proclamation of martial law by the Municipality, the forces of Britain, U. S. France Japan, Italy, etc., were to indicated in this joint guard plan.

Disposition of forces was made for taking guard positions as of zero hours on the 29th of January. Then suddenly our forces were attacked by Chinese troops and our side suffered heavy casualties. Being numerically inferior our landing party was compelled to fight a desperate battle. At 0320 hours on the same day, therefore, orders were despatched to the warship Notors, which was attached to the First Expeditionary squadron, to co-operate with the marines by bombing the Chang Wu Shu Kuan and the Hu Chou hui Kuan buildings, where the enemy forces were based.
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The warship Notors sent two type-14 patrol-seaplanes loaded with light bombs. The planes arrived over the Ghapei area at around 0420 hours and at dawn the previously stated military objectives were bombed.

According to reports submitted after the bombing, the targets were clearly visible and blackouts were ineffective. The planes dropped flare-bombs to confirm the targets, and direct hits were scored by low altitude bombing.

With the continuation of hostilities, enemy armored trains and railroad tracks were also bombed but in consideration of the fact that Shanghai was an international metropolis, strict orders were issued by Commander of the Fleet Admiral Shiozawa that utmost care must be taken not to bomb non-military objectives.

We had reports from units which went into action that every possible effort was made to execute accurate bombing.

I myself actually saw those planes flying at low altitudes, and entering the bombing course several times in order to effect precision bombing.

On this clash, no incendiary bombs were used.

5. On the 3rd of February, three Japanese destroyers the Kaki, Kuri and Nire of the 26th Destroyer Division were cruising down the Huangpu River on their way to Sasebo. While they were passing Woosung at 1125 hours, they were suddenly fired upon from the Woosung Fortress batteries. The destroyers immediately returned fire.

On the same day, the Woosung Fortress battery also opened fire upon our Third Division consisting of three cruisers.
I was informed of these facts immediately after they had taken place by Commander Nishiumi, Shoji, Commanding officer of the 26th Destroyer Division and Mori Teikichi, Commander of the Third Division Fighting Group.

On this 21st day of March, 1947
At Tokyo

DEONENT : ATTJN. Toyae (seal)

I, SGT.Jn. Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: /S/ SGT.Jn. Shinji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KIT. Jn. Toyae (seal)

- 5 -
Def Doc No. 563

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Tercy of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Tercy

Tokyo, Japan
Date 2 April 1947
工部局

三月二十七日午前上海経

港局

工部局

三方協議

三月二十七日午前上海経

港局

工部局

三方協議

三月二十七日午前上海経

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工部局

三方協議

三月二十七日午前上海経

港局

工部局

三方協議
命前激怒我方，我方无法继续容忍其言行。故

命前激怒我方，我方无法继续容忍其言行。故
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AFFIDAVIT

I, TAMBE, Junji, born November 22, 1905, and residing at 2372 Midorigaoka, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, having sworn as shown in the attached written oath, depose and state as follows:

I retired from the Navy in November 1936 with the title of Rear-Admiral, and have been engaged in business since then till the termination of the war.

I was appointed captain of the cruiser HILATO (approximately 5,000 tons) in December 1930. The cruiser HILATO was attached to the First Overseas Service Squadron at that time and was engaged in the guarding of the Yangtze River waters. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 the anti-Japanese movement became acute in the districts along the Yangtze River, including Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow.

On January 27, 1932, the cruiser HILATO, which had been anchored at Shanghai, weighed anchor and reached Nanking on the 28th. At the time of departure Rear-Admiral SHICHIWA, Koichi, commander of the Squadron, instructed me as follows:

"Both the Japanese Government and Navy are taking the policy of localizing the Manchurian Incident. Attend to the protection of the residents in Nanking with the utmost care and prudence so that no trouble may be caused."

With the news of the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident on January 29, 1932, the Japanese consul, the resident military and naval officers, and all the other Japanese residents took refuge in the Japanese steamship "UN-YO-JARU" as an emergency measure. The luggage of the residents was carried..."
to a wharf of the NISSHIN Steamship Co., where it was guarded by a section of
the landing forces dispatched from the cruiser "TENRYU". On the Yangtze River
off Nanking; there were at that time six Japanese naval vessels including
the cruisers "HIRATO", "TENRYU" and "TSUSHIMA" and three destroyers together
with one British warship, one American destroyer and about ten Chinese war-
ships.

In the early morning of January 29th Commander SHIOZAWA sent a message,
through myself, to Admiral CHEN Shao-Kuan, the Chief of the Chinese Navy
Department, in which he stated, "Although an untoward incident has broken out
in Shanghai, Japan does not regard China as an enemy, but is merely hostile
towards the 19th Route Army which has assumed a defiant attitude towards Japan.
I hope the intimate friendship between China and Japan may be continued as
before." To this Admiral CHEN Shao-Kuan replied that he agreed with Commander
SHIOZAWA and that he would see to it that when passing by a Japanese warship
the Chinese vessels would avoid any action which might cause a misunderstanding.

In the morning of February 1st, Captain KAO Hsien-chia, Captain of the Chinese
warship "HAIYUN" paid us a visit and said it was regrettable that the 19th
Route Army was fighting the Japanese in Shanghai, and it was the desire of the
Chinese Navy to remain on friendly terms with the Japanese. In the afternoon
I went to return his call. And otherwise everything went on as usual.

At about eleven o'clock in the night of February 1st, there was firing
from the SHIHTZESHAN Battery in the line of fort near Nanking. Shots were
heard from the wharf of the NISSHIN Steamship Company. Just then I perceived
our comrade vessels "TENRYU" and "TSUSHIMA" returning the fire, and then we
received a request for assistance from the section guarding the wharf. The
above-mentioned shots from the wharf were heard almost simultaneously with the
bombardment from SHIHTZESHAN Battery and it was the sound of rifle fire and
grenades coming from a point on the Chinese side near the wharf. One of our
third grade seamen was killed and another wounded as a result of the firing.
To cope with this situation, I, being the commander-in-chief, ordered the steamship "UN-YO-IUW" (anchored alongside the wharf of the NISSHIN Steamship Company) to weigh anchor, as I was worried about the possible danger to the residents. I also commanded the section guarding the wharf to return to the comrade vessel "TFTRIU". Since no more attacks from the battery followed, I ordered our warships to "hold fire" and then to "cease firing". We informed the British and American warships, which were anchored at the place, of the situation.

We observed the situation until morning with every precaution. However, the skirmish seemed to have come to an end, as there was no further bombardment from the fort. We had merely shelled several times in response. The distance between the SHIZESHAN Battery and Japanese warships was two thousand meters. We lodged a protest with the Chinese authorities through our consul and requested them to make reparation for the death of the sailor and for the luggage carried off the wharf.

Tange, Kunji (Signed) (Seal)

This 26th day of March 1947.

I hereby certify that the above affiant swore and stated, and signed and sealed in my presence.

Witness: Shinji

This 28th day of March 1947.
On this 18th day of March, 1947,

At Tokyo,

DEPOSITION TANGE, Kunji (seal)

I, TANGE, Kunji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth
withholding nothing and concealing nothing.

(signed)  Taken, Kunji (seal)
Deponent: TANGE, Kunji
Address: No. 2372, Midorigaoka, Meguro-ku, Tokyo.
Date of birth: November 22, 1885.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Translation Certificate

I, Charles L. Sheldon, Chief of the defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\/ Charles L. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan
Date 2 April 1947
南京に到着シシマンタシ出発ニ際シ司令官暹澤少尉ハ私ニ日本政府トレ
南亦電報トテモ断絶事実不良大ノ方針デアルカラヲ観テ歴々ナモ様態重
注意シテ居露好保観ニ望ルニハ訓示サレマナタ。

一九三二年一月廿九日上海事件勃發ノ報ニ接スル々領袖、陸在武官及
其ノ他ノ直屬部下及セザリ観余ノ措置トレテ日本武備一際廃減ニ配慮シ、居
住民ノ施策及各施設ノ修理サレマ＝テハルクニ持込巡洋ス一海龍ノヨリ陸
戦除一隻小艦ハシテテシテテ居リマシタ。南京ノ江上ハ日本ハ巡洋
艦戸ノ外避難ノ後、天龍ノヨリ島南ノ一隻小艦ハシテテテ巡洋ス一海龍ノヨリ陸
戦除一隻小艦ハシテテテシテテ居リマシタ。南京ノ江上ハ日本ハ巡洋
艦戸ノ外避難ノ後、天龍ノヨリ島南ノ一隻小艦ハシテテテ巡洋ス一海龍ノヨリ陸

三■三月二十九日朝霧、暹澤司令官ハ私ノ部下シテシテテシテテテシテテ居リマシタ。暹澤ノ軍艦ハ約十隻居リマシタ。二月一日午前ニハ日本軍艦 nisi 附近ルトキハ誤解
二月一日/夜十一時頃南京附近/要塞線経々山砲及び砲撃/を来り。/日清

デーハルクー、附近ノ/中ノ側ノ地区ヨリ来ル/銃撃ヲ受ケ、/前方ノ山砲及/カラ援助ヲ要請シテ/来シテにて/デー/ハルクー/ノノ射込/受シ、/一方/ハ三等水兵/一名死亡、/一名負傷/シテシマ/タ。（当時/デーハルクー/在ツク）

亡及Ηハルクルノ荷物ノ奪取ニ對スル損害賠償ヲ要求シテタ。
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）三月二十八日
於東京

立行人、經殿士

次

（文）
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-v-

ARAKI, Sadao; et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: OYAMA, Ayao

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

On this 9 day of January, 1947

at Tokyo

Deponent: (signed) OYAMA, Ayao

I, BANNO, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ OYAMA, Ayao (seal)
1. My name is OYAMA, Ayao.

2. My present residence is No. 8, 1-Chome, Nogata-cho, Kojimachi-Ku, Tokyo.

3. The date of my birth is January 2, 1883 (Meiji 16).

4. I held the directorship of the Judicial Affairs Bureau in the Kwantung Army as an army legal officer (then 3rd grade of the KOTO tank) from June 21, 1929 (Showa 4) to December 20, 1933 (Showa 8).

5. While I was in that office, there came the outbreak of the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931 (Showa 6).

6. Upon the outbreak of this incident, I went under orders to Mukden with the staff of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. Proceeding to the actual site, on September 23 of the same year, in cooperation with the authorities concerned, we examined the condition of the South Manchurian Railway which had been blasted at Lioutikow. The members of the party who were engaged in the investigation were:

   USUDA, Kanzo, Infantry Major attached to the Kwantung Army Headquarters (staff officer); OYAMA, Ayao, OKADA, Chiichi, and FURUKAWA, Soichi, Army Legal Officer of the Kwantung Army Headquarters; TSUKA, Kanzo, Gendarmerie Major of the Kwantung Gendarmerie; SHIMAMOTO, Masaochi, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Second Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrisons; ITAKURA, Itaru, Infantry Captain of the Kwantung Army Headquarters; TAMURA, Kazuc.
Surgeon Captain of the Kwantung Army Headquarters; and
KAKAWA, Kazuma, army clerk, who acted as witness and
stenographer.

7. On the basis of the above-mentioned investigation, the
party drew up the Report of the Investigation of the
Blasting of the South Manchurian Railway and filed it
with the authorities.

8. The document consisting of five sheets, including the
cover, which was drawn up on September 23, 1931, and
entitled the "Report of the Investigation of the Blasting
of the South Manchurian Railway," is a copy of the
original report drawn up at that time. I certify that
the content is the same as that of the original.

9. The document drawn up by the Kwantung Army Staff
Office and entitled "Table of Incidents concerning
Manchuria and Mongolia in the Last Four Years," is a copy
of the original which the Kwantung Army Staff Office
distributed to the parties concerned after the investigatio.
It consists of fifteen sheets, including the cover
and an appended paper. As the director of the
Legal Affairs Bureau of the Kwantung Army I read the
original at the time of its writing, and I certify that
as far as I remember the content of this copy is the
same as that of the original.

Drafted on September 23
in the 6th Year of Showa

-3-
Report of the Investigation of the Blasting
of the South Manchurian Railway

On the night of September 18, 1931, Chinese soldiers blow up the South Manchurian Railway and attacked the Japanese railway guards. Shimamoto, commander of the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrisons, who was responsible for defence of the railway, went to the Kwantung Army Headquarters on September 23 and made an oral report regarding the blasted spot and conditions in the neighbourhood.

Consequently, by order of the Commander of the Kwantung Army, the following personnel went to the actual scene of the incident and investigated the actual conditions: USUDA, KANZO, Infantry Major attached to the Kwantung Army Headquarters (staff-officer); OYAMA, Ayao, OKADA, Chiiichi, and PURUKAWA, Seiichi, Army Legal Officers of the Kwantung Army Headquarters; TANUMA, Kanzo, Gendarmerie Major of the Kwantung Gendarmerie; SHIMAMOTO, Masaichi, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Second Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrisons; ITAKURA, Itaru, Infantry Captain of the Kwantung Army Headquarters; TASURA, Kenzo, Surgeon Captain of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. Their report is as follows:

I. Spot blown up

The railway line under the management of the South Manchuria Railway Company; the east side track about 1,500
metres north of the Lieutikow Detachment Barracks north of Mukden Station.

II. Date of investigation

From 5.14 to 6.10 p.m. on September 23, 1931 in fair weather, at sunset.

III. Actual conditions of the spot blown up.

The spot blown up had already been restored, but fragments of tracks and sleepers were still scattered here and there. As to the condition of repair, two tracks of the east side and two sleepers had been replaced with new ones, and the earth and sand, ballast extending over 25 metres of the said tracks from north to south, and woody land on the east side had evidently been worked upon quite recently (about four or five days before).

Two tracks and two sleepers were crushed similarly at only one end. On examination, judging from the fact that there were remnants of explosives adhering to the ends of tracks, to sleepers, and to their scattered fragments as well as from the shapes of crushed fragments, we fully recognized that explosives were used to blast the railway.

Photographs of the above-mentioned actual conditions were taken by the photographers who accompanied us.

-5-
IV. Actual conditions in the area extending from the place blasted to the south west corner of Poitaying.

(1) Starting northward from the place blasted, on a path 30 inches wide of piled-up earth next to the ballast on the east side of the railway track, we noticed that the said path and the ballast next to it were dotted with clotted blood at intervals of about two metres. We found a slightly larger amount of blood at a point about one hundred and fifty metres away from the starting-point. Proceeding about two hundred metres, following the blood dotted as before, we discovered a corpse on the road parallel to the east side of the railway track and about 2 metres than the track. Further north we found no trace of blood. The aforesaid blood was dark brown, recognizable as being several days old. Photographs of the above mentioned actual evidence of blood were taken by the photographers who accompanied us.

(2) The corpse lay on the east side of the road, in a rut made by carts going through the mud. There were still puddles of mud in places. In the rut, with his head northwards, his foot southwards, the right side of his face, his right hand and his right foot sunk in the mud, and his left hand under his belly, a Chinese soldier lay dead, face downwards, dressed in a military uniform (without cap) but wearing a bayonet scabbard (the blade
of which was missing). To the north, thirty centimeters away from his head, was a soldier's cap, and to the south, two meters from his foot, a rifle with bayonet fixed. In the middle of the back of the corpse there was a blood-stained bullet hole in his uniform. A considerable amount of blood had been emitted from his mouth and nostrils and had permeated the earth next to his face. His face, hand, foot and uniform which had sunk in the mud, were stuck in the mud which had dried after a few clear days. The blood on his back and his face was dark brown and red, and the bare parts of the corpse were dark brown and rotted. A part of his head on the same side of his foot in the mud was submerged in a little water and that part had become slightly swollen. We feared that if we should try to move the corpse, the rotted corpse and uniform would fall apart. Photographs of the actual condition of the corpse were taken by the photographers who accompanied us.

(3) Northwards about one hundred meters from the corpse on the road parallel to the railway, we discovered the corpse of another Chinese soldier at the edge of a marshy pool on the east side of the road. He was in soldier's uniform without cap but with his bayonet. He lay dead with his hand northward, his foot southward.
his face downward, his right arm under his body and his left arm a little forward. In the centre of the back of the corpse there was a blood-stained bullet hole mark. From his mouth and nostrils had come a small amount of blood, which was dark brown and red. The bare parts of the corpse were dark brown and rotted.

The hood, hands and uniform had become slightly furred. Photos of the actual conditions of the corpse were taken by the photographers who accompanied us.

(4) Northward about one hundred metres from the corpse on the road, beyond the marsh (ten metres wide) on the east side of the road and in a small hollow near the eastern edge of the above-mentioned marsh, we discovered the corpse of a third Chinese soldier. He was in a soldier's uniform, without cap but with his bayonet. The cap was lying to the north of the corpse. He lay dead with the right half of his face downward, his head northward, his feet southward, and his right arm under his body. There were no cuts on the bare parts of the corpse, but he had vomited a large amount of blood, which was now dark brown and red. His face and his right arm had sunk in the mud and the blood had permeated the earth next to his face. His face, arm and uniform were stuck in the mud which had dried after a few clear days.
Photos of the actual condition of the corpse were taken by the photographers who accompanied us.

When we looked to the north-east from the spot where the corpse lay, we could see the south-west corners of the parapet of Poitaying about one hundred and fifty meters beyond a Keeling field.

We judged from the looks and uniforms of the aforesaid three corpses that they were doubtlessly Chinese soldiers, and the above-mentioned conditions convinced us that scores of hours had passed since their death. There is no evidence that the corpses had been moved.

The above investigation ascertained that the Chinese soldiers had blown up the aforesaid railway with explosives, and, that while retreating in the direction of Poitaying, they had been fatally wounded by pursuing Japanese railway guards who had discovered them, corpses of the three soldiers having been left where they died.

September 23, 1931.
Photos of the actual condition of the corpse were taken by the photographers who accompanied us.

When we looked to the north-east from the spot where the corpse lay, we could see the south-west corners of the parapet of Peitaying about one hundred and fifty meters beyond a Keeling field.

We judged from the looks and uniforms of the aforesaid three corpses that they were doubtlessly Chinese soldiers, and the above-mentioned conditions convinced us that scores of hours had passed since their death. There is no evidence that the corpses had been moved.

The above investigation ascertained that the Chinese soldiers had blown up the aforesaid railway with explosives, and, that while retreating in the direction of Peitaying, they had been fatally wounded by pursuing Japanese railway guards who had discovered them, corpses of the three soldiers having been left where they died.

September 23, 1931.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Chaxlie S. Torry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Chaxlie S. Torry.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 3 Apr. 1947.
私 名 大山 文雄

一、

年 三月 三日

二、

三、

四、

五、

六、

七、

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九、
（3）
昭和六年九月十八日第二支那方面軍進軍第二十一師団

東南方面軍

司令部

第二十一師団

戦時態勢

司令官

支那進軍

第二十一師団

司令部

部隊配置

田村一夫

山本信正

佐野正一

前田信一

吉川正明

大山雄二

川崎正夫

壱木正人

今村章一

板倉正一


doi: 877
二、調査ノ日時

昭和六年九月十三日午後五時十四分ヨリ同六時十分ニ至ル間天気晴朗朝四ニ頃頃

三、焼破現場ノ状況

焼破ノ前段ハ焼後二週間ニ亘リ焼ならシテ次ノ形ヲ成タリ然レトリ爆発ノ所ノ部ールニ爆発ノ所ノ有ノ余ワノ形ヲ成タリ爆発ノ所ノ焼後ノ状況ハ次ノナリ

焼後ノ焼場ノ一部ヲ観察ツ Divide

二〇二〇年十一月

(5)
昭和六年九月二十三日

独立守備歩兵第三大隊

陸軍歩兵少佐

前川

兵馬

正一

(13)
Sworn Deposition

Deponent: VACHI, Takaji

having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I. I was Lieutenant General at the time when the war ended.

2. I assumed the post of battalion commander of the 63rd Infantry Regiment at the city of Katsuc in August, 1929 (the 4th year of Shōwa), became a member of the Staff Office in April, 1931.

3. Colonel HASHIOTO Lingoro is my senior and is also an intimate friend of mine.

4. After I became a member of the General Staff Office, I occasionally attended meetings held by the society called Sakura-kai (the Cherry-Blooms Society).

5. Sakura-kai was a discussion meeting concerning the reformation of domestic affairs. Consequently, there was no occasion at which the problems dealing with Manchuria and other countries were studied.

6. Sakura-kai was a gathering of young officers below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and there were no rules as to the regulations or the
7. Sakurakai had no connection whatever with the Manchurian Incident. Neither was there any connection with the Kwantung Army. No one connected with the Kwantung Army enjoyed its membership.

8. Colonel KASHIMOTO Kingoro had never met ITAGI I Seishiro, EDHARA Kenji, ISHII Kenji, etc. of the Kwantung Army at about the time when the Manchurian Incident broke out. Also there was no occasion at which the liaison was established with these people by means of telephone, telegram or by any other means.

9. During that period, I and KASHIMOTO Kingoro were on very intimate terms in both official and private affairs so that I know about these matters very well.

10. I was reprimanded along with KASHIMOTO Kingoro and others on the charge of the October Incident. KASHIMOTO was subjected to heavy disciplinary confinement for 25 days and relegated to the Himoji regiment.

11. The aim of the October Incident was to remove corrupt politicians from the political parties and to recommend Lieutenant General ARAKI, a man of unimpeachable character, to head a new government. However, KASHIMOTO revealed this plan to Lieutenant General HIYI, Lieutenant General. HIYI told it to Minister of War KINJI, and that night Minister of War KINJI ordered the military police to arrest us so that the further development of the Incident was checked there. Consequently, the concrete and practical method of its execution had not as yet been considered.

- 2 -
12. Mr. CHIKA Shuhei had no connection with the October Incident. For fear that the information might leak out through civilians it was decided not to include any civilians at all in this plan. HASHIMOTO Kingoro said that the failure of the March Incident was due to the fact that they had included civilians and therefore it was deemed proper not to have any civilians this time.

13. HASHIMOTO Kingoro said that the March Incident was a move which attempted to form a new cabinet under the leadership of General UGAKI Issei and to remove corrupt politicians from the political parties, but it was suspended at the stage of a mere plan. However, I am not acquainted with its details.

14. The motive of the October Incident was based on the fact that both of the political parties, Goiyukai and Iinseito, were absorbed in party interests as well as self-interests and never thought of the hardships of the people. For these reasons, it was a move to exclude KAKATSUKI Peijiro who was a typical example of the corrupt party politicians, and there was no connection whatsoever with the Manchurian Incident.

15. Captain CHO Isamu was one of my intimate friends. Captain CHO was dispatched to Fokin as a study committee at the beginning of August 1931 (the 6th Year of Showa), and returned to Tokyo at the early part of October of the same year after the Manchurian Incident started. Therefore, he has no connection whatsoever with the Manchurian Incident at its outbreak.

16. Major General TANAKA Ryuichi had no connection with the Sakura-kei. He is a junior of HASHIMOTO Kingoro but HASHIMOTO is not his close friend.
On this 21st day of March, 1947
At Sugamo Prison

DEFENDANT /S/ HACHI, Takezo (seal)

I, HAYASHI, Itsuro HAYASHI, Kunji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of those witnesses.

On the same date
At Sugamo Prison

Witnesses: /S/ HAYASHI, Itsuro
            KASAI, Kunji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ CHI, Takeji (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Teruo Otsuki, the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation ascribed in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Teruo Otsuki

Tokyo, Japan
Date 2 April 1947
良心を発揮し、日々の研鑽を積み重ねて、何等かの役割を果たして参る

（徐署印名）

知    番
Independence Declaration of the New Manchu-Mongolian State.

Since an incident broke out in the North-East, several months have already elapsed as though in a "twinkling of an eye." Now the people of our country are longing for a good rule as the hungry long for food and the thirsty for water. And at this moment of renewal and reformation, we desire from the depths of our hearts, the resurrection and revival of all things.

We, Ching-hui (T.N. Chang Ching-hui calls himself by the first name in oriental manner) and the others, had the honor to be elected as leaders of the provinces and the district. Discarding the old and starting anew, we hope not to evade our responsibilities by transferring them to others.

When we assembled here to confer together on the foundation of our policies, all of us said unanimously, "Without a solid organization we would not be able to manage the whole situation. Unless we act on the basis of the general will of the people, we would not be able to establish our new policy." Accordingly, we established a new organization which consists of four provinces of the North East, one special administrative district, and the districts of the Kings and Princes of Mongolia, and named it the Administrative Committee of the North East. As soon as it was established, we dispatched official telegrams to all the internal and external authorities.

Now, the four provinces and the district of the North East have established their independence completely, and have annulled their separation from the National Party Government. With
spirit of independence afresh we should endeavor to plan admini-
strative reforms.

Now we remember the time when the warlords misruled this
country and extorted the people arbitrarily for which reason
the people felt as though they were in a fire or in deep water,
a condition whereby they were not even able to protect their
very lives. Even now, although tears that were shed throughout
the country are not yet dried, they (i.e. bandits and the
like) still retain their power comparable to the claws and fangs
of tigers and wolves. We must be ready therefore to comolately
eradicate them so that these "branches and twigs" may not be able
to spread and prevail.

An old scripture tells us, "a lord who comforts his subjects
shall be called a "KO" (T.N. generous emperor), and a lord who
protects his subjects, shall be called a King." In other words
reviving the people and gaining peace and rest constitutes good
government.

This is number one of the appointed tasks of this Committee.
Lately the despotic, abusive administration acting arbitrarily
has incurred the animosity of the people and society's morality
has been tending to deteriorate gradually. Society is the
foundation of a state. Morality is the source of government.
Again in the classics too there is, (TN: the saying), "If there
be loyalty and faith towards the lord : and friendship and mutual
respect among the people, we can administer even in a land of
savages and barbarians." In this spirit, we heartily desire not
to hold anti-foreign policies, to cease international conflicts,
to have the open door now, and with the principle of equal coor-
tunity to live and prosper together with the peoples of the world.

This is the second of the appointed tasks this Committee.

To secure domestic peace, and to enter into amicable relations with other nations is the foundation of government. We have already established firmly the root of the tree of politics; now, we must arrange for the buds and branches of the tree to flourish.

Accordingly, we should encourage and stimulate every branch of business, promote farming and commerce, gradually increase those who earn their living for themselves, decrease the number of the unemployed, thus sharing the returns of society, and then conflicts between classes will disappear of themselves. In this manner shall we avoid communization and secure our democratic policies. This is the third of the appointed tasks of this Committee.

For the achievement of these three missions, we, Ching-hui and the others hereon have organized this Committee, in order to secure happiness for the sake of the people in the four provinces and the district in the North East. This again, we believe is based on our desire to secure happiness for the various peoples of all East Asia.

High up in the Heavens, the Sun witnesses this declaration of ours. Gentlemen, our fellow country men, rise and sustain our mission.

February 18th, the 21st year of Minkuo. (TN: 1932 A.D.)

The Administrative Committee of the North East.
The Imperial Enthronement address

Know ye, Our Subjects:

As the emperor divinely descended from heaven, would proclaim
that two years have elapsed since our country entered arduous
wars founded on a basis of benevolent government and self-abasement
with our literary helpers. In the early days we suffered from
the injustice and inhumanities of officials who were sent on... life
of ease and comfort during military service. The good people, in
spite of their urgent cry for heaven’s help, could not stand on
their own feet. At that juncture the Japanese Empire, addressing
the suspicious and wistful citizens哑哑 the rest of the world,
came forward to our aid. Thanks to Japan’s unpremeditated services
rendered in our behalf, we have seen and borne all our tribulations
solve all our difficulties.

Heaven has most graciously enabled Us to reign over the
country. Peasants have regained their loyalty to Us and all refugees
have gradually returned to their homes. Popular voices are truly
alleed and public opinion united. The internal disturbances have
been largely suppressed. Problems are now efficiently in the palm
of Our Hands...

And ye, Our Subjects: Heaven is by no means partial in
rewarding good and never hopes only the virtuous. There is a will
on the part of the people, contrary to model, however, they are
easily turned into a state of confusion. The people, therefore, are
appealing for a right person for the whole. And every one consulted
expressed his hearty approval. How could he hesitate to obey the
divine duty. On this first day of the third month of the third year
of 'Tai-T'ung to be revised the imperial edicts of the reign of King Yu,
which contains all the laws of the state. Our country shall not be blamed
unoffensively. Nevertheless, internal disturbances might yet arise
at any moment. Why should he remain inactive at such a critical
moment?

As for the nature and policies of science and administration
of our country, we will cooperate in perfect accord with the
Japanese Empire and our continuing hope for everlasting national
security. The clauses of the law of this governing the state and
the violation constitute same really substantially unchanged.

Although there are several loose and tribes residing within
our country, let us, with an open mind, endeavor to respect
our common interests.

Know ye, our subjects: The truth of these laws of ours is
self-evident and the living law. It is our wish that ye would
unanimously combine to every word of our resolves.

[Imperial seal: 御未.] [Imperial seal: 同治].

The first day of the third month of the first year of the
'K'ing to the

[imprint]

The Premier

Respective ministers of the Cabinet.
CERTIFICATE

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, TAKAO, TORU, Chief of Continental Division, Central Bureau of the Japanese Overseas Residents Division, Central Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese hereto attached consisting __ pages and entitled

"Imperial Inheritance Record",
is in exact typewritten form of document entitled "Spirit of Foundation of Empire——Collection of Documents in Japanese Language" issued by the Central Bureau of the Consular Society of Japan.

SIGNED AT TOKYO ON THIS
16TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1940

(Signed) TORU, TAKAO
Signature of Official

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, CHARLES D. SHELTON, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the following translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation, due to a note or certificate to the wording of the original document.

TOKYO, JAPAN
DATE 19TH SEPT., 1940

/\ CHARLES D. SHELTON
शक से जीवन में एक निजी और सार्वजनिक मार्गदर्शक निर्माण की होनी चाहिए। यदि आप जीवन में एक सार्वजनिक मार्गदर्शक निर्माण करना चाहते हैं तो आपके लिए कुछ निर्देश दिए गए हैं।

1. जीवन में निर्माण की होनी चाहिए।
2. स्वयं का समय व्यय होता है।
3. आपको निर्माण करने का समय व्यय होता है।

यह शक से जीवन में एक सार्वजनिक मार्गदर्शक निर्माण की होनी चाहिए।
Every country is overtaken today by emergencies of unprecedented magnitude. Our need is alike embittered by adverse circumstances. It is indeed the hour that calls for an intensification of effort on the part of our entire nation. We cannot but then public service, whether civil or military, small locally or from its appointed duty, and that all the people shall pursue their destined tasks with allegiance. Only not from the point of restitude in action, and in action, always the same sound: active to meet the present situation with united determination and courage and resolution. So may ye carry into the war's work confidence of all energies and imperial fire and contribute to the prosperity and well-being of mankind.

Imperialism shall not be.

March 27, 1932.
方今列目は徳有・世間は筆者・速報に是非値・時頃・楊・部数に

公の学問・囲、斯の如く・計も、斯の如く・計も、斯の如く・計も、斯の如く・計も、

昭和八年三月二十七日

名 徳
Certificate

Statement of Copy and Authenticity

I, Chief of the Archives, Section, Japanese
Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereinafter attached
consisting of 17 pages and entitled "The Imperial Rescript
on the Japan's Withdrawal from the League of Nations, March 27, 1945"
is an exact and true copy of an official document in the Japanese
Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo

on this 1st day of August, 1945

[Signature]

Chief of Office

Witness: Nejyuru Saka

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Japanese Language Branch, hereby
 Certify that the following translation constitutes in the above
 Certificate it, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct
 Translation and is as near it possible to the meaning of the original
 Document.

/6/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan

13th Sept. 1946
In proceeding this day to the signature of the Agreement between Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Cession to Manchoukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), the Plenipotentiaries of Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed upon the following stipulations:

ARTICLE 1.

1. It is understood that the handing over of archives, records, papers and documents as stipulated in Section 1 of Article 3 of the Agreement is not intended to involve anything in the nature of rendering accounts.

2. Whereas the new administration of the Railway is at liberty whether to adopt or not the advice given by the advisers mentioned in Section 2 of Article 3 of the Agreement, the said advice can on no occasion result in any responsibility being imposed on the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or on these persons.

ARTICLE 2.

The stipulation of Article 5 of the Agreement concerning the property which is to be placed under the occupation and management of the community of the citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Harbin shall not in any way
FIRAL PROTOCOCI.
( BETWEEN U.S.S.R. AND MANCHUKUO )

Signed at To'kvo, March 23, 1935.
Effective from March 23, 1935.
Published March 25, 1935.

In proceeding this day to the signature of the Agreement between Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Cession to Manchoukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), the Plenipotentiaries of Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed upon the following stipulations:

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ARTICLE 2.

The stipulation of Article 5 of the Agreement concerning the property which is to be placed under the occupation and management of the community of the citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Harbin shall not in any way
preclude the application of the law of Manchoukuo as to the said property, its occupation and management.

ARTICLE 3.

The Government of Manchoukuo agree to grant subsidies, in the same manner as up to the date of the coming into force of the Agreement, to schools which are under the management of the 4th Section of the Educational Department of the Office of Pin-Chiang Province and used for the education of children of the employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for three months after the coming into force of the Agreement.

ARTICLE 4.

The school inventory purchased from funds supplied by the parents who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the stage appurtenances acquired, by the former Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), are to be turned over to the Consul General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Harbin as property not belonging to the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway).

ARTICLE 5.

The Government of Manchoukuo take no exception to the liquidation of the cooperative society of the employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) in accordance with its Articles and will permit certain members of the society who are citizens of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and whose presence is required for purposes of such liquidation to remain in Manchoukuo till the completion thereof.

**ARTICLE 6.**

Until the conclusion within the prescribed period of the separate agreement concerning the telegraphic connection provided for in Article 13 of the Agreement, the status quo of such connection shall be maintained.

The present Final Protocol shall constitute an integral part of the above-mentioned Agreement and come into force simultaneously with the said Agreement.

Done in duplicate in the English Language in the City of Tokyo, this twenty-third day of the third month of the second year of Kangte, corresponding to the 23rd day of March 1935.

W.S.Y. TING.
CHICHI OHASHI.
TSU-F-SU-JONG.
C. C. YOUNG.
R. I. KOLZOVSKY.
KUZNETSOFF.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English hereto attached, consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Final Protocol", is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of Sept., 1946

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu ODO
FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
DEF. DOC. #57

CERTIFICATE

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, H. Y.uchi, Koku, Chief of Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese hereto attached, consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Final Protocol", is an exact and true copy of an official document of this Japanese foreign office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of Sept., 1946.

(Signed) K. O. K. T.
Chief of Archives

Witness: (Signed) Ken, Koku Oki
The territories of Manchuria and Mongolia form a region remote and isolated on the Continent of Asia. The records of the past show that its history is a long one; that the country experienced unions and disunions within its borders; and that the soil of the land is fertile and the people honest and simple in their manners and customs. After the country was opened to intercourse with outside countries the population increased in numbers and the products in volume, thus turning the country into a land of abundance and promise.

On the contrary, since the establishment of the Chinese Republic following the revolution of 1911, the military factions of the Northeastern Provinces, taking advantage of civil wars in China Proper, usurped its administrative power, and brought the Three Eastern Provinces under their control. Twenty years have elapsed since the revolution, during which time one war-lord had succeeded another, each of whom, completely disregarding the welfare of the people, indulged himself in greed, extravagance and dissipation. While they were bent upon the pursuit of their self-interest and cupidity, the people, on the other hand, were burdened with over-taxation at the will of the war-lords. As a result the currency system witnessed complete ruin, and the business of the country became stagnant and finally collapsed.

At this critical time, again, the war-lords, giving rein to their ambition, advanced their army into the country south of the
Great Wall, and caused unnecessary strife, killing and wounding a large number of people. Although they suffered defeat many a time, they never realized their own folly: they have lost the confidence and respect of the foreign powers. They waged wars with neighbouring countries: and with utter disregard to the spirit of friendliness and cordiality towards foreign countries, they encouraged anti-foreign movements.

The laxity in the police administration caused disturbances in the country and gave rise to ravages by thieves and bandits. Acts of looting, arson and massacre by these lawless elements terrified the entire population and exposed them to hunger in all corners of the country. To leave these thirty million people of Manchuria and Mongolia further in their hands within the border would have meant their exposure to atrocity and lawlessness and finally to their extinction. The people earnestly desire to extricate themselves from this extreme danger and sorrow. Happily, through the aid of the army of a neighbour Power, it has been possible to expel these corrupt elements from the area where they had entrenched themselves for many years past. The home of misrule and corruption is thus now being given a thorough cleaning. This we believe is a Heaven-sent opportunity to the people of Manchuria and Mongolia to shake off their shackles, who should, therefore, rise to the occasion and strive for generation and rebirth with courage and determination.

Turning our eyes to China Proper we note that the rival war-lords have engaged in intermittent warfare ever since the revolution took place. Of late years despotic rule over the country was exercised by one party alone. Under the guise of the "Three Principles of the People," the people are put to death in the name of Minsheng: their
leaders are bent only upon promoting their own interests and indulging in their greed in the name of Min-chuan; and in their eyes there is nothing outside their own party although they profess the principle of Min-tsu. In this manner, though they declare that the country is ruled with fairness and equality, the practice of the party leaders is in utter contradiction to what they profess, thus not only deceiving themselves but the people at the same time.

Of late years, internal strife caused by illegal partitioning of one another's territory have been frequent in China Proper. Even the existence of the Kuomintang party itself is now in danger. In these circumstances, it is impossible to expect from them any regard for national welfare. The country is at present overrun by Communist bands whose poisonous influences are fast eating into the flesh of the people and the very heart of the national government. In the face of these deplorable conditions we are compelled to look to the savior of the golden age of our history. It should be noted that this savior of ours is equally shared by friendly nations abroad.

The result of twenty long years' experiences has convincingly taught us that we must bravely face the realities and take upon ourselves the task of reforming our national life and of bringing about a new golden age. The fact must be borne in mind, however, that evil influences are still with us, and should we evade the issue at this time and fail to check the spread of Communism, it is obvious that the destruction of the nation is inevitable. In this hour of crisis unless the people of Manchuria and Mongolia awake to salvation of the Heaven-given opportunity call to liberate themselves from this corrupt political state, their extinction, too, will have to be faced.
After thorough deliberations for several months past at numerous meetings, the leaders of Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol Provinces, Harbin Special District, and those under various banners of Mongolia, have come to a unanimous conclusion to adopt a practical application of good rule rather than a display of words in the administration of State affairs. Under whatever form of government, the primary duty of the State is to assure the inhabitants peace and security.

Manchuria and Mongolia constituted in the past a separate State detached from China Proper. The present situation places us in a position to strive for our own national independence. Accordingly, by the will of the thirty million people, we hereby declare on this day that we sever our relations with the Republic of China and establish the State of Manchuria, and we hereby make a public proclamation of the fundamental principles on which this new State is founded.

1. We believe that statecraft should be founded upon the principle of Tao or the Way, and Tao founded upon Tien or Heaven. The principle on which this new State is based is to follow Tien or Heaven that the people may have peace and security. The government must be approved by the people and no man's personal views shall be permitted to influence the affairs of the State.

2. There shall be no discrimination with respect to race and caste among those people who now reside within the territory of the new State. Besides the races of the Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Japanese and Koreans, the peoples of other foreign countries may upon application have their rights guaranteed.

3. In internal affairs the new State will reject the policies adopted in the dark days of the past. It will revise laws and enforce
local autonomy, draft able men into the service of the government and elevate the officials deserving promotion, encourage industry, unify the currency system, open up the natural resources of the country, endeavour to maintain a good standard of living for the people, adjust and regulate the administration of the police, eliminate banditry, and promote and popularize education, respect Li-chiao, the teachings of Confucianism, and apply the principle of Wang-tao, the way of Benevolent Ruler, and practice its teachings. These, we believe will enlighten the people to maintain the honour of perpetuating the peace of the Far East and thus set an example of model government to the world.

4. The foreign policy of the new State shall be to seek and further promote cordial relations with foreign powers by winning their confidence and respect, and to observe strictly international conventions. Financial obligations incurred within the territory of Manchuria by treaty stipulations with various countries prior to the establishment of the new State shall be met according to the usual international conventions. Foreign investments by any nation shall be welcomed for the furtherance of trade and the exploitation of natural resources, thus bringing the principles of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity and the like to a fuller realization.

The foregoing articles constitute the fundamental principles underlying the establishment of the new State. The newly-formed government will bear all responsibilities thereof from the day of the creation of the new State and the Government hereby pledges upon oath to the thirty million inhabitants that these shall be faithfully carried out.

1st March, 1932
First Year of Tatung.

Manchukuo Government.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the translation of the document entitled "Proclamation on the Establishment of Manchukuo by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manchukuo Government," is to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date 8 January 1947
株式会社藤原各地の酒造各地で醸造

農業

産業

関東

市場

民風

食生活

の

農業

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食

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の

農業

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民

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食
資源を活用し、新旧の体系を構築するため、政府は新しい政治体制の構築を計画している。この計画は、旧政府の構造を破壊し、新しい政治体制を築き上げることを目指している。

旧政府の構造を破壊するためには、まず旧政府の構造を理解することが不可欠である。旧政府の構造は、さまざまな部門や官僚組織により構成されており、それぞれの役割は明確であった。しかし、新しい政府は、これまでの旧政府の構造を打破し、より効率的な政治理論を試みることを目指している。

この新しい政府の構築は、主要な政治理論を受講するための教育機関を設けることから始まる。この教育機関は、より効果的な政策を策定するための知見を提供するものであり、国際的な視点からも新しい政府が構築されるための基盤を築き上げる必要がある。

政府の構築は、単に新しい政治理論の教育機関を設けるだけではなく、政治理論を適用するための体系を構築することである。新しい政府は、政治体制の改革を進めることにより、政府の機能を向上させ、より効率的な政策を策定することが目指している。
ナラシ、東亜永久平和を期するため、安保条約は更に重要視される。政治の観点から、安保条約は国家間の安定を保つために不可欠である。

を通して、条約の重要性は再認識される。安保条約の実施は、国際社会の理解を深め、平和のための努力が望まれる。

天皇陛下の言葉に賛同する。安保条約の重要性を再確認し、国際社会の理解と協力を更に推進したいと考える。
Japan-Lanchow Year Book

1936

Cyclopedia of General Information and Statistics on the Empire of Japan and Lanchow

Appendix: Who's Who; Business Directory

Occupants of Leading Lanchow Government at Posts, 1935

Minister of the Imperial Household.......................... Hsi Chien

Lord Keeper of Privy Seal.......................... Yuan Chin-hai

Chief Aid-de-Camp.......................... General Cheng Hai-pang

President, Privy Council.......................... Tsang Shih-i

Vice-President, Privy Council.......................... Kamashichi Chikuishi

Gen. Yu Chi-shan

Minister of Finance.......................... Sun Chih-chang

Minister of Industry.......................... Ting Chien-hsiau

- 1 -
Minister of Communications..........................Li Shao-kung
Minister of Justice..................................Rong Han-Ching
Minister of Education................................Yuan Chen-tso
Minister of Mongolic Administration.................Chi-mao-tso-su-pi-lo.

Director of General Affairs Board.....................Ryuichiyo Naganaka
Vice-Director of General Affairs Board..............Shigeo Odachi
Director of Legislation Bureau......................Shigeo Odachi
Director of Legislation Bureau......................Kozo Fujiyama
Director of State Highways Bureau....................Hiroto Hachi
Director of Capital Construction Bureau.............Cheng Yu

Supervisory Council
President................................................Lo Chou-yu
Chief Justice, Supreme Court.........................Lin Chi
Chief, Supreme procurator's Office....................Li pen
Diplomatic and Consular Service
Envoy to Japan........................................Hsieh Chih-chih, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Consul at Blagoveshchensk.............................Kuji Hongo-chi
Consul at Chita........................................LiHum
Consul at Shingi-cho.................................Li Hum
Honorary Consul at Mij................................Sazo Idemitsu
Foreign Affairs Commissioner at Harbin..............Shih Li-pan

Governors of Provinces
Hon. Prefecture........................................Feo Ching
province

- 5 -
Foreign advisors or Counsellors

Counsellor, Dept. of Foreign Affairs........Arthur H. F. Edwards

Counsellor, Dept. of Foreign Affairs....Cheny Edwards Sir.

* Those holding two or more posts concurrently.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>日期</th>
<th>金额</th>
<th>备注</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/30</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td>其他说明</td>
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**说明**

- 2023年12月30日的账目
- 金额为2,430元
- 其他说明空白
The Japanese Delegation have notified the Assembly that they disagree with the Draft Report prepared by the Committee of Nineteen and cannot accept it. It is hardly necessary for me to say that the Japanese Government have given careful and serious consideration to this document and that it is with disappointment that they have come to this conclusion.

One outstanding feature that is noticeable throughout the Draft Report is the failure on the part of the Committee of Nineteen to realize the actual situation in the Far East, the difficulties of Japan's position in the midst of unparalleled and appalling circumstances, and the ultimate aim that is impelling Japan in her action.

For over twenty years, China has been going through a revolution which has brought disaster to her people. Tens of millions of the people have lost their lives as the result of internecine warfare, tyranny, banditry, famine and flood; hundreds of millions of them have been plunged into misery and despair. With the armies of communists rushing over a wider territory than the Peiping Government controls, a condition of chaos reigns throughout the country. Such distress and misery as exist among the Chinese people are beyond the imagination of the average man or woman living in Western countries, and the end of this catastrophe is not in sight. No one can foresee how long it will continue.

The fundamental cause of trouble in the Far East is the lawless condition in China, the impossible reign of self-will in that country, without recognizing on her part her obligations to her neighbours. China has long been derelict in her international duties as a sovereign state, and Japan, as her
nearest neighbour, has been the greatest of forces on that score.

(5) Since the beginning of the revolution which has shattered China into parts, all of that were called, under the T'ang dynasty, dependencies of the Empire have been lost to the Republic. Ever since, these former dependencies have China any longer any control. Tibet is independent; Chinese Turkistan is completely cut off from contact with China proper; Outer Mongolia became many years ago a part of the Soviet Union. Only Tashkurgan is remained down to the last year a part of China——a part by mere of contract and concession under the nominal sovereignty of that country. To say that Tashkurgan was under the full sovereignty of China would be a distortion of the actual and historic facts. Now this territory has gone; it has become an independent state.

(6) China is a vast country; but it is not a nation or country in the sense that Western peoples mean the term. It is a country, as I have said, larger than Europe, a region with as many governments in it as there are governments in Europe, a region with almost as many different groups of peoples, speaking almost as many mutually unintelligible dialects. That is a reason why China, in spite of her size, in spite of the enormous number of men in various creeds of the many dialects, is unable to defend itself today, unable to rid itself of the foreign military forces stationed in and about its treaty ports and the foreign naval vessels that fly the Manchester, British, American, French, Italian and others. They guard the lives of the diplomats accredited to the central government. Less than five years ago, a portion of these forces, British and American, had to be into action at Hankow, the capital of the country, to save the lives of their official representatives assaulted by government troops.

For the moment, however,——this present moment,——the hostility to other
Foreigners are 'bated; it is being officially restrained with a definite object in view. We are not new hearing of China's determination to undo the unequal treaties. Why not? Why has this agitation, vigorously and officially, conducted prior to September 1931, come abruptly to an end? The answer is obvious.

I need not make it. China is a backward country, a country in appalling condition of disintegration and distress. China is a problem, as the Lyttleton Commission has reported, to the peace of the world.

(7) Beside China and beside another vast country,----I speak of Soviet Russia,----is Japan, a comparatively small country very different from either of its colossal neighbours. The conditions of these neighbours in the past twenty years have given us Japan's deep and serious concern. Our anxiety is not ended. To look into the gloom of the future and see no certain gleam of light before us.

(8) Incredibly situated beside China in chaos, Japan has had to bear end forbear, and for many years tried patiently to remedy. She followed that policy of conciliation even in the face of violent criticism from a portion of her own people. It has been Japan's hope and determination that 'enochiria should become a land of law and order, of peace and abundance,----a land that would be of benefit not only to Eastern Asia but to the world at large. To achieve that end Japan was long prepared to cooperate with China, and she sought this cooperation----sought it for years.

The Chinese, however, would not accept our proffers of friendship and assistance. Instead, they offered constant obstructions and created continuous difficulties. In recent years----and especially since the deliberate development of anti-foreign sentiment by the 'norintang and by the Nationalist Government----this opposition was intensified. The more we displayed patience, the more intense became the opposition until at last it reached a point that was
intolerable. Instead of meeting us half way, China took this attitude of
course as a sign of weakness. The Chinese began to claim that the Japanese
should be driven out of Manchuria, that Japan should no longer share in the
development of that land, condemning Japan as an aggressor, pure and simple,
so though there was no reason whatever for her to be in Manchuria, ignoring
the whole historic background. The impossible attitude and violent move-
ment based on such psychology on the part of the Chinese lay really at the
bottom of the trouble that finally resulted in what happened. Japan's
policy of retrenchment and economic adjustment failed. It failed because of China's
or rather Chiang K'ai-Shek's inability to appreciate Japan's
intentions and friendliness.

(9) It should not be necessary for me to dwell upon the fact that Japan attaches to Manchuria. The Assembly of the League should know
by this time the economic and political necessities of Japan in that territory. But at this critical moment, I want to remind you again that Japan
fought two wars in Manchuria, in one of which she strove her existence as
a nation on the outcome. The want to fight no other. It is true that
international peace can be secured only upon the basis of mutual concessions.
there are, however, with every nation certain questions so vital to their
existence that no concession or compromise is possible. The Manchuria
problem is one of them. It constitutes such a problem to the nation of
Japan. It is regarded by our people as a question of life and death.

(10) The Powers of the world have long been discussing China. I am sure we should have noticed the first article of the Covenant requires that a state, dominion or colony, to be a member of
the League, shall "fully and completely," China is not such state.
"stand China proper, the sovereignty of China has long been gone, while
within China Proper there has been no constituted government supreme and able to govern. The existing Government administers today the affairs of less than four of the eighteen provinces. The world cannot deal in such fictions as these and will soon the terms to uphold the letter of treaties.

In such principles lies danger.

(11) It is a firm conviction of the Japanese Government that Japan has been and will always be the ministry of peace, order and progress in the Far East. If she has taken a definite stand regarding "Munich" in recent months, it is because she has been actuated by the implicit faith that it was the only course left to her after years of unceasing forebearance and waiting. If she insists upon the "existence of the independence of Peking", she is guided by the confident belief that in the present circumstances that independence offers the only guarantee of peace and order in the Far East.

(12) Even after the present Sino-Japanese dispute began, Japan continued in her policy of conciliation. If China had been capable in those days of realizing the actualities of the situation and had speeded to negotiations with Japan in a sincere desire to arrive at an agreement, one could have been accomplished without great difficulty. But China did not take that course. Instead, she appealed to the League of Nations. She sought to bind her own hands through an intervention of the "veto" composing the League and the League, not fully understanding the real issues involved or the actual conditions existing in the Far East, and perhaps not suspecting the real motives for the Chinese move, gave her encouragement.

(13) It cannot be doubted that the League of Nations, in dealing with the Sino-Japanese dispute, endeavored sincerely and conscientiously to bring about a satisfactory settlement at an early date. But, in point
of fact, its actions have continually resulted in giving China a false
hope and in encouraging her to take an attitude of defence against Japan.
In making her appeal to the League, China was not, as you have been told,
acting from her love of peace and her loyalty to principles. A country
with more armed men than any other is not a nation of pacifists.
A country which has habitually broken international pledges is not a nation
that respects principles.

(14) In proposing to the League to send a Commission of Inquiry to
China, Japan was actuated by the belief that it was urgent and essential
that the League should fully understand the realities of the conditions
existing there. But the result was disappointing to Japan, the Report of
the Commission proved to be, in some respects, superficial in character.
It displayed in parts a lack of penetration. It often failed to probe the
problem to its depths. One of the reasons for this was undoubtedly the
brief time in which the Commission had to make its investigation.

(15) In this connection, let me say a word regarding the population
of "Nuneluk". A false impression has been given to the world by the
Lyttelton Report on this subject. There were no authentic statistics upon
which the Commission could base its view. No reliable Chinese census has
ever been taken, even of China Proper, and any figures placed before the
Commission by the Chinese authorities could not be regarded as dependable.
For many years, the racial term "Chinese" has been applied, particularly
by foreigners, including the Japanese, to most of the people of the Chinese
Tribes. But this locality in precise expression should not be taken to mean
that "Nuneluk" and "Nungas", or even the people of China Proper, are all of
a single racial stock.

The majority of the people of "Nuneluk" are distinctly different from
those of China. Even the people of North China, from the provinces of Shantung and Hopei, who have migrated to 'anchurie to an extent of several millions in recent years, are strikingly different from those of other Chinese provinces, different from those of the Yellow Valley, more different from those of South China, radically different from those of Western China, different in physical appearance, different in many of their customs and in some cases even in their language. But even these immigrants who have come from China to 'anchurie in recent years do not form the bulk of the population. They form probably but tenth, and at most, but a fifth of it. The great body of the population can be properly described as 'anchurian. It is formed by descendants of the old 'anchu stock, by the old Chinese stock which affiliated itself with the 'anchus in former years, and by 'angels. The great majority of these people have never lived in China and have no such attachment with that country as the Lyten Report describes. Here the Report was clearly in error.

(16) Regarding the Report of the Committee of Inquiry, I am constrained to make a critical remark. I do not want to accuse that Committee of prejudice. But I cannot refrain from making the observation that, while China is exalted, nothing whatever is said of the work of my country and people in their long and difficult efforts to preserve peace, to promote law and order, to benefit the people of 'anchurie.

The good work of my country in 'anchurie is on record. It is not on record in the Draft Report, but it is there; it can be seen in 'anchurie. The physical developments that we have made in 'anchurie are the visible remonants of our efforts and our ability. The well-ordered cities of the leased territory, the thriving condition of the Rialto Zone, the improvement of Chinese cities influenced by our initiative,
In short, we have been an extraordinary civilized and stabilizing force in that wild country. If the Committee of Nineteen knew and understood what we have done for the benefit of the people of Manchuria, they might have gone out of their way to say a word in favour of this work. If they did not know and understand why the people of China were migrating to Manchuria, it might have been well for them to inquire. Yet they have felt that their knowledge was sufficient to qualify them in preparing to the Assembly that it adopt the momentous proposal contained in the Draft Report.

(17) On the first page of the Report are these lines. I quote them:

"The issues involved in this conflict are not so simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, and only intimate knowledge of all facts, as well as of their historical background, should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them."

Beginning with this statement, the Committee of Nineteen has proceeded to pass a judgment against the action which is the bulwark of whatever, law, order and peace exists in the Far East, and in favour of one whose backward condition has been the cause of war for nearly a century. I suppose I may take it that the members of the Assembly who are now about to vote on the Draft Report have all read the histories of China written by impartial authors. But I am not too sure of that, for there seems to have been a lack of careful reading even of the Lytton Report.

Let us now turn to the Recommendations made by the Commission of Inquiry. Their full significance seems to have been overlooked in the Draft Report before us. I refer in particular to the tenth and final principle contained

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in Chapter IV. That principle reads as follows:

"Since the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship and an anxiety to the rest of the world, as the maintenance of peace in the Far East is a matter of international concern; and since the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong central government in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-Sen."

I would ask the League to consider carefully this definite warning.

I would ask that it be not misled by a thought or hope that China can be changed by the mere sending of technical commissions to aid the harassed government with advice regarding sanitation, education, military, financial and other administration. More than that is needed, much more---so much that no great power or group of them would be willing to undertake the task. Some form of powerful international control will be necessary. Of this I am speaking earnestly with knowledge of China--real China that exists in fact and not in theory or imagination, China that has made many wars already and no sects to make another, China that does not fight her own battles but calls on distant friends to fight her nearly neighbour.

In the above connection, permit me to put one categorical question to my Chinese colleagues. Are the Chinese Government prepared to accept those recommendations which envisage in the final result the imposition on China of international control in one form or another? Will you make the position of your government clear on this point before the Assembly votes on this present Draft Report?

(19) I have no doubt that the attitude of the League in the present dispute, has always been conceived with a genuine desire to uphold the sanctity
of tactics and the principles of force, and to serve the cause of force, but its efforts have had the result of adding confusion to the situation.

The Jochel affair, which is giving all of us a shock at this moment, is the case in point. It is a demonstration on the part of the Japanese Government, who are not the least anxious about the outcome of the conflict with the Chinese contingents. They are not troops of a modern army, well-trained, well-disciplined, well-organized, well-equipped. They are not troops inspired with the zeal for the cause or love of their country. They are mercenary troops, with loyalty only to their military chiefs, and like other Chinese armies, loyal because their chief provides for them the means of living. But Japan is loath to see further unnecessary bloodshed, and for that reason is endeavoring to persuade Marshal Cheng to withdraw his forces. Prospects, however, do not seem at this moment very encouraging.

(10) I refer to the situation in Jochel to bring home to you the possible effect of the adoption of the Report now before us may have upon the situation in the Far East. Adoption of this Report would give an impression to the Chinese that they have been exonerated from all responsibility, that they could continue to defy Japan with impunity. It would serve further to embitter the feelings of the Japanese and Chinese people, whose interests are closely interwoven. The two peoples ought to be friends and should cooperate with each other for their common welfare. By adoption of the Report before you, the Assembly would not be helping us, either Japanese or Chinese, along the road to that goal, nor would it serve the cause of peace.
or the interests of suffering masses in China.

(20) The Report of the Committee of Nineteen not only accepts the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, but goes even further; it pressed a judgment on the basis of premises which are incoherent and for removed from the realities. Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria was only nominal at best, but the Draft Report before us would undertake to establish Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria in a more or less effective manner; that is to say, it undertakes to introduce into Manchuria a power and influence that China has never had before. Let us pause and think: Does it stand to reason? It would, moreover, open the way for Chinese agitators and give rise to more complications only to end in another, and possibly worse catastrophe.

Again the Draft Report takes an attempt to establish a measure of international control over Manchuria, where there has been and is no such control. That justification is there for such an attempt? I cannot see. Would the American people desire to see control over Fiume Grand Zona? Would the British people permit it over Egypt? In any case, how would you do it? Which of your governments would undertake it, assuming grave and heavy responsibility certain to entail sacrifices? In this connection, let me state it clearly once and for all that the Japanese people will, for reasons too potent for me to feel it necessary to explain, oppose any such attempt in Manchuria.

(21) A verdict is given in the Draft Report that the Chinese boycott against Japanese goods imposed after the outbreak of the present dispute falls within the sphere of retaliatory measures. If adoption by the Powers of any feasible measures, well necessary by the exigencies of the situation, for the protection of their rights and interests, is on each occasion to be met lawfully by retaliatory boycott, a dangerous principle
Seeds of an incalculable future trouble for each and every power interested in China will have been sown.

(22) In the actual circumstances Japan finds herself in, as above described and for reasons above stated at some length, there is no alternative for Japan to take in regard to the Draft Report before us. The longue has left her none. The answer promptly and unequivocally to answer, "No".

Gentlemen, our desire is to help China as far as lies within our power. This is the duty we must assume. Paradoxical as this statement may sound to you at this juncture, it is true, and our present effort to assist Yen-houkouo to her feet over which we are unfortunately having differences, will lend some day, I am confident, to the realization of China's desire and duty to help China and thereby at last to succeed in firmly establishing peace throughout the region of Western Asia. I beg this body to realize the facts and see the vision of the future. I earnestly beg you to deal with us on our terms and give us your confidence. To deny us this appeal will be a mistake. I ask you not to do this Report.
松岡代表の演説

一九三三年二月二十四日の帝国議会総会に於ける松岡代表の演説

日本代表は既に十九人委員会の作成せる報告案に同意し難く従って之を受諾し従べる旨を議会に通告した。報告案全體を通じて感謝し得る一
つの顯著なる事実は、十九人委員会が、日本の対日情勢と比類をなさ
つつ戦線すべき情勢の異常中にある日本の困難なる立場と、日本をして従
来の行動を執るの已むならに至らしめ其の收穫的目的を認識しなか
ったことである。

松岡代表於る於ける紛議の根本原因は、支部の無法律的動機と其の際局への
義務を承認せずして飽くまで自已の意志のみを行ひ得とする非違之であ
る。支部は今日まで永い間為立証としての建築建設を怠つて來て居り、
日本是其の最も近い瞬間として此の時で至るも大の損害を蒙つて來た。

而して進局の代表は乙至る国に於る之の際局の下に支部本土と
一国の接觸と連絡を持つことにより支部の一部分として遂つて居るもの


ある。満洲が完全に支配の下に在ったと言ふ如きは実際的且つ歴史的事実に対する虚無である。今やこの地方は支配より離れ、独立国となつた。

満洲を出して法華及び劣等の国であるが、平和及び幸福の地にしろ、歴史的変化をはされぬと云ふ東アジアのみならず、全世界の幸福を支しむることは日本の希望であり決意である。而して此の目的を達成する為、日本は水年に於て支那と協力せんとする冠頜を有し、数年間に亘って此の協力を求めつれて来た。若し乍ら支那に我々の友情と援助を受け容れようとせり、一昨年より日本政府による計画の補助民展の助長が行われ、今日遂に此の反對は激化し、遂に我々の塔へ得べからざる點に拒絶した。日本は到つて我々の顚覆を教訓し、凡ての歴史的背景を無視し、偽に日本を見直し支配を於ての支配を解釈し、本人は満洲に在る理由なきが知く、日本を目して絶絶なる戦略なるべき
略奪として非難し、日本は最早同地の開発に渋るべきか否かと主張し始めるに至った。

日本が認めている満洲の重大性に於ては更て詰問する必要を余は認めてない。総会は最早同地方に於ける日本の経済的政策的必要を知悉し居るべき答である。然し余は、日本の重大時機に於て今一度諸君の注意を喚起したい。勿論日本は満洲に於て三成の戦争をして、更も共の一つに於て平和を安定させる存立を暗いのである。日本は最早戦争を欲しない。無理を為せば得られると日本在日領事は何れの国もその存立の為め到頭前歩も安義も不可能であります。然し乍れの国に於て居る。現況問題は問みられてゐるものである。

世界の諸国は永い間仮想の下に支那を取扱つて来た。我々は近ずか以前に聯盟規約第一條の聯盟国たるべき国、常領及び領属地に於て完全な自治に於て居るべき答を求むるべきである。
十九人委員会の報告書に基づき、残念ながら批評的見解を述べざるを得ない。

この事実に際し、我々の立場が明確であることを祈る。
余は此の明確なる報告を従って考へざんことを鄙猥に受請するものである。
人の感情を更に悪化させるに過ぎないであります。両国をは反目する
べきものであります。我々の共同の安寧の為に相互に協力すべきものであります。

高橋の前には設けられた報告書の複製により、議会は我々の提案のもとでない
人への制裁に対しては如何に有益に最終的に必要なものである。

報告書複製は数々の調査に於て助労を興へるもので私は

この問題に機会をもって申し上げます。数々の調査に於て
助労を興へるもので私は

報告書複製は数々の調査に於て助労を興へるもので私は

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報告書複製は数々の調査に於て助労を興へるもので私は
何を根據として此の企図を敷てせんとするのであるか、余の説するに寄
しむ所である。米国人はパナマ運河地帯に新る管理を決定することに同
意するであろうか。英語人は之を敷てさせんとするのであるか。照君の
何れにせよ、雅卿は如何にして之を執行せんとするのであるか。照君の
政府の何れが，依頼を伴ふこと発覚は巨大責任を纏って此の任に差らん
とするのであるか。此の點に関し余は頼然日本政府が，余に取って除
ける所であるか。此の点に関し余は頼然日本政府が，余に取って除
けするのであるか。此の点に関し余は頼然日本政府が，余に取って除
けするのであるか。
而して我々は現在不幸にして満洲属に居し意見を異にして居るのであ

が、而も満洲国の自立を助すとする日本の願望と親善を実現する契機とな

がて後は支那支援に於いて現在我々の努力は、や

は確信する。

余は此の機関に属し、申願を認識し将来の理想を直視せんと

取るべき且つ信望されんことを願ふものである。余は誠に

此の我々のアドバイスを尊重

さらんことを要請するものである。
Excerpt from "The Japan-Manchoukúo Year Book 1937"
Cyclopedia of General Information and Statistics on
the Empires of Japan and Manchoukúo Appendices: Who's
Who; Business Directory p.p. 710--711

Japan's Policy Regarding Abolition of
Extraterritoriality

On August 9, 1934 the Japanese Government issued the following
statement in the form of remarks by the authorities of the Foreign
Office:

"The keynote of Japan's national policy towards Manchoukúo is
as already stated clearly in the Imperial Rescript issued in March
1933, in connection with Japan's withdrawal from the League of
Nations and in Japan-Manchoukúo protocol signed on September 15,
1932.

"It is that the indivisible relationship between Manchoukúo
and Japan shall be maintained. Manchoukúo shall attain a healthy
development as an independent State so that the situation in the
Far East may be stabilized, and so that the new State may contribute
to Japan's national policy, the justice of which Japan is trying to
proclaim throughout the world.

"Since its foundation Manchoukúo has been showing sound
development. Internally, while working for a readjustment and
completion of its political, economic and other systems, externally,
the new State has been endeavouring to gain the confidence of other
Nations.

- 1 -
"In preparation for the abolition of extraterritoriality, it has been devising measures for the improvement of its land system, police, taxation, etc.

"For this purpose it had even appropriated the sum of more than 8,000,000 yen in the budget for the first fiscal year of Kangte (1934-35).

"Japan has for many years enjoyed in Manchuria extraterritorial rights, which under the conditions existing prior to the establishment of Manchoukouo, were important factors which were essential to Japanese progress in Manchuria. "However, with the development of Japanese policy towards Manchuria, these factors have gradually come to lose their importance.

"At the same time it has become necessary to relinquish these rights if Manchoukouo is to be allowed to attain full development.

"Such a relinquishment is also essential for real harmony between the Manchoukouo and Japanese nations, and for the strengthening of the friendly and indivisible relationship between the two countries which is required if full progress of Japanese nationals in Manchoukouo is to be made possible as well as assured.

"As for the South Manchuria Railway zone, it was obtained by our country in the Russo-Japanese war at the risk of our national fortune.

"Since then for 30 years it has been administered with untiring energy.

"Needless to say, it has formed the basis of Japanese development in Manchuria."
"Since the foundation of Manchoukuo, it has become necessary to readjust and transfer Japan's administrative right in the railway zone gradually, owing to the new situation arising as a result of the establishment of the new State.

"The Japanese Government, consequently, at a cabinet meeting on August 9, decided upon the following principles concerning the relinquishment of extraterritoriality and the readjustment and transfer of administrative rights in the S.W.R. zone, and is planning to devise concrete measures to be carried out step by step:

"(a) In accordance with the spirit of past agreements and in step with the improvement of various systems and facilities in Manchoukuo, Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchoukuo shall be relinquished gradually so as to avoid any sudden change in the life of our nationals in that country.

"In relinquishing such rights special consideration will be given to the desire to see a greater development of the Japanese citizens throughout the whole of Manchoukuo and to the necessity of a smooth execution of Japanese policy towards Manchoukuo.

"(b) The S.W.R. zone itself will of course be retained by Japan, but Japan's administrative rights in the said zone shall be readjusted and transferred in view of their connection with the cession of extraterritoriality mentioned above.

"Such readjustment and transfer shall be undertaken as improvements are made in the various systems and facilities of Manchoukuo, and in step with the gradual retrocession of extraterritorial rights and in accordance with the nature of each matter to
affected thereby.

"Finally a word must be added here that the lease of the Kwantung territory is a very different matter, in origin as well as nature, from the administrative rights within the S.M.P."

"Consequently, it is obvious that a readjustment and transfer of these rights will have no bearing or connection whatsoever upon the question of the lease of the Kwantung Territory."

In response to the above statement by the Japanese Government the Manchoukuo Government issued a statement in the form of remark by a Foreign Office spokesman, which was to the following effect:

From the foundation of Manchouko all Japan has assisted in her growth at the cost of anything and everything with the result that she has attained the present prosperity. Furthermore, the Japanese Government decided at a Cabinet Council to relinquish Japan's extraterritorial rights which she has enjoyed as her paramount interests for more than thirty long years and also to transfer gradually her administrative rights in the S.M.P. Zone. It is a cause of deep gratitude to Manchoukuo, which is on the road to development, that Japan should have thus demonstrated to the whole world a proof of the friendly relations of Japan and Manchoukuo. While offering heartfelt gratitude for the amity and great decision thus shown by Japan, H.I.M. the Emperor and his 30,000,000 people rejoice the fact that the foundation of the friendly relations between the two countries is being more and more solidified.

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治外法権設置に関する日本の政策

英仏中仏条約（一九三七年版）

日仏軍事協力に関する一般記録

実業家、人名録

学術案内より抜粋

観延の際に入国して、現実に不可分の関係を保つにあたって、経済上、政治上、教養上、軍事上の事情を考慮して、日本政府は外務省当局者の形で次の観延を設けた

一九三四年九月一九日。日本政府は外務省当局者の形で、次の観延を設けた。
「治外法権の権限の拡張として」としては、実際は土佐町、間取町、新居町、新野町の改元に及んだものである。

五年戸の経済力の賦課に対する問題があった。日本は三十年後には不適な努力を以て之を経済として来た。その結果にして、新居町の結果として生じた新居町に至って終

（2）
日本政府の主導の下、中国の側面も顧みて、事実を考慮して行われたものである。

Signed at Amur, on Sept. 4 of the 9th year of Shove (1934)

Effective on Sept. 4 of the 9th year of Shove (1934)

The Manchukuo Harbin Navigation Bureau and the U.S.S.R. Amur Navigation Bureau (hereinafter referred to as "both parties") have agreed upon the following Articles with a view to the improvement of navigation on the parts of the various rivers and lakes existing in the border districts, namely on the Amur, the Arguni, the Usuri, the Sungari rivers as well as Lake Hanka, where joint operations shall be carried but in accordance with the articles designated below:

Article 1

The Navigation of ships of both parties on the various rivers and the lake mentioned above shall be carried out within the hydrographical spheres of these waters as indicated by the navigation signs jointly installed, without causing any obstruction, by strictly observing the Navigation Rules approved by both parties, which are attached to the present agreement. (Cf. Supplementary Rules)

Article 2

In order to execute as a joint undertaking assurance for the best conditions of the navigation on the waterways designated in Article 1, installation and maintenance of necessary navigation signs, digging and dredging of various kinds and other operations, a Joint Technical
Committee shall be organized with 3 committees consisting of 4 from each party. One committee of each side shall be Chairman thereof. The Regulations governing the said Joint Technical Committee shall be separately determined.

Article 3
The Joint Technical Committee shall work out the budget and plans necessary for this sort of undertaking, supervise the execution thereof and decide by examination on the settlement of expenditures.

Article 4
The expenditures for the members of the Joint Technical Committee as well as those of necessary technicians shall be paid out separately by each party.

Article 5
Either party shall execute single handed the operations of erecting signs on either bank and the supervising thereof respectively on their own territorial side, but dredging and diving and all other waterway operations shall be jointly executed.

Expenditures for general operations shall be shared equally by both parties in accordance with the budget assessed by the Joint Technical Committee.

Article 6
If any doubt arises as to the application of this Agreement or the Regulations of the Joint Technical Committee, the point at issue shall be decided by a Special Committee.
The said Special Committee shall be organized with two members selected from each party. The decisions made by the Special Committee shall be
final, to which no objection shall be raised.

Article 7

Both parties shall, as occasion may require, render assistance toward the prosecution of the joint operations stipulated in Article 2.

Article 8

Both parties shall take necessary measures for the protection of various installations needed for navigation, such as are stipulated in Article 2.

Article 9

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the affixation of signatures and seals thereto, and after the lapse of 2 years this Agreement can be abrogated by either party at 3 months' notice. When notification is made as designated in the previous paragraph, both parties shall convene a conference immediately for conclusion of a new agreement.

Article 10

This Agreement shall be done in duplicate in the Manchukuoan and Russian languages and both parties, after affixing their respective signatures and seals thereto, shall keep two copies, one in the Manchukuoan language and the other in the Russian language.

Sep. 4, of the 1st year of Kenjoh, 1934

Representing the Manchukuoan Harbin Navigation Bureau, Consul in Musi, Manchukuo,

Kosei (T. M. ?) Buru-chih (corl)

Chief of the 2nd Section of the Road Administration Bureau, Communications Department,

SHIMIZUKI Yoshibi (corl)

- 3 -
Chief of the General Affairs Section, Harbin Navigation Bureau,

HORIUCHI Takejiro (seal)

Vice Consul in Harv, menkouko,

YGUSHIY Miyashi (seal)

Representing U.S.S.R. Amur Navigation Bureau, Chief of the State-established Amur Navigation Bureau,

A. Moterizzo (signature)

Chief of the Institute, State-established Navigation Bureau,

Be Chok (signature)

Chief of (c currently) Operation and Liaison, State-established Amur Navigation Bureau,

M. Zerin (signature)

(Compiler's note:-)

The Navigation Rules supplementary to this Agreement are the older ones which have, for convenience sake, been brought back into force by affixing signatures and seals thereto.

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CERTIFICATE

Statement of accuracy and authenticity


Signed at Tokyo,

on this 26th day of December, 1946.

(signed) K. HIYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) T. S. TO

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the preceding translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date: 30 Jan, 1947
満洲帝國埋設航政局及ソビエト連邦國立アムール船舶局間ノ
行為規定改定ニ関スル協定

昭和九年（一九三四年）九月四日締結

第一条

満洲帝國埋設航政局及ソビエト連邦國立アムール船舶局間ノ
行為規定改定ニ関スル協定

上記ノ内容ノ要旨ヲ付フォアノス（附則参照）
The Extra Number of the Official Gazette, January 22, the 11th year of Showa, (TN: 1936). No. 3, stenographic records of the proceedings of the House of Representatives in the 68th Diet Session.

(Tuesday) Jan. 31, the 11th year of Showa in. 1936 at 1:41 p.m. the session was opened.

President (Mr. HAKADa, Kunimatsu); Mr. HIROTA, Koki, the Foreign Minister; (Mr. HIROTA, Koki, the Minister of State) went on the platform.

The Minister of State (Mr. HIROTA, Loki): "I deem it an honor that I can speak on the recent progress of diplomatic affairs of our Empire and at the same time express my opinions. It is indeed a matter for congratulation that the international position of our Empire has steadily enhanced of late making our responsibility ever greater, that the world has gradually come to understand our intention of making contributions to the maintenance of the true peace of the world, that every nation has come to realize our Empire's special devotion to the stabilization of East Asia and that the establishment of friendly relations with other countries has thus gradually materialized.

It gives us a great delight that our ally, the State of Manchukuo is making steady progress and development year after year. As her relations with our Empire have become ever closer, we are intent on contributing to her independence and development, by
gradual abolition of the extra territoriely which we are now enjoying in that country and the gradual adjustment of our administrative right in the South Manchurian Railway zone. The close and inseparable relations between our Empire and Manchukuo can be seen in the fact that the Joint Defense Pact was concluded when Manchukuo was founded and that the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Joint Committee has come to be established, because we considered it natural that the two countries should cooperate in the economic field as well. Moreover, I believe that in order to secure that objective she must endeavor, on her part, to enhance her international position, and at the same time to promote friendly relations with the neighboring countries. The stately existence of this newly established Manchukuo and her sound development truly constitute the fundamental conditions of the virtual stabilization of East Asia. In other words, she should make her utmost efforts to adjust the relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China on one hand, and to act with prudence in the relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and Soviet Russia on the other hand.

In the first place, as to the relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China, though a gradual improvement is noticed, it cannot be said that they have been restored to the normalcy. Naturally, we keenly feel the necessity of solidifying the foundation upon which the stability of East Asia rests by improving the relations among three countries till they are perfectly normalized. Hereupon our Government has established a definite policy towards
China after a careful deliberation. Roughly speaking, this policy consists of the following three points: The first point concerns with the fundamental adjustment of the relations between Japan and China. It means that China would not resort to any such unfriendly actions or policies in any form as she has hitherto practiced, and that not only refraining from adopting such unfriendly actions or policies in the passive way, but also she would positively work hand in hand with Japan in order to realize friendly cooperation between the two countries. It is not only unwise of the two countries but also unbearable when viewed from the general situation in East Asia that Japan and China are opposed to each other. If China takes any unfriendly actions towards us or retrograde from stabilizing East Asia by taking such conventional steps as utilizing any third nation, it would truly be a matter of great regret. In case China thoroughly awakens to this point, our country will of course be ready to give help to her both materially and spiritually towards her development. Our Empire, from the general viewpoint mentioned above, has urged her to reflect and realize her responsibility in East Asia, waiting patiently for the change in her policy towards us. China, on her part, has also come to recognize this general situation and has manifested her intention to ameliorate the relations between the two countries for the past 12 months. Our Government announced in the 67th Session of the Diet our fundamental policy of non-threat and non-aggression towards our neighboring
countries, and taking that opportunity we endeavored to restore the relations between China and Japan to a normalcy and to promote the adjustment of the mutual interests of the two countries, but on this point, we regret to say that satisfactory results have not yet been obtained. In order to restore the relation between Japan and China to a normalcy, the relation between China and Manchukuo should as a matter of course be put on the right track also. It is especially so in North China where various interests of these three countries are interwoven. However, China does not yet recognize the independence of Manchukuo which is adjacent to North China, and in addition to this, due to the locally peculiar tradition of long standing in Northern District, a good deal of unrest prevailed for a time in North China, but as you know, since the Hopei-Chahar Political Council of Hopei and Chahar Provinces has been organized, the tension there has greatly been relieved. Thus the stability of the relations between these countries can hardly be attained without adjusting not only the direct relations between Japan and China but also those between Japan, Manchukuo and China. The second definite policy toward China, therefore, concerns with the attainment of this objective. In other words, in order to realize a thorough adjustment of the relations between these three countries, fundamental solution could not be attained unless China, first of all, should recognize the existence of Manchukuo, enter into diplomatic relations with her, and further harmonize the relations of mutual interests. Accordingly, we are looking forward to the advent of the day when this fundamental solution will be
realized at the earliest possible moment, but in the meantime, I believe it is necessary for us to take some means not to aggravate the relations of these three countries.

I believe the greatest difficulty China is confronting at present is the Communistic movement. In the instability of East Asia lies the great possibility of Bolshevik advancement. China, for instance, is highly menaced by it in her internal social system as well as in her outlying districts, and the rampant activities of Communists in China are beyond our imagination. As to the Bolshevik movement, East Asia is not the only place exposed to that peril, but it seems that in East Asia the movement is specially active. Therefore, in order to secure the stability of East Asia, nay, that of the whole world, it is a common matter of importance for every nation, to say nothing of our neighbor, China, to check this movement in East Asia and save China from the peril to which she is exposed. This is the third point our Government has decided, and we desire to cooperate with China in many matters for the prevention of Bolshevization.

The foregoing three points are the established principles of our Government, but they are not especially new ideas; they are nothing but fundamental ideas that we ought to have in order to attain the grand objective of stabilizing East Asia. Therefore, the spirit of the principles may well be said to be a policy common to all the countries in East Asia. The Chinese Government also has understood this point well, and has already shown her
approval of the above-mentioned three principles and has proposed to have negotiations with us for a friendly cooperation of the two countries based on the spirit of these three principles. Of course, our Government is not in opposition to her proposal, but it is a matter of regret that such a situation repugnant to the foregoing fundamental principles as an anti-Japanese Movement by Chinese students has recently occurred. We agreed to China's proposal, however, and are waiting for the notification of the Chinese Government that she has finished her preparations for opening negotiations with us, expecting that she will take measures to straighten the situation before long, thus accelerating the opening of negotiations in an amicable atmosphere. If the negotiations progress satisfactorily, I believe that the basis of the fundamental adjustment of the relations between Japan and China will be established.

Then, as to the relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and Soviet Russia, our Government has made invariable efforts to establish peace and friendship and the success of the negotiations to purchase on our part the North Manchurian Railway from Soviet Russia has served to eliminate obstacles of long standing covering the relations of the three countries. As our Empire is primarily responsible for the joint defence of Manchukuo, her relations with any of her neighboring States in politics and military affairs will automatically influence us directly. Therefore, we should pay special attention to the relations of Japan, Manchukuo and Soviet
Russia. Trouble is apt to be provoked in the relations of Manchukuo and Soviet Russia as some parts of the long border-line between the two countries are not yet clearly marked.

The establishment of a Joint Committee is now talked about, the Manchurian Government insists, first of all, on the necessity of clarifying the ambiguous border-line. The one point we are deeply concerned about in the relations of the three countries is the excessive military preparations on the part of Soviet Russia in her far outlying colony of East Siberia. As this is directly inciting the feeling of not only the Manchuriens but also of our people, we are taking every opportunity to demand sincere consideration on this point on the part of Soviet authorities.

As to the Naval Disarmament Conference which was held in London since December 9, last year, and upon which our Government placed much importance, our delegates have come to withdraw from it as you know. The fundamental principles we advocated at the Conference did not differ from what I told you at the time when Preliminary Negotiations were going on in London the year before last. In October last year, in order to make preparations for that conference the British Government asked our opinion on the proposed Declaration Regarding Construction of Warships and the Problem of Qualitative Disarmament. In answer to this, we elucidated our views as follows: If a real world peace is to be maintained and promoted, every nation should give careful consideration to mutual existence and needs on one hand and drastically reduce its armaments on the other, to the minimum which will bring about
the status of non-menace and non-aggression to each other; it is necessary that the Great Powers should, from this standpoint, take the initiative in materializing this objective and go forward for the promotion of peace. The fundamental contention of our Government at the Naval Disarmament Conference is nothing but thorough disarmament. According to this principle, at the present conference our delegates proposed the laying down of the lowest possible common maximum limit and the abolition of capital ships and aircraft carriers which were aggressive weapons as well as a large-scale scrapping of A-class cruisers. But in spite of the efforts made by our delegates, our fair and proper fundamental contention was not approved by other powers, and it became clear that their proposals did not agree with our principles either. So our delegates endeavored to ensure a smooth functioning of the conference by reaching agreements in whatever matters they agreed on. This having also been denied by the delegates of other nations, there was no other way open for our delegates but to withdraw from the Conference. When we look at the general situation of the world at present, unrest and troubles are prevailing everywhere, and there is tendency that all the powers are rather trying to replenish their armaments, therefore the spirit of disarmament is checked and this has developed to be a cause for not admitting our plan of thorough disarmament. Our Government respects, however, the spirit of non-menace and non-aggression irrespective of the existence of a
disarmament treaty, and has no intention whatever of provoking armament competition. Moreover, it is needless to say that our Government will never falter in its intention to cooperate with other powers for the cause of disarmament in order to establish world peace.

Thus the Disarmament Conference ended in a rupture, but Japan is not going to change her friendly policy towards the chief Sea Powers represented at the Conference. Especially with Great Britain and the U.S.A., our Empire has been traditionally and historically on intimate terms. Since Japan and the U.S.A. are geographically separated by the Pacific and keep their own spheres of activity, there can never be any collision between the two countries. And as for Great Britain, I believe it is natural for us to adjust ourselves well to the complicated political and economic relations and interests in various parts of the world, and thus maintain our traditional friendly relations. As for British Dominions, we are strengthening our friendly relations and the commercial ties are becoming ever closer. To Australia we sent Ambassador DEBUCHI to reciprocate the friendly mission of Mr. Latham, the Foreign Minister of Australia, and also we made him pay a visit to New Zealand to promote friendship with that Commonwealth. As for the South Sea Islands, our Empire looks forward to promoting amicable relations expecting the development of our commercial intercourse with them. From this point of view we heartily hanker
after satisfactory development of the Philippine Commonwealth which has lately been founded.

It is quite encouraging that our overseas trade is on the increase and expansion year after year, in addition to the increase in our productive power at home. This tendency extends over both export and import which proves the spirit of live-and-let-live among the trading countries. It goes without saying that the sound development of international trade is indispensable for the promotion of world economy and international friendship.

It is a matter of great regret, however, that many foreign countries are resorting to various measures and steps to check freedom of international commerce. It is, in fact, indispensable for the economic independence of a modern nation especially such as our country which has a large population and meager resources to have a secure hold of raw materials and the markets for manufactured goods. For this purpose it is necessary for us to restore the freedom of trade, to abolish all unnecessary measures and steps of restraint on international trade, and to keep the doors open. Then only, I believe, the international political stability can be accomplished. It is nothing but a retrogression of civilization to raise purposely high barriers making the world small with the possible result of frequent conflict and friction. It is without doubt that an atmosphere of freedom and mutual reliance will be brought about and as the result the world peace will be secured if free transportation of both people and goods all over the world, and open and equitable sharing of natural resources by all nations be realized.

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From this standpoint our Empire is doing its best to advance our overseas trade through friendly negotiations with those countries concerned for the purpose of adjusting mutual interests. Last year we were unfortunately obliged to apply the Protective Trade Law on Canadian merchandise, but afterwards a perfect compromise was reached between our country and Canada, our true intention being thoroughly understood by Canada, and to our heartfelt congratulation, we have ceased to apply the law any longer.

It is a matter of regret that some leading statesmen of the world try to dictate others by forcing their ideas and, if others do not agree, blame them as if they were peace breakers. No one is qualified to speak of world peace unless he truly realizes the duty of his own country and understands and respects the standpoint of other countries as well. We often understand and respect the point of view of other countries through appreciation and high esteem of their culture. Our Empire has built up its present position by introducing and digesting the cultures of various Western countries and adding them to our own. But, I believe, the time has come when we should go still further and strive to introduce our culture to other countries in order to realize the amalgamation of the cultures of both East and West, thus promoting international understanding and to making contributions to the cultures of the world as well as to the peace and welfare of humanity.

As stated before, our future international relations are very complicated and divergent. But as our international position is
steadily advancing, it is my belief that we should cooperate and go forward, and meet the present situation observing the spirit of the Imperial Decree on the Withdrawal from the League of Nations by winning the confidence of other countries and by discharging our duties faithfully in our official and private lives."

(Appplause)
CERTIFICATE

I, YAMASAKI, Takashi, Chief of the General Affairs Section in the House of Representatives, certify that the attached document consisting of 13 sheets of paper written in Japanese is a copy of the stenographic records from page 11 to page 12 of No. 3 of the proceedings of the House of Representatives, met on January 21, the 11th year of Showa (TN: 1936), and the original document is in my official charge.

On this 16th day of December, 21st year of Showa (TN: 1946) in the House of Representatives.

YAMASAKI, Takeshi (Seal)

I hereby certify that the foregoing was signed and sealed by the above-named in the presence of this witness.

On the same date and at the same place.

Witness: MATSUI, Tokuhei (Seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-- against --

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

STORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: MINAMI, Jiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depone as follows.
1. I was born on August 10, 1874 at Fijii-machi, Cita Prefecture. After completing the usual course at a military preparatory school and the Military Academy, I was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant of Cavalry in 1895. I took part in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) as a captain of cavalry. At that time ear trouble developed as a result of concussion of cannon fire and for this reason, I have now lost my auditory sense.

2. In 1924, I became Cavalry Inspector as Lieutenant General; in 1926, Commander of the Sixteenth Division; in 1927 Assistant Chief of the General Staff; in 1929, Commander of the Korean Army; and in 1930, a Supreme War Councilor as Full General. On April 14, 1931 when the second WAKATSUKI Cabinet was formed, I was appointed Minister of War. The above a period in which the Japanese Army was reduced by four division to carry into effect the decisions of the Washington Conference, and energetic efforts were made in the retrenchment of the national budget. Especially the cabinets formed by the Minseito party, viz., the KATO, Takaaki Cabinet (June 1924 - January 1926), the first WAKATSUKI Cabinet (January 1926 - April 1927), the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet (July 1929 - April 1931), and the second WAKATSUKI Cabinet above referred to took internally the policy of financial re'trenchment and upheld externally the policy of peaceful and conciliatory diplomacy.
although I was not a member of the MINSEITO, I had at
through understanding of its policies because General UGAKI,
my intimate senior and by whose recommendation I became his
successor, had been in office as War Minister for a long time
in the Minseito Cabinets ever since the formation of the
KATO Cabinet mentioned above. On August 4, 1931, I called
the customary conference of Division Commanders in the War
Ministry for the first time since I assumed the office of War
Minister. The address of instructions which I delivered on
that occasion unexpectedly aroused the opposition of a
section of the political circles. As it would be clear from
a glance at its contents, I gave expression to nothing more
than a view natural to a War Minister -- stating that every
effort should be made in the training of soldiers to maintain
the efficiency of the Imperial Army under the difficult con­
ditions caused by arms reduction. It appears that an issue
was created by the fact that some anti-government elements
conspired to overthrow the government by intentionally
distorting some of my statements. That I was not opposed to
arms reduction may be recognized in the light of the fact
that in May 1931, I revised the Army Pay Ordinance, with
salary reductions ranging from 5.8% for First Lieutenants
to 12% for Generals, and that I also endeavored even to
effect a cut in pensions. I said no more than this: that,
while the European and American powers had swiftly modernised their armaments as a result of World War I, Japan has left her arms in the same condition as they had been in the previous century, and therefore stressed that in order to perfect our national defense with a minimum of arms, we must effect an improvement in quality. That I did not try to inscribe a positive policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia may be best illustrated by the fact that, when an incident broke out later, I strenuously maintained the policy of non-expansion to such an extent that I was attacked for being too passive both by the army on the spot and by the people at home. What I said in my speech was that inasmuch as the pending question in Manchuria and Mongolia exceedingly complicated, and inasmuch as Premier WAKATSUKI and Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA had announced their views toward the new situation, the army also on its own part should not fail to give its attention there-

4. In the night of September 18, 1931 I was staying as usual in the official residence of War Minister. About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, I was suddenly awakened by an officer on duty in the War Ministry, and handed a telegram despatched by the Special Service Organ in Mukden. The message said that about 10:30 a.m. of the 19th the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway northwest of Mukden had been destroyed by Chinese troops, that our railway guard unit had
been fired upon and that the Second Battalion of the Independent Garrison had started to move to the spot. About an hour later a telegram came from Commander KONJO which said: "Leave Port Arthur at 3:00 a.m. for Mukden." The telegram was simple and the situation was not clear, but as it was evident that a clash had occurred between the regular Japanese and Chinese troops, I immediately called Lieutenant General SUGIYAMA, Vice-Minister of War, Major General Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, and Lieutenant KUSHIBUCHI, my private secretary, to my official residence to consider steps to meet the situation. At about 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. I reported the incident by telephone to the Premier, and the Foreign, Overseas and Navy Ministers, and to the Premier, I requested the immediate convening of an extraordinary cabinet meeting. Meanwhile the General Staff Headquarters had also received a similar telegram and Chief of the General Staff KANAYA, Assistant Chief of the General Staff WINOMIYA and other responsible members of the Headquarters were in conference. At about 7 a.m. Director KOISO of the Military Affairs Bureau representing the War Ministry went to the General Staff Headquarters for liaison. About 9:00 a.m. the two parties came to an agreement, and decided upon the policy of non-expansion. What we feared more than anything else at the time was whether or not the lengthy railway line, the 200,000
Japanese residents and one million Koreans in Manchuria could be protected with the small Kwantung Army force of 10,000 men in the face of the formidable army of CHANG Tae-kuk-lin numbering 250,000. If the Nikolaievsk Incident involving the massacre of several hundreds of Japanese residents in Nikolaievsk by Russians in 1920 were to be repeated, it would be a serious matter and the army would be charged for negligence in proper performance of its duties to the people. For this reason opinion in the Supreme Command strongly favored the despatch of reinforcements for operational reasons and therefore it took some time before the War Ministry could come to a decision on the non-expansion policy. At an extraordinary cabinet meeting held at 10:00 a.m. the foregoing policy was adopted by the Cabinet, and thereafter the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff in turn reported the decision to the throne, and obtained the Imperial sanction.

That afternoon, the Chief of the Army General Staff wired this fact as a Supreme Command order to Commander HONJO of the Kwantung Army and I sent telegraphic instructions on the government policy to the Commander myself. From this time on, the military operations of the army on the spot came under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army General Staff as an exercise of the prerogative of the Supreme Command. At this time, Lieutenant General HAYASHI, Senjuro, Commander of the Korean Army, reported to Tokyo that the

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sending reinforcements to Manchuria admitted of no delay, but a stop order was communicated to him through the Chief of General Staff.

5. In the afternoon of the 21st, while I was engaged in consultation with Premier WAKATSUKI after the conclusion of the Cabinet meeting and all cabinet ministers had retired, a telegram arrived from the Commander of the Korean Army, reporting that, moved with irresistible sympathy over the fervent requests of the Kwantung Army, he had, at his own discretion, ordered the Shingisht Mixed Brigade to cross the border. After conferring with the Premier, I reported the border crossing of the Korean Army at its own discretion to a cabinet meeting held in the morning of the following day, the 22nd. The Cabinet, taking into consideration precarious position of the Kwantung Army, saw no alternative, but to approve the despatch of the said brigade and the defrayal of expenses accompanying such action. The Prime Minister immediately reported the affair to the Emperor, the Chief of the General Staff following suit, and the Imperial Order, for the crossing of the border was communicated to the Korean Army by the Chief of the Army General Staff. The cabinet meeting on the same day decided that as the action of the
Kwantung Army was a temporary seizure and not an occupation of Manchuria, no military administration was to be established. This decision was communicated to Commander HONJO by myself. Further, on September 26, the Cabinet passed a decision prohibiting Japanese participation in the movement to establish a new government in Manchuria, and telegraphic instructions to this effect were sent by the Foreign Ministry to Foreign Office organs, in Manchuria and to the Kwantung Army by myself. Such instructions were considered necessary, because we had received reports that movements for the independence of Manchuria had suddenly become active with the outbreak of the incident, and especially that those in favor of restoring the Ching Dynasty had started vigorous activities and we were concerned lest the army on the spot should be dragged into such activities. Later, in the early part of November, a person by the name of TOYAMA, Tako brought me a letter as a messenger of Emperor HSUANTUNG who had been residing in Tientsin. Although I did not personally talk with him, his message which was conveyed to me through my secretary or officer on duty-I do not remember which—was that: the Emperor HSUANTUNG was desirous of effecting fundamental correction of the evil administration of the Fengtian regime in Manchuria." As there was no reason for me to believe the words of such a messenger, and especially as it was the government's fixed
policy not to interfere in the domestic affairs of China and I did not favour the proposition, I ignored the letter without replying to the letter of Mr. PU Yi.

Not only that, on November 16, I sent telegraphic instructions to the Commander of the Kwantung Army stating that: "While various rumors current about the question of Emperors PSUANTUNG, the Kwantung Army must strictly refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of China, and act with utmost caution." Several years later, when CHENG Hsiao-hsueh, Prime Minister of Manchukuo, visited Japan, I called on him at the Imperial Hotel, and showing him the letter in question, asked him whether the letter was genuine or false. CHENG signed the letter certifying that it was the real handwriting of Emperor HSUANTUNG. I have kept this letter to this day as a souvenir.

6. On September 24, the Japanese Government issued its first statement concerning the Mukden Incident. Prior to this announcement on the situation were being issued, about twice a day by our delegation to the League of Nations. Conditions on the spot, however, were not sufficiently clear even to us cabinet ministers. After the incident, seemed to have been settled, a new situation developed with the result the situation was always ahead of the government statement, placing me in a very awkward position. This was because as
as a principle on which the army was established the War Minister could not interfere with military operations. The Kwantung Army, on the other hand, appealed to us that the situation on the spot was such that, while the army in Manchuria had to abide by the non-expansion policy it was unavoidable for them to take necessary measures for self-defense in the face of constant attacks by an enemy whose forces were more than twenty times greater than our own and that unless they did otherwise nothing remained for them but self-annihilation. And yet, when a request came from the Kwantung Army for permission to despatch troops to Harbin for the protection of Japanese residents, we not only persuaded the Chief of the Army General Staff and had it flatly rejected, but also succeeded in having the main force withdraw to the railway zone. However, with the withdrawal of our troops Chang Hsuch-liang's armies, taking advantage of the situation, advanced to the railway zone, causing disturbances in the rear. Consequently, in the beginning of October, a reconnaissance flight was made by our aircraft over Chinchou, the headquarters, of the CHANG army. Then the report was received that as the CHANG forces had opened fire, our aircraft had dropped bombs on them. As the flight was made without any previous notification either to the Chief of the Army General Staff or to me, I immediately
issued a severe warning to Commander HONJO. In November
MA Chan-shan's army destroyed a railway bridge over the Nonni
River and fired on our units to repair it. As MA's
troops failed to comply with our repeated warnings, the
Kwantung Army decided to repulse them. Later the central
military authorities ordered the Kwantung Army to evacuate
immediately from TSIITSIHKAR and this order was effectivelv
carried out. In the latter part of November, when a riot
broke-out among Chinese troops in Tientsin, a request came
from the North China Garrison for reinforcements. Not only
was this request refused, but the reinforcement of the
Kwantung Army which had advanced to the neighborhood of Chin-
chow also was ordered to withdraw to the railway zone near
Hsinmintun east of the river Tatao. About this time, the
annual army maneuvers were held in Kyushu under the personal
supervision of the Emperor. Although the War Minister had
to accompany His Majesty, I remained in Tokyo with the Im-
perial permission as I had to attend to the ever changing
situation both at home and abroad, and exerted my best effo-
orts to prevent the expansion of the conflict, in close coll-
aboration with government as well as the Supreme Command.
I still remember that when we succeeded in preventing the
advance of the Kwantung Army to Chinchow the Prime Minister
and I, just the two of us together, drank a toast congratula-
ting ourselves on our success at the Premier's official
such being the case, I can state with the utmost confidence that at least while I was War Minister, there absolutely never was issued a false statement or a breach of international agreements committed, although because of the rapidly changing situation in Manchuria, the statements of the Japanese Government and the actual conditions on the spot were inverted in point of time and therefore were confused.

Aside from the many difficult problems in Manchuria mentioned above, I was informed in the middle of October that there were indications of possible disorder among a group of young officers at home. I had these elements immediately apprehended by the Gendarmerie, and had the matter properly dealt with. Because of the moderate policy of the WAKATSUKI cabinet, voices of dissatisfaction against it grew up both within and without Japan. This led the Prime Minister to try to reorganize the Cabinet by a coalition of the Minseito and Seiyukai parties. This attempt failed, however, and the independent action taken by Home Minister DACRI caused the Cabinet to resign on bloc on December 10 because of disunity in the Cabinet. After my resignation from the office of War Minister, I was given the obscure post of Supreme War Councilor. There was nothing to do except to assemble about twice a year to hear lectures given by the
military authorities. As I had been requested to serve as tutor to the young Prince KAN-IN, I devoted my time to this work, and paid but little attention if any to political and military affairs. Just after three years, on December 10, 1934, I was unexpectedly appointed ambassador to Manchukuo, and concurrently Governor of the Kwantung-leased Territory and Commander of the Kwantung Army, at the recommendation of the OKADA Cabinet.

Being installed in the new posts by the personal command of His Majesty, I went to Hsinking, after consultations with Prime Minister OKADA, Foreign Minister HIROTA, Finance Minis TAKAHASHI, War Minister HAYASHI and Justice Minister OBARA, entrusted with the task of having the government's policy thoroughly carried out in Manchoukuo. Not only had the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol been concluded and Japan recognized the independence of Manchoukuo the previous year, but the Vatican, the Republic Salvador and the Dominican Republic had also recognized her and Manchoukuo was growing as a newborn independent state. In January of the following year (1935), Foreign Minister HIROTA declared in the Diet the policy of amity toward and on February 3, Replies thereto came from General CHING Kai-shok, Mr. WANG Ching-wei and Mr. SUN FO, thus bringing about mutual understanding between China and Japan. This was followed by the satisfactory conclusion of various agreements between Manchoukuo and China.
relating to customs, postal and telegraphic matters. In March, Manchukuo entered into agreements with Soviet Russia for the navigation of inland waterways and for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railways, and it was agreed to that a committee be appointed for the settlement of the boundary question. "A Field Marshal Nudzo, the first ambassador to Manchukuo, was received by the Emperor of that country on the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month, and General Hisaka the second ambassador, on the 2nd, 12th and 22nd, I, as the third, had the 3rd, 13th and 23rd of each month as my days for regular audiences. During the period between April 2 and April 27, the Emperor of Manchoukuo visited Japan, and was graciously received by our Imperial Family. Thus as Japan and Manchoukuo stood on equal footing, it was the policy of the Okada Cabinet and also my personal conviction that the independence of Manchoukuo should be completely respected and every encouragement given for her healthy growth as a sovereign state. Hence the Kwantung Army made the maintenance of peace and order as its primary function and for this reason I frequently gave them stern instructions not to meddle in politics or do anything injurious to the prestige of Manchoukuo. In pursuance of the policy of the government, as soon as I took office, I abolished the Special Service Department of the army and the government of the Kwantung
Louched Territory, and tried my best to simplify the Japanese organs in Manchukuo to every extent possible. During my tenure of office, there was never a case of Japanese troops crossing the border.

In May, 1935, the Japanese legation in China was elevated to Embassy status and Ambassador Ariyoshi presented his credentials to President Lin Ch'ong of the Chinese Government. In June, General Ch'ing Ku-i-shek promulgated the Neighborly Friendship Ordinance which greatly stimulated the growth of friendly sentiments between Japan and China. During the same month, in order to assure peace along the China-Manchukuo border, the so-called "UmezU Ho Yin-chin", Doihara-Chéng To-chun and other agreements were concluded. With regard to these agreements I received reports that they were concluded in an exceedingly friendly atmosphere. Although these agreements were of a local nature, they were concluded with the full approval of the governments of both countries.

In July the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Commission was set up to deal with various economic questions on a basis of equality. In June, the Japanese government announced its decision to relinquish Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchoukuo. This was a serious decision on Japan's part, as she was to return to Manchukuo the rights and interests which she had hitherto enjoyed there. During the same
month, Prince TEH of Inner Mongolia came to Hsingking with
a request for an audience with the Emperor. It is believed
that the Prince, envious of the sound and peaceful develop-
ment of Manchukuo, desired to make Inner Mongolia independ-
ent following the example of Manchoukuo. "As for me, I believe
that the independence of Inner Mongolia which Prince TEH
was planning as not proper both from the standpoint of
substance and time, and always refused his requests for
assistance. Lieutenant Colonel TANAKA, Nagayoshi, then a
staff officer of the Kwantung Army, being well acquainted
with the conditions in Mongolia because of his duties, was
enthusiastic about the question of Mongolia. Even as late
as 1942 he visited me in Tokyo with a request that I be-
come the head of an association for assisting the indepen-
dence of Mongolia. Of course, I refused to comply with the
request. For the same reason, with regard to the North Chi
question also, I only devoted my efforts for the mainten-
cance of peace between China and Manchukuo, in accordance with
the directions of the central government, and never at any
time did I attempt to engage in political negotiations. I
heard that the formation of the Hooei-Chahar regime toward
the end of the same year was at the initiative of the
Chinese government. On February 26, 1936, an armed insurrec-
tion broke out in Tokyo, resulting in the assassination of
dumber of prominent men. Lamenting over this situation,
I voluntarily requested to be relieved from my office. I was relieved of my post on March 6, and placed on the waiting list on April 18, and as transferred to the reserve list on April 22. Soon after my return to Japan, on August 5, I was unexpectedly appointed Governor General of Korea.

10. I think it as my predecessor as Governor General of Korea, General UGAKI, who recommended me as his successor. I took this office not as soldier but as civilian. As all military affairs were under the exclusive charge of the Commander of the Korean Army, I never handled military matters during tenure of office in Korea. As Governor General, I have nothing to say except that I devoted myself entirely to the elevation of the status and conditions of the Korean people.

11. After my retirement as Governor General of Korea on May 29, 1942, I was appointed a Privy Councilor, which post I held until March 1945. During my tenure of office His Majesty consulted the Privy Council with regard to a proposal concerning the revision of the government organization regulations to place the governor-generals of Korea and Formosa under the jurisdiction of Home Minister, in consequence of the establishment of the Ministry of Greater East Asia tie Affairs in October 1942. At that time, I was appointed a member of the Investigation Committee of this proposal by the President of the Council. Although I did not utter a
a single word about the Ministry of Greater East Asia tie
Affairs, I vigorously opposed the government proposal con­
cerning the office of the governor-general of Korea, on
the basis of my personal conscience, because I felt apprehen­s
lest the new measure have various undesirable effects upon
colonial administration. However, the proposal was approved
over my objection by the majority. I have nothing else to
say with reference to my tenure of office as Privy Councillor.

12. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society formed during
the KONOE Cabinet by the dissolution of all political
parties, gradually lost the confidence of the people, and
in its place the DAINIPPON SEIJI KAI (Japan Political
Association) was established on March 30, 1945. Unlike the
former, the latter was not a government serving organization.
The chief aim of the new association was to reflect public
opinion upon government, and thereby correct the policies
of the government and the military. In this respect, the
new organization was fundamentally different from the Im­
perial Rule Assistance Political Society, which had no
link whatsoever with the people. I was recommended to lead
this association by those who used to hold leading position
in the former Seiyukai and Minseito Parties because in their
opinion I was best qualified to restrain and control govern­
ment and the military. Realizing enterely the necessity
of guiding Japanese politics in accordance with public opinion in view of the increasingly critical war situation. I accepted the offer, pledging my life to the performance of my task. In order to attain the aims of the new association, I began my work as its head by establishing chapter in prefectures, cities, towns and villages throughout the country, with a view to maintaining direct contact, with the people. The expenses of the new society were met by membership fees. No financial support whatsoever was received from the government. In order to hear the true voice of the people, I personally attended the inaugural meeting of local chapters, and as soon as I returned to Tokyo from my trips, I counselled the government and military authorities as to how the people thought and what they wished. Less then six months after the association was formed, the war came to an end and it was dissolved on August 20, 1945.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

On this 8th day of January, 1947

at

Deponent MINAMI, Jiro

I, KONDO, Giichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KONDO, Giichi (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 27 Mar. 1947
Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/3/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 27 Mar. 1947
軍艦が衝突シコンの前後アリスカから次官に失礼であると批判された後に、が主な責任を負ったとされる。

海軍の四大臣、陸海相・加藤高明、外務・権利長官、造山の次長が、以下首権部を示すリスキーリマシタ。以下で日本延長及び二十萬ノ在日本人、百萬ノ朝鮮人ノ果シテ損 vengeanceラ長大ナル残遺遺産ヲ決定シマシタ。後半大正九年（一九二〇）ニ尼ペ於テ日本民民ノ数百名ヲ構成サレタテノノ為ノカデリマシタ。

師部ニ於テ少揺動ノ後、主トスル監視ヲ強クさせリマシタ。之ガ為アリノ変へ見地ヲ持ッテミテテ
ガヴィカル右方針を政府トンテ確定シ、首相及参謀総長ハ相次テ参内上奏

本駐司令官ニ下合セラレ政府ノ方針ハ自分ヨリ同司令官ニ訓令シマシタ。

アリトノ上申シテ参りマンタガ詰詰領長ノ通ジ中止命令ガ発セラレマ

ガ
命セラレ、国田首相、応田外相、高橋内相、松岡、小原法相監トモ

命セラレ、国田首相、応田外相、高橋内相、松岡、小原法相監トモ

命セラレ、国田首相、応田外相、高橋内相、松岡、小原法相監トモ

命セラレ、国田首相、応田外相、高橋内相、松岡、小原法相監トモ
昭和元年（一九二六）二月二十九日朝鮮総督府官庁テ封書内附会長官並存分ノ経管ラ於テハ箇マサハハリ又ハハリハテハガノ言官

今ノ文書ハハリマセンデハトシテノ自分トシテハ

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一ニハ元々ハハリマセントノ文書ハハリマセンデハトシテノ自分トシテハ

昭和十一年（一九三六）三月二十九日朝鮮総督府官庁テ

封書内附会長官並存分ノ経管ラ於テハ箇ンガハリマセンデハトシテノ自分トシテハ

在任ノ文書ハハリマセンデハトシテノ自分トシテハ

現ニハハリマセンデハトシテノ自分トシテハ

封書内附会長官並存分ノ経管ラ於テハ箇マサハハリ又ハハリハテハガノ言官

今ノ文書ハハリマセンデハトシテノ自分トシテハ

前ニハ元々ハハリマセントノ文書ハハリマセンデハトシテハ
To: Mr. Komatsubara, Michitaro, head of the Japanese residents in the Soviet Union.

Forwarded through the Foreign Ministry in USSR.

Top Secret
Army General Staff
Confidential №2081

Instruction
on investigation of special organizations, associations and important individuals who may be used for the gathering of intelligence information, for propaganda and subversive activities. October 6, 1942.

To: Komatsubara, Michitaro,
Military Attaché at the
Japanese Embassy in the USSR.

I request to gather the most detailed information on special organizations, associations, important individuals, etc., who may be used for collecting intelligence information, for propaganda, and subversive activities, in concert with various military operations in each informant's area, and keep sending this information as soon as it is received, according to the following points:

1. Information concerning organizations (associations)
   - The name of the organization (association)
   - Its establishment (objectives)
   - Its program
   - Organizational basis
   - Main leaders and their brief biographies
   - Number of members
   - The whereabouts of the central body and of the branches
   - Source of financial funds, present activities, publications, etc.
   - Present influence and means of spreading it
   - Methods of using it
   - The extent of direct contact with us at present; methods of employment of these organizations; preparation for it in time of peace; and all other necessary information.

2. Information concerning individual persons
   - Name, surname
   - Nationality
Sex
Date of birth (day, month, year),
Occupation
Brief biography and education
Personal qualities
Home conditions
Circle of acquaintances
Special abilities
Has he carried or is he carrying on the work of gathering intelligence information or some other work of special character. If the answer is affirmative, then what is this work and its results.
Knowledge of languages.
How he may be used in future; your intentions for the future.
Other important information

To: Kametsubera Michitarō, Military Attache of the Embassy in Soviet Russia.
Confidentially
Top Secret
From: General MIJAMI, Jiro, Governor-General of Korea
To: His Excellency, the Foreign Minister UGAKI, Issei

Sir:

Approximately one year has passed since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident. Through the wise policy of Your Excellency as Prime Minister at a time when the situation is so extremely grave, the prestige of our country is being enhanced at home and abroad, and I feel it is a matter for congratulations for the sake of our nation.

Ever since the Incident our troops have been invincible, and I believe Hankow, the last capital of the Chiang Regime, will soon be conquered.

It is natural that the significance of the fall of Hankow, in this Holy War, will have an extremely great influence at home and abroad. I feel there are many measures to be taken by our nation at this juncture, but the most important problem, I believe, is the recognition of a pro-Japanese Regime in North and Central China simultaneously with the fall of Hankow, and to expound it at home and abroad.

The recognition of a pro-Japanese Regime by our country will, internally, convince our people of the progress of our policy in China; and externally, give the Chinese masses a strong suggestion that there is no other way than to get rid of the Chiang Regime and depend on the new Regime, and at the same time the third powers behind Chiang will also fully realize that there is no other way than to approach the pro-Japanese regime in order to protect their own rights and interests. I believe it will have great effect at home and abroad.

I feel Your Excellency has already given individual consideration to various measures to be taken after the fall of Hankow, but it is my wish to have Your Excellency make final judgment on this point.

Yours respectfully,
CERTIFICATE

IPS No. 1835-A

Statement of Sales and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages (Japanese), dated 23 September 1938, and described as follows: Letter from Governor-General MINAGA to Foreign Minister UCHIDAMARD. 3rd September 1938. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (including also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of April, 1947.

Witness: K. Urabe

Signature of Official

Chief, Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 8th day of April, 1947.

Witness: Henry Shimizu

Investigating I. P. G.
昭和元年起phetamine. Ex. 2137

大正四年

T. C. 1835 A
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Suda, et al

STORN LEIPOSITION

Deponent: - UEDA, Kerkichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

On this 22 day of March, 1947, at Oiso-Machi, Kanagawa Prefecture

/ / UEDA, Kerkichi (seal)

I, YAMADA, Hanzo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: (signed) YAMADA, Hanzo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/ / UEDA, Kerkichi (seal)
I, Kenkichi, a former army general and reside at OISO, OISOMACHI, KAMAGAYA Prefecture. Since I served as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, held the post of Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Manchukuo from March 1936 to September 1939, I shall relate an outline of the assistance given by Japan towards the development of Manchukuo during that period.

1) Fundamental principle of Japan's assistance towards the development of Manchukuo. The fundamental principle of Japan's attitude towards assistance in the development of Manchukuo during my tenure of office as the Commander-in-chief of Kwantung Army was as follows.

A wholesome development of Manchukuo can be attained by bringing about a harmonious unity among the various races in Manchuria, thus, domestically, securing a peaceful life and wealthy livelihood of the people as well as promoting culture and industries, and towards foreign nations, maintaining the principles of "peaceful frontiers" and "co-existence and co-prosperity". So-called "Kingdom of utopia" which is truly a peaceful nation can thus be established. It was only natural for Japan, who is closely related to Manchukuo racially and geographically and in various fields such as culture, industry, etc., and whose interests and ideals are similar, to contribute to the development of Manchukuo.
On the other hand, Japan carried out such aids and contributions so as to respect and safeguard the basic principles of the foundation of Manchukuo.

2) Position of the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

The Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army was appointed personally by the Emperor of Japan. He commanded his subordinates and took charge of the defence of Manchukuo, coming under the jurisdiction of the Chief of General Staff, for operational and strategic matters, and of the War Minister, for military administration matters. He concurrently fulfilled the duties of an Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary and, in that capacity, was under the direction and supervision of the Foreign Minister, for diplomatic matters. He was, by an Imperial order, under the direction and supervision of the Prime Minister for the administration of matters falling under the charge of the Kwantung Bureau.

In order that Manchukuo might achieve a wholesome development in the early stage of its foundation, it was most essential to promote peace and order within that country, consolidate its basic structure and firmly establish its national defence in accordance with the international situation. Therefore, the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, who concurrently held the post of Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary, was made, for the time being, to cooperate with
Manchukuo for its development. The guiding principles of his cooperation and assistance towards Manchukuo remained to the last that he should respect its independence and responsibilities and that the primary duties of the Kwantung Army should be its national defense and establishment of peace and order within the country, strictly in line with the spirit of the Japan-Manchukuo Joint Defense Agreement. Efforts were to bring about harmonious coordination in this respect.

Furthermore, assistance extended to the Manchukuo Government was in the forms of advices, encouragements, suggestions, expressions of hopes and so forth, and was never given by orders or directions from the Kwantung Army. Moreover, in response to the progress of Manchukuo’s growth and development, the assistance thus extended was gradually reduced to cover only the matters pertaining to its fundamental policies, and by the time I left my post there in August, 1939, Japan’s extraterritoriality had already been relinquished and Manchukuo was principally governed at its government’s own initiative.

3) Organs for assisting the development of Manchukuo.

At the time of Manchukuo’s foundation a Special Service Department was created, aside from the Staff Department, with a view to assist the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army in his task of aiding in its development. In January, 1935,
however, the Special Service Department was abolished, and, in its place, was created the Advisory Department composed of six civilian officials, "which was also abolished after my arrival in December, 1937, in consideration of the state of Manchukuo's advance following the relinquishment of extraterritoriality. At the same time, the 4th Section of the Staff Department was reorganized and its personnel was reduced to a more number of 9 comprising 3 staff officers including the chief and 6 other members, whose primary duties were to handle liaison business between the Japanese central authorities and Manchukuo authorities. "The Japan-Manchukuo Joint Economic Commission" was established, in June, 1935, by an agreement between the two countries in order to study and discuss important economic problems of Japan and Manchukuo. "The Commission for the Development and Exploitation of Manchukuo" was also created during my tenure of office, in August 1936, with a view to join the efforts of all Japanese and Manchukuan experts, both official and civilians, in deliberating policies for the development and exploitation of Manchukuo.

4) Recommendation of Japanese Nationals as Officials in the service of the Manchukuo Government. Upon the request of Mr. Pu-yi and in accordance with the appendix to the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, for the time being, was given the task of recommending Japanese
nationals as officials of the Manchukuo Government and was to be consulted in the cases of their dismissal. However, during my tenure of office as Commander-in-chief of the Kwantun Army, recommendations were given only when officials of the KANNIN Rank (equivalent to the Japanese CHOKUNIN Rank) were appointed and particularly to those who were to occupy important positions. In practice, the choice of these officials was made after having considered primarily the wishes of the Manchukuoan circles and my duties were merely to convey those wishes to the circles concerned in Japan. There had never occurred a case where the Kwantung Army forcibly recommended particular persons nor had them discharged upon its request. Furthermore, this function of the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army was strictly limited to giving recommendations and, therefore, the appointments and dismissals of government officials were carried out solely on the responsibility of the Manchukuo Government and in accordance with its laws and decrees as well as its right to appoint or discharge its own officials.

5) Relinquishment of extraterritoriality.

The policy of the Okada Cabinet with respect to the gradual abolition of extraterritoriality in Manchukuo was decided upon in August 1935 and its partial relinquishment was carried out in June 1936, subsequent to my assumption of the Command of the Kwantung Army. It should be admitted that some concern
was felt regarding the abolition of extraterritoriality because of the state of law and order and of internal administration which prevailed in Manchukuo in 1935. However, it was observed that, once our national policy for the relinquishment of extraterritoriality had been decided upon, the Manchukuo Government and people, to say nothing of its Emperor, Prime Minister Chang and other state ministers, were all feeling extremely grateful for Japan's goodwill and were full of hope and fervour, looking ahead to the prosperous future of their country. Meanwhile, a certain Japanese circle was rather dissatisfied with this step, inasmuch as it would deprive the Japanese residents in that country of the privileges which they had been enjoying under extraterritoriality and, particularly, of their right of tax exemption.

I exhorted them, however, stating my belief that, equality and harmony among the various races of Manchukuo was necessary for its wholesome development and the Japanese residing in Manchukuo should discard all the privileges that they had hitherto been enjoying in order to give full play to their real abilities by working hand in hand with the various other races, and that the ideals entertained at the time of the foundation of Manchukuo can only thus be attained. Later, it was considered that an immediate settlement of the question of extraterritoriality would be more profitable to the development
of Manchukuo than its gradual relinquishment, in the light of
the conditions which then prevailed in Manchukuo and, particularly,
of the progress of the restoration of law and order and its
government's administrative and judicial capabilities. A total
relinquishment of extraterritoriality was therefore decided
upon, and a treaty in this regard was concluded on November
30, 1937.
6) Relationship between the Emperor of Manchukuo and the
Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

Since my assumption of the command of the Kwantung Army,
I saw the Emperor now and then and reported to him on various
matters, in order to consolidate further the confidence which
His Majesty had placed in the successive Commanders-in-chief
of the Kwantung Army. During my tenure of office, Manchukuo
was confronted with various external and internal events and
was gradually being accorded recognition by the powers. His
Majesty put his trust in Prime Minister Chang at all time and,
upon his advice, personally attended to the affairs of the state.
His Majesty personally held also the supreme command of the
Manchukuo Army upon the counsel of the Minister of War. I used
to be deeply moved especially, to see that he held firm confidence
and friendship towards His Majesty the Emperor of Japan. Prime
Minister Chang also served the Emperor most diligently and
understood well the true intention of the part of Japan.
I have known Emperor Pu-yi since my days as Commander of Japanese Garrison in Tientsin, and had occasions to contribute to safeguarding his person. I knew that YOSHIOKA, Masanao who served for a long time in the Imperial Household Ministry as a liaison officer since April, 1934 and has been on intimate terms with the Emperor. He stayed in that capacity in compliance with the strong wish of the Emperor and enjoyed his confidence during the period in which he advanced from the rank of major to that of Lt-general.

7) Relationship between the Concordia society of Manchukuo and the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

The outstanding characteristic of Manchukuo is the realization of racial harmony. To attain this it was necessary to unite the leaders of various races who had firm beliefs in racial harmony and to initiate their popular movements. The people had to be organized particularly in view of the looming menace of communism as well as feudalistic ideas of militarists at that time.

Observing the conditions in Manchukuo after my arrival at the post, I was convinced of the necessity of racial harmony in the political field, for cooperative administration; harmonies between capital and labor and between, financial interests of various races in the economic field; and racial cooperation in the field of labor. The Concordia Society had never aimed at discrimination since its foundation. It was a unique existence in Manchukuo solely devoted to invite a harmony of races. It
was engaged in the principle of synchronizing with the Manchukuo Government. It was a custom for the Emperor to attend and issue an Imperial Rescript at the national convention which was held in autumn each year.

8) Colonization policy: Manchukuo established a fundamental national principle, as it is evident in the proclamation of the establishment of the state, that the Japanese, Koreans and other people who desire to stay in the country for a long time be equally treated as its nationals along with its natives such as Manchurians, Chinese, and Mongolians. In conformity with this fundamental national principle, it was desired that a large number of Japanese, Koreans or Chinese with excellent qualities participate in the Construction of Manchukuo in addition to the original Manchurians, Chinese and Mongolians in order to realize the prosperity of the state and to develop the country. Therefore it was certainly desirable that Japanese with real understanding of this spirit, especially good farmers and sincere young men migrate to Manchukuo. However, their migration involved various complicated problems such as problems of acquisition of land, settlement among the natives, Manchukuo's own problem of exploiting its resources and so forth. Due consideration was given in this respect.

In addition, it was necessary to choose areas where least frictions with the natives would arise. Thus it was inevitable
to seek colonizing areas in the remote regions in North Manchuria and other out-lying parts of the country with the natural result that a considerable protection had to be given to the colonizers.

As for the utilization of land the interests of Manchurians were deeply involved, and therefore the Manchukuo Government, after a careful consideration, established a suitable plan for the utilization of unutilized lands and did its best in executing this policy smoothly.

3) The Five Year plan for industrial development of Manchuria.

In Nov. 1936 the Manchukuo Government established for the time being a Five Year plan for industrial development of Manchukuo. It was a plan with an expenditure of merely a little over 2,400,000,000 yen, covering 5 years. The change of international situation caused by the sudden outbreak of the China Incident in July, 1937 rendered the execution of this plan extremely difficult. The fundamental idea of the plan was to establish the basis of development and Industry of Manchukuo so as to enhance the livelihood of people and give security which were necessary in view of the events leading to the establishment of Manchukuo. Judging from the economic conditions then prevailing both in Japan and Manchuria, it was contemplated for carrying out this idea to establish the Manchurian Heavy Industry Co., a Manchurian corporation, which would cover over-all and multi-branched business, inviting the participation of foreign capital
especially American capital and technique.

Taking in with the establishment of the Manchuria Heavy Industry Co., the South Manchuria Railway Company was reorganized to handle mainly transportation, inaugurating such new plans as the rationalization of the management of all railways in Manchuria. The living condition was especially stabilized through the system of gradual decrease per distance of freight rates, and new railways were constructed for the purpose of colonizing unexploited lands and strengthening of national defense and so forth. It is to be especially noticed that when the capital of the company was increased in 1939 (the 14th year of Showa), reorganization of the company was carried out to meet the new situation by allowing the Manchuko Government to own a part of the Company shares and to appoint directors representing the Manchuko Government.

10) Crisis created by the outbreak of the China Incident and our attitude.

When the North China Incident broke out in July, 1937, it was the wish of the Kwantung Army that the Incident be settled as soon as possible in view of the progress being made by Manchuko and also because of the relationship between Japan and Manchuko.

In view of the racial constituent of Manchuko, the Kwantung Army did not wish to declare war against China and
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opposed to words and actions which irritated the sentiment of
the Chinese people such as "Punishment of outrageous China", etc.

As the Incident progressed, it called for more measures
for national defense in response to the prevailing situations.
I believed it necessary for the settlement of the China Incident
to realize the ideal of race harmony with the hope for further
development and prosperity of the new state. Therefore, I did
my best in urging self-restraint and self-reflection on the part
of the Japanese Army and the civil and military officials of
various Japanese organizations in Manchuria. Particularly in
order to bring about racial harmony and cooperation between Japan
and Manchuria I cautioned the Japanese so that they might not
abuse their authorities. The greater the situation demands
the more I exerted myself to solving pending difficulties by
perfect collaboration and mutual trust among various races and
by united efforts on the part of Japan and Manchukuo.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan
Date 4 April 1947
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私、植田誠吉八元陸軍大将デ神奈川県大磯町大磯ニ住デ居リマス

私ハ一九三六年（昭和十一年）三月カリ一九三九年（昭和十四年）九月迄関東軍司令官兼満洲国駐軍特命全権大使トシテ勤務シテ居リマシタ。満洲國ノ發展協力ニ對スル根本ニ於テハ、

ノ所此間ニ於ケル吾等ノ満洲國ノ發展協力ニ對スル根本ニ於テハ

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四瀬、国日系系長兼専務、

義氏、国日系系長兼専務、
官吏の推選は、春の東宮司命を兼ねて行い、又多任を二階へ移し、三階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、八階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、九階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十一階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十二階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十三階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十四階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十五階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十六階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十七階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十八階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、十九階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十一階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十二階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十三階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十四階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十五階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十六階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十七階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十八階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、二十九階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十一階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十二階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十三階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十四階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十五階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十六階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十七階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十八階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、三十九階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十一階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十二階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十三階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十四階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十五階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十六階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十七階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十八階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、四十九階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十一階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十二階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十三階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十四階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十五階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十六階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十七階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十八階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、五十九階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十一階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十二階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十三階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十四階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十五階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十六階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十七階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十八階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、六十九階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七十階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七十一階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七十二階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七十三階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七十四階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七十五階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七十六階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七十七階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、七十八階への交替役を兼ねて行い、七十九階へ交替役を兼ねて行い、八十階への交替役を兼ねて行い、八十一階への交替役を兼ねて行い、八十二階への交替役を兼ねて行い、八十三階への交替役を兼ねて行い、八十四階への交替役を兼ねて行い、八十五階への交替役を兼ねて行い、八十六階への交替役を兼ねて行い、八十七階への交替役を兼ねて行い、八十八階への交替役を兼ねて行い、八十九階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十一階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十二階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十三階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十四階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十五階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十六階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十七階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十八階への交替役を兼ねて行い、九十九階への交替役を兼ねて行い、百階への交替役を兼ねて行い。
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條約ヲ締結レマシテ。
Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Shatsuki Tamotsu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE F. A. E.S.T.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

against

Mr. 1, Sado et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Shatsuki Tamotsu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE F. A. E.S.T.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA & OTHERS

versus

Mr. 1, Sado & OTHERS

AFFIDAVIT

by

Mr. TSUKI Tamotsu

of

1731 H-chome, Fukasawa-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

- 1 -
I, above named, having first duly sworn as set forth in the separate paper, in accordance with the form observed in Japan, do depose as follows:

I, SHIRU TAMOTSU, has a career as stated in the following:

March 9, 1933. Born in Tsuruoka City, Yamagata Prefecture, Japan
March, 1922. Enrolled in School of Tokyo Imperial University
May, 1922. Employed by South Manchurian Railway Company.
June, 1932. Councilor, Legislative Bureau, Manchoukuo
April, 1935. Chief, Secretariat Section, General Affairs Board, Manchoukuo
June, 1937. Chief Legislative Section, General Affairs Board, Manchoukuo
March, 1938. Director, Secretariat Bureau, Manchoukuo
Privy Council
May, 1940. Deputy Chief, General Affairs Board, Manchoukuo
June, 1943. President, Manchoukuo Audit Bureau
October, 1944. President, Tatung Academy Institute, Manchoukuo

as the above record suggests I was chiefly concerned with legislative affairs in Manchoukuo, accordingly my statement will be made on the fundamental laws of the land and matters related thereto.

I - THE EMPEROR SYSTEM.

First I am going to explain about the Emperor system. On March 9th, 1932, Mr. Henry Pu-ai was inaugurated as the Chief Executive of Manchoukuo in the City of Changchun, thus becoming officially the supreme ruler of Manchoukuo. But those former subjects of the already defunct Ch'ing Dynasty who were close associates to him, including
Chen Hsiao-hsu (the first prime minister of Manchukuo), Lu Chen-yu (Privy Councillor and later president of the Control Yuan), Hu Tsuyuan (Chief of Home Affairs Section of the Chief Executive's Office and later Privy Councillor), etc. wanted to realize an early enthronement of Mr. P'u-i, and were indeed aspirant for the restoration of the Ch'ing or Manchu dynasty.

Opposed to these there was another group of who were really influential in actual politics as represented by Chang Ching-hui (the first president of the Privy Council and later prime minister) and Tsang Shih-i (the first Chief of the Civil Administration Department and later the president of the Privy Council). These men had little sympathy with the early realization of the Emperor system, and showed a strong dislike of the restoration idea under the belief that any re-establishment of the Manchu dynasty would beget various evils. But as time went on, these influential politicians too became increasingly supporting the Emperor system apart from the restoration of the old dynasty. Furthermore they could not neglect the cold fact that such title as the Chief Executive would suggest something transitional and therefore would make the early consolidation of the national foundation impossible and political situation left unstable. This is the reason why the Emperor system was established relatively so early as on the first day of March 1934.

The restoration idea such as conceived by the former subjects of the Manchu dynasty, the close associates of Mr. P'u-i, was not given general support. Consequently in the law of the Imperial Succession
Def. Sec. 79:2

it was provided that with Mr. Fu-i as the first Emperor the throne should be inherited only by his descendants, prohibiting the succession by his brothers and their lineage. On the other hand, the old Chinese principle that any one, however mean by birth, can be a successor to throne only if he be most qualified was put aside, and the system of dynasty was instituted. Hence the provision "The throne of the Manchurian Empire shall be succeeded to forever by the male descendants of the male lineage of Emperor Kuang Teh (the title of Mr. Fu-i as enthroned)."
2. The Status of the Emperor.

Next I will state about the status of the Emperor. As was prescribed in the Constitution, Manchukuo was not an autocratic state, but the prime minister, assisting the Emperor, was made responsible for all of the state affairs. The prerogative power of the Emperor could not be wielded in his own arbitrary decision. Before any important matters of state were promulgated the Privy Council was to be consulted by the Emperor, who upon the advice of the privy council was to give final approval. And in the promulgation the counter-signatures by the prime minister and the other responsible ministers were also made necessary. To explain this procedure in practice, the prime minister was granted an interview to report to the Emperor in detail on matters discussed in the State Council meeting, as well as other state affairs, on the day after the weekly meeting of the State Council. When the matters to be discussed at the State Council meeting had special importance this was usually reported to the Emperor beforehand to ask his opinion.

As for the meeting of the Privy Council, the Emperor attended it in person whenever it discussed important matters such as civil laws, penal codes, annual budgets, civil service ordinances, armed service ordinances, etc. When the Privy Council dealt with merely ordinary affairs the Emperor's presence was not asked, but instead the President of the Council was received before the throne once a week to take a detailed report to the Emperor on the matters discussed among the councillors.
As appears from the above, state affairs were administered by the government in close contact with the Emperor. But the Emperor, not entirely free from the old tradition of the autocratic days of the Chinese dynasty, and also unaccustomed to the procedures of a modern constitutional monarchy, showed his strong desire to intervene in the administration. At times he went so far as to instruct government officials without awaiting the advice of the responsible organs, thus causing great embarrassment to the government authorities, who experienced a great difficulty in settling the confusion resulting from such intrusion. For example, on 2 May 1936, at a banquet commemorating his first visit to Japan of just a year earlier, he surprised the government officials by a proposal to build a monument symbolizing his favorite motto, "One Virtue and One Soul."

One more example is to be mentioned in this connection. Each year as a rule, either late in January or early in February, the provincial governors' conferences were held at the conference chamber of the State Council Building in Ch'ang-ch' an, lasting several days. On the occasion of these governors' conferences held in 1942 and 1943, the prime minister was suddenly called to the palace in the midst of the conferences where he was sitting, and was given imperial messages consisting of several items of his Majesty's instruction by the Emperor in person to be transmitted to the governors.

According to the Manchoukuoan Constitution, the appointment and removal of state officials, both civil and military, was apart of the Imperial prerogative, but it was the prime minister's responsibility to
advise the Emperor in such matters. Therefore neither the throne nor
the government could appoint or remove state officials without the
consent of the other. Such procedure is only natural in a constitu­
tional monarchy. In Meiji, when the matter was concerned with
important personnel, the prime minister asked the Emperor's opinion
before a formal request was presented; therefore the Emperor was
given an opportunity to express his opinion, if any, beforehand.
3. The Status of the Prime Minister

In Manchoukuo the Prime Minister was the only state minister who was responsible to the Emperor. He was, "under the Emperor, to deal with important affairs of state administration, directing and supervising the other ministers who head the various administrative departments." This powerful authority of the prime minister over the other ministers was necessitated in view of the peculiar condition of Manchoukuo, especially in its embryonic stage. But, however authoritatively stipulated in laws and statutes, the controlling power of the prime minister might become reduced to a mere scrap of paper if he could not hold the key points of the administrative system in his grip. Accordingly the authority to request the Emperor to appoint and remove state officials, the power to examine state budgets and legislation, etc., were placed directly in the hands of the prime minister. For the purpose of executing these powers and authorities there was established within the State Council the General Affairs Board, which was to be placed under the immediate control of the prime minister. In view of the reality that the prime minister, who was made responsible for all of the affairs of the state, could not devote himself solely to the detailed business of the General Affairs Board, a special official was appointed to head the Board, assisting the prime minister as well as superintending the board's business.

Though the chief of the General Affairs Board was appointed from among Japanese from the first, he was, in no sense, either an official of the Japanese Kwantung Army nor subject to the direction of the Army.
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Although the Kwantung army did in fact make some demands either upon the prime minister or upon the chief of the General Affairs Board in connection with defense measures on the basis of the Manchurian-Japanese Defense Alliance, these were, after all, nothing but demands in true sense of the word, and never took the form of directives.
4. The Powers of the Chiefs (Ministers) and Vice-Chiefs of the Various Executive Departments.

The duty of the chiefs (ministers) of the various executive departments was to "deal, under the direction and supervision of the prime minister, with the affairs which are placed under their respective charge," and that of vice-chiefs was to assist their respective chiefs.

The department chiefs were appointed from among the natives (Chinese). As for the deputy chiefs, only three departments, i.e., the War, Home, and Finance Offices, were furnished with the officials of this level at the beginning of the national foundation. And they, too, were appointed from among the natives in those days. Later, in view of an increasing complication of the administrative affairs, a Japanese for the first time was instituted as the vice-chief of the Foreign Office in June, 1932. Around 1936 and afterward, all the other departments became provided with deputy chiefs appointed from among Japanese.

Next I wish to clarify the relation between the department heads and their deputy chiefs through explaining some details in which administrative affairs were actually handled. The administrative duties pertaining to the various departments and their subdivisions were prescribed in the provisions of the government organizations and of the respective departmental organizational rules. All of the administrative plans were first drafted, as a rule, in offices of the division level, the assignment of each draft being determined by the above-mentioned organizational provisions. The drafted plan was then submitted
step by step to the bureau director, the vice-chief, and the minister for their examination and approval. In the course of drafting and examining the plan, all related divisions, bureaux and departments were consulted in the form of conferences or otherwise. When agreed upon by all related offices, the plan was explained by the deputy chief to the minister of the bureau in whose office the plan was originated. The department minister in his turn gave approval, if he had no objection; and in the case of a departmental ordinance the plan so approved was announced without further procedure at a higher level. In the case of a law or Imperial ordinance, the plan as approved by the department head chiefly responsible was forwarded to the Legislative Section of the General Affairs Board for its examination. If a budgetary question was involved, the accounts Section of the Board also had to be referred to. If no objection was raised by these sections, the chief of the General Affairs Board submitted the plan to the departmental vice-chief's conference to seek their opinion. When passed by this conference it was then presented for examination to the State Council meeting, to seek the opinions of the ministers; when consent was given by this Council meeting the plan was submitted to the Privy Council for deliberation. If it was favorably reported by the Privy Council the final approval of the Emperor was granted for its promulgation.

Such being the case it was impossible that any important affair of state was decided at the level of vice-chiefs, with the ministerial level being kept in the dark. It was necessary for the Japanese
vice-chiefs, who were expert in administrative technique, to assist
those native ministers such as: Chang Ching-hui, first president of
the Privy Council and later Prime Minister; Tsang Shi-i, Home Minister;
and Hsi Hsia, Finance Minister, who, though they had occupied ministerial
position since the foundation of the state and were politically in-
fluential all over Manchuria, were in reality unaccustomed to modern
administration. But even these dignitaries became gradually familiarized
with modern governmental business so much that they were finally seen
expressing their opinions with confidence and in positive manner.
5. The Meetings of the State Council, of the Departmental Vice-Chiefs, and of the iriy Council.

The meeting of the State Council, as stipulated in the state Council Organization, was the meeting legally established for the contact of administrative business; it had as members the heads of the administrative departments and of the General Affairs Board, with the prime minister as the presiding officer. The subjects to be discussed in this meeting were all enumerated in the provisions of the State Council Organization and included all important matters of state such as laws, Imperial Ordinances, budgets, treaties, appointments and removals of the KANWIN rank officials (Manchoukuo equivalent of the Japanese ChokUNIN officials), etc. Being a councillor of the Legislative Bureau at an early stage of the national foundation, I was occasionally called into this meeting to give explanations of the bills, laws, etc., and further opportunities were given me later to attend this meeting because I was appointed ex-officio secretary of the Council as the chief of the Secretariat Section of the General Affairs Board from 1935, and then as the General Affairs Board vice-chief from 1940 to 1943. So far as I know the debates and discussions at the meeting were very active and brisk. As against the businesslikeness of the discussions at the vice-chiefs' meeting, the nature of the discussions at this meeting was chiefly political.

And if a draft plan which had been passed in the vice-chiefs' meeting was voted down or revised in the State Council meeting, was notified to the next following meeting of the vice-chiefs.
The vice-chiefs' meeting lacked legislative basis, and no mention of it was made in the provisions of the government organization. In the early days of the national foundation the more prominent officials of Japanese origin held informal conferences from time to time in order to insure liaison on governmental affairs with each other. For about half a year this practice continued without interruption until it became a well-established customary meeting. After that it was held regularly once every week to discuss such important problems as were to be submitted to the following State Council meeting. At first it had no regular or systematic membership, but by and by it became established that the chief of the General Affairs Board was to take the chair with the vice-chiefs of the General Affairs Board and of the various administrative departments, as well as the heads of the sections of the General Affairs Board, consisting the regular membership. Other officials were also called in whenever their explanations were required on questions on the conference agenda. Accordingly native officials as well as Japanese were there, and all attendants regardless of the difference of their races, were engaged in an active and eager debate.

The Privy Council meeting was held on the basis of the Constitution and the government organization in order to prepare for a report to the throne in compliance with his Majesty's consultation. Being an advisory organ, it had no power to propose revision of the government drafts laid before the Councillors for deliberation, but the debate became earnest and serious that the government experienced con-
siderable hardships in having its proposals safely passed through. In order to overcome obstacles which might otherwise have appeared in the plenary sessions of the Privy Council, preliminary examining conferences were held between the Councilors and the government for smoothing out difficult points. But in some cases, such as those of the Electric Power Enterprise Bill and others, there were some government plans which were ultimately stagnated owing to the death of Emperor in the plenary session. Regarding such bills as were considered necessary of passage at any cost, the government asked the Emperor to withdraw them from consideration of the Privy Council, and those plans were revised by the government and submitted again to the Emperor for further deliberation in the Privy Council. This last-mentioned circumambulatory process was made necessary, because it would have been contradictory of the principle of "consultation" to allow the Privy Council to revise the government proposal.
6. The Nature of Officials Appointed
from among Japanese

Manchoukuo was a state which was founded on the principle of co-existence and cooperation of the five races, i.e., Chinese, Manchus, Mongolians, Koreans and Japanese. Though no legislation on the matter of nationality had as yet been completed, the afore-mentioned principle was made clear in the Declaration of the National Foundation. Furthermore, in 1940 the Statute of the Citizenship was enacted to define the citizenship of the Manchoukuoan subject. According to this statute those who migrated into Manchoukuo, not as mere travellers but for the purpose of setting up residence, were to be registered as Manchoukuoan subjects regardless of whence they had come. And these five races were equally eligible for government office, subject only to a special examination stipulated in the Civil Service Ordinance. In reality, however, if the examination result had been made the sole standard for selection, the majority of the officials would have been chosen from among Japanese, thus upsetting the desired ratio between Japanese officials and those of the other races. Therefore both the maximum number and the posts to be permitted to the Japanese were limited, moreover a specially rigid screening was introduced for the Japanese candidates in the examination.

Many posts of the central government which were much concerned with planning were apportioned to Japanese officials, since few native officials had been sufficiently experienced or trained in such duties. Inversely the posts
in local governments were filled mostly by native officials. The native official stationed at the central government appeared rather timid in the execution of their duties, for the following reasons: in the first place, they lacked knowledge and experience in modern administrative service, especially in the field of specialized techniques; in the second place, the new officialdom composed of these young recruits was still in its infancy; and thirdly, their traditional nature, which had long accustomed them to the temperament of safety-first and anxiety of responsibility, still held grip on them.

But as they acquired experience, the condition altered gradually; they became increasingly active and positive in fulfilling their duties. This was especially so in the case of young and intelligent officials, whose number was on the increase. Above all else, in the field of internal civil administration they showed a strong interest in drafting plans by themselves as well as in putting them into practice confidently. Hoping to realize a more eager participation by the native officials in the activity of the central offices, the government authorities strove to train young and well-qualified officials from among natives. For this purpose, the Chien Kuo Te Hsueh (National Foundation University), the Fa Cheng Te Hsueh (Law and Political University), etc., were established to educate native youths. And for re-educating young officials the Tatung Hsueh Yuan (Tatung Academic Institute) was established.

As for the local government, the majority of the posts were occupied by native officials; posts for the Japanese were limited to the field of planning or to those fields for which no suitable candidates could be obtained from among natives, e.g., fields for specialists. Particularly the positions in the administrative field which had direct contact with the populace were occupied
almost entirely by officials of native birth. At the same time, however, effort was made to educate specialists from among natives through establishing colleges for such sciences as agriculture, forestry, mining, engineering, medicine and veterinary medicine.

As a state racially complex, Manchouko demanded much effort to secure harmony among the differences of the various races. That attempt was not at first very successful, but by and by improvement became apparent, thanks to the enthusiasm of all concerned for the realization of an idealistic state as well as to the effort made by them to understand each other's languages and custom as early as possible. The establishment of educational institutions for the rearing of government officials was very contributory to this end. In these institutions students from all races sat, dined, and slept harmoniously in the same classrooms, dining rooms, and bedrooms. The seed sown in those days grew into a plant which bore fruits of friendship among young officials after they were graduated from these schools. Thus a close cooperation was established among these officials despite their racial differences. In the last thirteen years of my official career I had many superiors, equals, and subordinates whose race was different from mine; though I kept secret nothing from them and adopted no discriminating attitude toward them on the ground of racial prejudice, no difficulties or failure was ever caused by such open-mindedness on my part. Once I heard Economic Minister Ju-n Chou-tse speaking to the effect that all government officials of Manchouko should be called by the one unified term "Manchoukauen", in stead of being called by such discriminating terms as "Menchus, Mongolians, Japanese", etc. This kind of sentiment became generally prevalent. During the one year of hardship
immediately following the termination of hostilities, hearty mutual assistance was maintained intact throughout and among the old colleagues and friends, Japanese and native Chinese. Then the Japanese were going to be repatriated from Manchuria the long-standing friendship between the Japanese and the natives was recalled gratefully to each other, romances were exchanged, and in short they parted regretfully and sympathetically but leaving no grievance. This was not peculiar to my case alone. The friendly relations built up between the natives and the Japanese who spent long years in Manchuria were all alike.
7. The Pay of the High Officials.

The salaries of the high officials were fixed by the Imperial Ordinance concerning Salary as of March 15th (the fifth year of Kang Tu), they were, for example, as follows:

Prime Minister........ ¥1,500 monthly.
President of Privy Council... ¥1,300 monthly.
Privy Councillors, Ministers, & General Affairs Board Chief... ¥1,300 monthly.

It was also provided that native officials of TOKUNIN rank (Manchurian equivalent of Japanese SHIKUNIN rank) were to be paid monthly ¥500 as a social intercourse allowance beside the above.

The vice-chiefs of the administrative departments were all ranked on the KANNIN level (Manchourian equivalent of Japanese CHIKUNIN) regardless of their races, and the minimum salary for this rank was fixed at ¥800 per month. In addition to this sum they were paid monthly ¥200 as duty allowance. They were also given bonuses twice every year, the amount of each bonus being determined from time to time at such a sum as two months' salary, or one and a half months.

The TOKUNIN rank officials, whether native or Japanese, were given year-end allowances by the emperor instead of government bonuses. Of course, the sum was greater, the total of the two bonuses yearly given to KANNIN officials.

Moreover the high-ranking native officials received a special allowance ranging from ¥5,000 to ¥10,000 - three annually, on the ground that they needed much money due to their traditional way of living both private and...
official. Nothing of the sort of this allowance was given to the Japanese.

In addition to all of the above, in 1935 (the 2nd year of Kang Te), each of the native high officials, then incumbent, was given National Foundation Meritorious Service Bonds in large sums ranging from ¥50,000 at the least to ¥400,000 yen at the most. The bonds bore 5% annual interest, and the overall sum of the bonds thus given totalled ¥8,500,000. No Japanese was the beneficiary of this grant.
8. The Legislative Yuan

The Legislative Yuan was the government organ to assist the Emperor in the enactment of laws and budgets under the provisions of the Constitution. Its organization was relegated by the Constitution to statute. The method of organization raised, therefore, quite a difficult problem from the first days of the national foundation. After Dr. Chao Hsin-po, a legal expert, was appointed Chief of the Yuan on 9 March, 1932, various discussions and consultations were had between him and the Legislative Bureau. Due to the delicate position of the Bureau, which in turn had to consult other various departments and bureaux, and had to move very cautiously, an early settlement could not be expected. The following were the chief problems which were discussed at the time by Dr. Chao and the Legislative Bureau:

a. Menchoukuo was a state of racial complexity. Therefore all races had to be represented. But how were these representatives to be chosen?

b. In Manchuria there had existed so-called legal bodies such as the Commercial Business Society and the Agricultural Society with tremendous influence among the populace.

c. Geographical representation was of course necessary. But with the condition of peace and order as well as the standard of civilization among the populace what they were, would the election of the representatives through general ballot be possible?

In view of these difficult problems, the Imperial Ordinance concerning the Legislative Yuan Secretariat Section organization was promulgated in April or May 1932. This Ordinance provided that the Secretariat Section of the
Legislative Yuan was to study the prospective organization of the Yuan as well as to prepare for its inauguration. Meanwhile, around 1933, a new organ called the Constitution Research Committee was officially formed, and Dr. Chao was appointed its chairman. The then existing Constitution, hastily written in the busy days of the national foundation, was of only provisional nature, as stated in its preamble. Therefore the primary duty of this Committee was to draft a well-established constitution. But as its supplementary duty this Committee was also assigned the task of drafting a plan for the organization of the Legislative Yuan. Thereupon the Secretariat Section of the Legislative Yuan became to assume a position something like a secretariat office of this Committee.

While devoting himself under a special order of the Emperor to this important task, Dr. Chao suddenly resigned in the fall of 1934 without reaching the conclusion of his task. And the function of the Legislative Yuan was delegated to the Privy Council for the time being under the provision of the old Constitution as revised, dated 1 March 1924 (this revision was made in the Supplemental Rule of the Constitution).

Side-by-side with the abovementioned events and progress, the Concordia Society of Hankou was inaugurated on 25 July 1933 to stimulate and promote the free expression of the people's will and to transmit and diffuse the government policies and intentions to the people. There was initiated in this Society some time in 1934 or 1935 the Combined Congress which took a position something like a general assembly of the representatives of the Society members. As time went on, this Congress was gradually improved and increasing.
well-shaped. In conjunction with this the composition of the Concordia Society itself was greatly enlarged and strengthened after around 1936. Hereupon the Congress was subdivided into three classes, i.e., the Prefectural Congress, Province Combined Congress, and the National Combined Congress, which were to correspond in their functions to the prefectural assembly, the province legislature, and the national diet respectively. These congresses were convened every year, and were making remarkable progress and improvement year by year. Contrasted to this, the work of the Legislative Yuan was left wholly behind and was still wandering around in the preparatory stage. Then arose a question regarding how to harmonize legally the Legislative Yuan and the Concordia Society. And this problem was studied and attacked in the Fundamental Laws Department of the Committee on the Reexamination of the Existing Laws and Ordinances. But before any conclusion was produced in this committee, the existence of Manchukuo came to an end.
9. The National Slogan "One Virtue and One Soul between Japan and Honshuken"

The national motto "One Virtue and One Soul between Japan and Honshuken" was originated with the Emperor himself. In 1935, during his first visit to Japan, which took place in April 1935 (the 2nd year of Kang To), is described in detail in a book entitled "The Emperor on His Visit to Japan" and written by HAYASHIDE. Konjiro, who was a member of his Majesty's retinue during the visit. In the midst of the travel the Emperor expressed his wish to issue an Imperial rescript, after his return to Honshuken, to share with the people his exultation in the visit and to have it treasured in their memory forever. In those days I was, as the chief of the Secretary Section of the General Affairs Board, busy engaged in preparations for various festivities to be held, consequent upon his Majesty's return to Honshuken, under the direction of Prime Minister Kono and General Affairs Board Chief Minister CHIDÔRI (General Affairs Board Chief NCC was III, accompanying the Emperor). The Imperial rescript was drafted in the State Council and the Imperial Household Office as its constituent. When Prime Minister Kono submitted the draft to the Emperor for his approval on 29 April, His Majesty, after reading it through, said that his meaning had not been fully expressed in it yet, and then dictated the following to the Prime Minister: "...Its essence may be said that I am united in soul with the Emperor of Japan. You, the people of this country, truly adhering to this intent of mine, shall live in one virtue and one soul with
the people of Japan, shall consolidate the ever-living foundation of both nations, and shall execute the true spirit of Japanese morality..."

Besides the above, his Majesty showed about one-third of the draft and directed the Prime Minister to not soon the alterations. Still not content with this, on the next day, 30 April, he suddenly called to the Household Office high officials of the KAMIN rank and above, both civil and military, who were then in the capital, and standing on a platform delivered an address for about an hour. The gist of his address was concerned with his interpretation of Oriental morality as well as his observations on the Japanese-Mongolian relation which would be secured, according to his opinion, with a tie forever indivisible based upon the principle of One Virtue and One Soul. Raising his voice particularly he concluded his speech in the following manner:

"If any Mongolian should act against the interests of Japan, he shall never be a loyal subject of mine; vice versa, if any Japanese should entertain a design inimical to the good of this country, such a Japanese could never be called loyal to the Japanese Emperor."

Moreover, in the evening of 8 December 1941, when the Pacific War broke out, he called a Privy Council meeting in his presence in the Imperial Household building to give consideration to the Imperial Household concerning the momentous situation. In this meeting he exerted his elder criticism by saying "To interpret this war as a mere conflict fought by Japan against Great Britain and the United States would constitute an error. As a matter of fact this is a war to liberate all the Asiatic races from the bond of Europeans and Americans who have intruded into Asia for the several hundred years past. Mongol will cooperate with Japan in this war with all our national resources and power."

As for the National Foundation Shrine, its history began something like this: at first in some quarters there arose an opinion that, being a state founded upon the cooperation of several races, Manchoukuo needed a kind of spiritual center, the altar of which every Manchouman, regardless of his race, would piously bow down. But the question of what god should be enshrined presented a very difficult problem, and for a time it came to a standstill.

Later on, however, apart from this movement there came to the fore another idea that the post-mortem spirits of the patriots of all the five races should be deified and enshrined as National Guardian Gods. According to this idea, there would arise no objection to the worshipping of those gods from any of the races. The idea of this National Guardian Gods Shrine came to take a shape so concrete that the building of the shrine was started. But before it was complete the once suspended idea regained its strength, and it was agreed that the God of National Origin had to be given priority rather than the National Guardian Gods. Thus the old question of choosing the Origin God for whom the shrine was to be hollowed naturally presented itself again. After all sorts of discussions it was finally decided, based upon the initiative of the Emperor, the Sun Goddess was to be the Origin God of Manchoukuo, as in the case of Japan also, because of the principle of One Virtue and One Soul between Japan and Manchoukuo, and that to this God the National Foundation Shrine was to be dedicated. It was also decided that the shrine building at Nenling which was already under construction as above mentioned was to be the home of the post-mortem spirits of the heroes whose lives had been sacrificed to the cause of
the national foundation, and that this shrine was to be directly subordinated to the Sun Goddess' shrine under the title of the 'National Foundation Heroes' Shrine.'

But on the ground that no worship would be more compulsory to the people, the building of branch shrines of the National Foundation Shrine in provincial regions was not permitted. In reality, moreover, the National Foundation Shrine was built in the premises of the imperial palace where general public had no means of easy access. Neither was any legislative attempt ever made to establish a state religion, though the Shrine Office was instituted as a part of the government system owing to the necessity for appointing the shrine priests; nor any idea had ever occurred of revising the criminal code for punishing blasphemy toward the shrines.

In a very pious spirit the Emperor worshipped every month before the National Foundation Shrine. When M. Toyama, acting Governor of Fushun Province, was granted an interview by the Emperor to report to his Majesty the situation in his province, he was asked a question by the Emperor: 'What is the basic doctrine of the education of your province?' Seeing the acting Governor hesitate to answer for a while, His Majesty rustled as if to teach him, 'It is Shinto.'

Another example will suffice for my explanation on this point. As stated in Paragraph 2 above (on the status of the Emperor), on two or three occasions when provincial governors' conferences were going on, the Emperor called the prime minister to the palace to give imperial messages of several items of his teachings prepared by himself for the provincial heads. All these messages
began with the sentence "The Provincial Governors shall direct and guide the people in accordance with the principle of Shinto."

On this 3rd day of April, 1947

At Tokyo

I, Banno, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of his Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

"Witness: (signed) Banno, Junkichi (seal)"

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) Matsuki, Tamotsu (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Terue, Otsuki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Terue, Otsuki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 4 April 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The United States of America et al. v. ARAKI Denzo et al.

AFFIDAVIT

Deposant TAKAMURA Furu

I, TAKAMURA Furu, being duly sworn as per statement given below, in conformity with formalities used in Japan, do hereby depose as per separate statement.

OATH

I hereby make oath that, by dictation of my conscience, I have stated all truths, without secretly concealing anything whatsoever and without deliberately adding anything whatsoever.

Signature and seal: Furu Takamura.

ITNESS

Tokyo, February 2, 1947

This is to certify that Deposant TAKAMURA Furu has taken an oath and put his signature and seal in my presence.

Witnes:

Mutsu Sakamoto

Chief of Criminal Identification Section
Metropolitan Police Board.
I am a resident of Tokyo, and my age is 36.

I have been attached to the Criminal Identification Section of the Penal Affairs Department of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board since 1929, where my duties are the examination of handwriting and seals. During the said period, I qualified myself in the subject of identification of handwriting through almost exhaustive studies of Chinese and Japanese books on calligraphy, and examination and comparison of innumerable actual samples of Chinese and Japanese writing.

In connection with my official duties in the Metropolitan Police Board over the past seventeen years I have testified in the Japanese courts as an expert on calligraphy concerning some thirty trial cases; I have worked on some 1,500-2,000 investigation cases for the Metropolitan Police Board, including 110 for the Ministry of Education, Home Ministry and other government departments and private interests; and in the course of this work have examined an estimated 200,000 separate specimens of Chinese and Japanese handwriting, using the customary methods of visual and microscopic and other scientific examinations. I am the author of a book, Shoryu Kantei (Methods of Judging Documents) on the subject, which was printed in 1943 for circulation among law-enforcement agencies, though not published. This work was the first of its kind to appear in Japan, and as the only such work yet in existence may be considered the standard work on the subject.

I confirm hereby that the following is the text of my evidence to be given to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Dated 1947. Signed
I

Having been requested by the Defense Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, on 29 August 1946, to give my expert opinion on certain specimens of handwriting, I shall proceed to give the results of my examination of them.

It might be added that the examination was made at the Office of the Clerk of the Court of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and at the Criminal Identification Section of the Penal Affairs Department of the Metropolitan Police Board.

The Specimens submitted for examination were as follows:

1) A letter addressed to General Minami, purporting to be written by Pu-yi, and identified as Tribunal Exhibit No. 265 (hereinafter referred to as "Exhibit 278");

2) A Chinese poem on a fan, appearing in photographic reproduction inserted between pages 443 and 449 of Sir Reginald Johnston’s book *Twillight in the Forbidden City*, admitted as the calligraphy of Pu-yi, and identified as Tribunal Exhibit No. 282 (hereinafter referred to as "Exhibit 282");

3) The signatures of Pu-yi, admittedly the calligraphy of himself, appearing in the three aforementioned documents identified as Tribunal Exhibit nos. 283, 284 and 285 (hereinafter referred to as "the Signature" or "the Signatures", as the case may be);

4) An autograph document written by Pu-yi on 29 August 1946 in the presence of myself and others, at the U.S.S.R. Embassy in Tokyo (hereinafter referred to as "the Autograph").

The question for decision was whether Exhibit 278 was written by the same person as Exhibit 282, the Signatures and the Autograph, as evident by expert examination of the
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above specimens of handwriting.

Conclusion
It is my determination as a result of my examination of
the three specimens of handwriting that Exhibit 278 was written
by the same person who wrote Exhibit 282, the signatures and
the autograph, although it is recognized that the fourteen
characters of the endorsement on the lower left-hand corner of
Exhibit 278 were written by another hand.

III
Reasons
(A) General Observations on Calligraphy
In daily experience and observation that document written
by one and the same person, on paper of the same kind and with
the same brush and India ink, and according to the same style
of penmanship, not only vary in their form and force of the
brush, but even the same ideograph so written by him at different
times presents a greatly varied appearance in force of the
brush, arrangement of strokes and inclination. And in case
these objective conditions are different, handwriting will be
subject to an even greater variation. But especially, the
mental condition of the writer at the time of writing—such
subjective cases as exhilaration, despondency, enthusiasm,
indifference, joy or anger, pain or pleasure, fatigue, intoxica-
tion, ricty, melancholy, trickishness—will produce a
great effect on handwriting. Then a writer, for instance, has
deliberately altered the shape of ideographs and use of the pen,
or imitated another's hand with the desire of disguising his
own style or calligraphic features, it will require a good
deal of circumvisation on the part of an examiner to determine
the truth, still more so if the writer is experienced and
In ordinary circumstances, a person's penmanship improves with the lapse of time, but physical disability will make the pen limp and halt. The mental state of a writer at the time of writing produces, as has been said, an effect on his writing. Again, if he intends to disguise his hand, he can, of course, write a document which will appear to a cursory observation like the handwriting of another person.

To judge writings to be the production of different hands on considerations of this sort, however, is a mistake committed only by those who have little knowledge of penmanship, or whose study of the science is inadequate. He who has studied the art of handwriting-examination scientifically, and who has had wide experience, will fall into this sort of error.

Notwithstanding all outward seeming, the penmanship of every person is the crystallization of his long practice, and invariably has an individuality which others will find it difficult to imitate. Change your style as you please, and you will still find in your autograph the traits, wholly or in part, of your latent individuality of penmanship unconsciously acquired by daily practice. If a handwriting is closely examined and carefully studied with these criteria in mind, it is by no means impossible for one bringing expert knowledge to bear to determine whether it is genuine, even if the writer has attempted to deceive. It is with these considerations in mind that I am asked to examine the specimen submitted for my opinion.

(3) General View of the Specimen

I find that Exhibit 278 is a letter of 181 characters written in "gošho" (a free style of writing intermediate between "kaisho", the square style, and "sosho", running style)
with a brush on yellow silky cloth lined with thin paper.

Exhibit 282 is a print on art paper inserted between pages 446 and 447 of Dr. Reginald Johnston's book. The calligraphy, being printed by fine half-tone photogravure, appears in white characters, on a black background in the shape of a folding fan (it is noted that the autograph writing was intaglioed on a stone, on which paper was placed and impressions taken by means of India ink).

On examination of these two documents I have found that the force of the brush, the manner of use of the brush and the appearance of the ideographs in these are all similar. In other words, I have noted in these documents an altogether common feature in the use of the brush, which was easy, unshaken and fluent. It is also apparent that in the writing of these documents brushes of nearly the same size were used to expend a proper quantity of ink, and that the speed of the brush was about the same in the two cases.

The autograph consists of three sheets of Oriental paper ruled in red, containing characters written mainly in the "Kanishō" style with occasional mixture of "gyōsho" style. It is observable, from the boldness of the characters, that ink was used more freely in this document than in the others.

As compared with Exhibit 282, which Pu-yi recognized as his own handwriting, this autograph appears at a glance to differ in the manner of use of the brush as well as in the appearance of the character. But this difference may be attributed mainly to the change in style occasioned by the influence of the author's mental state at the moment. In this connection, it must be pointed out that in the course of execution of the Autograph, Pu-yi repeatedly refused to write in the "gyōsho" style on the ground that he was incapable of doing so. Then, however, he began spasmodically to mix in the "gyōsho" style, his handwriting was decidedly un-
nobody can doubt, on the other hand, that the standing of a Chinese as Manchu Emperor necessitated him to study deeply into the calligraph of all styles and that Exhibit 282 and the Signatures, admitted as genuine by Pu-yi himself, were both executed in a beautiful and masterly style of "gyōsho". Needless to say that such a contradiction is the result of an attempt to disguise his hand. In fact, the handwriting clearly shows that in both cases, the brush followed a similar course in writing, and the same style of penmanship prevails throughout all the specimens. The specific methods employed in the determination of their identity will be shown hereunder.

(C) Methods of Examinations

To begin with, salient features of penmanship, such as commencement of a stroke, end of a stroke, stop, brushing up, and covering of line, were scrupulously examined with a microscope. Then, ideographs in those documents were photographed in a magnified form, and the magnified photographs of characters were dissected into components, namely, the left-hand radical and the body, and these components were examined in comparison with the corresponding parts of the characters of other characters. An ideograph in one document, likewise enlarged, was further dissected into several lines and dots, so as to compare with those of characters in the other documents. The process of this cooperative study is as follows:

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(a) Photographs taken for Examination purposes

1. Exhibit 278 was photographed to make Figure 1.
2. Exhibit 232 was photographed to make Figure 2.
3. The first part of the autograph was photographed to make Figure 3.
4. The second part of the autograph was photographed to make Figure 4.
5. The third part of the autograph was photographed to make Figure 5.
6. The ideographs \( \frac{1}{4} \) and \( \frac{3}{4} \), both in Exhibit 278, and \( \frac{1}{4} \) and \( \frac{3}{4} \) in Exhibit 282, were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 6.
7. The ideographs \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 278 and \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 7.
8. The ideographs \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 278 and \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 8.
9. The ideographs \( \frac{1}{4} \) and \( \frac{1}{4} \), both in Exhibit 278 and \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 9.
10. The ideographs \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 278 and \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 10.
11. The ideographs \( \frac{1}{4} \), \( \frac{1}{4} \), and \( \frac{1}{4} \), all in Exhibit 278 and \( \frac{1}{4} \) and \( \frac{1}{4} \), both in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 11.
12. The ideographs \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 278 and \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 12.
13. The ideographs \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 278 and \( \frac{1}{4} \) in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 13.
Def. 400. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 14.

15. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 15.

16. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 16.

17. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 17.

18. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 18.

19. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 19.

20. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 20.

21. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in the autograph were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 21.

22. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in the autograph were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 22.

23. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in the autograph were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 23.

24. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in Exhibit 282, and in the autograph were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 24.
25. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in Exhibit 282 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 25.

26. The ideographs in Exhibit 278 and in the Signature of Exhibit 235 were magnified by photography and mounted together to make Figure 26.

[b]Examination by Sectional Dissection of Ideographs[/b]

(1) If the radical appearing in the ideograms and in Exhibit 278 is compared with the ideograph in Exhibit 282 (vide Figure 6), it will be noticed that:

The initial touch of the first stroke, being very slender, makes the appearance of (vide Figure 6, A); the second stroke was written by gradually increasing the pressure of the brush from the upper left hand to the lower right hand (B); then diminishing the pressure and brushing up leftward, and increasing the pressure somewhat downward, was the third stroke given (C); then the pressure was once more diminished in carrying the brush toward the end of the second stroke (B), and on entering upon the fourth stroke (D), the pressure was increased on the lower right side of the brush then proceeded downward in that condition, but in that straight line is closely examined, it may be perceived that the brush first turned rather to the left (D, E), then to the right (F, G) and again to the left (G, H); a series of dexterous changes in pensmanship (vide D, E, F, G, H).

The special features mentioned in the above are common to both Exhibits.

(2) If the left-side radical of the ideograph in Exhibit 278 is compared with that of the ideograph in Exhibit 282 (vide Figure 7), it will be seen that:

The junction from the first stroke to the second is rather roundish (A) the pressure which had been increased at the
second stroke (9) "as gradually diminished till the brush was somewhat inclined (C); on entering upon the third stroke the pressure was again increased and it ended with a brushing up (D)."

The two documents resemble each other in all these points.

However, it must be taken into consideration that such a coincidence sometimes occurs when the handwriting of a person by chance happens to be more like to that of another person, and similarity of shape alone cannot establish the fact that the two documents were written by one person.

(3) If the two radicals \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \), excerpted from the ideograph \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) in Exhibit 278 is compared with \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) of the ideograph \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) in Exhibit 272 (vide Figure 9), it may be observed that:

- The initial touch of the first stroke is extremely thin (A);
- going from the right to the left and then returning to the right just before finishing the stroke (B), the brush drew a roundish shape (A, B) then gradually increasing its pressure and then diminishing its pressure, the brush traveled upward for the second stroke, and formed the junction between the two strokes as if it were intended for a circle (B, C) increasing its pressure again, the brush ran to the lower right side and next moved to the lower left side.

In all this the two documents are the same (A, B, C, D, E, F, G). In this resemblance the thinness of the initial stroke (A) and the roundish junction of the first stroke with the second (B-C line) make the peculiar style of the writer.

(4) When the body \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) of the ideographs \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) and \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) in Exhibit 276 is examined in comparison with the body \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) of the ideograph \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) in Exhibit 272 (vide Figure 9), it will be seen that:

The initial touch of the first stroke goes toward the lower right (A, B) and then to the lower left hand (B, C); the second stroke makes the appearance of an "S" flattened rightward and placed horizontally (C, D); the third stroke started from the middle part (E) of the second stroke (C-D line). If the same spots of the ideographs \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) and \( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \) in Exhibit 278
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are exaggerated, it will be observed that the writer has his habitual style of penmanship.

To be more particular, the line, starting from the middle part of the second stroke, goes down next slightly to the lower right side, then slightly leftward, and again rightward and finally to the lower left hand once more (E, F, G); next the initial touch of the fourth stroke was begun horizontally (I, J), and the brush, having gone to the lower right hand, gently proceeded further to the right side with its pressure increased.

The above features are common to Exhibits 273 and 282.

(5) When the body \( \frac{1}{2} \) of the ideograph \( \frac{2}{3} \) in Exhibit 273 is examined in comparison with the body \( \frac{1}{2} \) of the ideograph \( \frac{2}{3} \) in Exhibit 282 (vide Figure 10), it will be observed that:

The initial touch of the first stroke was begun in a comparatively lower place (A, B); the initial touch of the second stroke having started from the left side, a figure line was drawn (C, D). How was then the brush handled in drawing the vertical line of the second stroke? Then the question is studied by the help of the magnified photographs, it will be found that the line at the start inclines leftward (D, E), next rightward (E, F) and finally left and again (F, G).

The two handwritingg are of a piece in all these respects.

(6) All the \( \frac{1}{2} \) of the ideographs \( \frac{1}{2} \), \( \frac{1}{2} \), and \( \frac{1}{2} \) in Exhibit 273 appear to have been written first by directing the end of the brush to the upper left hand, next by increasing its pressure downward to the right so as to make a line (vide A, B), and then by moving the brush in the direction of the upper left hand with its pressure gradually diminishing (vide Figure 11). The mode of writing showing the propensity pointed out above is often seen in writing with a brush. In so far as the handwriting under review is concerned, however, the degree of flexion
Ref. Doc. # 400

's very sharp, and after drawing a line it is then brushed up 
(A, B, C).

The / of the ideographs / and / in Exhibit 282 were 
written quite in the same way, and I perceived that there are 
two communities and connections between the two Exhibits.

(7) Then the left-hand radical / of the ideograph / in Exhibit 278 is studied in comparison with the / of the 
ideograph / in Exhibit 282 (vide Figure 12), it will be noticed 
that:

The initial touch of the first stroke descends vertically 
(A, B), and then the brush proceeds downward to the left, asking 
a curve (A, B, C); next the line drawn to the upper hand tends 
to bend downward (C, D); the line then drawn downward to the left 
tends to bend rightward (D, E); the line drawn again to the 
upper right hand (E, F) is comparatively short; the next line 
(F, H) comes down from the upper part; and the finishing stroke 
's brushed up rightward with the pressure of the brush increased  
(G, H).

A.. these features are common to the two hand-writings.

(8) If the only of the ideograph / in Exhibit 278 is 
compared with the / of the ideograph / in Exhibit 282 (vide 
Figure 12), it may be observed that:

The finishing touch of the second stroke, which was begun 
with an increase in the pressure of the brush proceeded rather 
upward with the reduced pressure (A); the joining line was made 
by commanding the brush in such a way as if a circle were to be 
drawn downward (A, B).

The whole appearance of the third stroke together with all 
the points already mentioned, is identical in the two documents.

(9) If the of the ideograph / in Exhibit 278 is 
examined in comparison with the / of the ideograph / in 
Exhibit 282 (vide Figure 14), it will be seen that:

- 13 -
The initial touch of the first stroke is slender and makes a curve with the gradually increased pressure of the brush (A, B, C); after pressure of the brush was increased at the finishing touch of the first stroke, the pressure was relieved before its junction with the second stroke was formed, as if a circle were to be drawn downward (C, D).

In these respects the one Exhibit bears great resemblance to the other.

(10) The peculiar style of the writer revealed in the initial touch of a short vertical line in Exhibit 278 is pointed out (vide Figure 15).

The initial touch has a special feature; namely, it is thin, goes from the right to the lower left hand, is pointed and flows to the right side (a, B, C). This special feature of his in a vertical line can be seen in the ideographs 国, 翁 and て in Exhibit 278; the same particular style can be found in the vertical lines of the ideographs 心 and 门 in Exhibit 282, the vertical lines of the ideographs と and で in Exhibit 282.

(11) If the 水 of the ideographs 考, 意 and 悦 in Exhibit 278 is compared with the 水 of the ideograph 悦 in Exhibit 282 (vide Figure 16), it will be noticed that:

The initial touch of the first stroke is thin in the upper part (A); after increased the pressure of the brush, the junction is drawn toward the second stroke, and the shape of the initial touch of the second stroke is characteristic (C); the dot of the fourth stroke is drawn horizontally (G).

The above features are identical in the two documents.

(12) If the 一 of the ideographs 考 and in Exhibit 278 is compared with the 一 of the ideographs 考 and in Exhibit 282 (vide Figure 17), it may be observed that:

The initial touch is directed rather upward and on coming to its change of direction, the shoulder, so to speak, it lowered and the brush takes its course somewhat leftward (B, C); the line then tends to turn rightward (C, D),
and next to flow toward the left hand (D, E).

The two documents are similar in these points.

(13) When the ideograph \( \frac{a}{b} \) in Exhibit 278 is examined in comparison with the characters \( \frac{a}{b} \) and \( \frac{c}{d} \) in Exhibit 282 (vide Figure 18), it will be noticed that:

The initial touch of the first stroke, running down slightly to the left, turns to the lower right hand (A, B); then changing its course a little, the brush proceeds to the lower left hand (B, C).

In these respects the Exhibits are the very same.

(14) When the \( \frac{a}{b} \) of the ideograph \( \frac{c}{d} \) in Exhibit 278 is compared with the corresponding part of the ideograph \( \frac{e}{f} \) in Exhibit 282 (vide Figure 19), it will be seen that:

After the finishing touch of the first stroke of the part \( \frac{a}{b} \) the brush starts upward to the right chin with its pressure relieved and comes up to the third stroke (C, D); then the pressure is increased and the brush comes down to the lower right hand (D, E); with the pressure of the brush again diminished, the stroke is rounded upward (F).

Not only is the personality of the writer revealed in these points, but also the manner of the use of the brush appears entirely similar in the two documents.

(15) To examine the ideograph \( \frac{a}{b} \) in the Signature of Exhibit 285, it will be noticed firstly that the perpendicular line from the top to the bottom of \( \frac{a}{b} \) has begun by a light touch which became heavier downward, bending a little to the right and then a little to the left, with a tendency to turn again to the right (vide Figure 26 (A)); secondly that the first stroke of \( \frac{a}{b} \) was written from the upper left hand to the lower right hand, adding a little pressure in that direction, then decreasing the pressure, the brush was turned to the lower left hand to the direction of the second stroke (vide Figure 26(2)) and thirdly that the perpendicular
line of \( \frac{1}{2} \) was drawn at its end part with a measure to the lower left hand and then brushed up to the upper left hand (vidic. Figure 26 (C). The left hand radical \( \frac{1}{2} \) of the ideograph \( \frac{1}{2} \) (vidic. Figure 26 (B)), the perpendicular line in the ideograph \( \frac{1}{2} \) (vidic. Figure 26 (A)), and the end part of \( \frac{1}{2} \) of the ideograph \( \frac{1}{2} \) (vidic. Figure 26 (C)), in Exhibit 278, correspond exactly to those of the Signature in their characteristics.

The Signatures in Exhibit 281, 284 and 285 are obviously identical, all having been admitted by Pu-yi as his own handwriting. Hence, the ideograph \( \frac{1}{2} \) is hereby shown only from the Signature of Exhibit 285 and compared with the handwriting of Exhibit 278 which is in question.

(c) Examination of Unusual Style of Writing of Ideographs

(1) In Exhibit 278, the last stroke of the ideographs \( \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \frac{1}{2} \), that is, the shape of the finishing touch of the long vertical line, which is brushed up, presents a peculiarity of great importance (vidic. Figure 20). On close inspection, it will be noticed that the vertical line extending long downward inclines rather to the left at the finishing stroke (A); the extremity of the finishing stroke forms an acute angle (B); and is brushed up a little toward the upper left hand (C).

All these make special features of this Exhibit.

In Exhibit 282 the ideograph \( \frac{1}{2} \) also presents the same individualistic style as the foregoing (vidic. Figure 20).

The calligraphic habits herein enumerated make a special feature which will not permit of imitation or emulation by other writers. The cursive peculiarity here is that the last stroke of such ideographs as \( \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \frac{1}{2} \) is not ordinarily brushed up, and these characters with their finishing stroke brushed up are very rarely to be met with.
Being interested in this point, I kept a record of my examinations of handwriting which illustrated this particular feature. My notes show that between February 1935 and April 1944, I discovered characters of this type in the handwriting specimens of 26, 122, persons, of which number only four, or about one in 6,500, brushed up the final stroke of such ideographs.

(2) In Exhibit 278, the left hand radical of the ideograph 周 is found in the shape of 周 (vide Figure 24). In Exhibit 282, the body of the ideograph 周 is found in the same shape of 周. In the autograph, 周 of the ideographs 周 and 周 is written with the same characteristic feature (vide Figure 24).

This method of writing is seldom seen except in ancient Chinese books such as "Yi-chin's. Generally we do not write in the shape of 周, but in the shape of 周.

(3) In Exhibit 278, the body of the ideograph 周 assumes the form of 周 , the vertical line of the second stroke which extends to the lower left hand piercing through the top of the first stroke (vide Figure 25). In Exhibit 282, the same ideograph 周 is written in the same way. The formative peculiarity of this particular ideograph thus can be seen in both handwritings (vide Figure 25).

Such a style of penmanship is not in vogue for and a while. It cannot easily be found even in ancient documents written by famous Chinese calligraphers of the various ages. Usually 周 is written instead of 周. Although we find 周 in epitaphs of the Tang Dynasty and 周 in the calligraphy of "Yen Chong-ming, these are fundamentally different from the style mentioned above. I do not, of course, mean to say no other calligraphers have adopted this style, but only that very few have done so.

(d) SUMMARY

On reviewing all the results ascertained by the examination outlined above, I am compelled to the conclusion that all the documents under examination are veracious with the common individualistic peculiarities of the handwriting of one author, and display no important marks of difference whatsoever among
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themselves. The resultant force of the brush, which is
closer to a particular writer, generally pervades all these
specimens of handwriting. It is, therefore, my conclusion that
the proof is absolute that the documents constituting Exhibits
278 and 282 and the Autograph were written by one and the
same person.

Attention is called to the fact that some may contend that
such common features of commonality as I have mentioned above may
sometimes be found by chance in the hands of two or more persons.
Such negative contention is valid only where points of resemblance
are few in number, or where one special feature of the
many is observed independently of the others. But where there
are present in common so many peculiarities in the specimens
as in the present case, a negative contention of this sort
will not hold good, for it is inconceivable that the hand-
writing of one person should coincide with that of another in
embodying so many similar features.

Some may further argue that the coincidence of common
features may be caused by the imitation of handwriting by a
forger who has studied the handwriting of another person. It
is true that among forgers are some who excel in the
imitation of the manuscript of others. Resemblance, however,
is revealed in the structural features such as distance between
strokes, inclination or the length of strokes. The similarity
in the appearance of form, however, is not accompanied by the
sameness of force. Moreover, it is impossible to imitate
the delicacy of the distinct individuality of handwriting in the
initial touch, the ending of a stroke and in the drawing of
creases. A minute examination of such handwriting will be
sure to discover unnatural points.

The manuscript of Exhibit 278 being extremely natural in
the operation of the brush, it is clear that there is no
forgery in it.

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In view of the accumulation of decisively peculiar features of relationship common to all documents under examination, as above pointed out, and the conspicuous absence of any important differences, I am fully convinced of all the documents under examination being written by one and the same person.

Tokyo,

Signature: [Signature]

[Signature]

Translation Certificate

I, Toshio Okamoto of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Toshio Okamoto, Barrister-at-Law of England & Japan, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ T. Okamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date March 1st, 1947.
Def. Doc. No. 400-A

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR FAR EAST

The United States of America et al

versus

ARAKI, Sadao et al

Affidavit

I, TAKAMURA Iwao, take oath in conformity with the formalities prevailing in Japan, and testify in accordance with the separate sheets.

Oath

I, TAKAMURA Iwao, hereby take oath and say that, by dictation of my conscience, I have stated all truths without any secret reservation whatsoever.

Affidavit

February 17, 1947

I, as witness, certify that TAKAMURA Iwao took oath and affixed his signature and seal in my presence.

TOKOROYAMA Kôshû, Witness

Chief of Criminal Identification Section
Metropolitan Police Headquarters.
Def. Doc. No. 400-A

I, TAKAHURA Iwao, expert for identifying handwriting on behalf of the defense counsel of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, recognizing the disagreement with the expert opinion expressed on 10 December 1946 by Chang Feng-chu, specialist for identifying handwriting on behalf of the prosecution, upon examination of the opinion presented in writing by Chang Feng-chu, find the basis of his argument is weak and erroneous, which I shall point out, and state my opinion as below.

1. Under the paragraph "Spirit and Air in the Handwriting", the two documents were determined to have been written by different persons for the reason that "Pu-yi's handwriting is heavy and clumsy, while the document in question is thin and flighty". As regards the difference between thin and heavy writings, in case of handwriting by a brush, a heavy writing is produced when a brush absorbs India ink freely and pressure is exerted thereon, while the release of pressure produces a thin writing, even when written by one and the same person. This is in the natural course, and it is entirely wrong to accept thinness or heaviness of penmanship as the basis of judgment for identity or difference of handwritings.

2. Under the paragraph "Style of the Handwriting", Mr. Cheng states that "the fact that the one is written in the 'intermediate style' while the other in the 'square style' does not prevent an adequate comparison for the purpose of determining the genuineness of the questioned letter". Mr. Chang, however, does not give any concrete explanation thereon, and states that the 'intermediate style' is definitely poor and that, comparing it with a letter addressed to General Minami, the letter was written clearly by a different person.

Mr. Chang only recognized the clumsiness of the 'intermediate style' of In-yi's handwriting, and overlooked the points intentionally drawn, unnaturally, and totally ignored
the latent individuality common to both handwritings.

To point out the latent individuality common to both Pú-yí's handwriting and the letter addressed to General Minami, a common point can be noted in the commencement of the upper right vertical line of the body of the ideograph . More particularly, in the commencement of the upper right vertical line of the body, the line was drawn thin from the lefthand side toward the righthand side extending to the lower part (vide Figure 27, marked with an arrow).

Mr. Chang stated that Pú-yí "put some effort to learn to write both small and large characters in the 'square style'; he is definitely weak in the 'intermediate style' of penmanship". Pu-yí, however, admitted as his own the handwriting beautifully written on the fan.

3. Under the paragraph "Strokes in the Handwriting", Mr. Chang states that the two documents were written by different persons for the reason that "the dots in each character of Pu-yí's handwriting mark the form , while the dots in each character in the letter addressed to General Minami take the form . However, among Pu-yí's own handwriting which should be written in the form of according to Mr. Chang, the dots are found written with the latent feature of the form . For example, the dots in the ideographs , and bear the form of . (vide Figure 27, marked with an arrow).

Again, in the letter addressed to General Minami which should bear the form according to Mr. Chang, the dots written in the form of are found. For example, the dots in the ideograph illustrate this point (vide Figure 27, marked with an arrow). Mr. Chang also points out that the left component part of the ideograph in Pu-yí's handwriting is entirely different from the of the ideographs appearing in the letter addressed to General Minami. I, however, do not find any significant
difference whatsoever in those loft component parts.

A careful examination will prove the presence of the latent individuality common to all ideographs (vide Figure 27).

In order to facilitate the explanation in this regard, the ideograph 亻 is taken from Pu-yi's handwriting and given the numbers (3), (4) and (5). Then the ideographs 亻 and 亻 are taken from the letter addressed to General Minami, and the numbers (1) and (2) are given thereto. Below is given an example for reference to those who have no technical knowledge of identifying penmanship.

In Figure 27, the left component part 亻 (3), (4) and (5) are written on the same sheet of paper and are clear as Pu-yi's handwriting. Knowing this fact, the so-called amateur specialist, with his preconception, will admit straight without any doubt that they were written by the same person. If, however, these (3), (4) and (5) are cut out separately and shown to an amateur specialist with a hint that they were written by unknown writers at different places, some may judge that (3) and (5) were written by different writers. Still others may say (1) and (2) were written by different persons. A majority will find that (3) and (2) were the products of different writers, but (5) and (1) by the same person.

Such contradiction derives from the disregard of individualistic peculiarity of penmanship. Handwriting differs each time when it is written, and even a child knows that the same character does not appear exactly as in the case of a printed type.

Mr. Chang's judgment overlooks the latent feature common to all handwritings.

4. Under the paragraph of the ideograph 亻, Mr. Chang states that "the mistake in the use of the ideograph 亻 not only proves that the letter in question was not written by Pu-yi, but also was not written by a Chinese". Mr. Chang's deter-
mination that the letter was not written by a Chinese is a clear mistake. Even if the ideograph is not a character used in China, it is possible for a Chinese who knows that it is sometimes used in Japan to employ this character in a letter addressed to a Japanese. It is premature to conclude that such a character is never used by Chinese.

As regards the use of such a character, the same conclusion can be drawn even in the case of a Japanese character inserted in an English document addressed by an Englishman to a Japanese, without mentioning a document exchanged between a Chinese and Japanese.

In such a case, it is possible for a man, in preparing a document in his or her country, to employ a character used in the country where the party to whom the document is addressed resides. The use of the ideograph is not an evidence that the document was not written by a Chinese.

In this connection, I shall indicate below the points which are considered to show that the letter addressed to General Minami was not written by a Japanese.

(A) The ideograph is written .

I have never found such a character in the handwritings of the Japanese. If there is any, it is extremely rare.

(B) The ideograph is written in the form of , and the ideograph as .

I have never seen such a character in the handwritings of the Japanese.

(C) The lower part of of the ideograph is written in the form of . In most cases the form is used; very few persons write .

(D) The part of the body of the ideograph is written in the form of .

The Japanese for the most part write the form of and very few persons write .

(E) The left component part of the ideograph is written
Def. Doc. No. 400-A

in the form of 萌, most of the Japanese write 萌, and very few 萌.

Such an abnormal way of writing is also found in the handwriting of Pu-yi which he admitted as his own. Below is given a comparative table.

Exhibit 281

(Letter addressed to General Minami)

1. The ideograph 醛 is written in the form of 醛.
2. The ideograph 初 is written in the form of 初.
3. The lower part of the ideograph 可 is written in the form of 可.
4. The body of the ideograph 碍 is written in the form of 大.
5. The left component part of the ideograph 難 is written in the form of 難.
6. The ending part of the ideographs 幸, 料 and 碍, which is not usually brushed up, is brushed up.

Only one out of 6,500 persons uses such a peculiar writing. (Refer to "Observation from Abnormal Method of Writing" in the Expert Opinion of Handwriting submitted by TAKAMURA Iwao).

Exhibit 282

(Poem on the fan and Pu-yi's autograph)

1. The ideograph 醛 is written in the form of 醛.
2. The ideograph 初 is written in the form of 初.
3. The lower part of the ideograph 可 is written in the form of 可.
4. The body of the ideograph 碍 is written in the form of 大.
5. The left component part of the ideograph 難 is written in the form of 難.
6. The ending part of the ideograph 幸, 料 and 碍, which is not usually brushed up, is brushed up.

The identity shown above may be proved in a simple form by a mathematical probability which anyone can make. Supposing that fifty out of every hundred persons employed a style
containing any of the six chirographic peculiarities above mentioned, it might not be so unreasonable to presume that two documents embodying all six points were written by the same hand. If, however, only ten in a hundred persons employed any of these peculiarities, the probability of two documents containing all six points being written by the same person would have greatly increased. If only one person in a thousand (not to say one in 6,500, as mentioned in (6) above referred to) employed one of these peculiarities, the probabilities of the handwritings containing all six points being written by different persons would be astronomically small.

5. Under the paragraph "Note and Signature" (Cheng Hsiao-shu), Mr. Chang stated that "the absence of (Chen, meaning 'Ministerial Servant') above Cheng Hsiao-shu's name, and (Chin Tih, meaning 'respectfully noted by') under the signature as 'required by convention and court usage', reveals the forgery of the document."

Mr. Chang's ruling that the document is a forgery was given by the observations of circumstances, and not as the result of the direct examination of the features of the said handwriting.

Such an indirect judgment based upon observations of circumstances often causes a serious mistake.

Though I do not know whether or not such convention or court usage exists in China, everyone knows well that custom or convention is often discarded in various circumstances that may happen unexpectedly. It is when such exceptional circumstances have taken place that the question of expert examination is often required.

It is, therefore, not justifiable to conclude that the absence of and constitutes evidence that the letter addressed to General Minami is a forgery.

February 17, 1947

TAKAKURA Iwao
Identification Expert in Criminal Identification Section, Metropolitan Police Headquarters
Def. Dcs # 400

Translation Certificate.

I, Toshio Okamoto of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Toshio Okamoto, Barrister-at-Law of England & Japan, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ T. Okamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date March 1st, 1947.
極東国際軍事裁判書。被告側鑑定人高村義男氏、昭和

反駁論点：張錦興氏提出の意見は、相違アルリと認メタリ

摘論点：張錦興氏提出の意見ハ、相違アルリと認メタリ
愛三新教教会

教義

『新約聖書』

福音書

約翰福音 3:3

「公義」に生きる人を求める

新約聖書

約翰福音 3:3

「公義」に生きる人を求める
昭和二十二年二月十七日
警視庁刑事部鑑識課技師
筆跡鑑定人 高村 嚴
良心ニ従ヒ真実ヲ述べ何事ヲモ黙セズ又何事ヲモ附加セルコトヲ誓フ

高 村 崇 役
日和

供述者、宮本光之

日和

於回所
Sworn Deposition

Dependent: NANAMI, Toshio

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on June 6th, 1894 at Maebashi-City, Gunma Prefecture, and am now living at No. 969, Namitsu-Nishicho, Sagara-Machi, Haibara-Gun, Shizuoka Prefecture.

2. I was appointed an aide-de-camp to General Minami on December 26th, 1932. At that time General Minami was a Military Councillor, and I was captain. On December 10th, 1934, when General Minami was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, I was a major and accompanied him to Manchoukuo as an Aide-de-camp, which post I held until March 6th, 1936, when General Minami resigned from his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and returne
to Japan. I was a Colonel when the Pacific War came to an end.

3. On April 2nd, 1934 General Minami called on the special envoys from Manchoukuo, Mr. Cheng Hsiao-Hsu and Mr. Hsi Hsia who were on an official trip to Japan and were staying at the Imperial Hotel. His visit was to pay a return call to the envoys who had called on the General at his residence whilst he was absent. I accompanied the General as usual and was able to meet the envoys. On that occasion, General Minami took with him a letter that had been sent to him by Pu-Yi in 1931 when the General was Minister of War and asked Mr. Cheng Hsiao-Hsu to judge whether it was the true handwriting of Pu-Yi or not. After looking at it earnestly, Mr. Cheng assured that it was his true handwriting. General Minami asked him to write a certificate for it before he took leave of Mr. Cheng.

4. On the next day, April 3rd, (February 20th of the Lunar calendar) at about one o'clock in the afternoon, I again called on Mr. Cheng at the Imperial Hotel to receive the above letter by order of General Minami. (It was written on a piece of Yellow Silk cloth) Mr. Cheng was waiting for my call, took out the letter which had been left with him previously and solemnly wrote in my presence at the end of the letter, "The Emperor's own hand writing" and signed "February 20th, 1934," "Cheng Hsiao-Hsu," and he carefully
handed it to me. I therefore received it and returned it to General Minami.

On this 13th day of March, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ NANAMI, Toshio (seal)

I, MATSUZAWA, Tatsuo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness: /S/ MATSUZAWA, Tatsuo (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 29 March 1947
日中拳路ご興発、日本国に於て、当該事業に於て、発公の等、団体、個人等の、ます。
国际货币基金组织

货币委员会

委员会

原因

建议

备忘录

LDF 1200 No. 033
良心

從

事

名

敬

郎

書

印名
Concerning the National Temple of Manchukuo.

Sometime in February or March in 1940, Mr. Kagoshima, Vice Director of the Imperial Household Office of Manchukuo, and Major General Yoshioka called on Mr. Shirano, Vice Minister of the Imperial Household and said:

"His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Manchukuo is united with a fervent desire to build a commemorative shrine to the Goddess Amanaru as a manifestation of the idea of "the moral and ideological unity of Japan and Manchukuo, and thereby to strengthen more than ever the foundation of his Empire. You will please arrange so that His Imperial Majesty will be pleased to grant to this Temple its divine offering."

Later a memorandum to the above effect, as conveying the wish of the Emperor of Manchukuo, was transmitted to us through the Ministry of War. Accordingly, there were held at our Ministry frequent conferences of the Division and Bureau directors concerned, as the result of which it was concluded that it would be improper for His Majesty to grant any article to serve as a divine offering. At the same time, this being a matter having to do with the Grand Shrine, which was in charge of the Government, it was felt necessary to ascertain the views of the Cabinet.

So I got in touch with the chief of the Cabinet General Affairs Section, Mr. Inada, and made inquiries of Mr. Minister Yonai and others. I discovered that they all thought the whole affair was
incomprehensible, and that they were profoundly dubious about the
proposition of enshrining the Goddess Amaterasu as the principal deity
of Manchukuo.

Furthermore, His Majesty, when the story reached his ear, was said to
have remarked; "I hear that in China they have worshipped heaven from
ancient times. If now Manchukuo is to have a shrine, would it not be
proper for them to adopt the form of heaven-worship?"

Thus, on the question of the deity to which the Manchukuo's national
temple was to be dedicated, fundamental doubts were entertained on all
sides. However, as long as the idea was said to have emanated from the
deep wish of the Manchukuo Emperor himself, we did not go far into argument
on the point, but only rejected the request for the Imperial donation of
the divine tablet as absolutely improper.

But Vice-Director Kayoshima and Major General Yohioka, after yielding
to our contention, proposed that the object to serve as a divine tablet
should be made in Manchukuo, and brought over here on the occasion of the
Manchukuo Emperor's visit to Japan, to be placed in the Sacred Music
Hall of the Grand Shrine and have the Sacred Music Player before it
when the Emperor of Manchukuo worshipped at the shrine, so that it might
be carried back to Manchukuo as a divine tablet. Then they asked that
we arrange for the Imperial donation of an article that would serve as a
sacred treasure for the National Temple upon its completion.

Note: It being the year of the 2,600th anniversary of Japan, there was a plan of the Manchukuo Emperor's
visit to Japan to convey felicitation; and his
Itinerary included a day of worship at the
Grand Shrine.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, MASAHIKO, Koaru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 3 pages and entitled "PROCLAMATION WITH REGARD TO THE SURRENDER FOR THE EMPIRE OF MUSHAKUO" is an exact and correct copy of an official document in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 4th day of Dec., 1945.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Masaharu Oda

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, WILLIAM E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 4 December 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

I am KAGOSHIMA Torao. I was vice-director of the Imperial Household Ministry of Manchoukuo from June 1939 to June 1943, and later served as a member of the Manchoukuo State Council.

As vice-director of the Imperial Household Ministry I was close to the Emperor of Manchoukuo, and particularly am well acquainted with the circumstances of the establishment of the Kenkoku Shrine, concerning which I shall testify herein.

The idea of enshrining the Goddess Amatorasu in Manchoukuo originated with the Emperor, at the time that the establishment of a "National Foundation Shrine" was under consideration. Lieutenant-General Yoshioka of the Kwantung Army and I were accordingly sent to Tokyo in March 1940 to request of the Japanese Imperial Household Ministry and the Japanese Government that permission be given by the Emperor of Japan for importing the spirit of the Goddess to Manchoukuo. Though this strong desire of the Emperor of Manchoukuo was, after considerable debate, finally acceded to, as was the proposal of making Amaterasu the main deity of Manchoukuo, agreement was refused to the request that the Emperor of Japan should play any part in the plan.

After consideration, it was decided that a mirror should be made in Manchoukuo and taken to the Grand Shrine of Ise by the Emperor of Manchoukuo when he visited Japan; that the mirror should be set in the Kagura Hall of the Shrine and sacred music played; and that it would then be taken back to Manchoukuo for enshrinement as the spirit of the Kenkoku Shrine. This was subsequently done. It was also agreed that the Emperor of Manchoukuo should choose, from among the presents to be given to him by the Emperor of Japan, one which he would make the sacred treasure for Shrine; accordingly, a sword presented by the Japanese Emperor was subsequently so used. There was no question of the Japanese' forcing upon us Shinto, Amaterasu or the treasures for the Shrine; rather, it was only by reason of the strong re-
presentations of the Manchoukuoan officials that the Japanese agreed to this course of action.

After the return to Manchoukuo of the Emperor, there were established two shrines. The first of these was the Kenkoku Shrine, which was erected within the Imperial Palace grounds and was exclusively for Imperial use. The general public was not allowed admission to the Shrine, and it was used only by the Emperor in performing his own devotions. Although the Emperor was a Buddhist, he considered worship at the Kenkoku Shrine to be a form of ancestor-worship, and he worshipped at the Shrine with the deepest reverence. Thus, he personally attended the minor ceremonies held on the first day of each month, although ritual required him only to send a representative; he always personally wrote the ceremonial letters when he paid his respects at the Shrine; even in the coldest weather he refused to wear a coat when worshipping at the Shrine. When the construction of a torii, or symbolic gateway, was being planned for the Shrine, he insisted that it be made large enough to be visible from his private room, which was done in spite of the torii's being disproportionately large for the Shrine itself. The other shrine established under Shinto ritual was the Chureibyo in Hsingking, which was modelled on the Yasukuni Shrine of Tokyo, in commemoration of war dead.

A Board of Ritual (Sakishfu) was established to care for these two shrines only, but no attempt was ever made to institute Shinto as the state religion or to compel adherence to it by the population at large, but officials or others; neither at the time of the establishment of the Kenkoku Shrine nor at any other time was any law enacted abridging freedom of religious belief. The statements by the former Emperor of Manchoukuo to the effect that military and civilian officials of Manchoukuo were compelled to erect and worship at Shinto shrines, that punishment by confinement for more than a year was ordered to be imposed upon persons showing disrespect to Shinto, and that the inhabitants of Manchoukuo were compelled to "worship the Japanese Emperor", are completely without basis in fact. Religious belief in Manchoukuo was completely free. The Emperor himself and many of the high government officials were Buddhists or Taoists; the concubine of the Emperor who died was given a Buddhist funeral; Prime Minister Chang himself brought to Manchoukuo a relic of Buddha and established a Buddhist shrine.

-2-
Def. Doc. No. 976

I M T F E

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: KAGOSHIMA Torao

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
On this 3rd day of April, 1947
at Tokyo

DEFONENT KAGOSHIMA Torao (seal)

I, Ono Kisaku, hereby certify that the above statement
was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal
thereto in the presence of this witness.

Witness: (signed) Ono Kisaku (seal)
Def. Doc. No. 976

I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KAGOSHIMA TORO (seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch,
herby certify that the foregoing translation of the affidavit
of Kagoshima Torao is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning
of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 3, 1947
就根据现有数据资料进行进一步分析。表中显示了不同地区的人口数量、面积以及人均GDP等数据。从表中可以看出，地区A的人口数量最多，而地区C的面积最小。人均GDP方面，地区D的水平最高。
RELIGION

The religions in Manchuria can be divided conveniently into two groups: the native Chinese religions, and those brought into the country from Japan and other foreign countries. The native religions possess a highly complicated nature, and are composed of Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Mohammedanism, Iamaism, etc., all having long histories. These religions are closely related socially, politically, and educationally. In recent decades many foreign religions have found their way into Manchuria, the more important of them being the Japanese religions and Christianity.

The number of religious temples and followers by religions for the latest year available are shown below:

**Table 12. STATISTICS OF RELIGIOUS TARPORIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>No. of Temples</th>
<th>No. of Shrines</th>
<th>No. of Churches</th>
<th>Priests</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>3,935</td>
<td>395.0</td>
<td>873.2</td>
<td>1,768.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taoism</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4,127</td>
<td>368.6</td>
<td>370.6</td>
<td>939.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemaism</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>27,341</td>
<td>474.4</td>
<td>385.3</td>
<td>832.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammedanism</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>162.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian Sects</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>122.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sects</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Native Religions.** There are various sects and denominations in the native religions, and each of them is intimately bound up with the social and political life of the people. Religious edifices are popularly called "miao" (shrine), or "ssyuan" (temple).

Besides the above, there are 35 "San Miao" or Confucian shrines in Fengtien Province, 15 in Larin Province and 12 in Kailungjiang Province.

Hungwantszchui or Red Swastika Society which is also regarded as a sect of Taoyuan exercises considerable influence over the Manchoukouans.
宗

宗を論ずるに於ける宗教の別は、彼の随分より、さらに垣内に於でされる宗派を別として、
本支の宗教は非常によく、彼の随分より、さらに垣内に於でされる宗派を別として、
政治的及び文政的と密接して居る。これ等の宗教は、彼の随分より、さらに垣内に於でされる宗派を別として、
宗が政治的及び文政的と密接して居る。これ等の宗教は、彼の随分より、さらに垣内に於でされる宗派を別として、

引言

最近生に於ける宗教に関する寺院及信教者には次の如くである。

-1-
東京の宗教。在来の宗教には各種の宗教及び仏教があり、その末尾は教民の
社会生活及び俗生活に密接に統結して居る。宗教的態度は一部に「儒」「仏
の二つの一分派をも見られるが、宗教の一部は多くの宗教人及び教徒が
多大の力を発揮して居る。

3
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE PACIFIC

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: ISHIHARA, Shizuma

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

REMINISCENCES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NANCH'ING

OUTLINE OF THE WITNESS' CAREER:

I, the witness, was born at Ogimachi, Ogigun, Saga, on Aug 25, 1878;

entered the Military Academy in December, 1898;

graduated from the Academy in November, 1899;

received my commission as 2nd lieutenant, Infantry in June, 1900;

was appointed Regimental Commander of the 17th Infantry Regiment at Abita in March.
1925;
Brigade Commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade at Asahigawa in March, 1928, attached to the Headquarters of the 8th Division at Hiroshiki in April, 1928
placed on the reserve list on 1 April, 1929;
appointed a Manchurian lieutenant-general and became,
Aide-de-camp to the Chief Executive, on 12 June 1933;
remained in office on 1 April 1935, which brings me up to the present.

In 1932, soon after the establishment of Manchoukuo and Mr. Pu-yi's inauguration as Chief Executive of the country, the persons concerned wanted some competent advisers to the Chief Executive, partly at the suggestion of the Chief Executive himself. And I received visits at my house from Mr. Hsu Ping, who later became Councillor of the Office of the Chief Executive, Mr. Tsai Fa-ping, the then Secretary of the Office of the Chief Executive, and Mr. Eiko Tadashi, the Chief of the Guard of the Office of the Chief Executive, who personally came one after another to ask me to serve as an attendant to the Chief Executive. And I received another earnest request to take the post from an old friend of mine, Lieutenant-General Iwakami, who was an old acquaintance of the
Chief Executive, as Mr. Fu Yü was living quietly in Tien tsin when he had been Commander of the North China Army. Meanwhile, when this came to be materialized, it turned out that I was allotted the post of senior aide-de-camp, and not as adviser to the Chief Executive, not nominal but real Chief Aide-de-Camp (the Manchurian Aide-de-Camp was away from Haikinko as Governor of Jehol Province, and commander of the garrison of the province). This caused me great embarrassment, because I was in doubt whether it was right for me, then a Japanese soldier, to serve the ruler of another country, in the light of the teaching of oriental morals, "A faithful retainer never serves two masters." At length, I happened to come across a passage in a book written by SAIGO, Harshū, (a personality of the Meiji Restoration revered by the Japanese), "A man who is not loyal to the Emperor is not a dutiful and obedient son"); and I reached the conclusion that to serve the ruler of Manchoukuo meant nothing but my serving our Father, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and, firm in that belief, I made up my mind to go over to Manchoukuo.

I stayed in Manchoukuo about two years—from June 1933 until April 1935—from the time of Mr. Fu-yü's day as Chief Executive, to those as Emperor of Manchoukuo conducting all state affairs; a brilliant period and I served as Aide-de-Camp in close attendance to the Emperor night and day discharging my duties faithfully for the sake of Manchoukuo and the Emperor.
2. Emperor Pu yi was very sagacious and amazingly quick of comprehension. In sanctioning all sorts of administrative and military matters, he was never long in grasping the main points mentioned in the papers submitted for his approval, and time and again amended them in person. He always gave a clear and prompt judgment on every matter. More than once, I remember, to make decisions of his own accord, without any assistance of the officials, on affairs of state. To give one or two examples. The draft of the Imperial Rescript to be given to the soldiers, which was submitted by Chang Ching-hui, the Minister of military Affairs on 22 February in the 3rd year of Tatung, 1934, was amended in very important points by the Emperor himself. Again in January, 1935 he made his first trip to Port Arthur since his ascension to the throne. Port Arthur was really dear to the Emperor who had stayed there for some time on his first visit to Manchuria to take the post as Chief Executive. Port Arthur was then within the Leased Territory of Japan, and was therefore legally outside the territory of Manchoukuo and its citizens foreigners. Nevertheless the Emperor, then the ruler of Manchoukuo, reflecting probably upon his days of the past deep emotion warmly gave an Imperial speech to the Japanese citizens who had gathered in front of the hotel to hail the Emperor. With a sense of responsibility as an attendant to the Emperor, I felt it necessary to know the contents of his speech and in what circumstances it was to be delivered; I therefore immediately inquired of Imperial Household Minister Shen how the delivery
of the Imperial speech had been decided upon and whether the
Minister had given any advice on its contents. The Minister
told me that he did not know of it that he had not rendered
any assistance whatsoever and added that the speech was
drafted of the Emperor's own accord and that the entire text
was written out by the Emperor himself. This Imperial
Rescript was the first statement he had delivered at home or
abroad as Emperor, and the spiritual foundation of the new
state and his attitude as sovereign of the state shown in it
were thought to bear profound significance and to be a record
which is historically commemorative. Soon the same day I got
a copy of the text written by the Emperor himself from the
Chief of the General Affairs Board Hsu Pachong and am keeping
it even today as a precious family treasure.

The gist of the Imperial speech is as follows: "Now I
deam the cooperation of Japan and Manchoukuo will make the
greatest possible contribution to the peace of the Orient.
Japan and Manchoukuo are to be mutually cooperative not by the
more consideration of international interests but by the
cardinal consideration for the furtherance of the welfare of
mankind along the lines of inherent Oriental ethical concep-
tions. And again what I deem very important for both
Japanese and Manchurians is to uphold the principle of 'One
Virtue, One Soul'. I am greatly delighted and looking forward
to the trip to Japan this spring to pay a visit to the Emperor
of Japan, to strengthen the ties of friendship of the two
Imperial Houses. I intend to strive for and make further
efforts all the more towards the peace of the Orient and for the sake of friendly relations between Japan and Manchoukuo.

The Emperor after his return from Japan, issued the famous Imperial Rescript the people which was founded on the concord of the five races (Manchurian, Chinese, Mongolians, Japanese and Koreans), pointing out the way they should follow. And in it both the Japanese and the Manchurians were deeply impressed with the four words, "One virtue One Soul", as everyone knows. This guiding principle, which was of his own conception, I think he had in his bosom before he became the ruler of Manchuria.

3. The Emperor was a devout ancestor-worshipper, and warmly attached to his relatives. Well-mannered and sociable, at the same time I think he was very prudent and cautious, as he had experienced many storms and had to pass through threads of sinister conspiracies and malignant intrigues. Nevertheless, more than once I observed him placing his reliance upon the fair and magnanimous attitude of the Japanese Imperial Family and his envy of the loyalty of the Japanese people to their Emperor. Now, as an illustration of how truthful and affectionate he was to his old acquaintances, let me state how warmly Sir Reginald Johnston, the late professor at London University, England, who truly understood the Emperor's feelings and stated his unbiased observations frankly, was received by the Emperor at the Imperial Palace at Hsinking in September 1935.
Here will also be seen the environment with which he was surrounded and his mental condition during those early days of Manchoukuo. Sir Reginald had lived in China as a British official for about 30 years, during which he served as tutor for 13 long years to the former Emperor of China, Piu-yi and later Emperor of Manchoukuo. He played an active part in the eventful days at the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty. He was a widely-known authority on Oriental political and economic conditions, and wrote many books and articles for magazines such as the National Review, a periodical published in London. His observation of the Emperor's mental attitude and his story of the cordial reception he was given at the court appeared in the National Review for September 1930. At the time I translated it and distributed copies widely among my friends.

And I, who served as an attendant to the Emperor, can say I can personally endorse it myself. The following is a part of Sir Reginald's article appearing in the National Review:

"It was in China a few months prior to his departure from Tientsin that he directed me to visit Manchoukuo. At the time he held great expectations of leading a splendid life as ruler in Manchuria, the cradle-land of his forefathers, quitting his retired life at Tientsin. There was a recurrent rumor started by Chinese that he had been compelled by Japan to take the post, but considering from the fact that he, filled with rupas, had told me to go to Manchuria, I found the rumor was an inconsistent fiction."
In September 1935 I landed at Yokohama via Canada. I was received by members of the Manchurian Embassy staff, who had been given instructions by the Emperor, and many of the celebrities of Japan. Receptions were accorded by both the government and the public and sightseeing of famous spots was done. I reached Dairen by sea and then went up to Hsinking by rail. At 5 P.M. one day I arrived at Hsinking Station, where I was greeted by my old acquaintances from our days at Peking, but especially by Cheng Hsiao-hau, an elder statesman of Manchoukuo respected in both Court and political circles, who conveyed to me the Emperor's message, 'His Majesty will grant an audience to you as soon as possible upon your arrival at Hsinking.' So I proceeded immediately to the Palace. He had returned only one hour before from Harbin, where he had inspected the Yangtze River Fleet; I was ushered into the Emperor's private room where he, still in the naval uniform which he had been wearing at Harbin and who apparently had been waiting for me greeted me with warm and kindly words. I had so much to talk about with him that I did not know what to begin with. After chatting, he showed me into the dining room. Those present, seven in all, were all his relatives--princesses Sau-ko and Wu-ko, both unmarried younger sisters of the Emperor, and Mr. Chuan-an, Mr. Chuan-hau, sons of his uncle Tsai-tao, and others. The dinner then given to us was in Chinese style and produced a very congenial atmosphere. The Emperor was really in a merry mood. My daily meals in the Court were served in the Emperor's private room, where I was treated as a member
of his family—except one occasion when an official banquet was held in my honor in the audience room (17 high officials and officers attended it).

Prior to my arrival in Manchuria, I was told by certain people, who were said to be well-informed on the actual state of things there, that I would be shadowed and watched by Japanese secret agents, and that I would find the Emperor to be a mere puppet in the hands of Japanese advisers. But as I had kept in touch by letter with Court officials since the Emperor's advent in Manchuria, I was skeptical of the reliability of such talk. It was therefore no wonder to me that it proved to be all fiction.

Europeans often overlook the fact that the Emperor is not a Chinese, but a Manchurian. It is natural that he feels under no obligation to China, a foreign country, if he thinks of the fact that the Chinese Revolutionary Government, which banished him from the throne, condemned Manchoukuo as a spurious country when it was founded under the Dynasty of the same line as the Ch'ing Dynasty which had reigned over China about three hundred years, and went further to abrogate the Abdication Agreement, depriving him of all his property and the only privileges accorded to him.

It is true that he owes chiefly to Japan the position he holds today. And it is a matter of course that the is pro-Japanese, entertaining deep respect for Japan. Needless to say, he needs advisers and ministers, since he is no despot. By no means, however, are his actions instigated by those Japanese.
Some say he is a puppet in the hands of Japan and that when Japan has come to need him no longer, he will be deserted. But I suggest the advisability of waiting to see whether Japan will really do so—which, I assume, is most improbable—instead of our attacking or laughing at the Emperor trusting Japan."

When the Empire of Manchukuo was dismembered on 20 August 1932, ministers and high officials of Manchurian and Chinese origin, all looking to their own safety, immediately left the Emperor at Taikoku, without even paying any regard to safeguarding him. Even at this time high officials of Japanese origin wanted to share the lot of the Emperor, and finally these officials as well as the Emperor were made prisoner by the Soviet army at Mukden. Just looking at this act, I feel, one can understand the fulings of the Japanese.

4. The Emperor, as new Manchurian ruler, in spite of the ill treatment formerly given to him as Emperor Hsuan Tung (TN: Fu yî's Chinese Emperor designation) by the Chinese Revolutionary Government, wished peace and happiness for the people of China Proper and made repeated donations from his slender Privy Purse for charitable works and aiding sufferers from disasters in China Proper.

Among the officials and officers of the Imperial Household and the government there were not a few who, still longing for the comfortable life at Peking, wanted to return there; but the sole concern of the Emperor seemed to be how to make the lives of the people of the five races easy and peaceful, and he appeared to harbor no least political design on.
extending his sovereign power or of returning to the old capital. I noted that not only was this so in my conversations with him, but I remember it was also seen at his interview with Mr. NOWURA, Hidet, the political editor of the Tokyo Asahi, in December 1932:

"Question: I should like to hear what you think and feel about China Proper?

"Answer: In the Revolution of 1911, the reins of government were transferred peacefully so that the people might be spared of the evils which would have been caused by disorders. But to our bitter regret the Revolutionary Government, unworthy of the confidence we had reposed in it, is still unable to give relief to the people after twenty long years of its administration.

"Question: What do you want China to become in the future?

"Answer: All mankind ought to be equal in securing happiness and welfare. I am keenly desirous that the people of China Proper shall come to enjoy a better life."

As in the above manner, the answers of the then Chief Executive were indeed magnificent and I had nothing but admiration for him. I desired with all my heart that this astute monarch develop in his character even more and reach perfection in his kingly attributes.
On this 2 day of Jan., 1947
At Tokyo

DEponent  ISHIWARA, Shizuma (Seal)

I, KOndo, Giichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

witness: (signed) KOndo, Giichi (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/\S/ ISHIWARA, Shizuma (Seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document. /\S/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 4 April 1947
国大衆院

答題

日本の戦犯は、戦争の責任を問う必要がある。国大衆院は、戦争の実質的な責任を問うべきである。


FIRST OPium CONFERENCE

AGREEMENT

Signed at Geneva, February 11th, 1925

AGREEMENT

THE BRITISH EMPIRE (WITH INDIA), CHINA, FRANCE, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL AND SIAM,

Being fully determined to bring about the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in and use of prepared opium, as provided for in Chapter II of the International Opium Convention of January 23rd 1912, in their Far Eastern Possessions and Territories, including leased or protected territories, in which the use of prepared opium is temporarily authorised; and

Being desirous, on the grounds of humanity and for the purpose of promoting the social and moral welfare of their peoples, of taking all possible steps for achieving the suppression of the use of opium for smoking with the least possible delay;

Having decided to conclude an agreement supplementary to the said International Convention;

Have nominated for this purpose as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

Sir Malcolm Delevingne, K.C.B., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department,

And for India:

Mr. Harold Clayton, C.I.E., I.C.S.,

The President of the Chinese
The President of the French Republic:
Mr. Ed. D.'Hell, Minister for the Colonies,

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:
Mr. Sagetaro KAMU, former Civil Governor of the General Government of Taiwan,
Mr. Isotaro SUCHIURA, Counsellor of Embassy, Assistant Head of the Imperial Japanese bureau accredited to the League of Nations,

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands:
Mr. W. G. van VIJTUN, former Head of the Opium Regie Department in the Netherlands Indies,
Mr. de KAT ANGELINO, Secretary for Chinese Affairs to the Government of the Netherlands Indies,

The President of the Portuguese Republic:
Mr. A. Bartholomeu XANAS, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Portuguese Republic to the Swiss Federal Council,
Mr. Rodrigo RODRIGUES, Governor of the Province of Macao,

His Majesty the King of Siam:
K.S.H. Prince DAMKAS, Siamese Charge d'Affaires at The Hague,

who, having examined the present situation in regard to the application of Chapter II of the said International Opium Convention in the above-mentioned Far Eastern possessions and territories; and

Taking note of the fact that the increase of the smuggling of opium in the greater part of the territories in the Far East since the ratification of the Convention is hamper-
Def. Doc. No. 733

...greatly the accomplishment of the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium, as provided for in the Convention, and is even rendering less effective some of the measures already taken for that end; and

Taking into account the different situations of the several countries,

Having deposited their full powers found in good and due form;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article with regard to retail sale, the importation, sale and distribution of opium shall be a monopoly of the Government and the right to import, sell or distribute opium shall not be leased, accorded or delegated to any persons whatever.

2. The making of prepared opium for sale shall also be made a monopoly of the Government as soon as circumstances permit.

3 (a) The system of employing persons paid by a fixed salary and not by a commission on sales for the retail sale and distribution of opium shall be applied experimentally in those districts where an effective supervision can be exercised by the administrative authorities.

(b) Elsewhere the retail sale and distribution of opium shall be conducted only by persons licensed by the Government.

Paragraph (a) need not be applied if a system of licens-
ing and rationing of smokers is in force which affords equiva-
lent or more effective guarantees.

Article II
The sale of opium to minors shall be prohibited. All possible steps shall be taken by the Contracting Powers to prevent the spread of the habit of opium smoking among minors.

Article III
No minors shall be permitted to enter any smoking divan.

Article IV
The Contracting Powers shall limit as much as possible the number of retail shops and, where smoking divans are permitted, the number of divans.

Article V
The purchase and sale of "dross", except when the "dross" is sold to the monopoly, is prohibited.

Article VI
(1) The export of Opium, whether raw or prepared, from any Possession or Territory into which opium is imported for the purpose of smoking shall be prohibited.

(2) The transit through, or trans-shipment in, any such Possession or Territory of prepared opium shall be prohibited.

(3) The transit through, or trans-shipment in, any
such Possession or Territory of raw opium consigned to a destination outside the Possession or Territory shall also be prohibited unless an import certificate, issued by the Government of the importing country, which can be accepted as affording sufficient guarantees against the possibility of illegitimate use, is produced to the Government of the Possession or Territory.

Article VII

The Contracting Powers shall use their utmost efforts by suitable instruction in the schools, dissemination of literature and otherwise, to discourage the use of prepared opium within their respective territories, except where a Government considers such measures to be undesirable under the conditions existing in its territory.

Article VIII

The Contracting Powers undertake to assist one another in their efforts to suppress the illicit traffic by the direct exchange of information and views between the heads of the services concerned.

Article IX

The Contracting Powers will examine in the most favourable spirit the possibility of taking legislative measures to render punishable illegitimate transactions which are carried out in another country by a person residing within their territories.
Article X

The Contracting Powers will furnish all information which they can obtain with regard to the number of opium smokers. This information shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for publication.

Article XI

The provisions of this agreement shall not apply to opium destined solely for medical and scientific purposes.

Article XII

The Contracting Powers agree that they will jointly review from time to time at such dates as may be mutually agreed, the position in regard to the application of Chapter II of the Hague Convention of January 23rd 1912, and of the present Agreement. The first meeting shall take place at latest in 1929.

Article XIII

The present agreement applies only to the Far Eastern possessions or territories of the Contracting Powers, including leased or protected territories, in which the use of prepared opium is temporarily authorised.

At the moment of ratification any Contracting Power may declare that its acceptance of the Agreement does not include any territory over which it exercises only a protectorate; and may accede subsequently in respect of any protectorate thus excluded by means of a notification of accession deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.
who shall forthwith notify the accession to all the other Contracting Powers.

Article XIV

The present agreement, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be subject to ratification.

The deposit of ratification shall be made at the Secretariat of the League of Nations as soon as possible.

The Agreement shall not come into force until it has been ratified by two Powers. The date of its coming into force shall be the 90th day after the receipt by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of the second ratification. Thereafter the Agreement shall take effect for each Contracting Power 90 days after the receipt of its ratification.

The Agreement shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations upon the day of its coming into force.

Article XV

If one of the Contracting Powers should wish to denounce the present Agreement, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations who will immediately communicate a copy of the notification to all the other Powers, informing them of the date on which it was received.

The denunciation shall take effect only as regards the Power which notified it, and one year after the notification thereof has reached the Secretary-General.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named plenipotentiaries have
signed the present Agreement.

DONE AT GENEVA, the eleventh day of February of Nineteen
hundred and twenty-five, in a single copy which shall remain
deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of the League
of Nations, and of which authenticated copies shall be trans­
mitted to all the Contracting Powers.

BRITISH EMPIRE

INDIA

CHINA

FRANCE

JAPAN

THE NETHERLANDS

PORTUGAL

SOUTH AFRICA

Malcolm DELEVINGNE
Harold CLYTON
Li. DALADIER
S. KAKU
W. VETTUM
A.D.A. de KAT AUGILINO
A.M. Barholomeu FERREIRA
Rodrigo J. RODRIGUES
D.MRAS
Certificate as to Source and Authenticity of a Document

I am Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office. I hereby certify that the printed material hereto attached in Japanese, French and English consisting of 518 pages and entitled, "A Collection of Treaties and Resolutions Concerning Opium" is a document prepared and published by the Foreign Office.

At Tokyo
27th February, 1947

/s/ KAWASHI, Kaoru (Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed in my presence.

Same Place
Same Date

Witness:

/s/ SATO, Takegoro (Seal)
Certificate as to proven and authenticity of a document

I am Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office.

I hereby certify that the printed material hereto attached in Japanese, French and English consisting of 513 pages and entitled "collection of Treaties and Resolutions Concerning Opium" is a document prepared and published by the Foreign Office.

At Tokyo.

17th February, 1947

/s/ H.Y. Hori, Akoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed in my presence.

Same Place
Same Date.

Witness:  /s/ Sato, Takeguro (seal)

(11) Total Prohibition.

Total prohibition is enforced only in the Philippine Islands.

Prohibition of opium-smoking is the principle of the legislation in Formosa and in the Kwantung Leased Territory; but it may be said that the system actually applied is registration, licensing and rationing of opium-smokers. In Formosa, smoking may be permitted to those smokers who were addicted at the coming into force of the Opium Ordinance of 1923, provided they are medically certified as being incurable opium-addicts. In principle, therefore, legal opium-smoking in Formosa will come to an end at the death of the last smoker licensed under the 1928 Ordinance. In Kwantung Leased Territory, the Opium Ordinance gives authority to the Government to license smokers, but only when it is considered a necessity for curing them of their habit. New smokers are allowed to obtain licences subject to being certified as addicts.

Experience has proved that total rigorously-applied prohibition of opium-smoking does not lead to total suppression of the opium-smoking habit, in view of the persistency of the deeply rooted vice and the great difficulties in preventing imports of illicit opium and its distribution to illegal consumers. It seems better that the opium-smoking habit should be suppressed gradually by legalising smoking by confirmed addicts and by supplying such smokers with Government opium. This method only offers the possibilities of limiting individual consumption and preventing the spread of the habit to more and more individuals. Whether the system be prohibition or Government control, limitation and, as far as possible, eradication of the illicit traffic is indispensable to success.
Opium Monopoly

Manchoukuo's opium monopoly system was established to control opium production and transactions in order to facilitate the execution of its opium policy. If illicit cultivation of poppy, illegal transactions in opium and illicit opium smoking are suppressed and replaced by government licensed cultivation and smoking, the practice, it is believed, can be gradually lessened, and the evil eventually exterminated. This method which has been adopted by Manchoukuo conforms with that which was introduced into Taiwan several decades ago with marked success. As a first step towards eradicating the evil the Manchoukuo Government promulgated the Opium Law in November, 1932.

According to Article 2 of the Opium Law, no person is allowed to smoke opium. Special permission, however, may be given to those adults who had already acquired the habit before the Law was enforced, and to whom the drug is an indispensable necessity. Licensed smokers in 1938 numbered about 350,000, while the number of addicts is roughly estimated at one million, although no thorough surveys have as yet been made.
B. Short Historical Resume of the Control of Opium-Smoking.

When, in 1895, Formosa came under Japanese administration, it was found that a great number of the Formosan population was addicted to opium-smoking. Although absolute prohibition of opium-smoking had always been the established policy in Japan, investigations proved that it would be almost impossible to abolish opium-smoking in Formosa at once. In 1896, the Government-General declared that the Government alone would be allowed to import opium and that only habitual smokers would for medical reasons be permitted to consume opium. By the Opium Ordinance for Formosa, promulgated in January 1897, total prohibition of opium-smoking was laid down in principle, but special licenses to smoke were granted to medically-certified chronic addicts. An Opium Monopoly was established, and the opening of smoking establishments and the manufacture and sale of smoking paraphernalia was made subject to a licensing system. In September 1901 the preparatory work for the licensing of opium-addicts had been completed and 169,064 addicts were given smokers' licenses. The control system was based on the principle that no more licenses would be given, and consequently opium smoking would entirely disappear with the death of the last of the licensed smokers registered in 1900.

In course of time, however, it proved impossible to carry out this principle. A great number of secret smokers existed, who relied on the illicit traffic for their supplies, and it was found impracticable to apply the penalties of the Ordinance for illicit smoking on account of the large number of offenders. Twice the registers were opened and new smokers admitted to the licence system. This occurred in 1904-05 and in 1908, when 30,543 and 15,849 new addicts were given smoking licenses. At the end of 1928, there remained slightly over 77,000 licensed smokers.

The Government, aware of the existence of numerous secret smokers, decided, in view of the coming into force of the Geneva Opium Agreement of 1925, to enforce a still stricter control of opium-smoking in Formosa. For this purpose, a revised Opium Ordinance was promulgated in January 1929, under which smokers' licences could be given only to persons already addicted at the time when the Ordinance came into force. In addition, the penalty for illicit smoking, which under the previous Ordinance had been imprisonment or a fine, was increased to imprisonment with hard labour for a period not exceeding three years, without the inclusion of an alternative fine only. A consequence of this new Ordinance was the licensing of all confirmed addicts of the time of its coming into force.
are licensed and rationed. The administration of the Opium Ordinance comes within the competence of the Monopoly Department, which instructs farmers on the cultivation of opium poppy, manufactures prepared opium, extracting gum so that the finished product uniformly contains 6 per cent morphine, and distributes its prepared opium through licensed wholesale and retail dealers. The manufacture and sale of smoking paraphernalia may be undertaken only by licensed persons. Smoking establishments have been established since 1949. All licensed opium-smokers are under strict police control. Officers carry out inspection of smokers and their homes at regular intervals. Women are allowed to become licensed smokers under the same conditions as men. There are no legal stipulations as to the minimum age of licensed smokers, but licences have been given only to persons above the age of 20.

The purchase and sale of dross is prohibited, and the smokers are obliged to destroy the dross under police supervision. At present the monopoly does not purchase dross, although there is legal provision for such purchase by the Government.

Prepared opium is sold wholesale only by the Monopoly in metal tins holding 375 grams (10 tahils). Retail sales are by weight. The present retail price of prepared opium is 44 yen per tin (10 tahils), which includes 10 per cent commission to retail dealers. Wholesale dealers receive a commission of 1.3 per cent on the wholesale price, which is 40 yen per tin of 10 tahils. The wholesale price has been gradually increased from 10 yen, which was the price when the control system was first established in 1897. The price has remained unchanged since 1919.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaooru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 653 pages and entitled "Commission of Inquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East, Report to the Council, Volume I, II (1930, 1931)" is an official document issued by the League of Nations, duly received by, and in the custody of, the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 28th day of February, 1947.

/s/ K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: K. [Signature]
八三一〇

（阿片取締規則に基づく防害に関する歴史的検証）

【参考文献の「く」開への啓示】第一四〇八頁及び四〇九頁より抜粋

一八九五年、台湾が日本に支配下に入ると当時、多數の貧困住民が阿片の吸煙に溺れていたことが判明した。一八九七年一月公布された阿片取締規則は、阿片の輸入に政府のみ許され、普通の消費者の吸煙は原則として全面的に禁止されたが、公衆上の疑惑をうけた観音阿片使用者のみ吸制の特別許可が与えられた。

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 281
阿片の薬販制は確立され、吸煙所の開設・吸煙用小物の製造、販売は免許制度に据わることになった。昭和9年9月、阿片使用者許可の準備は完了し、昭和9年、65名の使用者に吸煙許可証が交付された。これ以上許可証は交付されないのであるから、従って昭和9年に登録された吸煙者の後の一人の死亡と共に阿片の吸煙は全く消滅するであろうといふ原理に立脚していた。

然しながら、やがて、右の原理を實際に常に常に従う事は不可能であるから、又違反者が多い様であった為に、密吸煙に而て締めの間金を課する事は實際不可能であるといふ事があった。登録が再び開始され、新吸煙者に発許証が与えられた。此れは昭和9年昭和5年昭和2年昭和8年に至る間、及び昭和9年に起り、その後10年8月1日及び昭和9年新設の時夫々30、50、30、30名及び15、10、15名等の新しい使用者に吸煙許可証が与えられれた。昭和9年8月の暮に於ても公認の阿片吸煙者は二七、〇〇〇名より多少多かった。
多くの密吸煙者の存在に気付いた政府は、一九二五年のジェノヴァ阿片
協定の履行に際して、密に於ける阿片吸煙者の処罰を実行しようと決心した。この目的の為に、一九二九年一月、改正阿片取締令が公布され
た者に限り興へられた。加ふるに、密吸煙に対する刑罰は、以前の取締令
では除却焚きは罰金であつたのが、強化されて三年を越えざる重罰の禁
制となり、之には罰金のみでの、代替を認めめておらなかた。此の取締令
の下では、密取締令が公布されたが、密吸煙者に対する刑罰は、以前の取締
令に於ては何れも削減を受けて、遂に一九三九年には全く廃止されている。

(c)現在履行中の阿片取締りの一般制度

吸煙者は児童を受けて阿片の取締を受けるのである。

上の説明を受けた者を除いて阿片吸煙を一般的に禁じてある。
阿片を製造するが、モルヒネは、出されがりの製品が一歩に六パーセン
に含有する様に抽出される。吸煙所は、その製薬を関連の製造小物を弁当に
して、数名の製造を続けて来る。発許を受けて有人吸煙所の事務を負
いう。発許者は、一定期間毎に吸煙所の在庫を監督して是正に法律上の
規定は、決して行なわなければならない。政府による買入を規定してゐる法律
は、決して行なわなければならない。現在製薬所の小

回部の麻制令の施行は専賣局の権限に属し、専賣局は生薬を輸入し、精
PROCLAMATION

Opium smoking is of ancient origin and has become firmly established as a common custom. Consequently the waste of lives and fortunes was regarded with contempt by the people. As long as escape from this evil custom is impossible, it is most regrettable viewed from the standpoint of the spiritual good of the state. However, the suitability or lack of suitability of an opium system is a major problem bearing on the rise or fall of a nation.

Now that the establishment of Manchuria has been accomplished, it is time for complete political reform. If we do not create near for abolishing the use of opium, establishing such means as a fundamental policy immediately, this evil will further spread in the father and will result finally in a hopeless situation.

We are forced to admit that such a policy would be a mistaken one, proper disposition of opium addicts, which are presently existing in large numbers, was overlooked, if we try now to prohibit it as it would be like damming a river without controlling its source. We are forced to admit that such a policy would be a mistaken one.

In view of the fact that a legal system to prohibit the use of opium had early been completely provided for, it is a fact that it was not effective in the least.

In order to cure the people of this long-admitted evil habit, we must resort to progressive measures for gradual decrease of the number of addicts, and strictly prohibit general use of opium, or permitting those already addicted to the habit its continued use for medical purposes. We must also establish medical institutions.
for the relief of the victims of the drug while striving to prevent the appearance of new victims by such means as education and various other social measures, awakening the people to the fearful facts of the addiction. By these means let us strive for gradual extirpation of this evil custom, these apparently being the measures proved by the experiments in different quarters of the world to be the most effective means for the suppression of opium addiction. Our government, therefore, following the above-described policy, promulgated on November 30, 1932 (D.II.0 1), the Opium Law, Imperial Ordinance No. 111, in the hope of attaining the above aims. We expect that our people will understand the significance of this law reflect well on their conduct and faithfully observe the dictates of our great project for the renovation of our national life.

November 30, 1932 (D.II.0 1)

CHENG, Hsiao-hsu,
Prime Minister of Manchukuo.
Translation Certificate

I, Charles L. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles L. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 April 1947
CERTIFICATE

I, Kamata, Yoshio, hereby certify that the attached Proclamation of Premier in 1932, in my handwriting, is a true and full copy made by me from the source document entitled, "Opium Laws and Regulations of Manchukuo Government Bulletin."

/s/ Kamata, Yoshio
Kamata, Yoshio

11 April 1947.

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date 11 April 1947
CERTIFICATE

I, who occupied the post of the Professor of Kankoku University of Lanchoukuo from 1939 to 1943, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in Japanese, consisting of thirty (30) pages and entitled, "Opium Law and Regulations Concerning Thereof" was published by Lanchoukuo Government and obtained by me in that capacity and has been kept in my library.

February 12th, 1947

/s/ OKANO, Kanki

No. 75 Idojayanakama-ohi
Kinami-Ku, Yokohama

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were subscribed and affixed before me.

At the same place
On the same date

Witness: /s/ SAMYONJI, Shohai
Counselor at Law

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, KIGITA, Kasao, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of the certificate of source of Defense Document No. 978 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ KIGITA, Kasao

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 17th, 1947
**LICENSED' OPIUM-SMOKERS BY SEX (NATIVE FORMOSANS) (1897-29).**

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of licensed smokers to entire population</th>
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<td>29,001</td>
<td>4,754</td>
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<td>21,057</td>
<td>3,569</td>
<td>24,626</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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</table>
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, MASAHIRO NAKAJIMA, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English, consisting of 873 pages and entitled "COALITION OF NATIONS INTO THE CONTROL OF OPIUM-SMOKING IN THE FAR EAST, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, VOLUME I, II (1930; 1931)" is an official document issued by the League of Nations, duly received by, and in the custody of, the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 21st day of January, 1947.

[Signature of Official]

Witness: [Signature]
1945
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年</th>
<th>男</th>
<th>女</th>
<th>計</th>
<th>人口に対する</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1887 | 3736 | 2320 | 6056 | 0.1%
| 1888 | 3840 | 1600 | 5440 | 0.2%
| 1890 | 3210 | 6500 | 9760 | 0.5%
| 1900 | 152090 | 2500 | 154590 | 1.4%
| 1901 | 145887 | 10044 | 155931 | 1.5%
| 1902 | 130149 | 13543 | 143692 | 1.3%
| 1903 | 116059 | 10044 | 126103 | 1.2%
| 1904 | 123420 | 14760 | 138180 | 1.3%
| 1905 | 115462 | 15014 | 130476 | 1.4%
| 1906 | 107100 | 14131 | 121231 | 1.1%
| 1907 | 105010 | 13238 | 118248 | 1.2%
| 1908 | 106052 | 14923 | 120975 | 1.3%
| 1909 | 106202 | 12705 | 118907 | 1.2%
| 1910 | 80947 | 12020 | 92967 | 1.0%
| 1911 | 75090 | 11572 | 86662 | 1.0%
| 1912 | 71301 | 10747 | 82048 | 1.0%
| 1913 | 69340 | 10155 | 79495 | 1.0%
| 1914 | 62150 | 9520 | 71670 | 1.0%
| 1915 | 57020 | 9010 | 66030 | 1.0%
| 1916 | 55030 | 8470 | 63500 | 1.0%
| 1917 | 48158 | 7914 | 56072 | 1.0%
| 1918 | 44680 | 7173 | 51853 | 1.0%
| 1919 | 41375 | 6397 | 47772 | 1.0%
| 1920 | 38680 | 6842 | 45522 | 1.0%
| 1921 | 30257 | 5061 | 35318 | 1.0%
| 1922 | 33085 | 4938 | 38023 | 1.0%
| 1923 | 31201 | 5130 | 36331 | 1.0%
| 1924 | 29001 | 4764 | 33765 | 1.0%
| 1925 | 26402 | 4151 | 30553 | 1.0%
| 1926 | 24912 | 3131 | 28043 | 0.9%
| 1927 | 23001 | 3141 | 26142 | 0.9%
| 1928 | 22087 | 3160 | 25247 | 0.8%
| 1929 | 21057 | 3180 | 24237 | 0.8%

The enquiry has brought the Commission to the conviction that all Governments concerned are endeavouring to fulfil their international obligations as regards control of opium-smoking, and attempting to control and reduce as soon as possible the consumption of opium for smoking purposes. The basis of these control systems, when total prohibition is not yet enforced, is a Government Monopoly. The systems in force differ greatly on important points. Some Governments have been able to carry the restrictive measures further than others owing to more favourable local conditions or to a stronger initiative.

The complete Government monopoly system for opium control has the following principal features:

1. Import of raw opium for non-medical purposes is the exclusive right of the Government.

2. The manufacturing and packing of prepared opium is the exclusive right of the Government.

3. Prepared opium is distributed through Government shops.

4. Prepared opium is sold at a price fixed at a high rate, making opium a luxury.

5. Possession and consumption of prepared opium is only permitted to registered or licensed smokers with special regulations regarding race, sex and age of smokers.

6. Individual consumption is limited by a system of rationing allowing smokers only daily limited quantities of prepared opium.

7. Smoking of opium is only permitted in Government-owned or licensed smoking establishments, where prepared opium is sold for consumption on the premises.

8. The dross resulting from smoking becomes the property of the Government or is collected by the Government.

9. The profit derived from the Opium monopoly goes to the Government as any other state revenue.

10. The monopoly is protected by organisation of preventive services and adequate legislation to suppress illicit trade in and illicit consumption of opium.

(a) Extent of Opium monopoly.

The complete system of control through Government monopoly as outlined above is not in existence anywhere in the Far-Eastern territories concerned. All systems in practice fall short
of this programme in some respects. There is only one point in which the situation is the same everywhere, namely, that the import of raw opium for smoking purposes is a Government monopoly. In all territories, except two - Kenny-Chow-Van and the Kwantung Leased Territory, the manufacturing of prepared opium is a Government monopoly. In Hong-Kong, the Government sells raw opium direct to the consumer, and the manufacturing of prepared opium for sale is prohibited. So far, only a few territories, the Straits Settlements and most of the States in British Malaya, including the British protectorates of Borneo, and the Netherlands Indies, have brought the retail distribution of prepared opium under complete Government monopoly, that is, retail sales are undertaken by Government officials in Government-owned shops. In all other territories retail sales are effected through vendors licensed by Governments. In Siam, licensed shops are gradually being replaced by shops owned and managed by the Government. In Burma, the shops are Government owned but run by licensed vendors, each shop being controlled by a special excise officer permanently attached to it.

Registration or licensing of opium-smokers exists completely in Burma, in the Straits Settlements, in most of the States in British Malaya and in the British protectorates of Borneo, in Formosa, and in the Kwantung Leased Territory. In the Netherlands Indies the system varies as regards registration and licensing in different parts of the territory. A great many of the smokers are licensed and, although practically all the smokers are required to register when purchasing opium, there is no system of registration under which opium may be sold only to smokers who have previously been allowed to register by the Government.

The system of rationing smokers is complete in three territories, Burma, Formosa, and the Kwantung Leased Territory. In the Netherlands Indies, all licensed smokers are rationed but not those who are registered only.

In practically all territories, opium legislation fixes the maximum quantity of prepared opium that an individual may have in his possession. This can be considered as an initial stage of rationing. In Siam and in Hong-Kong special groups of smokers are rationed. In Siam, special licensed smokers who are allowed to smoke in their homes are rationed but they are comparatively few, which is also the case in Hong-Kong with the rationed smokers of a specially high-grade opium called "Kamshao opium".

Siam is the only country where all opium-smokers, except the few hundred who are licensed, must obtain their supplies of prepared opium and consume it in Government-owned or licensed smoking establishments, from which smokers are not allowed to take away either prepared opium or dross. All dross is collected in the smoking establishment and handed over to the Government.

The purposes for which the monopoly was introduced have not been realised when the illicit trade sometimes amounts to three or four times the sales of Government opium. Very much remains to be done in order to make the monopolies effective.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 653 pages and entitled "COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CONTROL OF OPIUM-SMOKING IN THE FAR EAST, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, VOLUME I, II (1930, 1931) "is an official document issued by the League of Nations, duly received by, and in the custody of, the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 28th day of February, 1947.

/s/ K, HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ K, URAKAWA
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阿片専売の範囲

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地域では何處にも行われてある。

現に實施されている制度はすべてしきの点でこの轄領に際し及ばないが、何処に於ても同一の事情にある點がたたった一つある。それは即ち、

吸用の生阿片の製造は政府の保護になってゐるところである。満州

と門東州租借地を除く凡ての地域に於ては新興阿片の製造を除く政

府がやってゐる。ビルマでは政府が消長者に直接生阿片を販なし、販募

を目的とする製造生阿片の製造は禁止されてゐる。今日までのところ

ポルネオの英領保護国に於ては海塞殖民地。英領マレーの

大名領の州等二～三の地域に於てのみ耕種阿片の製造は政府の完全な
シャムでは官有官営の店が淘汰許小販店にさって替りつつある。特に吸煙者の中には技術的問題を考慮してでは店を取締っていたのが業界に取りまとめられた。ビールでは店は官有であるけれども認可を受けた者手の手で小販が行われての地域に於ては何等でも政府から認可を受けた者が手の手で小販が行われている。
には配給があるけれども登録だけのものには配給がない。

絵であるすべての地域においては、図書館の法律により個人が所持できる書籍片の最大数が定められている。これは別冊配給の第二段階であると考えるべきである。

シャムでは自宅で吸煙を許された特別の発許者だけが配給を受けている。しかし香港では比較的少数である。これは香港についても同じであっても、考慮でスカムシャム片の特別高級な片の配給を受けられるのが多い。なぜなら、配給を受けるための特別の書籍片の申出が多いために、配給を受けるためには特別の書籍片の申出が必要である。
17. Opium Revenue.

Opium control as actually practised in the Far-Eastern territories furnishes revenue to the Governments. In the course of time opium has become a source of income necessary to Governments for the balancing of their budgets, sometimes as much as one third of the total revenue being obtained from opium.

As all Governments concerned have by international agreements undertaken ultimately to suppress opium-smoking, opium as a source of revenue will in time disappear and must be replaced. It would be to the economic advantage of the territories concerned if Governments began immediately to adjust their finances to the gradual loss of opium revenue by making their budgets independent of it.

On moral grounds strong objections are raised to the fact that Governments obtain revenue from opium control. The reasons for these objections would be removed if the opium revenue were increasingly devoted to the campaign against opium-smoking and to social and hygienic development likely to reduce the future demand for opium.

The opium excess revenue should be transferred to a special section of the budget. In case legislative measures are necessary to introduce this change in the budget accounts, measures for this purposes should be considered in each territory. Every expense connected with opium including preventive services, should be charged against that revenue. If any item cannot be exactly determined an approximate amount should be charged.
The net opium revenue being thus arrived at, the available balance should be first applied to cover the expenses connected with the campaign against illicit traffic in opium, control of, propaganda, cure of addicts, scientific research and so on, such items being also charged against the opium revenue account.

The balance, if any, should be applied to the creation or increase of any form of Opium Revenue Replacement Fund or transferred either to the ordinary budget with a view to meeting expenditure for social or sanitary purposes or to the extraordinary budget to meet expenditure on public works directly or indirectly connected with the campaign against opium smoking.

At the Conference to be called under Article XII of the Geneve Opium Agreement, the Governments should agree to fix a definite period by which they will have taken the necessary steps to make their ordinary budgets independent of the opium revenue.
政府は、阿片の統制に依り収入を得てゐると云ふことにより創薬的見地から

をるであります。

阿片に対する反対の理由も阿片収入が減少せんために不可欠であり、また正義の為に投せられ又阿片に対する将来的需要を減少するやうな社会的且

 Wenger経済に於る變更をなすために立法的措置が必要である場合には、所

算勘定に基づく必要であるべく、阿片に関する利息の換算である場合においては、所

合する費用を償ふために欠かされるべきであり、断る費用は又阿片

に於ける非正取引に対する費用を償ふためには欠かされるべきものである。
CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS SUGGESTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By the terms of reference laid down by the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations, the Commission was asked what action should, in the existing circumstances, be taken by the Governments concerned and by the League of Nations in regard to the use of opium prepared for smoking. The Commission has reached the conclusion that the gradual and effective suppression of opium smoking requires concerted action on similar and concurrent lines by all Governments concerned. In view of this the Commission's suggestions are directed to all the Governments of the Far-Eastern territories included in the enquiry. The action suggested to the Governments should be based on international agreements and continuous international co-operation, covering all the aspects of the opium-smoking problem.

The Commission suggests to the League of Nations that it should use all its efforts to help the Governments in reaching agreements on the lines suggested by the Commission and in carrying out such agreements in co-operation with each other. The League should, moreover, follow closely the situation as regards opium control for the purpose of ensuring progress and the final suppression of opium-smoking in all territories.

The following are the Commission's conclusions and suggestions:

1. Necessity for Concurrent Measures.

Sincere efforts have been made to combat the opium-smoking habit and the illicit traffic in opium throughout the Far-East. On the whole, however, these efforts have had but few lasting results owing to the fact that each step taken was isolated and not co-ordinated to any general plan. The opium policy in some countries had the character of a series of experiments. Again, a measure has sometimes been adopted in expectation of results that never materialised from a measure adopted previously.

It has proved a bad policy to concentrate on some measures and to ignore others: to combat the illicit traffic but to disregard poppy cultivation which supplies that traffic; to endeavour to limit the demands for opium but to ignore the causes of that demand; to register smokers but not to ration them; to control the use of opium but not of dross, or to control smoking establishments but to allow opium-smoking outside them.

In order to attain the desired results it is essential that all measures aiming at gradual suppression of opium-smoking should be taken concurrently and applied as progressively as circumstances permit.

If Governments find it necessary to employ private licensed individuals for the retail of opium to consumers, even the best efforts to check the spread of the opium smoking habit and to suppress the illicit traffic in opium may be, and often are, useless. It may be assumed that a person in the direct employment of a Government will as a rule carry out the Government's instructions more faithfully than a licensed retailer or his employee who might let private considerations of profit influence their actions. It is only by making the retail dealers independent of financial considerations that Governments can obtain even a relative safeguard against dealers taking advantage of their position to increase their profits by trying to enlarge the sales of opium. Complete Government monopoly is almost everywhere in force for the buying of raw opium and for the manufacture of prepared opium.

The principle that Governments should have contact with smokers only through Government officials or employees should be applied everywhere as soon as possible, to every transaction connected with distribution of opium to smokers. The first step in this direction should be the abolition of all licensed retail shops and their replacement by Government shops managed by employees of the opium monopoly and subjected to constant and rigorous inspection by the monopoly itself, as well as by other Government officials in the districts. The second step should be the gradual merging of these Government retail shops into Government-owned and Government-managed smoking establishments.

11. Measures to Control Individual Consumption.

Individual consumption of opium must be under efficient control in order to bring about gradual suppression. This can be done by limiting the consumption of individual smokers and by the adoption of measures to prevent the spread of the smoking habit. Methods which have proved practicable are registration pure and simple, registration with licensing and registration with licensing and rationing.

Registration pure and simple means that opium may be purchased only by persons who have been inscribed in smokers' registers, kept at retail shops, and who give their names at each purchase. This method has the advantage of giving Governments a knowledge of the approximate number of opium-smokers, which is indispensable for systematic campaign against the opium vice. It is also possible to limit legal consumption to certain races or groups of the population. This method, however, does not give any control of individual consumption unless combined with licensing.

Registration with licensing means that opium may be purchased only by persons who have obtained smoking licences from the competent authorities. These licences record the name, age
and occupation of the holder and bear his photograph. They specify the retail shop where supplies of opium may be purchased subject to the production of the licence. Each purchase is noted on the licence or a special pass-book, provided for this purpose. Registers of the licences are kept by the Government. This method has the same advantages as simple registration and, further, the daily purchases can be controlled and limited by a legal maximum for purchase at one time.

Registration with licensing and rationing means that smokers, in addition to being licensed and registered, are limited in their purchases to individually fixed daily doses. This method has all the advantages of registration with licensing and permits control of degree of addiction; it also helps to prevent supplies of legal opium from reaching unlicensed smokers and thus tends both to limit individual consumption and prevent the spread of the habit.

Registration with licensing and rationing is the only really efficient method for the control of consumption. A class of illicit smokers will, however, be formed if licensing facilities are not given, to new addicts, owing to a premature closing of the registers.

In all territories registration with licensing and rationing should be put into effect; where special preparations are necessary, these should be taken immediately. The issue of licences and the rationing of smokers should not be left to subordinate officials but to the civil service or monopoly officials in the administrative districts. The daily rations should be calculated on the individual smoker's minimum requirement. Both licensing and rationing should be based on a medical certificate wherever there are a sufficient number of qualified physicians.

Smoking licenses should not be issued unless the licensing authority has received satisfactory evidence by medical certificate, trustworthy witnesses or otherwise that the applicant is a confirmed opium addict. Wherever registration systems already exist, but the registers have been closed, they should be reopened for the licensing of certified addicts. Thereafter all licensing registers should be kept open or reopened at regular intervals.


As long as opium-smokers are allowed to smoke in private the control of opium-smoking is incomplete and spread of the habit always possible. Measures must be taken to suppress illicit "opium dens" where smokers who do not wish or cannot smoke at home congregate. Smoking at home as well as in "illicit dens" facilitates illicit traffic in opium. Smokers should therefore in principle be obliged to smoke opium in public smoking establishments. These concentrate smokers to a few localities and make it easier, to control the individual and his consumption, to prevent the spread of the habit and of disease through pipes, and to collect the doses produced by smokers of legal opium.
It is therefore recommended that the system of compulsory smoking in public smoking establishments be introduced everywhere in spite of the fact that such a policy is not to insufficient knowledge of the harm done by exposure to public smoking establishments. The policy of limiting as much as possible the number of smoking establishments mentioned in Article IV of the Geneva Opium Convention is said to be adopted. The policy suggested by the Government would involve the closing of a sufficient number of smoking establishments to accommodate the addicted smoker.

To ensure effective control of public smoking establishments they should be under the scrutiny of the Government. The retail shops also owned and rented by the Government should be merged into the smoking establishments as much as practicable. Only such persons who for special reasons are permitted to smoke in their homes or in other specially licensed places should be allowed to smoke outside the Government smoking establishments. Special permits for these persons should be an exception and the holders subjected to regular control. The taking away of opium or tuss from smoking establishments should be prohibited and be made a penal offence. Holders of special smoking permits should not be allowed to purchase new supplies of opium until they have returned the stipulated quantity of opium.


Opium pipes are supplied to the smokers in the smoking establishments. No adequate measures have been taken, however, to prevent these pipes, which are used by one smoker after another, from serving as a means of spreading contagious diseases such as syphilis, tuberculosis and other.

In public smoking establishments the opium pipes should be sterilised by a solution of sodium after use by each smoker. Sterilisation in such a manner cannot be considered satisfactory. Other smoking places, rooms and coaches should be kept in hygienic condition.

The only persons who would require to have opium pipes in their possession would be those smokers who are specially licensed to smoke outside smoking establishments. No one should be allowed to possess a pipe without a licence from the Government, and licensed possessors of pipes should be subjected to periodical control including inspection of the hygienic condition of the pipes.


The cure of opium addicts is an important step towards the total suppression of opium-smoking and the prevention of a further spread of the habit. The discovery of an inexpensive method which will cure opium addicts without involving too much suffering in overcoming the craving for opium would be a decisive step in the anti-opium campaign. This question has already received
Considerable attention in some territories in the Far-East, sometimes in connection with the cure of addiction to other narcotic drugs. Investigations have been conducted either as part of scientific research or in connection with the actual cure of smokers. Medical care has also been given in some cases to non-drug users suffering from narcotics in order to treat them by smokers of similar habit. In times of economic depression smokers have been prevented from smoking opium while in hospitals, but they have returned to their habit as soon as they were again able to afford it.

Increased and systematic attention should be given to the cure of opium addiction. The Government should take the lead in this question and give every encouragement to private efforts. Special opium wards should be attached to existing hospitals and additional hospitals built which might, when no longer necessary for the cure of opium addicts, be turned into mental hospitals. Funds for these purposes should be made available from the opium revenue.

The experience and results obtained in relation to the cure of addiction to opium by medical authorities should be communicated to the medical authorities of other territories.

There should be after-care of cured addicts in order to prevent relapse. Compulsory cure should be tried as soon as possible in special districts in order to gain experience for the purpose of gradually curing all addicts.
委員会の決議及びその関係諸政府並びに関係諸国への提案

国際連盟第九 toArrayの定めた諮問事項に際り本委員会に求められたことは
現状における、派生用紙及び件の所用に関して関係諸政府並びに関係諸国への提案

に拝察されている措置は、阿片吸食問題の全部について対策にしている。関係諸政府
となる協定と事務的な国際間の協力に基を置かなければならないものである。

本委員会は、関係諸政府が委員会の提案した方針に従って協定に達するや
という形で相互に協力してかかる協定を実行するようになる。聯盟は互いにすべての地域に於ける進歩を確保し、最近には国片観察を根拠する事を目的とする国片の取締関係して、事態を綿密に研究せねばならぬ。

本発表の論論及び提案は以下に述べてある。

| 真向の効果しか取れておなかったのは、夫々の處ガパラパラであり、全体の計画と調和が取れておなかったためである。| ある観察に言念して、他の處置を顧みないのは、不得体である事があ
| これが一簡の実験たることである。亦以前に採った措置からは決して実現しなかった結果を期待して再びある措置が採用された事もある。| ある観察に言念して、他の處置を顧みないのは、不得体である事があ
九

若し政府が消費者に阿片の小貢をする為に個人を使用することを必要とするならば、阿片吸食の習慣が蔓延するのであっても、政府（政府の命を副）

利用して阿片の摘取の依頼を行おうと、小貢はその依頼を受けて阿片の買入を

政庁はその旨更に使用人を通じてのみ阿片吸食者と接觸すべきと

必得な政府に事実を前言して政府が阿片の買入並に調製阿片の厳粛に交じし

ては底底的なる政府に事実を前言して政府が阿片の買入並に調製阿片の厳粛に交じしり

若し政府が消費者に阿片の小貢をする為に個人を使用することを必要とするならば、阿片吸食の習慣が蔓延するのであっても、政府（政府の命を副）

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必得な政府に事実を前言して政府が阿片の買入並に調製阿片の厳粛に交じしり

ては底底的なる政府に事実を前言して政府が阿片の買入並に調製阿片の厳粛に交じしり

若し政府が消費者に阿片の小貢をする為に個人を使用することを必要とするならば、阿片吸食の習慣が蔓延するのであっても、政府（政府の命を副）

利用して阿片の摘取の依頼を行おうと、小貢はその依頼を受けて阿片の買入を

政庁はその旨更に使用人を通じてのみ阿片吸食者と接觸すべきと

必得な政府に事実を前言して政府が阿片の買入並に調製阿片の厳粛に交じしり

ては底底的なる政府に事実を前言して政府が阿片の買入並に調製阿片の厳粛に交じしり

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必得な政府に事実を前言して政府が阿片の買入並に調製阿片の厳粛に交じしり
十一
個人消費の統制方法

阿片の個人消費は鴨水を抑えるために個人の吸煙者の消費量を制限し、鴨水の習慣が

方針は、単純な登録、免許登録及び免許定数支給登録である。今日迄適用的であった
単純登録に於ては小販店に貰うだけの吸殻者名簿に記入済みの者で
 Ark片を買う度毎に姓名を並べる者ののみが良片を帰用することができ
る。この方法だと政府は吸殻者の情報を除く組織的配慮に必要である
と考える。これにより、個人消費を統制する方法ではない。

阿片の購入はその都度この免許状又は目的のため作られた特別
し得るものである。この免許状には所有者の姓名年齢及び喫用
者の法定消費を認

rif fen No. 3-1
登録と同一の便宜があり更に日々の購入は一時的に購入しないが、この方法は何万と見られるのによつて統制され且つ制限される。

でなくその険入量は個々人別に定められた一定の用量に制限される。従って受領証を発行して forsk.

しかし、又法定の現状を異にせんと為に自動的に登録簿を保存し、受領証の発行を停止し、その結果

が達へられることを助けるにする。
登録の際、契約者は被告当官が許可の書類や事務所の場所を述べる必要がある。登録者には、この届出書の内容が記載されている。本件に関する書類は、登録者に提出されるべきである。
十三

吸煙者

阿片吸煑者がつつそり吸煑を出る限り阿片吸煑の維持は完全ではない
その習癖はつつじも喫煙する可能性がある。家庭での吸煑は欲情せぬや
一義制の阿片吸煑は勿論家庭での阿片の吸煑は阿片の吸煑を欲情せぬや
少なくなる。故に吸煑を適当に喫煙し喫煙の習癖を保留する手段を取らね
なければならぬ。公設吸煑所は吸煑習慣を二三の場所におきまらせ、又各個
人及びその適当を統制し吸煑の習癖と吸煑から病気かるかすのを防
じたるし

それ故この問題に対する理解が復いため公設阿片吸煑所が設

9
公設阿片吸納所の取締を効果的にやるためには之を官有官経にした場所で吸納を許されあらぬ。官有官経の小販店も亦出るだけ速かに公設吸納所に併合されねばならぬ。吸納所の設置の理由から吸納所は家庭外で吸納を許されず、これに反する阿片又は吸納所に持ち去らぬ。特別吸納許可状の所持者は規定通りの阿片を返退し、法令に従らすべく犯

したというば数規に阿片を仮入することを許されてはたらない。
十四　阿片用の煩管の取揃え及び消毒
阿片用の煩管は吸煙所で吸殻者に交付される。然し相次いで使用され
った عمدخ في الشراكة في البيروت

公設吸殻所では阿片用の煩管は各吸殻者が使用後は消毒的方法で殺
菌されねばならぬ。吸殻所の所持を許しではならぬ。而して煩管の所持を許
してはならぬ。煩管の所持を許されれば何人にも違った便管の所持を許され
たらね。
一六 阿片吸殻者の治療

阿片常用水者に於ける治療は、阿片の吸殻を根絶し、次いで阿片の治療を発見することである。故に阿片の治療は、阿片吸殻者の所要の治療を決定的なる第一歩である。次に阿片吸殻者の治療法を決定せしめるために、阿片吸殻者の治療の方法を研究せんとせり。

この研究の一部として、阿片吸殻者の治療のための便宜な治療法を発見せんとせり。然し、阿片吸殻者の治療法を発見せんとせり。故に、阿片吸殻者の治療法を決定せんとせり。
阿片患者を治療するには、非常に大きな且つ系統的な注意が興へら

一し、且つ個人の能力に対しても激勧を與へべきである。関係諸政府は、本問題に先づけツけねばならない

にもこれは当然である。阿片患者を治療する必要がある。従って、病院

に設置されねばならない。これに於いては、一

又は用立つべきである。

医務局長は阿片薬の常に治療に関し得るか、又は他の

地域の医務局長に通告せねばならない。

地域の医務局長が阿片患者がぶり返さないよう、又は

数快させる阿片患者がぶり返さないよう、又は

於いては、出来るだけ早く、総べての阿片薬品

を漸進的に治療する目的のための経験を得るため、強制的治療を試み

なければならない。
Opium and Narcotics. The opium monopoly has as its fundamental purpose the extermination of opium evil through national control. In this respect, the re-organization of the system in 1934 and further study of the problem in general finally led the Government in August, 1937, to discard the policy of gradually eliminating addicts and to adopt a new policy of completely exterminating the habit within a period of ten years beginning in 1938. The ten-year plan for the extermination of opium evil as announced on August 12, 1937, outlined an elaborate program including (1) education against opium-smoking, (2) prevention of the appearance of fresh cases, (3) curing of addicted persons, (4) control and improvement of opium to be used in the treatment of addicts, (5) self-restraint of Government and municipal officials, and (6) rigid control of production, buying and selling of opium in conformity with the policy of eradicating opium-smoking. Simultaneously with the strengthening of the opium monopoly, the Government has decided to ban the use of narcotic drugs. Consequently, the Narcotics Law was promulgated in August, and enforced from September 15, 1937. The narcotic administration under the Narcotics Law is presently under the jurisdiction of the Health Department but, as the opium from which narcotic drugs are manufactured is a monopoly product, the manufacture, importation, and distribution of morphine and heroin were placed under the supervision of the Monopoly Office (For the texts of these Laws, see Appendix III, Nos. 9 and 7).
一九三九年（昭和十四年）五月の関東大震災に関する報告書

片の案件を緩和することであった。この點では、一九三七年八月政府は徐々に使用者を多く加え、一九三八年度の結果を確認した後、一九三九年（昭和十四年）八月に使用を継続する方針を決定した。これにより、一九三九年度に使用する一〇年計画の実施を完了に進め、さらに使用の内容は、

一、使用方法

片の案件を緩和化と同時に出、政府は関東大震災を緩和に決定した。その後、
昭和政綱は、八月に公布される。一九三七年（昭二十二年）九月十五日から実施された。昭和政綱は、昭和政綱法において、昭和政綱は元来衛生講話であるが、昭和政綱材料たる関係が昭和政綱違反の生産する故、昭和政綱の
（その法律改正案）
昭和政綱（第三、第四條及七律ノ法律）
Opium Law

Imperial Ordinance No. VII.

Promulgated November 30, 1832

(Revised January 11, 1838)

Article I. The term "opium" as used in the present Law shall include raw opium, prepared opium and opium for medical use.

Article II. No person shall be allowed to smoke opium. However, the foregoing provision shall not apply to addicts over the age of 25 years, who are deemed to require opium for bodily treatment and licensed by the Government.

Article III. The official sale of opium and the manufacture of prepared opium and opium for medical use shall be executed by the Government. The manufacture of prepared opium under conditions stipulated in Items (2) and (3) of Article V, however, is excepted.

Article IV. Opium or instruments for opium-smoking shall be prohibited from importation or exportation except when falling within the purview of any one of the following conditions:

1. Importation or exportation of opium by the Government;
2. Exportation of opium for medical use by agents who are appointed in accordance with the provisions of orders concerned;
3. Importation of instruments for opium-smoking by producers of instruments as provided for by orders concerned.

Article V. The manufacture, sale or purchase, transfer,
ownership or possession of opium or instruments for opium-smoking shall be prohibited except when stimulated by order and coming within the purview of any one of the following:

1. When a producer of instruments manufactures, buys and sells, transfers, owns, or possesses instruments for opium-smoking.

2. When the Hsinking Special Municipality, Municipalities, Hsien or Banner Governments or an opium retail agent manufactures prepared opium, or buys and sells, transfers, owns or possesses raw opium, prepared opium, and instruments for opium-smoking;

3. When an opium addict mentioned in the proviso of Article II manufactures prepared opium or obtains by transfer, owns or possesses raw opium, prepared opium or instruments for opium-smoking;

4. When a person who has been permitted to cultivate pop manufactures, transfers or possesses raw opium;

5. When an opium purchasing agent purchases, transfers, owns or possesses raw opium;

6. When a pharmacutist or any one who has received the license mentioned in Article II of the Drugs Act obtains by transfer, owns or possesses raw opium or opium for medical use;

7. When a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharmacist, a person who has received the license mentioned in Article VII of the Drugs Act or agent dealing in opium for medical use buys and sells, transfers, owns or possesses opium for medical use;
Article I. The person obtains by transfer, owns, or possesses opium for medical use with a written prescription obtained from a physician, dentist, or veterinarian;

9. When an inheritor or receiver of property transfers or possesses opium or instruments for opium-smoking as a result of the inability of the original person permitted to own or possess opium or the instruments for opium-smoking by virtue of any of the foregoing provision.

Article VI. The Hamsing Special municipality, Municipalities, (Pasin or Banner Governments or opium retail dealers shall not sell or transfer prepared opium bought from the Monopoly Bureau after working up or adding other mixtures to the same.

Article VII. No person shall be allowed to maintain opium smoking dens or provide facilities for the smoking of opium for others with the object of making profit. Licensed opium retail dealers, however, may be permitted to do so when Government approval is secured.

Article VIII. No cultivation of poppy intended for the manufacturing of opium or its substitute shall be allowed without the approval of the Governments.

Article IX. The sale or purchase and the transfer of poppy seeds intended for the object mentioned in the previous article shall be forbidden; the sale and transfer of the same to those cultivating poppy with Government approval, however, shall be excepted.
Article X. Any one cultivating poppy with government approval shall deliver the raw opium produced to the Government for the time being, however, such a raw opium may be sold to opium purchasing agents designated by the Government.

The said opium purchasing agents shall deliver the raw opium so purchased to the Government.

Article XI. The manufacture, sale or purchase, transfer, ownership or possession of adulterated opium shall be prohibited.

Article XII. In order to correct the habit of opium-smoking, the Minister of People's Welfare shall adopt necessary measures for the opium-addicts.

The expenditures required for the aforesaid measures shall be determined by the Minister of People's Welfare.

Article XIII. In case of necessity, the Government may order the persons mentioned in the different items listed in Article V to submit reports.

Article XIV. Persons coming within the purview of either of the following shall be punished by penal servitude not exceeding seven years, or a fine not exceeding seven thousand yu
1. Persons who have violated the provisions of Article IV or V with the object of selling opium;

2. Persons who have violated provisions of Article VII, VIII.

In case the foregoing act or acts are committed the above mentioned penal servitude and the fine may be imposed simultaneously upon the violator.

Article XV. Persons, who have violated the provisions of Article IV or pertaining to instruments for opium-smoking with the object of selling, shall be punished by penal servitude not exceeding five years or a fine not exceeding five thousand yuan.

In the foregoing case the penal servitude and the fine may be imposed simultaneously upon the violator.

Article XV—2. Persons who have violated the provisions of Articles II, VI or IX shall be punished by penal servitude not exceeding three years or a fine not exceeding one thousand yuan.

Article XVI. Attempted acts of crimes described in the three preceding Articles shall be punishable.

Article XVII. Persons coming within the purview of either of the following shall be punished by penal servitude not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding one thousand yuan:

1. Addicts described in the provision of Article IV smoking opium other than that obtained through Government sale;

2. Persons who have violated the provisions of Article IV or V without the object of selling.
Article XVIII. Persons coming within the purview of either of the following shall be punished by penal servitude not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding three hundred yuan:

1. Persons violating the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article X;

2. Persons disobeying the disposition provided for in Article XI;

3. Persons neglecting without adequate reasons to submit reports provided for in Article XII or submitting false reports;

4. Persons refusing, hindering or evading the official inspection provided for in Article XIII, or those refusing to reply to questions put to them or making false replies during the said inspection or disobeying the disposition by the proper authorities concerned.

Article XIX. In case a person violates the provisions of present Law, the opium, poppy, or instruments for opium-smoking concerned shall be confiscated without regard to their own ship.

In case the said opium, poppy or instruments cannot be confiscated, a sum equivalent to the value of the same shall be collected.

Article XX. In case the representatives, the head or members of the family or the employers of the persons who are importing or exporting opium for medical use or instruments for opium-smoking described in item (2) or (3) of Article IV, or of the persons mentioned in item (1), (2), (4), or (7), of
Article V. Violate the provisions of the present Law or orders issued based upon the present Law, the persons so mentioned shall not evade punishments thereof on the ground that such violations had been committed without their direction.

Article XXI. In case the representatives of a juridical person, or its employees, or persons engaged in its service is found to have violated the provisions of the present Law, the representatives of such juridical person shall be punished.

Article XXII. The date of the enforcement of the present Law shall be decided by Ordinance.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who from April of 1936 until Oct. of 1938 occupied the post of Councillor of the Bureau Legislation of the Manchukuo Government, hereby certify that the book hereeto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1215 pages and entitled "Digest of Laws (Manchukuo)" was published by the Manchurian Administrative Society, compiled and edited by the Manchukuo Law Research Society, with which I had connection in the capacity above mentioned, and which book has since been in my custody.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 29th day of Jan, 1947

MITO, Tomio
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereeto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: KAZAWA, Yasuo
(seal)
Translation Certificate.

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation of the Opium Law described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 4 Apr. 1947
十一条　民生部大臣八阿片吸食ノ者ヲ処死シテ之ヲ告発スル者ニ为スル為ノ処分ヲ為ス

第十二条　當該官吏ハ五倉所ノ管轄ヲ負スル民生部大臣ノ定スル所ニ於テ

指令ノ下ヲハ取従事上ヲ必要ナル処分ヲ為スルヲ得

第四条　左ノ各項ノハ該当スルハハ七年以下ノ従刑又ハハ五千元以下ノ罰金ニ處ス二

違反レタルノベハ五倉以下ノ従刑ヲ科スルコトヲ得

四条又ハハ五倉以下ノ罰金ニ處ス
本法ハ康徳三年四月一日ヨリ之ヲ施行ス

從前ノ規定ニ代り指定セラレタル同片卸人ガ本法ヲ施行ノ際ヲ除キハ有スル

附則（康徳四年二月二十七日）

本法ハ康徳五年一月一日ヨリ之ヲ施行ス

得
日本法人会計調査研究会が発行した「日本法人会計調査研究会誌」についての記録です。
Regulation Governing the Enforcement of the Opium Law.

Inoerail Ordinance No. 112
Promulgated November 30, 1932
Revised several times since then

Chapter I Opium Addicts

Article I. The opium addicts, who, requiring opium for bodily treatment, desire to obtain the license mentioned in Article II of the Opium Law, shall submit an application for the same to the Police Office as designated by the Minister of People's Welfare.

Article II. In case a Police Office grants the license mentioned in Article I of the Opium Law, a certificate to that effect shall be issued to the opium addict concerned.

Article III. Opium addicts shall not obtain opium or instrument for opium-smoking from any one other than the baking Special Hsien Municipalities, Municipalities, or Wzner Governments or licensed retail dealers.

Chapter II. The Manufacture and Traffic of Raw Opium, Prepared Opium and Instruments for Opium-Smoking.

Article IV. All raw and prepared opium shall be transferred to the licensed addicts by the proper Opium Monopoly Offices
through the "sinking Special Municipality, Municipalities, Hsien or Banner Governments or the licensed retail dealers.

The instruments for opium-smoking shall be transferred to the licensed addicts by the licensed manufacturers of the said instruments through the Hsinking Special Municipality, Municipalities, Hsien or Banner Governments or the licensed retail dealers.

Article V. The opium retail dealers and the number and place of opium-smoking houses managed by the "sinking Special Municipality, Municipalities, Hsien or Banner Governments shall be designated by the Governor of the Province concerned. The manufacturer of instruments for opium smoking shall be designated by the Director of the Central monopoly Bureau.

Article VI. Retail dealers and manufacturer of instruments for opium smoking shall not maintain their business outside of the location officially designated.

The establishment of any new subagency by a manufacturer of instrument for opium smoking shall be subject to the approval of the Director of the monopoly Bureau.

Article VII. In case a manufacturer of instruments for opium-smoking, desires to import instruments for opium smoking, he shall report to, and obtain the approval of the Director of the central monopoly Bureau by submitting the name and address of the consignor, the quantity and route of importation.
Article VIII. The selling price of opium shall be determined by the Director of the Central Monopoly Bureau.

Article IX. The Hanking Special Municipality, Municipalities, Hsien or Banner Governments or the retail dealers shall not transfer opium or instruments for opium-smoking to any one other than opium addicts who present the certificate mentioned in Article II.

Article X. In case a pharmacist or any one who has received the license mentioned in Article II of the Drugs Act requires raw opium for pharmaceutical purposes, he shall make an application for the purchase of such raw opium to the Director of the Monopoly Bureau concerned presenting the permit issued by the Minister of People's Welfare.

Article XI. Retail dealers and manufacturers of instruments for opium-smoking shall record in their books on every occasion the kind, quantity, and prices of the raw opium, prepared opium and instruments for opium-smoking received and sold, together with the date of each transaction, and the names and addresses of the parties with whom transactions are done. Retail dealers and manufacturers of the instruments for opium smoking shall submit to their respective Governors concerned and the Director of the Monopoly Bureau concerned before the tenth of each succeeding month monthly reports on the receipt and sale of raw opium, prepared opium and instruments for opium-smoking.

- 3 -
Chapter III. The Production and Delivery of Raw Opium.

Article XII. The location and area for the cultivation of opium shall be determined annually by the Director of the Central Monopoly Bureau.

Article XIII. Any person who desires to cultivate opium shall annually apply for a permit, submitting the following items, to their respective Governors concerned. The same procedure shall be required in case of alteration or discontinuance of such cultivation.

1. Name; Address; Year and Date of Birth;

2. Location of the Field for Cultivation; its area.

Article XIV. A person who has obtained the aforementioned permit for cultivating opium shall erect a wooden sign post in his field showing the area, name and address of the owner.

Article XV. A cultivator of opium shall report to the respective Governor concerned and the Director of the Central Monopoly Bureau on the quantity of raw opium produced prior to the date designated by the respective Governor.

Article XVI. A cultivator of opium shall deliver the raw opium produced to places designated by the Director of the Monopoly Bureau concerned or sell it to the licensed opium purchasing agents.
Article XVII. The aforementioned opium purchasing agents shall be named by the Director of the Central Hononoly Bureau, who shall place a necessary restriction on the number of such persons.

Article XVIII. An opium purchasing agent shall deliver the raw opium purchased by him during the term and at the place designated by the Director of the Central Hononoly Bureau.

Article XIX. The Director of the Hononoly Bureau shall examine the raw opium delivered by the opium purchasing agents and pay compensation for the same according to the quality of the goods.

Article XX. An opium purchasing agent and his employees shall be supplied with certificates of identity as shown herein after.

An opium purchasing agent and his employees shall carry their certificates of identity when engaged in their business.

Chapter IV. The sale of opium for medical use.

Article XXI. Opium for medical use shall be transferred to physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists, and those who have received the license mentioned in Article II and "II of the Drugs act by the agents dealing in opium for medical use.
Article XXII. Agents dealing in opium for medical use shall be named from among the pharmacists by the respective Governors of the provinces concerned.

Article XXIII. No sale or purchase or transfer of opium for medical use shall be allowed except when coming within the purview of any of the following conditions:

1. Opium transferred by pharmacists or those who have received the license mentioned in Article VIII of the Drugs Act to physicians (or surgeons), dentists, veterinarians, apothecaries, pharmacists, and those who have received the license mentioned in Article II of the Drugs Act;

2. Opium supplied by pharmacists to persons demanding the same for medical treatment according to the prescription of physicians, dentists, or veterinarians.

3. Opium supplied by physicians, dentists, or veterinarians to persons demanding the same for medical treatment.

Article XXIV. Any agent dealing in opium for medical use who intends to export opium for medical use shall submit for approval to the Minister of Social Welfare an application for the same, together with a note regarding the place and quantity of opium to be exported, and a permit of importation granted by the local authorities of the ports of destination.

Article XXV. All agents dealing in opium for medical use, pharmacists and those who have received the license mentioned
in Article VIII of the Drugs Act shall keep books containing records of every transaction in such opium, showing the quantity, use, and date of each, as well as the name and address of any person receiving or supplying the same.

Opium used by pharmacists for the preparation of medicines shall, however, be excepted. The persons mentioned in the foregoing paragraph shall submit by the end of every January to the respective Governors of the Provinces concerned reports covering the transactions for the preceding year.

Chapter 7. Miscellaneous

Article XXVI. An opium purchasing agent, retail dealer, or manufacturer of instruments for opium-smoking shall, when appointed or licensed, deposit a certain sum fixed by the respective Governors of the Provinces concerned or the Director of the Central Monopoly Bureau.

Article XXVII. In the event a person or an opium smoker who has been appointed or licensed in accordance with the present Regulation discontinues business or smoking, or has the appointment or license canceled or not renewed at the expiration of the designated term or dies, the said event shall be reported within thirty (30) days of its occurrence to the Director of the Monopoly Bureau or to the Director of the Branch Office of the Monopoly Bureau in the case of opium purchasing agents and manufacturers of instruments.
for opium-smoking and to the respective Governors of the Province's concern in the case of others. Such reports shall be made by the person in question (principal) or his inheritor or the receiver of his property, who shall seek the advice of the authorities concerned with regard to the disposal of the opium, coco, or instruments for opium-smoking in existence at the time of such event. In the foregoing case the Director of the Monopoly Bureau or the Governor of the Province shall fix the price of the same and shall require, then to be transferred to the persons appointed or licensed in accordance with the present regulation. In case the aforesaid persons happen to be a retail dealer, he may apply to the Monopoly Bureau for re-purchase of the said goods. In case the principal or the inheritor or receiver of the property desires to obtain the fund deposited with the authorities, in any of the events described in the foregoing paragraph, a request for the same shall be made to the Governor of the Province concerned or the Director of the Monopoly Bureau.

**Article XXVIII.** An opium retail dealer who intends to open a place for opium-smoking shall apply for the same to the respective Governor concerned by submitting the following facts:

1. Name; address; year and date of birth.
2. Location and equipment of the opium-smoking place.
Article XXIX. All papers to be filed with the Minister of People's Welfare or the Governor of the Province as required by the present Regulation shall be submitted through the respective Police Office concerned, and those to be filed with the Director of the Central Opium Bureau shall be submitted through the nearest Opium Bureau.

Chapter V. Punishment.

Article XXX. Any person who violates the provisions of Article VI or VIII shall be punished by confinement or a fine not exceeding two hundred (200) yuan.

Article XXXI. Any person who violates the provisions of Article XI or XIV or XXV shall be punished by confinement not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding one hundred (100) yuan.

Article XXXII. In case any person dealing in opium or instruments for opium-smoking in accordance with the provisions of the present Regulation or any one permitted to cultivate poppy is found to have committed dishonorable acts in connection with his business, he may be ordered to suspend his business, or he may have his appointment or permit cancelled, or may have his deposit money confiscated.
Supplementary

Article XXIII. The term "Governor of a Province" as used in the present Regulation shall mean the Inspector General of the Metropolitan Police within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police Board.

Article XXXIV. The present Regulation shall come into force on the date of enactment of the Order Act.
Def Doc No. 966

Translation Certificate

I, Migita, Masuo, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Regulation Governing the Enforcement of the Opium Law is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Migita, Masuo

Tokyo, Japan
Date 8 April 1947
阿片法施行令

改正

二月法（大正五年五月制定第三号）二年二月制定第一号

阿片定性

阿片法施行令

第十八条

教官上阿片ノ吸食ヲ許可スルトキハ　

第一条

阿片定性

（附則）

阿片法施行令
第三条

前条於同片吸食器具ヲ漬受ラルノヲ含ミテ

第二條

前條並ハ同片吸食器具ヲ漬受クルコトヲ得ス

第三條

同片ヲハ同片吸食器具ヲ漬受スヘテ

第四條

同片ヲハ同片吸食器具ヲ漬受スヘテ

第五條

同片ヲハ同片吸食器具ヲ漬受スヘテ

第六條

同片ヲハ同片吸食器具ヲ漬受スヘテ
2月（満11・12日）

2月

2月

2月

2月

2月

2月

2月

2月
Poppy

The largest poppy growing region in Manchoukuo is the province of Jehol. The government has decided to curtail production of this crop and lately an appreciable decline in the area under cultivation and output has been effected. In 1937 poppy production in the legalized areas amounted to 1,030,000 hectares, fell to 700,000 hectares in 1938.

Table 20, LOCALIZED AREA FOR POPPY GROWING
(Unit: 1,000 Hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jehol</th>
<th>Lin</th>
<th>Hsin-</th>
<th>Feng-</th>
<th>Chin-</th>
<th>An-</th>
<th>Chien-</th>
<th>Pin-</th>
<th>Sen-</th>
<th>Kiang</th>
<th>Kiang</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>690</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>880</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,030</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>710</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
The Narcotic Law of the Police Law

Promulgated on July 22, the 4th year of Kang-teh (1937).
Imperial Ordinance No. 215.
Effective on and after Sept., 15, the same year.

(From P. 24 to P. 27)

The Narcotic Law

Promulgated on July 22, the 4th year of Kang-teh (1937)
Imperial Ordinance No. 215
Effective on and after Sept., 15, the same year

Amendment. Nov, the 5th year of Kang-teh (1938). Imperial Ordinance No. 266.
In accordance with ARTICLE XXXVI of the Constitution and after submitting it to the State Council for deliberation, we hereby sanction the Narcotic Law and cause the same to be promulgated.
(Countersigned by the Premier and the Ministers of the Civil and Economic Departments.)

The Narcotic Law

ARTICLE I. Narcotics included in this law, refer to articles enumerated under any of the following items:

- 1 -
1. Morphine, diacetyl-morphine, (other) esters of morphine, and their respective salts.

2. Ecgonin (irrespective of specific rotary powers (light)), cocaine, (other) esters of ecgonin and their respective salts.

3. Dihydroxycodeine, dihydromorphinon, acetyl-dihydrocodeine, dihydromorphine, and their respective esters and salts.

4. Codeine, ethyl-morphine, benzyl-morphine, other morphine ethers, and their respective salts.

5. Morphine-N-oxycizae, other pentanitric morphines, and their catalyzing agents.

6. Dihydrocodeine, tebain, and their respective salts.

7. Morphine, esters of morphine or those substances in which esters of morphine or morphine ethers are found by test except those medicines manufactured or imported with the permission designated under ARTICLE VII of the Drug Law.

8. Dihydro-oxycodine, dihydrococodeine, dihydromorphinon, acetyl-dihydrocodeine, dihydromorphine, their respective esters, pentanitric morphine or those substances in which catalyzing agents are found by test except those medicines manufactured or imported with permission designated under ARTICLE VII of the Drug Law.

9. Those substances in which ecgonin, cocaine or other esters of ecgonin are found by test except those medicines manufactured or imported with the permission designated under ARTICLE VII of the Drug Law.
10. Indira hemp, hashish and those substances in which they are found {the 5th year of Kang-teh (1915), No. 266}.

ARTICLE II. Manufacture, importation or sale of narcotics mentioned under Item 1 of the preceding Article, shall be conducted by the Government.

The matters which are necessary in connection with manufacture, importation and sale of narcotics mentioned under the preceding clause, shall be established by an Imperial Ordinance.

ARTICLE III. Any one who desires to manufacture narcotics mentioned under Items from 2 to 9, Article I, shall apply for permission to the Minister in charge, by reporting on the following:

1. Place of manufacture.
2. Names of narcotics.
3. Location, structure and equipments of the building to be used for manufacture and storage.

If one, after obtaining permission under the preceding clause, desires to change any of the matters in the items of the preceding clause, he shall obtain a new permission regarding that matter.

ARTICLE IV. If one receive the permission mentioned under Clause 1 of the preceding Article, he shall apply to the Minister in charge for approval every year, by reporting on the following items:

1. Quantity of manufacture.
2. Kind and quantity of the material and source of supply.

If one desires to change any of the matters mentioned in the items of the preceding clause after obtaining the permission
designated under the preceding clause, he shall apply for new permission regarding the matter.

ARTICLE V. Any one who obtained the permission under the preceding clause, shall report to the minister in charge by the end of January of the following year, regarding the matter mentioned in the following items for the year.

1. Quantities of material, received, used and on hand.
2. Quantity of narcotics manufactured, disposed for sale and other purposes, and on hand.

The preceding provision shall be applied to those who manufactured non-narcotic articles, using narcotics as material.

ARTICLE VI. If one desires to import narcotics mentioned in Item from 2 to 10 of ARTICLE I, he shall apply to the minister in charge for approval, by reporting on the following items:

1. Name and quantity of the articles.
2. Purpose of importation.
3. Consignor's name or firm name and the place of one's business concern.
4. Period of importation.
5. Means of consignment.
6. Place of importation (the name of the post office in case of sending by mail).

If one desires to change any of the matters in respective items of the preceding clause after having obtained the permission under some clause, he shall obtain a new permission regarding the matter.

When the minister in charge gives permission in accordance with the preceding two clauses, he shall issue an import permit or the certificate of an import permit.
ARTICLE VII. If one desires to export narcotics, he shall apply for permission to the minister in charge, by reporting on the following items, along with the certificate of an import permit or the certificate of a permit to bring the articles into a bonded warehouse, which has been issued by the authorities concerned at the place of importation.

1. Name and quantity of the article.
2. Consignee's name or firm's name and the place of his business concern.
3. Period of exportation.
5. Place of exportation (the name of the post office in case of sending by mail).

If one desires to change any of the matters in the respective items of the preceding clause, after having obtained the permission under the same clause, he shall obtain a new permission regarding the matters.

When the minister in charge gives permission in accordance with the preceding two clauses, he shall issue an export permit and a copy.

The copy mentioned in the preceding clause shall be attached to the consignment.

ARTICLE VIII. One who has imported or exported narcotics, shall report to the minister in charge to that effect within ten days, along with the import permit and a copy of the export permit attached to the bill of consignment or the original export permit.
ARTICLE IX. If one has obtained permission for importation or exportation but has not actually imported or exported, he shall report to the Minister in charge to that effect within ten days after the expiration of the permit, along with the import permit and the certificate of the import permit or the export permit and a copy of the export permit.

ARTICLE X. In case of transporting narcotics with a view to passing them through the Empire, this shall be treated as importation or exportation so far as the application of this law is concerned.

The preceding provision shall not be applicable to transport by mail.

ARTICLE XI. Narcotics shall not be transferred or taken over; however, the rule shall not be applicable to the following provided by the order.

1. When one obtains permission to manufacture, import or export narcotics in accordance with ARTICLE III, VI or VII.
2. When physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists or those who have permission in accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Drug Law, need narcotics for professional purposes.
3. When needed for prescriptions of physicians, dentists or veterinarians.
4. When used for scientific research.

ARTICLE XII. Narcotics shall not be used for inhalation, eating, injection or any other purpose except in the cases provided for under one of the following:

1. When physicians, dentists, veterinarians or pharmacists need them for professional purposes.
2. When needed for prescriptions of physicians, dentists or veterinarians.

3. When used for scientific research.

ARTICLE XIII. If a physician discovers any addict to narcotics by medical examination, he shall report as to the addict's age, sex, domicile, and kind of narcotic, to the police station within the jurisdiction of the clinic within ten days.

ARTICLE XIV. In order to cure any narcotic addict of his habit, the Minister in charge may take necessary measures for him. The charge for expenses for the measure taken in the preceding clause, shall be determined by the Minister in charge.

ARTICLE XV. In order to maintain supervision, the Minister in charge may take necessary steps to deal with those who deal in narcotics.

ARTICLE XVI. The officials in charge may enter manufactories, shops or other places kept by those who deal in narcotics and examine materials, manufactured goods, machineries, tools, books, papers and other matters or question the persons concerned.

ARTICLE XVII. In case one who has dealt in narcotics gives up his business or dies, an order shall be issued as to the disposal of the existing narcotics and materials.

ARTICLE XVIII. Should those who have the permit in accordance with the provision of ARTICLE III, VI or VII, or those who manufacture non-narcotic articles using narcotics as material, infringe this law or commit a crime or any other unlawful act, the Minister in charge shall cancel the permit, forbid or suspend the manufacture.

ARTICLE XIX. Those who secretly manufacture, import or sell narcotics mentioned under Item 1 of ARTICLE I, shall be sentence
of to penal servitude, not more than 7 years or a fine of not more than 7,000 yen.

The penal servitude and the fine given under the preceding clause may be imposed together.

ARTICLE XXI. If one manufactured or imported narcotics mentioned under Items from 2 to 10 of ARTICLE I, without the permit in accordance with the provision in Clause 1 of ARTICLE III or ARTICLE VI, he shall be sentenced to penal servitude of not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than 5,000 yen.

The same rule as in the preceding clause shall be applied to any one who exports narcotics without the permission in accordance with the provision of Clause 1, ARTICLE VII.

ARTICLE XXII. Attempted crimes given in the foregoing two articles shall be punished.

ARTICLE XXIII. Those who prepare to commit the crimes under ARTICLE XIX shall be sentenced to penal servitude of not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than 2,000 yen.

ARTICLE XXIV. Those who infringe the provisions under ARTICLE XI or ARTICLE XII, shall be sentenced to penal servitude of not more than 3 years or a fine of not more than 3,000 yen.

ARTICLE XXV. Those who infringe the provisions under Clause 2 of ARTICLE III, ARTICLE IV, Clause 2 of ARTICLE VI or VII shall be sentenced to penal servitude of not more than 6 months or a fine of not more than 500 yen.

ARTICLE XXVI. Those who do not follow the measures in accordance with Clause 1 of ARTICLE XIV, shall be sentenced to penal servitude of not more than 3 months or a fine of not more
ARTICLE XXVI. Those who fail within the purview or any of the following shall be fined not more than 300 yen:

1. Those who do not follow the measure in accordance with the provision of ARTICLE XV.

2. Those who conduct the examination of officials in charge in accordance with the provision of ARTICLE XVI, or do not answer or gave false answers to their question.

ARTICLE XXVII. Those who infringe the provisions under ARTICLE XV, Clause 4 of ARTICLE VII, ARTICLE VIII, IX or XIII, shall be detained or fined.

ARTICLE XXVIII. If narcotics held illegally by violators of this law, belong to no one else, they shall be confiscated. If the criminals consumed or transferred them, the amount shall be collected in addition.

ARTICLE XXIX. If narcotics, illegally held by those who infringe this law, belong to any person other than the criminal they may be confiscated as an administrative measure.

ARTICLE XXX. If employees or operators act against the penal regulations of this law in connection with the business of the person in question, both the criminals and the person himself shall be punished. However, when the person in question is mentally deranged or a minor who is not competent in business as a major, the one legally responsible for him shall be punished.

ARTICLE XXXI. If employees or operators of a judicial person act against the penal regulations of this law in connection with the judicial person's business, the staff member or the official who conducts the business as well as the criminals shall be
If a staff member or an official who conducts the business of a judicial person commit crimes designated under the preceding clause, the staff member or official shall be punished.

ARTICLE XXIII. In case of Article XXII or Clause 1 of the preceding article, when the person in question, the person legally responsible for him, the staff member or the official testifies that there was no way to prevent the foregoing illegal act, he shall not be punished.

A supplementary provision:

The date of enforcement of this law shall be set by an Imperial Ordinance (effective on Sept. 15, the 4th year of Japan (1957) by Imperial Ordinance No. 271 issued in Sept., the same year)

Those who are actually addicts and need medication as a result of enforcement of this law, shall be given for the time being a card certifying their addiction in accordance with the order.

The card in the preceding clause is treated as the prescriptions under Item 5 of Article XI and Clause 2 of Article XII.

Veterinarians included in this law refer to those who practice veterinary surgery with the governmental license.

A supplementary provision (Imperial Ordinance No. 266 issued on Nov. 24, the 5th year of Japan (1958)).

This law shall come into force on the day of promulgation.
Re: The manufacture, importation and sale of narcotics in accordance with ARTICLE II of the Narcotic Law.

Promulgated on Sept. 15, the 4th year of Kang-teh (1937)
Imperial Ordinance No. 270
Effective on the same day

Amended Dec., the 4th year of Kang-teh (1937) Imperial
Ordinance No. 289.

After submitting it to the State Council for deliberation,
we hereby sanction the ordinance regarding the manufacture,
importation and sale of narcotics in accordance with ARTICLE II
of the Narcotic Law and cause the same to be promulgated.
(Countersigned by the Premier, and the Ministers of the Civil and
Economic Departments.)

Re: The manufacture, importation and sale of narcotics in accordance with ARTICLE II of the Narcotic Law.

ARTICLE I. The manufacture, importation and sale of narcotics in accordance with ARTICLE II of the Narcotic Law, shall be conducted by the monopoly offices.

ARTICLE II. Narcotics are sold from the monopoly offices to dealers in medical opium, thence to physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists and those who have permission under ARTICLE III of the Narcotic Law or those who intend to use narcotics for scientific research.

ARTICLE III. Narcotics shall be contained in uniform receptacles and sealed by the monopoly offices.

ARTICLE IV. The sales agents of medical opium and those who have the permit in accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Medicines Law shall open or repack the receptacles of narcotics or break the
seals.

Those persons mentioned in the preceding clause shall not sell the narcotics whose receptacles have been opened or repacked or whose seals have become null.

ARTICLE V. The prices of narcotics shall be regulated by the Director of the Monopoly Bureau.

(No. 469, the 4th year of Kang-teh (1937)

ARTICLE VI. Any one who infringes the provision under ARTICLE IV, shall be sentenced to penal servitude of not more than 6 months or a fine of not more than 500 yen.

A supplementary provision:

This Ordinance shall come into force on the day of promulgation of the Narcotic Law. (Effective on and after Sept. 15, the 4th year of Kang-teh)

The narcotics to be supplied to those who hold the certificates mentioned in Clause 2 of the Narcotic Law Supplementary Provision shall be sold by the special city of HANKING, Cities, prefectures, village tracts (TN: Chi), pharmacists or those who have been appointed by the Governors of provinces in their jurisdiction and have permission in accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Drug Law.

The narcotics needed by the special city of HANKING, cities, prefectures or village tracts shall be sold by the monopoly offices.

In case of Clause 2, those who have been appointed shall retail narcotics irrespective of the provision under ARTICLE IV.
A supplementary provision [(Dec. 27, the 4th year of Kang-tch (1937)] Imperial Ordinance No. 48.

The Ordinance shall come into force on and after Jan. 1st, the 5th year of Kang-tch (1938).
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupied the post of councillor in the Bureau of Legislation, Manchukuo Government, from April, 1935 to October, 1935, hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 753 pages, entitled "Digest of the Laws of Manchukuo Empire based upon the Newly Established Adding and Subtracting System (TI: and issued in 1935) is a book which was edited and published by Manchukuo Justice Association with which organ I was connected while in the above position, and it is a volume among the collection of books in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 30th day of January, 1947

AUTO, Tokyo

(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here to in the presence of the Witness:

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: YAMADA, Yasuo

(seal)

Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 15 January 1949
Matters under the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Welfare.

**Ordinary expenditures section**

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<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>The General Bureau for prohibition of opium-taking</td>
<td>1,332,245</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>1,440</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Salaries of officials of Men-min rank</td>
<td>116,240</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Salaries of officials of Ban-min rank</td>
<td>405,700</td>
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<td>Salaries of officials of Peking rank</td>
<td>58,500</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Allowances for special duty</td>
<td>136,704</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Allowances for winter season</td>
<td>10,780</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Allowances for duty in special districts</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Special allowance for duty in northern frontier districts</td>
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<td>Office expenses</td>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>Special expenses</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Miscellaneous office expenses</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Allowances for linguistic printing</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Office maintenance expenses</td>
<td>52,564</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Expenditures for office fixtures</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Expenditures for reception and entertainment</td>
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Def. Dec. 1051

Article 2. Expenditures for prohibition of opium-smoking ........ 7,442,002

Clause 1. Expenditures for prohibition of opium-smoking ........ 7,442,002

Item 1. Expenditures for guidance and supervision .............. 56,520

2. Expenditures for training and teaching ................. 25,000

3. Expenditures for meetings ................................ 27,562

4. Expenditures for propaganda and social education ........ 230,000

5. Expenditures for free medical treatment and medicine .......... 121,080

6. Expenditures for control .................................. 273,180

7. Miscellaneous expenses for controlling illicit traffic .......... 75,000

Article 3. Business expenses ...................................... 58,707,908

Clause 1. Various expenditures for purchase and distribution ........ 47,950,634

Item 1. Expenditures for the purchase of opium .............. 46,200,000

2. Expenditures for the purchase of opium ashes .......... 500,000

3. Expenditures for the purchase of special materials ...... 97,200

4. Packing costs ........................................ 639,500

5. Transport and storage costs ............................... 513,934

Clause 2. Operating expenses ...................................... 1,934,588

Item 1. Wages ........................................ 962,168

2. Miscellaneous office expenses ........................... 33,560

3. Allowances for linguistic knowledge .................. 2,270

4. Office maintenance expenses .......................... 169,900

5. Expenditures for office fixtures ....................... 99,800

6. Expenditures for working equipment .................. 511,000

7. Expenditures for the repair of buildings, machines, and instruments .................. 100,600

8. Expenditures for experiments ......................... 25,000

9. Expenditures for medical treatment and medicine .... 16,000

10. Expenditures for the leasing of land and houses .... 15,000
| Clause 3 | Expenditures for the collection of goods | 4,969,000 |
| Clause 4 | Special subsidies for the collection of goods | 1,772,000 |
| Clause 5 | Subsidies for the collection of goods | 1,600,000 |
| Clause 6 | Subsidies for opium fields | 300,000 |
| Clause 7 | Expenditures for the experimental poppy farm | 77,286 |

| Item 1. | Expenditures for the collection of goods | 4,969,000 |
| Item 1. | Special subsidies for the collection of goods | 1,772,000 |
| Item 1. | Subsidies for the collection of goods | 1,600,000 |
| Item 1. | Subsidies for opium fields | 300,000 |

| Item 1 | Hages | 29,026 |
| Item 2 | Miscellaneous office expenses | 2,800 |
| Item 3 | Office maintenance expenses | 10,000 |
| Item 4 | Expenditures for office fixtures | 22,560 |
| Item 5 | Expenditures for experimental planting | 5,000 |
| Item 6 | Expenditures for the leasing of land and houses | 2,400 |

| Article 4 | House of Correction | 360,552 |
| Clause 1 | Salaries and allowances | 42,049 |
| Item 1 | Salaries of officials of Pennin rank | 22,080 |
| Item 2 | Salaries of officials of Inin rank | 11,760 |
| Item 3 | Allowances for special duty | 4,088 |
| Item 4 | Allowances for winter season | 2,776 |
| Item 5 | Allowances for duty in special districts | 1,425 |

<p>| Clause 2 | Office expenses | 222,655 |
| Item 1 | Wages | 29,090 |
| Item 2 | Miscellaneous office expenses | 7,100 |
| Item 3 | Allowances for linguistic knowledge | 1,500 |
| Item 4 | Office maintenance expenses | 31,000 |
| Item 5 | Expenditures for office fixtures | 11,540 |
| Item 6 | Expenditures for patients | 142,745 |
| Item 7 | Expenditures for the leasing of land and houses | 1,700 |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
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<tr>
<td>Clause 3.</td>
<td>Expenditures for occupational guidance</td>
<td>17,728</td>
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<td>Item 1.</td>
<td>Expenditures for fixtures</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Cost of materials</td>
<td>16,528</td>
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<td>Clause 4.</td>
<td>Expenditures for experiment and research</td>
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<td>Item 1.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
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<td>Expenditures for guidance of the cured</td>
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<td>Allowances for living expenses</td>
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<td>Allowances for family</td>
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<td>Medical expenses for the sick and wounded on duty</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Donations donated by the state</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>State donations to mutual benefit societies</td>
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<td>Reserve fund</td>
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<td>Clause 2.</td>
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<td>Total of ordinary expenditures</td>
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### Temporary Section

**Article 1.** Building and repair expenses ........................................ 35,000

- **Clause 1.** Building and repair expenses ........................................ 35,000
- **Item 1.** Construction and modification costs .................................. 35,000

**Article 2.** Expenditures for equipment ........................................... 79,200

- **Clause 1.** Expenditures for equipment ........................................... 79,200
- **Item 1.** Expenditures for equipment for house of correction ........... 34,200
- **Item 2.** Expenditures for equipment for annexed buildings .......... 15,000
- **Item 3.** Expenditures for equipment for the experimental poppy farm .......... 30,000

**Article 3.** General account of transferred funds .......................... 990,000

- **Clause 1.** General account of transferred funds .......................... 990,000
- **Item 1.** Allotments to persons employed in local opium control .......... 990,000

**Article 4.** Special account of transferred funds ......................... 20,152,600

- **Clause 1.** Special account of funds for local financial regulation .................. 15,500,000
- **Item 1.** Funds for adjusting local administrative costs .......... 10,000,000
- **Item 2.** Local public welfare costs ........................................... 5,500,000
- **Clause 2.** Special account of funds used in adjusting bond transfers .................. 4,652,600
- **Item 1.** Bond redemption ......................................................... 4,280,000
- **Item 2.** Interest on bonds ....................................................... 372,600
Article 5. Supply funds for opium control work in cities, prefectures, and districts. ................... 268,200

Clauses 1. Supply funds for opium control work in cities, provinces, and states. ................... 268,200

Item 1. Supply funds for opium control work in cities, provinces, and states. ................... 268,200

Article 6. Funds for adjustment of special accounts for the prohibition of opium in cities, counties, provinces, and districts. ................... 5,000,000

Clauses 1. Funds for adjustment of special accounts for the prohibition of opium in cities, counties, provinces, and districts. ................... 5,000,000

Item 1. Funds for adjustment of special accounts for the prohibition of opium in cities, counties, provinces, and districts. ................... 5,000,000

Article 7. Expenditures for temporarily appointed personnel

Clauses 1. Wages and allowances. ................... 16,725

Item 1. Salaries of officials of Sen-nin rank. .......... 1,160

Item 2. Salaries of officials of I-rin rank. ........... 11,090

Item 3. Salaries of officials of probational I-rin rank 1,315

Item 4. Allowances for special duty. ................... 3,160

Clauses 2. Office expenses. ................... 3,346

Item 1. Wages. ................... 2,509

Item 2. Expenditures for office fixtures. ................... 837

Supervisory account total. ................... 26,545,071

Grand total. ................... 98,642,930

- 6 -
Certificate of Authenticity

I, who occupied the post of the councillor of the General Affairs Board, Manchukuo, from May 1942 to May 1945, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 155 pages and entitled "Special Account Budgets for 10th year of Kang-te (1945)" is a true copy of the book then compiled by the Manchukuo Government and obtained by me in that capacity and has been kept in my custody.

March 5th, 1947

/s/ Watamabe, Kinzo
No. 5217, 6-chome, Itabashi-ku, Itabashi-ku, Tokyo.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

/s/ Matsuura, Keisuke
Translation Certificate.

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 2 Apr. 1947.
民生部所管

第一款

第二款

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5
第四款

收入各特别会计

第一项

地方特别财政特别基金特别会计

第二项

收入特别财政特别基金特别会计

地方财政特别基金特别会计

第三项

地方特别财政特别基金特别会计

第七项

临时定员及理目
Excerpts from "The general budget for the 10th year of KOTOKU (1943)."

Revenue and expenditure totals (P.19, L.2 ; T.216, J.16)

The general budget for the 10th fiscal year of KOTOKU (1943)

Annual revenue total
M. ¥ 1,055,000,000

Annual expenditure total
M. ¥ 1,055,000,000
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who formerly occupied from May, 1942 till May, 1943 the post of a councillor in the General Affairs Board of the Manchoukuo Government hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 227 pages and entitled "The General budget for the 10th fiscal year of KOTOKU [1943]" is an exact copy of a document compiled and issued by the Manchouku Government which has been in my custody since I obtained it in the above capacity.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this ___ day of March, 1947

/S/ VATANABE, Kikuzo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ IATSUDA, Reisuke (seal)

Translation Certificate.

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 22 March 1945.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon.
文書ノ成立及出所ニ関スル説明書

余ハ一九四二年五月ヨリ一九四三年五月マデ満洲国総務部事務官ニ職ニ
在リタルモノナルトコロ。兹ニ言フノ日本語ニ二二七頁ヨリ成ル康徳十年昭
和二十二年三月

於東京

松田

介

昭和二十二年三月

於東京

松田

介

昭和二十二年三月

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昭和二十二年三月

於東京

松田

介
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

I, NAMEA, Tsunekazu, swear on my conscience that the following statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I entered the Finance Ministry in 1924, right after I had graduated from the political course of the law department of the Imperial University of Tokyo. In 1927, I was appointed the superintendent of the Yokosuka Revenue Office, and in 1929, the superintendent of the Kobe Revenue Office. About September or October in 1932, while I was still in the service of the Kobe Revenue Office as its chief, a request was made by the Manchoukuo Government to select and despatch an official who was best suited for the work in the newly established Monopoly Bureau of that Government. I was chosen by the Finance Ministry for the post, and after resigning from that office, I left Japan on January 2nd, 1933, arriving at Hsinking in Manchoukuo on 11th of the same month. I immediately assumed the duties of my position as the Vice Director of the Monopoly Bureau. At that time, the office of the Monopoly Bureau had already been opened but its organization was unfinished.

A proclamation, concerning the prohibition of opium smoking had been issued by the Prime Minister. The organization of the Monopoly Bureau as well as the Opium Law had also been promulgated. The plan for the setting-up of the Monopoly Bureau was ready, but it was not functioning satisfactorily speaking from the practical point of view.
To quote a hackneyed expression, the form was set up, but it had no body to it. The director of the Bureau was a Chinese by the name of Chiang En-chih. Although he performed his duties as the Director, he was not very familiar with the government work. Therefore, we made a thorough practical study of every measure before it was presented to him for approval. In my position, I worked mostly on the organization and operation of the Bureau.

The organization and mode of operation of the Monopoly Bureau were substantially as follows: The Bureau was organized under the supervision of the Minister of Finance of the Manchoukuo Government and began its first operation mainly under the provisions of the following ordinances. The Organization of the Monopoly Bureau, the Opium Law, and the Regulations Governing the Enforcement of the Opium Law, all of which were promulgated in November, 1932, as well as the regulations concerning the purchase by the Government of opium and the prohibition of private traffic in opium.

In the beginning, it was intended that the Monopoly Bureau should be a general monopoly organization to handle other commodities besides opium; however, only opium was handled for the first few years. It had its Central Office established in Hsinking, with branch offices or sub-branch offices in each city. At first there were only five districts or branch offices, but at the time when Manchoukuo was divided into 16 provinces in 1937, there was an office in each province. Poppy has been cultivated in large quantities from olden times in various districts in China, and the custom of smoking opium is spread very widely creating many addicts. The fundamental rule under the old regime in Manchuria was to strictly prohibit, in principle, the cultivation of opium by law. Therefore, the real fact mentioned above was not fully
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appreciated by foreigners in general. However, the real practice was to cultivate poppy secretly in various districts in Manchuria and the illicit traffic in opium produced in this manner was carried out very extensively. Opium smoking was so widely spread that among families in general there were very few who belonged to the middle class or among those where opium smoking was not practiced to some extent. I found it rather unusual to see people among the general public, especially among labourers, to say nothing of so-called high officials of the government and leading business men, who did not know opium. I also discovered that this very opium seemed to have been the greatest cause of corruption among those in power such as Government officials and soldiers of every rank as well as influential business men, etc. For example, the illicit sale of opium which was practiced very widely all over Manchuria was done through bribing the authorities concerned. In the case of the secret cultivation of poppy, it is not too much to say that the cultivation was done under the protection of the local authorities concerned, to whom a considerable sum of money was offered in the name of a so-called tax. Under such circumstances, I thought that the evil influence of opium was, besides the poisonous effect brought out by smoking, the vital factor in corrupting those people in power.

Especially, bandits, notorious outlaws of Manchuria, depended upon the cultivation of poppy or traffic in opium as the biggest resources of their income. I was able to confirm the above facts when I conducted a strict anti-opium cultivation campaign throughout Manchoukuo.

I, first of all, will give an outline of the physiological ill effects of opium according to my several years' observation.

Generally speaking, those
who are judged to be fairly addicted by opium can hardly bear office work for several hours a day, and especially if manual labour. Whenever the opium loses its effect from head to foot, even if several times a day, they smoke more opium and lie down. Moreover, as is usual with any sort of narcotic, they, once addicted, gradually drift into taking heavier and heavier doses than ever. At this stage, they cannot live without opium.

The Manchoukuoan policy toward opium was, in a word, to establish a strict prohibition principle based on the policy of gradually decreasing opium, in order to make a clean sweep of the long standing evil within the shortest possible time following the establishment of Manchoukuo. Let me enlarge further upon this point. In prohibiting opium, there are roughly two variety of methods. The first is absolute prohibition. It may be called an immediate ban which is a means of absolutely prohibiting people by law from smoking opium and enforcing it by force. The second is to prohibit people, on principle from smoking opium by law but to allow addicts to smoke for the time being and to get their number to decrease by degree. At the same time, every possible means should be employed, of course, to prevent new addicts. And thus smokers were expected to be exterminated in time whether several years or decades hence. This may be called the gradual-decrease-policy. In case of Manchoukuo, she adopted the latter.

The reason for this, briefly stated, was as follows: In Manchuria, as aforementioned, this evil practice was of long standing and prevailed in general. Further, opium of good quality was produced in every part of territory. It was all but impossible to take the first measure under such conditions and, even if enforced, its results would have been obvious. Besides, resorting to a
heartless and rigid policy would have lead to aggravating corruption of government officials, military men and influential persons in general in the country. That is to say, if strict control should be enforced in a country which had not only a large number of smokers, unable to either work or live without opium but also a great amount in production, it would only prove to further smoking in secret and blackmarketing. Accordingly, it would give rise to political evils of increased incomes or sources of incomes for lawless people. For fear of this, Manchoukuo adopted the latter. And regarding this, after we investigated the various opium treaties and the systems of various states on the problem, we came to the conclusion that the "diminution policy" was the most appropriate to take, and even for this, to take a method of establishing a stable system and by the strength of the system to decrease gradually the number of addicts. That is to say, we were convinced that the best way was to establish a strict monopoly system and to put entire Manchuria completely in the network of a monopoly and to try to exterminate the taking of opium gradually and steadily. Especially since the monopoly system in Formose had actually shown its good results, and also since the purport of the International Opium Agreement at Geneva in 1925 consisted of this point. Now, in carrying this "diminution policy" into effect, we set up a plan which was divided into two periods. In the first period, we aimed at establishing a monopoly system. And one of the stops was where we commenced registering the addicts in all of Manchuria in order to learn their number as quickly and as accurately as possible. Each addict was given a government permit with which he was allowed to buy opium from the Government. Of course those who were under age were not allowed to do so. But as for those who were of age and deemed to be fairly
addicted, we had them register according to their declaration without making any strict investigations and laying down rigid conditions. The reason why we did so was because of our apprehension that if we should make a strict investigation or lay down troublesome conditions, they who were supposed to register might avoid it and secretly continue to smoke opium forever. It would be, we thought, more harmful; and if we could not make out the number of addicts, we would never be able to set up a definite monopoly policy. Thus, we were even generous with the quantity of opium which they were allowed to buy, first of all for the purpose of making it easier for them to register and so that they would be able to do so freely. Secondly, the basic subject for us was rigid and thorough control over secret poppy plantations. Opium is not bulky and a small quantity is effective. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to control illicit sales and purchases after it has become a product, while secret plantations can be controlled easily as it is visible to everyone during the several months while it is being cultivated. Therefore, we decided to limit the fields for plantations to a definite region and to thoroughly control secret plantations. Once we gave permission for cultivation, we tried as hard as possible to get the opium into the hands of the Government as completely as possible, in order that the opium product not fall into the hands of the black market. Plantation fields were designated by the chief of the Monopoly Office annually. The cultivator was given a certificate of permission. It was provided by laws and regulations that all opium products were solely to be purchased by the Local Monopoly Office, its branches, and special purchasers designated by the Government. Thus we made effort to purchase opium so that it would not be sold illicitly. Thirdly, was the
prevention of illicit sales and secret smoking of opium. As for illicit sales, we carried out strict control through customs, railways and other routes and means over which opium produced in the country and imported from other countries would have to pass. Though the Department of Civil Administration was essentially responsible for the general enforcement of the Opium Law, I had hundreds of special supervisors under my direct control in order to prevent violation of the regulations concerning the cultivation, smoking, selling, dealing and transportation of opium, and to check the loading of opium into trains or other transportation facilities. In the earlier period of the opium monopoly system, big offenders were arrested, but there were, I think, a considerable number of those who escaped the "net" of the control also. Of course, such controls had a close relationship with the general condition of public order. In Manchuria where the land is vast and transportation inconvenient, thorough controls were not carried out during periods when public order was inadequate. Then, there were those who had not registered and yet smoked at will. Needless to say we placed them under control. But the control of secret smokers was more difficult and troublesome than that of secret sales and purchases mentioned above. Because if thorough control was to be carried out, it could not be done thoroughly without interfering with every individual home. However, it would arouse the people's dissatisfaction and antipathy to go so far, and in the earlier period it was rather advisable not to investigate strictly to such an extent. Therefore, stress was placed on secret opium smoking establishments namely special shops for smoking opium in secret. These were placed under thorough control from the beginning.

At this time I heard many people blaming us for opium smoking having come
be allowed openly since Manchoukuo was founded. The cause was as follows: there had been many secret opium smoking houses in every city. All of them were suppressed and replaced by a few retail shops. On the grounds that addicts would suffer if all were simultaneously suppressed, public retail shops were established ——several in such large cities as Harbin and about one or two in the smaller cities. And there opium smoking was allowed with sanction for the addicts. Those scenes at the public retail shops, no matter how few, attracted the general travelers' attention; whereas secret smoking, no matter how many, did not. That was the reason why such criticisms sometimes occurred. Short-tempered people who did not really comprehend the spirit involved in the first-period policy which aimed at gradual prohibition of the smoking were apt to ensure the policy, picking up only its aspect of official permission for smoking. But such blamings were irresponsible and emotional criticisms made by those who did not understand the true state of things. Thus in this manner the opium monopoly system had been fairly well established, elimination of those elements making profit on opium was next attempted. At first, all anchuria was divided into several sections and in each of which an opium dealer was set up. The Monopoly Local Offices or the Branch Offices which had bought opium distributed the opium for the use of registered addicts at first to the wholesalers who distributed it then to the many retailers in the sections assigned to them. A channel of distribution like this was unavoidable in the earlier period of the monopoly system, but it was not advisable that the distribution of opium be entrusted to such commercial organs forever. In 1934 when the monopoly system was gradually nearing completion, the wholesalers were moved and the monopoly offices sold opium directly to the retailers to prevent
misuse. Further, as the local administrations advanced sufficiently as many as possible retailing organs were transferred to the local administrative organizations, and finally all the retailers were eliminated. As for the control of the smoking itself too, the more the monopoly system developed, the stricter it became. Formerly applications for smoking were approved by the police without full investigation, but in the next stage it was made necessary to submit a doctor's certificate and the quantity of opium to be used limited. But those measures were taken after I resigned in 1937.

Concerning the cultivation of opium-poppy, steps were put into practice that officially approved land for cultivation be designated to a single region as much as possible and if possible to a frontier district; and cultivation in bandit zones, etc. was to be prohibited as much as possible. In the beginning, north-eastern part of Kirin Province and Jehol Province were designated, but later it came to be limited to Jehol Province only. Generally speaking, Jehol Province is a place where grains do not grow well. The seeds of opium-poppy were distributed freely to cultivators, but that was done as one of the means of the control.

We were successful in decreasing poppy-growing on lands not authorized by the Monopoly Office. The case of unlawful growing never increased in number except in 1933 and 1934 when the Monopoly Office was not able to fully exert its control power. Poppy has a distinct feature in that it can not be mixed with such other plants as are intended to camouflage it.

For the purpose of making the collin price of poppies to the government lower, there were cases where taxes were decreased on lands which were used for poppy growing. But we had no intention, in doing so, to encourage poppy-growing.
With the progress of our supervising the growing lands, we redoubled our efforts in exercising a thorough-going control over lands where poppies were secretly raised. In 1935-36 when the Japanese Army and the Manchoukuo Army fought to subjugate bandits, some officials of the Monopoly Office always accompanied them, and whenever a bandit base was occupied by the expedition, invariably they found poppies being secretly grown. We destroyed them completely. A rigorous warning was despatched to each local governor, and in case the secret growth of poppies was discovered within his jurisdiction, he was severely punished. There were cases where it led to the resignation of the Governor of the Heilungkiang Province or the Governor of the Lungkiang Prefecture. Furthermore, purchasing agencies in poppy-growing areas were gradually adjusted and we endeavored to purchase all opium manufactured. But if we hurried in succeeding in our work and made the control of opium excessively strict, secret trade and smoking of opium would come about on the other side. So we had to be moderate. Otherwise, despite the appearance of being improved, the truth might be behind the scenes things were getting worse. This is a point on which we were extraordinarily cautious.

It was after 1937, I think, when as a result of our effort, the opium monopoly system had become firmly established and secret growing and secret trading had almost disappeared from whole of Manchuria. It may be said that, since we reached the stage where we could operate freely and conscientiously a domestic monopoly system which was firmly founded, it was high time for us to deliberate systematically in how to carry out the prohibition policy. Moreover, the matter as to how many years we should plan to spend in eliminating opium-smokers and addicts posed a very difficult question. If we should proceed with
all speed, there is the possibility of doing it in ten years. But in order to accomplish it thoroughly and from the specialist's point of view it will require a period of thirty or fifty years. Since Manchoukuo was a new state she had very lofty ideals and she decided upon and published a "policy for prohibition in ten years" after she made various studies and carried out numerous discussions. During such a period well-equipped institutions for treatment are, first of all, needed. Not only this, but the strengthening of various movements and propaganda must be carried out vigorously in order that the people may be thoroughly informed of the harms of opium. And in doing so, a needed the understanding and cooperation of the general public. So Manchoukuo set up in each prefecture a hospital to which addicts were admitted, and general propaganda was carried on every year through the Concordia association. A special directive was issued from the Government that, in case a government office or civilian company finds any addicts among its workers including leaders, it must give them leave of absence for a necessary term for treatment, and whoever neglects to take such treatments must be dismissed. Besides this, the Government made the regulations stricter and took drastic measures to leave no room to smoke opium.

At the time we first embarked upon the realization of monopolization, we referred to the example in Formosa and estimated the number of addicts in Manchoukuo at approximately one million, considering it at a little more than 1% of the entire population. Of course this figure will vary according to your standard of addiction and the actual figure might become several times larger if the number of more smokers are included. But the smokers who became the object of the monopoly system the smokers requiring medical treatment were estimated approximately, for the time being, to be one million.
and all preparations were made according to this estimation. Opium-smokers generally take opium three times a day -- in the morning, in the daytime, and at night. These habitual smokers use about two or three chien a day (10 chien equals 1 liang), and more habitual ones smoke about ten times a day, using six or seven chien daily. But the greater number of smokers use only one chien or two a day. Thus it is computed that, on an average, each smoker takes 30 liang a year. So, estimating the yearly ration amount required for one million smokers to be 30 million liang, we set about our work and made the fiscal budget. In the early years, however, opium very often went into the black market because the true meaning of monopoly of opium was not understood and also because cultivating farmers had never been accustomed to compulsory sales to the Government. In order to prevent cultivators from making unauthorized sales to North China, measures were taken to collect and buy at a higher price than there. Despite rigid Government control, however, only a portion of the amount produced could be bought up, and some of it would go in secret to North China, while others went into the black market within the country. So there were indeed several years before we came to succeed in getting any fairly satisfactory results. During this period the addicts had to be provided with their required amount of opium. In addition, if the Government had no stock equivalent to the total amount required for ration, there was a corresponding decrease in ration. As a result, even the registered smokers would smoke secret opium. So it was quite necessary for the Government to secure the required amount. Being the case, when the Government was short of stock, it was compelled to import through regular channels from the Kuantung
leased Territory, Korea and even from Iran in one instance make up for the shortage. But the imported amount, as compared to the total required amount, was very small. I held my post from 1933 to 1937, when the registration system had not long been in effect. Any my observation was that it was almost impossible to assume the number of registered smokers to be the actual number of the addicts, so I cannot definitely say that they were decreasing but I am sure that the addicts were not increasing. The only exception was that before the enforcement of the registration system there was an unusual number of smokers who had not yet reached an addiction stage. Such people who could not be called genuine smokers, naturally did not dare register and so came to find it more difficult to get opium than formerly. As a result, such smokers decreaseddistinctively in number. In other words, the registration system achieved great success in the way of driving away opium from the home. Indeed some of the higher officials — Councillors, Ministers, and Provincial Governors — gave up opium smoking, and the habit of entertaining guests with opium at home disappeared. In the first year or two, the number of the smokers who had been registered by the Government was one-third of that which had first been estimated, namely, less than three hundred thousand to one million. This was because they could not understand what the Government was driving at, and also because even those smokers who were fairly advanced in poisoning had a tendency to get secret opium in some way or other without registering. In addition, they were planning to rely upon
a considerable amount of unofficial opium, which had been concealed in the country. As the monopoly system was gradually established, however, there was less and less opium to be found in the country and so the addicts had no alternative but to apply to the registration so that they might take opium. Consequently the number of registered smokers increased in the first two or three years. This was not an increase in the actual number of smokers, but a happy tendency of secret smokers learning to apply to the Government. I remember that the registered smokers numbered more than 590,000 at the time of enforcement of the so-called Ten Year Program for the Prohibition of Opium. This figure made it possible for us to grasp how many addicts there were in Manchukuo and brought us to a stage where prohibition policies were to be established. As far as I can remember, we estimated the possible profit to be 5 million yuan a year when we made the first budget. But the profit proved to be only about 360,000 yuan the first year (1932). In the following year the profit was about 1,200,000 yuan but in the fourth year, 1936, it amounted to about 10,000,000 yen, as my memory runs.

The Manchukuo Government managed the income and expenditures of opium in a special account called "The Opium Monopoly Special Account", and on which exact figures were shown in the annual budget and closing account of the Government. Even small amounts of income and expenditures were clearly accounted for.

The above-mentioned profit is the balance of the total sales of opium and the expenses incurred in purchasing and
transporting opium and for the Monopoly Office, all of which are the expenses directly necessary for the opium monopoly. When the police expense for regulating opium is taken from the balance, the amount of profit left would become even smaller.

About 10,000,000 yuan, as best as I can remember, was transferred to the general account in 1936 but compared to the total revenue of the general account it was not more than a small percent of the total.

The increase in profit in opium sale does not indicate an increase or decrease of opium smokers. It can be attributed to the increased sale in quantity and the raised selling price of opium. The more complete the monopoly system became and the more opium addicts registered, the more the sale of opium increased. Therefore this was a favorable sign showing political success in the first stage of the policy for gradually diminishing opium addicts.

My investigation on the statistics on Formosan shows that the registration number of opium addicts suddenly increased in the first several years, but it gradually decreased after the whole absolute numbers of opium addicts exceeded the number registered. According to our estimate, it was expected that their numbers might reach the highest in 1937 or 38 in Hanchukuo and sure enough, such a tendency was shown in 1937, the year I left office.

The increase in revenue had other important causes. One is that the unit price of opium was raised. In the earlier days of the governmental opium monopoly, the Government raised the buying price of opium as a preventive
of its going into the black market and distributed it to the registered opium smokers at a comparatively cheap price. Later, as the opium monopoly became thorough, the Government raised the price of opium by degrees. The other is the abolition of the wholesale dealer system and the raw opium selling system. Regarding the abolition of the former, I have already explained. As for the raw opium selling system: According to the Government policy formerly pursued, the Government supplied raw opium and had retailers make prepared opium and had it distributed to the registered smokers. It was, however, reformed in 1936 and transferred to the government. According to this, prepared opium came to be manufactured in a Government factory established in Hakone to be distributed to the registered smokers. When raw opium and prepared opium are compared, the latter becomes higher in price by several percent and thus so much of the government's direct revenue increased. Needless to say, it was not for the purpose of increasing the revenue that the Government abolished these two systems. The wholesale dealer system was abolished to prevent middlemen from illicitly disposing opium. The prepared opium system was introduced by the Government to remove such evils as follows: There was a tendency in prepared opium manufacturing, to mix opium ashes or other various impurities with raw opium and to sell such inferior manufactures to the registered smokers. And also a tendency to use the rationed raw opium as a base for narcotics.
With regard to the control of narcotics, the Manchukuo Government had adopted a policy of rigid control and suppression since the beginning. As the first step, the manufacturing of narcotics was absolutely prohibited in 1932 by order of the Civil Administrative Department. Whenever the control over illicit traffic of opium was exercised, the prohibitions of illicit traffic of narcotics was also put into force. At the time of opium control movement in 1935, the amount of narcotics confiscated was comparatively larger, as I remember. In 1937 the year the Government launched rigid control on the use of opium after preparation had been duly made, the Narcotics Law, the main point of which was immediate control and suppression, was enacted in parallel with the control opium, and the law prescribed to inflict heavy punishment to any offender.

Before the abrogation of extraterritoriality, thorough investigation and control was enforced with mutual cooperation among the authorities of Japan and Manchukuo, and as a result, illegal manufacturers have run away to the North China districts. I resigned from the Monopoly Bureau in August 1937.
Deponent: KÔNÔ, Tsunekazu

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of April 1947, in Tokyo, Japan.

(signed)

BERNARD A. RICORDON
1st Lt., Inf.
Administrative Officer
Defense - Legal Section
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Iwamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

(signed) Yukio Iwamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Dated: April 5, 1947
人の義理をした。彼は学長としての威厳をSlideしたが、政府の
事務には余り関係がなかかったのです。それでも私達は、あら
ゆる方策を専門に研究し、立場にして彼の承認を求める為にしました
私は、私の地位に於いて主として公署の組織化及運用の為に働
いました。京官公署の組織及び活動の方法及資質的次第により、公
署はgovernment府財務部大臣の管理の下に組織され、その最初の活動を
一九三三年十一月に制定された京官公署官制、阿片法及び阿片法施
行に関じる規則その他のア片の取締み私に係る逃法及適用の規定を
開始しました。最初の京官公署は阿片の外に他の物品をも扱う一
般的な職務に関たるべく企図されましたが、最初は阿片だけが取
扱われました。まして東京が十六の省に分かれた一九三七年には阿
片の省に改称所が作られました。
元来、かれは方々で阿片が盛んに吸わる。阿片吸歯の風習は、
非常に広く浸透してしまった。吸歯者も多かった。
当政権下に於ける、阿片の密接する所は、
阿片の密接する所は、
興味深い事である。
阿片の密接する所は、
興味深い事である。
これら標力者を退治の有力なる原因たる所にあらずと私は恐れました
時に東南名物の請領に此際は例外なく阿片を作らせ、或はこれを賄
貢し、彼等の長大の財源とし、これを利用して居りました。其際の
状況は、引続き数年間、賛美に於ける阿片の容売を私は確認しました。

第一に生した阿片の容売に付し、私が数年間観察したところによつ
て策略を御詰し欲しあり、大体阿片の相営程度の中毒者を認められ
る者は一日数時間の執務殊に警備されていふことには殆んだ敬えられ
る。身内中に阿片が含まれるその都度徴収に互つて阿片を吸つ（そう
して嘆ます。而も一旦中毒になるときはその薬効剤でも効きま
せぬ、既に中毒度が知らぬ知らずの間に馴えて参ります。そうし
にこの段階にいりますと阿片がなくと行けなくなります。此際の
阿片の阿片政策は、一言にして阿片へは永年の此薬屋を建業出来
る関係に一括するため阿片の規制方策による薬物政策を確立し
たのであります。其意味を少し解釈して申しあがき阿片禁止の方法
裏は密である之にひきかへ、密造造の方は栽培中の数ヶ月間、葉の目
にも著き立ちから比較的に行き易いので、従って先づ栽培地を一定
の場所に閉鎖すると共に、隠密栽培は徹底的に取扱うにたって、さして
一旦栽培を許可したならば契約から出発した阿片さいふものが間に流れ
ないように出発する支け完全に政府の手に収めざるをえず。さして
栽培の特別の局主人に買上げる事に努力しました。法令によればすべての生員阿片は公定や農民や政府
栽種の指定は色々専員公署長が行いました。そして栽培者には毎可
契約は民政府の責任とありました。外に栽培の機密を防止するため
に、私を直接監督下に身の回り目箇所
結局、如何に困られたけれども、残念ながらこの意見は相違の存在であるということを覚えておく必要がある。

Certains sont déçus de cette opinion, qui est contraire à leur opinion. Il est nécessaire de se rappeler que cette opinion est différente.
その言葉色の人から清澄園になったから大ひらに河床が乾く様になっていたのです。河床を一時に彫刻したのです。それや金箔彫刻してその代り少数の小販
店を設けたのです。町も町が一時に彫刻したのです。中傷をされぬので
公の小販店を奉天宮の大都市には数箇所、小都市には一、二箇所程度

しかるべきのもいる。もって公の小販店は直ぐ日につく。さらに小販出
から見る所多いもののはいくら深山あつても水り人目につつめる

非議が掛った事があらり。次次の公販の面だけを取上げて攻撃されど

の里ました。がこれの賢旨を知らぬ者を無実等に想定して

かうして販売制度が確立します。そして次には、管糸の子の排除を行ひ

し。最初は全販を区区に分けて区区に阿片の販売人を設きました。阿

片を上上げた販売者分は、区区に管領をししてあつて是等の子を排除し

人に配布し、さうして此の販売人は更に区区に分かれ多数の小販

を売む。
阿片を商人的横間に何时迄も任せる事は行きません。専賣の制度が段々進展して来ると小販機関は出来ねだけ地方行政懲歩に移して行きは後には小販人も取止してしまったのでありまつ。そこから又吸殻そのものの取

植も取止が段々進めまして来ると共に段々にしてありまつ。それから又吸殻そのものの取

植に取止ましては、公許した栽培地を成るべく一ケ所に而も遠地の地に

許する様にして栽培地帯等は出来ねだけ之を禁止すると云ふ方法を勧行し

て行ったのでありまつ。最初は吉林省湖北省北京府と熱河省を栽培地として

指定しなけりが順次之を熱河省ののみに限定して行きました。大体熱河地方

方は余り農物は出来ぬところであります。栽培者に於いては自由に其


穂を分剤したがそれは統制の一手段としてそうしたのです。私達は

官署公認でない土地の種稲の裁培を減らせしめる事によく成功した

しかし、政府公認がその統制力を充分に発揮出来なかった。九三三年に

九三四年を除っては、不法の裁培は決して多くはありませんでした。政府

にすら如しく無視されてます。政府への阿片の裁培は引下げがけにより裁培

の裁培を奨励する要領を以てなされたのでありましたが、それ如何ら

九三五年、六年間は日々戦並びに組織団が組織を計画する時に対し

各県の裁培を省ぶと必ず何方か流れが

農民から裁培がありません。それを完全に役に立たしました。先ず県の裁

長官にも配慮を寄せたところで其管内に裁培を没見した場合に現状に

広がりがあります。
いかにして努力の結果阿片吸薬問題が確立して大衆全類に密接なり密接
して来ましたかという事は、非常に難しい問題です。なる
く年でも出来得る可能性があるのです。しかし阿片吸薬政策の実行方法を計画的に考察すべき段階に達した際
いては、国内の吸薬問題が確立して三年七年はかり密接
して来るのでこれを即座に考え上げざるをえなければならぬ。
かなるべきが如何なるのが起るのですかから余りの重
に見えて延べ認識する事があろうので其点は特に我々が
今考えなばならないのであればある

三十七年五十年の年月を記するのも余り歳月大でさ
又年間的にも之を考えてはさ

14
発熱や嘔吐を主症状とする患者を十数例に絞り、検査を慎重に施行し検査したところです。この場合に特に先ず治療開始を統一させ、次に又同様の手順を国民に周知後再びある各院の運動宣伝強化を基にして十四日にしたがわれなかった。こうして一例から発熱、嘔吐を示す患者を受容する基準にして一旦の医療強化を再びとし、その結果が認められる場合には、各病院の統制を基にして同様の手順を講じて、それから規律に置いて阿片を授した後、の手順のない場合に十数例をふる手います。
最初、薬物の実行に着手する時に我々は薬剤の例をも参照にし、薬剤の
中毐者の数を購入人口の3％余を見て百万位と推定致します。
勿論これは標準とする中毐の程度の差によって当然ある数字で宜に問題
片を吸うと言ふ者迄入れれば実質は何倍にかかれるかを一応治療
準備を致しました。
通常薬片吸煙者は一日に三度朝と晩、吸煙を致
します。この様の場合常使用者は日に約ニ・三チャレン（ドライアンガーラン）
を消費するものでありますが、もっともせんとなった吸煙者は一日に十前位六
千万チャレン位を吸います。吸煙者の多所は一日に一ニ・チャレンしか用ひ
ません。それでさと一年間の配給必要量を一人三十リャン平均百万で三
十五グラムでした故が最初の中は薬片専薬の本当の意味が分らぬから
それから培者たる農民に政府に必ず儲かなければならばならばにいふ習慣が
今迄なかったのですから。もしすればは関に流れることがありましょう。
それで栽培者が北支の方に関流し合するのを防ぐために北支の値段より
10
常に貯金数を高く支払って改定する操作を行いました。しかし厳真

部長は数年間かかって数々満足の配達に配給しなければならぬ。政府は数配給員の手数料を掛けなければ
配給が延る。政府の配給が流れば納税者にまちがいありません。その間に

発したが必要な数倉の確保が政府として必要でありました。それで不足の年

に朝鮮から詣って負ったと、又イノベーションからも入ったことがありますが。

無年から三七年の数倉間に於ける自分汗の見当の結果を延べて見ると同様間

で数に始末する期間であるから数倉者の役は数倉者の役で一致
し難いので、減ったことは言葉出来ないが、増加しておらぬことは確が
ある。たか中部とまでは違うでないので、自覚的に、又暗証的に配給を
吸って来た者は、登録制度を施行前後は非常に遺しに思っていた者、
之等の人間は登録をするだけの勇気もなく、又昔と較べて阿片の入手
が著しく困難となったので、その間に中流者等は皆勧善を非常になし
ました。之言すれば、登録制度は、家庭から、阿片の廃置することに
は、大成功を収めました。現に、長者、大臣、家主、高官等の、阿片
を廃置することに
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。
見積の百万人に対して三千万も仲々登録はしなかった。といふのは政府の趣旨が解らぬものですから、相当な対策者でも仲々登録をしないで何とかして密賀阿片を吸うと努力した傾向があったのです。自が段々専賀制度が確立致しましたから、それを吸ってやる密賀片が少しなくなつて、従って藤者に登録して阿片を吸はねばならぬ様になったのです。

【大正時代の密賀阿片の問題】

昭和初期には、密賀阿片の問題は政府に認識され、専賀制度が導入されました。しかし、密賀阿片の取締めは必ずしも効果的ではなかった。密賀阿片の吸い手たちは、専賀制度の下でもアリバイを作り、密賀阿片を吸うことを続けました。

昭和3年には、密賀阿片の取締めが強化され、専賀制度が確立しました。しかし、密賀阿片の吸い手たちは、専賀制度の下でもアリバイを作り、密賀阿片を吸うことを続けました。
したが、毎四年目一九三六年には、利差は一千万円程度になったと記憶します。

洲国政府では、阿片に関する収支は、阿片専売特別会計と称する特別会計として運営し、その正味収益は年々政府の決算に掲載発表され、阿片の利益金及び負担金において、正味収益は年々増加し、負担金は年々減少している。
一九三六年では一ヶ月給料入約一千万円と記録してあります。しかし、一般に社会の高収入の増加は、吸収着の数の増加を示すものであると私見です。従って、社会の高収入は、出身地が相違し、収入の増加が規制されるものは定まっています。従ってこれは、施設は、急激に増加し、無差別の絶対数に近いものが出ているようです。前記所では一九三七年八月に、私見は、その相違が問題になった一九三七七年にはその相違が問題に認められました。
税額を高く定めることにより、所得の一部を固定する。また、この方法は税収を増加させ、政府の財政を安定させる役割を果たす。

一方、税法改正により、所得の一部を固定する。また、この方法は税収を増加させ、政府の財政を安定させる役割を果たす。

政府より生財を供給して、所得の一部を固定する。また、この方法は税収を増加させ、政府の財政を安定させる役割を果たす。

方針が高額になると、所得の一部を固定する。また、この方法は税収を増加させ、政府の財政を安定させる役割を果たす。

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I, NAKBA, Tsunekazu, swear on my conscience that the following statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief:

I was in the employ of the Finance Ministry of Japan during the period from 1924 to 1932. In the fall of 1932, I was in Kobe as head of the Kobe taxation office. About September or October of 1932, HOSHINO, Naoki, who was then head of the Bureau of General Affairs of the Finance Ministry, came back to Japan. He talked to officials in the Finance Ministry here in Tokyo and requested that someone whose qualifications were appropriate for work in the Opium Monopoly Bureau be selected. I was chosen for this post.

Mr. HOSHINO did not have an official position in the Japanese Ministry of Finance at that time, but he had previously been in the Finance Ministry in Japan. I had a conversation with Mr. HOSHINO at Kobe about that time in which we discussed my going to Manchukuo. We discussed very generally the work to be done but we made no plans nor did we discuss the organization of an opium suppression program at that time, although after I went to Manchukuo there were many discussions of the possibility of suppressing opium smoking. I had no specific advice in Japan that I was to organize suppression activities, but in my own mind I was considering that aspect of the problem. It was indicated that the Opium Monopoly Bureau would be a big undertaking, and it was anticipated that the revenue would be very large, which was of course an important factor, because at the beginning the Manchukuo Government did not have much income. I believe that at the same time Mr. HOSHINO negotiated with the Japanese Finance Ministry for a large loan from the Japanese Government to the Manchukuo Government, but I did not enter into such negotiations, and I have no personal knowledge of the amount, terms, security and so on.

I arrived in Cheng Chih, Manchukuo, in January 1933 and assumed the duties of my position, which was Vice-Chief of the Opium Monopoly Bureau. When I got to Manchukuo, the Bureau was not exactly organized. The Opium Law and the Monopoly Law were in effect, and the organization of the Bureau was also set up on paper and had been promulgated, but in fact things were
not functioning in this way yet. To speak in ordinary language, the form was set up, but it did not yet have any substance. The Director of the Bureau was a Chinese, CHIANG En-Chih. He performed the duties of his post but he was not very accredited to Government offices. Therefore, we studied practically everything and then recommended things to him for approval. There was another factor in the situation. Most of the affairs of the Manchukuo Government were done in the Japanese style, with which CHIANG was not very well acquainted, whereas we were. In view of this situation, most of the affairs were managed by me, since I was more familiar with the form of the work, and after the plans were drawn up, they were presented to Mr. CHIANG for his approval. In my position I worked mostly on the organization and operation of the Bureau. With regard to accounting matters of the Monopoly, of course, these were under my purview, but the net revenue was put into the general budget of the Manchukuo Government. Thus, the matters pertaining to disbursements out of the funds thus obtained were quite out of the scope of my duty. This aspect was looked after by the Bureau of Budget Affairs in the Son核查.

Our contact with the Japanese Government was maintained by liaison with the Third Section (changed to the Fourth Section in 1937) of Headquarters, Kwantung Army. The General Affairs Board (SONUCHO) was the agency through which liaison between the Manchukuo Government and the Kwantung Army was maintained. Actually, however, we usually dealt directly with Headquarters, Kwantung Army because of our personal contacts with officers there. The Kwantung Army was interested in getting the Monopoly Bureau on an operating basis as quickly as possible, (1) to gain control of unofficial local governments as well as bandit groups gaining revenues from illegal opium traffic, (2) to regulate opium smoking to avoid disgrace to the country, and (3) to turn illicit revenues into regular governmental income.

The organization and method of operation of the Monopoly Bureau were substantially as follows: The Bureau was organized under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance of the Manchukuo Government and began its first operations under the provisions of the following ordinances:

The Organization of Monopoly Bureau, Nov. 3, 1932;

The Opium Law, November 30, 1932;

Regulations Governing the Enforcement of the Opium Law, November 30, 1932.
From the beginning the Monopoly Bureau was intended to be a general monopoly organization to handle other commodities in addition to opium, but because only opium was handled for the first few years the bureau became known as the Opium Monopoly Bureau. By the time I left the Bureau about August 1937, we had set up monopoly organizations for petroleum, matches, salt, alcohol and had done preliminary work on a wheat monopoly organization. The head office was in Cheng Chon or Hsingking, with branch bureaus and sub-branch bureaus in various cities. At first there were only five districts or branch offices but when Menchukuo was divided into 16 provinces we eventually had offices in all provinces. The general function of branch and sub-branch offices was to collect opium from farmers and to distribute it to the wholesale and retail shops. The bureau designated certain areas for the cultivation of poppy and issued permits to the growers. Under law all opium and poppy seed had to be sold to the Bureau. The Bureau fixed the price to be paid for the opium and poppy seed that was collected from the farmers by branch offices or by purchasing agencies appointed by the government. In each district a wholesale dealer was appointed and of course he was obliged to secure the opium from the growers of the Monopoly Bureau. The wholesaler in turn distributed the opium to retail shops which were licensed by the government. The method of distribution of opium to wholesaler and retailers changed from time to time in order to bring about better control, and gradually distribution was brought under the direct control of the government as far as possible.

General enforcement of the opium law was the responsibility of the Police Department, but I had several hundred special agents under my direct supervision to control violations in connection with growing, smoking, sales handling and transportation, and even controlling shipment of opium by train and other means of conveyance.

Under the 1932 law the smoking of opium was allowed under government licenses. The first step in licensing smokers was to issue a general permit to smokers upon their own simple request, but at the next stage it was planned to make smokers produce certificates from medical authorities showing that they required opium for their health, and that plan was put into effect after I resigned in 1937. At no time were legal minors allowed to smoke opium. Japanese nationals in Menchukuo were also unable to obtain smoking permits. We were lenient at first in issuing smoking permits because we wanted to know how many people were addicted to opium. At the beginning we were not so particular even as to the amount of opium the smokers bought, since the object was to have them registered.
Usually an opium smoker smokes three times a day, morning, noon and night. The kind of an addict would consume about two or three chiens (ten chiens to one liang), but a more habitual smoker would smoke about ten times a day and consumes six or seven chiens. The majority of smokers use only one or two chiens a day. During my time in Kowloon, the retail price for one chien of opium was about 7 j. At that time the daily cost of food of the coolie type was only 30 sen.

I do not believe that the number of opium smokers increased after the Opium Monopoly Bureau was set up, but at the same time I cannot deny that it didn’t. But it is true that the number of actual smokers became better known through registration. As I recall, there were about 8,000,000 people out of a population of 30,000,000 to 35,000,000 people in Kowloon who used opium in one form or another, but the number of actual opium addicts was far less than that.

As nearly as I can recall when the first budget was set up, we had estimated a profit of ¥1,000,000, but actually the profit was only about ¥10,000, because the people did not fully understand the purpose of the Monopoly Bureau. Profit for the second year was about ¥1,200,000 but in the third year, or 1925, the profits jumped to ¥10,000,000, and the profits increased in the same ratio thereafter. Income then increased to ¥20,000,000 and next to ¥30,000,000. I believe the ¥30,000,000 was the maximum profit in any year. I do not know what the total sales were for each year.

The first few years after the establishment of the Bureau we set up a budget as to the amount of opium to be distributed but we could not get the required amount of opium in Kowloon, so the fact that some of the opium went through black market channels rather than through the opium monopoly office. It therefore became necessary to import opium from Kwantung Province and from Chosen in order to meet our budget estimates.

We sometimes distributed free opium seed to the coolies, but we did so as a medium of control, because if the poppy seed were planted it would make the indigo very visible so that we could keep very close check. I always felt that we did very well in reducing the growing of poppy in areas not authorized by the Monopoly Bureau, and I do not believe there was very much illegal cultivation except in 1923 and 1924 when the Monopoly Bureau could not fully exercise its control. It is not possible to mix poppy with a grain or other growth so as to camouflage it.
In order to reduce the cost of opium to the Government, adjustment was made in some cases by lowering of taxes on land used for poppy cultivation, but this was not done with any intent of encouraging poppy growth.

I resigned from my position with the Monopoly Bureau in August 1937 and paid little attention to Bureau activities afterwards because I entered private business.

I have read the foregoing statement in both the English and the Japanese languages.

Sworn to and subscribed by the
above-named MAJA, Tsunekazu
before the undersigned officer
at the War Ministry Building this
2nd day of July, 1946

s/Arthur A. Sondusky
Capt., JASS
请参考以下内容：

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阿片薬品一般認可・再認可・販売取引許可及び製造・販売許可

阿片薬品一般認可・再認可・販売取引許可及び製造・販売許可

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Currency Stabilization. The Central Bank of Honchou at first followed the policy of maintaining the value of the Yuan equal to the price of 23.51 grams of pure silver and was able to retain its stability through the control of money in circulation and also through transactions in silver and exchange on Shanghai. However, it was not long before it was found extremely disadvantageous to continue linking the Yuan with silver, owing to the United States embarking upon a silver-purchasing programme. Affected by the United States' policy of hoarding the price of the white metal, the price of silver, dissociating itself from general commodity prices, began to move upward from the autumn of 1934, and as a consequence the equilibrium between silver and commodity prices was broken, causing a rise in currency values and a fall in commodity prices in the countries with silver currencies. In order to reduce the disturbing effects of the violent fluctuations in the value of silver to the minimum, the Central Bank watched the developments in the silver situation and endeavored to prevent any violent changes in currency values and commodity prices by managing its currency so that its rise was limited to only one half of that of silver. In this way the Central Bank, while keeping an eye on the silver situation, neither linked its currency to silver nor divorced it from the white metal. This policy was pursued until March, 1935.

In the meantime, the fluctuations in the price of silver became increasingly violent; the London bar silver quotation on April 26, 1934 advanced to about 34 pence from 32 pence or so the previous day, and rose sharply further to over 36 pence the next day, but soon dropped to around 33 pence again, manifesting a very erratic tendency. Awakening to the fact that if the national currency continued to be linked with silver its value would rise and fall violently and cause serious disturbances to the economic world, the Central Bank finally decided to divorce the national currency from silver and shifted over to the policy of a simple managed currency, having for its object the stabilization of commodity prices. As a result the internal value of the currency was stabilized withstanding the drastic rise in the price of silver abroad. Commodity prices also became stable.

At the time the Honchoukou currency was first completely divorced from silver, the Yuan retained a relatively stable value in relation to the Japanese Yen at around 107 and 108 Yen against 100 Honchoukou Yuan. But when the Honchoukou currency began to have a stable relation to the Japanese currency, without being influenced by the fluctuations in the price of silver, it began to be generally talked about that the Honchoukou currency was being controlled with the object of bringing it to par with the Japanese currency. This view gradually gained ground, and the value of the national currency which had been stabilized against the Japanese Yen at around 107 to 108 Yen gradually approached the Japanese Yen in value. Thus step by step, through the months of May, June, July and August, it became closer to Yen, finally reaching parity in September, 1935. It has remained so ever since.
満洲中央銀行は最初純銀三三・九ーグラムと等値の銀の価格を維持しえる政策を探り、通貨管理及上海に於ける銀及代替相場操作に依ってそ

した政策を保つことを得た。然しながら間もなく銀と銀とのリンクを失い、通貨実行に乗り出したからである。合衆国之銀の価格を一九三四年一八月から銀貴し始め。その後銀価と物価との間の均衡は破れて、之が

為に通貨の価値及び物価の激変を銀の価格を銀の通貨操作に依り防止せんと努力し、通貨の価値及び物価の激変を銀の通貨操作に依り防止せんと努力し。
銀と切離すこともしなかった。この政策は一九三五年（昭和一〇年）三月に採用された。

銀の関入銀の損失に当たる振動は非常に激しくなった。一九三五年三月から三月邊に限られた円を含む金・銀は、前日には三ニャン、その後には三ニャン、さらに四ニャンに上昇し、盤面上に激しい弾動を示した。この振動が銀と総経済を一緒にリンクさせられた理由は、特別に強い利益の傾向を示したためであった。銀は総経済の重大なる障害となると云ふ事実上、中央銀行は廃止した。その目的とするところは特急を安定させた。その結果週間銀の値を安定させていた。特急週間銀の値を安定させていったため、週間銀の値を安定させた。特急週間銀の値を安定させていった。
一般の業に上った。此の見解は次第に根拠を得、日本圏と一〇七圏及一〇八圏に
二〇〇歩前で昭和三〇年九月、七月、八月、九月を経て昭和の価値に接近した。斯くし
ては昭和三〇年九月、十月、十一月、十二月に接近し

昭和三一〇年三月、四月、五月に接近した。
Registration of Opium and Narcotic-Addicts. To ascertain the precise number of addicts was the basic and most important conditions for the execution of all programs and measures aimed at the eradication of drug-taking. Naturally, the Central Government took every opportunity to give instructions and encouragements to local authorities with regard to the registration of addicts, in the hope that all addicts might be registered before the end of July, 1913, the time limit set for registration.

But some addicts in those districts where the preservation of peace and order was unsatisfactory or in other areas, shocked by the intensity of the anti-drug movement launched immediately after the announcement of the Government's policy, misconstrued this registration system as presaging the imposition of a tax or compulsory labour. They considered it a shame to themselves to have their names registered.

For these and other reasons, only slightly more than 200,000 addicts had been registered after a lapse of four months since the registration system was started, according to official reports received from the various provincial governments by the end of May. Thus, the results of the registration were far from satisfactory.

In order to cope with this situation, the Central Anti-Opium Encouragement Committee despatched parties of officials to local districts to expedite the registration of addicts. For about one month, these parties acted positively upon the various organs concerned in the principal cities of the country, thus dispelling groundless rumours of an extension of the time-limit for registration. At the same time, the local authorities concerned were better informed in order to understand the real objective of the registration system and to make positive efforts towards accelerating the registration task. Quite fruitful, indeed, was the despatch of these parties. Thus, the registration of addicts throughout the country had nearly been completed by the end of July, save for some districts in Sinkiang, Tungchuan and Jehol Province and in Huastien-hsien, Kirin Province, where specific conditions prevailed.

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Further, no active endeavours have been exerted to accommodate many addicts into these infirmaries. Due also to the failure of these establishments to institute any positive remedial measures for the addicts taken in, seven out of the ten persons treated at the infirmaries again become addicts after retaining from the institutions. This fact has given rise to the occurrence of the opinion that the curing of the addicts is impossible.
In the firm conviction, however, that if such remedial facilities are substantially improved, better guidance is given to the addicts and thoroughgoing control is exercised, the undertaking can progress successfully, the Government decided to erect a total of 200 more infirmaries in different provinces during the three years of 1938, 1939 and 1940 and has mapped out a 10-year program under which all addicts (estimated at 900,000 including young addicts or legal minors) to be given under remedial treatment during the period of 10 years. Below is given a detail of this program.

Table 9. TEN-YEAR ADDICTION TREATMENT PROGRAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Existing</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Accommodation Capacity</th>
<th>No. of persons admitted per annum</th>
<th>No. of addicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>19,704</td>
<td>230,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>19,704</td>
<td>230,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>95,574</td>
<td>699,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>95,574</td>
<td>603,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>95,574</td>
<td>508,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>95,574</td>
<td>612,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>95,574</td>
<td>916,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>95,574</td>
<td>221,178</td>
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<td>1946</td>
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<td>232</td>
<td>13,562</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>232</td>
<td></td>
<td>232</td>
<td>13,562</td>
<td>95,574</td>
<td>30,090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The period of accommodation for each addict is 50 days. Estimating the total number of addicts in 1938 at 900,000 of whom about 50,000 will be cured or will die during the 10-year period over which this program spreads, it is indicated that there will be no addicts left by the end of 1947 (the 14th year of Langte).

OPium-Smoking in Relation to National Problems

In spite of its determination to dispose of the opium question in as short a period of time as possible, the Manchoukuo Government is faced with certain problems, a knowledge of which is essential to the understanding of its policy with regard to the eradication of the opium habit. In the following paragraphs a close study will be made of the urgent problems related to the whole opium question.

Government Finance. According to figures for the past several years, the profit derived from the opium monopoly by the Manchoukuo Government amounted to the sum of ten million yuan for one of the record years. On the surface, this may seem a profitable source of State revenue. But close scrutiny reveals that this sum is not a profit in the real sense of the word. In the first place, Manchoukuo consumes annually some 180 million yuan worth of opium. In the second place, the opium habit not only demoralizes the addicts spiritually, but also weakens them physically. Together with the decline in their utility, comes a proportionate lessening of the productivity of the country. It appears that addicts consume more resources than the average individual at the same time producing much less. As a proverbial Chinese saying says, they are "fond of eating, but dislike work." If this extra consumption and the sub-
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Conce now, the criminal rate increases in direct ration to the number of addicts, putting an extra burden on the policing and administrative costs to the State. Taking into consideration these various facts, the elimination of the opium habit from Manchoukuo would mean approximate savings every year to the State of over 300 million yuan, conservatively estimated.

The not saving of this huge sum, directed into usual channels would mean a corresponding increase in the consuming power in the country, providing a potential incentive to the general economic prosperity and well-being of Manchoukuo. It is also evident, that as a result of the increase of economic activity, the State revenue from taxes would more than offset the rather dubious gains to be gotten from the enforcement of the opium monopoly.

The relatively small profit accruing incidentally from the opium monopoly may cause some suspicion on the part of foreign public opinion as well as misunderstandings. But an examination of the actual situation leaves no room for such doubts or cynicism.

True, there are difficulties and obstacles to be overcome in any undertaking. But in connection with the opium problem, the Manchoukuo Government is firmly determined to hurdle any and all obstacles to the achievement of ultimate success.

Conclusion. Already, more than two years and a half have passed since the Government first adopted its positive policy of suppressing the drug habit. During this span of time, the Government has left nothing undone in its efforts to find a speedy solution to the various problems that are related to the policy. Taking into consideration the volume of past attempts in this direction and the necessity of meeting the exacting requirements of the current situation in the country, the anti-opium campaign has been divided into several different stages.

The first stage, completed by the end of July, 1937, was occupied with the registration of all old addicts. The second stage, which was started immediately after that date, covered the perfecting of medical facilities to be placed at the disposal of the addicts. The third included the institution of stringent laws to prevent the rise of new addicts. This was started the very day the registration of the addicts was finished. But its enforcement was not to begin until after the completion of the second stage. Accordingly, individuals, not duly registered, found smoking opium and those found profiteering from the narcotic traffic have been severely punished, and will be punished with equal severity in the future.

Beginning with 1939, moreover, addicts in government service or in the employ of special corporations will not be tolerated. From every angle, efforts are being made to eliminate smokers once and for all, no matter what difficulties may crop up in the way. It should also be pointed out that the year 1938 was the time limit allowed for the reformation of such addicts. Thus if any addicts are found among public servants or employees of special corporations, there should, of course, be no room for any sympathetic considerations.
The opiates mentioned above are applicable according to the social position or occupation of the addict. Besides, age restrictions are in force, in accordance with which all addicts aged under 30 were required to cure themselves voluntarily from the evil habit by the end of 1939. In case any such addicts are found after that date, they are to be indicated and subjected to forcible remedial treatment.

The original policy for the suppression of the drug habit was to be spread over a maximum period of ten years, but the Government intends to complete the policy within the shortest possible period. With respect to some narcotics, the Government, seeing that they were several times more poisonous than opium, adopted a policy of immediate suppression at the very outset.

In spite of this policy, some supply of these narcotics is still permitted. This is for no other reason than the prevention of their illegal traffic which otherwise would be impossible. After the perfection in the future of necessary medical facilities, the addicts will preferentially be taken into infirmaries and other institutions. All addicts and illegal drug traffickers when found even after that will be severely dealt with.
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But some addicts in those districts where the preservation of peace and order was unsatisfactory or in other areas, shocked by the intensity of the anti-drug movement launched immediately after the announcement of the Government's policy, misconstrued this registration system as presaging the imposition of a tax or compulsory labour. They considered it a shame to themselves to have their names registered.

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In order to cope with this situation, the Central Anti-Opium Encouragement Committee despatched parties of officials to local districts to expedite the registration of addicts. For about one month, these parties acted positively upon the various organs concerned in the principal cities of the country, thus dispelling groundless rumours of an extension of the time-limit for registration. At the same time, the local authorities concerned were better informed in order to understand the real objective of the registration system and to make positive efforts towards accelerating the registration task. Quite fruitful, indeed, was the despatch of these parties. Thus, the registration of addicts throughout the country had nearly been completed by the end of July, save for some districts in Sinkiang, Tsinghai and Jehol Province and in Huatien-hsien, Kirin Province, where specific conditions prevailed.

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Further, no active endeavors have been exerted to accommodate many addicts into these infirmaries. Due also to the failure of these establishments to institute any positive remedial measures for the addicts taken in, seven out of the ten persons trusted at the infirmaries again become addicts after retiring from the institutions. This fact has given rise to the occurrence of the opinion that the curing of the addicts is impossible.
In the firm conviction, however, that if such remedial facilities are substantially improved, better guidance is given to the addicts and thorough-going control is exercised, the undertaking can progress successfully, the Government decided to erect a total of 200 more infirmaries in different provinces during the three years of 1938, 1939 and 1940 and has mapped out a 10-year program under which all addicts (estimated at 900,000 including young addicts or legal minors) to be under remedial treatment during the period of 10 years. Below is given a detail of this program.

Table 9. TEN-YEAR ADDICT RELIEF PROGRAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State Opium Smoker's House- Existing</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>State Accommodation</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>No. of persons admitted per annum</th>
<th>No. of addicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2,672</td>
<td>19,704</td>
<td>2,672</td>
<td>1,029,296</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>12,162</td>
<td>85,194</td>
<td>12,162</td>
<td>795,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>95,574</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>699,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>85,574</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>603,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>55,574</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>508,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>55,574</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>412,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>202</td>
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<td>202</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>55,574</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>412,262</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>202</td>
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<td>202</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>55,574</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>412,262</td>
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<td>1946</td>
<td>202</td>
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<td>202</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>55,574</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>412,262</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>55,574</td>
<td>13,362</td>
<td>412,262</td>
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新潟県年報
（一九四三年普通教科教員、実業、実務教育委員会出版）

の六九七・六九八・六九九・七〇一・七〇七頁より抜粋

阿片並びに鴉片吸食者の捜出

病者の救出に際し知る所も多いが、鴉片の濫用を防ぐ目的を図る全日本損害保険の募集が実施されている。従って

手数を要する上に足を出して現実的確信なる偽造である。従って

中央政府ととしては、凡ての対策を講ずるに到っても、地方自治体に委ねるにあつては、病者保護

をはかることをうらは、一九一八年七月末迄に発見をしめし、病者保護に

について調査を進め、一九一八年七月末迄に発見をしめし、地方自治体

に於ける病者の中に於いて政府の保護者を認める地方及びその他の地方に

関する病者の中には、一切の保護区を設けざる地域及び影響を及ぼす

外に却って病者を守るに足りを見るが、此の取扱いは簡単略しくは明白経過を要する

ものなり今この多くを働く保護に当る所が少なかった。そして彼は自己
の全顔を呈にされるに相原で会った。かっした役々の主の前五男血族に在省守府より入城した正式受付
に服ばそのル補助品の如き検査より出る次第に、検査され
たのは会って以来二十人
が少し評えるとは思なかった。注くしてその検査の結果は知れて不
充分なるものであった。

なお一行はこの間の主要都市に於ける吾等に役に立つ所
の役を果たし、藤寄務の如き役も必要不可欠を知り
時に関係地方百局にもこの役若しの主官を進呈せられ
この役のを重視なる事は先ず住民を更に詳し知らせ
た。}

かつて関係者彼等の下にあった二江、福井、越谷、藤寄
河の各省及び吉林省挨句

-3-
病案に対する否認の事実に、感じた敵意が少ないことは、能登の場面での失敗を認めることなく、その結果を論じるべきである。また、能登の場面でのこの点から、同片の報案が不可決であるとの結果が明らかに現れる。
ならぬ。同政府はこの様な治療設備を実質的に改竄し、阿片吸者に対し

一ケ年断歴の

吸容者数
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国家財政。過去数年間に亘る数字によると貿易順差政府が阿片事費より騰げた利益は巨額である。なぜその利益を有効に使用すべきかを検討した結果、中長期の利益がある。長期利益の増加にあたっては、短期的利益は相対的に小さい。長期の利益を増加させるためには、短期の利益を増加させることが必要である。
考察の一端に、犯罪率が真の懸念の対象に比例して増加している可能性がある。犯罪率が増加するにつれて、日本は警察が必要とする犯罪に対処する力が不足していると見なされることが予想される。

したがって、犯罪率の増加は、社会全体の安全に対する懸念を引きずり上げ、防犯対策の必要性を強調するものである。犯罪率が増加するにつれて、警備体制がより強化されるべきである。
1. I, MATO, Tomio, live at No. 157, 3-Chome, Tamagawa-Okuzawa-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo Metropolis.

2. I was graduated from the Law Department of the Tokyo Imperial University in the 2nd year of Showa (1927). I served as Probationary Judge at Yokohama and, in the 4th year of Showa (1929), was appointed Judge. After that, I was appointed Judge of the Tokyo District Court. I was in my office at the Tokyo District Court until the 9th year of Showa (1934), except when I was in Manchuria where I served for a while. In April 1934, I resigned my post and became an official of the Manchoukuo Government. I served as Chief of the First Section of the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Judicial Department until March 1935. In 1935, I was transferred to Councillor of the Bureau of Legislation of the Government. The Bureau of Legislation was changed afterwards, by the reform of government organization, into the Legislative Bureau of the General Affairs Board where I was in service as councillor until April of the 13th year of Showa (1938). In April of the 13th year of Showa (1938), I was transferred to Councillor of the Information Bureau of the General Affairs Board. In March of the 14th year of Showa (1939), I was appointed the Director of the Information Bureau and I served until April of the 19th year of Showa (1942). In May of the 19th year of Showa (1943), I returned to Japan to be appointed Chief of the First Division of the Information Bureau of the Japanese Government. I held that post until November of the 19th year of Showa (1943) when I was appointed Councillor of the JUSOININ rank attached to the Investigation Section of the same bureau. I retired from office on the last day of June of the 20th year of Showa (1944).

3. One of the basic policies of the Judicial Department in Manchoukuo at the time I arrived at my post was, first of all, to improve judicial system. As to judicature, the general opinion was as follows:

Prior to end of the time of the foundation of Manchoukuo, the judgement of the courts was under the influence of bribery. One who offered more bribe than the other won the case after all. So long as bribery continues, any case was carried from the lower instance to the higher instance and again back to the lower instance to repeat the same proceeding. The people thought that anyone who bribed more than the other party would win the case after all when the latter became out of money. I once talked with Mr. FURITA, the head of the General Affairs Bureau of the Judicial Department at the time of my arrival at my post, about whether bribery was really controlling the judgement of the Court. He said, "Although Manchurian people say that the judgement of the courts are controlled by bribery, no one has grasped the kernel of the question. I am not yet assured of it." Soon afterwards, however, a certain murder case occurred at Fushun with the examination of which I was concerned. The case was that a tailor struck his apprentice to death and threw his corpse into the well, destroying evidence of crime. After the accusation, it proved that money given and taken concerning this case amounted to as much as some 20,000. I could get positive evidence that the money was delivered to public procurators, clerks and coroners.
This fact convinced me of the judgment being influenced by bribery. It was the first task for the Government to make judicature thus poisoned by bribery fair just.

3 (a) The second task was to consolidate legislation. There existed th codes formerly made by the Chinese Government. Chinmens, Huis, and Man-ward codes were not prevailing. Furthermore, since the Chinese had customs and manners peculiar to them, a new code which accorded with this state of affairs had to be made. Accordingly, it was decided to enact the civil code, the penal code, the commercial code, the code of civil procedure, the code of criminal procedure and other attached laws, etc.

The third task was to organize the courts. The organization of the courts was very defective as well. There existed organs called 'courts' with modern forms in such large cities as Harbin, Mukden, Fushun, Tientsin, etc., and the accusation system of procedure was in practice in the Chinese region; and in civil cases, modern legal proceedings were pursued. But in most prefectures, administration and judicature were mixed together in previous, as the Chinese judges in the prefectures, gave judgements. There were inspectors called 'yang-chun-yuen' who assisted prefectural governors. According to the direction, administration and judicature confounded and administration minded in trials. If anyone has interest in case with the governor, he can sway the court judgement. A judicial organ of such a was called a prefectural office transacting the business of judicature', in a case of the prefectural governor passing judgement. There existed another kind of judicial organ called a judicial office which ranked between a court and a prefectural office transacting the business of judicature'. In a judicial office, judicature was separated to some extent from administration, and yet the prefect governor was concerned in the proceeding. Those offices numbered six or seven throughout the country. The above-mentioned explanation concerns the first in of the civil or criminal case. The second or third instance was under the jurisdiction of the district court or the higher court in large cities or the Supreme Court respectively. To reorganize the courts in such chaotic conditions was one of the basic works. As for prisons, there existed institutions which had the appearance of a modern prison in the large cities where the courts were located. The accommodations, however, were extremely poor just like jails in old days. Prisons of prefecitures were in appalling conditions, for instance, prison cells were jamed with prisoners leaving no room for lying. The conditions were so that they, answering the question how to lie at night, said that they lied their selves alternating their heads and legs, as they could not place their heads in row. Any sort of exercise was not permitted to take. There was no light at all. They were packed like sardines. It was generally thought that, once a man was put into such a prison, there was no telling whether he could return alive. To improve prisons was one of the basic works.

5. Independence of judicature was necessary; in the first place, for proving judicature from corruption as mentioned above. For this purpose, separate of judicature from administration in prefectures, improvement and independence the courts had to be achieved. And at the same time, excellent judicial office officers had to be sent to such judicial organs. Such conditions created a necessity for training judicial officers. As the people speak Chinese, judicial work had to be done by Chinese-Manchoukuan officers. Only such officers could administer justice fairly. In improving and managing judicial organizations, Chinese-Manchoukuan officers were to take the initiative with collaboration of Japanese-Manchoukuan officers. Accordingly, the Judicial Department decided, the 1st year of Zokoku (1934), upon establishing the Jurisprudence School of the Judicial Department where training for fresh judges and public procurators was started. Applying for admission to the school, excellent students swarmed. The number of the applicants was fifty times as many as that of the admitted. Some 200 students who had the makings as good as those of Japanese university undergraduates were admitted into the school after a strict examination.
They were judicial officers in embryo of Manchuria. Such men, graduating every year from the school, entered the courts and the public prosecutors' offices and caused the judicial organization to be improved.

6. As to the consolidation of the codes, the Judicial Department first drew up the drafts, carried them to the Bureau of Legislation. After that the drafts went through due formalities and thus the codes were enacted. These codes were completed before the abolition of extraterritoriality in the 4th year of Kotoh (1937). I, as a Councillor of the Bureau of Legislation and of the Legislative Bureau, successively, made technical examination into every draft of proposed laws.

7. As to the reorganization of the court, modern systems of the courts and the public prosecutors' offices were almost completed prior to the abolition of extraterritoriality in the 4th year of Kotoh (1937). Until that time, the Supreme Court, the higher courts, the district courts, the local courts and the public prosecutors' offices corresponding to those courts were merely completed. Those, the completion of which delayed for the bad economy and other reasons, were also accomplished by the 6th year of Kotoh (1939) and thus the judicial system of Manchoukuo was changed and the modern organization of the courts and the public prosecutors' offices came into existence. At the same time, such talent as mentioned above graduated from the Jurisprudence School of the Judicial Department and entered the courts and the public prosecutors' offices. As a consequence, justice came to be administered fairly for the first time in Manchuria.

8. Steady reforms were also carried out on the prison system after the foundation of Manchoukuo. Improvements were made on the prisons situated at such large cities as Hsinking, Mukden, Harbin, etc. and other places. In Hsinking, for instance, completion of an ideal prison raised a discussion among the people of knowledge. When the living condition of the Shantung coolies was compared with that of prisoners in newly-built prisons, the latter was far better. So good were the new prisons that there was apprehension that they might serve as a stimulus to a criminal act. However, since the Government has built a prison, a prisoner must live there a life worthy of a human being even if the living condition in the prison was better than that of coolies, and this was the very manifestation of the spirit of founding Manchoukuo. This was the conclusion which they arrived at.

9. As to the bar system too, there existed the Chinese system of 'Risshi' (lawyer) prior to the foundation of Manchoukuo, which was, however, an imperfect one. But 'Risshi Ho' (the Bar Law) was enacted in 1935, elevating the status of lawyers.
I frequently attended the Cabinet councils and the conference of the Privy Councillors in the capacity of Councillor of the Legislative Bureau. I was on duty under the Chang Ching-hui Cabinet. The Premier and his Cabinet colleagues of the time were statesmen who had great influence over the Manchurian land and people. So that, in case that any bill or important policy, especially, those connected with land, cereals and native capital, was introduced in the Cabinet Council, furious discussions took place and sometimes the original bill fell through due to objection of these ministers. During my term of office as the Director of the Information Bureau, for instance, a bill for the Uncultivated Lend Expropriation Law, which had been submitted to the Cabinet council, was finally compelled to be withdrawn owing to strong dissenting atmosphere in the council. It had been decided upon that uncultivated land alone should be purchased for the Japanese settlers. Practically, however, there was a case in which cultivated lands had inseparable relation with uncultivated ones (for example, a small cultivated area surrounded by wide uncultivated tracts of land). The said bill contained a proviso to the effect that, in such a case, even cultivated land could be bought. The bill, proposed by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, was withdrawn due to dissention of the Cabinet council.

When I was in office as Councillor of the Legislative Bureau, the conference of the Privy Councillors consisted of seven councillors of Manchurian line and three councillors of Japanese line, Tsen Shih-yi taking the chair. A decision was made by majority of votes. As to this conference too, opinions
were set forth actively by Manchurians as to a bill of importance. Sometimes it was difficult to get a government bill through the council. As far as I can remember, a question of punishing parricide was at issue on the occasion of enacting the penal code. The original bill which had passed through the Cabinet council provided that parricide should be condemned to death or life imprisonment. Put in the conference of Privy State Councillors, it was strongly insisted that it should be punishable by death alone. Especially, the most persistent were those Councillors who were surviving retainer of the Ching dynasty, for instance, Hu Chih-yuan, Tseng Wen and Chen Jui-lin, etc. According to the Manchurian Councillors' view it was against morality to condemn any murderer of his parent to life imprisonment. Finally, it was settled, after the discussion in a conference in the Emperor's presence, that parricide, only when the motive deserved compassion, might be condemned to life imprisonment.

While I was in office as Director of the Information Bureau 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō' (the State Founding Divine Mausoleum) was founded. The announcement of founding 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō' was made on July 15 of the 15th year of Showa (1940). On July 13, an outline for the announcement was indicated to me as a resolution of the Cabinet council. I and my staff made arrangements for announcing it according to this resolution. Its purport was as follows:

"A. The Emperor's friendly relation with the Japanese Imperial Household has been enhanced and his spirit became one with that of the Japanese Emperor. As a result, he has come to dedicate 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō' to the ancestor of the Imperial
Japanese Household. The Emperor and his descendants are to worship it.

B. The people shall not be coerced into worshipping 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō'. However, when the Emperor worships it and his virtue pervades the people, any of the people are not prevented from worshipping it if he would do so.

C. 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō' is, accordingly, not in conflict with any existing religion at all.

D. The announcement shall be made according to the above principles."

In line with the aforementioned principles, I, as the Director of the Information Bureau, not only made the announcement but also carried out subsequent policies of information.

After 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō' was founded, the local authorities of various Provinces, Prefectures, etc. raised repeated cries for establishing its detached shrines. The central authorities however, did not consent to them. It was because of the view that the establishment of detached shrines was unadvisable as it would give an impression of urging the worship of the shrine on the people. Such being the case, 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō' was quite different from what is called a religion. It had nothing to do with the people's individual life. Manchukuo, from the outset of her foundation, let any religion take its own course.

I, being a Christian, had been an elder of the Japan Christian Church, located at Chūō-dōri (Central Avenue) Hsin-king, from right after the arrival at my post in Manchukuo up to the time of returning to Japan. Even while I was in office.
as the Director of the Information Bureau, I often occupied the pulpit during the pastor's absence. That I was an elder of the church did never interfere with my post of an official of the government. After 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō' was founded, I often visited as ever the Manchurians' church. There was a church at Wu-malu, Hsinking, established by the Swedish Presbyterian Church, which I visited and delivered a sermon. I was asked by Mr. Wang Hsing-shan, elder of that church, to preach in the memorial service of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the church. It was in the autumn of 1941. I made a sermon on the spirit of Christianity and the spirit of the foundation of 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō' to pastors of the Presbyterian Churches who had gathered from every part of the country. Also, when I made an official trip to Tunghua, I, at the request of the pastors and elders of the Tunghua Christian Church who called on me, visited the church late at night and preached before the congregation of some 100 Christians, on the subject of "You are the light of the world", telling them that the Christians in Manchukuo are the light of the world. On the occasion of my transference to Japan, the Hsinking Manchurian Church held a farewell party for me, attended by elders and other interested persons, including Rev. Pastor Hu Cheng-Kuo. As mentioned above, the establishment of 'Kenkoku-Shimmyō' exerted no pressure upon religions.

Originally, the duties of Director of the Information Bureau should have been performed by any Chinese-Manchukuoan official. Although a Manchurian was to occupy that post, there were something inconvenient for him from the practical point of view in Manchukuo. These were the relations with Information
Division of Kwantung Army as well as with the Information Section of S.M.R. Co. The Kwantung Army had the Information Division for the purpose of transacting military information with which the government information had something to do. Accordingly, the connection and adjustment between the army's information and that of the government were of great importance. As to S.M.R., there was also the Information Section which, with Dairen as its centre, carried on oversea propaganda and other general propaganda of Manchuria, besides information regarding railway service. So that the government had as well to keep in touch with the Information Section of S.M.R. Co.

Such being the case, the Director of the Information Bureau took charge of connecting and negotiating with the outside, such as the Kwantung Army, S.M.R., etc. As to the domestic information and propaganda of Manchuria, I left them in the hands of Chinese-Manchukuoan
I had, as one of my staff, a man of ability, named Chuang Kai-yung who was the head councillor. He framed the information policies, drafted the Government statements, prepared the original forms of the Premier's talk and thus settled everything consulting with the Premier. Besides, there were under him those younger set of excellent Chinese-Manchukuoan officials, for instance, Lin Sheng-yuan, Su Cheng-hsin, who directed and carried out domestic propaganda. No one but Chinese-Manchukuoan officials could make propaganda toward 40,000,000 Manchurian natives. In the propaganda toward the people in general, Chinese-Manchukuoan councillors and secretaries played the most active part; I, Director of the Information bureau, being a robot rather than otherwise.

So far as I was concerned, there was no discrimination between Chinese and Japanese Manchukuoan officials in transacting business. A way of settling and carrying out the information policies was that every official, after talking and consulting frankly with one another, decided on any plan and put it into practice. The languages used in such a case were Chinese or Japanese as the case might be and sometimes a medley of both languages was used in talking, discussing and disputing. We became so united into one that we, in doing daily work, were not conscious of any discrimination between the Chinese and Japanese. When a visitor from Japan happened to call on me while we were in a meeting and after seeing the scene, asked by me, "Among those who were engaged in arguments here, can you distinguish between a Japanese and a Manchurian?" he was sure to answer, saying, "Everyone looks a Japanese and looks a Chinese at the same time. I don't know what's what."

It was almost the same, though in different degree, with other government offices as with here and especially in the local government offices. The Japanese and Manchurians became so completely fused together that it was hard to distinguish between them.
Such being the case, it is said that, after the termination of hostilities, the Chinese who were formerly Manchukuoan officials looked after the Japanese very kindly. As for ex-councillor Chuang Kai-yung, for example, he remained at the Information Bureau to the end, took care of Japanese-Manchukuoans, even preparing meals for them together with his wife, and when the Nationalists army entered Changehun, finished handing over, representing the Information Bureau, the business to the representatives of the Chinese Government. Afterwards he helped the Japanese implicitly and explicitly and did great service to them up to the day when the 8th Route Army entered the city. These things are what I heard from the people who returned from Manchuric last year.

There are many stories that the Japanese who were later on repatriated from Manchuria had been helped by the Chinese-Manchukuoans. These stories are very touching.

13. Now, let me refer to the purpose of establishing the Manchurian Heavy Industry Company. I remember it was in the autumn of the 17th year of Showa (1942) that I met President AYUKAWA Gisuke, of that Company and dining with him, listened to his reminiscences about it in a room of the Yamato Hotel, Hsinking. It was on the very day of his resignation from the presidency of the Company. His story continued as long as for three hours without being interrupted by any visitor. The details of his story were as follows:

14. "The land of Manchuria resembles that of America. The reason why the Japanese industry has not made a progress is that the Japanese have too skillful hands and manage to do anything with their fingers, which hindered the development of engineering industry. We cannot get out of handicraft so long as we imitate the Japanese industry. We must, introducing American machinery and technique, build up here at one stroke an industry in larger
scale than in Japan. It is possible that a highly developed engineering industry may grow in Manchuria. I would like to create the second America in a bit smaller scale, tying up with U.S.A. at any cost. Manchuria has electric power besides iron, coal, non-ferrous metals, etc. If dams are constructed on the Sungari and Yalu Rivers, they will produce very abundant and cheap hydro-electricity, supplying abundant electric power at low charges, developing resources and turning Manchuria into a great industrial nation in such a short time as ten years.

With this dream, I decided to come over to Manchuria. And I was of the opinion that, for the sake of introducing American capital and technique, we had to have U.S.A. create a credit for us and that we would give the underground resources of Manchuria to U.S.A. as the security for this credit.

I set about introducing the capital. My move, however, came to the knowledge of some Rightists and ultra-nationalistic diplomats. With MCNEA, Kuremato, for instance, as a leader, they talked over their reaction against my plan at the Seiyoken Restaurant at Ueno. They made a fuss about it, crying, "This is the second Harriman Affair. Ayukawa is selling Manchuria to U.S.A. As the news about this appeared in the newspapers, things began to go wrong. Simultaneously the China Incident broke out and the Panay Incident occurred. Little did I dream of the outbreak of the Great East Asiatic War. Thus, I met with unexpected earthly faults one after another.

I, entirely depending upon introduction of the American capital, thought of establishing the Manchurian Heavy Industry Company and set about introducing the Nissen into Manchuria.

When I started this campaign, it won fair popularity in U.S.A. and at that time, many business men of various commercial firms in U.S.A. thronged to me to negotiate for selling their machinery and technique. From among them, even swindlers made...
their appearance. As the situations at home and abroad were growing worse, I prepared for going over to U.S.A. but circumstances prevented me from doing so. Should I have made bold to go over to America at that time, the situation would have been altered and consequently that of the world might have been changed.

That I got a moment behind the time disabled me to materialize my dream. When I failed in introducing the American capital and technique, the Manchurian Heavy Industry Company had no significance to me. Though I made my entry into the Company as the President, as circumstances drove me there, I had already lost my vision and could not realize my aspiration.

Being desirous of retrieving somehow the general situation by introducing German machinery, I went over to Germany. However, the Russo-German War suspended the Siberian route, baffling my plan again. In spite of my title of President of the Company, I could not, up to present, realize what I had dreamed." This was Mr. Ayukawa’s reminiscence.

15. At the time when the state of Manchoukuo was founded, Japanese Government officials at the age of 30 or so, resigning their post and becoming citizens of Manchoukuo, left for their new post one after another as Manchoukuon officials. I was one of them. It was because something attracted them that these young men thus streamed there.

A vision of establishing an ideal state and of realizing an Utopia stirred the youthful blood. The foundation of Manchoukuo was the materialization of such an ideal. Therein existed morality and light. It was based on ‘Humanism’.

On July 7 in 1937 when the China Incident broke out, the Manchoukuon officials cried, “Hang it!” They were afraid that the China Incident would become a great obstacle to the
construction of Manchoukuo and hinder them from realizing their ideal. "Hung it!" meant this.

/s/ Shicu, Togio

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of April 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ ERTI:ED I. HARG:DCN
1st Lt., Inf.
Administrative Officer
Defense Division
極東国際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆国部

荒木貞夫

其他

宣誓供述書

武藤富男

供述

DEF. DOC. NO. 957

自己宣誓

鉄腕

供述

通
確信を持ったです。

理由は、田舎の主人が小僧をなくし、その死体を戸穴に投げて、跡をかくした事件に付
いてみる確証を握った者がありました。それで裁判が頓挫し、動かざるをえませんでした。

その任務は法制の整備であり、中国政府の作つた法律を法典に整備するました。みならず、法制に整備する事となりました。

裁評の改編である裁評と法典の改編を速やかに整備する事となりました。新京。奉天。吉林。ハルビ

等の大都市には近代的な形式を持った法廷に整備するものがあります。裁評の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事があり、裁判は裁評に整備する事となりました。然し、裁判の改編は整備に整備する事が

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に経る難も持たぬものなり、例へば弘毅大臣在位中、未利用地収用法案が国会院会議に上題
これまじシテ後は国対の空気を強く遂に改訂され傾向の破目にあつた例ありテーヨ
民に用望せしむべき土地としては未利用地だけを買収するといふことにおいて
面積の既耕地が未利用地を不可分関係にある場合はして広大な未利用地を周囲に囲う間
た法律案でありました。シテ後是等大臣から提案され於て丁が国務院会議の空気の不適に依
敬問されました。
私が法制定困難の項は、令議会は長来参議七十一公卿議上人となるをため、議決は少数

この意見を面でし、政府案を通過が困難であると、審議者を指摘して、意見を強硬でし、

この文書の意見に対しては、親政を務めたもの有能ににするのが道義に反すと、いきなり

議決の文書で、親政を務めたもの有能にするのは、道義に反すといきなり、いきなり、

七月十七日、私は国務院会議に出席しました。国務院会議に出席しました。国務院会議

について、私に配当してあります。

立憲主義者、皇位の九州島と親政を務め、天下皇室と親政を務め、親政を務めることである。

但し、皇位者が、それを辞専し、その徳の及ぶ、

立憲思想の存在は、国民に余り過剰である。
「牧師」 pencils of light
牧師としての
教義と伝統

教義としての
牧師の役割と
伝統の承継

教会の構造と
牧師の位置

教義の発展と
牧師の役割

牧師の教義と
伝統の重要性

牧師の役割と
教会の役割

教会の伝統と
牧師の役割

牧師の教義と
伝統の関係

牧師の役割と
教会の役割

牧師の教義と
伝統の関係

牧師の役割と
教会の役割

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伝統の関係

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牧師の教義と
伝統の関係

牧師の役割と
教会の役割

牧師の教義と
伝統の関係
満州の実際からすると満州では困難な点が多々ありました。それに関係をもって満州事務局報道部をついて居り、政府が報道上の

「満州国」を「満州」と称するように報道しました。政府が報道上の「満州国」を「満州」と称するように報道したのである。
次に、満洲重工業株式会社設立の趣旨について述べますと、昭和七年の秋に設立し、満洲に設立された日本の重工業企業の一つです。その目的は、満洲の工業の発展と日本との経済連携を促進することでした。設立の趣旨は、満洲の資源を活用し、日本の工業技術を導入して、満洲の工業を発展させることでした。これにより、満洲の工業の発展が期待され、日本との経済連携が促進されました。
昭和十三年（九月七日） 昭
同日 於 日會人 固本 敏男

供述者

右ノ為立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトラ
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>项目</th>
<th>内容</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>项目名称</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OUTLINE OF GOVERNMENT

1. Revision, Abolition and Adjustment of Internal Taxes.

The following taxes, as listed below, have been reduced, exempted or revised in accordance with the policy to revise and abolish various types of taxes and to effect the unification and adjustment of tax rates with a view to lightening and making equitable thereby the tax burden. This has been done from the standpoint of social and industrial policy with the increase in revenues, which is reflective of the advancement of public well-being, and in parallel with the development of business enterprises resulting therefrom and because of the improvement in the revenue situation. The reduced burden in terms of money has reached Yen 23,750,000. (unit of 1,000)

1. Reductional unification of the rate of business taxes in Mukden Province.
2. Reduction of the rate of the Cigarette Excise in Jehol Province.
3. Reduction by 50% of the Poppy Cultivation Tax in Jehol Province.
4. Abolition of double Taxation on production and livestock breeding.
5. Abolition of Certification Fee.
6. Abolition of the transit tax and surtax from the cargotax and livestock transit tax in Jehol.
7. Abolition of the miscellaneous monthly tobacco tax in Harbin Special municipality.

- 1 -
8. Reductional adjustment of the grain production tax and abolition of the grain market tax and grain measurement tax in Kirin Province.

9. Exemption of family tax on salt and staple book and fine for violation of anti-opium regulations under the old system of former province of Jehol.


11. Reduction of the rate of business taxes in Hailunkiang Province.

12. Reduction of the rate of the salt gabelle.

As in China, the price of salt is the highest in the world and greatly oppresses the lives of the people. The salt price prevailing in Mukden and in Hailungking being different and it being a matter of urgency to reduce the burden and make equitable the distribution thereof; measures were taken, in consideration of the financial condition, to reduce, the salt gabelle rate by 25.00 per 1 teng on March 1, 1931 and to effect a general reduction of prices on monopoly goods in Hailungking Province. It is the Government's policy to bring about a fundamental reduction of the tax burden in accordance with the increase in the internal tax and other general revenue. In the meantime the revenue from the salt gabelle and salt monopoly shall be fixed at Yen 25,000,000 and anything over that amount will be applied to the reduction of the salt price.

13. Establishment of cigarette excise inspection certificate.

Sec. 97.

(TN: tunsui is an excise instituted in place of certain miscellaneous taxes.)

15. Enforcement of three kinds of excises in Kirin and Jehol Provinces.

16. Inaction of a temporary grain business tax law.

Furthermore, for the purpose of conducting a fundamental investigation concerning the improvement of the administration and adjustments of the taxes various investigations have been made from July 1923 to February this year into the social and economic conditions and financial affairs in localities under the jurisdiction of forty Tax Offices, the government is endeavoring, to end thus contribute to the fair distribution of the tax burden.
（大同三年十月）吉川裕
（大同三年十二月）吉川裕
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（大同三年十二月）吉川裕

序状三月一日、二月、三月

（大同三年十月）吉川裕
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（長田）

（長田）

（長田）
I, who occupied the post of Professor at the Hekokun University, Manchukuo during the years 1939 and 1943, hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 44 pages and entitled "Outline of Government" is a book which was officially published by the Manchurian Government, and bought by me in the capacity as mentioned above, and which has been thenceforth in my custody.

Certified at No. 75 Idogaya-nakamachi, Minami-ku, Yokohama.
On this 12th day of February, 1937.

[Signature: Senki] (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of this witness.

At the same place
On the same date

Witness: [Signature: Shohei]
Translation certificate

I, Migits, Wasco, of the defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Chapter on Economy and Industry is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Migits, att. o

Tokyo, Japan

Date 8 April 1947
3. Monopolies

1. Reduction of the Price of Salt.

a. In view of the fact that the price of salt in the Chihli district is the highest in this country and the great extent of smuggling that is being carried on because of the common frontier, a price reduction of from Yen 2.00 to Yen 0.55 per one tant of salt was carried out in September, 1935. For the purpose firstly lighten the burden of the people and secondly to prevent smuggling.

b. As the first step in the execution of this policy, reduction was made from March 1 this year in the price of salt of the transportation office under the Kirin salt smuggling jurisdictions. Combined with the reduction of 3.42 per one fun in the salt tax rate a decrease of Yen 1,100,000 in the monopoly profit was effected.

2. Carrying out of the opium monopoly.

The monopoly system of opium was adopted to carry out the opium policy. Its object is to prevent illicit traffic in opium and to control and reduce poppy cultivation, thereby exterminating
the bad opium smoking habit.

with the completion of the monopoly system and the perfection of the health. It was further decided the government intends to attain this object. Moreover the policy has been laid down not to use the profit from the opium monopoly to cover general expenses, but to devote it to cover the expenses of control, remedy, education and other purposes necessary in carrying out the opium policy.
Excerpt from Conditions of State Finance,
January, the 4th Year of Kangte (1937)
Bureau of Statistics, General Affairs Board.

Table of State Expenditure classified (General Account, 1937)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Household</td>
<td>2,253,865</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>117,155,288</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense and Maintenance of Order</td>
<td>86,694,045</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Collecting Tax</td>
<td>15,699,640</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Debts Service</td>
<td>21,695,922</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Reserve Fund</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>248,098,760</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:
1. For Items of Administration, see another table.
2. National Defense and Maintenance of Order is inclusive of Yen 19,500,000 to be contributed as Manchukuo shares for National Defense.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupied the post of the Councillor of the Planning Board, Manchukuo, in January 1937, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 21 pages and entitled "Present Condition of Finance, Bureau of Statistics, January 1937" is a true copy of the book then compiled by the Manchukuo Government and obtained by me in that capacity and has been kept in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo
On this 5th day of March, 1947

(signed) TAKAKURA, Tadashi

Witness: MATSUDA, Roisuko

Translation Certificate

I, MIGITA, Masao, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Present Condition of Finance, Bureau of Statistics, Jan. 1937 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

(signed) MIGITA, Masao

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 9, 1947
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0&lt;1000</th>
<th>1000&lt;2000&lt;5000</th>
<th>5000&lt;5000</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>来源</th>
<th>备注</th>
<th>状态</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

注：此表仅供参考，具体数据请以实际为准。
Excerpt from Conditions of State Finance, January, the 6th Year of Kangte (1938), Bureau of Statistics, General Affairs Board.

4. Table of State Expenditure Classified (General Account, 1933)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Household</td>
<td>3,052,573 Yen</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>167,382,410</td>
<td>549%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense</td>
<td>77,588,446</td>
<td>254%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of Order</td>
<td>12,344,895</td>
<td>.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Collecting Tax</td>
<td>17,016,087</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Debts Service</td>
<td>18,210,089</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Reserve Fund</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>304,550,600</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,000%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks
1. For items of Administration, see another table.
2. National Defense and Maintenance of Order is inclusive of Yen 19,500,000 to be contributed as Manchukuo shares for National Defense.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupied the post of the Councillor of the Planning Bureau, General Affairs Board, Manchukuo in January 1938, hereby certify that the document attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 23 pages and entitled "Present Condition of Finance, Bureau of Statistics, January 1938" is a true copy of the book then compiled by Manchukuo Government and obtained in that capacity and has been kept in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo
on this 5th day of March, 1947

(signed) TAKAHASHI, Tadashi

Witness: MATSUDA, Roisuko

Translation Certificate

I, MIGITA, Masao, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Present Condition of Finance, Bureau of Statistics, Jan. 1938 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

(signed) MIGITA, Masao

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 11 9, 1947
<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC 1</td>
<td>内</td>
<td>内</td>
<td>国籍</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

※保護権者等を除き、無断複製及び公衆送信を禁ずる。
Excerpt from Conditions of State Finance,
January, 6th Year of Kangte (19.⑤),
Bureau of Statistic*, General Affairs Board.

4. Table of State Expenditure Classified (General
Account, 19.⑤)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Household</td>
<td>3,492,626</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>242,390,009</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense and Maintenance of Order</td>
<td>114,015,577</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost for Collecting Tax</td>
<td>17,082,054</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Debts Service</td>
<td>19,397,189</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Reserve Fund</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>403,377,655</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks
1. Details of Administration to be shown in another table.
2. National Debts Service is inclusive of Yen 12,324,687 transferred therein as Sinking Fund Account and Special Loan Adjustment Account.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupied the post of the chief of General Affairs Section, General Bureau of Cultivation, Department of Agriculture, Manchukuo in January 1939, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 27 pages and entitled "Present Conditions of Finance, Bureau of Statistics, General Affairs Board, State Council, January 1939" is a true copy of the book then compiled by Manchukuo Government and obtained by me in that capacity and has been kept in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo
On this 5th day of March, 1947

(signed) TAKAKURA, Tadashi

Witness: MATSUDA, Reisuko

Translation Certificate

I, MIGITA, Masao, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Present Conditions of Finance, Bureau of Statistics, General Affairs Board, State Council, Jan. 1939 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

(signed) MIGITA, Masao

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 9, 1947
In consideration of the lack of sound banking facilities in agricultural villages, the Provincial Government of MKDEN planned, in the 1st year of Tetun (1932), to organize cooperative banking societies within the districts of its jurisdiction. First of all, on the 2nd year of Tetun, the MKDEN Cooperative Banking Society was established, and afterwards, on May 5th of the same year, the FUSHEN Cooperative Banking Society. These two societies gave very satisfactory results and showed sure evidence that the cooperative system is suitable to the conditions of our country. Since 1933, the Department of Finance has taken direct charge of supervising and guiding the societies, and their number has increased yearly, with 11 cooperative banking societies in the 2nd year of Tetun, 39 in the 1st year end, 32 in the 2nd year of Kante, reaching the end of December, the 2nd year of Kante, the total number of 82.

For establishing the cooperative societies, every prefecture was made a unit, and 42 per cent out of 161 prefectures and 30 MONGOLIAN villages throughout MANCHUKUO have their own cooperative banking societies.

These financial cooperations are to cultivate the spirit of self-government and self-help, among farmers on one side, and, on the other hand, make effort to facilitate financing operations in rural villages which have been neglected for many years, thus doing their part in making rural inhabitants recognize the benefit of the "Single Way" of government.
Itemized Loans of the Cooperative Banking Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>6,234,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Agricultural funds.</td>
<td>5,665,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds for farming.</td>
<td>3,975,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds for agricultural improvement.</td>
<td>85,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds for stock-farming and forestry.</td>
<td>138,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redemption of old loans.</td>
<td>301,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous.</td>
<td>1,165,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Commercial funds.</td>
<td>311,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds for special products.</td>
<td>45,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of various goods.</td>
<td>220,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redemption of old loans.</td>
<td>13,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous.</td>
<td>32,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Industrial funds.</td>
<td>61,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Miscellaneous.</td>
<td>296,102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupied the post of the Professor of Kyushu University, Manchukuo from 1937 to 1945, hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Chinese, consisting of 298 pages and entitled "Third Annual Report of Manchukuo Statistics, General Affairs Board, State 1946" is an exact copy of the book published by Manchukuo Government and obtained by me in that capacity and has been kept in my library.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 7th day of March, 1947.

Okano, Kenki (seal)
No. 75, Hodogaya-nakamechi
Minami-ku, Yokohama.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: Oko, Mitsuo (seal)
金融組合（金融合作社）の設立は、大正元年度に設立の計画を示し、次いで同年三月二十七日には講習会を開催し、設立の意義を示した。之は組織の一歩も、

第三政局報告書

（原稿）

（三九九頁）三七三頁

金融組合（金融合作社）の設立は、大正元年度に設立の計画を示し、次いで同年三月二十七日には講習会を開催し、設立の意義を示した。之は組織の一歩も、

王道政治の意思に沿じて進むものである。
文書变所ニハスル謄明

明和二十二年正月一日

立会人

(署名)

(署名)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

APAKI, Sadao, et al.

AFFIDAVIT

Deponent, ONISHIURA, Shinji

I, according to the form used in my country, make oath as per sheet attached hereto and state as follows:
I, OKUMURA, Shinji, was born in Kanagawa Prefecture in 1894 and graduated from the Law Department of the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1920. I immediately secured a position with the South Manchurian Railway Company. In January 1932 I was appointed the chief of the Second Division of the Economic Research Commission of the said company, and in September 1936, I assumed the post of vice-chairman of the said Commission and also vice-director of the Industrial Division. In December 1937 I was selected as director of the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation and resigned from the South Manchuria Railway Company. In May 1942 I was appointed the director of the North China Iron Manufacturing Company, Ltd. and resigned from the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation. In June 1944 I was again appointed the director of the said Corporation and remained in that post up to the time of the termination of war.

Towards developing railways, the South Manchurian Railway Company has taken a great interest in the investigation of the economic condition of Manchuria since the beginning of its establishment, and the Research Section was established in its head office. As is well known to the public, various plans for industrial development were studied with that office as its centre and the South Manchuria Railway Company made great efforts to contribute to the development in the various fields of mining, engineering, agriculture and stock-farming with the funds and techniques that it possessed.

In order primarily to meet the great change in objective circumstances in Manchuria caused by the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the South Manchurian Railway Company in January 1932, newly organized the Economic Research Commission
Defense Doc. No. 1160

ea synthetic large research organ to make investigations, conduct research and draw up plans systematically on the matters relating to industries, traffic, communications, finance and trade which were necessary for the development of Manchurian economy. I belonged then to the said Commission and was in charge of the industrial division.

On the other hand, in order to obtain sufficient basic materials for general industrial development, the new government of Manchoukuo established an organ which was called the Temporary Industrial Research Bureau in 1934 and started the fundamental investigations into the industry and economy of Manchuria with the three-year plan.

Investigating staffs were despatched, not only to those districts along the railway lines, but also to the interior regions, and investigations into the various fields of mining, engineering, agriculture and forestry were instituted, for example the site of the hydroelectric plant on the Sungari was discovered on the occasion of those investigations.

Thus, with the result of the investigations achieved by both the temporary Industrial Research Bureau of Manchoukuo and the Economic Research Commission of South Manchurian Railway, fairly complete investigations of the resources of all Manchuria were accomplished. Investigation materials which had been deemed insufficient as a result of the investigations by South Manchurian Railway alone were gradually completed.

In the summer of 1936 some general discussions were held among the officials of the Manchoukuo Government and South Manchurian Railway Company of establishing by their cooperation a fundamental long-term plan for the industrial development of the new...
Ul. State. At that time, the Kassian second Five-Year Plan was in progress, the information from U.S.S.R. on the success of its plan was spread and the interest was increasingly roused among officials of both Kanchoukuo and South Manchurian Railway Company. This to some extent had led to the germ of such an idea of long-range planning.

The Kwantung Army agreed to this idea and rendered its good offices, going between the Government and the South Manchurian Railway Company, whose understanding might not have been quite sufficient of each other in the past, and the Kwantung Army, made effort to affect a smooth progress of the joint planning. Thus, several competent persons for each different branch were selected from both the Government and the South Manchurian Railway Company, and these men began an overall study of tentative production goals of raw materials. On this occasion I was one of the persons selected to take charge of the division of industries generally. Then, as the aforementioned studies came to a conclusion for the time being, those who participated in the studies, together with other people concerned of the Kwantung Army, Government and the South Manchurian Railway Company held a conference in October 1936 for the purpose of reporting their studies and discussing the industrial development problem, as a result of which an outline of very rough plan for industrial development was drawn up. Based on this plan, a further study was made for another two months on more detailed items, and in November of the same year a concrete plan was obtained. This is the so-called first Five-Year Plan of industrial development.

Then the Kanchoukuo Government, for the purpose of obtaining necessary funds and industrial materials for the realization of this plan, sent several persons who were connected
with the drawing up of this plan and made them explain it to
the Japanese Government and request its understanding and as-
sistance. I came to Japan as one of those dispatched.

At the middle of December 1936, we met the officials
concerned of each Japanese Government department at the Man-
churian Affairs Board and after the explanation of the plan
requested their understanding and help. Among these officials,
there were of course some from Ministry of War. Besides this,
we also went to the War Ministry authorities for the explanation
but we were not at all informed of the fact that there would be
another plan of like nature in the War Ministry. However, the
attitude of the Japanese Government was very conservative at
that time, and it merely listened to what the Manchurian side
had explained and hoped. But, the Manchoukuo Government started
to execute the plan according to the policy already set out,
making 1937 as its first year.

The object of the Five-Year Plan or industrial develop-
ment is to aim at the coordinated development of industries
and communications in Manchuria, and to lay the foundations for
economic progress in the future.

It was thought to make a rapid progress of industriali-
zation in Manchuria and to bring up her economic condition to
the world's level, in view of the fact that so long as Manchuria
was left in a primitive colonial condition as in the past,
neither increase of the national economy nor promotion of peo-
ple's life could be expected.

Speaking of the contents of the Five-Year Plan, emphasis
was laid on the development and enlargement of basic industries
in Manchuria, and equal stress was laid upon the development of
agriculture, live-stock breeding, transportation and communications. Within the mining and engineering branch of the plan, items for the expansion of munition and airplane industries were included but these items occupied only a small portion of the whole plan. Speaking on the capital outlay of the plan, total capital for the plan was 2,500,000,000 yuan, while the capital for munitions (including tanks and airplane industries) was 130,000,000, being only five per cent of the total.

It was of course, considered that this development plan would contribute toward the national defense, but at the same time it was believed as necessary a step to improve the people's life.

Soon after the above plan was put into practice. The China Incident broke out, but this was entirely beyond our anticipation and an uneasiness was felt in securing the necessary funds and materials in fulfilling the plan and we who were concerned in the plan were greatly annoyed and wished for speedy settlement.

Because such a long term plan for the development of basic industries presupposes a state of peace which enables a state to devote all of its power for carrying out such a coordinated plan, and in laying down this plan, we had never dreamed a condition of war might happen in the near future. Therefore the outbreak of the North China Incident imposed a great obstacle in carrying out the Five-Year Plan. For instance, development of Manchurian industries had to depend chiefly upon coolie labor immigrated from North China for the necessary labor. This is just one instance where prosecution of the plan was hindered by the outbreak of the Incident. However, the situation grew worse contrary to our expectation.
In December I assumed the post of a director of Manchurian Heavy Industry Development Co., and at the beginning of 1938, the Government of Manchoukuo had made a modification concerning the Five-Year Plan and requested the cooperation of the company. According to my knowledge, at that time Japan felt the shortage of materials caused by the unexpected expansion of the Incident. Under the international situation prevailing, it gradually became difficult for Japan and Manchoukuo to import materials, and it was keenly felt the reinforcing of the supply of basic materials by developing the resources in Japan and Manchuria as much as possible so as to stabilize the foundations of economy and national defense. Accordingly, the Japanese side also desired to increase production of basic materials, such as coal, iron and electric power in Manchuria, and she gradually increased her effort to supply funds and material.

Besides this desire, along with the further research into resources, such items as iron, coal and hydroelectricity had been discovered in Topentao District of Manchoukuo. Incorporating the development of these resources into the plan further modified the five year plan and enlarged the production goal.
Defense Doc. No. 1160

On this 14th day of April 1947

DEPONENT OKUURA, Shinji (Seal)

I, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

at International Military Tribunal for the Far East

Witness: (Signed) MATUDA, Reinsuke (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) OKUURA, Shinji (Seal)
I, YIGITA, Masao, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of the affidavit by Mr. Okamura, Shinji, Defense Document No. 1160 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yigita, Masao

Tokyo, Japan

Date April 15, 1947
貿易等各班人の進歩系統の興旺発表地列スコト、ナリ私八當時同時

貿易等各班人の進歩系統の興旺発表地列スコト、ナリ私八當時同時

他方試験ル新政府ニ於テモ発表進歩ニ基本調査ヲ開始シテオリマシタ。}
ルーマニアに、長距離電気鉄道を建設することを決定しました。この決定には、長期的に必要な投資が含まれています。電力産業の発展を目指して、電力供給を確保するための計画が策定されます。この計画は、既存の電力供給網を拡張し、効率的な電力供給を確保することを目的としています。これにより、地域の経済発展に寄与するものと期待されています。
良心に従い何事ヲ語ルヤズ又何事ヲ語ルヲ附加ザルコトナ
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）四月十四日於

同日
於原東軍事裁判所

立會人
松田

供述者
奥村

監

右ハ原立會人ノ面前ニ於テ口頭且ツ書名捺印シタルコトヲ証明シマス
A most important feature of the Second Five-Year Plan period is the change in the rate of development of the production of means of production (industries of group A) as compared with the rate of development of articles of consumption (industries of group B). While in the First Five-Year Plan period industries producing means of production developed at a relatively greater speed, in the Second Five-Year Plan period industries producing articles of general consumption will develop faster. It was the task of the First Five-Year Plan to create a heavy industry, which would serve as a basis for the technical reequipment of the whole national economy. With that task we coped successfully, and we are now in a position to accelerate both heavy and light industry, and particularly to accelerate the production of articles of general consumption.

The following changes in the relative proportion of the output of the two basic groups of industry (A and B) are indicated for the Second Five-Year Plan period:

<p>| PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN THE RELATION OF THE BASIC INDUSTRIAL GROUPS IN THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN PERIOD |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group A - Instruments and means of production</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group B - Articles of consumption</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, group A and group B exchange places. This is due to the fact that the rate of production of means of consumption in the Second Five-Year Plan period, 18.5 per cent, is considerably higher than the rate of development of production of means of production, 14.5 per cent. This rate is also greater than the rate of production of articles of consumption in the First Five-Year Plan period (17 per cent). Having hitherto lagged behind the general rate of development, the industries in group B will now be accelerated and this development will exceed the average rate of development for the whole of industry. Thus the light industries and food industries, as well as the other industries producing articles of general consumption, are now facing tremendous tasks connected with their development.

Our duty is not only to secure a further rapid development of the large state industries. During the Second Five-Year Plan period we must also accelerate the development of the local industries, and give them state assistance. The task is to make the maximum possible use of local sources of raw material and local fuel, particularly in order to increase the output of articles of general consumption. A large share of the profits of
A most important feature of the Second Five-Year Plan period is the change in the rate of development of the production of means of production (Industries of group A.) as compared with the rate of development of articles of consumption (Industries of group B.). While in the First Five-Year Plan period industries producing means of production developed at a relatively greater speed, in the Second Five-Year Plan period industries producing articles of general consumption will develop faster. It was the task of the First Five-Year Plan to create heavy industry, which would serve as a basis for the technical reequipment of the whole national economy. With that task we have coped successfully, and we are now in a position to accelerate both heavy and light industry, and particularly to accelerate the production of articles of general consumption.

The following changes in the relative proportion of the output of the two basic groups of industry (A and B) are indicated for the Second Five-Year Plan period:

| PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN THE RELATION OF THE BASIS INDUSTRIAL GROUPS IN THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN PERIOD |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1932 | 1937 |
| Group A - Instruments and means of production | 53.3 | 49.1 |
| Group B - Articles of consumption | 46.7 | 50.9 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Thus, group A. and group B. exchange places. This is due to the fact that the rate of development of production of articles of consumption in the Second Five-Year Plan period, 18.5 per cent, is considerably higher than the rate of development of production of means of production, 14.5 per cent. This rate is also greater than the rate of production of articles of consumption in the First Five-Year Plan period (17 per cent). Having hitherto lagged behind the general rate of development, the industries in group B. will now be accelerated and this development will exceed the average rate of development for the whole of industry. Thus, the light industries and food industries, as well as the other industries producing articles of general consumption, are now facing tremendous tasks connected with their development.

Our duty is not only to secure a further rapid development of the large state industries. During the Second Five-Year Plan period we must also accelerate the development of the local industries, and give than state assistance. The task is to make the maximum possible use of local sources of raw material and local fuel, particularly in order to increase the output of articles of general consumption. A large share of the profits of
local industries must be placed at the disposal of the local ex-
ecutive committees. This will be an important stimulus to the
further development of local industries. Our local government
bodies, particularly the regional organizations, have during re-
cent years considerably grown in strength and we must accordingly
entrust to them a number of the Union and republic enterprises.
This primarily concerns enterprises employing local raw materials
and local fuel.

It would also be wrong to ignore the vast possibilities
for future development of the handicraft industries. In spite of
the rapid development of state industry, handicraft industry can,
and should, provide a no small share of additional products for
the local markets and also supply industry with subsidiary pro-
ducts and buliding materials.

1. The Expansion and Reconstruction of Industry

I now pass to the subject of the development of individual
branches of industry during the Second Five-Year Plan period. Here
are a number of the most important indices for the main branches
of industry, those producing means of production:

INCREASE OF CROSS OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY (GROUP A.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output or means of production (in billions of rubles, calculated in 1926-27 prices)</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1937 to 1932</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Machine building and metal working (in billions of rubles)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>207.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Metal working lathes (thousands)</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>267.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Heavy machines (millions of rubles)</td>
<td>140.5</td>
<td>390.0</td>
<td>263.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Tractors (in 15 h.p. units-thousands)</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>157.0</td>
<td>323.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Harvester combines (thousands)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>200.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Locomotives (goods and passenger, calculated in units of the B and SU type)</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>2200.0</td>
<td>238.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Freight cars (calculated in 2-axle units - thousands)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>531.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Motor cars (thousands)</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>260.0</td>
<td>837.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Textile machinery (millions of rubles)</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>350.0</td>
<td>532.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Food industry machinery (millions of rubles)</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>130.0</td>
<td>273.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Electric power (millions K.W.)</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>283.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District stations of Elekvenero</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>296.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Coal (millions of tons)</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>152.5</td>
<td>237.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Oil and gas (millions of tons)</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>210.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pig iron (millions of tons)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>250.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Steel (millions of tons)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>287.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Rolled steel (millions of tons)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>303.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Copper (thousands of tons)</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>135.0</td>
<td>229.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Chemicals (millions of rubles)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>280.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Lumber (millions of cubic metres)</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>176.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It will be seen from this table that considerable development will be attained by every important branch of heavy industry, while the machine building industry, which plays a leading part in the work of completing the technical reconstruction of the national economy, will develop faster than the average rate for heavy industry. As a result, in the last year of the Second Five-Year Plan period 80 per cent of the whole industrial output will be produced by new enterprises, constructed or completely reconstructed during the First and Second Five-Year Plan periods, whereas at the end of the First Five-Year Plan period only 35 per cent of the output of industry was produced by new enterprises. Not merely industry, but also other branches of economy will require vast amounts of new equipment for their technical reconstruction. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period not less than one-half (50-60 per cent) of the means of production in actual use in all branches of national economy will consist of means of production put into operation during the Second Five-Year Plan period.

We are setting ourselves the task of effecting the technical reconstruction of our national economy with the aid of machines produced by our own Soviet industries. In this respect the Second Five-Year Plan period will differ radically from the first. During the First Five-Year Plan period we imported from abroad various machinery to the value of 1,500,000,000 gold rubles. This was necessary in order to lay the technical foundation for a number of branches of industry and of agriculture, and particularly in order to guarantee a rapid rate of development of the Soviet machine building industry. By the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan period the Soviet machine building industry had already achieved tremendous successes. As compared with 1913 the output of the machine building industry had in 1932 increased tenfold. The U.S.S.R. in 1931 accounted for 21.4 per cent of the output of the machine building industry of the world, as compared with 4 per cent in 1928.

During the Second Five-Year Plan period our machine building industry must accomplish still greater tasks in serving all branches of the national economy. Moreover, the types of machinery produced will undergo considerable change; numerous new types of means of production will be introduced. The program of machine-tool production in the Second Five-Year Plan provides for an increase in the proportion of complex machine-tools—semi-automatic, automatic, grinding, turning, cut-off-cutting, etc; about 200 new types and sizes of machine-tools will be put into production as well as a considerable number of special type machine-tools for the aviation, automobile and transport equipment industries. During the Second Five-Year Plan period the output of machine-tools must amount to 129,000, whereas at the end of the First Five-Year Plan period the total number of all working machine-tools in the U.S.S.R. did not exceed 169,000. The metallurgical industry must be fully supplied with equipment complete in every detail. Rapid development will also be given to the construction of power machinery (turbine, boiler-steam, internal combustion engines and atom boilers), to the electrical high tension and low tension equipment industries and to the construction of complex chemical machinery. The construction of transport equipment will develop at a gigantic rate. The automobile industry must produce not less than 200,000 automobiles in 1937. The output of machinery for the food industries will increase threefold, and for the textile industry sixfold. At the end of the First Five-Year Plan period the agricultural machinery industry of the U.S.S.R. had already become the most powerful in the world. In the Second Five-Year
The completion of technical reconstruction is inseparably connected with the mechanization of all labour-absorbing processes in industry. This particularly applies to such important branches of industry as coal mining, lumbering, pet production, metallurgy and building construction. As an example of the development of mechanization, one may cite the coal mining industry, in which practically every basic process will be mechanized: hoisting 93 per cent, trucking 80 per cent, delivery 90 per cent.

In the Soviet Union the machine is the emancipator and friend of the toiler in the literal sense of the term; it lightens heavy labour, increases productivity and raises the standard of living of the toilers.

A prime factor in the reconstruction of the national economy is electrification. The demand for electric power will vastly increase in the Second Five-Year Plan period. This applies particularly to chemical production and heat treatment, particularly to metallurgy and in the chemical and machine building industries. Electricity will be a tremendous factor in transport, particularly for the overloaded railroads of the Donets Basin, the Dnieper Basin, Trans-Caucasia, the Urals, etc. During the period there will also be a distinct increase in the consumption of electric power in agriculture, e.g., threshing.

The output of electric power will increase in the Second Five-Year Plan period from 12,400,000,000 kwh. to 38,000,000,000 kwh., i.e., almost triple. In the output of electric power the Soviet Union will outstrip all European countries and occupy second place in the world. The amount of power per worker in the Soviet Union will reach 71 per cent as compared with the amount of power per worker in the U.S.A. and more than 150 per cent as compared with the amount of power per worker in Germany. No comparison will be possible in this respect with the pre-revolutionary period. This increase of electric power per worker is the most striking index of the technical re-equipment of our country.

The fuel industry will also vastly develop during the Second Five-Year Plan period. The output of coal will increase from 64,300,000 tons to 152,500,000 tons. The oil industry will increase its output from 22,300,000 to 46,300,000 tons. The past and shale industries, representing as they do local forms of fuel, must be developed to a larger extent.

The iron and steel industry, which now lags behind the general rate of development of national economy, must make good the gap and completely satisfy the growing demand of the country for metals. The output of pig iron must increase from 6,200,000 to 16,000,000 tons, steel from 5,900,000 to 17,300,000 tons, rolled steel from 4,300,000 to 13,000,000 tons. Both in respect to productive power and output our metallurgical industry must assume first place in Europe, although it will still be considerably behind the U.S.A.

Of particular importance is the development of the production of high quality rolled steel, electric steel, and alloyed steel. Iron ore production must also be widely reconstructed, and enriching and concentration processes introduced. In the Second Five-Year Plan period the development of the iron and steel industry...
will continue to be one of our central economic tasks.

The non-ferrous metallurgical industries especially lag a long way behind our general rate of development. Yet the requirements of the machine building industries and the electric supplies industry, not to mention the requirements of national defense, cannot be satisfied, unless a decisive improvement is achieved in such industries as copper, aluminum, etc. One of the most important tasks of the Second-Five-Year Plan period is to put an end to the backwardness of the non-ferrous metallurgical industry and to achieve its technical reconstruction.

The chemical industry must play a crucial part in the work of technical reconstruction in the Second Five-Year Plan period. During the First Five-Year Plan period a number of chemical industries were created, such as nitric, coke products, aniline dyes, potash, asphaltite, etc. A number of new chemical industries will be created in the Second Five-Year Plan period, e.g., the chemical distillation of coal, brass wire, new dyes, plastic masses, synthetic rubber, etc. The introduction of mineral fertilizers is to increase tenfold during the Second Five-Year Plan period. The development of this latter in industry is of exceptional importance both for the national economy and for national defense.

I would like to speak more in detail concerning the Far East Region inasmuch as its special economic and political importance is clear to everyone.

The tremendous industrial development of the Far East Region raises a number of very serious problems which demand a solution during the Second Five-Year Plan period.

The first and most essential of these is the problem of transport. The problem of overland transport is being solved in the main by the construction of a second track for the Ussurisk Railway, by developing the construction of a new trunk line - the Itkul-Amur trunk line, of big highways and finally the erection of an automobile assembly plant in the Far East Region.

At the same time the plan specifies that a great deal of work be done on water transport - to correct the river bed of the river Amur, to do construction work on the port of Vladivostok and those of Kamchatka, etc. The questions of shipbuilding are very closely bound up with the problem of water transport. The completion of the construction of a major shipyard in Komsomol'sk and the radical construction of the Dalnavod ensures the creation of a powerful shipbuilding base in the Far East Region.

The second important problem which is being solved in the Far East Region during the Second Five-Year Plan period is the problem of fuel, particularly liquid fuel.

The completion of the construction of the oil combinat in Khabarovsk which is operating with 3 million oil will assure the automobile and tractor plants of the Far East Region of a source of bright stock supply. The output of oil rises from 292,800 tons in 1932 to 800,000 tons in 1937. Simultaneously the output of coal is being
raised from 1,392,000 tons in 1932 to 6,500,000 tons in 1937, owing to the fact that new coal deposits are being exploited.

The construction of a metallurgical works is of tremendous importance in determining the progress of development of the Far East Region.

Such are the measures taken to overcome the principal sore spots in the development of the region.

The plan envisages the further development of the fishing industry which supplies very important export products: the fish catch is increasing from 345,800 tons in 1932 to 365,000 tons in 1937, reaching 22.8 per cent of the entire catch in the Union.

The development of the timber industry is being given much attention.

The creation in the region of its own agricultural base and industry for manufacturing articles of consumption is one of the principal problems of the Far East Region.

During the Second Five-Year Plan period the Region is creating its own base for a surir industry: biscuit factories, confectionery factories, needle-trade shops, shoe factories, button factories and a number of other enterprises of the food and light industries are being built. In agriculture the plan provides for an increase in the total sown area by 25.2 per cent, including an increase of 200 per cent for rice, and of 112.8 per cent for vegetables and a ton, and a growth in agricultural production commensurate with the needs of the Region.

The number of tractors is being increased by 52 per cent; livestock-raising in the Region is likewise expanding considerably.

The granting of liberal privileges to the population of the Region on the initiative of Comrade Stalin will be an important factor in solving a most acute problem of the Region -- that of manpower.

The development of the Eastern regions will receive powerful support from our old industrial centres which acted as a base for the technical reconstruction of the new districts even during the first Five-Year Plan period. The old districts ought to assist in this in about the decided changes in the economies of the Eastern districts of which I spoke above by harnessing their production, their technical experience, their cadres, to this task. One of the most important sources among these old industrial centres belongs to the Leningrad Region.

(Excerpt from: "Completion of Technical Reconstruction", G. K. Orjandzidze, p. 529)

I must insist to respect for our labour and our products.

I have said, comrades, that tempo is the whole point. That tempo did we have in the development of industry? If we compare the tempo of the development of our industry with the tempo of the development of industry in other countries, we obtain the fol-
following picture. How many years did the foremost capitalist countries take in covering the distance which the U.S.S.R. has traversed during the last three years? Take coal—the United States of America increased its output of coal from 15,000,000 tons to 76,000,000 tons in the course of nine years; Germany increased its output from 47,000,000 to 73,000,000 in the course of thirteen years; and our country increased its output from 48,000,000 to 74,000,000 tons in the course of three years. Take pig iron—America increased the quantity smelted from 12,500 tons a day (annual mean) to 21,000 tons in the course of seven years; Germany increased it from 12,500 to 20,000 in the course of nine years; our country accomplished this in three years. The same applies to the generation of electric power; Great Britain increased the total power generated from 8,500,000,000 to 16,000,000,000 kilowatt hours during the course of ten years, while we in the course of three years increased it from 8,300,000,000 to 15,900,000,000 kilowatt-hours. Germany took thirteen years to double the output of its machine-building industry. The U.S.S.R. did it in three years. And so it is with everything.

This teaches provided the solution for the problem of the defence of the country. I shall not speak of defence, I shall not count any dates; I shall only say that no comparison can be drawn between 1930 and this year. I could tell you how many tanks we produce, how many guns, how many machine guns, aeroplanes, and everything else— but I shall only say that last year we supplied our artillery incomparably better than in 1932.

And if these pilot snouts force us to mobilize our whole industry to form our Red Army, I think we shall fulfill this task best of all the tasks that we have fulfilled. (Applause.)

(Extract from: "Resolution on the Reports of Comrades Molotov and Kalinin," p.e.5 551)

16. The specified program of large-scale development of new construction contains the conditions for decided improvements in the allocation of the forces of production:

c) By developing the old industrial centres, new bases of support of industrialization in the eastern districts (the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, Bashkirs, the Far East Region, Kazakhstan and Central Asia) are being created; machine building, metallurgy, coal, oil, electric power production and other branches of industry are being intensively developed. Almost half of all capital investments made in new construction of heavy industry go to the eastern districts. In 1937 the eastern districts will supply one-third of the pig-iron output as against one-fourth in 1932; more than one-third of the coal output as against one-fourth in 1932; about one-fifth of the electric power output (of district electric power stations) as against 6.5 per cent in 1932; one-tenth of the machine-building output as against 5 per cent in 1932.
Lecture by KISHI, Shinsuko

(Vice-Head of the Industrial Department of Manchukuo)

Delivered on 26 November 1939 at a meeting held at Osaka, Japan, Manchuria and China Economic Discussion Board.

As it is already well known, seven years have passed since the establishment of Manchukuo, and during this period the establishment of peaceful order that constitutes the first requisite for its construction and the sweeping away of numbers of old evils existing from the time of the former regime have almost been accomplished, and as the fundamental investigation necessary for the industrial development has also been thoroughly achieved, we are now confronted with the problem of speedily exploiting its extremely rich resources in the most reasonable way. From this standpoint we instituted the so-called "5 year program of developing Manchurian industry" in the fall of the year before last. At the time, too, I took this proposition back to Japan and upon the consent of the authorities concerned asked their assistance necessary for its execution. Thus nearly two years have already passed since we started on the execution of the first year's part of the five year program. You have perhaps been acquainted with a general idea through newspapers and other information of what has actually been done during the first year,
but in the course of that year, when half a year had scarcely passed, the North China Incident broke out, causing present conditions as you see now. This is a condition we did not expect at all when we first instituted the 5 year program, and we, the officials engaged in the execution of the plan, had to face many unexpected difficulties. Fortunately however, thanks to the assistance and cooperation of various circles, we have been successful, as a whole, concerning the actual results of the first year in such economic fields as electricity, iron, coal mining and other industries which are especially the most important of the 5 year program. As to other items, we carried on our work under the plan of reducing the time allotted to them, in view of its future, and we managed to obtain results far better than expected at first. Again as you know, this 5 year program for industries was so difficult to carry out that a close examination of many branches has shown that in many points we did not get what we had expected.

Especially in the field of agriculture, owing to climatic and other conditions of last year we managed to do our planting, sowing etc. almost as we planned, but the harvest was considerably below our expectation. In the lines of industry, the coal mining for instance, seems to have met with many difficulties in technique and expenditure. However, when we look back on the actual results of the past year and take into consideration what
has since been developed, the aim of this five year plan becomes too small to determine the future course of Manchurian industry, although the plan was thought by many to be considerably large at the time of its formation, and although the plan has been in execution for only one year.

From the present standpoint our aim must not be so low. Unless it is raised much higher, it will not meet with the demand of the new age. Such being the opinion of both the Japanese and Manchurians concerned, we formed the so-called "revised five year plan" early this year and are endeavouring to carry it out at present for fortunately the natural resources of Manchuria and the field for exploitation since then have showed that such a further extension was not impossible. I shall not go into the details of the plan here, but for the purpose of giving you a general idea of the program this much may be said that the scale at first determined upon in the line of capital was from ¥2,500,000,000 to ¥3,000,000,000 when all the items were considered, whereas in the revised plan the sum total needed when the program is carried out as planned, will amount to 5 -- 6 billions, or about twice as much. Of course this amount is also considered to be due to the rise in the prices of raw materials and other commodities since the time of planning, but in brief, the enlarged scale is confined to field of industry, agricultural and animal products being excluded.

Thus, in some cases expenditure has since been doubled while in
ethers such as coal and liquid fuel that require electricity for their motive power, in addition to the automobile and aeroplane industries necessary from the defense point of view, the expenditure necessary for the plan has been raised to 5-6 billions from 3-3.5 billions of yen. Since then, we have been endeavouring to carry the five year program into effect. Often when we have met with difficult problems that have arisen in this connection since then in carrying out our special ideas in overcoming the difficulties originally expected at first, we used to inform to influential circles in Japan of our problems and seek their assistance. Fortunately, it is now possible to give figures for a part of the program from this year or it gives us great pleasure to report to you matters for the current year figures for which have already appeared.
CERTIFICATE CONCERNING PREPARATION OF A DOCUMENT

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 466 pages, entitled "A Report of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Consultation Society (TN: The Nichi-Man-Shi Keizai Kordankai)" is a book compiled and published by the above society and the Japan-Manchukuo Central Institution Corp. (TN: The Nichi-Man Chuo Kyokai) and also that a part of the book from 182-185 pages, entitled "Mr. KISHI, Shinsuke (Vice-Chief of the Department of Industry of Manchukuo)" is an exact copy of my lecture at the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Consultation of Osaka on November 26, 1938, when I held the post of Vice-Chief of the Department of Industry of Manchukuo.

Certified at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo.
On this 19th day of February, 1947.

KISHI, Shinsuke

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 22 February, 1947

(Certificate Concerning Preparation of a Document—"Mr KISHI, Shinsuke")
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 31 Jan, 1947

Lecture by KISPI, Shinsuke.

- 6 -
岸信介（当時内閣総理大臣）の演説

（大阪帝国大学講演会）

敬間に御承知のように、西園寺博士は、今年の年明け以来に新しい政策を実行するため、日本全体の発展を図るための準備に着手して居ります。

わが国は、その第一の課題として、世界の平和と領土の安全、経済の発展を図るため、産業を円滑に開発するという目標を設けて居ります。

産業の持つ力は、大変に重要なものであり、これによって、産業を円滑に開発するという目標を達成することが出来ます。

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その字はおきまして、一年の半はつきました。もう、北風の春が
到りまして、今日の朝の景色を見ることになりました。これは五歳の君
に、少し驚いて見つめられました。彼女たちの音楽は、
おお、公の運行に従って遊んだのですにあら
とこの運行に従って遊んだのですにあら
いふように五歳頃のもの、自己我
れの音楽の下に、頭の首の上をへやり、
ては大笑いが響き立つものに降り
たしました。土又地を駆けのり
まりに行かなかったことには少なかっ
たのででらりたたえました。土又地
の音楽、その他の音楽のために従行、
音楽などをなさる、大笑い Goingの決めまりのあるものと

LEF LOC 668
この五年計画の目標と、五年前の目標と、今後の目標に見ると、一つ一つの目標が大きく、目標を見ることと、目標を達成することを重視している。しかし、目標達成のためには、目標を見ることが必要だという。

しかし、目標が大きく、目標達成のためには、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標達成のためには、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だということは、目標を見ることが必要だうこと
「うれしや、君様。これを読むことができるのです。」

「でも、君様、この文書、これは誰が作成したのですか？」

「それは、彼の友人、君様が作成したものです。彼は君様を敬愛し、信頼する存在でした。」

「ふむ、ありがとうございます。この文書は、君様が私たちの未来を導くためのものです。」

「もちろんです。君様、あなたが君の決断をするためにここにあるのなら、それは豊かで幸せな未来を保証します。」

「ありがとう。君様。」
ぜひ今年からその一歩をお進み貴重な現れるさらに歩み合って、来年
のことを考えて共にこの現在の政体に確固たる支えの
想いをほどこすことの一助の一番であります。

働きませんかこと持たなるべし。
I, TANAKA, Shizuka, swear on my conscience that the following statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief:

I was in the employ of Finance Ministry of Japan since April 1929, when I was graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, the 12th year of Taisho to July 1932 when I was selected as one of the group of young officials for the posts in the Manchukuo Government. We all arrived in Hsinking 17th July 1932 and assumed the new posts. From that time I was in the service of Finance Department (later called Economic Department) of Manchukuo Government until the end of 1937 when I assumed the post of the directorship of Manchuria Heavy Industry Development Co. on its establishment. In October 1938, I was selected to be one of the directors of Manchuria Steel Works Corporation and remained in the same position until the end of this war.

After the foundation of Manchuria the most fundamental problem of great importance confronting the new state was the establishment of financial basis and unification of currencies. However, there could be found no fitting personnel available for the post who could undertake this kind of work. Manchukuo Government, then, requested the Japanese Government to send some officials who were acquainted with this kind of business to undertake the task. I was chosen for this post with Mr. Hoshino, Naoki and others by Mr. Takahashi, Korekiyo, then Finance Minister of Japan, and Mr. Ohno, Ryuta, then Chief of the Secretariat Division thereof. When we were told by them about going over to the
far away new state of which we knew very little, we all, and especially Mr. Hoshino, declined to accept the posts, but after their persuasions, we decided to go realizing that some should go anyway.

I recollect being told by Viscount Saito, then Prime Minister and assassinated in 1936, when we took leave of him that we should be going over there not as Japanese officials but to become the officials of Manchukuo and keep this fact always in mind while being in the service.

On arrival in Hsinking I was appointed the Chief of Finance Bureau in the Finance Department, while Mr. Hoshino, the Chief of General Affairs Bureau in the same department. The Minister of Finance was then Mr. Hsi-Hsia and Vice-Minister thereof was Sun Chi-Chiang and after Mr. Hsi-Hsia was relieved of the post, Mr. Sun was promoted to the Minister and Mr. Hung Wei-Kuo was appointed the Vice-Minister.

The Finance Department consisted then of the following three bureaus; namely, General Affairs, Finance and Revenue. The Finance Bureau was chiefly engaged in the business concerning banking and currency, while Revenue Bureau had taxation and custom duties.

The duty of the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau was to maintain the coordination and unification of the business among all other bureaus, and has no such superior position to the Bureau Chief as the Vice-Minister had.

As it has very often proved difficult to discharge business in such position from a practical point of view the office of the Chief of General Affairs Bureau was abolished later when the reorganizations of various departments were carried out.
It was a little before assuming our new duties in the Manchukuo Government that it started to take over the administrations of Kirin-Heilung-Kiang Salt Monopoly Office, Liaoning salt administration office and Maritime Customs one after another and to separate the financial office from every provincial government so as to put it under the control of the Finance Department and thereby to concentrate the profit from salt monopolies, salt taxes, maritime customs and internal revenues in the same department. However, being without any definite prospect as to how much of these incomes could be realized, the government could find no other way than to live on a monthly budget which was extremely partial. Under such circumstances we were instructed to endeavor to find an estimated amount of yearly income within as short a time as possible.

On the other hand, the Central Bank of Manchu which had opened its business on 1 July 1932, had set on the work of unification of old currencies with a new currency issued by it. As the most important task which the government was then confronting was the maintenance of the value of the new currency, it had to avoid by all means the unbalance of income and expenditure and loans from the Central Bank. But due to the unsatisfactory conditions of peace and order, the prospect of income was pessimistic, and in addition thereto increase of expenditure became unavoidable to defray the expenses for reconstructive works for the damages caused by floods in North Manchuria. Therefore, a plan was suggested in the government for raising a loan in Japan, which if it could be realized, would as well contribute to the maintenance of the value of the currency. The government sent Mr. Hoshino, the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Finance Ministry which took charge of the matters pertaining to the loan and Mr. Yamanari, Vice-President
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of the Central Bank, to Japan for negotiating loans in October of the same year. As I recollect, a report soon came from them in Tokyo telling us that the banking circles in Tokyo were not as favorable for the loan to be floated as was the Manchukuo Government as they were afraid there might be small hope of certainty of it, and further, that, if they would agree to the flotation of the loan, they would surely demand a guarantee as they used to do for a loan to China.

After the deliberation in the government, it was decided that profit from opium and salt monopoly should be made the security because such revenue from taxations and customs were not considered proper for the purpose, and it was also decided that the monopoly profits should be made securities only on condition that it would be free for Manchukuo to change the monopoly system whenever it might be necessary. We then instructed Mr. Yamanari and Mr. Hoshino accordingly. Later, on receiving the notice from them that the negotiation had been taking a favorable turn through the good offices of Mr. Takahashi, the Finance Minister of Japan, and that the ¥ 30,000,000 loan could be floated as was expected by us, the Government of Manchukuo took measures necessary to carry out this loan agreement. The law concerning the state foundation loan was thus promulgated 16 November 1932 in Hsingki, while in Tokyo the agreement was signed the 19th of the same month by Mr. Hoshino and Mr. Yamanari representing us and by the representatives of Japanese loan syndicate. This loan could be duly repaid as agreed within seven years.

It was in October 1932 when the first Manchukuo yearly budget could be formed. In this this budget, least possible expenditure was estimated, the loan from the Central Bank being limited to the amount of little more than ¥ 10,000,000. Simultaneously with these steps, measures were successfully taken to concentrate all sources of revenue which had been in the hands of various provincial organs under the control of the central government. Thus the yearly budget system could be accomplished on a sound financial basis.
As I stated before, one of the most important tasks of the new government was to stabilize and maintain the value of the new currency, and this task was to be done mainly by the Finance Bureau of the Finance Department of which I was then the Chief. When I arrived in Hsinking, the government had already started the unification work of currencies. The law concerning the adjustments of old currencies had been promulgated already in June 1932 and the work of redemption of old notes was in progress. However, a greater portion of these notes were still left in circulation and yet to be redeemed. There were about fifteen kinds of such notes which had been issued by various provincial banks under the old regime, and which had annoyed the people very much; each with its constantly fluctuating value to a greater degree.

It was in August 1935 that the unification of the currency was accomplished and in line.

The kanchukuo Government adopted a new currency based on silver as was prescribed by the provisions of the Currency Law of 1932 and endeavored to maintain the value of Yuan equal to the price of 23.91 grammes of pure silver. The new currency was welcomed by Manchurian natives as they had become accustomed to silver dollars and we were able to retain its stability as the overall financial condition in the country was rapidly improving and the balance of payment in the foreign markets was favorable.

We went on with this currency based on silver until 1935 when we finally were compelled to be divorced from silver in order to save our economy from the difficulties caused by the world silver situation.
Another important task to be discharged relative to the unification of currency was the arrangement for the withdrawal of the Bank of Chosen notes from Manchukuo. The Bank of Chosen had been entitled to issue its notes even in Manchukuo and the notes had been treated as legal tender in the South Manchurian Railway zone and among Japanese even in Manchukuo proper. The amount of the notes in circulation in Manchukuo was large, of which accurate estimation no one could easily make. In view of the currency unification such a state of affairs was very much undesirable for us, and should be remedied as soon as possible.

In November 1935, we were successful in obtaining the understanding of the Japanese Government for the ceasing of circulation of these notes. In August 1936, I was sent over to Tokyo to negotiate further with the Department of Finance concerning such concrete measures as were necessary to carry out the agreement and to liquidate the undertakings to be closed therewith. As a result of this negotiation, the Bank of Chosen notes ceased circulating in Manchukuo from January 1937. This arrangement contributed very much for the integrity and independence of Manchukuo from the economic and financial point of view.

Concerning the economic and industrial activities, it was the definite policy of Manchukuo to treat any of its citizens equally and priority was never accorded to any of them. There were many corporations in Manchukuo, semi-governmental and usual, however none of these doors were ever closed to Manchurian natives for investment therein if it was open for any other citizen. The government even made
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special effort to encourage the investment from Manchurian citizens in case of such shares like those of Manchu Electric Company which was deemed promising, but very few would take them. Generally speaking, they did not show any interest at all in investment in stock. Later the government established in Harbin a stock exchange which was specially intended for the use of Manchurian citizens. In view of this purpose, all the members of this stock exchange were made to consist of Manchurian citizens. However, in spite of such an arrangement, Manchurian citizens did not use this institution as we expected.

I was selected as one of the directors of the Manchurian Heavy Industries Development Company in December 1937 on its foundation. The president thereof was Mr. Aikawa, Gisuke, while its vice-president was a Manchurian by name of Mr. Feng Hang-ching. Besides Mr. Aikawa and Mr. Feng, there were six directors including one Manchurian citizen. The idea of Mr. Aikawa's was to develop Manchuria under a well coordinated plan and by such highly advanced and grand-scale methods as were carried on in the U.S.A. and for this purpose he felt keenly the necessity of inviting investments and industrial techniques from the U.S.A. All the directors cooperated with him in carrying out this scheme. Mr. Foster Bain of New York was employed to conduct a thorough investigation into the mineral resources of Manchuria, and Brassert Company of New York City was employed to map out a plan for enlargement of Anshan Steel Mill which was to be one of the biggest in the Orient. The Company sent Mr. Asahara Censhichi, Yamamoto, Soji and Yano, Yoshicki one after another to the United States in its effort to obtain investment and other cooperation from industrialists there.
Through their efforts they could solicit the investment and cooperation from Monsha Machine Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, an unexpected development and the expansion of the China Incident in 1937 and thereafter, put an obstacle in achieving a desired end, as the public opinion in foreign countries, especially in United States, became unfavorable to such undertaking. Mr. Aikawa and all of us concerned worried over the situation, but the affairs were taking a turn from bad to worse.

Since the mission and the ideal of the company had failed in this manner, Mr. Aikawa left Manchukuo as soon as his first term as the president thereof came to an end. What the company aimed at was the peaceful development of Manchukuo and to elevate her to be one of the modern industrial states of the world.

[Signature]

So sworn to and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above named TAIWA, at the War Ministry Building, Japan, the 8th day of April, 1947.

/s/ David W. Farquhar
Captain, Inf.
Investigation Officer
Translation Certificate

I, Mitsuo, Masao, of the Science, hereby certify that the attached translation of affidavit of Tanaka, Shizuka is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Mitsuo, Masao

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 4, 19(47)
この文書は日本語で書かれているが、内容が不明瞭であるため、具体的な意味を解釈することはできません。
総合的計画

まず、米国に行なるルートは、日本の経済状況と技術力により決定されるべきです。このため、以下の項目を考慮に入れることが必要です。

1. 技術力
2. 米国の経済状況
3. 貿易政策

各々の項目については、以下の点で検討することとします。

1. 技術力
   - トヨタの技術力は、米国市場での競争力を確保するため、重要である。
   - 日本企業においては、リモート開発や協力企業との連携も重要である。

2. 米国の経済状況
   - 米国の経済状況は、貿易戦略に大きな影響を及ぼす。
   - また、経済政策や金融政策も考慮に入れることが必要である。

3. 貿易政策
   - 米国は、日本企業に対する貿易政策を決定する可能性がある。
   - そのため、貿易政策の影響を考慮に入れることが重要である。

以上のことを考慮に入れて、総合的計画を決定することが必要である。
Treaty between Japan and Manchukuo Concerning the Abolition of Extraterritoriality in Manchukuo and the Transfer of the Administrative Rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone

Signed in Beijing, November 5, 1937, Proclaimed November 9, 1937
Enforced December 1, 1937.

Whereas the Government of Japan, in accordance with the principle of the Preamble to the Treaty between Japan and Manchukuo concerning the Residence of Japanese Subjects, Taxation, etc., in Manchukuo signed on the Tenth Day of the Sixth Month of the Eleventh Year of Showa, corresponding to the Tenth Day of the Sixth Month of the Third Year of Kangte, and having regard to the results of the operation of the said Treaty and also to the improvements introduced into the laws and ordinances and the various systems of Manchukuo, have decided completely to abolish the right of extraterritoriality at present enjoyed in Manchukuo by Japan and entirely to transfer the administrative rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone; and

Whereas the Government of Manchukuo, in response to this decision by the Government of Japan, are now in a position to afford, in the spirit in which their Empire was founded, all the necessary guarantees for further ensuring and enhancing the well-being and prosperity of Japanese subjects in Manchukuo;

Now, therefore, with reference to the abolition of the right of extraterritoriality at present enjoyed in Manchukuo by Japan and to the transfer of the administrative rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone, the Governments of Japan and of Manchukuo have agreed as follows to regulate the relations between the two countries:
ARTICLE I. The Government of Japan shall, in accordance with the stipulations of the Supplementary Agreements to the present Treaty, abolish the right of extraterritoriality at present enjoyed in Manchukuo by Japan.

ARTICLE II. The Government of Japan shall, in accordance with the stipulations of the Supplementary Agreements to the present Treaty, transfer to the Government of Manchukuo the administrative rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone.

ARTICLE III. Subject to the stipulations of the Supplementary Agreements to the present Treaty, Japanese subjects shall be governed within the territories of Manchukuo by the provisions of the laws and ordinances of that country.

With regard to the application of the stipulations of the preceding paragraph, Japanese subjects shall not, under any circumstances, be accorded less favourable treatment than that which is or may be accorded to the nationals of Manchukuo.

The stipulations of the preceding two paragraphs shall, in so far as they are applicable to juristic persons, apply to Japanese juristic persons.

ARTICLE IV. Companies and other juristic persons which have been established under the laws and ordinances of Japan and which have, at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, head or principal offices within the territories of Manchukuo shall, simultaneously with the coming into force of the present Treaty, be recognized as companies or other juristic persons of a nature similar or most closely analogous established under the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo.

The Government of Manchukuo shall recognize the establishment of
companions and other juristic persons which have been established under the laws and ordinances of Japan and which have, at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, branch or subordinate offices within the territories of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE V. The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not prejudice the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions of particular Japanese subjects or juristic persons based on the special engagements entered into between Japan and Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE VI. The present Treaty shall come into force on the first of December, the Twelfth Year of Shōwa, corresponding to the first of December, the Fourth Year of Kangtō.

ARTICLE VII. The present Treaty has been drawn up in Japanese and Chinese texts, and, should any difference in interpretation arise between the two texts, the Japanese text shall prevail.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Hsinching, in duplicate, this Fifth Day of the Eleventh Month of the Twelfth Year of Shōwa, corresponding to the Fifth Day of the Eleventh Month of the Fourth Year of Kangtō.

(L.S.) Konkichi Uyoda,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Manchoukuo.

(L.S.) Chang Ching-hui,
Primo Minister of Manchoukuo.
Supplementary Agreement "A"

Signed in Hirohinking, November 5, 1937, Proclaimed November 5, 1937

In signing today the Treaty between Japan and Manchoukuo concerning the abolition of extraterritoriality in Manchoukuo and the Transfer of the administrative rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I. JURISDICTION

ARTICLE I. The system of Consular Courts existing for Japanese subjects in Manchoukuo shall, simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty, cease to be in force, and thereafter Japanese subjects shall come within the jurisdiction of the Law Courts of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE II. The Government of Manchoukuo engage to guarantee to the lives and property of Japanese subjects such judicial protection as conforms to international law and the general principles of law.

ARTICLE III. Contentious cases, civil and penal, and non-contentious cases which remain pending at the Consular Courts of Japan at the time of the coming into force of the Treaty, shall continue to be disposed of in pursuance of the procedure hitherto followed, and, for the purposes of that disposal, the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts of Japan shall continue to be in full force.

In all matters that relate to the cases to be disposed of under the preceding paragraph, the competent authorities of Manchoukuo shall afford aid on request by the competent authorities of Japan.

ARTICLE IV. With regard to criminal acts committed by Japanese subjects before the coming into force of the Treaty, the Law Courts of Manchoukuo are competent to try and decide cases concerning the said acts, only when such
acts either contravene the penal laws and regulations of Japan in force at
the time they were committed and also constitute punishable offences under
the penal laws and regulations of Manchoukuo, or contravene those penal
laws and regulations of Manchoukuo the application of which to Japanese
subjects has been approved by Japan.

The Government of Manchoukuo engage not to punish more severely than
under the laws and ordinances of Japan the criminal acts of Japanese subjects
referred to in the preceding paragraph.

ARTICLE V. With regard to any of the offences under Articles 73 to
79, 81 to 89 and 197 of the Criminal Code of Japan, or under the Japanese
Law for the Preservation of the Public Peace, which were committed by Japanese
subjects within the territories of Manchoukuo before the coming into force
of the Treaty, the Government of Manchoukuo shall deliver the offenders,
together with the relevant evidence, to the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE VI. Those criminal cases in which searches are being made by
Japanese Consular Officers at the time of the coming into force of the
Treaty and which can be punished under the laws and ordinances of Manchoukuo
shall, together with the relevant documents and evidence, be taken over by
the competent authorities of Manchoukuo.

With regard to the cases taken over under the preceding paragraph,
the Government of Manchoukuo shall recognize the procedure which was, before
they were so taken over, fulfilled under the laws and ordinances of Japan
in respect of accusation, prosecution, self-surrender and search, as having
the same validity as if it were fulfilled under the laws and ordinances of
Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE VII. The Government of Manchoukuo recognize the validity of
the titles of debt drawn up under the laws and ordinances of Japan before the coming into force of the Treaty. The same shall apply to the titles of debt drawn up in respect of cases to be disposed of under the first paragraph of Article 3 of the present agreement.

ARTICLE VIII. The Government of Manchoukuo shall recognize the registrations effected before the coming into force of the Treaty by Japanese Consular Officers under the laws and ordinances of Japan as having the same validity as if they were effected by the competent authorities of Manchoukuo under the laws and ordinances of that country.

ARTICLE IX. Administration over the South Manchuria Railway Zone

ARTICLE X. The Government of Manchoukuo engage, after the transfer of administration under the preceding article, to take appropriate steps, in administering the South Manchuria Railway Zone, to prevent interference with the advancement of general culture, the development of industries, etc.

ARTICLE XI. The taxes the imposition of which is within the rights of the Government of Japan at the time of the transfer of the administration over the South Manchuria Railway Zone shall be levied and collected by the Government of Manchoukuo in accordance with a decision to be made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchoukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.

In connection with the stipulations of the preceding paragraph, the Government of Manchoukuo shall deliver to the Government of Japan funds of an amount to be decided upon by consultation between the Japanese
CHAPTER III. Police and Other Administration

ARTICLE XII. Within the territories of Manchoukuo, the Government of Japan shall, simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty, cease to exercise police and other administration in respect of Japanese subjects, and thereafter they shall come within the jurisdiction of Manchoukuo in regard to such administration.

The Government of Manchoukuo engages, in exercising police and other administration in respect of Japanese subjects, to afford all possible guarantees for the protection of their lives and property.

ARTICLE XIII. Cases concerning police and other matters, which are being dealt with at the time of the coming into force of the Treaty by the competent authorities of Japan, shall, as a general principle, be taken over, together with the relevant documents, by the competent authorities of Manchoukuo.

CHAPTER IV. Administration concerning Shrines, Education and Military Matters

ARTICLE XIV. The Government of Manchoukuo agrees that, within their territories after the coming into force of the Treaty, Japan or her subjects shall establish shrines under her own laws and ordinances, and her Government shall administer matters relating to such shrines.

ARTICLE XV. The Government of Manchoukuo, with regard to important matters connected with the educational administration to be exercised by them in respect of Japanese subjects, engage, for the time being, to act in accordance with a decision to be previously made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchoukuo.
and the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.

The Government of Manchoukuo agree that, within their territories for the time being after the coming into force of the Treaty, Japan or her subjects shall, under her own laws and ordinances, open, conduct or control schools and other educational institutions, and her Government shall administer educational matters concerning her subjects, in accordance with a decision to be made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchoukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.

Within the territories of Manchoukuo, the Government of Japan may, under her own laws and ordinances, establish School associations, and the Federations of such associations, of the status of public juristic persons, in order to cause them to open, conduct or control the schools and other educational institutions referred to in the preceding paragraph. The Government of Manchoukuo shall recognize the establishment of such associations and Federations.

ARTICLE XVI. The Government of Manchoukuo agrees that, within the territories of Manchoukuo after the coming into force of the Treaty, administration concerning military enlistment, service, muster and other military matters in respect of Japanese subjects shall be exercised by the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE XVII. Of the laws and ordinances of Japan to be applied under the present Chapter, those which are applicable through judicial procedure shall be applied by the judicial authorities of Japan.

ARTICLE XVIII. The Government of Manchoukuo engage to afford aid in the application, under the present Chapter, of the laws and ordinances of
Supplementary Agreement "A"

Signed in Hsinking, November 5, 1937; Proclaimed November 5, 1937

In signing today the Treaty between Japan and Manchoukuo concerning the abolition of extraterritoriality in Manchoukuo and the Transfer of the administrative rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I. Jurisdiction

ARTICLE I. The system of Consular Courts existing for Japanese subjects in Manchoukuo shall, simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty, cease to be in force, and thereafter Japanese subjects shall come within the jurisdiction of the Law Courts of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE II. The Government of Manchoukuo engage to guarantee to the lives and property of Japanese subjects such judicial protection as conforms to international law and the general principles of law.

ARTICLE III. Contentious cases, civil and penal, and non-contentious cases which remain pending at the Consular Courts of Japan at the time of the coming into force of the Treaty, shall continue to be disposed of in pursuance of the procedure hitherto followed, and, for the purposes of that disposal, the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts of Japan shall continue to be in full force.

In all matters that relate to the cases to be disposed of under the preceding paragraph, the competent authorities of Manchoukuo shall afford aid on request by the competent authorities of Japan.

ARTICLE IV. With regard to criminal acts committed by Japanese subjects before the coming into force of the Treaty, the Law Courts of Manchoukuo are competent to try and decide cases concerning the said acts, only when such
ARTICLE XXI. The Government of Japan shall deliver to the Government of Manchoukuo records, registers, drawings, papers and other things concerning the administration of justice, police, taxation, communications, etc., which are necessary for the operation of the present agreement.

ARTICLE XXII. Details concerning the operation of the present agreement shall, as occasion arises, be decided upon by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchoukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE XXIII. The present agreement shall come into force simultaneously with the Treaty.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of Manchoukuo have signed the present agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Haikinko this Fifth Day of the Eleventh Month of the Fourth Year of Kangto.

(L.S.) Iinkichi Uyoda,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Manchoukuo.

(L.S.) Chang Ching-hui,
Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.
Def. Doc. 71019-0
.

Good Terms of Understanding between the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of Manchoukuo with reference to the Treaty between the two Countries concerning the Abolition of Extraterritoriality in Manchoukuo and the Transfer of the Administrative Rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone, and also to the Supplementary Agreement "A" to that Treaty.


I. Article III of the Treaty and Article I of the Supplementary Agreement:

1. In matters relating to the personal status of Japanese subjects, the law Courts of Manchoukuo shall conform to the laws and ordinances of Japan.

2. The Government of Manchoukuo shall take the steps necessary for the protection of the rights and interests which, at the time of the coming into force of the Treaty, Japanese subjects enjoy under the laws and ordinances of Japan or by usage.

II. Article IV of the Treaty:

1. The Government of Manchoukuo shall levy no charge whatever in recognizing the establishment of juristic persons under the present Article.

2. The Government of Manchoukuo shall safeguard the benefit of reduced rates of tax at present enjoyed by the juristic persons whose establishment has been recognized by them under the present Article.

III. Article III of the Supplementary Agreement:

1. The cases to be disposed of under the first paragraph of this present Article include the subsequent procedure that occurs in connection with the cases dealt with by Japanese Consular Officers before the coming into force of the Treaty, as well as the cases to be dealt with by Japanese Consular Officers under the first paragraph of the present Article.
2. The criminal cases that occur in connection with the judicial procedure to be fulfilled by Japanese Consular Officers under the first paragraph of the present Article shall be disposed of in the same way as the cases under the said paragraph.

IV. Ad Article VIII of the Supplementary Agreement:

With regard to registrations made under the laws and ordinances of Japan, the Government of Manchoukuo shall regard rights pertaining to immovable property as the similar or analogous rights, and trade-marks and trademarks as such respectively, under the laws and ordinances of Manchoukuo.

V. Ad Article IX of the Supplementary Agreement:

1. The Government of Manchoukuo shall, as a general principle, establish advisory bodies in places where Local Committees have hitherto existed, in order that the local authorities of that country can ascertain the opinions of residents within the South Manchuria Railway Zone in respect of such local administration as directly affects the welfare and interests of such residents.

2. The public imposts at present collected by the South Manchuria Railway Company within the Railway Zone shall be abolished simultaneously with the transfer of the administration over the said Zone.

VI. Ad Article XV of the Supplementary Agreement:

1. The educational administration mentioned in the first paragraph of the present Article refers, as a general principle, to that concerning primary education.

2. The Government of Manchoukuo shall as far as possible improve and replenish the system of primary education for Japanese subjects; as occasion arises, the Government of Manchoukuo shall grant a reasonable
amount of subsidy to bodies conducting such educational work, and the Government of Japan shall also afford them financial assistance.

2. The Government of Manchoukuo shall, in accordance with a decision to be made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchoukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo, pay each year a share of the expenses of the educational work for Japanese subjects conducted by Japanese within the territories of Manchoukuo.

VII. Ad Article XVII of the Supplementary Agreement:

The judicial authorities of Japan referred to in the present article are, for the time being, her Consular Officers.

VIII. Ad Article XIX of the Supplementary Agreement:

The Government of Manchoukuo shall, with regard to the institutions and staffs concerned, taken over by them under the present Treaty, take appropriate steps with a view to facilitating the disposal of business relating to the organization of the said institutions, the assignment of the said staffs, etc.

IX. Ad Article XX of the Supplementary Agreement:

The Government of Manchoukuo may cause Japanese subjects to have renewed by that Government the certificates of approval, of permission, of licence, etc., issued by the competent authorities of Japan before the coming into force of the Treaty, provided that the said Government shall levy no charge in connection therewith.

Done at Hanking this Fifth Day of the Eleventh Month of the Twelfth Year of Showa, corresponding to the Fifth Day of the Eleventh Month of
Def. Doc. 1019-G
the Fourth Year of Kangte.

(L.S.) Konkichi Uyeda,
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of
Japan to Manchoukuo.

(L.S.) Chang Ching-hui,
Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.
Def. Doc. 1019-D

Supplementary Agreement "B"

Signed in Hsinking, November 5, 1937, Proclaimed November 9, 1937

In signing today the Treaty between Japan and Manchoukuo concerning the
Abolition of Extraterritoriality in Manchoukuo and the Transfer of the Administrative Rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have agreed as follows with reference to a communication and allied business in Manchoukuo:

ARTICLE I. Of the communication business within the South Manchuria Railway Zone, that which relates to third countries shall be conducted and controlled by the Japanese Administrations until the time to be decided upon by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchoukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE II. The Government of Japan may entrust to the Government of Manchoukuo the conduct of business of a kind which exists under the internal system of Japan but which does not exist under the internal system of Manchoukuo, and of other kind of business which is considered to be of special necessity. The kind and the scope of the business to be so entrusted shall be provided for in a business agreement to be concluded between the competent authorities of Manchoukuo and of Japan.

The Government of Manchoukuo shall, with all the attention required of a bona fide trustee, dispose of the business entrusted to them under the preceding paragraph, on behalf of the Government of Japan, in accordance with the provisions of her laws and ordinances.

The Government of Japan shall pay to the Government of Manchoukuo fees for the disposal of the business entrusted to the latter.

- 1 -
Def. Doc. 1019-D

ARTICLE III. The currency to be used in connection with the business entrusted under the preceding Article shall be Manchoukuo currency.

The rate of exchange between Japanese and Manchoukuo currencies shall be decided upon by consultation between the competent authorities of Japan and of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE IV. Matters relating to the operation of the present agreement shall be provided for in a business agreement to be concluded between the competent authorities of Japan and of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE V. The Protocol of Signature attached to the Treaty between Japan and Manchoukuo concerning Postal Business signed at Hsinking on the twenty-sixth of December, the Tenth Year of Showa, corresponding to the twenty-sixth of December, the Second Year of Kangte, shall cease to be in force.

ARTICLE VI. The present agreement shall come into force simultaneously with the Treaty.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of Manchoukuo have signed this agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Hsinking this Fifth Day of the Eleventh Month of the Twelfth Year of Showa, corresponding to the Fifth Day of the Eleventh Month of the Fourth Year of Kangte.

(L.S.) Kenkichi byeda,
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of
Japan to Manchoukuo.

(L.S.) Chung Ching-huai,
Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.

- 2 -
Supplementary Agreement "J"

Signed in Hsinking, November 5, 1937, Proclaimed November 9, 1937

In signing today the Treaty between Japan and Manchoukuo concerning the Abolition of Extraterritoriality in Manchoukuo and the Transfer of the Administrative Rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone, the respective plenipotentiaries of the two countries have agreed as follows with reference to communication and allied business in Manchoukuo:

ARTICLE I. Of the communication business within the South Manchuria Railway Zone, that which relates to third countries shall be conducted and controlled by the Japanese Administrations until the time to be decided upon by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchoukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE II. The Government of Japan may entrust to the Government of Manchoukuo the conduct of business of a kind which exists under the internal system of Japan but which does not exist under the internal system of Manchoukuo, and of other kind of business which is considered to be of special necessity. The kind and the scope of the business to be so entrusted shall be provided for in a business agreement to be concluded between the competent authorities of Manchoukuo and Japan.

The Government of Manchoukuo shall, with all the attention required of a bona fide trustee, dispose of the business entrusted to them under the preceding paragraph, on behalf of the Government of Japan, in accordance with the provisions of her laws and ordinances.

The Government of Japan shall pay to the Government of Manchoukuo fees for the disposal of the business entrusted to the latter.
ARTICLE III. The currency to be used in connection with the business entrusted under the preceding Article shall be Manchoukuo currency.

The rate of exchange between Japanese and Manchoukuo currencies shall be decided upon by consultation between the competent authorities of Japan and of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE IV. Matters relating to the operation of the present agreement shall be provided for in a business agreement to be concluded between the competent authorities of Japan and of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE V. The Protocol of Signature attached to the Treaty between Japan and Manchoukuo concerning Post, 1 Business signed at Hsinking on the twenty-sixth of December, the Tenth Year of Showa, corresponding to the twenty-sixth of December, the Second Year of K'angte, shall cease to be in force.

ARTICLE VI. The present agreement shall come into force simultaneously with the Treaty.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of Manchoukuo have signed this agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Hsinking this Fifth Day of the Eleventh Month of the Twelfth Year of Showa, corresponding to the Fifth Day of the Eleventh Month of the Fourth Year of K'angte.

(L.S.) Kenkichi Uyeda,
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of
Japan to Manchoukuo.

(L.S.) Chung Ching-hui,
Prime Minister of Manchoukuo.

- 2 -
Translation Certificate

I, Higita, Masao, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Ref. Doc. # 1019 (A-D) is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Higita, Masao

Tokyo, Japan

Date April 14, 1947
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<th>Month</th>
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<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Attitude of China</th>
<th>Steps taken by central authorities of Japan</th>
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Lives of policy for dealing with the North China Incident decided upon.

Orders for action given to the air and land forces of Kwangtung.

Endeavor to make Sung Cho-ynan of China agree to and execute the terms of settlement of the 11th.

Chinese forces stationed in North China amount to 30 divisions.

Preparation for Mobilization in Japan.

Chung and air and naval forces.

Preparation for mobilization suspended.

2° Manchurian Incident occurs.

26 kamagari-ron Ganto Incident occurs.
| 7 27 | Sung Che-yuan ordered by tele- for the purpose of using armed forces. The Cabinet explains the object of using force (to the effect that Japan does not take an enemy of Chinese people, nor has any territorial design). |
| 29 | Fighting at Nan-wan. 3 divisions mobilize in Japan. |
| 29 | Tungchow Incident breaks out Tientsin and Tangku attacked. Public force corps concentrate in the true area of Shanghai. |
| 30 | |
| 3 1 | |
| 2 | Troops of the Central advance one after another. |
| 6 | National Defence Conference held. |
| 9 | Truce affair breaks out at Shanghai. |
| 12 | China concentrates forces 50,000 strong in the vicinity of Shanghai (Japanese force numbers 4,000). |
8 13  China announces abrogation of the Shanghai Truce Agreement.

9 15  Chang K’u-cheshek is installed as Commander-in-Chief of the Land, air and Naval Forces. His General Headquarters is established.

10 20  15 divisions mobilized since October.
Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947
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| 7 | 26      | 件名     | 内閣法令
| 7 | 27      | 件名     | 内閣法令
| 7 | 28      | 南京攻囲    | 内閣三河関連
| 7 | 29      | 江州部隊：天津方面包囲、上海防備整備    | 内閣三河関連
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| 8 | 1       |          |         |
| 8 | 2       | 中央指令    |         |
| 8 | 6       | 国防省       |         |
| 8 | 9       | 上海大山事件 |         |</p>
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<td>8.12</td>
<td>上海附近中国第五軍ノ兵ヲ締結（我方四千）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>上海停止協定ヲ締結</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>藤介石踏海空軍ノ総司令官トナル大本営設置</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>十月来十五ヶ師</td>
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<td></td>
<td>日本大本営設置</td>
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</table>
Opium smoking is of ancient origin and has become firmly established as a common custom. Consequently the state of life and fortunes are regarded with contempt by the powers. As long as escape from this evil custom is impossible, it is most regrettable viewed from the standpoint of the spiritual good of the state. However, the suitability or lack of suitability of an opium system as a problem bears on the rise or fall of a nation.

Now that the establishment of Buddhism has been accomplished, it is time for complete political reform. If we do not create means for abolishing the use of opium, establishing such means as a fundamental policy immediately, this evil will further spread in the future and will result finally in a hopeless situation.

However, a policy under which, as in the case of the old system, disposition of opium addicts, which are presently existing in large numbers, was overlooked, if we try now to prohibit it, it would be like emptying a river without controlling its source, we are forced to admit that such a policy would be a mistaken one.

In spite of the fact that a legal system to prohibit the use of opium had only been completely provided for, it is a fact that it was not effective in the least.

In order to curb the people of this long-admired evil habit, we must resort to suppressive measures for gradual decrease of the number of addicts, and strictly prohibit general use of opium, with the exception of those already addicted to the habit its continued use for medical purposes. We must also establish medical institutions...
for the relief of the victims of the drug while striving to prevent the appearance of new victims by such means as education and various other social measures, awakening the people to the fearful facts of the addiction. By these means let us strive for gradual extirpation of this evil custom, these apparently being the measures proved by the experiments in different countries of the world to be the most effective means for the suppression of opium addiction. Our government, therefore, following the above-described policy, promulgated on November 30, 1932 (DAIDO 1), the Opium Law, Imperial Ordinance No. 111, in the hope of attaining the above aims. We expect that our people will understand the significance of this law and reflect well on their conduct and faithfully observe the dictates of our great project for the renovation of our national life.

November 30, 1932 (DAIDO 1)
CHENG, Hsiao-hsu,
Prime Minister of Manchukuo.
CERTIFICATE

I, Komata, Yoshio, hereby certify that the attached Proclamation of Premlei in 1932, in my handwriting, is a true and full copy made by me from the source document entitled, "Opium Laws and Regulations of Manchukuo Government Bulletin."

/s/ Komata, Yoshio

Komata, Yoshio

11 April 1947.

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 April 1947
CERTIFICATE

I, who occupied the post of the Professor of Kenkoku University of Lanchoukuo from 1939 to 1943, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in Japanese, consisting of thirty (30) pages... entitled, "Opium Law and Regulations Concerning Thereof" was published by Lanchoukuo Government and obtained by me in that capacity and has been kept in my library.

February 12th, 1947

/s/ CKANO, Kenki (seal)
No. 75 Idojyanakama-chi
Kinami-Ku, Yokohama

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were subscribed and affixed before me.

At the same place
On the same date

Witness: /s/ SAITOMJI, Shohai
Counselor at Law

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, KIGITA, Lasao, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of the certificate of source of Defense Document No. 978 is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ KIGITA, Lasao

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 17th, 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST


SWEORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT; KAIHABE, Shōzō

Having first duly sworn en oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
To the questions asked by Messrs. MIYATA and blackney, by counsel, at Tokyo, on November 2 in the 21st year of Showa (1946), I, Lawaller, Shōzō, replied as follows:

1. Tell us about the term of your service at Peking as commander of the Infantry Brigade stationed in China.

2. From April, 1936 (Showa 11) until August, 1937 (Showa 12).

3. Tell us about the strength of the army which you, as Brigade Commander, commanded at the time, and how you stationed the troops.

A. I had two infantry regiments, the strength being about 5,000. The headquarters of the 1st Regiment of Infantry was at Peking. One battalion each was posted at Peking, Peiktai and Tientsin, and one company was sent to Tungchow. The headquarters of the 2nd Regiment of Infantry was posted at Tientsin, where two battalions were also stationed. One battalion was posted at Shantai and along the railway east of Tientsin. The headquarters of the Brigade was at Peking.

4. Where was the headquarters of the Army? And in what manner were the technical corps posted?

A. The headquarters of the Army was at Tientsin, and cavalry, artillery, or Mixed and tank corps were also posted there.

5. Were there other military organs at Peking?

A. A Special Service Agency, military attaches to the Embassy and a RETREAT unit were at Peking, and these three were all independent organs.

6. Give an outline of the disposition of the Chinese Army at the time of the Lühuoshiao Incident.

In North China, the 29th Army under the command of was stationed in the area, including Tientsin, Peking, Peiktai and Kalgan. The headquarters of the Army was at Peking, and one division each was stationed near Peking, Tientsin, Kalgan and Peiktai.

In the neighborhood of Lühuoshiao, about a battalion was stationed at Hanyuan, Peiyuen, Tungchow and Kalgan. It seemed that at Lungwangmiao was posted a part of the battalion.

7. Were the Japanese and Chinese armies on good terms before the outbreak of the Incident?

The relations between the two armies were very friendly until the fall of 1935 (Showa 11). Both armies often inspected each other's maneuvers and took part in friendly relations between both armies were promoted remarkably. But on Sept. 18, 1936 (Showa 11), a skirmish was begun between Japanese and Chinese units when they were marching near Peiktai and passed each other. It was peacefully settled by the efforts of the staff members of both armies.
part of the Chinese troops stationed at Fengtai were moved elsewhere. This seemed to have left an unpleasant impression on the part of the Chinese army. And after the Hsian Incident, which took place in December in the same year, the sentiment of the Chinese in the vicinity of Peking generally became unfavorable toward Japan, and the communists' secret maneuvers became more active. Accordingly, it cannot be denied that the Chinese troops were affected by the communist movement. Although in the Chinese higher circles there was still seen a strong trend toward the harmonious collaboration of Japan and China; among the lower circles of the army it was observed there was an anti-Chinese sentiment which was very keen.

Q. How were the relations between you and Mr. Chou and other Chinese staff members?

A. I was not especially intimate with Mr. Chou, except on the occasions of formal exchange of courtesies. But I was very intimate with Cheng Tse-hsun, the Division Commander. We often exchanged frank opinions about the friendly relations of the two nations. Our opinions were similar on some points.

Q. What sort of instructions were given to you by the authorities as to the attitude of the Japanese garrison forces toward China? And tell us how you instructed your men in line with the instructions from the authorities.

A. It was the fundamental policy of the Army to keep contact with the Chinese army like a friendly army and bring about better relations between both armies. As a brigade commander, I always kept this in mind and led my men to be on good terms with the Chinese army. When I went to the General Staff to pay a visit of courtesy after I was appointed Brigade Commander, Major General Isami I., Kanji, who was then Chief of Military Operations, told me privately, clearly showing the intention of the Central authorities, "The Central Authorities have no intention of fighting a war with China. You will please keep this in mind in line of duty."

Q. What were the duties of the Stationary Force in China?

A. The protection of the official institutions and the Japanese nationals in North China as well as the defense of railway, traffic and communications.

Q. Tell us about the plans for military operations of the Japanese garrison forces against China.

A. I never received any instructions for military operations against China.

Q. Please explain about the program of the garrisoning.

A. In accordance with the duty, that is, the order to defend railway, traffic, communication and to protect Japanese diplomatic establishments and Japanese residents, the Brigade, in peace time, scattered its forces along the railway, Peking and Tientsin and the thus stationed forces took charge of the garrisoning of their respective stations.

Q. Please explain about the garrison near Peking.
Fengtai, Peking and Tungchow constituted three stations respectively as one unit near Peking, which were put under my command as the Peking garrison district. In Fengtai the commander of the battalion, in Peking the commander of the infantry regiment, and in Tungchow the commander of the company, were ordered to discharge their duties as the commanders of stationary forces.

Explain about the preparation for the operations against China which the Japanese garrison forces in China made.

We did not think of fighting with China, so we made no preparation for operations against China. Our forces were the so-called garrison forces; therefore, in organization we had no moving activity and in conditions we had no stock for operations except those which were continually supplied.

Was the Brigade charged with duty regarding secret information and the investigation of topography necessary for the army?

We were not charged with any such duty.

Were you given directions regarding where to place the emphasis in the education and training of the Japanese garrison forces in China?

We were given directions about education, but it meant the training which aimed at complete preparation and equipment of the forces and was not aimed at the Chinese army. This was applicable similarly in the case of the forces in Japan. We had no idea of fighting with the Chinese army, so we did not think of aiming at it.

Explain about the disposition and the maneuvering areas of the Japanese army near Fengtai.

One battalion under the command of Major Ichii was stationed in the Japanese barracks at Fengtai with some infantry guns attached to it. To the north of the barracks there stretched a narrow parade ground, but near Fengtai there were many farms and no maneuvering areas. About three kilometers west of Fengtai, there was the ballast-collecting place of the railway, which was not a farm but was a plain well-adapted for maneuvering. After negotiations with China, Japan was granted temporary use of this plain, with Ichimonji as its center and we were to use it as a maneuvering area. In that district ballast was collected for the Peking-Lukden Railway.

Where was the maneuvering area of the forces in Peking?

Though there was a narrow common parade ground for the units each nation to the west of Hsininkong within the walls of Peking, the Japanese units in Peking used to utilize the exercise grounds surrounding the units of the Tungchow garrison as their area for field exercises.

Were they at liberty to use the maneuvering area?

Yes, they were at liberty to use it. Hitherto, in case of carrying out maneuvers, the Chinese units had done it by their own choice without the necessity of informing the Chinese authorities of it. However, at the beginning of June, there was a friendly desire from the Chinese, saying,
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"...a night maneuver is apt to excite the public, you will kindly inform us of it in advance, by which, we would like to announce it to the public previously so as to prevent any excitement". Understanding this, the Army made it a rule to make an announcement in each case through the military intelligence bureau.

C. About the time when the incident broke out, did they carry out exercises every night?

Yes. Almost every night after the mid of June they practised exercises. The units practised several exercises as it was just before the inspection of the second term.

C. Were you in Peking on 7 July, the very day of the incident?

I was not there. In order to attend to the inspection of the Second Infantry Regiment which took place at that time, at the maneuvering area at Nantassu, south of Shanhkwan, I left Peking on 6 June.

C. Who was the garrison commander while you were absent?

The commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment, Colonel MUDGUCHI, acted for me.

C. Were all the units in Peking at their permanent stations?

Leaving one company in the city, all the Peking infantry regiments were in Tungchow for the purpose of maneuvering. Therefore, only with one company within the walls of Peiping and a battalion at Fengtai, we had had little strength.

C. How were you informed of the situation about the outbreak of the incident when you were traveling?

Throughout the night of 7 July, there was the inspection of exercises. About 3:00 A.M., on 8 July, on the scene of the maneuvers, a slip of paper with something written down as a telephonic report to be from the commander of the Peking Regiment was brought to me from the signal corps. The paper read, "While a company was practising exercises at the maneuvering area of Lukouchiao, we were fired upon by a Chinese unit and one of our soldiers is missing. The Ichiki battalion has been shifted to the guarding formation and is now searching for the missing soldier." I did not reply to it. When morning came, I made contact with the Army Headquarters at Tientsin and determined to return to Peking. As an airplane was fortunately provided by the Army, I left Shanhkwan at about noon, and after changing to a train at Tientsin and arriving at Fengtai, at about 3:00 P.M., I immediately hurried to Lukouchiao.

C. Did you visit the Army Headquarters when you passed Tientsin?

The train schedule did not permit me to go, but I established contact by telephone at the station to the Chief of Staff, Hashimoto. The Chief of Staff said, "The policy of the Army is to achieve a solution on the spot. You will watch the situation as it is at present." By this I was informed of the Army's policy of localizing the affair.
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Did you suspend the inspection of the Second Infantry Regiment at Montessori?

I had ordered the regimental commander to continue the inspection.

Was the regimental commander there when you reached Lushushi?

Yes. He was there, and reported the situation in general as follows:

"After eleven o'clock last night, I received the following report from the battalion commander, ICHEL. In company carrying out exercises was fired upon by a Chinese unit, and as a soldier is missing, a search is now being made for him. The battalion has now concentrating at N. Ichimoji in preparation for any emergency." Then, I, the regimental commander, ordered the battalion by telephone as follows: 'You will await further orders as you are now. It is expected that the investigation parties will be dispatched from both Japanese and Chinese sides to the spot to investigate the situation on the spot.'"

"By the mediation of the Military Intelligence Bureau, it was decided to make a common investigation by sending committees from both Japanese and Chinese sides. Then, with a regimental officer, Lt. Colonel ICHI, as the chairman, the committees were dispatched to the spot. The Chinese chairman was the chief of the Yunnan davon."

"After 2:00 A.M., there was a report of units under fire by Chinese armed forces at the Yunnan-von. Furthermore, after 1:00 A.M., there was another report that we had again been fired upon by the Chinese. I, the regimental commander, gave the following order: 'It is an insult against the Japanese that the Chinese had fired upon us again, despite the fact that, as it had begun to get light, the Japanese could be easily identified. If you should be fired upon again in the future, your battalion will be free to fight back.' However, it was about 5:00 A.M. when the party of the investigation committee arrived at the spot by automobile while inspecting the spot, the ICHEL battalion launched an attack, was deployed and was just about to advance. Thereupon, the Lt. Colonel rebuked the battalion commander for the battalion's unlawfulness. When the battalion commander replied that he had just received an order from the regimental commander that the battalion was free to accept the challenge, there was another volley from the Chinese. So Lt. Colonel ICHI told the Chinese committee, 'The unlawful firing of the Chinese units is as you are now actually witnessing. I cannot disregard the battalion commander's determination to accept the challenge, and the Lt. Colonel agreed to the battalion commander's determination. Then after 9:00 A.M., the battalion attacked the Chinese at Lungwanmiao.'"

Then what did you, the brigade commander, do upon receipt of that report?

I gave the following order to the units, 'Such the Chinese under present situation. Do nothing."

- 5 -
time, I ordered that the casualties be taken care of.

Q. There is talk that the encounter between the Japanese and the Chinese units at Lukouchiao started from an intrigue by a third party. What do you think about this?

A. I cannot say distinctly about that, but after the outbreak of the incident on 7 July, while the Japanese and the Chinese were facing each other, there frequently was unlawful firing every night. Every time such unlawful firing took place, we investigated the situation, but there was no sign that either the Japanese or the Chinese unit had opened fire. It almost seemed that a third party which did not belong to the Japanese unit nor to the Chinese were firing from the intermediate area between the Japanese and the Chinese which were facing each other. And we could assume that it was an intrigue by someone.

Q. After 7 July, both units were facing each other, while negotiations were in progress between the Japanese and Chinese. Did any untoward incident break out during that time?

A. There were successive outbreaks of untoward incidents, such as the unlawful firing at Mt. Ichimoji on 21 July (company commander wounded), the Langfang incident on 25 July, the Tannamen incident on 26 July, etc. The anti-Japanese sentiment of the lower class Chinese officers and other ranks was most intense.
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On this 27th day of February 19
At Tokyo

Defendant: IIARII, Shôzo (seal)

I, IIARII, Shôzo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereon in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) IIIHII, SHISHISHI (seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and saying nothing.

IIARII, Shôzo (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

Being duly sworn on oath in accordance with the procedure of my country, I, Masakazu Kawabe, hereby depose and say:

I was born on December 5 in the 19th Year of Meiji at Nōka Higashi-Noziri-mura Higashi-Tochinomi-gun Toyama prefecture, which is my permanent address, and I live at 2874 Koganei Koganei-machi Kitatama-gun Tokyo.

My career runs as follows:

1907 graduated from the Military Academy
1915 graduated from the Military Staff College
1936 major-general
1936 commander of the Infantry Brigade stationed in North China

September 1937 vice-chief of the staff of the North China Area Army

February 1938 chief of the staff of the Central China Expeditionary Forces
January 1939  chief of the Department of the Inspector-General of Military Education

March 1940  commander of the 12th Division

March 1941  commander of the 3rd Army

August 1942  chief of the staff of China Expeditionary Forces

March 1943  commander of the Burma Area Army

December 1944  commander of the Central Army

March 1945  general

April 1945  commander of Whole Air Force

I. I served as chief of the staff under General Shunroku HATA, Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, from February to December, 1938, and later as general chief of the staff under General Shunroku HATA, Commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Forces, from August, 1942, to summer, 1943.

II. General HATA was appointed commander-in-chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces in succession to General Iwane MATSUI. His duties, however, essentially differed from that of his predecessor, Commander-in-Chief MATSUI. His was a very negative one, being restricted to the maintenance of peace and order with the strength of about six divisions in the triangular zone connecting Nanking, Hangchow and Shanghai. Therefore he did not take over the duties any report concerning military operations from the ex-Commander-in-Chief MATSUI.
III. In spite of negative restrictions of his duties to the maintenance of peace and order, he carried out the Hsuchow campaign for the following reason. About the beginning of April, 1933, the North China Expeditionary Forces reached Tsinan while the Central China Expeditionary Force reached the "Wai River". The 10th Division, however, suffered a considerable loss at the battle of Taierhchwang, east of Hsuchow, and the 5th Division also was unsuccessful in attack, thus the North China Expeditionary Forces had difficulties for further advance. It was, therefore, found necessary for the two expeditionary forces to expel to the west the enemy forces and secure their contact. The Imperial Headquarters issued an order to carry out such operation. Under these circumstances the Katsu Forces began movement on about May 10 and opened an attack against the enemy forces at Taierhchwang, east of Hsuchow, with the strength of about three divisions, while the North China Expeditionary Force attacked them with about four divisions, with the result that the enemy forces were driven away on about May 20 and the battle at Hsuchow came to an end.

IV. At last stage of the battle at Hsuchow namely, about the middle of May, the Imperial Headquarters issued an informal order that we should carry out Hankow operations with the Central China Expeditionary Forces as the main strength. We were then
to continue Hankow operations on the one hand and prepare ourselves for Hankow operations on the other. This compulsory operation orders threw us into no small panic. In the middle of June, we received the Imperial Headquarters a formal order to effect Hankow operations.

At the beginning of July we had necessary reinforcements for Hankow operations on orders from the Imperial Headquarters and re-organized the entire forces for the operations. The troops reinforced to us the 2nd Army Under Prince Higashikuni and the troops under Lieutenant-General OKAHUKA. Wuchang and Hankow campaign was scheduled for early autumn.

Hankow fell on October 26 and on November 5 Commander-in-Chief HATA made formal entry into the city. At that time people in Hankow remained very calm, order was maintained, the building were in good order, and it was difficult to believe that battle was fought in the city recently.

When Wuchang and Hankow fell, we met with resistance of the enemies until we reached a spot two or three 'ri' outside the city, but after that little resistance was made and it was almost a bloodless occupation; therefore the soldiers remained composed and showed no excitement.

Commander-in-Chief HATA not only issued strict orders to each unit under his command to take the utmost care to maintain military discipline, but to prevent disorder in the city after
the occupation, he gave each unit as instructions of the chief of the staff, detailed regulations accompanying the orders. Those instructions indicated the directions the Army and Navy or individual unit of the Army should take, and fixed the areas of occupation by the Army and Navy. We also made a definite agreement with the Navy regarding the use of the buildings in the city, and selected the best soldiers out of each unit to enter the city; that is, we transferred the units engaged in the battle to the rear and sent into the city the very best portion of the 13th Division which was not only full trained and educated but was mild and obedient. As we gave such strict orders and instructions and took every precaution with utmost care, we believe there was not a single case of violation of military discipline in Hankow, such as massacre, violence, plunder and etc. Nor did we receive any report or even hear of them. I read in the papers that someone notified to the massacre in Hankow, and I am astounded at such inconceivable testimony.

The army and navy air forces engaged in Hankow campaign had their bases in banking and ministry respectively and were under entirely different command. However, part of the air forces had been transferred to the battle of Canton, and the strength was considerably decreased, so that long-distance bombing was not carried out.

V. The Central China Expeditionary Force had nothing to do
with the Canton operations, and we resisted at the transfer of part of the air forces.

VI. The Central China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the Changkufeng Incident either. The occurrence of the Changkufeng Incident made it impossible for us to get the air forces which the Japanese Army in Manchuria had promised to give us. As the Central China Expeditionary Forces were in the midst of the Hankow operations at that time, we felt bitter about it.

VII. The authority of General HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was restricted to negative duties relating to the maintenance of peace and order. He had not sufficient strength under him and he had to receive orders from the Imperial headquarters and get reinforcements from their instruction in order to make any military movements. He had no authority to act independently.

Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces were restricted to the duties of the strategic operations and military administration, and offensive operations were beyond his authority. His was the authority over the defense of the occupied territories and administration was in the hands of the ambassador after his appointment.

VIII. Since the China Interim Board was founded, political and economic affairs were handled by the Commander-in-Chief.
were transferred to it, but till the set-up of the Board was completed, special service organizations handled them in reality in every place upon request of the Chinese authorities.

IX. As regards to the Chinese prisoners of war, we made it a rule to deliver them to the Central Government of China as there existed no treaty concerning them. Persons responsible for them were the Commanders-in-Chief (i.e. the Commanders-in-Chief of each army under General (HATA), and they acted upon permission of the War Ministry.

X. The communist Army in China endeavoured to win the people, In the villages under its control all the people offered resistance to the Japanese Army. No sooner had the Japanese Army entered the villages than the communist went underground and they doubled our trouble, because we could not distinguish underground soldiers from the villagers. In those areas we could not but fight the people in general.

XI. The China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China. We had no knowledge of it and we never used the money obtained by traffic in opium. Secret funds of the China Expeditionary Forces was supplied by the War Ministry and we had no other fund. Therefore, it is clear that the Commanders-in-Chief had nothing to do with the opium question, but I am not quite certain how far the special service bureau or the special service organizations knew about it.
XII. The court-martial of the air force officers who attacked Tokyo in April 1942 was held upon orders of the War Ministry and everything was carried out strictly in accordance with orders.

XIII. The headquarters of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was in Shanghai at first since General HATA was appointed Commander-in-Chief but later it moved to Nanking. Then in March 1941 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the China Expedition Forces in succession to General NISHIO, and the headquarters was in Nanking at that time. Therefore, General HATA stayed at first in Shanghai while he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces (1939) and at the time of Wuhan-Hankow campaign he issued orders of despatch of troops at the headquarters in Nanking. He left there on August 25 and moved the headquarters to Kinking where he stayed until October 30. On November 3 he entered Hankow and stayed there until the middle of the same month. After holding a requiem service for the war-dead, he returned directly to Nanking.

XIV. The duty of General HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was not a positive one. His was the negative duty of maintaining peace and order in the occupied areas, therefore he laid special stress on the maintenance of military discipline. Soon after his arrival in Shanghai he held the conference of Division Commanders, when I remember vividly that he gave whole-hearted instructions concerning the...
maintenance of military discipline. General HATA was not involved in any irksome as he was not engaged in any outstanding operations.

/S/ Masakazu Kawabe

At Sugamo Prison
6 December, 1946.

I, Tomoharu Kokubu hereby certify that the affiant was sworn to and affixed his signature to the above statement in my presence. (He did not, however, affix his seal as he was not in possession of it)

/S/ Tomoharu Kokubu (seal)

At Sugamo Prison
6 December, 1946

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to state the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Masakazu Kawabe
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-Against-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT: SAKURAI, Tokutaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, SAKURAI, Tokutaro, served in the headquarters of the (Japanese) Garrison Troops in China from May 1936 to August 1937, and at the same time as an adviser to the Hopei-Chahar Political Committee and was a military adviser to the 29th Army, I was in service for the Chinese Army. I had the experience of being on the scene when the Lukouchiao Incident broke out, and was busily engaged in mediating between the Japanese and Chinese Army and was injured at last at the Kuangman Gate when the Kuangmenen Incident occurred. I shall now say a few words about circumstances at the time, chiefly about the Lukouchiao Incident.

a. Japan's attitude towards China

Japan's attitude towards China was to realize a close relationship with China. And it was often admonished by the commander of the Japanese Garrison troops in China or other commanding officers that the Japanese army should never cause a disturbance with China, but should try to realize a close relationship,
especially with the Chinese army, regarding it as a friendly army. It was for the purpose of serving as a wedge between these two armies that I became an advisor to the Chinese army.

b. My Official Duty

My only duty was to assist the instruction and training of the Chinese 29th army while being a conciliator for the two armies. I believed that it was most important to understand each other well in order to bring about a close relationship between the two armies, so I tried my best to inform the Chinese Army as to conditions in Japan and to bring about mutual inspection of as well as the exchange of courtesies between the two armies.

Since I had been a professor of the Chinese Military College in Peiping from 1929 to 1931, I was well acquainted with the state of affairs in China, and the commander of the 37th division, Yang Chih-an, the vice-commanders, Chang Ling-yun, a brigade commander, Liu Tsu-ch'en and another brigade commander, Hsie were my students. These facts helped my work go smoothly.

In carrying out my business, it had been decided that Colonel M. TSUI, Takuro, the head of a special service agency in Peiping should take the measures.

c. The Chinese Army's attitude Towards Japan at the Time

The attitude of the upper part of the Chinese army was amicable and friendly. Especially Sung Che-yuen, the commander of the army was very glad to have me as an adviser and instructed me to try my best to bring about a close relationship between Japan and China, emphasizing
its necessity. But the lower officers and soldiers of the Chinese Army were not all friendly towards Japan. There were quite a few of them who were anti-Japanese. I tried under difficulties to enlighten these soldiers. Especially after the outbreak of Hsian Accident, their attitude seemed to grow worse. There were Communists even in the army, who, in touch with other communists instigated the anti-Japanese idea in the army.

d. The day of the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident

I was in the official residence in Peipin on the night of the 7th of July, 1937. At eleven P.M. I got a telephone from the Peipin special service agency saying, "Trouble between Japanese and Chinese armies has just broken out. Come quickly". I went to the special service agency at once and was informed about the conditions. Then I went to Chin To-Chun, the vice-commander of the 29th Army to determine the actual situation by the order of the head of the agency. While I was there it was decided to dispatch a committee from both the Japanese and Chinese sides for mediation and I, being appointed a member of the committee, started in advance with Chou Yung-ch a major general of the Chinese Army, by car to the Japanese Army to the scene, the north side of Mount ICHIKI. There was a battalion commander ICHIKI. He was a about to
take the unit to its post, having received an order from the regimental commander, MUTAUCHI, that he might return the fire because of the repeated illegal firing of the Chinese Army.

I asked the battalion commander to give up the attack against the Yuanping castle for the sake of the people inside. He approved of what I said and seemed to have decided to attack only Lungwangmiao which was the actual point of their firing. Then I went into the Yuanping castle at once and met Mr. Chin, a Chinese battalion commander and asked why they had opened fire on the Japanese army from Lungwangmiao. The battalion commander answered that since there were no soldiers of his command in Lungwangmiao, they might have been bandits or vagabonds, if there had been any firing. So I reported this to the regimental commander ICHIKI through my secretary SAITO, Hisshu.

Nevertheless we heard loud gun reports about 5:40 A. M. from the direction of Lungwangmiao. Then the battalion commander Chin confessed that he had his men at Lungwangmiao, canceling his previous words. He had deceived me.

I inspected the situation from the castle-well with the battalion commander Chin, displaying a white flag. By this time the attack against Lungwangmiao by the Japanese army had begun. The battalion commander ICHIKI kept his promise and did not attack the Yuanping castle.

As the Chinese army on the west bank of the Yungting River opened fire when the Japanese army reached
Lungwangmiao, I ventured to go to the left bank of Yungting River and stopped their firing.

Then I returned to the Yuanping castle and met Mr. Chi, a Chinese regimental commander. We consulted regarding how to prevent the further spread of the incident and we decided to report to our superiors. I had Captain TERAKIRA on the staff of the Peipin special service agency return to Peipin to report this to Colonel MATSUI.

A truce agreement was concluded on the 9th of July. I went to Lungwangmiao with a member of the Chinese staff, CHOU. There were many dead bodies of the Chinese army, bullets and cartridges dispersed in all directions. Seeing this I was convinced that the Chinese army had been occupying Lungwangmiao.

There I talked with a Japanese Captain and non-commissioned officers who had encountered the incident on the night of the 7th of July and was informed about the circumstances of the night when they were attacked all of a sudden by the Chinese army.

c. Circumstances After the Incident

After this there were gun reports at night, when I was staying inside the Yuanping castle with Chinese security units and was watching operations. After inquiries I often found that the Japanese army did no firing but the Chinese army did, saying the Japanese had shot at them.

One night, there was a violent bombardment from the Chinese army prompted by the shooting of firecrackers in a village were there were no garrison
troops between both armies. I thought it to be a very serious incident as it seemed to me to be a stratagem of somebody who was between the armies without belonging to either one.

After this many illegal actions were committed by the Chinese army.

I myself was often shot at by Chinese sentries.

Among many illegal actions I know personally particularly of an incident in which a Japanese soldier (or soldiers) was shot at the outside of the Yungting gate and another of a Japanese cavalryman (or cavalrymen) being shot at Tuanchia, south of Nanyuan. I myself went to claim the bodies.

In those days the Chinese side instigated the anti-Japanese idea very actively through newspapers and radio and the communist party in Peiping as well as students from North-eastern China become conspicuous by their anti-Japanese speeches and actions.

f. The Kwanganmen Accident

Although there were three thousand residents inside the Peiping castle, there were only fifty of them left after the Japanese army had been to the Fengtai districts. It was decided then to move a battalion back inside from Fengtai, for it was very dangerous to have only fifty people there if worse came to worse.

In order to avoid misunderstandings we asked the Chinese authorities consent beforehand. But I went to the Kwangan gate and waited on the castle wall for the Japanese army with a Chinese Colonel Chang Tsu-to.
in case an incident occurred.

About 7 P. M. the Japanese army were approaching the castle gate in vehicles. When the first few vehicles had passed the first gate and approached the second, the Chinese army on the castle wall suddenly attacked the Japanese army, opening fire and throwing grenades. About half of the Japanese troops passed at high speed through the second gate, under fire.

The shooting was stopped after great difficulty as Chinese company commander Wang and I amazed at this sudden accident, desperately tried to stop it.

Then I advised sending Colonel Chang Tsu-to who had been with us to Mr. Sung Che-yuan to report on the circumstances. He hurried to Mr. Sung at once.

Then while I was still on the scene with my interpreter trying to mediate the interpreter was shot dead and I was shot in the left thigh with a pistol by a Chinese soldier. I was taken unaware and immediately jumped down from the wall. The wall was ten metres high but fortunately, I received only a fracture of the right leg. If I had remained on the wall I would have been killed.

As I was resting in a private house, Chu, a member of the Staff was sent for me. I was taken in his car to the special service agency and after making a detailed report was removed to the military hospital.

I wrote a report about this incident and presented it to MATSUI head of the special service agency on the 26th of July. Since this report is in my possession, I am presenting it together with affidavit for information.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SAKURAI, Tokutaro (Seal)

On this 27th day of January 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT SAKURAI, Tokutaro (Seal)

I, SAKURAI, Tokutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (Signed) IKEDA, Sutai (Seal)
REPORT ON THE K'ANGAMEN INCIDENT (26 July 1937(12 Showa)

By SAKURAI, Tokutaro, Infantry Major attached to the Tientsin Army Headquarters.

1. Situation Before the Affair

On the morning of 27 July upon receipt of the telegram to the effect that the 2d Battalion (minus one company), of the 2d Regiment Infantry was to enter Peiping from Fengtien to protect the Japanese residents in the city, Adviser NAKAJIMA, with Interpreter SAITO set forth with the Battalion on a liaison mission. The telegram stated that the Battalion would enter from Kwanganmen about 4 P. M. As it seemed wise to avoid giving the Chinese enough time to excite their suspicion by informing them of the entry too early consequently making the entry impossible, we telephoned to Chang Wu-chiin, Secretary to Chin Te-chun to come to the Special Service Agency by 3:30 P. M., but he did not come. At that time Chief of Special Service Agency KATSUMI had gone to hand over the ultimatum concerning the Lungfeng Incident of the previous day to Sung Cho-yuan in Chin-teh she. I, Adviser SAKURAI, went to the Kwangan Gate in his place with KATSUMI, Yoshio, 1st Class Civilian employee and some military policemen at 3:50 P. M.

At that time Interpreter SAITO was there for purposes of liaison. He negotiated with WANG, 37th Regimental Commander with whom he was acquainted,
telephoned to the Chinese Military Government Headquarters and to Brigade Commander Liu Tsu-chen, and it was arranged to open the gate. Therefore we were about to order SAITO to contact (the commanding Battalion) regarding this situation when a tall man in white two-piece Chinese suit after speaking with Mayor Chih over the telephone, called up the Company Commander again and had him to close the gate and prepare for fighting on the wall saying that was the order of Mayor Chih. At this situation, we ordered SAITO to make contact with the Battalion coming from Fengtai, while I went to the Chinese Military Government Headquarters. I found that both Brigade Commander Liu and Chief of Staff Hsu had gone to Chin-teh Shu and were absent, but I came back to the Agency and tried to institute about the opening of the gate. About 5:30 P.M. there was a telephone from Hopei-Chohar concerning the opening of the gate, and they informed us that Secretary Hung Che-yuen, Chang Tsu-tao and a member of Diplomatic Committee Lin Kung-ye would be the witnesses of the Japanese army's passing of the gate. Therefore I went to the Kwangan Gate again with KAMIODA, 1st Class Civilian employee and YONEZAWA, a member of the Special Service Agency.

2. The Incident

The situation until immediately after the vanguard of the troops had passed the gate.

I had an interview with Brigade Commander Hwang at the Kwangan Gate Police Detachment and got the information that the order concerning the opening of the gate was issued already from Hopei-Chohar. I went
up on the wall accompanying Brigade Commander Wang, made the Chinese soldiers thoroughly understand that they were absolutely forbidden to fire at the Japanese Army making the entry and made them lay aside and cover up their guns and take a rest. Then I made a Chinese policeman outside the Gate keep contact with Adviser NAKAJIMA (he was situated at a coaling station by the railway crossing 200 metres west of the Gate).

After a while contact was made by Interpreter 3AIT0 who got out of an automobile and went outside the Gate. At this time, Secretary Chang came. After I had Brigade Commander Wang explain the situation to the Chinese soldiers again so that they should be no misunderstanding, I had them open up the gate halfway.

At that time, YOSHITOMI was under the Gate, 3AITO outside the Gate by the bridge; KAWAMURA, Cheng and I at the north side of the two-storied gate on the Wall Gate. At some minutes past 6 P.M., the Japanese Motor Transport Troops proceeded with Adviser NAKAJIMA's car at the head. As they were just about to enter through the gate, suddenly a few guns were fired 50 meters south of the Gate. Following this example, the Chinese soldiers on the Wall began to fire without permission. Therefore I, with KAWAMURA, immediately gave a strict command to the light machine guns at the north side of the two-storied Gate to cease fire and also ordered the light machine guns which were sweeping the road cease fire and accompanying Brigade Commander Wang went to stop the firing of the Chinese soldiers at the east side of the two storied gate on the Wall. At this time,
about ten of the Japanese trucks had passed the gate already but the Chinese soldiers on the east two-storied gate continued firing and throwing hand grenades. I witnessed the main body of the Japanese Motor Transportation Troops stop and begin to get off the trucks. As the result of making every effort and giving a strict command to stop firing, we were able to stop firing on the wall. I immediately I had Chang go to make contact with Sung Che-yuan. KAWAMURA and I, holding Brigade Commander Wang, gave a strict order to the Chinese, "Secretary Chang is keeping contact with Sun. You are absolutely forbidden to fire from now".

2. The situation from the beginning of the attack by the Japanese within and without the Gate until I made escape

Until 7 A.M. some of the Chinese fired but somehow we managed to make them stop. When the Japanese within and without the Gate began their activities at some minutes past 7 P.M., the Chinese began to fire from the wall at the Japanese on both sides. Meanwhile, some Chinese infuriated by a few casualties inflicted on the Chinese situated by the north side of the eastern two-storied gate, got close to me and KAWAMURA crying "Kill the Japanese". I, holding Brigade Commander Wang, tried to control the Chinese but in vain. First of all the Chinese of 132d Division fired from a distance of 10 metres. Then light machine guns at the north side of the west two-storied gate began to fire. Adviser KAWAMURA seemed to have been hit by several bullets trying to prevent them from firing, and from the same
direction several Chinese rushed forward towards us with Chinese halberds and pistols. At his time, also from the direction of the eastern two-storied gate, ten or more Chinese came forward and one bullet hit my left leg. Now that there was no use to fight, I grappled with Brigade Commander Wang, and knocking him down I jumped down to the yard between the walls (the north part of the place between the eastern and western two-storied gates), struck my right leg on the concrete roof, falling down from the roof and lighting on the earth on my right shoulder.

As I was being fired upon and the Chinese on the Wall were throwing hand grenades at this time, I entered the yard seeking dead angle. About this time the firing on the Wall was very intense, and I presumed the Japanese army to be attacking from within and without the Gate. In the yard between the Gate Walls there was not a single Chinese soldier and though I was sure that they would not come to search for me during the fighting, I prepared some sticks and bricks by way of precaution. Intermittently firing was heard, but at sunset it became calm for a little while. During the night sometimes firing was heard.

I could not tell whether it was the Japanese attacking from within and without the Gate or the nervous Chinese firing wildly at random.

I took a rest for several hours leaving my fate to Heaven, then helped by a Chinese policeman who knew me and came to search for me calling my name I went to the Kuangmu Gate Branch of Police, met with Staff
Officer Chou who came there to search for me. Then I came back to the Special Service Agency and entered the Army Hospital.

3. The Numerical Strength of the Chinese Army in the Incident

In this incident, the strength of the enemy which was at the Kwangan Gate was 60 soldiers commanded by the 37th Brigade Commander Wang and another 60 soldiers of the 132d Division which were dispatched to take the place of the former. The former were situated west of the western two-storied gate and the latter on the eastern two-storied gate and on the Wall.

This report is to Colonel MATSUI

I certify that this report was written by me.

January 27, 1947

S. KURAI, Takutaro (Seal)
お立の説明は、以下のようなです。

【説明文】

日本の伝統文化の中で、茶道（ちゃどう）は重要な地位を占めています。茶道は、茶の淹れ方、茶の具の選択、茶の室の装飾、音楽、詩歌、書写など、さまざまな要素が組み合わせられた運命的な活動です。茶道は、心の平穏を追求するものであり、参加者に様々な感動を提供します。茶道の時間は、忙しい現代社会において、心を静める場として役立つでしょう。
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

FUMI, SADAO, et al

AFFIDAVIT

I, T. U. C. I., TANAKA hereby make the following statement, taking an oath as one the serve to shoot in accordance with the formality common in our country.

1. In the year 1922, I graduated from the Naval Academy and was serving in the Imperial Navy as an officer. In 1937, I was a lieutenant-Correspondent and the first director of the Naval Radio Receiving Office, located at Amada, Saitama.

In this office, all foreign radio communications were intercepted.

2. It was a little after 1:00 p.m., on Saturday, July 13, 1937, that an urgent code telegram was matched by a U.S. naval officer in Tokyo. The code was "UHY" to the Headquarter of U.S. Naval Operations. The code address "UHY" was intercepted. As it was in a simple cipher, it could easily be decoded. The gist was as follows:

- 1 -
"According to the information received from a certain reliable source, the junior group of the 29th Army under the command of Sung Che-Yuan is not satisfied with the agreement concluded on the spot and at 7.00 p.m. (?) they will start their attack against the Japanese forces."

3. I considered this telegram very important and at once telephoned to the Naval General Staff, but as the time happened to be a Saturday afternoon and there was nobody remaining there, I called up Commander M.N.M., the adjutant of the Navy Ministry and duly made this report.

4. I heard later that the navy at once transmitted the report to the adjutant of the war ministry, but, at first, the army did not believe it as it happened immediately after the agreement, was made on the spot on that very day. However, it was a fact that from the evening of the 10th as per the American telegram, China began to attack breaking the agreement of that day and the incident became uncontrollable.

In the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,

this 23rd day of December, 1946

Witness, "GUL, Tsunazo.

- 2 -
Translation Certificate

I, M. Kanzaki, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of the affidavit of M.G. Kozo is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

M. Kanzaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date: April 9th, 1947
Def Dsc No. 1999

IMPE

SWORN EXPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: Mr. S. T. Tariji

Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.
1. I was formerly a lieutenant-general in the Japanese Army and am now being confined at Sugamo prison.

2. I was at Tientsin as a senior staff-officer of the Japanese Garrison Army in China from August of 1936 to the end of July 1937. I was in charge of Intelligence.

3. Therefore, personally experiencing and understanding the state of affairs in North China before and at the time of the Lukouchiao Incident which occurred on July 7, 1937, I should like to state the following facts for reference.

4. First, I will give a few facts for information on the situation in North China prior to the incident. Around August of 1936 when I arrived at Tientsin to take my new post, there were many unemployed soldiers of the Northeast Army (Chang Hsueh-liang's Army) infiltrating into North China. Ma Chan-shan was also in Tientsin. One day I met him at the home of Fan-fu at the English Concession. The fact that many of these unemployed soldiers had joined the Kintung Government Army was also related in the talk by GORO, Araki who was formerly the advisor of Chang Hsueh-liang in Fei-ping. "In order to attack the Communist Army in Northwest China, Chang Hsueh-liang himself and the Northeast Army were dispatched but these officers and men of the Northeast Army communicated with the Communist Army saying that their enemy was Japan and since Japan was also the enemy of the Communist Army, they should not fight each other. For that reason, the subjugation of the Communist Army did not progress. Therefore, in order to encourage the punitive forces, Chang-Kai-shek himself went to Siam Incident occurred", stated Ma Chan-shan to Haia Ienyun, my secretary.
Also, these facts stated above were confirmed by other intelligence reports which I gathered.

5. In the spring of 1937 I met Han Fu-chu at Tsinan. He told me that he received an unofficial notification from the central authority that war would break out between Japan and China in the autumn of that year, and that at that time he had to go to Tsientsin. However, he stated that if he should go to Tientsin, the base of Shantung would be captured during his absence. So, for the reason that the Japanese Army might also land at Tsing-tao, we should advance to Meihsien.

6. From about the spring of 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) the attitude of Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of the Kicha Political Committee became more and more inclined to be anti-Japanese. There was an instance when I tried to have an interview with him at the Military Officers Club at Tientsin, but he replied that he could not meet me there because that building had been contributed by Yan Ju-keng (who was pro-Japanese). Communist troops began even gradually to join the third division of the 29th Army under Sung Che-yuen’s command. Meanwhile, on the side of Japan, Vice-chief of the General Staff, Nishio, Toshizo, summoned Colonel Kusumoto of Shanghai, Major Obashi of the Kwantung Army and myself of the Japanese Army stationed in North China and instructed us to assume a passive attitude lest we should cause a disturbance in China. The Chief of Military Operations of the General Staff Headquarters at that time was Major General Ishihara, Kanji.

I also informed him fully about our cautious attitude in North China.
7. After I returned to my post in Tientsin, I guided the attitude of the Japanese Army stationed in North China according to the purport of the instructions which I received at Tokyo. Shortly after, Lieutenant Colonel CIAJJO, Miyofuku came to Tientsin from the Headquarters of the General Staff and, upon his return after inspecting the state of affairs of the Japanese garrison in China, he expressed relief that there were absolutely no signs to indicate that our side was ready to cause any disturbances.

3. The Lukouchiao Incident, as is well known, occurred on 7 July 1937, but at that time Lieutenant General TASIIRO of the Japanese Army in China had been in bed suffering from heart-asthma since several months before and he was absolutely unable to command his army. He was so seriously ill that he died on the 9th of that month. For the purpose of inspection, the main force of the 2nd Infantry Regiment stationed at Tientsin was dispatched to Shanhaikwan. A greater part of the battalion stationed at Peiping was also at Shanhaikwan. Major General KAMABISHO, the Commander of the Infantry Brigade at Peiping, together with his subordinates had left Peiping on his way to Shanhaikwan on official business. The amount of arms, ammunition and military supplies in storage at Tientsin which was the Japanese Garrison Base was exceedingly low.

9. I received a report of the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident at midnight on 7 July. I was ordered to proceed to the spot by HATUIJRO, Gun, Chief Staff Officer, and on the following day I went to Tung-chow by airplane, and from Tung-chow I entered Pei-ping by car. At Pei-ping I participated in the settlement of the incident at the spot where it occurred with Colonel MATSUI, Takuro. This negotiation was settled the following day on the 9th. As to the settlement of the incident at that spot, the conditions were like conditions of infringement; that is, the incident was settled in the morning on the condition that China withdrew her troops to the Lukouchiao Castle and the grounds around the castle and punish the responsible persons.
10. Since the aforementioned agreement was achieved, I returned to Tientsi. to my post via Tung-chow, and at Tung-chow I met Yin Ju-king and TANAKI (Advisor of Ki-tung Government).

At this time Yin said that he was going to muster six battalions of his command at Tung-chow. These six battalions later caused the Tung-chow Incident which occurred on the 29th of this month.

11. After returning to my post at Tientsin, I went to Tokyo on official business by order from Tokyo, and I reported the situation at the scene of the incident to the General Staff Headquarters and the War Ministry.

At that time I reported to TANAKA, Shinichi, Chief of t Army Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, as follows:

"Under the Japanese North China Army Authorities, the policy of non-expansion and peaceful settlement is being driven home well. For example; due to the stimulus accorded to the Chinese, the railroad between Poi-ping and Tientsin is prohibited to transport of Japanese troops; the railroad between Fung-tai and Poi-ping is also not permitting Japanese troops in uniform to ride; all Japanese passing through the Yungting gate are tolerating interrogation by the Chinese Military Police; six thousand Japanese nationals within the Poi-ping Castle are being guarded by merely two or three platoons of our infantry because of the existing condition whereby Chinese machine-guns are trained on the Japanese houses within the Poi-ping Castle; we also refrained from transporting the wounded into the Poi-ping Castle for surgical operations and the corpses of those killed in action are being neglected. Moreover, in regards to the artillery bombardment by the Chinese, a condition exists whereby it would be possible to fight back immediately. But in spite of all these facts, I am complying fully with the orders of the Army Headquarters at Tientsin and submitting myself to complete humiliation and inconvenience. I am strictly prohibiting action which may act as a provocation to the spread of the incident."
11. After completing the aforementioned report, I returned to North China about noon on July 28. There I was informed by Major General Giga, the Chief of the Air Group, that the 29th Army had attacked our units at Fungtri the day before, on July 27. Today, the 28th, Tientsin was attacked by Chinese troops and consequently communication between the Tientsin air base and the Tientsin Occupation Army was temporarily severed. Then I was able to return to our original headquarters on the 29th of the same month.

12. While I was on official business in Tokyo, Mr. Nakashima (Tetsuzo), the Chief of the General Affairs Department of the General Staff Headquarters, informedly ordered me to become the Regimental Commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment (Kochi) because the emergency in North China was almost settled. However, on August 1 there was a formal order issued and I took up my duties as the commander of the aforementioned regiment.

13. About August 10, 1937 I arrived at the place where the 44th Regiment had been stationed. Three days after my appointment, however, I received an urgent mobilization order and was sent to Shanghai. There I served in the field in the battle of Shanghai and after this, in March 1938, I returned to Japan. I was attached to General Staff Headquarters and given a special assignment in China. Consequently I went to Tokyo and, presenting myself at General Staff Headquarters, received my orders. My assignment was to have a talk with the Chiang Government to put an end to the Incident.
14. In June 1938, I went to Hong Kong. At the same time I tried to negotiate with the Chiang Government through Sir-Cheny in North China whom I knew. They seemed to be looking forward to the matter being settled before the fall of Hankow. At last we reached a single plan. It was as follows: The Manchurian problem to be talked to the future; termination to fighting in China; the personal elements of the Provisional Government in Peking and the Restoration Government in Hankow to be absorbed into the National Government; and that Chiang Kai-shek temporarily leave the scene, etc. That the Japanese would acquire Chinese territory or monopolize Chinese interests, etc., were not included.

15. I came back to Tokyo around the end of August 1938 and reported the above to Mr. Minister Itagaki and the Vice Chief of the General Staff Mr. I was given approval to negotiate with the above as the basis.

16. I went to Hong Kong during September of the same year and when I reported this to Sir he also agreed with me. I decided on Fu-Chow of Fuchien Province as the site for negotiations and was about to begin the negotiations when Hankow fell in October of the same year and was not able to realize it.

17. Even after this I continued negotiations actively through Sheng's son, Ching Li-luen, and other prominent men endeavoring to get relations between Japan and China back to its natural form. I know that there were many men besides me who exerted themselves in this effort also.
On this 3rd day of April, 1947

At I.M.T.F.I.

DEPOSITION  LACJI, Takeji

I, Kiyosu, Ichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

on the same date
at same place

Witness: (signed)  KIYOSU, Ichiro  (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and saying nothing.

LACJI, Takeji  (seal)
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DEF. DOC. #1144

NOTE ON THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF TIENSTIN

This document is the note of the Representatives of the five Powers France, Germany, Belgium, Italy addressed to Prince Ch'ing, Conjoint Plenipotentiary, under date of July 15, 1902, taken from the "Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919," compiled and edited by Mclnurray, edition of 1921, pp. 278 - 284.

In connection with the handing back to the Chinese authorities of the administration of Tientsin (as to which see For. Rel. of the U. S., 1902, pp. 184-201), the representatives of the five Powers maintaining the provisional government of the port (namely, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan) addressed to the Chinese Government, under date of July 15, 1902, identical notes of the following tenor:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Highness' note of the 5th instant, inclosing copy of a letter from his excellency the viceroy Yuen, urging reasons why the administration of the city of Tientsin should be handed back to his excellency at an early date."

"In reply I have the honor to state to Your Highness that, in accord with my colleagues representing powers that still have delegates on the council of the Tientsin provisional government, I am authorized by my Government to consent to the dissolution of that body, provided that the Chinese Government signifies its adherence to the following propositions:

- 1 -
By Article VIII of the final protocol of September 7, 1901, it was declared that the Chinese Government agreed to have the forts at Taku and others which might interfere with free communications between Peking and the sea, demolished; and it was added that arrangements had been made for this purpose.

The Chinese plenipotentiaries having expressed to the diplomatic body their desire to be relieved of the direct responsibility for carrying out this article, the representatives of the signatory powers intrusted the work to the Tientsin provisional government. It is not yet entirely completed. In order therefore, to insure the fulfillment of this article, I have the honor to propose to Your Highness that the work of demolition shall, from the moment of the dissolution of the Tientsin provisional government, be placed in the hands of the G.O.C.'s at Tientsin, the necessary funds being provided out of the moneys then remaining in the treasury of the Tientsin provisional government.

By Article IX of the same protocol it is provided that the powers shall have the right of occupying certain points between Peking and the sea, of which the whole town of Tientsin is one. Consequently, after the dissolution of the Tientsin provisional government, foreign troops will continue, as hitherto, to be stationed there, in the places actually occupied by them, their supplies of all sorts continuing, as at present, to be exempt from all taxes or dues whatsoever. They will have the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc., without informing the Chinese authorities.
except in the case of feux de guerre."

"It is desirable, however, to avoid as far as possible occasions of collision between the foreign troops and those of China. I propose, therefore, that with this object the Chinese Government shall undertake not to station or march any troops within 20 Chinese li (6 2/3 English miles) of the city or of the troops stationed at Tientsin; further, in correspondence exchanged between the foreign representatives and the Chinese plenipotentiaries, of whom Your Highness was one, previous to the signature of the protocol, it was agreed that the jurisdiction of the commanders of the posts to be established along the line of communications should extend to a distance of 2 miles on either side of the railway, and this arrangement ought to be maintained as long as the line of posts specified in Article I of the protocol continue to be occupied."

"I am willing, however, in concert with my colleagues, to consent that the viceroy should have the right of maintaining a personal bodyguard in the city of Tientsin not exceeding in number 300 men; and also that his excellency may maintain an efficient body of river police along the river, even where it runs within the 2-mile limit above mentioned."

"The demolition of the forts implies an obligation upon China not to reconstruct them, and the same obligation applies to the wells of Tientsin city, which, during the troubles of 1900, were made use of as a fortification directed against the security of the foreign settlements. We can not, however, consent that the Chinese Government establish maritime defenses at the mouth
of the "teihco at Chingmun" or at Shenheikumen."

"I propose that the accounts of revenue and expenditure of the Tientsin provisional government be audited by two competent persons, one to be chosen by the G.O.C.'s at Tientsin, the other by the viceroy, and the balance, after deduction of the sum required to complete the demolition of the forts, be handed over to the provincial treasury."

"Your Highness will no doubt think it right to agree that no Chinese subject who has been in the service of the Tientsin provisional government or of the foreign contingent shall be in any way molested on the ground of such service."

"Chinese subjects in the employ of the foreign forces on the lines of communication will be provided with certificates of identity. It appears to me necessary that the Chinese Government should admit that in case any such Chinese person commits an offence the commandant in whose service he is should have the right of punishing him or of handing him over to Chinese authorities as may, in his opinion, be best calculated to secure the ends of justice."

"The right of foreign troops to occupy summer quarters when necessary ought, in my opinion, to be recognized."

"A list of unexpired punishments imposed by the Tientsin provisional government will be furnished when the body is dissolved to the provincial government, which ought to undertake to carry them out. No action either criminal or civil, adjudicated by the provisional government can ever be
of the Tientsin provisional government be audited by two competent persons, one to be chosen by the O.O.C's of Tientsin, the other by the viceroy, and the balance, after deduction of the sum required to complete the demolition of the forts, be handed over to the provincial treasury.

"Your Highness will no doubt think it right to agree that no Chinese subject who has been in the service of the Tientsin provisional government or of the foreign contingent shall be in any way molested on the ground of such service."

"Chinese subjects in the employ of the foreign forces on the lines of communication will be provided with certificates of identity. It appears to me necessary that the Chinese Government should admit that in case any such Chinese person commits an offense the commander in whose service he is should have the right of punishing him or of handing him over to Chinese authorities as may, in his opinion, be best calculated to secure the ends of justice."

"The right of foreign troops to occupy summer quarters when necessary ought, in my opinion, to be re-examined."

"A list of unexpired punishments imposed by the Tientsin provisional government will be furnished when the body is dissolved to the provincial government, which ought to undertake to carry them out. No action either criminal or civil, adjudicated by the provisional government can ever be
"The archives of the Tientsin provisional government I consider should be intrusted to the senior consul, and application can be made to him by any person entitled to consult them."

"As regards taxation, I consider that the inhabitants of the city and district should be regarded as having discharged their duty to the Chinese Government during the period of the continuance of the administration of the Tientsin provisional government and that no arrears ought to be demanded of them under this heading."

"Such are the proposals which I consider is my duty to place before Your Highness for the acceptance of the Chinese Government, and I have the honor to declare that I am ready to consent to the dissolution of the Tientsin provisional government four weeks after I receive from Your Highness an intimation that they are accepted. I have only further to request that Your Highness will be so good as to designate the official to whom formal delivery of the city and district can be made by the council of the Tientsin provisional government."

"I have, etc."
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K.Y. SHI, Koro, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 5 pages and entitled "NOTE ON THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF TIENTSHIU" is an exact and true extract from "TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA, 1894-1919, HONGKONG, VOLUME I, KACHIN PERIOD (1894-1911)" which is in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 10th day of April, 1947.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. URABA
Note of Acceptance of the Terms of the Dissolution of the Provisional Government of Tientsin.

This document is the Note of Prince Ch'in, Chinese Ambassador, under date of July 13, 1902, informing the United States Minister in China of the acceptance of the terms of the dissolution of the Provisional Government of Tientsin by the Chinese Government, taken from the "Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1854-1902," compiled and edited by Emmons, edition of 1901, pp. 310-313.

The understanding upon which the terms of this note (the note on the dissolution of the Provisional Government of Tientsin) were accepted by the Chinese Government was communicated to the American Minister in a note from Prince Ch'in under date of July 13, 1902, of which the substance is (in translation) as follows:

"On the 10th of the sixth month twenty-eight year of Kung-hsu (July 14, 1902), I received a dispatch from certain ministers of the treaty powers, stating that in regard to the transfer of the city of Tientsin and the country adjacent to the jurisdiction of the viceroy of Chihli, these foreign ministers had agreed (of the same opinion). They also had had the honor of receiving the sanction of their respective governments for the abrogation of the provisional government, provided only that the Chinese Government should, first of all, distinctly consent to the conditions proposed, when they, on their part, would promise that in four weeks from the day on which consent was given, the provisional government of Tientsin should be abrogated. They, therefore, request that it be clearly pointed out to them, when
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the time arrives, and into whose hands the provisional government should transfer Tientsin city and the country adjacent.

"I have carefully reviewed the dispatch with regard to the point that military posts should be established along the highway or line of communication from Peking to the sea, with powers to control and punish, the distance to extend as far as two English miles on each side of the railroad.

"I would remark that according to the decree, His Excellency Colong's dispatch of the sixth month, twenty-seven years of Kuang-hi (July, 1901), military control would only refer to offenses against the railroad, the telegraph lines, or against the allied armies and their property.

"As to the remaining articles I have no objection to take.

"On the 13th of the current month (July 17) I memorialized the Throne on the subject and had the honor of receiving the sanction of the Throne by imperial decree.

"Thereupon, I at once sent notices to the ministers of the treaty powers, in order that they might transmit the same to the provisional government of Tientsin, that the provisional government be abolished within four weeks, and the city of Tientsin and its adjacent country be returned to Chinese administration and handed over to the superintendents of the northern ports, who, at the head of the local officials, civil and military, will be there to receive it.

"Henceforward, whenever there is need for consultation, the
foreign civil and military authorities can, from time to time, consult with His Excellency the Superintendent of Northern Ponds, which, I hope, will be for the good of the place."

(For. Re. of the U.S., 1904, p. 201)
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. Yashi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "NOTE OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF TIENTSIN" is an exact and true excerpt from "TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH JAPAN CONCERNING CHINA, 1904-1919, M. CHURRY, VOLUME I, KINCHU PERIOD (1904-1911)" which is in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 10th day of April, 1947.

(Signed) K. Yashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabo
Resolutions adopted by the Diplomatic Body at Peking regarding Military Occupation of the Railway from Peking to Shanhaikuan.


During the revolution of 1911-12, the representatives of the Powers found it advisable to exercise the right of military control over the Peking-Shanhaikuan Railway from the capital to Shanhaikuan, and American, British, French, German, Italian and Japanese troops accordingly occupied allotted sections of the railway, between the points specified, in accordance with the following resolutions adopted by the Diplomatic Body at Peking and embodied in its circular No. 13a of January 26, 1912:

RESOLUTIONS OF DIPLOMATIC BODY REGARDING MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE RAILWAY FROM PEKING TO SHANHAIKUAN. -- January 26, 1912.

"1. That troops should be placed at important stations, bridges, etc., along the line of the railway.

"2. Both Chinese Imperial and Revolutionist troops are at liberty to utilize the railway line and adjoining piers and wharves for the purposes of transportation.
landing or embarkation and will not be interfered with.

"3. Both parties will be notified to avoid any interference with the railway and to refrain from damaging it in any way. The Board of the Imperial Railway of North China will be requested to maintain at both Shanhaikuan and Tientsin a repair train loaded with suitable materials for repairing damages.

"4. Any attempts to permanently damage important parts of the line, such as stations, depots, machinery, bridges, etc., will be resisted by the combined forces of the six Powers cooperating in the defense of the railway.

"5. The Board of the Imperial Railway of North China will be requested to always keep ready at Shanhaikuan and Tientsin sufficient rolling stock to transport 250 infantry in order that reinforcements can rapidly be dispatched.

"6. The telegraph offices are to be protected and telegraphic communication maintained. Chinese troops of either side may make use of the line.

"7. Officers commanding posts and patrols should be informed of the conditions laid down in Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 6 and told to do their best, with the forces at their disposal, to carry them out."
Certificate

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:

Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and as such official, I have custody of the original book from which the document hereto attached has been extracted, consisting of 2 pages, in the English language, dated January 26, 1912, and described as follows:

Resolutions adopted by the Diplomatic Body at Peking regarding Military Occupation of the Railway from Peking to Shunhaihuan.

I further certify that the attached document is a true and exact copy of the pertinent part of the original book, which is part of the official archives of the following Ministry:

Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 12th day of February, 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi

Chief, Archives Section

Witness /S/ K. Urabo
Declaration of the President of China Relating to Respecting of Treaties, Agreements and Vested Rights

October 10th, 1913.

I, as President, hereby declare that all the treaties, agreements and commitments that have been made between the former government of the Empire of China as well as the Provisional Government of the Republic of China and respective foreign governments shall be infallibly observed, and the legitimate contracts concluded by the former government with foreign companies or foreign nationals shall also be duly observed; moreover, the rights, privileges and immunities which have already been acquired by foreign nationals in China according to international Agreements, national law, and various established customs and precedents shall sincerely be recognized, thereby to keep friendship and to maintain peace.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Declaration of the President of China relating to Respecting treaties, agreements and vested rights is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (For... Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 18th day of March, 1947

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /s/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)

Translation Certificate.

I, Charles D. Sholdt, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sholdt.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 29 March 1947.
日本語に依ツテ寄カレ一真ヨリ成立条約及既得権連合国間スル

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日本大皇帝ノ宣言ト願スル旨願ハ日本政府（外務省）ノ保管ニ係ル公文
My name is HASHIMOTO, Gun. I served as Chief Staff officer of the China Garrison Army from August 1936 to the end of August 1937. During that period the China Incident broke out. I am going to discuss the circumstances of those days.

1. Concerning the force and disposition of the China Garrison Army. There were the following units: 1 Infantry Brigade (2 Regiments), 1 cavalry company, one artillery regiment (two battalions), one engineering company, 1 communication unit, military police, hospitals and the Special Service Organ (PEPIN, CHANG-CHI-KOU, TAIYU-N, CHI-N, TUNG-CHOU.) The headquarters of the Army was in TIENSTIN. The headquarters of the Infantry Brigade was in Pepin. The headquarters of the 1st Infantry Regiment was in PEPIN, and the battalions were stationed in PEPIN, FENOTAI and TIENSTIN. Another small unit was in TUNG-CHOU. As for the 2nd Infantry Regiment, its Headquarters and two battalions were stationed in TIENSTIN. (One battalion was in SHANHAIKWAN, and some units were in TANGKU, TANG-SHAN and CHIMHU-NOTAO,
The headquarters of the military police was in TIENTSIN and some of its force were stationed in various other districts. Besides an officer attached to the Japanese Embassy was residing in PEKING. He was under the direct command of General Staff Office and was also subject to the command of the commander of the Army.

The advisers on military affairs had been dispatched to the 29th Chinese Army. The total force was about 7,000.

2. Concerning the Duties of the China Garrison Army

The China Garrison Army was charged with the same duties as those of the garrison armies of the other countries, these duties being based on the Protocol of the Boxer Incident of 1900. That is to say, it was charged with the security of communication lines from diplomatic establishments and PEKING to ports and harbors and with the protection of the Japanese residents.

3. Concerning the names of the Commander and Chief officers of the China Garrison Army at the time of the outbreak of the Incident.

The commander was originally Lt. General TASHIRO, Kenichiro but he fell critically ill several days prior to the outbreak of the LUKUCHEH Incident and died on the 9th. Lt. General KOZUKI, Seishi was appointed his successor. The commander of the Infantry brigade was Major General KAKABE, Shozo; the commander of the
Concerning the disposition of the Chinese Army in North China before the outbreak of the Incident

The 29th Army under the command of SUNG WEN-LIN was disposed in TIENTSIN, PEKIN, CHUNGCHIAKOW, FAOTING and TAMING districts (one division was stationed in army each of the above mentioned district). The/under the command of YEN HSI-HAN was in SHANCHI province, and the army under the command of HAN FU-ChU was in SHANTUNG Province. The Peace Preservation unit under the command of YINJU-KENG was in KIHTUNG District. The Central army was not stationed in North China. As I remember, exclusive of SHANHSI Province, the Chinese Army in North China numbered about 300,000.

Concerning the nature of KIHTUNG Anti-Communist Autonomy and the KIHTSA Political Affairs Committee

The KIHTUNG Anti-Communism Autonomy with YINJU-KENG as its chief, was evidently separated from the Nanking government and stood for an independent regime. The outstanding political object of this regime was the prevention of Communism. The KIHTSA Political Affairs Committee, with SUNG WEN-LIN as its chief, was the local self-governing body recognized by the Nanking government. Its fundamental principles had been carried out either by the instructions or through
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1st Infantry Regiment, Colonel MUTAGUCHI, Ryuse; the
Commander of the 2d Regiment, Colonel SUGASHIMA, Ko;
the Commander of the Artillery Regiment, Colonel
SUZUKI, Sotsudo; the Director of the PEPIN Special
Service Organ Major General KATSUI, Takao;
and the officer attached to the Embassy, Major
IMAI, Takeo.

4. Concerning the disposition of the Chinese Army in
North China before the outbreak of the Incident.

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was the local self-governing body recognized by the
Nanking government. Its fundamental principles had
been carried out either by the instructions or through
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the counsel of the Nanking government.

6. Concerning the attitude taken toward China by the China Garrison Army which was instructed by military authorities in TOKYO.

The China Garrison Army strove tirelessly for the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation with Manchukuo and at the same time worked for the elimination of the threat of Communism, instead of presenting a political or military threat to China.

When I took up the post of Chief of Staff Officer of the China Garrison Army, I went to the Military authorities in TOKYO to report my appointment. In the General Staff Office, as well as in the War Ministry, I was told to strive for the promotion of friendly relations with China.

7. Concerning the plan of operation against China and preparations on the part of the Chinese Garrison Army before the outbreak of the Incident with regard to any operation against the Chinese Army.

The military authorities in TOKYO gave no instructions whatsoever to the China Garrison Army.

As we did not consider waging war with China at all, we did not work out a plan of operation against the Chinese Army. However, for the purpose of satisfactorily discharging the duties of the Garrison Army in case of emergency, that is, to protect diplomatic establishments and Japanese residents and to secure communication lines, various units worked out a garrison plan. This was, so to speak, a plan of passive defense. Now I shall emphasize the fact that the China Garrison Army made no preparation for
operations against the Chinese Army.

(a) As stated above the China Garrison Army had no plans for operations against the Chinese Army, but the outbreak of the WUKOUCHIAO Incident did not warrant optimism. Such being the case, it was not until 16, July that the China Garrison Army worked out such plans for operations as to enable the army to be equal to any emergency. This could not be said to be an over-all plan of operations against the Chinese Army. It was the plan of operations against only the 29th Army.
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(b) The China Garrison Army was no more than a simple garrison unit without the transport corps and automobiles essential for the task action of the army. Therefore, offensive warfare was impossible for this army.

(c) Such war supplies as arms, ammunition, provisions, etc., essential for operation were not provided in full for the army, nor did the army hold any stock other than a regular supply.

(d) The principal object of the education and training of the China Garrison Army in peace time was to form forces as well-equipped and powerful as those at home. We did not aim at the Chinese forces.

VIII. I will relate here the relationship between the China Garrison Army and the Kwantung Army.

As a result of the conclusion of the Tangku Truce Pact between the Kwantung Army and the Chinese Army, the Kwantung Army had been taking a responsible part in North China problems. However, in April, 1936, in accordance with the order of the central authorities, affairs concerning the truce pact were transferred from the Kwantung Army to the China Garrison Army, together with several other matters. Thus, the duties of both armies were made quite clear. Since then both armies kept to their respective spheres of duty, hence no trouble whatever has occurred between these two armies.

IX. I will describe here feelings between the Japanese and the Chinese forces and also between these two nations.

As members of the Japanese army, we strove, in accordance with the national policy of friendship between Japan and China, to convince the Chinese army of our desire to strengthen the ties of amity with the Chinese army.
While the majority of the higher classes of the Chinese army well realized the necessity of Sino-Japanese cooperation and made efforts to achieve it, the lower officers and soldiers did not thoroughly understand the intentions of their seniors, and anti-Japanese speech and behavior has never ceased. In particular after the Suiyuan and the Hsien Incidents, the underground activity of the Communist Party grew more intense and, accordingly, there was no gain saying the fact that the Chinese army was greatly influenced by this agitation.

The feelings of the Japanese and the Chinese people at that time were, to our regret, not conducive to friendship, in spite of the indispensability of maintaining friendly relations between the nations.

Following is an enumeration of some substantial examples:

On September 18, 1936, when the Japanese and the Chinese forces were on the march at Fengtai and passed each other on the road, a clash was about to break out originating from blows assailed by a Chinese soldier on a draught horse of the Japanese army. However, this was settled quietly, thanks to an appropriate measure taken by the leading officers of both armies.

Also, military communications between Peipin and Tientsin were often broken. There were, in addition, cases of insults to the Japanese flag in some places.

For example of the pro-Japanese feelings on the part of higher ranking Chinese officers, even when trouble had broken out and there were many bloody incidents at the front, although their emotions were becoming more and more excited, relations between the higher ranking men of both armies were as friendly and calm as usual. Mr. Sung Che-yuan even attended alone and unguarded the funeral of army commander...
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TASHIRO held in the Japanese concession on the 16th of July. He cried bitterly before the spirit of the deed over losing such a close friend.

X. Concerning the conflict between the Japanese and Chinese armies at Lukouchiao.

The Lukouchiao accident was neither a planned strategical move nor a challenge on the part of the Japanese side. The following will prove this fact:

(a) The army commander, TASHIRO, had been ill in bed one month before the outbreak of the accident, had been growing worse day by day, and had finally died on July 9. If there had been any planned conspiracy on the Japanese side, it would have been better to change the army commander at once.

(b) Brigade Commander KIMIBE, the most responsible man, was not on the scene on the day of the accident, having gone to Shanhaikuen for an inspection.

(c) On the day of the incident the troops in Peipin had gone to Tung-chow for maneuvers and only one company of troops was left in Peipin. This was not enough to indicate that the incident had been planned.

(d) A battalion out of the infantry regiment in Tientsin was also dispatched to Shanhaikuen for maneuvers.

(e) Since the unit which was holding maneuvers at Lukouchiao had no live shells, and consequently could not return fire when shot at by the Chinese, they, therefore, retreated from the place to Lt. Ichimonji for refuge.

(f) The place where the company was holding maneuvers was strategically a very disadvantageous lowland surrounded by Yuanpieng and Lantiao, where the Chinese garrisons were located. Under such disadvantageous circumstances, it would have been very dangerous for the Japanese to initiate a disturbance.
The objective circumstances were very disadvantageous, rather dangerous, for the Japanese side as I have said above. It was impossible for the Japanese army to challenge the Chinese army under such conditions.

XI. Concerning the maneuvers and the location of maneuvers of the Japanese army.

The stationary troops in the North China of the countries had had their own maneuvering grounds under an agreement with the Chinese side in accordance with the protocol of the Boxer Uprising of 1900 (Meiji 33). Also, in accordance with an agreement with the Chinese, the Peiping troops had grounds in Tung-chow, and the Tung-tai troops had both a parade ground at the north side of the barracks and maneuver grounds on a plain, three kilometres west of the barracks. The stationary troops in Tientsin or other places also had maneuver grounds. This was the case not only of the Japanese army but also of the troops of other countries.

It is true, as Witness Chin Te-chun said, that the Japanese army carried out their maneuvers without any notice to the Chinese side. However, there was no obligation to give such notice. The protocol had given the troops of foreign countries the right to maneuver without notice. But in May of 1937, the Chinese side wanted to be informed about night maneuvers, since they excited people and caused social uneasiness. If notified, Chinese authorities could forecast maneuvers to the people and relieve anxiety. We agreed to this request and decided to give notice of night maneuvers beforehand. As for the night maneuvers of July 7, as I found out after the incident had ended by inquiring through the special service agency, that it was clear that the Chinese had been notified.
XII. Concerning the measures taken by the Japanese army after they had learned about the Lukouchiao accident.

The military authorities approved the first report from the front that a committee of Japanese and Chinese would investigate actual conditions.

On July 8, in the morning, they heard from the front that the "ICHIKI" battalion had attacked the Chinese army in Lungwangmiao. The authorities stopped action at the front at once and ordered the battalion to wait for the further instructions.

The military authorities held a staff conference and determined to settle the problem without allowing it to spread any more. They issued orders to their units in accordance with this decision, telegraphed the decision to central headquarters, and awaited orders. At the same time, they took steps to get Brigade Commander KUMIBE back to Peipin. When he passed Tientsin, I instructed him by telephone to put a stop to actions at the front according to the policy and to settle the trouble on the spot. In order to avoid misunderstandings of the policy of the military authorities, I also dispatched a staff there.

On July 8, at 6 P.M., the general staff, by telegram, ordered adherence to the non-spreading policy, and especially the avoidance of the use of force to prevent the spreading of the incident.

The military authorities made a plan for settling the problem at the actual place and delivered it to headquarters. Then I went to Peipin and showed the plan to the Chinese authorities, who agreed to it and signed it on the same date. The main points are as follows:
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(a) The representatives of the 29th Army will proclaim their responsibility for the incident, express their regret to the Japanese, and punish the responsible people.

(b) Since the Chinese army is too near to the Japanese army in Fengtien and incidents are apt to occur, there will henceforth be no troops in Mukdahan and Lungaang-miao, and a Peace Preservation Corps will maintain security.
As this incident was mainly led by the "Blue Shirts Society" and other communist or anti-Japanese associations, the Chinese authorities will consider a counter-plan to control them thoroughly. Thus, the treaty was signed and sealed, but the Chinese authorities did not soon carry out the treaty's promises.

Observing conditions, the headquarters instructed the Army as follows.

The following are the basic principles involved in settling the situation:

A) To request at least the following points to be performed on the 19th of July.
   (1) Sung Che-yuan shall express his regret formally.
   (2) Punishments of the responsible are to extend to the dismissal of Feng Yeh-an.
   (3) Troops in Papaoshan shall retreat from that point.
   (4) Sung Chu-yuan shall sign the conditions of the settlement presented on the 10th of July.

B) If the Chinese Army does not perform these requests of ours in the period allowed, our Army will stop negotiations on the spot, and the Japanese Army will punish the 29th Army. In order to do that, the Japanese authorities will mobilize troops at home at the end of the time limit and dispatch them to North China at once.

C) After the time limit, even if the Chinese side does yield and agree to perform our requests, the 29th Army is to retreat to the right bank of the River Yungting.

D) Since Japan wants to limit the situation to North China and settle the trouble on the scene, we request the Nanking Government to restore the Central Army to its former state, to stop the challenging actions against Japan, and not to interfere with settlement at the actual scene. Thence, we sent the above instructions to the Chinese authorities. Sung Che-yuan accepted them, came to Tientsin himself on July 18, expressed his regret to the Army Commander, and presented the provisions for the control of the Communist and other anti-Japanese associations mentioned in the above agreement.
Thus, the Chinese side, though they accepted our offer, failed just as before to try to carry out its terms. Especially they delayed the carrying out of the items of the agreement concerning the Chinese Army's evacuation. To the contrary, disgraceful affairs came out one after another in various places, and we did not find them at all since.

I shall speak about the disgraceful affairs during the confrontation of both sides.

On July 11: On Marco Polo Bridge the Chinese Army fired at us illegally and we had ten casualties (six of them killed).

On July 13: The Chinese Army fired unlawfully at Japanese Army Troops passing Nanyuan and Hotan, and we had ten casualties (five of them killed).

On July 16: The Japanese Army, while passing by the vicinity of Anping, was fired upon by the Chinese Army. Fortunately, there were no casualties.

On July 20: On WENZU-SHAN, the Chinese Army fired unlawfully at Japanese Army Troops and we had four casualties (one of them killed).

On July 25: The Chinese Army fired unlawfully at Japanese soldiers who were repairing the communication line at Langfeng. There were fifteen casualties on the Japanese side (four of them killed).

To prevent the occurrence of such an untoward incident, we had given them advance notice of the repair work and had begun to work. The attack was, therefore, malicious.

On July 26: The Kwangan-gate Incident occurred. In this case also, we gave them advance notice, and, with their consent, one of our battalions passed through the Kwangan-gate in order to return to the camp in the Castle of Peking for the purpose of protecting our residents. On the way, the Chinese Army shut the door of the walled city and attacked the Japanese soldiers who had already entered. This was a most malicious attack. We suffered seventeen casualties (two of them killed, and, in addition, two journalists killed).

Concerning the military action of mobilization and massing of the Japanese Army after the occurrence of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. In the morning, on July 3, our stationary Army in China decided not to allow the incident to spread and at the same time not to request for an increase in the Kwantung
Army, but to mass the main power of the Stationary army around Fengtai and Tanchou for the worst. This was arranged to prevent expansion of the incident. Nevertheless, on July 10, in the Central Headquarters of the Chinese Army, mobilization of the air force was ordered, and four divisions were commanded to gather at the north line of Honan province.

On July 12, it was ordered to mobilize the units in the province of Honan, Hopei, Anhwei and Kiangsu, and to mass them along the Lzongsai railway and Peiping-Hangkow railway.

On July 14, Canton air force and army were dispatched. Thus the Chinese showed a tendency toward advancing north; therefore, the position of our stationery army became dangerous. Headquarters in Tokyo, put the 20th Battalion of Korea, as well as the mixed brigade of the Kwangtung Army, a mechanized brigade, some air units and other auxiliary units under command of the Commander-in-chief of the Stationary Army in China. These units came to north China in succession after about the July 12. Then Central Headquarters massed the 20th Army in the district of Tangshan and Shankaikwan (after that one part advanced to Tientsin); units of Kwangtung Army, in the vicinity of Shuni, north of Peking; the main forces of the regular stationary army, in Fengtai; and a part of the same arm in Tunchow.

Afterwards negotiations with the Chinese were continued.

After the stationary army in China came to take decisive steps, other divisions in Japan proper were mobilized. Specifically on July 27, 3 divisions were ordered to mobilize. On the 29th, the mobilization was completed and they were transported to north Chin.
in succession. It was on August 15 that the first of these divisions arrived in north China.

15. Concerning the motives of our stationary army for deciding the systematic attack against Nanyuan and the actual beginning of hostilities.

After the malicious, disgraceful incidents at Langfang, Kwangan-gate, etc., had broken out in succession, more serious incidents might occur and dangerous consequence might fall upon us if the Japanese side remained patient any longer. In view of that possibility, we decided it proper to punish the Chinese in order to protect our right and to force the 29th army to reconsider its actions. We thus determined to attack, but we did not attack without warning.

On July 25, as soon as the Langfang Incident broke out, we sent notification asking the Chinese side to reconsider. Again on the 26th, when we met with the Kwangan-gate Incident, we sent an ultimatum, leaving room for reconsideration, but we received no answer to that. Thereupon on the 27th we carried out the attack against Nanyuan. Notification sent after the Langfang Incident were as follows:

"It is regrettable that both our forces have come into collision at last, forced by unlawful fixing on the part of your forces against a part of the Japanese forces, which had been despatched to protect communication lines at Langfang on the night of the 25th.

"Such a situation has been caused by your lack of sincerity in enforcing the conditions agreed upon with our forces and by your
continued belligerent attitude. If your forces wish to keep you this outbreak from spreading, first immediately order the troops near the Marco Polo Bridge and Papanshan to retreat to Changsintien by tomorrow noon and that part of the 37th division in Peipin to move from the tailed city of Peipin to the western district of Yungting River by noon of the 28th through the northern districts of the Peipin - Hankow Railways. They must be accompanied by the other troops of the 37th division who are in Hsian. Thereafter you must begin the gradual transportation of these troops toward Paoting.

If your forces do not act upon our advice, we shall consider your forces as lacking in sincerity; and we shall, therefore, be forced to take suitable action. In that event your forces will be charged with responsibility for anything that occurs."

I cannot relate the note which was, issued after the Kwang-anmen incident, since I have no record, but I remember that, by and large, they urged a reply to the above related note within a time limit.

This resolution to wage war was not directed against China as a whole, but against only the 37th division, which was the most characteristically anti-Japanese of the units in the 29th Army. This was simply because of the fact that the army had truly intended to limit its activities even when operations were started. Especially, since the withdrawal of the 37th division had been demanded as shown in the aforesaid notification, it was but natural for the Japanese army to conclude that she had a right to leave other divisions at Tientsin and in the neighborhood of
peking. This determination of the army was reported to the Central Headquarters. The Central Headquarters agreed to this and issued an order for the commencement of a movement.

In the order, however, there was a clause which instructed the army "not to go beyond the line along the river Yungting-ho". By this clause the army understood that the Central Headquarters had not abandoned the hope of settling the question at the spot.

16. I should now like to tell the reasons for the non-expansion policy of the army and also to discuss the attitude of the Central Headquarters.

The reasons for which the army had taken the non-expansion policy might be stated briefly as follows: It was considered improper to change the great policy of the state which had been to bring about good relations between Japan and China, simply because of a military conflict at a certain locality. Moreover, the Japanese Army stationed in China never thought of going into war with that country, and, consequently had no preparation for such a war. Again, we considered that if we opened war against China, it would grow into a racial conflict and that the conflict might be a prolonged war, due to the vastness of the Chinese territory. So, we determined to avoid a war with China as long as possible.

Fortunately, the leaders of the Chinese Army, the other party of our negotiation, also had a "non-expansion" principle, and we believed that we would be able to reach a peaceful agreement. I have already mentioned in fragments the fact that various measures were taken by Central Headquarters just in the same manner to prevent the expansion
of the affair. In particular, commander KAGETSU, on his arrival there to assume his new post, gave instructions to persist in the "non-expansion" policy. Again, Chief of the General Affairs Section of the General Staff NAKATA and Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry SHIBATA were sent to the front to obtain full understanding of the non-expansion policy of the Central Headquarters, on the part of the entire army, at the front.

17. I shall relate a strange event which happened while the Japanese and the Chinese forces were face to face at the front. After the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, there were persons who often discharged guns from the flank to tempt the Chinese to open fire illegally which both the Japanese and the Chinese forces were in a state of mutual suspense. It was repeated almost every evening. I heard rumors that it was probably done by Chinese students or by Communist elements. I think there existed a third party's intrigue to provoke a conflict between the Japanese and the Chinese forces.

18. I should like to add one thing to what witness Chin Te-chun has told about the establishment for the sake of the strengthening of military power. Mr. Chin Te-chun misunderstood the facts. One infantry battalion was stationed in Icagtei. However, our barracks were in railway property belonging to a railway station, and, since the area was small and inconvenient for sanitation as well as for drilling, we asked to borrow some land in the neighbourhood as a new site for our barracks. However, the authorities of the Hopei-chahar Regime shirked their responsibility under the pretext
that Chinese natives opposed the move. Therefore we asked a few Chinese natives and discovered that their answer was favorable to us. According, we negotiated with the Chinese authorities, but the authorities ordered the Head of the Yuanping-hsien to compel the natives to write a document opposing us.

Definite denial was not given to this request and as time went on the matter was left as it was. The conversation between Mr. Chin and myself written in Mr. Chin's oral statement is a pure fabrication. I met Mr. Sung Che-yunn once only to urge him.
On this 25th day of March 1947
At TOKYO

DEFENDANT HASHIMOTO, Gun (Seal)

I, ONO, Kisaku hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At TOKYO

Witness: (Signed) ONO, Kisaku (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

HASHIMOTO, Gun (Seal)
Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon of the defense language branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan
Late 11 April 1947

(AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES D. SHELDON)
Resolutions adopted by the Diplomatic Body at Peking regarding Military Occupation of the Railway from Peking to Shanhaikuan.

This document is the resolution adopted by the Diplomatic Body at Peking at the time of the Chinese Revolution on January 26, 1912, taken from the "Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919," compiled and edited by MacMurray, edition of 1921, pp. 318-319.

During the revolution of 1911-12, the representatives of the Powers found it advisable to exercise the right of military control over the Peking-Muksun Railway from the capital to Shanhaikuan, and American, British, French, German, Italian and Japanese troops accordingly occupied allotted sections of the railway, between the points specified, in accordance with the following resolutions adopted by the Diplomatic Body at Peking and embodied in its circular No. 13A of January 26, 1912:

RESOLUTIONS OF DIPLOMATIC BODY REGARDING MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE RAILWAY FROM PEKING TO SHANHAIKUAN. -- January 26, 1912.

"1. That troops should be placed at important stations, bridges, etc., along the line of the railway.

"2. Both Chinese Imperial and Revolutionist troops are at liberty to utilize the railway line and adjoining piers and wharves for the purposes of transportation,
landing or embarkation and will not be interfered with.

3. Both parties will be notified to avoid any interference with the railway and to refrain from damaging it in any way. The Board of the Imperial Railway of North China will be requested to maintain at both Shanhaikuan and Tientsin a repair train loaded with suitable materials for repairing damages.

4. Any attempts to permanently damage important parts of the line, such as stations, depots, machinery, bridges, etc., will be resisted by the combined forces of the six Powers cooperating in the defense of the railway.

5. The Board of the Imperial Railway of North China will be requested to always keep ready at Shanhaikuan and Tientsin sufficient rolling stock to transport 250 infantry in order that reinforcements can rapidly be dispatched.

6. The telegraph offices are to be protected and telegraphic communication maintained. Chinese troops of either side may make use of the line.

7. Officers commanding posts and patrols should be informed of the conditions laid down in Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 6 and told to do their best, with the forces at their disposal, to carry them out.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:

Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and as such official, I have custody of the original book from which the document hereto attached has been extracted, consisting of 2 pages, in the English language, dated January 26, 1912, and described as follows:

Resolutions adopted by the Diplomatic Body at Peking regarding Military Occupation of the Railway from Peking to Shunhaihuan.

I further certify that the attached document is a true and exact copy of the pertinent part of the original book, which is part of the official archives of the following Ministry:

Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 12th day of February, 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi

Chief, Archives Section

Witness /S/ K. Urabe
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: TANAKA, Shinichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:
I. I, TANAKA, Shinich, formerly a lieutenant-general, live at No. 2,042, Mizawa-mura Yokoseko, Mie District, Mie Prefecture.

I occupied the post of the chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, from March of 1937 to February of 1939, and had charge of the affairs concerning the organization, equipment, budget, mobilization and reinforcement of our forces, under the command of the director of the bureau.

It was about the middle of March, 1937, that I arrived at my post. When I paid a visit of courtesy to Minister of War SUGIYAMA, he pointed out that the time had come to try strenuously to avoid all foreign troubles and devote ourselves to the completion of national defence; that the Army would try to modernize its armaments and particularly to improve and complete its war materials; and that the Military Affairs Section should make a special effort to improve the organization and equipment of our forces.

II. As to whether or not our Japanese Army had a plan of operations against China before the outbreak of the China Incident, the General Staff Headquarters of the Japanese Army had no plan of operations for the war with China before the outbreak of the China Incident. While I was engaged in the affairs concerning the organization, reinforcement and mobilization of our forces, as the Chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, I never received any report or information concerning the mobilization and operational preparation necessary for any plan of operations.
against China, either from the General Staff or from the superior authorities. This means that the General Staff had no preparatory plan of this kind at that time. For the plan of operations as well as that of mobilization and operational preparation were just in its charge, but the realization of such plans was necessarily accompanied by the strength, munitions and expenditure. Therefore they could not be realized without the approval and cooperation of the War Ministry, and the Chief of Military Affairs Station would have had to be informed of the business concerning such plans, all the more so because I arrived at my post in March -- at the end of the fiscal year.

III. As to whether or not the Japanese army was then so situated as to be able to attempt Chinese operations in China, in view of the strength and munition materials of the Japanese Army at that time, it would have been almost impossible to attempt operations in China.

1. In 1937, when the China Incident broke out, Japan had only a peace-time strength of 17 divisions and a war-time one of 30 divisions. In the judgment of the General Staff as well as of the War Minister, as later referred to in this affidavit, it was very dangerous for the Army to operate in China with the fighting strength available at the time in view of the fact that China had a force 20,000,000 strong (200 divisions), and a vast as well as the social idiosyncracies of the Chinese people.

In addition, we had to be greatly concerned in the Russian military preparations in the Far East. According
to the information received by the General Staff as to the Russian preparations for war with Japan, she had a standing peace-time strength of 28 sniper divisions, 45 cavalry divisions, 6 mechanized brigades and 1,900 aircraft for the Far East, including the Siberian Military District, together with a peace-time force of 10 cavalry divisions and some mechanized units and air units for Outer Mongolia. The minimum wartime strength that she could use against Japan amounted to 31 or 50 divisions, of which mobilization, concentration and reinforcement were to be sufficiently secured. It was concluded, therefore, that it would be dangerous and inadvisable to carry out operations in China under such circumstances, taking into consideration the movements of the Soviet Union. In this connection, after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out in July, 1937, the General Staff gave the following explanation:

"Considering the Chinese situation, the present incident is liable to turn into a head-on, protracted war between Japan and China. If so, we could use only 11 divisions in these Chinese operations, or, adding the reserve corps of the Army, 15 divisions in total. But, if we should use half our wartime strength, totalling 30 divisions on the plan of mobilization, in the Chinese Area for a long time, then we are sure to meet with a serious crisis from the viewpoint of national defence. So it is necessary to take every possible measure for the immediate settlement of the incident."

As I was present when this explanation was made, I know that the War Minister was in entire accordance with
The production and maintenance of munitions were under as much difficulty and disadvantage as the abovementioned problem of military strength.

According to the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry, having charge of the production and maintenance of munitions it was very difficult to mobilize and dispatch about 15 divisions and even to maintain operations in the incident at the time, in view of our conditions of production and supply of munitions. In 1937, our Army had only an eight months' stock of ammunition for fifteen divisions. As to the ability of munitions mobilization, we could barely hope to meet the operational consumption of 15 reinforced divisions in about eight or nine months after the mobilization was commenced, and a continuous supply of special materials was impossible. As regards the arms, supposing that we were able to use all the arms we had in stock and bring our munition mobilization to a maximum, it would have been difficult to meet the operational consumption of 15 divisions, and this was especially the case with special materials. Therefore, if we should go to a protracted war with China, it would not be sufficient to use all the stocks and maximum munitions mobilization in the operations in China, and if our relations with another country should be strained under such circumstances, we were sure to be at a loss what to do for self-defence. Generally speaking, with our anticipated munitions mobilization for 1937, and guaranteed a supply of 70 per cent of munitions, including arms and
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ammunitions, for the estimated war-time strength of 30 divisions for the fiscal year, we planned to be able to mobilize in about ten months after such munitions mobilization was commenced. However, far more materials were expected to be consumed in the China Incident, so we admitted that it was extremely difficult to maintain operations with 15 divisions.

iv. Data indicating that the incident was not planned from the Japanese point of view.

In addition to the date in the above II and III, I wish to refer to the following:

1. Establishment of non-enlargement and non-exercise of military strength. On July 8, when the Army was informed of the clash at the Marco Polo Bridge early in the morning, it immediately determined the general policy of non-enlargement of the incident as well as non-exercise of military strength, and informed the Chief of the Staff of the Army at the front to that effect through the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. This I know from documents. About July 8 or 9, the Imperial Government established the policy of non-enlargement, desiring for the smooth settlement of the incident by reconsideration on the part of China, and simultaneously decided to take proper measures for self-preservation, according to the circumstances, though it was too early to send more forces at that time. This I heard from Lieutenant General USHIROKU, Director of the War Service Bureau who was informed thereof in the Bureau-directors Council by the War Minister.

2. Effort for speedy settlement at the front. On July 9, the General Staff instructed the army at the front to nego-
tiate with the Hupci-Chahar authorities for the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which I know from documents. The gist was to avoid reference to political issues under such circumstances, and to obtain the approval of the Hupei-Chahar Political Committee and fulfill as soon as possible our demands, such as the suspension of stationing the Chinese forces on the left bank near the Marco Polo Bridge, its necessary guarantee, and the punishment and apology of those persons directly responsible.

According to the reports which I received from the army at the front, our occupation forces in China prohibited promptly any military movement, following the policy of non-enlargement of the incident and its speedy settlement at the front. In order to save the situation, Major-General MATSUI, Daikuro, Chief of the Peiping Special Service Agency, was negotiating with the Chinese military authorities, and it seemed that an agreement would be reached in conformity to the above-mentioned policy of negotiation with Hupei-Chahar.

However, according to the information received by the General Staff, the Chinese authorities ordered four divisions of her central army near Suckow to march for the frontier of the Honan Province and all her air forces to move out. Moreover, there was no indication that the northern Chinese situation might be mitigated; the Chinese forces in North China were strengthening preparations for war, such as construction of their positions or transport of munitions, and also illegal firing was being repeated near the Marco Polo Bridge.
If the state of affairs had been left as it was, the lives and properties of our residents in Peking and Tientsin would surely have been forced to face unavoidable danger. Thus the General Staff EQ's was compelled to adopt the following judgment of the situation:

"The authorities in Peking and Tientsin as well as the Nanking Government, seem to be exerting themselves to prepare for armed hostilities against Japan. As a result of the aggravation of the situation, caused by the reinforcement of Chinese troops in North China, the lives and properties of our residents are, now, on the verge of utmost danger. It is high time for us now to dispatch a minimum possible number of forces to the Peking-Tientsin area, in order to protect our residents. A grave situation is arising also in areas other than Peking and Tientsin, which comes to call our careful attention with regard to protection of our nationals."

I was informed of the above adoption by the report and explanation of a high class officer of the Military Affairs Section.

IV. Our government made the following point clear in an official statement on 11 July, that we were utterly compelled to send forces to North China to cope with anti-Japanese armed actions, planned by the Chinese side. But upon being informed that the Hopei-Chahar Government authorities had accepted our proposal, we took steps, in the afternoon on the same day, as to reserve our preparation for the mobilization and dispatch of our home divisions. Furthermore, orders
were issued by the General Staff HQ's, with the approval of the Government, to dispatch only a part of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and of the Chosen Army respectively. The latter step was taken in view of the situation as mentioned above, to ensure the achievement of peace-time duty by our garrison in China under aggravated situation in the Peiping-Tientsin area.

V. According to an information I got around 13 July from the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the outcome of the Cabinet Conference was as follows:

"It is extremely doubtful whether the Nanking Government has the sincerity to settle the matter in peace. For the Chinese Central Army forces are now advancing hastily to the north and anti-Japanese actions and unlawful firing cases are being repeated everywhere. Thus not only in North China but also in Shanghai and Chingtao the situation is very dangerous in regard to the protection of the Japanese residents there. Therefore, it will be advisable for us in accordance with our firm policy of localization, to pay constant attention to the future course of things; urging on the one hand, the Hopei-Chahar Government to fulfil the stipulated terms, and abstaining on the other hand from provoking the Chinese."

In conformity with this principle, the governing body of the General Staff and of the War Ministry decided upon the so-called 'policy for the settlement of the North China Incident' on the night of 13 July.
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The outline of the above 'policy' is as follows:

"All possible measures should be taken to avoid the expansion of the incident to an all-out war, adhering to the principle of localization and settlement at the spot. For this purpose, it is desirable to accept the terms for settlement proposed by the representative of the Chinese 29th Army and signed on 11th instant, and to see to it that these terms are fulfilled by the Chinese. Whether or not our forces now in homeland should be mobilized is a matter to be decided in the light of the future course of things. In case however the Chinese ignore the above terms and show no sincerity to put it into practice, or in case the banking Government removes their central army forces to the north to prepare for attack, resolute steps must be taken on our part."

It was that it is necessary for the garrisons statining in China to receive beforehand the recognition of the central headquarters. This was what Lieutenant-General ATOMIYA who was the Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau participating in setting up the plan (regulation) reported directly to me.

VI. As I was connected with mobilization, I wish to explain the real circumstances under which mobilization and dispatch were carried out with cautious attitude.

A. It was a fact acknowledged by the government on July 9th when the incident broke out that the mobilization and dispatch of divisions at home might be necessary to meet the emergency circumstances, although it was not considered necessary at the beginning of the incident. (I knew this through the Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau as a report from the minister after a cabinet meeting.)
B. Taking consideration of the dangerous state of Japanese residents in the Peking-and Tientsin district, increasing preparation of fighting power and repeated attacks of Chinese forces in the same district, as well as the insincerity of Hopei-Chahar authorities in negotiations of reconciliation and the northward advancement of the Chinese central armies, the Japanese Government announced on 11 July the dispatch of troops to north China.

C. But in the afternoon of July 11th, as the Hopei-Chahar authorities accepted our proposal, the mobilization, and dispatch of divisional troops at home and other preparations were discontinued.

D. On 13 July it was decided as the policy of dealing with the north China Incident that the mobilization of divisions at home would be considered properly according to circumstances which might occur afterwards.

E. As a new circumstance which appeared up to 15 July I mention an increase and concentration of Chinese armies in the area of the north Lanchow-Haichow railway, the activity of the Canton air forces, the delay of actual withdrawal of the Chinese Army forces from the left side along Yingtinho, which withdrawal had been accepted by an agreement. Not only that, further construction was continued and more army forces were concentrated (a report from the General Headquarters). Considering the above report, it was decided at a cabinet meeting that the carrying out of mobilization of divisional armies at home which had been discontinued on 16 or 17 July should be prepared as to be practicable whenever
necessary after 19 July. The officers and officials concerned in the General Headquarters and the War Ministry proceeded with preparations in their respective sections. But the authorities decided to persevere as much as possible considering self-defense, as the Hopei-Chahar authorities accepted once our proposals, in spite of the report that Chang-Kai-shek revealed his firm determination against Japan on 19 July. Besides the acceptance of the Hopei-Chahar authorities, expecting the conclusions of the *Enking Conference, the preparation for mobilization of divisional armies at home was postponed and reserved for the future on 22 July.

F. After the Langfang incident on 25 July and the Kwanggan Gate Incident on 26 July, the condition in north China became finally serious. A report was received from a higher officer stating that the Japanese Government had decided upon a program on 27 July to mobilize and dispatch divisional armies at home. And the purpose of the mobilization and dispatch was to eliminate the threat of the Chinese forces to the lives and property of Japanese residents and transportation and communication and also accomplishment of self-defense of the already dispatched garrison troops in north China. The mobilization and dispatch at first for the time being were emergency operations with peace-time formation and equipment not suitable or sufficient for actual operations. These operations were only for the purpose of protecting the Japanese residents and to carry out the duty of self-defense.

G. There was no definite expression of intention of the authorities of the General Headquarters whether further mobilization of divisional armies at home would be carried out
or not in the future besides the above stated one. I recog-
nized that the Minister, the Vice-Minister of the War Minis-
try and the Chief of the Military Affair Bureau who were the
highest staff authorities, maintained a passive attitude in
regard to further mobilization.

H. Since then higher officers adopted the policy of taking
proper steps in regard to further mobilization after considera-
tion and investigation of developments which might occur in
the future. When the Shanghai Incident broke out, two divi-
sions were sent to cope with the emergency and when it be-
came urgently necessary to protect the residents of Tsintao,
a plan to send out one division was set up and when faced
with the necessity of carrying out operations in the area of
Paotin, Hopei Province in central China, a hasty mobilization
at home was begun. As above stated, patching and supplemen-
tary mobilization and dispatch were carried out as circum-
stances required. Eventually after the outbreak of the inci-
dent up to October 1937, army forces totaling 15 divisions,
were mobilized and dispatched on eight different occasions,
to say roughly 4 divisions in July, 7 divisions in August,
and 4 divisions in September and October.

I. In 1938, prior to the execution of operations in Hankao
and Canton, the number of the divisions in China reached 23
but among them there were several divisions which were organ-
ized in fighting zone as the circumstances required. There-
fore, although the number of army divisions in China increased
generally, the number of soldiers decreased in each division
and the predisposition of each division and equipment were
lowered.
VII. As examples of lack of unity and non-planning of military action, I wish to make mention of the capture of NANKING operations in HSU-CHOW, capture of KUANGTUNG and operations in HANKOW.

The following is necessarily confines of my duties as announced by the General Staff and other quarters.

1. Concerning the capture of NANKING, I was, at first, informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that the General Staff had no intention to realize it and the War Minister had the same opinion as the General Staff. I approved of this. But because of the tendency of the tide of war on the spot and because of the desire to seize the opportunity of terminating this incident, the decision to capture NANKING was firstly decided on December 1, 1937 (the 12th year of SHOWA) and the order for the taking NANKING was issued.

2. Carrying out of the HSU-CHOW operations.

In May 1938 (the 13th year of SHOWA), an agreement of views between the War Minister and Vice-Chief of the General Staff was not reached until immediately before the decision to carry out operations was made. The point at issue was that if it was possible to preserve the contact between north China and central China by securing permanently the important area of HSU-CHOW after the occupation of this area and to supply needed army strength because of the necessity to increase by 2 or 3 divisions the strength necessary for securing the important area of HSU-CHOW, but the fundamental fact was the disagreement of views as to the anticipation of settling this incident in accordance with the policy of non-expansion.
Finally, agreement of views to carry out this military operation was arrived at due to strategic demand in the light of the entire situation. Part of it, I personally heard at the above-mentioned conference and the rest I learned from my superiors.

3. As to the HANKOW and KUANGTUNG operations, decision was not made so quickly. Only in September 1938 it was decided to carry out the HANKOW operation about October 1938 and capture KUANGTUNG about that time to cut the communication and supply route from abroad.

4. Under these circumstances, the army budget passed at the ordinary session of the Diet in 1938 had not anticipated these military operations. Therefore a great deal of inconvenience was felt in the matter of expenses for the year as explained in the following:

VIII. I, as one of the men who were connected with the military budget, wish to state as follows; by way of proposing materials to indicate that the operations in HUCHOW, HANKOW and KUANGTUNG were not planned well before they actually occurred. After about October 1937, in TOKYO, prospects were entertained for putting an end to the positive operations against China and, moreover, plans and preparations were promoted regarding the adjustment of and extraction from the military strength in China, on the premise that the Incident would be concluded in the near future. To explain more in detail, at about the end of 1937, our military strength in China consisted of 16 divisions, forming its main part. As the first step, these were to be reduced to about 10 divisions.
Following this, in the units, which were to remain in China, the reservists were to be relieved from active service. The enforcement of this program was first to be started from the early spring of 1938, and, pursuant to the anticipated establishment of peace, an all-round withdrawal of the armed forces was planned. With respect to this matter, both the department quarters and the out-post army authorities were unanimous in their opinion.

Accordingly, the budget, agreed upon at the ordinary session of the Diet at that time, was also based on the above; namely, it was made on the premise that (1) the military strength in China was to be reduced roughly by half; (2) the repatriation of those troops who had been inducted; (3) the continued stationing of armed forces to such an extent as to presuppose no positive operations.

But, as it was, the situation did not favorably develop the failure of peace negotiations and as was expected, and after the occupation of NANKING, the consequent operations in HSUCHOW, HANKOW and KANTUNGH necessitated the total abandonment of the attempted adjustment of the military strength as aforementioned, not only this but in the 1938-1939 fiscal year an enormous deficiency was found in the budget.

IX. I wish to submit the following materials about how the military budget was actually prepared. About the expenditures of our expeditionary forces which were sent to Korea and Manchuria on July 11, 1937, I was asked by my superiors in the War Ministry to negotiate with the Finance Ministry with a
view to meet current expenses with a reserve fund and to open a three months' budget covering August, September and October for the troops that had already been sent, including their evacuation expenditures and supposing their stay to be about three months. But in fact, after negotiation with the Finance Ministry, it was reduced to two months. A budget for two months of August and September was presented at an extraordinary session of the Diet in July and passed. A budget for four months from October till January of the next year for about 11 divisions already mobilized by the end of August, passed at a session convened at the beginning of September.

Thus budgets were prepared little by little according to the number of the expeditionary forces, instead of making a wholesale estimation for a long period in expectation of aggravation and protraction of the incident. This is also clear by the fact that the budget for the fiscal year of 1938 proved greatly deficient as hereinbefore stated.

X. Realization of Japan's policy of non-aggravation.

1. What I have already stated shows efforts to realize a policy of non-aggravation.

2. As a reference to strict execution of non-aggravation policy on the spot, I wish to mention a verbal report made to the Minister of War, in my hearing, by Lt. Col. YACHI, a staff officer of the expeditionary forces in China, who had been called up to the central government to make a report of the situation developing on the spot.

Its gist is as follows:
The policy of non-aggravation and peaceful settlement of the Incident was thoroughly disseminated to the commanders and all the rest of the Japanese forces in North China and utmost care was being taken for it. For instance, the transportation of any Japanese troops was prohibited by the railway between Peiping and Tientsin. Any Japanese soldier in uniform was also prohibited to make use of the railway between Fengtai and Peiking.

And though all the Japanese who passed through the gate of the Peiping Castle were examined and interrogated by the Chinese military police. They submitted to it.

Every castle gate in Peiping was closed by the military force of the Chinese 37th Division, Chinese machine guns were turned upon the Japanese houses within Peiping Castle, and 6,000 Japanese were guarded by only two Japanese infantry platoons.

In spite of being in a position enabling us to go into action immediately against any Chinese bombardment, we were operating upon the instructions of the Army headquarters in Tientsin as they came to us one by one. Being afraid of aggravating the situation, we refrained from carrying the wounded into Peiping Castle to be operated upon; likewise we left the bodies of the dead as they were, etc. This was but an example of our policy of localization to prohibit actions which might provoke a magnification of the incident. Thus to carry out this policy, we submitted to any humiliation or inconvenience.

As for the Chinese forces, anti-Japanese sentiment was high among officers and soldiers alike, and especially among those in the grade of second major. The Chinese in the Pintsin Area were convinced that the Chinese 29th Army had won at Marco Polo Bridge, that the Chinese losses were small.
and that the Japanese Army had completely withdrawn. We endured the rising anti-Japanese sentiment.

In addition, it was said that the Central Operations Staff had advanced to Paoting.

3. Concerning the strict observance of the localization policy of the local Army Commander, I will state what General Terauchi, the Army Commander in the North China area, told me when I was there about October 1937 (Showa 12), for liaison work.

That was as follows:

Hitherto the Central Supreme Command has made the technique of leading actual operations difficult by not clearly showing beforehand the general purpose of operations and the points of operation. Instead they have simply given the purpose and time of each local operation (such as the Central Hopei operation and the Taiyuan operation). To facilitate operations the Supreme Command should clearly show the general scope and purpose of the operations as a whole and leave the details of local operations to the Army Commander at the front. However, this case being merely an "incident" and having no bearing on our general national policy, it is necessary to sacrifice perfection in technique to the preservation of our general localization policy. In the future, it will be necessary for both the central and local commands seriously to consider various technical methods which would relieve the disadvantage to actual operation, brought about by strict observation of the localization policy.

4. On the policy of localization in the Pingtsin Area in July 1937 (Showa 12) it was decided that the occurrence of the Langfang and Kwangan Gate Incidents, together with the lack of sincerity on the part of the Hopei-Charhar authorities to fulfill the terms of agreement as well as
the aggressive actions repeated everywhere by the Chinese, made it at last necessary to mobilize our divisions now in the homeland.

On the night of July 26, the General Staff gave me a notice: "Hitherto we have avoided the mobilization of the home divisions but the actual situation in China admits of no further delay." Even the then Chief of the First Department of the General Staff, who was one of the strongest opponents to the mobilization of forces for fear of conflict between Japan and China, at last admitted on the 26th the necessity of mobilization by way of self-defense.

On the 27th the governing body of the War Ministry also recognized the unavoidability of mobilization.

Then a draft was prepared for adoption by the Cabinet conference concerning the mobilization of three home divisions, and the War Minister issued orders in the evening of the same day with the approval of the Cabinet conference about the mobilization of three home divisions.

After a meeting of the Bureau Chiefs, I was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that on the 27th of July the government had decided as follows:

To mobilize three home divisions; to maintain the policy of localization and settlement at the spot even in case of the outbreak of a self-protective battle in the Pingtsin Area, such a battle should be purely for the achievement of the peacetime duties of the commander of the Japanese Army in China; to do its best not to bring about a situation which might require despatching soldiers to Tsingtao and Shanghai for the protection of Japanese residents -- though such a situation may eventually come about; and to do no damage to the personnel of third Powers.
Besides I learned that the Minister gave an explanation at the said meeting of the Bureau Chiefs to the following effect:

Exercise of military force in Pingtsin Area which might be required in the future would be purely self-defensive action and as such it would never be contradictory to the policy of localization adhered to by Japan. And even if despatch of forces to Shanghai or Tsingtao should be required for the protection of the Japanese whose security was being seriously menaced at that time; it would never run counter to the policy of localization. And the actions of the Japanese forces had hitherto been in strict conformity with the localization of military movements, and could and should remain so in the future as well.

I also learned from a document that the mobilization of home divisions was ordered in the evening of the 27th, and the Chief of the General Staff approved the application of the Commander of the Japanese Army in China for taking military action against the Chinese 29th Army, and that at the same time he ordered that the actual shooting be limited to the line of the Yungting River.

5. I was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that at the Five Ministers' Meeting held about the 20th of July, they debated upon the advisability of the Japanese policy to improve the situation by taking means to clarify our observance of the principle of equal opportunity in North China, in order to satisfy the Western Powers, as well as China herself; and upon the plan to withdraw the forces at that time in the Pingtsin area, which had been despatched there from Manchuria and after the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and then to take diplomatic means for the solution of questions pending between Japan and China. The Five Ministers' Meeting was a conference...
held at the time by the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, and the Finance Minister. I also heard directly that at the end of July, there was an opinion among the governing body of the General Staff that contemplated neutralizing the situation by gathering and moving all the Japanese forces in North China back to the area of Tientsin in order to bring about prompt settlement of the incident, and then to hold a personal interview between Konoye and Chiang Kai-shek, and thus to smooth out the difficulty between Japan and China. However, since the attitude on the part of the Chinese was against this plan, it was not realized after all.

6. Circumstances after the Oyama Incident at Shanghai:

About the Incident Captain Oyama, I received a report on the morning of the 10th of August 1932 in the War Ministry from Hoshina, the Chief of the First Section of the Navy Ministry. It purported that the Japanese authorities in Shanghai would not take further steps until they were assured of the sincerity of the Chinese by negotiating with them, and that the circumstances might require preparations for despatch of troops.

On that day the government authorities seemed to be of the opinion that adequate measures for the protection of our residents in Shanghai should be taken after the real circumstances of the Oyama Incident came to light, but that it would be worth while to study the Navy Minister's proposal demanding preparations for eventual mobilization as a last resort. But I learned later that on the 13th, the Cabinet conference took up a plan to despatch forces, and that on the 14th this plan was being subject to re-consideration. Then a statement was made by the Imperial Government on August 15. In accordance with this
statement, it was decided to despatch a 'despatched force' to Shanghai of which two divisions from the homeland formed the main body, for the purpose of protecting the Japanese subjects in Shanghai. This word 'despatched force' was used to show that it had nothing to do with pure military operations thorough. The mobilization for this purpose was ordered on August 15.

As for Tsingtao, I heard that it was talked about at the Cabinet conference that the situation in Tsingtao being calm, it would be possible to maintain the status quo, provided that nothing happened to disturb it, but some measure would be taken for the protection of residents there in case the worst should happen.

About August 15 or 16, 1937, the General Staff concluded that the Chinese had decided upon the policy of beginning over-all military operations. This conclusion was based on the report that the Chinese had established headquarters on August 15th, made Chiang Kai-shek Supreme Commander of all the land, sea and air forces and divided the whole country into four war zones (the 1st war zone, Hopei-Chahar; the 2nd, Chahar-Shansi; the 3rd, Shanghai, the 4th, South China), and that general mobilization was ordered on the same day.

About the 16th or 17th of August, I was duly notified at the meeting of the Bureau Chiefs as usual that the following has been decided at the Cabinet conference:

"It is becoming difficult to solve the affair in strict conformity with the policy of localization, as the Chinese have determined to carry out a long war. Therefore, the utmost efforts should be made to restrict the war to the minimum in point of time as well as strategically, and territorially."
As the original object of the Shanghai operations lay chiefly in the protection of the Japanese residents, they had to be confined to a minimum. To check the danger of creating a general clash between Japan and China on the one hand, and to avoid trouble with other countries on the other, Japan at first despatched less than two divisions temporarily with the idea of carrying out the operations with minimum forces. Nevertheless the difference of forces between Japan and China was so great that the war situation did not take a favorable turn as it was expected. The central Supreme Command, therefore, despatched first five battalions during the period from the end of September to the beginning of November, and then five more divisions from North China; in addition, the beginning of November three divisions landed at Hangchow and again in the middle of that month one division landed at Peilaojiang. By supplying forces temporarily as stated above, the battle continued for three months, and at last in the middle of November the Chinese Army made a general retreat to the west. Thus the operations which were executed to protect the residents in Shanghai were brought to a conclusion. But the fact that Japan was obliged to use forces in such a way as was considered to be an error from a viewpoint of strategy shows the circumstance under which Japan was curbed by her own policy of localizing the Incident. In fact, General Sugiyama, ex-Minister of War, who was afterwards appointed Commander of the North China Expeditionary Army, pointed out these circumstances, saying that the delay in occupying Shanghai was an important cause that prolonged the Incident, but the fundamental cause lay in the numerical shortage in military forces and amount of materials, so the Japanese policy of solving the Incident in a short time should have been carried out more thoroughly. The
General told me so personally when I made a business trip to North China in the winter of 1938 (Showa 12). He was then the Commander of the North China Expeditionary Army.

The headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was reorganized into the headquarters of the China Expeditionary Force, and at the same time was entrusted with the duty of operating in the vicinity of Shanghai with the aim of creating an opportunity to settle the Incident. This meant that the authorities wanted to find an opportunity of settling the Incident in the operations near Shanghai, and had no intention of capturing Nanking at that time.

After the battle near Shanghai the Central Authorities of the Supreme Command instructed our forces not to advance beyond the line of Changsha-Soochow-Kashing so as not to give an unnecessary provocation to Nanking. Later I learned from documents that confidential instructions had been given to the forces not to enlarge the theatre of operations further west than Wusih and Fuchow.

8. In our country the Imperial Headquarters Ordinance was enacted on November 17, 1937, and the Imperial Headquarters was established in Tokyo for the first time on November 20 of the same year.

In the same month the munitions mobilization program was begun. However, the order for the national general mobilization had not yet been put into force (T.N. in that year).

The General Mobilization Law was promulgated in March of the following year, that is, 1938. But it was in May 1938 that a part of the law was applied for the China Incident.

With this I bring my affidavit to an end.
Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL.

VERSUS

ARAKI, SADAO ET AL.

AFFIDAVIT UNDER OATH (No. 2)

In accordance with the formula employed in our country, I, after having taken an oath as set forth in the accompanying paper, hereby depose as follows:

KAWASE, Torashiro,
Affiant.
AFFIDAVIT
OF
KA'AEZ, TORASHIRO
As I, KABE Torashiro, was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army from August 1934 to March 1936, I shall state what I know about the position of the Kwantung Army in regard to various problems which arose in North China and Inner Mongolia resultant from the then prevailing conditions of Manchuria.

1. General Condition of the Kwantung Army and Manchuria at the time

As the problems of North China and Inner Mongolia, of which I shall speak later on, are related to the condition of the Kwantung Army and Manchuria at the time, I shall first summarize the conditions which prevailed during my term of office.

(1) Leading officers of the Kwantung Army and the business in my charge.

In August 1934, when I arrived at my post, Commander of the Kwantung Army was General HISHIKARI, Takashi; Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General NISHIO, Toshizo; and Vice-Chief of Staff, Major-General OKAMURA, Yasuji. But in December the same year General MINAMI, Jiro was appointed Commander and Major-General ITAGAKI, Seishiro became Vice-Chief of Staff.

For a year after taking up my post (when I was Lieutenant-Colonel) I was chiefly in charge of affairs relating to operations and defense, and for about eight months (when I was Colonel) until I left the office was a sectional chief in charge of information.

(2) Condition of Manchoukuo.

A. Foreign relations.

At that time there were some foreign countries which gave official, or at least de facto, recognition of
Manchoukuo as an independent state. For instance, the Vatican recognized her in September 1934, and the Dominica Republic in April 1935, while the transfer of the North Manchurian Railway was signed between the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo in March 1935.

As for the relations with China, the Tangku Truce Pact had been concluded between the Kwantung Army and the military regime in North China in May 1933, the year preceding my arrival at my post, and all-round diplomatic relations had not yet been established between China and Manchoukuo. However, at the so-called Dairen Conference held in July 1933 a mutual agreement was reached as to the means to avoid Sino-Japanese clash in North China, and since then agreements were concluded in succession between China and Manchoukuo, e.g. in regard to railways in July 1934, concerning customs tariff in December the same year, and regarding mail in February 1935, while with the rise of the tendency to restoration and enhancement of friendship between Japan and China the relations between China and Manchoukuo also gradually improved and China showed an attitude to virtually recognize the independence of Manchoukuo in large measure.

3. Internal condition of Manchoukuo.

After the declaration of independence of Manchoukuo in March 1932, the pseudo-troop bandits who numbered near 300,000 under the command of former war-lords in various provinces were for a time rampant throughout her territory but they were for the most part suppressed in the course
of 1933. Just as in many parts of China, Manchuria was infested by bandits before the founding of Manchoukuo and even after the suppression, the remnants were still active in some localities. Their number was estimated at about 30,000 at the time when I arrived at my post. Those bandits may be classified into several groups, e.g. gangs of regular robbers, those of a political nature resisting Japanese and new Manchurian power, and bandits imbued with communist ideas. Moreover, not all of those bandits were natives of Manchuria. There were many who made their way from North China, Shantung Province or Korea, while some Koreans and Manchurians living in the districts of the Russian Littoral Province adjacent to Manchoukuo stole in across the border. Among the above classified bandits those who were imbued with some ideology, especially those who had their bases of activity outside Manchuria were most difficult to deal with.

The peace and order of new Manchuria was considerably disturbed by those bandits and its healthy growth as a state was much hampered. But as a result of the strenuous efforts on the part of the Manchoukuo Government and people and the assistance extended by the Kwantung Army in accor with the principle of joint defence as stipulated in the Protocol between Japan and Manchoukuo, the independence of Manchoukuo gradually took definite shape, particularly as her relations with China and other countries were more and more improved. On the frontiers, however, troubles still occurred frequently.
(3) General policy of the Kwantung Army at the time.

Under the principles set forth in the Protocol, it was the duty of the Kwantung Army to undertake the defence of Manchuria in cooperation with the Manchoukuo Government. In view of the existing condition of the country, the Kwantung Army, especially after the commander, General MINAMI's arrival at his post, adopted as the two main objects of its policy, (1) establishment of public order in the interior of Manchoukuo and (2) maintenance of peace and quiet in the border regions. In order to accomplish the first object, the entire strength of the Army was dispersed widely over the country so as to contribute to the maintenance of local peace and order, even at the disadvantage and inconvenience that might be caused thereby to the training in proficiency essential to an army. For the second object, the Army made it its principle to avoid the use of armed force as much as possible and to ensure the enjoyment of mutual benefit through prudent measures taken by neighboring countries among themselves, through parleys and negotiations held by the Manchoukuo Government or the Kwantung Army at its discretion with China, the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia and others.

II. Doihara-Chin Te-chun Agreement.

It was in the regions on the border between Manchuria and Chahar Province, China, that the troubles referred to above occurred most frequently. Among them may be mentioned the insult to the Japanese military officers and Foreign Office clerk at Changpei by Sung Che-yuan troops on October 16 1934, intrusion into Manchoukuo of a unit of Sung Che-yuan troops on January 24 1935,
second intrusion and firing of a Sung Che-yuan unit upon the Japanese border garrison. Fearing that such frequent troubles on the borders might lead to more untoward affairs between China and Manchoukuo or Japan, the Commander of the Kwantung Army deemed it proper to enlarge the scope of application of the Tangku Truce Agreement, and under instructions from the highest military authorities at home despatched Major-General DOIHARA, Kenji, who was on the staff of the Kwantung Army and Chief of the Special Service Agency at Mukden, to carry on negotiations with the Chahar Province authorities in China. The reason why Major-General DOIHARA was entrusted with this mission was (1) because those troubles had arisen within the area for which he was in charge of information and DOIHARA was well versed in the actual facts of the affairs, and (2) because his character was best suited for negotiating with the Chinese on those sundry affairs and settling them in a friendly, peaceful way.

As a result of his negotiations the Doihara-Chin Te-chun Agreement was signed on June 27, 1935. It stipulates the dealing with the responsible persons and the units concerned, the suppression of anti-Japanese agitations in Chahar Province, the area where cessation of hostilities was to be effected, etc. By this agreement the Chinese demilitarized zone was extended to part of Chahar Province, and peace and order could be anticipated in this part of the borders.

A few days after the conclusion of the agreement, when Major-General DOIHARA came to the Kwantung Army Headquarters to make a verbal report on the negotiations to the Commander, I was in
attendance and could listen to it. From his report and also from what was told by a member of the staff who accompanied the Major-General, I gathered that the negotiations had been carried on in a very friendly manner.

III. The Kwantung Army's Concern about Inner Mongolia.

A considerable part of the western borders of Manchoukuo abuts on Inner Mongolia, while in Heilung Province and the Jehol area in Manchoukuo there lived many Mongolians who constantly intercommunicated with similar tribes in Inner Mongolia. To the Kwantung Army which was responsible for the defence of Manchuria, therefore, it was a matter of grave concern as well as an important focus of attention in collecting information about the condition of Inner Mongolia, how it would affect Manchuria, and in particular whether Red influence would be exerted on Manchuria. The Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, who had harbored antipathy against the Chinese, were given impetus from the independence of Manchoukuo and were striving to establish a self-governing machinery of their own with Prince TE, an influential figure among them, as the leading spirit. The Kwantung Army was aware that Prince TE made it an important aim in his policy to prevent Inner Mongolia from turning Red. While I was at my post in the Kwantung Army, the relations between Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were amicable with no trouble arising between them. In December 1935 a skirmish occurred near Manchoukuo borders between a unit under Prince TE's command and Chinese troops. We feared lest it should lead to some trouble in Manchoukuo, but it was settled in a short space of time before it developed into a serious matter.
IV. The Kwantung Army's Concern about the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council.

Under the Tangku Truce Agreement, an area of North China adjoining the Manchoukuo borders had been designated as a demilitarized zone, where the Kwantung Army held the right of carrying out inspection as occasion demanded.

And after the conclusion of the said truce pact, Mr. YIN Ju-keng of China, on the recommendation of Mr. HUANG Fu, Chairman of the North China Political Affairs Adjustment Commission, became administrative inspector for 23 counties in the above-said demilitarized zone.

To the Kwantung Army it was naturally a matter of important concern whether the condition of the area was consistent with the objects of the truce pact, and whether the demilitarized zone would turn Red. Especially in the Jehol area, which adjoined the area in question, the activity of communist bandits had been incessant from former times, and so the Kwantung Army was making special efforts in collecting information about conditions in East Hopei. Mr. YIN Ju-keng, just referred to above, dissatisfied with the financial policy of the Nanking Government and in view of the fact that in the district under his control a peasants' agitation for self-government was started at the communists' instigation in October 1935, deemed it necessary to establish his political authority and carry out financial autonomy and anti-communism in the area. At last, in November 1935, he organized the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council under his chairmanship and declared the establishment of an autonomous
Previous to the declaration, about November 20, 1935, if I remember rightly, I had at the Kwantung Army Headquarters a visit from Mr. YIN's two envoys, who, revealing Mr. YIN's intentions, told me that as the area was one which under the Tangku Truce Pact had an important bearing on the Kwantung Army, they were desirous to learn the opinions of the leading officers of the Army regarding Mr. YIN's project. To this I replied that it was their own affair and none that the Kwantung Army should meddle in. I did not introduce them to my superior officers, nor take the trouble to ascertain the latter's views upon the matter.

About a week after the interview, I learnt by a newspaper report of the declaration of the East Hopei Autonomous Government.

V. Position of the Kwantung Army in regard to the Formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

After the conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement, there came into existence in North China a political machinery called the North China Political Affairs Adjustment Commission, with Mr. HUANG Fu as chairman and exercising control over the five provinces of North China. Such Chinese political machinery in North China had since undergone some changes. And with the growing improvement in the relations between Japan and China as well as between China and Manchoukuo as mentioned above, especially after the signing of the Doihara-Chin Te-chun Agreement in June 1935, which made wider arrangements for the maintenance of peace and order on the China-Manchoukuo borders, the Kwantung Army became aware of the fact that among the war-lords in North
China there was an inclination to form a new political structure as a bond between China and Manchoukuo, and hoped that it might take advantage of the inclination to devise some anti-communistic measures between China and Manchoukuo, promote intimate relations between the two countries, and secure the national defence of Manchoukuo. Deeming it a proper opportunity to despatch some envoy to explain to the war-lords in North China the position of Manchoukuo as well as of the Kwantung Army and quicken the realization of their intentions, the Kwantung Army, with the approval of the highest military authorities at home and after consultation with the command of the Japanese expeditionary forces in China, sent Major-General DOIHARA again to Peiping in November 1935, for he was regarded as best suited for such negotiations.

The position of the Kwantung Army with regard to the political machinery is North China and the reasons for the despatch of Major-General DOIHARA were as stated above. Pending the negotiations, the Major-General once returned to the Kwantung Army Headquarters towards the end of 1935. From what the Major-General himself and the staff officer who accompanied him told me at that time, I learnt that during his weeks' stay in Peiping, Major-General DOIHARA had held friendly talks with war-lords of North China, especially with Sung Che-yuan, and that well aware of the fact that Sung Che-yuan and others were keeping in close touch with the Nanking Government, the Major-General had been proceeding with the negotiations in a very friendly and peaceful manner.
In witness whereof I have hereunder set my seal and hand this 21st day of November, 1946, at Tokyo.

(Signed and sealed) KA'ABE, Torashiro,
Affiant.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of November, 1946, at Tokyo.

(Signed and sealed) RANNO, Junkichi,
Witness.
WITTEN OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the
trust—adding nothing and withholding nothing.

(Signed and sealed) KABE, Torashiro.
Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 13 Jan 1947
任スル課ノ課長ヲ変更シタリ

（注）トレード・ディスペンサリ

外務省書記官長

注 1. 視察料

注 2. ローマ法王ハ

注 3. ムルモノガ

注 4. ハレルハ

注 5. マンシ

注 6. チー

注 7. 九三五年

注 8. ハンマル

注 9. フレ

注 10. 誠ノ

注 11. 倫理

注 12. 東京ノ

注 13. 理事

注 14. 国際

注 15. 理事

注 16. 会

注 17. 会

注 18. 会

注 19. 会

注 20. 会

注 21. 会

注 22. 会

注 23. 会

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注 54. 会

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注 56. 会

注 57. 会

注 58. 会

注 59. 会

注 60. 会
機械長

幼稚園

形態

より

派遣

機械長

幼稚園

形態

より

派遣

機械長

幼稚園

形態

より

派遣
第三条 東京・内閣・対スル解心

第四条（西部地区）

第五条（内閣）

第六条（対外）
第四〇回東防共自治委員会対スル橋梁ノ関心

塔台等ノ議定ニヨリテハ北支ノ一定箇所ハ非武装地

保有シテルリマント・而シテテハ非武装ノ影響ヲ防止ノ為ヲ一時終従スルスノ規定ハ

帝トシテテメラレヒリハノノ支那ノ臨時管理シテル

保有シテルリマント・而シテテハ非武装ノ影響ヲ防止ノ為ヲ一時終従スルスノ規定ハ

帝トシテテメラレヒリハノノ支那ノ臨時管理シテル

保有シテルリマント・而シテテハ非武装ノ影響ヲ防止ノ為ヲ一時終従スルスノ規定ハ
友情を礎に東京政府と築いてゐる松下村の如き政治家、金子光世、安部真次、石原莞爾、加藤高明、関西電業の森田幸之助、丸善の金子文雄、松本隆吉、等等を挙げると、実に豪傑たる人々である。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIEUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

ARAKI, Sadar, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponents: SHIBAYAMA, Warashiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby debase as follows.

From August, the 8th year of Showa (1933) to December, the 9th year of Showa (1934), I served in Peking as an assistant of the Military Attaché to the Japanese Embassy in China. After the Manchurian Incident, the feeling between Japan and China was markedly thronoming, but it was temporarily restored to tranquility with the conclusion of the Tangku Agreement, and diplomatic relations between the two states began to proceed smoothly once again. This was indicated by the Dairon Conference relative to transportation and communication. The object of this Conference was the opening of transportation.
and communication between Manchukuo and North China. In
other words, it was nothing but to have diplomatic relations
return to normalcy. The leader of the North China Regime
at the time was Huang Fu, who was directly responsible for
transportation and communication work. This, however, was
so serious diplomatic problem that they could not
成功fully deal with it by disregarding the Nanking
Government. Therefore, the North China Authorities received
orders from the Nanking Government and in its behalf
carried on negotiation. But the Nanking Government never
did directly concern itself in it. That was because it tried to
keep away from formally recognizing the independence of
Manchukuo. In other words, in those days the Nanking Government,
as a matter of actuality, recognized her. I heard of this at
the time from many Chinese leaders. The diplomatic relations
between the two states was in this manner gradually improved
but the undercurrents of anti-Japanese feeling among the
Chinese people never disappeared and remained vigorous as ever
correlating with the secret activities of the Communists.

This was made manifest by the assassination of a pro-
Japanese correspondent which took place in Tientsin in May, 1936
(Showa 11). Without eliminating such terrorist dark age
administration or anti-Japanese current thought, North China
could be made bright and peaceful and after all the rapporteurment between Japan and China could not be expected. That is why Lt. General UMEZU made a proposal to General Ho Ying-chiong in regard to the withdrawal of anti-Japanese forces from North China. Thus the so-called UmezU-Ho Ying-chiong Agreement was signed. It aimed at making North China to be a happy and peaceful place.

April 4,
22d year of Showa (1947)
at Tokyo

Deponent: SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereunto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
or the same date

Witness: ONO, Kisaku
(seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SHIBUYAMA, Kaneshiro (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947
In accordance with the formula employed in our country, I, after having taken an oath as set forth in the accompanying paper, hereby depose as follows.

I, ISHIKAWA, Jun, on December 4, 1946, at Tokyo, made the following answers in answer to questionings by Defense Counsel ITO and

(Ques.) Please state the period of your residence in North China and your duties while there.

(Ans.) I was in residence in North China between September, 1932 and January, 1937 as head of the MILNICH SHIBUN FEIFING Branch and in addition head of the Tientsin Branch of the same paper.

(Ques.) Please state the political situation in North China at that time.

(Ans.) My period of residence was from the Manchurian Incident to the spring of the year in which the China Incident broke out, so North China was the cynosure of the world, being in an atmosphere delicate as well as most serious, from a military, political, and economic point of view. As a result of the agreement, signed at Tung Ku May 31, 1933...
of the suspension of hostilities, the CHIIN PRO saw the creation of a demilitarized zone in it. In regard to the preservation of public peace, the Kwantung Army had a voice. CHIANG KAI-SHEK had left FEIPING and the former North-East Army had lost its power in North China; the Executive Council Administration Adjustment Committee stationed in FEIPING whose Chairman was HUANG Fu, and in addition the FEIPING subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee had been sent with Ho Yin-chin the Chief of the Military Administration Department as its chairman PRO tempore.

(Ques.) Was North China then in friendly relations with Japan?

(Ans.) Not necessarily so. Because of close geographical and economic relations between North China and Manchoukuo, as a natural course of event, political frictions were likely to arise in the former, and because of a strong desire for restoring the lost territory, somehow or other we felt there was unrest though not yet coming to the surface.

(Ques.) When did Major-General UMEZU arrive as Commander of the Garrison in China?

(Ans.) In April, 1934.

(Ques.) How was the attitude of the common people to Major-General UMEZU'S arrival as such?

(Ans.) Because of the Major-General's reputation as a man of good common sense with moderate and fair thoughts, his coming was generally welcomed. With this general as Commander, they thought that he would not make a mistake in coping with the complicated state of affairs in
North China.

(Ques.) How were you related with Major-General UMEZU?

(Ans.) While there, I had come to be on very intimate terms with him. Not as a newspaper man, but rather as a member of the Japanese nation, I often had interviews and frankly expressed my opinion and occasionally reminded him of the behavior of the Army. The Commander frankly admitted my unreserved opinion and gladly expressed his own thoughts on the matter.

(Ques.) Why did you come to be on intimate terms with Major-General UMEZU? Was there any motive?

(Ans.) The Commander once expressed his thoughts as follows:

"Since the Manchurian Incident Japan's foreign relations have become tense. So Japan's attitude toward North China has been the cynosure of the world, we should use prudence and caution in our behavior. I may be here one year or two years. I don't know how long. I would rather prefer being called a fool during my stay than having trouble with China. I want you to understand this and I wish you too will be a fool in the same sense as I am."

I was very deeply impressed with this brief remark of immense significance. Believing there would arise no trouble in North China while this Commander was in office, I positively wished to be good friends with the Commander without reserve, and I did so. Besides, the fairness of his thoughts regarding our attitude toward China also proved a motive of my being attracted to him.
(Ques.) How did the Commander express to you his thoughts regarding our attitude toward China?

(Ans.) The Commander often told me the following in substance as follows:

A. It is not proper for Japan to behave toward China with a sense of superiority.

B. We should take a sound and fair attitude toward China. Threats and coercion should never be resorted to on any account.

C. The rights and interests of Powers in North China should be fully respected. I strictly prohibit any act tending to infringe on these.

D. We should never interfere in Chinese internal affairs.

(Ques.) The UMEZU-HO Yin-chin agreement is said to have been proposed by Japan on the assassination of pro-Japanese newspaper men. Please tell us what you know about this matter.

(Ans.) In spring, 1935, the anti-Japanese sentiment in North China was quite serious, giving rise to even sanguinary incidents. Thus the situation had been increasingly threatening. In the meantime, on May 5 Hu En-pu, proprietor of the KUO CHUAN FAO was assassinated in the Japanese concession in Tientsin, and the next day on the 3rd, FAI E Yu-huan, proprietor of the CHEI FAO met the same fate in the Japanese concession. These two persons had been regard as pro-Japanese. The observation, on the part of the Japanese garrison, on this matter was that the Kuomintang party was behind the assassins and everything related with these incidents.

On May 29 when I heard that the Chief of the Staff Colonel SAKAI,
Tekashi and a military officer posted in PEIPING called on General HO Ying-chin and submitted various demands to him, I wished to ask the Commander's opinion, but since he was out in Shinkin being wired for by the War Minister HAKUSHI, I saw him when he came back from the trip. Then the Commander told me as follows:

"Frequent assassinations are really injurious to the diplomatic relations. If China fail to take some drastic measures toward this matter, unfortunate incidents will repeatedly happen. The agreement regarding the North China incident also provides for the suppression of anti-foreign acts. I sent the chief of the staff with items desired by us to talk with representatives of the Chinese Government as to how can we brighten, in the spirit of the agreement, the situation in North China. The items suggested by us were briefly this - the military forces and political party local chapters, from which dark politics or terrorism are likely to originate, should just be removed from the districts where Japanese residents are. I learned from him that it is not anything formal like a treaty or an agreement but simply an oral representation, and felt relieved as I thought such a step was just what his character might dictate.

(Ques.) Was this representation accepted by the Chinese?

(Ans.) General HO Ying-chin, as a result of his previous conference with the Nanking Government, accepted the items proposed by the Japanese Army and on June 10 withdrew of his own accord the anti-Japanese military forces. So there is nothing like an agreement.

- 5 -
There is much misunderstanding about this and many people think as if there is an agreement because the newspapers designated it the UMEZU-HO Ying-chin agreement.

(Ques.) Was Commander aware at that time that this representation had provoked the Chinese Government?

(Ans.) It is true that it proved more provocative than expected on account of poor statesmanship on the part of the negotiators themselves. Commander UMEZU tried not to give any further provocation to the Chinese.

I will give one example:

In the middle of June I had a visit from HSU Hsin-chih, Vice-Minister of the Department of Internal Affairs, from whom I got the following representation: "Kwantung Army airplanes are found flying over the withdrawing central military forces. There is danger of occasioning a war. Will you tell this to Commander UMEZU and ask him to stop it?" Immediately I called on the Commander and told him all about this. The Commander readily wired to the Kwantung Army and had it stopped, which favorably influenced the Chinese Government. This I learned later from HSU Hsin-chih.

(Ques.) Didn't he secretly expect the birth of something like a North China government or a self-government movement as a result of this agreement?

(Ans.) The Farmers' Self-government Movement was organized two months after Mr. UMEZU's departure and the CHICIA Government four months after.
It is not thinkable that he secretly expected the birth of such organizations behind the agreement. Mr. UMEZU, being of such a character, did not like politics and had a firm conviction that we should never interfere with the internal affairs of China. Though I had often talked with the Commander about China, I could hear from him not a word about such intention. So far as I am concerned, I shall never hesitate to deny it.

(Ques.) Wasn't there any gulf or difference between the Army Commander and the Chief of the Staff in regard to their opinion or character?

(Ans.) There was a considerable difference, it seems to me. I heard the Chief of the Staff publicly say "The Army Commander is weak." I often heard the Chief of the staff criticising the Commander because he was dissatisfied with the Commander who thoroughly rejected military oppression or coercion policies. When the Chief of the Staff SAKAI was going to make a representation to HO Ying-chin, he suggested to the Commander the concentration of our garrison forces in Faking, but the Commander did not permit it, saying it was not proper to make a demand by force of arms. I remember the Chief of the Staff criticized the Commander thus under these circumstances. I learned from the Commander himself at that time regarding the concentration of our military forces.
I swear, according to my conscience, to state the whole truth, neither concealing what I know nor adding what I do not know.

(signed) ISHIKAWA, Jun (seal)

On this 4th day of December, 1946
At Tokyo

Affiant: ISHIKAWA, Jun

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, 1946, at Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) IYATamental, Mitsuo (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defence Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947
CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that, according to our investigation, the document entitled "Policy for the settlement of the North China Incident, decided upon on 15 Jul 1937" was burnt at the time of the end of the war, and that therefore it is not in our custody at present.

On this 5th day of April, 1947
at Tokyo.

YOSHIYAMA, Yōzō (seal)
Chief Archives Section,
1st Demobilization Bureau

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

On the same date, at the same place

witness: BANNO Junkichi (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clark, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William F. Clark

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 April 1947
Def. Doc. No. 1153

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the telegram which was dispatched to the Commander of the Japanese Occupation Army in China from the Chief of the General Staff on July 9, 1937, to the effect that the Commander should keep from using armed forces, in order to prevent the spread of the affair, is not preserved in this Bureau, as it has come to light through examination that it was burnt at the termination of war.

Certified at Tokyo,
on April 5, 1947.

YOSHIYUKI, Yoizo (seal)
Chief of the Archives
Section of First Demobilization Bureau.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness,

of the same place, on this same date.

Witness: JUN KO, Junkichi (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 April 1947
昭和二十二年七月八日参謀総長ヨリ支那陸軍司令官宛電
止スル為ニ造営デ員単位ヲ行使スルコトヲ遠クハキ電ヲ差シタル電報文ハ
昭和二十二年四月五日
第一復囲局文書課長
於東京

右署名捺印ハ原立合人ノ面ニテハミテハサレタルモノ诺コトヲ聴聞ス
同日
於同所
立合人
阪

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LE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 301
CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the telegram which was despatched to the Chief of the Staff of the Japanese Occupation Army in China from the Vice-Chief of the General Staff on July 9, 1937, in regard to the Japanese course of action for the negotiations for settling the LUOCHIAO Affair, is not preserved in this Bureau as it has come to light through examination that it was burnt at the termination of the war.

Certified at TOKYO,
On April 5, 1947

YOSHIYAMA, Yozo
(Seal)
Chief of the Archives Section of First Demobilization Bureau

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereat in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
On the same date

Witness: BANNO, Junkichi
(Seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 April 1947
COMMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE AUTHORITIES ON THE CHINESE REPLY.

July 20, 1937.

The main points of the Japanese memorandum sent to the Nanking Government through acting Ambassador Hidaka were:

1. The Nanking Government should not obstruct the execution of the agreement reached on the spot.

2. The Nanking Government should stop all hostile movements against Japan.

The main points of the reply made on July 19 by the Nanking Government were: 1, simultaneous withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops to original positions; 2, solution by diplomatic negotiations; 3, the necessity of authorization by the Nanking Government for any agreement on the spot.

In bringing out these 3 points the Nanking Government simply evade our proposals and does not answer them.

1. The direct cause of the present incident is the wanton firing by the Chinese upon the Japanese and the responsibility rests entirely with China. She should therefore stop committing any more wrongs, withdraw her forces and in all sincerity seek a solution of the matter. The proposal
of the Nanking Government for the simultaneous withdrawal of forces is calculated to place a part of the burden of responsibility on Japan, who is not at all responsible. Moreover, the Chinese have already committed a series of unpardonable outrages by firing upon our troops, causing considerable casualties, in violation of the agreement of mutual withdrawal and cessation of hostilities; and we ignored the Chinese request for simultaneous withdrawal on the 12th.

2. China had armies of 200,000 strong already concentrated in North China and made a gesture of wiping out the small number of our Garrison troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area as well as all the Japanese in North China.

The decision of the Japanese Government to dispatch troops across the sea was nothing but an exercise of the right of self-defense. At the same time we continued to maintain an attitude of patience and self-restraint, hoping against hope that China might yet reconsider. Our home troops have not yet left Japan except for a few small units already sent. It is ridiculous that China should speak of self-defense while she concentrates colossal armies in North China.
3. The Hoooi-Chahar Political Council is a unique political entity of considerable proportions, the like of which is not soon elsewhere. This body has in the past engaged in a number of important local negotiations; and that the Nanking Government, which has hitherto refrained from interfering with those negotiations should suddenly insist upon the necessity of its recognition for any agreement to be made between Japan and the Hoooi-Chahar Political Council, can not but mean that Nanking desires to obstruct and amicable settlement of the incident by inventing pretexts. The aggravation of the situation is caused by the Nanking Government which is not only obstructing the settlement on the spot but is moving government troops into North China. The situation is likely to pass out of control unless the Nanking Government reconsiders at this very moment.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Comment of the Foreign Office Authorities on the Chinese Reply, July 20, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. URABE
TALK OF FOREIGN OFFICE SPEAKEN ON THE
NEGOTIATION CARRIED OUT IN NANKING. (July 20, 1937)

Late on the night of July 17, the Japanese Counsellor, Hidaka, called on the Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang-Chunghui, and handed to him a memorandum in which the Japanese Government urged upon the Nanking Government not to interfere with the execution of the agreement arrived at on the spot and to suspend immediately all military movements against Japan. Foreign Minister Yang told Counsellor Hidaka that he would be able to reply by Monday July 19.

At 2:30 p.m. July 19, Tung-Taching, Chief of the First Section of the Asiatic Bureau, by order of the Foreign Minister of the Nanking Government, called on the Japanese Counsellor, Hidaka, at the latter's office and handed an aide-memoire after reading it aloud to him.

1. Hidaka asked Tung if it were a reply to the Japanese memorandum presented to Foreign Minister Yang. Tung answered that he brought it merely by order of the Foreign Minister. Then Hidaka told Tung that he would receive it as a reply from the Minister Yang, but if it were not, he would expect to hear again from Mr. Yang within the day.

2. Hidaka pointed out that the aide-memoire seemed to mean that the Chinese would not suspend their military movements before the date to be agreed upon, that is, they would not immediately suspend those actions.
3. Counsellor Hidaka also pointed out that while the Chinese aide-memoire might be construed as not refusing to recognize a local settlement, it did not make clear whether or not the Nanking Government intended to interfere with the carrying out of the terms of settlement. Hidaka requested Tung to report to Foreign Minister Wang on the above three points, which Tung agreed to do. Repeatedly stressing the gravity of the situation, Hidaka called the attention of Tung to the fact that, in his private opinion, the Chinese reply on the present issue was of far greater importance than the Chinese Government appeared to think.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Keoru, Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Talk of Foreign Office Spokesman on the Negotiation Carried out in Nanking, (July 20, 1937)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 8th day of April 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi (seal)

Witness: /S/ K. Urabe
Late on the night of July 17, the Japanese Counsellor, Hidaka, called on the Chinese Foreign Minister, Vang-Chunghui, and handed to him a memorandum in which the Japanese Government urged upon the Nanking Government not to interfere with the execution of the agreement arrived at on the spot and to suspend immediately all military movements against Japan. Foreign Minister Vang told Counsellor Hidaka that he would be able to reply by Monday July 19.

At 2:30 p.m. July 19, Tung-Tszeching, Chief of the First Section of the Assistie Bureau, by order of the Foreign Minister of the Nanking Government, called on the Japanese Counsellor, Hidaka, at the latter's office and handed an aide-memoire after reading it aloud to him.

1. Hidaka asked Tung if it were a reply to the Japanese memorandum presented to Foreign Minister Vang. Tung answered that he brought it merely by order of the Foreign Minister. Then Hidaka told Tung that he would receive it as a reply from the Minister Vang, but if it were not, he would expect to hear again from Mr. Vang within the day.

2. Hidaka pointed out that the aide-memoire seemed to mean that the Chinese would not suspend their military movements before the date to be agreed upon, that is, they would not immediately suspend those actions.
3. Counsellor Hidaka also pointed out that while the Chinese aide-memoire might be construed as not refusing to recognize a local settlement, it did not make clear whether or not the Nanking Government intended to interfere with the carrying out of the terms of settlement.

Hidaka requested Tung to report to Foreign Minister Tung on the above three points, which Tung agreed to do.

Repeatedly stressing the gravity of the situation, Hidaka called the attention of Tung to the fact that, in his private opinion, the Chinese reply on the present issue was of far greater importance than the Chinese Government appeared to think.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Talk of Foreign Office Spokesman on the Negotiation Carried out in Peking, (July 29, 1947)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi (seal)

Witness: /S/ K. Urebe

I am happy to have this opportunity today of stating my views concerning the foreign relations of Japan.

It is not necessary for me to expatiate afresh on our national policy, which aims at securing Japan's position as a stabilizing force in East Asia, and contributing toward the establishment of true peace throughout the world. I believe that in order to carry out this policy we should, first of all, consider the relations between Japan, Manchukuo, China, and the Soviet Union.

In surveying the conditions of present day China, our Government can not but profoundly regret to note that anti-Japanese sentiments and movements have been encouraged and systematically exploited for the purpose of unifying public opinion and arousing nationalistic consciousness, and that untoward incidents evidently resulting therefrom are taking place in various quarters in China. At the time of the Chengtu Incident last year, the Japanese Government took occasion to ask the Chinese to rectify their attitude towards Japan, which constituted the fundamental obstacle to friendly intercourse between Japan and China, and to invite the Nanking
Government to demonstrate their sincerity regarding the concrete questions bound up with the amelioration of the relations between the two countries. Unfortunately, as you know, the negotiations came to an impasse, owing to Chinese recalcitrance. Since then, Sino-Japanese relations have been, frankly speaking, far from satisfactory. I need not report here that Japanese policy in East Asia is directed solely toward the realization of the stability of that region through conciliation and cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and by stopping the Communist invasion of the Orient. The Japanese Government therefore earnestly hope that China will, as soon as possible, come to have a full understanding and appreciation of our basic policy.

Today in China not only is such understanding or appreciation absent, but anti-Japanese sentiments have been still more intensified, of which the Lukouchiao Incident of the 7th of this month, was only the logical consequence. As regards the present incident, the Japanese Government have maintained, as announced in their official statement of July 11th, a policy of seeking a settlement on the spot and non-aggravation of the situation. Accordingly, the Government have been doing their best to effect a peaceful local solution, and at the same time to induce the Nanjing
Government to take proper steps for an early settlement of the question. It is my earnest hope that prompt reconsideration on the part of the Chinese authorities will lead to a faithful execution of the terms of settlement arrived at on the night of July 11th. The governments of the Powers have been informed in detail through our diplomatic representatives of this policy of the Japanese Government, and I believe they understand fully Japan's attitude of patience and self-restraint.

On the other hand, there is no knowing what will be the possible repercussions among the Chinese masses, dependent as this is upon what stand the Nanking Government may take. There exists, it must be admitted, the danger of an untoward outbreak at any moment. We have more than once called the attention of both the Chinese central government and the local authorities to the necessity for control of anti-Japanese activities and protection of our nationals in China. In order to insure the safety of our fellow-countrymen the Japanese Government are prepared to use all available means, which may be called for by the development of the situation.

Thus, in a word, China holds the key to the settlement of the present incident, as it depends entirely upon what course she may choose to follow. I confidently hope that the Nanking Government will adopt such effective and appropriate measures as will accord with our desire and bring about an early and
amicable settlement.

The Government are giving careful consideration to our relations with the Soviet Union. Incidents have continued to occur along the Manchoukuo-Soviet frontier. The most serious case was the recent illicit invasion and occupation of Manchoukuo islands in the Amur, which led to an armed clash of the Japanese-Manchoukuo forces with the Soviet intruders. The situation threatened for a time to develop into one of extreme gravity. However, the affair ended, as you know, in a peaceful settlement, the Soviet Government agreeing to restore the status quo ante in that region. The Japanese Government are deeply concerned over the state of things on the Manchoukuo-Soviet frontier, which gives rise to frequent friction. What is needed first of all is to take practical steps to prevent these border disputes. For that purpose, we should lose no time in setting up these two commissions for the demarcation of the border line and the settlement of disputes, which for some years past have been under consideration, and also devise other means of removing the tension all along the frontier. I cannot but urge most strongly upon the Soviet Government to co-operate freely and unreservedly with us in this task for the sake of the peace of East Asia.
Again, it is a matter of no small concern for the Government whether or not our nationals engaged in fishery in the northern waters and those having oil and coal concessions in North Sakhalin are to be accorded full guarantees for the legitimate operation of their enterprises. It is our policy never to tolerate the creation of any such circumstances as will in substance destroy these enterprises sanctioned, as they are, by treaty. In short, there remains between Japan and the Soviet Union a number of issues still pending, for the solution of which the Government will do their utmost.

As for our relations with Great Britain, I am deeply moved when I say that a short while ago on behalf of His Majesty the Emperor, His Imperial Highness Prince Chichibu, accompanied by Princes Chichibu, attended the Coronation ceremonies of the King and Queen of England, and by their mission they have enhanced the traditional friendship that binds our two nations. It has always been the consistent policy of the Government to promote Anglo-Japanese friendship, and more recently the two governments have come to an agreement of views regarding the advisability of entering into frank conversations with the object of adjusting the relations of the two countries. We hope to bring about an early attainment of
Japanese-American relations have been ultimately very good, being marked by evergrowing amity and good will. I am glad to say that the Economic Mission which visited the United States some weeks ago, have by their candid exchange of views with various circles accomplished much toward establishing closer contact between our two nations economically and otherwise.

Last year this country concluded the Anti-Comintern Agreement with Germany. The Government are striving for an effective application of the said agreement, and at the same time for the furtherance of friendly and intimate relations between Japan and Germany.

Now to turn to our trade relations with other countries.

Obviously the expansion of our export trade constitutes not only an indispensable condition of our national existence, but one of the most important means of balancing our international accounts under the present economic circumstances of the country. But as a matter of fact, the foreign Powers, for economic, financial or other reasons, still continue to maintain commercial barriers of various kinds against Japanese goods. The Government are working for a smooth development of our export trade by concluding such individual agreements.
with the governments of these countries as may be best suited to their respective circumstances, or by arranging for private agreements to be arrived at between our business interests and those of other countries. I am glad to say that since last spring our trade negotiations with India, Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, and Turkey, have all been brought to a successful conclusion. The Government will strive more energetically than ever for the maintenance and furtherance of Japan’s commercial interests, and at the same time make all possible endeavour to ensure free access to raw material and natural resources, and to promote the freedom of international trade. It is gratifying to note the growth of certain tendencies favourable to the restoration of the freedom of the Japanese Government to participate heartily in any international undertaking to convert these tendencies into a reality.

As may be seen from what I have stated above, Japan’s foreign relations at present are fraught with problems of great difficulty. For an effective execution of our foreign policy at this time a true rational unity is required—a unity which is based upon a full comprehension of the international situation. And I appeal to you for support and cooperation.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, KAZU, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English, consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Address of Mr. Koki, HIROTA, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 71st Session of the Diet, on July 27, 1937" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. URABE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- v -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: KAYASHIMA Takashi

Having first only sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depon as follows.

On this 9th day of April, 1947,
at Tokyo

/s/ KAYASHIMA Takashi

I, IMANARI Yasutaro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal hereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ IMANARI Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KAYASHIMA Takashi (seal)
I was formerly a lieutenant-general in the Japanese Army. At present I live at 1734, TAKANABE-Machi, MIYAZAKI Prefecture. From March in the 10th year of Shown (1935) to November in the 12th year of Shown (1937) I served as the Commander of the TIENTSIN Infantry Unit and Commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment in China. I was stationed in TIENTSIN most of the period.

On July 29, 1937, I took post in the fighting in NANYUAN south of Peking, as commander of the main regiment. On the evening of that day, we assembled at FENGTAI and, on the following day, the 29th, we advanced to a point near TATSING village and awaited further orders there. At 3:00 a.m. on the 30th, I was ordered to rescue the Japanese people in TONG-CHOW, where a disturbance had broken out. I hurried to TONG-CHOW at 3:30 a.m., at the head of the main regiment.

At that time the KIH-TUNG government was located in TONG-CHOW, and about 700 or 800 Japanese and Korean people lived there. Soldiers of the 1st Infantry Regiment, numbering about one platoon, were stationed there for the protection of the Japanese residents.

I heard that a disturbance had occurred in TUNG-CHOW, but I did not know at the time what sort of disturbance it had been. However, I was informed that Japanese people had been slaughtered. On the 29th, a fire broke out in the vicinity of TUNG-CHOW and black smoke could be seen rising high.
I therefore knew that something unusual had happened there.
We had hurried there without taking rest.
We arrived at TUNG-CHOW at 4 p.m. since we had got fragmentary information before we arrived to the effect that many Japanese people in TUNG-CHOW had been slaughtered, and that the Japanese Garrison there was having a hard fight and was at the brink of complete destruction. Seeing that our unit had arrived at TUNG-CHOW, the enemy retreated to the northeast and hid. Therefore we entered TUNG-CHOW without a struggle.

Within the wall, we found the very tragic sight of the abandoned corpses of ill-fated Japanese residents. The necks of most of the corpses were bound with rope. The corpses of innocent children and butchered bodies of women were such that the sight was almost unbearable. Astonished and indignant we hurried to the Japanese Garrison.

The Japanese Garrison consisted of 30 soldiers. The total member of Japanese soldiers there, including an additional 60 soldiers belonging to an automobile unit was about 100. Attacked and closely besieged by 3,000 Chinese soldiers, they had a bitter struggle. Fortunately, however, sheltered in a stone building, they had narrowly escaped complete destruction. There were 20 soldiers who had been killed or wounded.

Immediately by my order, the gate of the wall was closed, search was started within the wall, and the remnants of the
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Japanese people there were gathered together. Only 150 out of 700 or 800 Japanese residents assembled. 350 Japanese were found dead. It was unknown where the remaining 200 or 300 Japanese residents had gone, or whether they had been slaughtered.

At that time I inquired into details of the incident and reported them to the proper authorities.

I have no records of this report now. Therefore, in the following account I shall, rely upon the memory of what I witnessed. The impression of the miserable sight is unforgettable and will remain in my memory for the rest of my life.

1. I saw a restaurant called ASAPI-kEN. There 7 or 9 women aged between 17 or 19 and 40 had all been stripped of their clothing, raped, and shot to death. The private parts of 4 or 5 of them had been thrust through with bayonets. At the entrance of the house, a boy in school uniform aged 12 or 13, had been shot dead. Within the house, there was no furniture, bedding or clothing, etc., everything having been looted. Other Japanese houses were in a condition similar to the above.

2. The corpses of Japanese men who had been shot or stabbed to death remained in buildings which had housed business firms and public offices. Almost all of them seemed to have been pulled about with ropes around their necks. Blood was splattered on the walls. These scenes were beyond description.

3. In the case of KINSUIRO, the sight was appalling. It
Def. Doc. No. 1090

seemed to be the place where Japanese residents in TUNG-GHOW, sensing imminent danger had gathered together. They had been massacred on a large scale. Household articles had been scattered about near the front door and entrance, nearly all valuable articles had been stolen, and 4 male guests staying there had been shot to death in a parlour. It was said that the proprietress and the maids at KINSHURO had been tied together, raped with their hands and feet bound and finally beheaded.

4. Three Japanese, a husband and wife, and their baby, had hidden above the ceiling and narrowly escaped danger. The husband told me that they had witnessed beneath them the slaughter of one Japanese after another.
Translation Certificate.

I, Chadlio S. Terry, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\  Chadlio S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date 14 Apr. 1947.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

SHAZI, Sadao, et al

Short Deposition (Translation)

Exponent: SHAZI, Shizuo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accord with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
I was formerly a major and live at present at NOMI, SENCHO Village, ICUMI, CHIB Prefecture. I acted in behalf of the commander of the Infantry Gun Company of the 2nd Regiment, despatched on rescue duty to Tungchow in July, 1937. I arrived at Tungchow at 2:30 a.m., July 31, and, driving the enemy from the scene, saw many traces of the slaughter of the Japanese residents there. I relate here what I saw, and also submit some photographs I took at that time.

1. I went to the KINSUIRO Hotel about 8 a.m., July 31. When I got to the gate, I was surprised to see that the hotel was greatly changed, and felt disgusted at the stench from the corpses. I could see the interior of the house even from the gate because the porch-doors, shoji, and furniture were all smashed to pieces.

At the entrance, I found a corpse of a woman who seemed to have been the hostess of the KINSUIRO Hotel. Nearly naked, she was lying on her back along the passage near the entrance, with her feet stretched toward the door and with a sheet of newspaper placed over her face. She seemed to have made a strong resistance, for she was lying on the floor, stripped off her clothes. I remember that both the upper and lower halves of her body were exposed, revealing four or five bayonet wounds, which I thought to have been fatal to her.

Her private parts seemed to have been scooped out with a sharp instrument, for there were scattered marks of blood. The counter and the kitchen were so much ransacked that there was no room for me to step in, showing unmistakable signs of looting.
I saw four corpses of Japanese women lying in the maid-servants' room on the right side of the passage. It seemed that they had died in an extreme agony, but they were lying one upon another, in comparative order—perhaps on account of shooting, except one, lying dead on her back with her private parts exposed. The room was in such disorder that we could not stay in. Then we entered the counting-room and the kitchen, where a man and two women were found lying dead on their face or back. I didn't know whether they had been outraged or not, but there evidences of struggles having been made; the man had his eyes gouged out and the upper half of his body honeycombed with bayonet thrusts and two women had on their backs marks of bayonets stabs.

Next we stepped into the passage. In a room downstairs two corpses women were seen lying nearly naked, with marks of bayonets thrusts on their private and other parts.

Next, we found several corpses upstairs. They were comparatively covered with a quilt. Their feet, hands and hands were seen extruding, but I did not dare to remove the quilt.

There were seen a few corpses floating in an adjacent pond, but we had not time to approach them.

2. At a certain café in the city.

I went to the café where I had been a year before. When I opened the door, I felt relieved to see the room in its usual condition. But, stepping into the room, I found in a box a woman's corpse, nearly naked and strangled with a rope.
At the back of the cafe was a Japanese house, where a child and its parent had been cruelly murdered and the former had all its fingers cut off.

3. Corpses on the road.

There was a Japanese shop near the southern castle-gate. A corpse of a man who seemed to be the master of the shop was lying on the road, having been dragged out and killed. He had his bones exposed on the breast and belly, and his entrails scattered about.

On this 10th day of April, 1947

At Tokyo

DEponent KATSURA, Shizuo (seal)

I, MIYATA, Shigeo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) MIYATA, Shigeo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

__ KATSURA, Shizuo (seal)
I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/3/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 14 April 1947
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: SAKAIRAI, Fumio

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I am an ex-army-major and at present residing at No. 938 SAKUSABE MACHI, CHIBA City.

At the time of TUNG-CHOW incident, I moved in to that walled city, on July 30, 1937, for purposes of rescue as a platoon leader in the Second Regiment which was stationed in China, along with the main strength of the regiment, and saw closely the spectacle of the massacre of TUNG-CHOW. So I will relate the conditions of that time as follows:

1. As soon as I entered the walled city, at about 4 p.m. I was ordered to sweep the southern half of the walled city TUNG-CHOW with the platoon under my command, as the commander of the mopping up force and I immediately commenced operations.

First of all, as we moved out the east-gate of the garrisons camp, we witnessed the massacred bodies of men and
women of our residents lying scattered, every few YO (TWO; 2 yards). Our indignation reached its climax but as we could no find any enemy soldiers about, we exclusively engaged ourselves the accommodation of those who were still alive until midnight.

As we examined each house crying loudly, "Is there no Japanese?", from here and there, crawling out one after another from garbage-bins, trenches, or from behind a wall, a child whose nose was pierced crosswise with wire or an ox, or old women whose one arm was cut off, or a pregnant woman whose abdomen was stabbed with bayonets etc. came forth.

2. Inside a certain restaurant, I witnessed the remains of an entire family massacred, with each of the individuals with the heads and both arms cut off.

All and any women more than 14 or 15 years of age were raped. It was indeed an unbearable sight.

3. When we entered an eating-house called the "ASAIKIHON", we found the corpses of seven or eight women completely stripped, raped, and shot or bayonetted. Among them, there were those whose private parts had a broom inserted, those whose mouth was stuffed with sand, those whose abdomen were cut open lengthwise etc., it was indeed unbearable to see.

4. There was a pond near a shop kept by a certain woman in the neighborhood of the east-gate. In this pond, whose water was dyed red with blood, were found the six corpses of an entire family; their necks were tied together with rope and their two hands tied together and pierced with No. 8-iron-wire as heads.
Thus it was after 9 o'clock that night, if I remember correctly, when we finished mopping up. I remember that up to that time I had seen about a 100 massacred bodies, and that we had collected about 20 seriously or slightly injured persons from the area with which I was responsible for mopping up.

Among these who were injured, there were some who became insane, others, almost without exception, were in a dazed stupefied state.

This tragic "picture-scrawl of hell" which I had seen with my own eyes is deeply engraved in my brain even now.

Since I took some pictures of some of these massacred bodies of our residents, I will present them here.

on this 10th day of April, 1947
At Tokyo

DPFOMENT SAKURAI, Furio, (seal)

Miyama, Mitsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depenent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

At Tokyo

Witness: (Signed) MIYAMA Mitsuo (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ SAKUPAI Fumio (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947
昭和廿二年（一九四七年）四月十一日
於東京

供述

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"Since July 29 a movement for the formation in the Tientsin municipality of a commission for maintenance of peace and order was progressing with Mr. Shen Tung-wu and other influential Chinese as guiding spirits. Mr. Kao Lin-wei, an elderly and influential Chinese of the locality was chosen for the post of chairman of the projected commission for maintenance of peace and order in Tientsin. Mr. Kao is now deliberating with his colleagues for the formal inauguration of the commission at the Fuomin Hotel in the French Concession.

Members of the commission are to be chosen in the proportion of 5 members from commercial and industrial circles and 5 members from local gentry. Those representing commercial and industrial circles are: Mr. Wan Hsiao-yen (Director of the Chamber of Commerce and chairman of the Native Bankers Association), Mr. Wan Chu-lin (Chairman of the Tientsin Chamber of Commerce), Mr. Chiu Yu-tang (executive Director of the Chamber of Commerce), Mr. Chang Che-chou (Inspector of the Chamber of Commerce), and Mr. Chao Ping-ching (Chief Inspector of the Chamber of Commerce).

The members representing the local gentry are:

Mr. Liu Yu-shu (formerly Director of Public Safety Department of Tientsin Municipal Government), Mr. Sung Jung-yu (formerly chief secretary of Tientsin Municipal Government), Mr. Niu Chuan-shan (Member of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council), Mr.
Fang Jo (Influential Member of the Chinese Community in the Japanese Concession), and Mr. Shen Tung-wu (Lieutenant-General).

The Commission for Maintenance of Peace and Order in Tientsin is to handle urgent matters regarding the stabilization of peace in the city including the distribution of provisions and other materials and restoration of communications in conjunction with the Chinese police service when the latter regains its functions.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Foreign Office received on the night of August the following report from Consul-General Furiuchi at Tientsin," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947,

/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

witness: /S/ K. Urabe
As I had occasion a short while ago at the 71st session of the Diet to speak on Japan's foreign relations in general, I shall confine myself today to a review of the developments since then of the China Affair.

Ever since the beginning of the present affair, the Japanese Government, in pursuance of their policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, have exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution. The Hankow Government, whose prompt reconsideration was invited, failed to manifest a grain of sincerity, but concentrated their cries in North China to challenge Japan, while in the Yangtze Valley and elsewhere in South and Central China they embarked upon an anti-Japanese campaign of the most vicious kind, which not only prevented our nationals in that region from engaging in their peaceful pursuits, but also jeopardized their very existence. In these circumstances, the Japanese Government still desiring to avoid the disturbance of peace as far as possible, ordered the evacuation of all Japanese residents in Hankow and other points along the Yangtze River. Shortly after that, on August 9 at Shanghai, Sub-lieutenant Oyano and Seamen Seito of the Landing Party were murdered at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps. Even then, Japan, adhering to peaceful course, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited Zone, and
finally launched an unprovoked attack upon the Japanese. Thereupon, as a matter of duty our Government despatched a small naval reinforcement to Shanghai as an emergency measure to insure the protection of our nationals in that city.

In view of these disquieting developments in Shanghai, the ambassadors at Washington of the five Powers—Great Britain, America, France, Germany, and Italy—sent a joint request on August 11 both to Japan and China that the two countries do all in their power to carry out effectively a plan to exclude Shanghai from the scope of any possible hostilities so as to safeguard the lives and property of foreigners therein. Our Government replied through Ambassador Franco to the effect that while Japan was most solicitously concerned over the safety of the lives and property of all foreigners as well as of the Japanese in Shanghai, China should, as the first prerequisite, withdraw outside striking distance her regular troops and the Force Preservation Corps that were advancing on the Settlement and concerning the Japanese, and remove the military works in the vicinity of the International Settlement, and then Japan would be prepared to restore her forces to their original positions provided China agreed to take the above steps. The ambassador was also instructed to request the Powers concerned to exert their influence toward inducing China to execute these urgent and appropriate measures, which, however, were firmly rejected by China.

On August 17, the Consul-General at Shanghai of Great Britain, America and France submitted a certain concrete plan, proposing that Japan and China enter into direct negotiations for the purpose of averting the impending crisis. The text of the proposal was received in Tokyo at midnight, August 18. But in the afternoon of that very day, the Chinese carrier,
that had been pouring into the Shanghai area, took the offensive, and on the 14th their airplanes dropped bombs not only on the headquarters of our Landing Party, our Consulate-General but also all over the International Settlement. No longer could we do anything but abandon all hopes for a peaceful settlement and fight for the protection of our 30,000 nationals in Shanghai. I regret to say that the earnest efforts of the Powers concerned were thus nullified by Chinese outrages.

Shanghai, having been converted into a theatre of hostilities, grave concern was naturally shown by the Powers who had vast amounts of capital invested and large numbers of their nationals residing in the city. Great Britain notified both Japan and China under the date of August 18, that if the governments of the two countries agreed to withdraw their forces mutually and to entrust to foreign authorities the protection of Japanese subjects residing in the International Settlement and on the Extra-Settlement roads, the British Government were prepared to undertake the responsibility provided that other Powers would cooperate. Next day on the 19th we were informed by the French Government of their readiness to support the British proposal. The American Government also had previously expressed their hope for the suspension of hostilities in the Shanghai area.

Japan, having as great interests in Shanghai as these Powers, is equally solicitous for the peace of the city. But as has been stated above, the actions taken by the Chinese in and around Shanghai are plainly in violation of the "Treaty Agreement of 1932," in that they illogically moved their regular troops into the zone prescribed by that Agreement, and increased both the number and armaments of the Peace Preservation Corps, and in that relying upon their numerical superiority, they challenged the Landing Party
and civilian population of our country. Therefore, in their reply to the
British proposal our Government explained in detail Japan's successive
attempts toward a peaceful solution, as well as the truth regarding the
inflaming Chinese attacks, and stated that the hostilities at Shanghai could
not be brought to an end save through the withdrawal of the Chinese regular
forces from the prohibited zones, and of the local Invasion Corps from
the front lines. At the same time, our desires were expressed that
Great Britain as one of the parties to the Peace Agreement would use her good
offices to bring about the withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside the
prohibited zones. Similar replies were sent France and Europe.

As for North China, in the full time and of the various plebes and
6 months, Chinese Central armies were moved northward to indulge in a
series of preventive sanctions, and large forces been to pour into the
province of Shaan. Our Government, therefore, have had to take determined
steps to meet the situation.

Thus hostilities have now spread from North to Central China, and
Japan finds how if carried on a major conflict with China in extended
fields. I am to deeply joined to say that some 50,000 Japanese residents in
various parts of China have been forced to evacuate, leaving behind them
their businesses and interests, while not a few of them have been made
victims of hostilities. It is clear that nations of third
countries in China are being subjected to similar trials and tribulations.
All this is due to no other cause than that the Nanking Government and also
the local militarist rulers in China have for many years past deliberately
under-taken to incite public opinion against Japan as a means of strengthening
their own political power, and in collusion with Communist elements they
have still further impaired Sino-Japanese relations. Now our loyal and
valiant soldiers, with the united support of the nation behind them, are
engaged in strenuous campaigns night and day amid incalculable hardships
and privations. We cannot but be moved to hear of their heroic sacrifices
as well as their brilliant achievements.

It is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese
Government runs at the stabilization of East Asia through conciliation and
cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China for their common prosperity
and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motive, has mobilized her
vast armies against us, we can do no other than counter if by force of arms.
The urgent need at this moment is that we take a resolute attitude and
compel China to mend her ways. Japan has no other objective than to see a
happy and tranquil North China, and all China freed from the danger of a
reoccurrence of such calamitous hostilities as the present, and Sino-Japanese
relations so adjusted as will enable us to put into practice our above-
mentioned policy. Let us hope that the statesmen of China will be brought
to take a broad view of East Asia; that they will speedily realize their
mistakes; and that turning over a new leaf, they will act in unison with
the high aim and aspirations of Japan!
have still further impaired Sino-Japanese relations. Now our loyal and valiant soldiers, with the united support of the nation behind them, are engaged in strenuous campaigns night and day amid indescribable hardships and privations. We cannot but be moved to hear of their heroic sacrifices as well as their brilliant achievements.

It is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government rises at the stabilisation of East Asia through conciliation and cooperation between Japan, 'Manchuria, and China for their common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motive, has mobilized her vast armies against us, we can do no other than counter if by force of arms. The urgent need at this moment is that we take a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her ways. Japan has no other objective than to see a happy and tranquil North China, and all China freed from the danger of recurrence of such calamitous hostilities as the present, and Sino-Japanese relations so adjusted as will enable us to put into practice our above-mentioned policy. Let us hope that the statesmen of China will be brought to take a broad view of East Asia; that they will speedily realize their mistakes; and that turning over a new leaf, they will act in unison with the high aim and aspirations of Japan.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source on Authenticity

I, M.Y. Shii, "H.uru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the "current record" attached in English consisting of 18 pages and entitled
"Author's of the "Yokkai" Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Seventy-Second Session of the Diet, September 5, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official translation
of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certificated at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of January, 1937.

(Signed) (Signature of Official)

Witness: (signature) in room, office.
支那事変の発展に伴い、中国軍の活動拡大が進み、関東軍は中国軍の勢力を制圧するために対策を講じた。この中で、関東軍はチョウ族の反乱を抑え、中国軍の進撃を防ぐために有事態対策を講じた。また、関東軍は支那事変の発展に伴い、中国軍の勢力を制圧するために対策を講じた。この中で、関東軍はチョウ族の反乱を抑え、中国軍の進撃を防ぐために有事態対策を講じた。
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. M. Oishi, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese
Embassy Office, hereby certify that the document hereinafter
attached is authentic consisting of 2 pages and entitled
"Address of Mr. Koki Kimura, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
at the Seventeenth Session of the Diet, September 5, 1937."
is an exact and true copy of an official Document of the
Japanese Embassy Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
this 17th day of January 1947.

[Signature]
Minister of Official

Witness: [Signature]
STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO THE PRESS, SEPTEMBER 2, 1937.

Since my appointment as Foreign Minister in the Konoye Cabinet, I have been looking forward to the pleasure of meeting you. I am, therefore, genuinely delighted to have this opportunity of discussing, freely and frankly, questions of the day with you. As I am fairly well-acquainted with most of you, I hardly need, I think, to explain to you again what are my cherished hopes and aspirations, except to say that the policy of "concord and cooperation with all nations" does still remain with me as the guiding principle in conducting the foreign relations of my country.

There has developed between Japan and China a situation which is indeed very regrettable. I shall not touch upon the origin and development of the present incident which you all know so well. I wish only to emphasize here the high degree of patience and forbearance with which the Japanese Government have consistently been striving to bring about a peaceful settlement. At the time of the Lukouchiao affair, our Government, hoping to the last to reach a pacific solution, through a local settlement, did everything possible to prevent the aggravation of the situation, in spite of the repeated bad faith of the Chinese. The Nanking Government, which manifested
a complete lack of sincerity, not only rejected the agreement arrived at on the spot, but also moved vast armies northward, challenging Japan directly. Moreover, they incited and instigated popular feeling against this country to such an extent that the lives and property of our nationals throughout China were suddenly jeopardized.

As the conflict began to spread, we lost no time in ordering the evacuation of Japanese residents from Hankow and other points on the Yantze as well as from various places in Shantung and South China. This measure was taken with a view to forestalling the occurrence of any untoward incidents, and this, more than anything else, demonstrated powerfully our sincerity in observing the avowed policy of non-aggravation. Of course, this measure involved untold sacrifices on our part, as it amounted to a complete abandonment of business interests acquired after many years of arduous toil by our nationals; however, we decided to bear even these for the purpose of avoiding the aggravation of the situation.

Again, when on July 11, the Cabinet decided on despatching contingents in view of the forth Chinese situation which was growing worse every moment, we still clung to the anticipation of bringing about an amicable solution, and continued to nourish the hopes that the Hankow Government would reconsider their attitude. Thus, to the last moment we sought and strove for
a pacific settlement, firmly determined as we were to prevent an armed clash. And we took exactly the same attitude in regard to the Shanghai affair.

In some quarters abroad, people seem to be under the erroneous impression that at Shanghai, Japan was retaliating for the murder of an officer and a sailor of her Naval Landing Party by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps. Nothing could be further from the truth. Of course, China was entirely to blame for the shooting of our marines, but our Government, with the greatest self-restraint, endeavored to reach an amicable local settlement through diplomatic channels. The hostilities broke out in Shanghai because China, in violation of the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities around Shanghai concluded in 1932, rushed her regular troops into the forbidden area, and strengthened her Peace Preservation Corps both in number and equipment, and then deliberately provoked the Japanese. Our Government firmly believe that, as the first prerequisite, those Chinese forces should be made to withdraw from the fighting area and the Chinese military works in the vicinity of the International Settlement should be removed, if the city is to be spared the disastrous effects of an armed conflict. In other words, foreign lives and property in Shanghai are menaced not by the small Japanese forces defending the Settlement, but, rather, by the Chinese armies which, relying upon their vastly
superior numbers, undertake the offensive against the Japanese. In fact, in our desire to maintain peace and security in and around Shanghai, we were giving favourable consideration to the proposal of the Powers to preserve these regions from the danger of hostilities when the Chinese launched a sudden attack upon the International Settlement, our Consulate-General, and our warships on the T'hampoo, bombing them indiscriminately from the air—and our forces were compelled to return the fire for the defense of our nationals, numbering more than 30,000, in the city.

Both in North China and at Shanghai, it was without question unwarranted Chinese provocations that precipitated the hostilities. The fundamental causes lay in the fact that the leaders of present-day China have long fostered anti-Japanism as a tool for political purposes, exploiting diplomatic issues to enhance their prestige; and to that end they have, through collusion with Communists, openly and energetically prepared for a war with Japan. The Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact concluded a few days ago is of special significance in this regard. To this, Japan as a bulwark against Communist encroachment upon East Asia, can not afford to remain indifferent.

A major conflict is now in progress between Japan and China, despite our earnest efforts to avert it. However, striving as our armies are for the protection of our legitimate rights and
interests and for the attainment of an enduring peace in East Asia, the Japanese Government are prepared as ever to recall their expeditionary forces and join hands with China in friendship, the moment the Chinese Government demonstrate their sincerity in reconsidering and rectifying their attitude toward Japan. But, in view of the fact that the Japanese people cannot tolerate the recurrence of such deplorable affairs, and with the situation already assuming the serious proportions it has, we are firmly determined to pursue our declared policy until the possibility becomes ripe for a fundamental settlement.

Japan and China are, after all, neighbors and old friends. It should not be such a difficult task to realize the ideal of mutual prosperity and well-being. In the interests of the peace of East Asia and of the world, I cannot conceal my fervent hope that the Chinese Government will reconsider the policy they have pursued up till now vis-a-vis Japan.

As regards the rights and interests of third Powers, I can assure you that they will be fully respected by Japan. Our Government are giving careful consideration to the matter of safeguarding them. At the same time, in order that peace may be restored as soon as possible, the Powers are invited to cooperate with Japan by refraining from any action which would be likely to prolong the present hostilities. I deeply regret to hear that the victims of the conflict included many foreign
residents.

Since the press have an important rôle to play in promoting international understanding and good will, especially in such a critical situation as is now prevailing, I wish, ladies and gentlemen of the Press, to appeal to you for your whole-hearted cooperation.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Knoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Statement of The Minister For Foreign Affairs to the Press, September 2, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) K. Urabe
南京政府強化ノ具ニ仏シ節ナ外交内政問関ニ悪用シ、多年ニ亘リ抗日ノ風
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自分

文書の出所及び成立

レタル日本語に依ツテ寄カル

九月一日於外務大臣高知人記者会見ト

保管ニ係ル公文書ノ正確ニシテ現実ナルナル事ヲシテ

立会人

明治二十二年四月八日
於東京

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浦部

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同日於同所

石ノ署名抜印ハ自分ノ前に於テ為サレタリ

馨
In spite of the negotiations now going on in Ruping based upon the agreement by which both Japanese and Chinese armies in the Marco Polo Bridge district ceased hostilities since noon the 9th withdrawing to both sides of the Yung Ting Ho and are strictly forbidden to commit all hostile actions, a little over 100 Chinese soldiers started to attack our unit near the Marco Polo Bridge Station accompanied by chase-gun bombardments from the direction of Jeh-mun-Kow which is situated at a point about 4 kilometers north of Marco Polo Bridge since 5.10 p.m. on the 10th. However, our army repulsed them immediately. At 7 p.m., another new unit again started to attack the area around the Marco Polo Bridge, and at present both sides are pitted against each other. In addition, the Chinese unit on the right bank of the Yung Ting Ho started to bombard our unit by trench mortars. The Chinese forces on the right bank of the Yung Ting Ho were thus greatly increased and now amount to 5 groups and 5 regiments, accumulating munitions in a brisk manner in the area. Challenging actions such as these have become ever more audacious, and no one can tell what would happen in the immediate future.

Our army is still doing its best in checking the incident from aggravating. However it is feared that our efforts might prove fruitless. We must contend that all responsibility for this state of affairs entirely rests with the Chinese side.
Def Doc No. 1163

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by Nakazawa, Yukio, consisting of 383 pages and entitled "China Memories Continued" is a book which was bought in 1932 Sept. at Tokyo, and which has been thenceforth in my custody.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 1st day of April, 1947.

[Seal]

O.H.RO., Shinichi

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: [Seal]

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北支軍部在日支軍部は九日正午以来永稿河を臨で、彼をまって一切の戦闘行為を固く禁止するとの照会の下に自下北平において会談を臨み、我が部隊に攻撃を来し、直ちに之を観察した。午後九時に到り、永稿河南方近くに於て、戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件は斯く未増加して五個団五個陸戦に達し、その後方には戦闘状況附近に於て、支那陸戦部事件はス
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Sworn Deposition

Defendant: FURUYAMA Katsuo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I am FURUYAMA, Katsuo by name, living at house-number 41, 1-chome Mabashi, Suginamiku, Tokyo and aged 52.

Graduated from the Law Department of the Tokyo Imperial University in 1921, became a member of the South Manchurian Railway Company Ltd., in May of the same year. Resigned from the Company at its dissolution in September, 1945. While in the South Manchuria Railway Company I was an Adviser of the Mukden Railway Office, January, 1932 to May, 1934.

Regarding the so-called Dairen Conference, I state as follows:

Manchukuo was founded on March 1st, 1932. It took about one year and a half, to see the internal order and peace regained.
and various systems needed in an independent state inaugurated. It was on September 15th, 1932, that Manchukuo gained recognition by Japan as an independent state. Later the Umogu-Ho Ying-Chin agreement was signed for the purpose of solving all disputes between China and Manchukuo. An understanding was reached between the leaders of the two countries to make use of that opportunity and settle all other questions pending between China and Manchukuo. In July or so of 1933, a Conference was held at Dairen for inaugrating a through sever between railways and communications of the two countries.

I myself took part in matters of the railway. China was represented at this conference by the Director of the P-iping-Shanhaik Railway, Mr. Yin Tung, and the local government representative, Mr. Lei Sheu-Yang, as Chief-delegates, while from the side of Manchukuo, the Director of the Mukden Railway, Mr. Kan Tuo, and I, then Advisor to the same Railway Office, attended as Chief-delegates.

The conference was held at the Hyoto-Hotel, Dairen. As a result of the conference an establishment, the Toho-Ryokosha (the East Tourist Bureau), was set up which was to be run by the joint-management of China and Manchukuo for the purpose of carrying on all businesses concerning the through traffic service. All detailed matters were drawn up in about two months after the conference, and this became the agreement governing through traffic service of the Mukden-Shanhaikwan and Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railways. The through railway traffic
service between the two countries by the virtue of the aforesaid agreement was commenced from about January 1st, 1934.

"FURUYAMA, Katsuo.

On this _fourth_ day of February, 1947
At KOKUMIN School, Nishimachi, Shityaku.

DEPONENT  FURUYAMA, Katsuo  (son)

I, SANMONJI, Shohoi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At KOKUMIN SCHOOL, Nishimachi, Shityaku, Tokyo-To

Witness: (signed) SANMONJI, Shohoi,  (son)

Attorney.
Def Loci No. 1506

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

FURUYAMA, Katsuo (seal)
Ordinance for the Promotion of International Amity
(Tw-issued by the Nanking Government)
(June 10, 1935)

National Government Ordinance

As immediate means to ensure the independence of our country it is essential that internally we administer the affairs of State with fairness, quicken the advance of culture, and enhance the national strength, while international good faith should be faithfully kept and international peace should be established in harmonious co-operation with other countries. Above all it is of urgent importance to promote friendly relations with our immediate neighbours.

In obedience to the repeated admonitions of the Central Government, our people should endeavor to cultivate a close friendship with our allies and strictly refrain from such speech and acts as will incite agitation and ill feeling against the allied nation(s). Especially we decree that no organization shall be borned that will interfere with amicable relationship with our allies. Those who act contrary to this decree shall be severely punished.

We hereby issue this Ordinance.

Chief of National Government: Lin Sen
Chief of Executive Yuan: Wang Chao-nung.
DEF. LOC. #BB.

CERTIFICATE

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

1. HAYASHI Keoru, Chief Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "International Relations Promotion Ordinance," issued by the Makana Government, is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo
on this 11 day of August, 1945.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
Witness: Narukawa Oto

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 19th Sept. 1945.
(Translation)

The address of Dr. H.Kachiro Jita, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
At the 69th Session of the Imperial Diet, May 6, 1936.

Having assumed the responsibility of conducting our foreign affairs in these eventful times both at home and abroad, I have the honor to-day of stating my views concerning the foreign policy of Japan.

To insure the stability of East Asia, contributing thereby to the cause of world peace, and at the same time to promote the happiness and welfare of mankind by upholding firmly international justice, has always been our national policy, and in the execution of this policy it should be, I believe, the guiding spirit of our diplomacy: to seek the security and development of our national life as well as to work for concord and cooperation among all the nations and especially to maintain upon the basis of our special and inseparable relationship with Manchoukuo, our position as the stabilizing force in East Asia.

Under such a policy animated by such a spirit, we shall of course be independent and positive in dealing with various international questions. On the other hand, we must take care not to impair the honor and dignity of Japan as a great Power but strive assiduously to conform to the august wishes of our Sovereign by cultivating, as is set forth in the Imperial Rescript issued at the time of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, "mutual confidence between Our Empire and all the other Powers and make known the justice of its cause throughout the world."
Nowadays there prevails all over the world an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and unrest, and tendencies are everywhere that are threatening the preservation of peace. So must first of all eliminate the causes that underlie this atmosphere of unrest and dissatisfaction if we are to insure the peace of the world. While it is only natural that all nations should try to safeguard their own interests, excess of ardour in that attempt often leads a country to disregard the position of others. This is one of the prime causes of the universal unrest today. One cannot but hope that the statesmen of the world will give serious thoughts to this point as they address themselves to the task of readjusting international relations, political and economic.

With these preliminary remarks I shall now speak on our relations with the Powers.

We desire for the sake of the peace of East Asia the maintenance of normal and peaceful relations between Japan and Manchoukuo on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other. It is scarcely necessary to say that neither Japan nor Manchoukuo harbors any aggressive designs. That there should occur, nevertheless, incidents, such as have so frequently occurred in recent months, along the frontiers both between Manchoukuo and the Soviet Union and between Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolia, is most regrettable. Our Government have already called the attention of the Soviet authorities to the fact that wanton resort to arms on a dogmatic assumption that a trespass has been committed upon their territories, where there exists no clear border demarcation, can serve no useful purpose and only injure the friendly relations between the nations concerned. I take this occasion
to emphasize this point again most strongly. The Japanese Government, after consultation with the Government of Manchoukuo, proposed in the middle of March last a plan for taking proper and effective measures for the clarification of the border line all along the Soviet-Manchoukuo frontier, and, simultaneously, for setting up an organ for the peaceful solution of all border disputes. We proposed to put this plan into execution, beginning with the zone between Lake Khanka and the Tamon River on the eastern frontier, where disputes have been most frequent. And in view of the fact that nearly all of the recent incidents have taken place in this region, it was thought that our practical proposal would speedily be accepted by Government of the Soviet Union. Now that they have indicated their concurrence with our views, I hope that discussions of concrete questions will begin in due course.

Direct negotiations are now in progress between Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolia. Along with the progress of these negotiations it is, I am told, the intention of the Government of Manchoukuo to solve amicably the various pending questions and to establish good neighborly relations with Outer Mongolia. It is hoped that these direct negotiations will result in an early solution of all questions, and particularly in the exchange of... 

As may be surmised from what I have said so far, the present relations between Japan and the Soviet Union cannot be said to be altogether felicitous. The fundamental cause of this unfortunate state of things lies, if I may say so frankly, in the lack of comprehension on the part of the Soviet statesmen of Japan's position in East Asia, coupled with their baseless fears...
and suspicions. The fact that the Soviet Union maintains excessive armaments at her remote outposts in the Far East constitutes a real menace to peace in this part of the world. I desire to state definitely on this occasion that Japan in her solicitude for the peace of East Asia cannot remain indifferent to that fact.

As regards Manchoukuo, we are pursuing our immutable policy which is rooted in the inseparable relationship between our two countries, and aims consistently at the establishment of normal tripartite relations among Japan, Manchoukuo and China. While we continue to assist as much as possible in the economic development of Manchoukuo, we are also making preparations for carrying out step by step the abolition of extraterritoriality and the adjustment and transfer of the administrative rights in the South Manchuria Railway zone.

With China we are to proceed with negotiations on the basis of the three principles expounded at the last session of the Diet by the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota. Only it is essential in order to expedite these negotiations that the Chinese authorities should take a truly broad view of the situation in East Asia and enter upon them with a firm resolve. It is very unfortunate that apparently China as yet has not come to a full decision. However, in the face of the obvious and imperious necessity of adjusting Sino-Japanese relations in the interest not only of the two countries but also of the peace of East Asia, it is our intention to urge the Chinese Government to make up their mind and at the same time to do everything possible on our part to bring about the readjustment of our relations along all lines. The Japanese Government are greatly concerned...
over the inroads of the communist influence into East Asia. It is reported that a part of the main force of the Red army, that moved into Shensi from Szechuan sometime ago, has recently invaded Shansi, and is still active in that province. Moreover, in view of the likelihood that they may march on northwards at any favorable moment, we are watching the developments with particular attention.

On the 22nd of January last King George V passed away — an illustrious monarch, universally loved and admired for his wisdom and the rare personalit, which, during his long reign of twenty-five years, enabled him to guide his people through great trials, including the World War. The new King, Edward VIII, who once visited Japan, is thoroughly conversant with the intricacies of the international situation. I desire to express our country's best wishes that the British Empire may prosper as ever under His Majesty's rule, and our confident hope that the traditional friendship of our two countries will continue to grow. There are a number of questions in various parts of the world, which affect our mutual interests and which await settlement in one way or another. However, if the two countries, keeping in mind their old friendship and their common responsibilities toward world peace, give full consideration to each other's special needs, the adjustment of their interests should not, I believe, prove too difficult.

The Japanese-American friendship lies the very key to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. It is most fortunate that not only are the economic relations of the two countries complementary, but their mutual understanding is being steadily deepened. I believe that the two nations, always respecting each other's position and aims, should collaborate more and more for
insuring the peace of the Pacific. I shall devote my best efforts to the
furtherance of Japanese-American amity and understanding.

In the field of international trade the tendency is more in evidence th:
ever among many countries abroad to attempt the exclusion of foreign products
under one pretext or another, or to form the so-called economic blocs,
heavily armed with weapons of trade war. If this tendency is left unchecked,
it will, as has always been pointed out by our Government, serve only to
aggravate the world-wide depression, ultimately paralyzing international
commerce and shattering the economic life of all peoples. We have taken
every available occasion to urge upon those countries the abolition of their
economic armaments as the true and only means of saving the world from the
thorns of economic depression, of realizing the common prosperity and
happiness of all peoples and of promoting peace in the world. However, I
regret to say that our just claims have not been accepted by most countries,
which are expanding the scope of their obstructive measures against trade
more widely than ever—in some cases apparently for the sole purpose of
excluding Japanese goods. This is a serious matter for our nation, which
cannot sustain its economic life except by securing abroad a supply of raw
material and a market for finished products. We shall have to continue our
efforts by friendly means for the mitigation or abolition of economic arma-
armament. But should the conditions fail to improve despite our endeavors,
we might be compelled to adopt the necessary measures in order to meet the
situation. Even then, we would, of course, have no other end in view than
that of causing the Powers concerned to reconsider their policies and of
placing international trade relations in a free and wholesome atmosphere.
Finally, I should like to say a few words on international cultural relations. The knowledge and appreciation of one another's culture and civilization is essential for promoting unity and good understanding among nations. Since 1938 the Japanese Government have given their support to the inauguration of various international cultural enterprises and have encouraged their expansion; besides carrying on as hitherto the activities in China of the Cultural Work Bureau. As a result, a marked growth of interest in the study of things Japanese has been recently seen abroad.

We shall continue to foster the enterprises in this field in order to advance the cause of international understanding and human well-being.

It is also our plan to improve and expand the various facilities and institutions now under the auspices of the Cultural Work Bureau for fostering cultural co-operation among Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and for contributing to the advancement of the world's civilization through the dissemination of the noble and profound culture of the Orient.

The recent unfortunate incident in Tokyo seems to have shocked the whole world. But for the august virtue of our sovereign and the spirit of loyalty and solidarity manifested by our people on that occasion, Japan's foreign relations might have suffered untoward consequences. I firmly believe that our people in all walks of life should, with a full grasp of the international situation, work together with courage and determination if we are to surmount the difficulties we before us and to put into execution the national policy of our requires. Let us rely upon your earnest and whole-hearted co-operation while I, on my part, will do all in my power to fulfill the responsible duties of my post.
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The recent unfortunate incident in Peking seems to have shocked the whole world. But for the august virtue of our Emperor and the spirit of loyalty and solidarity manifested by our people on that occasion, Japan's foreign relations might have suffered untoward consequences. I firmly believe that our people in all walks of life should, with a full grasp of the international situation, work together with courage and determination if we are to surmount the difficulties we face and to put into execution the national policy of our Empire. Let us rely upon your earnest and whole-hearted co-operation while I, on my part, will do all in my power to fulfill the responsible duties of my post.
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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in JAPANESE consisting of 4 pages and entitled "EXCERPT FROM THE HOUSE HD RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE 69TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET NO. 3 (WEDNESDAY MAY 6, 1936) is a book which was bought in 1936 at TOKIO, and which has been thenceforth in the custody of our OFFICE.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 12 day of JUNE, 1947

7/S/ TSUNO, Naoyoshi (seal)
(Chairman of Tokyo Lawyers association)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place, on the same date

Witness: /s/ OKO, Mitsuo (seal)
東南アジア

東南アジアの歴史

東南アジアには、5世紀から8世紀にかけて数多くの王国が存在した。これらの王国は、現在のタイ、マレーシア、フィリピン、インドネシア、ベトナム、ラオス、カンボジア、ミャンマー、シンガポール、ブラ-du、東南アジアの歴史に影響を及ぼした。これらの王国は、中国との交渉、観光地であることもあり、また、近世から近代にかけての経済、文化の発展に寄与した。
不详
For turning to our foreign affairs, I wish to say that the Government will pursue in the spirit of international justice a national policy, embodying the unanimous will of the nation, in order to secure the stability of East Asia and to promote the common prosperity of all nations and to brighten thereby the horizon of our international relations. To that end we will further strengthen our intimate and inseparable relations with Manchoukuo, and pay special attention to the adjustment of our relations with China and the Soviet Union.

As regards China, it is to be deeply regretted that despite our efforts in the past to act in concert with that country for the purpose of ensuring stability in East Asia, the Chinese Government have as yet failed to understand fully our true intentions, and there have risen a number of problems between the two countries. I believe that it is of urgent necessity at this juncture to cultivate cordial feelings between the two nations and to improve their relationship so that they may be brought to work in close co-operation for the peace and stability of East Asia. And for this purpose we must foster mutual appreciation and bring about closer contact not only between the two Governments but also the two peoples and achieve in more concrete form co-operation and mutual assistance of the two countries. No matter what obstacles there may be, we are resolved to surmount them and to effect the adjustment of the relations between the two countries.
For the sake of the peace of the Orient it is of course necessary that the Soviet Union should correctly comprehend Japan's position in East Asia and that both the Soviet Union and Japan should seek to establish harmonious relations. To speed the negotiations or the pending issues toward an amicable settlement is to contribute to the accomplishment of this end. I wish therefore to urge upon the authorities of the Soviet Union to take a broad view and cooperate with us in that regard.

A short time ago our Government concluded with the German Government an agreement guarding against the menace of the Comintern; this was a timely measure as well as one of imperative necessity for Japan to take in the light of the rampant activities of the Comintern throughout the world, especially in East Asia in recent times. The Government will try not to err in the execution of the agreement but will do their utmost to secure best results therefrom.

Japan's policy of promoting friendship with Great Britain and the United States is immutable. Between the former country and ours there exist questions of various sorts requiring adjustment. But none of them is of such character as will impair the foundations of the Anglo-Japanese friendship. I firmly believe that they will be solved through mutual understanding.

As for the naval disarmament problem, Japan from this year on is not a party to any limitation treaty. However, it is needless to say that there shall be no change in our policy of strict adherence to the principle of non-menace and non-aggression.

Finally, one of the indispensable conditions of Japan's national development is the expansion of the foreign trade, of which the need now particularly
For the sake of the peace of the Orient it is of course necessary that the Soviet Union should correctly comprehend Japan's position in East Asia and that both the Soviet Union and Japan should seek to establish harmonious relations. To speed the negotiations of the pending issues toward an amicable settlement is to contribute to the accomplishment of this end. I wish therefore to urge upon the authorities of the Soviet Union to take a broad view and cooperate with us in that regard.

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Finally, one of the indispensable conditions of Japan's national development is the expansion of the foreign trade, of which the need now particularly
gent in view of the present economic situation of our country. The
Government will do everything to eliminate whatsoever obstacles
against the foreign trade of Japan, and take appropriate steps to
expand its volume.

The execution of these varied programmes of our foreign policy
will require the united strength of the entire nation, without which
it will be impossible to obtain the desired results. I avail
myself of this occasion to ask for your support and co-operation.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Part of the Address of the Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, Mr. Senjuro Hayashi, bearing on the Government's Foreign Policy, at the Seventieth Session of the Diet, February 15, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 13th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato
満願を、当行、著者に返上。
日本の中立国は、シリアの問題について、国際連合の決議に従って、中立を保つ方針を貫いている。この方針は、日本が国際社会への参加を積極的に行うための基盤を形成している。

日本の外交政策は、平和維持と国際協力を重視している。日本は、国際連合の活動に積極的に参加しており、国際社会の問題解決に貢献しています。

日本は、国際社会の多様性を尊重しつつ、自己の利益を追求する方針を貫いている。日本は、国際社会の多様性を尊重しつつ、自己の利益を追求する方針を貫いている。日本は、国際社会の多様性を尊重しつつ、自己の利益を追求する方針を貫いている。
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Knoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that
the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting
of 43 pages and entitled "Part of the Address of the
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr. Senjuro
Hayashi, bearing on the Government's Foreign Policy,
is an exact and true copy of an official document of the
Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato
NEW YEAR STATEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER ARITA
January 1, 1939, (the fourteenth year of SHOWA)

(Translation)

We greet now here the new spring of the 14th year of SHOWA (1939) and the third year of the China Incident. The strength of the Imperial Army has already swept away important cities of China, as well as principal ports along the three great basins of the Yellow River, the Yangtse River and the Pearl River. The Chiang-kei-Shek Administration has already fallen into a local regime and the foundation of the new government, which advocates a pro-Japanese and anti-communist policy as its guiding principle for the salvation of China, has been greatly strengthened. Popular resentment against the Chiang Administration, which by its anti-Japan and pro-communist policy has brought about the downfall of East Asia, is rising high and among the Chinese masses.

That Japan has as its final aim the establishment of a new order for ensuring a lasting peace in the East Asia is as was already announced by the Government. This new order aims at sweeping off the old idea which regarded the Orient as the colony of the Western Capitalism, and establishing a new equitable relationship based upon the International justice by amending various international principles built upon the old
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conception. This new order will have a close link among three nations — Japan, Manchukuo, and China — as its basis and, by perfecting a common defense against communism, will cut off the evil roots of subversive intrigues of the Communist International. It will also, by the realization of an economic coalition, promote the welfare of the masses and will create a new culture of the East and, thus, contribute to the progress of human culture of the world at large. With this unprecedented great work before us, we are in a flame with an ardent will of accomplishing it by the united efforts of our people, and we feel a boundless hope for our promising future.

At this time, we, the Japanese people, should express a profound feeling of gratitude toward the two anti-Comintern nations, Germany and Italy, who have a clear-cut understanding about our resolute stand against communism, and who, with an accurate cognizance of the reality existing in East Asia, take a sincere attitude to join hands with us for the up-building of peace in East Asia. It is needless to say that there still are numerous obstacles lying in the way to the establishment of a lasting peace in East Asia. The Chiang-kai-Shek regime now removed to the interior of China is re-organizing its defeated armies and is still making active propaganda of continued resistance against Japan. It is obvious that we cannot attain our final aim unless we succeed in annihilating these anti-Japanese forces. It is a specially deplorable fact that some third
powers are openly adopting policies of assisting the Chiang-kaip-Shek regime from diverse motives and, by so doing, are retarding the termination of the hostilities. We need also keep a constant vigilance against the menace of Bolshevism which, in taking advantage of the chaotic condition prevailing now in East Asia, is conceiving subversive intrigues. Furthermore, there are Powers who, being too anxious to guard their vested rights and interests in China, ignore realities existing within the zone of military operations and make unreasonable demands, or who are apt to meet the new situation that will arise after the Incident with their old conception inconsistent with the new state of affairs. In view of such a situation, we keenly feel the need of making greater efforts than ever for correcting the understanding of the third nations and adjusting international relations.

Taking this occasion of entering upon the third year of the Incident, I wish to offer my congratulations for the commencement of the task of creating a new order which aims at establishing a lasting peace in East Asia as well as to pray for its prosperous future. I also wish to express; together with the whole nation, an immutable resolution to carry out at all costs the work for the restoration of East Asia, keeping in mind the importance of the duties imposed upon us for the execution of this great task.
Excerpt from "Matters concerning the Anti-Japanese Movement and the Boycott of Japanese Goods in the "Jinan Incident Volume X.

Note from MOHI, Yoshitaka, Charge d’Affaires ad interim to China, to Baron TAIKA, Giichi, Foreign Minister, dated Nov. 24, 1923 (Showa 8).

Subject: Report on the Japanese Goods Registration Act, anti-Japanese Slogans, etc.

No. 1261.
November 24, 1923 (Showa 8) (appendix attached)

From: MOHI, Yoshitaka, the Charge d’Affaires ad interim to China.
To: Baron TAIKA, Giichi, the Foreign Minister.

Subject: Report on Japanese Goods Registration Act, anti-Japanese Slogans, etc.

releating to my telegram No. 1591, I am sending you for reference one copy each of the following documents hereto attached:

1. The Regulations for Registration of Japanese Goods of Each Store in the Special City in Peking, made public on the 12th November by the Anti-Japan Society here.

2. Translation of the Regulations for Punishment of “Chien-min” (T.N. wicked people), distributed by the National Anti-Japan Society.

3. Translation of Anti-Japanese Slogans announced at the Anti-Japan Propaganda Commission on the 13th this month. Copies of this note to be sent to: Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin.

- 1 -
The Regulations for Registration of Japanese Goods of Each Shop
in the Special City in Peiping.

Article 1. The present Regulations are enacted according to Main
Principles of the Plans for Breaking-off of Economic
Intercourse with Japan* distributed by the National Anti-
Japan Society.

Article 2. The present Regulations shall be applicable to Japanese
goods which arrived at each shop in this city prior to
15th November and have not yet been sold yet.

Article 3. Japanese goods which have already arrived and have not yet
been sold, shall be divided into two kinds, namely "Relatively
Prohibited Goods" and "Absolutely Prohibited Goods".

(A) Relatively Prohibited Goods:

Japanese goods for culture, transportation and medicine; and various
materials produced in Japan which are indispensable for manufac-
turing in our country and for the livelihood of our people, and for
which suitable articles cannot be substituted for the time being.

(B) Absolutely Prohibited Goods:

All goods other than Relatively Prohibited Goods are prohibited with­
out exception.

Art. 4 Japanese goods which have already arrived at each shop in this
city and have not yet sold been will be registered at the
Anti-Japan Society from Nov. 15 to Nov. 30, and two (2)
registration lists will be made, of which one is to be kept at
the Society and the other at each shop for reference.

Art. 5. In case unregistered Japanese goods have been found after the
term of registration has expired, they will immediately be
confiscated. For absolutely prohibited goods, a transit and
consumption pass shall be valid until the end of this year
according to the lunar calendar, but not good at the expiration
of the term.

Art. 6. Absolutely Prohibited goods shall be examined at the Investi­
gation Section of the Commission for Breaking off Economic
Intercourse, where a certificate shall be issued for them.
Each merchant shall report himself with the certificate to
the "Save-the-Nation Fund" Commission of the Anti-Japan
Society and pay the "Save-the-Nation Fund at the following rate
ad valorem:

(1) Cotton Piece goods: 50 per cent.
(2) Coarse Muslin: absolutely prohibited (This 2nd item shall be treated
   according to the 3rd item.) - (This item is not clear)
(3) Coarse Muslin: 50 per cent.
(4) Sugar : 50 per cent.
(5) Stationery : 20 per cent.
(6) Sea-products : 50 per cent.
(7) Chinaware : 50 per cent.
(8) Dyos : 40 per cent.
(9) Medicines : 10 per cent.
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(10) Nutriments: 30 per cent.

(11) Foreign Haberdashery: 50 per cent.

(12) Silk: 90 per cent.

(13) Timber: 50 per cent.

(14) Perishable Goods: 90 per cent.

(15) Luxuries: 90 per cent.

(16) Silk Textiles: 50 per cent.

(17) Coolie Cloth: 50 per cent.

(18) Hides and Leathers: 50 per cent.

(19) Toys and other miscellaneous goods: 90 per cent.

Art. 7. For relatively prohibited Japanese Goods already registered, the Save-the-Nation Fund shall be paid at least at the rate of 5 per cent. ad valorem.

Art. 8. For relatively prohibited Japanese Goods imported after May 3 will be registered at the Anti-Japan Society and may be sold after payment of the Save-the-Nation Fund at 5 per cent. ad valorem thereon.

Art. 9. In respect to absolutely prohibited Japanese Goods which were ordered before November 15 and have not yet arrived each merchant shall cancel his order, and if impossible, they shall be dealt with according to Article 5, provided that they may be received after being registered at the Anti-Japan Society.

Art. 10. Japanese Goods which were already registered and for which the Save-the-Nation Fund was paid, may be sold after a pass has been issued for them by the Investigation Section.

Art. 11. Japanese Goods which were already registered and for which the Save-the-Nation Fund has been paid and the transit and consumption pass issued by the National Anti-Japan Society.
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may be sold everywhere.

Art. 12. Those goods bearing neither a trade mark nor a firm's name shall be regarded as Japanese goods.

Art. 13. Relatively Prohibited Japanese goods shall be decided upon at the Public Decision Commission organized by the Anti-Japan Society.

Art. 14. The present regulations shall be put in force on the day of promulgation.

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Translated by
Defence Language Branch

The Regulations of Punishment of "Chien-min" (T.N. literally, "wicked people") distributed by the National Anti-Japan Society.

Art. 1. In order to realize the breaking off of economic intercourse with Japan and to stop the sale of "enemy goods" by "Chien-Shang" ("wicked merchants") and the export of prohibited goods, this society specially enacted the Regulations for the Punishment of "Chien-shang".

Art. 2. The methods of punishment come under the following three categories:

(a) Honor Punishment:

In the area where "Chien-min" resides, as their names, permanent domiciles, photographs, offences, etc. shall...
be advertised in newspapers, and sign-boards of "Chien-min" will be erected at places where they will attract public attention.

(3) Public Right Punishments:
The names and offences of "Chien-min" will be reported to the "central Forty and the Government, and they shall have public rights necessary for their business suspended.

(C) Monetary Punishments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade Fine</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st grade</td>
<td>10,000 yuan and over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd grade</td>
<td>5,000 yuan and over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd grade</td>
<td>1,000 yuan and over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th grade</td>
<td>1,000 yuan and under</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Art. 3. One who violates any of the following provisions, shall be punished according to this Regulation:

(1) One who has not his "enemy's goods" registered according to the provisions, shall have the goods confiscated and be punished with the 4th grade fine.

(2) In case any person is found to have concealed Japanese goods or to have made a false report at the time of registration thereof, he shall have the goods confiscated and be punished with the 4th grade fine.

(3) One who has sold Japanese goods without receiving a pass after registration thereof, shall have the goods confiscated.
In case any person is found deliberately not to have had his goods examined, he shall have the goods confiscated and be punished with the 2nd or 3rd grade fine.

For discrepancy between the Sales Report and the Registration List, the person responsible for shall be punished with the 3rd fine.

One who has smuggled or secretly sold Japanese goods shall have the goods confiscated and be punished with the 1st or 2nd grade fine.

One who has changed the trade marks or the appearance of Japanese goods to pass them off as domestic or other countries' goods, shall have the goods confiscated and be punished with the 1st grade fine and, in addition, with Honor Punishment.

One who has smuggled out the home products, the export of which is prohibited, shall have the goods confiscated, and be punished with the 1st grade fine and, in addition, with Public Right Punishment.

One who has sold staple raw materials produced in our country to Japanese merchants or factories shall have the goods confiscated and be punished with the 1st grade fine and, in addition, with Public Right Punishment.

Land and sea forwarding agents who have communicated secretly with "Chien-shung" and dealt in the latter's goods shall be punished with the 2nd or 3rd grade fine.
and Honor Punishment, and the said goods shall be forfeited.

(11) One who stores Japanese goods in secrecy shall have the goods confiscated and be punished with the 2nd or 3rd grade fine.

(12) One who has advertised or publicized Japanese goods shall be punished with the 2nd or 3rd grade fine and Honor Punishment.

(13) One who engages in business jointly with a Japanese merchant shall have his share forfeited and shall be punished with the 1st grade fine and Public Right Punishment.

(14) One who has sold Japanese goods to our merchants as an agent shall be punished with Honor Punishment and the 4th grade fine.

(15) Any retail dealer who has sold directly to consumers Japanese goods which were not yet registered, or which were registered but for which a pass was not issued, shall be punished with Honor Punishment and the 4th grade fine.

(16) Any clearance agent who has forwarded Japanese goods to any port in our country for a consignor shall be punished with the 3rd grade fine and Honor Punishment.

Art. 4. (Omitted)

Art. 5. Any person who in case when the fine imposed upon him has misrepresented that he has not the ability to pay it or has not paid it may be detained by the neighboring Police Bureau which will be informed of such a person by the Anti-Japan Society at the appropriate peace.
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Days under detention shall be calculated at one yuan a day.

art. 6. (omitted)

art. 7. The present Regulations shall be promulgated and put into operation on the day when passed at the meeting of the Executives of National Anti-Japan Society.

(remainder omitted.)
Anti-Japanese Slogans

A. Those concerning overthrow of Japanese Imperialism.

1. Down with Japanese Imperialism!


3. To put into practice "the Three Principles of the People" begins with Knocking down Japanese Imperialism.

4. Don't forget Japanese Imperialism which murdered our brethren in Tsinan.

5. Down with Japanese Imperialism invading Manchuria and Mongolia!

6. Overthrow of Japanese Imperialism is Outlet to Emancipation of the Chinese Race.

7. Knock down Japanese Imperialism, that is our Responsibility.


B. Those regarding to national Humiliation.

9. Don't forget the National Disgrace of May 3!

10. Don't forget the Tragedy of the Tsinan Incident!.

11. I swear to avenge our brethren murdered in Tsinan.

12. Don't forget the Massacre of our brethren on May 3!

13. I swear to wipe away the National Humiliation.

C. Those concerning diplomacy.

14. Abolish all the Unequal Treaties between China and Japan.

15. Fellow countrymen! Be united and back our diplomacy!
16. Nullify all Japanese rights in China!
17. Execute revolutionary diplomacy!
18. Diplomacy is backed by the armed people.
19. Without withdrawal of Japanese armed forces, negotiations on the
    Tsinan Incident cannot be opened.
21. Recover us Manchuria and Mongolia!
22. Rights of constructing the Changchun-Talai and the Kirin-Hailung
    Railways cannot be conceded to Japan.
23. Punish the leaders of the tragic Incident in Tsinan!

D. Those concerning breaking off the economic intercourse.
24. We would rather die than use "Enemy's goods".
25. Japanese paper money should not be used.
26. Breaking off economic intercourse shall be executed.
27. Boycott Japanese goods!
28. Strictly prevent "chien-shang" from smuggling Japanese goods!
29. Cutting economic intercourse is sufficient to seal the fate of Japanese
    imperialists.
30. Execute tariff autonomy!.
31. Use home products in order to boycott Japanese goods.
32. Boycott Japanese goods by promoting our industries!
33. Don't supply raw materials to Japan!
34. Never be employed by Japanese!
35. Don't convey Japanese goods!
36. Don't board Japanese ships!
37. Patronage of home industries is a step forward in the anti-Japan task.
36. Withdraw your money from the Bank of Japan!

39. Fellow countrymen! Be united and oppose Japan with one accord.

40. Three cheers for the success of anti-Japan movement!
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, 1st. Lt. McPl, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 13 pages and entitled "Note from Jori, Chargé d'affaires ad Interim to China, to Tanaka, Foreign Minister, dated November 24, 1923." is an exact and true extract of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

On this 20th day of February, 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urao.

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William A. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William A. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date: March 21, 1947.
公第一五六四十四

在

帶

時代理公使

陳

外務大臣

田中一寛

往暹第一五月九日

日貨登記條例及反日謠等事報告

宣言委員會附於

本日報送

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第十條　凡本條約施行之際所為之約定，不得加以更改。
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第二條
合同ノ為ハ左ノ三種トス

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第四条

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(中文内容)

(中文内容)

(中文内容)
日本銀行の信用状を発行する機関は、主として日本銀行の主導下で信用状を発行し、これを保証するものである。信用状は、必要な場合に日本銀行の資産を用いて発行するもので、その信用状の発行は、日本銀行の準備金の一部を用いて行うものである。

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To: Baron SHILISHA, Kijûrô, the home Minister.

From: HORIYACHI, Jensuke, the Extraordinary Charge d'Affaires, in China.

August 14th, the 4th year of Shôwa (TN: 1929)

Report concerning the association for Expediting the Abolition of Treaties.

I have reported the renaming of the local Anti-Japanese Association to the Peking National Association for Expediting the Abolition of Treaties, by telegram No. 783. After that, however, the Peking Branch of the Nationalist party planned to establish separately an Association for Expediting the Abolition of Treaties with the present member of the following five bodies -- i.e. Laborers' Union, Students' Federation, Journalists' Association, Farmers' Association and the Merchant's Association which were under the influence of the Nationalist Party. As a result, all staff members of the former Anti-Japanese Association, resigned on July 15th. Accordingly, the said five bodies opened a joint conference on the 20th of the same month, at which they decided to establish a Preliminary Committee for Association for Expediting the Abolition of treaties. The General Assembly of the Preliminary Conference was held on the 22nd of the same month, with Mr. Chang Tai-chun and Mr. Sung Shu-chun representing the Merchants' Association, Mr. Hsu Shu-chuan and Mr. Chang Kian-chu representing the Laborer's Union, Mr. La Feng-tei and Mr. Tan Iao-shan representing the Farmers' Association, Mr. Hsu Taun-hao and Mr. Lu China-chun representing
The Students' Federation, Miss Li Hui-chen representing the Women's Association and Mr. Pan Cheng-i and Mr. Lan Shih-yuen representing the People's Training Association, etc., etc., attending. The following items were decided at the assembly:

1. All operations should be suspended until the establishment of the association for Expediting the Abolision of Treaties.

2. To take over the respective organs related with the Anti-Japanese Association.

3. The allotment of position. Afterwards, the Preliminary Committee determined to establish a Permanent Committee of 5 representatives selected from three persons from each of the said bodies. Accordingly, Pan Shu chuan (Lavorer's Union), Li Han-chan (Merchants' Association), Kan Hsien-yin (Students' Federation) Li Hui-chen (Women's Association) and Li Feng-wei (Farmers' Association) respectively assumed their positions of committeeman.
Certified at Tokyo,
on this 16th day of March, 1947.

/S/ HAYASHI, Kooru. (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed
here-to in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date

witness: /S/ URAI, Katsuma. (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify
that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is,
to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is
as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

//S/ Yukio Kawamoto. (seal)

Tokyo, Japan
Late 26 April, 1947.
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代表者
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図版・平面図を参考に、展開図を調査を行なって、今後の提案を進める予定です。

昭和40年11月11日

調査

図版名

制図

2023年3月
Consul-General SHIGEITSU's Telegram to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, (19 Aug. 1929) No. 12681

A code telegram Shanghai 19 Aug HM
Arrived Home Office 17 Aug HM
TO: Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA
FROM: Consul-General SHIGEITSU

No. 983-2

According to the information received at this office the original of the secret order from the government of CHIANGSU Province to the head of each province under its control (as the telegram of 9 August) has the same content as the instruction No. 648 of the nationalist government to the FUKIEN Province government referred to in the telegrams of Consul-General in FU-CHOW to your excellency of Numbers 131 and 132 and its main points are as follows:

1. Although it is inevitable that the economic breach with Japan should be continued rigorously, the lynching by the anti-Japanese organizations themselves of the search, attacks and confiscation of Japanese goods or of interference should be ceased.

2. From now on the boycott against Japanese goods should be carried on by each merchant's
asssociation on their own responsibility.

3. The merchant's association concerned should be punished severely when it does not arrest and punish the people who handle the Japanese goods.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Keoru, who occupy the post of the head of Document bureau of Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Consul-General SHIGEMITSU's Telegram to Foreign Minister " is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 12 day of March, 1947

HAYASHI, Keoru
(Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witnesses.

At the same place
On this same date

Witness: UJIIBE, Katsuma
(Seal)

Defense Document 1306
The Note from Consul KAWAI at Shanghai to Foreign Minister ARITA

December 24, 1936

Top Secret No. 1850
Received on December 28, 1936

East Asia Bureau

TO: Foreign Minister ARITA, Keisuke

FROM: Consul-General KAWAI, Tatsuo at Shanghai

SUBJECT: Attitude of "Save-the-Nation" organizations towards the Sian Incident.

Both the Chinese and foreigners are watching with deep concern the development of the Sian Incident which broke out on December 12th. As Chang Hseuh-liang and his followers' anti-Japanese policy consists of "resistance to Japan through compromise with communism and union with Soviet Russia", the attention of the people has also been turned to the movements of the Federation of "Save-the-Nation" organizations throughout the country and the "Save-the-Nation" organizations under it, which advocate the same policy and have been making frantic efforts to organize an anti-Japanese united front through the cooperation of political parties and groups.

But perhaps because the highest leaders of the Federation of "Save-the-Nation" organizations throughout the country are under wholesale arrest (top-secret document No. 1557, dated December 19) no activities by such organizations have since been apparent for several days. As the facts about the Sian Incident became gradually clear, their attitude seems to have been decided on, for they issued a few days ago, under date of December 15,
"The Emergency Declaration concerning the Present Situation", the translation of which is as attached hereto.

The main points of the opinion of the "Save-the-Nation" organizations concerning the Sian Incident are as follows:

1. Cessation of civil strifes.
2. Suspension of the drive against the communists.
3. Formation of a united anti-Japanese front and putting an end to the Chiang-Cheng rivalry.
4. Peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident.
5. Strengthening of hostilities against the Japanese forces in Suiyuan.

And it seems to be their object in view to put an end to civil strifes by carrying on hostilities against the Japanese. While keeping a vigilant watch over the movements of the "Save-the-Nation" organizations, we hasten to report on the present situation as above.

One copy each of this telegram has been sent to:

Ambassador to China, Peiping
Ambassador to Manchoukuo
Consul-Generals in China
Hongkong
Harbin
Kwantung Bureau
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupies the post of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Telegram from Consul-General KAWAI, Tatsuo at Shanghai to Foreign Minister ARITA, Katsumo, received on December 28, 1936" is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo
On this 3rd day of April, 1947

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
On this same date

Witness: URIBE, Katsumo (seal)
United States America, etc.  

- Versus -  

M. A. Sadee, etc.  

Plaintiff:  

Deponent:  

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
1) I was the Chief of the American Bureau in the Foreign Office until April 1937 (12th year of Showa). I was the Consul General in Shanghai from May 1937 (the 12th year) until March 20th 1938 (the 13th year), and was a Councillor at the Japanese Embassy in London, from June 1933 (the 13th year of the Showa era) until September 1939. I received an order to return home in August 1940 (the 15th year of the Showa era) at the time when Mr. K. TSUZUKI was the Foreign Minister, I resigned when I returned home in October 1940, and was appointed as the Japanese Consul General at Singapore in October 1,41 (the 16th year of the Showa era), I arrived at Singapore on October 5th of the same year, and was interned on the 3th day of the same month due to the outbreak of the war. I was transferred to India, then sent to Lorenzo Marcez (phonetic) due to the exchange of diplomats between Japan and England in August 1942, (the 17th year of the Showa era), I was ordered to go Europe from the same place, and was appointed as the Minister to Sweden in November 1942. I took office there, and after the surrender of Japan, departed there in January 1946 (of the 21st year of the Showa era), I returned home in March and resigned from the office in April.

2) During my life as a diplomat, I was in England from the 9th year till the 11 year of the Taisho era, again from the 13th year till 15th year of the Showa era, in America for the 5 years from the 14th year of the Taisho era till the 6th year of the Showa era, and took office, in the same office, of the Chief of a Section in the European and American Bureau, and the Chief of the American Bureau. My relationship with England and America...
Having lived over a long period of time, and I had so many friends among the people of the both countries that, I think, I might be regarded as one of the pro-British and pro-America faction in the Foreign Office.

Realizing the correctness of this principle, I believed that Japan, England and America should not conflict in any manner, at any time, and that, further, they were not able to wage a decisive conflict, considering many conditions surrounding them, the only way for them to get along was to bring about friendly understanding between them.

3) In Shanghai too, I made a friendly acquaintance with Mr. Yu Hung-chun, the then Mayor of Shanghai, Mr. Gauss, the U.S. Consul General, Mr. J.W.O. Davidson, the British Acting Consul General, and Mr. John Keswick, an influential business man in Shanghai.

4) At the time when I arrived at my post at Shanghai, while there was the feeling of relief among the Chinese people on the news that the Sian Incident was settled and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek rescued, there was a gloomy and uneasy foreboding about Sino-Japanese relations even in Shanghai over some indications caused by the North China situation.

5) When I investigated the affairs concerning Japan and China on my arriving at my post at Shanghai, I got the report that China, breaking the Cease-Fire agreement of May, 1933 (of the Showa era), was reinforcing many Manchui (or ROC Preservation Corps) in the forbidden area, mixing it with the regular army, and was constructing trenches and wire entanglements around the place, and was reported to be reconstructing the Musung Fortress. When I received these reports, I did not want to neglect too, though it was not long since my assuming office, and recognizing the necessity of
calling them to attention of the authorities concerned, I requested on 23rd of June the calling of a meeting of the joint committee based on the Cease Fire agreement of May 5, 1933. The navy, after consultation, approved my idea.

This committee was organized with the Consul-Generals and military and naval attachés of Japan, Britain, U.S.A., France and Italy, and was to meet from time to time. But it had not met for five years.

The joint committee met at the French consulate-general, and was chiefly concerned with the discussion between Mayor Yu and myself.

I proposed in substance as follows: 'I have received information about the reinforcement of the Pacotui, the construction of trenches, and the use of light tanks and iron-entanglements by the Chinese army at the forbidden area. If this were true, it could constitute a breach of the Cease-Fire agreement, and I wish the committee would take measures to investigate whether the above facts are true or not.' Mayor Yu made an objection to the proposal for investigation, insisting that Japan was too nervous. And the third party members present at the Committee seemed not too pleased to intervene in the strife between Japan and China. The meeting did not reach any specified conclusion. But I believed that I should call the attention of the Powers to the source of uneasiness at Shanghai and that I drove a nail into the Chinese policy.

On July 7, 1937 the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out. It brought serious anxiety to the Chinese and Foreigners at Shanghai.

At that time, the Hayashi Cabinet had already fallen and Prince Konoye formed a Cabinet. The Foreign Minister was Mr. Shinoda. A few days after the
outbreak of the Incident, I received instructions by telegraph from the Government.

The instructions were as follows: "The Government is maintaining the policy of local solution and of no-enlargement of this incident. You shall take all possible means to prevent any incidents at Shanghai." Instructions bearing the same import reached my hands on two or three successive occasions.

7) Answering the anxious inquiries from the Chinese, the Foreigners and from consuls, I explained the spirit of the instruction from the Government, and told them that I could assure them, in view of the local solution policy of the Government, the incident would not spread to Shanghai.

8) On around July 15, I remember, Mr. Yu Hung-chun, the Mayor of Shanghai, invited me to a tea-party, requesting the military and naval attachés to accompany me. So I presented myself at the party with Major-General KITA Seiichi (Army), Rear Admiral HONDA Tadao (Navy) and some of the staff of the Consulate-General. The party was held at the Mayor's official residence, and there was a small group of Chinese, an influential man from Shanghai, the Chief of Police, the Chief of the Roantui and the Secretary of the Mayor, -- Tu Yueh-shang, Yu Chia-ching, Wang Hsiao-hai etc.

The Mayor spoke in greeting as follows:

"The citizens of Shanghai do not want to have another model of the incident which happened five years ago. We wish, whatever may happen in another district, to avoid a warfare between Japan and China at Shanghai. I will do everything possible and I hope the Japanese will cooperate with us in this aim."
In reply, I said:

"Japan, too, does not intend that the incident shall spread to Shanghai. Especially, since I have been receiving from our Government the instructions which request us to take all possible means to prevent a clash between Japan and China at Shanghai, the policy of our Government being local solution and non-enlargement concerning the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. I am very pleased to hear the present proposal from China. Japan will naturally cooperate with China to prevent any clash between them at Shanghai. But we are afraid that China might invoke a crisis at Shanghai by terrorism and by the anti-Japan movement as was experienced by Japan five years ago, and we hope the Chinese authorities will be careful about controlling these matters."

We exchanged opinions in this manner, and since then, we were very close with each other. The Mayor would phone two or three times a day, requesting us to restrain some acts on the part of our marines etc.

9) While the situation in North China was aggravated contrary to our expectations, and as the phase developed, the attitude of China seemed to gradually alter.

At first, I thought that China was earnestly wishing to prevent the warfare spreading to Shanghai. But by this time I got the report that it was the prevailing idea of young Chinese officers that if Japan would defy a military action which might develop in North China, China could give pain to Japan in Shanghai and China would be able to fight well in this area because the defense works were comparatively good there. There was the report, too, that the Paoantui had been reinforced in the prohibited area, that the
regular gathered round Shanghai amounted to several divisions. All these matters indicated to us that something was being actively plotted by China.

10) At the beginning of August, circumstances made us feel that something imminent would happen, and the Japanese residents evacuated from the Yangtze Valley on board the gunboats and destroyers which were dispatched by the Japanese Navy along the Yangtze River. These people gathered at Shanghai.

11) Under these imminent circumstances, when I was exerting all of my best efforts with a view to avoiding a clash between Japan and China, there finally happened the incident of August 9, in which Sub-lieutenant OYAMA was killed by Chinese soldiers near Hsinchao Airdrome, whereupon the situation suddenly assumed a serious turn.

12) On August 11, I, foreseeing a crisis and partly under instructions from the home office, visited Mayor Yu at the City Government. I showed him the information about the reinforcement of the Fuzantui, the construction of trenches and wire-entanglements at Kusung or in other places where it was prohibited to do so under the Cease-Fire Agreement, and said "If you neglect these conditions, it may be very dangerous, and a clash between Japan and China may not be avoidable. If you truly desire to avoid such a clash, I hope you will make an effort to withdraw the Fuzantui to a reasonable distance necessary to accomplish that end." The Mayor did not easily accept my proposal stating that Japan was responsible for the aggravation of the incident by reinforcing the marines by war-ships. But after four hours' talk at the City Government I received a promise that he would take every possible means to prevent a clash between Japan and China. I left the City Government a little past seven, and it was dark. My automobile was stopped on the way by
Chinese soldiers with bayonets. They did not allow me to pass, at first even though I told them that I was the Japanese Consul-General. But I passed finally by ordering my chauffeur to tell them clearly to pass us as it was the Japanese Consul-General.

13) On the next morning (12th of the month) the 87th and 88th divisions of the Chinese Army advanced to the Puhoshan Station at Shanghai. Immediately, I made a phone call to the City Government, but the Mayor was absent. Then, finding him at his official residence at the French Concession, I requested a member of the staff of the Consulate-General to phone him. That official reported to me that the Mayor said that he could do nothing, when the situation got bad like this. And in reply to the former's question as to why the Mayor was not in the City Government office, the Mayor said he would not go to City Government office because he was stopped several times last evening on his way home by the Poontai, and they did not allow him to pass, though he informed them many times that he was the Mayor. This I heard from the official.

14) Then I considered that this was the time to exert my final effort, and I requested a meeting of the joint committee.

The meeting was opened at the Shanghai Municipal Council in the afternoon of the same day.

The attendance there was Mayor Yu, American and French Consul-Generals, British and Italian Acting Consul Generals, myself and Senior Staff Officer of the Marines T.K.E.D. from Japan.

At the beginning of the meeting, I told them the importance of the
situation, and I said as follows: "Yesterday afternoon, I asked the Mayor to
force the Pescantui to withdraw to a removable distance to avoid clash between
Japan and China, and the Mayor promised to exert every effort. Nevertheless,
the Chinese Regular Army advanced to the Hankou Station this morning and
besieged the Japanese residents in Honkou Area. Now the circumstances do not
permit any delay in adopting measures to stop a conflict. Then I requested
the Joint Committee to investigate China's breach of the Cease Fire Agreement,
and to take adequate measures to avoid a clash.

Against this, Mayor Yu said that Japan could not avail herself of the
Joint Committee based upon the Cease Fire Agreement, because Japan had broken
and voided this Agreement last year by the fact that the Japanese marines
advanced to Pataochiao. (With regard to this point, the commissioner of a third
power assaulted him and inquired whether China had filed a protest with the
Joint Committee against Japan's breach of the Agreement.) He also said that
the present measures were taken by China as a means of self-defence against the
concentration of Japanese forces, and declined to cooperate with Japan in
order to avoid a clash.

Then I asked further, "What kind of measures for this remedy does each
power have?"

The representative of Britain said: "After all it may need the power of
the Marines of Shanghai, but, as for Britain, we cannot do anything without
instructions from our home land."

The representative of United States of America stated: "It is impossible
to use the American Marines without the order of the Chief of the General Staff."
Italy's representative stated: "We can place the Italian army between the Japanese and Chinese army to avoid a clash, but this very army is now on the way from the home land to Shanghai."

Being that no good ideas were produced at the meeting other than the above, the meeting was closed after we decided that Japan and China should have never resorted to force, not to the extent that they would be actually attacked by the other party.

Under these circumstances, Staff Officer [NAME] was very anxious saying that we were not then prepared for defense, and if we delayed in taking up some necessary measures, we would be driven into an impossible position. In reply, I said that in these grave circumstances, we had to claim all that was possible for us, and to exert every effort we could, lest we do "use any trouble for Japan. And I stopped his taking any action.

I believe I took every possible measure for the settlement of the incident, and exerted with the last moment, every effort possible.

Incidentally, the meeting was closed at 6 p.m.

15) On August 13, the Chinese plain clothed soldiers began to fire from the building of the China Press and in the afternoon an exchange of shots took place at the Ratsuichiao.

In the evening of the same day, the American and British Consul-General made a proposal that if it was the desire of Japan to avoid a clash, they would use their good offices for it. The condition of the use of their good offices was to reduce the then situation to the state as it existed at the date of the happening of the Captain OYAMA affair in order to avoid
a clash between Japan and China. He accepted this, and notified Mayor Yu.

Then Mayor Yu managed to report it to Nanking. But the proposal to use the good offices was too late, as the affair entered an irrevocable phase by then.

She pointed out that Japan's squadron and on the Japanese residence area in Shanghai was raiding Japan's squadron and on the Japanese residence area in.

At the beginning of the outbreak of the incident, I was told by a foreigner as follows:

"I know that Japan has made every effort to prevent an incident. And China had the same idea at the beginning. But the idea gradually changed among the Chinese. The tough elements in the Chinese military circles, believing their strength, have boasted that if Japan would use violence in North China, China could start entanglements for the purpose of torturing Japan around Shanghai where it would be most convenient for China to attack the enemy and to defend herself." They said further: 'and once there arises a clash at Shanghai, we will seize all the Japanese and throw them into the Huanpu River within two days.'"*

Moreover, that marine strength at the time was 2,000, and to this was added 300 non-evacuated from Hankow, plus about 1,000 reinforcements from Japan taking the total of 3,000 against the Chinese forces around Shanghai area which was estimated between 50,000 to 100,000. The odds is so great it is unthinkable the Japanese would try to wage war. I frequently explained these facts to the consular corps and other interested parties and my explanation was accepted. In fact the Japanese side was placed in a very difficult position soon after the outbreak of hostilities.
In particular, on August 17, because of the scarcity of Japanese forces in the Yang Tze Poo area, the Japanese position was also destroyed. As a result we reached the conclusion that we must be prepared for the worst.

My efforts in requesting the joint commission on June 23rd, and August 12th, 1937, to investigate and attempt to settle the violation by the Chinese of the truce agreement of May 1932, be read in the minutes of the two meetings of the said commission.
On this 4th day of Jan., 1947

at Tokyo.

I, Inn. Jum, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) INAGA... Tatsuo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

INAGA... Tatsuo (seal)
The Chairman observed that he had convened the meeting at the request of the Japanese Civil Delegate. It seemed unnecessary to say that all the members of the Commission hoped that hostilities would be kept away from Shanghai and that a peaceful settlement of the present difficulties between the Chinese and Japanese sides would be come to.

Mr. Okamoto said that in spite of the statements of the Chinese Civil Delegate to the contrary, he had received definite information to the effect that units of the Peace Preservation Corps, since last evening had taken up various positions in areas quite close to the International Settlement. Moreover troops of the 88th Division were now at a position of Haskell Road near the North Station, with the result that the position today had taken suddenly a turn for the worse. This heavy concentration of Chinese armed forces all over the territory covered by the Truce Agreement of 1932, to say nothing of various points in close proximity to the International Settlement, has caused grave anxiety and fear of an unfortunate clash between the Sino-Japanese forces.

In the face of this sudden entrance of Chinese armed forces the Japanese Naval Landing Party who up to the present had confined their activities...
to the protection of Japanese nationals, would be obliged to take up suitable protective positions. In these circumstances he thought the duty devolved on the Joint Commission of taking immediate steps towards averting the grave danger threatened, and with this object in view, he suggested that the Joint Commission for an investigation party composed of members of the Neutral Friendly Powers, accompanied by both Chinese and Japanese Delegates, to look into the state of affairs now obtaining in the areas in question. He would like to add that this was not a moment for discussions, rather a single moment should not be lost. He would like to hear the views of his esteemed colleagues on the matter.

Mr. Yui, addressing the Chairman and Honourable Members of the Joint Commission said in reply, after listening to the address of his Japanese Colleague he was constrained to state that the attempt of the Japanese side to make the Joint Commission serve its own purpose was unwarranted, unreasonable and highly improper. The Japanese delegation must know that the Joint Commission was organized for the specific purpose of maintaining peace and order in Shanghai and not for aiding and abetting Japan in carrying out her national policy vis-à-vis China. His Japanese Colleague seemed to think that the neutral members of the Commission, however just and impartial, could be made to serve as their tools, to be used whenever they so desired and relegated to the background or a dark corner whenever it suited their purpose to do so. The Japan (when who) stationed armed forces at Faixzechao (6 character bridge), an area far beyond the railway, and in the neighbourhood thereof, not according to the aforesaid agreement, the Japanese forces were supposed to be withdrawn from that area. That breach of the agreement alone would ipso-
facto render it null and void and ineffective. Certainly no agreement could be valid which was only observed by one party to it, no matter how scrupulously observed by one side. The Chinese delegates submit therefore, that the Japanese side having violated the agreement, they no longer had the right to invoke that instrument. Again with reference to recent developments in Shanghai in consequence of the unfortunate Hungja incident, he would like to call attention to one phase of the question. While his Japanese Colleague, in his capacity as Japanese Consul-General, was informing him that the Japanese Government was willing to have the issue settled through normal diplomatic means, and while the investigation was still under way, there suddenly eventuated a big Japanese naval concentration at Shanghai and the Japanese armed forces ashore were greatly increased. Armaments and war supplies of all kinds were being quickly landed, and according to reliable reports further reinforcements were on the way. All these coercive measures could not fail to menace the peace and order of Shanghai and constituted a serious threat to his country. In such circumstances China had the right and was entitled to adopt appropriate measures for self-defense, which accounted for the present disposition of the Chinese military units. He humbly submitted therefore that the present tense situation in Shanghai had been created because of the heavy Japanese naval concentration and the augmentation of the Japanese armed forces ashore. China was acting only in self-defense and could not be held responsible in any way.

Responding Mr. Okamoto said that he would like to point out again that this was not the time for heated discussions and that not a single moment should be lost. No useful purpose could be served by argument on which side
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was responsible etc. The great thing before the Commission was to consider means of averting an unfortunate clash of arms which was immediately threatening. He wondered whether or not his Chinese Colleague really wanted to avoid the armed clash that was menacing Shanghai. If his Chinese Colleague sincerely entertained such a desire he ought to agree on the necessity of searching at once for a suitable way of accomplishing it.

He recalled that only the previous night the Chinese Civil Delegate had promised him to do his best to withdraw the Iaoantui from places where Japanese residents were living or from positions close to the Headquarters of the Naval Landing Party; yet this morning not only had the Iaoantui not been withdrawn but units of the regular Chinese army had entered the prohibited zone. His Naval Landing Party had not yet done anything in preparation (to resist an attack?) but he wanted to know at once if anything could be devised to avoid an armed clash. He would like to hear the views of his Chinese Colleague on the subject.

Rejoining Mr. Xiu stated that the Chinese delegates were not a whit behind their Japanese friends in their desire to maintain peace and good order in Shanghai, but he submitted that peace and good order could be maintained only through sincere cooperation on the part both of China and of Japan. He would like to clarify one point raised by his Japanese colleague, who had just mentioned that the Chinese delegate had assured him only last night that the Iaoantui would be withdrawn from areas close to Japanese residents. He would point out that the Chinese Civil Delegate had not made such a statement, but that he, as Mayor of Greater Shanghai had an interview with the Japanese Consul-General last night, when the latter had asked for the withdrawal of the Iaoantui.
Ho (the Mayor) had then raised the question of the reported arrival of heavy Japanese naval reinforcements outside Nanking, whereupon the Japanese Consul General had expressed surprise and uttered the remark that he didn't know anything about it. Ho (the Mayor) then said that if there was no truth in that report he would agree to withdraw certain of the Paoantui. However no sooner had the Consul-General for Japan deported when reports began pouring into the Mayor's office substantiating the earlier reports of the arrival of Japanese reinforcements. Thus the Chinese side was compelled to adopt measures of self-defense. He again submitted that if any solution to the present situation was to be found, it would have to be discovered by the two Governments concerned and not through the efforts of the members of the Joint Commission no matter how willing or earnest they might be, because as he had said before, the agreement creating the Joint Commission had already been violated by the Japanese side. He did not think it fair to the members of the Joint Commission to trouble them with a matter outside their province. So he would suggest that his Japanese colleague in his capacity as Japanese Consul-General, get into touch with the Japanese Ambassador, and he, in his capacity as Mayor of Greater Shanghai would get into touch with the Nanking Government pointing out the urgency and seriousness of the situation and leaving it to those two parties to work out a practical solution. His Japanese friend seemed to think that the situation could be saved by the withdrawal of the Paoantui, but the Chinese side could equally well insist that the situation could be saved by the withdrawal of the Japanese fleet and reinforcements, the arrival of which they claimed, threatened the peace and order of Shanghai. He would like to refer to contradictory...
statements made by the Japanese Civil Delegate, who said the Japanese Naval Landing Party had not made any preparations and yet had mentioned that the Japanese were taking up positions in self-defense. Mr. Okamoto interjected that what he said was that if the Japanese feared an attack they would be obliged to take up positions in self-defense although they had not already done so. Mr. Yui rejoined that was exactly the Chinese argument, namely that they had taken up positions in self-defense, fearing an attack.

Mr. Okamoto observed that he wished to emphasize his willingness to cooperate with the Chinese delegates or with the Joint Commission in devising some way to avert the threatened clash which seemed imminent. That was his earnest intention and he hoped no one would misunderstand it. He had already telegraphed to his colleague in Nanking (Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy) asking for his assistance in approaching the Chinese Government to do everything possible to avert a serious clash in Shanghai. He was going to do his utmost to that end and he hoped the Joint Commission would do something to help. Of course he and his Chinese colleague must do everything possible to assist their respective Governments to work out a solution and they could have talked between themselves on the subject, but at the same time he hoped it was quite proper to ask the members of the Joint Commission to help as he thought they could make a valuable contribution to the maintenance of peace in Shanghai. It was partly because he had this in mind that he had asked the Chairman to convene the meeting this afternoon. He did not want to say much about the "Eight Character" Bridge beyond remarking that since last year the Japanese Naval Landing Party had stationed a small detachment there consequent on a murder case.
which had caused Japanese residents in the area to be uneasy about their persons and property. However he did not want to waste time going into those details, since as he had said before there was not a moment to lose. He would like to have the opinion of his colleagues on the Commission.

Mr. Yui said he would like to make a few further remarks. As mayor he had always done his utmost to preserve peace and order in Shanghai and would continue to do so but he would have to repeat his opinion that the present difficulty could be solved only between China and Japan, although no doubt the Governments represented by the Neutral Friendly Powers on the Joint Commission would always be glad to do something along the line of advising China and Japan to come to terms. So he thought it was futile for the Joint Commission to waste its efforts. He reiterated that the Joint Commission could only base an action it took on the instrument which was the foundation of its activities. Since that agreement had been violated through the action of the Japanese side in stationing forces at the "Eight Character" Bridge as had just been admitted by the Japanese Civil Delegate, the Japanese side had no right now to invoke the agreement. He again assured the meeting that in his capacity as mayor he would do his utmost to ameliorate the existing situation with a view to ensuring peace and good order in Shanghai to the benefit of the citizens of China, Japan and other friendly Powers.

Mr. Okamoto said he would proceed straight to the point. If Mr. Yui could avert this threatened serious clash without the help of the Joint Commission he would be satisfied. However he would like to know whether or not Mr. Yui could successfully stop, at this juncture, the threatened clash, because he was inclined to doubt it. If Mr. Yui could stop it he would not
be alarmed, but otherwise he thought it quite appropriate to ask the Joint Commission to assist in avoiding a clash.

Addressing Mr. Yui the Chairman recalled that the Chinese Civil Delegate had said that the solution of the present situation lay with the Governments of China and Japan. Did he mean by that statement that he would refuse the help of the Joint Commission even if that Commission could do something to assist in avoiding a clash?

Replying Mr. Yui said he did not mean that. He meant that as the Japanese side had violated the 1932 agreement they did not now have the right to invoke that compact.

Mr. Gauss asked if Mr. Yui had made any representations to the Joint Commission at the time the alleged violation of the agreement took place last year. Mr. Yui responded that he had made representations to the Japanese side at the time as he had documents to prove. He submitted that under the agreement there was no occasion to make representations to the full commission unless there were "doubts" arising.

Mr. Okamoto asked if it was not a fact that Mr. Yui did not object at the time. Mr. Yui replied that he did not object at the time because he did not want to disturb the friendly relations between China and Japan which were then existing and also in the interests of peace and good order. That was on record.

Mr. Okamoto said that the Japanese navy owned a piece of land in the vicinity of the "Eight Character" Bridge which he pointed out on a map.

The Chairman remarked that at the last meeting of the Joint Commission, Mr. Yui had disclaimed any intention of regarding the Commission as defunct. Would he therefore object to the good offices of the Commission.
being exercised in the present instance?

Mr. Yui observed that he only said he felt such efforts would be futile.

Mr. Davidson said it was apparent the situation was too serious for argument and so he would like to know if anything could be done by the Joint Commission or any of its members to assist in bringing about a temporary settlement to last until a more permanent settlement could be worked out by the parties concerned. He would like to offer his services in any capacity and he was sure his colleagues of the neutral powers would want to extend the same offer. A clash would be against all their interests.

Mr. Gauss said he would be glad to do anything to assist either side.

Mr. Yui remarked that he would welcome and would be grateful for any efforts of the neutral Civil members in their capacity as Consul-General or they could call them the "Authorities concerned" and not mention the Joint Commission.

Mr. Okamoto said he wondered if it were possible for the Commanders of the Neutral forces stationed in Shanghai to meet together and as military officers work out some plan which they could recommend to the Japanese and Chinese Commanders as a definite way of avoiding a clash?

Mr. Gauss enquired if General Yang Hu (Garrison Commander) was in command of the Chinese forces confronting the Japanese? Mr. Yui said he doubted if General Yang Hu could decide the matter if a recommendation as suggested by Mr. Okamoto was presented to him. The General would probably have to refer the matter to Nanking and the Japanese Commander to Tokyo, which would involve a loss of time.

Mr. Okamoto inquired who had ordered the Chinese troops to advance to
the Hankow road area? Who was in command?

Mr. Yui said he was not called upon to answer that question.

Mr. Okamoto pressed for an answer "just for his private information".

Mr. Yui replied that he really did not know; it might have been a petty officer or the commander.

Mr. Davidson observed that as both sides were prepared to admit that a clash should be avoided, something should be done to avoid it.

Mr. Yui said he hoped that something could be done, but he did not know what it could be, because of the heavy Japanese concentration.

Mr. Gauss enquired if the Japanese troops were all in settlement or extra-settlement road areas, or if any were in advanced positions such as the "36th Character Bridge"?

Mr. Okamoto said that a few marines were there serving as watchmen of the land owned by the Japanese Navy. Mr. Yui interjected that there were "more than a few."

Mr. Gauss said he did not think the neutral military commanders could suggest anything to avoid a collision which the neutral civil representatives on the Joint Commission could not do if it did not seem to require technical knowledge to propose that a proper space be set between the opposing sides so as to obviate a clash. If the Japanese side kept to their original positions and the Chinese vacated the reinforcements which had apparently penetrated the adjoining areas originally occupied only by police forces it would seem that an interval could be established which would ensure against an immediate clash at any rate.

Mr. Yui said that the heavy Japanese concentrations constituted a threat to China. The way to avoid a clash was for the Japanese to
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 confined themselves within their proper lines.

Mr. Gauss observed that the same might be said of the Chinese side.

Mr. Okamoto reminded the meeting that the danger of a clash was
imminent, which caused Mr. Gauss to remark that apparently nothing could
be done tonight.

Mr. Yui observed that if the Chinese side was not overreached upon,
nothing would happen tonight, tomorrow night or any other night.

Mr. Gauss enquired if Mr. Yui had anything to suggest which the Foreign
Powers might attempt to do to alleviate the situation and which would
be acceptable to the Chinese side.

Mr. Okamoto interjected that some of the Japanese warships had left
Shanghai this afternoon, whereupon Mr. Yui remarked that others may be
coming.

Mr. Davidson asked if it were possible to get an assurance from both
sides not to make an attack within say 24 or 48 hours to see if something
could be done in the meantime?

Mr. Yui replied that he could give an assurance that if the Chinese
side were not attacked, they would not attack, whether in 24 hours, 24
days or 24 years. The Chinese side were always on the defensive.

Mr. Okamoto remarked that his side did not want to make any trouble
so long as they were not provoked or challenged. That he could say with
authority.

Mr. Yui asked how Mr. Okamoto understood provocation. Mr. Okamoto
replied that if the Japanese side were threatened they would attack.

Mr. Yui observed that the Chinese side could not attack but would
defend themselves.
Mr. Okamoto stated that a Japanese newspaper man had been arrested that morning at the North Station by Chinese troops stationed there. He was trying to find out where he was. That was provocation.

Mr. Yui related how the Commissioner of Public Utilities had been dragged out of his car last year and searched by Japanese Marines.

Mr. Okamoto said it was useless to pursue these mutual inaccuracies.

Mr. Davidson enquired if there were any independent Chinese military units in the areas adjacent to the Japanese positions.

Mr. Yui replied that he could give assurances that there were no independent units in those areas.

Mr. Guase asked if it would not be possible for the Chinese and Japanese Civil Delegates to approach their respective military commanders and arrange that they will not resort to arms in the present situation under any circumstances unless actually attacked?

Mr. Okamoto replied with assurance that he could do so. Mr. Yui replied that he had already given assurances that the Chinese side would not attack unless they were attacked.

Mr. Okamoto, after consulting Commander Takeo, repeated that the Japanese forces had no intention of taking the offensive. However he pointed out that there was a detachment of Chinese regular troops in the area around Hanksell Road (which he indicated on a map) immediately opposite a section of the Settlement boundary and quite close to the Headquarters of the Japanese Naval Landing Party. Because of the presence of these Chinese regular troops, the Japanese Naval Landing Party would be compelled to station a detachment along the section of the boundary mentioned, both as a protection to the Japanese side and as a protection to the Settlement. No Japanese troops were there now but they would be
sent there shortly.

Mr. Goss, after looking at the map asked Mr. Yui if the Chinese
detachment mentioned by Mr. Okamoto could not be withdrawn to the other
side of the railway?

Mr. Yui replied that the Chinese detachment had the right to be there.
He suggested that the Japanese side might make some move.

Mr. Okamoto remarked that he too inform: the Chinese detachment
mentioned was "uncontrollable" and therefore might start an attack.
He suggested that if Mr. Yui was unable or unwilling to get into touch
with the Chinese Commander, that the neutral civil delegates (either
as such or in their capacity as Consul-General) do so, with a view to
having the detachment withdrawn.

At this stage Mr. Yui and Comdr. Takoda withdrew.

Mr. Marchiari suggested that as a temporary measure and in order to
avoid a clash which seems to be imminent with the Chinese forces occupying
a position at Haskell Road, a detachment of neutral forces might be sent to
occupy the sections of the settlement boundary opposite that position
so as to avoid the necessity with the Japanese claim, of sending their
forces there. Mr. Okamoto assured Mr. Marchiari that if that could be
done the Japanese side would be satisfied and would not send their forces
to that section.

The other neutral members felt that this would be a matter for the
Defense Commanders to decide. The American and British civil delegates
said they would inform their respective Commanders of that suggestion
by telephone.

THE MEETING THEN TERMINATED

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in English, consisting of 14 pages and entitled "Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Commission" prepared by the Archives Section of the Joint Commission is a copy of the document received in 1938 by the Japanese Consulate-General from the said Commission and which has been thenceforth in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of January, 1947.

/s/ OKUWA Kiso (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness,
at the same place, on the same date

Witness: /s/ Attorney INAKI, Tatsuo (seal)
課長は日本民間代表の要請により派遣を召集したと述べた。委員会全員は上海が騒乱に推移されることにより現在の日支間の際問題の平和的解決を望むものであるとする。民間代表の反對声明にも拘らず保安隊の部隊は昨夕より共同租界近接而も今や第八十九師団の部隊は北停車場附近ハスケル（恩司克而一路）に至る部隊特警監の部隊は勿論一九三二年の休戦協定に含まれた全地域に至るに対する恐怖をと満足してある。

この突然の部隊武裝監督の進出に直面しては現在までその活動範囲を日本国民の保護に止めてそこで日本海軍陸戦監は適當時防禦態勢を取る。この如き事情に鑑みて岡本氏は切迫せる重大危機周避への単時の方策をたてる任務に共同委員会の肩に懸ってあると考へその目的を以って共同委員会は問題の諸地域に於て現在進展しつつある事件の状況を日支代表を同行して調査すべき中立友好諸國人
よりなる論理面を組織することを提案した。彼は今や討議すべき時期で
考えられる」と海軍当局にこの問題についての見解を伺いたいと云った。又その意
数する同席者達にこの問題についての見解を伺いたいと云った。
鈴氏は共同委員会委員長及び共同委員会を日本側の所存に役立た
せんとする日本側の企は挫しがたく不利益であり又甚だ不都合である
というふ仮定の目的の為に組織されたものであることを承知すべきである。日本人同盟
遂行を援助する為のものではないことを承知すべきである。日本人同盟
利用したい時に何時でも利用し無用物として遞届へ寄しからる方が都合
に思はれる日本が経路線路を遠く至した地方である八華橋はその附近
の地帯より撤收してゐる管を取りてゐるものである。此協定違反され自体
が事實上協定を無効無益無用のものとせすである。一方の国が如何に
早日本がこの協定に訴える権利を有すべきに非ずとするのである。更に
かの不幸なる観察品の結果を起る上海に於ける近来の情勢に関し此
間の一局面に注意を挙げたいためモノない。それ故に、支配代表は日本側が
為の協定を遂行した以上故

於て日本政府は通常の外交的手段に依りて問題を解決しなき意志である

における武器及びあらゆる軍需品はいち早く抑制されない所である。したが

て本日上海大乗会が突然行はれ陸上日本軍隊は益しく厳重さるのである。其

に於て此等の感覚的方策に必ずや上海の平和と秩序とを維持し又支配

が在るためが支配軍諸部隊の現在の配備の理由である。彼は被連な態度

であることを謳んで申すのであると云った。支配は単に

結果生じたものであることを謳んで申すのであると云った。支配は単に

する。
自己防衛行動したのであり責任を取ることはどうしても出来ないと言った。

これに答えて岡本氏は、今は激論をたたかい証拠を提出はしないと云ふことを聴きつつあるかと考えた。何れの側に責任があるかを自分には再び指摘せんとするものであるという所も、後を聴く気はなかった。

委員会の直面する重大事は即刻に今後さらに発展するものである。彼は被弾者同様が上海に所得の軍隊の証拠を聴取することをからに云っただけである。彼は昨夜支那代表が在日を去るに抵抗する方法を直ちに聴く必要性に同意すべきである。彼は昨日支那代表の希望を退けたばかりか支那代表の在日と政府の間の不調を聴いたばかりか

支那代表が在日を退けさせるのに最善を盡すことを約したばかりかありであるのに故に在日

支那代表が在日を退けさせるのに最善を盡することを約したばかりかを聴くため

在日を退けさせるのに最善を盡することを約したばかりかを聴くため
これに答えて氏は支那代表者達は上海に於ける治安秩序を維持せんと希望することに於ては日本の同意を必要として劣るものでかい、しかしながら治安秩序は支那と日本両国の一意圧力をもって維持されしものであると申述べた。彼は日本人同様によく見聞された所で支那代表が日本人及び民間人民に近接の地域より保安隊を撤去させることを昨夜保安隊が取った時大上海市次として面会したるを指摘した。そこで彼（高佩）は保安隊の一部が昨夜上海市民に対して乱事をでたるを営めしないと。彼は昨夜日本陸軍部や保安隊の撤退を要請した時日本陸軍部長として面会したるを指摘した。そこで彼（高佩）は保安隊の一部が昨夜上海市民に対して乱事をでたるを営めしないと。彼は昨夜日本陸軍部や保安隊の撤退を要請した。
関係二国政府により見出されるべきであり、如何に共同委員会の委員達が心から熱心であるとしても彼等の奮力を通して見出されるべきである。協定を既に犯したからである。彼は日本人同僚は总領事の銳利なる言辞を示し、實際的解決方法を突出するのに於て南京政府と連絡して情勢の変容を効かず論議せり。彼は日中民間代表者名の行わせ得るを承知した直後に、彼は本件を互に解決するに於ては日本政府と連絡して情勢の変容を効かず論議せり。
たらばその態勢の整備を余儀なくされるであろうということである。

ふふ明に支配側の首分であると考えたが、
同本氏は急迫せる情勢を周旋する何等かの方法を見出すことにより自分は
支配者者取は共同委員会を援助と称ししたものでないことを強調したい
と述べた、これは自分の顧問なる意志であり、又自分の事態を解釈され
たとし、ついに署名にあらわる同様（日本大変化）委員会に
共有を打ち上海に於る親与者会を通達する為に余力を尽すべく支配者者
会を援助するについて彼の援助を保証し、そして彼にとの目的の為に彼の
援助を要望した。勿論自分及び支配者会等は、大々の簡単が隠蔽され
ても互に該当することに可能なのである傍し同時に自分は、共同委員会員
は上海の治安維持に於て支障なる責任をみなし得ると考へるので彼等に援助
を要請することを全く適当なることであると思ふと述べた。彼が委員会員
からたるのである。彼は八字形事件については、その法律の日本履習
に於て人命、財産に対する不安を遠としがた教示事件の結果昨年より日
本海軍陸戦隊は他のに一歩分離を進め故にと述べる事以上に多
を皆無に近づかなかった。何故ならば、前も彼が言った如く今夜帰る
後は、その辞頭を隆して時を浪費すると好ま
なかったのである。彼にこの委員会の同僚職の意見が聞けたいと云った
上は安定、秩序の維持に共の長官を飯して来たのであり、これ幾ら
るる心島である。併し自分は共同委員会を設成するにこれ寄り共に列
代表する組織政府は日東間の妥協を期待するにこふ行き方で常に喜んで
代表するのであることは美味しいではないか、併し現在の政治は日東間
ののみで解決し得るものであるといふ自分に意見を続け返す外はないと
この事に立つ外はないと続け短した。
日本民間代表がたった今寄託した如く日本側は八字橋に軍隊を進出させ、同協定を侵害した以上日本側にはその協定を発動させる機関はないのである（彼は市長として支那、日本両側有好邦国の市民建の利益の為に上海の治安秩序を確保する目的を以て現状改容に全力を盡すことを再び委員会に約した）

松本氏は直接要請に進みたいと言った（松氏が同委員会の助力を希する此の切通しに重大衝突を同逢することが出来るなら、自分は満足である。併し自分に於てその事は殆どしか思われるので、松氏は急迫せる衝突を此際首尾よく防止する事が出来るなら俺、自分も別に恐れ思ふ。松氏にして之を阻止する事が出来るなら俺、自分も別に恐れ思ふ所でないがさもなくば衝突問題に際し同委員会の援助を乞ふことを全く遅切と考える次第）。

松氏に向ひ、委員長は支那民間代表及び現状の解決の道は日本及支那の政府にあつたといつたことに注意を惹かることの為に即ち於て議長より當委員長に依って何らかの援助を為すことが出来るとしても呪の
三二年の関東委員会開催の際、日本側は風流間協定に訴えて事態を避ける利害を有しないということを意味したのである。三二年の協定を侵害した際に、日本側は風流間協定に訴えて事態を避ける利害を有しないということを意味したのである。
あると言ひ、その場所を共団の上で示した。

委員会は此の前の委員会の会合で御氏は共同委員会の存在を御報告する意

志は少しもないと言った。

それは在に現在とられてある委員会の監督に対して彼が異議を唱えようと

があるからうと懇願した。

従来の委員会は携帯は携行に困難があると略を述べたのに驚かれたと

言われた。

 Naturally, I'm not 100% confident in the accuracy of the above translation, particularly when a significant portion of the text contains katakana characters, which are often indicative of loanwords from foreign languages. It's crucial to ensure that any translated text is comprehensible and meaningful in the target language. If you have any specific questions or need assistance with another section of the document, feel free to ask.
岡本氏は上海に住居する中立国司令官達が会合し、日本及び支那の司令官に勧告を出したのである。その勧告は、かねてより日本の司令官は真に誠懐するものであるから、他の勧告は指摘するよう命じたが、内閣が指摘者であったか質問した。岡本氏は真に誠懐するものであるから、他の勧告は指摘するよう命じたが、内閣が指摘者であったか質問した。

以下は岡本氏の答である。
デイドソン氏は、両国が衝突を避けるべきであると確認する用紙があるが、何らかの同調策を講ずべきであると述べた。彼氏は、何等かの方策が取り得るところを望むが、日本は大策を計る結果、何がなすべき得られるかわからないと述べた。

ガウス氏は、日本軍は日本海北方の基盤設置に対する日本海基盤設置の意向を示すか否かを尋ねた。彼氏は日本海の浮遊要塞を構成するための要塞設置は日本海の浮遊要塞を構成するものであり、日本海の浮遊要塞は日本海の浮遊要塞を構成するものであることを認めた。

同委員会によれば、日本海の浮遊要塞を構成するための要塞設置は日本海の浮遊要塞を構成するものであり、日本海の浮遊要塞は日本海の浮遊要塞を構成するものであることを認めた。
ガウス氏は、支那に於いても同様の方法が行われるであろうと言った。

同氏は、支那の官吏は切迫してゐるところを一間近づき、支那が敗れそうもないことを云はしめた。

支那は何等も起らねないだろうと述べた。

ガウス氏は、支那が敗れることがないならば、何等も起らねないだろうと述べた。

同氏は、支那に於て何等かの方法がふるさとから出るかを一間近づき、支那が敗れるときを挙げて支那は他
の意見が発表して来るかをしめされたと云った。

デヴィドソン氏は、一方に於て何等かの方法がふるさとから出るかを挙げて支那は他
の意見が発表して来るかをしめされたと云った。

同氏は、支那が敗れることがないならば、何等も起らねないだろうと述べた。

支那に於て何等かの方法がふるさとから出るかを挙げて、支那は常に守ら
二十四日間で支那をしかかえる事がないことを証明しゐる。支那に於ては常に守ら

15
の位置にあるであるを客へた。

岡本氏は自分の側に於けても挑発又は挑発されない限りは動揺を引き起

さるこは思はない。自分はこの話は結構を以って断言し得るこ述べた。

顧氏は同じ言葉を受ければ攻山を加へるであろうを客へた。

顧氏は支那軍は攻山を加へないが併し防衛をするご述べた。顧氏は

日本軍は若し荷装を受ければ攻山を加へるであろうを客へた。

顧氏は支那軍は攻山を加へないが併し防衛をするご述べた。

顧氏は如何にして昨年公共工程局長が彼の自動車から引降され日本は共

の身体捜索を受けたと語った。顧氏は相互に非のなする合ひをするか

かご質問した。

顧氏はそれらの地域に於て不立部隊はおらいないこふらを証明出来ると答

へた。
ガウス氏は、日本及び支那民団代表は各自の軍司令官に交渉し、事務的に
攻撃をされるなら、如何なる事があつても現在の事情にあって武力に訴へ
と協定する事が出来るかどうか尋ねられた。

岡本氏は武田中佐と相談した後、日本軍は攻撃に手を出さない事を断
された。彼等は自分は支那軍は攻撃を
しても協定する事が出来ないなら、如何なる事があつても現在の事情にあって武力に訴へ

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して協定する事が出来ないなら、如何なる事があつても現在の事情にあって武力に訴へ
が、少し移動するよう提案した。

同本氏は今言った支部間分遣隊は無駄であるから攻撃を開始するから

知れぬ情報を得たまるごと逃げた。

彼は、若し彼氏が支部軍司令官を追討することが出来ないか、もしくはす

長さをしてか、又は内の資格で一か二三することを提案した。

マルギリ氏は、一時の手段として支部軍司令官ガハクスケルの一隊山

占領し、ある結果押適した衝突を固むするために、日本軍が占領する兵の

地溝への日本軍の派遣の必要を呼ぶする旨に中立国軍の派遣を関係する

反対にある階級境界線地域占領の分に派遣することを提案した。

岡本氏はマルギリ氏にそれが出来れば日本軍は固足である。又その地

域に軍隊を送ることははないと保障した。

他の中立国軍司令官はこの問題は防衛司令官迄の決定すべき事項であると明

じて米国及び英国の民間代表者達は夫々の司令官にこの策案を読書により是非す
CORRECTED MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION HELD AT THE CONSULATE GENERAL FOR FRANCE ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23RD, COMMENCING AT 2.30 P.M.

Present

French Civil Representative and Chairman.
French Military Representative
Chinese Civil Delegate.
Chinese Military Delegate.
Japanese Civil Delegate.
Japanese Military Delegate.
American Civil Representative
American Military Representative
British Civil Representative.
British Military Representative.
Italian Civil Representative.
Italian Military Representative.
( Vice Consul for Japan )

V. Baudrez, Esquire

It. Poudre, Esquire

Maj.-General Tung Yuan-liang,
S. Okamoto, Esquire,
Commander T. Takeda,
C. F. Caras, Esquire,
Captain F. A. Aume,
Mr. C. Davidson, Esquire,
Major T. T. T.,
C. Marchiori, Esquire,
It. Carlo Monel,
T. Kawasaki, Esquire,

The Chairman said he would like first of all to thank the members of the Joint Commission for electing him as its Chairman. He asked the meeting to excuse him if owing to language difficulty he did not at the time make himself clear.

He referred to the Circular (No. 232) convening the meeting, which had been called at the request of the Japanese Civil Delegate and invited Mr. Okamoto to proceed.

Responding Mr. Okamoto said "Mr. Chairman and honourable members, I understand that it is quite some time since the Joint Commission last met together and I am very glad to have the present opportunity of meeting my colleagues, I am particularly grateful to the Chairman for having kindly acceded to my request to convene the present meeting."

Continuing Mr. Okamoto remarked that the subject which he wished to discuss was one in which he was sure the Joint Commission was vitally interested. He had recently received information to the effect that fortifications are being erected or were about to be built in the Woosung area. This matter being of no small concern, was one which the Joint Commission could not condone at.

The Commission was aware that by virtue of Article II of the May 6th, 1932 Agreement, Chinese troops were not allowed to pass through certain specified areas, including the Woosung area "pending later arrangements". While it may be argued that this article only provides that movements of Chinese troops were to be restricted, any attempt of the Chinese Authorities to fortify any part of the demilitarized area constituted in his submission, a hostile act and as such ran counter to the spirit of the 1932 Agreement.
Furthermore he was constrained to believe that the members (neutral?) of the Joint Commission would agree, that if the fortifications had actually been built, they would be regarded as serious menace to the integrity and safety of the International Settlement and French Concession. The May 5th, 1932 Agreement thus far proved an admirable instrument towards the maintenance of peace in and around Shanghai and the building of fortifications in the area mentioned would in his submission render that instrument null and void. He sincerely hoped that the report of fortifications actual, or contemplated, at Woosung was untrue, but he was anxious to have his Chinese Colleagues dispel Japanese suspicion in this regard. In order to disprove or verify this report, he would like to request that the Chinese delegation be good enough to allow an inspection at an early opportunity of the Woosung area by the Japanese delegates. Should the report prove to be correct he hoped that immediate steps would be taken to end these warlike preparations. In conducting the proposed inspection he suggested that the neutral members of the Commission accompany the Japanese Delegates should the Chinese delegation so desire.

Mr. O. F. Yui asked for and received the permission of the Chairman to translate into Chinese the substance of Mr. Okamoto's remarks to his Chinese Colleague (Major-General Tung Yuan-liang) as the latter did not speak English.

Continuing Mr. Yui said: Mr. Chairman and honourable members of the Joint Commission, before answering the specific point raised by my esteemed Japanese Colleague, I would like first of all, on behalf of myself and of any military colleague, to express our heartfelt thanks for the valuable assistance which the neutral members have rendered to both the Chinese and the Japanese side in connection with the Agreement for the cessation of hostilities dated May 5th, 1932. Following this Mr. Yui made the following remarks. More than five years had elapsed since the Agreement referred to was signed, and he was quite sure that all those present at the meeting would agree that the situation obtaining at the present time was quite different to that existing at the time the agreement was signed. His Japanese Colleague had raised a question about fortifications at Woosung and had said that it was a matter in which the Joint Commission would be vitally interested. He further had stated that if the report of fortifications was true, the act would be contrary to Article IV of the said Agreement and in spite of the fact that the agreement explicitly restricts only the movements of Chinese troops in the areas concerned, had further said that any attempt on the part of the Chinese Authorities to build fortifications in the so-called "demilitarized area" the term used by his Japanese Colleague would be regarded as an hostile act. Furthermore his Japanese Colleague had stated that the existence of fortifications at Woosung would threaten the integrity and safety of the International Settlement and French Concession, and had added that the construction of such fortifications would render the 1932 Agreement null and void. His Japanese Colleague was therefore anxious to find out the truth or other wise of the report about
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Woosung fortifications by obtaining permission from the Chinese Authorities for an inspection by the Japanese Delegation of that area accompanied by the neutral members of the Commission. Mr. Yu asked if this was a correct summary of the points raised by his Japanese Colleague and received Mr. Okamoto's reply in the affirmative.

Continuing Mr. Yu said that in reply he would first of all like to refer to the Agreement in question (May 5th, 1932 Agreement). In his submission, the Joint Commission which was created by virtue of this Agreement could only function according to the explicit provisions laid down therein. The representatives of the Participating Friendly Powers had given great help and advice in bringing about the cessation of hostilities in 1932 and in framing the May 5th, 1932 Agreement, they had envisaged the situation as it existed at the time, i.e. in order to avoid a further clash between the opposing forces, the Chinese troops were to remain in the position they were in at the time and the Japanese troops were to be withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-territorial roads in the Hongkew District. It was felt necessary and advisable that there should be some supervision of these conditions and so the Joint Commission was set up for the purpose. Article I of the Agreement said that as the Japanese and Chinese Authorities had already ordered to cease fire the cessation of hostilities was to be made definite from May 5th, 1932 and that the two sides were to cease every form of hostile act. Article IV provided that the Chinese troops were to remain in the positions described in Annex I of the Agreement the intention being of course that if they did not remain in those positions the Joint Commission could interfere. Article VII provided for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the places specified, the duty of the Joint Commission being to see that this was done. Article IV provided for the establishment of the Joint Commission to certify the mutual withdrawal and to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police -- a special constabulary. Thus the functions and duties of the Joint Commission was clearly defined and have been faithfully carried out, for which the Chinese Authorities were and are deeply grateful. The five intervening years had been peaceful years, peace and order had prevailed undisturbed, and the Chinese side could not be accused of having violated any part of the Agreement. He wished to repeat that in his submission, the Joint Commission had been given specific duties which are expressly mentioned in the Agreement for the cessation of hostilities, and the Commission was not supposed to be bothered with questions which go beyond the scope of the Agreement. He contended that the question of fortifications at Woosung, which was raised by his Japanese Colleague, did in fact lie outside the province of the Joint Commission, and he was sure the members of the Joint Commission would agree with him when he said that it was not the intention of the Participating Friendly Powers to restrict the Sovereignty of China in any way except as expressly provided in the 1932 Agreement. In other words although the Sovereignty of the area concerned around Shanghai had remained
to China, she had agreed not to exercise all her sovereign rights in that area temporarily because of the provisions of the 1932 Agreement.

His Japanese Colleague had used the term "demilitarized area". He was surprised to hear that term and he would ask his Japanese Colleague if he could give him any reason whatsoever which would justify the use of that term. There had never been such a thing as a "demilitarized area". It was quite true that due to the efforts of the Participating Friendly Powers, China and Japan had agreed not to send their troops into the area concerned, but there was nothing more than that, and he asked permission to call attention to that fact.

This was the year 1937, and more than five years had elapsed since the May 5th, 1932 Agreement ended the deplorable state of warfare between China and Japan. The two countries were now doing their utmost to bring about friendlier and closer relations. Every day the talk was of promoting friendship and fostering understanding, which was some thing that China and Japan and other friendly powers most desired. He was sure the meeting would agree that China had not been behind any other country in her endeavors to bring about peace in this part of the world. The events of the past few years had been an earnest of her resolve in this regard. She had not committed one hostile act against any nation nor did she cherish any hostile intention against any nation. However the did not mean that China would deprive herself of the means of self-preservation. He was not in a position to say anything about the "Woosung fortifications", but even if such fortifications had been erected, it did not necessarily be a hostile act.

Many countries were now in process of permanent, but no one could asser t for instance that because Japan was building up her Navy that she had the intention of attacking some country, or that Great Britain cherished hostile intentions because she had increased he budget for the fighting services. If the erection of a fortification at Woosung was to be construed as an hostile act against Japan it might equally be regarded as an hostile act against Great Britain the United States, France or Italy.

The Japanese "Naval Landing Party" frequently held maneuvers in Shanghai with the use of guns and machine guns, but the Chinese Authorities had never regarded such maneuvers as hostile acts and had never made any complaint about them. The Japanese suspicion was very hard to understand, especially at a time when the two countries were declaring to the world their desire for friendship and understanding. Concluding Mr. Yui made a fervent appeal for the removal of doubt and suspicion of China and reiterated his assertion that the points raised by his Japanese Colleague did not come within the purview of the Joint Commission whose functions and duties were expressly defined in the Agreement of May 5th, 1932.

Rejoining Mr. Onomoto said that after listening to Mr. Yui's speech it was clear to him that there were fundamental differences
of viewpoint in the Chinese and Japanese interpretations of the 1932 Agreement. That Agreement, by virtue of which the Joint Commission came into being had proved an effective instrument for safeguarding the integrity of the foreign controlled areas in Shanghai. Although the Round Table Conference of the Interested Powers, which it was originally intended should take place following upon the conclusion of the Agreement, had never been convened, the provisions concerning the notification of troop movements have been and were still being consistently observed by the Chinese delegates. The Agreement, therefore, far from being defunct, is still serving the useful purposes for which it was originally intended.

However, should any one ever entertain an idea that, with the lapse of time and comparative tranquility that has prevailed in Shanghai for some time, the Joint Commission is no longer called for, it would be a gross mistake indeed. On the contrary, the Agreement is still alive both in its letter and spirit, and although an agreement of this nature may remain dormant in normal times, its usefulness should immediately be invoked the moment anything goes amiss.

The Japanese Government, as one of the most interested parties, attached great importance to the Agreement of 1932 and also to the continuance of the Joint Commission. The importance and usefulness of the Agreement is just as great at present, as when the Agreement was first brought into being some five years ago. The Agreement for these reasons could not be allowed to die a natural death, nor to be relinquished unilaterally. It must also be in the interest of those members of the Commission other than the Chinese and Japanese delegates to see to it that the terms of the Agreement were scrupulously observed at all times by the parties concerned, for it must not be forgotten that the strict enforcement of the Agreement of 1932 is the only way to ensure peace and order in Shanghai. The Agreement of 1932 stipulated in the first place that the cessation of hostilities would be rendered definite and that this cessation of hostilities would be assured by preventing the Chinese forces from moving into a certain district which is specified in its Annex I. In other words the demilitarized zone was thus created where neither of the parties concerned could engage in hostilities in the future. Moreover, the negotiations at the peace conference, in framing the Agreement, undoubtedly envisaged the cessation of hostilities as including the cessation of various military preparations in the area concerned.

The fortress at "Oosung, now in question, was destroyed by the Japanese forces during the Shanghai Incident. "Oosung was situated within the said demilitarized area and any attempt on the part of Chinese to restore the razed fortress, with possible replenishment of its armament, could not but be construed as a serious contravention of the Agreement of 1932. He wished to emphasize, particularly, that such a project would constitute a serious menace to peace and security of the Foreign Controlled areas of Shanghai and he was sure the members of the Friendly Neutral Powers would
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share his conviction.

It followed from what he had said that no troops were to be admitted to the demilitarized area. The Chinese Authorities, by mutual agreement between them and the Japanese Authorities have made it a point of informing the Japanese Delegate of their troop movements whenever they have occasion to move troops through that area. This notification has been and still is a regular practice. How, then, could the Chinese Authorities undertake to build fortifications, or dig trenches in an area where no troops are supposed to enter at all? This was the point on which he would like the Chinese delegates to enlighten him.

He must emphatically state his conviction that these warlike preparations which he was informed were being undertaken by the Chinese Authorities, ran counter to the spirit of the truce Agreement of 1932, to say nothing of undermining peace and order in the Shanghai Foreign Concessions in which they were all vitally interested.

This was his reply to the speech of the Chinese Civil Delegate.

In reply Mr. Yui said he hoped he would not exhaust the patience of the Meeting by a too lengthy rebuttal. The Japanese Civil Delegate had hinted that there may be an impression that the 1932 Agreement and the Joint Commission were defunct and had mentioned that the Japanese Government attached the greatest importance to the continuance of both the compact and the Commission. If his Japanese Colleague meant that the Chinese Government regarded the Agreement and Commission as defunct he was entirely mistaken and was perhaps stretching his imagination. He wished to emphasize that the Chinese Government had no intention of disregarding any Agreement solemnly entered into. His Government likewise attached great significance to the Agreement as long as it had not become null and void. This stretching of the imagination was very dangerous and perhaps accounted for the Japanese psychosis which persisted in attributing hostile intentions to the Chinese. China asked only the right of self-preservation and co-existence with other friendly Powers.

As he had previously said she entertained no hostile intentions towards other countries but of course she would defend herself if attacked. He maintained that even if China had erected fortifications at Woosung she was entirely within her rights in doing so and it would not in any way violate the Agreement of 1932. There was positively nothing in the Agreement either expressed or implied which inhibited China from erecting fortifications in the area concerned. As a matter of fact not a single soldier had been sent into that area, so he could not understand how China could be accused of hostile intentions there. China was as much interested and concerned in maintaining peace and order in the foreign administered areas of Shanghai as was Japan or any other Powers, but she felt that the best way to preserve those conditions was to...
rely on mutual trust and not to cherish suspicions of hostile intentions on the part of China. So he hoped this Japanese delegation would set their minds at ease and banish doubts and suspicions. China had scrupulously observed the peace in the Shanghai area since the despicable days of 1932 and certainly would not be the first to break it.

Responding Mr. Okamoto said he was particularly pleased to hear from the Chinese Civil Delegate that the Chinese Government regarded the 1932 Agreement and the Joint Commission as being still in existence. Mr. Yui had mentioned that no single soldier had been sent into the area concerned but the Peace Preservation Corps was in that area and it would be easy to convert that corps into a regular army force. "The Agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities, and by "cessation of hostilities" the Japanese Authorities understood that no warlike preparations of any kind were to be made in the prohibited area. This was the crux of the Japanese argument. Hence any fortification or digging of trenches at Wuosung would be a breach of the 1932 Agreement. The Japanese contention is that the Chinese Military position in the area concerned should remain as promised by the Agreement five years ago and therefore if fortifications were erected in the area it would alter that position and violate the Agreement. The Japanese Government attached great importance to that point, so he wanted to know if any fortification had been erected or were intended, and if the Chinese Delegation would agree to an inspection at Wuosung.

Replying Mr. Yui observed that his Japanese Colleague seemed concerned about the possibility of the Peace Preservation Corps being used for hostile purposes. However that Corps was only a special constabulary established for the purpose of maintaining internal peace and order. China's right to maintain the Corps could not be questioned.

His Japanese Colleague might just as well ask for the evacuation of all Chinese from the area concerned. He was afraid he was wearying the Meeting but he could only repeat that China did not harbour hostile intentions towards any Power but as a self-respecting nation she had the right and duty to provide for defence. If there was anything in the 1932 Agreement which inhibited China from erecting fortifications in the area concerned, she would of course be stopped from constructing such military works but as he had previously maintained there was nothing of the sort in the Agreement. He really thought the Japanese Delegation were alarming themselves needlessly and were bothering the Joint Commission unnecessarily.

Mr. Okamoto rejoined by saying that following upon the signing of the 1932 Agreement the City Government of Greater Shanghai decided to establish the Peace Preservation Corps in Chapel beginning July 1st that year. As the Japanese side was not without apprehension lest this body, the Fae-An Tui as it is known in Chinese, Should be something akin to a regular armed force, the
rely on mutual trust and not to cherish suspicions of hostile intentions on the part of China. So he hoped this Japanese figure would set their minds at rest and banish doubts and suspicions. China had scrupulously observed the peace in the Shanghai area since the desorable days of 1932 and certainly would not be the first to break it.

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Japanese delegate at the time, acting under instructions from his Government, asked Mr. O.K. Yui for information regarding the real nature of the Fao-An Tui. Mr. Yui explained that the object in creating this body was no other than the maintenance of peace and order in Chapel; that the Fao-An Tui was so-called in order to distinguish it from the existing police force of the Public Safety Bureau and that the body was to be 2,000 strong, which would be divided into two regiments, each regiment being subdivided into three battalions. Mr. Yui further declared that although revolvers, guns, and machine guns would be supplied to the Fao-An Tui, tanks, armoured-cars, and bomb-guns, etc., would not form parts of their equipment, and that soldiers of the regular army would on no account be incorporated into the said organization, whose members would be composed exclusively of a portion of the Peiping Pao-An Tui, constables of the Public Safety Bureau, and some ex-gendarmes. These statements of Mr. O.K. Yui at the time were recorded at his Consulate-General.

In spite of Mr. Yui's assurance, he (Mr. Okamoto) had received definite information to the effect, that the Fao-An Tui had been steadily reinforced; their number now is estimated at about 6,500 within the demilitarized area and that they are being equipped with tanks and guns. It is further reported that not a trench or fort has been dug in the immediate vicinity of Shanghai. In fact their equipment and organization are such that there is little which distinguishes the Fao-An Tui from the full-fledged regular army.

The Japanese delegates viewed this situation with considerable concern and wished to draw the attention of the Joint Commission to this alarming state of affairs.

Mr. Yui enquired of the Chairman whether or not he should reply to Mr. Okamoto's remarks about the Peace Preservation Corps.

The Chairman replied that as it was apparent from the discussion that there were differences in the interpretation of the Agreement by the Chinese and the Japanese delegations, he thought it would be well to consider this question of interpretation before proceeding further. After discussion, the Chairman requested the Chinese and Japanese delegations to withdraw to an adjoining room in order that the neutral members might deliberate on that having been said by both sides.

Before withdrawing Mr. Okamoto observed that the Chinese Civil Delegate had contended that there was no specific provision in the Agreement prohibiting the construction of fortifications in the area concerned while the Japanese contention was that the term "cessation of hostilities" in that Agreement meant the cessation of any warlike preparations in that area. Mr. Okamoto wondered if his Chinese colleague would care to make any statement regarding alleged fortifications at "oosung?"
Mr. Yui replied that under the agreement he was not called upon to answer that question. He also said he wanted to place on record his objection to the term "demilitarized area" which was used by the Japanese Civil Delegate.

The Chinese and Japanese delegations having withdrawn, the representatives of the Participating Friendly Powers discussed the situation, resulting in the following decision which was read by the Secretary to the Chinese and Japanese delegations after they had joined the meeting:

"The representatives of the Participating Friendly Powers of the Joint Commission feel that they are not in a position at the present time to express an opinion on the conflicting interpretations of the Chinese and Japanese delegations on the points raised in the present issue.

However, they would express whether or not as a gesture of conciliation and good will and without prejudice to his stand, the Chinese Civil Delegate would be prepared to make any voluntary declaration as regards the composition and numbers of the Peace Preservation Corps in the Shanghai area and on the question of any fortifications within the so-called prohibited zone."

Responding, Mr. Yui said that speaking for himself and the Chinese Military Delegate, he thanked the Chairman and the neutral members for their kindness in coming to the meeting and for their consideration of the matters brought before it. As regards the suggestion that he should make a voluntary statement regarding the fortifications at Tungchow, he regretted to say that as his Powers as the Chinese Civil Delegate on the Joint Commission were limited and as the matter lies beyond the scope of the Joint Commission, he could not say anything without the permission of his Government. However, this much he would say. That nothing so far undertaken by the Chinese Authorities (in the area concerned) held behind it any hostile intention or warlike preparation. He denied that any warlike preparations had been made by the Chinese Authorities as alleged by the Japanese Civil Delegate and said he wished to repeat that the Chinese Authorities were second to none in their desire and efforts to ensure lasting and permanent peace and good order in Shanghai.

The Chairman said that he and the other neutral members very much appreciated the courtesies and statements expressed by Mr. Yui.

Mr. Oemoto extended to the Chairman and the neutral members his sincere appreciation for their courtesy in coming to the meeting and said he was very grateful indeed to them for giving so freely of their valuable time.

The Chairman expressed acknowledgements.

The meeting then terminated.

Circulated: July 22nd, 1935.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the document here attached, written in English by the Shanghai Joint Committee office, consisting of 9 pages and entitled "Proceedings of the Joint Committee" is a book which was given the committee in 1953 to the Japanese consulate general in Shanghai, and which has been thereafter in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo,

on the 27th day of January, 1947

[Seal]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: Counsel IHAMA, Tatsuo

[Seal]
出席者

日本民間代表

伊藤・中村

英国民間代表

英丸・ダリオ・ジェイ・トーニー・スタン・アーサー・イーグン・シモ・ノワ・シン・カーロ・トトレル・川崎

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM
心のため共同委員会

この報告書は、特定のテーマについての議論の結果をまとめたものです。報告書の内容は、すべての関与者の意見を反映しています。

1. はじめに

本報告書の目的は、特定のテーマについての議論の結果をまとめたものです。報告書の内容は、すべての関与者の意見を反映しています。
等ノ好戦的態度ヲ中止スルヲ勧告ス。當社ハハタハ勿論、支部長代

日本駐ヨリナラハ委員會ノ中立的ニ同行ソラテハ廿四デアローカト

自ニ私ハ先づ一九三一年五月五日呼成第ニ回ニ中立委員各ニ次ノラノ斯ノコ處

ラ皆彼念スルモノデアリマス。
以上述べた如くカシテ如何ナルか然モ非武装地区ニ立ヒュテハナラ
ナイトイフコトナルノ。支部當局ハハ日支間ノ相互協定ニヨッテ同地区テ
通過シテ支部軍隊ヲ移動スルコトアル時ハ之ヲ断立陳ニ行ハレルペラデアルノ
ノノトメタ。此通告ハ従来ト同ジク今ヨラ立陳ニ行ハレルペラデアルノ
ソレナラハ如何ニシテ支部當局ハバレヲ全ク立スルコトナハナナイ等ノ
場所ニ要対策ヲ講築シ或ハ戦争ヲ防センコトヲ出来ルノカ、之ハ日本側委員
オトシテ支部側委員ヲ説明ヲ求メテハ特ヲデアル。支部當局ニヨッテ行ハレ
テラルトイフ品ヲナルノナルノ等ノ係制ヲ整順ハハ二年防艦ヲ協定ノ前提ハノ
日本側一向代表ハニ九三年ニ協定ヲ問ヒ同委員ヲ命ヲナイトノノトナッ
16
Affidavit of Isamu Takeya

1. I am line 3
   2952 Inamihana, Kataseyachi, Amakuro-gun

2. I am line 13
   (11th Showa) till Dec. 1957 (18th Showa) I was...

3. I am line 15
   Office from that date till Feb. 1958 (19th Showa)

4. I am line 5
   On the morning of the 12th, the 63rd and 67th

5. I am line 14
   Following the defense plan agreed upon
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ETC.

VERSUS

ARAKI, Sadao, ETC.

AFFIDAVIT

SUBMITTED BY:

ISAMU TAKEDA

BORN: 31ST JULY 1893. (26TH MEIJI)

2932 MINAMIHAMA, ISHICAWA, KAMAKURA-GUN,

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE

I hereby submit this affidavit according to Japanese form, after having been sworn in as per attached sheet.

(1) I am a former rear-admiral. From December 1936 (12th Shōwa) till December 1937 (13th Shōwa) I was senior staff officer of the Shanghai special landing force and continued in office from that date till December 1938 (14th Shōwa) as chief of staff.

(2) As I was senior staff officer at the time of the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on August 13th I was informed of the causes of the outbreak of the incident and of its progress.

L
I did my utmost to prevent an incident occurring in Shanghai, but the repeated efforts of the Japanese proved of no avail and despite the prayor of third party nationals and Chinese resident in Shanghai external pressure caused war to break out.

(3). The prime causes of this incident are the Chinese violation of the Sino-Japanese agreement of May 5th 1932, in the increase of forces, consolidation of defences and construction of military installations in the prohibited zone and their boast to wipe out at one blow the Japanese landing force and Japanese residents, the gradual encirclement of the Japanese landing force and Japanese residents, the gradual encirclement of the Japanese sector, their general attitude of defiance and challenge. The force of the Peace Preservation Corps had been determined by the armistice agreement at 2,600 and at first had been despatched from Poiping to be stationed at Shanghai. But from about 1936 onwards the force of the Peace Preservation Corps was gradually increased in violation of the armistice agreement till they were equipped with small cannons, this again in violation of the agreement, before the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7th July 1937. Meanwhile military installations such as oil-boxes and barbedwire entanglements were constructed inside the prohibited zone. The barbed-wire entanglements were so set up as to encircle the...
Japanese area and vicinity, while the pill-boxes were erected at various points inside the prohibited zone. A typical example of an open-typed pill-box was the one built on the western edge of Fiumgwan Chin and representative models of the camouflage regular type were those built in the vicinity of Hungjao aerodrome and those found at various points constructed by utilizing farm houses. Complete pill-boxes were being gradually constructed. However peaceful conditions still prevailed at this time and when we met the Peace Preservation Corps units on the road greetings were mutually exchanged and officers of the two forces were on a footing where they would joke and drink together.

(4) On 23rd June 1937, (12th Showa), at the request of consul-general Okamoto a committee meeting based on the Armistice Agreement concluded on May 5th 1932 (7th Showa), was convened at the French Consulate General. I attended the same meeting in the capacity of military committee member for the Japanese side. The object of this committee meeting was the investigation of the facts of the construction of military installations especially of the alterations and repair of Wocsung Port and the increase of troops. However no conclusions was arrived at, and the investigations proved fruitless.
(5) With the outbreak of the Marco Polo bridge incident on 7th July in Northern China, things began to take on a new aspect.

That is, from about this time, the 87th and 88th divisions consisting of 30,000 men and considered crack troops of the Nanking Government began to occupy the prohibited zone fitted out in dark blue uniforms. At that time the uniforms of the regular army were of khaki colour, those of the Peace Preservation Corps being light yellow, but these troops now began to filter in specially fitted out in dark blue. These divisions were thoroughly instructed in Japanese-resistance and anti-Japanese education, very strong in their combat consciousness and ready for combat with the Japanese. Simultaneously with the moving in of the above troops the Chinese began hurried construction of installations and positions around the Settlements.

(6) Shortly thereafter a new phase was entered upon which was radically different from the situation in the early days of August and may be characterized as an outgrowth of the Kuling Conference held by the Chinese High Command at that time. Namely, the papers in one voice reported "China has arrived at the last pass. She will have to meet the situation with extraordinary resolution," and began to assume a tone as though they had determined on a fight with Japan. Especially
the Anti-Japanese newspapers and the Commander of the Wusung-
Shanghai defense garrisons Lieut. General Yang Hu expressed
full confidence in such bombastic language as the following:
"If hostilities are once opened we will overwhelmingly rout
the entire Japanese population into the Whang-He inside two
days."

From about this period, Chinese planes began to be stationed
at Hungje aerodrome and other places within the prohibited
area fixed by the armistice agreement. They began to fly
occasionally over the landing party in intimidation flights.

In actual fact the strength of the landing party at this
time was a standing force of 2,000 plus 300 troops which
had accompanied Japanese civilian evacuees down the Yangtze
from the Hangkow area, a total of 2,300 (to which 1,000 were
added after the Gysan incident to bring a total up to 3,330).
Opposed to this an estimated 60,000 crack Chinese troops lay
in preparedness in the close vicinity at Shanghai. Hence
their full confidence in their strength was justifiable
under the circumstances.

The increase of troops from about this time was conducted openly,
units dressed in regular army uniforms being sent in as reinforce-
ments. The situation had become such that Japanese military
and civilian and third party national strength could no longer
confronted with this outside pressure and it hurriedly began to take on the aspects of a quasi-state of war. Civilian Chinese living on the outskirts of the settlements began to feel misgiving for the occupation and construction of positions by the Chinese regular troops and following the directives of the officials began evacuation starting at the settlements. In the first place, third party nationals and civilian Chinese, not to mention Japanese residents in Shanghai had learnt their lesson from the tragedy of the first Shanghai incident of five years ago, so that it was their mutual prayer that no other incident take place, not at least in Shanghai.

We too, following the policy of non-extension of hostilities of the Control Command did our utmost absolutely to prevent an incident breaking out in Shanghai.

(7) In the afternoon of August 9th the following incident took place. Lieut. J.G. Oyama, defense commander of the western sector while passing through the sector under his command in an automobile was shot by machine-gun fire on Monument Road in the Extension by Chinese regular troops, together with his driver First Class Seaman Saito and cut to death by Chinese soldiers.

(8) It was decided to settle this incident through diplomatic negotiations, following the policy of non-extension
of hostilities of the central command.

Consul-General Okamoto undertook the diplomatic negotiations in general and for the moment an on-the-spot investigation was conducted and the corpses received.

As the result of the above investigation which was made by Japanese and Chinese interested parties together with third party national newspaper men, it was made evident that Lieutenant J. G. Oyama and his driver were suddenly fired upon by Chinese regular troops with machine-guns and cut to death with Chinese swords; the whole constituting an illegal act. The chief of staff admitted this fact and extended an apology.

(9) Mayor Yu called on Consul-general Okamoto and deplored that the situation was entirely out of his control. The Chinese headquarters which was at Lung Hwa immediately moved to Chen Lu Chin and prepared to assume the duties of a combat command, trucks and civilian ships in the vicinity of Shanghai were mobilized as were railways and all manner of other transportation facilities for the quick advance of the 200,000 troops laying in wait outside the boundary fixed by the armistice, to the outskirts of the settlements.

(10) The landing party in the midst of this commotion conducted the funeral rites of Lieutenant J. G. Oyama and First
Class Seaman Saite from 1.00 p.m. of the 12th in the inner
grounds of the landing party headquarters.

(11) The rush of Chinese regular troops to the outskirts
of the settlements reached its high-water mark on the 12th.
On the morning of the 12th, the 77th and 78th divisions
passing through North Station had advanced to the western sect-
ion of North Szechuan Road, and in the course of the morning a
Japanese soldier was killed and a civilian abducted.
Third party nations too, to meet the situation began to
take up defense positions in their several sections according
to the Shanghai Defense plan, which had been agreed upon
and was in existence since 1927 (2nd Sheen). The defense of
Toyoda Textile factory was delegated to the British garrison
following defense plan agreed upon.

(12) In the middle of the funeral ceremony of Lieut.
J.R. Oyama there was a telephone message from Consul-General
Okamoto to the effect: "As I have requested a meeting of the
joint committee of the settlements to impeach the illegal
action of the Chinese, I would like you to attend at all costs.
I attended the joint committee meeting held at the Municipal
Council after the funeral rites were concluded. The Chinese th-
already being unable to contact the military, there were no
officers present, only Mayor Yu attending."
The conference attended on the Japanese side by Consul-general Okamoto and myself by Mayor Yu on the Chinese side and by Consul-general and military attached of all the other nations, lasted till around 6 o'clock. Consul-general Okamoto disclosed the facts of the violations of the agreement by the Chinese in their increase of military strength, their rush to the outskirts of the Settlements, and construction of military installations in the area around the settlements, and stressed the retirement of the Chinese troops to a certain line to ease the tense situation. But Mayor Yu stated he was already powerless to cope with the situation. Further, the joint committee could propose no concrete plan to break the deadlock.

(13) Nothing occurred during the night of the 12th but around 9 o'clock of the morning of the 13th, the settlement garrison of the Japanese landing party was fired upon from the building of the Commercial Press Warehouse.

At 1 p.m. the commander of the landing party called an emergency meeting of all officers above the rank of Battalion Commander and gave them among others the following instructions, again stressing the policy of non-extension of hostilities:

"All efforts to be made to prevent spreading of hostilities to Shanghai. Unless attacked by Chinese, absolutely to refrain from fighting." From after 4 p.m. the Chinese opened artillery
Fire on the landing party from the direction of Pa Tsu Chiao (8th Character Bridge).

Up to this time every possible effort was made and everything was patiently endured, but the landing party could no longer calmly look on without endangering the lives and properties of the Japanese community; and further, as there was danger of the landing party itself falling into a critical condition, the order "All hands on the alert" was given. The time was 4.30 a.m., August 13th. The troops of Japan and other countries then assumed their positions. There were about 3,000 British Troops, 2,000 American Marines, and 2,000 French Troops.

The Chinese strength of the first line alone at this time was estimated at 200,000. The Japanese landing party was a weak force of 3,500. The fighting reached its peak on the 16th of August, when the landing party was in a critical position and the whole Japanese community resigned itself to the worst.

(14) The situation in Shanghai being of such a critical nature, a section of the army forces was dispatched by warships. Those units which arrived Aug. 23rd moved hastily mobilized in the emergency and their equipment was of an extremely make-shift nature and they arrived without sufficient munitions and military stores. Thereafter, further reinforcements arrived to equalize the situation.

15th
This day of April 1947

(Signed) Isamu, TAKEDA (seal)
Def Doc No. 1186

I, Tatsuo Inagawa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the 5th Day of May 1926 at TOKYO

Witness: Tatsuo Inagawa

I, T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Isamu Takeda

-11-
REPLY OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SEPTEMBER 9.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note, No. 126, under the date of August 26, addressed to me by Mr. J. L. Dodds, then Charge d'Affaires of the British Embassy, concerning the incident in which Sir Hugo Knatchbull-Hugesson was wounded.

The Japanese Government, on receiving the news of the event in question, took a grave view of the incident, and hastened to convey expressions of profound sympathy to His Britannic Majesty's Government and to Sir Hugo through myself and the Ambassadors to the Court of St. James and to China respectively and, at the same time, they sent urgent instructions to the authorities on the spot to investigate the case thoroughly. Although the results of these investigations have so far failed to produce any evidence to establish that the shooting was done by a Japanese aeroplane, the Japanese Government is taking measures for further investigations by the authorities on the spot in order to spare no efforts to ascertain the facts of the case.

In these circumstances, it is still impossible to determine whether or not the responsibility for the incident rests with Japan. Nevertheless, in view of the traditional ties of friendship which bind Japan and Great Britain, the Japanese Government express their profound regret that Sir Hugo should have met with such a misfortune incidental to the hostilities.
that were actually in progress in the region of Taitsang on that particular day.

In this connection, I wish to assure Your Excellency that the Japanese forces always take the fullest precautions against causing injuries to non-combatants, and it is certainly very far from the desire of the Japanese Government that such an unfortunate event should ever occur in future through any fault of their own. Fresh instructions have consequently been sent to their authorities on the spot to exercise the strictest caution in this regard. I earnestly hope, therefore, that the British authorities will, on their part, kindly cooperate with the Japanese authorities with a view to forestalling the recurrence of a similar event by taking such necessary measures as giving notice in advance to the Japanese authorities on the spot when entering a zone of danger.

In making the above ad interim reply, I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sir Robert Craigie

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to Japan.

Etc. Etc. Etc.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "REPLY OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SEPTEMBER 9." is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 4 October 1946.

(signed) Nagaharu, ODO
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) T. SATO
NOTE OF THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

British Embassy, Tokyo, 23rd September, 1937.

No. 148. Moiour le Ministre,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I duly communicated to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the terms of the Note which Your Excellency addressed to me on the 21st September in regard to the attack on His Majesty's Ambassador in China by two aeroplanes in the neighbourhood of Shanghai on 26th August last:

2. I have now received instructions from His Majesty's Government to state that they have received this communication with satisfaction and regard the incident as closed.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.


His Excellency

Mr. Foki Hirota

H.I.J.M. Minister for Foreign Affairs.

- 1 -
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "NOTE OF THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS" (23 September 1937) is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 4 October 1946.

(signed) Nagaharu, ODO

Witness: (signed) T. SATO
NOTE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE U. S. GOVERNMENT
DATED DECEMBER 14, 1937.

The Spokesman of the Foreign Office made public today the content of the official Note which the Foreign Minister, Mr. Koki Hirota, sent on 12th December to Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the American Ambassador at Tokyo, with respect to the incident of the sinking of the American gunboat Panay and three vessels of the Standard Oil Company, in which he requested Ambassador Grew to convey the sincere apologies of the Japanese Government to the American Government.

TEXT OF THE NOTE

December 14, 1937.

Monsieur l'Amiral:.

Regarding the incident of the 12th December in which the United States gunboat Panay and three steamers belonging to the Standard Oil Company were sunk by the bombing of the Japanese naval aircraft on the Yangtse River at a point about twenty-six miles above Nanking, I had the honour, as soon as unofficial information of the incident was brought to my knowledge, to request Your Excellency to transmit to the Government of the United States the apologies of the Japanese Government. From the reports subsequently received from our representatives in China, it has been established that the Japanese naval air force, acting upon information that the Chinese troops fleeing from Nanking were going up the river in steamers, took off to pursue them, and discovered such vessels at the above mentioned point. Owing to poor visibility, however, the aircraft, although they descended to fairly low altitudes, were unable to discern any mark to show that any one of them was an American ship or man-of-war. (1)
Consequently the United States gunboat Panay and the vessels of the
Standard Oil Company, being taken for Chinese vessels carrying
fleeing Chinese troops, were bombed and sunk.

While it is clear, in the light of the above circumstances, that
the present incident was entirely due to a mistake, the Japanese Gov-
ernment regret most profoundly that it has caused damages to the
United States man-of-war and ships and casualties among those on
board, and desire to present hereby sincere apologies. The Japanese
Government will make indemnification for all the losses and deal app­
ropriately with those responsible for the incident. Furthermore,
they have already issued strict orders to the authorities on the spot
with a view to preventing the recurrence of a similar incident.

The Japanese Government in the fervent hope that the friendly
relations between Japan and the United States will not be affected
by this unfortunate affair, have frankly stated as above their sincere
attitude, which I beg Your Excellency to make known to your Gover­
ment.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency
the expression of my highest consideration.

Signed: KOKI HIROT

His Excellency

Mr. Joseph C. Grew,

Ambassador of the United States to Japan.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, [Name], Clerk of the Foreign Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereunto attested in English consisting of [number of pages] pages and entitled "Note of the Japanese Government to the U.S. Government dated December 15, 1945" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo

on this [date] day of [month], [year].

[Signature of Official]

Witness: [Signature]
グループ米国大使宛に日外相公文（昭和十二年十二月十四日）

所屬飛行機ノタメ爆発ヲ破リ沈没セシメラレタル事件ニ付テハ不取扱本大
臣ヨリ閣下ニ対シ帝國政府ニ陳謝ヲ米国政府ニ傳達ヲ期シテハ不取扱本大
...

良好ナラサリシヲ稲穂ヲ當リ相當低高度迄飛下シタルヲ発見シタル處所ヲヨリノ機體ヲ
...

表シ候尚帝國政府ハ本件ニ依リテ生シタルルニ

ヘ其ノ乗員ノ死傷者ヲ並シスレルニモノハ

ニ基キテ発生シタル事件ヲナルコト判明カールモ呪詛ヲ依テ発送ノヲハクノヲ

テヲヨリヲ依リテ生シタルルニモノハ

ニ基キテ発生シタル事件ヲナルコト判明カールモ呪詛ヲ依テ発送ノヲハクノヲ
ル一切ノ損害ニ對スル補償ヲナシテ責任者ニ對スル適切ナル處置ヲ講

国立政府ハ此ノ遺憾ナル事件ニ依テ日本間ノ國交ニ破壊致シテハハシテラ

敬本國政府ニ御停賽相成度此段申追帯本大臣ハ該ヲ示テハハシテラ

敬具

外務大臣
田
方
 preschooler
STATEMENT OF CORRECT AND AUTHORITY

I, [name], Acting Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 36 pages and entitled "Note of the Japanese Government to the U.S. Government at Washington December 14, 1927.

is a correct and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo.

on this 3rd day of December, 1927.

[Signature of Official]

[Attends: [Name of Document]
NOTE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DATED DECEMBER 24, 1937, REGARDING THE PANAY INCIDENT.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Regarding the unfortunate incident occurring on the Yangtze River 26 miles above Nanking on the 12th instant, in which Japanese naval aircraft attacked by mistake the U.S.S. Panay and three merchant ships belonging to the Standard Oil Company of America, causing them to sink or burn with the result that there were caused casualties among those on board, I had the honour previously to send to Your Excellency my note dated the 14th of December. Almost simultaneously, however, I received Your Excellency's note which was sent by the direction of the Government of the United States, and which, after describing the circumstances prior to the occurrence of the incident, concludes that the acts of the Japanese forces in the attack were carried out in complete disregard of the rights of the United States, taking American life and destroying American property, both public and private; and which states that, "in these circumstances, the Government of the United States requests and expects of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, and an undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications, and an assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken which will ensure that hereafter American nationals, interests, and property in China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatsoever."

As regards the circumstances surrounding the present un-
Fortunate incident, I desire to state that while it is concluded in Your Excellency's Note that the incident resulted from disregard of American rights by Japanese armed forces, it was entirely due to a mistake, as had been described in my Note above mentioned. As a result of the thorough investigations which have been continued since then in all possible ways to find out the real causes, it has now been fully established that the attack was entirely unintentional. I trust that this has been made quite clear to Your Excellency through the detailed explanations made to Your Excellency on the 23rd instant by our naval and military authorities.

With reference to the first two items of the requests mentioned in Your Excellency's Note, namely, a recorded expression of regret, and indemnifications, no word needs to be added to what I have said in my aforementioned Note. As regards the guarantee for the future, I wish to inform Your Excellency that the Japanese Navy issued without delay strict orders to "exercise the greatest caution in every area where warships and other vessels of America or any other third Power are present, in order to avoid a recurrence of a similar mistake". Furthermore, rigid orders have been issued to the military, naval, and foreign office authorities to pay, in the light of the present untoward incident, greater attention than hitherto to observance of the instructions that have been repeatedly given against infringement of the rights and interests of the United States and other third Powers. And the Japanese Government are studying care-
fully every possible means of achieving more effectively the
above-stated aims, while they have already taken steps to
ascertain, in still closer contact with American authorities in
China, the whereabouts of American interests and nationals, and
to improve the means of communicating intelligence thereof
speedily and effectively to the authorities on the spot.

Although the attack on the non-oil and other vessels of
the United States was due to a mistake as has been stated above,
those who were concerned with the attack have been duly dealt
with, on the ground of a failure to take the fullest measures of
precaution. The Japanese Government are thus endeavouring to
proceed absolutely all possibility of the recurrence of inci-
dents of a similar character. It is my fervent hope that the
fact will be fully appreciated by the Government of the United
States that this drastic step has been taken solely because of
the sincere desire of the Japanese Government to safeguard the
rights and interests of the United States and other third Powers.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excel-

lency the assurances of my highest consideration.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "NOTE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DATING DECEMBER 27, 1927, REGARDING THE PANAY INCIDENT." is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 1: October 1946.

(signed) H. Kaoru
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Makaharu Gō
昭和十二年十二月二十四日関於米国政府

「パネラー難事件ニ関スル外務省発表（昭和十二年十二月二十一日）」

大便、来訪の米国

交涉

本月十二日南京上流約二十六里ノ揚子江上ニ於テ帝國海軍飛行

機過誤ニ致リ米国軍艦「パネラー」難及米国スタンダードフライ

返

会社所有蒸気三隻ニ對シテ攻撃ヲ加へ沈没又ハ火災ヲ起シメ其

際乗員＝死傷者ヲ生セムル＝至リタル不幸ナル事件ニ於テハ

前後ラ以テ米国政府御米国ニ於テハ反攻ヲ行ヒ事故ヲ

事態ヲ著シテセラルル故ニ本件ヲ始末シテ

ハ米国、対等に基づスルシテ米国国民＝生命ヲ顕と且

ノ私有財産ヲ損壊シタルニ於テハ

合衆国政府ハ帝國政府ハ正式著面ニ依ル遺憾ノ意ヲ表


FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese entitled "STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONCERNING THE PANAY INCIDENT, DECEMBER 24, 1537." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 14 October 1546.

(signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu Odo
NOTE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DATED DECEMBER 24, 1937, REGARDING THE PANAY INCIDENT.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Regarding the unfortunate incident occurring on the Yangtze River 26 miles above Yanking on the 12th instants, in which Japanese naval aircraft attacked by mistake the U.S.S. Panay and three merchant ships belonging to the Standard Oil Company of America, causing them to sink or burn with the result that there were caused casualties among those on board, I had the honour previously to say to Your Excellency by note dated the 14th of December. Almost simultaneously, however, I received Your Excellency's Note which was sent by the direction of the Government of the United States, and which, after describing the circumstances prior to the occurrence of the incident, concludes that the acts of the Japanese forces in the attack were carried out in complete disregard of the rights of the United States, taking American life and destroying American property, both public and private; and which states that, "in those circumstances, the Government of the United States requests and expects of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, and an undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications, and an assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken which will ensure that hereafter American nationals, interests, and property in China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatsoever."

As regards the circumstances surrounding the present un-
fortunate incident, I desire to state that while it is concluded in Your Excellency's Note that the incident resulted from disregard of American rights by Japanese armed forces, it was entirely due to a mistake, as had been described in my note above mentioned. As a result of the thorough investigations which have been continued since then in all possible ways to find out the real causes, it has now been fully established that the attack was entirely unintentional. I trust that this has been made quite clear to Your Excellency through the detailed explanations made to Your Excellency on the 23rd instant by our naval and military authorities.

With reference to the first two items of the requests mentioned in Your Excellency's Note, namely, a recorded expression of regret, and indemnifications, no word needs to be added to what I have said in my aforementioned Note. As regards the guarantee for the future, I wish to inform Your Excellency that the Japanese Navy, issued without delay strict orders to "exercise the greatest caution in every area where warships and other vessels of America or any other third Power are present, in order to avoid a recurrence of a similar mistake." Furthermore, rigid orders have been issued to the military, naval, and foreign office authorities to pay, in the light of the present unfortunate incident, greater attention than hitherto to observance of the instructions that have been repeatedly given against infringement of the rights and interests of the United States and other third Powers. And the Japanese Government are studying case-
fully every possible means of achieving, more effectively the
stated aims, while they have already taken steps to
ascertain, in still closer contact with American authorities in
China, the whereabouts of American interests and nationals, and
to improve the means of communicating intelligence thereof
speedily and effectively to the authorities on the spot.

Although the attack on the ram-of-war and other vessels of
the United States was due to a mistake as has been stated above,
those who were concerned with the attack have been fully dealt
with, on the ground of a failure to take the fullest measures of
precaution. The Japanese Government are thus endeavoring to
exclude absolutely all possibility of the recurrence of inci-
dents of a similar character. It is my fervent hope that the
fact will be fully appreciated by the Government of the United
States that this action has been taken solely because of
the sincere desire of the Japanese Government to safeguard the
rights and interests of the United States and other third Powers.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excel-
ency the assurances of my highest consideration.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, FAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, National Archives of Japan, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "NOTE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DATED APRIL 27, 1927, REGARDING THE PANAY INCIDENT," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 1 October 1946.

(Signed) K. Fayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Masaharu Ido
戦詞

供述者

委

供述書

荒木貞夫

其他

三、私八支那派遣軍総司令官部下

第十一軍參謀部アリシタノ部

中

陸上軍総部

昭和十九年三月

第十一軍参谋

昭和十六年十二月

大本営

昭和九十年三月

第一輯員局内

陸上部

昭和二年九月

日本籍地

第十一軍

吉松村市

昭和八年

昭和九年

敵

生

新教士

上

昭和十年

昭和九年

第十一軍

昭和十一年

昭和二年

昭和十一年

昭和十三年
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs.

Versus

ARAKI, Sadno et al

AFFIDAVIT. (Translation)

Affiant MASUDA, Kanotoshi

Swearing in accordance with the formality adopted in our country as indicated on the attached sheet I make the following statements:

1. I was born on Sept. 17, 1913 at No. 881, KIKKO YOSHIKONOSU-MURA, SHIKIMOTO GUN, KUMAMOTO Pref. which is my domicile. I am presently living at the First Demobilization Bureau.

2. My personal record is as follows: commissioned 2nd lieutenant in 1934, promoted to a captain in Dec. 1941 becoming a staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters, a major in March, 1944 becoming a staff officer of the 11th Army, and in Dec. of the same year staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters remaining there till the termination of hostilities.
3. I took part in the capture of KWEILIN, having been a staff officer of the 11th Army under the command of the commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces. The town of KWEILIN is surrounded by insurmountable rocky hills several hundred metres high. As the Chinese soldiers strongly defended themselves from these rocky hills, we suffered greatly in attacking them. There were rocky mounds throughout the town also where the Chinese soldiers planned and took up positions to offer stubborn resistance. The military strength of the Chinese army consisted of four divisions (about 20,000 men) resolved to defend this place to the end before the Japanese army closed in, the Chinese army forbade the residents at large to carry away any provisions in their possession, (This matter concerning provisions is a conjecture on my part) and ordered them to evacuate the town leaving their provisions intact in order to supply the Chinese soldiers (I remember intercepting this order) By the time hostilities were begun, not one single resident was left in town. Accordingly, the enemy resisted to the end, and it took week before we were able to draw up near the town. But since our unit on the eastern side crossed the river and assaulted the enemy fiercely from the eastern side of the town for two days the enemy at length retreated towards the southwest and we finally managed to capture KWEILIN. Japanese aircraft bombed only the airfield, south of
KUTFILN, and did not bomb the city sections of the town whatsoever.

4. A comparison of the Japanese air strength with that of the Chinese at the time of our KUTFILN attack, found the Chinese army's strength including the U.S. air units in CHUNGKING consisted of seven or eight hundred planes while ours was but 150. Of these, in the way of bombers, we had not more than 30 light bombers. There was such a vast difference in air strength that it was all we could do to but reconnoiter a few planes. The command of the air was entirely in the enemy's hands and the situation was such that it was absolutely impossible for us to carry out any bombings. So our ground units in this area fought the enemy without the assistance of air support.

5. In the SHANGTUN-KUTFILN operations, the Japanese army did not bomb within city limits at all (AT HENYING, we did). CHENGHUA was destroyed by fire from daytime bombings by large formations of enemy planes including U.S.B. - 23's, about a week after the Japanese occupation of the town. As a result, many Chinese civilians were killed by the bombings, and a good number of casualties were suffered by the Japanese army also.

In the HENYING operations too, after we had interred prisoners of war in the town, and about a week after the occupation, a formation of more than 20 Chinese planes raided and bombed the town, inflicting considerable damage.
For this reason when we occupied KWELIN, we did not bring our army enter the city. The enemy planes however did come to bomb KWELIN either.

6. Since commander-in-Chief H.T. had issued very strict orders concerning military discipline and public morality beforehand, bringing our attention even to the minutest details, we gave our best efforts not to violate the commander's orders and instructions. Accordingly, in the SIANGTAN and KWELIN operations, our army absolutely did not commit any misdeeds such as pillage, rape and massacre of the Chinese inhabitants. On this 24th day of December, 19...

at the 1st Demobilization Bureau
MISUDA, Kanotoshi

I certify that the foregoing was sworn to signed, and sealed before me.

Same date and same place

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu

The Written Oath

I swear to depose the truth according to the dictates of my conscience with holding nothing and adding nothing.

MISUDA, Kanotoshi
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the affidavit is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date 23 Jan. '47

Affidavit of MASUDA, Kanetoshi.
Def. Doc. No. 1196

STAMMT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

March 23, 1938.

The Japanese Government received on March 21 the following official note of the American Government through Ambassador Grew with regard to indemnity for the losses sustained in the sinking of the American gunboat Panay on the 12th December last year.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, March 21, 1938.

Excellency:

Reference is made to the exchange of communications between my Government and the Government of Japan regarding the attack upon the U.S.S. Panay and American merchant vessels on December 12, 1937, by Japanese armed forces and to the assurances contained in your Government's note dated December 14, 1937, and reaffirmed in its note of December 24, 1937, that the Japanese Government would make "indemnifications for all the losses" sustained.

I am instructed by my Government to state that if finds (1) that the amount of the property losses sustained is one million, nine hundred forty-five thousand, six hundred seventy dollars and one cent, (1,945,670.01) and

(2) that the amount of the indemnification which should be
paid in the death and personal injury cases is two hundred sixty-eight thousand, three hundred thirty-seven dollars and thirty-five cents, ($268,337.35). Therefore the total amount which my Government is prepared to accept is two million, two hundred fourteen thousand, seven dollars and thirty-six cents, ($2,214,007.36).

These figures have been arrived at after careful consideration and represent only the actual property losses and a conservative estimate of the damages resulting from deaths and personal injuries; the amount includes no item of punitive damages.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: Joseph C. Grew.

His Excellency

Mr. Koki Hirota,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc., etc., etc.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of source and authenticity

I, H.Y. SHI, General, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office, March 23, 1908," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April 1947.

F. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: A. Urabe

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/3/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 13 April 1947
"PANAY" INCIDENT

On December 12, 1937, the Government and people of the United States were deeply shocked by the news of the bombing and destruction by Japanese aircraft of the United States merchant vessels *Fancy* and three United States merchant vessels on the Yangtze River in China. The bombing and machine-gunning of the crews and passengers resulted in loss of life to citizens of the United States. This Government immediately sent a note to the Japanese Government stating that the United States vessels involved were on the Yangtze River "by uncontested and incontestable right", that they were flying the American flag, and that they were engaged in legitimate and appropriate business. The Government of the United States requested and expected of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, an undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications; and an assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken which will insure that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces.

This note was sent to Japan on the evening of December 13. On December 14, the United States Ambassador to Japan received a note from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the Japanese Government regretted "most profoundly" the damage to these vessels and the casualties among the personnel; that it desired to present "sincere apologies"; that it would make indemnifications for all the losses; that it would deal "appropriately" with those responsible for the incident; and that it had already issued "strict orders to the authorities on the spot with a view to preventing the recurrence of a similar incident". Finally, the Japanese Government expressed the "fervent hope" that the friendly relations between Japan and the United States would not be affected by this "unfortunate affair". The Japanese Government further promised indemnification in accordance with the request of the United States.
The overwhelming endorsement given by the people of the United States to the manner in which the Hay-Hunt incident was settled attested to their earnest desire to keep the United States out of war.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 51
1937年12月13日、合戦国が支那楊子江に碇泊中の米国艦「ベネディクト」号を、及び三隻商船が日本で航空機に爆撃されたというニュースに接して非常に動揺した。乗組員及び船客に警報を発した上で、当該船船長は合戦国軍の船員に対し次の如き内容の覚書を送付した。即ち合戦国の当該船船長は、疑問の餘地も無いため、長官に上に碇泊中であった且つアメリカ国籍を掲揚していた、故に合戦国の正規業務に従事してゐたのである。}

合戦国政府は日本政府に対し、以上の如き内容の覚書を送付したが、日本官憲又は軍艦の不法なる干渉を加へる事も無き役職合ふため
明確なる措置を取りたる旨保護すること。一を要求し且つ期待した。此の意旨は十二月十三日夕日本に送付された。十二月十四日、日本駐在米国大使は日本外務大臣から次の如き内容の見舞を受領した。即ち、

日本政府は米国政府に損害及び人員死亡者出しましたを一誠に哀悼し、一誠に哀悼し、残念を深し、

政府は米国の修好関係を此の不紛なる出事の件を一発して收め、一発して收め、

政府は米国の修好関係を此の不紛なる出事の件を一発して收め、

政府は米国の修好関係を此の不紛なる出事の件を一発して收め、
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: AOKI, Takeshi
No. 761 Horiuchi, Hayama
Kanagawa-Ken

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I was the Liaison Officer between the Second Combined Air Corps and the Expeditionary Forces in China. I arrived in Shanghai in mid-September 1937. I was a staff officer of the Third Fleet and concurrently a staff officer of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces.

My duties were to supply information to the Naval forces and to send requests from the Army to the Navy. I was also a Naval expert within the Army and in order to maintain liaison I made periodic flights to and from the airfield and the Headquarters of the Third Fleet.

On December 12, 1937 requests were received from the Army to bomb Chinese ships in which Chinese soldiers were fleeing.
from Nanking. It was reported that seven or eight large Chinese merchants ships filled with Chinese troops were fleeing up the Yangtze River and they requested assistance from the Naval Air Squadron in preventing this movement. I transmitted this request to the Air Corps by telephone. The Air Corps consented and sent several planes on the requested mission.

At that time, according to the Army reports, there were no foreign ships in the vicinity of Nanking. It was later reported that the mission was carried out with excellent results.

On December 14, 1937, I heard for the first time the bombing of the SS "PANAY". The first report stated that a foreign ship might have been bombed and I became aware of the facts when I reached Shanghai to investigate the facts in connection with this report. At Shanghai I discovered that the "PANAY" had been bombed in error, having been mistaken for one of the Chinese vessels attempting to flee from Nanking. The subsequent report of the pilot stated that the bombing of the "PANAY" was clearly an error on his part and that he had no intention of bombing a foreign vessel. It was his belief that the "PANAY" was one of the Chinese vessels fleeing from Nanking.

Insofar as the reported machine gunning of the crew is concerned, the report of the pilot denied that such machine gunning had taken place. It was not the practice of the pilots in such bombing missions to machine gun their targets.
Very strict orders had been issued by the Commander of the Third Fleet and the Commander of the Air Corps that care should be taken not to bomb foreign ships and this incident was regarded with extreme regret. For that reason, those who were regarded as being guilty of carelessness or possible negligence were punished.

On this 15th day of April 1947,
at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ Aoki, Takeshi (seal)

I, TATSUO INAKA WA, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at Tokyo

Witness: /S/ Tatsuo, Inagawa (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Aoki, Takeshi (seal)
Translation Certificate.

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch hereby certify that the attached translation of the Sworn Deposition of AOKI, Takeshi is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 21 April 1947.
私八第二聯合航空隊支部派遣官関ノ連絡官デアリマシタ。一九三七年九月中旬上海ニ着キマシタ。私八第三艦隊ノ參謀長上海派遣軍ノ参
飛行場ト第三艦隊司令部間ニ定期ノ往復シテ居リマシタ。

一九三七年十二月二十二日南京カラスル中國兵ヲ破リセテ中日両軍ノ交戦ナタリ。ソレニ依レパ八〇〇ノ八隻ノ大
環ヨ oneself 連絡ハ確シテ居リマシタ。中日両軍ノ連絡ハ確シテ居リマシタ。中日両軍ノ連絡ハ確シテ居リマシタ。
5

(签名)

[印章]

[日期：129]
THE OFFICIAL NOTE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH
THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HIROYA, KOIZUMI SENT TO SIR
ROBERT CRAIGIE (Dec. 14, 1937)

Monsieur l’Ambassadeur:

I have the honour to state that the Japanese Government regret profoundly
the incidents of the 12th instant, in which British men-of-war, the Ladybird,
the Bee, the Cricket and the Seabird, were subjected by mistake to gunfire and
aerial bombing by Japanese forces in the vicinities of Wuha and Hankow, and
to express herewith to Your Excellency on behalf of my Government their
sincere apologies. I desire to inform Your Excellency that the Japanese
Government have immediately taken the necessary steps to prevent the
recurrence of an incident of such character, and to add that they will, upon
the completion of investigations, deal appropriately with those responsible
for the incidents, and also that they are prepared to make the necessary
indemnification for the losses sustained by the British.

It is, let me say in conclusion, the fervent hope of the Japanese
Government that the traditional friendship between Japan and Great Britain
will not be affected by these unfortunate incidents.

I avail myself of this opportunity of renewing to Your Excellency the
assurances of my high considerations.

(signed) Koki, HIROYA

His Excellency

The Right Honourable Sir Robert Craigie, K.C.M.G.

H.I.M. Majesty's Ambassador to Japan.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HIYOSHI, Amoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Official Note of the Japanese Government which the Foreign Minister FUKUSUKE KOKI sent to Sir Robert Craigie (Doc. 14, 1937)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of April 1947.

K. Horyashi

Signature of Official

Witness: K. Uemba
UNITED KINGDOM LIAISON MISSION IN JAPAN,
BRITISH EMBASSY, TOKYO.


TO International Defence Section for Major War Criminals.
(Attention: Mr. Harris Through, G-2 Foreign Liaison Section)

SUBJECT: Certificate on "Ladybird" Incident.

1. Enclosed herewith please find a certificate signed by His Majesty's Political Representative in Tokyo on the above subject, as requested by Mr. Harris.

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this certificate.

(signed) R.G.H. WATTS.
Head of Chancery.

EW 21/3
Def doc No. 101.

UNITED KINGDOM LIAISON MISSION
IN JAPAN,
BRITISH EMBASSY,
TOKYO.

C.R.T.L. I.P.K.

His Majesty's Ship LADYBIRD was damaged by Japanese aerial fire at WANN on December 12th, 1937. Damage was originally assessed at £3,830 but this figure was later reduced to £2,942. A claim for £2,942 was presented to the Japanese Government on August 18th, 1938, and a cheque for this amount was paid to His Majesty's Ambassador, Tokyo, on August 31st, 1938.

(signed) A.D.F. GASCOIGNE.
His Britannic Majesty's Political Representative and Head of the
Honored Discussions in the House of Commons over China Incident; Looting by Chinese Troops Also Exposed.

London 22nd March)

On the 22nd the Sino-Japanese Conflict was taken up in the House of Commons in England as a main topic for discussions. A heated debate was carried on between Foreign Secretary Eden, Under Secretary for Navy Shakespeare, and representatives of each political party concerning General MATSUI's talk, the questions of British interests etc.

Main points of argument were as follows:

MATSUI-Little Interview

George Strauss, M.P. (Labor Party)

It is reported that the Commander-in-Chief of the China fleet, Admiral Little paid a visit to Commander MATSUI and offered his congratulations on the great victory of the Japanese armed forces. Who, if any, gave him such an instruction?

Under Secretary for Navy, Shakespeare.

Admiral Little did not express his congratulations to Commander MATSUI. Therefore no question should be raised.

Strauss M.P.

But it was already reported by the Japanese Government-controlled news agency. If what you have just stated is true,
Has the Government the intention to take formal steps in communicating its denial to both Japanese and Chinese Governments?

Under Secretary Shackleton.

It will not be necessary to take such a step. My explanation will suffice.

Ambassador Hugossen's Injury Case.

Locker Lamason, M.P. (Conservative Party)

The Government seems to have demanded no indemnity for the injury suffered by Ambassador Hugossen. If a representative of a country be injured by shooting and consequently his health be affected, is it not a natural course for the country to demand indemnity for him?

Foreign Secretary, Eden

It is a fact that the Government did not make a demand for indemnity to Japan. After a careful consideration the Government has come to the conclusion that it is proper for the Government itself to incur the cost of indemnity in view of the gravity of the case.

Notes exchanged between Japan and China

James Thomas, M.P. (Labour Party)

Did the Nine Powers conference discuss on the notes exchanged between Japanese and Chinese Foreign Ministers concerning the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July the 7th?
Def. Doc. No. 1076

Foreign Secretary Eden.

Neither the Chinese representative submitted such notes to the Nine Powers conference nor the conference itself recognized any necessity of re-examining detailed accounts of the Sino-Japanese Incident on which the General Assembly of the League of Nations had already deliberated. However, the essential point of the notes, namely the declaration by Chinese Foreign Minister that China was prepared to settle the Incident by peaceful means was emphasized by the Chinese representative at the conference. The conference took this point into proper consideration during its proceedings.

Hongjiao Road Incident.

William Garatcher (T.N. Ph.) M.P. (Communist Party)

Has Foreign Secretary Eden been informed that British residences in Hongjiao Road district in Shanghai were looted by Japanese troops?

Foreign Secretary Eden

According to an official dispatch the looting was done by defeated Chinese troops instead of Japanese. The authorities on the spot are expected to do their utmost in protecting lives and properties of British subjects. In case any damage be inflicted the Government will lose no time in taking steps to demand proper indemnity.
Problem of Chinese Refugees.

Alfred Knox, M.P. (Conservative Party)

Is Foreign Secretary Eden aware of the fact that during the recent fight in Shanghai Japanese armed forces made extraordinary efforts in protecting the foreign commercial as well as residential districts in the International Settlement?

Is there any intention on the part of the Government to approach the Japanese Government in order to obtain its assurance for the return of Chinese refugees to their original residences?

Foreign Secretary Eden

I consider it premature to give a final judgement to your first question. To your second question I must say that it is rather the duty of the Municipal Council of the International Settlement to take such steps. It is not yet decided whether the British Government would take an initiative in the matter. However, in fact, it seems to be impossible for these refugees to return to their original residences.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Chief of Research Dept. of
Tokyo (S.N.P. Press Co., hereby certify that the document hereto
attached, written in Japanese consisting of 1 page and
entitled "THE PROFILE OF THE CHUKI INCIDENT; A HUNTED
DISCUSSION IN THE HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT IN ENGLAND", is a copy of
a report on the 3rd page of the morning edition issued in
Nov. 24th, 1957.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of Feb., 1947.

/s/ S.K. MOTO, Izumi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were
certified hereto in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ I.M. INOUE, Tobayen (seal)
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5
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao et al

Sworn Deposition (transcription)

Deponent: -- MIYAKI Teizo.

3 Shinzaite, Aijo-mur
Mishina-gun, Osaka
Prefecture.
Born on April 26th,
in the 22nd year of
Meiji. (T.V. 1889)

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached sheet and
in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I
hereby depose as follows.

1. I am an ex-rear-admiral of the Japanese Navy. I served
as the commander of the 2nd Combined Naval Air Corps from
12 July, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) to December of the
same year. The following is a statement of facts, with which
I was directly concerned while I served as the commander of
the 2nd Combined Naval Air Corps in the Shanghai-area.
2. We received information on 18 September, 1937 (the 12th year of Shōwa) that the Chinese Air Force was about to launch an attack on us. We planned to counter-attack the enemy before they were prepared to take actions against us. But due to the poor condition of the air field we had no alternative but to postpone our attempt until the following day, that is on 19 September.

The Chinese Air Force, however, made a raid upon our positions as we had expected on the 19th. On the 19th our airplanes engaged in two air battles with the enemy over Nanking. Our planes destroyed many enemy planes in this battle, but we also lost three of our planes. Consequently, we gained command of the air over Nanking-area.

On 20 September of the same year we carried out an air raid and the targets being the offices of the National Government, the General Staff Headquarters, and Wireless Stations. On the 21st we cancelled our raid due to rainy weather. On the 22nd our air force made three raids on military installations such as the Aviation Bureau, the Anti-air Raid Committee Office, the Central Party headquarters, the Cha'nan Shan Gun Positions, etc.

For guidance in these attacks, I summoned Lieutenant Colonel NAKAHARA, who had resided in Nanking for many years. Referring to the map of the city of Nanking he orientated the air crew on position of the targets so no mistakes could be made and the conditions prevailing there. Again I ordered the crew to carry out dive bombing, in spite of the handicaps.
We would have to face in this operation.

We paid particular attention to the rights and interests of neutral countries. Giving one such instance here, our aim in the attack of Chinkiang desired that we launch an air attack against the Chinese forces retreating on many boats on the Yangtze River, but we did not because British merchant ships were lying anchored in the neighbourhood.

Again the Commander of the 3rd Fleet notified beforehand the diplomats of the third powers on 19 September that we were going to make an air-raid on Nanking, and again on the 20th of the same month, we notified beforehand the Chinese combatants of our air-raids and warned them to take refuge.

Next, I would like to mention the case of the misbombing of the "Fanay."

The Fanay was bombed and sunk about 1.00 p.m. on 12 December. It was obviously a misbombing. On the day it was sunk, we were not aware of the fact that we had sunk the Fanay. Until we were notified on 12 December by the Headquarters of the United States Fleet and then for the first time we learned of our misbombing of the ship.

Headquarters of the 3rd Fleet immediately dispatched flying boats carrying medical officers, medical supplies, and other things to the place of refuge. Also ships were sent to attend to relief of the men on board. Again we sent immediately the Chief of Staff to the Headquarters of the United States
Fleet to express our regrets.

4. I, the Commander of the Naval Air Corps of that time took sole responsibility for the incident and submitted my informal resignation by telegraph to the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. Consequently, I was "admonished" and ordered to return from the combat zone on 15 December 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) and given a position as Commander of the 2nd Air Fleet. (Aircraft carriers Sōryū and Ryujo).

On 5 May 1938 (the 13th of Showa) the flagship Sōwà was ordered into combat, therefore, aircraft-carrier Ryūjō was made the flagship and all headquarter personnel under me was ordered to remain. On 11 August 1938 (the 13th year of Showa) when the aircraft-carrier Ryūjō was also ordered to proceed into combat zone, I was the only one ordered to remain behind and was assigned as observer for the Naval General Staff.

Until I was placed in First Reserve on 16 December 1940 (the 15th year of Showa) I never went into the combat zone. I believe these actions, of not sending me to the combat zone, were taken against me by my seniors because of the Panay incident.

on this 20th day of December, 1947

At Tokyo

DENONT KINÔKI, Tetsu (seal)
I, INAKAWA, Tatsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

witness: (Signed) INAKAWA, Tatsuo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

"INAI", Te'iz̄(seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Kenjiro Akune, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Affidavit of Kimoto Teizo, is to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Kenjiro Akune

Tokyo, Japan

Date 16 April 1947

- 5 -
Dei Loc No. 1231

Errata Sheet

P. 1, Line 6, P. 4, Line 24 and P. 5, Line 10, 13.

Lt. W.i, Teizo to Alt. W.i, Teizo.

P. 2, Line 22.

Lieutenant Colonel to Commander.

P. 4, Line 8.

Air Fleet to Carrier Division.
ーパナライー號ハ十二月十二日午後時頃沈セラレマシタガ之ハ全ク
誤報ニヨルモノデアリマス。現沈ノ當日吾々ハ其ノ際沈ノ事實ヲ全然
知らず十二月十三日米艦隊司令部カラ通報ニシテ始メタルガ沈
空戦ガパナライー號ヲ破壊シテハ沈シタッヲ知リマシテ

空戦

第三部

司令部ニキマシテハ乗組員救護ノ為ノ軍部官、治療品等ヲ

飛行ヲ遅延せラル＝急派逓ト共ニ水上艦隊ヲ出動セシモノ乗組ノ救護

ニ努メ又直ニ参謀長ヲ米艦隊司令部ニ派遣シテ參謀ノ役ヲ

マシタ

國常時ノ航空隊司令官ダリマシタ私ハ當任チ感シ遅延退避トハ海軍大臣

並ニ司令部長ニ打電致シマシタ。其ノ結果私ハ一設問ノ應セラレ又

昭和十二年十二月十五日第一軍部ヲカラ内地ニ召還セラレ第二航空戦

司令官（短龍、龍）トナリマシタ

十三年五月五日當時ノ海軍一艦隊ガ第一艦＝出動スルコトヲ

ソレヲ私以下司令部乗組ハ内地ニ遣サレ

空母ニ接続ニ従ヒ力を更ヲ命セラレ私ヲ以下司令部乗組ハ内地ニ派遣サレ
REPLY OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1937
REGARDING BOMBING OF NANKING.

September 30, 1937.

Monsieur l'Ambarassadeur:

I beg hereby to inform Your Excellency that we have read your letter, dated the 22nd of September, concerning the bombing of Nanking by the Japanese forces.

Since Nanking is, as Your Excellency is fully aware, the central base of the Chinese military operations with unparalleled strong defense, it is unavoidable, for the purpose of attaining the military aim of the Japanese forces, that the military organs and establishments located in and around Nanking should be bombed. The bombing operations of the Japanese forces are not carried on beyond the scope above mentioned, it being unnecessary to say that they are not directed indiscriminately at non-combatants. The warning issued in advance to non-combatants serves as a testimony to the above statement. It goes without saying that in carrying out the present operations, there is no change in the policy frequent enunciated of late by the Japanese Government that they are earnestly solicitous of the safety of the rights and interests as well as of the lives and property of the nationals of third Powers which it is their wish to respect the greatest extent possible. Our request to the effect that the officials and civilians and vessels of your Excellency's country take refuge is due to no other thought than our earnest desire to prevent any untoward misfortune befalling the nationals of third Powers, in spite of the utmost caution taken by the Japanese forces.

The Japanese Government hope that the Government of the United States fully understanding that the Japanese forces, although greatly handicapped...
in their operations by giving advance notice requesting the nationals of third powers to seek refuge, will be good enough to cooperate with the measures taken by the Japanese Government.

As regards the damages suffered by the nationals of third powers as a result of the present hostilities in China, the intention of the Japanese Government remain the same as previously brought to the knowledge of Your Excellency.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Reply of Japanese Government on September 30, 1937, concerning bombing of Nanking, September 30, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1927

Witness: K. Urabe

Signature of Official
ファイルコピー

RETURN TO ROOM 361
良シトノ為ニ政府ノ民報ルニハ今次報文ニ於テシテ何等ノ声明ナリ

此ノ如ク帝國警察署命令ニ依リ作成行進ハカラル側封ノ被逮捕者

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政府ノ如クハ報レルニハ於クル民報行為ノ結果ヲ呈シ三日ノ内ノ恩将レルモノ政府ニ於テ

Pag: 1098
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES et others

vs.

ARAKI, Sadeo et others

SWEORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: KOBAYASHI, Yoshito

No. 5 URUGO 6-chome YOKOSUKA city

Born on Jan. 13, 1899

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. From June 1924 (the 13th year of T.·ISHO) I began to study in piloting aeroplanes chiefly the fighter planes. In the summer of 1929 (the 4th year of SHO·A) I went to England for the purpose of studying aerial tactics, and during the period from January to August 1930 (the 5th year of SHO·A), I completed the Flying Instructor's Course at the R.A.F. No. 5 Flying Training School, Seeland; and, after that, at the R.A.F. No. 111 Fighter Squadron, Hornchurch. At the R.A.F. No. 1 Fighter Squadron, Tangmere, I received further training in aerial tactics, being attached
to a service corps.

2. In 1937 (the 12th year of SHIJO) when the China Incident occurred, I was Lt-Commander and was the air commander of the aircraft carrier "RYUJO." From the beginning, I engaged in the aerial operations, annihilated the enemy planes in the SHANGHAI area and established the SHANGHAI Air Base (KUNGTA). After handing over the said base to the 2nd Combined Air Squadron, which had been a land air corps, I was transferred to the Kwangtung air operations.

3. Now that the activities of the enemy planes in the SHANGHAI area had been completely controlled, the aim of the Kwangtung air operations was to annihilate the enemy fighter units which were being trained and augmented in their strength with Curtishawk and British gloncester fighters as the main force in Kwangtung area. On Sept. 13 in the vicinity of the Wanshan islands, the "MEKO" was bombed by two enemy Northrop planes, and on Sept. 14 the "YUBU-HI" in the vicinity of Tachan island was bombed by a total of 11 enemy Northrop planes and 2 Curtishawk planes causing 5 casualties.

Therefore the 3rd Squadron Command planned for the annihilation of the enemy air forces in the south China region with the 1st Air Fighting Unit (comprising the aircraft-carriers "RYUJO" and "KOSHO") and the 1st Combined Air Squadron.

4. Account of the development of the Kwangtung attack follows:

Sep. 18 - Consultation pertaining to operations was conducted at the TAIHOKU base between the 1st Air Fighting Unit and the 1st Combined
Air Squadron.

Sep. 21 - In the forenoon, the first attack on Kwangtung by the 1st Air Fighting Unit was carried out.

In the afternoon the second attack on Kwangtung by the 1st Air Fighting Unit was carried out.

The objectives of the attack were the airfields of Tienho and Peiyun and the powder depot at Tsengshe.

Joint attack with the 1st Combined Air Squadron was scheduled, but due to the inclement weather, it was postponed.

Sep. 22 - In the forenoon, the Third Kwangtung attack by the 1st Air Fighting Unit was carried out with its objectives as the airfields of TIEKHO and PAIYUN.

In the afternoon the 4th attack on Kwangtung by the 1st Air Fighting Unit took place.

A fighter unit participated in escorting the medium-sized land-based bomber unit of the 1st Combined Air Squadron. Three ship-board fighters bombed the HUIEII airfield.

Sep. 23 - In the forenoon, the 5th Kwangtung attack by the 1st Air Fighting Unit was carried out, with its objectives as the powder depots at CHATAO and TSEKSH.

In the afternoon, due to the changing of weather, the attack by the 1st Air Fighting Unit was suspended.

Sep. 24 - Due to the inclement weather, the 1st Air Fighting Unit suspended
Sep. 25 - Due to the inclement weather, the 1st Air Fighting Unit suspended its attacks.

Sep. 26 - In the forenoon the 6th Wangtung attack by the 1st Air Fighting Unit was conducted, with its objectives as the iron bridges near Canton city.

In the afternoon, the 7th Wangtung attack was made by the 1st Air Fighting Unit with its objectives as the same as in the forenoon.

Here we discontinued the Wangtung attacks, and started for the SUSHILOGSHLN islands, in order to participate in the aerial operations in the SUSHILOGSHLN area again.

In the above mentioned bombing missions, any attacks on general civilians' houses or particularly against the rights and interests of foreign powers were prohibited, so that we, utilizing air photography, took great pains in the confirmation of the objectives, military installations or heavy munitions reservoirs only. From the Central Quarters, we had received a special warning order to pay full respect to foreign rights and interests.

Aviation maps and various intelligence data, showing the whereabouts of foreign rights and interests, were handed to us at the SUSHILOGSHLN islands before starting for the Wangtung attack. Detailed explanations were given to the crew members so that the attacks would be executed after confirmation on the military equipments.

During the period of the aforesaid attacks, the Air Fighting Corps
Command ordered coriel attacks to be discontinued when confirmation of
objectives was thought to be impossible due to adverse weather. The crew
members at that time were all of superior ability and, in addition to this,
they had gained experience in their fighting in the SHIJIH. I crec that
military discipline in the air was strictly observed by them.

On this 25th day of December, 1946

at Tokyo

DEFENDANT (signed) KOJIIJI, Yoshito (seal)

I, ONO, Seiichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by
the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of
this witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo

Witness: (signed) ONO, Seiichiro (seal)

C. TH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) KUDY. SHI, Yoshito (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, George K.B., of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of "KENDO YOZUNO YOSHI" by Yoshito is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 16 April, 1947

(signed) George K.B.
Ex 2532

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九月二十一日
両軍東攻取の進展は次のことでした。

九月十八日
台北近郊で第一航空戦隊と第一聯合航空戦隊の作戦

午前第一次第一航空戦隊廣東攻撃
午後第二次第一航空戦隊廣東攻撃

目標は天河、自雲飛行場及潮州火薬庫

第一聯合航空戦と協同作戦を行なったものでありました。

前第三次第一航空戦隊廣東攻撃

目標は天河、自雲

午後第四次第一航空戦隊廣東攻撃

飛行場

日向露丸は高崎群島附近で敵のノースプラントニ橋の砲台を受

け重爆弾三発（爆体被害なし）を出したので第三艦隊司令部は第
一航空戦隊、航空隊と桿礁、鳳翔と第一聯合航空戦隊に

方面の敵空母方航海を計画されたのでした。

天候不良のため延期となりました。
九月二十三日

午前九時五分第一航空戦隊艦載兵器部隊三機は虎門飛行場爆撃

九月二十四日

天候不良につき第一航空戦隊は攻撃中止

九月二十六日

午前六時第一航空戦隊艦載兵器部隊九機は虎門飛行場爆撃

九月二十五日

天候不良につき第一航空戦隊は攻撃中止

以上に述べた東京攻撃の準備は今年第四回目のもので、各部隊は準備に努め、大規模な攻撃を行なうことを目的とした。
中央からは外國機関の尊敬に対してもは勿論特に注意指令があり外國
機関所在記入の航空回と普通情報資料を適時政略に出し出す時に注意
山列島で没されましたが、ので塔乗員詳細説明表示し軍幕設設を確認
して攻撃を実施したのであります。
攻撃開始と同時に不適当で目標の確認出来ないとは思われる時は航空機
司令部より命令を中止させられて居ります又各塔乗員には目標が
確認出来てない場合は攻撃を止め、引き返す後に命令されて居りました。
面に於ける駆逐の機関もあり、飛行県報が厳守されました。

40
I am very glad of this opportunity of meeting you representatives of the foreign Press for the first time since my assumption of the office of Foreign Minister. I earnestly hope for your cooperation in the future.

It is the immutable policy of Japan to establish a permanent peace and promote prosperity in East Asia and thereby to contribute to the cause of world peace and welfare of mankind. Unfortunately the China Affair broke out in July last year. The Japanese Government, however, continued to maintain a calm attitude throughout the early period of the conflict and did everything possible to urge upon General Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider the policy of his regime toward our country. General Chiang not only failed to understand the real intention of Japan, but refused to alter his anti-Japanese attitude by declaring his stance for the so-called "prolonged welfare". Japan was thus compelled to embark upon an armed campaign in China. Our forces have since carried on their operations steadily and successfully, defeating the enemy on every front. In the latter part of last month they captured Hszechow, which the
Chinese lied boasted to be impregnable. Anking, the capital of Anwei Province, has also been taken and our forces are now advancing farther into the interior. The greatest interest of the Japanese people at present is concentrated upon the prosecution of the hostilities toward a successful conclusion.

As regards the attitude of the other Powers in connection with the present conflict, we note that while there are some Powers which take friendly measures toward Japan such as those of prohibiting the exportation of arms and munitions as well as the supply of war funds and military advisers to China, there are some which are apparently resorting to a policy ofencouraging China, in her futile opposition to Japan, thereby causing an unnecessary prolongation of the conflict and untold losses of lives and property.

This is to be profoundly regretted from the standpoint of humanity, and any impairment in the friendly relations between Japan and some such Powers should be considered to be due to such action of their part.

However, I can definitely state that the relations of our country with other Powers are as a whole satisfactory, and it is my intention to put forth my utmost efforts towards their improvement.
Defense Document 1176

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HIYASHI, Koro, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Statement of Foreign Minister Ushii Given to Foreign Correspondents on 6 June 1933" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April 1947.

/s/ K. HIYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ K. URAE
2533
All: 11/176

不फल : न करणि विद्यां "देवस" यदिन्। यदिन् अर्थे मनुष्यां विद्याः सत्तमा। अर्थे मनुष्यां विद्याः भूमिः सत्तमा। अर्थे मनुष्यां विद्याः भूमिः सत्तमा।

गुरुस्वयम् ग्रामान्त कुन श्रद्धा श्रवणेन श्रुतान्।

शरणागतमि जीतानि जीवानि न निर्भरते।

अग्नि न विद्या भूमिः सत्तमा। अर्थे मनुष्यां विद्याः भूमिः सत्तमा।
STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, MR. ARITA HACHIRO,
GIVEN TO THE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS ON DECEMBER 19, 1938

As has been made clear by the statement of the Japanese Government on November 3rd, what Japan desires is the establishment of a new order which will ensure the permanent stability of East Asia; or in other words, the establishment of a relationship of mutual helpfulness and co-ordination between Japan, Manchoukuo, and China in political, economic and cultural fields.

That the formation of a closely co-operative relationship between the three countries is an imperative necessity could be explained by the fact that it is, in its political aspect, a measure of self-defence against the Communist menace and of safeguarding the civilization and culture of the Orient, and in its economic aspect, a measure of self-preservation in presence of the world-wide tendency to erect high customs barriers and to employ economic measures for political ends.

It is not only of benefit to the Chinese people themselves but to the whole of East Asia, to lift China from its present semi-colonial status to the position of a modern State. The establishment of the new order, that is, of a relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchoukuo and China, simply signifies the creation of solidarity between these three countries for the common purpose of preserving the integrity of East Asia, while enabling each nation to maintain its independence and fully develop its individuality.

It is the firm conviction of Japan that the establishment of such a new order will perfectly be in consonance with international justice and will contribute towards the peace and tranquillity of East Asia, and it is her inflexible resolution to carry out her policy in this regard.

Leaving for a later occasion the political and cultural phases of the proposed tripartite relationship, I wish today to offer a few remarks on its economic aspect.

The economic aspect of the new order envisages a certain degree of economic cohesion and coordination among Japan, Manchoukuo, and China, and the only purpose of forming such single economic unit is to cope with, by strengthening its economic unit, the similar units which already exist elsewhere in the world and which are both powerful and self-sufficing. Although the term "bloc economy" is frequently applied to such an arrangement, the proposed unit in East Asia is by no means to be a system of closed trade. If by "bloc economy" is meant the exclusion of all interests other than those of the parties directly concerned, the employment of the term would be wholly improper in the present case.

At the moment, not a few observers seem inclined to feel as though Japan, by the inauguration of the so-called "Japan-Manchoukuo-China Economic Bloc" were aiming at the exclusion from East Asia of all enterprises, capital investments, trade and other economic activities on the part of foreign countries. It is quite regrettable that such an idea is to be seen reflected in the comments of various newspapers and magazines published in Europe and America. Japan has long stoutly upheld before all the world the principle of equality of commercial opportunity—though as a matter of fact, that principle has received scant
regard elsewhere, and Japanese products of good quality and
moderate price have everywhere been subjected to discriminatory
treatment. Japan, nevertheless, still believes that the way to
bring about the prosperity of each and every nation is to give
effect to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity,
and she upholds the freedom of economic activity in all parts
of the world as a matter of principle. It is far from Japan's
thought to aim at excluding European and American economic
activities from East Asia and she believes that such a thing
is totally impossible.

However, it is absolutely necessary from the point of view
of existence that Japan, being poor in natural resources and with­
out a large domestic market, and China, still economically weak,
should work together in order to ensure the production which is
necessary to maintain their policy of self-sufficiency for
necessary commodities in times of emergency. Within such limits
it must be admitted that the economic activities of the countries
which lie outside the limits of East Asia would have to be
regulated. In other words, it is imperative that the economic
activities of other Powers should be subject to certain restric­
tions dictated by the requirements of the national defence and
economic security of the countries grouped under the new order,
and that no political privileges should be attached to those
activities. The necessity of such restrictions is recognized
by "all modern states", including, I am sure, the British Empire
and the United States. But even if these restrictions are put
in force, there will still remain vast fields of commercial
and economic activity open to the people of other Powers.

The formation or existence of an economic co-partnership
of nations, such as is contemplated for Japan, Manchoukuo and
China, would by no means entail any diminution of the trade be­
tween that group and other countries. On the contrary, the
trade of other countries would also increase greatly by such
formation. In this connection, I might add a few words re­
garding Manchoukuo. To say that the new state has been closed
to Powers other than Japan is a gross mis-statement. Statistics
show plainly the progressive increase that has characterized the
foreign trade of Manchoukuo during the past few years. The total
value of the foreign trade of that country, which was
1,060,000,000 yuan in 1930, the year before her independence,
leaped to 1,530,000,000 yuan in 1937. As for the imports from
other countries during the same period, they witnessed an in­
crease of 35.3% for Great Britain, 49.9% for the United States,
and 33.2% for France. Especially conspicuous was the increase
in the importation of machinery, tools, vehicles, hardware and
timber, the demand for which is expected to expand further, with
the progress of the work of economic construction in Manchoukuo.
We should also take into consideration the imports from Western
countries via Japan, though these are not indicated in the
statistics. Again, we should take note of the trade of Manchoukuo
with the British and French colonies, which is fast developing
with the years.

In brief, the proposed new order for East Asia, when estab­
lished, will not only bring permanent stability to this part of
the globe but will also serve, I am firmly convinced, to put the
economic activities of Occidental Powers in East Asia upon a far
more solid foundation than at present.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of four pages and entitled "Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hachiro ARITA, given to the Foreign Correspondents, December 19, 1938", is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
文書送出前成立証明書

昭和二十三年四月
於東京

立會人
浦部勝義

同日於同証

外務省文書課長

政務課課長

文書送出前成立証明書
The Japanese Government are resolved, as has been clearly set forth in their two previous statements issued this year, to carry on the military operations for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese government; Government, and at the same time to proceed with the work of establishing a new order in Asia together with those far-sighted Chinese who share in our ideals and aspirations.

The spirit of renaissance is now sweeping over all parts of China and enthusiasm for reconstruction is mounting ever higher. The Japanese Government declare to make public their basic policy for adjusting the relations between Japan and China, in order that their intentions may be thoroughly understood both at home and abroad.

Japan, China, and Manchoukuo will be united by the common aim of establishing the new order in Asia on the basis of realizing a relationship of neighbourly unity, common defence against communism, and economic co-operation. For that purpose it is necessary first of all that China should cast aside all narrow and prejudiced views belonging to the past and do away with the fallacy of anti-Japanese, and a sentence regarding Manchoukuo. In other words, Japan frankly desires China to enter on her own volition into complete diplomatic relations with Manchoukuo.

The existence of the Comintern influence in Asia is not to be tolerated. Japan therefore considers it an essential condition of the adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations that
there should be concluded an anti-Comintern agreement between the two countries in consonance with the spirit of the anti-Comintern agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy. And in order to ensure the full accomplishment of our purpose, Japan demands, in view of the actual circumstances prevailing in

... that Japanese troops be stationed, as anti-Communist measure, at specified points during the time the said agreement is in force, and also that the Inner Mongolian region be designated as an anti-Communist area.

As regards economic relations between the two countries, Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China, nor does she intend to demand of China to limit the interests of those third powers, who grasp the meaning of the new rest

... al and unwilling to act accordingly. Japan only seeks to render effective the co-operation and collaboration between the two countries. That is to say, Japan demands that China, in accordance with the principle of equality between the two countries, should recognize the freedom of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of China, with a view to promoting the economic interests of both countries.

... In the light of the historical and economic relations between the two nations, China should extend to Japan facilities for the development of China's natural resources, especially in the regions of North China and Inner Mongolia.

The above gives the general lines of what Japan demands of China. If the true object of Japan in conducting the present military campaign be fully understood, it will be plain that what she seeks is neither territory nor indemnity for the
costs of military operations. Japan demands only the minimum guarantee needed for the execution by China of her function as a participant in the establishment of the new order.

Japan not only respects the sovereignty of China, but she is prepared to give positive consideration to the questions of the abolition of extraterritoriality and of the rendition of concessions and settlements-matters which are necessary for the full independence of China.
Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April 1977.

K. Y. S. I
signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
AFFIDAVIT OF

NAKAYAMA, Yasuto

1. I live at Sekido, Tama-mura, Minami-tama-gun, Tokyo, to now.

2. My career is summarized as follows:

   Graduated from the Military Staff College in November 1929.
   Became a member of the General Staff in
   Studied in U.S. in
   Studied in China in
   Became a staff member of the Central China Area Army in November 1937.
   Became Chief of a section of the Air Service Headquarters in
   Became Chief of a section of the General Staff in
   Became Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Fuel Headquarters in

3. My rank at the time when I became a staff member of the Central China Area Army was major. I remained in that post from November 1937 to March 1938, and during that period of time I was engaged in intelligence business.

4. The Central China Area Army was organized about November 5, 1937.

   In the neighbourhood of Shanghai and Central China, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army which had been organized in the middle of August 1937 was fighting the Chinese troops in order to protect the Japanese residents in and around Shanghai. However, the battles showed no advantageous progress on the Japanese side because of the great strength of the enemy and also for topographical reasons. For this reason, the 10th Army (Yamagata Army Corp.) was newly organized and was landed on the north coast of Hangchow Bay in order to facilitate the performance of the duty of the Expeditionary Forces. The Central China Army was organized with the duty of placing those two armies, namely the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces and the 10th Army under unified control.
5. General M. TSUI, Iwane was appointed Commander of the Central China Area Army and also held an additional post of the Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces.

The staff members of the Central China Area Army were:

Chief of the Staff -- Osamu TSUKADA, Major General
Vice Chief of the Staff -- Akira IUTO, Colonel
Other Staff Members -- Masatako KIMURA, Lt. Colonel
--- Yasuto NAKAYAMA, Major
--- Yoshikiyo NINOMIYA, Major
--- Takoji YOSHITADA, Captain

In addition to these mentioned above, there was one staff officer of the Army Air Force. Besides, there were three adjutants. The total number of the members of the Staff Department was only seven. The names of these above, however, I have completely forgotten. The Central China Area Army Headquarters consisted of only such personnel as were mentioned above. There were no other organs and personnel.

6. The Central China Area Army Commander was ordered to carry out the duty as follows:

"The Central China Area Army Commander will place the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army under his unified control and will regiment all supply works."

The chief duty was to adjust the concerted actions of the two armies. As for the practical use and command of the troops, the Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army was considered to assume charge of them. Consequently, in the Headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and that of the 10th Army, there were the perfect establishment of the Ordnance, Finance, Medical and Legal Affair Departments in addition to Staff and Adjutant Departments. In the Central China Area Army Headquarters, however, such organs were not in existence.
In order to explain why the Central China Area Army Headquarters were so imperfectly organized, it is necessary to clarify the duties allotted to each of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army.

The duty of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was "to procure the important lines of Shanghai and its northern districts, and to protect the people of the Empire".

The duty of the 10th Army was "to land on the north coast of Hangchow Bay and to facilitate the work of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army".

Besides, the Imperial General Headquarters decided the field of operations for the Central China Area Army on the delta of the Yangtze in the east of the line connecting Fushan, Suchow and Chinsing.

The Central China Area Army was organized only for the purpose of placing the two armies of the above duties under unified control. It was regarded, for this reason, quite unnecessary for this army to get its headquarters perfectly organized. It is because this Army was established only for a short time and its fighting area was quite narrow.

We received such information that, after retreated from Shanghai, Chinese troops concentrated large forces around the Nanking district and they were in a position to make a counter-attack.

On December 1, 1937 the following order was issued from the Imperial General Headquarters:

"The Central China Area Army will capture Nanking in cooperation with the Navy."

Even after this order was issued, the organization of the Central China Area Army Headquarters remained quite mechanized and it was engaged solely in command- ing operations as before.

One day after he received the above order, General MATSUI issued to both armies the orders which were almost like the following:

1. The Shanghai Expeditionary Army will attack Nanking with its main strength from the area along Wu Shih-Tanyang-Chuiping Road.
Def. Doc. 1345

2. The 10th Army will attack Nanking from the area along Huchou-Kuangte-Fuhu Road.

3. The 101 Regiment Division will make preparations for attacking Yangchow in the neighbourhood of Sungchiong.

4. The 11th Division and the 1st Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division will assume charge of maintaining the public peace in and around Shanghai.

10. Until December 15, 1937, the Central China Area Army Headquarters was located at the point about ten kilometers north of Shanghai, but advanced to Suchow on the same day. At that time, General MATSUI was sick in bed, but he disposed of all important matters in his sick-bed.

On December 7th, Prince ASAKA arrived at the actual field as the Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. General MATSUI was relieved of the additional post he had held and, as a result, he came to command the Central China Area Army solely.

11. After arriving at Suchow, General MATSUI told General TSUKIDA, Chief of the Staff, "As Nanking is the capital of China, our capture of it is an international event. Careful studies must be made in this regard so as to dazzle China even more greatly with Japan's military glory and to have the Chinese people in general place a greater confidence in Japan." This instruction was conveyed from the Chief of Staff to us staff officers. We began to make our study quite immediately with General MATSUI's principle in mind. As regards the International Law and International Practices, we consulted Dr. S. ITO, Yoshio.

Finally we made up such an order of the following gist:

1. The Central China Area Army intends to capture the Walled City of Nanking, the capital of China.

2. The Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 16th Army will capture the Walled City of Nanking in accordance with "The Way of Capturing the Walled City of Nanking", written in another sheet of paper.

In Clause I of the draft order, there was originally found the phrase "The Capital of the Enemy Nation". However, Commander MATSUI corrected it as "The Capital of China", based upon his own opinion that China as a whole was not our enemy, but only some section of her countrymen were enemies.
The "Joy of Capturing Nanking" referred in Clause II meant the following matters:

1. Both armies will stop and make preparations for the capture of the Walled City of Nanking when they have advanced to the line three or four kilometers off that city.

2. On December 9th, written advice for surrender will be scattered from airplanes among the Chinese soldiers inside the Walled City of Nanking.

3. In case the Chinese Army surrenders, two or three battalions selected from each division and M. P. units alone will be sent into the Walled City of Nanking. There, they will be engaged in guarding the zone which is shown on the map. Especially foreign rights and interests and all cultural institutions such as those which are particularly shown in a separate paper are to be perfectly protected.

4. In case the Chinese Army does not agree with our advice for surrender, an offensive will be commenced in the afternoon of December 10th. On this occasion, too, the Japanese units that will enter the Walled City of Nanking must act in the same way as above. Especially military discipline and morale must be strictly maintained and public order must be restored promptly. At the same time as the above order was drawn up, the instruction entitled "All the Orders and Words of Advice Concerning the Capture of and Entry into the Walled City of Nanking" was composed. This was drafted in the Staff Officers' Department so as to enable all the armies to realize completely what General MITSUI had intended.

The gist of the above instruction was as follows:

1. The entire world has been paying its sharp attention with the realization that the capture and entry into a foreign capital by the Imperial Army is the event which is quite unprecedented in the history of our country and will remain permanently in books. In view of the above fact, all troops should absolutely refrain from forcing their way violently into the city, from fighting among themselves, and from making any illegal acts.
2. Military discipline and moral of each unit should be most strictly maintained so that both the Chinese soldiers and civilians may respect the dignified manner of the Japanese troops and may also place allegiance to them. Thus, any such acts as would dishonour the Japanese Army should never be taken under any circumstances.

3. You are never permitted to approach any places for foreign rights and interests particularly diplomatic organs which are illustrated in an annexed sketched map. You should never enter any neutral zones where diplomatic corps have been established unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Sentries should be posted in all necessary points.

Moreover, you are prohibited to enter the tomb of SUN Yat Sen and the mausoleum of the Emperor Hsiao of the Ming Chao Era and other resting places of patriotic revolutionists which are situated outside of the Walled City of Nanking.

4. Units to enter the Walled City should be especially selected by the divisional commanders. The words of advice for the capture of the Walled City of Nanking, especially all the places of foreign rights and interests inside the wall, should be thoroughly given beforehand to all of them, in order that no mistakes may be made for any reason whatsoever. If necessary, sentries should be posted.

5. Severe punishment is to be given to those who would plunder or who would cause a fire to break out even because of their carelessness.

A great number of military policemen as well as assistant military policemen should be made to enter the Walled City at the same time as troops in order to prevent all unlawful acts.

12. All findings about foreign rights and interests are based upon the answers I received from Consul Generals or consuls of various countries in Shanghai whom I had inquired about them through the hands of the Japanese Consul General there. Thus, I drew all of them on a map in red ink for clarifying matters.
For cultural institutions, those except the tomb of Sun Yat-sen and the
monument of the Emperor Hsiao of the Hwang Era -- the locations of which were
clearly known, were investigated and instructed to me by Japanese diplomatic
organs. In this way, I drew all such matters in maps quite clearly so as to
enable all Japanese to understand them to the fullest extent.

13. All these orders, instructions and maps referred above concerning the
capture of Nanking were carried and delivered on December 3 to the Shanghai
Expeditionary Army Headquarters by General TSUKADA, Chief of the Staff, together
with Lt. Colonel HII KII, a member of the Staff and myself. Another staff
officer was at the same time dispatched to the 10th Army to enable the whole
army to learn perfectly the above matters. Notes of advice for surrender to the
Chinese Army inside the wall were scattered on December 9th by the air corps of
China.

At that time, General HATSUKI was sick in bed in Suchow, and Colonel IMAI,
Vice Chief of the Staff, was with him.

After delivering the above-mentioned orders, the Chief of Staff and all of
us resided in T'an-chou-shen.

14. Until about 1 p.m., December 10th, General TSUKADA, Chief of the Staff,
and I had been waiting outside the CHINGSHIH Gate for the becsm of the flag of
truce from the Chinese Army. However, he did not come at last. For that reason,
from about 2 p.m., a general attack was commenced against Nanking. Although the
Chinese offered stubborn resistance behind the wall, the Japanese armies succeeded
in capturing the Wall of Nanking at about 12 p.m. of December 12th. Fearing the
enemies might be thrown into confusion, General TSUKADA, Chief of the Staff, had
his subordinate staff officers inform both armies of their strict obedience to
the above orders. Despite this, the majority of the first line troops had already
entered the Wall before we could be aware of it. I heard later that they were
drawn into the Wall under the natural influence which came after the enemy's strong
resistance was broken down. It was also due to the fact that the Japanese troops
could not be quartered because all barracks and schools outside the wall had been
destroyed or burnt by the Chinese Army or the Chinese people. There was still
another reason that there was very little water outside the wall, and even if there
was some, it was not drinkable at all, I was informed some time later.

15. On December 13th, in order to ascertain the fact concerning the capture of Nanking, I entered Nanking City through Chungshan Gate. On the 14th and 16th, I paid a visit to Nanking again for making preparations for the formal entry of General MATSUI. I proceeded along the main road through Chungshan Gate to the National Government Office first and then to the Capital Restaurant.

The road I took was expected to be taken by General MATSUI at the time of his entry into Nanking. I witnessed on that road no dead bodies except some sand bags which were scattered about near Chungshan Gate. Near the airbase inside the Wall, that is to say, in the southern part of Nanking, I caught a glimpse of some smoke which was rising up there, but on the area in and around the Capital Restaurant, namely on the northern part of Nanking, no great damage was inflicted. The National Government had had no damage at all. The Capital Restaurant, though it appeared undamaged, yet its inside desperately devastated, because the Chinese troops seemed to have been staying there. Under the leadership of the Adjutant of the Department of the Headquarters, the Capital Restaurant was being cleaned on the morning of the 16th, and in the room for General MATSUI, necessary preparations were made with some difficulty. All members under the Chief of Staff, however, were ready for bivouac, it was told.

16. General MATSUI received, on December 14th, the information concerning the capture of Nanking. Though he had not yet completely recovered from his illness, he flew in a small-sized airplane from Suchow on the 15th together with Col. MATO, Vice Chief of the Staff, and arrived at the airbase of Chüjung where he advanced by motorcar as far as Tangshuichon.

On December 17th, the ceremony for the triumphant entry into the Walled City of Nanking was held, and General MATSUI entered together with Vice Admiral NASHIOKA, Kiyoshi, Commander of the Navy. The Capital Restaurant was his lodging. After the ceremony, General MATSUI gathered all participating officers and ordered them to be more strict in maintaining military discipline and morale. He also commanded the troops inside the Wall/adjust, and ordered unnecessary troops to go outside. This order of his was demanding more strict execution of his
earlier orders was issued because he had received a report from the Military Police there regarding some crimes connected with military discipline and morale which were committed by some troops under his command.

General Tsuchi immediately ordered the staff officers under him to inspect the outside of the female City of Nanking for the investigation of the quartering power there. As the result, the area came to be found out that it was absolutely unfit for military quartering. For that reason, on December 19th, it was decided that the 10th Army would be sent back to the Wuhu district, and that the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, leaving only the 16th Division for the protection of Nanking would be made to retire gradually to the north coast of the Yangtze and to the Shanghai district. This was gradually put into practice.

17. On December 18, a memorial service for the dead officers and men was held. In celebrating this memorial service, General Makui strongly emphasized that "not only the souls of the Japanese dead, but also those of the Chinese dead should be worshipped and appeased -- such alone is the foundation for the establishment of peace and harmony between China and Japan and is also the real spirit of the Greater Asia Doctrine I always emphasize". He gave an order to the Chief of the Staff to make preparations for the memorial address, etc.

However, there was not enough time left for us to do so. It was therefore decided that the memorial service for the departed spirits of the Chinese would be held on another occasion. General Makui regretted it quite immensely. After repatriating to Japan, he had a temple built for the Goddess of Mercy at Tsuchi, Wanchi City and Kanagawa Prefecture, and there he worshipped the souls of the dead of both the Japanese and Chinese troops. The temple still exists now.

18. The so-called poor people's quarters which were administered by the Nanking Safe Area Committee were not officially acknowledged as a neutral zone according to the international laws, but these quarters came to be considered that there would be no trouble. Therefore, it was decided that, even after the capture of Nanking, these quarters would be protected and that these quarters would be clearly partitioned and guarded by military troops. It was considered that even soldiers would not be permitted to enter these quarters without special permission.
Later, we heard that the committee had protested against the atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers within those quarters. However, their protest did not reach the Central China Area Army Headquarters. Even granting that there were such illegal acts there, protests had to be offered to the Japanese Consulate which was to establish communication with the Special Service Organs, and the Shanghai Expeditionary Army Headquarters which had direct responsibility for guarding Nanking. Despite this, there were no instructions from Shanghai Expeditionary Army to Central China Area Army and therefore, neither Commander M. TSUI nor the Staff Department knew the abovementioned protests.

Unlawful acts by the Japanese soldiers, if any, had to be investigated and court-martialed and only the results were to be reported to the Central China Area Army Headquarters.

However, the rumor that there were unlawful acts of the Japanese troops in Nanking came to the knowledge of General M. TSUI after his return to Shanghai with all his staff officers. General M. TSUI came to feel quite uneasy and had no transmit the following instructions:

"It is rumoured that illegal acts are being committed in Nanking by Japanese troops. As I gave instructions on the occasion of the entry ceremony into Nanking, no such acts should be taken under any circumstances for the honour of the Japanese Army. Especially, because Prince ASUKA is our Commander, military discipline and morals must be even more strictly maintained. Any one who would misbehave himself must severely be punished. As for damages done, measures should be taken that they may be compensated or returned."

Therefore, on or about the 26th or the 27th of December, I left Shanghai for Nanking and conveyed the above order to the Chief of the Staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces. It was reported that the Chief of the Staff and all the staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces were inspecting day and night all the streets there so as to realize the perfect maintenance of the military discipline and morals there.
19. Before and after the ceremony for the entry into the Walled City of Nanking was held, I went to Nanking and carried out inspections in the city. On these occasions I saw no dead or massacred bodies of the Chinese civilians except about one hundred dead bodies near Haikouan, and about thirty near Asia Park which looked like Chinese soldiers.

I hear that there were about five thousand prisoners of war in Nanking, but they have never been massacred, but they have gradually been released on the other side of the Yangtso, according to the information received from both armies.

20. General LI CHU was always anxious to avoid friction with foreign nations, and gave orders to protect foreign rights and interests. The Staff Department, too, transmitted them to both armies on all possible occasions. However, some violations of foreign rights and interests came to my knowledge by the information which came from both armies. Since violation of the foreign rights and interests were to be settled by international negotiations, it could not be treated by either of the two army headquarters. For that reason, the information came to the Central China Area Army. Concerning the protection of foreign rights and interests, one thing we were practically embarrassed with on the battle-field of China was that the Chinese soldiers and civilians made false use of the American, British, German and other country flags. It was quite frequent that they hampered Japanese operations in this way. For instance, although it was quite evident that at Yangchou, there existed no foreign rights and interests, as the result of previous investigations, British, American and German national flags were being put up. Consequently, this occasioned our doubts and on examination it became clear that the Chinese had been using the foreign national flags falsely.

The above is only one instance among many. Such instances on the battle-field of China, both on sea or on land have often been reported to me. In consequence, we had to experience such inconvenience that the Japanese soldiers were unable to believe that where there were foreign national flags, there were foreign rights and interests. To believe that the case of violating foreign rights and interests which broke out in Nanking must have been treated and settled by the hands of the Damage Investigating Committee in Shanghai consisting
of members of both Army and Navy and of diplomatic organs there.

21. I know about the affair concerning the sinking of the "Lady Bird". I received the information that a British gunboat had been fired upon near Wuhu by the artillery troops attached to the 10th Army. About the 14th of December, therefore, the Chief of the Staff ordered me to go and investigate the real situation.

I immediately went to the 10th Army Headquarters and conducted investigations. The following facts have been discovered as a result:

On December 11th, the 10th Army Headquarters were advancing near Wuhu. Severe battles were being fought near Nanking, and the Chinese troops were in the midst of retreating on the Yangtze aboard various kinds of vessels, big and small, which they had mobilized. Lt. General YAMADA being aware of the situation, conveyed to Colonel HASHIMOTO, Commander of the 13th Artillery Regiment, an order by telegram: "Regardless of nationality, carry out bombardment!"

The reason why he issued this order was that he understood that the ships were retiring with retreating Chinese soldiers on board and with foreign national flags. Col. HASHIMOTO who received this order was advancing in the direction of Nanking at that time, but on the 11th returned to Wuhu all of a sudden, and thus occupied positions there. On the morning of the following day, he witnessed in the thick mist on the Yangtze several vessels carrying the retreating soldiers, and instantly he fired upon them. It became clear that the "Lady Bird" had been among the fired vessels, and that entirely due to the thick mist, he had made an error.

I reported the results of my investigations as above to General TSUKADA, the Chief of the Staff, and then to General MATSUI.

General MATSUI ordered General TSUKADA, the Chief of Staff, to transmit his message to the Commander of the 10th Army that apology should be immediately made to the Chief of the British Navy, and I heard about this matter beside him. Then I heard that General MATSUI, immediately after returning to Shanghai from Nanking, met Admiral Little of Britain to whom he expressed feelings of his great regret, and that the Admiral came to understand this matter and promised
him to convey General ILTSUI's apology to the British Government.

22. The shelling of the "Penny" was chiefly investigated by the Navy. I obtained the outline of the case only and never went into details. As regards this matter, too, I have received the information that General ILTSUI, after returning to Shanghai from Nanking, expressed feelings of regret to Admiral Yarnol, Commander-in-Chief of the American Navy.

23. General ILTSUI entered the walled City of Nanking on December 17th, and on the 20th left for Shanghai by destroyer with the Chief of Staff. All other members including Colonel IITO, Vice Chief of the Staff, reached Shanghai on the 21st or 22nd by temporarily named train. The reason why General ILTSUI hurried back to Shanghai like this was because he had been ordered by the Imperial General Headquarters to commence the attack against the Hengchow area at the end of December, and he, for this reason, had to command operations.

24. Until the capture of Nanking, there had been no judicial department attached to the Central China Area Army and naturally no court-martial. However, the Japanese Army on or about December 20th was like this: The Shanghai Expeditionary Forces Headquarters was placed in Nanking, the 10th Army Headquarters in the Hengchow area and Central China Area Army Headquarters in Shanghai. Therefore, at the end of December, the Judicial Department was established also in the Central China Area Army by the order of the Imperial General Headquarters, and the court-martial came to establish itself.

The Judicial Department attached to each army is an independent law organ. It is under each commander and is never commanded by the Chief of the Judicial Department of the Central China Area Army, though the results of the court-martial had to be reported to him.

The chief of the staff of each army has no right to command the Chief of the Judicial Department, but he is able to administer the business affairs of the Judicial Department. However, the Vice Chief of the Staff of each army has no authority whatsoever concerning this.

Such being the case, all the staffs below the vice-chiefs are quite ignorant of the results of the court-martial or the business of the Judicial Department.
unless they are given some special information from the Chief of the Judicial Department.

25. The so-called Nanking Incident came to be rumored in the world long after I had resigned the post of staff of the Central China Area Army. As I have stated above, I paid my visit to Nanking several times, but I have never heard about such great events as have been rumored so far, nor have I seen anything concerning such events.
On this 27th day of Jan., 1947

At Tokyo.

DEPOSITION  YOSHIDA, YASUTO (seal).

I, KAWASAKI, TAKUZEN hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) KAWASAKI, TAKUZEN (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YOSHIKAWA, YASUTO (seal)
Page 2, line 12 should be amended to read "Army Air Force whose name I have forgotten. In line 13 and 14 the sentence reading "The names of those above, however, I have completely forgotten", should be deleted.
Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 April 1947.
I n T F l

United States of America etc.

- Verse -

Areski, Sadeo etc.

SIGNED DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: Hidoku, Shinrukuro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
AFFIDAVIT:

by HIDAKA Shinrokuro

loko, 3-chome, matsuzawa-machi, 1.
I am now living at seta uku, Tokyo.

I served the Japanese Embassy in Nanking as councillor from April 30 to August 16 1937, and later I stayed in Shanghai from 29 August 1937 to 3 March 1938, holding the same position. On 17 March 1938, I was appointed consul-general and was in charge of the Consulate-General at Shanghai from that day until 12 December 1938, when I was ordered to return home.

I went to Nanjing four times during my stay in Shanghai; the first time, 17 and 18 Dec. 1937, to attend the ceremonies of the triumphal entry to the city and of acknowledgement to the service; the second time, 25 and 26 Dec. 1938; the third time, from 1 to 8 Feb. 1938; the last time, 27 and 28 March, 1938, to attend the ceremony marking the establishment of the Restoration Government.

2. I have been acquainted with General Matsui for a pretty long time. In particular, when he attended at the Armament Reduction Conference held in Genoa in 1932, as plenipotentiary, I lived with him as an attendant of the Japanese Delegation.

When General Matsui arrived at Shanghai as Commander-in-Chief, Shanghai Expeditionary Army, I saw him for the first time on 10 September 1937, at Woosung. I met him often during
3. (a) General Matsui had long been a believer in Sino-Japanese cooperation. He had an understanding of Chinese culture and a deep affection for China and her people. These facts were often expressed by him when I talked with him.

(b) On Sep. 10, when I talked with him at Woosung stated the following intentions:

1. To treat POWs justly.

2. To keep a fair attitude toward the inhabitants in general.

As regards this matter, he intended to promulgate it in the name of the Army Commander-in-Chief.

3. To pay reasonable prices for food and other commodities requisitioned.

He told me various considerations with regard to the method of payment in cases where inhabitants had fled and no longer there, and stated that the matter should be promulgated to the general public to put them at their ease.

Furthermore, I remember that when he talked with me or with the personnel of the Embassy or the Navy, he frequently expressed his concern for the Chinese people.
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(a) He always paid special attention to foreign relations and often asked for the opinion of Consul-General Okazaki. Also, he took care to keep in touch with foreign press men. He met several times especially with Hallett Abend, a special correspondent of the New York Times and David Fraser of the London Times.

(d) I know that Gen. Matsui took the following steps, with regard to the attack on Nanking.

(1) He made many copies of the maps of Nanking City on which foreign embassies and legations, as well as other property involving foreign rights and interests were distinctly marked. These maps were distributed to troops. The Japanese Embassy assisted in making the maps, and I had a chance to see one thus made up.

(3) The Chungshan and Minshao Mausoleums on the Map were surrounded by a red circle and it was indicated that they were to be excluded absolutely, from destruction. This was made according to General Matsui's desires, so one of his staff officers of the Army Command told me.

(3) Near these places it was prohibited to fire any gun. I heard this fact afterwards from Noda Kongo himself, a regimental commander who advanced on the side of this area.

(4) Gen. Matsui had told us in Shanghai before the attack on Nanking that he intended to stop the forces outside of the city wall and induce the Chinese commander to surrender, and that he would dispatch only highly disciplined crack troops.
in to the City.

(5) After he had started from Shanghai to carry out
the Nanking Attack, I met him again in Shanghai, Jan. 1 next
year, when he was sincerely grieved, to find for the first time
that some of his subordinates had done wrong. I was deeply
impressed then to find that he had not been aware of such facts
until that time. I was told directly by both himself and his
staff members that he gave strict warning and directives in the
name of Commander-in-Chief accusing those who had acted wrong.

4. As regards dispositions made by the staff and other
responsible members of the Army HQ, the chief matters I happen
to know are as follows:

(a) The fair treatment of POWs was under their consid-
eration from various angles, and they were holding consulta-
tions concerning the establishment of suitable camps.

(b) At the time when Nanking City was entered, the
attitude of the Japanese gendarmerie was practically impartial.
They were well spoken of by both foreigners and the Chinese.

At first they were few in number; only fourteen including
the commander. I heard on 17 December that forty other
provisional military police were to be obtained in several days.

(c) I neither heard nor saw of the Army Staff's having
directed rough treatment of foreigners or misuse of foreign
rights and interests or of Chinese property.

(d) It was the General's idea to set up notices of no
admittance on foreign Embassies and legations and other property.
involving foreign rights and interests in Shanghai and Nanking, we diplomatic officials assisted in the work.

(5) In particular the staff officers of the Army in charge seriously did their best in investigating and settling cases involving foreign relations. For example, a staff officer accompanied by a diplomatic official went to Wuhu where the American flag incident had occurred, in order to investigate the incident on the spot. When they found that the troops concerned had already set off, they pursued the troops, who were by that time engaged in battle, overtook them at Hanchow, and spent two weeks completing the investigation.

5. (1) Up to this time, when there was any civil war or riot in China, or any incident or battle between China and any other country, Japanese diplomatic authorities had strived on the spot to protect not only Japanese but also foreigners and their rights and interests. We had also taken care to protect Chinese and to handle their property fairly.

During this incident also we worked under this policy from the beginning as a matter of course, even without special instructions from the government to that effect.

The Commander-in-Chief, General Matsui, approved our proposals and opinions.

(2) On the occasion of the Nanking Attack, more than ten men who had formerly been attached to the Nanking Consulate were
sent at the time of the Japanese Army's entry to cooperate with the Japanese Army in working for the protection of foreign residents and foreign rights, and interests. They were also instructed to strive to treat the Chinese people fairly, in order to preserve public order. They all always did their best along those lines. Examples are as follows:

(a) At first communications from Nanking were extremely difficult. Therefore, soon after the entry in to Nanking, they used a news correspondents' radio to send reports about the welfare of foreigners to Shanghai.

(b) They promptly investigated foreign rights and interests and other points requiring protection and, co-operating with the Army, had "no admittance" signboards set up.

(c) They employed Consulate policemen for the protection and convenience of foreign residents.

(d) They directed the Consulate-General Staff to treat the Chinese people fairly and in particular to protect civilians. Those carried out their duties with success, since they had all served formerly in Nanking and had been well acquainted with conditions in the city in ordinary times. (They sometimes posted look-outs at the entrances of such refugee quarters as Kinning University).

(e) Reports on anything wrong done by Japanese soldiers were submitted to the Consulate-General by foreign residents. Most of
those reports were based on hearsay, however, and since the Consulato-General had not time enough to investigate each of them, the reports were sent to the Foreign Ministry, Tokyo, (I read through some of the copies in Shanghai) and to the Army in Nanking. It seemed the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo gave notice of these reports to the War Ministry.

(3) I went to Nanking several times during that period, and each time I heard reports from the Nanking Consulato-General. I saw existing conditions and talked with foreign residents. I submitted a written report of these items to the Foreign Ministry, and made the same report orally to Foreign Minister Hirota and other Foreign Ministry Staff members when I returned home for instructions at the end of Jan. 1938. Then I heard that whenever reports were submitted from the officials on the spot the authorities in Tokyo called the attention of the Army to them. It was due to this fact, as I said before, that the Army Central Headquarters some times gave directives about this to Army officials on the spot. Furthermore I know that in early February Maj. General Homma, then chief of the General Staff Office Division, went to Nanking. He told me that, though the purpose of his trip was chiefly concerned with problems of foreign relations, there were other matters concerning the Chinese people.

(4) Soon after the collapse of Nanking I sent Secretary
Okumura to Nanking and Wuhu by Navy plane. He returned from Wuhu bringing with him an American correspondent who had been vice-in a hospital suffering from a wound, and the wounded commander of the warship, Lady bird. I also took steps to permit several foreign correspondents to go down the River to Shanghai at will.

(6) Just after the fall, the entire city of Nanking was confusion itself, but calm was gradually restored. Especially, after the Self-Governing Committee was established by Chinese citizens, 1 January 1938, and began to govern the city, working as mediator between the Japanese Army and the general public, mutual misunderstanding and doubt lessened. After the end of March, when the Restoration Government was established to govern the downstream area of the Yangtze River, the life of the general public brightened considerably.

7. Before and after the Nanking fall, there were affairs such as the following:

(1) In the battle around Shanghai, the resistance of the Chinese Army was far more severe than the Japanese Army had expected, since anti-Japanese feelings were very strong there.

The Japanese troops dispatched there for the protection of Japanese residents and Japanese rights and interests were far fewer than the Chinese force in number. Hence, the battle was very hard, and Japanese casualties were great. This naturally enhanced the fighting spirit of the Japanese soldiers. (Originally, the antipathy of Japanese soldiers toward the Chinese people...
(2) Accordingly, contrary to our expectations very few of the Chinese soldiers were taken prisoner at first, (most of them either died in the field or retreated).

(3) In order to hinder the Japanese Army the Chinese Army carried out from the beginning the so-called "scorched-earth policy", setting fire to houses and munitions dumps and compelling the inhabitants to evacuate. Hence, at the beginning of the battle the Japanese had few chances to contact inhabitants on peaceful terms, and it was natural that both the Japanese troops and the Chinese inhabitants had become more and more uneasy and suspicious of each other.

(4) It was due to the propaganda of the Chinese Army and authorities that anti-Japanese feelings were generally strong. Even the few old men, women and children who had remained in the occupied area, acted as spies, sabotaged, or attacked Japanese soldiers in the dark. By these acts the activities of the Japanese Army were greatly hampered. Japanese soldiers at first tried to treat civilians with kindness, taking them as quite apart from military men. As a matter of fact, however, confronted with such an attitude on the part of the inhabitants there arose among the Japanese soldiers a feeling of hostility and an attitude of suspicious watchfulness.

(5) The Chinese Army made strong resistance around Shanghai and the battle front came to a standstill there. It was thought that if the Chinese
were defeated there, they would make a stand on the route between Shanghai and Soochow and resume their opposition. Under these circumstances, it was necessary to destroy all the Chinese troops in order to set up security around Shanghai. For this purpose, Japan reinforced her Army in early November with a new force which landed at Hankow Bay. Meanwhile, the Chinese Army was defeated and the Japanese Army, giving them no time to recover, started to chase them and entered Nanking at once. Hence, it was impossible for the Japanese army first to lay siege on Nanking and then to attack and capture, as it had been foretold to us by General Matsui. And as a consequence, I believe, confusion arose.

(6) It was due to the said circumstances that along the road leading to Nanking, not only had munitions, houses, and fuel been taken away or burned, but the Japanese supplies were late in coming. It was very cold in December. Troops of the Japanese Army, individually took up things scattered about on the field to use, or to cut, or to burn as fuel.

Even in Nanking, military barracks and other buildings that remained were without beds and other facilities, and it was extremely difficult to quarter the Japanese Army there.

(7) At the time of Fall, Nanking was entirely without government. Directly after the Fall, conditions I observed in the City were as follows:
(a) When the Chinese Commander of the Nanking Guard retreated before the Japanese, all official members of military and civil organs absconded. There was no city government, no police, no responsible man remaining. All registers of citizens, land and buildings necessary for routine administration had been taken away. The police force and disbanded. No police man was to be seen. Only two or three policemen, employed in each foreign Embassy or Legation were found to be in the premises. There were numerous cases in other cities than Nanking, in which some of the civil officials or prominent personages of the place remained after the retreat of the Chinese Army, working as mediators to make relations smooth between the incoming Japanese Army and the common public in the place.

(b) Foreign Ambassadors, Ministers, Consuls, and other officials of foreign nationality, all went away from the city before its fall, and there was no person authorized to negotiate formally with the Japanese Army for the protection of the rights and interests of foreign residents and families.

All the foreign correspondents were desirous of getting out of Nanking to send telegrams to their main offices. Within a few days after the fall of Nanking, they all went to Shanghai, taking advantage of facilities offered by the Japanese Army in Nanking. None were to be found when I went there on December 17.

(c) The population of Nanking was said to be one million, but it had been reduced to two hundred thousand at the time of the
fall, most of whom, belonging to the lower class, had moved to the so-called "Safety Zone". The Chinese houses outside of this zone were practically all vacant. The organizing of refugees was in the hands of some 20 private individuals of foreign nationality who formed a committee.

The Japanese Army did not officially approve the above-mentioned zone. The reasons were (1) that the location was thought difficult to safeguard, from a tactical point of view, in case of a battle in the city, (2) that a high ranking Chinese official and staff lived there, (3) that the committee did not have enough power to keep defeated Chinese soldiers and other undesirable persons out of the zone and to maintain its "neutral". (The "Safety zone" in Shanghai was considered to differ in these points and was approved by the Japanese Army.)

The Japanese Army persisted in holding to the doctrine that a place without any hostile troops or military establishment, should not be attacked, and, actually, there was neither battle nor casualty in the area when Nanking was captured.

(d) When the Chinese Army retreated at the time of the fall of the city, many military men, audaciously took clothing from civilians (some civilians were murdered), and, putting it on instead of military uniforms, entered the "Safety zone" disguised as civilians. This fact was told to me by Mac Daniels, AP reporter in Nanking and Hallott Abend of the New York Times, then in Shanghai. It was a matter of course that the Japanese Army
for this reasons hold suspicions and doubts.

8. The safety zone in Shanghai (so-called Jaquinot Zone)

When the battle around Shanghai developed and the Chinese Army was expected to retreat, an international committee consisting of Britons, Americans, Frenchmen, etc., was set up with Father Jaquinot as its leader. The committee proposed to make a "safety zone" in a section of Nan-tao (Chinatown in the southern part of Shanghai) under the approval of both Chinese and Japanese. The purpose was to receive Chinese if the battle reached that area. At first Father Jaquinot, accompanied by Timorley, a Manchester Guardian correspondent, came to me and told me of this. I took steps, cooperating with Shanghai Consul-General O'Amote and Consul-General Okazaki, to put this plan into practice. Army Commander-in-Chief Matsui and Navy Commander-in-Chief Hasogawa showed a favorable attitude toward it from the beginning, and the plan was approved by the two commanders and the Chinese as well. At that time, General Matsui contributed ten thousand yen to the Committee to assist in financing the plan. (Naval Commander Hasogawa contributed money, etc.)

Furthermore, Foreign Minister Hirota sent a letter, dated December 8, to Father Jaquinot as a message of the praise and respect of the Japanese people felt toward such a humanistic work, with best wishes for his success. The reasons for which the plan was approved by the Japanese authorities was as follows:
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(1) The Area was purely a Chinoso town, and it was clear that Father Jaquinot and the other committee members were all impartial and disinterested.

(2) The committee would take in and protect non-combatant Chinese when there was a battle, and relief and protection would continue for a little while after the battle was over, but the committee would agree not to interfere in the government and supervision of the area, which was to be completely in the hands of the Japanese Army.

(3) As the authorities of French concession adjacent to the area willingly co-operated, the committee was thought to have enough actual power to maintain "neutrality".

(4) Judging from the location of the area, it was believed possible to maintain "safety" in the area, despite there being a battle near here.

In the final stages of the engagement in Shanghai, fighting spread to the boundary of the Area. However, no shells were dropped in the area. The Chinese soldiers who retreated into the Area were all disarmed by the committee. The Japanese Army did not enter the Area. Everything passed off quietly. Thus, several thousand houses and 280 thousand Chinese were rescued. The facts are written in detail in a pamphlet published by the committee.

-14-
Lef Toe No. 1165

On this 1st day of April, 1947

at Tokyo

DEPONENT "Inoue, shinroku" (seal)

I, witness hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo

witness (signed) "ITO, Sicyoshi" (seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

"Inoue, shinroku" (seal)
一、私八現在

東京御世田ノ京ノ地ニ住居シテ居リマスガ、昭和十二年
（一九三七年）四月三十日カラ同年八月十六日迄大使館於ク

三八年）三月三日於テ同日癸 Decoder 上海ニ居リマシタガ、同年三月十七

日続き居監主ニしシテ居リマシタ。  

输出ハ在南京ニ於テ勤務シテ、次テ八月ニ十九日カラ翌年（一九

三八年）十二月ニ於テ再び南京ヘ出荷、再び同地ニ於テ勤務シテ、

第一回八昭和十二年（一九

三七年）ニ於レ二の為、第二回八同日ニ於テ、十八ノ年ニ於テ

同地ニ於テ勤務ニ於テ、第三回八昭和七年（一九

三二年）ニ於テ新政府成立ノ際、在邦ニ於テ勤務ニ為スルレマシタ。

十八ノ年ニ於テ将軍ヲ譲タルハ日本政府ノ発言ヲ停戦トテ、

於テラレタ私八日本全農団ノ内トテ、随月同シ在テ居リマシタ。
十二年（一九三七年）九月十一日実挙及び Russo-フォーcasesの実際。同司令部

三

(4) 上海派遣軍司令官トシテララ XT時日、初ハ団目ニ掛けツタノハ足和

(1) 松井司令ハ古ラカラノ日勢提携破壊カラレル迄ノ問題ニ就テハミシク。

ハ督中満及中イ々シテ深イ破壊中ノ在ハノ文化ヲ

之ヲ以テハ官司令官名テノスヲ出ス第リデアルコト。

(2) 一ヲ実行ニ對シ公正ナ態度ヲ執コト。

(5) 九月ニロ日本攻ヨコトデ同日ホテハニノ共ワヲアリシツク。
日本軍入（按兩行）ハレシト稱スル類々ノ行方二聞シテ在留外
居リマシタ故良ク其ノ使命ヲ遂行シマシタ。（在留外人ニ
依リ設ケラレタ命ヲ施テ大學等ニ於ケル難民収容所ノ入口ヲ夜
間發倍シ（タコトモアリマス）

（按）

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間發倍シ（タコトモアリマス）

（按）
東京新民衆トノ閣＝立チ仕事ナリスルコトナツテカラハ双方
生活ハ余裕ルナッテ来マシタ。

前雨降ヲ前後ノ遥恵デハ中、近ノ箇所ガ少クナリ、三月末ニ維新政府ガ
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(4) 中囲側ノ東京監督司令官ガ昭和前ニ従テ退去サルト共ニ南
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黄絵イートンフ話ガリマシタ。最初ニニヤキノ母父ハーマ

妻

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松井監督

長谷川

松井軍司令官

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松井軍司令官

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松井軍司令官

長谷川
同日
於東京

立會人

石

當立會人ノ面前提ケ宣署シテハ署名捺印シテルヲ証明

供述者

日

髙

信大

於東京

15
Def. Doc. No. 1344

I am Thib.

United States of America et al.

v.

J. I., Saseo et al.

St. Oath

Deponent: Hiramoto, Michitaka

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Hiramoto, Michitaka (seal)
Def. Doc. 1344

1. I was formerly a Captain of the Japanese Navy. On November 15, 1939, I became Commander.

2. I was sent twice to China. Once, it was from the 1st of July 1940 to the 5th of September of the same year. Once, it was from the 20th of July 1941 to the 1st of September of the same year.

3. When I was sent there for the first time, I acted as the Air Chief Staff to the Officer in Command of the Combined Air Raid Detachment who held concurrently the post of the Commander of the First Combined Air Forces. This Officer in Command was placed under the operation directions of the Commander in Chief of the Fleet despatched to the Chinese waters. When I was sent there for the second time, I acted as the Air Chief Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Eleventh Air Squadron in which was placed the operation directions of the Commander in Chief of the Fleet despatched to the Chinese waters.

4. From the first of July 1940 to the 5th of September of the same year, I assaulted the area of the Ssu Chuan Province, concentrating my attack on Chung Ching. This was carried out in order to frustrate the will of the Chinese forces to keep on fighting, to shatter the Chinese central military organizations and to put an end to the China Incident swiftly.

The operations during this period were called No. 101 operations which were carried out jointly by the Army and Navy.

5. Chung Ching is a rugged small town of four or five square miles being situated at a junction point of rivers.
This town which forms a basin, is almost ever covered by clouds, and the vested rights and interests of third Powers are scattered throughout. It was a place which was the least fitted for bombing.

Hence, the commander troubled himself a great deal about the selection of the targets of attack. It was on the occasion of the first Shanghai battle that the Naval Air forces took part for the first time in the actual fighting since their organization. As we were engaged from the outset in difficult fighting at the small and narrow places where the vested rights and interests of third Powers were inextricably involved, great care was taken in the selection of the targets of attack and from the Commander down to the rank and file, all were ordered to follow very strictly, instructions given in this regard.

6. Upon assaulting Chung Ching, we had taken all necessary measures to bomb exclusively the military targets to the exclusion of other things.

(1) Every plane was instructed to carry the map of Chung Ching's streets investigated and edited by the Naval General Staff. Thus, we expected to ascertain the targets therein indicated.

(2) The Headquarters of the Air Raid Corps endeavored to obtain by all means the latest news on Chung Ching.

Not to speak of the utilization of spies, we approached particularly those Chinese leaders who escaped from Chung Ching and joined the Nanking Government, for the purpose of gathering the latest news on Chung Ching and specific...
those bearing on its central military organizations. We inscribed this information on the maps concerned with a view to determining exactly the targets of our attack.

3. For the sake of absolute prudence we availed ourselves of every opportunity to explain to the crews the purport of instructions from the Central Government, referring to "the orders to be observed in waging air war" and "miscellaneous matters regarding the bombing regulations". Simultaneously we have striven thereby to heighten the fair and just spirit, which has been institutional in our Navy.

7. The Central Military organizations in Chung Ching were mainly located in the west of the town. But the Gendarmerie Headquarters and some others were found scattered within the city. The base for the anti-aircraft battery seemed to be exceptionally well equipped and the whole town presented the spectacle of a fortress. Furthermore, we received information that Chung K'ai-sho's fighting headquarters established at several places inside and outside the town (they were estimated at seven) were shifting according to the requirements of the times. The information made us presume that the shifting fighting Headquarters in question were located in the following districts:

1. The western district of the city,

2. The western suburbs,

3. The western district within the city wall,

4. The western opposite river side,

5. The suburbs located at the southern river side,

6. The western suburbs located at the southern river side, etc.
8. While taking into consideration the aforementioned circumstances, we carried out our air assaults from the altitude of 2000 – 3000 meters against the military equipment within the city, with particular attention being paid to its western district.

On these occasions, we tried to hit the targets in reliance upon our good judgment.

9. Next, I participated in the operations against the interior of the Su Churn Province from the 20th of July 1941 to the 1st of September of the same year. At that time the operations were concentrated on attacking Chung Ching and this was the second onslaught on the city. This campaign was carried out in order to make up for the poor results of the action of the previous year. Regarding the objective of attack, the plan of attack, as well as its execution, we have followed the main lines of the principle determined in the previous year.

On this occasion, we took recourse beforehand, by diplomatic means to request the transferring of the people belonging to the third Powers to the southern river side so that their lives, rights and interests as well as their non-confiscation might not be jeopardized.

In particular, in regard to the war vessels and ships belonging to the third Powers, we have been constantly on the alert, lest stray bullets should cause such a disaster as the sinking of the Fryy.

10. It happened, however, that in the course of our attack on the military equipment east of Chung Ching City, an air detachment which had invaded from the northwestern direc-
tion was unable to drop bombs in time, presumably on account of the imperfection of their throwing appliances. A bomb thrown with undue delay fell in the vicinity of the northern Gunboat "Tutuile", lying at anchor on the river and caused damage to a boat being attached to her stern.

Fortunately, there was no damage done to the Gunboat and we considered this event as a matter of great regret, for we were so much concerned with the avoidance of any sort of misfortune.

11. We apologized for not having been able to avert that accident, because of the fact that such irregular bombing was due to our control. So that as it may, the crew of the air detachment showed their sincere penitence for misconduct.

As for me, I was then dispatched to Tokyo and Shanghai for the explanation of the matter involved. Both the Central Authorities and the Headquarters of the Fleet operating on the Chinese waters expressed their deep regret over the unhappy event, while I was duly reproved. I returned to my unit, after having received instructions to the effect that more precaution should be taken hereafter in the carrying out of air raids and that the vested rights and interests of the third powers should not be endangered any more.
On this 14th day of April 194
At Tokyo, Japan

DEPOSITION. Hiruoto, Miehitaka (seal)

I, Inakawa, Tetsuo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thoroeto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness: (signed) Inakawa, Tetsuo (seal)
 recruiter

不多余的话

(留言)

(签名)
FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
in opening the minimum navigable passages in those blockades at the cost of the enormous casualties and damages inflicted on us.

Since there was a concentration of Japanese warships and military requisitioned vessels which had to pass through quickly for military requirements, there was practically no spare passage for the free navigation of the vessels of Third Powers. Consequently, it was then very difficult for us to set about broadening the navigable passages. In addition, military occupations on a large scale were in progress in the upper stream regions and under those conditions we were afraid lest warships and other vessels of the Third Powers should suffer unexpected accidents in the course of their navigation. In fact, their navigation was likely to cause obstruction to the accomplishment of our

The river coasts of the Yangtze River were infested with Chinese partisans, doing much harm to warships and other vessels sailing therein. Mines laid by the Chinese Forces continued to "hurt to the detriment of the security of navigation, and their swerving as well as the installation of the beacon for a navigation line were not being undertaken satisfactorily. Under these circumstances, the sinking of a ship would lead eventually to the blockade of the watercourse. For the aforementioned reasons, free passage through the opened
areas of the Chinese blocked lines was subjected to restriction.
Such a measure was rendered inevitable on account of the necessity of military operations.

We were deeply concerned with the preservation of the vested rights and interests of the Third Powers, all the more so, because the Minister of the Navy never failed to give us instructions to that effect. I might mention here an instance which testifies to our sincerity in this regard. American and British ships wanted to navigate for the purpose of transporting food and fuel and of shifting their crews. When we got acquainted with these facts, we did not restrict the transportation by English and American warships, or the shifting of their crews and the embarkation of the personnel of their consulates. We occasionally put our Japanese vessels at their disposal for transportation. I remember that we went so far as to notify them of our preparedness to undertake transportation by our own vessels in case an emergency should arise.

Regarding the situation of the Chu River, almost the same can be said. The restriction of free navigation on that river was unavoidable in consideration of the requirements of military operation. When the necessity for maintaining this state of affairs lessened, the river was given free passage in April, 1940.

3. The interruption of communications along the Chinese coasts was undertaken in order to protect the lives and
properties of Japanese residents in China against the assaults of the Chinese Forces. This measure for our self-defense was thus necessitated in order to frustrate the Chinese fighting power and it was applied exclusively to the Chinese warships and other vessels. Hence, we did our utmost to respect peaceful trade carried out by Third Powers and we made no attempt to interfere therewith. To sum up, all our actions in connection with the communication interception problem were based upon international usage to be observed in case of a pacific blockade and the interception and internment accompanying a pacific blockade were also accomplished in accordance with traditional usage.

Be that as it may, some vessels of Third Powers which joined the Chinese Forces in fighting or rendering military assistance to them, were interned, because the navigation of such vessels could not be considered as the carrying out of peaceful trade.

Furthermore, vessels of Third Powers which could not be distinguished clearly from Chinese vessels in point of nationality were interned.

As regards the vessels whose Chinese nationality was changed after the declaration of the blockade, we upheld the principle that such a transfer would not be valid unless it was in accordance with the law of the country concerned. Thus, the vessels which navigated under the "flag of Third Powers were
inspected with a view to examining whether such a valid step was duly taken and any ship considered to be void of this capacity was taken into custody. The ships "Seglan Lorita" and "Porera" belonged to the first category, while the "Sparth" belonged to the second category.

4. The blockade of harbours was applied to those harbours which became the fighting areas or which were likely to become so; this measure was likewise taken to meet the military requirements. In view of this absolutely necessity the measure was not to be in conflict with Article II of the Geneva Convention concerning the laying of automatic contacts mines at the sea bottom. The blockade prevented the enemy vessels from entering and leaving the harbours in question. This state of affairs could not but affect to some extent vessels belonging to Third Powers. However, we clearly indicated the location of dangerous objects in order that any unhappy contingency might not take place. Prior to the application of the blockade, a certain period of grace was given, so that vessels of Third Powers anchored in the harbours concerned might safely set out to sea.

We did not apply a war-time blockade, consequently, we did not intend to capture those ships which ventured to enter and leave the harbours in defiance of the terms of our declaration. But, it was natural that Japan should have not assumed any
responsibility for such losses as may have resulted therefrom.

5. The entrance prohibition at specified harbours proved likewise a measure which was taken to meet the military requirements. However, application of this measure was confined to fighting areas and before its application a certain period of grace was fixed and Powers notified in order that the influence which would be brought to bear upon the vessel of Third Powers might be reduced to the minimum.

For instance, we refrained from keeping under detention even these ships which acted against our measures, with the exception of cases of grave error. In principle, we limited ourselves to indicating a modification of existing navigation routes.

6. Although various problems arose in connection with the above-mentioned matters, for the most part they were solved or reached a state of amiable settlement, so that our operations encountered no serious impediments.

YAMAMOTO, Yoshio

On this 21 day of April, 1947
At TOKYO

DEPONENT YAMAMOTO Yoshio (ss)
I, SOMIYA Shinji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At TOKYO

Witness (signed) SOMIYA Shinji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Y. YAMAMOTO (seal)
緊急の密謀を動かしてしまった。
私は長谷川提督は同年八月二十五日支那海岸の到着を告げました。三七三年七月七日の支那を経てその便を撤去した。十一月に写真を撮影した便を撤去した。十一月に写真を撮影した便を撤去した。十一月に写真を撮影した便を撤去した。十一月に写真を撮影した便を撤去した。十一月に写真を撮影した便を撤去した。十一月に写真を撮影した便を撤去した。
支那近辺の交渉は、在日日本居留民の自由権利を尊重し、支那の事情を尊重する必要がある。支那政府の指示に従い、日本政府は在日日本居留民の権利を尊重し、必要な措置を講じている。
でありまます。又第三駆逐艦で国境上明軍に支配下移を取った駆逐艦と異なり出不来なかったものです。なぜならば、これらの駆逐艦の乗組員は軍の命令に従って行動を起こし、国境上明の контр照をされるのであらゆる行動の下に行動するためには、これを抑制せざるをえませんでした。石戸陸戦局及び「スパルタ」号は第二の「グローブ」に入り、

「南洋の武将」は国境上明軍の駆逐艦に圧迫されているから、石戸陸戦局は、同様軍事上の必要に応ずる様に整理をされつつ、この駆逐艦が国境上明軍の駆逐艦に影響を及ぼす様に、その影響を抑止せぬものと解してゐました。
んでした。併し不参加事故が起らぬ様危険の箇所を明らかに指示
したことも欠然です。

町村長の出入禁止の連絡も入國保険法上の必要に応する形でした。
併し同様の出入禁止に対して特に違法されていると思われます。

例へば我々は若干の示例を例外を除き太を要した三等船に禁へる措置を最小限
として我々は単に既存航路の改正を示すことを止ま
らせました。従って我作戦には東大な支援を来すべきではないでした。
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）四月二十一日於東京

立命

宗諏

信

次

同日東京ニ於テ

供述者

山本

雄


石八常立命人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ト署名捺印シタルコトヲ聴明シ

6
一九三七年九月十四日，according to the previous content，日本大統領は，中立体制を保持の間においては現状と維持すべきとの趣旨の聲明を発した。即ち合衆国政府の指示を許可し、それは支那又は日本に対し、武器を導入して、新の発明品を支那又は日本に対して隠し、するものである。
一九三七年九月十四日、米日大規模に、中立條例適用の国にとって、日は、支那又は日本に対して、兵器、現品又は戦争用器具具の輸送を許可されない。面して、アメリカ商工を論ぜずして、新の輸出品を支那又は日本に対して輸送せんとする他の当局は、此れも皆軍の危険に於いて観す
On September 14, 1937 the President issued a statement to the effect that the question of applying the Neutrality Act remained in statu quo; that merchant vessels owned by the Government of the United States would not be permitted to transport to China or Japan any arms, ammunition, or implements of war; and that any other merchant vessel flying the American flag which attempted to transport such articles to China or Japan would do so at its own risk.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 47 and 48
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. v. IRAKI, Sadao, et al.

STORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: ENOMOTO, Juji
Fo. 5 Shot a Machi,
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo

I graduated from Tokyo Imperial University Law School in 1914. In 1915 I entered the Navy Ministry as legal advisor. I continued in this capacity from 1915 to 1945 and since then have continued in the service of the 2nd Demobilization Ministry and subsequently the 2nd Demobilization Bureau.

In 1921 I attended the Naval Disarmament Conference in Washington as a legal Expert.

In 1927, 1930, 1932, 1934 and 1935 I also attended Disarmament Conference at Genova and London as a legal Expert.

My principle duty in the Navy Ministry was to examine the draft of laws and regulations prior to their enactment or revision and to submit my opinion thereof to the Minister or Vice-Minister of the Navy.

-1-

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
On July 27, 1937, the pamphlet "Criteria in Air Fighting" was issued for the guidance of the Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry.

This pamphlet was distributed to the various sections mentioned in the certificate attached to said publication.

In view of the lack of any recognized rules of conduct at the time of the incident of July 7, 1937, it was decided that the rules of aerial conduct should be clarified in order to avoid unnecessary damage or possible conflict with third powers. Although some complaints were received from the China area that these rules were placing too severe restrictions on their operations, they were given the force of an order.

Subsequently on September 24, 1937, a supplementary guide was distributed to the same sections. This was the pamphlet entitled "Miscellaneous Observations on Aerial Bombing". This second pamphlet was issued through the initiative of Vice-Admiral YAMAMOTO because of reports which he received indicating that there was some further need for clarifying the rules in order to assure strict observance of the previously published regulations.

For example, one of the reports stated that the pilot had bombed a target "which seemed to be a military target". This, the Admiral stated, was a dangerous situation in that it would lead to bombing objectives without definitely ascertaining their military character. The further rules were published to prevent
any laxity in the application of the original set of regulations.

Subsequently, and in November 1937 further rules of conduct concerning the visit and seizure of shipping were published and distributed to the various sections of the Navy. This was likewise carried out because of the non-existance of any definite international rules of conduct which would be applicable to the situation.

A careful check was kept on the reports received daily in order to verify the fact that the rules were being adhered to as well as to prevent any possible unnecessary damage to non-military targets and property, especially that of third powers.

In general, it seems the establishing of a pacific blockade is usually approved on the ground that it may make resort to war less probable, and thus limit the range of possible use of force.

With reference to application of the pacific blockade, visit of third power vessels was carried out only in cases where there was doubt concerning the nationality of the ship. In cases of doubtful ships, they were required to be detained for a longer period of time in order to make certain of their nationality. In other cases ships were detained only when they were clearly being used to lend direct military assistance to the Chinese forces.

In handling any protests from third powers, we usually took the report which came in concerning the incident and sent it to the respective commanders for their further investigation.
In some cases we experience difficulty in carrying out our investigations because the area in question was exclusively under Chinese control.

In addition, it was recognized by some powers, including the United States Navy, that vessels of third states could be prevented from entering any port before which another state is maintaining a Pacific blockade.

On this 16th day of April 1947,

Tokyo.

DEPOSITION: /S/ EFOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I, SO'YA, Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the present of this witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo.

WITNESS: /S/ SO'YA, Shinji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ EFOMOTO, Juji (seal)
Criteria in Air Fighting
By Secretary Enomoto

International rules and usages governing air fighting are not fixed. I have made these criteria by studying various existing rules and usages. Especially an effort has been made to choose the "golden mean." Therefore, I am sure that any action taken within the scope of these criteria will not be subject to censure from outside. These criteria being no more than a so-called standard of judgement there is of course much room for choice in accordance with the circumstances of each particular case.

I. Bombing - Objectives

Objectives which may be bombed:

Irrespective of whether the city, town or village is defended or undefended the following objects may be bombed:

(a) Warships (including all categories of warships, and also converted cruisers).

Military transport ships, military oil tankers and all special duty vessels being used in military service.

(b) Armed forces (exception cases that small numbers of soldiers are scattered within a city, town or village)

(c) Military works:

Works of all kinds (including trenches and log barriers, etc.)

- 1 -
(d) Military establishment:
Military camps, military barracks, military aircraft hangars and sheds, wireless stations and arsenals.

(e) Military supply depots:
Military supply depots (even those belonging to civilians may be bombed if there is apprehension that they should be used for a military purpose).

(f) Factories engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition and military supplies:
Even civilian factories belonging to the above category may be bombed. But such small plants as are engaged in the manufacture of parts under subcontracts must be excepted. Bombing, in other words, should be restricted to relatively prominent factories.

(g) Lines of communication and transportation for military purposes, and railroad tracks and harbor facilities used for the transport of military supplies.
When bombing any of the above mentioned objects, utmost attention and care should be taken not to cause damage to any things belonging to Third Powers or to Third Power nationals.
Objects which may not be bombed:
The following objects may not be bombed so long as they are not being used for military purposes:

Of course, it is necessary for such objects to be marked by
signs clearly that they may be easily distinguished. In case of no signs, he can not protest even if they are bombed. (But as there is a great apprehension that such bombing should give rise to a public controversy or to irritate public opinion, it is necessary to have eerie not to carry out such bombing in any cases.)

But they may be bombed if they are used by the enemy’s armed forces as a base or are utilized by the enemy for military actions.

(a) Places of public worship: Shrines, temples, churches, etc.

(b) Buildings used for arts and sciences. Schools, libraries, etc.

(c) Buildings dedicated to charitable purposes: Asylum for the aged, hospitals and sick-rooms, quarters for the wounded and the sick, hospital ships, etc.

(d) Establishments of historical importance, historical monuments, tombs, and museums, etc.

II Bombing of cities, towns or villages:

This item contemplates cases where the whole of a city, town or village (irrespective of whether they are defended or undefended) becomes the target.

Bombing of objects located within a city, town or village shall be governed by the criteria laid down in the above paragraph on bombing objective.
Even in cases where the whole of a city, town or village may not be made the target of bombing, individual objects located therein may be bombed.

Bomboing is permissible in the following cases:

where large armed forces are concentrated in a city, town or village close to the area of operation of a land force (including landing party). It is unavoidable that the civilian population may be exposed to danger, but every effort should of course be made in such cases to minimize the danger to the civilian population.

Bombing is not permissible in the following cases:

(a) Where the purpose of bombing is merely to intimidate the civilian population, to destroy an object which is of no military character or to cause injury to non-combatants, bombing is not permissible.

(b) Where only a small force is scattered about or encamped in a city, town or village far remote from the area of operation of a land force, bombing the whole of the city, town or village is not permissible.

(c) Bombing on the ground that a requisition order or levy has been refused is not permissible.

III Notice (warning) of bombing:

In case of bombing, unlike naval or land warfare, notice is not necessary.
IV Bombing shall be restricted to areas under the jurisdiction of China.

Not only International Settlements and Foreign Concessions, but even extra-settlement areas where Third nations have close connections of interests must be avoided.
CERTIFICATE
Concerning the source and authenticity of the Document

1. The document hereto attached, consisting of seven sheets and entitled "Criteria Governing Air Fighting" is a copy of the Secretariat's Secret Document No. 2800 which was sent as a reference on the 27th of July, 1937 from Navy Department to each of the following sections.

DESTINATION:

Headquarters of the Combined, 2nd and 3rd Fleets:

Headquarters of the Combined, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Naval Air Forces:

Headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Combined Naval Air Groups:

Headquarters of the 5th, 8th and 12th Naval Units:

Headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Destroyer Flotillas:

Headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Submarine Flotillas:

Headquarters of the 22nd and 23rd Naval Air Groups:

11. The said document, which was sent as a reference, is customarily regarded as a quasi-order.

111. The said document is one which I made the research and compilation in the course as my duty at that time when I was working in the Naval Minister's Secretariat as a secretary. I am at present in charge of the original.
IV. I certify that the above statement is true.

In this 11th day of December, 1946.

In Tokyo.

/S/ EXOTO, Juji (seal)

Witness: /S/ M.UMA, Kyenosuke

Chief of the Archives Section
the Second Repatriation Bureau.

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke (seal)

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11-February, 1947
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Observations on Aerial Bombing by Japanese Navy Department

By Juji Enomoto,
Secretary, Navy Department.

September 1937.

1. Prohibition on terror bombing.

Bombing which has no direct military value or significance and is intended merely to terrorize enemy nationals is prohibited.

Consequently the bombing of any objects, other than military objectives, located in cities, towns or villages far removed from areas of land fighting is not legitimate.

2. Selection of bombing targets.

a. Bombing must always be aimed at military objectives.

It may sometimes happen that although the bombing is directed at a military objective, damage may be caused to other objects through an unavoidable error. But such an occurrence must be excused as an unavoidable concomitant of war.

There may also be cases where, notwithstanding that the bombing has been accurately directed at a military objective, damage is caused to other objects as a natural consequence.
of the bombing. Since there is nothing that can be done to prevent such result, the question of responsibility therefore cannot arise.

b. The dropping of bombs over any area under the assumption that "the military objective is probably somewhere around this place", in cases where the military objective is not clearly distinguishable, is in effect indiscriminate bombing, and hence illegitimate.

c. There may be cases where bombing is carried out under the erroneous belief that the object selected as the target is a military objective; and if, in such case, the object bombed proves to have been something other than a military objective, the question will arise as to whether or not reasonable care was exercised in the selection of the target.

The answer to that question will depend upon all the circumstances of the case, such as the location of the object bombed, etc. And if from such circumstances it is adjudged that the bombing was carried out with reasonable care (i.e., under such circumstances that the error could not have been avoided by a flyer engaged in a general bombing mission in the same position and under the same conditions despite the exercise of ordinary
of the bombing. Since there is nothing that can be done to prevent such result, the question of responsibility therefore cannot arise.

b. The dropping of bombs over any area under the assumption that "the military objective is probably somewhere around this place", in cases where the military objective is not clearly distinguishable, is in effect indiscriminate bombing, and hence illegitimate.

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The answer to that question will depend upon all the circumstances of the case, such as the location of the object bombed, etc. And if from such circumstances it is adjudged that the bombing was carried out with reasonable care (i.e., under such circumstances that the error could not have been avoided by a flyer engaged in a general bombing mission in the same position and under the same conditions despite the exercise of ordinary
care), the bomber will not be held responsible.

3. Bombing of land fighting areas and immediate vicinity (where bombers cooperate with land artillery and with warships cannonading defended cities, towns or villages).

a. There may be non-combatants and non-military objects in the fighting zone in such cases; but since it is impossible in fact to distinguish them from combatants and military objects, a general or uniform bombing (i.e., indiscriminate bombing) is inevitable. But even in such cases, effort should be made to afford every protection possible to hospitals, schools (not including military schools) and libraries; and any deliberate increasing of damage to non-combatants should be avoided.

b. Strips adjoining railways then being used for transporting troops and military supplies to the front lines, as well as areas not very far removed from combat zones, may be treated the same as battlefields.

c. Trains and stations being used at the time for military transportation purposes are in themselves military targets, and areas immediately adjacent to such trains and stations
will thereby become military targets.

4. Bombing of areas far removed from land fighting zones.
   a. Bomb targets must be confined to military objectives (armed forces, warships, military works, military establishments, military supply depots, factories engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition and military supplies, and lines of communication and transportation and harbor facilities devoted to military use). (Secretariat secret Document No. 2800; 27 Jul., 1937)
   b. Destruction of ordinary government offices and of the economic structure must be avoided (i.e. barring some special circumstances).
   c. When bombing any of the targets mentioned in (a) above, every possible effort should be made not to cause damage to non-combatants (Third parties, civilians in particular) and objects entitled to special protection (such as hospitals, schools, etc.). Particular care must be exercised in case of objects that have been marked.
   d. If an object, though a legitimate military target, is not of great importance, and there is apprehension that the bombing of
such object will cause great damage to non-
combatants or non-military objects, it is
better that such bombing be not carried out,
from the humanitarian point of view.

N.B. - It is of course had to allow sentiment or
emotion to cause one to hesitate to achieve the
maximum military results possible, the demands
of humanity must at the same time be strictly
complied with.

Even in the European War, in which combat-
ant rights were expanded to the extreme because
of the strong urge for reprisal, there were
instances where the flyers who, unsuccessful in
their search for military targets, returned without
having unloaded their deadly missiles because of
the fear that blind bombing would cause death and
injury to non-combatants.

On 2 September, 1914, a non-commissioned
officer of the French Air Force took off with
orders to bomb Mulhouse; but as he was not able
to find his objective because of clouds and
mist, he returned to Belfort with all the bombs
rather than risk killing or maiming non-combatants.

On 23 September, 1914, British air squadron
took off from their base to bomb
Düsseldorf and Cologne. They successfully bombed the Zeppelin hangars at Düsseldorf. But as Cologne was hidden from view by clouds and mist, the bombers flew around it for an hour, and still not being able to definitely identify their objective, they came back to their base without dropping the bombs because of the fear that bombing under such circumstances would result in damage to non-combatants.

On 10 August, 1917, Italy made an announcement to the following effect:

"Bombs were not dropped by all the planes. A part of them returned to their base with their bombs because of the apprehension that, owing to darkness, damage would be caused to ordinary civilians. That is the general rule in Italy. Austrian flyers, on the contrary, always resort to illegal bombing, and have even bombed residential sections along the Isonzo rivers by moon-light, etc., etc."
Certificate to the source of the document and its authenticity.

1. The 8-sheet document entitled "Miscellaneous Observations on Aerial Bombing" which is attached to this certificate is a copy of Secretariat secret document No. 7982 which was dispatched by the Ministry of Navy on September 24, 1947 to the following sections for their information.
   (a) Headquarters of the Combined Fleet, the 2nd and the 3rd Squadrons.
   (b) Headquarters of the 1st, the 2nd and the 3rd Air Flotillas.
   (c) Headquarters of the 1st, the 2nd and the Combined Air Forces.
   (d) Headquarters of the 5th, the 6th and the 10th Squadrons.
   (e) Headquarters of the 1st and the 2nd Destroyer Squadrons.
   (f) Headquarters of the 1st and the 2nd Submarine Squadrons.
   (g) The 22nd and the 23rd Air Forces.

2. This document was sent out by way of information, but it is of a character customarily having the force of orders.

3. This document was, as part of my official duties, studied and drawn up by myself when I was in the Naval Minister's Secretariat as a Naval Secretary. The original document is actually in my custody.

4. I hereby certify the above to be true in every particular.

In Tokyo
December 11, 1946 (the 21st year of Showa)

/z/ W. YOKOTA, Junji (Seal)
- 7 -
DEF. DCC. #1218

Witness: /S/ INAMURA, Ryosuke (seal)

Chief of the Section of Archives, 2nd Demobilization Bureau
本文書は参考として査読したものではなく、信頼性は保証できません。
文書の出所辺に公正に論する証明

文書の出所辺に公正に論する証明

本証明書に附付した文書から成る一事件一機密第四〇九号昭和十二年十

月十五日附の抄本有者に附する官署書面と関する文書はこれを出された

当時海軍大将官房に居り官除法規関係の主務者であった復本簿記官に配

布され現に所恃してあるものの高を相違ないことを証明する

昭和二十一年十一月十一日
於東京

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支部側

通報

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通ジテ行フ

（本件ハ職奔中央ト協議セリ）
Gummu Ichi Confidential: No. 409.

Date : October 15th, 1937

From : Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry. 
       Director of the 1st Division, Naval General Staff.

To : Chief of Staff, Third Fleet.

Subject : (Communication of) 
           Information concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

In view of the present international relations, when dealing with Chinese P.O.W.'s who have come under our authority, special attention must be paid on your part, that we may invite no pretext for censure on grounds of unlawful and cruel treatment.

When dealing with those who are to be interned as P.O.W.'s, it is very important that our attitude will signify (prove) fairness and justice in the light of International Law, both to the home front and abroad.

Therefore it is requested that P.O.W.'s be dealt with in accordance to the following, whenever circumstances of the district concerned allows:

1. The names and the affiliate units of the P.O.W.'s including those killed in action shall be notified to the Chinese authorities.

2. Necessary attention must be paid towards sick or wounded P.O.W.'s so that they are not treated roughly. In case a P.O.W. dies, it shall be notified to the Chinese authorities.

3. The personal belongings of a deceased P.O.W. (valuables, letters, etc.) shall be delivered to the Chinese side.

4. Any other necessary information concerning P.O.W.'s shall be notified to the Chinese, whenever possible.

5. The above mentioned communication with the Chinese authorities shall be carried out through our Consul-General.

(This matter has already been discussed with Army Central authorities.)
CERTIFICATE AS TO THE SOURCE AND ACCURACY OF DOCUMENTS

This is to certify that the two documents attached to this certificate with the title of "Gummu (Military Personnel Affairs) Part One, Secret No. 409, dated 15th October, the 12th Year of Showa (1937), "On the Inquiry about the Treatment of Prisoners of War" is identical with the original copy that was issued when I, Secretary Enomoto, was in the Secretariat of the Navy Ministry and the Senior officer in charge of matters regarding International Law. This was delivered to me and is now in my possession.

Tokyo, 11th November, the 21st Year of Showa (1946).

Enomoto Juji, (Sealed)

This is to certify that Mr. ENOMOTO Juji was with the Navy Minister's Secretariat as a Naval Councillor and a Naval Professor concurrently being Naval Secretary during the period of the 4th Year of Taisho (1915) to the 21st Year of Showa (1946), and that he was officially in the position to take part in this document.

Tokyo, the 21st year of Showa (1946).
The Chief of the Personnel Affairs Section, the Second Dep't, the Repatriation Ministry.

KAWAI Gen.

Witness:
The Chief of the Archives-Section of the Second Dep't, the Repatriation Ministry.

IMAMURA Ryonosuke.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date: 16 January 1947
21 November, 1937.

TO: Chief of Staff, China Sea Fleet
    Chief of Staff, 2nd Fleet

FROM: Chief, 1st Section Naval General Staff
       Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry

SUBJECT: Instruction concerning visit and search and capture of vessels.

Whereas numerous directives and instructions have been issued hitherto on the above subject, the various essential matters relating to blockade which have already been issued are collected together in the following instructions being issued on the occasion of the present reorganization of the blockade force. We trust that there will be nothing amiss in the enforcement of these instructions.

1. Vessels belonging to Chinese (including Chinese companies).

   (1). All vessels entering, leaving or cruising around the blockade zone shall be captured irrespective of their crews, passengers and cargoes, and shall be taken to the designated place (Sako, Sasebo or Port Arthur, whichever is most suitable).

   (2). Small boats engaged exclusively in coastal fishing or other local business shall be exempt from capture, except in cases where special reasons exist (e.g. hostile act, transportation of military supplies).

   (3). Where there is some reason for which it is
difficult to take a captured ship to the designated place, the following provisions shall govern:

(a) Important vessels.
Disposition shall be made in accordance with instructions to be received from Tokyo.

(b) Small steamers, sailing boats and junk
If there is a base, other than one of the designated places where an observation ship (or sentry) can be posted, the ship shall be taken to such base.

Where it is impossible to make the disposition mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the following shall govern:

(i) Any military supplies (including weapons) found among the cargo shall be seized; but any goods not suitable for seizure shall be suitably disposed of.

(ii) Other goods other than military supplies, if deemed to be of considerable value by reason of their quantity and price, may if necessary be disposed of along the same lines as military supplies.

(iii) Any military supplies belonging to Third Power nationals found among the cargo shall be detained.

Where, in case of cargo being transferred from a Third Power vessel to junks belonging to Chinese nationals off the coast of Haikow and Fukien, it is considered certain that such cargo contains military supplies, such cargo shall be examined after its transfer to junks has
been completed and the military supplies shall be detained.  

(iv) Upon completion of the disposition mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the vessel in question shall be prevented from reaching its destination, such as by causing it to return to the place from which it came. 

(v) Report shall be made as speedily as possible of the items, quantities and method of disposal of cargoes detained or otherwise disposed of, as well as of the category and name of the vessel (and if possible, of the names and addresses of the owner and captain of the vessel). 

(c) Where measures are taken to overcome resistance by a Chinese vessel, destruction of such vessel may be inevitable; otherwise such vessels are not to be destroyed. 

Where a vessel is destroyed, all persons aboard shall be rescued except in cases of absolute military necessity. 

(4) For the purposes of visit and search and capture, Chinese-owned fishing boats and junks which have acquired Hongkong registry shall be treated the same as Chinese vessels. In the treatment of their crews, however, care shall be taken not to give rise to unnecessary controversies with British authorities. 

(5) Crews and passengers of vessels which are to be taken to a designated place shall be sent to the nearest locality, with the exception of persons whom it is especially necessary to detain.
DPD. DCC. #1275

(6) Vessels belonging to the following firms shall be treated the same as Japanese-owned vessels under Chinese registry:


II. Japanese-owned vessels under Chinese registry.

Except where special reason exists, such vessels shall not be captured, but shall be given every possible protection.

III. Vessels owned by Third Power nationals under Chinese registry.

Such vessels entering or leaving the blockade zone shall be captured and taken to a designated place irrespective of their crews, cargoes and passengers.

Where it is difficult to take such vessels to a designated place, they shall be treated the same as in cases of vessels belonging to Chinese nationals.

IV. Third Power vessels and vessels flying Third Power flags.

(1) Vessels which are clearly Third Power vessels shall not be stopped nor subjected to visit and search.

(2) Where there is good grounds for the suspicion that a vessel, although flying a Third Power flag, is a Chinese vessel, it shall be subjected to visit and search and its nationality examined. If, as a result of visit and search, it is discovered to be a Chinese vessel, its treatment shall be governed
(3) Treatment of vessels which have been transferred from Chinese nationality to that of a Third Power subsequent to the blockade Declaration of 25 August shall be governed by the following provisions:

(a) With regard to vessels whose registry has been changed to that of Britain, America, France, Germany and Italy under circumstances warranting grave suspicion that the transfer of nationality was fictitious, they shall be detained temporarily; and their final disposition shall be made upon receiving instructions from Tokyo.

(b) With regard to a vessel which has been transferred to the registry of any nation other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, if there is any doubt as to such transfer, such vessel shall be captured for the purpose of investigation and shall be taken to a designated place. Report thereof, however, must be made to Tokyo forthwith.

(4) Whenever a Third Power vessel or a vessel flying a Third Power flag has been stopped, questioned or visited and searched, report shall speedily be made of the time, place, nationality and name of the vessel to the Commander-in-Chief of the China Seas Fleet and to Tokyo.

(6) When a Third Power vessel has been visited and searched, the fact of its having been visited and searched must be entered in its log if demanded by its captain. (Cf. Rules of Naval Warfare, Art. 149).
(6) If, in case there is necessity of subjecting a vessel of British or Canadian registry to visit and search, there is a British naval vessel in the neighborhood, visit and search shall not be carried out: instead, the British naval vessel shall be requested to examine the vessel's nationality.

V. The provisions of Arts. 129 to 141 of the Rules of Naval Warfare shall apply mutatis mutandis to stopping and visit and search of vessels.

The number of boarding officers shall be kept small. (not more than those for carrying out visit and search of British and Canadian vessels).

When carrying out visit and search, inspection shall be confined to the necessary ship's papers. It is better to refrain from searching the vessel. But the above need not be binding, of course, if there is suspicion that the vessel is a Chinese vessel.

VI. DAIKAI KIWITSU No. 26 para. 4 (Re Disposition of Chinese Vessels transferred to Third Power Registry subsequent to 25 August) and GENEZIBU KIWITSU No. 722 para. 1 proviso (Re Disposition of Vessels and Cargoes difficult to take to Designated Place) are to be considered as having automatically become extinct.
I, IMAWURA, Ryonosuke, Chief of the archives and Documents Section of the second Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization Board, certify that the attached papers of seven sheets written in Japanese and entitled "Instructions concerning visit and search and capture of vessels" is correct and true copy of part of the official document hold in custody of the Second Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization Board of the Japanese Government.

Tokyo, April 15th, 1947.

IMAWURA, Ryonosuke (seal).

The above signature and seal have been affixed before me.

On the same day and at the same place.

Witness: /S/ SOMIYA Shinji
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（海運法規第百三十九条参照）

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発行者名：中村書店

1984年3月

発行者：中村書店

著者名：小林克教

ISBN 4-88003-033-7

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British Embassy,
Tokyo,
31st December, 1937.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour on instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to inform Your Excellency that they have noted with appreciation the assurances contained in Your Excellency's note of December 28th in connexion with the attacks on British warships and merchant shipping on December 12th, and have learnt with satisfaction that the statements contained in Your note of December 14th apply to merchant vessels concerned as well as to warships.

His Majesty's Government are bound to observe that their information in regards to the circumstances in which the attacks took place -- notably, for instance, on points of visibility -- is at variance with that of the Japanese Government.

His Majesty's Government note however with satisfaction that the Japanese Government have taken or are prepared to take the necessary measures to deal suitably with the officers responsible for these incidents and to prevent any repetition. As regards the letter His Majesty's Government consider that the details of these measures and their effective application
may suitably form the subject of further conversations in the course of which they do not doubt that they will be informed of actual steps decided upon.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(signed) R. L. Creigie
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HIYASHI, Hiroyu, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "The British Note delivered by Sir Robert Crewe to the Foreign Minister on December 31, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of April, 1947.

(signed) K. HIYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. URABE
American Friends:

In the few minutes at my disposal, I wish to speak to you on some of the
fundamental aspects of Japan's policy toward China. I do so in the hope that
my traditional friends, the people of the United States, with whom we have
enjoyed eighty years of unbroken peace and unity, may obtain a better understanding
of the present situation in the Far East.

We are as ardent in our desire for peace as you are. We believe that a
nation should not only be animated by a desire for peace, but should realistically
seek to establish those conditions which are essential for the maintenance
of peace. This we have always endeavored to do.

It is indeed unfortunate that our patient and persistent efforts toward
establishing our relations with China on a firm and friendly basis had to be
interrupted by the present conflict. We still hope, however, that we shall be
able to come speedily to terms with our next-door neighbor and stabilize our
relations to our mutual benefit.

Why, then, have we had to resort to arms? We must emphasize, first, that
the expeditionary forces of Japan now in China have been sent there for no
aggressive purposes and secondly, that we have no territorial designs. Our
forces are in China to safeguard our legitimate interests, to protect our rights,
and to secure the safety of our nationals. These forces will be withdrawn the
very moment that their presence is no longer required.

And what, you may ask, necessitated the sending of such forces? In answering
this question, let me summarize the main features of the present conflict. I
shall first explain the immediate causes of the trouble which prompted our
decision to dispatch reinforcements to China, and then the more far-reaching and
underlying causes which have aggravated the situation to such serious proportions.

The immediate cause of the present conflict was the firing by Chinese
soldiers upon a small unit of our garrison troops which were holding usual night
maneuvers with blank cartridges in the outskirts of Peiping on the night of July
15, 1937.
JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARD CHINA

JAPAN'S MINISTER IN EUROPE, ITAKI: INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS, JAPAN

JULY 9, 1937.

American Friends:

In the few minutes at my disposal, I wish to speak to you on some of the confidential aspects of Japan's policy toward China. I do so in the hope that our traditional friends, the people of the United States, with whom we have enjoyed eighty years of unbroken peace and plenty, may obtain a better understanding of the present situation in the Far East.

We are as sincerely in our desire for peace as you are. We believe that a nation should not only be animated by a desire for peace, but should realistically seek to establish those conditions which are essential for the maintenance of peace. This we have always endeavored to do.

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And what led you to necessitate the sending of such forces? In answering this question, let me summarize the main features of the present conflict. I shall first explain the immediate causes of the trouble which prompted our decision to dispatch reinforcements to China, and then the more far-reaching and underlying causes which have aggravated the situation to such serious proportions.

The immediate cause of the present conflict was the firing by Chinese soldiers upon a small unit of our garrison troops which were holding normal night maneuvers with blank cartridges in the outskirts of Peiping on the night of July 

As a matter of fact, the troops of all major nations in prisons in China
be entitled to hold these maneuvers under the Boxer agreement of 1901. With China, we immediately demanded to minimize this incident by seeking a peaceful local settlement both on the spot and at Peking through diplomatic channels. Refusing to accept this friendly overture, the Central Government of China at Peking demanded that any settlement a naval locally would not be recognized, and began a ruse maps out to South China. We had hoped, up to the last moment, for a friendly and peaceful settlement of this untoward incident, but, in view of the measures taken by the Japanese Government, we were obliged eventually to the counter-measures so as to avert the danger of a complete ejection out of ourarrison and residents in North China; so the Japanese Government decided to reenforcements.

The theater of conflict has since extended to the densely populated international city of Shanghai, in which live many foreigners and with which are bound the rights and interests of many countries. Even before the North China Affair, units of the regular Chinese army were filtering into Shanghai under the guise of belonging to an armed police force known as the Peace Preservation Corps. This in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement signed by China and Japan and counter-signed by the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy. This agreement, use to ensure the security of the International Settlement, provides for a neutral zone in and around Shanghai within which all and every form of hostility is prohibited. Willfully disregarding this arrangement, the Chinese massed forces and erected military works around the Japanese quarter of the Settlement, threatening the safety of our thirty thousand residents there. Then, suddenly, the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps murdered an officer and a sailor of a Landing Party, which created a situation fraught with imminent danger.

To cope with any possible emergency, our Government reinforced the small naval force which was enormously outnumbered by the hostile Chinese troops.

Earnestly solicitous as we are of the safety of the lives and property of foreigners as well as of Japanese in and around Shanghai, the Japanese Government has done everything possible to preserve those areas free from the disaster of hostilities. Our landing parties were under strict orders to act with the utmost tienne, while the Government expressed its readiness to restore them to their original positions provided the Chinese withdrew their forces, which were massed
near the International Settlement. Far from withdrawing these troops the Chinese took the offensive against our naval forces and precipitated the hostilities in Shanghai.

I should add that when the atmosphere grew tense, following the murder of our naval man, the Japanese government, faithful to its declared policy of non-aggression, ordered the evacuation of its nationals in Hankow and other points in the interior of China. Although such evacuation amounted almost to a complete sacrifice of business interests built up by our nationals during years of arduous toil, this was deemed necessary as a precautionary measure to avoid untoward incidents.

I should also add that, at the moment when our Government was giving its favorable consideration to the proposal made by foreign Powers to keep Shanghai free from hostilities, the Chinese launched a sudden attack upon the International Settlement, our Consulate-General, and our warships, bombing them indiscriminately from the air -- and our forces were naturally compelled to return the fire.

The dispatch by your country of a regiment of marines to augment your regular marine forces stationed at Shanghai undoubtedly has brought home to you the gravity of the situation in that cosmopolitan city. In view of this character of the city, we want to take effective measures to stop once and for all the activities of the Chinese forces and make the metropolis safe from the repetition of a similar misfortune in the future. I hope that our reinforcements at Shanghai will soon succeed in restoring peace and security to the International Settlement.

Let us now briefly explain the underlying causes of the conflict -- the driving forces at work in China today -- for an understanding of them will enable you to grasp the true nature of the issues involved, and thus clarify the stand now being taken by our Government.

Then I say driving forces, I mean those shaping China's national policy and program. The ultimate aim of these forces today as declared by the leaders of China is to unite and revitalize China into an organized nation. In that in, the Japanese nation is sympathetic. We certainly hope to see such a China come into being, for then only can we enjoy real stability and security in the East. Unfortunately, however, these Chinese leaders have chosen the wrong
means to achieve their purpose. For several years past, they have carried on a relentless anti-Japanese campaign, adopting it as their policy — as a means of obtaining united national support for the ruling government. Extremist elements have during recent years combined their strength to push forward this anti-Japanese campaign.

It is common knowledge that the Communists have been playing a significant role in the nationwide agitation against Japan. It is also well-known that these elements are supported by the Communist International which aims at the destruction of the existing structure, both political and social, of the entire world. These elements are the forces directing the destinies of China today. These are the forces — one anti-Japanese, the other Communist — with which Japan must contend. These are the forces that underlie the fundamental causes of the present situation in China.

For the sake of her own national security and for the sake of the peace of Asia, Japan must eradicate this Communist menace. To have, therefore, repeatedly invited the attention of the Chinese Government to the danger of communism, simultaneously requesting them to suppress effectively the anti-Japanese agitation. But, far from listening to us, the Chinese Government joined ends with the Communists in their campaign against Japan, which became increasingly violent, and with this, all our efforts at re-adjusting Sino-Japanese relations proved futile.

It is to be greatly deplored that a major conflict which we have striven to do last to avoid is now going on. But as I stated at the outset, we have not lost hope for peace. Japan is deeply conscious that she must live in harmony and cooperation with China, for, after all, we are close neighbors, who should cooperate on the friendliest of terms for our mutual well-being.

Ties of many centuries bind the two nations together. Economically, if not politically, one cannot live without the other. This is a basic truth. If we sympathize with China's problems, so we ask her to understand and appreciate ours. We have to help each other. There is no alternative. Sino-Japanese understanding is the first essential for Japan to live, for China to live, for the entire Far East to live, in peace and security. This also is a basic truth.

It is with these truths in mind that the Japanese Government is pursuing
We sincerely hope that China will come to realize these basic truths, and that peace will soon be restored. We ardently hope that the relations between Japan and China will thus be put on a new and enduring basis.

In closing, I wish to express the appreciation of both the Government and people of Japan for the attitude which your country has maintained toward Japan during the present Sino-Japanese affair. The fair attitude taken by your Government and its offers of good offices are to us a source of deep gratitude. We are also grateful to your official representatives in China for the kind consideration they have accorded our officials and nationals in that country.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese
Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached
in English, consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Japan's
Policy toward China--Radio Address by Mr. Kenzuke HORIMUCHI, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Columbia Broadcasting System--
September 2, 1937."

is an exact and true copy of an official document of the
Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

in this 15th day of April, 1947

-- HAYASHI, Kaoru
Signature of Official

Witness: URAVU, Katsumi
日付：25日

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输入的文本无法正常显示，可能是由于图像文件不支持显示中文。
Def. Doc, No. 1074.

Change the title "List of Those Who Violated Military Discipline" of 2.4 to "List of Those Who Violated Morality".
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I live at No. 2546, Kichijoji, Musashino-aza, Tokyo. In January 1944, I had a slight attack of apoplexy. Since then I have had difficulty in walking and have been recuperating myself at home.

2. I had been a military judiciary till August 1943, when I retired. My career in the Shanghai Expeditionary Force is briefly as follows:
   - Aug. 15, 1937 appointed Chief of No. 10 Army Judicial Department.
   - Aug. 30, 1937, judiciary of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, prosecutor of the same.
   - Feb. 9, 1938, prosecutor, preliminary judge and judge of the Central China Expeditionary Force.
   - Jan. 1939, returned home.

3. I remember having counter signed, as chief of the Judicial Department, the instructions issued by Commander Jatsui about September, 1937 on landing at Shanghai, calling the attention of all the troops under...
Def. Doc. #1074

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

J. H. J, etc.

Sworn Deposition

Dependent: T. KIYOSHI, Hirotatsu.

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached witness and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby deponent as follows.

1. I live at No. 2546, Kichijoji, Musashino-cho, Tokyo. In January 1944, I had a slight attack of apoplexy. Since then I have had difficulty in walking and have been recuperating myself at home.

2. I had been a military judiciary till August 1943, when I retired. My career in the Shanghai Expeditionary Force is briefly as follows:
   - Aug. 15, 1937 appointed Chief of No. 10 Army Judicial Department.
   - Aug. 30, 1937, judiciary of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, prosecutor of the same.
   - Feb. 9, 1938, prosecutor, preliminary judge and judge of the Central China Expeditionary Force.
   - Jan. 1939, returned home.

3. I remember having counter signed, as chief of the Judicial Department, the instructions issued by Commander Yatsui about September, 1937 on landing at Shanghai, calling the attention of all the troops under
his command to the strict maintenance of military discipline and public morals, but the full text of the instructions is not in my hands now.

4. With the close of battles around Shanghai and the commencement of our army's pursuit of the Chinese forces, I became much more pressed with work as the Chief of the Judicial Department. After entering Nanking I was occupied much in the same way. On the very day of my entry into the city, I remember having tried some four cases.

5. I am convinced that I was strict enough to punish those who violated the military discipline, in accordance with the order of Commander Katsui and in conformity with the Field Service Regulations. So strict was the attitude of the Judicial Department of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force that sharp comments were sometimes made by some units on our severe punishment and our close examination into even slight offences. Such criticism was made known to me by Lt. Col. Otsuka, member of the Judicial Department, War Ministry, when he visited to establish communication with us. However, I carried out my judicial duties strictly in accordance with the military criminal law and in compliance with the intentions of Commander Katsui.

6. After the entry into Nanking, unlawful acts were committed by Japanese troops, and I remember having examined into these cases. I also remember Commander Katsui calling all officers together and telling them of the occurrence of such cases and giving strict orders for the maintenance of military discipline with the greatest severity.

7. I list at the end of this affidavit the names of those whom I punished, which I wrote down in my note. But I think there are still more names which were left out. In any case, I reported to the
Def. Doc. 91074

Judicial Bureau of War Ministry all the cases, names of persons, and kinds of punishment which had been handled by The Judicial Section of the Shanghai Expositionary Force, and these records would clarify the details. The records, however, have been burnt down and so the details are not available now. But, according to my memory, that report consisted of 6 sheets of 20-line ruled paper, so I am sure that I dealt with at least 120 cases.

8. Four or five officers were involved in the above cases, and the rest were mostly trifling ones committed by privates. The kinds of crimes were chiefly plunder, theft, etc., while the cases of rape and injury were few, and the cases of death caused by these very few, to the best of my knowledge. I remember there were a few murder cases, but have no memory of having punished incondieres or dealt with mass slaughter criminals. The above crimes were committed at different places, but a considerable number of cases, I believe, took place in the refugees' quarters in Nanking.

9. No Judicial Department had no right of carrying out search for criminals. The criminals were sent to Judicial Section, after search and arrest by the M.R. directly attached to the Army Hq. Then we collected evidence, based on which they were prosecuted.
**LIST OF THOSE WHO VIOLATED MILITARY DISCIPLINE.**

*Sept. 1937 --- Feb. 1938*

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<th>Rank</th>
<th>First Name</th>
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<td>K Mizukami</td>
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<td>Yoshiro</td>
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<td>Yotsumoto M.</td>
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<td>Tsujimoto M.</td>
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<td>Tanaka K.</td>
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On this 26th day of February, 1947,
at Tokyo

DEPOSI.T /S/ TSUKUMOTO, Hirotsugu.
Def. Doc. "1074

I, ITO, Liyoshi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness: /S/ ITO, Liyoshi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TSUKI ITO, Hirotsugu (seal)
EX 25 Y 8
Def. Doc., No. 1074.

Change the title "List of Those Who Violated Military Discipline" of 2.4 to "List of Those Who Violated Morality".

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RETURN TO ROOM 361
私は昭和十八年八月官庁に於ての役職は大権左の重りでありました。
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於東京
伊藤清

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8
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY RIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
- VERSUS -
ARAFAI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT of KIKUTA, Masaharu.

I, KIKUTA Masaharu, after having duly sworn as in the annexe\n\ndocument according to the customary formality in this country, declare and state:

1. I was born on January 30 in the 3rd year of TAISHO (TN: 1914) at my permanent domicile, No. 760, Oaza Mifune Mifuni-Machi, \nFamimusuki-Gun, Fumemoto Prefecture. My present address is \nNo. 417-5, Kohinaka-Machi, Hiroshima-Shi.

2. A brief outline of my personal history is as follows:
July 3th year of Showa (TN: 1935).
Graduated from the Military Academy.
October, of same year.
Commissioned second lieutenant, infantry.
August 12th year of Showa (TN: 1937).
Promoted to captain, infantry. Served as Company Commander \nof the Gun Company in the 23rd Infantry Regiment.
May 14th year of Showa (TN: 1939).
Attached to the Army War College.
November 16th year of Showa (TN: 1941).
Attached to General Headquarters of the Southern Army.
Later became a staff-officer of the same army.

August 17th year of Showa (TN: 1942).

Promoted to major.

October 18th year of Showa (TN: 1943).

Army staff-officer with the Imperial Headquarters and staff-officer of the General staff, up to the end of the

3. From August to the end of October of 1938, I served as a company commander in the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division and in the battle for the capture of Hankow led the vanguard entering the city. So, I shall relate the circumstances of those several days at the time of entry into Hankow.

4. The greatest of all the battles for reducing Hankow was the encounter in the area of the Tanish Mountains. The others were all battles of chasing the enemy. The last encounter we had with about three thousand of the enemy at Hwang-pi north-east of Hankow. And after standing four days in advancing the remaining 30RI (TN: about 70 miles; 1 RI = 2.4 miles.) we made a triumphal entry into the city of Hankow. We kept advancing the approximate distance of 30RI without a single enemy soldier resisting us.

When we came near Tsai-chia-shan to the north of Hankow, we found a broad expanse of water caused by the breaking open of the Chang-kung banks by the retreating enemy. And again since the bridge had been destroyed we were obliged to cross the river after great difficulty. Moreover since the number of boats were but a few a great deal of time was spent on this
5. The 2nd battalion of our regiment had been at the head of the advance but the 3rd battalion crossed the river first, next the 2nd, and then the 1st battalion in that order. In this manner we entered the city of Hankow on the third day. And in consideration of the foreign settlements in the city, we had a foreigner guide us into the city. Full attention was paid in order not to be looked down upon by the foreigners. All the troops in clean uniform and in regular ranks marched orderly into the city, while many foreigners lined up on both sides of the street to witness the spectacle.

Immediately after the entry, we went to our assigned billets we felt tired but relieved with the end of those long succession of battles. The triumphal entry into Hankow was, therefore, carried out in perfect peace and order. This was October 26, 1938.

As a consequence I believe that the troops who entered the city in this manner could not have committed violence or any other questionable deeds.

6. On the occasion of the capture of Hankow, there were orders from Division Headquarters that all troops maintain strict military discipline and to punish severely anyone taking an independent action contrary to the orders. In this way, no incident worthy of criticism occurred. The occupation of Hankow was carried out in a truly exemplary manner and I firmly believe that violence plunder, and the like absolutely did not occur.

7. At the time of our entry, the foreign residential quarter.
were bright with electric lights and absolutely no damage was found in the city outside of the Japanese settlement which had been set on fire by the enemy. And since the Japanese air forces had not bombed the city limits at all, there was not even the slightest damage in the city except those in the Japanese settlement.
December 13, 1946.

At the First Demobilization Bureau

FIKF'WA, Masaharu (seal)

I hereby certify that the above was sworn to and signed and sealed in my presence.

Same date and at the same location

Witness: KOBIBU, Tomoharu. (seal)

OATH

I hereby swear that I shall tell the truth according to the dictates of my conscience and neither withhold information nor add anything which is not true.

FIKF'WA, Masaharu (seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 28 Jan. 1947

(Affidavit of KIKAWA, Masaharu)
Def. Deo. No. 1438

IN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
against
R. A. Sadao et al

STORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Defendant: TOSHIYUKI, Senzo

Having first duly sworn an oath on an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born in NINAMIDANI, "SASHIKUMURA, OKAMU-GUN, TOTTORI prefecture which is my permanent domicile on September 14, 1905 (39th year of Meiji), and at present I'm still residing at the same address.

2. As for my brief personal history, I graduated from the Military Officers Academy and from the Army War College. During the Hankow campaign, I was in charge of the rear staff members of the 6th Division, and at the termination of the war, I held the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

3. I went to the locality after Nanking was captured for the preparation of operations that followed. The 6th Division commenced its attack on Hankow around October 20, 1933 and closed in on the city after breaking through NUNJIGU without
much difficulty. However, at THICHLIUSHAN, in the northern direction of Hankow, because the Chinese destroyed the embankment of the river, the areas was flooded and it became necessary to utilize boats to cross the flooded area. In addition since there were only a few boats available a considerable time was spent, and the troops that advanced to this point were compelled to stop in this area. Hankow was to be reached only by crossing this flooded area. Since a strict order on military discipline was previously issued by HATA, the Commander, it was printed on leaflets and distributed among the troops. This was written on the troops' attitude towards the Chinese residents, as well as on what precautions the troops should take within the city: It warned the troops to strictly observe military discipline and to prevent any disorders in the city.

4. Thus, we were to enter Hankow with every precaution. After crossing the flooded area no fighting had occurred in the outskirts of the city, and we entered Hankow in a peaceful manner. Since we decided that to give the honour of being the first to enter Hankow to advance unit alone was not such a good idea, we got in touch with Brigade Commander USHIJIMA and allowed 556th Regiment (23rd Regiment) as well as a part of the 45th Regiment to enter at the same time.

5. The above being the situation, it is inconceivable that the Japan army could have committed assaults, looting, robberies, and other brutal acts. I have never seen such acts, never heard of such rumors, and never received any reports of such atrocities.
Ref. Doc. No. 1435

On this 21 day of Jan. 1947

Tori prefecture.

I, (unsigned) Yosutaro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Document, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

at the same place.

Witness: (signed) Yosutaro (seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Yosutaro (seal)
TRANSLATION.

INSTRUCTION: MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

v.

JIMI Sato, et al.

AFFIDAVIT

Affiant YOSHIKAWA Heizo

I, YOSHIKAWA Heizo, being first duly sworn as an attached sheet and in accordance with the customary formality in this country deposit and state as follows:

1. I was born at HIGASHI-CHIKUMA-CHO, NAGOYA, on November 11, the 39th year of Meiji (1906). My permanent address is No. 228, MARU,
   HIGASHI-CHIKU, KITA-AI IMUGUN, TOKYO TO. At present, I live at No. 4
   KIOL-CHO, YOSHIKAWA-KU, TOKYO TO.

2. My past career is summarized as follows. In October in the 2nd year of SHO.1(T.N.-1927) was commissioned Sub-lieutenant. In June in the 13th year of SHO.1(T.N., 1938) was promoted to Captain and attached to the Staff of the Second Army.
   From October in the 13th year of SHO.1(T.N.-1938) till August in the 14th year (T.N.-1939) was posted mainly at Hankow. In November in the 13th year of SHO.1(T.N., 1938) was appointed Staff Office to the 11th Army and, then instructor at the Military Staff College. In October in the 15th year of SHO.1(T.N.-1940) was appointed Staff Officer to the Expeditionary
Forces to China. After October in the 16th year of Showa (1941) was
appointed instructor of the Military Staff College and, then, Aide-de-camp
to His Majesty.

3. At the time of the attack upon Hankow, I was a captain and was
attached to the Staff of the Second Army. I crossed the Tepich Mountains
together with the 16th Division. On October 25, 1938, a part of the 6th
Division advanced into Hankow, and the Japanese forces occupied the whole
city on October 27.

I was directed by telegram on October 25 to assist Staff Officer ODAIRA
in making preparations for the entry of our forces into Hankow. I met
Staff Officer ODAIRA at Sungfow, and in the afternoon of October 29th
entered Hankow from Tsinching, about 6 kilometers northeast of Hankow.
At that time, the outer Chengkung bank was overflowing. Crossing it,
I went to the Headquarters of the 6th Division which was then located at
the Chiangkun Middle School, where I met Commander of the 6th Division
Lieutenant-General INOUE, who informed me of the details of the entry of
our troops into Hankow. Moreover, I closely inspected the city and its
vicinity.

And I made sure that our troops entered Hankow peacefully without carrying
out any hostile actions, and that no trouble such as looting, violence,
rape or bloodshed occurred on the part of our soldiers. When I came to
Hankow, the city was, needless to say, in a peaceful state and not a single
shot was heard.

Then our entry took place, only a minor unit, short of a regiment, which
was selected from men, the 6th Division was admitted into the city area
for purposes of defense, by order of the army commander and the rest were

- 2 -
all prohibited from entering within 10 kilometers of Hankow.

The naval forces coming up the Yangtze River arrived in Hankow at the same time as the Army. Just then the Army troops which came up the same river also reached there. But all of them were prohibited from landing, and, the River was crowded with our ships full of soldiers.

Entering Hankow in the afternoon of 29th, I walked about every quarter in and around the city, but I never sighted any corpses.

As I stayed in Hankow from that time till August of the following year, I frequently inspected various parts of the city. And, it never failed to occur to me that if the enemy had offered us serious resistance, it would have been considerably difficult for us to capture the so-called 'three strong holds of Shanghai', and so it was very fortunate for our forces that the enemy had no idea of resisting us.

b. Our Army Commander had issued very strict order concerning military discipline. On the other hand, our Army authorities made every effort to establish recreation centers in order to prevent positively, the occurrence of vicious crimes, and you can imagine how surprised I was at the sight of the Japanese female recreation corps which came up the Yangtze River to Hankow as early as Nov. 1. By such means, while our Army authorities strictly punished the offenders with strict military disciplines, they were never too careful in installing such facilities.

At the time of our entry into Hankow the city was guarded by a minor unit under the command of Major General Ushijima. Kitaura of the Sixth Division as stated above. But as the Sixth Division moved southwards to attack Y-eh-wu, the Second Army was ordered to take their place.

Our Army authorities allowed only a small number of units selected from
Gr'scr ch Division, to enter the city and made efforts to maintain strict military discipline, to prevent from being held in contempt by foreign nationals. The main body of the army was directed to stay in the suburbs and was prohibited from entering the city. French residents in the French Concession appreciated us because they were well conscious of the fact that disciplines were being strictly maintained by the Japanese forces.

When the further unit of the 13th Division were ordered on Nov. 3 to be quartered at dirty buildings in the outskirts of Hankow, because our troops were banned from entering the city, an adjutant of the corps came along and started at me in excitement. "Such treatment is an insult to the army! However, I could not allow them to enter the city on account of the order.

After the occupation of Hankow, our army authorities clearly divided the areas into that for use of Japanese forces, the one for joint use by the Japanese and the Chinese and that to accommodate refugees. And for the Chinese residents in the Japanese-Chinese joint area our Special Service authorities issued certificates of residence, which were given to them to avoid trouble. At any rate, the most close precautions and strict supervision were exercised, to prevent our soldiers from committing any outrageous acts.

Therefore, I affirm here that such scandals as murders and rape of the Chinese people never occurred in Hankow.

After the capture of Hankow, however, we were greatly worried by fires caused by the Chinese Klein Clothes Corps which somehow made their way into the city.

December 24, 1946

At No. 8, HIOI-CHO,
KONJICHI-KU, TOKYO-TO

/oo./ YOSHIBACHI, Kaizo(soc.l)
I hereby certify that the above statement was made by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On this 24th day of December 1946, at the same place.

Witness /s/ KOJUJI, Tsubakuro (seal)

Oral.

I swear recollecting my conscience to state the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YOSHIKISHI, Kiz.
DEF. DOC. #291

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foreign translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 3 February 1947.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

-versus-

ARAKI, Sada-, et al

AFFIDAVIT

Doct. SAITOC, Toru-

In accordance with the system employed in our country, I, having taken oath as set forth in the accompanying paper, hereby depon as follows:

1. I was born September 21, 1902, at 12 Aoyama-Takagi-


och, Akasaka-ku, TOKYO, and am residing at present at 14

Mitani-och, Meguru-ku, TOKYO.

2. Regarding my personal history, I graduated in

March, 1930, from the Architecture Department, WASED'.

University and was employed in July, 1930, by the ASahi

Shimbun Office. I am at present a member of the editorial
staff of the ASAI SHIMPUN. At the time of the attack on

MANCHOW I was a social reporter of the ASAHI.
3. On the morning of October 25, 1938, by order of the ASAHI SHIMPUN I flew from KIUKIANG over HANKOW in naval reconnaissance plane at an altitude of 30 m. At that time the Japanese forces had not yet invaded the city of HANKOW. While flying over the North of the city our plane was fixed upon by the enemy. I saw Japanese troops in the outskirts of HANKOW marching toward the city. I also saw Japanese warships on the Yantze River approaching HANKOW.

On the 28th of the same month I again entered HANKOW by plane and stayed in the naval corps billet there. At that time I saw a large number of ships on the river.

Done this 10th day of February, 1947, at the ASASHI SHIMPUN Office, 3, 2-chome Yuraku-cho, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo.

Deponent: SAITO, Tatsuo (Seal)

I, IMANARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At TOKYO

Witness: (Signed) IMANARI, Yasutaro (Seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charlie S. Toury, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Toury

Tokyo, Japan
Date 8 Apr. 1947.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-v-

ARAHI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: OHKI Eiichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1) I was born on August 25, 1911 (Meiji 44) at 215, 1-chome, Takada-Suginami-ku, Tokyo.

2) Personal History:

I graduated from the Photography course of the Tokyo Higher Polytechnic School in March, 1932, (Showa 7).

Immediately after my graduation, I was employed by the Tokyo Asahi Shimbunsha (The Tokyo Asahi Press). Since that time I have been in the Photography section. I am now the Vice-chief of the Photograph Printing Section of the same newspaper.

3) By order of the company, I took part in the attack on Hankow as a war correspondent. On October 24, 1938, I advanced from Hwangpo, on the outskirts of Hankow with a tank unit. Our tanks made their way in the midst of retreating enemy soldiers. The tanks hurried to enter Hankow paying no attention to enemy troops left behind. However, when we reached this side of the Changkung embankment, we found the area flooded. Our units, therefore, ceased to advance and began to fire mountain-guns and field-pieces.
on enemy pill-boxes constructed on the side of Tsai-chia-shan. The attack drove the enemy farther back.

At that time, many columns of rising smoke caused by explosions could be seen in the direction of Hankow. They were from the Japanese concession in Hankow which was blown up by the enemy in retreat. I was able to cross the river that night with a unit that was crossing. After passing through a village we reached one end of the city of Hankow.

I saw very few Japanese soldiers in the city who had preceded us.

I passed that night on the outskirts of the city. On the following morning, that is, August 26, it stopped raining. Staff Officer Akagi told us that the enemy had already escaped, and that since we were expected to enter Hankow formally, we should tidy ourselves up. To correspondents of the Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, Doro, etc., entered the city in a body, escorted on both sides by the soldiers of a platoon. When we arrived at the North Station, we met with a few machine gun shots fired by remaining enemy troops. This enemy remnant was the last gun report that we heard. The units that crossed the river marched forward in columns. About noon, we arrived at the Japanese concession, which was in flames. Proceeding to the right from the demolished Japanese Consulate, we came to the wooden fence of the Italian concession. While we were hesitating as to whether or not we should advance farther, a French missionary Father Jakino (phonetic transliteration) appeared and acted as a guide for the Japanese units. Since I could speak both languages, I acted as interpreter in a conversation between the Staff Officer Akagi and the missionary. At that time, there were also a German officer and two foreign women there. Staff Officer Akagi instructed the Japanese soldiers, who were to be guided by the missionary, to adjust their uniform and to march four abreast in perfect order. While we were passing through
the streets, we saw many residents pooping at us from their houses or tearing anti-Japanese posters from their walls. No dead were seen along the way.

In the meanwhile, the Japanese Navy cruiser "Yaeyama" sailed up to the city, followed by many small craft. Up until that time, there had been almost no ships in the river, save a vessel which seemed to be an American gunboat. The navy forces entered Hankow about an hour later than the army forces, and the two groups exchanged greetings at a school called the Meiji Primary School.

In the city of Hankow, the waterfront area was allotted to the Navy, while the area on the opposite side of the road was made the Army zone. Most of the army forces were stationed in the suburbs, and only a few soldiers were allowed to come into the city. Headquarters of the division was located in a suburban middle school. The vacant land behind the customs house on the waterfront area was allotted to refugees, but the waterfront area itself was guarded by Japanese soldiers and not even armed soldiers, not to speak of us war-correspondents, were allowed to go into the area where the consulates stood. When we entered the city on October 25th there were almost no vessels in the Yangtze River, since the water had receded about 200 yards the bank. However, on October 26th, the river swarmed with vessels. The navy also prohibited its sailors to land, and there were many ships of the navy in the river. Many Chinese refugees were seen on board the ships flying flags of Britain, the U.S.A., France, etc. Immediately before the fall of Hankow, there were almost no vessels in the Yangtze River, near the city, but after the fall many ships congregated there. The reason for this was that persons on the ships, fearing at first the Japanese troops,
fled but returned after learning that the Japanese would do them no harm.

I swear that the rumour that Japanese soldiers slaughtered Chinese war prisoners and threw them into the river is entirely groundless. Actually, it was so calm on October 26 and 27 that not even the report of a gun was heard. The Japanese soldiers who entered the city were very few in number. In addition, since they were very busy with guard duty and with arrangements for their billets and belongings, they had not time enough to go out. Besides, their going out was forbidden as much as possible by official policy.

Only the Japanese concession was destroyed by fire. All other parts of the city remained safe. Consequently, the whole city, including the concessions, began to get crowded as early as October 28th.

On this 10th day of February, 1947
At Tokyo

Defendant: OIKI Eichi (seal)

I, IKUMA, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) IKUMA, Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing. OIKI Eichi (seal) On Feb. 10, 1947.
I, Charlie S. Terry, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date 9 Apr. 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE WAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

ARAKI Sadao, et al

SWEAR DEPOSITION

Deponent: Oha-i, Saburo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country here-by depose as follows:

1. I was born on August 17, 1892 (Taisho 1), at my home, 457, Makubo-cho, Naka-ku, Niigata-ken. My present address is 32, Konodai, Ichikawa-shi, Chiba-ken.

2. I became an employee of the Tokyo Asahi Press in April 1923, and have been in the service of the same company until the present time. At the time of the attack on Hankow I was with the Photography Section of the same newspaper.

3. Under company orders, I, as a member of the Photography Section of the Tokyo Asahi Press, sailed aboard a gunboat on the Yangtze River from Kiku to Whangchow, with the intention of joining the Mascot Unit for the purpose of photographing actual scenes of the attack on Hankow. However, when I happened to meet the Hirata Unit of the Formosan Army on the evening of October 24, 1933, I joined it
Def. Doc. No. 920

and proceeded with it to Wuchang, arriving on October 25.
Passing through Anyang, we reached Ankor on the 26th. At
that time, the Hanshu River, a tributary of the Yangtze,
was so crowded with vessels of all sizes that it was im-
possible for us to come directly alongside the bank. We,
consequently, had to walk across a number of ships to go
ashore.
Since I thought that the Japanese troops had already com-
pletely occupied Ankor, I entered the city immediately.
However, since I found no Japanese soldiers and since the
city was almost completely deserted, I immediately returned
to Wuchang, again going by way of Anyang.
On October 28, I again went from Wuchang to Ankor. At that
time a great number of vessels were already at anchor on the
river, so that upon landing I could not go directly ashore,
but had to walk across thirty or forty vessels anchored side
by side in order to reach the river. The city had already been
restored to its former prosperous condition, and I was
able to go to a restaurant as soon as I went ashore. The
streets were quite as tranquil as in peacetime.
I stayed in Ankor until November 1, and during that period
conditions in the city completely returned to normalcy.
On November 2, I left Ankor for Yochow with the Sixth
Division.

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Def. Doc. No. 920

On this 10th day of February 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT COL. WA SABURO

I, IMAMOTO Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (seigned) IMAMOTO Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and ad ing nothing.

This 10th of February, 1947

Witness: (seigned) IMAMOTO Yasutaro (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an accurate translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/ S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date 9 April '47
(T.N. For conveniences sake, the translator marked the inscriptions on the map "a, b, c, ......." etc.

a. From Oct 25 until Nov 4, a little less than 1/4 of the Transport Force and Baggage Section etc. of the regiment was waiting for orders.

b. Regimental Gun Unit, Anti-Tank Gun Unit, Mountain Artillery Battalion, Field Artillery Battalion, the Field and Combat Train of the respective units and the Baggage Section and the patients of the respective companies were in this vicinity generally until Nov 4, and on the afternoon of which day they proceeded to the Regimental bivouac area in the City of Hankow.

6. On Oct 27, on orders of the US IIIrd Brigade, the regiment began to advance about 300 passing through the thickly-populated area and advancing as far as the line connecting Lushangtiao Harbor and the Municipal Government building. In the afternoon, we moved our bivouac to the area extending from the vicinity of Kianghar, West to the vicinity of Chungshan Park. At the time, the gates of each of the people's homes were closed.
d. The Regiment stopped here from 1100 to 1230, Oct 26, and got into orderly formation.

e. The Third Bn. Commander Major MATSUZAKI reported that in this vicinity they were greeted by the Italian Consul-General. The entire Regiment stopped about 40 minutes and adjusted their uniforms. Then they made a triumphant entry into the city marching in a double file headed by the Third Bn.

f. In front of the Italian Consulate-General, we were greeted by the Italian Consul-General Bridgoly (T.N. phonetic), members of the Consulate Staff, about 30 soldiers, and some 40 Italian civilians of all ages and both sexes. Our officers and men received presents of cigarettes from them. After leaving the Italian Consulate-General, we were accompanied by a French missionary marching ahead of the Third Bn, and an Englishman who spoke very good Japanese ahead of the Headquarters of the Regiment, and they led us along safe roads to the central area of City of Hankow. At the vicinity of the Shun Le-zen Railway Station and proceeded through the central area of the City and I remember it was about 1600 of the 26th that the Regiment reached the Telegraph Office of Hubei Province.

g. Regimental Headquarters and the 9th Company stayed here for only the night of the 26th.
The main Strength of the Regiment stayed here from the night of Oct. 26 till Nov. 5. Headquarters was stayed at Jahan Hotel which was situated next to the Liaotung Restaurant or was in the Liaotung Restaurant itself.

Our lines as of the 27th.

Part of the First Battalion.
Certificate of Source

I hereby certify that the map hereon attached and entitled "A Map showing the Sectional Divisions of HANKOW", is a map which I carried with me while I was engaged in the siege of Hankow (in the autumn of 1938), and which has been thenceforth in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April, 1947

/S/ S. NO. Torata (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereon in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on the same date.

Witness: /S/ M. N. Y. (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date 5 May 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadso, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: IKEDA Ryuzaburō

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on March 21, 1887, at No. 22, Kita-machi, Wakayama City which is my permanent domicile. I am now living at No. 98, 2nd cho-me, Ogikubo, Saginami-Ward, Tokyo-City.

2. In July, 1938, I was appointed Commander of the First Lines of Communication of the 4th Division (I was then a colonel), in which capacity I participated in the Attack of Wuhan. After the fall of Hankow, I stayed at Hankow until March 1940.

3. First, I landed at Anking, and assumed the responsibility of supplying the Second Army, then by the order of Gen. HATA,
Commander of the Japanese Army in Central China I left Anking for Chinkiang where I made liaison with the headquarters of the above Army, and received detailed instructions regarding the actual measures to be taken to protect foreign rights and the person and properties of the Chinese at Hankow during the coming attack on that city. I then embarked for the same city and arrived there on November 2, of the same year, after the fall of that city.

When I arrived at Hankow, there were two gun-boats of foreign nationality lying at anchor on the Yangtse (They flew the flags of a third power), and more than 1,000 ships and boats (junks etc.) were found on the river. It seemed that there was no damage nor change in the roads along the river. After our landing, we established the L of C headquarters at the branch office of the MITSUI BUSSAN Co., and managed the business regarding the billeting and supply of the army. Whenever we purchased goods, we bought them directly from the Chinese on reasonable terms, and the wages of labourers were paid every day. We forbade the soldiers to go directly to the Chinese to get anything.

Coolies necessary to the transportation of goods were sometimes supplied through a local body called the "Jūmonji" Association. (T.R.)
Besides, we provided for the comfort of the people with the cooperation of the Special Service Department. Picture-halls were opened to the public, and entertainment meetings were held frequently. Accordingly we became very popular with the people. The mayor of Hankow, the President of the Peace Association, and other persons representing the people came to me to express their gratitude. Those surrendering from the Chinese army were also paid very well. We entertained them with frequent feasts, sports and various meetings. So that there was not one who tried to escape. They ever presented letters of gratitude to us.

The conditions in Hankow at the time I entered the city were such that, except that the Japanese Concession had been burnt out, all quarters including the Foreign Concessions, were quite calm. Of course not a human corpse was to be seen in the city. The conditions in the Foreign Concessions were perfectly normal. The other parts of the city also returned to their former gaiety after a short interval. Any how, I heard not a single gun-shot throughout my trip to Hankow.

Besides, the main body of the Japanese forces were not ordered to enter the city. Only a small number of garrison troops were stationed in the city.
4. When I had the chance to see General HATA, the Commander in Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, he told me earnestly to be cautious and discreet in action so as to prevent any possible complication in matters concerning protection of the people and foreign affairs. His prudence in action, as expressed his instructions stated above, was always to be admired.

5. As to the arrangement policy of Hankow city, we endeavoured, according to the detailed directives from the Expeditionary Force, Headquarters to adopt sufficient measures for flood control, sanitation and so forth, to supply materials in Hankow city as well as to maintain order. Everything was progressing ideally.

6. During my stay in Hankow, a plan was presented to erect a memorial tower in Hankow for the Chinese soldiers who fell in battles. I then, submitted my opinion that I thought it was better to erect the tower in the Chung-shan Park. Anyhow, I saw clearly with my eyes that the Chinese people entertained no bad feeling toward Japan. This fact proves that the Japanese did not commit any sort of violence.

On this 11th day of April, 1947,
at Tokyo

Deponent:/S/ IKEDA Ryûzaburô (seal)

- 4 -
I, IMANARI Yasutarō, hereby certify that the above statement
was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal
thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at the same place.

Witness: /S/ IMANARI Yasutarō (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ IKEDA Ryūzaburō (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch,
hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the
above affidavit is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a
correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning
of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 15 April 1947.
所ニ取リ行コトナキテ居リマシタ
人夫ハ同地ニ在タ出會トイフ目待ニテテ
デ居リマシタ勇モアリマシタ
他者ヲ問ヒト速蒟シテ民衆ノ無安ノ努力映ス
営業ヲ開キテニシ
シテガ民衆ノ集計ヲナモテコノハ市長ニ治
民衆ノ代表ヲ呼マノ私ニ御御ニ呼マリマシク
他者ヲ頼兵ヲ充従ノ貸金ヲ揚フニ機密ヲ通
向会ト無安ヲ開キテ速蒟シテ
ノ逃亡ヲ等ハ一人モアリマシテデシテ
ノ라シマス
市内ノ状況ハ私ノ蒙ロニ入タ姪ニハ日本ニ揃
パケ開キ持ハレテ
デシタノ倉庫ハ外國租界内ハ平常ト同
従ヲ来スデシテ
デシタノ倉庫ハ外國租界内ハ平常ト同
従ヲ来スデシテ
ノラシマス
昭和三十二年（一九五七年）四月十一日於東京

於同所

立會人

今

成泰太郎

5
Sworn Deposition

Deponent: MIYAZAKI, Shuichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I. I was born at my permanent domicile, No. 8604 GAZA MUTSUZAWA SHIMOJO-MURA SHIMOINA-GUN NAGANO-KEN, on the 6th of February, 28th year of Meiji (TN: 1895). At present I am living at the 1st Demobilisation Office

II. Outline of my Personal History:

October, 8th year of Taisho (TN: 1916) Commissioned 2nd Lieut
March, 13th year of Showa (TN: 1938) Colonel
From July 13th year of Showa (TN: 1938) 11th Army Staff Officer
to October 14th year of Showa (TN: 1939)

August, 17th year of Showa (TN: 1942) Maj-General Instructc. of Military Science at the Army War College
Loy, 18th year of Showa (TN: 1943) Chief of Staff of the
17th Army

August, 18th year of Showa (TN: 1943) Chief of the 4th
Section, Army General
Staff

August, 19th year of Showa (TN: 1944) Executive Officer,
Army War College

December, 19th year of Showa (TN: 1944) Lt. General
Chief of Staff, 6th Area Army

Till the cessation of hostilities Chief of the 1st Section,
Army General Staff

III. I was a staff officer of the 11th Army under the
command of Commander-in-Chief of the Central China
Expeditionary Forces, HATA, from July, 1938 to October,
1939, then served as Chief of Staff of the 6th Area Army
from August, 1944 to December 1944, under the command of
Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces,
HATA.

IV. First of all, since the WUHAN Operations was the
largest and most important of all operations for the
Central China Expeditionary Forces, great speed was
necessary in its execution. Peace and order in the
area, however, was most carefully maintained, while,
various concrete measures were devised in order to ensure
safety for the lives and property of the Chinese people
in general to say nothing of the rights and interests of
foreign nationals in WUH.N. This operation had but a purely military objective of occupying the WUHAN Area, the military and political center of CHIANG-KAI-SHÈK Regime's after the loss of NANKING to the Japanese, and was planned to crush the some 150 Chinese divisions in mass defense in the front lines of that area. Our main forces were dispatched towards the Sing Yang, Hankow areas and the Yo-Chow, Tungshan areas, and not sent directly towards the Wuh^A area. In the Wuhan area, not more than one tenth of the total strength, a division and a mixed brigade were dispatched. And in the capture of Wuhan only a certain amount of heavy fighting was done in the area advanced to by the large force described in the previous sentence. The situation was where one found the capture of Wuhan accomplished with only a few troops picked out from the divisions dispatched to the Wuhan area with it as its objective. When we approached the outskirts of Wuhan in the latter part of October, 1938, the Chinese troops were in the midst of disorderly flight and scarcely an enemy was to be seen on all fronts. There was no fight worth mentioning as a battle. Consequently, we can truly say that there was no war damage whatsoever in the Wuhan area. Again Japanese Air Operations, during the campaign, did not exceed attacking Chinese field troops bombing enemy planes on Hankow Airfield and in regards to the municipalities there was absolutely no bombing attack made. I was able to
confirm this fact upon inspecting the area personally following the occupation, to be just so. Commander HATA had given deep consideration regarding the actions of military personnel required for the capture of Wuhan and particularly with reference to the residents in general buildings, installations etc., outside the category of military objectives and ordered that they were not damaged or destroyed. One example of this is at the beginning of October of the same year Commander HATA issued orders to his subordinate commanding officers prescribing summary "Restricted Acts in the capture of WUHAN," together with a map minutely indicating rights and interests of foreign nationals as well as important Chinese political and military installations. He took scrupulous steps to prevent violation of International Law and to prevent occupation or destruction of installations other than military.

V. On 30 October, 1938, 3 days after the fall of Wuhan I sailed up the Yangtze River and went ashore at Wuchang in the afternoon of the same day, and made an inspection of the city and found all the residents had completely taken refuge a few days previously leaving not a shadow. I was not able to recognize the slightest after traces of a battle. Two or three days later (November 3rd), upon inspecting the cities of Hankow and Hanyang, I was able to recognize that the Chinese forces had intentionally blown
up the Japanese Concession, the Iron Works in Hanyang and the Munition Plants in Wuchang before flooding. In the British, French, Russian Concessions and China town there was no trace of a fire caused by combat. The people were bustling, the shops were doing flourishing business and at night electric lights were shining brightly on the streets and alongside the banks of the Yangtze. A few days after the occupation, however, a fire broke out in the warehouse area along the shores of the Yangtze. This was done by a straggler who had sneaked back in. At that time there were many crafts of the third powers, large and small, such as boats and lighters moored alongside the Yangtze near the Hankow area and it left us in no position to commit any illegal deeds such as rape, man slaughter etc., to any extent before them. Consequently no trace of destruction due to warfare was noticeable in the city. It was also literally unimaginable that any slaughter to speak of could have taken place in the streets and thereabouts. Actually, on that 7th of November, memorial services for the dead were held and quite elaborately. If this were right after a massacre it couldn't have been done so quickly nor so solemnly.

VI. At that time, cholera was raging over Hankow and many Chinese were dumping corpses into the Yangtze River. In the lower streams of the Yangtze, countless Japanese naval crafts were navigating about and since there are occasions in utilizing this water and if cholera should break out
among the Japanese troops it would be a matter of grave concern so great pains were taken to prohibit them from dumping the cholera corpses into the Yangtze.

December 24, 1946

At the 1st Demobilization Bureau

/s/ MIYAZAKI, Shuichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above took an oath in the presence of the witness and that the above signature and seal were affixed hereunto in the presence of the same.

At the same place on the same date

Witness: KUNIWAKE, Tomoharu

Written Oath

I swear to tell the truth according to my conscience, withholding nothing, and adding nothing.

/s/ MIYAZAKI, Shuichi (seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 17 February 1947

"Deposition of MIYASAKI, Shuich"
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: MOPIOKA Takashi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born in HIROSHIMA Prefecture on April 15, 1889. My permanent residence and present address is No. 164, Nakanacho, Meguro-ku, Tokyo.

2. The outline of my personal history:


March, 1938. Appointed major-general.

Attached to the Headquarters of the North China Expeditionary Army.

August, 1939. Attached to the Headquarters of the Central China Expeditionary Army. Commander of the Special Service Section at Hankow.

August, 1937. Chief of the Liaison office of the China Affairs Board at PEKING.
August, 1940. Appointed Lieutenant General.

I was attached to the headquarters of the Central China Expeditionary Army in August, 1938. Military operations to capture Hankow were in progress, and Hankow was on the eve of fall at that time. I was residing in Shanghai at that time. Preceding my subordinates, I went by plane the headquarters of the Army at Kikian. Unaccompanied, I boarded a destroyer at Kikian and arrived at Hankow on the evening of the 28th. I landed at the eastern end of the Japanese settlement, a spot down the river about a mile from the Customs House. The Japanese settlement in Hankow city was for the most part burnt down, and was very quiet, there being almost no one to be seen on the streets. I was not permitted to enter the French Settlement. After going around the French settlement, I came to the Customs House. Not a Japanese soldier was to be seen, except those of the headquarters unit of the Japanese Military Police stationed in the SSUMYG Bank, because the Japanese soldiers were not permitted to enter the city but were quartered on the outskirts of the city. I was looking for quarters of Japanese soldiers with the intention of lodging there. However, there were neither Japanese soldiers nor their quarters. As there was no alternative, I went to the wharf at the Customs House. A ship named "Hidori yaru," belonging to the Shipping Transport Command, lay at anchor. I shouted to the crew of the ship from the wharf. Then, going to the ship I asked for
lodging there and obtained their removal. I went on board the "Midori-Maruru" some time after 8:00 p.m. on October 28th and lodged there for six days, that is until November 3. I spent all of my time on the ship except when I went ashore on business in the daytime. At a distance of about thirty or forty from the "Midori-Maruru," a foreign ship lay at anchor. In addition there was a considerable number of Chinese junks near-by. Down the river British and French gunboats lay at anchor close to the river bank, and in the offing there were Japanese destroyers. While I lodged in the "Midori-Maruru," the city of HANKOW was truly quiet. Never once did I hear the report of a gun. Nor did I see a murder committed in the vicinity of the wharf. The Customs House nearby the wharf was used as the office of the Transport Headquarters, from the window of which we had an unobstructed view of the vicinity. Therefore, neither shot nor murder could have occurred. After its occupation by the Japanese Army, HANKOW was divided distinctly into two garrison areas, that is, that of the Army and that of the Navy. At the time when HANKOW was occupied, most of the Yangtze Valley was placed under the Navy's guard, and soldiers of the Army were not permitted to enter that area. These garrison areas were more or less altered later on.
On this 15 day of April, 1947

At Tokyo

DEFENDENT MORIOKA Takaishi (seal)

I, Murata Tomio hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) Murata Tomio (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

MORIOKA Takaishi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date April 25, 1947
On the 15 day of April, 1947
At Tokyo

DEFENDENT MORIOKA Takashi (seal)

I, MURATA Tomio hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) MURATA Tomio (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

MORIOKA Takashi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 25, 1947

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Member Governments, other National Authorities and  
Military Tribunals Box 402, 403 and 404

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents  
of the International Military Tribunal for  
the Far East (Tokyo Trials).  
Court Exhibits P&G- 3/2.3.3

Court Exhibits consist of a wide variety of published  
and unpublished documents mainly from United States  
and Japanese sources. The Japanese items are generally  
accompanied by English Translations (arranged  
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I certify that the micrographs appearing in this reel of film are true copies of the original records described above.

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Signature of Camera Operator:

[Signature]
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