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
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


**PAG - 3**

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



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





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
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


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
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FILE COPY

Def. Doc. No. 101-102 TO ROOM 36



From Tōgō to Nomura  
23 November 1941  
No. 816

It seems that the United States does not concur in the fourth clause of Proposal "B" relative to the undertaking not to indulge in measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavor for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China. We have no objection to President Roosevelt's being the introducer concurrently with Proposal "B", and it is our intention to have China, through the good offices of the President, express friendship toward Japan in accordance with the American proposal (B) of the 12th, and thereby commence peace talks directly with China. As it is expected that an agreement for a truce will be concluded between Japan and China at the opening of such negotiations, American assistance to Chiang would in practice become unnecessary in such an event. It should therefore naturally be made clear that the President, by his introduction, should cause Chiang Kai-shek to propose peace to Japan, that the United States in response should support the efforts for Japanese-Chinese peace with a view to establishing friendly relationships between the two countries, and that therefore the United States should refrain from any action which would disturb such efforts.

You are directed to do your best to get the United States to accept the fourth clause of Proposal "B" and, when the negotiations shall have been concluded, to bring about through the President's introduction, by the time set in my telegram No. 812, the peace proposal of Chiang Kai-shek (preferably a simple one).

2948

Def. Doc. No. 1401-V-2

From Nomura to Tōgō  
25 November 1941  
No. 1179

Secretary Hull has twice conferred jointly with the Ambassadors and Ministers of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and China. It seems, however, that with the development of the situation he confers mainly with the British Ambassador only. Since this morning, the 25th, Australian and Dutch representatives are informed through the British Ambassador, and Hull is going to talk with the Chinese Ambassador alone this evening after his conference with the British Ambassador. It is generally noted that the United States no longer treats the four countries on the same level.

Ex 2949

Def. Doc. No. 1401-X-2

From Nomura to T5g3  
27 November 1941  
No. 1190

The development of the Japanese-American negotiations is as you are well acquainted with through successive telegrams. The American proposal of the 26th (telegram No. 1189) shows that there is an extreme divergence between the positions of the two parties, and there is unfortunately no prospect whatsoever of America's accepting our position within the period you indicated.

As the United States made this proposal after having conferred with the countries concerned, in accordance with her long-standing position and because of our request to obtain their concurrence, we must maintain close vigilance regarding their intentions. On the other hand, we have, in accordance with your instructions, pressed them only for speedy conclusion of the negotiations, and have not, therefore, expressed anything in the nature of an ultimatum. Moreover, the situation is such that the President, at the meeting of the 17th, said that there can be "no last word". In such circumstances, if we resort to freedom of action after the time set w/out in some way terminating the present negotiations, it is very likely that the United States, taking advantage of the fact that she is at present conferring with the countries concerned, will make propaganda that Japan prolonged the negotiations with the aim only of gaining time for preparing for a definite course of action and launched on the planned action upon completion of the preparation even while the negotiations were still being carried on, thereby shifting to us the responsibility for the rupture of the negotiations. It should be recalled in this connection that the United States blamed our advance into French Indo-China for the suspension of the negotiations in the past. Our resorting to free action without taking steps to terminate the negotiations not only would be utilized for counter-propaganda against us, but would prejudice the good faith of Japan as a world power. Such steps, however, involve matters of military secrecy. It is considered advisable that the negotiations be terminated, depending upon the decision of the Government, either by notification to the American Ambassador in Tokyo, by an open declaration, or by any other means. In any case I should like to be informed in advance so that I can give notification here simultaneously.

As I am seeing the President soon, I should like to be instructed immediately if there is anything which I should bear in mind.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

42950

Def. Doc. No. 1401-A-3

From Nomura to Tōgō  
28 November 1941  
No. 1214

In reference to my telegram No. 1190.

The State Department, which had maintained silence concerning the Japanese-American negotiations, broke its silence and made disclosure of the conversations yesterday, the 26th. The press responded and printed such headlines as "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japan" and "America Rejects Second 'Munich'", and stressed abstract points, such as Hull's four principles, which have general appeal. It has to be noted that the papers argue that it is up to Japan either to accept or to reject the American proposal and that it is Japan's responsibility to make choice between peace and war.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



Ex 2957

Def. Doc. No. 1401-D-3

From Tōgō to ~~Nomura~~  
3 December 1941  
No. 878

COPY

In reference to your telegram No. 1225.

1. It is observed that the United States makes much of the statement of our Government, the trend of public opinion and the troop-movements in the south, and expresses apprehension on account of them over our sincerity in the negotiations. However, the facts about the statement of Premier Tōjō were as contained in my telegram No. 869, and we consider that the unexpected repercussion was caused by an extreme inappropriateness of translation (made by the Domei news agency). As to the direction of public opinion, I have been taking great pains over it. It is understood that Ambassador Grew has made report to his Government on this point, and even Secretary Hull himself expressed satisfaction with the improvement, as you reported in your telegram No. 1148. In spite of this, the recent tone of the press in the United States has been very provocative, and the radio broadcasts (especially the short-wave broadcasts from San Francisco in the last several days) are daily giving reports of the delicate subjects of the negotiations. Such broadcasts can never be made unless there is close contact with quarters familiar with the course of the negotiations. It is inappropriate for the United States to blame Japan without considering her own faults.

2. The United States, Britain and other countries have increasingly of late intensified their military preparations against Japan and adopted a provocative attitude toward us. On the 20th of last month, for instance, an American plane made a reconnaissance flight over Garambi in the south of Formosa. (Protest concerning the matter was made to the American Ambassador in Tokyo on the 27th.) This is not an isolated case of such American and British actions. It is our desire in view of the delicate situation that they should themselves refrain from repeating such actions.

3. You are directed to make further explanations to the United States that our proposal of 20 November was made from the standpoint of fairness, and that we believe it the best measure to save the situation at this moment. (It is assumed that the United States refers, when she asserts that our proposal is inconsistent with the general principles, to the provisions of Article 4 relative to non-interference with the peace between Japan and China.) Our assertion is, as repeatedly made clear to the United States, that she should stop assisting Chiang when peace talk is commenced between Japan and China through the introduction of the President. You should bear in mind, therefore, that our position by no means conflicts with what the United States calls fundamental principles.



295  
Def. Doc. No. 1401-3

From Nomura to Tōgō  
26 November 1941  
No. 1189

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 301

Ambassador Kurusu and I talked with Secretary Hull for about two hours from 4:45 P.M. on the 26th.

Hull stated that the United States for several days had thoroughly examined the modus vivendi proposed by Japan on the 20th of this month (Proposal "B"), and had fully consulted about it with the countries concerned, but that unfortunately she could not agree to it, and that she was constrained to propose instead a plan (marked "tentative and without commitment") which was a compromise between the American proposal of 21 June and the Japanese proposal of 25 September. The gist of the plan is as follows:

(A) Request of approval of the four principles

(B) 1. Conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Conclusion of an agreement among the United States, the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands and Thailand concerning non-aggression toward French Indo-China and equal economic treatment therein.

3. Withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China and French Indo-China.

4. Assurance that the United States and Japan will not support any régime in China other than the Chiang Kai-shek régime.

5. Abolition of extraterritorial rights and concessions in China.

6. Conclusion of a reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Japan on the basis of the most-favored-nation principle.

7. Reciprocal rescission of the freezing of assets.

8. Stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.

9. Understanding that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the purpose of this agreement and preservation of peace in the Pacific area (a proposal to make the Tripartite Pact a dead letter).

We argued strongly against the proposal, saying that it is in conflict with what has been discussed so far and that we were reluctant to make report of it to Tokyo. However, Hull showed no sign of concession.

It is presumed that the United States proposed such a strong plan as a result of the victory of the strong elements in the country over the supporters of compromise, because of our request to suspend American aid to Chiang, speeches of our leaders against Britain and America and the rumor that Japan requested Thailand to hand over the entire defense of the latter country, as well as under the influence of British, Dutch and Chinese pressure.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361Excerpt from TEN YEARS IN JAPAN, by Joseph C. Grew,  
United States Ambassador to Japan 1932-1942

Page 474

November 7, 1941

At the Soviet Embassy reception today, to celebrate their national holiday (they are the only diplomatic mission which now holds such receptions), I took occasion to make the strongest representations to every Japanese to whom I talked with regard to the Times and Advertiser editorial, mentioned above, listing seven points as a program for American "restitution" to Japan, and to point out what serious harm the editorial had done, especially at the moment of sending Kurusu to the United States to try to bring the current conversations to a successful conclusion. I spoke of the utter stupidity of creating such a hostile atmosphere here and such an unfortunate impression on the American public at a moment when constructive, not destructive, results were desired. I made it clear that it was not my intention to presume to interfere with the Japanese press but only to point out factually the inevitable effects in my country when such editorials, assumed to represent the views of the Japanese Government since the Times and Advertiser is known to be controlled by the Foreign Office, were reprinted in the United States.

Tōgō, the Foreign Minister, appeared to know nothing about the editorial and was sure that it had not been inspired by the Foreign Office, but he undertook to look into it and a few moments later he called Toshi Go, editor of the paper, over to him and told him what I had said. I also spoke to Toshi Go, who said that he alone was responsible for the editorial and had written it himself as indicating Japan's maximum demands which would undoubtedly be far beyond what the Government would ask for in the conversations. I told him that he could have no conception of the harm that he had done. Somebody else told me that Go had published the editorial as a protest against the secrecy under which the conversations were being held.

Shigemitsu, with whom I talked, was thoroughly sympathetic and said that he would do his best to stop this sort of thing, while Matsumoto, head of Domei, promised me that there would be an immediate change in the tone and substance of the Japanese press, and he was as good as his word because the tone did immediately change for the better. I think I succeeded in stirring them all up considerably, so the gathering at the Soviet party was distinctly useful.

The next time I called on Tōgō I repeated these representations and he replied that while the Foreign Office had exerted no control over the Times and Advertiser up to the present, it was jolly well going to exert such control from now on. The editorial may or may not have been dictated by the Foreign Office, regardless of what Toshi Go said. One informant said that it had been so dictated, but if so, I think it was probably done by some subordinate official and without the knowledge of the Minister, who, I am convinced, knew nothing about it.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

402954

Def. Doc. No. 1886

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Hayashi Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section of the Japanese Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Explanation of the Premier at the Imperial Conference on 1 December 1941" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 7 July 1947.

Hayashi Kaoru

Witness: Urabe Katsuma

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

H. Nishi

Tokyo

July 1947

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Lu 2954

Def Doc No. 1886


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COOPY

RETURN TO DEPARTMENT

昭和十六年十二月一日御前會議ニ於ケル總理大臣説明

御許シテ得タルニ依リマシテ本日ノ議事ノ進行ハ私カ之ニ当リマシテ十一月五日御前會議決定ニ基キマシテ、陸海軍ニ於テハ作戰準備ノ完整ニ勉メマスル一方、政府ニ於キマシテハ凡有ル手段ヲ盡シ全力ヲ傾注シテ、對米歐交調整ノ成立ニ努力シテ参リマシタカ、米歐ハ從來ノ主張ヲ一步モ譲ラサルノミナラス、更ニ米英蘭支聯合ノ下ニ支那ヨリ無條件全面撤兵、南京政府ノ否認、日独伊三國條約ノ死文化ヲ要求スル等新タナル條件ヲ追加シ帝國ノ一方的讓歩ヲ強要シテ参リマシタ、若シ帝國ニシテ之ニ屈從センカ帝國ノ權威ヲ失墜シ支那事變ノ完遂ヲ期シ得サルノミナラス、遂ニハ帝國ノ存立ヲモ危殆ニ陥ラシムル結果ト相成ル次第デアリマシテ、外交手段ニ依リテハ到底帝國ノ主張ヲ貫徹シ得サルコトカ明カトナリマシタ、一方米英蘭支等ノ諸國ハ其ノ經濟的、軍事的圧迫ヲ益々強化シテ参リマシテ、我國力上ノ見地ヨリスルモ、又作戰上ノ観点ヨリスルモ、到底此ノ儘推移スルヲ許ササル状態ニ立チ至リマシタ、事茲



ニ至リマシテハ帝國ハ現下ノ危局ヲ打開シ、自存自衛ヲ完ウスル爲メ米  
英蘭ニ対シ開戦ノ止ムナキニ立チ至リマシタル次第テアリマス  
支那事變モ既ニ四年有余ニ互リマシタル今日、更ニ大戦争ニ突入致スコ  
トト相成リ、宸襟ヲ悩マシ奉ルコトハ洵ニ恐懼ノ至リニ堪エヌ次第テコ  
サイマス  
然シナカラ熱々考ヘマスルニ國力ハ今ヤ支那事變前ニ數倍シ、國內ノ結  
聚愈々固ク、陸海將兵ノ士氣益々旺盛ニシテ、挙國一体一死奉公、國難  
突破ヲ期スヘキハ私ノ確信シテ疑ハヌ所テコサイマス就イテハ別紙本日  
ノ議題ニ付テ、御審議ヲ願ヒ度イト存シマス。尙外交交渉、作戰事項其  
他ノ事項ニ関シマシテハ、夫々所管大臣及統帥部側等ヨリ御説明申上ケ  
マス

文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ関スル證明書

自分、林 驥ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セラルル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレニ頁ヨリ成ル昭和十六年十二月一日御前會議ニ於ケル總理大臣説明ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（外務省）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月七日 於 東京

林 驥

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日 於 同 所

立 會 人

浦 部 勝 馬

4. 2955

The Explanation of the Foreign Minister  
at the Imperial Conference on 1 December 1941

Explanations will be made today chiefly on the development of the Japanese-American negotiations after the Imperial Conference of 5 November. To summarize the circumstances of the negotiations before that Conference, that is to say to about the end of October, the United States had insisted on the following four principles as the basis of international relations; namely:

- (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and every nation;
- (2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries
- (3) Non-discriminatory treatment in trade ;
- (4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means;

The United States insisted on the application of these principles; expressed doubt as to the peaceful intention of Japan; raised objections to the stationing of Japanese troops in China; insisted that the principle of non-discrimination in international trade be applied unconditionally in China; and demanded that the Tripartite Pact be rendered in effect a dead letter. The negotiations, thus faced with difficulties, at last came to an impasse.

Such divergence of views between the two countries has resulted largely from the fact that the United States Government obstinately adhered to the doctrinarian principles to which it had traditionally submitted, and insisted on their unconditional application to China and other areas, regardless of the actual situation prevailing in East Asia. It was evident that, so long as the United States refused to alter such an attitude, the conclusion of the present negotiations was extremely difficult.

The present Cabinet considered it proper to bring about the adjustment of Japanese-American relations on an equitable basis, and decided to make all possible concessions and to concentrate its energies to avert a rupture between Japan and the United States. From this viewpoint, our previous proposal of 25 September was moderated with respect to the following three questions which had so far been the main points at issue in the Japanese-American negotiations; namely, (1) the interpretation of the right of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Pact, (2) the principle of non-discrimination in international trade, and (3) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China.

- 1) With respect to the problem of the right of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Pact, we proposed that the United States should declare that she would not make any unwarranted extension of the interpretation of the right of self-defense, and that, at the same time, Japan also should make a similar declaration.
- 2) With respect to the principle of non-discrimination, Japan would recognize it to be applied to China on the understanding that the principle was to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world.
- 3) With regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops, it is provided that the Japanese troops dispatched to China in connection with the China Affair would be withdrawn within two years following the restoration of peace between Japan and China in accordance with the agreement to be entered into between Japan and China, except those in specified areas in North China and Meng-liang, as well as Hainan Island, which would be stationed for such period as may be necessary. In regard to French Indo-China, it is revised to stipulate that Japan respects the territorial in-



tegrity of French Indo-China, and that the Japanese troops dispatched thereto will be withdrawn immediately upon either the settlement of the China Affair or the establishment of peace in East Asia on an equitable basis. The Imperial Conference of 5 November decided upon the above.

In accordance with the decision, the Government instructed Ambassador Nomura to convey to the United States that Japanese-American relations, which were on the verge of collapse, could be saved in the pressing circumstances only through the consummation of the negotiations on the basis of the present proposal, and that it was earnestly desired that the United States should, in view of the greatest possible concessions which the Japanese Government had made in spite of every difficulty, sincerely reconsider the situation and cooperate with Japan for the sake of the peace of the Pacific. The negotiations were continued in Washington thereafter; but meanwhile I had frequent conversations in Tokyo with the American and British Ambassadors with a view to urging the negotiations. Ambassador Nomura, beginning with the interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 7th, met President Roosevelt on the 10th, and Secretary Hull on the 12th and the 15th, earnestly endeavoring to promote the negotiations. Meanwhile, in consideration of the serious situation, the Japanese Government on the 5th dispatched Ambassador Kurusu to the United States with a view to exhausting every possible diplomatic effort. He arrived at Washington on the 15th, and, assisting Ambassador Nomura, participated in the negotiations after the 17th. The negotiations were then already in full swing. From the 7th onward, the United States was putting questions about various points as if to sound the true intention of Japan. The United States, who had insisted on the overthrow of Hitlerism, demanded that Japan should give up the policy of force. She seemed to be still apprehensive of the policy of Japan in connection with the Tripartite Pact, and requested that Japan should reaffirm her peaceful intentions, as stated in the aforementioned statement of the Japanese Government of 28 August. Moreover, she repeatedly urged that there would be no need for Japan to maintain the Tripartite Pact after the consummation of a Japanese-American agreement, and expressed her desire that that treaty should cease to exist or become a dead letter. As regards the principle of non-discrimination in international trade, the United States desired to drop the condition which we proposed, that the principle be applied uniformly to the whole world, urging that she had striven for the restoration of freedom of trade. At the same time, the United States proposed separately "the Joint Declaration on Economic Policy", and suggested that the countries should cooperate in restoring free trade on the whole world; that the normal commercial relations between the two countries be restored through conclusion of a Japanese-American commercial agreement; that, as to China, complete control over her economic, financial and monetary affairs should be restored to her; and that a comprehensive program of economic development should be inaugurated in China under international cooperation. With regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, the United States made no special argument, but only showed disapproval of the permanent or indefinite stationing of them. It proposed, however, to employ good offices for direct negotiations between Japan and China, provided Japan would adopt a peaceful policy.

The Japanese Government replied that our proposal of 25 September comprehended all the points which the United States desired Japan to confirm in connection with its statement of peaceful intentions of 28 August, and that the present Cabinet naturally had no objection to confirming them. With respect to the qualification of the principle of non-discrimination, an answer was made that Japan desired its application throughout the world, and that it would recognize the application of the principle to China de-

pending upon the realization of that desire. And with respect to the American proposal for the joint international development of China, the Japanese Government replied that it was unacceptable to Japan as it disregarded the actual state of affairs in China and would open the way for the joint international control of that country. It was also replied that Japan had no objection to the American good offices for peace between Japan and China. It was at this stage that Ambassador Kurusu joined in the negotiations. Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu met President Roosevelt on the 17th, and had interviews with Secretary Hull on the 18th, the 20th, the 21st, the 22d and the 26th. In the interviews of the 17th and the 18th, however, the President stated that he desired peace between Japan and the United States, and that he had no intention either to intervent or to mediate between Japan and China, but wanted only to be an "introducer" between them. On the other hand, the Secretary of State emphasized that the Japanese-American negotiations would prove difficult as long as Japan cooperated with Germany, and dwelt upon the necessity of removing that fundamental difficulty. After exhaustive discussions it became clear that the difficulty lay as before in the questions of the Tripartite Pact, the principle of non-discrimination, and China. Thereupon, the Japanese Government presented on the 20th a new proposal which simplified the previous proposal full of propagandistic tone, on the basis of which the negotiations had so far been conducted; eliminated the question of the principle of non-discrimination, upon which an agreement was not readily to be attained, and also that of the Tripartite Pact, which was left to a future proposal to be made by the United States; and requested the United States simply to refrain from disturbing the peace between Japan and China with a view to leaving the China problem to direct negotiation between Japan and China. The contents of the proposal are as follows:

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
2. The Governments of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in the Netherlands East Indies.
3. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.
4. The Government of the United States undertakes not to indulge in measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
5. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

The Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

Regarding the above proposal, the United States contended that it was impossible to cease aiding the Chiang Kai-shek régime. As Japan clarified her relations with the Tripartite Pact and

gave assurance regarding her adoption of a peaceful policy, and that the President's offer of being an "introducer" presupposed Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. Thereupon, we requested reconsideration of the United States, pointing out that it was self-contradictory that the United States should, after the commencement of the Japanese-Chinese direct negotiations through the introduction of the President as proposed by the United States, continue aid to the Chiang Kai-shek régime, thereby interfering with the peace between the two countries, the United States being an intermediary of peace. Nevertheless, the United States failed to show any sign of concession, refusing to give up aid to the Chiang Kai-shek régime and repeating her assertions concerning the Tripartite Pact, although she stated that she had no objection to Japan's and the United States' holding leadership in East Asia and in the Western Hemisphere respectively, and that she desired the amicable conclusion of the Pacific agreement.

Meanwhile, the United States Government consulted with the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and Secretary Hull stated on the 22d that the above Powers, though they considered it possible to restore the normal relations of international trade if Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy was ascertained, seemed to intend to realize it gradually, and that the withdrawal of troops from southern French Indo-China alone would not be enough, according to their opinions, to ease the tense situation in the Southern Pacific. He further revealed that he considered the time not yet ripe for the President's acting as "go-between" of peace between Japan and China.

The United States Government continued consultations with the representatives of the Powers above referred to, and Secretary Hull told our two Ambassadors on the 26th that, although the United States had carefully studied the Japanese proposal of the 20th and had consulted with the countries concerned, she could not unfortunately agree to our proposal, and presented the following new proposals as being a compromise plan between the American June proposal and our September proposal. The first proposal was a request for confirmation of the so-called Four Principles (item 4 hereof was altered to the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention of controversies). It was proposed secondly as the basis for future negotiations that the two governments should undertake the following:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.
4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support--militarily, politically, economically--any Government or régime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restriction on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

Regarding the above proposal, our Ambassadors pointed out its unreasonableness, and strongly contended against it, but Secretary Hull did not show any sign of concession, it was reported. On the 27th, the President, in an interview with our two Ambassadors, told them that, although he still hoped for an amicable conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiations, he considered, on the basis of the latest information, that there was danger that cold water would be dashed upon the United States for the second time, just as had been done in last July by the advance of Japanese troops into the southern part of French Indo-China, and that it would be futile to try to surmount the crisis by a modus vivendi if the fundamental policies of the two countries were not in accord.

It is true that the American proposal contained some acceptable items, such as those concerning international trade (Items VI, VII, VIII) and the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China (Item V) but the items concerning China and French Indo-China (Items II, III) the non-recognition of the Nationalist Government of China (Item IV) the disapproval of the Tripartite Pact (Item IX) and the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact (Item I) are all unacceptable for Japan. In fine, this proposal is unreasonable, constituting a marked retrogression from the previous proposals of the United States and entirely disregarding the course of negotiations for over half a year.

In short, the United States Government has persistently adhered to traditional ideas and principles, disregarded the actual situation in East Asia and tried to force Japan to act on those principles which the United States herself would not observe. Throughout the present negotiations, lasting for the past seven months, the United States has made no concessions from her original stand, in spite of the various concessions made frequently by Japan.

It has been a consistent policy of the United States to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of the new order in East Asia, which constitutes our immutable national policy. If we accepted the present proposal of the United States, Japan would be in an international position inferior even to that which it had held before the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, and its very existence would also be endangered.

1. China under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek would become even more disposed to depend upon Britain and the United States, and Japan would have to break its faith with the National Government of China. The friendly relations between Japan and China would be ruined for years to come. Japan would be compelled to retreat completely from the continent; the status of Manchoukuo would accordingly be exposed to all dangers; and we would lose all means to carry through the China Affair.

2. Britain and the United States would reign over these areas as leaders. Japan would entirely lose its authority as well as its position as the stabilizing power of East Asia, and the work of establishing the new order in East Asia would collapse midway.

3. The Tripartite Pact would become a mere scrap of paper, and Japan would have to forfeit its national good faith.

4. The design to restrain Japan by the organization of a collective machinery of Powers, with the Soviet Union as a new member, would increase the menace on our northern frontier.

5. As to such principles as that of non-discrimination in trade, they are not necessarily to be excluded. However, it is only to carry through their selfish policy that Britain and the United States intend to apply these principles exclusively to the Pacific area, and Japan would have to face great difficulties in obtaining essential goods and materials which she requires.

All things considered, the above proposal is utterly unacceptable for Japan, and we cannot help recognizing that, unless the United States wholly withdraws it, it is almost impossible to realize fully our claims by continuing the negotiation further upon the basis of the present proposal.

**FILE COPY**

RETURN TO ROOM 361

44-2956

Def. Doc. No. 1401-C-2

From Tōgō to Nomura

4 November 1941

No. 731

Reference to my telegram No. 725.

As Britain is a de facto contracting party to the present negotiations, and in view of the circumstances that she possesses extensive rights and interests in the Far East, it has to be noted that, when the proposed terms of understanding (this with respect to both Proposals "A" and "B" are to be carried into execution, not only Britain, but also the Netherlands, must be in a position to carry them out. Unless there is a definite guarantee on this point, Japan cannot rest assured by the mere fact of having reached an understanding with the United States Government. It is necessary that Britain and the Netherlands should simultaneously concur in the Japanese-American agreement with regard to the matters concerning these two countries. Accordingly, you are directed to approach the United States to have her take necessary steps in order to obtain from the two countries assurances of their concurrence in the agreement, and cable the results.

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 301**

From TOGO to NOMURA  
3 November 1941  
No. 723

(1) On the occasion of my interview with the Diplomatic Corps on 30 October, while having a talk with the American Ambassador in Tokyo, I expressed my regret over the recent aggravation of the tense relations between Japan and the United States and pointed out the danger that things might, if left alone, have serious consequences. I called his attention to the fact that the Japanese nation had become impatient with the slow progress of the negotiations which had dragged on for six months and I expressed my desire to bring them to a conclusion promptly, and requested further cooperation on the part of the American Ambassador. I emphasized that, in order to break the deadlock, the American Government also should consider some measures for the settlement of the matter fitting to the actual situation of the Far East, without clinging to theories.

I referred, by way of explaining the complicated circumstances of the Far East, to the problem of the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, pointing out that there were certain countries besides Japan whose forces were actually stationed in China, and also to the situation in Outer Mongolia where the Soviet Union had stationed forces of considerable strength in spite of the fact that China regarded it as a part of her territory, and requested that the American Government should recognize the real state of affairs there and fully understand the Japanese viewpoint. The American Ambassador listened to my opinion, promised to cooperate, and replied that it was desirable to proceed with the negotiations simultaneously in Tokyo and in Washington.

(2) When the British Ambassador called on me for some other business on the 29th, I told him that the attitude of the United States tends to be so doctrinarian and unrealistic that there is at present little prospect of success of the negotiations, and the situation is one of deep concern; that should the negotiations end in failure the development of the situation would be unpredictable, and that inasmuch as such development would not be in the interest of Great Britain, who has important rights and interests in the Far East, it would be proper for her to strive at this moment for the improvement of Japanese-British-American relations and the maintenance of world peace. The Ambassador promised that he would immediately transmit the matter to his Government, and left. When I saw the Ambassador on the 30th I repeated to him the same effect and impressed upon him that the situation is very acute and allows of no further procrastination.

Transmit to London.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM

**EXHIBIT 2958**

Def. Doc. No. 478-B

Excerpt from SPEECHES BY BRITISH LEADERS  
Sept. 1st, 1939 - Nov. 10th, 1941 Vol. I

(Exhibit No. 2324)

Page 122

The United States' time-honored interests in the Far East are well known. They are doing their utmost to find a way of preserving peace in the Pacific. We do not know whether their efforts will be successful, but if they fail, I take this occasion to say--and it is my duty to say--that should the United States become involved in war with Japan the British declaration will follow within the hour.

. . . . .  
. . . I hope devoutly that the peace of the Pacific will be preserved in accordance with the known wishes of the wisest statesmen of Japan, but every preparation to defend British interests in the Far East and to defend the common cause now at stake has been, and is being, made.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 301



Ex 2959

Def. Doc. No. 1401-Z-1

For this purpose, the question of non-discrimination in trade, on which it should be comparatively easier for both sides to reach an agreement of views, might first be taken up (whereupon Welles asked whether what had been emphasized by Hull at the previous talk had been communicated to the home government, and Wakasugi replied that details thereof had been reported). Secondly, the question of obligations under the Tripartite alliance might be discussed. To this question Welles referred in terms which might be taken as revealing the possibility of an adjustment on the United States side itself. Next, the China question might be talked over. Thus Welles made a new proposal in the negotiations, and showed an attitude indicating a marked desire to promote a compromise.

Wakasugi, in reply, said that today he was not at liberty to add anything to the Japanese proposal of 25 September, because no detailed instructions had yet been received from the home government. It was desirable, however, that, with regard to the new method of approach proposed by Welles, a proposal be formulated by the United States side and presented at the next talk. A study of this new approach would also be made by the Japanese side.

With regard to the question of release of the frozen funds of the two Japanese tankers, referred to at the last talk, and of the two mail ships dispatched at this time, Welles said that steps had forthwith been taken at the time. At the Treasury Department, the necessary steps had already been taken in regard to the three mail ships. As for the tankers, there were strict regulations concerning United States banks. . . [two words un-  
decipherable] the protection of bank depositors. Once funds had been put in an account at the Yokohama Specie Bank, it was difficult to release such frozen funds, no matter whether they were funds which had been in that bank previously or were remittance drafts just received from another country. If, therefore, the funds in question were made into drafts via United States banks, the State Department would do all in its power to meet the request.

The last-mentioned matter is again to be talked over with Financial Attaché Nishiyama.

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

Ex 2960

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

KASE TOSHIKAZU

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1925, and was appointed Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of American Affairs of that ministry in November 1941, continuing in that position until April 1943. In the course of my official duties as such section chief I was familiar with the matters herein testified to.

2. Soon after my arrival at the Foreign Ministry at about 10 o'clock in the morning of 7 December 1941 (Tokyo time), I received information from the Dōmei News Agency that the United Press had carried a report to the effect that the State Department had announced the dispatch of a personal message by President Roosevelt addressed to His Majesty the Emperor. I immediately reported the matter to my superiors, including Messrs. Tōgō, the Foreign Minister, Nishi, Vice Foreign Minister and Yamamoto, the Director of the American Bureau. I then telephoned to alert Marquis Matsudaira, private secretary to the Lord Privy Seal, and asked him to let us know at once when and if the Imperial Palace received the President's message. For we were under the impression that, being a personal message, it would be sent directly to the Emperor, as in the case of the Panay incident of December 1937. An urgent telegram was dispatched without delay to Admiral Nomura, our Ambassador in Washington, instructing him to make inquiries into, and report back upon the matter (telegram no. 905 from Tōgō to Nomura, Defense Document No. 1401-F-3). Apparently crossing this telegram on the way, a short dispatch from Admiral Nomura arrived at the Foreign Ministry in the afternoon (telegram no. 1275 from Nomura to Tōgō, Defense Document no. 1401-E-3). This confirming the authenticity of the press news, I instructed all the staff in my office to be alerted for urgent work and waited for the arrival of the message in question. However, as nothing happened, I got in touch with Marquis Matsudaira once again in the evening, shortly after 8 P.M., by telephoning his residence. I was told that the President's message had not arrived yet.

3. At about 10:15 P.M. Mr. Tomoda Jirō, private secretary to the Foreign Minister, received a telephone call from the American Embassy requesting him to make an appointment around midnight for the Ambassador to see the Foreign Minister. I understand that Mr. Tomoda asked if the Ambassador could not wait until the next morning, but was told that an urgent telegram was being decoded and that the Ambassador wanted to see Mr. Tōgō as soon as it was ready. Shortly after midnight--at about 12:30 A.M., 8 December--Mr. Grew came to the official residence of the Foreign Minister where the interview took place; I was present at this meeting and interpreted the conversation. Saying that he had re-

Ex 2959

Def. Doc. No. 1401-Z-1

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**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

Def. Doc. No. 1401-Z-1

From Nomura to Tōgō  
24 October 1941  
No. 995

Reference to your telegram No. 698.

Wakasugi talked with Welles for an hour from 3:30 P.M. on the 24th.

In accordance with your telegram, Wakasugi said that the new Japanese Cabinet had as earnest a desire as the last Cabinet to arrive at a fair and equitable adjustment of Japanese-American relations, that Japan's position had already been made clear, and that, although no detailed instructions had yet been received from the home government, Wakasugi might say that, according to what he himself observed during his recent visit to Japan, the circumstances did not permit of any further indefinite protraction of the present conversations, it being desirable to arrive at a conclusion as soon as possible and without even a day's unnecessary delay. Wakasugi then asked for the presentation of the United States counter-proposal in response to the Japanese proposal of 25 September.

Welles asked about the intentions of the new Cabinet in regard to the continuance of the present negotiations. Simultaneously, he pointed out that lately persons in responsible positions in Japan had been making bellicose statements; for example, the Navy spokesman had said in a statement that the Japanese Navy was "itching for action"; and that the newspapers, etc., were vehemently attacking the United States. This fact, he pointed out, seriously irritated the Government and people of his country, and was injurious to the continuance of the present negotiations.

Wakasugi countered by saying that there were not a few influential statesmen in the United States, including for example, Senator Pepper, who were making vehement attacks on Japan. Above all, Secretary of the Navy Knox had said in a speech today that not only was a Japanese-American war unavoidable, but the clash was imminent. There were many such bellicose utterances in the United States, and the Government and people of Japan were being no less irritated by them. Welles made repeated explanations to get Wakasugi to understand that the speech of the Secretary of the Navy was not really so vehement, the press reports of it being merely exaggerations of its fragments; and that the Secretary of the Navy, as the highest person responsible for the Navy, the greatest force in the United States, was now and then using strong language in an attempt to encourage the Navy.

Welles proceeded to say, with regard to the counter-proposal of the United States, that, as repeated at the previous talk, the principles and the counter-proposal of the United States were clear in the proposal of 21 June. One idea might be to attempt oral adjustment between the United States and Japanese proposals, but, according to the experience of informal conversations carried on, merely to stick to the formula hitherto followed and discuss it by items would lead only to a repetition of the same arguments as has already been made, and render it difficult to achieve progress in the negotiations. As had been said at the previous talk in the presence of Secretary Hull, it might therefore be a quicker way to make a fresh survey by a new formula consisting of taking up matters of a general character, such as the three important problems, and in endeavoring to reach an agreement of views on them one by one, beginning with those which were comparatively easier of settlement.

Ex 2959

Def. Doc. No. 1401-Z-1

For this purpose, the question of non-discrimination in trade, on which it should be comparatively easier for both sides to reach an agreement of views, might first be taken up (whereupon Welles asked whether what had been emphasized by Hull at the previous talk had been communicated to the home government, and Wakasugi replied that details thereof had been reported). Secondly, the question of obligations under the Tripartite alliance might be discussed. To this question Welles referred in terms which might be taken as revealing the possibility of an adjustment on the United States side itself. Next, the China question might be talked over. Thus Welles made a new proposal in the negotiations, and showed an attitude indicating a marked desire to promote a compromise.

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**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

KASE TOSHIKAZU

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1925, and was appointed Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of American Affairs of that ministry in November 1941, continuing in that position until April 1943. In the course of my official duties as such section chief I was familiar with the matters herein testified to.

2. Soon after my arrival at the Foreign Ministry at about 10 o'clock in the morning of 7 December 1941 (Tokyo time), I received information from the Domei News Agency that the United Press had carried a report to the effect that the State Department had announced the dispatch of a personal message by President Roosevelt addressed to His Majesty the Emperor. I immediately reported the matter to my superiors, including Messrs. Tōgō, the Foreign Minister, Nishi, Vice Foreign Minister and Yamamoto, the Director of the American Bureau. I then telephoned to alert Marquis Matsudaira, private secretary to the Lord Privy Seal, and asked him to let us know at once when and if the Imperial Palace received the President's message. For we were under the impression that, being a personal message, it would be sent directly to the Emperor, as in the case of the Panay incident of December 1937. An urgent telegram was dispatched without delay to Admiral Nomura, our Ambassador in Washington, instructing him to make inquiries into, and report back upon the matter (telegram no. 905 from Tōgō to Nomura, Defense Document No. 1401-F-3). Apparently crossing this telegram on the way, a short dispatch from Admiral Nomura arrived at the Foreign Ministry in the afternoon (telegram no. 1275 from Nomura to Tōgō, Defense Document no. 1401-E-3). This confirming the authenticity of the press news, I instructed all the staff in my office to be alerted for urgent work and waited for the arrival of the message in question. However, as nothing happened, I got in touch with Marquis Matsudaira once again in the evening, shortly after 8 P.M., by telephoning his residence. I was told that the President's message had not arrived yet.

3. At about 10:15 P.M. Mr. Tomoda Jirō, private secretary to the Foreign Minister, received a telephone call from the American Embassy requesting him to make an appointment around midnight for the Ambassador to see the Foreign Minister. I understand that Mr. Tomoda asked if the Ambassador could not wait until the next morning, but was told that an urgent telegram was being decoded and that the Ambassador wanted to see Mr. Tōgō as soon as it was ready. Shortly after midnight--at about 12:30 A.M., 8 December--Mr. Grew came to the official residence of the Foreign Minister where the interview took place; I was present at this meeting and interpreted the conversation. Saying that he had re-

ceived an urgent message of the President to the Emperor, Mr. Grew requested the Foreign Minister to arrange an audience for him. Mr. Tōgō replied that it was unusual to take action on a request for audience at midnight, and inquired about the substance of the message. Thereupon, the Ambassador left a copy of the message with Mr. Tōgō for the latter's reference, and took leave of the Foreign Minister after repeating his request for the audience, stressing the extreme gravity of the situation. The interview lasted about 15 minutes. Mr. Tōgō gave me the copy and asked me to translate it into Japanese as quickly as possible. I did so with the help of my staff. I still vividly remember the very tense atmosphere that prevailed in my office, where everybody worked frantically in order to avoid delay in translating the message. Meanwhile, Mr. Tōgō got in touch with Marquis Kido, the Lord Privy Seal, by telephone, asking him to arrange for him to report the matter to the Throne. He then, I understand, went to the Premier's residence, consulted with General Tōjō, and left his official residence at about 2 A.M. for the Imperial Palace, there informing the Emperor of the President's message and receiving the answer to be sent through the American Ambassador.

4. In accordance with instructions given me on the previous day, I requested Mr. Grew early in the morning of 8 December to call on the Foreign Minister. This was originally for the purpose of handing to the Ambassador a copy of the memorandum of the Japanese Government, terminating the diplomatic conversations, which had been delivered by Admiral Nomura at Washington to the American Government. This meeting would have taken place even if Mr. Grew had not paid the midnight visit to the Foreign Minister in connection with the President's message. Mr. Grew came to the Foreign Minister's official residence at about 7:30 A.M., at which time I was again present at the meeting interpreting the conversation. Mr. Tōgō gave the Ambassador a copy of the memorandum with the remark that it was a copy of the document already delivered to the American Government by Admiral Nomura. He told the Ambassador also that during the night he had had occasion to learn the wishes of the Emperor in regard to the President's message, and orally transmitted the reply, which was later written out at the Ambassador's request (Exhibit 1247).

Although Mr. Grew seems to be under the impression that the memorandum of the Japanese Government constituted the Emperor's reply, this is a misunderstanding on his part. The memorandum is unrelated to the President's message, it having been delivered to Mr. Hull before Mr. Tōgō saw the Emperor on the matter.

5. We in the Foreign Ministry, including Mr. Tōgō, had no slightest suspicion that the Communications Ministry might delay the delivery of telegram addressed to the American Embassy. Moreover, we did not think that the President's message would be addressed to the Embassy. We took it for granted that it was addressed directly to the Emperor. Such an assumption was in fact supported by Admiral Nomura's telegram (no. 1275, Defense Document no. 1401-E-3), which said that the President had sent his message directly to the Emperor without going through the usual diplomatic channels. We, therefore, waited anxiously for word from the Imperial Palace of the arrival of the message. That being the case, the Foreign Ministry had no idea regarding the substance of the message. In fact, Mr. Tōgō learned the content of the message only when the American Ambassador brought it to his attention at the midnight interview above described.

Def. Doc. No. 2063

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kase Toshikazu (seal)

On this 13th day of August 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT Kase Toshikazu

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)



Ex 2960

Def. Doc. # 2063

辯護側文書 第二〇六三號

極 東 國 際 軍 事 裁 判 所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

對

荒 木 貞 夫 其他

宣 誓 供 述 書

供 述 者

加 瀬 俊 一

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル北次ノ如ク供述致シマス

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

一、私は大正十四年外務省に入り昭和十六年十一月アメリカ局第一課長に任ぜられ、昭和十八年四月まで此の職に在りました。右課長として在職中私は茲に證言する諸事實を知つたのであります。

二、私は昭和十六年十二月七日午前十時（東京時間）頃外務省に到着するに直ぐ同盟通信社より情報を入手しました。

右に依ればロP通信は國務省がルーズベルト大統領に於て、天皇陛下宛親電を發送したことを公表した旨の報導を行つてゐる由でした。私は直ちに東郷外務大臣、西外務次官、山本アメリカ局長等の上司に對し本件を報告しました。次に私は内大臣秘書官長松平櫻餅に右を電話通報し且宮内省に大統領の親電が接到した場合には直ちに通知されたい旨を依頼しました。それは吾々は右が親電であるので一九三七年十二月のバネー事件の場合と同様に直接天皇陛下に送付せられるものと考へて居たからです。

外務省は即刻ワシントン駐在日本大使野村大將宛緊急電報を發し、本件の真相を調査回電するより指示を與へました。

(東郷發野村宛電報第九〇五號) 辯護側文書第一四〇一—F13號)

然るに本電報に入れ違ひに野村大將よりの簡單なる電報が午后外務省に到着しました(野村發東郷宛電報第一二七五號辯護側文書第一四〇一—E13號)

之により新聞報導が確認されましたから私は全課員に對し要務に備へ待機するよう指示を與へ、メツセージの到着を待ち受けました。然し何等の發見がなかつたので夕刻八時頃松平候爵の私邸に電話して連絡を取りましたが大統領の親電は未着との事でありました。

三、同夜十時十五分頃外務大臣秘書官友田次郎氏は夜半頃米國大使が外務大臣に會見し得る機に取計はれたい旨の米國大使館よりの電話依頼を受けました。私の承知する所によれば友田氏は大使が翌朝まで待た得ないかを断じたことでもあります。然し目下緊急電報を解讀中であつて大使は準備出來次第東郷外相に會ひたいとの話でありました。十二月八日夜半少し過ぎ即ち午前零時三十分頃グルー大使は外務大臣官邸に來られ、同夜に於て會見が行はれました。私は此の會見に出席し會談を通譯しま

した。グ大使は大統領の天皇陛下宛緊急メツセージを受領したから拜謁を  
を取計つて頂きたいと申入れました。之に對し外相は何分深夜のこと故  
拜謁に關する措置を取ることは異例に屬するに述べるに共に右メツセー  
ジ内容を尋ねました。そこで同大使はメツセージの寫しを参考の爲に外相  
の手許に残し、事變の極度に重大なことを強調して、拜謁したき旨を反  
殺した後辭去しました。會見は十五分内外で終りました。東郷外相は私  
にその寫しを渡し出来るだけ速に日本語に翻譯するように命ぜられました  
た。そこで私は譯員を動員して翻譯に當りました。寸刻を争つて「メツ  
セージ」の翻譯を急ぎ全員懸命になつて仕事に熱中しましたが其時の極  
度に緊張した空氣は今日尚ほ鮮かに私の記憶に残つて居る所でありませ  
一方東郷外相は電話を以て木戸内府と連絡をとり、陛下に本件を報告す  
る爲の手筈をするよう依頼しました。右に引續き東郷外相は東條大將と  
首相官邸に於て會見し午前二時卅分頃天皇陛下に拜謁して大統領の親電  
に付き内奏し米國大使を通じて傳達すべき御回答を頂かれた趣でありま

す。

四私は前日與へられた訓令に基き十二月八日早朝グルー大使に對し外相を來訪するより要請しました。之はもとも野村大將がワシントンに於て米國政府に手交した外交々涉打切に關する日本政府の覺書の寫しを同大使に手交せんかためでありました。本會談はグルー大使が大統領親電に關して深夜外相を訪問することがなかつたとしても行はれた筈であります。グルー大使は午前七時三十分頃外相官邸を來訪しました。私は此の會談にも出席して通譯に當りました。東郷外相は既に野村大將が米國政府に手交した書類の寫しである旨を述べて右覺書の寫し一通を同大使に手交しました。

次で外相は前夜の中に大統領の親電に關し天皇陛下の思召を承る機會があつたと述べて口頭を以て右を傳達しました。これはグ大使の要望により後刻發物されました。(法廷證第一二四七號)

グルー大使は日本政府の右覺書が天皇陛下の御回答であるを考へて居る様子ですが之は同大使の誤解であります。本覺書は大統領の親電とは何等關係ないものであります。本問題に關して東郷外相が天皇に拜謁する

以前右覺書は既にハル氏に手交されてゐるのであります。

吾逕信省が米國大使館宛電信の配達を遅延させようなど云ふことは東郷外相以下我々誰一人として思ひもよらぬ事でした。尙我々は大統領の親電が大使館宛に發せられようとは考へて居りませんでした。我々は當然それが陛下宛直接に發せられるものと信じて切つて居りました。右の推測は野村大使からの電報（辯護側文書第一四〇一、E 13）によつても支持された所であります。即ち同電報に依れば大統領は親電を通常の外交機關を経由せず直接に天皇陛下宛に發送したと云ふことであります。故に吾々は宮中から親電接達の通報の來るのを心待に待つたのであります。かゝる事情がありましたので、親電の内容に關しては外務省當局に於ては誰一人承知する所がなかつたのであります。實際東郷外相は上述の如く深夜の會見に於て米國大使が親電を外相に内示した時初めてその内容を承知した次第であります。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月十三日 於 東京

供 述 者 加 瀬 俊 一

右ハ營立人ノ面前ニ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 口 於 同 所

立 介 人

西

春

彦

宜 齋 軒

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ默秘セス又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ  
誓フ

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442961

Def. Doc. No. 1401-F-3

From Tōgō to Nomura  
7 December 1941  
No. 905

The AP and UP news agencies report that the State Department has disclosed the dispatch by the President of a personal telegram to the Emperor. Make report immediately about the facts thereof.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. No. 1401-E-3

From Nomura to Tōgō  
6 December 1941  
No. 1275

In the evening of the 6th, the Department of State disclosed that the President had dispatched a personal telegram to His Majesty the Emperor. The contents of the message are unknown, but it is generally assumed that it concerns the reinforcement of troops in French Indo-China and the advance into Thailand, in view of the simultaneous disclosure by the Department, based on information received, that in addition to one hundred twenty-five thousand troops already stationed in French Indo-China, two corps were moving this morning into the Gulf of Siam (refer to news dispatch).

The dispatch of the message by the President to the Emperor directly, and not through diplomatic channels, may, it is considered, be the result of taking into consideration our steps in connection with the personal message on the Panay incident some years ago.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ex 2963

Def. Doc. No. 1030  
(Revised)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

MATSUDAIRA YASUMASA

Having first duly sworn on oath on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was the private secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal from June 1936 to November 1945.

2. I received a telephone call from Mr. Kase, an official of the Foreign Ministry, in the morning of 7 December 1941 at the Imperial Household Ministry. He told me that the Foreign Ministry had received a telegram from Washington reporting that a personal telegram had been dispatched from the American President to the Emperor, and asked me if the telegram had been delivered directly to the Imperial Household Ministry. I told him, however, that the Imperial Household Ministry had not received such a telegram.

On the same day about 8:30 P.M., when I was at my private residence, Mr. Kase telephoned and asked me again about the above-mentioned private telegram from American President. Thereupon, I immediately inquired of the office of the Chamberlain (Jijushoku) and of the officer on duty in the Ministry about the matter, and informed him (Mr. Kase) that the Ministry had received no such telegram as yet.

Later on, after 12 o'clock of the same night Mr. Kase called me by phone and informed me that the American Ambassador in Tokyo had conveyed the telegram of the President to the Foreign Minister.

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

Def. Doc. No. 1030

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Matsudaira Yasumasa

. . . .

On this 13th day of August 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT Matsudaira Yasumasa (seal)

I, Katō Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Katō Denjirō (seal)

. . . .

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo  
13 August 1947

# EXHIBIT

2963

0000001030

遠東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣審供述書

供述者 松平康

自分後我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙  
次ノ如ク供述致シマス

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COPIES  
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遠東國際軍事裁判所

供述者

入て来たとの電話がありました。  
 加藤警視正官から在京米國大使が外務大臣に大統領の電報を傳  
 宮内省に届けて、早速待從から取直して、右の電報を大總統に  
 送りました。更に加藤に、早記言か、その後、同日午後八時、  
 の事を答へて、電報に、早記言か、その後、同日午後八時、  
 したか、と尋ねました。たが、官内省は、直に、内省に、居り、  
 来た旨の報道があるところ、右親電は、直に、内省に、居り、  
 加藤警視正官から電報が、二月七日午前、私が、官内省に、居り、  
 一九四一年十月七日午前、私が、官内省に、居り、  
 ありました。

一私ハ昭和十一年六月より昭和二十二年十一月まで内大臣秘書官長で

シ

DefDoc 1030

昭和廿二年（一九四七年）八月十三日於東京都

供述者 松平康昌

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニ於宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シ  
マス

同日於同所

立會人 加藤傳次郎

DefDoc 1030

宣  
審  
審

審  
フ

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ

署名  
捺印

松  
平  
康  
昌

4



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants

60-2964  
**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**  
**A F F I D A V I T**

KAMEYAMA KAZUJI

Having first duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Japanese Foreign Ministry in February 1922, and served as Chief of the Cable Section of the Ministry from September 1940 to October 1942. I shall state herein matters which came to my knowledge in the course of my official business in that position.

2. On 7 December 1941 a telegram was sent by Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura in Washington to the effect that the AP and UP news-agencies were reporting that the State Department had made public that the President had sent a personal telegram to the Emperor, and that the matter should be investigated and a report made (Def. Doc. No. 1401-F-3). Simultaneously the Ambassador had sent a telegram dated 6 December to the effect that the President was reported to have sent a telegram to the Emperor (Def. Doc. 1401-E-3). I, as Chief of the Cable Section of the Foreign Ministry, was aware of these two telegrams, but I did not see the contents of the reported telegram of the President at that time. I recall that only on 8 December, as I remember it, was I informed by the American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry that a personal telegram of the President had been transmitted from the American Ambassador to our hands.

3. The Cable Section of the Foreign Ministry used to obtain copies of coded telegrams to and from diplomatic and consular representatives in Japan for the purpose of research in coding technique. As a matter of fact, the Cable Section sent messengers to the competent section of the Communications Ministry to receive such copies, and their receipt by the Foreign Ministry was delayed one or two days after receipt by the Communications Ministry. It was the custom at the time that the code-research group of the Cable Section did not work Saturday afternoons and Sundays. As 7 December 1941 was a Sunday, there was nobody working in the afternoon of the 6th and all day the 7th. It was not possible, consequently, for the Foreign Ministry to have decoded the telegram of the President on 7 December.

Presumably the code-research group of the Foreign Ministry in the usual course received the President's telegram in code from the competent section of the Communications Ministry on 8 or 9 December. (Foreign telegrams in code were not received by me, but went directly to members of the code-research group and were dealt with by them.) The personnel of the group at that time was very small, and only about five were engaged in research on the Anglo-American codes. The situation was therefore that, of the coded telegrams received daily, only a small proportion of the decodable ones was actually decoded. In addition, the Foreign

Ministry received some decoded telegrams, mainly from the Army high command. There is nothing to show that the President's telegram was decoded by the Foreign Ministry, nor anything to show that it received a decoded copy thereof from the Army high command. For, all such telegrams which were either decoded by the code-research group or obtained by the group in decoded text were submitted to me as Chief of Cable Section, and I have no recollection of having seen the decoded telegram of the President's message.

4. It is true, as has been stated, that the code-research group of the Foreign Ministry received in those days from the competent section of the Communications Ministry telegrams sent and received by diplomatic and consular representatives in Japan, but it had nothing to do with the delivery and dispatch of those telegrams by the Communications Ministry. The code-research group of the Foreign Ministry merely obtained copies of those telegrams from the competent section of the Communications Ministry after they had been delivered or dispatched as the case might be. The Foreign Ministry never intervened in the delivery or dispatch of those foreign telegrams. The Foreign Ministry thus had nothing to do with any delay in the delivery to the American Embassy of the telegram of the President.

5. I recall that I received the original copy of the memorandum of the Japanese Government to the United States prior to the start of the war in the afternoon of 6 December 1941 from the section in charge of the matter (the first section of the American Bureau), and had it coded immediately in fourteen parts. The results of an investigation made at the Tokyo Central Telegraph Office and reported to me by my subordinates at my order in December 1941 showed that the first thirteen parts were telegraphed from the cable room of the Foreign Ministry to the Central Telegraph Office between 8:30 P.M. on the 6th and 12:30 A.M. on the 7th, and that the latter cabled them to the United States between 10:10 P.M. on the 6th and 1:50 A.M. on the 7th.

The dispatch of the fourteenth part was withheld, at the request of the section in charge of the matter, until notice should be given by them. That section requested at about 4 P.M. of the 7th that it be cabled, and steps were immediately taken to that end. Of this part the same text was sent through the MKY and the RCA, two American cable companies, at an hour's interval in order to assure speedy and accurate receipt in Washington. The report of the same investigation disclosed that the fourteenth part was cabled from the Central Telegraph Office at 5 P.M. on the 7th through MKY and at 6 P.M. on the 7th through RCA.

6. Prior to the dispatch of our memorandum, an instruction had been sent from the Foreign Ministry at 8:30 P.M. on 6 December to the effect that as soon as our memorandum to the United States had been received preparation of the document and all the necessary arrangements were to be made so that the memorandum might be handed to the United States at any time upon the receipt of the instruction to deliver it (Exhibit 1216). This telegram was sent, according to the above-said investigation, from the Central Telegraph Office to the United States at 9:10 P.M. on the 6th.

7. The instruction to hand the memorandum to the United States at 1 P.M., 7 December, Washington time (Exhibit 1218), was cabled through two channels, MKY and RCA, to make sure of speedy and accurate delivery, and investigation showed that it was sent from the Central Telegraph Office to the United States at 6:30 P.M., 7 December, through the MKY, and at 6:28 P.M. through the RCA.

8. One technical error was discovered by an examination conducted immediately after the coding, in one of the first thirteen parts of the coded telegram (I recall that it was something like the dropping of one line), and a telegram of correction was immediately sent (it was, of course, a very simple one). The exact time of dispatch of this telegram of correction is not known, the record kept in the Cable Section having been destroyed by fire; but it cannot have been later than the early hours of the 7th, because several telegraph clerks were on duty throughout the night of the 6th to the 7th.

There was one more telegram of correction, replacing one word in the original text of the memorandum. The original text of the telegram shows that it was cabled from the Foreign Ministry to the Central Telegraph Office at 7:20 P.M., 7 December (Def. Doc. No. 2050-A). In the light of the then prevailing situation this telegram should have been sent from the Central Telegraph Office to the United States not more than an hour after its dispatch from the Foreign Ministry to the Central Telegraph Office.

8(a) For convenience of reference, the comparative Tōkyō and Washington times for the hours mentioned above are as follows (the time-difference being 1½ hours):

	Tōkyō Time		Washington Time		
	Date	Hour	Date	Hour	
Instruction to Washington to prepare memorandum immediately upon receipt, sent to Central Telegraph Office	6th	8:30 P.M.	6th	6:30 A.M.	
Instruction to Washington to prepare memorandum immediately upon receipt, sent from Central Telegraph Office	6th	9:10 P.M.	6th	7:10 A.M.	
13 parts of memorandum sent from Cable Section to Central Telegraph Office	6th	8:30 P.M.	6th	6:30 A.M.	
	7th	12:20 A.M.	6th	10:20 A.M.	
13 parts of memorandum sent from Central Telegraph Office	6th	10:10 P.M.	6th	8:10 A.M.	
	7th	1:50 A.M.	6th	11:50 A.M.	
First Section, American Bureau, ordered 14th part sent	7th	4:00 P.M.	7th	2:00	
14th part sent to Central Telegraph Office	7th	4:00 P.M.	7th	2:00 A.	
14th part sent from Central Telegraph Office	Via MKY	7th	5:00 P.M.	7th	3:00 A.M.
	Via RCA	7th	6:00 P.M.	7th	4:00 A.M.
Instruction to deliver memorandum at 1 P.M., 7 December (Washington time) sent to Central Tel. Office	7th	5:30 P.M.	7th	3:30 A.M.	
Instruction to deliver memorandum at 1 P.M., 7 December (Washington time) sent from Central Tel. Office	Via RCA	7th	6:28 P.M.	7th	4:28 A.M.
	Via MKY	7th	6:30 P.M.	7th	4:30 A.M.
Cable correcting one word in memorandum sent to Central Telegraph Office	7th	7:20 P.M.	7th	5:20 A.M.	

9. Knowing that, the communications conditions between Japan and the United States at that time being generally very good, it did not take more than 30 minutes to an hour for communication, I ordered these various messages sent on the supposition that the times of their arrival in Washington would be (Washington time):

(a) the telegram instructing preparation of the document and other necessary matters, at about 8 A.M., 6 December;

(b) the first thirteen parts of the memorandum, approximately between 9 A.M. and 1 P.M. of the 6th;

(c) the fourteenth part of the memorandum, between 4 and 5 A.M. of the 7th;

(d) the telegram of instructions of the time of delivering the memorandum, at about 5:30 A.M. of the 7th.

All the telegrams concerning the Japanese-American negotiations were handled as "Government" and in view of the tenseness of the situation at that time, the American telegraph companies presumably handled the telegrams concerning the negotiations speedily. Supposing it to have taken as long as two hours for delivery to the Japanese Embassy in Washington after receipt in the United States, it may be assumed that the telegram in (a) of the preceding paragraph was delivered to the Embassy at about 10 A.M., 6 December, that in (b) between 11 A.M. and 3 P.M. on the 6th, that in (c) between 6 and 7 A.M. on the 7th, and that in (d) at about 7:30 A.M. on the 7th. As to the two telegrams of correction, the one correcting the technical error should have been delivered to the Embassy at latest prior to the delivery of the fourteenth part of the memorandum; and the other, correcting one word in the text of the memorandum, should have been delivered by 9:30 A.M. of 7 December at the latest.

10. Those telegrams sent from the Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Embassy in Washington subsequently to the dispatch of the thirteen parts of the memorandum which were received by the Embassy toward the late hours of 6 December and in the morning of the 7th are as follows, according to my memory and as disclosed by the telegrams themselves: (a) correction of technical error; (b) instruction to keep strict secrecy (Exhibit 1217); (c) the fourteenth part of the memorandum (Def. Doc. No. 2045); (d) inquiry about the President's telegram to the Emperor (Def. Doc. No. 1401-F-3); (e) instruction indicating the time of delivering the memorandum (Exhibit 1218); (f) instruction to destroy the coding machine; (g) the Minister's greeting to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu; (h) greeting of the Director of the American Bureau to Counselor Iguchi and other members of the Embassy; (i) instruction indicating the number of the final telegram; and (j) correction of one word in the text of the memorandum (Def. Doc. No. 2050-A). If my memory serves me correctly, the telegram correcting one word in the text of the memorandum was the last.

All those telegrams except the fourteenth part of the memorandum were simple ones composed of not more than a few lines. The decoding, by one coding machine, of the fourteenth part would have taken twenty or thirty minutes but each of the rest of them would have been decoded in ten or fifteen minutes each. All those telegrams therefore could have been decoded in about two hours.

The Embassy had been instructed to the effect that there should always be some clerks on duty in the cable section. Moreover, an instruction had been sent to the effect that the document and all the necessary preparations were to be made ready beforehand

(Exhibit 1216). In those circumstances the Foreign Ministry sent these telegrams to the Japanese Embassy in Washington with the conviction that even if a considerable amount of time should be necessary for typing the memorandum, there would be a sufficient amount of time so that our memorandum be handed to the United States without fail at 1 P.M., 7 December, Washington time.

11. Allowing for the decoding of the first thirteen parts of the memorandum to the United States to take six hours and a half at the longest, I assumed that the decoding would have been completed by 9:30 P.M., 6 December, Washington time, even if the decoding was started after the last of the thirteen had arrived. As a matter of fact, each part should have been decoded as soon as it had arrived, so that the writing of the clean copy of the memorandum could have been started before 9:30 P.M. (the instructions for the preparation of the memorandum having been sent before the memorandum itself was cabled). Moreover, the telegram making the technical correction concerning one of the thirteen parts was sent by the early morning of 7 December, and there was no doubt that it was sent before the fourteenth part of the memorandum (the arrival of the fourteenth part at the Embassy is assumed to have been between 6 and 7 A.M., 7 December). Consequently the Embassy must have received the telegram on the technical correction by 7 A.M., 7 December, Washington time, by the latest, and could have decoded it without delay. The last telegram, correcting one word in the text of the memorandum, should have been received and decoded not later than 10 A.M., 7 December, Washington time. Therefore, even if the officers and clerks of the Embassy concerned had taken a normal rest from 6 to 7 o'clock, the full text of the entire memorandum in fourteen parts could have been written in clean copy by 11 A.M., 7 December, Washington time, by the latest.

12. It having become known in the Foreign Ministry through radio broadcast from America that the delivery of the memorandum to the United States on 7 December had been delayed in Washington, Foreign Minister Tōgō instructed me upon the return of the Embassy staff from the United States to conduct an investigation of the matter. In the course of the investigation which I accordingly carried out, it was reported to me by one of the telegraph clerks of the Embassy in Washington who returned on the exchange boat in August 1942 that the instruction for preparation of the memorandum so that it could be handed to the United States any time had been received by the Embassy in the forenoon of 6 December, Washington time; that the memorandum had started to arrive at the Embassy from about noon of the same day, and the thirteen parts had been decoded by about 11 P.M. of the same day; that the fourteenth part of the memorandum had arrived at the Embassy by about 7 A.M. of the 7th; and that the telegraph clerks of the Embassy finished decoding the fourteenth part about 12:20 P.M. Kondō, another telegraph clerk of the Embassy at that time who returned home in March 1946 on the boat repatriating the Japanese diplomats from Europe, reported in general to the same effect.

13. The Foreign Ministry was often asked by other government agencies to obtain information concerning economic, financial, military and other matters abroad, and instructed its establishments abroad to obtain and report such data. Since the gathering of such information and their communication to the government agencies which had asked for them had no direct relationship to the decision and execution of diplomatic policies, instructions of such nature, when cabled, were generally drafted by officers in the section in charge of the matter and, with the approval of the bureau director and the section chief, or sometimes of the section chief only, were forwarded to the Cable Section for dispatch. In practice, therefore, the Minister and the Vice-Minister had nothing

to do with such telegrams, and they were generally dealt with at the responsibility of the bureau director, or more often the chief of section, in charge of the matter. When a telegram of information in response to such instructions was received, the Cable Section forwarded it to the bureau director and the section chief concerned, and the section in charge sent it to the government agency which had asked for it. Parallel with such procedure, the Cable Section sometimes sent copies of such telegram directly to the government agencies which had made the request, but that practice was a supplementary measure to meet their executive requirements.

All telegrams sent from the Foreign Ministry to its establishments abroad were sent in the name of the Foreign Minister, and all the telegrams from its overseas establishments to the Foreign Ministry were addressed to the Foreign Minister. Of these telegrams, however, the Foreign Minister examined only those telegrams which were deemed important, and there were many which were not brought to his attention. While I was Chief of the Cable Section, for instance, some two hundred telegrams were received and some one hundred dispatched daily, only about one tenth of which were submitted to the Foreign Minister for examination.

I recall that, while I was Chief of the Cable Section, instructions were sent for gathering information concerning the movement of warships and merchant vessels in Hawaii, Manila, Java and other places, and that telegrams in reply thereto were received. These communications were all dealt with in accordance with the procedure above described, and I have no recollection that any of them, either sent from or received by the Foreign Ministry, was submitted for review to the Foreign Minister or the Vice-Minister.

. . . . .  
O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kamoyama Kazuji (seal)

On this 13th day of August 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT Kamoyama Kazuji (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo  
13 August 1947

4, 2 964

Def, Doo 1079

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 龜山 一 二

自分儀我國に行はるる方式に従ひ先づ別紙の通り宣誓を爲したる上次の如く供述致します

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一、自分は一九二二年二月外務省に入り一九四〇年九月から一九四二年十月迄外務省の電信課長でありました。右の資格で執務中に私の承知した諸事項に付左の如く陳述致します。

二、一九四一年十二月七日東郷外務大臣より在米野村大使に宛て A P 及 U P 通信に依れば米大統領より天皇陛下に宛て親電が發せられた旨國務省より公表あつた由であるが其の真相回電ありた旨電報あり（辯護側文書第一四〇一—P—三號）又右と入違に華府同月六日附を以て同大使より同大臣に宛て米大統領より天皇陛下に親電が發せられた趣なる旨電報がありました（辯護側文書第一四〇一—E—三號）私は當時外務省電信課長として右二つの電報發受の事實を承知してゐますが、私は當時右親電の内容を見たことなく、唯十二月八日頃アメリカ局より在日米大使より右親電が我方に傳達せられた旨を聞知した後に記憶します。

三、當時外務省電信課に於ては暗號技術の研究上在日外國公館發受の暗號電報寫を人を派して逕信當局より受取つて居ましたが右は大体前日



受領して居た實情でありました。

而して右電信課内暗號研究班に於ては土曜日は午后から、日曜日は全日、全員休業することになつて居ましたが偶々一九四一年十二月七日は日曜日でありました爲暗號研究班員は六日午後から、七日は全日に亘つて勤務に就いて居た者はありませんでした。従て七日中に本件大統領親電を外務省に於て解讀したと云ふことは在り得ぬことであります。

十二月八日乃至九日には恐らく普通の例に依り逕信當局より右親電の暗號に組まれた電報の寫を外務省電信課暗號研究班に於て受領して居たものと推定せられますが（私は嘗て此等逕信當局より受領する暗號電報寫を直接受取つたことはなく同班員が受取り適宜に處理して居りました）當時右班員は極めて少く英米暗號の研究に従事して居たのは約五名に過ぎませんでしたので、茲より此等毎日受領する暗號電報寫の内解讀し得るものの中より更に極く一小部分のみを適宜抽出して自ら解讀し他は主として參謀本部より解讀文を入手して居た次第ですが

受領して居た實情でありました。

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十二月八日乃至九日には悉らく普通の例に依り遞信當局より右親電の暗號に組まれた電報の寫を外務省電信課暗號研究班に於て受領して居たものと推定せられますが（私は嘗て此等遞信當局より受領する暗號電報寫を直接受取つたことはなく同班員が受取り適宜に處理して居りました）當時右班員は極めて少く英米暗號の研究に従事して居たのは約五名に過ぎませんでしたので、茲より此等毎日受領する暗號電報寫の内解讀し得るものの中より更に極く一小部分のみを適宜抽出して自ら解讀し他は主として參謀本部より解讀文を入手して居た次第ですが

右親電に付ては當時外務省側に於て解讀した形跡はなく、又參謀本部よりも受領せられた形跡はありません。右種電報の解讀文は、外務省電信課暗號研究班に於て解讀しました場合も又他より其の解讀文を手しました場合も、すべて電信課長たる自分に必ず提出することとなつて居たのでありますが、右親電の解讀文を私は、當時讀んだ記憶が全然ないのであります。

四、尙前述の通り、當時右暗號研究班に於ては遞信當局より外國公館發受の暗號電報寫を入手して居りましたが右は遞信當局より當該外國公館への右暗號電報の配達乃至右公館よりの電報の發送とは何等の關係はなく、單に右配達乃至發電濟暗號電報の寫を事後に於て遞信當局より研究班に於て貰ひ受けて居たに過ぎなかつた次第で、素より外務省が右電報原本自体の在日外國公館への配達乃至右公館の電報發送に付何等干涉したことはなく、従つて大統領親電の在日米國大使館への配達を遅延せしめるの措置を當時外務省に於て採つたことはありません。

五、太平洋戦争開始に先立つ日本政府の對米覺醒發送の電報原文は主管課（アメリカ局第一課）より一九四一年十二月六日午後當時外務省電信課長であつた自分に於て受領し電信官をして直ちに之を十四本の送號に組ましめたと記録しますが、其の後、一九四一年十二月自分が命じて部下をして東京中央電信局に就き調査報告せしめました所に依りままと、最初の十三本は同日午後八時三十分乃至七日午前零時二十分に外務省内電信分局より東京中央電信局に發送せられ右中央電信局は之を六日午後十時十分乃至七日午前一時五十分迄に米國向け發送した趣であります。

第十四本目は主管課の申入に従ひ同課より發送方要求ある迄發送を差控ふることとしましたが、主管課よりの右發送要求は七日午後四時頃ありましたので直ちに發送方を手配しました。而して右十四本目の電報は特に迅速且正確なる華府到着を期する爲米國 H K Y 及 R C A の兩路線を同じ一時間の差を置いて同文を夫々發送せしめました。而して右第十四本目の電報は右調査に依れば東京中央電信局より十二月七日午後五時に H K Y 經由、午後六時に R C A 經由夫々發送せられた趣

であります

六、前項對米覺替發電に先ち十二月六日午後八時半對米覺替接到の上は訓令あり次第何時にても米油に手交し得る機文替の整理其の多萬端の手配を了し置くべき旨の訓電（法廷證第一二一六號）が外務省より發送せられました。が、前述の調査に依れば右は同日午後九時十分東京中央電信局より米油に向け發送せられた趣であります。

七、又對米覺替を華府時間十二月七日午後一時に手交すべき旨の訓電（法廷證第一二一八號）は之亦特に迅速且正確なる送達を期する爲 M Y K 及 R O A の兩路線を通じて發電せられました。が、右の東京中央電信局より米油向發電時刻は前述の調査に依れば十二月七日午後六時三十分（M Y K）及同午後六時二十八分（R O A）であつた趣であります。

八、尙對米覺察電報を暗號に組んだ後取調べた成最初の十三本中一本に技術的誤（一行程脱字したものの如く記憶します）があることが發見せられましたので直に訂正電報を發送しました。（右は勿論極めて簡單なものであります）。

有訂正電報の發送せられた正確な時刻は外務省の火災に際し電信課記録が焼失した爲調査し得ませんが、六日より七日にかけて電信係官數名を終夜宿直勤務せしめて居りました故右は七日早朝よりも遅くなつたことはなかつたものと存じます。

更になほ一通、覺察原文中一字訂正の指示電報が發送せられました。右は電報原文に依れば十二月七日午後七時二十分外務省内電信分局より東京中央電信局に發送せられて居りますから（辯護側文書第二〇五〇、A）當時の實情に照らし遅くも其の一時分後には東京中央電信局より直接米局に向け、發覺せられたるものと思考します。

参考便宜の爲の上述時間に對する東京ワシントン比較時間を示すと  
 次の通りであります（時差は十四時間であります）

	(期日)	(東京時間)	(期日)	(ワシントン時間)
受領次第即時覺書を準備すべき旨のワシントン向ケ訓令中央電信局へ送らる	六日	午後八時三十分	六日	午前六時三十分
受領次第即時覺書を準備すべき旨のワシントン向ケ訓令中央電信局より送らる	六日	午後九時十分	六日	午前七時 十分
十三部の覺書電信課より中央電信局に送らる	六日より 七日に亘り	午後八時三十分より 午前十二時二十分に 至る	六日	午前六時三十分より 午前十時二十分に 至る
十三部の覺書中央電信局より送らる	六日より 七日に亘り	午後十時十分より 午前一時五十分 に至る	六日	午前八時十分より 午前十一時五十分 に至る
アメリカ局第一課覺書第十四部送達を命ぜらる	七日	午後四時	七日	午前二時
覺書第十四部中央電信局へ送らる	七日	午後四時	七日	午前二時

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九、而して當時の日米間に於ける通信状況は一般に良好で電信連絡所要時間は大抵三十分乃至一時間でありましたので

<p>第十四部中央電信局より送らる</p> <p>(ワシントン時)十二月七日午後一時に電報を手交すべき旨の訓令中央電信局へ送らる</p> <p>(ワシントン時)十二月七日午後一時に電報を手交すべき旨の訓令中央電信局より送らる</p> <p>電報中の一語訂正の電報電信課より中央電信局に送らる</p>	<p>(M V Y 經由) 七日 P O A 經由) 七日</p> <p>七日</p> <p>(R C A 經由) 七日 (M K Y 經由) 七日</p> <p>七日</p>	<p>午後五時 午後六時</p> <p>午後五時三十分</p> <p>午後六時二十八分 午後六時三十分</p> <p>午後七時二十分</p>	<p>七日 七日</p> <p>七日 七日</p> <p>七日</p>	<p>午前四時 午前四時</p> <p>午前四時三十分</p> <p>午前四時二十八分 午前四時三十分</p> <p>午前五時二十分</p>
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- (a) 對米覺替の文書整理其他必要措置手配方指令の電報の華府到着時間  
は、華府時間（以下何れも華府時間）十二月六日午前八時頃
- (d) 覺替最初の十三本の電報は十二月六日午前九時乃至午後一時頃
- (c) 覺替第十四本目の電報は同七日午前四時乃至五時頃
- (b) 對米覺替手交時刻を指定せる電報は同七日午前五時半頃  
夫々華府へ到着する豫想を以て發電せしめたのであります。
- 本件日米交渉關係電報はすべて官報であつたばかりではなく、米國電  
信會社に於ても時局柄此種電報の處理は迅速を期したものと想像せら  
れますが、假に受信後二時間にして在華府日本大使館に電報が送達せ  
られたとすれば前記
- (a) の電報は、十二月六日午前十時頃に、
- (d) の諸電報は六日午前十一時乃至午後三時頃迄に、
- (c) の電報は七日午前六時から七時の間に、
- (b) の電報は七日午前七時半頃迄に夫々華府日本大使館に送達せられ得  
たものと想像します。

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と想像します。

幕府時開十館に電報二通の中日七時午前九時午後一時迄は同大發館に配送せられたるも  
日本大使館十館に電報二通の中日七時午前九時午後一時迄は同大發館に配送せられたるも  
又幕府時開十館に電報二通の中日七時午前九時午後一時迄は同大發館に配送せられたるも

一〇、而して外務省より覺察電報十三本以後に十二月六日夜遅くから十二月七日朝にかけて、在米日本大使館宛に送せられた電報は、自分の記憶及び電報自體の示す所に依ります。 (a) 技術的訂正 (b) 機密保持の訓令電報 (法廷證第一二一七號) (c) 覺察第十四本目 (辯護側文書第二〇四五號) (d) 天皇陛下宛大統領親電の真相問合 (辯護側文書第一四〇一、三號) (e) 覺察手交時間指示 (法廷證第一二一八號) (f) 暗號機破壞方に關する指示 (g) 大臣より野村來栖兩大使宛慰勞電 (h) 同じくアメリカ局長より井口參事官以下館員宛慰勞電 (i) 最終電報の番號通報 (j) 一字訂正方指示の電報 (辯護側文書第二〇五〇一A號) に過ぎなかつたのであります。右の内、覺察中の一字訂正方の電報を以て最終とした機密憶します。

右電報中覺察第十四本目のものを除き他は何れも發行を超えない簡単な内容のものであります。

従つて之を暗號機破一臺を以て解釋する爲に要する時間は第十四本

目録は二、三十分他は何れも十分か十五分位で充分なる程度でありますから華府日本大使館電信課に於ては右諸電報は其の接收到後二時間内外で之を譯了し得た筈であります。更に在外公館の電信課には必ず常に宿直員を置くべき旨豫而訓令せられて居り、又本件覺書文書の整理等に豫め万端の準備をなしておくべき旨訓令せられて居た次第であつたことにも鑑み（法廷證第一二一六號）當時外務省に於ては右覺書の淨存の爲相當なる時間を見積るも猶充分の餘裕を以て華府時間十二月七日午後一時に覺書を米國政府に手交し得るものと確信を以て此等各電報の發送を取運んだものであります。

十一、對米覺替十三本迄の分は解譯完了に最大六時間半を要すと認められるものでありますから右の内最後のものの到着した後に解譯に着手せられたとしても華府時間十二月六日午後九時半頃迄には解譯を完了し得た筈で而して事實は各電報は到着毎に解譯せられた筈でありますから之が淨替は右午後九時半以前に着手し得た筈であります(蓋し覺替の文替の至急整理方に関する訓電は右覺替發電に先立ち發送せられたものであるからであります)更に覺替十三本迄の分に對する技術的訂正電報は東京時間十二月七日拂曉發電せられ如何なる場合にも第十四本目覺替電報(大使館に配達せられた時刻は華府時間十二月七日午前六時乃至七時頃と推定せられます)より先に發送せられて居たことは確實でありますから日本大使館に於ては遅くも華府時間七日午前七時前後迄には其の配達を受け遅滞なく之が解譯を完了し得た筈であります。又最後の一字訂正の電報は遅くも華府時間十二月七日午前十時を過ぎずして接到且解譯を完了し得た筈でありますから大使館の擔當係官に於て六日より七日にかけ適當に休息就眠したとしても覺替十四本全文ノ完全なテキストは遅くも同

七日午前十一時頃迄には之か淨書を完了し得た筈であります。

十二、十二月七日對米覺替の手交が華府で遲延した事、米印からのラヂオ放送で判明したので東洋外務大臣は大使館員が米印から歸朝の上は取調べをなすべき旨私に命せられました、かくして行つた調査に於て一九四二年八月交換船で歸朝した華府大使館電信書記生の一人が私に語つた所に依れば大使館では覺替を何時にても米側へ提出し得る様準備し置くべき旨の訓電を華府時間十二月六日午前中に接受し、又覺替は同日正午頃より引續き接到同日午後十一時頃迄に十三本の解題を了し又覺替第十四本目は七日午前七時頃迄に接到して居り、同大使館電信課員が第十四本目の譯譯を了したのは午後零時二十分頃であつた筈であります、又在歐日本外交官引揚船を以て一九四六年三月歸還した嘗時の在米大使館電信課員近藤電信書記生等の語つた所も石と大体同様でありました。

十三 外務省は屢々他の國內官廳より外國の經濟、財政、軍事其の他諸般の事に関し情報の入手方の依頼を受け、之が入手報告方を在外公館に訓令しました。此等の情報の入手及依頼官廳への轉達は外交方針の決定乃至遂行に直接の關係がないので、此種訓令は電信に依る場合當該主管課事務官に於て起草し、局長及課長時には課長のみの承認を得て直ちに電信課に發電を依頼し越すを常とし、實際には大臣又は次官は聞知せず、局長又は多くの場合主管課長の責任に於て夫々處理せられて居ました。又右訓令に基き在外公館より情報電報到來の場合之を電信課より當該主管局長及課長に送付し、主管課から、調査を依頼して來た官廳に轉送することになつて居りました。右に併行して時に電信課からも直接右依頼官廳に同一の電信寫を送付したことがあります。右は依頼官廳からの事務的要請に應せる補助的手段でありました。外務省より在外公館に發せらるる電報は總て外務大臣名義で發送せられ、又在外公館より外務省に宛てた電報は總て外務大臣宛とすることになつて居ますが此等電報中外務大臣の査閱するのは特に重要と認め

らるるもののみで、査閲を経ない電報も深山ありました。例へば自分の電信課長時代には毎日來電の数は大略二百通内外に達し、發電數は大略百通内外でありましたが、此内外務大臣の査閲に供した電報は約十分の一位でありました。

自分の電信課長在任當時に於て、ハワイ、マニラ、ジャバ、其の他の地方に於ける軍艦商船の動靜に關する情報入手の訓電が發せられ又其の回電を接受した事をお憶しますが、此の住復電報は何れも右に述べた方法で處理せられましたので發受信共外務大臣乃至次官の閱覽に供した記憶はありません。



昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月十三日 於東京

供述者 鮎山 一二

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣讀シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日 於 同所

立會人 西 春 彦

17

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月十三日 於東京

供述者 龜山 一二

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣讀シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日 於 同所

立會人 西 春 彦

17

宣 誓 書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セス又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ  
誓フ

署名捺印

龜

山

一

二

148

2966

Def Doc No 2045

華文文藝

號

「眞珠灣事件」ヨリノ拔萃

(米國政府印刷局・華盛頓一九四六年)

第 一 卷

證據第一 傳受セラレタル日本ノ電報

第二四五頁

東京 華盛頓宛

一九四一年十二月七日

第九〇二號 十四部ノ中第十四部

(註一此部分ヲ取扱フル電信局ニ對スル指示トシテ平文ニテ「緊要」トアリ)

七、准フニ合衆國政府ノ意圖ハ兵衛凶暴ノ他ト苟合策動シテ東亞ニ於ケル帝國新秩序建設ニ依ル平和確立ノ勢力ヲ削弱セントスルノミナラス日支兩國ヲ相闘ハンメ以テ英米ノ利益ヲ離脱セントスルモノナルコトハ今次交渉ヲ通シ明瞭ト爲リタル所アリ、斯クテ日米間交ヲ調整シ合衆

國政府ト相携ヘテ太平洋ノ平和ヲ維持確立セントスル帝國政府ノ希望ハ  
遂ニ失ハレタリ。

仍テ帝國政府ハ茲ニ合衆國政府ノ態度ニ鑑ミ今後交渉ヲ繼續スルモ妥結  
ニ達スルヲ得スト認ムルノ外ナキ旨ヲ合衆國政府ニ通告スルヲ遺憾トス  
ルモノナリ

二五八四三

T D I - 七一四三

(M)海軍翻譯一九四一年十二月七日(S-I-T)

44 2966

Def. Doc. No. 2045

Excerpt from book entitled PEARL HARBOR -- Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941, published by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington: 1945.

Page 245

From: Tokyo  
To : Washington  
7 December 1941  
No. 902 Part 14 of 14

(Note.--In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve the Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

25843  
35-1: 7143

(M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-7)

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. # 2050-AB

44-2965

TELEGRAM NO. 911 from Foreign  
Minister TOGO to Ambassador NOMURA

Drafted on December 7, 1941.

Official in charge: Oda (initialed)

Chief of Cable Section: Kameyama (seal)

46899 (Despatched in duplicate)  
46901

By order of the Foreign Minister

Nishi (signed)

Despatched at 7:20 P.M., December 7.

(Urgent, office chief cipher)

Reference to my telegram No. 950,

Please correct "proposal" as "assertions" in the sentence in the first part of the paragraph III of the memorandum to the American Government; "But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal".

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. # 2050-AB

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authority

I, UFAB<sup>7</sup>, Katsuma, Acting Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the attached photostat consisting of 2 pages, in English and in Japanese of the telegram No. 911 dated 7th December, 1941, despatched by Foreign Minister TOGO to Ambassador NOMURA in Washington, is an exact and true copy of the document in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 11th day of August, 1947.

/s/ UFAB<sup>7</sup>, Katsuma (seal)

Witness: /s/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)



44-961

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., {

v.

No. 1

ARAKI SADAO, et al.,  
Defendants

A F F I D A V I T  
of  
YUKI SHIROJI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in April 1937. In December 1940 I was appointed Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of American Affairs of the Ministry, serving in that position until October 1941. In November I was appointed, in the capacity of a senior secretary, to accompany Ambassador Kurusu on his mission to the United States, and left with him on 5 November. I remained at the Embassy in Washington, engaged in the business of the Japanese-American negotiations, until the outbreak of the Pacific war. I was accordingly concerned, directly or indirectly, in the general business of the embassy with regard to the negotiations, though I was not a regular member of the embassy staff. Therefore I have knowledge of the facts concerning the delay in the delivery of the memorandum of the Japanese Government to the United States on 7 December 1941, and state herein the circumstances thereof. (The time I use in this statement is Washington time, 14 hours earlier than Tokyo time.)

2. Telegraphic instructions from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, deciphered by noon of 6 December (Saturday) had instructed us that they were going to send, by separate telegrams, the memorandum of the Japanese Government in response to the American proposal of 26 November; that it would be the following day before this long message would be completely received (it was actually sent in 14 parts, the last of which was delivered on the morning of 7 December); and that, in consideration of the delicate situation, the receipt of the memorandum should be kept in strict secrecy (in this connection, we were instructed by another telegram--Exhibit 1217--to take every prudent measure to keep it in secret, and especially, not to entrust the preparation of the memorandum to typists). We were further told that we would be instructed later of the time for handing the memorandum to the United States, and that all necessary steps, including the preparation of the documents, should be taken promptly so that the memorandum could be delivered at any time upon receipt of instructions (Exhibit 1216). Subsequently, the 14 parts into which the memorandum was divided began to arrive, and the first 8 or 9 parts had already been deciphered by dinner-time (about 7 P.M.) that evening.

There was a farewell dinner, which I did not attend, for a member of the embassy staff who was being transferred to another post; I had dinner with Ambassador Nomura, then retired to my bedroom. On Sunday morning, 7 December, I went to the so-called Secretaries' Room of the Embassy, which is in the Ambassador's residence, at about 9, and there found Secretary Okumura busy typing the memorandum. The typing apparently had not been started on the night of the 6th. As the staff of the cable section began arriving soon afterward, I learned from talking with them that after the dinner of the night before the whole staff of the cable section (Telegraph Officer Horiuchi and clerks Kajiwara, Horikawa, Kawabata, Kondō and Yoshida) had returned to the office and resumed

the work of deciphering at about 9:30, the deciphering of the first 13 parts being finished before midnight. Having nothing to do but to wait for the 14th part to be delivered, the members of the cable section had then busied themselves, while waiting for it, in disposing of the remnants of the cipher machine which had been destroyed on the night of 5 December in accordance with the order of the Foreign Minister. The 14th part, I learned, had not arrived during the night, and Counselor Iguchi having advised the members of the cable section to retire, they returned to their respective lodgings before dawn, leaving a duty officer.

3. While Secretary Okumura (who was the only senior official of the Embassy staff who could operate a typewriter at all) recently typed the memorandum, I proof-read the typed pages in the adjoining room with Chancellor Nakajima. Before my arrival (between 7 and 9 o'clock, I was told) several telegrams had been delivered, and the night duty officer had called up all the members of the cable section at their respective lodgings--finding, to his uneasiness, that, having left the office only a short time before, they were not prepared for prompt attendance. At from 9:30 to 10 they had all gathered in the office and from 10 o'clock they set about deciphering the telegrams. Telegrams marked "urgent" were first deciphered. The greetings of the Foreign Minister and the Director of the American Bureau came first, then a few telegrams of corrections. It was about 11 o'clock that they deciphered the telegram directing that the memorandum be handed to the United States (to the Secretary of State if possible) at 1 P.M., 7 December (Exhibit 1219).

In accordance with Ambassador Nomura's order, eleven-interpreter Enseki promptly called the Secretary of State at his private residence, asking for an appointment for an interview at 1 P.M. The Secretary of State replied that, as he had a previous engagement for lunch, he wished that the Ambassadors would meet Under-Secretary Welles in his stead. Shortly after, we received a telephone message to the effect that the Secretary of State himself would receive the Japanese ambassadors at 1 P.M. at the State Department.

4. Meanwhile, by 11 A.M. Secretary Okumura had finished typing the memorandum as far as the 13th part. However, saying that that copy was meant to be a draft and was not well-typed, and that there was still plenty of time before 1 o'clock, he began to type the draft over again with the assistance of interpreter Enseki. That day, however, they were under such a strain that they were slower and making more mistakes than usual. This became more perceptible as time passed after we had received the instructions to hand the memorandum to the United States at 1 P.M. As the above-mentioned telegram of correction was deciphered, however, they were compelled to retype a page which they had barely finished typing. Another telegram directing the insertion of a sentence of one or two lines which had been dropped out of the memorandum, forced them again to retype, not only the page in question but also the following page, on account of the slipping down of lines. At any rate, in these circumstances it took longer than we had expected, and time flew by rapidly. It was around 12:30 P.M., as I remember, that the deciphering of the 14th part, the last part of the memorandum, was sent to the Secretaries' Room. The typing of the thirteen parts, however, was not yet completed by that time.

5. In the meantime, Ambassador Nomura came frequently to the Secretaries' Room to press for the document. Ambassador Furusu also was holding himself in readiness to start, and was waiting impatiently for the completion of the typing.

As it became clear that the typing could not be completed in time for the appointed hour, interpreter Enseki, by order of Ambassador Nomura, told the secretary to Secretary Hull that the call of the two ambassadors might be delayed because the necessary document was not yet ready, and received a reply that Mr. Hull would expect the Japanese ambassadors as soon as the preparations were completed. It was already about 1:50 when secretary Okumura and interpreter Enseki finished the typing. The two ambassadors, who had been waiting at the entrance-hall of the Embassy, started for the State Department as soon as they received the typewritten memorandum. I understand that they reached there at about 2 o'clock, were kept waiting for about twenty minutes, and met the Secretary of State about 2:20 and handed him the memorandum.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Yūki Shirōji

On this 9th day of August 1947  
at Tokyo

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At Tokyo

Witness Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

. . . . .  
Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo  
13 August 1947

Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington: 1946)

Vol. 14

Pages 1413-1416

Exhibit no. 41

Information from Documentary Evidence on Messages No.  
D 901, 902, 907, 910

Note: Information based on documents in Navy files indicated by "(N)"; information based on documents in Army files indicated by "(A)".

No. 901 (pilot message; Exhibit 1, p. 238)

	<u>Washington Time</u>
Filed by the Japanese 8:56 p.m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time (A&N)	6:56 a.m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) 1215-1220 GMT 6 Dec (N)	7:15-7:20 a.m. 6 Dec
Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army SIS from Navy (A)	12:05 p.m. 6 Dec
Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS (A)	6 Dec

No. 902 (14 part memo; Exhibit 1, pp. 239-45)

Part 1

Filed by the Japanese 10:00 p.m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N)	8:00 a.m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) 1303-1310 GMT 6 Dec (N)	8:03-8:10 a.m. 6 Dec
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649 GMT 6 Dec (N)	11:49 a.m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed at Navy (N)	6 Dec

All parts of this message were in English, so that translation was not required

. . . . .

Part 13

Filed by the Japanese 1:25 a.m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N)	11:25 a.m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S, 1635-1652 GMT 6 Dec (N)	11:35-11:52 a.m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)	
Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951 GMT 6 Dec (N)	2:51 p.m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed by Navy	6 Dec

Part 14

Filed by the Japanese 4:38 p.m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N)	2:38 a.m. 7 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S, 0805-0810 GMT 7 Dec (N)	3:05-3:10 a.m. 7 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)	
Decoded and typed by Navy (N)	7 Dec

No. 907 (one o'clock message; p. 248 Exhibit 1)

	<u>Washington Time</u>
Filed by the Japanese 6:18 p.m. 7 Dec. Tokyo time (N)	4:18 a.m. 7 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) 0937 GMT 7 Dec (N)	4:37 a.m. 7 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A) Decoded by Navy (A) Sent by Navy to Army SIS Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A)	7 Dec

No. 910 (code destruction; p. 249 Exhibit 1)

Filed by the Japanese 6:44 p.m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N&A)	4:44 a.m. 7 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) 1007 GMT 7 Dec (N)	5:07 a.m. 7 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A) Decoded by Navy (A) Sent by Navy to Army SIS Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A)	7 Dec

Ev 2769

Def. Doc. no. 1500-J-6

Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington:1946)

Vol. 11

Pages 5480-91

Department of the Navy,  
Office of the Secretary,  
Washington, 16 May 1946

1093A (HLB)  
Memorandum  
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In compliance with the request of Vice Chairman Cooper at page 10783 of the Record of Proceedings, referred to in item 14 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, Captain Kramer has prepared, and there is forwarded herewith, a smooth copy of the study made by him of the times of delivery to the White House of certain translations of Japanese intercepts.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,  
John Ford Baecher  
Commander, USNR.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. 12/25/46

IP#	Origin	Date	Trans.	Page in Ex. 1 or Transcript	Subject & Army Number	Delivered by Navy
713:	B-T #1421	12/5	12/6 N	11215	Gave Germans dope on U.S. negotiations. Think we should tell them re Konoye note	First message of block delivered about noon 6 December
7138	B-T #1408	12/3	12/6 N	11217	(Re 7132) Re-Rostov and Rowmel	
39	W-T #1261	12/5	12/6 N	235	Hull-Kanuma-Nom talk on 5th	
40	T-W #896	12/5	12/6 N	234	(Re 7051) Hava Terasaki etc. leave in next few days. ** My footnote re Terasaki	Eve 6 December
41	W-T #1262	12/5	12/6 N	11225	(Re 7440) Want to keep Terasaki for present)	
42	T-E #897	12/6	12/6 A	237	Re code machines, keep one I meant (25835)	
43	T-W #902 (Parts 1-13)	12/6	12/6 N	239	Jap Note parts 1-13 (25843)	
43	T-W #902 (Part 14)	12/7	12/7 N	245	Jap Note part 14 (25843)	08:5-1000 7 December
44	T-W #904	12/6	12/6 A	245	Re Typist (25844)	)
45	T-W #907	12/7	12/7 A	248	1 P.M. msg (25850)	)
46	T-W #908	12/7	12/7 A	248	Thanks to 2 arns. (25853)	)
47	T-W #910	12/7	12/7 A	249	Destroy all codes and papers (25854)	)
7148	T-Circ #2494	12/7	12/7 N	251	Rel. Det. Jap & Eng. (Hidden Word Code)	) 1030-1100 7 December
49	T-W #901	12/6	12/6 A	238	Pilot Msg (25848)	)
50	T-W #905	12/6	12/7 A	10745	ARDE reports re FDR msg to Emperor (25857)	)
51	T-W #909	12/7	12/7 A	248	Thanks to Enb Staff (25858)	)
7152	Rio-T #460	12/5	12/7 N		Re planes to Africa	PM 7 December

\*\*No footnote in original

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

RUFUS S. BRATTON

RUFUS S. BRATTON, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says

Q What is your name?

A Rufus S. Bratton, Colonel, United States Army.

Q What is your present position?

A Deputy Chief of CIS, G-2, GHQ SCAP.

Q What was your position in the month of December 1941?

A Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

Q What, in general, were your duties at that time?

A I supervised the work of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division, and specifically was the custodian and processor of the Japanese diplomatic messages which were being intercepted and translated by the Army and the Navy. I had charge of that material from the time it reached the Military Intelligence Division.

Q Was it your responsibility to make delivery or dissemination of that intercepted diplomatic correspondence?

A It was my responsibility. I had some officer assistants who helped me in processing the material and occasionally in distributing it.

Q When did you first learn that orders had been issued to Japanese Embassies and consulates to destroy their codes and documents?

A On 3 December we had intercepted orders from Tokyo to the Embassy to that effect, and I had sent one of my officers to the Embassy and he reported that they were burning their papers in the back yard.

Q Whom did you notify of this fact?

A General Sherman Miles, my superior officer and Chief of Military Intelligence, and General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. The intercepted message was sent to the usual recipients of this material, which included the Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff. Distribution to the Secretary of the Navy and the President was at that time the responsibility of the Navy.

Q Did you and Generals Miles and Gerow discuss the meaning of this destruction of codes?

A Yes, we agreed that it meant at the least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war.

Q Do you remember the so-called pilot message, which appears in evidence in this case as Exhibit 1,216 and which I am having handed to you?

A I do.



Def. Doc. 2094

- Q When did this message first come to your attention?  
A Some time around 2 o'clock of the afternoon of Saturday, 6 December 1941.
- Q Did you discuss the matter with anyone on that Saturday afternoon?  
A Yes; with General Miles and with General Gerow. In addition, that message was distributed to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State.
- Q Are you familiar with the 14-part message which was later received in accordance with this pilot message, in evidence here as Exhibit 1,245-K, which is being handed to you?  
A I am.
- Q When did you first see any parts of this message?  
A That message began to come into my office in the late afternoon or early evening of 6 December, and the first 13 parts had arrived completely between 9 and 10 o'clock that evening.
- Q To whom did you make distribution of those 13 parts?  
A To the Secretary of State, by delivery of the locked pouch containing them to the night duty officer in the State Department some time after 10 o'clock that night. I also advised General Miles by telephone of the contents, and was told by him that he had seen the 13 parts.
- Q When did you first see the 14th part of the message?  
A The 14th part was delivered to me at my office in the War Department 8:15 or 8:30 on the morning of Sunday, 7 December.
- Q What distribution of it was made by you?  
A It was delivered immediately to the State Department by me or my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury.
- Q When did you first see the message ordering 1 o'clock delivery of the memorandum contained in the 14-part message, Exhibit 1,218, which is being shown to you?  
A At just about 9 o'clock of the morning of 7 December.
- Q Whom did you notify of receipt of this message?  
A Generals Miles and Gerow, and General Marshall, Chief of Staff.
- Q Do you know whether General Marshall had read the 14-part message?  
A At 11:25 that morning Generals Miles and Gerow and I met with General Marshall in his office. He then read, in our presence, the complete 14-part message and the 1 o'clock delivery message.
- Q Was the significance of the 1 o'clock delivery discussed?  
A At General Marshall's request each of us gave him his evaluation of it, which was that we concurred in believing that it meant Japanese hostile action against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 o'clock that afternoon.
- Q What did General Marshall do as a result of this conversation?  
A He called Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, on the telephone, and after consultation with him wrote out in his own hand a warning message to be sent to Hawaii, the Philippines, Panama and other American outposts in the Pacific.
- Q I am having handed to you Defence Document no. 1500-E-6. Please examine this document and state whether it is a copy of the message at that time prepared and sent by General Marshall?  
A This is the message which General Marshall wrote and which at his order I took to the War Department Message Center for coding and transmission.

Def. Doc. 2094

Q Were you advised by the chief of the message center how long it would take for delivery of that message to the addressees?

A Colonel French, the chief of the message center, told me that it would be in the hands of the addressees within 30 or 40 minutes, which fact I reported to General Marshall.

Q What time was it then?

A It was then 11:58 A.M.

FURTHER the affiant saith not.

At Tokyo, this 18 August 1947

/s/ R. S. Bratton

Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authority, on this 18 August 1947, at Tokyo.

/s/ Worth D. White  
Capt. Inf.  
Summary Court Officer

Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Printing Office--Washington: 1946)

Vol. II

Pages 812-13

Friday, November 30, 1945  
Congress of the United States  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of the Pearl Harbor Attack

Washington, D. C.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES . . .

Mr. Gesell. Now, just how far, General, did this question of security go in this regard? To take an extreme case, assuming you had intercepted a message in which the Japanese said that they planned to attack Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December at dawn. I take it I am correct in assuming that that message would have been transmitted to Hawaii for their information?

General Miles. It would have been, by the Chief of Staff. I think that case is similar to the one which actually occurred on the morning of December 7. We didn't know where this attack was coming but we very much feared an attack would come coincident with the 1 p.m. delivery of the Japanese reply and my action then was to bring this to the notice of the Chief of Staff so that an additional warning would be sent out.

Page 922

Mr. Gearhart. . . . But, General Miles, things happened on the 6th of December which suddenly centered your attention upon Hawaii as a possible object of attack, did there not?

General Miles. Things happened on the morning of the 7th of December, sir, which centered my attention on the probable Japanese attack somewhere coincident with the delivery of the Japanese reply at 1 o'clock that day.

Mr. Gearhart. You are familiar with the so-called 14-part Japanese reply to the Hull message of November 26, are you not?

General Miles. I am, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When they speak of it as the 14-part message they are referring to the method the Japanese used in transmitting that message, are they not?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It came in in installments, in other words, rather than in a solid typed coded message; is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Thirteen parts of that message were received in Washington on the 6th day of December, were they not?

General Miles. On the late evening of the 6th they were received, sir.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know when the fourteenth part was received on the 7th of December?

General Miles. I understand that that was received fairly early on the morning of the 7th, at 7 or 8 o'clock. Again, I am not able to testify as to the accurate hour.

Page 925

Mr. Gearhart. You were impressed with the importance of that fourteenth part of the message, were you not?

General Miles. When I read it, I was very much impressed with the fourteenth part.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you make any out-of-the-ordinary directions in reference to its immediate delivery to the ones that were entitled to receive copies from an emissary from your division?

General Miles. It had been delivered to the recipients about coincidental with its delivery to me, with the exception of General Marshall with whom I was in touch either directly or through Colonel Bratton to get this information to him.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you make any special effort, by telephone or otherwise, or by calling at his office, to inform General Marshall of the receipt of that fourteenth part of the message?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Were you successful in contacting him?

General Miles. I was, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When did you inform him of the fourteenth part of the message?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I have written notes on my activities on the 6th and 7th which, perhaps for clarity and saving time, I might read.

My wife and I dined at the house of Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, then Chief of ONI. We were there from 8 p.m., until about 11 p.m. Shortly before we left, I think about 10:30 p.m., Commander Kramer came to the house, bringing with him a summary, I think, although it may have been the full translation of the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our note of November 26. This was the first knowledge I had that these 13 parts were in.

Page 926

Early on the morning of the 7th, Colonel Bratton called me at my house, told me that important information was in and that he was trying to get in touch with General Marshall. I asked Colonel Bratton to tell General Marshall that I would come out to Fort Myer to see him if he

desired. Either Colonel Bratton or I called General Gerow. These telephone messages were designed to effect a meeting of the Chief of Staff with General Gerow, Colonel, and myself, which subsequently took place in General Marshall's office.

I then went to my office. There I saw the full Japanese reply, and the 1 p.m. delivery message, and discussed them with Colonel Bratton. The latter message and the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply struck me immediately.

Soon arrangements had been made for us to be notified when General Marshall arrived. When so notified, I went to General Marshall's office. What took place in his office is best recalled by me in a memorandum I prepared for the Chief of Staff, dated December 15, 1941, subject: "Sunday Morning, December 7, 1941."

This is the memorandum that I refer to, as my recollection of what occurred.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff  
Subject: Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

1. My recollection of what occurred in your office on that morning is as follows:

I found you alone in your office at about 11:25 a.m. We were almost immediately joined by Colonel Bratton, who brought in the Japanese reply and the Japanese directive that the reply be given to Secretary Hull at 1 p.m. that day.

You then read aloud the Japanese reply, which was of considerable length. You then asked what Colonel Bratton and I thought should be done about it, or what it signified. We said that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply--1 p.m.--an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand, but it might be any one or more of a number of other areas.

I urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, and to be on the alert. You then picked up the telephone and got Admiral Stark. You told him you thought we should send out warning as indicated above. After Admiral Stark replied you put down the telephone and said that the Admiral did not think any further warnings necessary, since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Colonel Bratton and I nevertheless urged that warnings be sent.

You then wrote out the warnings message. There was some discussion as to whether the Philippines should be included or not, but I am not quite clear exactly when this discussion occurred. You again got Admiral Stark on the telephone and read the message to him. He apparently concurred, and asked that the naval forces be informed. You added that at the bottom of the message.

Page 929 (continued)

At about this time General Gerow and Colonel Bundy arrived. You asked us in succession, beginning with me, what we thought the Japanese reply and timing meant. I said that I thought it probably meant Thailand, but that the timing had some significance and warning messages should be sent. General Gerow and Colonels Bratton and Bundy concurred. The message in your handwriting was then given to Colonel Bratton to take immediately to the Message Center. (There was a little discussion here as to whether it should go to General Gerow's office for typing first, but time was then pressing and I gave it to Bratton for immediate delivery. General Gerow said as Bratton was leaving, "Tell them to give it first priority to the Philippines if there is a question of priority" or something to that effect.) Bratton returned in a few moments and you directed him to find out how long it would take for the delivery of those messages. Again he went to the Message Center and returned and reported to you that they would have them encoded in three minutes, on the air in eight, and in the hands of the recipients in (I think) twenty.

Colonel Bratton states that he looked at his watch on delivering your message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a.m. He further states that the Message Center gave him no intimation that all four messages would not go over Army radio direct to the four Army Headquarters.

Signed by me.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you remember when you first saw the full message of the 14 parts?

General Miles. I cannot identify the hour exactly, sir. I only know that I got down there to the office fairly early after this telephone conversation with Colonel Bratton, and I think that General Gerow, although of that I am not quite certain, and that I had considerable time to read the message and discuss it with Colonel Bratton before the arrival of the Chief of Staff.

. . . . .

Page 930

Mr. Gearhart. But the very use of 1 o'clock by the Japanese Government in directing their Ambassador and Envoy to present that at that hour certainly excited in the minds of every officer who saw that message much comment in respect to its possible meaning, did it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir. It was a very unusual request to make on a Secretary of State of a foreign power, that he receive a message at 1 o'clock on a Sunday afternoon.

. . . . .

Page 931

Mr. Gearhart. All right. What did 1 o'clock in Washington mean in Hawaii?

General Miles. I am trying to remember, Mr. Congressman but I do not remember that any of those places specifically were discussed, or that we related the 1 o'clock in Washington to any specific place. We thought the line of action would be Thailand, still thought it that morning, but we wanted our overseas departments and the west coast alerted, and it was an awful urgency about it

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Page 931 (continued)

General Miles. One o'clock, as we now know, meant about 7 o'clock, I think, in Hawaii.

. . . . .

Page 933

Mr. Gearhart. When was the conference completed insofar as the determination to send a message was concerned?

General Miles. I wrote on that same day, December 15, that Colonel Bratton looked at his watch on delivering General Marshall's message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a.m.

Vol. III

Page 989

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. Mitchell (general counsel). General Gerow, will you state your present rank and station?

General Gerow. Leonard T. Gerow, lieutenant general; station, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

Mr. Mitchell. Were you in the War Plans Division in the War Department in 1941?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. When did you receive that assignment?

General Gerow. I reported, sir, in November 1940, and left the War Plans Division in February 1942.

Mr. Mitchell. You were head of the War Plans Division during that period?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans Division.

. . . . .

Page 990

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. You may. Just a part of the regulations relating to the War Plans Division.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.  
I quote paragraph 12:

War Plans Division, general duties:

a. The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the use in the theatre of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.

b. The War Plans Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning--

- (1) Location and armament of coast and land fortifications;
- (2) Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the national defense;
- (3) The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment

to be the duty of the Operations and Training Division);  
(4) Actual operations in the theatre of war;  
(5) Consultation with the Operations and Training Division and the Supply Division on major items of equipment.

Those are the responsibilities of War Plans Division, 1941, sir.

Page 1042

General Gerow. Well, the first time the 14-part message or the 1 p.m. message was in the office of the Chief of Staff on the morning of December 7th was about 11:30 o'clock.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL;  
SPECIAL ENVOY TO CHINA

Friday, December 7, 1945

Mr. Mitchell. Now, when we closed last evening I had just asked you a question. I will repeat it now:  
"Do you remember this diplomatic message from Tokyo to their Ambassadors here, what we call for short the 14 part message and the 1 P.M. message?"  
Your answer was, "Yes, sir."  
"Will you state in your own way just when you first knew about that and under what circumstances?"  
And you got as far as saying: "I first was aware of this message when I reached the"--and then we adjourned.  
Will you give us now the answer?

General Marshall. When I reached the office on the morning of Sunday, December the 7th.

On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about eight, and following the routine that I had carried out on previous Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter.

I think in one of the previous statements I made in this investigation of Pearl Harbor incidents that I said I probably rode at 8:30. Discussions with the orderlies and also evidence that I had seen of other individuals leads me purely by induction and not by definite memory to think that I must have ridden later; just what time I do not know; but between 9 o'clock and the time I went to the War Department I ate my breakfast, I probably looked at the Sunday papers and I went for a ride. . . .

My recollection beyond that is that while I was taking a shower, either as I went into the shower or while I was actually taking a shower, word came to me that Colonel Bratton had something important and wished to come out to Fort Myer. I sent word that I was coming to the War Department, so I finished my shower, dressed and left for the War Department.

My average time of taking a shower and dressing would be about 10 minutes, possibly less. As to what time I arrived at the War Department is a matter of conjecture; I have no recollection.

On my arrival there Colonel Bratton handed me these



Page 1108 (continued)

intercepts which included the 14 sections of the Japanese message, and I started reading them through. You recall it is a rather lengthy document and of such a nature that there were portions of it that I read twice.

When I reached the end of the document the next sheet was the 1 o'clock message of December 7.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message that directed the Ambassadors to deliver this thing at 1:30 p.m. Sunday to the American Government?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, that message. That, of course, was indicative to me, and all the others who came into the room, of some very definite action at 1:00 o'clock, because that 1:00 o'clock was Sunday and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State, all of which were rather unusual put together.

I think that I immediately called Admiral Stark on the phone, and found he had seen the message, and I proposed a message to our various commanders in the Pacific region, the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, that is the Panama Canal, and the west coast, which included Alaska. Admiral Stark felt that we might confuse them, because we had given them an alert and now we were adding something more to it.

I hung up the phone, which was the White House phone, and in longhand wrote out the message. My recollection was that he called me back. I am told now that the White House telephone records show that I called him back. I had no recollection of reading the message to him. I thought, on the contrary, he called me just as I finished the message, saving the last sentence.

However, one way or the other, there was a call or conversation between Stark and myself, the effect of which was he wished me to add to the message specifically "Show this to your Naval officers," which I did in longhand.

I then directed Colonel Bratton to take it immediately to the message center and start it. There was a proposal then that we have it typed. The decision was there was no time for typing, and Colonel Bratton left with the message.

On his return I questioned him as to the length of time involved and I could not make out whether or not he was talking about the time of encoding as well as the time of dispatching and the time of receipt, so I sent him back accompanied by Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of the immediate details of all Pacific affairs.

They came back and gave me the estimates of the time of deliveries in these various parts of the world. My recollection is that I sent at least Colonel Bundy back again, and I thought Colonel Bratton with him. I believe others state that there was no third trip. There were certainly two--my own recollection is there were three. However that may be, that was the procedure on the dispatching of the message.

Page 1111

Mr. Mitchell. Then at least you did read the message and were in the act of preparing a warning by 11:30 or 11:40?

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Page 1111-1112

General Marshall. Yes, sir; 11:40 would be quite evidently the completion of it, because I had it all written except the last sentence.

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer now, as Exhibit 61, a photostat which reads as follows: "December 7, 1941." It is typed.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary,  
General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army;

And the message is this:

Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

Marshall.

It has the signature of General Gerow on it. Has the committee a copy?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. And the committee will note that underneath it is a record:  
"Radios as follows dispatched 11:52 AM, 12-7-41 by Code Room, WDMC."

General Marshall. War Department Message Center.

Mr. Mitchell. And another was dispatched 12:05 to Manila, another one to Hawaii at 12:17; the one to the Caribbean Command is blurred. It looks like 12:00 o'clock, and the one to the Fourth Army at San Francisco at 12:11.

Tuesday, December 11, 1945

Page 1327

General Marshall. Senator, as I recall my testimony and as I recall the events a message came to my quarters as I was taking a shower or getting into a shower after riding that Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house to see me with an important message and I--

Senator Ferguson. Well, then--

Mr. Gesell: Let him finish, please.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Please go ahead and finish your answer.

General Marshall. That Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house, wished to come out to the house with an important message and I sent word that I would be out to the Department and I completed my shower and dressed and I believe I said that would probably take me about 10 minutes and then got in the car and drove down to the Department.

Def. Doc. no. 1500-E-6

Page 1327 (continued)

Senator Ferguson. Which, as I understand it, was 7 or 10 more minutes?

General Marshall. I imagine about 7 minutes; yes.

Senator Ferguson. So that would be 17 minutes--

General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. (Continuing.) After you knew that Bratton wanted to get in touch with you--

General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You received this message?

General Marshall. No, sir. I will say that is all, I think, that-- well, you say "this message" meaning what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the 14 parts.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the 1 o'clock.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the destruction of the codes.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So that 17 minutes after you received notice from Bratton as far as you were concerned you received these messages?

General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that was on the Sunday morning?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; Sunday morning.

. . . . .

Ex 2972

Def. Doc. no. 1500-I-6

Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington: 1946)

Vol. 8

Page 3555

Testimony of Capt. Laurence Frye Safford, United  
States Navy

. . . . .

Page 3556

All my shore duty has been spent in my specialty as a cipher expert and radio intelligence expert. I came ashore to assume this duty in charge of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit in May 1936, and remained on that duty until February 15, 1942, at which time I was removed by the orders of Admiral Horne.

. . . . .

Page 3661

I would like to make one statement which may or may not be important, that the Navy completed its distribution of that message, all 14 parts, plus the pilot message, about 3 hours before the Japanese Embassy in Washington called up the State Department and asked for a delay in their appointment with Secretary Hull because they were not ready.

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington: 1946)

Vol. 10

Page 4659

Mr. Richardson. Will you state your full name, please?

Commander Schulz. Lester Robert Schulz.

. . . . .

Mr. Richardson. What was your assignment for duty in Washington during the first week of December?

Commander Schulz. I was under instruction in the Office of Naval Communications for communication intelligence. That was my permanent assignment. However, I was on temporary duty under verbal orders at the White House as a communications assistant to the Naval Aide, then Captain Beardall.

. . . . .

Page 4660

Mr. Richardson. Were you on duty at the White House in Admiral Beardall's office there on the night of December 6, 1941?

Commander Schulz. I was on duty in the White House.

. . . . .

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall Captain Kramer coming to the White House on the evening of December 6 to deliver any papers?

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. Richardson. About what time did he come?

Commander Schulz. Between 9 and 10; I should say about 9:30.

. . . . .

Page 4662

Mr. Richardson. Are you able to state now whether among the papers which were delivered to the President there were this 13 parts of what was eventually the 14-part message?

Commander Schulz. No, sir; I cannot. I did not read the message. I have only learned of its substance through information that has been divulged during this inquiry, from newspapers and so on.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, what happened when you delivered these papers to the President? You remained there?

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; I remained in the room.

Mr. Richardson. What happened?

Commander Schulz. The President read the papers, which took perhaps 10 minutes. Then he handed them to Mr. Hopkins.

. . . . .

Commander Schulz. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance--I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance--"This means war."

RETURN TO ROOM 361  
FILE COPY

(United States Government Printing Office:  
Washington, D.C. 1946)

Vol. II  
TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY  
OF STATE

Page 513 . . . . .

Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear from any source that the Japanese Ambassadors in various places, for instance, here in Washington and in London, were destroying codes, or did you ever hear of it?

Mr. Welles. I recollect that shortly before December 7th an intercept gave an indication that the Japanese Embassy here was instructed to destroy its papers.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall when that was?

Mr. Welles. Without referring to a record I could not give you the precise day or time.

Senator Ferguson. Was it prior to the 7th?

Mr. Welles. Prior to the 7th.

Senator Ferguson. What did that signify to you as a diplomat and Under Secretary of State?

Mr. Welles. What signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator Ferguson. Did you catch that?

Mr. Welles. That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say it indicated war?

Mr. Welles. A rupture of diplomatic relations at the very least and under the circumstances then existing the probability of war.

Page 777

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. Gesell (Chief Assistant Counsel). General, will you state for the record your full name and your present rank, and duty, please, sir?

General Miles. Sherman Miles, major general, Army of the United States; stationed in Boston, Mass.

Mr. Gesell. You were head of G-2, were you, General, on December 7, 1941?

General Miles. I was, sir.

Mr. Gesell. How long have you had that duty?

General Miles. I reported on May 1, 1940.

Mr. Gesell. What, in a general way, would you say are the duties and the functions of G-2?

General Miles. The Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff is charged with the collection, analysis, estimation, dissemination of information primarily for the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.

G-2 is a staff officer of the Chief of Staff, an assistant chief of staff for intelligence.

Mr. Gesell. G-2 is another name for Military Intelligence Division, is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

. . . . .

Page 841

Mr. Gesell. May I ask you, General, what significance could properly be attached at this time to the number of messages which we had intercepted from the Japanese in the period from December 1 to December 5 and later indicating that the Japanese were destroying their most secret and confidential codes in Washington and in fact throughout the world?

General Miles. The inference would be that the Japanese had either planned for the outbreak of war, in other words, planned to initiate a war as they did or feared war coming suddenly though what was described in that message you recently read, a class of arms.

Mr. Gesell. Therefore, the information concerning code burning and destruction was of a specific and vital military nature, was it not?

General Miles. It was, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. L. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY

Page 4221

Mr. Richardson (General Counsel). Admiral, will you state your name to the reporter, please?

Admiral Ingersoll. R. L. Ingersoll, Admiral, U.S. Navy.

Page 4222

Mr. Richardson. What was your assignment during November and December 1941?

Admiral Ingersoll. I was at that time Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Richardson. Your immediate superior was Admiral Stark?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. What were your duties generally speaking in that assignment, Admiral?

Admiral Ingersoll. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations had no duties assigned by law or by Navy regulations. By Executive

order he was a member of the joint board which was the forerunner of the joint chiefs of staff. By office regulations prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations he had in general supervision of all officers of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. I had no original cognizance of any manner. As a matter of fact I had no office other than myself. And all heads of sections took up their questions with me usually before presenting them to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Once the Chief of Naval Operations had established a policy, I endeavored then to relieve him of all the load that I could of the details in carrying out that policy, in signing papers and releasing dispatches, I kept him informed of correspondence where I thought there was something of which he should be informed.

. . . . .

Page 4226

Admiral Ingersoll. - considered that the information which we received regarding the destruction of the codes and which was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one being the dispatch stating that, "This is a war warning" in effect and that all hope of negotiations had broken off.

Now, the wording in that winds message did not say that we are going to be in a state of war or that hostilities now exist. It referred to a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or that the situation between the countries was becoming critical.

The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes is this: if you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The consuls stay on.

Now, in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes but they told their consuls in Manila, in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Batavia to burn their codes and that did not mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations, it meant war, and that information was sent out to the fleets as soon as we got it and it made no difference whether we ever got an execute from the winds after that or not, and that is why I think officers in high positions are vague about it. It did not make any difference.

Page 4233

Mr. Gearhart (Representative from California). . . . Now the reason why you knew that the destruction of the codes meant war and not merely breaking off of negotiations was the fact that if they were merely breaking off diplomatic negotiations with us they would not have to destroy their codes?

Admiral Ingersoll. Not necessarily.

Mr. Gearhart. They could pack them up, as you said with their second suit of clothes and take them home if they were merely breaking off diplomatic relations.



Admiral Ingersoll. Correct.

Mr. Gearhart. So that it was a dead tip-off, a foregone conclusion in the estimations of the higher ranking military officers that the order for the destruction of their codes within our areas meant nothing but war?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; and the fact that the consulates were included cinched it in my opinion that it was war and not a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic relations.

Page 4269

Senator Ferguson. But would you say that all Navy men would come to the conclusion that the moment that codes were going to be destroyed that that meant war between the countries?

Admiral Ingersoll. That was what we construed it and I think everybody construed it, that it would mean that.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now you know of no one in the high command in the Navy that construed the destruction of the codes in any other way than you construed them?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think everybody in the Navy Department construed the destruction of the codes as the fact that Japan expected to be at war very shortly with the three countries that were involved in that series of messages.

Senator Ferguson. Then we come to this conclusion, that at least on the 4th--I think that is the date they sent the messages out, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. Third or fourth.

Senator Ferguson. Third or fourth, that everyone in the Navy, as far as the high command was concerned, were alerted that war was going to occur between America and Japan?

Admiral Ingersoll. Those instructions were sent to certain commanders, to the commanders of the fleet, to the naval attaches in Europe and to the Marine detachments and others and the purpose of sending it to them was to inform them that we expected to be at war--or that Japan expected to be at war with those countries in a very short time.

Senator Ferguson. And our country was one of them?

Admiral Ingersoll. And our country was one of them.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY

Vol IX

Page 3998

Senator Ferguson. May I want you to look at page 249, the top message from Tokyo to Washington, December the 7, 1941,

"Extremely urgent." The other one was listed, 907, "Urgent, very important," but this is "Extremely urgent" and I will read it:

After deciphering part 14 of my #902<sup>a</sup> and also # 907<sup>b</sup>, 908 and 909. please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine--'

You will notice it says:

the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

Now, I will ask you when that message was received and decoded.

Capt. Kramer. I cannot state, sir, from first-hand knowledge when it was received and when it was decoded. I do know that it was not received, or at least seen by me, until about the middle of Sunday morning,

Senator Ferguson. Now, what hour would that be?

Captain Kramer. I believe that this particular one, 910, which you read, was seen by me first when I returned from my appointment at the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that it was seen at the same time as the 1 o'clock message?

Captain Kramer. That is my recollection, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now I have information here that a 910 and 907--907--there are two short messages I have just read--was filed in Tokyo on 4:18 a.m. on the 7th of December. This is Exhibit 41. It is page 248 of Exhibit 1. And it was intercepted in Japanese code by the Navy station at Bainbridge Island, Washington, at 4:35 a.m.

Captain Kramer. It says 4:37".

.....

Page 3999

Senator Ferguson. You don't know; all right.

Now, let us get to 910, this message about:

Please destroy at once---After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, #908 and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes--

and so forth.

64 2975 A

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Page 2.

/ Translator's Notes to "State Secret Outline of Future Diplomatic Measures vis a vis the United States" /

Pencil additions in the Japanese language to original Japanese typescript are shown by underlining.

/1/ Original sentence (partially crossed out) read as follows prior to alterations:

"But for the time being have the two ambassadors as though it were their own opinion continue the negotiations with the United States with the same opinion as has been expressed hitherto in regard to the basic plan."

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Doc. 3134A

Eu 2975A 2.

- (イ) 米國采ハ帝國從來ノ根本主張ニ長スルモノナルヲ以テ今後交渉ノ基礎トスル能ハサルコト
- (ロ) 我方ハ九月二十五日采又ハ十一月二十日采以外考慮ノ餘地無キコト
- (ハ) 此上トモ米國側ノ再考ヲ促スモノナルコト

備考

- (一) 本同答采ノ内容ハ帝國ノ信義ト公正ナル主張トヲ闡明シ且他日公表ノ場合ヲモ考慮ニ加ヘタルモノタルコト
- (二) 本同答ニ於テハ今後成谷ノ責任ヲ米側ニ負ハシムルヲ如キ指持トシ、而モ交渉打切りヲ印象ツクルカ如キモノタラサル様留意スルコト

Ex 2975A

TIS DOC. 3134A

Page 2.

/ Translator's Notes to "State Secret Outline  
of Future Diplomatic Measures vis a vis the  
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to the basic plan."

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Def. Doc. No. 1401-B-3

From Nomura to Tōgō  
30 November 1941  
No. 1222

The newspapers of the 30th reported an address of Premier Tōjō under big headlines, and special importance was attached to the expression therein that the "exploitation" of the Asiatic peoples by the British and Americans "must be purged with a vengeance." Meanwhile, the White House secretary announced, according to the press, that Secretary Hull promptly reported the speech by telephone to the President, who was taking a rest at Warm Springs, and that the President suddenly changed his program and left there in the afternoon of the 30th for Washington, which he was to reach on the morning of the 1st. As it is feared that the American Government may use the address as material for their propaganda, please take appropriate steps in connection with it and send its text (in Japanese and English) to me promptly.

Def. Doc. No. 1401-C-3

642977

From Tōgō to Nomura  
1 December 1941  
No. 866

Premier Tōjō's address in question was delivered on the occasion of the meeting, held on 30 November under the auspices of the Kōa Dōmei, celebrating the anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and China. It was drafted by the administrative office of that organization. The draft was handed to the press at their request in the evening of the 29th, without due inspection by the Premier and other Government authorities, as the 30th was Sunday and there were to be no evening editions.

The Premier in fact delivered no address on the 30th. As regards the draft, the Premier as well as the Government authorities had no knowledge of it. Necessary measures were taken concerning the Kōa Dōmei.

It is added that the expression in the English translation, "For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance", was in the original Japanese, "For the honor of mankind, and for the pride of mankind, this must be thoroughly rejected." This is for your information.

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442977

Def, Doc, No, 1401-D-2

辯護閣倒文書第一四〇一D&號

東京發野村宛一九四一年十一月五日第七三五號

一、往乳第七二五號日米交渉對策ハ本五日ノ御前會議ニ於テ決定ヲ見タリ  
說テハ貴大使ハ前覽副令ノ趣旨ヲ体シ急折衝ヲ開始セラレ度シ

二、從來ノ深緯ニモ鑿ミ引續キ六月二十一日案從ツテ我方ヨリ言ヘバ九月

二十五日案ヲ基礎トシ交渉ヲ進ムルコト米側ノ期待ニ副フモノト推察セ

ラルルニヨリ話合ノ順序トシテハ先ツ米(往乳第七二六號)ヲ提示ス<sup>1</sup>

ルコト交渉ヲ急速ニ取極ムル爲便宜ナルベシ(當方トシテハ實ハ從來ノ

日米案形式、表現ニ就テモ面白カラスト認ムルモノアルモ價直上甲案ヲ

先ツ提示セントスルモノナリ)據テハ石ノ爲旨ヲ米側ニ對シ説明セラル

ルトキニ往乳第七二五號ノ算情ヲ篤ト完方ニ納得セシメ、以テ最短期間

内ニ同案ニヨリ妥結方極力御盡力アリ度シ

三、米側ニ於テ甲案ニ對シ著ルシキ態度アリ右ニテ妥結不可能ナル際ハ最

後ノ局面打開策トシテ乙案(往乳第七二七號)ヲ提示スル意圖ナルニヨ

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COPY



リ前段甲案ニ對スル米側態度ヲ大至急突止メ電報アリタク尙乙案提示ノ  
隊ハ必ス速メ請訓アリ寢シ  
四、今次訓令ハ帝國政府ノ最後案ナルコト前報ニ續々申渡セル通りニシテ  
事態臨ル切迫シ絶對ニ遲延ヲ許サルルニ付其ノ御含ニテ御努力アリ度ク  
此點重ネテ申渡ス  
五、尤モ「タイム・リミット」ヲ附シ若クハ最後通牒的態度ヲ取ルカ如キ  
印象ハ之ヲ避ケタキニヨリ友好的構衡ヲ以テ出來得ル限り速カニ交渉成  
立ヲ期待スルカ如キ態度ヲ持セラレ度シ

612778

Def. Doc. No. 1400-H-7

Excerpt from Foreign Relations of the United States  
Japan: 1931-1941 Vol. II

Page 778

Statement Handed by the First Secretary of the Japanese  
Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on  
December 2, 1941

The so-called speech of Premier Hideki Tojo was originally drafted by members of the office staff of the East Asia Restoration League, a non-governmental organization of which Mr. Tojo happens to be President, as a congratulatory address to be delivered on November 30, on the occasion commemorating the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China, under the auspices of the said League.

However, November 30 happened to be Sunday; the League staff gave out the manuscript to the newspaper reporters upon their request on the night of November 29 (Saturday), before the said draft was examined by either the Premier himself or other Government officials, and this unapproved manuscript was printed in the metropolitan newspapers.

As a matter of fact, the Premier himself made no speech of any kind on the 30th. Moreover, neither the Premier nor other government authorities had any knowledge as to the content of the said speech.

It should further be noted that the reported statement "For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance" is a mistranslation of the original text. There is, in the original text, no such expression as "purge" or "with a vengeance." The correct translation of the statement should be "For the honor and pride of mankind, this sort of practice must be removed."

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Lup. acc. 1400H-7

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海軍側文書第千四百四十四ノ七

アメリカ合衆国外國關係文書ヨリノ抜萃

一九卅一年乃至一九四一年——日本——

第二卷

第七七八頁

一九四一年十二月二日、日本大使館一等書記官  
(寺崎氏)ガジョゼン・タアリュー・パロンダ  
イン氏ニ手交シタル譯稿也。

東條英機首相ノ例ノ演説ハ、元來ハ、東條氏ガ  
例マソノ懇談タリシ民間團體タル具亞同盟ノ事務  
職員ガ起草シタモノテ十一月卅日ニ上記同盟主催  
ニカ、ル日華基本條約締結一周年記念祝賀會ノ席  
上ケ起ベタルルベキ祝辭デアツタ。  
、コロガ例マ、十一月卅日ハ日曜ニ當ツタノテ、該  
同盟幹部ハ、新聞記者達ノ請フマ、ニ、首相自身  
又ハ他ノ政府ノ官吏ノ校園ヲ俟タズ十一月廿九日  
(土曜日)夜、該草稿ヲ發表シヨノ未承認ノ草稿  
ガ帝都ノ新聞紙上ニ載ツタデアル。  
事實首相自身ハ、卅日ニハ如何ナル演説モシオカ

ツタ。即之首相モ他ノ政府當局者モ、上記叙説ノ  
 内容ニ関シテハ何等知ル處ガ無カシク、  
 長ニ柱目トシテ、ナラズ、  
 類ノ名譽トシテ、  
 東京市ノ徴臣的ニ、  
 原文ノ誤謬ヲ、  
 徴臣的ニ、  
 即チ正體ニ、  
 斯ノ類ノ、  
 二、  
 長ニ柱目トシテ、  
 類ノ名譽トシテ、  
 東京市ノ徴臣的ニ、  
 原文ノ誤謬ヲ、  
 徴臣的ニ、  
 即チ正體ニ、  
 斯ノ類ノ、  
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Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Government Printing Office-Washington: 1946)

Vol. 2

Page 493

**SENATOR FERGUSON:** Now I ask you about a telegram sent by Mr. Winant, our Ambassador to London, dated December 2, 1941, received 10:40 A.M. This was sent to the Secretary of State, personal and secret to the Secretary and the President.

British Admiralty reports that at 3 A.M. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.

Winant

Do you know why the British Admiralty would be notifying our State Department and the President about these ships if we did not have some agreement in relation to their movement?

**MR. WELLES:** Because the information given in this telegram, which I remember very well, was a clear indication that the Japanese were already moving further, proceeding further on their course of domination of the Southwest Pacific region.

Page 495

**SENATOR FERGUSON:** Would you read the one of the 28th, please?

**MR. WELLES (reading):**

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning.

The Ambassador began the conversation by saying that he had expected to spend the week end in Philadelphia, but, since he had heard from his Embassy here that his government was "greatly excited," he had returned to Washington. He read to me a telegram from his government which indicated that our naval officials in London had been informed by the Navy Department that the negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken off and that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated, and that consequently precautionary measures must at once be undertaken. The Ambassador inquired whether this was in fact the case. I replied that the situation so far as I knew was exactly as it was last night, namely, that the Japanese Ambassadors had submitted a statement of the position of this Government, handed to them by the Secretary of State, to their government and that no reply from the Government of Japan had as yet been submitted to this Government through them. I said that consequently I could not say technically that the negotiations had been broken off, although it was, of course, the assumption on the part of the Government of the United States that the Japanese Government would not accept the basis proposed by the Government of the United States. I told the Ambassador of the various reports which had reached the Department of State regarding the situation in the Far East today.

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EX. 2979-A

Def Doc No 1500-D-6

付されたものです。

今朝ロンドン時間で午前三時にカンボデヤ。ポイント沖合で二船団が時  
 間にして十四時間の距離にあるクラ方面に向つて除行してゐるの好見ら  
 れたと英國鎮守府は報告してゐる。第一船団は輸送船二十五隻、巡洋艦  
 六隻、驅逐艦十隻から成り、第二船団は輸送船十隻、巡洋艦十隻からな  
 つてゐる。

（アメリカ合衆國政府印刷局・ワシントン昭和二十一年）

漢語海政譯からの抜萃

格闘圖六を第一五（〇一八一六

THE COPY RETURN TO ROOM 361

ワイナント

吾々にそれらの船舶の移動に際して報告する約束を決めた譯ではないのに英國鎮守府が國務省及大統領に對してかゝる船舶の爲て報告して來た理由を知つてゐますか。

ウエルズ氏 本電報に記載されてゐる情報によれば、私はそれをよく記憶してゐるのですか。日本が既に西太平洋方面を支配する方針に乗り出して、既に移動してゐることが明らかだからです。

上院議員フエルグソン　どうか二十八日附の報告を讀んでくれませんか。  
ウエルズ氏（朗讀）

六使は話の切出しに次のやうに申した。即ち大使はフィラデルフィヤで週末を過す豫定であつたが、英政府は非常に興奮してゐるといふことを當地の英大使館から報告を受けたのでワシントンに歸つた。大使は英政府府が送付した電報を私に讀上げてくれたがそれによると日本とアメリカ合衆國との間に進められてゐた交渉は決裂し日本がすぐ移動を開始するのが予想され従つてそれに對する警戒的措置を速かにとらねばならぬといふことを海軍省が海軍士官達に知らせたことが分る。大使はそれは實際本營であるかどうかと訊ねた。それに對して私の知つてゐる範圍内では情勢は昨夜と全然同じである。即ち日本大使達は國務長官が彼等に渡したアメリカ合衆國政府の立場に對する聲明書を本政府に提出したが、日本政府からの返答は大使達を通じてアメリカ合衆國政府に提出されてゐないと私は答へた。

Def Doc No1500-D-6



従つて交渉は決裂したと私は技術的に申すことは出来ないと言つた。勿論アメリカ合衆国政府が提案した基準案を日本政府が承認しないだらうといふのはアメリカ合衆国政府側の推定であつたが。今日の極東情勢に關し國務省に達した各報告を私は大使に話した。

最後の節である左記の節の内容は次の通りである。

昨日二人の日本大使と大統領及國務長官との間に行はれた合談に就て大使は報告しなかつたので本國政府は大使には困つたものだと思つてゐると大使は言つた。本件に關する報告を私が大使に與へることが出来るかどうか大使は私に訊ねた。そこで私は白亞館で行はれた合談に關する國務長官の覺悟の内容を大使に教へたのである。

Ev2980

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

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Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Yorio SAWAMOTO

1. My name is Yorio SAWAMOTO. I served in the Navy from November 1908 (Meiji 41) when I graduated from the Naval Academy until September 1945 (Showa 20) when I was relegated to the reserves as a full admiral.

During that period I participated in work connected with naval organization in the capacity of First Section Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry (at the time as a captain) from August 1929 (Showa 4) until November 1932 (Showa 7). Further I held the following posts in Tokyo during my years of service.

From August 1921 (Taisho 10) until June 1923 (Taisho 12) - Staff of First Section Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry (Lieutenant Commander).

From December 1926 (Taisho 15) until December 1928 (Showa 3) - Staff of First Section, Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry (Commander).

From February 1936 (Showa 11) until November 1937 (Showa 12) - Chief of General Affairs, Bureau of Naval Fleet Activities Headquarters (Rear Admiral).

From April 1941 (Showa 16) until July 1944 (Showa 19) - Navy Vice Minister (Vice Admiral - Full Admiral)

Besides having held the above posts, I served as Commander of the Second China Fleet from October 1940 (Showa 5) until April 1941 (Showa 16).

2. In the Japanese Navy, naval administration fell under the authority of the Navy Minister, while the Chief of the Naval General Staff disposed of matters concerning naval operations. Naval administration and supreme command were classified according to organization. Both the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff were directly subordinate to the Emperor, so that there was no question of the one being superior or subordinate to the other.

3. The Navy Minister controlled naval administration and supervised all matters concerning naval officers and naval civilians. The office of Navy Minister was that of a civilian official and his appointment and dismissal were decided by a report to the Throne by the Prime Minister in similar fashion with those of the other ministers. It was customary however for the outgoing Navy Minister to nominate a successor and recommend him to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, acting on his recommendation, then took the usual procedure of appointment.

The appointment of the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau followed the same procedure as those of the other Bureau Chiefs of the Navy Ministry and the Navy Minister had complete control of same.

4. The Navy Ministry was composed of the Navy Minister, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Vice Minister, Councillors, the Ministerial Secretariat, the Naval Affairs Bureau, the Mobilization Bureau, the Personnel Bureau, the Educational Bureau, the Bureau of Stores, the Medical Bureau, the Bureau of Accounts and Supplies and the Judicial Affairs Bureau. The Naval Parliamentary Vice-Administrator, Vice Minister and Councillors and the Ministerial Secretariat were similar to the corresponding offices of the other ministries.

The Naval Affairs Bureau handled affairs touching naval administration in general, naval armaments, national defense policy, international regulations, general public relation issues, dissemination of naval knowledge, etc.

The Mobilization Bureau supervised affairs concerning general despatch preparations, national mobilization, supplementing of arms and munitions, sea and land installations and equipment, mobilization of munitions industries, affairs concerning material and resources, shipping port facilities, port service and transportation and protection of trade and labor.

The Personnel Bureau supervised affairs relative to general personnel appointment, dismissal and replacement of officers and special service officers, conferment of rank and honors, pensions,

relief (support), calling out and war time mobilization of naval officers, men and civilians and the drafting of enlisted men, etc.

The Educational Bureau controlled general education and training of the Navy, acceptance into service of naval students, education of naval reserves, education of extra-naval personnel engaged in maritime pursuits, etc.

The Bureau of Stores supervised preparation, preservation and supply of requisites for warship management (equipment, consumption goods) fuel, lubrication oil, clothing, food, etc., as also the regulations and technical knowledge concerning these various items.

The Medical Affairs Bureau controlled medical affairs and sanitation of the Navy and all education concerning same.

The Bureau of Accounts and Supplies handled accounts and finance, budget and settlement of accounts and affairs concerning national property, wage contracts, and original cost calculations

The Judicial Affairs Bureau controlled the various regulations concerning naval judicial affairs, the judicial police and military prosecution.

The various bureau chiefs were appointed by the Navy Minister and their duties were to have their respective bureaus completely in hand and to direct and supervise the work of the divisions and sections of their bureaus.

5. The Naval General Staff disposed of affairs relative to national defense logistics. The Chief of the Naval General Staff was under the direct command of the Emperor and participated in the secrets of the Imperial War Council and controlled the Naval General Staff.

6. As above shown, the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff were organs of different character, though they possessed various common aspects as well.

For example, naval strength was planned by the Naval General Staff as it constituted the basis of operational planning, but the Navy Ministry demanded the budget and the equipment of military strength was conducted by the Ministry. Hence in planning naval

strength it was necessary for the Naval General Staff to consult the Navy Ministry in the first instance.

The actual procedure was for the Chief of the Naval General Staff to plan affairs concerning naval strength and to discuss the same with the Navy Minister. The Chief of the Naval General Staff consulted the Navy Minister on the important items of supplementing of naval strength, despatch preparations and national defense logistics while the Navy Ministry discussed expenditure necessary for the execution of these measures with the Naval General Staff. Further, planning and execution of operations were under exclusive charge of the Naval General Staff, so that the Navy Ministry could have no part therein. Consequently, it was impossible for the Navy Ministry to discuss the pros and cons of operation plans. But depending on the circumstances relative to preparations for operations for which the Navy Ministry was responsible, the Naval General Staff might be forced to change its plans of its own accord.

In the event of war or of hostilities (incidents), if necessity demanded, the Imperial General Headquarters was established. In face of the China Incident, the Imperial General Headquarters was established in November 1937 and was continued throughout the Pacific War. The Imperial General Headquarters was composed of the Supreme Command organs of the Army and Navy, and its internal organization was clearly divided into the two departments of the Army and Navy. The Chiefs of the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff were both Chiefs of Staff and of equal rank and were the highest responsible persons for the operations of their respective forces. Consequently the responsibilities of their work were clearly divided. These organizations related to the Army and Navy were respectively called the Imperial General Headquarters Army Division and the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Division.

In other words the Imperial General Headquarters was composed of an Army Division and a Navy Division. However, the Army and Navy Staff Division which formed the nucleus of the Imperial General

Headquarters were actually the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff respectively, and the two were completely independent of each other. Consequently, in the execution of duties, on operations which concerned both the Army and the Navy, joint discussions and exchanges of information were effected; but on matters which did not concern both branches, there were no consultations, and orders were issued and executed independently. There were two types of Imperial General Headquarters orders - the "Imperial General Headquarters Army Order" and the "Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order" - those related to the Army belonging to the former category, and those related to the Navy forming the latter. Even when the Imperial General Headquarters was established, as there were no special buildings or offices for it, the Naval General Staff became the Imperial General Headquarters, Naval Division, and a board reading Imperial General Headquarters Naval Division was placed alongside the Naval General Staff sign. When the Imperial General Headquarters were established, the Navy Minister had an office in the Headquarters but he did not thereby become an officer on its staff. Neither did the Navy Ministry thereby become an organ of the Imperial General Headquarters. It goes without saying that the Navy Minister was <sup>not</sup> subordinated to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, who was the Chief of Staff of Imperial General Headquarters for the Navy because of this set-up. The presence of the Navy Minister in the Imperial General Headquarters was for the purpose of controlling the various naval affairs connected with operations. Consequently, though the Navy Minister was able to attend the Imperial General Headquarters conferences he had no voice in the proceedings as a general rule.

Important naval operations were planned and put into execution at the Imperial General Headquarters according to the following procedure. The senior officer of the First Division of the Staff of the Naval Division of the Imperial General Headquarters drafted the plan. After passing in order from the First Section Chief, the First Division Chief and the Vice Chief of the Headquarters, the

Chief submitted it to the Emperor for approval. After the sanction had been granted, orders were communicated to the ~~Commander-in-Chief~~ of the Combined Fleet or to the ~~Commanders-in-Chief~~ of the Fleets and dependent on the nature of the issue, to the commanders of naval and minor naval stations. Consequently, the Navy Minister did not participate in operations plans.

1. Commanders-in-Chief were allocated to fleets, naval and minor naval stations.

Commanders-in-Chief of fleets were under the direct orders of the Emperor and assumed command of the Fleet and supervised fleet duties.

Commanders-in-Chief of naval and minor naval stations were under direct orders of the Emperor and controlled defense of their allotted defense sectors and despatch preparations within their sphere of jurisdiction.

The several Commanders-in-Chief received orders from the Navy Minister in matters pertaining to naval administration and instructions from the Chief of the Naval General Staff on matters concerning operational plans.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet directed the fleets under his command but in matters of naval administration, in items other than those immediately related to the command of the Combined Fleet, the Commanders-in-Chiefs of the several fleets received instructions direct from the Navy Minister.

The same applied to the case of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleets.

It was ruled that administration in occupied areas was to be controlled by the several commanders-in-chief under the orders of the Navy Minister. The Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief did not participate in the above administration.

On this 4th day of August, 1947

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: SAWAMOTO, Yorio (seal)

I, SAWAMOTO, Yorio hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAWAMOTO, Yorio (seal)



642980

亞東國聯軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國

其他

對

荒木貞夫

其他

宣誓供述書

供述者


東京都目黒區市ノ木坂町一一〇

澤本頼雄

明治十九年十一月十五日生

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一余は明治四十一年（一九〇八年）十一月海軍兵學校卒業以來昭和二十年（一九四五年）九月海軍大將で豫備役に編入せられる迄約四十年間日本海軍に勤務した

此の間昭和四年（一九二九年）八月から同七年（一九三二年）十一月まで海軍省軍務局第一課長（當時海軍大佐）として海軍の制度其他に関する事務に關與し又左の通り中央關係の勤務に従事した

大正十年（一九二一年）八月より同十二年（一九二三年）六月まで

海軍省軍務局第一課局員 （海軍少佐）

大正十五年（一九二六年）十二月より昭和三年（一九二八年）十二月まで

海軍省人事局第一課局員 （海軍中佐）

昭和十一年（一九三六年）二月より同十二年（一九三七年）十一月まで

海軍艦政本部總務部長 （海軍少將）

昭和十六年（一九四一年）四月より同十九年（一九四四年）七月まで

海軍次官

（海軍中將—海軍大將）

右の外昭和十五年（一九四〇年）十月から昭和十六年（一九四一年）

四月まで第二遣支艦隊司令長官を兼ねたこともある

日本海軍では軍政は海軍大臣の権限に属し統帥は軍令部総長の處理する所であつて軍政及統帥は制度上區分されている。海軍大臣及軍令部総長は各々天皇に直屬していて大臣と總長との間には上下の關係はない

海軍大臣は海軍軍政を管理し海軍軍人軍屬を統督し所管の諸部を監督する

海軍大臣の地位（ポスト）は文官であり他の各省大臣と同様内閣總理大臣が奏上して任免さるるものであるが、實際上の慣例として前任の海軍大臣が後任の海軍大臣を總理大臣に推薦し總理大臣はその

推薦に基いて任命の手続をするのである

軍務局長の補職は他の海軍省の局長の補職とその手続は同様であつて海軍大臣が専行するものである

四

海軍省は大臣、政務次官、次官、参與官と大臣官房、軍務局、兵備

陸軍人事局、教育局、軍需局、口務局、経理局、法務局よりなる

海軍政務次官、次官、参與官及大臣官房は他の各省と同様である

軍務局に於ては海軍軍備、国防政策、國際規約、一般海軍軍政、一

般渉外事項、海軍軍事普及等に関する事務を掌る

兵備局に於ては出陣準備一般、國家總動員、兵器軍需品の充實、水

陸諸施設、軍需工業動員、物資、物源等に関する事、船舶、港湾

港務、運輸等に関する事、通商保護、勞務等に関する事務を掌る

人事局に於ては人事一般、士官、特務士官等の任免補職、敘位、敘

助、恩給、海軍軍人軍属の被服召集、戦時充員、兵の徵募等に関する事務を掌る

教育局に於ては海軍の教育訓練一般、海軍生徒の採用、海軍豫備員の教育、海軍部外海軍関係員の教育等の事務を掌る

軍需局に於ては艦營需品（備品、消耗品等）燃料、潤滑油、被服、糧食等の準備保管供給に關すること及之等諸就に關する規程、技術等に關する事務を掌る

海務局に於ては海軍に於ける海軍官校生徒及之等の教育に關することの事務を掌る

經理局に於ては會計經理、豫算及決算、國有財産に關すること給與、契約、原價、計算に關すること及會計經理の教育に關することの事務を掌る

法務局に於ては海軍法務關係諸法規、軍事司法警察及海軍檢察に關すること、軍事司法の教育等の事務を掌る

各局等は夫々海軍大臣の命を承け其の主務を掌理し局内各部課の事務を指揮監督する

海軍令部は國防用兵に關することを掌る處であつてその長たる軍令部

總長は天皇に直屬して帷幄の機務に參照し軍令部を統轄する  
即ち軍令部總長は用兵作戰に關する海軍の全責任者である

ハ以上の如く海軍省と軍令部とは注目の相異なる機關であるが又相關  
運する部面も多い

例へば兵力量は作戦計畫の基礎をなすものであるから軍令部に於て  
案算するが豫算を要求し兵力の遂行を行ふのは海軍省である、従つ  
て兵力量案算に當つて軍令部は豫め海軍省と協議することが必要と  
なる

實際の手續としては兵力量に關しては軍令部總長が起案して海軍大  
臣に協議することになつて居り兵力量の充實、出師準備及國防用兵  
に關する重要な諸施設に關しては軍令部總長は海軍大臣に協議し之  
等の實施に必要な經費に關しては海軍省から軍令部に協議すること  
に定められている。又作戦の計畫に實施は軍令部の基に掌る處であ  
つて海軍省は之に關與することは出来ない。従つて其の是非を検討  
することは勿論不可能であるが海軍省側適當の作戦準備の情況に依

つては軍令部は自發的に計畫を變更せざるを得ないこととなる  
七 戦時又は事變に際して必要に應じ大本營を設置されることになつて  
居り現に一九三七年十一月支那事變に際して大本營が設置され太平  
洋戦争中も之が繼續せられた。大本營は陸軍及海軍の統帥機關から  
成つていて其の内部の組織は陸軍、海軍に確然と二分されて居る  
參謀總長と軍令部總長とは共に幕僚長として並頭で各軍の作戰に關  
する最高責任者であり、従つて業務の責任もハツキリ兩者で分擔さ  
れて居る。而して之等陸軍、海軍關係組織を夫々大本營陸軍部及大  
本營海軍部と呼稱されて居る  
誤言すれば大本營は陸軍部と海軍部とから成つてゐると謂ふことに  
なるのである。而して大本營の主体たる陸海軍幕僚部は實際に於て  
夫々參謀本部及軍令部其のものであつて兩者は全く獨立してゐた。  
従つて其の業務遂行にあつて陸海軍相互に關係を有する作戰に  
關しては互に協議又は通報を行はなければならざるものは協議を行は  
ず總て單獨に命令を發し又實施してゐた。大本營の命令には「大

陸命」と「大海令」の二つあつて海軍に関するものは前者であり海軍に関するものは後者である。又大本營が設置されても建物の事務所が別にあつた譯ではなく軍司令部がそのまま大本營海軍部となり軍司令部の看板と並んで大本營海軍部と云ふ看板を一枚掲げられたのである。大本營が設置せられた場合海軍大臣は大本營には在るが幕僚でも無く大本營の諸機關でも無い。又海軍の幕僚長たる軍司令部總長の隷下に無いことは勿論である。

海軍大臣が大本營にあるのは作戦に關連する軍政百般の事務を掌理する爲である。従つて海軍大臣は大本營會議に列席することは出来たが作戦に關しては何等發言しないのが例であつた。大本營で海軍の重要な作戦が計畫せられ實施せらるる迄の順序を述べるに、大本營海軍部參謀部第一部の主務者が起草し第一課長、第一部長、次長と順序を経て總長の決裁を受け、次で陛下の御裁可を仰ぎ連合艦隊司令長官又は艦隊司令長官或は種類によつては鎮守府警備府各司令長官に命令が傳達されるのである。従つて作戦計畫に



海軍大臣は關與はしない

へ 艦隊、鎮守府及警備府には司令長官を置いてゐる

艦隊司令長官は天皇に直屬し艦隊を統率し隊務を統督してゐる

鎮守府、警備府各司令長官は天皇に直屬し所管警備區の防備並に所管の出師準備に關することを掌る

各司令長官の所管事項中軍政に關しては海軍大臣の指揮を承け作戦計畫に關しては軍令部總長の指示を受けてゐる

連合艦隊司令長官は 下艦隊を統率するが軍政に關しては連合艦隊の統率に直接附帯する事項の外は各艦隊司令長官が直接大臣の指揮を承けることになつてゐる

方面艦隊司令長官に就いても連合艦隊司令長官の場合と同様である  
占領地の行政に關しては各司令長官が海軍大臣の命を承け之を掌ること  
に定められてゐる但し連合艦隊司令長官は之に關與しないこと  
になつてゐる

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月四日

供述者 澤本 順 雄

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シ  
マス

同日 於

立會人 小野 清 一 郎

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Second Demobilization Office of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese and English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Chart of the Organization of the Imperial Japanese Navy" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Second Demobilization Office of the Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 1st day of August 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori  
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.


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Board of Health

Board of Health



系統  
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Except from

海軍  
Marshal's Fleet Admiral

海軍會議院  
Parliament of War Councilors

海軍大臣官  
Parliamentary Sec-  
Minister of the Navy

海軍參事官  
Parliamentary Councillor  
of the Navy


海軍省  
Ministerial Secretariate

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Minister of the Navy


海軍省

水 部  
Hydrographic Department

海軍測量部  
Submarine Department







陸軍部  
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艦隊司令部  
Ships and Units

駐紮地方海軍官員  
Resident Naval Officers in  
China and its Frontier Areas


艦隊司令部  
Fleet Command

兵 (陸軍)  
Gendarmes (Army)

陸軍部  
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陸軍部  
Staff Officers  
陸軍部  
Chief Engineer

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
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第 四

條

艦

艦隊合艦隊ニ司令長官(503)等ト稱スルヲ例トス

艦隊ニハ必要ニ應シ水雷隊、掃海隊、驅逐隊、警備隊等ヲ編入シ

艦船ヲ附屬ス

艦隊ハ編成ニ因リ之ヲ第一艦隊、第二航空艦隊、第三水雷艦隊、

第四潜水艦隊、第五輸送艦隊等ト稱ス

艦隊等ヲ以テ編成スルトキハ之ヲ航空艦隊、水雷艦隊、潜水艦隊、

驅逐隊、水雷隊、砲隊、海防隊、輸送隊、驅逐隊、潜水艦、輸送

ヲ以テ之ヲ編成ス、但シ主トシテ航空母艦、水上機母艦、航空隊

ハ航空隊ヲ以テ軍艦以外ノ此等ノ一部ヲ以テ又ハ航空隊三隊以上

上潜水艦二隻以上砲艦二隻以上海防艦二隻以上輸送艦二隻以上若

艦隊ハ軍艦二隻以上ヲ以テ軍艦及驅逐隊輸送隊驅逐艦二隻以

艦隊ハ必要ニ應シ之ヲ艦隊ニ編分ス

第 二

條

艦

艦 令 抜 萃 (大正三ノ一ノ三ノ五ノ令海軍十ニシ)

艦隊ニ司令長官又ハ司令官ヲ置ク

艦隊ニ司令官ヲ置ク但シ第三十條ノ場合ニ於テハ之ヲ置カサルコ

トヲ得、聯合艦隊司令長官、艦隊司令長官及獨立艦隊司令官ハ新

補トス

第十條 聯合艦隊司令長官ハ

天皇ニ直隸シ聯合艦隊ヲ統率シ之ニ關スル隊如ヲ統督ス、

聯合艦隊司令長官ハ軍政ニ關シテハ海軍大臣ノ指揮ヲ承ケ又作戦

計畫ニ關シテハ軍令部總長ノ指示ヲ承ク

第十一條 艦隊司令長官ハ

天皇ニ直隸シ麾下ノ艦隊ヲ統率シ隊務ヲ總理ス

艦隊司令長官ハ軍政ニ關シテハ海軍大臣ノ指揮ヲ承ケ又作戦計畫

ニ關シテハ軍令部總長ノ指示ヲ承ク

第三十一條 聯合艦隊ニ屬スル艦隊司令長官又ハ獨立艦隊司令官ハ聯合艦隊司令

官ノ指揮ヲ承ク

第三十二條 艦隊司令長官ノ職責中統率ニ關スル事項ハ之ヲ聯合艦隊司令長官ニ準用ス

第三十三條 獨立艦隊司令官ハ

天皇ニ直隸シ其ノ職權ニ付テハ艦隊司令長官ニ關スル規定ヲ準用ス、

第三十四條 戰隊司令官ハ艦隊司令長官ニ隸シ麾下戰隊又ハ其ノ一部ヲ指揮統率シ第十二條至第十六條乃至第十九條第二十六條及第二十七條ノ規定ニ準シ服務ス

聯合艦隊司令長官又ハ艦隊司令長官ノ直率スル戰隊ノ司令官ハ司令長官ノ命スル所ニ依リ服務ス



第三十二條 艦隊司令長官ノ職責中統率ニ關スル事項ハ之ヲ聯合艦隊司令長官ニ準用ス

第三十三條 獨立艦隊司令官ハ

天皇ニ直隸シ其ノ職權ニ付テハ艦隊司令長官ニ關スル規定ヲ準用ス、

第三十四條 戰隊司令官ハ艦隊司令長官ニ隸シ麾下戰隊又ハ其ノ一部ヲ指揮統率シ第十二條第十六條乃至第十九條第二十六條及第二十七條ノ規定ニ準シ服務ス

聯合艦隊司令長官又ハ艦隊司令長官ノ直率スル戰隊ノ司令官ハ司令長官ノ命スル所ニ依リ服務ス

同日於所

立會人

宗

實

信

次

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ門前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

明治二十二年五月十九日 於東京

吉

井

道

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文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ關スル證明書 (三編)

自分吉井道翁ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處茲ニ添  
附セラレタル日本證ニ依ツテ聲カレ三頁ヨリ成ル試験令擬萃ト題スル  
事竝ハ日本政府(復員廳第二復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ抜萃ノ正  
確ニシテ眞實ナル屬シナルコトヲ證明ス

6-1-1975

Def. Doc. #1648

GENERAL ORDINANCE CONCERNING THE  
ORGANIZATION OF THE FLEET (AIRCRAFT)

(Gunrei-Kai No. 10, Nov. 30, 1941.

Art. 2. A fleet shall be divided into squadrons as the occasion may demand.

A squadron shall be composed of the following: two or more battleships; a battleship and a destroyer division, submarine division, transport division, two or more destroyers, two or more submarines, two or more gunboats, two or more escorts, two or more transports or air groups; a portion of these without a battleship; or two or more air groups; when it is composed of aircraft carriers, seaplane carriers, flying corps, destroyer divisions, submarine division, gunboat divisions, escort divisions, transport divisions, destroyers, submarines, transports etc., it shall be customarily known as the air squadron, destroyer squadron, submarine squadron, transport squadron etc.

When the occasion demands, a squadron may include destroyer divisions, minesweeper divisions, sub-chaser divisions, patrol ships, etc. or have independent floating unit attached to it.

Depending upon the manner of its organization, a squadron shall be known as the First Squadron, Second Air Squadron, Third Destroyer Flotilla, Fourth Submarine Flotilla, Fifth Transport Squadron etc.

Art. 4. The Combined Fleet shall have a commander-in-chief.

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Def. Doc. 1648

Each fleet may have either a commander-in-chief or a commandant. A Squadron shall have a commandant. But in the case of Article 30 below, this post may be omitted.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, commanders-in-chief of the fleets and the commandant of an independent fleet shall be direct Imperial appointments.

Art. 10. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, directly subordinate to the Emperor, shall command the Combined Fleet and superintend affairs relating to the fleet. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall receive orders from the Minister of the Navy as regards administrative affairs and directions from the Chief of the Navy General Staff as regards the planning of war operations.

Art. 11. The commander-in-chief of a fleet, directly subordinate to the Emperor, shall command the fleet under him and direct affairs of his fleet. The commander-in-chief of a fleet shall receive orders from the Minister of the Navy as regards administrative affairs and directions from the Chief of the Navy General Staff as regards the planning of war operations.

Art. 31. The Commanders-in-chief of the fleets or the commandant of an independent fleet under the Combined Fleet shall be commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

Def. Doc. #1648

Art. 32. Of those duties relating to the commanders-in-chief of the fleets, those pertaining to military command shall be applicable to the Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

Art. 33. The commandant of an independent fleet shall be directly subordinate to the Emperor, and those provisions pertaining to fleet commanders-in-chief shall be applicable to him regarding his official powers.

Art. 34. The commandant of a squadron shall be subordinate to a fleet commander-in-chief. He shall hold and command the squadron or a portion of it under him and shall perform his duties in accordance with the provisions as set forth in Articles 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26 and 27.

The commandant of a squadron directly commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet or the commander-in-chief of a fleet shall perform his duties as ordered by the said commander-in-chief.

Dof. Doc. #1648

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, DOKYO, who occupy the post of Chief of Archives Section, Second Demobilization Office Demobilization Department, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Imperial Ordinance Concerning the Organization" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Second Demobilization Office Demobilization Department.)

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 19 day of May, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, DOKYO (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /s/ IMEMIZU, Shinji (seal)

RULES GOVERNING BUSINESS CONTACT BETWEEN  
NAVAL MINISTRY AND NAVAL GENERAL STAFF (EXCERPT)

(Mei-rei No. 294 Oct. 1, 1933)

Art. 1. The rules below provided govern the manner in which affairs will be dealt with that are interrelated between the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff.

Art. 2. When the Imperial Supreme Headquarters is not established though the nation is at war, interrelated affairs will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the "wartime Imperial Supreme Headquarters Service Regulations besides the Rules herein provided.

Art. 3. As regards the scale of military strength the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft and seek the decision or approval of the throne after negotiation with the Minister of the Navy.

Art. 4. As for the following matters, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy, seek the Imperial sanction, and then transmit them to related Imperial armed forces as well as notifying the Minister of the Navy. In case the Minister of the Navy sees some necessity regarding the despatch of naval forces, he will propose negotiations with the Chief of the Naval General Staff in that connection.

- a. The strategical despatch of armed forces, and the duties and movements thereof.

b. The tactical and strategical duties and movements of fleets.

c. The despatch of armed forces for protective purposes overseas, and the strategical and tactical duties and movements thereof.

Art. 5. As for the following matters, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy, seek the Imperial sanction, and then transmit them to appropriate quarters as well as notifying the Minister of the Navy:

a. Order of Battle in time of war.

b. Military manoeuvres and exercises, both major and minor.

c. The basic models and principles on tactics and logistics for the use of naval forces at war.

Art. 6. Concerning the following matters, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy, seek the Imperial sanction, and then transfer them to the Minister of the Navy, who will in turn put them into execution:

a. Peacetime organization of fleets and flying units.

b. Organizations of destroyer flotillas, submarine flotillas, torpedo-boat units, minesweeper divisions, flying units, landing parties, etc.



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- c. Regulations governing the Fleet Manoeuvres; and the Regulations governing the Naval Manoeuvres.
- d. The Rules governing the Succession of Military Command and like matters.

Art. 7. As for the following matters, the Minister of the Navy will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and put them into execution; in the case of matters which require the Imperial sanction, the Chief of the Naval General Staff shall seek it or them and transfer them to the Minister of the Navy for execution. In spite of the above the Chief of the Naval General Staff shall propose the negotiation to the Minister of the Navy when he sees the necessity:

- a. Despatch of naval forces, and the duties and movements thereof, excepting those provided for in Article 4 above.
- b. The commissioning of naval combat vessels, and the change of service status thereof.
- c. The administrative allocation of naval combat vessels among various naval stations regarding the maintenance and manning thereof.

Art. 8. As for the following matters, the Minister of the Navy will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Chief of the Naval General Staff, seek the Imperial sanction when

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necessary, and put them into execution; but the Chief of the Naval General Staff will propose the negotiation to the minister of the navy when he sees the necessity:

- a. The establishment of the permanent organization of naval forces and schools, and the fixing of the standard personnel thereof.
- b. The appointment of staff officers.
- c. Standard instructions and rules concerning the exercise of naval arts, and the handling of weapons.

Art. 9. Concerning specially ordered inspections the Chief of the Naval General Staff will conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy, and the Minister of the Navy will seek the Imperial sanction concerning them.

Art. 10. As for the various important establishment relating to the strengthening of naval armament, to the preparation for war, and to the national defense and to the use of armed forces, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy.

Art. 11. As for the following matters, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft and transfer it to the Minister of the Navy:

- a. The Various Regulations concerning "wartime Communications and the Witness Communication Regulations.

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necessary, and put them into execution; but the Chief of the Naval General Staff will propose the negotiation to the minister of the navy when he sees the necessity:

- a. The establishment of the permanent organization of naval forces and schools, and the fixing of the standard personnel thereof.
- b. The appointment of staff officers.
- c. Standard instructions and rules concerning the exercise of naval arts, and the handling of weapons.

Art. 9. Concerning specially ordered inspections the Chief of the Naval General Staff will conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy, and the Minister of the Navy will seek the Imperial sanction concerning them.

Art. 10. As for the various important establishment relating to the strengthening of naval armament, to the preparation for war, and to the national defense and to the use of armed forces, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy.

Art. 11. As for the following matters, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft and transfer it to the Minister of the Navy:

- a. The Various Regulations concerning "Artine Communications and the Wireless Communication Regulations.

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b. Secret Code Books, Signal Code Books, etc.

Art. 12. As for the necessary expenditures for the various important establishments relating to the strengthening of naval armament, to the preparations for war, to the national defense and to the use of armed forces, consultation will be made by the Ministry of the Navy with the Naval General Staff.

Art. 13. As for matters affecting the strength of armed forces such as the installation of ships' armament and selections of types thereof and important establishments on land and sea, and as for matters concerning important research and experiment on the above, consultation will be made between the Ministry of the Navy and the Naval General Staff.

Art. 14. As for the reports and the like materials related to education and training, to research and experiment, and to important missions, investigations will be made jointly by the Ministry of the Navy and the Naval General Staff.

Art. 15. After consultation with the Chief of the Naval General Staff, the Minister of the Navy will give instructions on administrative matters to the naval attaches and assistant naval attaches detailed to the Japanese embassies and legations abroad.

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Art. 16. As for matters involving monetary expenditure such as the intelligence service, fleet manoeuvres, operations of naval vessels, or the compilation of books, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will draw up a plan and institute negotiations with the Minister of the Navy.

Art. 17. As for the matters concerning discipline and morals, education and training, and other important military affairs and various regulations related to the national defense and the use of armed forces, in addition to those provided in the various articles stated above, the Minister of the Navy will keep close contact with the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Def Doc No. 1647

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of The Chief of the Archives of the 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Rules Governing Business Contact between Naval Ministry and Naval General Staff" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The 2nd Demobilization Section).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 19th day of May, 1947

YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness:

SOJIMA, Shinji (seal)

91, 2932

ref Doc # 1147

海軍省軍令部及海軍省軍令部相互間ニ関シテ

昭和八年十月一日  
内令第二九四四號

第一條 本規程ハ海軍省軍令部相互間ニ関シテアル事務ノ處理ニ「スルコト  
ヲ規定ス

第二條 戦時ニ在リテハ大本營ヲ極カレザル間ニ於ケル業務ニ関シテハ本  
規程ノ外戦時大本營勅令ヲ適用ス

第三條 兵六景ニ關シテハ軍令部總長之ヲ提案シ海軍大臣ニ商議ノ上御裁  
定又ハ御内裁ヲ仰グ

第四條 在ノ戸口ハ軍令部總長提案シ海軍大臣ニ商議シ允否ヲ仰ギタル後  
之ヲ傳達シ海軍大臣ニ送附ス又海軍大臣ハ陸軍省ノ派遣ニ關シ  
必取ト認ムル場合ニハ軍令部總長ニ商議ス

第五條 軍令部ニ關スル陸軍省ノ派遣任務及行勤  
第六條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤

第七條 海外特派員及陸軍省ノ派遣、用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第八條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第九條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
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第七十九條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第八十條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第八十一條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第八十二條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第八十三條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第八十四條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
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第八十八條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第八十九條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
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第九十六條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第九十七條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第九十八條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第九十九條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤  
第一百條 陸軍省ノ用兵上ノ任務及行勤

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Rev. Hist. = 1647

一 平時編成

二 大小洋群

三 海軍要令

第六條 左ノ事項ハ軍令部部長之ヲ起シ海軍大臣ニ報告シ之ヲ仰ゲタル後海軍大臣ニ移シ海軍大臣之ヲ奉行ス

一 戦隊及航空隊ノ平時編制

二 陸隊、潜水隊、水雷隊、掃海隊、飛行隊、陸戦隊ノ編制

三 艦隊運動程式、演習令

四 軍令部令及之ニ關スル事項

第七條 左ノ事項ハ海軍大臣起案シ軍令部部長ニ報告シ之ヲ仰ゲタル後海軍大臣ニ移シ海軍大臣之ヲ奉行ス  
又ハ進行ス但シ軍令部部長ハ必要ト認ムル事項ハ海軍大臣ニ報告ス

一 第四條ニ規定スル以外ノ海軍部隊ノ派遣、任及行務

二 艦艇ノ定額



第八條左ノ事項ハ海軍大臣起案シ軍令部總長ニ承認シテ之ヲ發スルモノ

一 海軍大臣之ヲ仰キ海軍大臣之ヲ奉行又ハ執行ス但シ軍令部總長ハ必要ト認ムル事項ヲ海軍大臣ニ承認ス

二 艦隊部除及學校ノ組織及定員ノ制定

三 參謀官ノ補職

四 教練、操式類

第九條特命檢閱ハ軍令部總長海軍大臣ニ商議シ海軍大臣之ヲ仰グ

第十條兵力ノ充實、出師準備及國防用兵ニ關スル重要ナル諸施設ニ關シ

テハ軍令部總長海軍大臣ニ商議ス

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一 戰時通信準備規程、無線通信規程

二 陸軍、海軍等

第十二條兵力ノ充實、出師準備及國防用兵ニ關スル重要ナル諸施設ノ爲

ニ關シテハ海軍大臣之ヲ軍令部ニ承認ス

第十三條陸軍兵力ノ整備、訓練、重要ナル水陸設備等兵力ノ伸縮ニ關ス

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第八條 左ノ事項ハ海軍大臣起案シ軍令部部長ニ稟請シ允テ奏テ要スルモノ

ハ海軍大臣之奏ヲ仰キ海軍大臣之ヲ奉行又ハ奉行ス但シ軍令部部長

長ハ必要ト認ムル專断ヲ海軍大臣ニ認ムス

一 艦隊部除及學校ノ编制及定員ノ制定

二 參謀官ノ補職

三 教練、操式類

第九條 特命檢閱ハ軍令部部長海軍大臣ニ商議シ海軍大臣之奏ヲ仰グ

第十條 兵力ノ充實、出師準備及國防用兵ニ關スル重要ナル諸施設ニ關シ

テハ軍令部部長海軍大臣ニ商議ス

第十一條 左ノ事項ハ軍令部部長之ヲ起案シ海軍大臣ニ稟請ス

一 戰時通信規程、無線通信規程

二 陸軍、信務規程

第十二條 兵力ノ充實、出師準備及國防用兵ニ關スル重要ナル諸施設ノ爲

ニ關シテハ海軍大臣ハ之ヲ軍令部ニ商議ス

第十三條 陸軍兵器ノ整備、製造、重要ナル水陸軍用兵器ノ俾給ニ關ス

162, No. 1647

ル事項及重要ナル實地研究ハ海軍省軍令部互ニ協議ス

第十三條 教育訓練、實地研究及重要任務ニ關スル報告等ハ海軍省軍令部共ニ之ヲ報告ス

第十五條 海軍大臣ハ軍令部部長ニ附屬ノ上在外帝國大使館ニ武官同輔佐官ニ對シ軍政上ノ訓令ヲ與フ

第十六條 艦艇、汽船、鐵船行動又ハ編纂等經費ヲ要スル事項ハ軍令部部長其ノ計畫ヲ豫定シ之ヲ海軍大臣ニ協議ス

第十七條 前條條ノ外軍紀風紀、軍隊教育其ノ他國防用兵ニ關スル重要ナル軍令及訓法規ニ關シテハ海軍大臣ハ軍令部部長ト密接ナル連絡ヲ保

持ス

文書ノ出所如ニ成立ニ スル弊毀者

自分吉井道彦ハ有員廳第二復員局文書部長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添補セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ四頁ヨリ成ル海軍省軍令部第五號規程抜抜表ト題スル書類ハ日本政府ハ復員廳第二復員局ノ保管ニ任ル公文書ノ據萃ノ正碁ニシテ保管ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年五月十九日 於東京

吉 井 道 彦

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ印前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立入人 宗 宮 信 次

File # 1647

# EXHIBIT

2804

Def. Doc. # 1671

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

## ORDINANCE CONCERNING COMBINED NAVAL FLYING CORPS. (EXCERPT)

( Naval General Staff order No. 17,  
Dec. 10, 1938.

Art. 1. Combined Naval Flying Corps shall be composed of two or more air groups each, shall be known as the First Combined Naval Flying Corps, Second Combined Naval Flying Corps, etc.

Other naval units, afloat or ashore, may be attached to a Combined Naval Flying Corps when such necessity arises.

Art. 2. A Combined Naval Air Command shall be composed of two or more Combined Naval Flying Corps.

Art. 4. The Combined Naval Air Command shall have a Commandant. The commandant directly subordinate to the throne, shall command the Combined naval air command under him. He shall also be in charge of naval administration subject to orders from the Minister of the Navy.

With regard to the planning of operations, the commandant shall receive directions from the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

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Def. Doc. # 1671

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michirori, who occupy the post of Chief of Document Section, the Second Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of one page and entitled "Ordinance Concerning Combined Naval Flying Corps." is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 10th day of May, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII Michirori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ YAMAMOTO Shinji (seal)

2

海軍聯合航空隊令拔萃

(昭和十三年十二月十日軍令海陸第十七號)

第一條

海軍聯合航空隊ハ海軍航空隊二隊以上ヲ以テ之ヲ編成シ第一聯合航空隊第二聯合航空隊等ト稱ス。

第二條

海軍聯合航空隊ニハ必要ニ應ジ戰術部隊ヲ附屬ス。海軍聯合航空隊二隊以上ヲ以テ海軍聯合航空總隊ヲ編成ス。

第四條

海軍聯合航空總隊ニ總隊司令官ヲ置ク。總隊司令官ハ天皇ニ直轄シ部下ノ海軍聯合航空總隊ヲ統率シ又海軍大臣ノ命ヲ承ケ軍政ヲ掌ル。

總隊司令官ハ作戰計畫ニ關シテハ軍令部總長ノ指示ヲ承ク

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文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

自分、吉井道致ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ筆カレ一頁ヨリ成ル海軍聯合航空隊令拔萃ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（復員廳第二復員局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年五月十九日 於東京

吉井道致

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 宗 宮 信 次



6-1-25

LAWS AND ORDINANCES CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION  
OF NAVAL STATIONS. (EXCERPT)

(Naval General Staffs order Aug. 23, 1926)

Art. 1. There shall be established a naval station in every naval port. Each naval station shall be called by the name of the respective naval port where the naval station is located.

Art. 2. The naval stations shall deal with defense and security measures of the respective naval districts under their jurisdictions, as well as the various naval preparations for war delegated to them, and shall supervise various offices and departments attached to them.

Art. 3. Naval Stations shall be commanded by their respective Commanders-in-Chief. The Commanders-in-Chief shall be appointed by His Majesty the Emperor.

Art. 4. The Commanders-in-Chief shall be directly subordinate to the throne and shall be in command of their respective subordinate armed units, both afloat and ashore. They shall also deal with administrative matters as directed by the minister of the navy. In matters concerning the planning of war operations, they shall be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Art. 5. The Commanders-in-Chief shall direct all the affairs of their respective naval stations, and shall supervise and superintend the discipline and morals as well as educations and training of their respective subordinates.

Art. 11. The Commanders-in-Chief are empowered to direct the military police stationed in their respective naval districts as regards the enforcement of the Fortified Zone Law and the Regulations Concerning both Regular and Auxiliary Naval Ports.

... 1672

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Yoshii, Michinori, who occupy the post of Chief of the Document Section, the Second Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Law and Ordinances Concerning the organization of Naval Stations." is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd., Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 12 th day of May, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness : /s/ MUNEMITSU, Shinji. (seal)

612985

鎮守府令 抜萃

(大正十二年八月二十三日軍令海第五號)

第一條

各軍港ニ鎮守府ヲ附ク。

第二條

鎮守府ハ其ノ所在ノ地名ヲ冠稱ス。

第三條

鎮守府ハ所管警備區ノ防禦及警備並所管ノ出帥準備ニ  
コトヲ掌リ又所屬各部ヲ監督スル所トス。

第四條

鎮守府ニ司令長官ヲ附ク。

第五條

司令長官ハ親補トス。

第六條

司令長官ハ

天皇ニ直隸シ部下ノ艦船部隊ヲ統率シ又海軍大臣ノ命ヲ承テ  
軍政ヲ掌ル。

司令長官ハ作戰計畫ニ關シテハ軍令部總長ノ指示ヲ承ク。

第七條

司令長官ハ府務ヲ總理シ部下ノ軍紀風紀及教育訓練ヲ統  
監ス。

第八條

司令長官ハ要塞地帶法及軍港要港規則ノ施行ニ關シテハ所  
在

憲兵ヲ指揮スルコトヲ得。

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文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル詳細書

自分吉井道致ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添  
附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ二頁ヨリ成ル鎮守府拔萃ト題スル書  
類ハ日本政府（復員廳第二復員局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニ  
シテ確實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年五月十九日 於東京

吉 井 道 致

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同 日 於 同 所

立 會 人 宗 宮 信 次

Ex 2986

Def. Dec. 1673

LAWS AND ORDINANCES CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION

OF AUXILIARY NAVAL STATIONS (EXCERPT)

NAVAL GENERAL STAFF ORDER NO. 1

March 26, 1923

Art. 1. Auxiliary naval stations shall be established at all auxiliary naval ports (excluding the Tokuyama and Bako auxiliary naval ports). Each auxiliary naval station shall be known by the name of the locality in which it is situated.

Art. 2. An auxiliary naval station shall deal with matters relating to defense and police measures of the patrol area under its jurisdiction as well as the preparations for war delegated to it, and shall supervise various offices and departments attached to it.

Art. 3. Each auxiliary naval station shall have a commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief shall be appointed by His Majesty the Emperor.

Art. 9. The commander-in-chief shall be directly subordinate to the Emperor and shall be in command of all naval forces, afloat or ashore, under him. He shall also be in charge of naval administration subject to orders from the Minister of the Navy.

With regard to the planning of war operations, the commander-in-chief shall be directed by the Chief of the Navy General Staff.

Art. 10. The commander-in-chief shall direct affairs pertaining to his naval station and superintend the discipline, morals, education and training of his subordinates.

Art. 15. The commander-in-chief is empowered to direct the military police stationed in his district as regards the enforcement of the Fortified Zone Law and the Regulations concerning Regular and Auxiliary Naval Ports.

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Def. Doc. # 1673

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII Michinori, who occupy the post of Chief of the Document Section, the 2nd, Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, hereby certify that document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of one pages and entitled "Laws and Ordinances Concerning the Organization of Auxiliary Naval Station. (Excerpt)." is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board.)

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 19th day of May, 1947

/s/ YOSHII Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /s/ MURAMATSU Shinji (seal)

警備府令 抜萃

(大正十二年三月二十六日軍令海第一號)

第一條

各要港（徳山要港及馬公要港ヲ除ク）ニ警備府ヲ置ク。  
警備府ハ其ノ所在ノ地名ヲ冠稱ス。

第二條

警備府ハ所管警備隊ノ防禦及警備並所管ノ出師準備ニ關スルコトヲ掌リ又所屬各部ヲ監督スル所トス。

第八條

警備府ニ司令長官ヲ置ク。

司令長官ハ判補トス。

第九條

司令長官ハ

天皇ニ直轄シ部下ノ艦艇部隊ヲ統率シ又海軍大臣ノ命ヲ承ケ軍政ヲ掌ル。

司令長官ハ作戰計畫ニ關シテハ軍令部長ノ指示ヲ承ク。

第十條

司令長官ハ府務ヲ總理シ部下ノ軍紀風紀及教育訓練ヲ統監ス。

第十五條

司令長官ハ要港地帯法及軍港要港規則ノ施行ニ關シテハ所在憲兵ヲ指揮スルコトヲ得。

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文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

自分、菅井清致ハ復員局第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル事、茲ニ添付セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ一頁ヨリ成ル警備府令拔萃ト稱スル書類ハ日本政府（復員局第二復員局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル事ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年五月十九日 於東京

吉井清致

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 宗宮信次



442987

Def. Doc. No. 1926

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: SHIMIZU, Mitsumi

Having first duly sworn as oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. My Name is SHIMIZU, Mitsumi. I am a former Vice-Admiral of the Japanese Navy. I occupied the following posts in connection with personnel affairs during the 26 years of my naval service.

From December 1923 till December 1924

(Lieutenant Commander)

Staff officer of the Education Bureau, Navy Ministry. Naval Cadets Selection Committee member.

From December 1931 till April 1934 (Captain)

1st Section Chief of the Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry.

From December 1936 till December 1938 (Rear-Admiral)

Chief of Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry.

2. All Naval personnel affairs were handled by the Navy Minister.

- 1 -

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3. Although a naval officer was appointed to the post of Navy minister, he was considered a civilian official from the standpoint of the Government system. Hence his appointment and dismissal were determined by a Report to the Throne made by the Prime Minister as in the case of other cabinet ministers. In the event of change of the Navy Minister, it was customary for the Premier to request the outgoing Minister of the navy to recommend his successor and the latter to name an appropriate candidate from among the officers of the Navy.

4. The appointment of staff officers, officers who were very closely connected with the Chief of Naval General Staff and the Naval General Staff, was decided by the Minister of the navy after Consultation with the Chief of Naval General Staff. In cases where Imperial sanction was required, the Minister of the Navy directly reported to the Throne for same without approaching the Cabinet.

5. The appointment of the Vice-minister of the navy and of the various Bureau Chiefs of the Navy Ministry was conducted as follows. The Personnel Bureau Chief after Considering various qualification such as personality and ability would select three most promising candidates, numbering them in order of merit and would submit the list to the Minister of the Navy. Whereupon, the latter would decide on the one which he believed was most suited to the office.

In the selection of the several Bureau Chiefs the opinion of the Vice-minister was taken into consideration besides the plan of the Chief of the Personnel Bureau.

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6. It was customary to appoint Commander-in-Chief of Fleets and of Minor Naval Stations simultaneously with the regular annual personnel shifts in December. The regular personnel appointments were decided by the Minister of the Navy through selection of an Appointment Plan tentatively drafted by the Chief of Personnel Bureau.

Special consideration was given in the selection of Naval school instructions and others in educational posts, people with abundant common-sense and sublime personalities being chosen for these posts.

7. According to the Service Table regulations, the commanders of each unit were responsible for the preparation of a service table of his subordinate officers and the submission of same to the Minister of the Navy through their superior officers of the direct line of command, every August. The Chief of the Personnel Bureau kept in custody and adjusted these service tables, and being kept fully informed on details of the personalities and abilities of all the officers of the Navy, drafted and submitted to the Minister of the Navy the Personnel Change Plan of all Naval officers on the principle of just and non-partisan choice of the right man for the right post. The Minister of the Navy passing his decision on the basis of this plan would result in the issuing of the appointment orders.

8. Selection for promotion of officers was handled with special care; a promotion conference being held each year in autumn to decide promotions. This Promotion conference was attended by all

the commanders-in-Chief of Fleets, Minor Naval stations and important ports and by the admirals designated by the Minister of the Navy (Fleet Admirals, Members of the War Council, Vice-Minister of the Navy, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff, Chief of Naval Technical Department, Chief of the Department of Naval Aeronautics, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, Chief of Personnel Bureau, Chief of Educational Bureau, etc.) The Minister of the Navy presided the conference, and after serious deliberation and on the principle of fairness selection for promotion of all Naval officers was conducted. The results were published in the early part of December.

9. Personnel of especially high character and qualifications composed the Personnel Bureau of the Navy Ministry.

Utilising only the above mentioned carefully prepared service tables and based on the aim of choosing the right man for the right job, fairly and without bias, all appointments were the result of careful selection and there was no opportunity given for the formation of factions or cliques.

10. It was perceived that from about the time of the Manchurian Incident a very small group of young naval officers, dissatisfied with the times were beginning to harbor revolutionary ideas and were seen to move in a direction contrary to the soldiers' code. The Navy never for a moment relaxed vigilance of this trend. Most unfortunately however, the disgraceful incident known as the May 15th Incident occurred in the May of 1932. At the time, the Navy fearing that to leave officers who harbored such thoughts on the

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active list would not only undermine the discipline of the Force, but would in the long run jeopardize the very existence of the sea and endanger the State, decided to act with a firm hand. Hence it relegated some 30 off officers to the reserves who were found to be sympathizers of the young officers involved in the incident. Simultaneously the Minister of the Navy issued instructions to all officers of the Navy to abide respectfully by the Imperial Edict to the Armed Forces and not to participate in politics. With the approval of the Minister of the Navy and in place of the personnel Bureau Chief who was absent due to illness, I issued instructions to the Navy as a whole at the Chief of Staff's conference immediately after the incident, the gist of which is as follows: "If there is any officer who now wishes to take part in politics, let him lay down his sword, leave active service and follow his inclination. However versatile a genius he may be, let him leave the active lists at once."

As the result of further investigations, it has however been confirmed that there exist neither written evidence of the above Navy Minister's instruction nor of my Oral statement made in my capacity as 1st Section Chief of the Personnel Bureau in the absence of the Personnel Bureau Chief.

On this 24 day of July, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT SHIMIZU, Mitsumi (seal)

Def. Doc. No. 1926

I, TAKIGAWA, Masajiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness:(signed) TAKIGAWA, Mitsumi(seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SHIMIZU, Mitsumi (seal)

# EXHIBIT

A

Ref. Doc. #1951-3

Naval Regulations Vol. II: (PP. 166 - 167).

Excerpts from Imperial Ordinance Concerning Naval  
Officer Promotion.

(the Imperial Ordinance No. 58, 29 March 1920)

## Chapter 2. Promotion of Officers and Special Service Officers.

Article 10. The promotion to higher ranks of the officers of any branch on or above the rank of captain shall be made according to the consideration of the Throne.

Article 11. As for the promotion of the officers of any branch on or below the rank of commander, the candidates and their priorities shall be decided in the promotion council, subject to the final review of confirmation by the Throne. However, in time of war, in time of quasi-war, or in time of other rugency, the decision of the promotion council may be dispensed with. In promotion council the Navy Minister shall sit in the chair; its members shall be composed of the Chief of Naval General Staff, various Commanders-in-Chief, Commander of a Fleet which is not headed by Commander-in-Chief, and other ex-officio admiral members as designated by the Navy Minister. The admirals designated by the Navy Minister shall attend only such Promotion councils as the Navy Minister specifies. The Navy Minister may exempt

De. Doc. #1951-B

Commanders-in-Chief or Fleet Commanders stationed at far-flung localities from attending the meeting. In case the Navy Minister is prevented from sitting in the chair owing to an accident, the admiral topmost in seniority shall act in his behalf.

In the case of Special Service Officers, the candidates for Promotion and their priority shall be decided by the Navy Minister.

Article 12. (Deleted together with the rest).



Def. Doc. A951-B

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled Excerpt from Imperial Ordinance Concerning Naval Officer Promotion is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 2 day of June, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /s/ TAKAGAWA, Masajiro (seal)

w 2978A 2

海軍諸例則 卷二 (自第一六六頁至第一六七頁)

海軍武官進級令 大正九年三月二十九日勅令第五十八號 披萃

第二章 士官、特務士官ノ進級

第十條 各科大佐以上ヲ進級セシムルハ上旨ニ依ル

第十一條 各科中佐以下士官ノ進級ノ候補及列序ハ進級

會議ニ於テ議決シ其確定ハ上裁ニ依ル、但シ戰時、事變其ノ他急ヲ要スル場合ニ於テハ進級會議ノ議決ヲ省略スルコトヲ得

進級會議ハ海軍大臣ヲ以テ議長トシ軍令部總長、各司令長官、司令長官ヲ置カザル艦隊ノ首席司令官、警備府司令長官及海軍大臣ノ指定スル在職ノ將官ヲ以テ之ヲ組織ス、海軍大臣ノ指定スル將官ハ海軍大臣ノ指定スル會議ニノミ參與スルモノトシ司令長官又ハ司令官ニシテ遠隔ノ地ニ在ル者ハ海軍大臣ニ於テ之ヲ會議ニ參與セシメザルコトヲ得、海軍大臣事故アリテ進級會議ノ議長タルコト能ハザルトキハ上席將官其ノ職務ヲ代理ス、特務士官ノ進級ノ候補及列序ハ海軍大臣之ヲ決定ス

第十二條 以下省略

Adj Doc 1957-13

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Reg Doc 1951-13

文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ關スル證明書 (三號)

自分吉井道敏ハ復員廳第二復員局又警務長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ管カレ二頁ヨリ成ル海軍武官進級令拔萃ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(復員廳第二復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正種ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年六月二日 於東京

吉井道敏 教印

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日 於 同所

立會人 瀧川政次 郎印

E. 2989

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**  
Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Shikazo YANO

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Shikazo YANO. I was formerly a Vice Admiral in the Japanese Navy with thirty years of naval service. After graduating from the Naval Academy in December 1915 I held various positions including that of Staff Member of the Personnel Bureau of the Navy Ministry, instructor at the Naval Staff College, First Section Chief, Educational Bureau, Navy Ministry and from November 1942 until 1944 I held the office of Educational Bureau Chief of the Navy Ministry supervising naval education.
2. I have been informed that the Indictment in this case charges that the educational system of the Navy, as well as other branches of the Government, were used to inculcate a spirit of totalitarianism, aggression, desire for war, cruelty and hatred of potential enemies. Because this is so completely erroneous, I wish to state as best I can without going into details, the general type of educational matters presented officers and potential officers at the Naval Schools.
3. Besides elaborate and well designed courses on international law, taught both in the schools and even in the midst of fleet duties, there were other subjects which were calculated to mold the character and personality of the potential officer. In the first place, great care was taken in the selection of instructors. These men were thoroughly investigated and were required to possess well rounded personalities and moderate and mature judgment.

Subjects designed to promote the individuality of the student were given with the consequent result that any subject which would result in a belief in totalitarianism and the like would be diametrically opposed to the educational tradition of the Navy.

4. Since the aim of naval education was the cultivation of the man before the soldier, lectures on morals, psychology and philosophy were delivered toward the end of training the individual to be a model citizen on the basis of reasoning that a good soldier made a good citizen. There was no suggestion of advocacy of teachings of cruelty and hatred of potential enemies or the desire for war. The basic educational policy of the Navy was respectful abidance by the Imperial Edict issued to the Army and Navy with the accompanying interpretation based on the spirit of "Bushido" which was the code of morals hitherto prevailing among the Samurai Class.

Freedom of religion was taught and of course permitted. Therefore, it was possible to be a member of any religious faith and at the same time to be a naval officer. There were no special religious phrases or slogans, for this reason, adopted as educational slogans by the Navy. There was no restraint therefore upon the right of a student to individual thinking.

5. While the academic subjects of the naval schools followed closely the teachings of those of other countries relative to practical subjects, the Academy laid special stress on four cardinal principles which were loyalty, courtesy, valor and fidelity as indicated in the Imperial Edict. Instructions on each of these were constantly given. Among officers of the Japanese Navy and following historically the practice adopted and patterned after the British Navy, it was the standing tradition that the Japanese Navy and its personnel must at all times observe gentlemanly behavior. In short, the educational policy of the Japanese Navy was reverend abidance by the Imperial Rescript and the embodiment of "Bushido." It laid special stress on the observance of justice and humanity and non-transgression of international law. It would be difficult to imagine that either a cursory or thorough study of the subjects

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taught or the method used in teaching at the naval schools were susceptible of an interpretation of totalitarianism, aggression, desire for war, cruelty and hatred of potential enemies.

On this 12th day of August, 1947

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: YANO, Shikazo

I, YANO, Shikazo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) TAKIGAWA, Seijiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YANO, Shikazo (seal)

Ex 2992

DEF. DOC. #1513

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-against-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: KONDO, Shunsuke

Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is KONDO, Shunsuke. I live in Tokyo. I served as Chief of the Nanyo-Cho or the South Seas Bureau from April 1940 to November 1943. My headquarters during that period were on the Island of Palau. Some years before I took over the above position a so-called 10-year plan for the development of the Mandated Islands was commenced. It envisioned the construction of harbors, aviation facilities light houses, wireless stations, meteorological stations, roads and fisheries facilities. These facilities were not in contemplation of war nor were they considered as either fortifications or military installations by the Bureau. They were actually necessities and of great cultural and commercial value to Japan in furthering the development of the Islands.
2. The harbor work at Palau, Saipan, and Truk consisted of opening up the coral reefs, construction of wharves, erection of light houses and installing navigation aids, all with the object of assisting the merchant

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shipping. These works were commenced under my predecessors in office and were continued during my tenure. The aviation facilities which had been constructed consisted of an air field for land planes on Saipan and ramps for sea planes on Saipan, Truk, Palau and Jaluit, the principal ones being at Saipan and Palau. All of these facilities were constructed by the Nanyo-Chu or the south seas Bureau with the object of establishing an airline between Japan proper and the Islands together with an inter-island service between Saipan and Palau, Truk, Ponepe and Jaluit. These airline services were undertaken by the Nippon Air Line Company.

Although neither the planning or execution of the above mentioned project had been made at the request or under the direction of the Navy, some assistance was received from the Navy in the way of technical advice and in the procurement of materials and labor, and in the transportation. We would have been seriously handicapped or the task made completely impossible were it not for this assistance rendered us by the Navy.

3. At the time I assumed my position there were about 100 foreigners living on the Islands, mostly Spanish missionaries and Chinese. I recall one American family on Kusai Island which had settled there from the preceding generation and were engaged in soap manufacturing. Travel between Japan proper and the Islands had actually been restricted from before my time. That restriction applied to foreigners and Japanese. There was a decided inadequacy of shipping accommodations, especially since so many merchantmen had been requisitioned after the outbreak of the China trouble. Besides there was a decided lack of lodging facilities.

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proper food supply and other accommodations which were necessary for existence on the Islands. Because of these circumstances, it is true that travels for the Islands were restricted to the minimum. Prior to December of 1941 I did not see any guns or other military installations. Actually many of the Japanese on the Islands were extremely uneasy as to what would happen to them in the event of hostilities and thought that there should be some measures taken to afford them security.

On this 23rd day of May, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: KONDO, Shunsuke (seal)

I, ONO, Seiichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) ONO, Seiichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) KONDO, Shunsuke (seal)

44 2991

Def. Doc. # 1742.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: HAYASHI, Hisao

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. My name is HAYASHI, Hisao. From August of 1933 to September of 1936 I was Chief of the South Sea Board, which was the administrative organ of the South Sea Mandated Islands, with its main office in FAIAO.
2. I state positively that there were no military installations in the South Sea Islands while I held my post there. It is true that there were some harbor constructions and some aeronautic installations. However, they had no military purpose, their only objective being the economic and cultural development of the South Sea Islands.
3. As soon as I assumed my post, it occurred to me that

- 1 -

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aeronautic installations were necessary for transportation between Jagan proper and the Islands, for discovering schools of fish and for the rescue of the wrecked ships. Just before I went to PALAO to take up my post, I talked with Admiral OSUMI, Mireo, the Minister of Navy, about the construction of airfields. He told me that the construction of airfields would better be given up for the present, because it could cause difficulties in the League of Nations. However, since I believed that it was absolutely necessary for the development of the South Seas Area, and as it was for no military purpose, I made up my mind that it should by all means be carried out.

The South Sea Board first constructed a seaplane ramp in PALAO, and then one in SAIPAN. The Board also planned to construct seaplane ramps in other islands. At first we had only two seaplanes which we borrowed from the Navy and operated on a test basis. The construction work on the airfield for land planes was commenced in SAIPAN in 1934. However it was not completed during my tour of duty.

4. My idea of the development of the South Seas Area could not easily be fully carried out owing to the small budget of the South Sea Board. So I tried to attain my object by setting up a ten-year plan for the development of the South Sea Islands. This plan was carried out by a

Cabinet decision which adopted the report of the Investigator Committee for the Development of the South Sea Islands. This plan had in view a wide range of projects concerning the development of the South Sea Islands and included the following items:

- (1) The development of agriculture, forestry, mining and aquatic products industries is to be encouraged and promoted.
- (2) The transportation facilities are to be organized well. Especially, navigation routes between Japan proper and the South Sea Islands, and those from the South Sea Islands to Australia through outer South Seas Area are to be established. Harbors in SAIPAN, PALAU, PONAPE, TINIAN, ROTA, YAP and other islands are to be constructed or repaired.

Air-routes are to be established between the Islands themselves, and between Japan proper and the Islands.

- (3) The education system is to be improved. Education of the natives adjusted to the real conditions of life should be carried out thoroughly.
5. During my time at this work, I never took measures to prohibit or to restrict foreign travellers from visiting the South Sea Islands. It is true that I had been told by the

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NIPPON Yusen Kaisha that as far as possible the same company was trying not to accept foreign passengers. I heard that it was on account of the difficulties in supply of food and other accommodations, and of the lack of hotel facilities. However, the South Sea Board never ordered the same company to refuse to accept foreign passengers, and it was never requested to make such order by the Foreign Ministry or by the Navy Ministry.

I recall many instances of foreign visitor's calling on me at PALAO during my stay there.

On this 28 day of May, 1947:

At Tokyo.

Deponent /s/ HAYASHI, Hisao (seal)

I, ONO, Seichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ ONO, Seichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HAYASHI, Hisao, (seal)

Table 15

## Classified Table of Export Trade

(unit: a thousand yen).

	1919	1937	1939
1. Plants & animals (living)	1,914,391	4,226,297	6,231,169
2. Grains, Flours, Starches & Seeds.	52,754,469	45,962,607	73,938,525
3. Beverages, Comestibles & Tobaccos	95,693,375	203,159,342	360,983,045
4. Skins, Hairs, Horns, Tusks & manufactures thereof	6,920,367	21,979,240	13,166,645
5. Oils, Fats, Waxes & Manufactures thereof	35,453,766	75,391,733	88,263,563
6. Drugs, Chemicals, Medicines & explosives	73,147,387	70,143,703	107,502,051
7. Dyes, Pigments, Coatings & Filling matters	9,278,175	20,530,957	37,060,109
8. Yarns, Threads, Twines, Cordages & materials thereof	788,372,920	598,345,620	694,366,666
9. Tissues & Manufactures thereof	502,723,337	1,000,019,119	803,150,829
10. Clothing & Accessories thereof	101,947,777	229,911,530	168,466,068
11. Papers & Paper Manufactures	36,513,156	60,388,891	120,104,338
12. Minerals & Manufactures thereof	46,705,308	23,949,034	33,533,825

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13. Potteries & Glass	42,310,509	87,543,505	75,073,636
14. Ores & Metals	59,079,521	125,422,214	139,051,115
15. Metal Manufactures	43,291,101	98,812,703	147,326,408
16. Clocks, Scientific instruments, Fire arms, Vehicles, Vessels & Machinery	37,169,955	227,699,181	370,323,352
17. Miscellaneous Articles	111,755,299	203,675,957	264,050,691
18. Re-exports	32,968,551	43,876,712	12,096,247
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,098,372,617</b>	<b>3,175,418,224</b>	<b>3,576,370,409</b>

Sources: Foreign Trade of Japan, a Statistical Survey,  
1935 and Toyo Keizai Statistical Year Book,  
No. 24.



En. 2972

Def. Doc. 1513

近藤啓介宣旨附送書

亞米利加合衆 其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

近藤啓介宣旨附送書

一、私の姓名は近藤啓介です。私は東京に住んでおります。私は一九四〇年から一九四三年十一月迄南洋廳長官の職にありました。南洋廳の六廳はパラオ、島にありました。私が上述の地位を引継ぐ数年前から委任統治諸島開發の爲所記十年計畫が始められて居りました。それには港灣、航空施設、燈臺、無線電信所、測候所、道路及び漁業施設等の建設が意圖されておりました。長年の施設は戰爭を考慮に入れたものではなく又同所としては此等を要素或は軍用施設であることは考へて居ませんでした。此等は日六が此等の諸島の開發を促進する爲に實際必要であり文化産業上大なる價値を有するものでありました。

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ニバラオ、サイバン及びトラックに於ける築港事業は珊瑚礁の除去、埠頭の築造、燈塔の建設及び航海保安設備等總て此等交遊業を援助する目的を以つてでありました。此等の工事は私の前任者の在任中に始められ私の在任中も続けられました。又それまでに建設された航空施設はサイバンの陸上飛行場とサイバン、トラック、バラオ、ヤルートの水上操縦の諸施設等で、つて主要なるものはサイバン及びバラオにありました。此等總ての施設は南洋艦によつて建設されたものでサイバン、バラオ、トラック、ボナペ、ヤルートの諸島間の航空路並に日六内島、委任統治島間の航空路開設の爲でありました。その運営には大島六郎海軍少将をして兼らしました。上述の諸島の航空施設も海軍の要求或は海軍の補助をして兼らしたのであります。施設の助言、物資と多力の斡旋等は海軍の補助を海軍から受けました。此の援助なくして施設の仕立は不利な地位の下に置かれ或は不可能となつたかも知れませんでした。

三 私の前在任時南洋群島は百人位の外人が住んで居つて其の大部分は

メイン宣教師及支那人でありました。先代からクワイク島に住み石炭製造に  
従事して居たアメリカ人の一家族があつた事を思ひ出し、日本と南洋  
諸島の旅行は私の差任以前から實際上制限されてゐてその制限は外國人  
及日本人に適用せられて居りました。特に支那軍艦が島後諸島に多くの艦  
船が徴用されて以來郵組施設は明かに不十分でありました。しかのみなら  
ず旅館の設備適當な食糧の供給及び諸島に於ける生活の爲に必要な其他の  
設備は明かに不足してゐました。斯る情況でありましたので委任統治諸島  
への旅行は最少限度に制限されて居つた事は事實であります。

一九四一年十二月以前には砲臺其他軍事施設と呼ばれ得るものは何も目撃  
しませんでした。島中に在住して居つた多くの日本人は戦争が  
起つた場合に自分等はどうかと云ふ事について態度に不安を感じて居り  
ました。彼等を安心せしむる爲に何等かの方法が採られるべきであると考へ  
て居りました。

昭和二十二年五月二十三日 於東京

供述者 近藤 啓介

右ハ被告立合人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明  
シマス

同日於同所

立合人 小野 清一郎

宣 告 書

良心ニ崇ヒ眞實ヲ勉メ何事ヲモ黙秘セズ又何事ヲモ加  
セザルコトヲ誓フ

署名捺印

近 藤 以 介

4-2992

Ref Loc No. 1513

正  
限  
表

辯護側文書第一五一三號

近藤俊介口供書

第一頁第一行目

「一九四〇年」の次に

「四月」を挿入願ひます。

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Ex. 2972

Def. Doc. 1513

近藤 啓介 氏 事務所

近藤 啓介 氏 事務所 其 他

對

荒 木 貞 夫 其 他

近藤 啓介 氏 事務所 近藤 啓介 氏

一、私の姓名は近藤 啓介です。私は東京に住んでおります。私は一九四〇年  
 から一九四三年十一月迄南洋廳長官の職にありました。南洋廳の六廳  
 はパラオ、島にありました。私が上述の地位を引継ぐ数年前から委任  
 統治諸島開發の爲所屬十個年計畫が始められて居りました。それには  
 港湾、航空施設、燈塔、無線電信所、測候所、道路及び漁業施設等の  
 施設が意圖されておりました。長年の施設は戦争を考慮に入れたもので  
 はなく又同種としては此等を要緊或は軍用施設であることは考へて居り  
 ませんでした。此等は日六が此等の諸島の開發を促進する爲に實際必要  
 であり文化産物上大なる價値を有するものでありました。

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ニ、バラオ、サイバン及びトラックに於ける築港事業は珊瑚礁の除去、埠頭の築造、燈塔の建設及び航海保安設備等總て商業交通を援助する目的を以つものでありました。此等の工事は私の前任者の在任中に始められ私の在任中も続けられました。又それまでに建設された航空施設はサイバンの陸上飛行場とサイバン、トラック、バラオ、ヤルートの水上操縦の離着水施設等であつて主要なるものはサイバン及びバラオにありましたが。此等總ての施設は南洋艦によつて建設されたものでサイバン、バラオ、トラック、ボナメ、ヤルートの諸島間の航空路並に日六内地、委任統治島間の航空路開設の爲でありました。その運営には大日本航空會社をしてまかしました。上述の如き計畫實施も海軍の要求或は海軍の下にまかしたものであります。上掲の如き計畫實施も海軍の要求或は海軍の下にまかしたものであります。此の援助意欲は私達の地位は不利な地位の下に置かれ又は不能となつたかも知れません。

三、私の在任時南洋群島は百人位の外人が住んで居つて其の大部分は



メイン宣教師及支那人でありました。先代からクワイバーンに住み石炭製造に  
従事して居たアメリカ人の一家族があつた事を思ひ出します。日本と南洋  
諸島の旅行は私の奉任以前から實際上制限されておてその制限は外國人  
及日本人に適用せられて居りました。特に支那事變以後平常に多くの船  
費が徴用されて以來船組施設は明かに不十分でありました。しかのみなら  
ず旅館の設備適當な食糧の供給及び諸島に於ける生活の爲に必要な其他の  
設備は明かに不足しておりました。斯る情況でありましたので奉任統治諸島  
への旅行は最少限度に制限されて居つた事は事實であります。

一九四一年十二月以前には砲臺其他軍事施設と呼ばれ得るものは何も目撃  
した事はありませんでした。諸島に在住して居つた多くの日本人は戦争が  
起つた場合に自分等はどうかと云ふ事につき態度に不安を感じて居り  
ました。彼等を安んずらしむる爲に何等かの方法が採られるべきであると考へ  
て居りました。

昭和二十二年一月九日四七年五月二十三日 於東京

供進者 近藤 啓介

右ハ常立合人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明

シマス

同日於同所

立合人 小野 清一郎

宣 告 書

良心ニ崇ヒ眞實ヲ勉メ何事ヲモ欺秘セズ又何事ヲモ加  
セザルコトヲ誓フ

署名捺印

近 藤 忠 介

6-2992

Ref Loc No. 1513

正  
誤  
表

辯護側文書第一五一三號

近藤俊介口供書

第一頁第一行目

「一九四〇年」の次に

「四月」を挿入願ひます。

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Ex 2994

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DEF. DOC. NO. 1517

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al ) A P P I D A N T  
- AGAINST - ) of  
YAMAGUCHI, Sadao, et al ) NUKUNA, Nisaburo

1. My name is NUKUNA, Nisaburo. I reside in Tokyo. I have been connected with the South Seas Islands for many years having gone to Truk Island in 1916 as an employee of the South Seas Trading Company. In 1926 I was transferred to Palau Island where I stayed until 1937. As vice-chief of the branch office I again returned to Truk where I remained until Spring of 1939 when I returned to Tokyo.

In September, 1941, I again went to Palau as chief of the branch office. In August, 1942, I became chief of the business office at Ambon where I remained until January, 1944, at which time I returned to Japan.

2. When I went to Truk in 1916, I found the headquarters of the South Sea Island Defenses with a certain number of armed personnel. Around 1918 or 1919 all of the forces were withdrawn and from that time up to 1926, when I left, and also from 1937 to 1939, during which time I resided again on the same island, there were no armed personnel, military installations or fortifications.

3. During my days on Palau from 1926 to 1933, a resident

DEF. DOC. NO. 1517

naval officer. was there and with this exception there were no military personnel or military installations of any kind. In 1941, when I returned to Palau, there were still no military installations. Air travel was limited to sea planes operated by the NIPPON Air Navigation Company. Even at the outbreak of war, the island appeared wholly defenseless, causing us great anxiety that disaster might lie in wake of this unpreparedness. After commencement of war some naval aircraft and naval personnel came to the island but no fixed military installations were constructed until August of 1942.

4. Counsel has shown me affidavits or statements taken from various natives on the South Sea Islands, which, I was told, were used in this Court to prove the construction of military installations. Because of my long association with these peoples I can truthfully say they, on the whole, were possessed of poor mental faculties. Most of them are unable to tell their age and even those educated in public schools under the South Sea Board could count only such simple numbers as were necessary for daily life. Further, I did not find them trust-worthy, they would lie on the slightest provocation or from mere expedience.

On this 20 day of May 1947

at I M T F E

DEPONENT MUKAWA, Misaburo (seal)

REF. DJC. NO. 1517

I, \_\_\_\_\_ hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

at I M T F E

Witness: (signed) ONO Saichiro (seal)

DATE

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

MIKAWA Hisaburo (seal)

Ex 2-995

DEF. DOC. #1516

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Hideo, et al

A F F I D A V I T

of

SUZUKI, Suguru

1. My name is SUZUKI, Suguru. I hold the rank of Commander in the Japanese Navy and between the years 1937 and 1939 I served as Flying Section Officer of the Yokohama Naval Air Force. I was required to assist in the training of personnel for the Nippon Airlines Company, a privately owned concern which was planning to open a regular air route to the South Seas Area. It was planned to use heavy flying boats which demanded that new personnel be taught maintenance, air navigation and piloting of such heavy craft. Since even the Navy itself possessed few men with definite knowledge in this field I was assigned to serve as instructor.

2. In pursuit of my assignment, in August of 1938, I made an inspection tour of the Inner South Seas Island area visiting many of the Mandated Islands. Later, also in the course of my

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duties, it was necessary to fly directly down to the islands for the purpose of making a survey for potential landing facilities on the islands. I received no instructions from the Navy to assist in this work for the purpose of establishing potential military air fields and I emphatically emphasize the fact that they were considered only for civilian commercial purposes for the use of the Nippon Airline Company.

3. In December of 1939 I was appointed Staff Officer of the newly organized 4th Squadron of the Japanese Navy. My duties pertained to matters dealing with aviation and communications. Again I toured the Inner South Seas area, this time aboard ship visiting many of the Mandated Islands. I made over-all studies of the Mandated Islands to the end of drafting plans for military defense that might be employed in the event of possible hostilities. This did not mean that the intention was present to fortify the Mandated Islands but only that the necessary plans and preparations to properly defend said islands would be on hand and available in the event their use was necessary. Military men will understand this to be a necessary procedure. At no time during my many visits to the Mandated Islands which included Saipan, Kwajalein, Motje, Jaluit, Taroa, Truk and Palau did I observe any military fortifications or constructions that might be classified as military installations. To the contrary, it appeared to me that Japan was being extremely lax in taking necessary precautionary measures which they rightfully could have done

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even under treaty specifications.

4. In April of 1940 I was relieved of my assignment and enrolled at the Naval Staff College as a student officer. Therefore, after this date I truthfully can not testify from personal observations as to the conditions on the Mandated Islands. I can say that when I returned to Japan at this time I submitted a plan, in documentary form, to the Naval General Staff setting forth my ideas on potential defense preparations that should be made regarding the South Seas Islands area. It may well be that the blueprint map of potential installations on Wotje Island, dated August 10, 1940, and introduced as Prosecution evidence in this case, was the result of some of the suggestions made in my report. I wish to stress that they were merely plans of potential action to be taken and were not in any way concrete schedules to be actually executed.

In regard to the establishing of air fields on several of the Mandated Islands, I wish to state that the Nippon Airline Company desired to begin trial flights on its new commercial run in September of 1938. In order to make this possible it was necessary to construct simple sea plane ramps to accommodate the 4-engine heavy flying craft. As I stated previously, the supply of pilots for this type of aircraft was extremely limited and that the only source of instruction for potential

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pilots had to come from the Navy. Even in the Navy itself there were very few men who could handle such large ships. The first group to receive training consisted of four pilots, two wireless operators, two mechanics and a number of ground mechanics. The number was gradually increased and by the end of 1939 eight pilots had completed the training course. They were all civilians, two of which were reserve naval petty officers. Landing facilities for the planes were established at Arakobson Island in the Palau Group and nearly completed in late 1938. At Saipan Island a temporary slip had been built and it was not until late 1938 that a concrete slip and a small sized hangar was installed. If my memory serves me correctly there was an improvised air field on Saipan which was little more than a leveled off bit of farm land. At Yap Island there were no facilities to lift or lower planes and only buoys were used.

5. The Nippon Airline Company was a privately owned concern receiving subsidies from the government. The reason for this was during this time it was difficult for the company to sustain itself in such an early period of development with income dependent solely on passenger traffic and freight charges. Since it was deemed advisable, from purely a commercial point of view, to promote a rapid development of this type of air travel the government, but naturally, lent

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its assistance.

While I have no knowledge of restrictions placed against foreigners visiting the Mandated Islands I do specifically recall that in 1939 I was refused the privilege of visiting Guam which was of course an American possession. It was proposed to visit Guam for the purpose of discussing and airline junction between the Nippon Airline Company and the Pan Pacific Airlines. The refusal came from the American Embassy in Tokyo. I recall during the early part of 1940 our planes directly encountered U. S. patrol Catalina Flying Boats in areas over the Mandated Islands and while our aircraft were in the atolls of the Marshall Group during training flights we encountered many wireless obstructions. These obstructions appeared to be a systematic procedure convincing us - rightfully or wrongfully - that they came from U.S.

Naval sources. Similar wireless obstructions were experienced in communications between our war ships. Again, such incidents as occurred in February, 1940 when a United States naval cruiser wandered outside the port of Saipan at very close range for a period of 50 to 60 minutes caused great mental unrest among Japanese naval circles and indignant reports from Japanese resident on that island were received. Such incidents as these combined with other activities on behalf of the United States Navy during times when great suspicion and anxiety existed between the two countries resulted in a situation which might be described as a psychological war of nerves,

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adding fuel to the argument of exponents of criticism of the Japanese Navy for failure to take precautionary measures in regard to protection of the Mandated Islands.

On this 26th day of May, 1947

At I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT SUZUKI, Suguru (seal)

I, OFU Seichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depoent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At I.M.T.F.E.

Witness: (signed) OFU Seichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SUZUKI, Suguru (seal)

Eo 2996

Def Doc No. 10921

自分等ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り回答ヲ爲シタル上  
次  
供述致シマス

飯果算 双利所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

實 證 供 述 書

供 述 者 後 藤 謙

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

- 一、私の名は後藤、横須賀市に住んでゐます。私は元海軍技師でありました。そうして昭和十二年（一九三七年）十月より昭和十三年（一九三八年）四月までパラオ島に昭和十四年（一九三九年）十月より昭和十六年（一九四一年）三月までサイパン島に出張して居りました。二、パラオに於ては、私はペリリニュー島の飛行場建設に従事いたしました。それは當時「空場」とよばれてをりましたが、實際のところ里にジャングルを切り倒し、新築の岩石を砕いて地ならしをした程度のもので飛行場としては使用不能のものでした。この飛行場の建設は南洋廳の事業でありましたが、海軍がそれを援助して行いました。それは演習の際の不時着場として利用するためであると聞いてをりました。パラオには當時すでに水上飛行機の發着場並にこれに附属する若干の施設もありましたが、これは専ら私設会社である日本航空會社の航空路に利用されてをり、軍用的のものではありませんでした。三、サイパンに於て私は主として油槽の建設工事を指導監督いたしました。

その油槽は總數五ヶで一萬噸級のもの三個、一千噸級のもの二個でありましたが、いづれも私が一九四一年三月日本に着るまで未完成でありました。サイパンにも陸上飛行場及び、水上飛行場發着場がありましたが、陸上飛行場は十分備へられておらず、格納庫修理工場、通信設備等もなく飛行場として使用出来る程度に完成されておりました。又水上飛行場の發着場はパラオのそれと同様専ら日本航空會社に使用されておりました。

パラオに於てもサイパンに於ても私の滞在中費用施設はありませんでした。陸軍にするとすれば前述の飛行場設備があつただけでありました。飛行場又は油槽の建設工事に一部土人の勞働力を使用しました。しかし陸軍を以て強制し又は強使したことはありません。相當の資金を與へて使用したのであります。

四、マニユエル、ブランコ (MANUEL BLANCO) の供述書 (法廷  
第八八三號)によれば一九四〇年の初めアスリート飛行場に高射砲、沿岸砲が添附けられたと言つて居りますが、當時砲の添付けはありま



せんでした。又一九三八年防壁壕や假裝格納庫の存在したことを述べて居りますが、かゝることは絶対にありませんでした。

五、イグナチオ、ベナヴェンテ (IGNACIO BENAVENTE) の口供書 (法廷證八八五號) には一九三五年サイバンの港附近に於て彈藥の築積所と大さなタンクが建設中であつたことを告いだと云つて居ります。これは誤りであります。大タンクは一九三九年私がサイバンに行つて初めて建設に着手したものであり前述の通り私が一九四一年三月まる迄には完成しなかつたものであります。

六、エリアス、ビー、サブラン (ELIAS P. SABLAN) の口供書 (法廷證八八六號) は一九三七年頃、日本人は十時位の砲を持込み一九三九年及び、一九四〇年には届付けられたとありますが、かゝる事實はありません。演習用の砲を一時鹽漬けしたのをいつてゐるに違ひありません。同口供書は土人の強制労働は一九三九年に続つたと云つてゐますが、土人を労働に従事せしめたことは事實であります。しかし決して彼等を差使したことはありません。一日二回は晝時として

七、 は相當の寔情であります。  
アントニオ、アングイルン ( ANTONIO ANGUILEN ) の口供書 (姓姪  
八八八號) は一九四〇年の本軍の砲床が特付けられたと云つてゐます  
が、一九四一年三月私がサイパンを去るまでかゝる事實を見ませんで

八、 コンツエラチオン、アウソコ ( CONSPIRACION BRANCO ) の口供書 (法  
姪八九〇號) によれば一九三八年約三千人の鹽海軍人を敗察し、  
兵舎が三棟建設されたと云つて居りますが、約百人を收容し得る宿  
舎が二、三棟あつたに過ぎません。しかし該人は一人もゐたかつた

九、 ビンセイテン、トリオン、グエヒロ ( BINCENTI DE LOS GUERREROS ) の  
口供書 (右証八九一號) には一九三七年サイパンに六個の地下洞窟  
があつたことを語つて居りますが、サイパンに於ける油燭は一九三九  
九年私が前尋に於いて初めて獲手したものであります。又一九三九  
年サイパンに砲床が語えられたとありますが、之も誤りでありませ

十、ホセ、エス、パンゲリナン (JOSE S PANGELINAN) の口供書 (法廷證八九三號) には一九四〇年サイパン島に小型機、大型機等を入れた二つの格納庫、あらゆる種類の銃薬、弾丸、炸彈等を入れたコンクリートの地上防空壕、二、三、の航空機、修理工場、大きな兵舎八乃至十棟があつたと云つてゐますが、之は恐らく降戦後のことを間違へたものであります。一九四〇年にサイパンにそれらしきものとして、は直かに一機を存れ残る水上機の小格納庫二棟、外に小建物二、三、棟があつたのみであります。大きな兵舎などはなく、第一重人は居ません、修理工場、防空壕共にありません。

Def Doc No. 1632

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）五月十七日於

供 述 者 後 藤 謙 三

右ハ被告ノ証言ニテ真ニシ且ツ筆名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

面 目 於

立 証 人 小 崎 清 一 郎

Leaf No. 1692

良心ニ於テモ  
比擬シテ  
遠ク  
何事ヲモ  
加セザルコトヲ  
後

宣

書

書

(卷名印)

後

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書

7

正 誤 表

辯護側文書第一六九二號  
第二頁五行目

「完成されてをりました」を

「完成されてをりませんでした」を訂正願ひます

DEF. DCC. #1692

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sedao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: GOTO, Yuzuru

In accordance with the procedure in my country having first sworn an oath as on attached sheet I hereby depose as follows:-

1. My name is GOTO, Yuzuru. I live in YOKOSUKA-city. I was formerly a naval engineer. I was at PALAO Islands from October, 1937 to April, 1938 and at SHIFAN from October, 1939 to March, 1941.
2. In PALAO Islands I was engaged in the construction of the aerodrome at FELILIU.

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It was called "the farm" at that time. It was actually impossible to use it as an aerodrome, since nothing was done but ground-levelling by clearing the jungle and laying down coral. The construction of this aerodrome was undertaken by the South Seas Board, but the Navy gave assistance to that work. I was informed that the Navy's intention was to use it as a field for forced landings in time of manoeuvres.

In P.L.O Islands there was already a sea-plane ramp with some attached establishments, but it was merely utilized for the air-route of the NIPPON Air Navigation Company, a private company, and was not for military purposes.

3. In S.I.P.N, mainly I supervised the work of oil-tank construction. The oil-tanks were five in all, three of them having a capacity of about 10,000 tons while the other two had a capacity of about 1,000 tons. None of them was however completed by the time I left there for Japan in March, 1941.

There were an aerodrome and a sea-plane ramp in S.I.P.N, but the aerodrome was not sufficiently surfaced, had no hangar, <sup>no repair</sup> works and no radio station. It was not completed to be utilized as an aerodrome. The sea-plane ramp was used only by the NIPPON Air Navigation Company as in P.L.O.

During my stay in P.L.O and S.I.P.N there were no military installations. The aerodromes and oil-tanks above referred to were the only things I saw that could in any way be the subject of controversy in this regard.



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Some natives were used as labourers in the construction of aerodromes or oil-tanks, but they were not compelled by corporal discipline, nor were they treated cruelly. Reasonable wages were paid to them.

4. MANUEL BLANCO, in his Deposition (I.P.S. #6022, Court Exhibit #883), says that anti-aircraft guns and coast guns were installed at SLETO (T.N. Phonetic) in 1940. However there were no gun installations at that time. He also states that there were air-raid shelter trenches and camouflaged hangars in 1938. There were nothing like these at that time.

5. In the Deposition of IGLICIO BELLENTE (I.P.S. #6019, Court Exhibit #885) it is stated that he heard that a dump of ammunition and large tanks were under construction near the S.I.P.N Harbour in 1935. This is a mistake. The construction of large tanks was commenced after I arrived at S.I.P.N in 1939 and not completed when I left in March of 1941 as I stated before.

6. According to the Deposition of ELIAS F. SABLON (I.P.S. #6020, Court Exhibit #886) the Japanese brought guns of about 10 inch caliber to S.I.P.N around 1937, and set them up in 1939 and 1940. However, there was no such fact. It must be that he referred <sup>F</sup> to the fact that guns for manoeuvres were landed temporarily.

In the same Deposition, he states that enforced labour of natives began in 1939. It is true that natives were engaged in the construction work, but they were never used severely. Two Yen a day was no small pay at that time.

7. ANTONIO LANGALLEN, in his Deposition (I.P.S. #6025, Court Exhibit #888), states that Japanese gun-emplacements were laid in 1940.

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But there was no such fact as this by the time I left SAIPAN in March, 1941.

8. CONCEPCION BLANCO, in his Deposition (I.P.S. #3021, Court Exhibit #890), states that five barracks having a capacity of about 3,000 military and naval men were constructed in 1938. However there were only two or three barracks having a capacity of about 100 persons, and there were no military or naval men.

9. VINCENTI DE LEON CASPERERO, in his Deposition (I.P.S. #6017, Court Exhibit #891), states that in SAIPAN there were six underground oil-tanks in 1937. However the construction of oil-tanks in SAIPAN was for the first time undertaken after I arrived there in 1939. He states also that gun-emplacements were laid in 1939. This is not true.

10. JOSE S. FANGELIARI, in his Deposition (I.P.S. #6018, Court Exhibit #893), states that in SAIPAN there were 2 hangars containing big and small air-planes, 1 big concrete shelter containing all kinds of explosives, bullets and bombs, 2 or 3 aircraft repair-shops, and 6 or 10 big barracks in 1940. He must refer to facts after the outbreak of the war. In 1940, there were no such constructions except two small hangars containing one seaplane and two or three small buildings. There was no big barracks, furthermore there was not a military or naval troop. There were no repair works and no shelter trenches.

On this 17th day of May, 1947,

Deponent /s/ GOTO, Yuzuru

Def. Doc. #1692

I hereby certify that the above was signed and sealed in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at the same place.

Witness: /S/ ONO, Shinichiro (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ GOTO, Yuzuru (seal)

by 2997

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST	
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al	) A F F I D A V I T
- AGAINST -	)
	) OF
ARAKI, Sadao, et al	) IWASAKI, Asashichi

1. My name is IWASAKI, Asashichi. I reside in Tokyo. From September 1st, 1928 until October 15th, 1945 I was employed as an assistant engineer in the Naval Construction Division of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station. My duties encompassed the supervision and planning of various blueprint maps for potential naval construction.
2. Some time around August 1940, My office received a routine order from the Naval General Staff to prepare a blueprint draft of some building constructions on Wotje Island. I supervised the making of this blueprint which was done by my assistants. It was completed in approximately three days. My reference to the making of this blueprint as a routine order was because it was quite customary for my office to receive various assignments for blueprint construction in order to give the Navy definite and accurate information on which to base their requests for the Naval Budget around April 1st of each year. We had yearly work assignment sheets which were put on the shelf after completion and never used.
3. The particular blueprint prepared by my assistants and myself pertaining to Wotje Island is the same one which is in evidence before this Court as Prosecution

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 RETURN TO ROOM 361

Exhibit 1253C. This blueprint is not the kind to be used in actual construction of buildings. The Execution Plan or the plan from which actual constructions would be made consists of a different kind of paper. If this blueprint had actually been the one that had been used in constructing the buildings on Wotje Island, the identification box in the lower right hand corner would show the name of the engineer actually in charge of executing the plan. I have with me the type of form that is used in making actual blueprints from which construction would be made and point out that in the lower right hand corner the form is entirely different, as I stated before. I did not undertake the plans for construction that were actually to be utilized as direct building plans. That type of work was done by special personnel handling final execution plans.

In either August or September of 1941, I recall that a staff officer came to my office and asked for this particular map which I gave to him personally. It is quite possible that this planning map would be used as the basis for the construction of an execution plan. It would take approximately three to five months of concentrated effort to construct the various buildings and projects set forth in this blueprint. It will be noted that the blueprint shows only the location of the

objectives to be achieved and not the dimensions that are actually necessary for construction. The ordinary practice involved would be to take this blueprint map to the Island of Wotje, make a spot investigation, and then return and commence the drafting of the actual execution plan.

5. From viewing the blueprint map which I prepared and the aerial photographs of Wotje Island, Prosecution Exhibit 1253A and 1253B, I note a discrepancy in the outlines of the air field itself. It is also impossible for me to tell from looking at the aerial photograph what the various constructions consist of. While I am not an expert in the matter of reading aerial photographs, I must say that I can not identify the items mentioned on the blueprint map as being those in the photograph.

On this 26 day of May, 1947

At TOKIO

DEPONENT IWASAKI Asashichi (seal)

I, ONO, Seichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At TOKIO

Witness: (signed) ONO, Seichiro (seal)

DWF. DOC. #1521

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

IWASAKI Asashichi(seal)

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Translated by  
Defence Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent:-- WAKAMATSU, Makoto

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

My name is WAKAMATSU, Makoto and I reside at No. 774, Karuizawa, Karuizawa-machi, Nagano Prefecture. I wish to make the following statement:

1. I was an employee of the NANYO KOHATSU KABUSHIKI-KAISHA (South Seas Development Co., Ltd.). As an employee of the said company, I was on Tinian Island under Japanese mandated rule from January to October 1935, on Rota Island from October of the same year to January, 1937, and on Saipan Island from January 1937 to April 1946. On June 14, 1944 the United States forces landed on Saipan and I was in custody of the forces from

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July 13, 1944 to April, 1946 when I was repatriated to Japan.

2. During my internment, on or about March 16, 1946, I was summoned to the United States Military Government in Saipan and examined by a young American Lieutenant (jg) of about twenty years. He knew Japanese and interrogated me in that language. His Japanese was not fluent, but good enough to make himself understood. He wrote down my statement in English and had me sign it but he did not translate it and read it to me.

I have looked at the original document numbered Prosecution Exhibit 384 which was shown to me by Defense counsel at the time I was interviewed here in this building. I do not understand spoken English. I can only understand written English if I have an English-Japanese dictionary before me and considerable time to ponder over the written material. On the original document is a statement by Ensign Charles D. Sheldon which reads as follows:

"I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Japanese language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Japanese language to the person who signed same."

This statement is in error. A translation of this English document was not given to me either orally or in written form. The manner in which I was questioned is as follows; The American Lieutenant asked me questions in Japanese to which I responded. Then, writing with a fountain pen on a piece of paper, he appeared to be making out a statement. The interview lasted about 20 minutes, at the end of which time

the Lieutenant gave the handwritten piece of paper to a Navy enlisted man who typed out the piece of paper which I ultimately signed in the same room. I knew Ensign Sheldon by sight since he was in charge of the Japanese internees at my camp and I saw him almost every day. However, I had never spoken to him nor he to me. Therefore, the inaccuracies and mistakes appearing in the affidavit, Court Exhibit 884 in regard to which I shall make my statement, must have occurred because the English was never translated into Japanese and read back to me for confirmation.

3. I want to point out inaccuracies and mistakes in the affidavit (Court Exhibit 884) which is purported to be the record of my oral statement, as follows:

- (a) In the above-mentioned affidavit it is written: "I observed the various military installations in the vicinity of ASLITO Field on which construction was commenced in 1933." However, I merely stated: "I think that ASLITO Air Field had been there about two years before I reached S.I.F.N." I did not state "I observed various military installations."
- (b) In the same affidavit it is written: "Two years before the outbreak of the war, the Japanese military built a series of concrete trenches and shelters around the ASLITO Air Field which were designed to serve as means of protection in case of air raids." However, this is an error. I stated: "One or two years before the U.S. forces occupied

SaIPAN, I saw concrete air-raid shelters along the road near the Air Field."

(c) In the same affidavit it is written: "In 1940, I happened to see some Japanese Navy Men storing a huge amount of ammunition in some warehouses in ASLITO Air Field. These warehouses were situated in a forest section and were camouflaged to look like trees." This also is a mistake. I merely stated: "About one year before the occupation by the U. S. forces I saw camouflaged warehouses on the hillside of ASLITO." And when I was questioned in regard to what was contained in those warehouses, I answered: "I don't know."

(d) In the same affidavit it is written: "There were coastal guns located on AGINGAN Point and NAFUTAN Point." However, actually I answered: "About one year before the occupation of the U. S. forces, I heard that there were coastal guns on AGINGAN Point and NAFUTAN Point."

(e) In the same affidavit it is written: "I heard after from NKK officials that there was an anti-submarine net in TANAPAG Harbour placed there just before December, 1941." However, the fact is that when I was asked "You know that there was an anti-submarine net in TANAPAG Harbour, don't you?" I answered: "I don't know about it."

4. Since, as above mentioned, I stayed on SaIPAN, TINIAN and ROTA Islands for about ten years from 1935 to 1946, I am very familiar with conditions

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in these islands. The cultivation of sugar-cane, the manufacture of sugar and alcohol, and the improvement of fishing and fisheries, etc. in these islands were promoted by the Japanese. Beside the Japanese, the CHAMORROS, KANAKS and other natives were also employed, and they were engaged in the above productive industries, thereby elevating their economic standard of living to a remarkable extent.

In each island, besides schools for the Japanese, public schools for the natives were established. Primary education was widely carried on. Secondary education was given to both the Japanese and the natives together in the Japanese school. Some of the natives who graduated from intermediate school went to Japan to be educated in colleges. The Japanese made almost no discrimination in their treatment of the natives. It is true that the standard of living of the natives was lower than that of the Japanese, but generally the Japanese were kind to them, and never worked the native laborers excessively. Therefore, the natives always felt well disposed toward the Japanese.

On this 22nd day of May, 1947,

at I. M. T. F. E.

DEPONENT /S/ M.K.M.TSU, Makoto (seal)

I, ONO, Seiichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depoent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date at \_\_\_\_\_

Witness : /S/ ONO, Seiichiro (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1728

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ WAKAMATSU, Makoto (seal)

Ex 2-999

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)	A F F I D A V I T
- VS -	) of
ARAKI, Sadao, et al	) Paul W. Wenneker

1. My name is Paul W. Wenneker. I reached the rank of Full Admiral in the German Navy. From 1934 until 1937, and later from 1940 until the surrender I was the chief German Naval Attache to Japan, residing in Tokyo. After returning to Germany in 1937 I was given general naval duty including command of the German pocket battleship Deutschland.
2. My duties as German Naval Attache were quite similar to the duties of attaches of other countries at that time. During my first stay in Japan from 1934 to 1937 I had absolutely no instructions of any kind with reference to military collaboration with Japan. In fact my association with the naval men of other countries, namely Great Britain, the United States and Russia was much closer than with the Japanese. We were all treated with like suspicion and distrust by Japanese naval officers. Even when I returned the second time in 1940, after the outbreak of the European war, the situation relative to cooperation between my country and the Japanese naval officials was not greatly improved. I seldom was able to inspect their ships. My request to visit the Mandated Islands had been repeatedly refused. I was never afforded the courtesy of discussing matters with Japanese naval officers of my own rank but was forced to deal with captains and younger officers. Even after the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, cooperation was sadly lacking between German and Japanese naval officials.
3. I was not informed by the Japanese that they were to attack Pearl Harbor. I did not know that hostilities would commence on December 8, 1941. Such information had not been conveyed to my country through my office or through the Embassy, even though both Germany and Japan were then faced with a common

enemy. As to the real strength of the Japanese Navy, the number and size of ships under construction, the construction projects under consideration, the oil supply in stock and operational plans under contemplation, I must state that I possessed not even an approximate knowledge concerning them, even though I was the logical person to receive such information. I had inquired concerning these matters frequently both officially and privately but received either no replies or such vague answers as to be of no value whatsoever.

During the Pacific War, further evidence of lack of cooperation was the fact that the Japanese failed to reveal vital information concerning their losses incurred during important naval battles. I distinctly remember that it was around a year after the battle of Midway that I first learned that Japan had lost four carriers. We had requested information concerning this particular matter on many occasions since we had heard American broadcasts to this effect but the Japanese consistently refused to inform us.

Relative to cooperation between Germany and Japan in regard to submarine warfare, I wish to say that the utter lack of cooperation would be the better topic for discussion. Germany did attempt to school Japanese naval officers in the thought that submarines should be used to attack enemy merchant shipping and thereby to cut off the supply lines. The Japanese Navy contended that they could better use their submarines for direct attack against fighting vessels of the enemy. Hence our proposal was completely rejected. We wished to assist the Japanese toward the construction of modern and efficient submarines. To this end we presented them with two new submarines. The first was delivered by German crew at Kure. The second was lost in the North Atlantic and never reached the Japanese Islands. The first submarine was minutely inspected by the Japanese but I was later informed that they did not feel they could duplicate it and did not intend to do so. Therefore, insofar as German

activity is concerned, the Japanese submarine warfare was not effected in any way.

5. In April of 1942, I was finally allowed to visit some of the Mandated Islands. I went to Palau and Saipan, also stopping at Guam. I have been asked if there were any fortifications on Saipan or Palau. I, like the Italian Attache who was with me, was greatly surprised to note there were absolutely none. We saw air strips, some good billets, houses and store houses, but no guns and no fortifications. I saw a large field on Saipan which was supposed to be an airfield but which was grown over by weeds. The harbors were very poor and they were only commencing the building of oil tanks. As I said before, we were greatly surprised at the lack of precautionary measures taken by Japan on these islands and I felt that the reason for the prior refusals to visit the islands was more to conceal the lack of fortifications than to reveal fortifications.
6. Germany lost two auxiliary cruisers, three submarines and six steamers in Japanese waters during the war. Most of these were lost out of lack of cooperation, that is, insufficient escort or the relaying of vital information concerning the enemy's position by the Japanese.
7. During my stay in Japan and from my many social and business contacts with various military men, I noticed a decided lack of cooperation even between the Japanese Army and Navy. They were constantly suspicious and jealous of each other and I personally tried to smooth matters over as best I could. The Army escorted its own convoys and except for those military movements which necessitated the use of the Navy in transporting Army troops the disunity was quite amazing to me.



Karuzawa  
Nagano Prefecture, Japan) SS

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul W. Wenneker, being duly sworn upon my oath do hereby state that the foregoing writing consisting of three typewritten pages is true and accurate according to my best knowledge and belief.

PAUL W. WENNEKER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of August, 1947.

DAVID W. PARSONS, 0244429  
Captain, Infantry  
Investigating Officer

EX 3000.A

Certificate of Non-Existence of Documents

1. I, Yoshii Michinori, as Archives Section Chief of the Demobilization Bureau II of the Demobilization Office, and a document custodian of the Demobilization Bureau II.

2. The originals, duplicates and copies of the following telegrams do none of them exist in the Demobilization Bureau II, the organization disposing of the remaining business of the former Japanese Navy Department.

- (1) The telegrams exchanged in 1941 between Vice-Admiral Nomura at Berlin and the Japanese Navy concerning American-Japanese negotiations.
- (2) The joint telegraphic instructions dispatched in January 1942 by the Navy Minister and the Naval General Staff Chief to Vice-Admiral Nomura at Berlin concerning the conclusion of the Military Agreement
- (3) The telegrams exchanged between Vice-Admiral Nomura at Berlin, and the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff since the March-April period in 1942 concerning the intensifying of operations by the Japanese Navy in the Indian Ocean area.

3. Of the foregoing telegrams, the duplicates of the outgoing telegrams and the originals of the incoming telegrams in section (1) were in the custody of the General Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, or in the Navy Minister's Secretariat; the duplicates of the telegrams in section (2) and the duplicates of the outgoing telegrams and the originals of the incoming telegrams in section (3) were in the custody either of the General Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, the Navy Minister's Secretariat or of the 1st Department of the Naval General Staff, and where there were no originals or duplicates, there were found copies kept in custody. The rule was that copies of telegrams should all be kept for one year in the custody of the Telegraph Section of the Navy Ministry.

4. In the United States air-raids of May 1945, continuing from midnight of the 25th to dawn of the 26th, the bulk of the Navy Ministry building was destroyed by fire. The Minister's Secretariat, the General Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, and the 1st Department of the Naval General Staff and the office rooms of the Telegraph Section were all reduced to ashes, and almost all the documents kept in these places were lost. The originals, duplicates and copies now missing are believed to have all been destroyed by fire on this occasion.

5. As for the originals and duplicates of the above-mentioned telegrams kept in custody at the Japanese Embassy at Berlin, we inquired of all the returnees including former Admiral Nomura, but none of them possessed the copies, obviously having destroyed them by fire previously to the German capitulation.

I vouch for the truth of the above statements in every respect.

Certified at Tokyo  
on this 19th day of August 1947  
Yoshii Michinori

Archives Section Chief of the  
Demobilization Bureau II

100-1, B, & C  
100-1, B, & C

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,  
On the same date

Witness: Okuyama Hachiro

. . . . .  
Certificate

I, who occupy the post of the Archives Section Chief of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, hereby certify that the telegram dispatched about March 1943 by Ambassador OSHIMA at Berlin concerning the transfer to Japan of German submarines and the reply telegram thereto are not among the documents in the custody of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

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Certified at Tokyo  
on this 19th day of August 1947

Hayashi Kaoru

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place  
on the same date

Witness: Sato Takegoro

. . . . .  
Certificate

1. I, Taniguchi Yasumaro, occupied from May 1940 till May 1945 the post of Assistant Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy at Berlin, and was in charge of the telegrams dispatched and received by those concerned with the Navy and the custody of these documents.

2. With air raids on Berlin intensified from about November 1943, we consigned to the fire some of the important documents and telegrams on several occasions, and in April 1945 when Berlin fell in a crisis, we destroyed the rest of them by fire for the last time.

3. The originals, duplicates and copies of the telegrams mentioned below do none of them exist as they were completely destroyed by fire on the above-mentioned occasions.

- (1) The telegram exchanged in 1941 between Vice-Admiral Nomura at Berlin and the Naval Department concerning the America-Japan negotiations.
- (2) The telegraphic instructions dispatched in January 1942 by the Naval General Staff Chief and the Navy Minister to Vice-Admiral Nomura concerning the conclusion of the Military Agreement.
- (3) The telegrams exchanged between Vice-Admiral Nomura

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at Berlin, and the Japanese Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry since the March-April period in 1942 concerning the intensifying of operations by the Japanese Navy in the Indian Ocean area.

I vouch for the truth of the above statement in every respect.

Certified at Yokosuka  
on this 16th day of August 1947

Taniguchi Yasumaro  
General Affairs Section Chief of the  
Yokosuka Local Demobilization Bureau

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place  
on the same date

Witness: Shikame Yoshisuke  
Director of the Yokosuka Local Demobilization  
Bureau

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Def. Doc. No. 1606

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

IRAKI Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

by HONJUR. Naokuni,  
No. 1, 2-chome, Kitazawa,  
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

(Born on 15 May, 1935)

I, the above named, after having duly sworn as shown in the separate paper in accordance with the form observed in Japan, do depose as follows:

1. German-Japanese Military Cooperation Before the Outbreak of the Pacific War.

When the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Alliance Pact was concluded I was appointed military committee member of the Mixed Technical Commission which had been set up in accordance with article 4 of the Pact, and in this capacity I left Tokyo for Germany in December, 1940. On my departure the Navy Minister's instructions were handed to me by Toyoda, Teijiro the Vice-Minister of the navy. They read: "The Tripartite Alliance Pact aims at precluding a war with the United States, and, by improving our diplomatic relation with that country, it is to give an impetus to an early settlement of the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

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Such being the case, the primary duty of the Military Commissioner is to pass correct judgement from the military viewpoint on the question of 'whether or not an act of offense has been launched upon one of the parties of the alliance' as provided in Article 3 of the Pact. In view of the fact that this pact is for an alliance for defensive purposes care must be taken to avoid immaturly reaching the decision that 'an act of offense has been committed' and thereby drawing, this country into the abyss of a war. Since the final decision will be made in Tokyo, the problem must be handled with utmost caution and wisdom and all efforts must be exerted to investigate and report the real circumstances involved."

I arrived at Berlin on January 5, 1941, but the Mixed Commission was not inaugurated for a long time. In the meanwhile, the German government did not accord us due treatment as Commissioner, and all opportunities were denied us for opening official discussion. Consequently there was no occasion for us to deal with the question of 'whether or not an act of offence has been launched' or to submit a report to Tokyo on the question.

Although the Mixed Commission was hastily inaugurated after the outbreak of the Pacific War, it was not more than a perfunctory meeting and was held only two or three times in the earlier stage of its introduction, to be followed by no meeting at all later on. Under these circumstances the existence of the Commission was only nominal, though I continued to stay in Berlin in the capacity

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of Military Commissioner until March, 1945, when I was relieved of the office and left Germany for home. During my stay in Berlin I acted exclusively as military adviser to the Japanese ambassador there. However, with regard to problems concerning purely military operation, I consulted directly with the Military authorities concerned, thus making them clearly distinct from political matters. And even in the disposition of these military matters, our military commissioners acted merely as a liaison office between Tokyo and Berlin.

The only work in which the military commissioner had acted under explicit directions from Tokyo concerned the conclusion of the Military Agreement which was originated by the instruction of the Japanese Government given to him in January, 1942, i.e. immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War. No other direction was given from Tokyo at all.

During the period of the American-Japanese diplomatic talks, not even information relative to the above negotiation could be received by us from our Central Office. (T.N. Japanese Government in Tokyo). Aroused by loud talks in the air as reverberated through papers of neutral states I referred the matter to Tokyo more than once by telegraph, because of my great anxiety. As a response to my repeated inquiry, if I remember right, just a single answer was received some time in July or August of 1941, to the effect that the Japanese Government was conducting negotiations with the United States in strict conformity with the spirit

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of the Tripartite Alliance Pact which aimed solely at the prevention of the American participation in war and at the settlement of the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

7. Concerning the Military Agreement.

On January 19, 1942, Showa 17, shortly after the commencement of the Pacific War, the Military Agreement was concluded by Germany, Italy and Japan. Because this was purely a military accord among the Supreme Commands of the three powers, the Japanese ambassador took no part in the agreement. According to the provisions of the agreement, Japan was to destroy the enemy in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean east of Longitude 70 degrees east, and Germany and Italy were to destroy the enemy in the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean west of Longitude 70 degrees East. The basic idea of this accord was that the best coordinated operational result might be expected through independent activities of each navy in its respective designated area. Therefore each navy conducted its operations entirely under its own plans and abilities, apart from those of the colleague powers; and no special mutual talks were held for the coordination of the operational activities of the three. Though, of course, as will be mentioned later, there were several occasions when one party or another made proposals regarding a partner's methods of operation, as is naturally the case with a wartime alliance, these proposals were nothing but the expression of the desire of the party so proposing, all deciding authority over the actual conduct of the operations being always



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reserved by the party responsible for the operations.

3. Military Cooperation, including Submarine Warfare, after the Outbreak of the Pacific War.

Based on the information that around March or April, 1942 the United States had commenced transportation activities on a large scale to the North African theatre via the Cape of Good Hope, the navies of Germany and Italy made repeated proposals to the effect that they were desirous of seeing the Japanese navy intensify its activities in the Indian Ocean including offensive action against the American transportation activities and re-enforce its forces strongly in this theatre. In this proposal, their desire was for a powerful reinforcement of the Japanese fleet in this theatre with strong surface vessels as the main strength rather than a mere encouragement of the submarine campaign as heretofore conducted by the Japanese navy.

Whenever these proposals were made I tried to persuade the German authorities on the basis of directions from Tokyo that the Japanese fleet were too fully occupied with the operations in other theatres to divert much of its strength to the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless the same proposal was repeated again and again with the increase of difficulty in maintaining the German military position in North Africa. In some cases they expressed their desire to have Japan at least strengthen the submarine forces in the Indian Ocean to a great extent. As a reply

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to this sort of proposals I always explained to them assiduously that the Japanese submarines were being employed for the most part in operations of main fleet and that in view of the smallness of their number the dispersion of more submarines to the Indian theater on the part of Japan was very difficult.

Although I do not know what the German naval authorities expected of Japan in connection with Hitler's offer to Ambassador Oshima of the donation of two German submarines to Japan, but from what had been explained to us, it originated entirely in Hitler's own mind and was utterly unconditional. In return for this offer no request was made for more intensified submarine warfare on the part of Japan. The following are the Fuhrer's words as told me by Ambassador Oshima: "Lately the German submarines have been strikingly improved in their maneuverability and especially, underwater capacity. Hoping the Japanese navy will be benefited in her submarine construction, I wish to donate two of the new German submarines to Japan at this time." These words by the Fuhrer were carried in the ambassador's telegram addressed to Japan at that time; and a message from Tokyo in response to this telegram explicitly stated that Japan would accept with gratitude this Hitler's offer. Further, in the telegram I received from Tokyo in those days in connection with the bringing of these submarines to Japan, no allusion was made to such a subject as the encouragement of the submarine warfare; the naval authorities in Tokyo simply instructed me by telegram

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that, as the primary objective of bringing the German submarines to Japan lay in the contributory effect of these new submarines upon Japanese submarine-building technique three German submarine technicians should be brought to Japan with submarines. In short, as far as the Japanese navy and I myself were concerned, it was understood that the submarine offer was made solely along the line of the above mentioned words of Hitler and that no intensified activities of submarine warfare on our part was entailed condition in this offer, not to mention our acceptance of such request.

One of these two submarines was lost on the way to Japan, and only one safely reached her destination. However such a difficult problem as the improvement of our submarine construction techniques could not be solved in a short period. During the course of time, on the other hand, an opinion became prevalent, pressed by the need from the forces on the front, that this type of submarine with its inferior underwater speed would not meet our purpose and that an entirely new idea was instead needed in our submarine construction. Such being the case, these submarines brought about after all no practical benefit to Japanese submarine operations.

About such a policy as annihilating the crew-members of enemy vessels sunk by submarines, nothing was ever suggested to us by the Germans. I never heard of such a suggestion either <sup>or</sup> from Ambassador Oshima from anyone else. On the occasion of the London Disarmament Conference which I attended as a member of

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the Japanese delegation, I myself personally participated in the discussion of the problem of how crew-members should be treated when their ships had been sunk by a submarine, accordingly, if I ever had heard talk of this kind, it would surely have remained in my memory. I have no memory of such talk. Of course no telegram was dispatched by me to our authorities in Tokyo regarding such subject.

On this 10 day of April, 1947

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT NAKURA Naokuni (seal)

I, YASUDA, Shigeo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
at same place.

Witness: (signed) YASUDA Shigeo (seal)

O. M.

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

NAKURA Naokuni (seal)

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TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, heroby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 26, 1947

Ex 2011AOC

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文書不存在に關する證明書

- 一、私は吉井道敏で現在復員局第二復員局文書課長の職にあり第二復員局の文書の保管に任じて居る
- 二、左の各電報の本紙、控及寫は何れも元日本海軍省の殘務整理機關である第二復員局に現存しない
  - (一) 日米交渉に關し一九四一年在伯林野村海軍中將と日本海軍省との間に往復せられた電報
  - (二) 一九四二年一月軍事協定締結に關し在伯林野村海軍中將宛海軍大臣軍令部總長連名の訓令電報
  - (三) 一九四二年三、四月以降日本海軍の印度洋方面作戰強化に關する在伯林野村海軍中將と海軍省及軍令部との間に往復せられた電報
- 三、前項の電報中(一)の往電の控、來電の本紙は海軍省軍務局又は海軍大臣官房に保管してあり(二)の控及(三)の往電の控及來電の本紙は海軍省軍務局海軍大臣官房及軍令部第一部の何れかに保管し之等三者のうち本紙又は控の無い所には寫が有つた。又各電報共その寫は一年間海軍省電信課に保管することになつて居た

四、一九四五年五月二十五日夜半から翌二十六日未明に至る間の米軍の空襲に依り海軍省の大部分は焼かれその際海軍大臣官房、軍務局各課、軍令部第一部及電信課の事務室は全部焼失し保管文書の殆んど全部も焼失した

前記各電報の本紙又は控及寫全部はこの際焼失したものと認められる  
五、前記各電報の駐獨大使館側本紙及控は野村元海軍大將始め歸還者全部に就き調査したが殆ど乙降服前焼却処分したと確實でその寫を所持する者も一名も無い

右各項は事實に相違ない

昭和二十二年八月十九日 於東京

第二復員局 文書課長

吉 井 通 教

Def. Doc. #2127-A

右署名捺印は當立會人の面前に於て爲された

同日於同所

立會人 奥山八郎



證 明 書

一、私は溪口泰磨で一九四〇年五月から一九四五年五月まで駐獨日本大使館附海軍武官輔佐官の職にあり、獨逸國に居た海軍關係者の發受する電報の取扱及保管に任じて居た

二、一九四三年十一月頃から伯林に對する空襲が強化されたので、數次に亘り重要書類及電報類の焼却處分を行ひ、更に一九四五年四月伯林が危機に頻した際最後の焼却處分を行つた

三、左の各電報の原文、控及寫は前述の處分の際完全に焼却したので、何れも現存して居ない

(一) 日米交渉に關して一九四一年在伯林野村海軍中將と日本海軍省との間に往復せられた電報

(二) 一九四二年一月軍學協定締結に關し在伯林野村海軍中將宛軍令部總長海軍大臣よりの訓令電報

(三) 一九四二年三、四月以降日本海軍の印度洋方面作戰強化に關する在伯林野村海軍中將と日本軍令部及海軍省との間に往復せられた電報

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RETURN TO ROOM 201

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右各項は事實に相違ないことを證明する  
昭和二十二年八月十六日 於横須賀

横須賀地方復員局總務部長

漢 口 泰 磨

右署名捺印は當立會人の面前に於てなされた  
昭和二十二年八月十六日 於横須賀

立會人

横須賀地方復員局長

鹿 目 善 輔

EXHIBIT

3001

Defense Doc. No. 1596

ADDRESS NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF SHIPS

REFER TO FILE NO.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF SHIPS

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

The information concerning vessels constructed or under construction by the United States Navy Department, as of 7 December 1951, and other information dated 23 January 1947 and bearing the symbols (NAVSHIPS (1351)) consisting of 11 pages hereto attached and made a part hereof was prepared by ALBERT B. RAY who being duly sworn did depose and say that he is the Production Analyst in charge of the Ships Statistics Section of the Bureau of Ships of the Navy Department; and, as such Production Analyst, he has access to the official records of the Navy Department with respect to the matters herein considered; that the information contained herein was taken by him from such official records as a part of his normal and regular duties; that the information contained herein and taken from such official records was accurately and correctly transcribed.

/s/ Albert B. Ray

District of Columbia SS

Sworn to and subscribed before me, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, by ALBERT B. RAY to me known to be the above described person and known to me to be the Production Analyst in charge of the Ships Statistics Section of the Bureau of Ships of the United States Navy Department, having the duties stated above.

/s/ Herbert A. Engler

Notary Public

My commission expires January 3, 1951.

S E A L

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FROM BUREAU OF SHIPS

I. Vessels Under Construction as of 7 December 1941.

<u>Type</u>	<u>No. of Vessels</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
BB	10	410,000
CV	22	442,300
CB	3	81,000
CA	8	107,200
CL	31	278,000
DD	206	393,080
DE & BDE	50	57,500
SS	<u>96</u>	<u>146,496</u>
TOTAL COMBATANT	426	1,915,776
Auxiliary	90	249,508
Mine Craft.	313	121,233
Patrol Craft	328	42,028
Large Landing Craft	15	67,500
District Craft. (SP)	73	19,215
District Craft (NSP)	<u>76</u>	<u>16,872</u>
GRAND TOTAL	1321	2,432,137

II. Vessels On Hand as of 7 December 1941.

<u>Type</u>	<u>No. of Vessels</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
BB	17	534,300
CV	7	154,600
CVL	0	0
CVE	1	8,000
CA	18	171,200
CL	19	157,775
DD	172	239,530
SS	<u>111</u>	<u>116,621</u>
TOTAL	345	1,382,026

III. (a) Carriers On Hand 12-7-41 and Completed up to 8-13-45.

Type	No.	Name	Tonnage	Keel	Launch	Commission
CV	2	LEXINGTON	33,000	1-8-21	10-3-25	12-14-27
CV	3	SARATOGA	33,000	9-25-20	4-7-25	11-16-27
CV	4	RANGER	14,500	9-26-31	2-25-33	6-4-34
CV	5	YORKTOWN	19,800	5-21-34	4-4-36	9-30-37
CV	6	ENTERPRISE	19,800	7-16-34	10-3-36	5-12-38
CV	7	WASP	14,700	4-2-36	4-4-39	4-25-40
CV	8	HORNET	19,800	9-25-39	12-14-40	10-20-41
CV	9	ESSEX	27,100	4-28-41	7-31-42	12-31-42
CV	10	YORKTOWN	27,100	12-1-41	1-21-43	4-15-43
CV	11	INTREPID	27,100	12-1-41	4-26-43	8-16-43
CV	12	HORNET	27,100	8-3-42	8-30-43	11-29-43
CV	13	FRANKLIN	27,100	12-7-42	10-14-43	1-31-44
CV	14	TICONDEROGA	27,100	2-1-43	2-7-44	5-8-44
CV	15	RANDOLPH	27,100	5-10-43	6-28-44	10-9-44
CV	16	LEXINGTON	27,100	7-15-41	9-26-42	2-17-43
CV	17	BUNKER HILL	27,100	9-15-41	12-7-42	5-25-43
CV	18	WASP	27,100	3-18-42	8-17-43	11-24-43
CV	19	HANCOCK	27,100	1-26-43	1-24-44	4-15-44
CV	20	BENNINGTON	27,100	12-15-42	2-26-44	8-6-44
CV	21	BOXER	27,100	9-13-43	12-14-44	4-16-45
CV	31	BON HOMME RICHARD	27,100	2-1-43	4-24-44	11-26-44
CV	36	ANTIETAM	27,100	3-15-43	8-20-44	3-1-45
CV	38	SHANGRI LA	27,100	1-15-43	2-24-44	11-1-44
CV	39	LAKE CHAMPLAIN	27,100	3-15-43	11-2-44	6-3-45

III. (b) Carriers On Hand 12-7-41 and Completed up to 8-13-45.

Type	No. & Name	Tonnage	Keel	Launch	Commission
CVL	22 INDEPENDENCE	11,000	5-1-41	8-22-42	1-14-43
CVL	23 PRINCETON	11,000	6-2-41	10-18-42	2-25-43
CVL	24 BELLEAU WOOD	11,000	8-11-41	12-6-42	3-31-43
CVL	25 COMPIENS	11,000	11-17-41	1-27-43	5-28-43
CVL	26 MONTREY	11,000	12-29-41	2-28-43	6-17-43
CVL	27 LANGLEY	11,000	4-11-42	5-22-43	8-31-43
CVL	28 CABOT	11,000	3-16-42	4-4-43	7-2-43
CVL	29 BATAAN	11,000	8-31-42	8-1-43	11-17-43
CVL	30 SAN JACINTO	11,000	10-26-42	9-26-43	12-15-43

III. (c) Carriers On Hand 12/7/41 and Completed up to 8/13/45.  
Start of Conv.\*\*

Type	No.	Name	Tonnage	Keel	Launch	Commission
CVE	1	LONG ISLAND	8,000		3/18/41	6/ 2/41
CVE	6	BATTLER	9,800		4/ 4/42	10/31/42
CVE	7	ATTACKER	9,800		9/27/42	10/ 7/42
CVE	8	HUNTER	9,800		5/22/42	1/ 9/43
CVE	9	BOGUE	9,800		5/ 1/42	9/25/42
CVF	10	CHASER	9,800		2/16/42	4/ 9/43
CVE	11	CARD	9,800		5/ 1/42	11/ 7/42
CVE	12	COPAHEE	9,800		2/ 8/42	7/22/42
CVE	13	CORE	9,800		5/15/42	12/10/42
CVF	14	FENCER	9,800		2/27/43	3/25/43
CVE	15	STALKER	9,800		3/ 5/42	12/21/42
CVE	16	NASSAU	9,800		5/ 1/42	9/21/42
CVE	17	PURSUER	9,800		7/18/42	6/14/43
CVE	18	ALTAHAHA	9,800		5/ 1/42	10/15/42
CVE	19	STRIKER	9,800		5/ 7/42	5/18/43
CVE	20	BARNES	9,800		5/ 1/42	2/20/43
CVE	21	BLOCK ISLAND	9,800		6/ 6/42	3/ 8/43
CVE	22	SEARCHER	9,800		5/ 1/42	4/ 7/43
CVE	23	BRETON	9,800		6/27/42	4/12/43
CVE	24	RAVAGER	9,800		5/ 1/42	4/25/43
CVE	25	CROATAN	9,800		5/ 1/42	4/28/43
CVE	26	SANGAMON	11,400		2/25/42	8/25/42
CVE	27	SUWANEE	11,400		2/15/42	9/24/42
CVE	28	CHENANGO	11,400		3/16/42	9/15/42
CVE	29	SANTEE	11,400		3/19/42	9/ 8/42
CVE	30	CHARGER	11,400		10/ 4/41	3/ 2/42
CVF*	31	PRINCE WILLIAM	9,800	5/18/42	8/23/42	5/ 1/43
CVE*	32	SLINGER	9,800	5/25/42	9/19/42	8/11/43
CVE*	33	ATHELING	9,800	6/ 9/42	9/ 7/42	7/30/43
CVE*	34	EMPEROR	9,800	6/23/42	10/ 7/42	5/31/43
CVE*	35	AMEER	9,800	7/18/42	10/18/42	6/28/43
CVE*	36	BEGUM	9,800	8/ 3/42	11/11/42	7/22/43
CVE*	37	TRUMPETER	9,800	8/25/42	12/15/42	8/ 4/43
CVE*	38	EMPRESS	9,800	9/ 9/42	12/31/42	8/ 9/43
CVE*	39	KHEDIVE	9,800	9/22/42	1/30/43	8/25/43
CVE*	40	SPEAKER	9,800	10/ 9/42	2/20/43	11/20/43
CVE*	41	NABOB	9,800	10/20/42	3/ 9/43	9/ 7/43
CVE*	42	PREMIER	9,800	10/31/42	3/22/43	11/ 3/43
CVE*	43	SHAH	9,800	11/13/42	4/21/43	9/27/43
CVE*	44	PATROLLER	9,800	11/27/42	5/ 6/43	10/22/43
CVE*	45	RAJAH	9,800	12/17/42	5/18/43	1/17/44
CVE*	46	RANEE	9,800	1/ 5/43	6/ 2/43	11/ 8/43
CVE*	47	TROUNCER	9,800	2/ 1/43	6/16/43	1/28/44
CVE*	48	THANE	9,800	2/23/43	7/15/43	11/19/43
CVE*	49	QUEEN	9,800	3/12/43	8/ 2/43	12/ 7/43
CVE*	50	RULER	9,800	3/25/43	8/21/43	12/20/43
CVE*	51	ARBITER	9,800	4/26/43	9/ 9/43	12/31/43
CVE*	52	SMITER	9,800	5/10/43	9/27/43	1/20/44
CVE*	53	PUNCHER	9,800	5/21/43	11/ 8/43	2/ 5/44
CVE*	54	REAPER	9,800	6/ 5/43	11/23/43	2/18/44
CVE	55	CASABLANCA	7,800		4/ 5/43	7/ 8/43
CVE	56	LISCOMBE BAY	7,800		4/19/43	8/ 7/43
CVE	57	ANZIO	7,800		5/ 1/43	8/27/43
CVE	58	CORREGIDOR	7,800		5/12/43	8/31/43
CVE	59	MISSION BAY	7,800		5/26/43	9/13/43
CVE	60	GUADACANAL	7,800		6/ 5/43	9/25/43
CVE	61	MANILA BAY	7,800		7/10/43	10/ 5/43
CVE	62	NATOMA BAY	7,800		7/20/43	10/14/43
CVE	63	ST LO	7,800		8/17/43	10/23/43
CVE	64	TRIPOLI	7,800		9/ 2/43	10/31/43



III. (c) Carriers On Hand 12/7/41 and Completed up to 8/13/45.  
(Cont'd.) Start of Conv.\*\*

Type, No. & Name	Tonnage	Keel	Launch	Commission
CVE 65 WAKE ISLAND	7,800		9/15/43	11/ 7/43
CVE 66 WHITE PLAINS	7,800		9/27/43	11/15/43
CVE 67 SOLOMONS	7,800		10/ 6/43	11/21/43
CVE 68 KALININ BAY	7,800		10/15/43	11/27/43
CVE 69 KASAAN BAY	7,800		10/24/43	12/ 4/43
CVE 70 FANSHAW BAY	7,800		11/ 1/43	12/ 9/43
CVE 71 KITKUM BAY	7,800		11/ 8/43	12/15/43
CVE 72 TULAGI	7,800		11/15/43	12/21/43
CVE 73 GAMBIER BAY	7,800		11/22/43	12/28/43
CVE 74 NEHENTA BAY	7,800		11/28/43	1/ 3/44
CVE 75 HOGGATT BAY	7,800		12/ 4/43	1/11/44
CVE 76 KADASHAN BAY	7,800		12/11/43	1/18/44
CVE 77 MARCUS ISLAND	7,800		12/16/43	1/26/44
CVE 78 SAVO ISLAND	7,800		12/22/43	2/ 3/44
CVE 79 OMMANEY BAY	7,800		12/29/43	2/11/44
CVE 80 PETROF BAY	7,800		1/ 5/44	2/18/44
CVE 81 RUDYERD BAY	7,800		1/12/44	2/25/44
CVE 82 SAGINAW BAY	7,800		1/19/44	3/ 2/44
CVE 83 SARGENT BAY	7,800		1/31/44	3/ 9/44
CVE 84 SHAROCK BAY	7,800		2/ 4/44	3/15/44
CVE 85 SHIPLEY BAY	7,800		2/12/44	3/21/44
CVE 86 SITKOH BAY	7,800		2/19/44	3/28/44
CVE 87 STEAMER BAY	7,800		2/26/44	4/ 4/44
CVE 88 CAPE ESPERANCE	7,800		3/ 3/44	4/ 9/44
CVE 89 TAKANIS BAY	7,800		3/10/44	4/15/44
CVE 90 THETIS BAY	7,800		3/16/44	4/21/44
CVE 91 MAKASSAR STRAIT	7,800		3/22/44	4/27/44
CVE 92 WINDHAM BAY	7,800		3/29/44	5/ 3/44
CVE 93 MAKIN ISLAND	7,800		4/ 5/44	5/ 9/44
CVE 94 LUNGA POINT	7,800		4/11/44	5/14/44
CVE 95 BISMARCK SEA	7,800		4/17/44	5/20/44
CVE 96 SALAMUA	7,800		4/22/44	5/26/44
CVE 97 HOLLANDIA	7,800		4/28/44	6/ 1/44
CVE 98 KWAJALEIN	7,800		5/ 4/44	6/ 7/44
CVE 99 ADMIRALTY ISLANDS	7,800		5/10/44	6/13/44
CVE 100 BOUGAINVILLE	7,800		5/16/44	6/18/44
CVE 101 MATANIKAU	7,800		5/22/44	6/24/44
CVE 102 ATTU	7,800		5/27/44	6/30/44
CVE 103 ROI	7,800		6/ 2/44	7/ 6/44
CVE 104 MUNDA	7,800		6/ 8/44	7/ 8/44
CVE* 105 COMMENCEMENT BAY	10,900	9/23/43	5/ 9/44	11/27/44
CVE* 106 BLOCK ISLAND	10,900	10/25/43	6/10/44	12/30/44
CVE* 107 GILBERT ISLANDS	10,900	11/29/43	7/20/44	2/ 5/45
CVE* 108 KULA GULF	10,900	12/16/43	8/15/44	5/12/45
CVE* 109 CAPE GLOUCESTER	10,900	1/10/44	9/12/44	3/ 5/45
CVE* 110 SALERNO BAY	10,900	2/ 7/44	9/26/44	5/19/45
CVE* 111 VELLA GULF	10,900	3/ 7/44	10/19/44	4/ 9/45
CVE* 112 SIBONEY	10,900	4/ 1/44	11/ 9/44	5/14/45
CVE* 113 PUGET SOUND	10,900	5/12/44	11/30/44	6/18/45
CVE* 115 BAIROKO	10,900	7/25/44	1/25/45	7/16/45
BAVG***1 ARCHER	9,164		5/ 6/41	11/17/41
BAVG 2 AVENGER	4,133		8/ 2/41	3/ 2/42
BAVG 3 BITER	4,133		9/15/41	5/ 6/42
BAVG 5 DASHER	4,133		11/22/41	7/ 2/42
BAVG 6 TRUCKER	8,522		5/ 1/42	1/31/43

- \* . CVE built by Navy - other CVE's were acquired.
- \*\* Launch date for CVE's built - Start of Conversion for Acquisition.
- \*\*\* BAVG 1 Lend leased to United Kingdom as of 12-7-41 but listed for information.

Note: The above CVE and BAVG vessels were converted from Maritime C3 (Cargo) type vessels except the following:

CVE 26 - 29 (converted from tankers)  
CVE 55 - 104 (special military type/S4-S2-BB3)  
CVE 105 - 115 (special military type)

IV. 50 Old Destroyers Transferred to United Kingdom.

Type & No.	Name	Date Transferred	Tonnage	Class
DD 70	CRAVEN	10-23-40	1,020	DD 70
DD 72	CONNER	10-23-40	1,020	" "
DD 73	STOCKTON	10-23-40	1,020	" "
DD 75	WICKES	10-23-40	1,090	DD 75 - 185
DD 76	PHILIP	10-23-40	1,090	" " "
DD 78	EVANS	10-23-40	1,090	" " "
DD 81	SIGOURNEY	11-26-40	1,060	" " "
DD 88	ROBINSON	11-26-40	1,060	" " "
DD 89	RINGGOLD	11-26-40	1,060	" " "
DD 93	FAIRFAX	11-26-40	1,090	" " "
DD 108	WILLIAMS	9-24-40	1,060	" " "
DD 127	TWIGGS	10-23-40	1,090	" " "
DD 131	BUCHANAN	9- 9-40	1,090	" " "
DD 132	AARON WARD	9- 9-40	1,090	" " "
DD 133	HALE	9- 9-40	1,090	" " "
DD 134	CROWNINSHIELD	9- 9-40	1,090	" " "
DD 135	TILLMAN	11-26-40	1,090	" " "
DD 140	CLAXTON	11-26-40	1,090	" " "
DD 143	YARNALL	10-23-40	1,090	" " "
DD 162	THATCHER	9-24-40	1,060	" " "
DD 167	COWELL	9-23-40	1,060	" " "
DD 168	MADDOX	9-23-40	1,060	" " "
DD 169	FOOTE	9-23-40	1,060	" " "
DD 170	KALK	9-23-40	1,060	" " "
DD 175	MACKENZIE	9-24-40	1,060	" " "
DD 181	HOPEWELL	9-23-40	1,060	" " "
DD 182	THOMAS	9-23-40	1,060	" " "
DD 183	HARADEN	9-24-40	1,060	" " "
DD 184	ABBOT	9-23-40	1,060	" " "
DD 185	BAGLEY	9-23-40	1,060	" " "
DD 190	SATTERLEE	10- 9-40	1,190	DD 186-347
DD 191	MASON	10- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 193	ABEL P. UPSUR	9- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 194	HUNT	10- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 195	WELBORN C. WOOD	9- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 197	BRANCH	10- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 198	HERNDON	9- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 252	MC COOK	9-24-40	1,190	" " "
DD 253	MC CALLA	10-23-40	1,190	" " "
DD 254	RODGERS	10-23-40	1,190	" " "
DD 256	BANCROFT	9-24-40	1,190	" " "
DD 257	WELLES	9- 9-40	1,190	DD 186-347
DD 258	AULICK	10- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 263	LAUB	10- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 264	MC LANAHAN	10- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 265	EDWARDS	10- 9-40	1,190	" " "
DD 268	SHUBRICK	11-26-40	1,190	" " "
DD 269	BAILEY	11-26-40	1,190	" " "
DD 273	SWASEY	11-26-40	1,190	" " "
DD 274	MEADE	11-26-40	1,190	" " "

It is assumed the following and third Vinson Plans: (As ship Construction is concerned)

1. The Vinson Trammel Act of 27 March 1934 (Public Law Number 135 - 73d Congress) which authorized:

(a) That the composition of the United States Navy with respect to the categories of vessels limited by the treaties signed at Washington, 6 February 1922, and at London, 22 April 1930, is hereby established at the limit prescribed by those treaties.

(b) That subject to the above treaties to construct (in addition to those vessels previously authorized by act of 13 February 1929 and Executive Order 6174 of 16 June 1933)

(1) Aircraft carrier of approximately 15,000 tons Standard Displacement,  
99,200 tons of Destroyers,  
35,530 tons of Submarines.

(c) Replace overage vessels by vessels of modern design and construction as limited by the above treaties.

Note: The total tonnage established by the above treaties (as amended) for the United States Navy (Combatant Vessels) was 1,262,068 tons.

2. The 20% Expansion Act of 17 May 1938 (Public Law 528 - 75th Congress) which authorized: (as amended)

(a) 135,000 tons Capital Ships  
(b) 40,000 tons Aircraft Carriers  
(c) 68,750 tons Cruisers  
(d) 38,000 tons Destroyers  
(e) 13,658 tons Submarines  
(f) In addition approximately 133,650 tons of auxiliaries were authorized and 15,000,000 dollars for use in construction of experimental vessels.

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant Vessels) for the United States Navy was 1,557,780 tons.

3. The 11% Expansion Act of 14 June 1940 (Public Law 629 - 76th Congress) which authorized:

(a) 79,500 tons Aircraft Carriers  
(b) 66,500 tons Cruisers  
(c) 21,000 tons Submarines  
(d) The above tonnages may be varied upward or downward 33,400 tons so long as the total tonnages (167,000 tons) is not exceeded. (this transfer later amended to 50,100 tons)  
(e) Acquire or construct 75,000 tons Auxiliaries.  
(f) Established the life of combatant ships as follows:

Battleships	26	Years
Aircraft Carriers	20	"
Cruisers	20	"
Other Combatant	16	"
Submarines	13	"

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant Vessels) for the United States Navy was 1,724,480 tons.

4. It is assumed that the so called Stark Plan (1940) is the 70% Expansion act of 19 July 1940 (Public Law 757 - 76th Congress) which authorized:

(a) 385,000 tons of Capital Ships  
(b) 200,000 tons of Aircraft Carriers

It is presumed the following and third Vinson Plans: (As ship Construction is concerned)

1. The Vinson Trammel Act of 27 March 1934 (Public Law Number 135 - 73d Congress) which authorized:

(a) That the composition of the United States Navy with respect to the categories of vessels limited by the treaties signed at Washington, 6 February 1922, and at London, 22 April 1930, is hereby established at the limit prescribed by those treaties.

(b) That subject to the above treaties to construct (in addition to those vessels previously authorized by act of 13 February 1929 and Executive Order 6174 of 16 June 1933)

(1) Aircraft carrier of approximately 15,000 tons Standard Displacement,  
99,200 tons of Destroyers,  
35,530 tons of Submarines.

(c) Replace overage vessels by vessels of modern design and construction as limited by the above treaties.

Note: The total tonnage established by the above treaties (as amended) for the United States Navy (Combatant Vessels) was 1,262,068 tons.

2. The 20% Expansion Act of 17 May 1938 (Public Law 528 - 75th Congress) which authorized: (as amended)

(a) 135,000 tons Capital Ships  
(b) 40,000 tons Aircraft Carriers  
(c) 68,750 tons Cruisers  
(d) 38,000 tons Destroyers  
(e) 13,658 tons Submarines  
(f) In addition approximately 133,650 tons of auxiliaries were authorized and 15,000,000 dollars for use in construction of experimental vessels.

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant Vessels) for the United States Navy was 1,557,280 tons.

3. The 11% Expansion Act of 14 June 1940 (Public Law 629 - 76th Congress) which authorized:

(a) 79,500 tons Aircraft Carriers  
(b) 66,500 tons Cruisers  
(c) 21,000 tons Submarines  
(d) The above tonnages may be varied upward or downward 33,400 tons so long as the total tonnages (167,000 tons) is not exceeded. (this transfer later amended to 50,100 tons)  
(e) Acquire or construct 75,000 tons Auxiliaries.  
(f) Established the life of combatant ships as follows:

Battleships	26	Years
Aircraft Carriers	20	"
Cruisers	20	"
Other Combatant	16	"
Submarines	13	"

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant Vessels) for the United States Navy was 1,724,480 tons.

4. It is assumed that the so called Stark Plan (1940) is the 70% Expansion act of 19 July 1940 (Public Law 757 - 76th Congress) which authorized:

(a) 385,000 tons of Capital Ships  
(b) 200,000 tons of Aircraft Carriers

- (c) 420,000 tons of Cruisers
- (d) 250,000 tons Destroyers
- (e) 70,000 tons of Submarines.
- 1,325,000 tons, Total
- (f) 397,500 tons transfer authorized between types of vessels above.
- (g) 72 Patrol Craft
- (h) 100,000 tons auxiliaries.

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant Vessels) for the United States Navy was 3,049,480 tons.



コロンビヤ地區艦船統計

上述ノ人物ニシテ又上述ノ職務ヲ有スル合衆國海軍省艦船局艦船統計課  
擔當ノ生員分析者タルアルバート、ビー、レイニ依リ、私儀コロンビヤ  
地區公署人ノ面前ニ於テ、宣誓サレ且ツ署名サル

署名 ハーバート・エ・エンゲラー

公證人

私儀任期ハ一九二一年一月一日  
月 日 満了ス

艦船局ヨリ

一 二 一



雜費表類

海軍省艦船局（一八五一）

一九四七年一月二三日

一、（昭和十六年）一九四一年十二月七日現在 建造中ノ艦艇

型	艦艇數	噸數
BB	一〇	四一〇、〇〇〇
CV	三三	四四二、三〇〇
CB	三	八一、〇〇〇
CA	八	一〇七、二〇〇
CL	三一	二七八、〇〇〇
DD	二〇六	三九三、〇八〇

總計	沂海田舟艇 (NSP)	沂海田舟艇 (SP)	大型上陸用 舟艇	哨戒艇	水雷敷設艇	補助艇	軍艦合計	SS	DE及ビ BDE
一三三二一	七六	七三	一五	三二八	三三三	九〇	四二六	九六	五〇
二、四三三、一三七	一六、八七七	一九、二二五	六七、五〇〇	四二、〇二八	一二一、二三三	二四九、五〇八	一、九一五、七七六	一四六、四九六	五七、五〇〇

精進帳簿

二、(昭和十六年)一九四一年十二月七日現在 手持精進帳簿 金額計表如下

型	DK	GV	CVL	CVL	CVL	CA	CL	DD	SS	合計
型	一七	七	〇	一	一八	一九	一七三	一一二	三四五	一、五八二、〇三六
幣	幣	幣	幣	幣	幣	幣	幣	幣	幣	幣
數	五三四、三〇〇	一五四、六〇〇	〇	八、〇〇〇	一七、二〇〇	一五七、七七五	三三九、五三〇	二一六、六三三		





辯護書類

三、(B)航空母艦、(昭和十六年)一九四一年十二月七日手持せるもの、及び(昭和二十年)一九四五年八月十三日迄に完成せるもの

型	番號	名	稱	噸	數	起	工	進	水	就	役	
CVL	二二	インディペンデンス		一一、〇〇〇	四一一	五一一	四二一	八一	二二	四三一	一一一四	
CVL	二三	プリンストン		一一、〇〇〇	四一一	六一	二	四二一	一〇一	一八	四三一	二二二五
CVL	二四	ペロー・ウッド		一一、〇〇〇	四一一	八一	一一	四二一	二七一	一六	四三一	三三三一
CVL	二五	カウペシス		一一、〇〇〇	四一一	一一	一七	四三一	一一	二七	四三一	五二二八
CVL	二六	モンタレー		一一、〇〇〇	四一一	二二	二九	四三一	二二	二八	四三一	六一一七
CVL	二七	ラングレイ		一一、〇〇〇	四二一	四一一		四三一	五二	三三	四三一	八一三一
CVL	二八	キヤボット		一一、〇〇〇	四二一	三一	一六	四三一	三	四	四三一	七一二四
CVL	二九	バタールン		一一、〇〇〇	四二一	八一	三一	四三一	八一	一一	四三一	一一一七
CVL	三〇	サン・ジアシント		一一、〇〇〇	四二一	一〇一	二六	四三一	九二	二六	四三一	二二一五

型	部	種	番	號	工	番	號	水	號	役
OVE OVE OVE	カ	一	カ	〇〇ノ				一	一	七
OVE OVE OVE	カ	一	カ	〇〇ノ				一	一	九
OVE OVE OVE	カ	一	カ	〇〇ノ				一	一	五
OVE OVE OVE	カ	一	カ	〇〇ノ				一	一	九
OVE OVE OVE	カ	一	カ	〇〇ノ				一	一	七
OVE OVE OVE	カ	一	カ	〇〇ノ				一	一	七
OVE OVE OVE	カ	一	カ	〇〇ノ				一	一	七

改裝開始 +  
 九〇ノキ田村六郎田二十五ノ  
 九〇ノキ田村六郎田二十五ノ (九〇ノキ田村六郎田二十五ノ) 九〇ノキ田村六郎田二十五ノ

九〇ノキ田村六郎田二十五ノ

CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE
二二二	二二一	二二〇	一九九	一九八	一九七	一九六	一九五	一九四	一九三	一九二
サ ー チ ア ー	ブ ロ ク ・ ア イ ラ ン ド	バ ー ン ズ	ス ト ラ イ カ ー	ア ル タ マ ハ	バ ー ス ー ア	ナ ッ ツ ー	ス ト ー カ ー	フ エ ン サ ー	コ ー ア	カ ッ バ ビ ー
九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇	九、 八〇〇
四二一 五一一	四二一 六一六	四二一 五一一	四二一 五十七	四二一 五十一	四二一 七十一八	四二一 五十一	四二一 三十五	四三一 二二七	四二一 五一五	四二一 二一八
四三一 四一七	四三一 三一八	四三一 二二〇	四三一 五一八	四二一 一〇一五	四三一 六一四	四二一 九一二	四二一 二二二	四三一 三二五	四二一 二二〇	四二一 七一三



OVR <sup>+</sup>		OVR <sup>+</sup>	OVR	OVR	OVR	OVR	OVR	OVR	OVR	OVR
三三二		三二	三〇	二九	二八	二七	二六	二五	二四	二三
スリンガ	ウキリアム	ブリン	チアチア	サンチ	チナ	スワ	サンガ	クロ	ラベ	ブレ
九、八〇〇		九、八〇〇	二一、四〇〇	二一、四〇〇	二一、四〇〇	二一、四〇〇	二一、四〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇
四二一		四二一								
五二二		五二二								
四二一		四二一	四二一	四二一	四二一	四二一	四二一	四二一	四二一	四二一
九一九		八二二	一〇一四	一三一九	一六一六	二二一五	二七三五	三二五	三二二	三二七
四三二		四三二	四三二	四三二	四三二	四三二	四三二	四三二	四三二	四三二
八一		五二	三二	九一	九一	九一	八二	四二	四二	四二

OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>
四三	四二	四一	四〇	三九	三八	三七	三六	三五	三四	三三	三三
レ ア ー	プ リ ミ ア ー	ホ ネ オ ボ ブ	ス ピ ー カ ー	ケ チ イ ヴ	エ ム ブ レ ス	ト ラ ン ベ ツ タ ー	ビ ー ガ ム	ア ミ ー ア	エ ン ベ ラ ー	ア セ リ ン グ	ア セ リ ン グ
九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇
四二一 一一一 一一三	四二一 一一〇 一一三	四二一 一一〇 一一〇	四二一 一一〇 一一九	四二一 一一九 一一三	四二一 一一九 一一九	四二一 一一八 一一五	四二一 一一八 一一三	四二一 一一七 一一八	四二一 一一六 一一三	四二一 一一六 一一九	四二一 一一六 一一九
四三 一四 一一	四三 一三 一一	四三 一三 一九	四三 一二 一一〇	四三 一一 一一〇	四三 一一 一一三	四三 一一 一一五	四三 一一 一一一	四三 一一 一一八	四三 一一 一一七	四三 一一 一一七	四三 一一 一一七
四三 一九 一二七	四三 一一 一一三	四三 一九 一七	四三 一一 一一〇	四三 一八 一二五	四三 一八 一九	四三 一八 一四	四三 一七 一二二	四三 一六 一二八	四三 一五 一三一	四三 一七 一三〇	四三 一七 一三〇

OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>
五四	五三	五二	五一	五〇	四九	四八	四七	四六	四五	四四
リ ー バ ー	パ ン チ ア ー	ス マ イ タ ー	ア ー ビ タ ー	ル ー ラ ー	ク ウ キ ー ン	セ ー ン	ト ラ ウ ン サ ー	ラ ニ ー	ラ ー ジ ア	パ ト ロ ー ラ ー
九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇	九、八〇〇
四三一 六 一 五	四三一 五 一 二	四三一 五 一 〇	四三一 四 一 二 六	四三一 三 一 二 五	四三一 三 一 二 二	四三一 二 一 二 三	四三一 二 一 一	四三一 一 一 五	四二一 二 一 一 七	四二一 一 一 二 七
四三一 一 一 二 三	四三一 一 一 一 八	四三一 九 一 二 七	四三一 九 一 一 九	四三一 八 一 二 一	四三一 八 一 一 二	四三一 七 一 二 五	四三一 六 一 一 六	四三一 六 一 一 二	四三一 五 一 一 八	四三一 五 一 一 六
四四一 二 一 一 八	四四一 二 一 一 五	四四一 一 一 一 〇	四三一 二 一 一 三 二	四三一 二 一 一 二 〇	四三一 一 一 一 七	四三一 一 一 一 九	四四一 一 一 一 八	四三一 一 一 一 八	四四一 一 一 一 七	四三一 一 〇 一 二 二

OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE
六五	六四	六三	六二	六一	六〇	五九	五八	五七	五六	五五
ウエークナイランド	トリボリ	セント・ロ	ナトマ・メイ	マニラ・メイ	ガダルキナル	マツシヨン・メイ	コレピド	ア・ン・チオ	リスコム・メイ	カサブランカ
七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇
四三二 九一五	四三一 九一二	四三一 八一七	四三一 七二〇	四三一 七一〇	四三一 六一五	四三一 五二六	四三一 五一二	四三一 五一二	四三一 四一九	四三一 四一五
四三一 一一一七	四三一 一〇一三一	四三一 一〇一三三	四三一 一〇一三四	四三一 一〇一三五	四三一 九一二五	四三一 九一三三	四三一 八一三三	四三一 八一二七	四三一 八一七	四三一 七一八

七六	カダシヤムシ	七、八〇〇		四三、一七三、一	四四、一五、一八
七五	ホガツト	七、八〇〇		四三、一七三、四	四四、一、一一
七四	ホベシタ	七、八〇〇		四三、一七三、八	四四、一、一三
七三	キタヒア	七、八〇〇		四三、一七一、三	四三、一三九、二八
七二	キトマ	七、八〇〇		四三、一七一、五	四三、一三九、二一
七一	キツトカ	七、八〇〇		四三、一七一、八	四三、一三九、二五
七〇	ミツヤ	七、八〇〇		四三、一七一、一	四三、一三九、九
六九	カサシ	七、八〇〇		四三、一〇一、四	四三、一三九、四
六八	カサシ	七、八〇〇		四三、一〇一、五	四三、一三九、七
六七	シロモシ	七、八〇〇		四三、一〇一、六	四三、一三九、二
六六	ホヤシ	七、八〇〇		四三、一九一、七	四三、一三九、五

CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE	CVE
八七	八六	八五	八四	八三	八二	八一	八〇	七九	七八	七七
ステイマール・メイ	シツトユール・メイ	シツブリール・メイ	シムログ・メイ	サキニンド・メイ	サギノウ・メイ	ラディヤード・メイ	ネトロフ・メイ	オマニール・メイ	サキ・ファイランド	マールカス・イランド
七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇
〇	〇	〇	〇	〇	〇	〇	〇	〇	〇	〇
四四一三二二六	四四一三二一九	四四一三二二二	四四一三二二四	四四一三二三一	四四一三二一九	四四一三二二二	四四一三二二五	四四一三二二九	四四一三二二七	四四一三二二六
四四一三二二四	四四一三二二八	四四一三二二二	四四一三二二五	四四一三二一九	四四一三二二二	四四一三二二五	四四一三二二八	四四一三二二二	四四一三二二三	四四一三二二六

CVE	OVE	OVE	CVE	OVE		OVE	CVE	OVE		OVE
九六	九五	九四	九三	九二		九一	九〇	八九		八八
サラモリア	ピスマトク・シー	ルンガ・ポイント	マキン・アイランド	ウキングム・ベイ	ストレイド	マカツサリ	セテイス・ベイ	タカニス・ベイ	エフパダジス	ケ...
七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇
四四一四一二二	四四一四一七	四四一四一二一	四四一四一五	四四一三一三九		四四一三一三三	四四一三一一六	四四一三一〇	四四一三一〇	四四一三一三
四四一五一二六	四四一五一二〇	四四一五一二四	四四一五一一九	四四一五一一三		四四一四一二七	四四一四一二二	四四一四一一五	四四一四一一〇	四四一四一九

OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE <sup>+</sup>	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE	OVE
一〇七	一〇六	一〇五	一〇四	一〇三	一〇二	一〇一	一〇〇	九九	九八	九七	
ギルバート・アイランド	ブツク・アイランド	ロックスメント・メイ	ムンダ	ロイ	アツツ	マタニコウ	ブーゲインヴィル	アドラルティ・アイランド	クウエゼリン	ホランディヤ	
一〇、九〇〇	一〇、九〇〇	一〇、九〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇	七、八〇〇
四三一一一一二九	四三一一〇一二五	四三一 九一二三									
四四一 七一二〇	四四一 六一一〇	四四一 五一九	四四一 六一一八	四四一 六一二	四四一 五一二七	四四一 五一三二	四四一 五一一六	四四一 五一一〇	四四一 五一〇	四四一 四一二八	
四五一一二一五	四四一一二一三〇	四四一一一一二七	四四一 七一八	四四一 七一六	四四一 六一三〇	四四一 六一二四	四四一 六一一八	四四一 六一一三	四四一 六一一七	四四一 六一一三	



BAVG	+++ BAVG		+ OVE	+ OVE	+ OVE	+ OVE	+ OVE	+ OVE	+ OVE
二	一		二五	二三	二二	二二	二〇	一九	一〇八
アヴェンチアー	アヴェンチアー		バイ	ブエノ・サウンド	シ・ガ・ユ	ヴェラ・ガルフ	サラ・ノ・ベイ	ケ・ブ・グロスター	クラ・ガルフ
四、一三三	九、一六四		一〇、九〇〇	二〇、九〇〇	一〇、九〇〇	一〇、九〇〇	一〇、九〇〇	一〇、九〇〇	一〇、九〇〇
			四四一七一二五	四四一五一一二	四四一四一一	四四一三一一七	四四一二一一七	四四一一一一〇	四三一二一一六
四一八一二	四一五一一六		四五一一一二五	四五一一一一三〇	四五一一一一九	四五一一〇一一九	四五一一九一二六	四五一一九一二二	四五一一八一五
四二一三一二	四一一一一一七		四五一一七一六	四五一一六一八	四五一一五一一四	四五一一四一一九	四五一一五一一九	四五一一三一一五	四五一一五一一二

BAVG	BAVG	BAVG
六 トラツカ	五 ダツシア	三 バイエタ
八、五二二	四、一三三	四、一三三
四二一五一一	四二一一一三	四二一九一五
四三一一一三	四二一七一二	四二一五一一六

海軍省建物の CVE 1 他の CVE は移籍

建設せられた CVE の進水日時 海軍に移籍のため改装

開始日時

+++ BAVG 一號は (昭和十六年) 四一年二月七日現在英國に貸與せられて居たが参考のため採録した。

備考 右の CVE 及 BAVG 型船は次のものを除き海運 03 (貨物) 型船より改装せられた。

CVE 二六號一八九號 (油槽船より改装)

CVE 五五號一〇四號 (特種陸軍型、S4、S2、BB3)

CVE 一〇五號一一一五號 (特種陸軍型)

四、英商ハ格機かられた五〇型の複式逐能

型式	番号	名称	種類	振替日誌	願効	積	類
DD	七〇	クラヴィン	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇三〇	七〇	
DD	七二	コリン	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇三〇		
DD	七三	スプラット	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇三〇		
DD	七五	ウインツ	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇九〇	七五	七八五
DD	七六	フレイ	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇九〇		
DD	六八	エザ	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇九〇		
DD	八一	シフ	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇六〇		
DD	八八	ロビ	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇六〇		
DD	八九	リソ	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇六〇		
DD	九三	フエ	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇九〇		
DD	一〇八	ウキ	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇六〇		
DD	一二七	トウ	DD	四〇一〇一三	一〇九〇		

DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD
一八二	一八一	一七五	一七〇	一六九	一六八	一六七	一六二	一四三	一四〇	一三五	一三四	一三三	一三二	一三一
ト	ホ	マ	カ	フ	マ	カ	サ	ヤ	ク	テ	ク	ヘ	ア	ブ
ー	ー	ツ	ル	ー	ド	ウ	ツ	ー	ラ	イ	ラ	ー	ー	チ
マ	ブ	ケ	ル	ー	ツ	エ	チ	ノ	ツ	ル	ウ	イ	ロ	ア
ス	ウ	ン	ク	ト	ク	ス	ア	ル	ク	マ	ン	ウ	ン	ナ
四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一	四〇一
九一二三	九一二三	九一二四	九一二三	九一二三	九一二三	九一二三	九一二四	九一二三	九一二六	九一二六	九一二九	九一二九	九一二九	九一二九
一、〇六〇	一、〇六〇	一、〇六〇	一、〇六〇	一、〇六〇	一、〇六〇	一、〇六〇	一、〇六〇	一、〇九〇	一、〇九〇	一、〇九〇	一、〇九〇	一、〇九〇	一、〇九〇	一、〇九〇
・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	DD
・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	七五
・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	・	一八五

DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD
二五七	二五六	二五四	二五三	二五二	一九八	一九七	一九五	一九四	一九三	一九一	一九〇	一八五	一八四	一八三
ウ エ ル ス	バ ン ク ロ フ ト	ロ ヂ ア ー ス	マ ツ ク ・ キ ア ラ	マ ツ ク ・ ク ツ ク	ハ ー ン ド ン	ブ ラ ン チ	ウ エ ル ボ ー ン ・ シ ー ウ ツ ド	ハ ン ト	エ ー ベル ・ ピ ー ア ツ ブ サ ー	メ ー ソ ン	サ タ ー リ ー	バ グ リ ー	ア ボ ツ ト	ハ ラ デ ン
四〇一 九一 九	四〇一 九一 二四	四〇一 九一 二三	四〇一 九一 二三	四〇一 九一 二四	四〇一 九一 九	四〇一 九一 九	四〇一 九一 九	四〇一 九一 九	四〇一 九一 九	四〇一 九一 二〇	四〇一 九一 二〇	四〇一 九一 二三	四〇一 九一 二三	四〇一 九一 二四
一、 二九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 一九〇	一、 〇六〇	一、 〇六〇	一、 〇六〇
DD 一八六 一三四 七	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	DD 一八六 一三四 七	・ ・ ・ ・	・ ・ ・ ・	DD 七五 一八 五

DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD	DD
二七四	二七三	二六九	二六八	二六五	二六四	二六三	二五八
ミ ド	ス ウ エ ー シ ー	ペ イ リ ー	シ ア ブ リ ッ ク	エ ド ワ ー ズ	マ ツ ク ・ ラ ナ ハ ン	ロ ー ブ	オ ー リ ッ ク
四〇一 一 二六	四〇一 一 二六	四〇一 一 二六	四〇一 一 二六	四〇一 一 一九	四〇一 一 一九	四〇一 一 一九	四〇一 一 一九
一、一九〇	一、一九〇	一、一九〇	一、一九〇	一、一九〇	一、一九〇	一、一九〇	一、一九〇
・	・	・	・	・	・	・	DD 一八六 三四七

五、以下の法令は第一次、第二次、第三次

ワインソン案を構成するものと考へらる(建案に關して)

(一) (昭和九年) 一九三四年三月二十七日のワインソン・トランメル法 (公法一三五號) 第七三條會  
は次の如く承認した。

(イ) (大正十一年) 一九二二年二月六日、ワシントンに於て、又 (昭和五年) 一九三〇年四月二二  
日、ロンドンに於て調印せられた條約により制限せられた條約の範疇に關する合衆國海軍の權

(9777777777)

〇〇〇〇、八三三	集	湖	〇〇〇〇
〇〇〇〇、八三三	集	湖	〇〇〇〇
〇〇〇〇、〇〇〇	集	湖	〇〇〇〇
〇〇〇〇、〇〇〇	集	湖	〇〇〇〇

〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三) 〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三) 〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三)

〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三) 〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三) 〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三)

〇〇〇〇、八三三	集	湖	〇〇〇〇
〇〇〇〇、八三三	集	湖	〇〇〇〇

〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三) 〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三) 〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三)

〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三) 〇〇〇〇、八三三 (〇〇〇〇、八三三)

(イ) 潜水艦

一三、六五八噸

(ロ) 尙補助艦一三三、六五〇噸が承認せられ、一五、〇〇〇、〇〇〇弗を許作用舟艇の  
建造のために使用することが承認せられた。

備考

本法令(軍艦)により合衆國海軍の保有すべき全噸数は一、五五七、四八〇噸であつた。

(三) (昭和十五年)一九四〇年七月一四日の一割一分擴張法(公法六二九號―第七六號令)は左の如く承認した。

(イ) 航空母艦

七九、五〇〇噸

(ロ) 巡洋艦

六六、五〇〇噸

(ハ) 潜水艦

二二、〇〇〇噸

(ニ) 右の噸数は總噸數(一六七、〇〇〇噸)を超へざる限り上下三三、四〇〇噸を加減  
費用してよし。

(此の費用は後に五〇、一〇〇噸に修正せられた)

(ホ) 補助艦七五、〇〇〇噸を移籍又は建造すること。

(ニ) 軍艦の艦齡を次の如くする。

戦艦

一六六年



(イ) 砲 艦 三八五、〇〇〇噸

(ロ) 航空母艦 二〇〇、〇〇〇噸

(ハ) 巡洋艦 四二〇、〇〇〇噸

(ニ) 驅逐艦 二五〇、〇〇〇噸

(ホ) 潜水艦 七〇、〇〇〇噸

合計 一、三三五、〇〇〇噸

(ウ) 右諸類別に於て三九七、五〇〇噸の増強を認可

(ハ) 砲艦艇 七十二隻

七一號七六號會)であり、次へ引く減額した。

備考 本法令(軍艦)により含まれる海軍の保有すべき全噸數は一、三二四、四八〇噸であつた。  
 四 所謂ヌタイク案(昭和十五年)(一九四〇年)は一九四〇年七月一九日の七割減額法案(公法七五

航空母艦	二〇年
巡洋艦	二〇年
他の軍艦	一六年
潜水艦	一三年

(イ) 補 助 艦

100,000噸

備考

右法令(軍艦)により合衆國海軍の保有すべき全噸数は三、〇四九、四八〇噸であつた。

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

は ず け 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

同 型 艦

三、〇四九、四八〇噸

Defense Doc. No. 1587

3002

ADDRESS NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF SHIPS  
Code 110A

REFER TO FILE NO.

FS(110A)  
EF13/DD

NAVY DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF SHIPS

WASHINGTON, 25, D. C.

3 APR 1947

To: Judge Advocate General  
Navy Division, War Crimes Office

Subj: Ship Information Requested by Defense Counsel in  
Main Tokyo War Crimes Trial.

Ref: (a) Internatl. Military Tribunal for the Far  
East, Defense Counsel ltr of 3 Mar. 1947  
to JAG, Navy Div., War Crimes Office.  
(b) JAG, Navy Div., War Crimes Office ltr,  
Encl.-1, of 19 Mar. 1947 to BuShips.

Encl: (HW)  
(A) Subject Information.  
(B) Copies of refs. (a) and (b) returned as requested.

1. Enclosure (A) contains a tabulation of the combatant and miscellaneous vessels under construction as of 7 December 1941, and the combatant and miscellaneous vessels on hand as of that same date.

2. It should be noted that reference (a) requested "in addition to information sent...the total number and total tonnage of miscellaneous vessels." This Bureau has assumed that the Defense Counsel for the Major War Criminals of the Far East was seeking the total number and total tonnage of miscellaneous vessels (a) under construction as of 7 December 1941 and (b) on hand as of 7 December 1941.

3. Enclosure (A) is complete and accurate, and has been authenticated and notarized.

/s/ Stirling P. Smith.

S.P. Smith  
By direction of  
Chief of Bureau

FROM BUREAU OF SHIPS

NAVSHIPS (1851)  
2 April 1947

## I. Vessels Under Construction as of 7 December 1941.

<u>Type</u>	<u>No. of Vessels</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
<u>Combatant</u>		
BB	10	410,000
CV	22	442,300
CB	3	81,000
CA	8	107,200
CL	31	278,000
DP	206	393,080
DF & BDF	50	57,500
SS	<u>96</u>	<u>146,496</u>
Total Combatant	426	1,915,576
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
Auxiliary	90	249,508
Patrol Craft	328	42,028
Mine Craft	313	121,233
District Craft	149	36,092
Large Landing Craft	<u>15</u>	<u>67,500</u>
Total Miscellaneous	<u>895</u>	<u>516,361</u>
GRAND TOTAL	1,321	2,431,937*

\*\* In NAVSHIPS(1851) 23 January 1947, this total was incorrectly stated as 1,915,276 tons.

\*\*\* In NAVSHIPS(1851) 23 January 1947, this total was incorrectly stated as 2,432,137 tons.

✓ 603002

Def, Doc, No1697

出所 海軍省艦船局 暗號 一一〇A

参照書類 海軍省艦船局コロンビヤ地区、華府二十五

PS (一一〇A) REF 13

DD

一九四七年四月三日

宛 戦犯局海軍部法務部長

主題 東京中央戦犯裁判ニ於テ辯護士ニ依リ請求セラレタル艦船報告

参照 (a) 戦犯局海軍部法務部長宛ノ一九四七年三月三日附極東國

裁判所辯護士ノ書類

(b) 艦船局宛ノ一九四七年三月十九日附戦犯局海軍部海軍省法務部

長ノ書類、封入書類一

封入書類 (HW)

(A) 主題報告

(B) 参照ノ書類、(a) 及び (b) ハ請求ニ從ヒ河原サレ

一、封入書類 (A) ハ一九四一年十二月七日現在建造中ノ軍艦及び艦務艦

及び同日現在手持ノ軍艦及び艦務艦ノ表ヲ含ム

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

警 船 局

ニ参照 (a) ハ「送付サレタ報告ニ加フルニ、、難務艦船艇ノ編隊及ビ總  
 領等一ヲ請求シタルコトニ留意スベシ、本局ハ惡意主要職犯人辯護國  
 ガ一九四一年十二月七日現在 (b) 遠近中ノ難務艦艇及ビ同日現在 (b) 手持  
 ノ難務艦艇ノ編隊及ビ總領隊ヲ求メアリシモノト推定セリ」  
 三、封入書類 (A) ハ完全正確ニシテ、且ツ認證サレ公認サレタルモノナリ

署名 スター、ン、ビー、スミス

局長ノ命ニヨリ

辯護書類 番 號

出 所 海軍省造船局

参照書類番號

海軍省造船局コロンビト地獄、達府二十五

一九四一年十二月七日現在合衆國海軍省ニ依リテ建造完了或ハ建造中ノ艦艇ニ關スル報告、及ビ一九四七年四月二日ノ日附ヲ有シ、此所ニ添附セラレ又此所ニソノ一部トシテ呈示セラルル所ノ二頁ヨリ成ル符號「海軍省造船局（一八五〇號）」ヲ有スル他ノ紙ハ、私儀アルバート、ビー、メイニ依リテ作製セラレタリ、正式宣言ニ依リテ宣言シ、私儀海軍省造船局ニ等船設計課當ノ生産分析者ニシテ、カク生産分析者トシテ此所ニ考慮サルル事項ニ關シ海軍省ノ公記録ヲ閱讀シ得ルコト、此所ニ含まラルル報告ハ通常正規ノ職務ノ一部トシテカカル公記録ヨリ本人ニ依リテ得ラレタルコト、此所ニ含まレ又カカル公記録ヨリ得ラレタル報告ハ正當ニ轉寫サレタルモノナルコトヲ其述ス

署名 アルバート、ビー、レイ





Ref. No. 1007

SS	DE	DD	OL	GA	OB	CV	BB	軍艦
九六	五〇	二〇六	三一	八	三	二	一〇	
一四六、四九六	五七、五〇〇	三九三、〇八〇	二七八、〇〇〇	一〇七、二〇〇	八一、〇〇〇	四四二、三〇〇	四二〇、〇〇〇	

型

艦隻數

噸

一九四一年十二月七日現在建造中ノ艦隻

海軍省造船局(一八五一) 一九四七年四月二日

事務合計 四二六 一、九一五、五七六 xx

業務費

補助費 九〇 二四九、五〇八

削減費 三二八 四二、〇二八

水雷敷設艇 三一三 二二一、二三三

近海用舟艇 一四九 三六、〇九二

大海上離用舟艇 一五 六七、五〇〇

業務費合計 八九五 五一六、三六一

總計 一、三二一 二、四三一、九三七 xxx

xx 一九四七年一月二十三日ノ海軍省造船局（一八五一）ニハ此ノ

合計ハ誤ツテ一、九一五、七七六噸ト記サル。

xxx 一九四七年一月二十三日ノ海軍省造船局（一八五一）ニハ此ノ

合計ハ誤ツテ二、四三一、一三七噸ト記サル。

一 三 一

海軍省 郵船

海軍省 郵船局 (一八五一)  
一九四七年四月二日

一九四一年十二月七日現在手持備送

SS	DD	OL	CA	OYE	OV	BB	型	號
一	一	一	一	一	一	一	五三三、三〇〇	一七
一	一七	九	八	一	七	一	一五四、六〇〇	一七
一	二						八、〇〇〇	一七
							一七一、二〇〇	一七
							一五七、七七五	一七
							二三九、五三〇	一七
							一一六、六二一	一七

軍務會計	三四五	一、三八二、〇二六
雜務會計		
補助	二三四	一、〇六三、一三二
明 戈 延	一〇二	三八、六二八
水雷船設艇	一三九	七三、八二五
近海用舟艇	七一七	一二四、八八四
雜務會計	一、一九二	一、二七三、四六九
總 計	一、五三七	二、六五五、四九五

Ex 3000

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 301

Deponent: Hidemi YOSHIDA

Born: - 5 March, 1902

Address: No. 982 4-chome,  
Shimo-Tokicho,  
Suginami-ku, Tokyo

I, Hidemi YOSHIDA, having first been duly sworn, do depose and say.

1. I served as a member of the staff of the Research Division of the Second Demobilization Bureau, the Demobilization Board, from June 1946 to May 1947. On the latter date I became Chief of the said Division, and am still serving in that capacity today. My work has been concerned principally with preparation and correlation of information and data to be submitted in compliance with demand from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Since spring of last year I have prepared many reports of various kinds pertaining to the armaments of the former Japanese Navy upon demand of GHQ and the International Prosecution Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. And I understand that a few of them - tables showing the vessels of the former Japanese Navy - have been exhibited in this Court.

2. In April of this year, the Defense Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East handed me a copy of an official document of the United States Navy Department pertaining to the vessels of the United States Navy, with the request that I prepare a comparative table of the vessels that the United States and Japanese Navies had already completed and had under construction as of 7 December 1941.

Since our data on the United States Navy had hitherto been largely a matter of inference and deduction I experienced no small pleasure in thus receiving for the first time such data of an

official character. In addition to the fact of the work of making accurate comparative tables of the navies of the two countries being a matter of personal interest to me, I could see no good reason for refusing to comply with the request of the Defense Section. I therefore accepted the assignment gladly and addressed myself with the utmost care to the preparation of the comparative tables in 11 sheets and handed them to the Defense Section upon completion. They are Defense Documents Number 1572 and 1573.

One difficulty encountered in this work was the fact that the two navies employed different systems in the classification of their ships. Adjustments to overcome this difficulty were made in the following manner:

(a) Vessels of the United States Navy listed as CV (aircraft carrier), CVL (carrier converted from cruiser) and CVE (escort carrier), as well as vessels of the former Japanese Navy listed as aircraft carrier and converted aircraft carrier (converted from merchant ship) have all been grouped together under the single category of aircraft carriers. I adopted this method of adjustment because of my belief that it would only serve to confuse understanding if these various classes of vessels were to be treated separately, whether from the standpoint of their capacity or the purposes for which they were intended; and also because the definition of aircraft carrier laid down by the London Naval Conference of 1930 being - "The expression 'aircraft carrier' includes any vessel of war, whatever its displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon" - it seemed the safest method to be guided by that definition.

(b) The United States Navy's CL (large cruiser) was included under heavy cruisers, while Japan's training cruisers were included under light cruisers.

(c) The United States Navy's DD (destroyer), DE (escort destroyer) and BDE (definition unknown to me) are all treated as

destroyers.

(d) Construction of Japan's capital ship SHINANO, along with another ship of the same type, was commenced in April, 1940. But work on both was suspended very shortly after their keels were laid the unnamed ship being dismantled, but the SHINANO being left untouched on the dock with no plan for proceeding with its construction until June 1942, when work was commenced to build it into an aircraft carrier in order to replace the carriers lost in the Battle of Midway.

For the above reason, the SHINANO is not included in the table of ships under construction, either as a capital ship or an aircraft carrier. Instead, I have merely made an annotation at the bottom of the table to the effect that there was one capital ship on which work was suspended shortly after the keel was laid.

5. In carrying out this request made to me by the Defense Section, I made one significant discovery. That was the fact that the estimate which our Naval General Staff had made of the United States Navy's strength by the process of inference and deduction was a strikingly close approximation of the actual strength as shown by the official document handed to me by the Defense Section; and that, if anything, our estimate was somewhat lower than the actual figures. All of which leads to the patent conclusion that not only the Naval General Staff's estimate of the United States naval strength, but the demand for shipbuilding programs which it submitted to the Navy Ministry on the basis of its estimate, were well grounded.

On this 15th day of August, 1947

At IMTFC, Tokyo.

DEPONENT: YOSHIDA, Hidemi

I, YOSHIDA, Hidemi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) ONO, Seichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YOSHIDA, Hidemi (seal)



Def. Doc. # 2085

如ク供述致シマス

自分機我國ニ行ハルハ方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上

明治三十五年三月五日

吉田 文 三

宣 告 供 述 者 東 京 部 並 區 下 高 井 戸 四 丁 目 九 八 二

荒 木 貞 夫 其 他

對

亞 米 利 加 合 衆 國 其 他

極 東 國 際 軍 事 裁 判 所

83002

一、私の姓名は吉田英三であります。私は一九四六年（昭和二十一年）六月から一九四七年五月迄復員局第二復員局資料整理部々員として、爾後は同部々長として勤務し今日に及んで居ります。私の任務は主として聯合軍司令部の要求に應じ提出すべき資料類を調整することであり  
ます。

私は昨年春以來聯合軍司令部又は國際核學團の要求に添き舊海軍々備に關する報告類を多種多様に亘り作製提出せしめられたのであります<sup>1</sup>が其の内の一部份である舊日本海軍艦艇一覽表の如きは既に當法廷に於て引用されて居るものと認めて居ります。

二 私は一九四七年四月經東軍事談判所辯護士から米國海軍艦艇に關する米國海軍省の公文書の寫を貸與され、一九四一年十二月七日現在に於ける日米兩海軍の現有艦艇及建造中の艦艇比較表を作製の上書陸とし

て提出すべき旨依頼を受けたのであります。

私としては従来米國側の資料は拒定し得るに過ぎなかつた處、此處に正式の公的資料を入取した致しもあり、正確なる兩國海軍の兵力比較表を作製することは兵隊もあり、且何等拒絶すべき理由も無いので、快よく右依頼を承諾の上最も思實な注意を以て比較圖表二葉を完成しこれ等を辯護圖に手交した次第であります。之等は辯護圖書第一五七二及一五七三號であります。

此等圖表の作製に當りまして、私は日本海軍の艦艇類別上の相違點を次の要領に依り處理致しました。

一 米海軍の CV (Aircraft Carrier), CVL (Carrier converted from Cruiser), CVE (Esc-

は艦巡へ含ましめて居ります。

(II) \*海軍の DD (Destroyer), DE (Escort Destroyer) 及び DES (定数不明) 等は

(I) \*海軍の CB (Large Cruiser) は重巡に含め、又日本海軍の練習巡洋艦

無難と信じたからて居ります。

種々の艦「となつて居りますので、此の定義に其の儘従ふのを最も

3 費用に計畫され且建造され更に何機から航空機發着可能である各

に於ける航空母艦の定義は「排水量の如何に拘らず専ら航空機の搭

扱ふことは却つて誤解を招くばかりであり且一九三〇年の倫敦會議

何とされば、之等各艦種を性能上から又は使用目的等から別個に取

急的に改装した母艦(等)も全部航空母艦として一括圖示致しました

ort Carrier) 等も日本海軍の航空母艦及特設航空母艦(艦)商船か

何れも艦逐艦として取扱ひました。

四日本海軍の軍艦信濃は一九四〇年四月に他の同型艦一隻と共に戦艦として起工されましたが兩艦共<sup>（一）</sup> 据附直後建造を中止しました。

同艦の方は間もなく解体されましたが、信濃のみは建造工事再興の企圖も無い儘船塹上に放棄せられ、一九四二年六月に至りミッドウェイ海戦後の航空母艦の缺を補ふ爲急に航空母艦として再生せしむべく工事を再興したのであります。

従つて同艦は建造中の艦艇表に於て、戦艦としても、航空母艦としても、之を統計に加へること無く、單に起工の儘建造中止中の戦艦一隻ある旨を註釋したに過ぎません。

五辯護國受望の作業を進めるに當り私は重要な発見をなしたのであります。

す。夫は往時日本海軍々令部が米國海軍兵力量に關し推測判断してを  
りました数量と今回米國海軍省から回附された公文書によつて示され  
た現實量とは極めて接近して居るといふ事實、並に我々の推定が實際  
の数字よりも幾分下廻つてゐたと言ふ事實であります。即ち當時の日  
本海軍々令部の兵力判断竝に之に應ずる海軍省への兵力整備要求には  
十分な根拠があつたことを物語つて居ります。

(終)

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月十五日

於極東國際軍事裁判所

供述者 吉田英三

右ハ營立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シ  
マス

同日 於 同 所

立會人 小野清一郎

Def. DOC. 2085

宣  
言  
書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ  
誓フ

(署名  
印名)

吉  
田  
英  
三



Ref. No. 103

# COMPARATIVE TABLE OF NAVAL VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION

昭和十六年十一月七日現在 日米建造中

	0	THOUSAND TONS.	100	200
BATTLE SHIPS 戦艦			2 VES.	128,000 TONS
			10 VES.	810,000 TONS
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 航空母艦			4 VES.	77,860 TONS
			22 VES.	442,300 TONS
HEAVY CRUISERS 重巡			11 VES.	188,200 TONS
LIGHT CRUISERS 軽巡			4 VES.	42,700 TONS
			31 VES.	278,000 TONS
DESTROYERS 駆逐艦			12 VES.	27,120 TONS
				450,520 TONS
SUBMARINES 潜水艦			29 VES.	42,554 TONS
			96 VES.	165,448 TONS
MISCELLANEOUS 其他			37 VES.	57,225 TONS
				816,361 TONS
TOTAL 合計			JAPAN — 88 VESSELS.	— 375,459
			U.S.A. — 1,321 VESSELS.	— 2,431,937

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM OFFICIALLY CONNECTED WITH THE JAPANESE RESEARCH DIVISION, SECOND DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU, AND IN SUCH OFFICIAL CAPACITY I HAVE OBTAINED THE DATA OF THE U.S. VESSEL RECORDS OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. THE DATA OF THE U.S. VESSEL RECORDS OF THE U.S. NAVY DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C. I FURTHER CERTIFY TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE.

SIGNED THIS ON THE 1<sup>ST</sup> OF MAY 1947, AT TOKYO.

Ex 3003 B

# COMPARISON BETWEEN THE U.S.A. AND JAPAN, AS OF DEC. 7, 1941.

艦艇比較表

NOTE  
注


JAPAN  
日本

U.S.A.  
米国

300

400

500



TONS.  
TONS.


( BESIDES THIS THERE WAS 1 BATTLE SHIP (62,000 TONS), THE BUILDING OF WHICH WAS SUSPENDED JUST AFTER KEEL LAID.  
 之外龍骨搖付直後建造中止の戦艦一隻(62,000噸)あり )

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AS MEMBER OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION ON SHIP CAPACITY HAVE PREPARED THIS CHART. THE TONNAGES AND TONNAGE CAPACITIES WERE TAKEN FROM THE RECORDS OF THE COMMISSION. I CERTIFY THE ABOVE CHART IS TRUE.  
 Hidemi Yoshida.

此表は第二種貿易資料整理部が資料を公式に日本政府に關係し、其の資格に於て日本政府の公式記録の亦當に作製したることを證明す。米国艦艇の噸數は左軍府米国海軍省の證明を記録した。是れは記為表の事實且正確なる事を證明す。  
 昭和二十一年五月一日 於東京 吉田英三

Def. Doc. # 1572

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF NAVAL VESSELS ON HAND BET  
昭和十六年十二月七日現在 日米現有身



I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM OFFICIALLY CONNECTED WITH THE JAPANESE G  
RCH DIVISION, SECOND DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU, AND IN SUCH OFFICIAL CAPAC  
FROM OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. THE DATA OF THE I  
TAKEN FROM CERTIFIED RECORDS OF THE U.S. NAVY DEPARTMENT IN WASHIN  
THE ABOVE CHART IS TRUE AND ACCURATE  
SIGNED THIS ON THE  
1ST OF MAY, 1947. AT TOKYO. *Kia*

613003A

# BETWEEN THE U.S.A. AND JAPAN. AS OF DEC. 7, 1941.

船舶比較表

NOTE:  
凡例

JAPAN.  
日本

U.S.A.  
米國

	600	800	1000	1200
TONS				
17 VES	534,300 TONS.			
6 VES.	490,384 TONS.			

~~273,869 TONS.~~

77 TONS.

95 TONS.

GOVERNMENT AS MEMBER OF RESEARCH  
 COMMISSION HAVE PREPARED THIS CHART  
 OF U.S. VESSELS AND TONNAGE WARE  
 HOUSEHOLD. I FURTHER CERTIFY  
 KEMI YOSHIDA.

此圖係由海軍省資料整理部部長以正式公認之關係  
 其資格在於日本政府之正式記錄之本圖之作業以此證明  
 其。米國艦艇噸數係在華府米國海軍省之證明之記錄  
 之標本。更以上記係表之真實且正確之事實證明之  
 昭和二十一年五月一日 於東京 吉田英三

合衆國大統帥府海軍長官千九百四十五年會計年度（昭和二十年）報告より抜萃

現役軍人——性別  
海軍、海兵隊及沿岸警備隊

自千九百四十年（昭和十五年）七月一日至千九百四十五年（昭和二十年）六月三十日

役務及性別	一九四〇		一九四一		一九四二		一九四三		一九四四		一九四五	
	七月一日	十二月卅一日	六月卅日	十二月卅一日	六月卅日	十二月卅一日	六月卅日	十二月卅一日	六月卅日	十二月卅一日	六月卅日	十二月卅一日
總計	205127	260086	284427	383150	463096	1,639,559	2,207,720	2,954,224	3,623,205	3,844,906	4,951,997	5,883,996
海軍	160997	215275	284427	383150	463096	1,259,167	1,741,750	2,381,116	2,981,365	3,201,775	3,883,996	4,612,316
官	15162	17725	28421	38601	67786	118058	174245	219279	237754	300101	317316	317316
士	13162	17723	28421	38601	67786	117268	170418	212820	260145	291367	308931	308931
男	0	0	0	0	0	770	327	6459	7611	8744	8385	8385
女	2569	4875	7918	11452	14529	36004	54295	120472	105019	84627	61231	61231
士官候補生	2569	4875	7918	11452	14529	36004	54295	120472	105019	84627	61231	61231
男	2569	4875	7918	11452	14529	36004	54295	120472	105019	84627	61231	61231
女	0	0	0	0	0	532	634	484	411	0	25	25
下士官兵	144824	192175	247417	352274	556477	1,102,218	1,507,779	2,034,345	2,600,115	2,808,134	2,993,565	2,993,565
男	144824	192175	247417	352274	556477	1,099,109	1,486,996	1,993,893	2,542,663	2,735,270	2,913,775	2,913,775
女	0	0	0	0	0	3,109	21,083	38,450	57,450	72,864	73,788	73,788
看護婦	442	504	671	823	1,778	2,907	5,431	7,022	8,199	8,893	11,086	11,086

5000

393

海軍人員名冊 1890

役務及性別	一九四〇	一九四一	一九四二	一九四三	一九四四	一九四五					
海兵隊	28364	47820	54359	75346	143628	238428	310994	405169	472582	472380	476709
<u>士官</u>	<u>1819</u>	<u>2480</u>	<u>3339</u>	<u>4067</u>	<u>7138</u>	<u>13151</u>	<u>21384</u>	<u>28193</u>	<u>32788</u>	<u>35422</u>	<u>37067</u>
男	1819	2480	3339	4067	7138	13151	21140	27588	31991	34598	36236
女	0	0	0	0	0	0	244	605	797	824	831
<u>士官候補生</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>262</u>	<u>394</u>	<u>371</u>	<u>702</u>	<u>2029</u>	<u>1816</u>	<u>10723</u>	<u>7526</u>	<u>5395</u>	<u>4203</u>
男	0	262	394	371	702	2029	1730	10573	7515	5384	4175
女	0	0	0	0	0	0	86	150	11	1	28
<u>下士官兵</u>	<u>26545</u>	<u>45078</u>	<u>50626</u>	<u>70908</u>	<u>135688</u>	<u>223243</u>	<u>287794</u>	<u>365253</u>	<u>422269</u>	<u>431573</u>	<u>435439</u>
男	26545	43078	50626	70908	135688	223243	284431	356533	422269	421561	421961
女	0	0	0	0	0	0	3313	8720	13399	29912	33478
沿岸警備隊	13766	16933	19235	27730	58998	141769	154976	171939	169252	169871	171192
<u>士官</u>	<u>1360</u>	<u>1405</u>	<u>1490</u>	<u>1854</u>	<u>3507</u>	<u>5477</u>	<u>8339</u>	<u>10352</u>	<u>11979</u>	<u>12615</u>	<u>13693</u>
男	1360	1405	1490	1854	3507	5462	8104	10033	11275	11697	11816
女	0	0	0	0	0	15	235	514	704	918	867
<u>士官候補生</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>262</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>301</u>	<u>349</u>	<u>992</u>	<u>1050</u>	<u>1566</u>	<u>298</u>	<u>480</u>	<u>511</u>
男	145	262	199	301	349	992	1050	1493	234	430	511
女	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	73	64	0	0
<u>下士官兵</u>	<u>12261</u>	<u>15326</u>	<u>17546</u>	<u>25575</u>	<u>55142</u>	<u>135300</u>	<u>145587</u>	<u>159821</u>	<u>156981</u>	<u>150770</u>	<u>157998</u>
男	12261	15326	17546	25575	55142	135231	142631	154251	149589	147865	149121
女	0	0	0	0	0	69	2956	5570	7392	8911	8877

出典：海軍人事局，合衆國海兵隊及合衆國沿岸警備隊

3004

Defense Doc. 1070

Service and Type of Personnel	1940		1941		1942		1943		1944		1945
	1 Jul	31 Dec	30 Jun	31 Dec	30 Jun	31 Dec	30 Jun	31 Dec	30 Jun	31 Dec	30 Jun
<b>MARINE CORPS</b>	<u>28,364</u>	<u>47,820</u>	<u>54,359</u>	<u>75,346</u>	<u>143,528</u>	<u>238,423</u>	<u>310,994</u>	<u>405,169</u>	<u>472,582</u>	<u>472,380</u>	<u>476,709</u>
<u>Officers</u>	<u>1,819</u>	<u>2,480</u>	<u>3,339</u>	<u>4,067</u>	<u>7,138</u>	<u>13,151</u>	<u>21,364</u>	<u>28,193</u>	<u>32,788</u>	<u>35,422</u>	<u>37,067</u>
Men	1,819	2,480	3,339	4,067	7,138	13,151	21,140	27,588	31,991	34,598	36,236
Women	0	0	0	0	0	0	244	605	797	824	831
<u>Officer Candidates</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>262</u>	<u>394</u>	<u>371</u>	<u>702</u>	<u>2,029</u>	<u>1,816</u>	<u>10,723</u>	<u>7,526</u>	<u>5,385</u>	<u>4,203</u>
Men	0	262	394	371	702	2,029	1,730	10,573	7,515	5,354	4,175
Women	0	0	0	0	0	0	86	150	11	1	28
<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>26,545</u>	<u>45,078</u>	<u>50,626</u>	<u>70,906</u>	<u>135,688</u>	<u>223,243</u>	<u>287,794</u>	<u>366,253</u>	<u>432,268</u>	<u>431,573</u>	<u>435,439</u>
Men	26,545	45,078	50,626	70,908	135,688	223,243	284,481	356,533	415,559	414,561	417,861
Women	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,313	9,720	16,669	17,012	17,578
<b>COAST GUARD</b>	<u>13,766</u>	<u>16,993</u>	<u>19,235</u>	<u>27,730</u>	<u>58,998</u>	<u>141,769</u>	<u>154,976</u>	<u>171,939</u>	<u>169,258</u>	<u>169,871</u>	<u>171,192</u>
<u>Officers</u>	<u>1,360</u>	<u>1,405</u>	<u>1,490</u>	<u>1,854</u>	<u>3,507</u>	<u>5,477</u>	<u>8,339</u>	<u>10,552</u>	<u>11,979</u>	<u>12,615</u>	<u>12,683</u>
Men	1,360	1,405	1,490	1,854	3,507	5,462	8,104	10,038	11,275	11,697	11,616
Women	0	0	0	0	0	15	235	514	704	918	867
<u>Officer Candidates</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>262</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>301</u>	<u>349</u>	<u>992</u>	<u>1,050</u>	<u>1,566</u>	<u>298</u>	<u>450</u>	<u>511</u>
Men	145	262	199	301	349	992	1,050	1,493	234	480	511
Women	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	73	64	0	0
<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>12,261</u>	<u>15,326</u>	<u>17,546</u>	<u>25,575</u>	<u>55,142</u>	<u>135,300</u>	<u>145,587</u>	<u>159,821</u>	<u>156,981</u>	<u>156,776</u>	<u>157,998</u>
Men	12,261	15,326	17,546	25,575	55,142	135,231	142,631	154,251	149,589	147,665	149,121
Women	0	0	0	0	0	69	2,956	5,570	7,392	8,911	8,877

SOURCE: Bureau of Naval Personnel, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard.

Defense Doc. 1870

Excerpt from ANNUAL REPORT Fiscal Year 1945 - THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY - BY TYPE

NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND COAST GUARD  
1 July 1940 through 30 June 1945.

Service and Type of Personnel	1940		1941		1942		1943		1944		1945
	1 Jul	31 Dec	30 Jun	31 Dec	30 Jun	31 Dec	30 Jun	31 Dec	30 Jun	31 Dec	30 Jun
GRAND TOTAL	203,127	280,086	358,021	486,226	843,096	1,639,359	2,207,720	2,958,224	3,623,205	3,844,006	4,031,097
NAVY	160,997	215,273	284,427	383,150	640,570	1,259,167	1,741,750	2,381,116	2,981,365	3,201,755	3,383,196
<u>Officers</u>	<u>13,162</u>	<u>17,723</u>	<u>28,421</u>	<u>38,601</u>	<u>67,786</u>	<u>118,038</u>	<u>174,245</u>	<u>219,279</u>	<u>267,754</u>	<u>300,101</u>	<u>317,316</u>
Men	13,162	17,723	28,421	38,601	67,786	117,268	170,418	212,820	260,143	291,357	308,931
Women	0	0	0	0	0	770	3,827	6,459	7,611	8,744	8,385
<u>Officer Candidates</u>	<u>2,569</u>	<u>4,873</u>	<u>7,918</u>	<u>11,452</u>	<u>14,529</u>	<u>36,004</u>	<u>54,295</u>	<u>120,472</u>	<u>105,059</u>	<u>84,627</u>	<u>61,231</u>
Men	2,569	4,873	7,918	11,452	14,529	35,472	53,661	119,988	104,578	84,627	61,206
Women	0	0	0	0	0	532	634	484	481	0	25
<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>144,824</u>	<u>192,173</u>	<u>247,417</u>	<u>332,274</u>	<u>556,477</u>	<u>1,102,218</u>	<u>1,507,779</u>	<u>2,034,343</u>	<u>2,600,153</u>	<u>2,808,134</u>	<u>2,993,563</u>
Men	144,824	192,173	247,417	332,274	556,477	1,099,109	1,486,696	1,995,893	2,542,653	2,735,270	2,919,775
Women	0	0	0	0	0	3,109	21,083	38,450	57,500	72,864	73,788
<u>Nurses</u>	<u>442</u>	<u>504</u>	<u>671</u>	<u>823</u>	<u>1,778</u>	<u>2,907</u>	<u>5,431</u>	<u>7,022</u>	<u>8,399</u>	<u>8,893</u>	<u>11,086</u>



FILE COPY

Defense Document 1978

RETURN TO ROOM 361

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Nobutake KONDO

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Nobutake KONDO. For approximately 40 years, from November 1907 (Meiji 40) when I graduated from the Naval Academy, until I was relegated into the reserves as a full admiral in September 1945 (Showa 20) I served in the Japanese Navy. During my term of service I held the following posts at the Naval General Staff at three different times.

From June 1930 (Showa 5) until December 1932 (Showa 7) -  
Naval General Staff First Section Chief (Captain)

From December 1935 (Showa 10) until December 1938 (Showa 13)  
Naval General Staff First Division Chief (Rear Admiral -  
Vice Admiral)

From October 1939 (Showa 14) until September 1941 (Showa 16)  
Vice Chief of Naval General Staff (Vice Admiral)

2. As a rule, the following procedure was followed by the Japanese Navy in its planning and effectuation of its armament program:

(1) The annual national defense plan was formulated by the First Section of the First Division of the Naval General Staff. This was a decision on policy on how to complete national defense, envisioning the eventuality of war, and formed the basis for armament plans and the training programs of all units, etc.

(2) The Third Division of the Naval General Staff collected and pieced together information on the international situation, the war preparedness conditions, and war potential of the major powers and distributed it to the divisions of the Naval General

Staff to serve as criterions for the various planning it did for the Navy in general.

(3) The Third Section of the Second Division of the Naval General Staff, on the basis of the above-mentioned National Defense plan, formed the draft of a plan for minimum possible armament required by the Navy for fulfilling its national defense responsibilities, after consideration of the national strength and of the armament situation of the major powers. The draft, after being approved by the superiors, was deliberated at a preliminary conference with competent officers of the Navy Ministry. At this preliminary conference, national strength, the difficulties of execution of the plan etc. were most minutely examined by the representatives of the Navy Ministry and of the Naval General Staff and it was customary for considerable alterations to be made in the draft.

(4) After an understanding had been reached at the above-mentioned preliminary conference, an official report of the conference was sent by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the Navy Minister, to which the latter set forth his opinions on the prospects of the execution of the plan in his reply.

(5) The Navy Ministry, besides, contacted the various government organs in connection with distribution of budget and material

(6) After the budget had been decided, the execution order was issued by the Navy Minister and the various organs began their allotted work in the execution of the order.

The organization being as above delineated, I - holding the positions before mentioned - had considerably detailed information on armaments.

It was immediately after the conclusion of the 1930 London Disarmament Conference that I was appointed First Section Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff. It was consequently at a time when the National Defense plan had to be revised to a yet more defensive order to conform to the new situation.

By the Washington Treaty, the number of capital ships and aircraft carriers permitted Japan for retention was limited to 60%

of those of the United States and Great Britain. However, information collected after the Treaty revealed that the United States Navy was steadily preparing for trans-ocean operations and it was thought that if the necessity arose the United States Fleet could at any time reach Japanese home waters. To oppose this threat, efforts were made to complete our national defenses by equipping the Navy with fleet-footed cruisers and other craft of lesser type which would depend principally upon their torpedoes to carry out interceptive operations in home waters.

Moreover, with the limitation placed on the strength in auxiliary vessels permitted for retention by the London Disarmament Treaty of 1930, the characteristic armament of our Navy was made subject to restriction. Further, we were forced to look on with folded arms whilst the United States Navy constructed new types of warships.

For this reason the ratification of the Treaty became a serious problem in the Privy Council, while Stimson's "Hats Off" speech in the Senate contributed not a little to aggravating the feelings of the Japanese people. The Naval General Staff arrived at the conclusion that there was no way of coping with this situation except through intensive training for the raising of technical strength and through construction of such small warships as were not limited by the restrictions of the Treaty and airplanes to cover up the resulting defects in armaments.

It was around this time that many precious lives were sacrificed in fierce training; and deplorable accidents involving warcraft which were not covered by treaty limitations occurred, such as capsizing in heavy weather of torpedo boats under 600 tons which were too heavily armed.

4. I was appointed Chief of Division One of the Naval General Staff at the time when the 1935-1936 London Disarmament Conference was in session. A month after my appointment Japan seceded from that conference.

What we advocated at this conference was a step forward from

our earlier demand for armaments that were non-aggressive and non-menacing - namely, armament which would remove all danger of war ever breaking out. Unfortunately our thesis was not accepted by the other powers. The Japanese Navy directed its attention to various experiments with the aim of fulfilling its responsibility in national defense within the scope of the minimum possible budget, in consideration of the meagre resources of the nation. The result was the discovery that there was no other way than to give our armament program the characteristics hereafter to be shown. As a result, the Third Supplementary Program was drafted.

The Third Supplementary Program called for the construction of two battleships, two aircraft carriers, eighteen destroyers and fourteen submarines - a total of thirty six ships with a total tonnage of 233,000 tons, plus thirty four auxiliary vessels displacing 44,500 tons by the end of 1941.

Considering that, even were the Washington and London Treaties to continue in effect, the time had arrived for replacement and construction of capital ships with the tendency present in all major powers to launch into large scale warship construction, the plan was indeed on a very minor scale.

The principal characteristic of this plan was the construction of two capital ships each carrying nine 18 inch guns and displacing 64,000 tons. As before mentioned, as there was finally no quantitative limitation adopted at the London Disarmament Conference because of the trend for replacement and construction of capital ships, the major powers simultaneously launched into construction of capital ships. In this situation our country, unable to realize armament in any way comparable to that of the other nations by any ordinary methods, adopted the construction of super-battleships as a last resort and attempted to fulfill its national defense obligations within the scope of a small budget.

In May 1938 (Showa 13) the second "Vinson" Plan passed the United States Congress and information steadily filtered in to the

effect that construction of capital ships and other craft was being promoted. Various measures to counter this situation were studied but expenditure running high owing to the China Incident, no concrete plan had been formulated up to the time of my leaving the post of Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff in December of the same year (1938).

5. It was immediately after the outbreak of World War II in Europe that I was appointed Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff. In our country it was the time when we were worrying over means of preventing the war from spreading outside Europe. We had already received notification of the abrogation of the Japan-United States Trade Treaty at the time. Our intelligence section knew that American reconnaissance troops had already moved into Hawaii and that the Hawaiian Army Air Force had been greatly strengthened. This United States pressure on Japan was felt acutely by us who were charged with the plans for national defense, and our uneasiness over the question as to how we should meet our responsibilities of national defense in the face of the rapidly mounting American naval preparations was hourly increasing.

At that time the Japanese Navy was in the midst of the above-mentioned Third Supplementary Program, but with the exception of the completion of a portion of the smaller craft, this Program was still unfinished. Meanwhile, from the beginning of the same year namely of the year 1939 (Showa 14), it had started on the Fourth Supplementary Program. According to the judgment of the Naval General Staff at that time, the United States, in accordance with the Second Vinson Plan, had started or was about to start construction in the near future on three 45,000 ton capital ships, aircraft carriers to the tonnage of 40,000 tons, cruisers to the approximate tonnage of 70,000 tons, plus destroyers and submarines totaling an approximate 40,000 tons, and other auxiliary craft, in addition to the six capital ships, two aircraft carriers and numerous cruisers and smaller craft it had under construction. It was because of this enormous United States armament program and the aforementioned

political and military pressure that the Third Supplementary Program was considered insufficient to warrant confidence from the national defense viewpoint, and the Fourth Supplementary Program was begun.

The Fourth Supplementary Program was a program for the construction of a total of fifty nine vessels including two battleships, one aircraft carrier, six cruisers, twenty four destroyers, twenty six submarines, displacing an approximate 296,000 tons, besides twenty four auxiliary ships totaling approximately 29,000 tons, by the end of 1944 (Showa 19); but at the time of my appointment in October 1939 (Showa 14), with the exception of part of the small warship program, the plan was not yet under way. Further, the two battleships of this plan were similar to those of the Third Supplementary Program. Their construction was commenced in the beginning of 1940 (Showa 15); but as will be shown later, the building had to be discontinued within the same year. One of them had to be scrapped before the outbreak of the Pacific War, while the other was abandoned with its keel on the docks until the war began.

Immediately after my appointment to office, information was received that the Third Vinson Armament Expansion Plan had passed the United States Congress and we felt grave misgiving touching national defense. And in January 1940 (Showa 15) the incident in which the "Asama Maru" was boarded by a British warship in waters so close to Tokyo made the Japanese people in general very sensitive regarding our security by sea. In July 1940 (Showa 15) the United States published its so-called "Stark Plan" for construction of a two-ocean fleet. Up to that time we had managed somehow to formulate national defense plans against the naval expansion of the United States; but we could discover no means of discharging our national defense duties within the scope of our limited national resources if this enormous plan were to materialize.

Moreover, as the United States - Japanese trade restrictions were steadily being stiffened and negotiations for increase of trade with the Netherland East Indies and French Indo China were

not progressing at all, it seemed as though the very foundation of our nation was being threatened. Further it was our belief that the fact of the United States Fleet moving into Hawaii, together with the strengthening of concerted United States - British support to the Chungking Government, made the latter confident of victory and thereby rendered more difficult the settlement of the China Incident, which was Japan's greatest concern at that time.

Such being the situation, and there being ever present the danger of war clouds spreading to the Far East by some untoward error at any time, the execution of the Third and Fourth Supplementary Programs had to be hurried.

As construction of the two battleships of the Fourth Supplementary Program was not progressing, and in order to concentrate all effort on speeding up construction of small-type craft especially required for defense purposes, construction on the former was discontinued in November 1940 (Showa 15). Again, around autumn of the same year, plans were submitted also for the emergency conversion of merchantmen into auxiliary aircraft carriers.

Toward the end of 1940 (Showa 15) the international situation took a sudden turn for the worse. Information was received of the mobilization of the Philippines Reserve Army, of the United States Secretary of War's instructions to declare martial law in Pearl Harbor, of the withdrawal of United States troops stationed in North China, of announcement of mines being laid in the eastern entrance to the Singapore Straits, of reinforcement of Australian troops in Malay, of military conferences and operations agreement between the United States, Great Britain and Australia and the arrival of United States troops to reinforce the Philippine Army in Manila, etc.

As for the Naval General Staff, it considered various plans realizing that it had to do something about naval armaments in view of the great naval expansion of the United States. While it was being hampered in forming any workable plan because of lack of national resources, the international situation took a turn for

the worse, as already mentioned, and in view of the steadily progressing United States naval armament expansion the Emergency Supplementary Program was put into effect in May 1941 (Show: 16) which called for the construction of nine medium and nine small submarines respectively, besides war-ships for defense purposes. Further, in August of the same year, an Emergency Armament Program, of which one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, twenty six destroyers, thirty three submarines and other defensive forces comprised the main points, was put into execution. However, with even this, we could not possibly keep pace with the enormous expansion plan of the United States Navy, and we always suffered from misgiving and apprehension. Our armament plans were stimulated by this overwhelming expansion plan of the United States Navy and what we considered the military encirclement of Japan. Thus our plans were formulated on the spur of the moment, as is indicated by the use of the names Extraordinary Supplementary Program and Emergency Supplementary Program. In substance, they were mainly based on small defensive warships.

6. The armament situation of the Japanese Navy during my various terms of office at the Naval General Staff was as given above. Those responsible applied themselves perseveringly to the task of fulfilling their duties of national defense and consolidating armaments within the scope of the meagre national resources to oppose the increasing naval armaments of the major powers.

In other words, our Navy's single thought was how to defend against the potential threat of a foreign fleet invading our home waters, and our plans were formed and armament policy decided on the basis of this consideration. Not even once was a plan drafted for an aggressive attack on another nation at this time.

I swear to the Tribunal that in my capacity as a high ranking officer in the Japanese Navy that during my tenure of office at the Naval General Staff there were absolutely no plans made by the Japanese Navy which were intended or planned for offensive war. Prior to my assumption of office there existed no such plans be-



cause I closely surveyed all of the information and papers that existed in the files of my predecessors. From personal observation of the plans for naval training which I received and those that I drafted myself while serving with the Fleet, as well as of the education given at the various naval educational institutions I emphatically testify that the naval plans for the protection of Japan were wholly defensive in nature.

7. During the time I held office at the Naval General Staff and was participating in the decisions on national defense plans and armament policy, the poverty of national resources constituted a large source of worry. Difficulties were encountered especially on the following points:

1. In the event of war, it was considered quite possible that Japan's shipbuilding speed might slow down but that it would be most difficult, if not impossible, for it to be increased, while the United States and Great Britain, on the contrary, were expected to accelerate their construction rate at a rapid pace as had been done at the time of World War I.
2. While Japan possessed very few first rate merchant ships which could be converted into auxiliary warships in case of emergency, Great Britain and the United States had many such vessels capable of speedy conversion.
3. Japan did not possess civilian aircraft which could be converted into a reserve air force as could the numerous civilian aircraft possessed by the United States and Great Britain.
4. Japan possessed only a small number of civilian factories capable of being converted into munition factories during war time while, on the other hand, the United States and Great Britain were capable of large scale conversion of civilian industrial plants into military use during war time.
5. Japan faced a shortage of materials vital for war time needs whereas, by comparison, both the United States and Great Britain had an abundance of such materials.

In the face of these facts, it was necessary for us to make

tain a comparatively large peace time force even though this meant a heavy strain on our meagre national resources. The ability of the United States and Great Britain to rapidly mobilize and draw upon their vast resources dictated this necessity. And to have failed to consider these factors would have left a serious defect in national defense.

8. In the affidavit of Admiral Richardson, presented to this Tribunal on November 25th of last year, it was stated that the Japanese Navy in its preparation for a war of aggression had been exerting itself toward the construction of aircraft carriers. The statement varies from the facts indicated by the very construction of the carriers themselves, which show that they were built for use in home waters.

It is a fact that aircraft carriers may very easily be utilized for offensive purposes, but it was also generally recognized that aircraft carriers were necessary for defense against attacks by fleets which included aircraft carriers.

The Japanese naval authorities believed that aircraft carriers were absolutely required for defense purposes as long as other powers possessed aircraft carriers.

For Japan there was great danger of attack by carrier-borne planes, in which event damage would be extremely great, for the following reasons:

1. Japan, being narrow and surrounded on all sides by sea, there was no area of the island which lay outside the attacking radius of carrier-borne planes.
2. Nearly all the major cities, large industrial areas, and the trunk lines of communications of Japan lie close to the coast.
3. Most Japanese houses, being constructed of inflammable materials, damage through bombing would prove extremely great; and if incendiary bombs were used there was great danger of large fires resulting.

To defend itself against attack by carrier-borne planes, Japan required numerous airfields and aircraft. As means of defense against attack by aircraft there are airplanes, anti-aircraft

weapons and barrage balloons, but aircraft was the most effective of the three. When the objectives to be defended lie along the coast, as was mostly the case in Japan, anti-aircraft weapons and balloon barrages usually could not be expected to prove sufficiently effective in warding off attack.

Japanese territory, being small and surrounded by seas, necessitated the existence of numerous airfields and aircraft for the defense against attack from air. Further, weather conditions, being often very bad, would prove an obstacle to movement and concentration of aircraft, and hence an even greater necessity for large numbers of airfields and aircraft.

It was impossible to maintain large numbers of aircraft owing to the meagreness of national resources. Further, construction of airfields was difficult because of the narrowness of the territory and especially because of scarcity of flat land.

On the one hand, for the Fleet not to include aircraft carriers while other nations possessed this type of ship would have meant a marked difference in capacity for reconnaissance, long distance attacking potential and strength in anti-aircraft defense. With the development of aircraft, a fleet without aircraft carriers lost its *raison d'etre*. It was therefore advantageous, especially in the case of Japan, to maintain this carrier strength of the Fleet at a point where it could fully hold its own against those of opponent nations, and thereby to serve the purpose of national defense.

Aircraft carriers could be utilized to advantage in the aerial defense of the home land since it is surrounded on all sides by water. Especially is this true since there was the danger of attack by enemy carrier-borne planes. In such an event our carriers could be used to attack the enemy carriers before they entered the radius for bombing of the Japanese mainland, thus providing us with adequate defense against air attack. In view of the comparative facility of movement and concentration, even in the event of bad weather, there were many favorable arguments in favor

of aircraft carriers in the naval defense of the narrow territory of Japan.

It was for this very reason that Vice Admiral Kanji KATO, the Senior Japanese Technical Committee member to the 1922 Washington Disarmament Conference, advocated the necessity of Japan having the same number of aircraft carriers as the United States and Britain, for defensive purposes.

Further, it may be clearly seen from the nature and capacity of the Japanese carriers that they were constructed for defensive purposes and not for offensive. Moreover, to utilize carriers for offensive warfare it is necessary to have various types of attending warships; but the Japanese Navy did not have them.

The number of Japanese aircraft carriers on December 7, 1941 including temporarily converted merchantmen, was ten with displacement of some 152,970 tons. Included in this number were the slow moving converted merchant ship "Kasuga Maru", the out-dated, over aged small carrier the "Hosho", which was used only for training purposes, the small carriers, "Ryujo" and "Zuiho", which could carry only a limited number of small aircraft. Consequently, the number of aircraft carriers which could be utilized for fleet action was six. Moreover, the cruising radii of these first line carriers were far shorter than those of United States naval ships. Evidence of this fact may be seen in the extraordinary refueling problems that later confronted the Navy in its preparations for the Pearl Harbor Attack.

On this 11th day of August,  
1947

At Tokyo.

DEFONENT: KONDO, Nobutake

I, KONDO, Nobutake hereby certify that the above  
statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature  
and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) SUZUKI, Isamu (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the  
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KONDO, Nobutake (seal)

3005  
D. D. 1500-B-2

Exhibit No. 12 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Washington 25, D. C.

14 November 1945

Hon. Frank B. Keefe,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Keefe:

I am enclosing a revised statement on naval estimates and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941 inclusive to be substituted for the one enclosed with the Secretary of Navy's letter sent you on yesterday.

This revised statement was prepared after collaboration between this office and the Bureau of the Budget in studying the records of the years in question, and the figures appearing thereon will agree with those furnished you by the Bureau of the Budget. While the records concerning the regular Naval Appropriation bills for each year were complete, information concerning auxiliary and supplemental estimates requested by the Navy Department was lacking in many cases and required extended search through the files for the years in question.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. G. Allen  
E. G. ALLEN,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Director of Budget  
and Reports.

(Enclosure)

Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive

Fiscal year	Appropriations requested by the Navy Department	Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			appropriations	Contract authority
1932				
Annual appropriation act	354,809,746	\$347,794,248	358,262,123	7,700,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	0	0	0	0
Total	354,809,746	347,794,248	358,262,123	7,700,000
1933				
Annual appropriation act	399,139,836	341,677,450	317,583,591	5,715,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	0
Total	409,139,886	351,677,450	327,583,591	5,715,000
1934				
Annual appropriation act	352,717,786	308,669,562	308,669,562	8,100,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	0	0	0	0
Total	352,717,786	308,669,562	308,669,562	8,100,000
1935				
Annual appropriation act	318,324,414	286,332,392	284,658,799	2,800,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	17,086,504	17,075,257	17,075,257	0
Total	335,410,918	303,407,649	301,734,056	2,800,000

D. O. 1500-B-2

Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1933 to 1941, inclusive

Fiscal year	Appropriations requested by the Navy Department	Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract authority
1936				
Annual appropriation act	502,855,817	485,443,847	458,684,379	6,590,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	20,931,725	23,931,725	23,915,851	0
Total	523,787,542	509,375,572	482,600,230	6,590,000
1937				
Annual appropriation act	585,010,984	549,591,299	529,546,532	13,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	1,921,300	1,921,300	1,921,300	0
Total	586,932,284	551,512,599	531,467,832	13,000,000
1938				
Annual appropriation act	594,269,223	562,425,709	516,258,808	15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	4,766,000	4,766,000	2,881,000	0
Total	599,035,223	567,191,709	519,139,808	15,000,000
1939				
Annual appropriation act	629,665,104	564,406,461	546,866,494	15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	89,714,905	85,839,950	76,659,700	0
Total	719,380,009	650,246,411	623,526,194	15,000,000

D. D. 1500-B-2



Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive

Fiscal year	Appropriations requested by the Navy Department	Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract authority
1940				
Annual appropriation act	788,775,549	790,342,453	773,049,151	20,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	288,602,340	186,088,316	170,326,098	2,450,000
Total	1,077,377,889	976,430,769	943,375,249	22,450,000
1941				
Annual appropriation act	1,354,442,202	1,337,311,577	1,274,171,138	148,741,612
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	5,062,187,700	2,224,094,342	2,275,212,207	797,356,500
Total	5,236,629,902	3,561,405,919	3,549,383,345	946,098,112
Total asked	9,434,271,533	7,428,240,190	7,256,826,276	1,029,038,112
1934-1941 inclusive:				
Budget cut requests	2,006,031,343	-----		
Congress executed budget by	857,694,198	-----		
			Total	
			8,265,934,388	

Appropriations, War Department military establishment,  
fiscal years 1932 through 1941

Fiscal year	Requested by War Department		Requested by the Bureau of the Budget		Appropriated by the Congress	
	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations
1932						
Annual appropriation act	347,856,137	3,000,000	339,725,859	3,000,000	335,475,965	3,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	3,448,157	0	3,444,951	0	4,291,679	0
Total	351,304,294	3,000,000	343,170,810	3,000,000	339,767,644	3,000,000
1933						
Annual appropriation act	316,079,255	0	301,030,642	0	289,500,024	0
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	15,164,468	0	15,164,468	0	15,461,468	0
Total	331,243,723	0	316,195,110	0	304,961,492	0
1934						
Annual appropriation act	320,884,513	0	277,730,841	3,000,000	277,050,381	3,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	16,000	0	16,000	0	16,000	0
Total	320,900,513	0	277,746,841	3,000,000	277,066,381	3,000,000
1935						
Annual appropriation act	279,913,374	0	260,624,208	3,000,000	255,526,147	3,000,000
Second and deficiency appropriation acts	25,357,947	0	25,335,947	0	25,335,947	0
Total	305,271,321	0	285,960,155	3,000,000	280,862,094	3,000,000

Appropriations, War Department military establishment,  
fiscal years 1932 through 1941

Fiscal year	Requested by War Department		Requested by the Bureau of the Budget		Appropriated by the Congress	
	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations
1936						
Annual appropriation act	346,723,362	0	317,459,277	0	341,348,204	7,686,753
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	14,627,792	0	14,340,000	0	14,190,000	0
Total	361,351,154	0	331,799,277	0	355,538,204	7,686,753
1937						
Annual appropriation act	458,193,897	0	375,025,510	8,000,000	383,104,859	10,669,766
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	8,329,018	0	8,040,000	0	5,140,000	3,000,000
Total	467,022,915	0	383,065,510	8,000,000	388,244,859	13,669,766
1938						
Annual appropriation act	456,608,221	0	416,486,461	10,462,000	415,263,154	21,667,394
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	11,596,630	0	9,546,675	0	2,721,875	0
Total	468,204,851	0	426,033,136	10,462,000	417,985,029	21,667,394
1939						
Annual appropriation act	510,733,043	-----	459,688,835	19,126,894	459,401,254	34,045,394
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	73,269,087	46,801,000	72,399,287	46,801,000	71,600,743	46,801,000
Total	584,002,130	46,801,000	532,088,122	65,927,894	531,001,997	80,846,394

Appropriations, War Department military establishment,  
fiscal years 1932 through 1941

Fiscal year	Requested by War Department		Requested by the Bureau of the Budget		Appropriated by the Congress	
	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations
1940						
Annual appropriation act	548,628,698	22,275,000	526,305,868	20,700,000	508,789,824	40,205,988
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	373,941,532	74,497,500	369,439,392	78,997,500	342,828,786	78,997,500
Total	922,570,230	96,772,500	895,745,260	99,697,500	851,618,610	119,203,488
1941						
Annual appropriation act	1,484,495,482	59,100,000	1,412,107,511	279,010,136	1,433,303,715	323,229,636
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	7,211,422,529	4,857,959,752	6,626,443,207	4,749,992,958	7,047,290,692	4,683,360,015
Total	8,695,918,011	4,917,059,752	8,038,550,718	5,029,003,094	8,480,594,407	5,006,589,651
Total, 1932-1941	12,807,789,142	5,063,633,252	11,830,355,139	5,222,090,488	12,227,640,717	5,256,883,466

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自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

東京都世田ヶ谷區太子堂一六六等址

近藤信行

明治十九年九月二十五日

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

一、私の姓名は近藤信竹と言ひます

私は明治四十年（一九〇七年）十一月海軍兵學校卒業以來昭和二十年（一九四五年）九月海軍大將で予備役に編入せられる迄約四十年間、日本海軍に職を奉じて居りました。

此の間、私は左の通り三次に亘り軍令部に勤務致しました。

昭和五年（一九三〇年）六月から同七年（一九三二年）十二月まで 軍令部第一課長（海軍大佐）

昭和十年（一九三五年）十二月から同十三年（一九三八年）十二月まで 軍令部第一部長（海軍少將—中將）

昭和十四年（一九三九年）十月から同十六年（一九四一年）九月まで 軍令部次長（海軍中將）

二、日本海軍に於ては軍備の計画を立て之を實施するのに次の様な手續きに依るのを例として居りました。

(一) 軍令部第一部長一課で毎年度國防計画を立案します。これは戦争勃發の場合如何にして國防を全うすべきかの方針を策定するものであり軍

備計画及部隊の訓練計画等の基準となるものであります。

(二) 軍令部第三部では海軍全般の諸計画立案上の参考資料とする爲国際情勢並びに列國軍備の状況及趨勢に關する情報を集め之を綜合し各部に配布して居りました。

(三) 軍令部第二部第三課で前記國防計画に基き我國力並に列國軍備の情勢を考慮し日本の防衛上海軍として國防の責任を遂行するに必要と考へられる最少限度の軍備計画の原案を作り上司の同意を経て海軍省の主務者と下協議します。この下協議に於ては國力、實行の難易等に就き省部間に極めて詳細な討議を盡して相當な修正を加へられるのが常であります。

(四) 上記の下協議が出来上つた後、軍令部總長から海軍大臣宛正式の協議書を提出し海軍大臣はこれが實行上の見込に關する回答書を出します。

(五) 海軍省に於ては又一方に於て予算及資材の配分等に關し政府の各機關と連絡します。

(六) 予算が決定せられた所で海軍大臣から實施に關する命令が下され夫々

の機關が分擔して作業の實行に移ります。

右の様を組織になつて居りましたので軍備に關することは前述の様な地位に居りました私には相當詳細に亙り判明してゐた譯であります

三、私が軍令部第一部長に就つたのは一九三〇年の倫敦軍備條約締結直後であります。従つて新情勢に對し國防計畫を一層、守勢的に立直さなければならぬと言ふ時でした。

華府海軍條約で我海軍の主力艦及び航空母艦の保有量を英米の六割に制限せられました。其の後諸種の情報に依り米海軍は着々遠洋作戦を準備し必  
要が起れば何時でも日本近海まで來攻するものと考へられました。之に對して巡洋艦以下艦隊艦艇を整備し日本近海に於ける遠洋作戦に於て主として魚形水雷の活用に依り我國防を完くせんと努力して居つたのであります

然るに一九三〇年の倫敦軍備條約で補助艦の保有量を制限せられ我海軍の特徴ある軍備を抑へられたばかりで無く米海軍が新式艦を整備するの  
手を東向して見てゐなければならぬことになつたのであります



之が爲に條約の御批准に關し樞密院で非常な回廊となつたので有りますが一方米岡上院では「スチムソン」氏の演説等が行はれ日本國民の感情に少からぬ刺戟を與へました。軍令部として之に對處する方策としては訓練に依る衛力の向上による外本條約の制限以外の小銃艇及飛行機を裝備し新たに<sup>並</sup>し軍備上の諸缺陷を補ふ外ないとの結論であつたのであります。この頃海軍訓練に依り幾多の費用なる人命を犠牲にした外超過の條約制限外の艦艇では六〇〇屯艇下の水雷艇に無理に多くの兵器を搭載した爲荒天に依り顛覆したと言ふ様な悲惨な事故を起したのであります。

四 私が軍令部第三部長になつたのは一九三五、六年倫敦軍備會議開催中で着任後一ヶ月餘りで日本の同會議よりの脱退となつたのであります

この會議に於ける我國の主張は從來の不脅威不侵略の軍備と言ふ主張を更に一步進めて取手主起の虞の無い様な軍備にすると言ふ主旨に基くものであります。不脅威各國の容るる虞とならなかつたのであります。依つて自分には爾後ほ乏しい国力に頼み成るべく少い予算の範囲内で如何にして国防

の實に任じ得るものならしめるかに關し種々研究致しましたが結局軍備に後進の如き特徴を持たせることの外無いといふことになりその結果、第三次補充計画が生まれたのであります。

第三次補充計画は戦艦二隻航空母艦二隻驅逐艦十八隻潜水艦十四隻合計三十六隻、二十三万三千屯、外に補助艦艇三十四隻、四万四千五百屯を一九四一年末迄に建造する計画でありました。

華府、倫敦兩條約が存続したとしても主力艦代換建造の時機に迫りて居り各國共大規模な建造を開始する氣運にあつた當時としては誠に小規模な計画でありました。

この案の主たる特長は排水量六万四千屯十八吋砲九門搭載の戦艦二隻を含むことであり、前述の様に主力艦代換建造の氣運にあつた上倫敦軍縮公約で結局裁的制限の取定めが出来なかつたので列國は一齊に主力艦の建造を開始しました。此の間に慮し及國としては尋常の方法を以ては國力の關係上到底之れを匹敵し得る軍備は出来ませんので剩餘の策として潛艦

を建造し少い予算内で国防の任を完つせんことを期したためであります  
昭和十三年（一九三八年）五月には第二次「ヴァインソン」案が米日議合を  
通過し主力艦其の他の建造が促進せらるる様を情報が次々と参りまして之  
が対策を種々研究致しましたが支那事變の爲、出費が多く同年十二月私が  
軍令部第一部長を罷めらるまでは具体案に到達致しませんでした。

耳私に軍令部次長に任命せられたのは第二次欧州大戦勃發直後で我國では戰  
亂の欧州以外に波及するものを防止する方策に苦心して居つた時でありま  
す

當時日米通商條約廢棄通告が既に来て居りました。又我情報部は索敵部隊  
布哇進出及布哇陸軍航空部隊の大増勢等を知つて居りました。我々国防計  
略担当者としては米國の對日威壓をひしひしと身近に感じその急激に増強  
してゐる海軍々備に對し如何にして國防の責に任ずべきかにつま不安は刻  
々に増大してゐる有様でありました。

當時日本海軍では前述の第三次補充計程進行中で小型艦の一部が完成した  
外何れも未完成であり又同年即ち昭和十四年（一九三九年）初から第四次

補充計画に着手して居りました。その頃軍令部の判断では米國は戦艦六隻、航空母艦二隻、巡洋艦以下多数建造中であつた外、第二次「ヴィンソン」案に依り四万五千吨級戦艦三隻、航空母艦四万屯巡洋艦約七万屯及驅逐艦潜水艦合計約四万屯其他補助艦の建造に着手し或は近く着手するものと考へられて居りました。この米國の甚大な軍備計画と前述の様な政治的、軍事的壓迫の爲、第三次補充計画だけでは國防上自信が無かつたので第四次補充計画に着手したのであります。

第四次補充計画は戦艦二隻、航空母艦一隻、巡洋艦六隻、驅逐艦二四隻、潜水艦二十六隻、合計約二九万六千屯外に補助艦二十四隻、約二万九千屯を昭和十九年（一九四四年）末迄に建造する計画でありましたが小型艦の一部の外は私の兼任した昭和十四年（一九三九年）十月には末だ起工してをりませんでした。

尚この戦艦二隻は第三次補充計画のものと同様のものでありまして昭和十五年（一九四〇年）初頃から建造に着手しましたが後に述べる様にその年

の  
う  
ち

のうちに工事を打切るの已む無きに到りましたが。このうち一隻は太平洋に到り  
、股前に解体し他の一隻は開腹造船廠上に放りつけられて腐りました。

私の着任直後第三次「ヴァインソン」海軍備擴張案が米國議會を通過したとの情報が有り我々としては国防上大なる不安を感じました。翌昭和十五年（一九四〇年）一月帝都近海に於て英國軍艦に依る淺田丸擄奪事件が起り一般國民は海洋の安全に對し海軍国防に對し非常に神話を刺戟せられました。昭和十五年七月米國は南洋艦隊建設の所謂「スターラ」案を發表しましたがこれ迄は米國の海軍擴張に對し何んとか国防計畫を立てて來たもの、この歴大な計畫が實現して來た場合限りある我國力の範圍内で如何にして国防の責を全くし得るかに就いては我々は殆ど方策を見出し得ませんでした。

然かも米國の對日貿易は急激にその制限を強化して來るし、蘭印、佛印等との貿易關係増進の交渉は一向進捗せず我々存立の根本が脅かされる有様でありました。加之米合衆國艦隊の布哇進出、米共歩調を揃へた重慶政府援助強化は重慶政府をして戦勝我にありと思はしめ爲めに當時、我國の最大關心事たりし支那事變解決は益々困難の度を加へるものと信ぜられました。情況斯くの如くで何時如何なる間連で戦雲が東亞に波及するかも知れぬと言ふ心配が有つたので第三次、第四次、補充計畫の實施を急がねばなりません。

でした。

第四次補充計程の戦艦二隻は工事も進捗して居なかつたし他の防備上特に必要な小型艦艇の建造促進に全力を注ぐ爲昭和十五年（一九四〇年）十一月その工事を打切ることになりました。又同年秋頃商船を應急的に改装して特設航空母艦を作る案を出したこともありました。

昭和十五年（一九四〇年）末頃より日露情勢は急激に悪化し比島豫備軍徴集、米陸相の眞珠灣戒嚴措置、訓令、北支歴市米軍の引揚、一シンガポール海峽東口の機雷敷設發表、海軍の馬尼ラ増強、米、英、澳等の軍事會談<sup>11</sup>及作戰協定、比島増援、米軍部隊の「マニラ」着等の情報が次々にありました。

命令として米国の海軍大擴張に鑑み我海軍軍備を可んとか致さねばならないと種々計程致しましたが国力の調子上實施困難で伸々實行計程が立たないである間に前述の様に我國を縛る國際情勢は緊迫の一途を辿ると共に米国の海軍軍備大擴張は着々進展してゐる情況に鑑みまして日本海軍では昭和十六年（一九四一年）五月に中小型潛水艦各九隻、其の他の防禦用

艦艇の臨時追加補充計程を實施に移し更に同年八月には航空母艦一隻、巡洋艦二隻、驅逐艦二六隻、潛水艦三三隻、其の他防禦的兵力を主とした臨時軍備計程を實施に移したのでありますが、到底これでは歴大な米海軍の大擴張計程の進展には追付かず不安焦燥の念に亘られたのであります。

之等の軍備計程は米海軍の壓倒的大擴張と帝國を繞る軍容包圍の緊迫に刺戟されて泥濘的にやつたもので臨時追加補充計程應急補充計程といふ名の示す如く何れも應急的なものであり、其の態も防禦的の小艦艇を主とするものであります。

六私が軍令部に勤務してゐた各期間に於ける日本海軍の軍備の状況は右に述べた通りでありまして關係者達は列國の言明せられつつある海軍軍備に對し貧弱な我軍力で賄ひ得る範圍で如何なる軍備を裝備し如何にして國防の責を全うするかと言ふ點に苦心し讀けて來たのであります。

一言すれば我海軍は萬一他國の艦隊が我近海に來攻して來た場合、如何にしてこれを防ぐかと言ふことのみを考へ我國防計程を練り我軍備の高級將校としての立場から私の軍令部在勤中、日本海軍が侵略戰爭の計程を立て



たことは全然無いと言ふことを裁判所に對し謗言致します。又私の着任前も斯の様な計畫は有りませんでした。このことは私が前任者の綴込に有つた總ての情報及書類を詳細に検討したので明かであります。私が艦隊に勤務中受けた訓練及自ら計畫した訓練の計畫から見ても、又海軍の各教育機關の教育から見ても日本海軍の國防計畫は防禦以外の何物でも無かつたことを強く謗言致します。

七私が軍令部に勤務し國防計畫及軍備方針の決定に參與してゐた際、我口力が貧弱であると言ふことは大きな悩みの種でありましたが、特に左の諸點はその對策を講ずるのに困りました。

(一) 一旦戦争となつた場合我口の艦船建造速度は遅くなることは有つても速くすることは極めて困難と思はれますが、英米は前世界大戦の例から見て著しく促進されるものと思はれる點

(二) 我口には戦時艦艇の補助として使用し得る優秀商船は極めて少いのに對し英米は多数の優秀商船を有すること

(三) 我口は海備空軍となし得る民間航空は極めて貧弱なのに反し英米は極め

て有力なる民間航空を有してゐること。

(四) 我々には戦時兵器製造に轉用し得る民間工業が少いのに対し英米は大規模な民間工業力を有し且之れを軍用に轉用した歴史を有すること。

(五) 我々は各種資源に乏しいのに反し英米は有り餘る程の資源を有しゐること。

之が爲、平時から比較的多くの既成兵力を整備することを要することとなり貧弱なる身力に對し負荷を重からしめることとなります。

英米兩國が迅速な動員が可能で且莫大な資源を引出すことが出来るのでこの必要が起つたので之れ無くしは国防上甚大な缺陷となるといふことになりす。

八、昨年十一月二十五日日本裁判所に提出せられた「リチヤードソン」海軍大将の供述書には日本海軍が侵略戦争準備の爲に航空母艦の建造に努力した後に述べられて居りますが、この陳述は日本の航空母艦の建造が示してゐる事實に相違して居ります。

日本航空母艦の構造は近海で使用する爲に建造せられたことを示して居ります。」

航空母艦が進攻的に使用せられ易いことは事實であります。航空母艦を含む艦隊の進攻を防禦する爲に航空母艦が必要であることも亦一般に認められてゐる處であります。日本海軍當局は他國が航空母艦を有する以上その防禦の爲に航空母艦を絶對的に必要と考へて居りました。

日本は航空母艦搭載機に依り攻撃せられる危険多く且その場合の被害は極めて大いのであります。その理由は次の通りであります。

一日本は四面海で且つ國土狹長でありますから航空母艦搭載機の攻撃國外に在る地域はありません。

二日本は大都市大工業地帯及交通の幹線は殆ど海岸近くに在ります。

三日本の家屋は可燃性の材料で作られてゐるものが多く爆撃に依る被害に極めて大きく焼夷弾を使用した時は特に大火災となる虞が大きいためです。

日本は航空母艦艦隊に依る攻撃を防禦する爲には極めて多数の飛行場と飛行機を必要とします。航空機に依る攻撃の防禦手段としては飛行機、対空火器、阻礙氣球等がみられますが飛行機が最も有効であります。日本の多くの場合の様に防禦すべき物が海岸に在る場合は對空火器阻礙氣球<sup>1</sup>では被攻撃前に充分の効果を得ない場合が多いのであります。

日本は土地が狭長で且四面海でありますから国土防空の爲には多数の飛行場と飛行機を要するのであります。又日本は天候不良のことが多く飛行機の移動集中に障害となるので飛行場及飛行機の所は幾層一層大であります。

日本は国力が豊かで無いから多数の飛行機を保有することは不可能であります。

又土地狭く特に平地が少いので飛行場建設は困難であります。

一方は敵に比し我が國が航空母艦を有する限り航空母艦を含んで居ない偵察力及射程に於ける攻勢力に對空防禦力で格段の差を生じ飛行機の發進に伴つて航空母艦を含まない艦隊は存在の意義が無い様になつて來ました。この結果の航空母艦力を充分對手國と匹敵し得る様にしてこれに對し日本、本土の四面海であるので國土防禦に航空母艦を使用するに便であります。特に敵航空母艦搭載機に依る攻撃の慮が多いためあります。

その外航空母艦を日本、本土空襲に入らぬに光ち之を攻撃して本土防禦の元壁を崩し得るのであります。天候不良の場合も移動集中が比較的容易でありますから國土機長な日本の場合利點が多いのであります。

一九二二年華府和約會議で日本首席顧問委員加藤寬治中將が日本は國土の状況から見て防禦上英米と對峙の航空母艦を要すると主張したのはこの理由に基くものであります。

尙日本の航空母艦が進攻的意圖の下に作られたもので無く防禦的意圖に

悉いて建造せられた事はその航空母艦の性能から見れば明かでありませぬ。のみならず航空母艦を進攻的に使用するには、附屬の各種艦艇が必要でありませぬが、日本海軍にはその準備はありませぬでした。

日本が一九四一年十二月七日に保有してゐた航空母艦は應急的に商船から改造した航空母艦まで加へて十隻、一五二、九七〇屯でありませぬが、この中には商船から改造した速力の遅い春日丸、練習船にしか使用してゐなかつた舊式小型艦、鳳翔及小型で小数の小型艦しか使用出来なかつた龍鳳、瑞鳳を含んで居りませぬ。

従つて艦隊展開に使用出来る航空母艦は六隻といふことになりませぬがその第一級航空母艦も他の日本海軍の冬留箱と同様航続力は米國海軍の艦艇に比較すると格段に少いのでありませぬ。

この事實は後に日本海軍が真珠灣攻撃の準備に當つて、燃料補給の非常な難題に當面したことに依つて證明せられます。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月十一日於東京

供述者 近藤 信竹

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ直譯シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シ

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Tatsukichi MIYO

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Tatsukichi MIYO and I was formerly a captain in the Japanese Navy. I served in Section One (Operations Section) of the Naval General Staff from 1 November 1939 until 27 December 1942. At that time I held the rank of Commander. During this period of service I was placed in charge of air operations and took part in the planning of the Pearl Harbor Operation as well as other operations in the Pacific War. My assignment involved coordinating work between the General Staff and the Combined Fleet.

1. The Pearl Harbor Attack was decided indirectly a short time before the outbreak of war. A study of the circumstances related to the planning and preparation thereof will reveal when it was originated.
2. Around May 1941, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet submitted to the General Staff a plan of operations to cope with the possibility of our being drawn into a war with the United States. This plan was based upon the assumption that the United States Pacific Fleet would be anchored at Hawaii and that our fleet could deal an initial blow against it through the medium of an air raid by carrier borne planes. This whole idea was a radical departure from the plans of naval defense hitherto designed by the Naval General Staff. Since it was a venturesome plan, the Naval General Staff viewed it with great scepticism and little interest.

Among some of the grounds that made the project appear definitely impractical was the fact that our air strength was not adequate; the degree of secrecy for such an operation would be difficult to maintain; the fact that the United States Fleet might not be in Pearl Harbor at the time designated for the attack, and the difficulty in securing proper intelligence for the execution of such operation. In addition to these, at that time both the Army and Navy Supreme Headquarters were in complete accord on the opinion that the Sino-Japanese conflict must be brought to a speedy conclusion and that all other matters pertaining to national policies in the Southern Regions and elsewhere should be left to the diplomatic representatives of our government for solution.

Moreover, the Navy at that time felt strongly that war with the United States could be averted. Such being the case, as said before, the Naval General Staff considered the Pearl Harbor Attack Plan a fanciful thing and did not take it seriously. In view of this opinion of the Naval General Staff, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet, in turn, did not press the subject further.

3. However in July of 1941, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands took severe economic steps toward Japan with the result that the oil supply of the country was shut off. Paralleling these measures, we had had knowledge of United States, British and Netherlands war preparations designated against Japan. And the conception of matters at that time in the Navy was that Japan was steadily being encircled.

The Navy, charged with the primary duty of national defense in the Pacific, faced a situation which could not be complacently ignored. Some time in September, and in view of the then existing conditions, my colleagues and I in the General Staff received orders from our superiors to begin making preparations for formulating potential plans of operation against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. Approximately in the early part of September, Headquarters of the Combined Fleet resubmitted

an opinion to the General Staff that an air attack against the United States Fleet at Hawaii was a requisite operation in the event of war. They also notified us that this plan was scheduled to be studied at one of the regular chart maneuvers of the Navy to be held some time in the middle of September with key personnel of the Fleet as the participants. Whereupon the Naval General Staff agreed that if the result of the chart maneuvers were found successful the Hawaii Operation would be taken into consideration and studied.

After the maneuver, opinions were exchanged between the Naval General Staff, Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and Headquarters of the First Air Force Fleet as to whether or not the plan was plausible. A recognition of serious difficulties in the execution of the plan, from a technical viewpoint, resulted from this discussion. The First Air Force Fleet, which would have to take the most active role in the attack, opposed the plan. The Naval General Staff also was opposed to it. It was then decided to make further studies of the matter. Therefore, at this time, there was no plan acceptable by the High Command directed at attacking the United States Fleet if the Navy was called upon in the event of war.

5. The Headquarters of the First Air Fleet later reversed their former opinion and around the latter part of September, 1941, Captain KUROSHIMA, Staff Officer of the Combined Fleet, came to the Naval General Staff and there stated the strong opinion of Commander in Chief Admiral YAMAMOTO in favor of the plan. The effect of this opinion was that the attack against Pearl Harbor was the only hope of successfully conducting naval operations against the United States. It was there pointed out by the General Staff that in the event of war it would be necessary for Japan to secure the main areas of the southern regions such as the Philippines, Netherlands Indies, Malaya, etc. at an early date from the standpoint of self existence and self protection. It was recognized that in face of the steadily increasing militar:

and naval preparedness of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, a Japanese attempt to secure the southern regions would be difficult of attainment, even if virtually all of our air strength was used in such operation.

If it was taken into consideration that our air power would have to be divided if the Hawaii Operation was to take place, a very difficult situation would arise. Furthermore, since a large portion of the Fleet would be involved in the attack on Hawaii, it was evident that a blunder at the very outset of the war would be disastrous. It was suggested that the unprotected Mandated Islands should be defended with what available force there was, based upon a plan that in the event the United States Fleet attacked us in the midst of our southern operations, the Southern Region Operation Forces could be diverted to meet it. In other words, the more advantageous use of our forces would be to concentrate the main strength in the southern region operations at the outset and smash the bulk of the enemy strength in that area as quickly as possible. Thereafter, to shift the greater part of our naval air strength to preparation for counter attack operations against the United States Fleet.

Against this line of thought, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet maintained that since the Mandated Islands were unprotected, even if the Southern Region Operation Forces were diverted to meet the United States Forces in the event of an invasion, it might be unavailing and the Islands would easily be occupied by American forces. If this occurred the Mandated Areas would be occupied one after another and the line of communication between Japan proper and the Southern region areas would be severed. Therefore it was deemed vital to stop the United States Fleet before it commenced offensive operations against Japan.

The execution of the Hawaii Operation Plan was so strongly advanced by Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO that he threatened to resign if it was not accepted. Therefore, in view of this set of facts as well as other arguments, the Naval General Staff was

compelled to give tentative consent for complete study of the project.

7. The aircraft carrier forces taking part in the Pearl Harbor Attack were formulated as follows:

On September 25th the aircraft carrier ZUIKAKU was completed and commissioned and together with the aircraft carrier SHOKAKU, completed in early August, made up the Fifth Air Force Squadron. This squadron was assigned to the First Air Force Fleet. The aircraft carrier strength of the First Fleet was then as follows:

First Air Force Squadron - composed of the AKAGI and KAGA.

Second Air Force Squadron - composed of the SORYU and HIRYU.

Fourth Air Force Squadron - composed of the RYUJO and a merchant ship which had been converted from the KASUGA MARU.

Fifth Air Force Squadron - composed of the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU.

The aircraft carriers of the Fourth Air Force Squadron were small ships of low speed and short radius of action. Furthermore, they were capable of carrying only a small number of old type planes and were unfit for the Hawaii Operation which more than taxed the cruising capacity of the new carriers.

Again, the air crew personnel and air crews on each of the above mentioned carriers was far less than the prescribed number fixed for war time operations.

The Headquarters of the Combined Fleet requested that the air crew personnel of the Fourth Air Squadron be diverted to fill vacancies existing in the First and Second Air Force Squadrons. They also requested that trained aviators with aircraft carrier experience be supplied from the Flying Corps ashore for the Fifth Air Force Squadron, together with the request that an increase in the number of carrier borne planes to estimated war time standards be made.

In order to provide trained personnel from shore flying units it was necessary to use instructor personnel of Naval Air Corps training units. This created an additional problem since the then existing conditions were that, even with the number of flying

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instructors on hand at that time, we were lacking sufficient instructors to meet the demand of training badly needed new pilots. However, because of the insistence of the Commander in Chief this request could not be denied although the central authorities exhibited great reluctance in complying with it since it greatly affected the plan to train an increased number of air crew personnel.

The air crew members mobilized through the above mentioned measures were assembled in the middle of October. Only one month was allowed for their warming up before the date of departure from the home ports for Hawaii in the middle of middle November. This hurried training inevitably restricted the personnel to daylight attack tactics as well as daylight landing and take off practice from the carriers and is responsible for the fact that the air force units conducting the attack against Pearl Harbor had to avoid night operations and take-off after daybreak.

9. The question of extending the radius of action of the aircraft carriers is important. Due to the established Japanese naval policy, our warships were so constructed that their cruising ranges were limited to our own waters and were far shorter than the cruising range of warships of the United States. For that reason, three carriers - namely, the AKAGI, SORYU and HIRYU - out of the six aircraft carriers taking part in the Hawaii Operation did not have sufficient radius of action.

As is well known to all navigators, during the winter a strong northeasterly monsoon ranges over the Northern Pacific Ocean with accompanying rough seas. The serious problem of how to refuel our vessels under these conditions presented itself. After considerable study it was decided to carry fuel even in the double bottom of each vessel and to also load fuel drums in every available space aboard ship. By these extra loadings we felt that the Fleet could operate so as to return near the area of the 160° East Longitude line, even if refueling on the way became impossible.

10. There was another problem involved in the use of aerial torpedoes. Previously, in order to secure dead accuracy in attacking warships with aircraft borne torpedoes, it was necessary not only to open fire at sufficiently close range but also to make certain that the torpedoes did not pass under the target.

To answer these technical requirements, research studies had been started around 1939 relative to the use of aerial torpedoes against ships at sea. However, satisfactory results were not obtained until the Yokosuka Naval Air Corps and the Aeronautical Technical Department discovered that the torpedo could be kept from submerging too deeply in the water by attaching a special balancing instrument. This was in September 1941.

These studies had not been made with the purpose in mind of attacking Pearl Harbor. The shallow waters of that area introduced a new problem which involved the use of an aerial torpedo with even a more shallow water approach than had been studied in past experiments. Thereafter, hurried research and experiments for this purpose were commenced early in October. The work of remodeling the torpedoes and equipping them with new balancing instruments was not completed before the aircraft carriers left port to rendezvous at Hitokappu Bay.

Other witnesses will testify more specifically as to these matters and will deal with the further hurried preparations that took place.

11. The Imperial Navy, with the hope of restoring peace to the Orient as soon as possible, was exerting her efforts for the speedy settlement of the China Incident. With this object in view the 11th Air Force Fleet, consisting of base air force units, had been diverted for operations in China.

However, when war clouds hung low over the Pacific Ocean in early September, the 11th Air Force Fleet was recalled to Japan to practice preparation trainings to cope with new problems.

The operation in China conducted by the above mentioned fleet had been mainly of bombing land targets as well as aerial combat

Therefore, in order to prepare for operations inherent to the naval air force, the personnel of the Fleet had to be trained anew in such vital tactics as the bombing of mobile vessels, torpedo attacks, scoutings and reconnaissances; aerial navigation, night flying etc. Such trainings were not only important but required considerable time. ~~To acquire necessary standards,~~ even highly experienced fliers were required to endure long hours of renewed rigid training.

It took practically a whole month for the ground crew together with air base equipments to withdraw from China to home bases. On top of that, it required almost another whole month for them to complete various preparations for proceeding to new bases where they were to await orders for next operations. Such being the case the period for the shore based flying units to go through a strenuous preparation training was limited to one month or so. Due to this lack of training various problems arose. The following is a striking example of it:

According to the original plan of the Naval General Staff, the fighter planes assigned to the Philippines operation were to take off from aircraft carriers due to their short cruising radius of action. As a matter of fact, however, there was not sufficient time to be spared for practicing take off from and landing on aircraft carriers. Therefore, in the field forces a special study and training was introduced in order to lessen the rate of fuel consumption of these fighter planes. At the same time the Fleet Headquarters modified the central authorities plan so that fighter planes would load as much fuel as possible and operate directly from land bases in Formosa. In case some planes would be forced to land on the way due to lack of fuel, rescue means were to be made by the Fleet.

As the above fighter planes had to leave Formosa before dawn they had to practice night flying. To meet this requirement the Air Fleet forces were forced to suspend the training of less experienced fliers and concentrate all available time and material



upon the training of experienced fliers. As a result, the inexperienced aircrew members could not fly until the southern area operations reached a definite stage, while on the other hand, the experienced fliers, whose number were naturally limited, became almost exhausted in taking part in continuous operations day after day.

2. The Navy was further unprepared for war as evidenced by the fact that the Air Base Construction Corps was not organized until the probability of war became imminent in November. The Navy Ministry did not consent to the request of the Naval General Staff regarding the draft and organization of the Construction Corps until too late to properly train them. Consequently, conditions were such that this construction corps boarded ship with practically no training just before the outbreak of war. They lacked necessary machinery and other equipment required for hurried construction of air bases and met with innumerable difficulties.

13. The Chief of Naval General Staff issued an Imperial Headquarters Naval Directive Number 5 on 21 November 1941. This directive has been destroyed by fire but has been reconstructed from memory and it reads as follows:

"The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet shall immediately recall all operating forces under its command and return home if the United States - Japanese negotiations reach an agreement."

Again, when Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO visited Tokyo on 2 December 1941 to say words of farewell, Admiral ITO, now dead but then Deputy Chief of Naval General Staff, told me that Admiral NAGANO verbally instructed YAMAMOTO as follows:

"If the United States - Japanese negotiations become certain of reaching an amicable settlement before the opening of hostilities, all forces under the Combined Fleet will be recalled from deployment to be returned home."

It was also stated in Combined Fleet Order Number 1 that in the event a great change is observed in the situation, Preparedness Status Number 2 may be retracted to Preparedness Status Number 1. "A great change in the situation", though needless to

explain, refers to United States - Japanese negotiations. That "Preparedness Status Number 2 may be retracted to Preparedness Status Number 1" meant the retirement of the Fleet Forces to waiting positions from the operational theaters of opening hostilities to waiting positions as was shown in Fleet Order Number One. Consequently, our naval forces were so arranged that in the event of a great change in the situation, such as an amicable settlement of problems between the United States and Japan, they would be able to return to Preparedness Status Number 1. That is, the Task Force would retire to the waiting position of the evening of December 3rd which was 42° North latitude, 170° West longitude. Preparedness Status Number 2 took effect when the Task Force moved into Hawaiian waters after December 3rd, 1941.

Further, the Combined Fleet Order dated 22 November stipulate that the "Task Force Group shall operate so that immediate recall from deployment be possible if negotiations with the United States reach a settlement."

Paragraph 4 of the Task Force Group Order Number 1, dated 23 November said: "Depending upon circumstances, operations may be suspended in the midst of the trip and this group may be made to return to Hitokappu Bay, Hokkaido or Mutsu Bay area."

14. After the Task Force left Japan, weather forecasts and various information was sent to them from the General Staff. I was chiefly assigned to the drafting of such information. As I recall, it was on the evening of December 6th when Operations Section Chief Captain TOMIOKA spoke to me and said:

"The Task Force Group proceeding toward Hawaii may be under great strain because of its belief that it may be ordered to return at any moment. As the situation stands at present it can be said there is no prospect of negotiations between the United States and Japan reaching an amicable settlement so we had better advise them of this fact."

Therefore, I added this sentence to the telegram I was drafting at this time: "No hope is in sight of United States - Japanese negotiations reaching peaceful settlement."

I later learned from Rear Admiral KUSAKA, then Chief of Staff

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of the Task Force Group, that they were considerably worried about receiving such a message too late to be effective, and because of the distance involved were alarmed that they may not receive it at all.

15. The submarines participating in the Hawaiian Operation were ordered to refrain from attack until they knew the aerial offensive had been launched. The sole reason for the above order was the possibility of the submerged submarines missing reception of the telegram ordering cessation of operations because of success in the negotiations at the last minute.

16. We did not expect that our operation against Pearl Harbor would be entirely undetected by the United States Forces. Rather, we anticipated that there was a great possibility of being detected at least 30 or 40 minutes before attack. Our submarines were to reach the waters near Hawaii one day before the scheduled attack in order to observe. We thought it to be entirely possible that they might be discovered or detected prior to the air attack. And in fact I later learned that one midget submarine was discovered and sunk one hour before the operation started. We judged that probabilities were roughly 90% that radar equipment had been installed at Hawaii and that, if so, our air force units would surely be detected at least 30 or 40 minutes before arriving over their target. Scouting sea planes were also scheduled to operate in the vicinity of Hawaii approximately 30 minutes ahead of the attacking air units. If the two sea planes should be caught by radar we thought it possible the detection of our planes would be made more than an hour before the opening of our attack. And, if detected by visual means, the attacking attempt would be discovered at least 30 minutes before the attack.

It was always our firm conviction that all necessary diplomatic steps preceding hostilities would be taken by the proper authorities. We fully expected that before hostilities commenced the United States would know a state of war existed with Japan.

3007 127

Defense Document 1976

On this 30th day of June, 1947  
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: MIYO, Tatsukichi

I, MIYO, Tatsukichi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

MIYO, Tatsukichi (seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**  
Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Mitsuo FUCHIDA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Mitsuo FUCHIDA. I formerly was a captain in the Imperial Japanese Navy. I commanded the First Air Attack Unit participating in the raid on Pearl Harbor, December 8 1941.

On the 25th of August 1941 an order was received for my transfer from the post of Staff Officer of the Third Air Squadron to that of Chief Flight Officer of the Aircraft Carrier AKAGI. A few days later I reported for duty aboard the AKAGI at Yokosuka.

At that time the AKAGI was the Flagship of the First Air Fleet and the Commander in Chief was Vice Admiral NAGUMO. The First Air Fleet was then composed of the carriers AKAGI and KAGA (First Air Squadron) and the SORYU and HIRYU (Second Air Squadron.)

2. After taking over the post of Chief Flight Officer of the AKAGI, I was named Senior Chief Flight Officer of the First Air Fleet and ordered to take charge of the combined training of all the air corps aboard the above mentioned four aircraft carriers, as well as to assume unified command of the air force when it should be organized.

Up to that time, there had been a tendency to carry out air training of the fleets in respect to individual carriers, with the result that the over-all strength of the group had not been adequately brought out. It was decided at this point to place special emphasis upon the group training and unified command of all the air corps attached to the First Air Fleet; hence, the above order issued to me in my position as Senior Chief Flight

Officer of the Fleet.

Most of the air corps then attached to the First Air Fleet were distributed for training purposes among several bases located in southern Kyushu.

I carried on my training duties at the Kagoshima Base and at that time neither I nor any of the other members of the flying corps even knew that the idea of the attack on Pearl Harbor had been conceived. We carried on the above-mentioned group training throughout September in the belief that it was our so-called "annual training".

3. Toward the end of September - I do not remember the exact date - Lieutenant Commander Genda, then Tactical Staff Officer of the First Air Fleet, came to me under orders from above with the instruction that as the negotiations with America were becoming more and more critical, the idea had been conceived that in the event of war breaking out between Japan and America, an aerial attack should be made at the outset of the war against the main force of the American fleet located in Hawaiian waters. And hence, that studies and training such as would enable our aircraft to meet the tactical needs of such an attack should be secretly carried out.

It was further explained to me that the object of this operation was to make an aerial attack against the main force of the American Fleet presumably located around Pearl Harbor so as to make it difficult for a time for the American Fleet to come across the ocean, and thereby enable us to complete our operations in the South during that time; and hence that the general plan was to make aircraft carriers and capital ships the primary target with the local airfields and the air force based there the secondary targets in order to preclude their being used in counter-attack.

This instruction was given only to myself and Lieutenant MURATA, who was also a Chief Flight Officer on the AKAGI, and none of the others in the air corps knew anything about it.

Lieutenant MURATA, being an expert on torpedo attack, was especially instructed to take part in this study. It was originally intended to use torpedoes as the principal weapon in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Beginning early in October, we therefore incorporated the study of the idea of the Pearl Harbor Attack into our training to determine whether or not such an attack was plausible or could be successfully executed.

Many problems came up in connection with the study and training concerning the execution of the plan of attack on Pearl Harbor. The waters of Pearl Harbor, being very narrow and only about 12 meters deep, it was felt that the ordinary torpedo attack method, hitherto used in training which caused torpedoes to penetrate the water to a depth of approximately 60 meters, would result in the torpedoes striking bottom and hence nullifying their effect. In our study and training therefore, we worked very hard to effect a torpedo firing method which could be adapted for use in shallow waters.

Near the very end of our training period, around the middle of November, we came to the conclusion, as a result of our studies, that the most effective firing method was to have the planes fire from a height of 20 meters and at an air-speed of 160 knots with the plane flying parallel to the water. As we were then supplied with torpedoes equipped with stabilizing gears, we selected a spot in the narrow waters of Kagoshima Bay where the depth was 12 meters and practiced firing until we gained confidence in shallow water torpedo operation.

This final training was carried out two days prior to the departure of the Fleet from Saeki Bay and barely in time. A study of torpedoes with stabilizing gears, together with research in shallow water torpedo firing, were carried out on the basis of our demands, and it was proved that the above torpedo was most effective when fired in shallow waters. However, the total number of required torpedoes had not been prepared and could not be supplied before the departure of the Fleet. Hence the aircraft carrier KAGA

remained behind for approximately three days in Saaboo, and after receiving the remaining torpedoes followed the Fleet.

5. The attack on Pearl Harbor demanded the use of as many high accuracy torpedoes as possible. It was decided, however, to use horizontal bombing also for the following reasons:

1. Although the problem of shallow firing suitable for the waters of Pearl Harbor was thus solved, such firing method required special skill and we felt some uneasiness in the case of flyers who had not been highly trained.

2. Should the American Fleet at anchor be protected by torpedo nets, the torpedoes we intended to use against them would prove ineffective.

3. It was reckoned that American warships would be lying two abreast while at anchor. In such case the only possible means of attack against the one lying on the landward side would be by bombs.

Since the accuracy of our Navy's horizontal bombing at the time was not very high, we decided on the formation "Probable" bombing method. And in order to increase the number of attacking units we reduced the number of planes per formation from nine to five. In order to maintain the hitting percentage, it was decided to reduce the bombing altitude to 3,000 meters which was the minimum height calculated to enable the bombs which we then intended to use (converted 16 inch shells) to pierce the armor of the American capital ships. Under those conditions it was calculated that such skill of the bombing leaders as we could count upon at the time would make it possible for the tactical demands of the operations against the anchored battle ships to be satisfactorily met.

However, the 800 kilogram armor-piercing bombs which were to be used for this operation were 16 inch shells urgently converted for the purpose. Consequently in the event of their being carried by planes, it necessitated the reconstruction of the



bombing apparatus of the plane structure.

~~The~~ supply of bombs was made in time for the departure of the Fleet from Saeki Bay. However, the reconstruction of the bombing apparatus of the newly received planes fell behind schedule. Hence the aircraft carriers took workmen on board and en route from the port of departure to the rendezvous point at Hitokappu Bay and completed reconstruction.

7. The aircraft carrier ZUIKAKU was completed on 25 September 1941, and the carrier SHOKAKU a short time earlier. Out of these two, the Fifth Air Squadron was organized and incorporated into the First Air Fleet. But as their crews had to be hurriedly trained, with the training of less than a month, their training and proficiency was not adequate. It was therefore decided to use the flyers belonging to the First and Second Air Squadrons in the attacks against warships since that required special skill, and the flyers belonging to the Fifth Air Squadron were to be used in the attack against the airfields.

It was first intended, at the beginning of the training, to have the planes take off from the carriers at night so as to make the attack on Pearl Harbor at dawn. But the training and proficiency of the flyers, especially when those of the newly organized Fifth Air Squadron was considered, was not believed sufficient to enable them to take off at night on group flight. Hence, when the training ended, I reported this opinion in effect to my superiors and the original dawn attack plan was changed so as to have the planes take off from the carriers at dawn and to make the attack by daylight.

On this 25th day of June, 1947  
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (seal)

I, FUCHIDA, Mitsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Minoru GENDA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Minoru GENDA and I formerly was a captain in the Japanese Navy. I was appointed Staff Officer of the First Air Squadron on 1 November 1940. On 15 November 1940 I was promoted to the rank of commander. On 1 April 1941 I became Staff Officer of the First Air Fleet and remained at that position until the latter part of June 1942.
2. Early in February 1941 when the Flagship KAGA was anchored in Ariake Bay (Kyushu), I received a letter from the Chief of Staff of the 11th Air Fleet, Rear Admiral ONISHI, with whom I was personally well acquainted. In this letter he asked me to come to Kanoya at once as he wanted to see me on important business. So I proceeded to Kanoya on the following day and called on him at the Fleet Headquarters.

He then showed me a private letter which he had received from Vice Admiral YAMAMOTO, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. I do not know where this letter is at the present time but in substance it was as follows:

"In the event of outbreak of war with the United States, there would be little prospect of our operations succeeding unless, at the very outset, we can deal a crushing blow to the main force of the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters by using the full strength of the First and Second Air Squadrons and thus to preclude the possibility of the American Fleet advancing in offensive operations in the Western Pacific for some time. And it is my desire that I be given command of this air attack force so that I may carry out the operation myself. Please make a study of this operation."

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Rear Admiral ONISHI then said to me: "Please make this study in utmost secrecy, with special attention to the feasibility of the operation, method of execution and the forces to be used."

I commenced this study upon returning to my ship and after a week or ten days I again called on Rear Admiral ONISHI and handed him my answer. I criticized the plan from several aspects and concluded that the attack, while extremely difficult, was not impossible. With some slight reference to my answer, Rear Admiral ONISHI prepared his views on the matter and sent them to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet.

3. At the time of the organization of the First Air Fleet in April of 1941, the only officers in the Headquarters of the said fleet who were aware of YAMAMOTO's idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor were Commander in Chief Vice Admiral NAGUMO, Chief of Staff Rear Admiral KUSAKA, Senior Staff Officer Captain OISHI and myself. From that time until the early part of September we did not undertake to draw up any concrete plan with reference to this operation.

Early in September Rear Admiral KUSAKA, Chief of Staff, summoned the Staff and ordered us to study and draft a plan for this attack and I was named Secretary for this purpose. After working for about a week aboard the AKAGI I completed a preliminary plan. While this preliminary plan was in the main similar to the Operation Plan that was actually executed, it differed from the latter in the following respects:

- A. The point of rendezvous prior to departure for the attack was fixed at Atsugishi Bay or Mutsukai Bay.
  - B. There was no connection with the advance force (submarines).
  - C. There was nothing concrete as to time.
  - D. The air-raid plan was not worked out in detail.
4. Around the 12th or 13th of September the chart maneuvers of the Combined Fleet were held at the Naval Staff College. The maneuvers relating to the Hawaiian Operations which were carried

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out separately from the general maneuvers were, for the most part, based on the above preliminary plan, the one difference being that it made use of Hitokappu Bay as the rendezvous point.

I believe it was on the 1st of October 1941 that Vice Admiral NAGUMO summoned the Headquarters personnel of the various air squadrons and commanders, chief flying officers and squadron leaders of all the carriers to his flag ship and issued the instruction that since this fleet would receive the assignment to attack Hawaii, in the event of war, the training and study of the Fleet thenceforth should be carried out with emphasis on that point.

The last chart maneuver of the Combined Fleet was held aboard the NAGATO in the western part of the Inland Sea early in October and was carried out on the basis of the three-carrier plan.

5. At the Task Force Headquarters, the Senior Staff Officer drafted the Hawaii Operation Plan (Secret Task Force Order No. 1) toward the end of October and then took it to the Combined Fleet Headquarters for approval. On the second of November the whole of the Task Force (with the exception of the fighter plane force and the Second Submarine Squadron) rendezvoused in Ariake Bay. All unit commanders and above, together with flying officers, were summoned aboard the Flag Ship AKAGI where they were told of the duties that would be assigned to our Task Force in the event of war and that, by way of preliminary training, maneuvers would be carried out with Saeki and Sukumo as targets, and the plan for these maneuvers was explained.
6. I do not have a clear recollection as to when we received the Combined Fleet General Order Number 1 but I believe it was just after we had completed the above maneuvers. The Task Force Order Number 1 was immediately printed and a part was distributed on 17 November prior to departure from Saeki Bay to the advance force (submarines) and other necessary quarters with the date of issue of the order left in blank. The balance were distributed with the date of issue filled in and distributed upon arrival at Hitokappu Bay.

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I believe that the part of the Combined Fleet General Order No. 1 pertaining to the Task Force (whether that part had been cut out from the General Order or printed as a separate pamphlet I do not recall) was as follows:

"The Task Force, keeping its movements in utmost secrecy and in accordance with a special order, shall advance into the Hawaii area; and immediately upon commencement of war it shall attack the main force of the American Fleet in the Hawaii area and deal it a mortal blow.

"Air attack is scheduled for dawn of X day (exact date to be given by a later order.)

"Upon completion of the air attack, the Task Force is to return to Japan.

"Should the negotiations with America prove successful, the Task Force is to return at once."

Although the Task Force Order No. 1 was probably the same, in the main, as the exhibit submitted in evidence by the Prosecution, I recall that communication and supply plans were attached to it.

The ships of the Task Force, upon completion of preparations, came to Saeki Bay one by one; and by the 16th all had rendezvoused there with the exception of the KAGA.

On the 17th, the ships left Saeki at intervals in scattered groups and rendezvoused at Hitokappu Bay on the 22nd. The KAGA arrived there somewhat later. The Task Force Order No. 3, which was the plan of air attack, was completed at this time and distributed to all the ships together with Order No. 1 on 24th November. This Order Number 3, I believe, was much the same as that submitted by the Prosecution.

In addition to the above orders, there was issued to the various units an order in the form of verbal instructions from the Chief of Staff pertaining to the measures to be taken under various conditions. Most of this order I drafted myself. Its principal points were the following:

- A. If, while proceeding eastward from Hitokappu Bay, the Task Force should encounter American warships, merchantmen or airplanes or neutral merchantmen, it should change direction sharply as soon as discovery is made by the patrol vessel; but advance toward the objective should

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be continued while maintaining greatest secrecy as to position. If the whole of the Task Force is discovered, turn back as though nothing had happened; but if such discovery is made on X-1 day or later, resolutely carry out the attack.

- B. If all the attendant conditions dictate an assault, despatch the combat planes of the second attack corps at the same time as those of the first attack corps.

Torpedo and bomb attacks are to be carried out while the 81 combat planes maintain control of the air.

All unit commanders and flying officers of the Task Force were summoned aboard the AKAGI on 24th November for final explanation of the operation plans and consultations, and the start for the attack was made from Hitokappu Bay on the 26th.

Defense Document 1974

On this 1st day of July, 1947

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: GENDA, Minoru (seal)

I, GENDA, Minoru hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

GENDA, Minoru



Doc ID: A661974

23009

憲兵國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

臺灣供述者

供述者 長崎縣長崎市小島町一四七番地  
源<sup>ゲン</sup> 司<sup>シ</sup> 賢<sup>ケン</sup>ノ<sup>ノ</sup>ル

昭和三十七年八月十六日

自分機我國ニ行ハル方式ニ従ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り重審ヲ爲シタル上矣  
ノ如ク供述致シマス

RETURN TO ROOM 361  
COPY

一私ハ元海軍大佐源田實チアリマス。私ハ一九四〇年十一月一日第一航空戦隊參謀ニ任命セラレ一九四〇年十一月十五日海軍中佐ニ任ゼラレ、一九四一年四月一日第一航空戦隊參謀ニ任命セラレ一九四二年六月下旬迄其ノ職ニ就テキマシタ。

一九四一年二月月上旬旗本加賀ニテ有明灣在泊中私ハ個人的ニ親交ノアツタ第十航空戦隊參謀大西少將ヨリ「要件ガアルカラ至急處置ニ來テ呉レト」ノ手紙ヲ受取リマシタ。ソコデ翌日鹿屋ニ行キ陸

隊司令部ニ於テ同少將ニ面會シマシタ。其ノ時同少將ハ聯合艦隊司令長官山本中將ノ大西少將宛ノ私信ヲ示サレマシタ。

此ノ手紙ハ現在何處ニアルカハ知リマセヌガ其ノ要旨ハ「日米開戦ノ場合ハ劈頭第一航空戦隊、第二航空戦隊ノ全力ヲ以テ南進方面ノ米艦隊主力ニ痛撃ヲ與ヘ、當分米艦隊ノ西部太平洋進攻ヲ不可能トナラシメナケレバ作戦成功ノ見込ナシ此ノ爲ニ同空軍部隊ノ指揮官ハ自分ガ拜命シテ實行シタイト思フ此ノ作戦ニ就テ研究

シテ呉レト書フ意味デアリマシタ。

大西少將ハ私ニ謝シ「本件ニ就テ極秘裡ニ其ノ作戦ノ可能性、実施方法、使用兵力等ニ就テ研究シテ呉レト厚望サレマシタ、私ハ歸國後此ノ研究ニ取掛リ約一週間乃至十日ノ後大西少將ヲ訪問シ私ノ答申を手渡致シマシタ。私ハ其ノ計畫ヲ凡ユル方面カニ諒解シ其ノ攻取ハ極メテ困難デハアルガ不可能デハナイトノ結論ニ到達シマシタ。大西少將ハ私ノ答申ヲ若干ノ参考トシ同少將自身ノ見解ニ依ル

答申ヲ聯合艦隊司令長官ニ出サレマシタ。

一九四一年四月第一航空艦隊編成當時長洲灣攻撃ニ關スル山本長官ノ着想ノアル事ヲ知ツテ居ツタノハ同司令部職員中司令長官前髪中將、參謀長草鹿少將、首席參謀大石中佐及私デアリマシタ。爾後九月初旬迄我々ハ此ノ作戦ニ關シ具體的、計畫、立案等ハ致シマセンデシタ。

九月始め參謀長草鹿少將ハ幕僚ヲ召集シ本攻撃計畫ノ研究立案ヲ下

令サシ私ハ其ノ事ヲ命ゼラレマシタ。

私ハ赤城ニ於テ約一週間ノ後作戰計畫ノ概案ヲ立案致シマシメ、此ノ概案ハ其ノ實際行ハレタ作戰計畫ト同様ノ事デアリマシタガ相違シタ主ナル點ハ次ノ様ナモノデアリマシタ。

イ 出撃集合點ヲ厚岸灣又ハ陸奥海灣ニ選定シタコト

ロ 先遣部隊（潜水艦）トノ關係ヲ有シナカツタコト

ハ 時機ニ關シテハ何等ノ具體性ヲ有シテカツタコト

ニ 空襲計畫等ハ詳細ニ亙ラナカツタコト

九月十二、三日頃海軍大學校ニ於テ聯合艦隊圖演ガ行ハレマシテ、布哇作戰關係ハ一般ト切離シテ別個ニ實施サレマシタガ此ノ圖上演習ニ於テハ單邊戰ヲ使用シタ外概ネ前記概案ニ依ツテ研究致シマシタ。

十月一日デアツタト思ヒマスガ南雲總司令ハ旗艦ニ各航空戰隊司令部職員、各艦隊長各母艦飛行長及飛艇隊長ヲ參集セシメ開戦ノ場合當艦隊ハ布哇空襲ノ任務ヲ受ケルベキヲ以テ爾後ノ訓練並ニ研究ハ

此ノ點ニ重點ヲ置ク豫訓示サレマシタ。

聯合艦隊ノ最後ノ圖上演習ハ十月初旬内海西部ニ於テ長門艦上ニテ行ハレ之ハ空母三隻使用案ヲ實施致シマシタ。

十月下旬機動部隊司令部ニ於テハ布陸作戰計畫（機動部隊命令第一號）ヲ首席參謀ガ立案シ首席參謀之ヲ携帶シ聯合艦隊司令部ニ赴キ承認ヲ求メマシタ。十一月二日機動部隊全兵力（艦上戰鬥機隊及第二潜水隊ヲ除ク）ハ有明灣ニ集合シ旗艦赤城ニ各所屬長以上及士官搭乗員ヲ彙集シ開戦ノ場合ノ當部隊ノ任務ヲ告ゲ其ノ豫行ノ爲佐伯及宿毛ヲ目標トシテ演習ヲ行フ旨及其ノ演習計畫ヲ説明致シマシタ。

聯合艦隊命令作第一號受領ノ時機ニ就テハハツキリシタ記憶ハアリマセンガ此ノ演習終了直後受領シタト思ヒマス機動部隊命令作第一號ハ直チニ印刷セラレ十一月十七日佐伯灣出港前ニ一部ハ先遣部隊等必要方面ニノミ配布サレマシタ。

此ノ命令ハ發布ノ日附ハ空欄デアツタ様ニ記憶シマス右先遣部隊以

外ニハ發布日附記入ノ上單冠灣到着後配布サレマシタ、聯合艦隊命令作第一號中機動部隊ノ項（勿論イテアツタカ別册デアツタカ記憶シマセン）ノ要旨ハ次ノ如キモノデアツタト思ヒマス。

「機動部隊ハ極力其ノ行動ヲ秘匿シツ、特命ニ依リ布哇方面ニ進出シ南院勢頭布哇方面合衆國法隊主力ニ對シ攻撃ヲ実行シ之ニ致命的打撃ヲ與フベシ、空襲第一番ヲ入日（後令）黎明時ト豫定ス空襲終ラバ内地ニ派遣スベシ機動部隊ハ對米交渉成立セバ即時歸還スルモノトス」機動部隊命令作第一號ハ此ニ據テ察例兵出艦隊ノ通ト思ヒマスガ此ノ外ニ通信計畫及補給計畫ガ附屬シテキタト記憶シテ居リマス。

機動部隊ノ各艦ハ準備終了後逐次佐伯灣ニ集結シ十六日ニハ加賀ノ艦隊ヲ集結シマシタ。

十七日各艦ハ逐次バラバラニ出港二十二日迄ニ單冠灣ニ集結致シマシタ。加賀ハ若干遅レタト思ヒマス。

機動部隊命令作第三號空襲計畫ハ此ノ間ニ完成シ十一月二十四日頃

命令作第一號ト共ニ各空ニ配布致シマシタ。

尙命令作第三號ハ海軍機密例從出證據ノ通ト思ヒマス此ノ他ニ參謀  
長口達等以下シテ麾下ニ配布セラレタ機密部ニ海軍官ノ各種狀況ニ  
對スル復業ハ主トシテ私ガ立案シマシタガ其ノ内主ナルモノハ次ノ  
通りデアリマス。

(イ) 單冠灣出擊東航中米國艦隊、船舶、飛行機乃至ハ第三國船舶等ニ  
遭遇シタ場合ハ警戒艦ノ發見ニ依リ大變針ヲ爲シ極力所在ヲ秘匿  
シテ目的地ニ進軍スルモ萬一露跡全貌ヲ發見セラレタ場合ハソ知  
ラヌフリシテ引返ス、但シ<sup>1</sup>日以後ハ敢然トシテ豫定通り突撃ス  
ス

(ロ) 諸般ノ情況強變ニ依ラザルベカラザル場合ハ第一次攻撃隊ト共ニ  
第二次攻撃隊ノ戰鬥機群ヲ同時ニ發進セシメ八十一機ノ戰鬥機ニ  
依リ制空權ヲ獲得シ爾後暫爆發ヲ實施ス

十一月二十四日頃各所艦長以上及士官落乘員ヲ赤城ニ參集シ作戰  
計畫ノ説明及打合せヲ終了シ二十六日出撃致シマシタ。

Do2D0001974

昭和二十二年八月九日（一九四七年）七月一日於東京

供託者 源 實

右ハ普立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ聲明シ

マス

同日於河所

立會人 奥山八郎



DefDoc 1974

宣  
密  
令

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺隠セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコト  
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三

安

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Ryunosuke KUSAKA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Ryunosuke KUSAKA, I was formerly a Vice Admiral in the Japanese Navy and participated in the Pearl Harbor Attack 8 December 1941, as Chief of Staff of the First Air Force Fleet.
2. As has been stated, the plan of attack was originated by Admiral Isoroku YAMAMOTO, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, around January of 1941. I remember it was April or May of that year and after I had been assigned to the post of Chief of Staff of the First Air Force Fleet that I learned of the plan. Generally speaking, the Pearl Harbor Attack was a hazardous and speculative operation penetrating deep into enemy lines. Since it was considered too venturesome, as a first step in military operations which decided the fate of the State, various studies were repeatedly made. However, since I could not agree with Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO's idea as I did not consider the plan to be practical, I expressed a lengthy opposition opinion directly to the Commander in Chief himself.

Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO listened carefully to my opinion and then said as follows:

"I fully understand your opinion; however if war should break out with the United States, taking into view the condition of military strength as it stands today, I have no confidence in fulfilling the responsibility of our national defense other than by attacking the United States Fleet immediately after the outbreak of war. Therefore, as long as the United States Fleet is stationed at Hawaii, it is my conviction as Supreme Commander, that we must commence operations by an attack there. I ask you, then, to stop opposing me from now

on and concentrate your efforts toward securing the success of this attack."

3. The Naval General Staff in early October 1941, in spite of its previous opposition to the plan, gave way before the firm opinion of Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO and finally consented to study the Hawaii Operation so that preparations could be made for any emergency situation that might arise. Subsequently, joint studies were made between the Naval General Staff Operations Section, staff officers of the Combined Fleet and the First Air Force Fleet. As studies of the operation advanced, the atmosphere gradually changed to the point of view of adopting the Hawaii Attack Plan as the first priority plan. This was largely due to the fact that the Combined Fleet Headquarters was so strongly convinced of its possibilities as compared with the disadvantage of having to plan a counter attack strategy against the enemy for the purpose of protecting the undefended South Sea Islands.

4. At that time there was only one carrier based air force fleet which was the First Air Force Fleet consisting of the following three air force squadrons:

First Air Force Squadron with aircraft carriers AZAGI and KAG.

Second Air Force Squadron with aircraft carriers SORYU and HIRYU.

Fourth Air Force Squadron with aircraft carriers RYUJO and the converted carrier "Kasuga Maru", named the "Taiyo."

At that time there were also the light aircraft carriers "Hosho" and "Zuiho" which formed the Third Air Force Squadron of the First Fleet.

On September 25th, 1941, the aircraft carrier "Zuikaku" was commissioned and, together with the aircraft carrier "Shokaku", which had been completed one month before, composed the Fifth Air Force Squadron. These were assigned for service under the First Air Force Fleet.

5. Of the four air force squadrons attached to the First Air Force Fleet, both carriers of the Fourth Air Force Squadron were capable only of carrying a small number of planes and those planes were out moded craft. They were slow with a short cruising range and entirely unfit for the Hawaii Operation. Therefore, the

Combined Fleet Headquarters submitted the following demands to the central authorities.

(a) Select highly trained air crew members from both carriers of the Fourth Air Force Squadron to fill vacancies in the First and Second Air Force Squadrons, thereby increasing the number of carrier planes on both air force squadrons and particularly the number of fighter planes.

(b) Fill the vacancies in the Fifth Air Force Squadron with trained personnel, experienced in service on carriers, from land air force units.

Concerning the two above items, there was no other way to supply men for item (b) other than to pull out training officers and enlisted men instructors from the training corps. The Personnel Bureau Naval Aviation Board showed great reluctance to do this because it would inconvenience the training and supplying of future air crew personnel. The demands of the Combined Fleet, however, were strong enough to enforce its wishes and it was finally done.

6. The Pearl Harbor Attack was thus conducted by a temporarily organized task force consisting of the First Air Force Fleet as its main body. It was mid October 1941 when the shifting of necessary personnel and the formation of the First Air Force Fleet was completed. Because the Pearl Harbor Attack was not thought possible unless rigid training be enforced, it was necessary to carry out practice schedules until late November. But as the embarkation date was around the middle of November, it left port without even a month's training.

As a result of studies made on the Pearl Harbor Attack Operation, daylight, or if possible, before daybreak, as the time of attack was desirable. But due to such circumstances as the insufficient training of air crew personnel, the accompanying lack of confidence in taking off from the carriers and flying in formation, together with navigating before daybreak, were problems which caused a change in the schedule of the attack so that it

was finally arranged for the planes to leave the carriers thirty minutes before daybreak and to fix the hour of attack at one hour and a half after daybreak.

The Pearl Harbor Attack was an extremely difficult operation and its major difficulties were the following two points:

(a) The problem of a shallow submersion torpedo.

Previous studies had been made to lessen the submersion degree of torpedoes after firing and to shorten the distance required to stabilize itself at an adjusted depth. These studies were made before the Pearl Harbor Operation was conceived and were designed for the purpose of aerial torpedo attacks on shipping. The results were far from satisfactory. When studies on the Pearl Harbor Attack began, research work in this field became more important for it was an unanswered question as to whether aerial torpedo attacks were possible in the restricted and shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. The First Air Force Fleet, with the cooperation of the Yokosuka Naval Air Corps and Naval Air Technical Department made repeated experiments and finally, in late October, reached the conclusion that it was possible.

The remodeling of torpedoes necessary for such operation was delayed and they could not be delivered to the ships before embarking for their rendezvous point at Takan Bay. So the aircraft carrier ~~AGATA~~ <sup>KAGA</sup> stayed behind until the last to receive the remodeled torpedoes and then to distribute them to each ship at Takan Bay. There was also the question of torpedo net cutters which were thought to be necessary for the operation but, although the research work was hurried, the studies and experiments did not produce satisfactory results and it was decided not to equip the torpedoes with cutters.

(b) The second difficulty was the problem of extending the cruising range of the ships participating in the attack. The attack force took a northerly course where navigating ships were scarce in order to avoid early discovery and planned to approach Hawaii from the north where we thought air patrols would be

sporadic.

It was the northeastern monsoon period and we knew that the aircraft carriers AKAGI, SORYU and HIRYU, as well as the destroyers, would not have sufficient cruising range if refueling en route was impossible due to the strong winds and high waves. As for refueling destroyers on the high seas, we had had considerable training and experience and in the event refueling was impossible, these ships could turn back and the operation be carried on by cruisers and heavier type ships.

The problem was different in regard to aircraft carriers. If three out of six participating were omitted, the operation could not be performed. Consequently, after many studies were made, it was decided to carry fuel even in the double bottomed sections and stacking fuel drums outside the storage rooms. Then, in case refueling was impossible, these ships would be able to return to a point at 160° east longitude.

However, loading fuel into the double bottomed sections of the aircraft carrier AKAGI and also the reserve fuel tanks was prohibited by naval regulations considering the strength of the ship's structure. I therefore entered into negotiations with proper officials, attempting to neutralize this naval regulation, but achieved no success. Whereupon the Commander in Chief of the Fleet was forced to take full responsibility regarding the possibility of an accident occurring and the decision was made to load fuel in the reserve fuel tanks and double bottom sections, although not in compliance with regulations.

The Task Force which was temporarily organized for the Pearl Harbor Attack was to embark from their port either alone or in small groups around 15 November 1941 in accordance with Combined Fleet Headquarters orders, and rendezvous at Tankan Bay by 22 November. After refueling, the Task Force left the bay at 0600 hours 26 November to the next stand-by point at 42° north latitude, 170° west longitude.

During this operation, there were two important problems which

caused me great concern in my capacity of Chief of Staff of the Task Force.

One was whether or not the main body of the United States Fleet would be stationed in the Hawaiian area at the time the attack was to be made. The other was the fear of enforcing the attack when orders to return might have been transmitted (if United States - Japanese negotiations reached an amicable settlement) but which might not be received owing to the remote distance of communications or other causes. It would indeed have been a grave problem had orders been dispatched to return and were not received by the Task Force.

Behind the reason for my concern on the latter point was the fact that on 2 December, Imperial Headquarters Naval Section orders stated that diplomatic negotiations would be continued even after a decision was passed designating 8 December as the day to open hostilities, and a ray of hope that hostilities could be avoided was still seen. If United States - Japanese negotiations reached an amicable settlement, or a possibility of reaching a peaceful solution became a certainty, all forces were to stop all operational actions and, after hurriedly rounding up all units, were to return home. This was so indicated in Imperial Headquarters Naval Department Instruction Number 5 and concurrently in Combined Fleet Headquarters Instruction Number 1. (In the instruction the words "In the event of important change in situation meant the amicable settlement of United States - Japanese negotiations.) Moreover, we had heard of this matter from Commander in Chief Admiral YAMAMOTO at every opportunity. Therefore, I was greatly concerned until on the 5th or 6th of December I received a telegram from Chief of Division One, Naval General Staff, stating that there was no hope of United States - Japanese negotiations coming to a peaceful conclusion.

10. As for the ultimatum to be delivered prior to the attack, I thought it was naturally being taken care of by the central authorities. Therefore, I was convinced that a notification

had been communicated before the attack began.

From a strategical viewpoint, an attack without notice might be idealistic, but such treacherous action was unthinkable from the point of view of training and common sense of the Japanese naval officer, and also because of the traditional 'Bushido' (the creed of the Samurai).

As a matter of fact, I expected the possible discovery of our operation before the attack by United States patrol planes in Hawaii. Our observation sea planes were scheduled to arrive at Pearl Harbor at least thirty minutes ahead of the attacking forces, and moreover, we were expecting our attacking forces to be caught by radar, thus revealing to the United States our potential attack. We actually were prepared to suffer considerable damage and casualties in this risky undertaking and were greatly surprised when such did not occur.



On this \_\_\_\_\_ day of August, 194  
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: KUSAKA, Ryunosuke (seal)

I, KUSAKA, Ryunosuke hereby certify that the above state-  
ment was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and  
seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At the same place

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole  
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KUSAKA, Ryunosuke (seal)

6. 30. 11

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## RETURN TO ROOM 361

二頁	十九行目
五頁	六行目
五頁	十三行目
七頁	七行目
七頁	十五行目
三五頁	七行目
五九頁	一〇行目
七〇頁	六行目
七三頁	十四行目

(誤)

正

誤

表

辯護側文書第一九〇四號  
左記ノ通り訂正願ヒマス

定ムルコトヲ
主席、代表
光天的
立案スル非常ノ
常上逸早ク
選ケントスル
諸國代表主張ニ
案全

(正)

榎本重治供述書

定ムルコトト
主席代表
先天的
立案スルニ非常ノ
常ニ逸早ク
○日本ノ主張スル・・・
テ次項ノ表題トスル
選ケントスル考ヘニ基ツ
イタモノデアリマシタ
諸國代表ノ日本代表主張ニ
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七五頁十二行目  
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 七六頁十一行目  
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 八九頁 八行目

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 非公式會談及  
 日英妥協案  
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Def, Doc 1904

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣稱供述書

供述者 櫻 本 重 治

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣稱ヲ爲シタル  
上ノ如ク供述致シマス

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

根本重治

(第一) 私ハ一九一四年東京帝國大學法科ヲ卒業シ  
一九一五年海軍省参事官(後書記官ト名稱變更  
セラレトシテ元日本海軍省ニ入リ一九四五年  
遼東ニ在リ以テ同省ニ勤務シ其ノ後ハ第二復  
員省次ヲ第二復員局ニ勤務シテ后リマス。

元日本海軍省ニ勤務中ノ私ノ主タル任務ハ一該  
法令ノ審査事務及國際法規調査事務ニ關與スル  
コトデアリマシタ。

私ハ元日本海軍省勤務中ノ左記ノ國際會議ニ専  
門委員トシテ出席シマシタ。

(イ) 一九二一年「ワシントン」軍縮會議

(ロ) 一九三二年「ハーグ」ニ於テ開催セラレタ  
時法規改正法律家委員會

(ハ) 一九三七年「シユネーゴ」ニ於テ開催セラレタ  
米、日、三國海軍軍縮會議

(ニ) 一九三〇年「ロンドン」海軍軍縮會議

(ホ) 一九三二年「シユネーゴ」ニ於テ開催セラレタ  
海軍軍縮會議

(ヘ) 一九三四年「ロンドン」ニ於ケル一九三五年  
海軍軍縮會議關係交渉

(ト) 一九三五年「ロンドン」海軍軍縮會議

私ハ石譜官談ニ詢スル準備驛務及ビ會議ニ於テ  
成立シタレドモ、批准ニ關スル驛務又條約實施  
ニ必長ナル國內法令ノ發布ニ關スル驛務等ニモ  
關與シマシム隨テ日本代表ガ會議ニ出席スル際  
受ケタレドモ、準備ナドモ知ツテ居リマス。  
以下續メル島嶼ハ省會議ノ議事録、元海軍省ノ  
公ノ記録等及ビ私ノ實地探險シタレドモ、實ニ差クモ  
ノテアリマス。

(第三) 一九二一年「ワシントン」軍縮會議ニ於ケ  
ル海軍集議ニ關スル問題ハ同年十一月十二日米  
國國務卿「ヒューズ」氏ノ提案シタレドモ、英、佛、  
伊、日ノ五國、海軍軍備制限ニ關スル具體案ヲ  
建議トシテ討論セラレタリマス。

(イ) 現  
「ヒューズ」氏ノ提案ノ骨子ヲ爲スモノハ(イ) 現  
行又ハ前章甲ノ三方艦艇前章ヲ提案スルコト  
(ロ) 舊式艦若干隻ノ廢棄ニヨリ其ニ補換ヲ行フコ  
ト(ハ) 關係各國ノ現存海軍勢カヲ考慮スルコト(ニ)  
各海軍カノ計畫ハ主力艦増設ヲ使フシ倫之ニ致  
リ所定補則艦ノ許容量ヲ比較的ニ定ムルコトヲ  
言フニアリマス。  
而シテ條約締結當時石炭、英、日三國ノ保有シ  
得ベキ主力艦數カハ米國一八隻五〇〇、六五〇  
隻、英國二二隻六〇四、日五〇隻、日本國一〇

2

海軍集議ニ關スル  
石譜官談ニ詢スル  
準備驛務及ビ會議  
ニ於テ

Def. 1900/1904

隻二元九、七〇の電テ條約ノ規定ニ從ヒ着艦ヲ  
新造ヲ以テ全部代表シタル艦ハ米國五〇〇、〇  
〇〇の電、英國五〇〇、〇〇の電、日本國三〇〇  
〇〇の電トナルコトトナツテ居マシタ。

而「ヒューズ」氏提議ニ對スル日本國ノ幕府家  
ノ研究ノ結果ハ若シ「ヒューズ」氏提議原則(三)  
ニ從ヘバ三國海軍力ノ比例ハ(1)前券海軍以後ノ  
モノ全部ヲ許上スルハ米國三三隻、七二八、三  
九〇の電、英國四一隻九六七、八三〇の電、日本國  
二五隻五三二、八一六の電ニシテ其ノ比率ハ米國

一〇、英國一三、二、日本國七、三トナリ、(2)  
若シ海軍以後ノモノ全部ヲ許上スルハ米國二  
〇隻、五三二、六五〇の電、英國四一隻、九六七  
八五〇の電、日本國一三隻、三六一、二七〇の電ニ  
シテ其ノ比率ハ米國一〇、英國一八、二、日本  
國六、八トナリ(3)又若シ海軍以後ノモノヲ許上ス  
ルハ米國一二隻、三六五、〇〇〇の電、英國二八  
隻、七二三、六六〇の電、日本國一〇隻三〇一、  
三二〇の電ニシテ其ノ比率ハ米國一〇、英國一九  
八、日本國八、三トナルト書ラコトテアリマシ  
タ。

又一方、國防上ノ所必要ハ日本國トシテハ艦艇  
ニシテ有スル強國ノ所存スル海軍ニ對シ七衛

ノ勢カラ以テ最少限トスル若シ諸國ノ極東方  
 面前進根據地ガ現狀ニ止マリ又軍備ノ性能ガ更  
 ニ變化ナキ限り一強國ニ對シ最少七割ノ勢カラ  
 備ハシバ國防ヲ全クシ得ベシト言フ兵衛上ノ論  
 實ニ難シテ諸國ノ日本國側ハ米國ノ保有スベ  
 キ勢力ニ對シ其ノ七割ヲ維持スルコトガ可能ナ  
 ズニ一ヒューストン氏提議ヲ變更セシコトヲ求メ  
 タノデアリマス尙又一ヒューストン氏案ニハ建造  
 中ナルノ故ヲ以テ廢棄スベキコトヲナツテ居タ  
 日本主力艦隊ハ事實上既ニ完成シテ居タノデ  
 其ノ訂正ヲモ求メタノデアリマスガ隨處ヲ廢棄  
 ノ部ヨリ存置ノ部ニ置キ替ヘルコトハ、米、英、  
 兩國ニ對シ各建造中ノ新主力艦二隻宛ヲ建造完  
 成シ保持スルコトヲ許サシムガ對米比率七割ヲ  
 維持スル點ニ關スル主張ハ容ララセシメテシ  
 タ、確定條約案ノ第十九條トシテ太平洋方面ニ  
 於ケル米、英、日ノ領地及島嶼ニ於ケル防備制  
 限ノ條項ガ一ヒューストン氏提議ニ附加セラレ  
 マシタガ日本國側トシテハ當初ヨリ斯ル前進根  
 據地ガ時々現狀通りニ存ルモノト豫定シテ七割  
 ノ勢カラ維持スルコトガ國防上最少限度ノ要求  
 テテツタノテ從令防備制限條項ガ附加セラレル  
 モ國防上最少限度ノ必要ナリト主張シタ要求ガ

1901. Dec. 1901.



Handwritten notes in the left margin, possibly including the number '5'.

容シテナカツタケテアリマス。  
石ノ様ヲ知テアルノニ拘ラズ日本國側ガ米  
價ノ主權ヲ得レテ條約ヲ締結スルニ至ツタノハ  
主トシテ日本ニ對スル誤解ヲ一掃シ得ニ米、日  
兩國間ノ關係ヲ改善スル切ナル念願カラテアリ  
マシタ。其ノ中ハ當時ノ日本國主席、代表加  
藤友三郎海軍大臣カ中岡敏吾ノ爲メ隨員ヲ歸國  
セシメタ。供送者自身モ兵ノ一人ハ隊長管ヲ口  
袋（兵ノ原記係ハ現存ス）シタ中ニヨク現ハレ  
テ居マシタ。其ノ中ニ左ノ如キコトガ合マレテ  
居マシタ。

「井出次官へ

大體ノ點トシテ會議ニ際シ固分ヲ光天的ニ支  
配セシモノハ是迄ノ日米間ノ關係ノ改善ニ在  
リキ。我々ハソレバ米國ニ接目ノ意見多キヲ感ル  
ベク。緩和シタマフノ希望之ナリ如何ナル間見  
ニ對シテモ此ノ見地ヨリ制リ出シテ是後ノ決  
心シナセリ。――――  
余ハ米國ノ提議ニ對シテ主義トシテ賛成セザ  
ルベカララスト考ヘタリ。假リニ軍備削減問題  
ナク是レ通過リノ製造競争ヲ繼續スルトキ如  
何、英國ハ到底天海軍ヲ擴張スルノ力ナカル  
ベキモ相當ノコトハ必ズ爲スベシ。米國ノ與國

5





Def. Sec. 704

國ノ局上ニアハ言フベカラズ、又此ノ考ヘハ  
少シク意氣地ナキ議論ノ如キモ止ムヲ行ザル  
必要トシテハ其方ナシ  
主力比草ノ決定ニ際シテモ余ハ常ニ石ノ如  
キ考ヲ有シタリ  
今回、米自カ彼ノ提案ヲナスニ付イテハ英國  
ニ兵部ノ口實ヲ與ヘザル如ク立案スル非常ノ  
苦心セシ味アリ、内閣ノ結果トハ想像セ  
ザルモ少クトモ常ニ英米一致シテ他國ニ當ル  
ニ便宜ナル案ヲ考テタルコトハ誤リナカルベ  
シ茲ニ於テ一呑口倒ナル日本ヲ説キテ先ヅ三  
國同テ決定シテ其ノ爲キ他國ニ當ルノ順序ヲト  
リ三國全權ノ非公式會合ヲ催セルモノナリ、  
日本トシテハ英米常ニ一致ノ態度ヲ取リ英ガ  
常上起早ク米案ニ賛成セル爲メ非常ニヤリ難  
クカリキ

兵スルニ海軍軍備擴張ノ準備上カラ見  
トバ各國ニ公平ナ保有益ヲ定メタモノテハナイ  
ト言フノガ日本國自ノ見解ナリマシタリシテ  
此ノ見解ヲ發表キスルが如キ事實ヲ起リマシム。即チ一九  
二一年十一月十七日ノ The Honorable Franklin  
Roosevelt (Assistant Secretary of the Navy)  
ト日本主席委員加藤定治中將會談ノ際「ル

7

8

19th. Dec. 1910

一、次官ハ一、米案ニ俄ル勢刀比算定  
 ニ於テハ國防ヲ本位トスル考慮ハ之ヲ展外願  
 シムトト誓ヒ又同月十九日ノ衆、日代表會  
 議ノ際、加藤友三郎海軍大臣ガ「七割説ハ國防  
 上日本ノ年案ノ主眼ナラツテ自分ハ議會ニ於テ  
 モ過ベクコトガアリ又、自兵一擧ノ希望アリル  
 ト過ベクニ試シ「ヒム一國務長官ハ「現存  
 勢刀ヲ善視トシテ善觀セザルハ萬難成立ノ見込  
 ガナシト答へ又「バルクガ「一擧ガ「一擧門外  
 眞ノ氣息ヲ確ケバ勢力増大ニ傾クヲ以テ之ヲ  
 辨スルヲ向トスル海軍勢刀ヲ短ムルニ國防ヨ  
 リ尚強スルトキハ英國ハ日本ノ十倍以上ノ勢力  
 ヲ長ストノ精備モ坐ズルテアラト過ベクナル  
 ガ如キ事實ガ表レナラザリマス。俄國代表モ  
 「ヒム一案ニ俄ル俄國保衛ニ付キ國防所  
 長ニ請フスモノテアルトシテ激烈ナル抗議ヲ蒙  
 シマス。

當時、日本國領トシテ志同の見地カラテ傑出案  
 ナカツタコトハ現有勢力ガ相合ズリ又其ノ海軍  
 ヲ必長トスル程度ガ非常ニ異ナルト思ハル米英  
 兩國同ノ海軍勢刀ヲ卒等ニナカントスル點ナラ  
 リマス現ニ此ノ條約案ガ海軍院ニ請附サルコト  
 際、一行海軍院ハ加藤友三郎海軍大臣ニ對シ「

Ref Sec 1/104

ウラ一ホテンシャル一ノ儲まり看へバ米國ハ赤  
 常ニ大デアアル。必長ノトキハ海軍力ヲ増大シ得  
 ル万ガアル故平時ヨリ大勢力ヲ備ふる必長ハナ  
 イ却テ日本ノ如キ資源乏ク工業力ノ劣ル國コ  
 ソ平時ヨリ備へ置カザレバ一旦必長起ツタ場合  
 ニ是レニ對應スル方法ナキ故軍備條約ノ如キ平  
 時ニ於ケル軍備ヲ定ムル協定ニハ米日間ニツイ  
 テ言へバ比率ハ等ラ道ニシ日本ガ米國ヨリ大ナ  
 ル軍備ヲ備ふるコトカ公平ニ非ズヤトノ質問ガ  
 據セラレタ進テアリマシタ。  
 條約有款如陸等ニ動シ外務省側職員ヨリ本取  
 廻メハ給局現狀維持ニ外ナラズモノデアアル故余  
 リ有款如陸ヲ長クスルハ道管ニアラズト言フ別紙  
 第一ノ如キ意見ガ提出サレマシタ。  
 石ニ逸ベク通り日本國側トシテハ種々了係出来  
 難イ點モアリ又不満足ノ點モアツタが大局上條  
 約ヲ締結シ米國トノ間ニ親善關係ヲ實現スルコ  
 トガ最も望マシイトノ見解ノ下ニ米國側ヲ安諾  
 シタノデアリマス前シテ此ノ條約ヲ誠實ニ履行  
 スル爲メ速ニ法律ヲ制定スル等細心ノ注意ヲ  
 拂ツタノデアリマス併シナガラ英ノ後ニ於ケル  
 米國政府ノ日本移民ニ對スル措置及ビ英國政府  
 ノ「シンガポール」大埠港ノ歐區ハ滿ク日本國

7

10

1904. 1500 1907.

民ヲ刺戟シ又失望セシメ世界地圖ヲ覆閉シテ奈  
 ヌ日本山政府當局ヲ普提ニ閉シ當局ハ國民ニ適  
 當ノ説明ヲ爲スノニ普シクシテ事實ガアツタコト  
 ヲ記憶シテ居リマス

華府會議ニ於テ日英同盟ハ割起及隣國ノ侵略ヲ  
 防止スル爲メ存続セラシムルモノナラガ其ノ危  
 険ハ去リ一方比ノ同盟ノ存スルコトハ却ツテ嚴  
 禁ヲ坐スル虞アル故等々廢止スルヲ可トスルコト  
 ノ趣旨ニ依リ四國海軍締結會議トシテ廢止ノ  
 コトニ決定シタルヲアルガ(別紙第三)此ノ趣  
 ハ日本政府トシテハ不承認テアリ又國民ニ對シ  
 機分國脈孤獨ノ感ヲ與ヘマシタ。

(第三)補助艦ニ對スル軍信制限ハ華府會議ニ於テ  
 ハ依有甚ニ嚴シ主トシテ例山ノ不同悉ニ依リ贊  
 成シナカツタガ一九二七年或メテ米山政府ハ一  
 シュモノーゾーニ於テ五國官制ヲ團體スルタメ華  
 府海軍軍備制限條約締結國ニ對シ補助艦ヲ對シ  
 夫、日兩國ハ之ツラ協定シタガ例山政府ハ米山  
 補助艦ニ含マサル提案ハ華府ニ於テ例山代表ガ  
 主張シ專門委員會ノ家制ヲ提スル原因自ラ(1)海  
 軍軍備ノ制限ハ國軍及海軍軍備制限ノ間別ヲ解  
 決スル方法ヲ考慮ニ入ラスツテ着手スルコト不  
 可能ナルコト(2)海軍ノ見地ヨリ米山谷國ノ必

107 Sec. 1107

長ニ屬シテ各國ガ自由ニ配給シ得ベキ如價取ラ  
各國ニ備蓄ツルニ非ザレバ算價制度ハ實現不可  
能ナルコトヲ察スルモノデアツテ尙且政府ハ  
石炭業ヲ採掘セシトセバ從來ノ制度ト公然矛盾  
セル懸念ノ故ニトナルトノ理由ヲ會議ニ參加  
不問無ク志同ラ示シ會議ニハ「オブザイバア」  
ヲ送ルコトスララ肯シモズ單ニ「インフホマ」  
ヲ送リマシタ、伊國政府モ會議ニ參加セズ非公  
式「オブザイバア」ヲ送ルニ止マリマシタ。  
本會議ハ一九二七年六月二十日カラ八月四日マ  
テ「ジュネーヴ」ノ聯盟總局内テ開催セラレ  
マシタガ各國ノ提議權長ハ左ノ如クデアリマシ  
タ。

(イ) 米價案

各締結國ノ米價亦何價取ラ定メ而シテ各國  
ニ對スル備蓄ノ量亦條約ノ主力價比率ヲ適用  
スル。

巡洋艦ニ付テハ英、米、二五〇、〇〇〇噸乃  
至三〇〇、〇〇〇噸、日本一五〇、〇〇〇噸  
乃至一八〇、〇〇〇噸驅逐艦ニ付テハ英、米  
二〇〇、〇〇〇噸乃至二三〇、〇〇〇噸  
日本一二〇、乃至一五〇、〇〇〇噸



1904. Dec 1904

各國ハ其來高ノ領事力増加ノ目的ヲ以テ新ニ  
送還計畫ヲ案定シ其ノ額多クニ送還シテ戻得セズ  
各國ノ海軍力ハ各國ヲ以テスル所ニ於テ尙  
ノ領事及海軍ニ對シテ其ノ額ノ増加ヲ送還  
トシ簡便ニ計畫中起見未着手ノ増加ノ計畫  
及此處計畫實施中代送還額ニ對シテキ送還  
ノ額其ノ考慮シテ水上補助船ニ重分シテ決定ス

(三) 日本國案

各國ノ海軍力ニ對シテ其ノ額ノ増加ニ對  
シ必長ニ考慮スル  
各國ノ海軍力ニ對シテ其ノ額ノ増加ニ對  
シ必長ニ考慮スル  
將來ノ巡洋艦ハ最大排水量七、五〇〇噸以下  
ル五、五、三、比準ヲ其ノ用途スル  
時ノ巡洋艦ニ對シテ其ノ排水量ヲ五、五、三、  
補助艦ニ對シテハ排水量一〇、〇〇〇噸備砲八  
寸砲連發ノ機銃ヲ備ヘシ  
及砲艦ヲ備ヘシ其ノ排水量及機銃連發艦ノ排水  
量及砲艦ノ機銃ヲ備ヘシ其ノ排水量及機銃連發艦ノ排水

(四) 英國案

補助艦ニ對シテハ英、五、〇、〇〇噸乃至  
九〇、〇〇〇噸  
日本三、〇〇〇噸乃至五、〇〇〇噸  
ノ間ニ各國ノ最大排水量ヲ定ムル

W. G. 1904

13

ル  
 石ノ中日本國家ハ海軍官制ノ條ノ「ヒューズ」  
 國務長官案ニ贊ツクモノデアリマシタ  
 石ノ案ニ贊キ案ニシタノデアリマスガ英國側ガ  
 第三回海軍委員會ニ於テ國防部長トシテ一〇〇、  
 〇〇噸ノ六寸砲艦一五隻小艦即チ六吋巡洋艦  
 五五隻及驅逐艦、航空母艦五隻計七五隻ヲ提示シ  
 英國ハ空軍ヲ重視スル艦艇ヲ小ニスルバ總噸數  
 ヲ減シ得ル旨ヲ説長シタルトコロ、米國側ハ英  
 國ノ案則英海〇〇〇〇噸ニ上ル米國海軍ノ盾トナリ章  
 制ノ案ガナイ英國ハ海軍官制ニ於テ水上補助艦  
 四五〇、〇〇〇噸ヲ承諾シタルニ准ヌヤト主張  
 シ茲ニ英國ノ小艦多數主義（國防長ニシツク  
 ト米國ノ大艦小艇主義トノ對立ヲ見ルニ至リ八  
 吋砲巡洋艦ノ空費ニ關シ英國側ハ「八吋砲ハ攻  
 撃的武器ナラバ二隻制陸セザル筈定ハ無意味テ  
 アルトト主張スルニ對シ米國側ハ「一〇、〇〇〇  
 噸巡洋艦以外ニ八吋砲艦ヲ許サザルハ米國ニ  
 対シテ問題デアルト反對シマシタ（第六回代  
 表會議會）  
 英國代表ハ英國ノ長官カ無禮カナイ證據トシテ  
 首席代表「アリツマシ」氏ハ一九二七年八月  
 四日ノ公報ノ第三回編會ニ於テ米國下院海軍委



( 卷ノ目録 )

71

Leg. Sec 1904

15

新ノ如ク米日ト英日トノ主張ハ相當ノ懸隔アリ  
 又討議ノ狀況モ激烈ヲ協調點ヲ後見スルコトハ  
 望ミ少イ狀況ナリマシム。  
 日本側ハ此ノ點ニ處シ爾等ノ停戦ノ役目ヲ引受  
 ケタ様ヲ情状トナリ茲ニ六月十四日ノ第二回總  
 會ニ於ケルキリシ事情ニキブソン・氏ノ演說中「  
 米日ハ總領海軍及巡洋艦々型ニ同シテハ日本  
 ト同意見ナルヲ以テ爾等ノ間ニ協定ニ達スルハ  
 容易ナルベク若シ日英ノ間ニ於テ爾日共ニ受諾  
 シ得ル何等カノ基礎ヲ見出ツ得バ米日モ亦之ヲ  
 受諾シテ三國ノ完全ナル協定ヲ成立セシメ得ベ  
 キヲ確信スル」と言フ趣旨ノコトガアツタノデ  
 茲ニ英日兩國ノ交渉開始セラレ英、日兩國間ニ  
 一ノ協定案ガ成立シタノデアルガ米日代表ハ八  
 時砲塔戰ノ目出ノ點ヲ主張シテ右協定案ヲ承認  
 シナカツタノデアリマス  
 茲ニ於テ日本代表ハ協定成立ノ最後ノ努力ト  
 シテ「英日兩國ハ各其ノ協定計畫ニ依ルノ外一  
 九三一年迄新ニ水上補助艦ヲ建造セズ又米日ハ  
 英國以上ニ其ノ水上補助艦隻ヲ増加セザルベ  
 キコトヲ約スル」とコトヲ趣旨トスル停戦案ヲ提  
 示シタノデアリマスガ米日代表ハ此ノ案ニテハ  
 討議ヲ進メ難ハザル旨ヲ表明シ茲ニ協定成立ノ  
 望ハ全く絶エタノデアリマス

25 of Dec. 1904

新クシテ八月四日ノ第三回總會議ヲ以テ會議終  
 了セシメタノデアルガ各口代表ハ各々自國ノ態  
 度ヲ聲明シ最後ニ別紙第三ノ三口共同宣言ヲ發  
 シ幕府三國海軍軍備制限會議ノ無期休會ヲ宣言  
 スルノ形式ヲ深リ赤義ヲ望エタノデアリマス  
 (第四) 一九三〇年二月六日(一)日カラ英國政府招請ニ  
 依ル「ロンドン」海軍會議ガ開催セラレマシタ  
 本會議ハ主トシテ一九二七年「ジュネーブ」三  
 國會議テ不成功ニ終ツタ補助艦ニ關スル制限ヲ  
 目的トスルモノデアツテ佛伊兩國モ參加スルコ  
 トトナリマシタ尤モ佛伊兩國ハ保有兵力量ノ問  
 題ニ關シ關係自ト協議成立シテカツタ爲メ同會  
 議ノ結果成立シタ所謂一九三〇年「ロンドン」  
 海軍條約中補助艦ノ兵力量ニ關スル規定ノ拘束  
 ラ受ケナイコトト爲リマシタ  
 本會議ニ於ケル日本口ノ主張ハ海軍兵力ニ付イ  
 テハ日本口ノ自主獨立ヲ擁護シ且國家存立上必  
 要ナル海上交通ヲ防護スル爲メノ量ヲ確保スル  
 コトニ在ツテ其ノ具體的數置ハ左ノ如クデアリ  
 マシタ  
 (イ) 幕府海軍々種制限條約ノ存續スル現狀ニ於テ  
 補助艦兵力量ハ一九三一年末ニ於ケル現有量  
 ラ標準トシ又比率ニ於テハ總米總括七割  
 (ロ) 右兵力量ハ軍備ノ真旨ニ反セス且ツ所要比率

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LCy 1862. 1904

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ヲ失ハサル限リ各國ト協定シ締結スルニ若カ  
 ナラス 但シ潜水艦ハ例外トスル

(ハ) 八吋砲塔 最大型巡洋艦ハ特ニ製米七割  
 潜水艦ハ一九三一年長末現有量(七八、四九  
 七七噸)

右(イ)ノ主張ニ對シメシメシメニハ極速  
 洋艦ノ驅逐艦ニ至テ少ノ機件ヲ忍ブコトハ  
 已ムヲ得ヌイ

而シテ右主張ハ日本政府ノ軍備根本觀念トシ  
 テ保持スル国防ノ要圖、國民負擔ノ輕減及外  
 國トノ平和親交ノ増進ノ各事項ト合致スルニ  
 ノト考ヘラレマシメ 尙代表ニ對スル訓令中  
 ニハ注意事項トシテ軍備ノ管刀ハ早ニ正派ノ  
 兵刀ノミナラス資源、商船隊及ビ工業刀等ノ  
 海産刀亦莫ノ一部ノ要業ヲ爲スモノデア  
 ツテ日本自ハ比レ等海産刀ニ於テ列國ニ劣  
 ル所アルガ故ニ海軍々備制限ヲ協定スルニ當  
 リテハ特ニ此ノ事情ヲ考量スル必要ガアル旨  
 ヲ記述ツテアリマシメ

右ノ日本自ノ主張ノ外各國ノ主張中保有兵刀  
 ニ關スル部分ヲ略述スレバ左ノ如クデアリマ  
 シメ

(イ) 米國  
 美國ト「バリテイ」トスルコト八吋砲塔 艦

Dep. Sec. 1904

艦ノ一定隻數ヲ要求スル  
 (ロ) 美國  
 補助艦ハ一定隻數ヲ要求スル  
 (ハ) 佛國  
 世界海軍ノ最高標準ヲ定メ其ノ範圍内ニ於  
 テ各自必要トスル保存立ヲ自主的ニ定メル  
 (ニ) 英國  
 歐洲最大海軍トシテ一パリティニシテ失ハザル  
 限リ幾何ニテモ維持スル  
 斯クシテ英佛兩國ノ割合量ハ遂ニ決定ヲ見  
 ルニ至ラテカツタガ米英日ノ間ニハ協定ガ  
 成立シマシタ  
 英ノ成立ニ至ル間日本代表ハ「リード」米日代  
 表ト松平代表トノ會談ノ結果ニ依ル假協定案ヲ  
 ルモノヲ協定ト爲スベク政府ニ請願シタノデア  
 リマス  
 英ノ假協定案ハ日本代表ガ命令ニ基ツキ主張シ  
 タル數置中對米總括七割ハ實質上増進スルコト  
 ヲ得タルモ大連遼洋艦ニ於テ一〇八、四〇〇噸  
 (約一割)潛水艦ニ於テ二五、一四一噸減シタ  
 ノデアリマシタ尤モ輕巡洋艦及驅逐艦ニ於テ四  
 一、四五二噸ノ増加トナツテ居タガ之レ等ハ日  
 本海軍トシテハ余リ長望シナカツタトコロノモ  
 ノデアリノ故モ爲シタル大連遼洋艦及潛水艦ニ



Def. Dec. 1904

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於テ補正不足シテ居ルノテアリマス  
 之ニ反シテ米自ハ大型巡洋艦ニ於テ現有量ヨリ  
 ハ三〇、〇〇〇噸増加シタル關係上新艦ヲ建造  
 シ得ルコトトナツルノテアリマス。即チ日本  
 ハ大型巡洋艦ニ於テ米自ガ新ニ増勢スルノヲ坐  
 視セザルヲ得テクナツルノテアリマス加之日本  
 自ハ大型巡洋艦及潜水艦ヲ相當期間新造シテク  
 ナル關係上造船技術ノ維持ノ上ニ於テ頗ル困難  
 ラシクナルテアリマス  
 茲ニ於テ日本海軍當局ハ本國の見地カラシテ本  
 業其ノ値ニテハ自防上不費ヲ添スルニ照ルトイ  
 フ意見ヲアツテ比ノ意見ニ若ク政府側令ガ代  
 表ニ到進シクナルテ代表ハコレニ應キ大型巡洋艦  
 ニ於テハ米自ハ一九三六年米自ハ三〇、〇〇〇  
 噸以上ヲ建造完厥シナイコト及日本自ノ造船技  
 術維持ノ爲カキテ一九三六年米自ニ潜水艦一  
 二、〇〇〇噸ヲ完厥シ得ルコト條約有效期間ヲ  
 一九三六年米自ノ運轉ノモノトスルコト米自ノ  
 會議ニ於ケル自國ナル意見ヲ妨テナイコト等ノ  
 修正及ビ條約ヲ廢ハシコトヲ米自側ニ申入レ妥  
 協成立シテ比ノ假令是等ノ妥協スルニ至ツルノ  
 テアリマス  
 尙政府同調ニ多少時日ヲ要シタルハ事ノ重大性  
 ニ依ルコトハ勿論アルガ代表自ト政府トノ建

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Hist. Dec. 1904

第十分ナラヌ官制施行ノ狀況ヲ政府ニ報告サル  
積多ク代表請願ノ際ニ政府ニハ之レガ判断ヲサ  
ス資料サヘナカリシ資料ニテ總代表團ニ呈シ  
兵部ノ總務ヲ兵部ノ總務司ノ選ビトナシタ  
ナアリアス英ノコトハ別紙第四ノ昭和五年三月  
二十六日ノ海軍次官長官選任司馬團員宛電報ヲ  
見レバ其ノ詳ナリ。

總團長任者ハ島根兵部ヲ以テシテハ從來ノ副  
防方針ニテハ口防ノ要目ヲ依シ置クトノ見解ナ  
リシニ依リ之レニ論スル處置ヲ海軍軍政省局長  
總團長任者トニ依リ置キラルコトナリ之レ  
等軍部局長等員ニ付テ現存艦船ノ勢力ノ向上及  
ビ維持ノ必要兵部ノ選任方針ノ見解及ビ  
備邊費ノ改善等殊水上艦隊ノ選任員選任及ビ  
工作力ノ維持ノ必要兵部ニ付テ總務司長處置  
ヲ請スルコトトナシタナアリアス兵部ノ選任  
別紙第三ノ同員選任ノ關係ニ於ケル海軍次官長  
總務司長見レバ詳ナリ。

新ノ案クシテ海軍部モ兵部ヲキリ認メテ同調セ  
ラレタメニテアリアス方官制ハ茲例トシテハ日  
本政府ノ海軍官制以來ノ主眼ナリテ又海軍部合  
ニハ兵部ニ依リ一層兵部ヲシテ海軍部少額  
兵ノ保有ニ對シテ兵部ノ長官而モ兵ノ長官ハ兵部  
ヲ兵部ノ長官トシテハ兵部ノ長官トシテハ兵部

1891

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上ヨリ音フモ朗カニシテ甲辰巡洋艦ニ付イテ音  
 へバ米日ガ十八錢百五ガ下莫保有スル場合ニ實  
 カニ一莫内外ヲ日本保有ニ加フルニ過キナイ  
 コトアノニモ拘ラス此ノ長家ガ容レラレヌト音  
 フコトハ誠ニ希跡ナル取致ヒヲ受クルモノナリ  
 トノ懸シタ受ケ而係山ガ今少シ強岳ヲ示サレタ  
 ラシニハ山民其細キ平野ニ歸シ山脈親善關係増  
 進及ビ一般算細島東進ノ上ヨリ見ルモ好マシ  
 キコトアルベキニ刻念アコトデアルトノ慮想ヲ  
 懐イタノデアリマス  
 尙一九三〇年「ロンドン」條約締結ニ關係シテ  
 所關統帥極干犯問題ナルモノガ起リ其時ラ口ガ  
 セマシタカコレハ條約調印後訂定ナル法律學者  
 政府ニ對スル不平分子等ノ策動及政府ノ議會ニ  
 對スル説明ニ多少ノ不備ノ點アリシ結果等ニ依  
 ルモノト認メラレタコトデアリマシテ「ロンドン  
 」條約締結ニ付イテハ其ノ當時内閣ト海軍省  
 トハ信ニ一致シ又海軍省部長ノ長官タル算令部  
 長モ兼該ハナカツタノデアリマス以上述べタ外  
 ニ「ロンドン」條約締結ニ付テハ米英日三百ハ  
 主刀艦ノ代表製造ヲ一九三六年迄延期スルコト  
 ヲ決定シマシタガ之レニ付イテハ日本側モ何等  
 異議ハナカツタノデアリマス  
 御前ノ補助艦保有ニ付イテハ前述ノ通り

1931. 10. 11  
by

...カアリマセンナシクガガ初代表提示ノ  
 算式ニ關スル一九二七年ノ所開妥協案(別  
 紙第六)ナルモノハ頗ル關係自ノ注意ヲ惹キマ  
 シ。此ノ案ハ關係自ノ海軍乃ニ骨キ各門ノ進ユ  
 ベカラサル共進限長ヲ定メ各自ハ其ノ限内ニ  
 於テ各自ノ保衛ヲ進ムルモノナアリマシテ一  
 九三〇年一月三十日ノ如三國總督ニ於テ米國一  
 キアソシテ代表ノ說明(別紙第七)ニ依リテモ  
 明カナルガ如ク一九二七年以後ノ實際明算總  
 算總管會ニ於テ總算セラルレ「ボール」ボック  
 「ル」案トシテ知ラレ一九二八年ニハ英佛諸國  
 ノ總算總限セラルベキ海軍艦船ヲ四種ニ分チ補  
 助艦ニ付イテ各自ニ進進ノ限長ヲ決定シ各自  
 ハ最後會議ニ於テ夫レ夫レ各自ノ必長トスル云  
 ラ示ストイフ案ヲ得々ノナアリマス  
 而ツテ一九三〇年「ロンドン」會議ニ於テハ米  
 國代表モ英佛諸國ノ會議ノ建議トスルコトニ  
 同意ツ又實際「ロンドン」條約第十七條及第十  
 八條等ニハ此ノ妥協案中ニ合マルル點點ニ關ス  
 ル方式ガ採用セラレタノナアリマシム。

(第五)一九三二年三月「ジュネーヴ」ニ開會セラ  
 レタ一級算總管會ハ具體的ノ結果ハ得ラレナカ  
 ツタガ日本政府ハ之ニ依リ示見ヲ表ハラレタ點  
 ガ少ナカツタノナアリマス

pp

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其ノ示以ヲ具ハラレタシノ主ナルモノヲ認ムレ  
バ左ノ如クテアリマシタ。

(イ) 小算備付ガ不算備付ノ算備ニ對シテ大算備付  
ガ想像スル以上ニ脅威ヲ應ジ精誠心ヲ持ツテ  
居タコト

(ロ) 口ノ安全ガ算備ノ先決條件テアルコト

(ハ) 一定ノ武器ハ国防上ハ勿論一般市民ニ對シ脅  
威ヲ與フルモノテアルコト

(ニ) 右ノ諸項目ヲ満足サセ各口ヲシテ安心シテ算  
備ヲ爲サシメントスルニハ安全保障ニ關スル  
組織ヲ完成スルノ要アルコトハ勿論テアルガ  
差シ當リ算備ニ付テハ先ツ萬長算備付ガ機能  
ヲ拂ヒ卒先算備ノ實ヲ達テ世界各口ニ模範ヲ  
示スコトガ必長テアルコト

右ノ諸項目ニ付イテノ示以ヲ具ハラレタシ料ハ  
悉クアリマシタガ主長ナルモノハ左ノ如キモノ  
デアリマシタ

(イ) 「トルコ」 「ハイチ」 「フィリピン」 等ノ  
算備平等ニ關スル主張及參事口ニ於ル一萬萬  
以上ノ算備ノ廢止主張

(ロ) 一九三二年四月二十九日採擧ノ算備ノ標準ニ關  
スル決議 ( Conf. D, C, G24 ) ( 別紙第八 )

(ハ) 一九三二年四月二十二日採擧ノ算備ノ原  
則ニ關スル決議 ( Conf. D, C, G26 (I) ) ( 別紙  
第九 )

Ref. Doc. 1904

(三) 一九三三年四月二十二日採集ノ取附資料  
圖方法ニ關スル決議 ( Conf, D, C, G, 28(I) )  
(別紙第十)

右諸決議ニ從ヒ海軍委員會ニ於テ各島ヨリ  
航運母艦ハ按テ進政性ヲ有スルコトノ最モ  
自防破壞ニ有效ナルコト最モ一般市民ニ寄  
與ラ具アルモノナルコトヲ認メ又主刀艦ニ  
付イテハ一是海軍ヲ進ヘ又一是口徑以上  
ノ備蓄ヲ有スルモノハ石性質ヲ有スルモノ  
ナルトノ意見ヲ載ルシタコト ( Reprt to  
the General commission presented by naval  
commission Conf, D, I2I, May 28th, 1932)

右ノ註狀況ニ從シ日本政府于一九三〇年「ロソ  
ド」會議ニ於テ表示セラルル英日海軍中隊艦長  
刀ニ關スル部分 ( Conf, D, I57 ) (別紙第十一)  
等ヲ參考トシテ左ノ決議ノ案ノ同會議ニ表示シ  
タシタ ( Conf, D, I50 ) (別紙第十二)

協定ヲ一般協定及特別協定ニ分テ一般協定  
ニ於テハ一般海軍艦艇ノ質同協定ニ主兵  
艦及主刀艦ニ於ケル主刀艦ノ海軍艦艇及甲  
級巡洋艦ノ質同協定ヲ行ヒ以テ之等艦艇ノ  
進政性ヲ大ニ減少スルコトヲ右三項ニ關  
シテ海軍委員會決議案ニ當キ然レテ大  
隊ヲ定メル事協定ニ於テハ最モ重要關係

Def Soc 1904

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ラ有スル自ノ國ニ於テ地理的地位特殊事情  
ヲ考慮シテ三トシテ乙級通商港口通商及港  
水艦ニ付キ畫的制限ヲ行フ

日云自ハ右ノ如キ案ニ依ツテ論メテ世界各口ニ  
満足ヲ與ヘル真如島定ガ能ハレ得ルモノト信シ  
メノデアリマス尤モ石炭ノ骨子ハ一九二八年既  
ニ英佛ノ國ニ妥協成立シタ案ト殆ソト同様ノモ  
ノデアリ又一般協定ト特別協定ニ分ツメノハ一  
九三〇年「ロンドン」條約ニ於テ大體定ト歐洲  
連トニ分ケテ審議ヲ行ツタ先例ヲ逸フモノニ過  
キアカツメノデアリマス

尙一九三五年ノ「ロンドン」條約會議ニ於テ（  
一九三五年十二月十六日<sup>註</sup>）席代表第一回會議）  
前通ノ英日案ニ言及シ「日本英米存続ノ精神ハ  
英府會議ニ於テ一九三二年十一月倫敦會ノ席上  
英日代表ガ懸案如少ニ謂シ英米ソルト限ル似  
トコロガアル云々」（原案第十三(1)第十三(2)  
ト述べマツタ

（第六）一九三四年三月十七日英日界報「サイ  
モン」氏ヨリ四年間カルベキ海軍軍縮會議  
ニ對スル準備行為トシテ案編交渉ヲ行ヒ良  
キ會議ヲ來リ日本政府ハ正チニ之レヲ願  
シ松平陸軍大使ヲ代表ニ任命シ六月十八  
日ヨリ米、英、日ノ三國代表ノ國ニ交渉開

19 of Nov. 1904

備せラレマシタ  
 併シ年々右交渉ノ範圍ハ一九三五年間ニ至ル  
 ベキ官詰ノ手續問題ニ際定セラレズ終極問題  
 限ノ實質問題ニ至ルヲ立入ルニ至ツタノナ  
 六月十二日一允ヲ甲申シテ二月二十三日ヨリ  
 交渉再開セララルル事ト爲ツタノナ日誌  
 ハ九月七日山本三郎少將(「ロンドン」  
 滯在甲申將ニ對シテ)ヲ兼備交渉代表ニ追加  
 任命シ同甲申ハ九月二十日東京直達出下月初  
 旬「ロンドン」ニ到着シマシタ  
 此ノ際私モ專門技師トシテ同行シマシタ  
 兼日政府ハ十月三日兼備交渉代表トシテ「  
 ノーマン・ナイザイ」氏及「スマン」氏  
 「一」大將ヲ任命シマシタ  
 山本少將ヲ代表ニ任命サレタ際ニ松平代  
 表ニ共ニ「ロンドン」ニ追加シテ管理  
 問題ニ關スル命令(前記如下同)ガ然平  
 山本代表ニ對シテ政府ガ長ヘカレマシタ  
 山本代表、直接ニ據シ國會議ヨリ右命令ノ  
 總旨ノ説明ヲ受ク又兼備ノ旨ハ山本代表ガ  
 ラ致向カテマシタ此ノ際則カニモカレマシタ  
 臨ハ臨不注、通リテマシタ  
 (4) 自防ノ要國及自民強國ノ總稱ト各口口ノ  
 平和親交ノ増進ノ各事項ハ至ニ矛盾スルコ  
 トコロナク同時ニ兼ハシテ之ヲ希望スルコ



25 of Soc. 1904

ト又各口商ノ平均額及地租ノ見解ヨリ言  
ハズ羨望ヲ法ニ由リ限リ注和ニスル為長  
カアノコト

(四) 口商利益ノカス為長トナル限長ノ算額  
ヲ有スル權利ハ各口商ノク定レラ奪有ス  
トノ原長ハ自比ノ強クハアスガ其利益限  
ノ若獲ノアストニコノ口商口規則第八  
條ノ精神ニ基クテ又「シユホーザ」  
一般算額官額ノ算額ノ計算ニ關スル決  
及同官額ニ於ケルは備平等ノ三級アリ  
ル等ノ事實ニ基キ得ニ得テハコト

(ハ) 不費或不安費ノ原長ノ總額ハ日本政府ハ  
一九三〇年「ロンドン」一般算額官額ノ際  
採用シタノアスガ今回「シユホーザ」  
一般算額官額ニ於ケルは備平等ノ三級ノ  
原長ノ採用及多寡口商口商ノ裁量ヲ  
止メントスル三級ヲ設ケルトニ付シ得  
ニ得テハコト

(ニ) 各口ノ保有シ得キ長刀量ノ米類及大  
長ヲ定ムルノ方式ハ一九三〇年「ロンドン」  
一般算額官額ニ於テ包口ヨリ示サレタル  
所謂保額案ト同様ニシテ又「シユホー  
ザ」一般算額官額ニ於ケルは備平等ノ三級  
ノ算額案刀ニ關スル部分ニ示被ヲ得タ

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19 of. Rec. 1904

ノチアツチニテモナクも亦ニ  
 在ルヲ其ノチアツチニ  
 而シテ若ハ日本カニ一ツ  
 般筆續行ニ其間ツク一  
 類メタモノチアツチコト  
 (以下次頁へ續ク)

15 of 18cc. 1904

以子之レカ主張スル反對ハ日本ノ意見ヲ「表明」スルニ付コト  
 今同會議止ニ於テハ、主權ノ反對ハ、世界和平ノ爲メ、性ヲ有スル英日  
 軍力擴張ヲ止スルニ於テハ、主權ノ反對ハ、世界和平ノ爲メ、性ヲ有スル英日  
 軍力擴張ヲ止スルニ付コト

(ト) 已トシテモ之ノカ、比例止ハ夫レ等ヲ有スル英日  
 軍力擴張ヲ止スルニ付コト

(ハ) 航空母艦及主力艦止ハ夫レ等ヲ有スル英日  
 軍力擴張ヲ止スルニ付コト

(ホ) 右方式ハ先ツ夫レ等ヲ有スル英日  
 軍力擴張ヲ止スルニ付コト



舞ヲ爲セバ米、英、其ノ他多致シヨリ干涉ヲ受  
 クベク斯ル場合ニハ假リニ日本ガ米英何シカノ  
 一國ノ海軍勢力ニ對抗シ得ル勢力ヲ保有シ得タ  
 リトスルモ夫レ等ヲ合シタル勢力ニ對抗シ得ル  
 カナキコトハ明カナルノミナラズ夫レ等ノ國々  
 ノ有スル優力ナル商船隊へ主力艦・航空母艦廢  
 止又ハ滅勢ノ境ハ極メテ有力ナル潜在艦カトナ  
 ル。其ノ他ノ潜在艦カヲ考慮スレバ其ノ勢力比  
 ハ格段ノ差異ヲ生ジ問題トナラナイコト  
 (又)  
 華府條約ノ廢止ハ新方式ニ基ツク軍縮協定ヲ作  
 成スル爲メ巴ムヲ得ナイ處置テ了ル故ニ之レガ  
 廢止ノ巴ムヲ得ザル理由ヲ速カニ關係口ニ示シ  
 能フ限リ與論ヲ刺戟セズ新軍縮協定作成ノ障害  
 ラ作ラザル様ナ方法ヲ採用スルコト  
 追加セラレタ日本國代表山本少將ガ「ロンドン」  
 ニ到着シタノハ十月初旬テアリマシマガ夫レ以前  
 ニ日本國ハ五月十七日ニ英國政府ヨリ豫備交渉開  
 始ノ提議ニ接スルヤ直チニ詰手續ヲ済マセ五月三  
 十日右英國ノ提議ニ應ズル旨並ニ日本代表ハ松平  
 陸英大使タルベキ旨ヲ回答シ六月十八日ヨリ對英  
 交渉ヲ翌十九日ヨリ對米交渉ヲ開始シマシタ尙米  
 國政府ハ六月九日「ノーマン」テザイス「氏ヲ代表  
 ニ任命シ渡英ノ途ニ駐カシマシマシタ隨テ「英國、

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米國ハ六月及七月討議ヲ開始シタガ日本代表ハ十月迄「ロンドン」ニ到着セズト言フノハ事實ニ非常ナ間違ヒガアリマス  
當時英國政府ハ關係國ノ一ノミト交渉スルコトハ動モスレハーツノ團結ヲ作り他國ヲ壓迫スルト言フ偏見ヲ生ジ易イノデ（又レハ國際會議ノ際アリガチノコトデアル）  
斯ルコトノナイ様慎重ニ行動シテ居ツタ、現ニ最初ノ會談ハ六月十八日午前英米、午後ハ英日ト言フ「プログラム」ニ依リ公平ヲ期シテ居タ位デアリマス尙ホ念ノ爲各國交渉中主要ナルモノヲ稍具體的ニ述べレバ概ネ左ノ如クデアリマシタ。

六月十八日 午前英米第一回會談午後「マクド

ナルド」首相松平代表會談

六月十九日 「デイヴィス」米國代表松平代表會談

六月二十日 英米第二回會談

六月二十一日 英米専門家會談

六月二十三日 米日第二回會談

七月 九日 米日第三回會談

七月十二日 「クレイギー」氏松平代表會談

右期間中日本國ハ駐英海軍武官ヲシテ専門事項ノ取扱者ト定メ更ニ岩下海軍大佐ガ追加急派セラレマシタ

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Aug. 13. 1904

此ノ交渉ニ於テ本會議ニ於ケル參加國開備地、開  
 催期日及ビ討議範圍等ニ付イテハ余リ困難ノ點ハ  
 ナカツタガ實質問題ニ付イテハ相當各國ノ間ニ意  
 見ノ相違アルコトガワカリマシタ。六月二十日英  
 米第二回會談行ハレ翌二十一日英米專門家會談行  
 ハレタルトコロ兩國間ニ大ナル意見ノ相違アルコ  
 ト判明シ殆ソド交渉行詰リノ状態ニ陥ツタトノ風  
 説アリトノ報告ガアリマシタ。又右ニ關聯シ六月  
 二十二日「ヘラルド」紙ニ英國提案トシテ  
 (1) 華府條約有效期日滿了ト同時ニ新戰艦艦隊ヲ  
 建造スルコト  
 (2) 新巡洋艦三十隻ヲ建造スルコト總計保有量七  
 十隻ヲ要求スルコト  
 (3) 新驅逐艦多數ヲ建造スルコト  
 (4) 新航空母艦ノ建造  
 ヲ構設セラレマシタ而ツテ六月二十八日「クヰギ」  
 氏松平代表會談ノ際英國ノ巡洋艦七〇隻要求ハ豫  
 テヨリ英國ノ最小限要求トシテ主張シテ居タモ  
 ノテアルト説明シ又米國ニ於テ六月二十五日齋藤  
 駐米大使ガ「ヘラルド」國務長官ヲ訪問シタ際「英島  
 ガ巡洋艦ヲ七〇隻ニセントソツ新兩ヲ利用シ宜停シ  
 居ルハ了解ニ苦シム」ト言ヒ不協ノ意ヲ洩シタト  
 ノ報告ニ接シマシタ。更ニ又七月九日「テグアイ」

1 Sep. Sec. 1904

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代表松平代表會見ノ際「テザイス」代表ハ「英山  
ノ小艦多私主義ト米山ノ大艦小私主義トノ間和口  
難ニシテ交渉進展セズ一應歸因シテ再察シ度イ」  
トノ旨ヲ述ベマツタ。伊山ハ六月十五日、佛山ハ  
六月二十一日頃豫備交渉ヲ應諾シ七月九日ヨリ十  
一日迄ノ間ニ英佛會議カ行ハレマツタ。又レヨリ  
發キ六月五日日本ノ國際聯盟海軍代表渡少將ハ佛  
山ノ國際聯盟海軍部長「ドルース」大佐ヨリ書府  
ニ於テ會見ノ際岡大佐カ「佛山ノ關心ハ獨伊山ニ  
シテ其ノ他ニ興味ナシ」トノ言ヲ聞キ又六月十六  
日佐藤大使ガ「マツシグリー」氏ト會談ノ際「豫備  
交渉ニハ參加スベキモ互山ノミノ會議ニハ參加シ  
難ク益海軍山ノ會議アラザレバ意味ナシ」トノ趣  
旨ノ主張ガ「マツシグリー」氏ヨリ爲サレタ旨ノ報  
告ガアリマツタ。更ニ下月二十二日松平代表ガ佛  
山大使ト會見シタルトコロ「佛山政府ハ海軍問題  
ヨリモ一般軍備問題ヲ重視スルト語リマツタ  
日本政府ハ六月二十九日松平代表ニ對シ實質問題  
ニ付イテモ討論シ差支ヘキ旨ヲ訓電シタノテアリ  
マスガ事實上實質問題ニハ深く立入ルコトハナカ  
ツタノデアリマス  
斯クノ如ク豫備交渉ノ前途ニハ容易ナラヌ難關ノ  
存在スルコトガ解ツタ次第ヲ日本政府ノ豫備交渉



July 1904

ノ第二次訓令中ニ「今次豫備交渉ノ復讐ヲ極ムベキニ鑑ミ云々」と記載シテアツタノハ斯様ナ事情ヲ考慮シテ代表ニ注意ヲ與ヘタニアリマシタ。而シテ第一次ノ豫備交渉ハ七月一時中止スルコトニ英米日ノ間ニ了解力既立シ七月十七日英米日ノ各首都ニ於テ同一内容ノ發表ヲ同時ニ行フコトトナリマシタ

(第七)豫備交渉ハ十月二十三日再興セラレ米、英、日ノ三國代表ノ間ニ主トシテ實質問題ニ關シテ討論セラレマシタ

此ノ豫備交渉ニ於テハ三國ノ間ニ各々相當重大ナ意見ノ相違ガアツタニ拘ラズ討論ハ極メテ溫和ナ變因氣ノ間ニ行ハレマシタ。之ハ後日ノ事ニアリマスガ「スタソドレ」一大將ガ出陣ニ拘テ手紙ヲ送り「日本ニ「オカリソビツク」一號發大倉方團借セラルル際ハ余ハ米山委員トシテ日本ニ行クヤモ知レズ其ノ際中將ニ面會出來ルノ誠ニ業ソイコトニアルトト記ベテアリマシタ又「クレイキール」氏ガ日本に駐劄大使ト爲リ赴任スルヤ外務省訪問サヘ濟マナイ先ニ管時海軍次官アリシ出陣ヲ防閑シ引續キ極メテ親密ニ交際ガ行ハレマシタ山本中將ハ國內ノ一部カラ彼ハ親英派ノ人物ナリトテ攻撃サレタコトガアリマシタ

1904. Dec 1904

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(A) 英日第二交渉ハ山本代表及米田代表「ロンドン」  
 到着前非公式ニ開始セラレマシタ。即チ十月八日  
 「サイモン」外相ガ松平代表ノ來訪ヲ余メ懇談ヲ  
 送ケルノテ「ル」ガ其ノ際松平代表ハ日本ノ主張ノ  
 大要ヲ説明シタノサアリマス尤モ正式交渉ハ米田  
 代表モ「ロンドン」到着後十月二十三日ヨリ開始  
 セラレマシタ。(日本ノ主張スル軍備「フオーツ  
 ユラ」ニ關スル部分)  
 二十三日再開後ノ第一回英日會談ノ際日本代表松  
 平、山本ノ兩代表ニヨツテ訓令ニ基ツク日本ノ保  
 本主義ヲ説明シタルトコロ之レニ關シ其ノ際及ビ  
 其ノ後ノ會談ニ於テ大要左ノ様ア意見ノ交換カ行  
 ハレマシタ

(イ) 英日ノ要旨及意見

- (1) 各國事情ニ依リ「バルネラ」ビリテ「一」ヲ禁ニ  
 スル後ツテ各々海軍力ノ所要量モ異ルベク共  
 通禁大限度ヲ定ムルコトハ不合理ナラズヤ
- (2) 日本禁ニ依レバ英日ノ如キ「バルネラ」ビリテ  
 「一」大ナル自モ「バルネラ」ビリテ「一」小ナル  
 自モ同一限度ノ保有兵力トナル場合「ル」コト  
 トナルガ之レニテ「バルネラ」ビリテ「一」大ナ  
 ル日ノ不安ヲ除キ得ルヤ
- (5) 海軍力ハ或ル程度絕對的ナルト共ニ他國相對  
 的ナリ共通大限トスレバコノ限度迄必要ト

15 Sep. 1902 1904

(四) 日本ノ答へ及ビ意見

(一) 元來自前ノ安全慮ハ資源工業力其ノ他ノ原因ニ依リテモ左右セラルルニ依リ「バルネラビ」リテ「一輪ヲ撰クテ兵力ヲ定ムル」資力トナスコトハ逆管ニテ「日本ノ方針ハ攻撃的兵力ノ版止消滅ニ依リ兵力ノ内容ヨリ攻取價値質ヲ除去セントスルニ在ルカ」ラ自然各艦ノ「バルネラビ」リテ「一」ハ消滅シテハ大イニ減少スル管テアル

(四) 日本ノ答へ及ビ意見

(一) 元來自前ノ安全慮ハ資源工業力其ノ他ノ原因ニ依リテモ左右セラルルニ依リ「バルネラビ」リテ「一輪ヲ撰クテ兵力ヲ定ムル」資力トナスコトハ逆管ニテ「日本ノ方針ハ攻撃的兵力ノ版止消滅ニ依リ兵力ノ内容ヨリ攻取價値質ヲ除去セントスルニ在ルカ」ラ自然各艦ノ「バルネラビ」リテ「一」ハ消滅シテハ大イニ減少スル管テアル

(二) 航空母艦ハ海軍北極ニ於テ已上ヨリノ空中攻撃ニ對シテハ必要ナル爲メ防禦上ハ困難ナリテ主力艦ハ自前ノ安全ノ爲メ防禦上必要ナリテ早急建造ニシテハ日本ノ意見ト大差ナク潜水艦ハ艦型ヲ選擇ニ關シテハ防禦的ナル

(三) 兵器ノ攻撃的ナリキ、防禦的ナリキハ何ニ依リテ區別スルヤ

(四) 長高限以下ニ止マラルルノ保有兵力數ハ何人ニ對シテモ必要トスルハ若シ

(五) 長高限以下ニ止マラルルノ保有兵力數ハ何人ニ對シテモ必要トスルハ若シ

(六) 兵器ノ攻撃的ナリキ、防禦的ナリキハ何ニ依リテ區別スルヤ

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「バルネラビリテール」多キ國ノ最少兵力ヲ以テ最高限トシ「バルネラビリテール」少キ國ハ夫レ以下ニ止マルベキコトハ日本ノ豫期スルトコロデアル現ニ五大海軍國以外ニハ條約ナキモ或ル一國ガ過大ナル海軍ヲ整備シ建艦競争ヲ起シタ例ガナイ

(2) 英日ノ間ニ事情ノ差アルコトハ認ムルモ一方英米ハ「バルネラビリテール」ニ大差アルニ拘ラス均等ナラスヤ對共關係ヨリ見レバ米ト日トノ間ニ差異アリトハ思ハレナイ又米國ト日本トノ關係ヲ見レバ日本ハ米國ニ比シ國防上大ナル「バルネラビリテール」ヲ有ス假リニ同率トナルモ日本ガ米國ノ脅威トナル筈ハナイ

(3) 攻撃的武器ヲ極度ニ制限シ海軍軍備ヨリ攻撃的性質ヲ極度ニ減少スレバ海軍軍備ノ相對關係ヲ重視スル必要減シ共通最大限ヲ定ムルモ不安ナキ筈デアル

(4) 最高限以下ニ止マル國ノ保有兵力ハ其ノ國自身ガ必要最少限度ヲ基準トシテ定メル

(5) 日本ハ安全感ヲ得ルコトヲ欲スルモ又國民ノ「プレスステール」ノ問題ヲ重視スル故ニ華府條約ノ比率ト言フ假定ヨリ離レテ凡テノ問題ヲ考ヘラレシコトヲ望ム

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(6) 航空母艦、主力艦、甲級巡洋艦ノ願ニテ攻撃

的性質ヲ有スト考ヘ乙級巡洋艦、隨逐艦及潛

水艦ハ防禦的ノモノテアルト考ヘル故ニ前者

ハ全廢又ハ極度ニ減スベク存置セバ艦種別制

限トスル、後者即チ乙級巡洋艦以下ハ總噸數

制限トシ以上ヲ總括シテ共通最大限ヲ定メ度

シ

航空母艦ハ全廢シ度ク主力艦ハ五國以外ニ保

有國モアリ即時全廢不可能ナラバ極度ニ減シ

度ク甲級巡洋艦モ成ルベク縮減シタシ

ハ此ノ攻撃的武器防禦的武器ヲ區別スル觀念

ニ付イテ日本代表ハ英國代表ガ一九二七年

三巴海軍會議ニ於テ八吋砲巡洋艦ヲ攻撃的

武器ナリトシテ強硬ニ之レガ制限ヲ主張シ

又大型潛水艦ハ攻撃的武器ナルモ小型潛水

艦ハ防禦的ナリト幾多ノ機會ニ於テ主張シ

タル事例ヲモ知ツテ居タノテ此ノ兩者ヲ區

別スルコトハ略々一般ニ認メラレタ觀念ヲ

アルト考ヘテ居マシタ

(兵力量ニ關スル部分)

日本ノ主張ハ各國海軍備ノ有スル攻撃的性質

ヲ除去スルコトヲ立前トシ小海軍軍備國ノ不安

ヲ除クコトヲ主眼トシテ居ツタノテ其ノ主張保

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Ref Doc. 1704

有量も極メテ低既ノモノヲ英國ノ主張トハ格段  
 ノ差ガアツタ尙英國主張ノ兵力増ハ既存條約所  
 定量ヨリ大トナル傾向ガアツタ而シテ英國ノ主  
 張ニハ海軍兵力ニハ絕對的所要量アリトノ考ヘ  
 ガ多分ニ含まレテ居ル如キ感怨ヲ受ケマツタ  
 一九三四年十二月二十八日「チャイトフイルド」  
 大將山本中將會談ノ際山本中將ノ示シタ案ハ左  
 ノ通りテアツテ本案ニ依レバ日本モ甲級巡洋艦  
 以上ニ於テ比例的ニ米英同様著シイ減少トナリ  
 又乙級巡洋艦以下ニ於テハ米英ト雖モ減勢トナ  
 ラナイコトトナツテ居マツタ

航空母艦 全廢強イテ保有ストセバ  
 主 力 艦 全廢シ得ザレバ 六隻又ハ 三 隻  
 甲 級 巡 洋 艦 更ニ縮減ヲ希望スルモ 八 隻  
 乙 級 巡 洋 艦 以下 三十五萬噸

十二月十三日「チャイトフイルド」大將山本中  
 將會談ノ際「チャイトフイルド」大將ノ携ヘタ  
 ル表ニ記載シアリタル數字ハ概ネ左ノ通りテア  
 リマツタ

主 力 艦 (三萬〇〇〇噸又ハ三萬〇〇〇噸) 一五隻  
 航空母艦 五隻

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甲級巡洋艦 一五隻

乙級巡洋艦 三五、八〇〇噸

(註) 右ノ外國巡艦一五〇、〇〇〇噸若水  
艦五〇、〇〇〇噸外ニ艦母船巡洋  
艦三〇隻計巡艦若干トナル計算ナリ  
リマツル

一九三五年一月十六日英日政府ヨリ日本代表部  
ニ送付ナル英日ノ山岡上野長陸軍少将ニ關スル  
覺書ニ表ハルテ數字ノ概ネ正ノ如クナリマツ  
ル

主力艦 (三五、〇〇〇噸) 一五隻

航空母艦 (三三、〇〇〇噸) 五隻

甲級巡洋艦 一五隻

乙級巡洋艦 五〇隻

艦隊内不時砲艦若干ノ平均三隻計算ナリ  
是ニ於テ七〇隻ニ到達セシムル、一九二  
二年末艦隊内甲乙級巡洋艦合計四七隻ニシ  
テ不足額ニ對シ艦母船巡艦ヲ保有スル必長  
ガアル

四 巡 艦

他國ノ潜水艦保有七が現在以上ニ増加スル  
ハ艦隊内巡艦巡艦ヲ追加保有スル必長ガアル

AC

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給水艦

全艦ヲ令サシテ現狀以下ニ備置スル  
 右英海軍ノ法信國海軍長官ト帯スルモノハ一九  
 二七年「シユネーダ」三國海軍會議ノ際六月二十  
 八日第三回專門委員會ニ於テ日防所長官トシテ議  
 示シタル所米海軍長官ノ要求ニ米海軍長官ノ二  
 倍トナリ建造ノ費ガナイト強ク非難シテ案ト略  
 タ同様ノモノガアツテ巡洋艦ニ於テハ現狀ヨリ二  
 ○隻ヲ増加シ七○隻トシ主力艦建造長官ノ意見ハ  
 縮減セズ各艦種長官兵力増ノ合計ハ「ワシントン」  
 「ロンドン」兩條約條規長官力量ヨリ寧ロ行大スル  
 傾向ノ下ルモノガアリマシタ  
 結局英海軍長官ノ要求ハ海軍長官ニ絶對長官認メシ  
 トスルモノガアツテ之トハ他ノ日ニ於テル軍備ノ  
 一般概念ト合ハナイコトトナルヲ下ル。此ノコ  
 トニ對シテハ艦三一九二七年三國海軍會議ニ於テ  
 モ米海軍長官ニ依ツテ開カニセラレタコト（原案第  
 十五）テ面モ露出下リト認メラレタコトトシテ此  
 ノ英海軍長官ノ主張ニ對シテハ日本領トシテハ長官當應  
 シタノガアリマス



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- (B) 米、日第二次交渉ハ十月二十四日ヨリ開始セラレ  
マツタ。
- (日本ノ主張スル軍縮「フオームユラ」ニ關スル  
部分)  
英日第一回會談ノ翌日、即チ十月二十四日、米國  
第一回交渉ヲ行ヒ日本代表、松平、山本ノ兩代表  
ニ依ツテ英國ニ對シテ行ツタト同様ニ日本ノ根本  
主張ヲ説明シタルトコロ之レニ關シ其ノ際及ビ其  
ノ後ノ會談ニ於テ交換サレタ意見中、英日會談ノ  
際ト幾分異ル部分ヲ述ベレバ凡ソ左ノ如クデアリ  
マツタ。
- (1) 米國ノ質問及ビ意見  
(1) 平等權ノ意義如何  
(2) 濶水艦ハ通商破壊ノ點ヨリ見テ防禦的武器ト  
見得ルヤ。
- (3) 一九二二年ノ「レラテラ・スタレングラス」ハ  
何故ニ日本ニ濶水艦ヲ與ヘタルヤ。
- (4) 日本ノ共通濶水艦規定ノ方針ハ條約ニモ同等  
ノ勢カラ認ムル意ナリヤ。
- (5) 質的制限ノ細目如何  
(6) 海軍力ノ増加ハ國家ノ「フレステイ」チ「ノ増  
加トナラズ支那問題ニ付イテ言ヘバ英、米、  
日、三國協カシテ當ルコトコソ國家ノ「フレ

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- (7) ステイツーラ増加スルコトナル。  
均等海軍勢力必スシモ安全ノ均等トハナラナ  
イ。
- (ロ) 日本ノ答へ及ビ意見
- (1) 平等權ノ主張ハ各國ガ平等ノ基礎ニ立チ協定  
スルノ意味デアツテ現實ニ最大限度迄造艦ス  
ルノ意味チハナイ、國力ニ應ジテ整備セント  
スルノチアル。差等比率ハ國家ノ「フレステ  
」チ「上ヨリ見テ適當チナイ。
- (2) 通商破壊ノ點ハ他ノ艦種モ同様デアツテコノ  
點ノミヲ取り潛水艦ヲ裁判スルコトハ出來ナ  
イ。潛水艦ノ使用ニ付イテハ「ロンドン」條  
約ニ嚴格ナル制限規定ガアル。
- (3) 一九二二年華府海軍軍備制限條約ニ依リ日本  
近海ニ於ケル兵術的均衡ヲ得タト考ヘラレタ  
ルガ艦船ノ行動力ノ増大ハ海洋ノ距離ヲ短縮  
シ攻撃者ニ有利トナツタ。
- (4) 共通環大限方式ニ依リ船隻ガ同等ノ權利ヲ授  
求スレバ拒ム理ナキモ兩國間ノ關係ハ兩國ニ  
テ協定セシメ差支ナイ。
- (5) 質的制限ニ關スル問題ハ日本ノ根本方針ト不  
確ノ關係ニアル右方針ハ戰爭ヲ不可能ナラシ

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ムルコトが基礎トナツテ居ル。根本方針定  
マラザレバ細目討議ハ無意義デアル。

(6) 支那問題ニ關シ三國協カスルコトハ同感ナ  
ルモ唯平等ノ立場ニ立チテ協カスルヲ要ス

ル。

比率ノ觀念ハ國民感情上、兩國間關係ニ不  
必要ニ好マシカラザル影響ヲ與フル虞ガナ  
イトハ言ヘナイ。

(7) 均等海軍勢力ガ必ズシモ安全ノ均等トナラ  
ナイトノ議論ガアツタガ少クトモ既存條約

ハ安全ヲ深ク考ヘシタモノデハナイ。米國

ノ五ノ勢力ガ日本ノ三ノ勢力ニ對シテ脅威

ナラズトスレバ日本ノ五ノ勢力ガ米國ノ五

ノ勢力ニ對シテ脅威トナル管ガナイ。

建造ニ關シテハ英ハ兎ニ角米ノ豊富ナル資

限及建造能力ハ米國ニ頗ル有利テアル。

(兵力量ニ關スル部分)

米國ハ「ロンドン」條約及華府條約ノ範圍内ニ

テ二割ノ精液ヲ行フ達前ナリ、ト述ベタルモ之

レガ適用ニ關スル具體案ハ示スマセンデシタ。

十二月十四日「スタンプ」大將ト山本代表

會談ノ際、英國建造計費案ニ關シテ「スタンプ

ド」大將ガ示シタ米國海軍建造計費ノ數字

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ハ左ノ如クデアリマシタ。

主力艦

一九三六年以前	〇	
三七、三八、三九年	各一	
四〇年	〇	計五隻
四一、四二年	各一	

航空母艦

一九三六年以前	一	建造中	
三七年以降	〇		計一隻

甲級巡洋艦

一九三六年以前	一	八	
三七年以降	〇		計一八隻

乙級巡洋艦

一九三六年以前	二		
(「オマハ」級代表)			計一〇隻
三七年以降	八		

驅逐艦

海軍驅逐艦	毎年	四		
驅逐艦	毎年	二		計
				二八隻
				八四隻

潜水艦

毎年	六		計	四二隻
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(a) 米英兩國間ニハ、十月十三日及十四日、英米間ノ交渉アリシトコロ翌十五日「クレーギ」氏ヨリ加藤參事官ノ來訪ヲ求メ英米交渉ニ關シ稟稟左ノ如ク通知シマシタ。

(1) 英國ハ小艦多徴ヲ主張シ米國ハ大艦巨砲ヲ主張シタ、英國ノ主張ヲ認ムル場合ニハ米國側モ他ノ艦額ニ多徴ヲ認メ想メ合セノ必要アリト主張シタ。

(2) 英國ト日本トノ間ニ打開ノ途ガ斷ゼラルベシ、米國同ノ意見モ極メ得ルデアラカ。

(3) 英國ハ質ノ制限ハ建議等防止上稟稟デアラルト主張シタ。

尙節、伊國ニ對スル交渉ニ付イテハ余リ交渉ガ進シタトノ報告ニ接シマセシメシタ。

(D) 米國ハ既存條約ヲ基礎トシテ其ノ比率ヲ維持シツ、各國保有量ヲ二割減スルノ案ヲ待ツテ居ルコトハ屢々言明シタガ其ノ具體的案ハ提出セラレナカッタノデアリマス。尙之レニ關聯シテ「スタントレ」大將ハ山本中將ニ對シテ「十二月三日」如何ナル艦種ニ付イテモ増徴ニ同意シ難イ英國ノ巡洋艦増勢ニ對シテモ同意シ難イ旨述ベテ居ル點カラ考ヘテ此ノ米國案ハ各艦種ニ付キ一律ニ、二割減ヲ爲サントスルモノト

恩ハレマシタ。然シナガラ新ノ如キ方法ハ小海  
 軍團ニ對シ勢力關係上ハ益々苦痛ヲ増サシムル  
 モノデアルノミナラズ實際問題トシテ英日ノ如  
 ク條約ニ違スル現在勢カヲ有スル國ト米國ノ  
 如ク主力艦以外ハ條約盡ニ違スル現在勢カヲ有  
 セザル國トノ間ニハ多大ノ程度ノ差異ヲ生スベ  
 キ事ガ豫想サレ公平ナ結果ハ得ラレナイト感ゼ  
 ラレマシタ。尙之レト同様ノ趣旨ノ提案ガ一九  
 三二年二月九日一般軍縮會議第五回本會議ニ於  
 テ「キアソソ」米國代表ニ依リ提案セラレタガ  
 之レニ對シ佛國專門委員「ドル」大佐ハ日  
 本專門委員大佐ニ對シ佛國ハ此ノ案ニハ贊成  
 出來ナイ旨ヲ歸リマシタ。(同年二月二十五日)  
 英國ハ十一月七日、英日交渉ノ際一ツノ草案ヲ  
 提示シマシタ。其ノ案ハ「各國ハ海軍力ニ關シ  
 自發的且一方的ノ宣言ヲ行ヒ該宣言條リテ主要  
 國海軍力ノ全体ノ衰ガ出來上ル仕組ニシテ此ノ  
 際關係國ノ保有セントスル意ノ内容ヲ知り其ノ  
 内容ニ付キ協議スルコトトシテ若干年間各海軍  
 力ノ「アロポ」シヨシ「ア」保持シ得シメシ  
 トスル「コトヲ趣旨トスルモノデアリマシタ。  
 右英草案ニ付イテ日本側ヨリ「兵力ノ宣言ヲナ  
 シタル後、其ノ決定ハ各國協議スベキカ」又「

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現存比率ヲ基礎トシテ將來ノ兵力ヲ定メントス  
 ルモノナリヤト質問シタルニ對シ英國側ハ「  
 兵力決定ニハ協議ノ要アリ」  
 「フレスターデ」  
 ハ均等ナルモ兵力ノ均等ハ認メズ  
 「又」計數ヲ  
 變更シ度キトキハ協議スル  
 「ト言フ意味ノ答ガ  
 アリマシタ。」  
 右建造計畫宣言ノ案ハ懸念トスルトコロハ現存  
 條約ノ勢力關係ヲ維持セントスルモノデ又徹底  
 シタ算精ヲ實現セントスル目的ヲ含シテ居ラス、  
 一時ヲ糊塗スル不徹底ナモノデアツテ日本ノ根  
 本主張トハ相容レナイ點ガアルト日本代表ハ考  
 ヘタノデアアルガ各國ノ主張ヲ調和スル爲メニハ  
 自己ノ案ノミヲ固執スベキニ非ズト考ヘ之レニ  
 對シ英國側ト共同研究シ十一月二十七日英日代  
 表合談ノ際、日本側ハ「英國提案ニ依ル各國造  
 造計畫ハ必要ニ應ジ變更シ得ルトノコトナルガ  
 斯クテハ却テ無制限建造競争トナル虞アルニ依  
 リ、英國案ニ共通最大限ヲ設定シ此ノ限度ニ達  
 スルハ即時ニアラス漸進的ニ進スルガ如クスル  
 ラ可ト認ムル旨ノ修正ノ申入レヲ爲シ更ニ十一  
 月三十日、山本中將ハ「デヤトフィールド」大  
 將ト自由討議ヲ行ヒ、日本代表ハ十二月十日、  
 英國案及ヒ之レニ關スル交渉ノ狀況ヲ政府ニ報

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皆スルト共ニ之レニ關スル政府ノ見解ヲ求メ、  
又日本代表部ハ英國案ヲ基礎トスル場合ニ之レ  
ニ共通最大限ノ方式ヲ採入スル方式ニ付イテ左  
ノ如キ試案ヲ作製シテ爾後ノ交渉ニ應ズル準備  
ヲ整ヘマシタ。

第一案

(1) 各艦種毎ニ保有シ得ベキ最大限ヲ主力艦三〇  
〇、〇〇〇屯、甲級巡洋艦一〇〇、〇〇〇屯、  
乙級巡洋艦以下四〇〇、〇〇〇屯トスル。

(2) 「ヤードスチタ」  
主力艦三、 甲級巡洋艦二、  
乙級巡洋艦以下一、

(3) (1)ノ屯數ニ (2)ノ「ヤードスチタ」ヲ乘シタ  
ル換算屯數  
主力艦九〇〇、〇〇〇屯、甲級巡洋艦二〇〇、  
〇〇〇屯、乙級巡洋艦以下四〇〇、〇〇〇屯、  
計一、五〇〇、〇〇〇屯

(4) 各國ハ換算屯數一、三〇〇、〇〇〇屯ニ相當  
スル現實兵力ヲ超過スル兵力ヲ保有スルコト  
ヲ得ナイ。

第二案

(1) 各艦種毎ニ保有シ得ベキ最大限ヲ主力艦三〇  
〇、〇〇〇屯、航空母艦六〇、〇〇〇屯、甲

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然シ米國側ハ二割檢査ノ外確定ノ對策ヲ示サズ  
 シト日本側チハ舊シテ居タノデアリマス。  
 爾ト交渉ヲ裁ムレバ必ズ或ルテ解點ニ趨ク得ベ  
 困難ト豫想セラレタルモ之レヲ基礎トシニ英米  
 視カラ見テ直チニ英米側ノ受諾ヲ得ルコトハ稀  
 シタ。尤モ深者兵力ノ小ナル故ニ於テ當時ノ狀  
 度、英蘭及米國ノ希望ヲ遂入レタモノデアリマ  
 ル「案及一ロンドン條約ニ差クモノテ或ル程  
 右二案ノ思想ハ其ニ違ヘタ「ボール、ボンク  
 ン」ヲ得ナイ。

スル現案兵力ヲ超過スル兵力ヲ保有スルコト  
 (4) 各國ハ其算屯數一、五〇〇、〇〇〇屯ニ相當  
 〇〇〇屯

巡洋艦以下四〇〇、〇〇〇屯、計一、八〇〇、  
 〇〇屯、甲級巡洋艦二〇〇、〇〇〇屯、乙級  
 主力艦九〇〇、〇〇〇、航空母艦三〇〇、〇  
 ル其算屯數

(3) (1) ノ屯數ニ「ヤードスチツク」ヲ乘シタ  
 巡洋艦以下一、  
 主力艦三、航空母艦五、甲級巡洋艦二、乙級

(2) 「ヤードスチツク」  
 四〇〇、〇〇〇トスル  
 級巡洋艦一〇〇、〇〇〇屯、乙級巡洋艦以下

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「クリスマス」前島國ヲ希望シ（最初十二月十七日「ロンドン」出發ヲ希望シタルモ後二十日以後出發ノコトニ變更ス）十分ナル討議ヲナスコトが出来ズ右日本試案モ遺憾ナガラ正式ニ提出スル機会ガナカツタノデアリマス。

(四) 該備交渉ハ十二月十九日ヲ以テ一應休會トナリマシタガ、日本側ハ散會スルトモ再會ノ期日ヲ決定シ置クヲ可トスベク進クトモ明年三月迄ニハ再會シ得ル機ニ休會ヲ期限附ノモノトスルコトヲ希望シ英國外相ハ米國ガ同意ナラバ差支ナキ旨ヲ答ヘマシタ（十二月十八日、英日會談）。

而シテ交渉再會ガ日本ノ希望通りトナラバ山本代表、其ノ他ノ東京ヨリノ派遣員ハ大部分「ロンドン」ニ滞在スル稟定デアリマシタ。

然ルニ米國側ハ期日ヲ詰約スルヲ好マズ又一定ノ基礎ナクシテ漫然再會スルモ無益ナリト言ヒ英國側ハ強テ米國側ニ要求スレバ却テ此ノ潮流合トアル虞アリト言ヒ自ラ要求スルヲ欲シナカツタノデ日本側ヨリ直接米國側ニ申入レ（十二月十九日）タガ遂ニ米國側ノ同意ヲ得ルニ至ラズ再開期日ヲ確定スルコトハ不可能トナリ唯威ルベク進カニ好機ヲ窺ヘテ、再會スベキコトヲ約スルニ止マリマシタ。

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Oct. Dec. 1901.

爾後ハ、英、米國側ト正式交渉ヲナスコトハ不  
 可能トナリタルモ、日本側ハ尙亦尋常ノ際交渉  
 ヲ圖指テラシムルコトヲ可ト認メ又難點解決ノ  
 端緒ヲ豫見シ置クコトハ關係國相互ニ取リ希望  
 スベキコトト考ヘラレタノテ正式祭會後モ英國  
 側トノ連絡ヲ斷タズ交渉ヲ進メ十二月二十八  
 日、二十九日翌年一月十八日十二月二十八日  
 「チヤトフイルド」大將「クレイギ」氏及  
 山本中將會談ノ際ニハ英國側ヨリ「貴官第國セ  
 バ建造計畫方式ヲ討論ノ邊境トスルコトニ政府  
 ノ同意ヲ得ル見込ミアリキ」ト質問シ之レニ對  
 シ山本中將ハ「張大保有壹ノ點ヲ解決シ得バ必  
 ビシモ不可能トハ思考セズ余ハ長擧ヲ種々打開  
 ノ途ヲ探スベシ」ト答ヘ協定成立ニ努カスベキ  
 ヲ約シタノテアリマス。此國後、山本代表ハ此  
 條國間ニ了解ニ達シテカツクコトヲ遺憾トスル  
 モ各國共其ノ主張ヲ披瀝シ互ニ夫レヲ了知スル  
 コトが出来タモノト認ムルモ日本ノ主張ヲ崇美  
 國側ニ容認セシムルコトハ今後一層ノ努力ヲ必  
 要トスル旨ヲ復命シテ居リマス。

(別紙第十六)

29th Dec. 1904

(五六)「ワシントン」海軍條約廢止ノコトハ日本例トシテハ今同ノ主張ガ「ワシントン」條約ニ規定セララルル冬國間ニ差等カヲ確定スル方法ニ依ラズ之レトハ根本的ニ吾ル方法即チ冬國平等ノ立場ニ立ツコトヲ原則トスル關係上同條約ニ規定セラルル條約條項、第二十一條(ニ依リテハ改訂ノ送ナク新義務ニ基ツク條約作製ノ爲ニハ同條約第二十三條第一項ニ依リ廢止通告ヲ爲シ以テ其ノ第一項ニ依リ一年內ニ開議セラルベキ會議ノ開催ヲ求ムル以外ニハ確實ナル方法ガナイトノ結論ニ達シ其ノ旨訓令ニモ示サレテ居マシタ。

尙訓令ニハ廢止ノ方法トシテハ總テ限リ平穩理ニ行ヒ爾後ノ交渉ニ惡影響ヲ及ボサズ爲テ大ノ注意ヲ拂フコト從テ出來得レバ關係國ノ合意ニ依リ之レガ廢止ノ手續ヲ爲シ次チ各國間力シテ新協定ノ成立ニ努ムルコトヲ示シテアリスシタ。

右訓令ノ意旨ニ從ヒ豫備交渉代表ハ豫備交渉再會ノ翌日即チ十月二十四日米日會議ノ際米國代表ニ對シ「ワシントン」條約ヲ廢止セザルヲ需ザル理由ヲ傳へ同月二十六日米日會議ノ際「ワシントン」條約ヲ廢止シ度キ旨ヲ傳へ同月二十七日米日會議ノ際米日會議同シテ廢止シタキ希望ヲ述べ同月三十一日米日會議ノ際日本代表ハ同條約廢止ハヨリ與キ士

Aug. Dec. 1904

ノトニヨリ其協定ヲ締結スル旨ヲ說明シ  
 タガ衆國ハ「ワシントン」條約ノ廢止ヲ好マズ又  
 英國ハ英國通告ニハ同意ヲ表シマシムベシトシタ。
 十二月六日英日管長ノ原英國備ヨリ「日本ノ廢止  
 通告ハ本年內ニ行ハルレバ效力ニ對リテキ次第ナ  
 レバ其ノ時點ハ或ルベク延キラ可トスル新クスレ  
 バ衆國ヲ引止ムル上ニ於テモ英衆國間ニ對シ自  
 分ノ方ヨリ日本ニ於テハ敬意ヲ以テ何等カノ解決  
 方法ヲ發見スルヲ希望スルモノナリト認得スル上  
 ニ於テモ放棄アリト思考スル上通止通告ヲ余  
 リ早目ニセザラシコトヲ希望シマシタ。
 之レヨリ英十一月二十二日總平代表英ハ英國並  
 英國大使ニ「ワシントン」條約廢止ニ關スル日本  
 國政府ヲ傳ヘタガ日程ナル運轉ハ自カレマセシテ  
 シタ。
 以上ノ如キ關係ガアリ日本政府ハ出來得ル限り廢  
 止通告ヲ遲ラセ十二月二十九日ニ新總理兼大使ヨ  
 リ「ハル」國新長官ニ通告シ「ワシントン」條約廢止  
 從テ日本ノ「ワシントン」條約廢止ハ豫備交渉ノ  
 結果ヲ見テ行ツタモノナリハナク且々條約後ニ行ハ  
 レタノハ關係國ノ利益ヲ害シ之レニ從ツタ爲メナ  
 リマシタ。
 「ワシントン」條約ハ或ソド前例ヲ見ナイ英國ノ

Log. Soc. 1901.

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下ニ締結サレタ算編ニ關スル條約デアツテ之レニ  
 依リ世界平和ニ貢獻シタ偉大ナル功績ハ日本政府  
 十分之レヲ認メテ居タノデアリマスガ條約ノ規  
 定ノ内容ニ付イテハ關係國ノ間ニ相當ノ不協ガア  
 ツタコトハ事實デアリマス。現ニ協國ハ主力陸ノ  
 勢力比率ヲ補助艦ニ適及ボスコトニ斷然反對シタ  
 タメ、補助艦ニ關スル保有勢力ニ關スル協定ハ不  
 成立トナリ其ノ後ノ會議即チ一九二七年及一九三  
 〇年ニ於テモ協國ハ參加ヲ拒ミ又兵力費ノ制限ニ  
 ハ同意シナカツタノデアリマス。而シテ又協國ハ  
 一九二九年十二月二十日附ノ地響ヲ以テ一九三〇  
 年「ロンドン」海軍算編會議ニ對スル態度ヲ示シ  
 マッタガ其ノ中ニ左ノ様ナ文言ガアリマッタ。

算編方式ニ關スル問題ハ少ナカラズ發展  
 ナモノデアル「ワシントン」會議ノ例ニ  
 依レバ米國政府及英國政府ハ單ニ數字上  
 段モ有力ナル海軍ニ關シ海軍兵力ヲ制管  
 テ而モ空荷上比率ニ差違ヲ懸タコトヲ意  
 圖シタ如ク思ハレタ、然シテガラ一九二  
 四年「ローマ」ニ於ケル會議ノ結果ニ依  
 レバ「ワシントン」條約ノ主眼ハ聯艦ガ  
 各國海軍ニ之レヲ擴張適用セントスルニ  
 際シ以テ來シタ、而シテ又單純ナル比

13 of Dec. 1904

卒ナルモノハ聯盟規約第八條ニ規定セラ  
 レタ三義即チ各國ハ其ノ地理的地位及諸  
 般ノ事情ニ従ヒ其ノ軍備ヲ固ノ健全及ビ  
 其ノ國ニ賦セラレタ國際義務ニ相應スル  
 最低限度迄減少スルコトヲ各國ニ對シ合  
 理的ニ適用スルコトヲ許サナイモノデア  
 ルト言フコトガ疑々「ジュネーヴ」ニ於  
 テ唱導セラレタ。

斯カル事情ハ屢々他ノ國ニヨリテモ卓立テラレタ  
 ノデアリヤスノチ日本トシテハ平穩想ニ各國ノ精  
 思スル條約ヲ作成スルノニハ「ワシントン」及「  
 ロンドン」條約ノ採用シタ方式トハ異ツタ軍艦方  
 式ヲ對ニ必要デアルトノ補償ヲ持ツテ居タノチ  
 アリヤス。尙亦「ワシントン」條約ノ兵力内容ニ  
 付イテハ日本國ハ締結當時ニ於テモ必スシモ満足  
 シテ居ラナクツタコトハ前述ノ通りデアリヤス。  
 夫レヲ更ニ十數年後迄モ其ノ恒トシテ技術兵器ノ進  
 歩因情國際情勢ノ變化等ヲ無視シテ永算スルコト  
 ハ愈々其ノ内容ガ公正ヲ悞クコトモ生スル理ナノ  
 デ一九三六年後即チ其ノ有欲期限後永算セシメル  
 コトハ適當チハナイトノ考ヘラ持ツテ居タノデア  
 リヤス。

而シテ「ロンドン」條約ハ一九三六年末ヲ以テ當

Def. Sec. 1904

然失効スルノデアリマスノテ問題ハ生ジマセンガ  
「ワシントン」條約ニハ有效期間延長ノ規定（第  
二十三條第一項）アリ又改訂ノ規定（第二十一條、  
第二十三條）モアルノテ改訂ニ依リ新秩序ニ應ジ  
又締約國以外ノ國ヲモ満足サセ得ル如キ方法アリ  
ヤノ點モ研究サレタノデアリマスガ其ノ研究ノ結  
果ハ「ワシントン」條約ノ改訂規定ニ依ツテハ根  
本的ノ改訂ハ困難デアル新基礎ニ基ツク協定ヲ作  
成スル爲ニハ同條約第二十三條第二項ニ依リ廢止  
通告効力發生後一年內ニ締約國全部ニ依リ開催セ  
ラルヲ要スル會議ニ依ルヲ最モ確實ナル方法デ  
アルトノ結論ニ達シタノデアリマス。之レニ關ス  
ル研究報告ハ別紙第十七ノ通デアリマシタ。

（以下次頁ニ接ク）



「從ツテ日本ガ一ラシントソ」條約ヲ廢止シ  
 タ、ハ全ク許種ノ新狀態ニ應ジ各國ラシテ滿  
 足セシメ得ル如キ新條約ヲ作り而モ右新條約  
 ラ作成スベキ會議ノ與儀ヲ確實ニスル目的ニ  
 出タノニ外ナラナカツタ、テアリアツタ而シ  
 テ廢止通告ラ一九三四年内ニ行ツタノハ一ロ  
 ソドソ「海軍條約」第二十三條第二項ニ依リ當然  
 與儀セラレベキ一九三五年ノ會議ノ與假期日  
 ト一致セシメントシタ、テアリアツタ通告ノ  
 日ガ第二次豫備交渉ノ結果如何ニ依ツタ、テ  
 ハアリアツタセシツタ尙亦一ラシントソ「條約  
 ノ廢止ハ重大問題チハアリアツタガ一ラシソ  
 トソ「會議ニ於ケル英國側ノ不協ノ聲モ聞カ  
 レ又傍國ノ不協ハ前途ノ通チアリ更ニ又英國  
 「サイモソ」外相ガ一ジュネイツ「一般貿易縮  
 會議ニ於ケル一九三二年二月八日ノ演說中ニ  
 「此ノ外說ル海軍國ハ既ニ海軍量縮少ノ問題  
 ニ直劍トシテ考慮ヲ加ヘ一ラシントソ」及一ロ  
 ソドソ「條約ナル形式ニ於テ積極的ニシテ費  
 重ナル結果ヲ成シ遂ゲタ。英國政府ハ之等條  
 約ハ吾等ガ今有スル目的ニ對シ大ナル貢獻ヲ  
 ナスモノナルコトヲ思ヒ一九三六年十二月ニ

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 1934 Dec 1904

之等條約ガ效力ヲ衰フ迄其ノ確保有シタキ悉  
 見テアルト述ベテ居ル點ナドカラ見テ一九  
 三六年内ニ廢止通告ヲナスコトハ別段不條理  
 テハナク又關係國ニ非常ニ大ナル刺戟ヲ與ヘ  
 ルモノト思ハナカツタノデアリマス出來ウレ  
 バ關係國ト共同シテ廢止ノ手續ヲ取ルコトラ  
 希望スル旨ヲ代表訓令中ニ記載サレテアツタ  
 ノハ萬一ニモ關係國與給ニ不當ナ刺戟ヲ與ヘ  
 誤解ヲ生ズルガ如キコトヲ生ズルハ不幸ナル  
 ヲ以テ斯ル尋釁ヲ避ケントスル  
 (第九)一九三五年一ロンドン海軍會議ハ  
 十二月九日ヲ以テ閉會セラレマシタ  
 同會議ハ十月二十四日ノ草繪會議招請ニ  
 開スル「クレーキ」氏替翰ニモ齊イテ  
 アル通リ「クシント」海軍條約二十三  
 條及「一ロンドン」條約ノ之レニ該當スル  
 條文ノ明白ナル規定ノ結果英國政府ガ招  
 請ノ勞ヲ取ツテ照儀セラレタモノヲ其ノ  
 目的ハ一九三六年未ラ以テ終了スル二條  
 ニ代ルベキ國際條約ヲ締結シ以テ海軍建  
 備制限ニ關シ能フ限り多方面ニ亘リ協定  
 ヲ成立セシムルニ在リマシタ。

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1597. Dec. 1904

(A) 日本政府ハ今回ノ公議ノ討議節トシテ海軍大臣  
 備益設直ルモノナルコトヲ確知シ茲ニ英  
 國ノ招請ヲ受諾シ今回ハ代表トシテ水野  
 海軍大臣及永井松三大使ヲ送リマシタ日  
 本海軍ハ豫備交渉ノ際ノ代表タリシ日本  
 本中尉ヲ送ル意向モアリマシタガ他國ガ  
 高級將官ヲ列席セシメタル狀況ニ鑑ミ候  
 禮上ヨリ言フモ山本中尉ヨリモ高級ノ將  
 官ヲ送ルヲ適當ト認メ且水野大尉ハ一九  
 三二年一ジュネーヴ一級軍縮會議ニ於  
 ケル日本代表タリシ關係上經驗豊富カチ  
 適任ナリト認メラレタ譯ナノテアリマ  
 シタ尙永井大使ハ一九三〇年一ロンドン  
 一海軍會議ノ日本代表者ノ一人ナリマ  
 シタ。

日本政府ハ十月二十九日英國政府ノ招請  
 ヲ受諾シマシタガ之レニ先ダ十月十八  
 日英國政府ニ對シ右ノ趣旨ノ申入レヲ爲  
 シ既ニ豫備交渉ニ於テ明カニシタコトナ  
 ールガ念ノ爲メ更ニ日本政府ノ一九三五  
 年海軍會議ニ對スル態度ヲ明カニシ英國  
 政府ノ考慮ヲ促シタノテアリマス。

Ag. 1900. 1904

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(イ) 直ニ世界平和ヲ維持促進スルノ方法ハ  
各口ガ相互ニ其ノ生存ト必然的需ニト  
十分ナル考慮ヲ加フト共ニ他方各口  
間ニ不脅威不侵略ノ義務ヲ招來セシム  
ベキ徹底的公正ヲ行フニ在リテ大同ハ  
右ノ見地ニ基キ寧先之ニ努万シ平和ノ  
促進ニ邁進スルコト

(ロ) 日本政府ノ海軍算議ニ對スル態度ハ右  
ノ趣旨ニ基ツク徹底的算議ヲ實現セシ  
トスルニ在ルコト

(ハ) 豫備交渉ニ於テ英國ノ示シタル義務計  
登宣言案ハ短期間ノモノトスルモ保有  
量ノ共通限度ヲ定メザル限リ差等比率  
ヲ實質的ニ存続スル結果トナリ且算議  
ノ效果ヲ是ゲ得ザルニ依リ日本政府ハ  
受諾シ難イコト

(ニ) 質的制限ハ量的制限ヲ伴ハザレバ算議  
ノ實ヲ是ゲ得ザルノミナラズ現存ノ兵  
力關係ヲ存続スル結果ト爲ルヲ以テ日  
本政府ハ之レニ贊同シ得ザルコト

一九三五年海軍算議會議ニ對スル日本代表ハ  
豫備交渉ニ於ケル各口ノ意見及ヒ主張ニ對シ  
左ノ如キコトヲ特ニ注意セラレマシタ

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Rep. Sec 1904

- (1) 美國ノ絕對必要トスル保衛兵力ナル點  
念ハ程編ノ實行ト豫盾スル點ヲ加モ軍  
備協定成立ヲ請フニカクメニハ英國  
ノ特殊事情ニ考慮シ石ノ英國ノ要求ハ  
能ク限リ考慮スル必要アルベキコト
- (2) 日本ノ三強ハ大體軍備擴張ノ發露  
限リ定ムルニ在ルコト現實ノ關係ト  
シテ日本ノ軍備ヲ石ノ程度ニ抑セシム  
ルニハ相當年ヲ經過スル方格ヲ講スル  
コト
- (3) 歐洲諸國ノ問題ハ極メテ複雜ナルニ  
依リ之レニ深入リシテ、果セザルコト  
(三) 現下世界ニ亙ル不安ナル情勢ヲ緩和ス  
ルニハ軍備協定ノ成立ハ最も望マシコ  
トナレバ勿差之レガ成立ニ努力スベキ  
コト
- (4) 國民ノ負擔ノ輕微ハ日本トシテモ意欲  
ナルヲ以テ勵志ニ奮リテハ必ズ此ノ目  
的ニ添フ如クヌルコト

尙軍備ニ與スル經費ニシテ三卷(別紙第十七  
一)ガ參考トシテ代表團ニ送付スルコト



同年十二月十七日ノ米、日第一非公式合  
 談ニ於テ「スマツドレ」大將ハ一巡洋  
 艦ニ付イテハ英國ノ艦隊ニモ繼ミ米國ハ  
 二明精誠ハ直チニハ編シ得ナイチーラウ  
 艦逐艦ニ付イテハ米國ハ約五〇隻ノ艦隊  
 艦過艦ヲ有スルニ依リ直チニ線少ノ用意  
 アリト言ヒ又「英國ハ群ヲ欲セザル  
 ノミナラズ巡洋艦ノ如キハ之レガ増加ヲ  
 ホノメカシ居ルガ貴方ハ右ノ如キ場合ニ  
 ハ右艦送シ上ラントスルカト暫間シマシ  
 タ。

右合談ノ際「チザイ」代表ハ「英國ハ  
 軍艦セズトノ態度ヲ示シ如ルトコロ米國  
 ハ歐洲ノ事變ニ捲キ込マレル可能ニガマ  
 ル故右英國ノ態度ハ米國ニ影響ナシト言  
 フコトヲ得ナイ貴方ト立揚ノ異ル所以ニ  
 シテ日米均等ハ決シテ日米區間ノミノ間  
 越テハナイト述ベ真ニ一米國ハ日本ノ  
 友情ヲ欲スル日米兩國ハ相互ニ良キ隣客  
 ニシテ世界ニ日米日米兩國間ニ解シ合フ  
 線ニ坐レバ國ハナイト確信スル米國ハ何  
 物ヲモ日本カラ奪ハントスルモノデハナ

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King. Rice. 1904

Ref. No. 1901

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イ。併シ伊「エ」紛争ト言ヒ中區ニ於ケル情勢ト言ヒ次ニ來ルベキモノノ何タルカラ察知スルコトヲ得ズシテ人皆不安ノ状態ニ在リ根本的協定ヲナスニ適當ナ時機ニアラザルヲ以テ相互ノ一サスビシヨシト述ベマシタ。

同年十二月十日第一委員會第一回會議ニ於テ佛國代表「ロ」ベルト「海軍中將」ハ從來ノ經驗ニ鑑ミ量的制限ハ困難ナル旨ヲ述べ之ヨリ發十二月七日ノ佛日非公式會議ニ於テ同國代表「ジュランビエール」中將ハ「佛ハ量ノ問題ヲ好マズ寧口質的制限協定ノミヲ希望スル佛國ハ從來量ノ問題ニツキ満足ヲ得タルコトナシ今回モ例ヘバ佛伊間ノミニテモ量ノ問題ノ解決ハ至難ト思ハルルニ依リ寧口量ハ無制限ヲ可トスル、英口例ハ長期例ヘバ八年位イノ建替制限案ニ依リ度キ意向ノ如クナルモ斯クテハ事實上比率主義ノ條約ト異ルトコロナク感服出來ズ佛國ハ短期間例ヘバ一年位イノ建替通報ヲ行ヒ不意打ヲ避クルニ



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Dr. G. S. S. 1904

止メコトシ一方廣ノ協定ヲ行ハストス  
 ム意向ヲアブルト述ベマシタ  
 會議中英、俄、帝ニヨリ夫々發給アリタ  
 ムモ主トシテ迅速通報ニスルモノヲ發  
 遣辭館ニ發給モ極メテ短期間ノ發給自主  
 的宣言表ニ止マリ廢棄ヲ仲ハキイモノヲ  
 日本側トシテハ新ノ預キ方法ニテハ到底  
 臺灣ノ目的ヲ達シ得ザルモノト考ヘラレ  
 タモノデアリマシタ。米國ニ比例的ニ條  
 約量ノ二割若シ不可能ナラバ一割五分、  
 一割若シクハ五分削減ノ義務ヲナシタ  
 ガ協定ノ通り十二月十七日米日代表第一  
 國會總ノ際一スマツドレール大野ハ一  
 巡洋艦ニ付イテハ英國、蘇俄ニモ艦ミ米  
 國ハ二割船ハ直キニハニシ得ザルベシ  
 ト言ヒ又主力艦ニ付イテハ一九三七  
 米日ノ保有艦船超過ハ七隻ニ箱スルト  
 コロ米日ハ最初ノ三連ハ三萬五千噸型ト  
 シ之レ等製造ノ空能ヲ豫計シ其ノ解除ニ  
 送ツキ石炭運送ノ距離短少ノ弊害ヲ豫  
 計コトスルバ宜シカラシト雷ヒ日本  
 側トシテハ米日側ハ艦隊ナカ意味ニ於ケ  
 具存無ク有シテ居ラナイノチハナイカ  
 トノ弊ヲ抱キマシタ。

大蔵省 1904

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(6) 斯ノ如キ會議ノ狀況ハ日本側ヲシテ甚ダシク失禮ニシメマシタ日本側トシテハ正界各口ヲシテ不致ヲ忌メシメズ安神シテ平穩視ニ各自ノ運命ヲ處置シ得ル如キ理類的ノ狀態ヲ出現セシメ一方ニ於テハ舊條約ノ下ニ於テ當然起ルベキ大體ノ大建差ニ因ル莫大ナル經費ノ浪費ヲ防キ國民負擔ノ軽減ヲ許ラントスル爲メ當時ニ於テ考へ得ル最良ノモノナリトノ確信ノ下ニ作成シ豫備交渉ニ於テモ米、英國代表者等ニ對シ既ニ相當說明シタルコトナレバ關係口特ニ米英例ニ於テ偏見ヲ持タズ公平ニ此ノ案ニ付イテ論究シタルニハ算續事業ノ上ニ大ナル進展ヲ見ルニ至ルデアラウコトヲ大イニ期待シテ居ツルカラデアリマス

日本側トシテハ世界ノ不安ハ其ノ因ツテ來ル原因ハ種々アルベシト雖モ或ル數國ガ進攻性ノ大算備ヲ整へ多數ノ小算備ニ不安全體ヲ果フルコトガ甚シク一層固デアルト考へ之レヲ除去スルコトガ急務ト考へ此ノ點ヲ主眼トシマシタ又此ノ日本ノ案ハ必ズシモ理應的ニ實行性ニ乏シイモノトハ





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19th Dec. 1904

限ヲ適用スベシトノ説明ハ第一回會議ニ於ケル  
 説明ト全ク別箇ノ新提案ヲ爲シタモノデア  
 三國間ニ協定ヲ行フ手續ニハ反對デア  
 議ハ五口ハ勿論其ノ他ノ領海軍國ニモ適用  
 得ベキ基礎ヲ發見スルニ在ルルト述バ  
 若ソ如キ、暫國代表主張ニ對スル批判ノ  
 ナル議論ヲ生ズルニ至リマシタ部チ十二  
 日第一委員會第四回會議ニ於テ一モソ  
 國代表ガ一共通最大限度ヲ三國及五國  
 ラルル以上ハ右ハ全世界ノ海軍國或ハ  
 モ同様ニ適用セララルモノナリヤルト  
 ナシ又一九三六年一月十五日第一委員  
 會議ニ於テ一アイルランド代表ガ一日本  
 採用セラレタル場合ニハ一アイルランド  
 ノ國ト同様ノ權利ヲ主張スベク一アイル  
 一ガ各國ト同一ノ基礎ニ於テ取扱ハレ  
 ニハ參加シ難イト主張シタルガ如キハ  
 テアリマス  
 之レ等ノ主張ハ實際的ナルベキ算議合議  
 類例少ナイ議論デアツテ日本代表ハ誠ニ  
 イシタ殊ニ英國自治領モ欲スルナラバ  
 彼等ヲモ

Ms. of Dec. 1904

(イ) 實業及合口代表ノ意見

又部分ノ觀ヲ察シ申述ハテマテマ合テ余リ重復セ  
 シタタシハノ中ノ豫備ノ對スル日代表ノ重復ノ  
 判ノ主ナルモ及之レ之レ各代表ノ重復及批  
 (四) 次日本代表ニ對スルハ日代表ノ重復及批  
 張上甚不辛ナコトハ日代表ノ重復及批  
 得タナラズトコトハ日代表ノ重復及批  
 二適用スルコトハ日代表ノ重復及批  
 來ノ極旨ニ非サザル單一ノ高限ヲ世界各國代表  
 右ノ如キ合議ノ狀ノ下況ニシテモ日本代表  
 ヲ了解シ難キ如キ狀況ヲ示シテマテマ合テ余リ重復セ  
 下リテシカカラ日代表ノ重復及批  
 包合テシムル極旨ヲ於テハ日代表ノ重復及批  
 附ノ「ロ」トシテ「海軍」ニ對シテ九十年七月日  
 然ノコトトシテ「海軍」ニ對シテ九十年七月日  
 包合テシムル極旨ヲ於テハ日代表ノ重復及批  
 勢力ヲ定ムル極旨ニ對シテ「海軍」ニ對シテ九十年七月日  
 一日代表トシテ「海軍」ニ對シテ九十年七月日  
 一單位トシテ「海軍」ニ對シテ九十年七月日



同 様ニ 及 ホ 及 世 界 ノ 三 國 及 五 國 及 自 治 領 二 以

(5) 上 ハ 石 ハ 全 限 有 七 世 國 及 五 國 及 自 治 領 二 以  
共 通 大 限 有 七 世 國 及 五 國 及 自 治 領 二 以

+ 均 等 勢 力 有 七 世 國 及 五 國 及 自 治 領 二 以

ハ 勢 力 分 割 如 英 國 ノ 如 勢 力 分 割 如 英 國 ノ 如

ハ 勢 力 分 割 如 英 國 ノ 如 勢 力 分 割 如 英 國 ノ 如

(4) 英 國 ノ 如 勢 力 分 割 如 英 國 ノ 如 勢 力 分 割 如 英 國 ノ 如



L.S. of L.S. of 1904

(ロ) 日本代表ノ答へ及び意見

(1) 英皇ノ所謂「バルネラビクテイー」ノ

差異ノ直接且最大ノ原因ハ兵刀ノ不當ナル差等ニ在ルガ故ニ先ズ之レガ除去ノタメニ共通最大限度ヲ定ムルノ要ガアル

「ワシントン」海軍條約ハ當時ノ現有勢力ト言フ偶然ノ奇蹟ヲ基礎トシ之レヲ特殊ノ方法ニ依リ計算シテ得タル數字ヲ用ヒタルニ過キズ大成直後ノ變遷的事情ノ下ニ締結セラレタルモノニシテ其ノ後改定ヲ加フル必要存スルコトハ豫期セラレテ居タモノデアル決シテ各國ノ衆意ヲ平等ニシタモノデハナカ

ツ

(2) 共通最大限度ヲ設定シ一方ニ於テ進攻的

兵器ヲ程度ニ縮減シ又ハ廢止スルコトニ依リ軍備ノ内容ヲ不脅威不侵略トスルニ依リ其ノ限度内ニテ各國ガ國防上必要ナル兵刀ヲ整備スルモ他國ヲ脅威セズ且其ノ限度ヲ低下スルモ互ニ他國ノ脅威ヲ受クルコトガナイ又算撥トナル虞ハナイ

K. G. Soc. 1907

(4) 海軍艦隊ノ移動ハ大ニ日ノ海軍ニシテ先ツ

包圍ノ結果ハ移動ノ大ニ日ノ海軍ニシテ先ツ

艦隊ノ移動ハ大ニ日ノ海軍ニシテ先ツ

ノ海軍ニシテ先ツ

先ツ

先ツ

先ツ

先ツ

(3)



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(E) 本合議ニ於ケル提案ハ日本ノモノヲ除イテハ

(イ) 左ノ如キモノガアリマシタ

新建造ニ關スル單獨宣言形式ニ關スル英國

案

此ノ案ハ或ル國ガ自國安全上必要トスル海

軍保有兵力ヲ各艦種別ニ數字ヲ算ゲテ一定

期間中ハ其ノ數字ヲ超エテ艦船ヲ建造シ又

ハ取得スルコトナカルベキ畧想ヲ自發的ニ

宣言スルコトヲ骨子トスルモノデアリマシ

タ

(ロ) 事前通告及情報交換ニ關スル英國案

此ノ案、締結國ガ互ニ排水量百屯(一〇二

ト)メートル式屯)ヲ超ユル艦船ノ建造ニ

關シ各會計年度ノ最初ノ一箇月以内ニ該會

計年度ニ建造命令ノ發セラルベキ艦船表及

各艦ノ艦種並ニ最大備砲口徑ヲ又各會計年

度ニ超エセラルベキ艦船名要目等ヲ各會計

年度ノ六ヶ月以内ニ通報スルコトヲ骨子ト

スルモノデアリマシタ

(ハ) 海軍兵力ノ自發的ナル量の制限ニ關スル伊

Ag. Dec. 1904.

國案

此ノ案ハ各締結國ハ他ノ締結國ガ各自國ノ

安全爲メニ必要ナル海軍兵力ヲ絕對自主權

ノ下ニ建造スルノ權利ヲ承認シタル上一年

毎ニ其ノ一年間ニ起エシ又ハ取得セントス

ル建造計畫ニ關シ現行條約規定ニ依ル各艦

種毎ノ總噸數及ビ隻數ヲ示ス數字ヲ超過セ

ザル各自ノ條約ノ下ニ他ノ各締結國ニ通知

スルコトヲ骨子トスルモノデアリマシタ

(二)

新艦建造ニ關スル一方的且自發的宣言ニ關

スル獨國案

此ノ案ハ各國ニシテ可能ナルモノハ任意ノ

時ニ各艦種毎ニ或ル期間ヲ通ジ超ユザルベ

キ新艦建造總噸數ヲ宣言シ右宣言ヲ爲スト

爲サザルトニ拘ラズ各國ハ毎年該會計年度

中ニ超エセントスル各艦種ノ表ト主要要目

トヲ超エ前公表スベキ義務ヲ有スト言フコ

トヲ骨子トスルモノデアリマシタ

右諸案ニ對シテハ日英代表ハ左ノ如キ態度ヲ

執リマシタ(一九三六年一月八日第一委員會

Dec 1904

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第九回會議ニ於ケル永野代表ノ表明

日本代表ハ意圖的制限ヲ最モ要視シ之ニヨリ  
 不脅威不侵略ノ事態實現ノ基礎ヲ確立スル  
 コトガ軍縮協定ノ必須條件ナクト確信シ居  
 ル故意圖的問題ニ移ルコトハ反對ナルニ依リ  
 情報交換ニ付イテハ何等意見ヲ述ベズ全部  
 ラ他日ニ留保スルモ佛伊英中露國制限ノ目  
 的ヨリ出發セル遠慮計盤宣旨ニ關スル部分  
 ニ付テノミ意見ヲ開演スルデアラウ  
 如懸案ニ對シテハ同案ガ最モ重ナル考慮ノ下  
 ニ作成セラレタルコトヲ十分了解スルモ同  
 案ハ現在ノ兵力關係ヲ調節スルニ適當ナル  
 方法ト認メ難イコト軍縮ノ實ヲ擧グルコト  
 ニ付キ考慮十分ナラザルコト遠慮競争ヲ有  
 效ニ防止スルコト困難デアルコト等ノ諸缺  
 點アルタメ實效的ニ效果アル量的制限ノ協  
 定ヲ實現シ得ナイ尙ホ延遲量ノ制限ヲ主ト  
 シテ經濟的ノ拘束ニ委ホントスルヤニ見受  
 ケラルルモ右ハ各國ニ平等ノ安全ヲ與ヘン  
 トスル根本原則ニ對スル考慮十分ナラザル  
 モノト認メラレル

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伊國案モ慎重考慮シテ作成セラレ殊ニ其ノ  
第一條ニ於テ各國海軍備ハ自主權ノ承認  
ヲ明カニシタルハ贊成スル所ナルモ佛國案  
ニ付キ起ベタルト略同様ノ理由ニ依リ同意  
シ得ナイ

英國案ニ付テハ其ノ第二次案タル建議通報  
案（第一次案ニ代リタル案）ニ付テハ日本  
代表ハ一月八日ノ第一委員會第九回會議ニ  
於テ右英國新案ハ單ニ建議通報ニ門スルガ  
故ニ意見ヲ後日ニ留保シタルモ英國ノ第一  
次案タル建議計整宣言ニ關スルモノニ付テ  
ハ一九三五年十二月二十日ノ第一委員會第  
七回會議ノ際左ノ趣旨ノコトヲ述ベマシタ  
（1）英國案ノ一海軍兵力ハ各國ノ安全ノ爲メニ  
スル最少限度ニ止マルベシトノ點ニ付テ  
ハ大イニ贊成スルモ其ノ實際的取扱ヒニ付  
テハ結局均等兵力ノ原則ニ立脚ラザルヲ得  
ナイ

(2) 英國案ニヨル建議量ハ比率主義ナラズトス  
ルモ之レニ近キモノナルベク艦船廢棄ニ關  
シ明瞭ニナシアラザル故各國ノ勢力關係ヲ

- (5) 英國ヲ示シテ軍ヲ發シテ英領ノ内ニ侵入シテタリテ回英ノ關係ニモ日本ハ日本ノ實情ノ主一兵一張  
 計英領ノ内ニ軍ヲ發シテ英領ノ内ニ侵入シテタリテ回英ノ關係ニモ日本ハ日本ノ實情ノ主一兵一張  
 (4) 英國ノ内ニ軍ヲ發シテ英領ノ内ニ侵入シテタリテ回英ノ關係ニモ日本ハ日本ノ實情ノ主一兵一張  
 (3) 英國ノ内ニ軍ヲ發シテ英領ノ内ニ侵入シテタリテ回英ノ關係ニモ日本ハ日本ノ實情ノ主一兵一張

15 of Dec 1901



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行ハシテタルニ在リ云々日ニハ對底の皇族ノ  
意カ乏シク之ラ際ノ他ノ日ニハ對底の皇族ノ  
變スルニ日ハ公式ハ非公式ハ非公式ハ非公式ハ非  
會九回會合議（

月七日未日非公式ハ非公式ハ非公式ハ非公式ハ非  
ハ新案ノ效力ハナクモ知レサレモ知レサレモ知レサ  
ハ皇族ノ效力ハナクモ知レサレモ知レサレモ知レサ  
谷口保ノ勢力ヨリ之ハ比例レニ對案ハ本代案ハ  
モ強ク外ニ張セズ、口ハハハハハハハハハハハハ  
右案ノ主眼ヲ取リテハハハハハハハハハハハハハハ  
日本ノ主眼ヲ取リテハハハハハハハハハハハハハハ  
力ノ主眼ヲ取リテハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハ

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調節シ難ク概ネ各國現在ノ兵力即係ヲ維持  
スルコトトナル

(3) 英國案ハ軍縮ノ斷行ニ付テ何等ノ考慮ガ拂  
ハレテ居ナイ縱令質的制限ヲ行フトモ軍縮  
ノ目的ハ達シ難イ

(4) 英國案ニ依レバ場合ニヨリ一國ガ過大ナル  
計數ヲ示シ軍縮ヲ助長スル長大デアル

(5) 英國案ハ國防安固確保ニ關スル日本ノ主張  
ヲ取り入レタリト言フモ日本ハ實質的ニ兵  
力ノ差等廢除ヲ要求スルモノデアルカラ日  
本ノ主張ヲ取りタモノトハ思ハレナイ  
右諸案ノ外ニ米口ハ二割減案ヲ示唆シタル  
モ強ク主張セズ、之レニ對シテ日本代表ハ  
各國保有勢力ヨリ比例的ニ二割ヲ削減スル  
ハ軍縮ノ效果ハアルヤモ知レザルモ公正ナ  
ル結果ハ得ラレナイ旨ヲ述ベマシタ(十二  
月七日米日非公式會談モ一月八日第一委員  
會第九回會議)

要スルニ日本ヲ除ク他ノ國ニハ當時軍縮ノ  
決意ガ乏シク之レニ反シ日本ハ徹底的軍縮  
ヲ行ハントスルニ在リ極端ナル對照ヲ示シ

クノデアリマシタ其ノ原因ハ當時會議ニ表  
 ハレタ所ヲ以テ見レバ日本ハ世界ノ不安ハ  
 他ニモ益々ナル原因アルベシト雖モ各國軍  
 備ニ大ナル差等ノアルコトガ其ノ有力ナル  
 原因ナル故各國軍備ノ大ナル差等ヲ廢止シ  
 威カヲ示シテ弊ヲ處理スル方式ヲ提タント  
 スルニ對シ榮英兩國ハ此ノ世界不安ノ際軍  
 備ニ大改革ヲ爲スコトハ益々不安ヲ増大ス  
 ル故現狀維持ヲ可トスルト言フ考ヘテアツ  
 タ様ニ日本例ハ觀察シマシタ。然レハ又如  
 國ノ再軍備ヲ考慮スルト同時ニ伊國トノ長  
 カ關係ヲモ考慮シ兵船艦艇ニ例ヘルコトヲ  
 好マナカツタモノト觀察サレマシタ  
 日本代表ハ會議中日本兵ノ兵艦ヲ各口ガ了解  
 シ協定成立ニ導ク如ク凡ラユル努力ヲシタ歟  
 況ハ誠ホ以下述ベル如クデアリマシタ  
 一九三五年十二月七日ノ英、日非公式ノ宣  
 布最初トシテ十二月十六日迄公式又ハ非公式  
 ニ各國代表ト引續キ交渉シ爾後モ機會アル毎  
 ニ日本兵ノ懸言及適用ニ付キ各國代表ノ了解  
 ヲ知ル如ク努メマシタ而シテ軍備協定上段モ

(g)

*Ref. Doc. 144*

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13 of Jan. 1904

右限度以上ノ兵力ヲ要スルコトアルベキコトヲ承知シ居ラルヤトノ疑問ニ對シ永野代  
表ハ「英國ノ兵力要ラズ大戦度トセバ可ナル  
ベシ但シ關係ニ於テ是レヲ越スルコトハ相互  
ニ包蔵シタク自ラ自ラニ防ニ當リナル兵力保持ノ精利ナシトス  
ルカ如キ結果ヲ極端中ニ記載スルコトハ越クルヲ要ス下巻  
頁三三三同年十二月廿六日矣、日第三回非公式合談ニ於テ  
永野代表ハ「英國最大限ヲ認定セバ冬回ハ右  
限度迄建造スル權利ヲ有スルコトナルモ吾  
々ハ英國ノ立場ニ付キ非常ナル同權ヲ有スル  
カ故ニ英國最大限ヲ越スルコトヲ認メル但シ  
之レヲ如何様ニ現ハスカハ自ラ自ラノ感情ヲ  
認却セシメサルヨクニ注意スベキデアルニ  
ト述ベマシタ

此ノ日本ノ態度ハ其意最大限ヲ定メル日  
迄ノ趣旨ト矛盾シ結局比率ニ陥レモノデハナ  
イカトノ批判モアツタカ日公報トシテハ只  
機定成立ヲ希ツタ結果如何ル態度ニ至ツ  
タノデアリマヌ尤モ上述ノ「アジヤストメン  
ト」ノ方法ハ其意を涉ニ於テ山本代表ノ準備  
シタル詭計ニモ攻リ入レテアツタ顯運ノ方法

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ノ石油ニ依リて海上其口ノ欲スル多数ノ管線  
 公有ニ使ナラシメ又一方以テ單位トシテハ其  
 ノ性能上下分ト認メラルル種別超邊種ノ保  
 有ヲ其口ニ計答スル等ノ方法ヲ考ヘシテ居タ  
 ノデアリマス（此ノ種別超邊種保有ノコトハ  
 一九二七年三月會議ノ日英貨協定ニモ認めテ  
 アリ歐米交渉ノ際モ其口カラ示唆セラレタ  
 一九三六年一月二十五日第一回委員會  
 ニ於ケル永野代表ノ演説ヲ見テモ右ノ事情ハ  
 長ク了解スルコトガ出來ル次第ヲ形勢上ハ見  
 ニ角トシテ實質上ヨリ見レバ日本ノ煤油三島  
 ト矛盾スルモノデアイトノ日本代表部ノ見解  
 デアリマシタ。

日本側ハ伊伊兩國ノ關係ハ甚ハナ問題モ存ス  
 ルニ依リ歐米諸國ノ關係ナル協定ニ容テ染入  
 リセザルコトガ一般協定成立上却テ有效ト認  
 メ其ノ提案モ感ルベク伊伊兩國ニ及ボサ  
 ザル如ク考ヘシタノデアルガ會議進行ニ進レ  
 打撃ノ如キ手取ヲ履ムコトヲ得ズ諸國ハ後難  
 ナ情勢トナツタノデアリマス。

(五) 兼フルニ米口ヲ除キ他ノ關係ニハ專断ヲ欲セ

ザル状況デアツテ實情の進展ヨリハ寧ろ質的進  
 展ニ着目ヲ置キ此ノ問題以外ニハ海軍ノ問題  
 ヲ討論スルニ止メシトスル傾向ニアツタノデ  
 日本側トシテハ貴ノ側限ヲ越レテ實情ノ進展ヲ  
 實現シ各國ノ安全感ヲ確保シ經費ノ節約ヲ圖  
 ルコトハ不可能デアルトノ信念ヲ懷イテ居ツ  
 タル條上日本代表ハ一九三六年一月八日爲ニ  
 委員長官九回會議ニ於テ貴國ノ方針々々作成  
 ニ付イテモ先ヅ實情の進展ヲ決定シ次ニ質的進  
 展及進歩ノ問題ニ移ルガ如クスルヲ必要トス  
 ル旨ヲ要請シタノデアリマス。  
 然ルニ翌日即チ一月九日英口官ノ申入レニ依  
 リ同日午後四時半英口官亦省ニ於テ非公式進  
 日代表會議（第四回目）ヲ爲シタルトコロ  
 モンセル代表ハ「目下委員官ニハ日本系、  
 英系、加系ノ三系提出セラレ居ルトコロ之等  
 三系ノ前議ニ返ルトセバ之ガ採決ヲ爲スヲ必  
 要トスル時機早々來ルベク石ハ日本代表ノ希  
 望スルトコロナリヤ」ト質問シ之レニ對シ亦  
 野代表ハ「右三系以外他ニ何等新提案ナキコ  
 ト助カトナラバ貴方ノ御都合良キ時機ニ爲サ

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Sept. 29, 1936

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レタシト答へタルトコロ「モシセル」代表  
 へ他ニ新案モナク日本案ハ必初ニ採定セラレ  
 タル關係上第一ニ之ヲ決定スルヲ要スル併  
 シ若シ日本案ガ否決セラレタル場合日本代表  
 へ尙ホ會議ニ出席シ得ルヤ又日本ガ會議ヨリ  
 退シ四山ニテ妥的制限通報問題等前案ノ如  
 キ會議ヲ執行スルトセバ日本ハ「オブサーヴ  
 アー」トシテ強リ稀ルヤ「トノ質問ヲシタノ  
 ケアリマス  
 右ノ如キ款券ハ未ダ日本代表ノ豫期セズ又會  
 議場ノ如キコトハ一九二七年三月會議後米  
 英兩國懸念ノ如例モ知ツテ居ルノテ全く希望  
 シナカッタ所デアルノテ亦其代表ハ「右ハ訓  
 令ノ範圍外ノ事項デアルト」ト答シ日本代表  
 へ「此ニ石會議ノ狀況ヲ以テ報告シ日本代  
 表ノ今後執ルベキ態度ニ付イテ別紙第十九ノ  
 如キ至意訓令ヲ仰イタノデアリマス之レニ對  
 スル政府訓令（別紙第二十）ハ一月十二日受  
 領シマシタ  
 夫ノ後官ハ「委員會議ノ他ノ場合ニ於テ日本  
 政府ノ根本方針タル共進家大限及ノ際定ト共



三 攻 軍 的 ノ 兵 力 ノ 露 質 兩 面 ニ 直 ル 繼 滅 ニ 依 ル  
 不 得 成 不 侵 略 ノ 原 則 ノ 確 立 並 ニ 徹 底 的 軍 備 精  
 少 ニ 處 ス ル 露 子 ノ 主 張 ヲ 更 ニ 懇 切 ニ 説 明 シ 日  
 本 政 府 ノ 熱 望 ス ル ト コ ロ ハ 公 正 妥 當 ナ ル 軍 備  
 條 約 ノ 締 結 ニ 在 リ 軍 備 競 業 ニ 對 シ 警 戒 ヲ 有 ス  
 ル コ ト ヲ 示 ス ニ ア ラ ヌ ル 勢 力 ヲ 奮 ス ベ ク 面 モ  
 尙 ホ 日 本 ノ 主 張 ガ 各 國 ノ 承 認 ヲ 受 ケ ザ ル 如 キ  
 最 後 ノ 協 定 ニ ハ 會 議 機 關 モ 已 ム ヲ 得 ザ ル 所 ナ  
 ア ル 然 シ ナ ガ ラ 此 ノ 後 後 ノ 協 定 ニ 於 テ モ 日 露  
 協 定 ニ 不 良 ナ ル 影 響 ヲ ア タ へ ザ ル 如 ク 五 國 協  
 定 協 定 可 能 ナ ル 條 項 ヲ 致 談 メ 復 ニ 日 露 協 定 間  
 事 加 緊 争 ヲ 爲 サ ス ト 言 フ カ 如 キ 共 同 宣 言 ヲ 爲  
 シ テ 一 極 會 議 ヲ 終 了 シ 其 ノ 他 ノ 同 題 ニ 付 テ ハ  
 引 續 キ 行 ハ ル ベ キ 四 國 間 ニ 於 ケ ル 新 タ ル 條 約  
 協 定 三 説 ル ト 言 フ カ 如 キ 方 法 ヲ 執 ル コ ト ガ 局 面  
 收 拾 上 進 宮 ナ ル コ ト 尙 又 出 口 會 議 ニ 一 考 ヲ 得  
 「 ヲ ア 一 」 ヲ 出 加 セ シ ム ル コ ト ハ 差 支 ヘ ナ イ  
 ト 言 フ ニ 程 リ マ シ タ  
 遊 ニ 於 テ 日 本 代 表 ハ 翌 日 即 チ 一 月 十 三 日 英 國  
 代 表 部 ト 會 合 シ 次 ノ 第 一 委 員 會 ニ 於 テ 日 本 案  
 ニ 付 キ 更 ニ 各 國 ノ 了 解 ヲ 得 ル 目 的 ヲ 以 テ 詳 論  
 ニ 説 明 ス ル コ ト 及 ビ 露 水 艦 使 用 條 限 ノ 問 題 等

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Ag. Dec. 1904

1949 Dec. 1904

五上同ニ協定可能ナルモノヲ先ツ協定スル如ク致シ度イコトヲ申入レタルモ五上同協定可能ノ見込ミアルモノヲ先議スルノ件ハ英二條ノ同意ヲ得ルニハズ次ニ日本衆ガ各國ノ同意ヲ得ザリシ場合ノ措置ガ同トナリ日本代表ハ萬一初ル場合ニハ日本衆ニ對スル票決ヲ行フコトナク英同トナリイテハ五上同ニ協定ニ起シ難キコト明カトナル事ナレバ一九二七年「ジュネーブ」三上同年會議ノ首領モアルコト故之レニ便ヒ無期延期ノ形式ニテ一應此ノ旨ヲ終止セシムル形式ヲ取ルコトガ上條條文ノ平解ヲ保ツ上ヨリ見ルモ望マシイ旨ヲ希望シタノテアルガ此ノ日本側ノ希望モ英二條ノ答ルトコトナラズ日本代表ハ手段盡キ去ノ血涙ノ第一長官ニ歸ムコトトナリマシタ。

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一方十五日第一發員會第十回會議ニ於テ永野代表ハ別紙二十一ノ如キ日本衆ニ對スル詳細ナル説明及ビ各上同ノ有スル疑念ニ對スル回答ヲナシ日本衆ヲ考慮セシコトヲ衆メタノテア

Sept 25 1904

リマス。之レニ對シ米日代表ハ日本兵三依レ  
 バ現在ノ優勢ヲ軍國ハ機勢シ劣勢ヲハ遺憾ヲ  
 許サルルコトナル日本ハ「ヴァルネラ」ビリ  
 テ「一」責任及必要ノ相違ヲ認メ之レガ調節  
 ラ加ヘントスル之レハ比率ノ縮減ヲアル安全  
 ノ平等ト兵力ノ平等トハ相谷レズ強政即防  
 防ノ區別ハ不可議ナリ等ノ理由ヲ以テ反對シ  
 マシタ。加國代表ハ日本兵ノ必要兵力自主的  
 決定ノ三點ニハ實感スル然シ安全ノ條件ハ口  
 ニ依リ兵隊兵力モ亦異ルヲ疑スルトノ趣旨  
 ノ意見ヲ表明シマシタ英日代表ハ日本基礎的  
 主張ノ前半部チ「一」安全ノ爲メ必要ナル兵  
 隊ヲ準備スルノ義務ハ各口ノ實シク享有スル  
 所ナリ「一」點ニハ全然同意スル而シ日本主  
 張中核の點ニ於ケル態度ノ力ハ平等ヲ必具ト  
 スル點「ヴァルネラ」ビリ「一」ノ差異ノ主  
 タル原因ヲ兵力ノ不平等ニ在リトスル點ニハ  
 承ルシ然ル日云ノ示シタ然タル方程ニヨ  
 ツテ「ヴァルネラ」ビリ「一」ノ差ヲ調節シ  
 而ルトハ恐ヘナイ天共通故天陸軍ヲ互ニ三  
 點スルコト及ビ英ノ態度ヲ密下スルコトニ反

1900. 1901

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謝テアルトノ趣旨ヲ述ベマシタ。而シテ伊口  
 代表ハ日本代表ノ提議シタル三管ニハ全然同  
 意スル海軍ニニ差等ヲ附スル基礎ニテ海軍開  
 出ヲ持替議スル用意ナシ然シ日本代表ハ共通  
 以大隈殿ヲ基礎トシテ裁節ヲ加ヘンコトヲ述  
 ベラレタ之ニ以ルトキハ持替比率ニ戻ル農ガ  
 アルトノ趣旨ヲ述ベマシタ  
 和ノ如キ各代表ハ夫レ々如特ノ見解ヨリシ  
 テスル點ニ於テハ日本代表ニ同意ヲ示シ或ル點  
 ニ於テハ反對ノ意見ヲ表明シマシタ  
 按彼ニ議長ハ「日本代表ニ對スル討論ハ今ヤ盡  
 サレタ也」ノ内外ニ於テ各代表ハ日本代表ヲ  
 極メテ慎重ニ攻撃シタガ余ハ同業ガ支持ヲ得  
 ザリシコトヲ認メザルヲ待ナイ日本代表ハ主ト  
 シテ「目的期限ニ以テアルトコロ目的期限ハ此ノ  
 會議ノ取扱ヲ諸國間ノ一部分ニ延キナイ様テ  
 茲ニ會議ヲ「アジアーン」シ次同ニハ延延計  
 程ノ事前通報ニ以テスル候、候、英業ヲ提議シ  
 タシ「トノ趣旨ヲ述ベマシタ。  
 日公加トシテハ「ザアルネラビリテイー」ノ

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Rep. Sec. 1904

臨ハ日本海ノ遼望及日本代表ノ説明ヲ良ク認  
 知スレバ英、米偏ノ公認ノ臨ハ停滯スル管ヲ  
 アリ又如日本代表ノ臨ハ日本海ノ遼望ヲ良ク  
 知タルニ非ズヤトノ臨ハ公認ノ臨ハ停滯スル  
 ノデアルカラ日本側トシテハ不可停ヲアリマ  
 シタ  
 米に及仰上代表ノ遊ベラレタ維馬比率ニ依  
 スルモノニ非ズヤトノ臨ハ公認ノ臨ハ停滯  
 ノ抱懐シテ居タ公認ノ方法ヲ公認スレバ之  
 ハ從來ノ公認會議ニ於テ公認ナル間隔ヲ處  
 スル場合ニ屢々居イラレタ方法ニ外ナラヌコ  
 トガ容易ニ公認シ得ル管ヲアルト日本側ハ考  
 ヘマシタ  
 又米に代表ノ如ベラレタ遼望防禦的ノ區別  
 ハ不可認アルトノ臨ハ公認ニ一九二七年三  
 會議ニ於テ英上代表ハ八時公認ハ遼望防禦  
 的アルト屢々明言シテ居リ又一九三二年一  
 會議ニ於テハ海軍艦船ノ遼望防禦ナルモノ  
 ト然ラサルモノトヲ具體的ニ公認シ得ル程  
 モノハ遼望防禦的ナリトノ多岐ノ意見ヲ表  
 示セテ居ル事實等ヨリ見テ之レ亦日本側ノ公認

Log Dec. 1944

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出来ナイコトデアリマシタ  
然シナガラ事茲ニ至ツテハ日本代表トシテハ  
其ノ盡スベキヲ盡シ万策ツキタト考ヘマシタ  
而シテ日本側トシテハ嚴密制限ナキ軍備制限  
協定ハ軍備制限ノ目的ヲ達シ難キノミナラス  
公正ヲ缺ク結果ニ陥ルモノナリトノ固イ信念  
ヲ有シテ居リマシタノテ會議ニ止マルモ會議  
ニ奇異スル方途ヲ失ヒマシタノテ遂ニ會議ヨ  
リ離脱セザルヲ得ナクナリ一月十五日夜第一  
委員會議長ニ宛テ日本代表ハ最早ヤ會議ノ討  
議ニ参加ヲ繼續スルモ無益ナル旨ヲ申入レ又  
同月二十日會議ノ討議ニ参加シ難キモノ「オヴ  
サーヴァー」ヲ盡スベキ旨ヲ申入レマシタ（  
別紙第二十二(1)(2)）  
日本側トシテハ公正ナル軍備協定ヲ完成セン  
トスル大ナル希望ヲ以テ會議ニ参加シ協定成  
立ノ上ハ之レヲ更ニ擴張スル研究（別紙第二  
十三）ヲモ遂ゲテアツタノデアルガ會議ノ狀  
況ハ日本ノ期待ニ反スルコト多ク不本意ナガ  
ラ遂ニ會議ヲ去ラザルヲ得ナクナツタノデア  
リマス。日本代表ハ復命ニ際シ會議離脱ヲ遺  
憾トシ恐懼シテ居リマシタ（別紙第二十四）

Doc, Doc 1904

同日於

立 母 人 奥 山 八 郎

右ハ立母人ノ面ニ子直母シ且ツ捺印シタコトヲ證明シ

供 述 者 横 本 重 治

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）七月三十日於東京

Def, Doc 1904

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザル  
ルコトヲ誓フ

宣  
誓  
書

署名捺印 榎 本 重 治



Σ 3011

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 14

Instructions Sent To Imperial Government Delegates  
At The Preliminary Negotiations Of The Naval Disarmament  
Conference Of 1935.

1. The reason for our Government giving consent to the opening of preliminary negotiations for the Naval disarmament conference which was proposed by Britain in May this year was because the present Naval Disarmament Conference is an important affair and as difficulties were foreseen. Therefore, it is to avoid unnecessary agitation of public opinions, of nations concerned, as well as to exchange opinions fully between nations represented and thereby clarifying the standpoints and assertions of all participant nations and accomplishing our objectives to enable the smooth attainment of the conference aims and also security of our national defense.

2. In view of the present preliminary negotiations inevitably facing a difficult situation the Imperial Government places great expectations to your efforts. In negotiations, follow the basic policy as indicated herein, as well as the import of this instruction and as for naval technical affair consult the senior naval-expert delegate.

As negotiations are expected to be delicate, anything which require fast and appropriate measures are entrusted to your decision within the scope of authority specified in this

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instruction.

3. As to the problem of formalities, exchange of opinions with the main participant nations have already been made but endeavour to accomplish our assertions on items still unsolved at the preliminary negotiations scheduled to open around October this year.

4. The British Government has repeatedly made proposals on debating on the problem of the so-called substantial problem of naval disarmament but it was not necessarily the same with the U.S.

As there seems to be considerable difference between what has been explained to our Embassy at Washington from competent U. S. authorities and what the U. S. delegates spoke to our delegates at London and therefore it is requested that you make it clear at the very beginning of preliminary negotiations if the U. S. is prepared to make sufficient arguments on the problem of substantial disarmament. Even in case the U. S. is not prepared to discuss on the substantial disarmament problem the Imperial Government has no objections in negotiating with Britain but attention must be paid to see that Britain does not lead in negotiations and make our standpoint disadvantageous.

5. In the present Naval disarmament preliminary negotiation, the Government, based on the basic policy as defined

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under No. 6. herein, shall prepare a disposition to form a new agreement which will secure an impartial and adequate naval strength and establish a stable national defense. Thereby reducing the people's burdes in the future and promoting peaceful intercourse between all nations. And after the expiration of already existing naval armament limitation agreements, it must be borne in mind that the Imperial Government will not tolerate the conclusion of any agreement which will continue to force upon us disadvantageous conditions and make our national defense insecure.

6. The following basic policy of the Imperial Government in connection with naval disarmament is viewed with greatest importance and therefore, our basic principles shall be here indicated. It is requested that every effort be exerted to get the recognition by the nations concerned, especially the U. S. and Britain. The basic policy of the Imperial Government is as follows.

The Imperial Government seeks to establish a principle of non-intimidation and non-aggression without impairing the sense of security in national defense for all nations because every nation is entitled to the right of possessing armaments required for the safety of the state. Among major naval powers it is a fundamental problem to agree upon a criterion for common maximum limitation of arms for each nation to

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possess, as a measure for reducing arms. In reaching an agreement on this point, in order to demonstrate the true spirit of disarmament minimize the above limitation and drastically curtail offensive arms while adjusting defensive arms. Thereby basing upon the principle of "difficult to aggress and secure in defending". To attain this objective, highly-armed nations will be compelled to make greater sacrifices than the others.

7. In reference to the grounds for the above basic policy, if necessary, you are to begin negotiations on definite problems bearing in mind the following factors.

a. You may assert the complete abolition of capital ships if the condition of the conference permits.

b. Assert the complete abolition of aircraft carriers.

c. In the case capital ships and aircraft carriers are to be maintained, place restriction on total tonnage of such ships including A and B class cruisers, destroyers and submarines as well. In this case, emphasis should be put on the reduction of capital ships, aircraft carriers, and heavy cruisers. Designate tonnage allotment for each type of ship to each nation and the allotment to the U.S. and Japan shall be equal. In the case capital ships and aircraft carriers are abolished this will be applicable.

d. The Imperial Government at an early possible

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date shall demand attaining the standard of the newly agreed military strength, but if necessary, in conformity to the above contents of agreed naval strength we shall consider concluding an agreement in which we will gradually have to attain a standard in a limited time.

8. Depending on the progress of preliminary negotiations, it may confront a situation where negotiations may be closed abruptly or adjourned or even not opened. But the manner in which the present negotiation proceeds will greatly influence the international situation to follow and therefore in such a case utmost care must be taken not to incur any undesirable conditions to our overall plans for the conference.

9. The question of equality in naval strength between France and Italy has been unsettled to this day. In connection with our present assertion, the standpoint of our Government against these two nations shall be extremely delicate. Therefore put the center of negotiation on the two nations of Britain and the U. S. first and thoroughly explain on the point that our assertion is the result of earnest desire cherished by our people. Endeavor to have the U. S. and British understand this point. Again, as for the two countries of France and Italy, according to situation, explain to them that the main objective of our assertion is Britain and the U. S.

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As for the relations between France and Italy, make it known to them that we have no objections whatsoever on any adequate compromise reached direct between the nations concerned.

10. The Washington Treaty on naval armament limitation in view of the assertion to be made at the present naval disarmament preliminary negotiation is to be abolished as of 1936 according to our Government policy. Even if we announce its abolition, it does not mean that we do not favor a new naval disarmament agreement but seek to contribute to the establishment of a world peace by forming an impartial and fair new agreement between the nations concerned. Therefore, in the present preliminary negotiations, first indicate our basic policy and impress upon the delegates of the respective participant nations that in view of the above policy the Washington Treaty inevitably must be abolished. Moreover, as our present assertion is based on the earnest hopes of our people the Government has already decided upon its abolition notification, but on the other hand our Government desires to carry out the preliminary negotiations in a friendly and effective manner to the extent it is possible. Therefore, the Government is withholding the notification so it is desirable that efforts be made to guide the negotiations so that this opportunity is taken to take formal steps in

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abolishing it with the mutual understanding of all nations concerned and following which all nations will cooperate in the formation of a new treaty. Thereby it will contribute to the alleviation of public opinion. This point should be explained to the respective delegates.

Of the above nations concerned, the U. S. will show considerable opposition. It appears that some part of the British side are opposed to the continuation of the Washington Disarmament Treaty. On the other hand, two years after the notification of its abolition, all signatories will witness its abolition, so it is wiser to put emphasis on future negotiations and develop it amidst a friendly atmosphere. Persuade the participant powers to consent upon abolishing this agreement by the end of 1936.

However, if case our proposal is not accepted or if the decision hung on a balance, the Imperial Government will announce its abolition by the end of the year according to its independent decision.

11. Any item besides what has been referred to in this instruction, or any matter considered irrelevant to the import of this instruction, it is requested that you cable us.

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the Demobilization Section of the Demobilization, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Instructions sent to Imperial Government Delegates at the Preliminary Negotiations of the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date.

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

P



Def Doc No. 1462-B

Ex 3012-A

ERRATA SHEET

Place: " Excerpt from Collection of official Statement  
concerning China Incident" above the title.

**FILE COPY**  
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Def Doc No. 1462 - B

JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE JAPANESE AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS  
ON THE JAPANESE ARMY STATIONING TROOPS IN  
FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

( At 5 p.m., September 27 )

A fundamental understanding concerning French Indo-China in view of promoting the establishment of a new order in East Asia and the settlement of the China Incident was reached during August at TOKYO between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and French Ambassador HENRY at TOKYO in a friendly manner.

The Japanese Government gave assurance to the French Government that she intends to respect the rights and interests of France in East Asia, especially the territorial integrity of Indo-China and the sovereignty of France to all of the Federation, and the French Government consented to afford the Japanese Government special facilities in Indo-China for the Japanese Army and Navy necessary in the execution of their operations.

Furthermore, a conference between the Japanese and French military authorities was held at HANOI with the view of attaining a concrete agreement on the offer of military facilities mentioned above and by September 22, this had reached a satisfactory and smooth conclusion.

Def. Doc. #1462-A,B,C

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of The Chief Archives of Foreign Office,  
hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese  
and English consisting of 806 pages (No.1 to No.5) and entitled "Collection  
of Official Statement concerning China Incident" is a document compiled  
and issued by the Japanese Government (The Information Bureau of Foreign  
Office.)

Certified at Tokyo, on this 18 day of Feb., 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed  
hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on the same date

Witness: /S/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: SAWADA, Shigeru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Circumstances of the Occupation of North  
French Indo-China by Japanese Forces.

1. From October 1939 to November 1940 I served as Vice Chief of the General Staff under Imperial Prince KAN-IN, then the Chief of the General Staff.

2. Early settlement of the China Incident was the policy Japan adhered to consistently. After the operations in China began to show a tendency for protraction, I went, with the permission of the Chief and the approval of the War Minister, to Hongkong, where I held a secret liaison conference for peace among the military representatives of Japan and China. This conference however ended in vain, and in

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consequence it became urgently necessary for us to cut off Chungking from North French Indo-China and the Burma Road, both of which were the most important supply routes for Chungking. For this purpose the Japanese Government opened negotiations with the Vichy Regime and the British Government. As a result of these negotiations it was decided that the above Road should be closed voluntarily, and in June 1940 a special committee headed by Maj. Gen. NISHIHARA was dispatched to French Indo-China in order to inspect the conditions at the border.

3. After the closing of the French Indo-China Route, the Chungking Government steadily gathered its forces along the border of French Indo-China, and it was feared they might enter the French territory. These circumstances led Japan to dispatch forces to North French Indo-China for the defense of that area. As a result of negotiations between Tokyo and Vichy, an agreement was reached in August 1940 between Foreign Minister MATSUKA and Ambassador HENRI for the dispatch of Japanese forces to North French Indo-China. The details of the matter were left to agreements to be reached at Hanoi between the military representatives of Japan and French Indo-China.

4. The negotiation in Hanoi encountered no little difficulties. By some means, however, on 4 Sept. we succeeded in bringing it to a point when the agreement was about to be signed. However, an unfortunate event broke out on 5 Sept. The MORIMOTO battalion, on approaching the borders for reconnaissance purposes, was informed by the commander in charge of the French Indo-Chinese border forces, that they were entering Indo-Chinese territory, whereupon the battalion immediately

withdrew. However not a shot was exchanged between them. According to further investigation, it was reportedly not certain, whether the MORIMOTO battalion had or had not, actually, wandered into their territory.

5. Making an excuse of this occurrence, the French Indo-Chinese authorities stiffened their attitude to claim the over-all denunciation of the agreement which was about to be signed. The Japanese, still desirous of peaceful settlement, resumed further negotiations, but the French Indo-Chinese authorities remained uncompromising and we could hardly reach a conclusion.

6. At that time the government of French Indo-China had pledged their loyalty to the Vichy Government. Nevertheless we received information to the effect that such was, more or less, dubious. Especially, the attitude on their part to delay, on some pretext or other, the carrying out of our occupation of Northern French Indo-China, which had already been agreed to by the Vichy Government, raised some suspicion. Thus an Imperial Headquarters finding it necessary to demonstrate a peremptory attitude with regard to the agreement in Hanoi, issued instructions to Maj-Gen NISHIMURA to demand a final answer on the part of the French Indo-Chinese authorities by noon 22 Sept. However, the Imperial Headquarters adhered to bringing the agreement to a satisfactory close, and was quite desirous of making a peaceful advance. Should they refuse, we would have to resort to the alternative of occupation by force, and hereupon, orders were given to the South China

Army to prepare, in advance, for any measures of war or peace. The foregoing orders issued by the Imperial Headquarters were to the effect that if an agreement was to be reached, we would make a peaceful advance from Haiphong in accordance with the said agreement; in case no consent could be obtained by noon 22 Sept., we should commence action at midnight on the 22nd, and make our way by force should their forces offer us resistance. It is reported that this written order has been burnt and no longer exists.

The Chief of the General Staff Headquarters had sent the Chief of Military Operations to direct this action to be taken by the South China Army and was one which required utmost delicacy and prudence in handling.

7. Noon of September 22 was the very moment to decide on war or peace. French Indo-China maintained an unbending attitude. Japan, being eager to keep peace at all costs, gave way at last. Thus the agreement for occupation was finally completed in peace. Therefore the agreement, which was scheduled to be concluded at noon, was actually concluded a few hours past noon.

8. The news of the conclusion of the agreement was immediately dispatched to our South China Army, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army ordered his units to set about peaceful occupation. Unfortunately, however, by that time the forward units of our forces had commenced actions for free occupation on a report that the agreement had not yet been reached at noon, and was advancing through a mountainous region in dispersed order. These forward units did not know that the agreement was

afterwards reached. Therefore at noon, 23 September, they began to enter French-Indo-China, a fact which resulted in the deplorable border hostilities.

9. Thanks to an order from Tokyo and to the adequate remedial measures taken by General ANDO, Commander-in-Chief of the South China Army, before the arrival of that order, the hostilities at the border ceased before entering a serious stage. The Japanese forces returned to French Indo-China all that they had obtained the hostilities. Thus the matter was completely settled.

10. According to the agreement, Japanese transports might have entered the Port of Haiphong under the guidance of the French Navy, but as a fighting had taken place on land to the north, an entry into the port of Haiphong was considered dangerous, and, for this reason, a landing was made in safety on the southern coast without provoking any battle. At the time of this landing, a unit of Japanese patrol-planes dropped some bombs in the suburbs of the city of Haiphong due to a misunderstanding of signals between the commander and his subordinates. As to this, reparations were made for damage and the commander was punished.

11. The military strength of Japanese troops in Indo-China consisted of about 1,000 soldiers in all, if I remember rightly. The Japanese Military Authorities considered it very dangerous to dispatch such a feeble unit alone to a remote foreign land, but, nevertheless, the Chief of the General Staff, in consideration of a principle of peaceful



occupation, decided the least possible military strength that circumstances would allow.

12. The crossing of the frontier by the MORIMOTO Battalion and the occurrence of fighting on the border, were much regretted by the central authorities of Japan, but were nothing but incidental happenings, but from the viewpoint of military discipline, the commander of the battalion, MORIMOTO, and (his regimental commander were committed for military trial and punished, and the two Commanders, namely ANDO and KUNO were dismissed, and degraded to divisional commanders. Moreover, even among the central military authorities, the Chief of the Strategic Section who was in charge of directing the South China Army was transferred.

13. As above, the entry into the northern part of French Indo-China was motivated by the necessity of hastening the settlement of the China Incident and that was the reason why the process of entry had been all the time accompanied by peaceful intentions. That is the commission's inspection was first conducted and the entry itself was put into practice as a result of concessions made on the part of Japan after reiterated negotiations had been made for more than two months with French Indo-China a country not very strong at that time. It was quite natural therefore that there was employed only the least possible military strength the agreement allowed, and, this, to manifest simply our peaceful intentions. In such a manner, the Japanese side tried wholeheartedly to express their sincere desire for peaceful friendship.

On this 14th day of August, 1947.

At Tokyo.

DEFONENT /s/ S. W. D. Shigeru (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1523

Exh. No.

I, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SAWADA, Shigoru (seal)

# EXHIBIT

3014

DEF. DOC. #1687

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

### Sworn Deposition

Depoent ; -- KONDO, Nobutake

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly an admiral.

I was appointed Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff on December 2, 1935 (Shōwa 10) and Commander-in-chief of the Fifth Fleet on December 15, 1938 (Shōwa 13), in which position I served until the following year, 1939 (Shōwa 14).

2. The operation of occupying Hainan Island was planned while I was, as above-mentioned, in the position of the Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff (around November 1938 (Shōwa 13)). I then, as chief of the First Department, that is, the chief of the Operation Department, had charge of

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

drafting the operation plan. Besides, occupying Hainan Island was carried out by the units under command of myself as the Commander-in-chief of the Fifth Fleet. Such being the case, I am very well informed concerning the military situation of those days, the subject of this operation and the state of affairs of the occupation movement.

3. Since the outbreak of the China Affair, Japan keenly realized that, with a view to the early settlement of the Affair, it was strategically necessary, aside from her continuous military efforts, for her to prevent arms and other munitions which had become the source of the Chinese resitant power against Japan from being imported from outside .
4. As a result of the Japanese occupation of Kwangtung which was carried out in October 1938 (shōwa 13), it was possible to keep in check the transport and supply of munitions island from there. Japan, however, found another inland supply route in the south-west of China. Thus the coastal of Kwangchow Bay and Annan Bay areas increased in importance to such an extent that Japan began to feel the necessity of blockading this area in her attempt to check the inland supply from the sea. For doing this thoroughly, the occupation of Hainan Island which it was intended to make one of our advanced

bases, was considered indispensable.

5. Japan, with the progress of her military operations against China, occupied important zones one by one and got into a position to deliver long air attacks upon other important zones. The result of our blockade operation of ingoing supplies to the Chinese Army however, turned out to be far from thorough-going because the spear-head of the Japanese Army did not reach the western part of Kwangtung Province, Kwangsi Province or the Kweichow and Yunan area and especially because it could not attack the South route at several inner important points. Thus Japan desiring to accomplish the aim of blockading her enemy's supply route, found it necessary to establish an air base on Hainanan Island and to make it an advanced base of hers.

6. The Hainan Island Operation was based upon an order, "Occupy Hainan Island," which was issued by the Imperial Headquarter in January 1939 (Showa 14) and was carried out in the form of a joint operation by the Army and Navy. On February 10, 1939 (Shōwa 14) an Army force (one mixed brigade) on a little more than ten transports which had been escorted by the Fifth Fleet under my command, landed on the island at Chengmai Wan Bay on its northern end and occupied Haikow and its vicinity. This started a series of occupations which was made at

various strategic points by our Army and Naval forces. This Japanese-held Island became of not a little help in our subsequent operations against the continental inland regions and the coastal areas of South China. Above all, the successive air attacks upon the South Supply Route were delivered by the air group of this Hainan Air Base.

7. As I mentioned above, the occupation of Hainan Island was made exclusively on the basis of purely strategic requirements. With the development of the conflict to the stage when Japanese troops advanced into French Indo-China and when the Pacific War broke out, this Island came to play a strategic role from considerations of its topography. In no way, however, was this planned from the outset nor did we operate with the intention of occupying the Island permanently.

On this 15th day of May, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ KONDO, Nobutake (seal)

I, YASUDA, Shigeo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) YASUDA, Shigeo (seal)

4

DRF. DCC. #1637

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KONDO, Nobutake (seal)

5-

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TO ROOM 361

德京國際軍醫裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述者

供述者

東京部世田谷區太子堂一六六

近藤信竹

明治十九年九月二十五日生

自分擬我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ允ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上  
次ノ如ク供述致シマス







つたものであります。其の後大國與地及南支沿岸海軍に對する諸作戰に裨益することとなつたが特に南万福給ルートに對する遠征航空攻撃は主として此の海南島遠地から行はれたものであります。

右述べた如く海南島占領は全く純然たる作戰上の要求に基いてなされたものであり、たとへ後になつては局の進展に伴ひ印進陸や太平洋に争勃發するに及び地形の關係から此の方面が作戰上一つの役割を演ずることの結果としてなりました。が之は勿論當初から意圖せられたものではなく又同島を永久に占領する意圖を以て行ひたるものでは絶對にありません。

Def Doc #1687

同日

於東京

立會人

安

田

重

雄

右ハ皆立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）五月十三日 於東京

侯 近 島 信 竹  
近 島 信 竹

Daf Doc #1687

長心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ越へ何事ヲモ誤秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

直 誓

署名  
捺印

近 藤 信 竹

6-15  
Def. Doc. No. 1689

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: ABE, Katsuo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure following in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am a former naval Vice Admiral I occupied the post of chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry from October, 1939 until October, 1940, when I was ordered to Europe, and was chiefly in charge of affairs concerning general naval administration and armaments as well as national defense policy, assisting the Navy Minister and the Navy Vice-Minister.

2. It was while I was in the aforesaid post of chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau that the Japanese Forces marched into the northern part of French Indo-China. Prior to the diplomatic negotiations, it was agreed by the Naval General Staff that, in the capacity of Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, represent the Navy and together with the representative of the Army hold

- 1 -  
**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

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conference with the authorities of the Foreign Office (mostly the Chief of the Bureau of European and Asiatic Affairs and the Treaty Bureau) on the basic problems which might be discussed in the diplomatic negotiations.

3. At the time Japan was taking pains in the disposing of the China Incident, and Imperial Headquarters recognized, that to hasten the settlement of the China Incident it was most necessary to block off the so-called French Indo-China route, the only supply route for Chiang via French Indo-China, and ordered the Expeditionary Forces of the Army to take Nanning temporarily with an eye to bombarding from the Nanning airfield the Yunnan Railway, which led to French Indo-China. Nanning, however, was a very small and unhealthy place and, what was worse, the airfield, being unstable during the rainy season, proved to be of little use for blocking the supply route, and the situation was where materials to aid Chiang went into China as before. Thereupon, under the positive necessity of securing the blocking of the route, the Imperial Headquarters consulted the Navy and Army Ministries about the plan of diplomatic negotiations in which the Foreign Office and the French Government were to talk with each other mutually expressing their sincerest views in realizing the blocking of the route practically and peacefully by the French Indo-Chinese themselves.

4. In compliance with the above intentions, the Foreign Office after much consultation with us, the authorities of the

Def. Doc. No. 1689

Navy and Army, determined to enter into diplomatic negotiations, which were conducted very prudently and patiently, and at length obtained an understanding from the authorities of French Indo-China. And it was decided that observers be posted along the frontier as well as at sea ports and some other places so as to keep an eye on the transportation of aid to Chiang supplies which were sent by way of French Indo-China. And in June, 1940, an observation party, which consisted of Navy and Army men together with officials of the Foreign Office with Major-General NISHIHARA as Chief of section, was sent to French Indo-China. The aim, however, was not attained, and the complete blocking off of the aid to Chiang supply route not readily realized.

To secure the blocking off of the route, the Foreign Office had had talks with Henri, the French Ambassador to Japan, at Tokyo since Aug. 1 of the same year, and on Aug. 30 an understanding as to basic problems such as occupation by Japanese forces of the Tonkin area for the purpose of securing the blocking off of the aid to Chiang supply route, and offering of facilities for our military operations in China, was reached at the talk between Foreign Minister MITSUOKA and Ambassador Henri, concrete details being left to be worked out by the Japanese and French military authorities on the spot.

5. Agreement between the authorities on the spot, however, did not take shape speedily and it was not until Sept. 22, when an agreement was reached at last. But it took much time to notify



Def. Doc. No. 1639

the dispatched troops of the Japanese and French armies of the said agreement, which caused some clashes between the troops near the frontier through misunderstandings. Except for these clash clashes, the agreement was materialized according to peaceful and reciprocal understanding and the occupation was also carried out in peace, which I learned from reports from the spot.

6. In short, the sole aim of the occupation of the Japanese forces of the northern part of French Indo-China, as stated above, was none other than for the acquisition of facilities for military operations for the purpose of blocking off the aid to Chiang supply route. Accordingly the occupation, being of a temporary nature, would have come to an end with the settlement of the China incident. and it was firmly promised at the above stated agreement that the occupied area provided in the agreement was limited to the regions of French Indo-China adjacent to the borders of China and French Indo-China, and that the Japanese Government would respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China as well as French sovereignty over French Indo-China. Japan never had any designs of territorial aggression.

On this 15th day of May, 1947

At Tokio

DEPONENT ABE, Katsuo (seal)

I, YASUDA, Shigeo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness (signed) YASUDA, Shigeo (seal)

Def. Doc. No. 1639

OATH

In accordance with the conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

LEE, 'atsuo 'soal'

Def. Doc. 1689

ERRATA SHEET

Page 1 - second line from bottom add "I" before "represent"

Page 2 - 1st line "Mostly" to "especially"

3rd line "he" to "be"

10th line from bottom "where" to "that"

Def. Doc. #2074

Exh. No.

3016 A

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

4. The Excerpt from the Arrangement, concerning the Construction and Exploitation of the Yunnan Railway.  
(Signed at Peking, Oct. 29, 1903)

The official documents dated 19th and 20th days of March of the 24th year of Kwang-Hsii, corresponding to the 9th and the 10th days of April 1898 were exchanged between Mr. Dubail, charge d'affair of the French Republic, at Peking, and Tsong-Ci-Yamen.

(Omitted)

Article 24

The railway having for its purpose uniquely to give facilities to the commerce, when the construction would be completed and the circulation of the trains commenced, it would not be permitted to use the railway for the purpose of transporting the Anamese salt, and the European troops, or the arms of war or munitions which may be served to the aforesaid European troops. The railway can not transport the objects prohibited by Chinese laws.

If China should engage in a war with a foreign country, this railway could not observe the regulations of the neutrality. It shall be put to the entire disposition of China.

(Abridged)

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Def. Doc. #2074

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Acting Chief of the Archives Section the Depart. for Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of one page and entitled "The Excerpt from the Arrangement, concerning the Construction and the Exploitation of the Railway of Unnan (Oct. 29, 1903)" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (the Dept. for Foreign Affairs).

certified at Tokyo,  
on this 14th day of Aug., 1947

/S/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,  
on the same date

Witness: /S/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)

ERRATA SHEET

DEFENSE DOCUMENT 2074

PAGE

LINE

1

3rd fr.  
bottom

change "a war" to "hostilities"

**COPY**

TO ROOM 361

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)  
Deponent: TERAI, Kunizo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly a naval captain. From 20 November 1938 to 15 December of the same year I was air-group commander on board the Shinsen Maru, following which, till 1 November 1939 I was commander of an air unit of the 16th Air Group stationed at Tongking Bay and I took part in the South China operations.
2. The bombing incident of "Takkei" (Ph.) in French Indo China on 26 August 1939 was believed to have been caused by an airplane under my command when I was commander of the air-unit of the above mentioned 16th Air Group. And for that reason I know the circumstances in detail. However, a considerable length of time has elapsed since that time and as I have no records of that time in hand, I do not recall exact figures.
3. Around 28 August 1939 a telegram from the Navy Ministry, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, was sent to Headquarters 5th Air Corps and also to the 16th Air Group demanding a detailed investigation and a report on existing circumstances, because there was an incident of a seaplane dropping a bomb on "Takkei" in French Indo-China on 26 August 1939 with the possibility of involving an airplane of the 16th Air Group. The reason for ordering an investigation to the 16th Air Group was because it was the only seaplane unit operating in that area at that time. As I was commander of the air-unit of the 16th Air Group I took charge of the investigation.
4. At the time, summing up air-reconnaissance reports and informations from other units it was concluded that

transportation of war-supplies into China through French Indo China was being carried out in a brisk manner. The 16th Air Group received orders to check it and continued daily patrol activities in the French Indo-China and China border areas.

On the day of the incident, 26th August, three airplanes type-15 patrol seaplanes, conducted a reconnaissance mission in the border area. Each plane carried two bombs, 60 kilogram bombs for land purposes, with instructions to attack targets effective in disrupting supply communication lines and in case such targets were not observed, to bomb air-fields, bridges or military installations in the Tungchow vicinity.

From the reports submitted by the air crew members of the above three planes, after returning from the mission, I learned that one plane got astray due to poor weather conditions over the border area and took the following course.

The same plane continued to encounter unfavorable weather and was compelled to keep flying at low altitude. Finally it lost the position of the plane and wasted time in attempting to confirm its own position.

Getting worried about returning to the base and when it decided to jettison the bombs in order to extend its cruising range, it spotted a town below which appeared to be Fungchow, the designated target area. However, due to the fact that it was not sufficiently confident and as it was after the Panay Incident etc., was under strict orders to respect foreign interests paying special attention in this respect, it avoided bombing the city limits and dropped its bombs in the suburbs.

5. In compliance with the enquiry telegram mentioned above, a detailed investigation of that day's occurrence was made but as there were absolutely no other plane than the one already mentioned, I presumed the above mentioned airplane had crossed the border without knowing it and penetrated into French Indo China due to bad weather and the point which the airplane thought to be the Fungchow area was actually the "Takkei" (Ph.) vicinity and I made out a report to that effect. However, compared with the bombs which were carried, it was hard to understand why "casualties were extremely high" as reported by newspaper telegrams and radio broadcasts.



Def. Doc. No. 2080 . .

Judging from the fact that aircrew members avoided bombing city limits, it is still doubtful to me to this day.

Furthermore, at the time of the incident I did not even dream that French Indo China territory was bombed and so I did not make a confirmation of the bombed locality.

6. The Japanese Government, based on the above mentioned report took up the case and through diplomatic channels expressed its regret to the French Indo China authorities and I learned from competent sources that reparations were made. .

On this 25th day of May, 1947  
at Tokyo.

Deponent: /S/ TERA I, Kunizo (seal)

I, YASUDA, Shigeo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
at the same place

Witness: /S/ YASUDA, Shigeo (seal)

#### OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TERA I, Kunizo (seal)

Ex 3018

Def. Doc. # 2016

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

**FILE COPY**

**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: Chikao, Yamamoto  
86 Ko, Niiyamachi, Niiyamura,  
Kitagun, Ehime-ken,  
Born: Oct. 13, 1896

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet  
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country  
I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly a rear admiral. On Nov. 15, 1939 I  
was made a Captain and on the same day was assigned to the  
15th Air Unit Command. I was in this position until Nov.  
15, 1940.

2. This 15th Air Unit was organized at HAINAN in November,  
1939. The Air Unit participated primarily in the operations  
in the South-China sector and it engaged in the bombing of  
the TIEN-YUEH Railway which was at that time an important  
supply route of war needs for the enemy.

3. The mistaken bombing of train on the TIEN-YUEH railway

Def. Doc. # 2016

on Feb. 2, 1940 was done by planes of the 15th Air Unit, the circumstances of which are as follows: (Incidentally, the 15th Air Unit was the sole unit that had participated in the raid and no other unit was involved.)

a) The bombing target had been confined to railway bridges and railways, and the bombing of trains had strictly been prohibited. On that day the bombing was carried out with the 7th bridge as main target.

b) According to the report of the crews on the planes, the air currents were bad at the time of bombing the enemy fighters, were intercepting, and the fire from the enemy anti-aircraft guns was heavy. The bombing was carried out under these adverse circumstances and the bombing altitude was 3,800 meters. Consequently, no one had realized the fact that there was a train on the 7th bridge at the time of bombing.

c) Later, as a result of my close examination of the aerial photographs taken at the time of bombing I discovered what seemed like a train on the bridge, entering half-way into the tunnel just north of the bridge. Therefore, I asked the bombing crews whether or not they had seen a train there at that time, or whether or not they had noticed any damage done to the train. But no one had noticed the existence of the train.

Def. Doc. # 2016

4. Such being the case, the mistake bombing of the train was an accidental incident occurred while the bridge was being bombed to cut off the enemy supply route.

On this 21 day of May, 1947  
at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ Chikao, Yamamoto (seal)

I, Shigeo, Yasuda, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

Witness: /S/ Shigeo, Yasuda (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Chikao, Yamamoto (seal)

Def. Doc. # 2082

Exh. No. 3019

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao et al

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

Sworn Deposition

Deponent :- SAITO, Takegoro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, SAITO, Takegoro, now reside at No. 346, SHIMURA-HASUNE-CHO, ITABASHIKU, TOKYO. At present, I am a secretary of the Archives Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On October 2, 1946, a certificate was issued by me, on behalf of the Chief of the Archives Section, concerning the source and authenticity of the document entitled the "Outline of Foreign Policies of the Japanese Empire (dated September 28, 1940) which was No. 837-4 of International Prosecution Section.

The aforesaid "Outline of Foreign Policies of the Japanese Empire" (dated September 28, 1940) is in file together with three other documents under the cover bearing the title of "Foreign Policies of the

Def. Doc. # 2082

Japanese Empire." <sup>My</sup> certificate referred to above, however, does not cover any of these three documents.

One of the three documents entitled the "Draft of the Japan's Policies toward the Southern Regions" (dated October 4, 1940) and typed on Japanese paper, 9 pages in all, bears no name of the compiler, nor are there any seal or signatures affixed thereto of the persons concerned with the matter or those who examined the document. Consequently, it is not clear whether or not the original of this document was prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On this 14 day of August, 1947.  
at Tokyo.

Deponent /S/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)

I, SUZUKI, Hitoshi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at Tokyo.

Witness : /S/ SUZUKI, Hitoshi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: MIYO, Tatsukichi  
Residence: No. 36, Taira-machi,  
Meguro-Ky, Tokyo-to  
Born: January 12, 1902

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I was formerly a navy captain.

During the period from November 1939 to December 1942, I served as a commander in the Operations Section of the Navy General Staff in the capacity of a staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters, taking charge of affairs relative to aerial operations.

The following is what I was enabled to learn, at that time by virtue of my official position, concerning the advance of Japanese forces to South French Indo-China, which took plan while I was on duty in the Navy General Staff.

1. At the time of my assumption of office in the Navy General Staff, it was a consistent policy pursued not only by the Navy, but by the entire nation, to try and effect speediest possible settlement of the China affair.

Now, Japan's deadlocked land operations in China had created such a situation as requiring the enforcement of economic blockade against China as an all-important factor in the solution of the Incident.

Our advance to South French Indo-China was prompted by various economic and political necessities, but what we, as parties directly concerned in military operations,

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felt most imperative of all reasons for this action was the necessity to avert a collapse of our national defense for one thing, and, for another, to bring the China affair to an early conclusion by means of an over-all economic blockade of our hostile neighbor.

It was about the beginning of July, 1941, if I remember right, that the First Department Chief of the Navy General Staff, while ordering us operation officers to make preparations for the proposed move to French Indo-China, initiated us into the reason briefly in the following terms why such a step was inevitable.

Much to the obstruction to our intended conclusion of the China affair, the Anglo-American aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime through the southwestern part of China is growing increasingly vigorous. Worse still, the United States, Britain, China and the Netherlands are acting in concert, forming against our country the so-called "A B C D Line". They are pushing on with their steady war-preparations and at the same time hardening their economic pressure upon us. Here, in illustration of this fact, we may take the failure of the Japan-Dutch-India negotiations as one of the most outstanding cases.

What is more, their evil influence is now reaching for French Indo-China and Thailand; and in fact, there are indications that the de Gaullist Partisans and other anti-Japanese elements in French Indo-China are, in collusion with the Britishers, inducing all French Indo-China to go over to the Anglo-American camp. There is indeed an unmistakable possibility of its becoming another Syria. If so, it is ten to one that Thailand will allow herself to be won over to the Anglo-American group in view of her prevailing domestic and foreign relations.



Should such a situation be created, the ABCD front would be invincibly fortified, forcing Japan to be completely isolated and shattering our project of blockading China whereby early to settle the Incident. Suppose we had our economic relations with Thailand and French Indo-China broken off, what would be the result? Excluded from Anglo-American trade as we actually are and with the economic negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies ending in failure, Japan would now suffer an economic collapse and be forced to fall on her knees before the joint ABCD pressure, to speak nothing of a successful settlement of the China affair.

"Suppose that British and some other allied forces made a move into French Indo-China, it would be very probable that the de Caullist elements and other anti-Japanese groups, would work together with these occupation troops, and provoke our forces stationed in North French Indo-China to a clash with them, which would ultimately lead to serious consequences.

"If we wish to prevent such an unhappy event to occur, the only possible way for us, though not a desirable one, is to get ahead of other powers by ourselves dispatching troops to South French Indo-China. There is no alternative.

"Speaking from the French standpoint, she will surely welcome the idea of defending her possession in East Asia conjointly with Japan, with a view to preventing it from becoming a second Syria."

2. Relative to the advance of Japanese troops to South French Indo-China, I will mention two facts.

(1) When I took office in the Navy General Staff, I found that the Navy had already been on its guard against Japan being involved in World War II.

The Navy had been consistently opposed to our country entering into an alliance with Germany and Italy, for fear that such a move on our part would cause increasing friction with the United States and Britain, and, moreover, would imply a danger for our country being embroiled in war.

Our Navy, after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, took special caution so that the Pact might not unnecessarily impose fighting obligations on Japan. It absolutely refrained from referring to any idea of concerted military operations with Germany and Italy or similar courses of action; for we were in dread that if we should unwittingly talk about such as any possible agreement among the three nations for joint military operations. Germany and Italy would at once take the Japanese Navy to be disposed to join in the war, and would even try to compell us under the terms of the Pact to fight their battles.

Such was the precaution that was adopted by the Japanese Navy at the time of Japan's occupation of South French Indo-China, and this precautions attitude on the part of our Navy was kept up to the time

immediately before the outbreak of the Pacific War. It is obvious from this fact that before the opening of the Pacific War there had been no joint operation agreement existing among Japan, Germany, and Italy. (2) When the Japanese military move to South French Indo-China was launched, we staff officers who were responsible for the formulation of war plans had no mention whatsoever for war in the Pacific area, nor had we any plans or preparations under such intention. It may clearly be seen from this that the Japanese advance to South French Indo-China was no preliminary step that had been taken in readiness for the Pacific War.

When I first came to make arrangements for the advance to South French Indo-China of our troops, I was much annoyed to find that there was no adequate military information available concerning the place. For instance, when I wanted to know about it, I found there was no data to work upon other than those materials collected by civilian interests, and it was from these meager materials that I managed somehow to get general ideas. The fact-finding survey that was conducted on the spot after our entry into the region revealed numerous errors in our previous calculation.

Immediately before the advance of our troops to South French Indo-China the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands almost simultaneously cut off economic relations with us and placed a ban on their oil exports to Japan. Japan, thus taken by surprise, endeavored to get the strained situation eased in any way, but there was no prospect of her efforts meeting with success; on the contrary things continued to go from bad to worse, with dark clouds hovering overhead. The outcome of all this was the September 6 decision of our National policy.

Immediately following the above decision came orders from our Section Chief in which he said that the Government had decided to make preparations for war that might break out any moment at the A B C D front, and that we operations officers should begin without delay to study and formulate plans of campaign in line with the government policy. To me, as one of the officers in charge of air operations, it appeared, a sheer absurdity to try to fight against the four Powers when we were finding the single China affair too much for us. So I said to the Section Chief; "With our air force so poorly equipped, we can't expect to wage war on the four Powers with confidence of success." Thereupon the chief said admonishingly: "It is not the question of our going into war because we are sure of success, or staying out of it because we are not sure of it. We are simply forced to be ready for any eventuality of war for the sake of self-defense. It is not for a war of our choice that we now stage preparations!"

Faithfully following this admonition of our Section Chief's, we now set to work on the preparation of military operational plans for a self-defensive war in assumption that such might occur and it was with this intention that we pushed on with our undertakings. It was about the beginning of September, that is more than a month after the Japanese military occupation of South French Indo-China that we started to formulate plans with a view to the possibility of a conflict with the four powers which ultimately developed into the Pacific War.

On this 15th day of August, 1947.

At Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ MIYO, TATSUKICHI

I, YASUDA, SHIGEO, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: /S/ YASUDA, SHIGEO.

Def. Doc. # 2097

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ MIYO, TATSUKICHI

643021

Def. Doc. #1989

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: HIGASA, Ken

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I. I am HIGASA, Ken.

I am now dwelling at No. 124, 2 Chome, Kitazawa, Setagaya-District, Tokyo Prefecture.

In the summer of 1941, I was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Japanese Army and occupied the post of staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters.

At the conclusion of the co-defense pact between Japan and French Indo-China, I was despatched by the General Headquarters to aid the spot negotiation which were carried out by Major General Sumita stationed at Hanoi at that time.

II. Major General Sumita was informed by the General Headquarters that the diplomatic negotiation regarding the co-defense of Japan and French Indo-China in July, 1941, was concluded in France on 21, July, between Mr. Darlan, the then Foreign Minister of the Vichy Government and

- 1 -

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

III. The contents of this agreement were none other than that of enforcing details in compliance with the official statement mentioned above. It is composed of concrete measures in detail, such as the movement of Japanese forces, their landing point and landing date, the course of the troops, occupation regions, the facilities for billeting and supplying of the Japanese forces, the removal of breech mechanism from the guns of French Indo-China forces, particularly to avoid the accidental occurrences of collision between Japanese and French Indo-China forces as is set forth in Article II of the official statement, the gist and region of withdrawal of the French Indo-China forces stationed in the vicinity of the beach where Japanese forces plan to land and the establishment of land marks visible from the air at the stationed areas of French Indo-China forces.

Neither the telegram sent from the General Headquarters, nor the agreement documents of that time can be found today.

(refer to the certificate attached)

IV. I flew by air to "gan-a" in the Hainan Island on the day after the conclusion of this agreement, and informed the Supreme Commanders of the Japanese Army and Navy, who were there as occupation forces, the course up to the conclusion and also of the contents of the agreement. We talked especially about the minute arrangements for the prevention of accidental collision.

Then, on or about the following day, the 25th of July, I remember going to Saigon by air with Major General Sumita and others. Detailed

Def. Doc. # 1909

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

on the same date, at the same place.

Witness, /s/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HIGASHI, Ken (seal)

EX 3021

Dof. Doc. # 1989

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

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Mr. MATO, Sotomatsu, the Japanese Ambassador to France, and that the exchange of official statements were made on 22 July, 1941. At the same time he was informed of the arrangement of military cooperation, the contents of which are identical with that of Exhibit No. 651. Although Exhibit No. 651 is dated 29 July, 1941, the contents were reported before this date.

Based upon these informations Major General Sumita immediately opened negotiations with French Indo-China.

At that time the relation between Japanese party and the party from the French Indo-China Government Office was very friendly, and always closely connected. As a result, the spot agreement based on the exchanged official statements, of which Major General Sumita was directly in charge, proceeded smoothly and speedily without any trouble. Together with the Navy and Foreign Office representatives I witnessed the signing between Major General SUMITA Raishiro and Governor-General Decoux. As the representatives of French Indo-China, there were present the Governor-General, the Chief-Secretary, Juan, and several other persons, and the signing was carried out in a very friendly manner.

At the signing, Major General SUMITA asked the French party whether the notification from France containing the same contents as that of Exhibit No. 651 stated above reached French Indo-China party, and the French party affirmed it.

I recall that the date of this agreement was 23, July, 1941.

III. The contents of this agreement were none other than that of enforcing details in compliance with the official statement mentioned above. It is composed of concrete measures in details, such as the movement of Japanese forces, their landing point and landing date, the course of the troops, occupation regions, the facilities for billeting and supplying of the Japanese forces, the removal of breech mechanism from the guns of French Indo-China forces, particularly to avoid the accidental occurrences of collision between Japanese and French Indo-China forces as is set forth in Article II of the official statement, the gist and region of withdrawal of the French Indo-China forces stationed in the vicinity of the beach where Japanese forces plan to land and the establishment of land marks visible from the air at the stationed areas of French Indo-China forces.

Neither the telegram sent from the General Headquarters, nor the agreement documents of that time can be found today.

(refer to the certificate attached)

IV. I flew by air to "gan-a" in the Hainan Island on the day after the conclusion of this agreement, and informed the Supreme Commanders of the Japanese Army and Navy, who were there as occupation forces, the course up to the conclusion and also of the contents of the agreement. We talked especially about the minute arrangements for the prevention of accidental collision.

Then, on or about the following day, the 25th of July, I remember going to Saigon by air with Major General Sumita and others. Detailed

arrangements were made there between. French Indo-China forces stationed there and us. Needless to say, the preliminary agreements etc. between Japan and French Indo-China at Saigon were carried out in a friendly atmosphere throughout these meetings. Scrupulous care and preparations were made lest any accidental collision should occur in the several days prior to the landing of Japanese forces. It was specially planned in advance that the SUMITA Mission shall certify the withdrawal of the French Indo-China forces from the beach, who in turn shall report it to the Japanese forces, and then the landing shall begin. This was executed exactly so. Accordingly a part of the Japanese forces landed on the 28th, and the greater part on the 29th, and no accident occurred.

V. I later found in a document (Court Exhibit No. 651) that the date of the formal signing of the protocol regarding the co-defense of French Indo-China was 29, July, 1941.

However, as mentioned above, the contents of the official statement exchanged by the representatives of both countries on 22 July, were reported to each respective despatched agency, by the governments of Japan and France. Based on this, the pact was concluded harmoniously and the occupation was begun.

On this 29 day of May, 1947.

At the Compound of the International Military Tribunal For East Asia.

DEPONENT /s/ HIGASA Ken (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1909

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I. YOSHIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of the chief of Document Section, the First Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization office, hereby certify that the following documents are at present not in the custody of this Bureau.

1. The telegram in which the General Headquarters informed the SUMITA Mission in French Indo-China on 22 or 23, July, 1941, that an agreement as to the co-defence of French Indo-China was concluded between Japan and France.

2. The pact concluded between SUMITA, Raishiro and Governor-General, Decoux, based upon the said telegram, in March, 1941.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 13 day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /s/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1909

I. KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

on the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HIGASHI, Ken (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1909

E, 3021

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Certified at Tokyo,

on this 13 day of July, 1947

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At the same place, on this same date.

witness: /s/ KIYOSE Ichiro (seal)

Doc. # 1909

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

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- 1 -

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

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On this 29 day of May, 1947.

At the Compound of the International Military Tribunal For East Asia.

DEPONENT /s/ HIGASA Ken (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1909

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

on the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HIGASHI, Ken (seal)

E, 3027

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

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2. The pact concluded between SUMITA, Raishiro and Governor-General, Decoux, based upon the said telegram, in March, 1941.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 13 day of July, 1947


/s/ YOSHIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /s/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

EXCERPTS FROM THE INTERROGATION OF  
TOJO HIDEKI



13 February 1946

- Q. What measures were to be taken in connection with advancing southward?
- A. I think perhaps they were the dispatch of troops into southern Indo-China.
- Q. What other measures were taken in connection with advancing southward?
- A. I think that was all.
- Q. Was anything to be done in connection with Thailand?
- A. I rather think so - in connection with increasing close relations with that country. Previous to this time, on 9 May 1941, Japan had arbitrated the border dispute between Thai and French Indo-China.
- Q. Was it not planned to occupy French Indo-China?
- A. Not at all. Japan concluded a joint defence treaty for the stabilization of French Indo-China on 29 July 1941.
- Q. Prior to that time, had any Japanese troops entered French Indo-China?
- A. No they had not. They were dispatched in accordance with the treaty. The treaty was signed on 29 July 1941 and the troops were dispatched to southern Indo-China on the same day. They entered the country on a basis of the agreement.
- Q. Prior to the treaty in question, had it not been decided in July 1941 to send troops to that country whether French Indo-China agreed or not?
- A. Not at all. A military agreement [gunji kyotei] had been concluded on September 22, 1940, under which the Japanese troops were stationed in northern French Indo-China. The situation was that military pressure from Singapore, the Philippines, and so forth, had continued and, on 25 July 1941, the American freezing of assets had gone into effect and it had become very difficult to carry on peaceful commerce with the Dutch Indies. The China Incident was continuing and the stabilization of French Indo-China was a very important matter. Therefore, on 29 July, troops were sent to the southern part of Indo-China in accordance with the agreement. The Imperial

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Conference had foreseen changes in the situation and had decided to carry on negotiations with France in reference to Indo-China.

\*\*\*\*\*

Q. Was not the real reason why Japan decided in July 1941 to advance southward that she needed raw materials?

A. This was certainly not the main reason. The main reason was the necessity for maintaining stability in French Indo-China while the fighting with China was going on, but Japan did need peaceful trade in order to support production at home as well as to maintain the struggle in China. America had stopped trade with Japan and Japan needed oil, iron ore, bauxite, tin, and food from the south to be gained by peaceful trade.

\*\*\*\*\*

Q. What was there about the stability of Indo-China that necessitated calling an Imperial Conference in July 1941?

A. The China Incident was in progress and Japan was exerting every effort to successfully conclude it. Any disturbed area to the south would have an unfavorable effect on the solution of the incident. Moreover, it had been a Japanese idea for a very long time before this to maintain the stability of East Asia. A third reason is that foodstuffs, principally rice, which were imported from French Indo-China, would be unavailable if conditions were unsettled in French Indo-China. These foodstuffs were very necessary for Japan.

Q. Was it considered by you, as War Minister, that French Indo-China would be militarily useful in connection with the China Incident?

A. Of course, I thought of it. Of course, from the military point of view, there was a practical relation as far as northern French Indo-China was concerned. The supply route north from French Indo-China was of assistance to the Chinese and, furthermore, we wanted, from the military point of view, to establish air bases in northern French Indo-China so as to be able to cut off the route from Burma. However, the fact that French power had declined, as a result of conditions in Europe, necessitated the stationing of troops not only in northern Indo-China but also in the central and southern parts for the maintenance of stability.

\*\*\*\*\*

2. You have mentioned that the presence of Japanese troops in French Indo-China was of assistance in the fighting against the Chinese. Would not the presence of troops in French Indo-China also be of assistance to Japan in case war should break out between Japan and England, America, or Holland?
- A. Economic and military pressure from England, America, and Holland was increasing. The stationing of troops in Indo-China was chiefly to maintain the stability of that country. However, it did assist operations against China and help make peaceful commerce possible. The stationing of troops there was for defensive military protection and was an appropriate measure of national defense, I believe.

\*\*\*\*\*

Def. Doc. #1690 (revised)

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

~~INTERNATIONAL~~ MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

IRAKI, Sadao, et al.

Sworn-Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: NISHIURA, Susumu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was serving in the business concerning the military preparations in the Military Affairs Section, the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry from October 1931 to August 1941, except the period from April 1934 to February 1937 during which I was residing abroad. From August 10, 1941 I was ill and in hospital over a month, and could not work in the office during the period of illness. Was transferred to the post of the Private Secretary to the War Minister in October of the same year, returned to the Military Service Bureau again in April 1942 as the Chief of the Military Affairs Section. Since then until December 1944, I was serving in the business of the same section.
2. First of all, I will speak about the fact that most of the armaments used in the Pacific war was spared or supplied from the military provisions either which had been originally prepared to be used in Manchuria for guarding Manchuria, against USSR or which had been prepared as an emergency in the process of the Sino-Japanese Incident. And it had not been originally prepared to be used in a Pacific war. In the Mobilization Plan of 1941 which had been planned by March of 1941, the organization of the units in operations was as follows:
  - (a) Having a large Baggage Transport-Section in the rear providing against the fighting in severely cold or barren regions.
  - (b) The whole organization of the brigade was equipped so as to be the Mobile Units in operations in Manchuria but under no consideration to be used in the Southern Islands.
  - (c) All the horses needed in the Supply and Baggage Departments were to be Manchurian horses except the horses for the Headquarters (which was one third of the whole horses).



These points are worth notice. Consequently, immediately before using these units in the Southern Regions, we had to change the organization completely to make it suitable for the purpose. And even though the organization had been changed, yet it could not be but a very unadjusted inadequate and incomplete one, when the unit was mobilized to the South. You can surmise the Operation Plan by the distribution of the Supplies for Operation. Noting, for example the distribution of ammunitions and aviation gasolines in the supplies for operations under the direct control of General Headquarters about the spring of 1941:

Ammunitions

In Manchuria	20%
In China Republic	30%
In Japan Proper	50%
In Formosa and French India	0%

Aviation Gasolines

In Manchuria	16%
In China Republic	4%
In Japan Proper	30%
In Formosa and French India	0%

Moreover, by the so-called "Seki Special Manoeuvres" which aimed at the strengthening of the guarding of the USSR Manchuria Boundaries, they began to send forth a considerable portion of the Supplies necessary for the operation which had been preserved within Japan to Manchuria from July or August 1941.

27% of the whole ammunitions and 14% of the whole amount of aviation gasolines were removed to Manchuria.

3. With the decision on National Policy early in September 1941, it was scheduled to make preparation for war by the end of October or thereabouts although we were working for a compromise with America through diplomatic negotiation and were decided not to resort to war with America and Britain except in unavoidable circumstances. But at least in the field of supplies Japan was already blocked entirely by America and England, and there was no room for an increase in output, and what was referred to as a completion of military preparation for the war against America and England was in reality a mere changing of the distribution of the supplies which were already possessed by Japan, or preparation of personnel and materials for developing resources in the Southern Region in case of an outbreak of operations in the South, and Japan was obliged to be content with this.

As for the supplies for operation mentioned above, for the first time, in the period from September 1941 to December, 10% of the ammunition and 12% of the aviation gasoline were transferred to Formosa and French India.

4. As a supplementary explanation, I will give the details of the completion of military preparation for about ten years preceding the Pacific War.

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In September 1931, the Manchurian Affair broke out. The Japanese Army at that time basically consisted of over 17 Divisions and 26 Air Squadrons. (EX. 380) However, although the numerical strength of the Front seems to have been arranged, material to equip them was badly wanting, and even the ammunition allotted to each Brigade on its mobilization was hardly sufficient.

Though it had been decided to produce these munitions by mobilizing all the industrial power of Japan evidently it was only a paper plan and there were many parts that could not be taken seriously. But as we had no concrete remedy for them, we did nothing about that. As for the productive power of aeroplanes and the storage of aviation gasolines they were almost none, and the real substance of the Imperial Army, which was commonly acknowledged to be the strongest army power in the East Asia, was a mere superficial armament that had no content. The amount of consumption of steel in one year by the army at that time was only 20 thousand tons, and the total budget was only about ¥ 200,000,000. Thus being under the restriction of state economy, in spite of the anxiety of the authorities concerned with the military preparations, not only were the preparations of the Japanese Army inferior when compared with those of the other powers, which after participating in the First World War showed a marked advance in their armaments, but they were also substantially getting poorer and poorer. Munitions and other materials produced were merely sufficient to supply the peace time consumption. In such a condition of the military preparation, the Manchurian Affair broke out. However, Japan had promised a cooperative defense with Manchukuo, while on the other hand had to consider the defense of that part of Manchuria which bordered with the great military power of USSR. In addition, she had to face the continued advancement of industries of the USSR, and her increase of the numerical strength in the Eastern Part of "Siberia". All of these necessitated Japan to increase her military power in Manchuria in order to feel secure in the northern region of Manchuria.

But in reality, the economical restriction was as strict as ever and the military power in Manchuria was increased only slightly year by year. For instance, aviation which needed the most urgent progress, the annual amount of production was only about 100 million yen in reality, and the entire Army air unit, which consisted of 26 companies in 1931, was barely increased to 50 some odd companies in 1936. Moreover the make up of these companies was so poor that no one thought it possible to carry out offensive operations.

In the General Staff Office, they considered that if something should arise between Japan and the USSR, the defense of Japan and Manchuria would be impossible unless Japan had at least as many as two thirds of the military strength anticipated to be used in East Asia by the USSR. However, in actuality such strength could never be provided.

So, it was a matter of course that no one had ever thought of preparing for an all out war with China, if such did ensue. Up to the happening of the Lukouchiao Incident in 1937, there had never been any request from the General Staff Office concerning the filling up of the armaments with a view to such an incident. The idea behind the desire to complete the armaments in those days was mainly to be prepared to take counter-measure if and when attacked by the USSR. It was planned with the idea that benzine and other necessary war materials, which were lacking in Japan and Manchuria, could be obtained from the United States and Britain and even from China. Fighting against China, Britain and the United States was never contemplated.

5. In the spring of 1937 when I came back to Japan from European duty to serve in the Military Affairs Office, they were just beginning to realize the above plan to complete the armaments - the plan which was being made intently since 1936 in the way of defense against the USSR. On the other hand they were having much discussion about the plan to expand the productive power of Japanese and Manchurian with the objective of developing industrial economy of the two nations. When we checked the military demand with this plan, the self-sufficiency of fuels in the event of war with USSR, for instance, would be impossible in Japan and Manchuria even if the plan was carried out accordingly. Furthermore we had never in peace time considered stocking the quantity necessary for war time. So the plan was being carried out with the idea of keeping friendly relations with America, England and China etc., even if a war should break out against the USSR.
6. In such a situation as explained above, suddenly the Lukouchiao Affair broke out in July 1937. The affair spread more and more in spite of the Japanese policy and effort to minimize it. The development of the hostile situation gradually made it necessary to mobilize and send to China a Group, which had not been expected necessary. Even the budget for the expedition was barely appropriated in 3 piecemeal amounts during the summer and fall of 1937. And a considerable quantity of the materials which had been accumulated with a great deal of trouble in preparation to defend against the USSR was consumed against China. Moreover, the divisions which were expected to be used in Manchuria had been used in China, and in many cases their organizations and equipment were not suitable for the local situation and we suffered greatly. For instance, though the use of field guns was inconvenient and mountain guns were more expedient in China, most of the Japanese divisions were Field Artillery divisions. Therefore we had to reorganize them with old-fashioned mountain guns. Moreover the consumption on the battlefield far exceeded the amount that could be produced. The mobilization of war industries was not as effective as desired since it had just then begun. The unexpected large-scale operation in China consumed a large amount of war materials on the one hand, and increased the danger in the northern region of Manchuria.

7. Especially the occurrences of the Changkufeng affair in the summer of 1938 and of the Hamonhan affair in 1939 gave us a lesson and a chance to reconsider our military preparations. The lack of our munitions in the Changkufeng affair made us realize the fact that we were capable of supplying only seven and a half divisions in the event the affair spreads. In the Hamonhan affair our capacity of supplying air and mechanized units was inferior when compared with the efficiency of supply of the mighty air and mechanized units of the USSR. These facts made us feel that unless we put our entire efforts in military preparation against the USSR, it was not possible even to carry out the China affair with confidence. On the other hand, as it became evident that the Sino-Japanese affair was going to be prolonged in spite of Japan's desire to settle the affair early, to supply the China theater of war and to increase the security against the North, the drafting of a plan was undertaken in 1939 and the idea conceived was to strengthen the army war supply mobilization for 3 years beginning in 1941. The total budget for the plan was about 100 billion yen, and 40% of it was to be appropriated for supplies in China and the rest was for military preparation in Manchuria. Also the transfer of a munitions industry to Manchuria was tried as much as possible in consideration of war against the Soviet, and it was decided to establish the South Manchuria Plant, etc., in Mukden and in other places. The immediate completion of military preparations being so urgently demanded at that time that the ordnance manufacturing was considerably advanced but the cultivation of the resources which was the basis of the manufacturing industries was much neglected. Especially, liquid fuel, "rubber", bauxite, and alloys of special steel among the war materials of Japan had to be obtained more than ever from abroad, that is America and England due to the expansion of necessary wartime strength and the consequent need of these materials. That is, the material support by America and England, which had been considered to be absolutely necessary in case of war with the Soviet in future, became much more vital. The army of that time, bearing even this serious burden, went ahead to draft the Three Year Plan.
3. As the Sino-Japanese affair progressed, it gradually brought about the anti-Japanese economical oppression of America, England and other countries. The situation became critically worse after the summer of 1940. However, if the relations with America and England should be broken, the Japanese army would be frustrated in carrying out the Sino-Japanese affair as explained above, and besides, it would also mean the upsetting of the foundation of completing military preparations for the defense of Manchuria in view of the frequent armed conflicts actually occurring along the Soviet-Manchuria borders. Also as we had never thought of warring against America and England, we believed we would somehow be able to come through this crisis. We were just unable to change our point of view and engage in military preparations for war against America and England. In fact, the public opinion was anti-American and anti-English and it

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would have been natural for the military authorities to prepare for an emergency because such is their duty. But they had a set traditional idea of defense against the USSR and anybody who knew anything about the material situation in the event of war with America and England were fully aware of the difficulties that would confront Japan in the course of such war. Those facts prevented them from making whole hearted preparations. For the Japanese Army at that time the solution of the China Affair and the military preparation for the defense against the USSR were more than they could handle. Even if full military preparation for war with America and England was ordered by their superiors they would not have been able to do so concretely due to the lack of materials and the budget. Since the middle of 1941, the situation grew worse day by day. In the Japanese Army, the consensus of opinion was to accelerate to reach an agreement through diplomatic negotiations and avoid the dangerous situation. And thus, the summer of 1941 came as mentioned above.

On this 28th day of May, 1947  
at I.M.T.F.E.

Deponent /S/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)

辭及圖書類六二六A-1-0號

東條英機氏問答ヨリノ抜萃

一九四六年二月十三日

REF ID: A660436

問 南方進出ニ關シテ計畫セル諸借置如何

答 多分、佛印南部ヘノ兵力派遣テアツタト思フ。

問 南方進出ニ關シテ他ニ執ツタ借置如何。

答 又レ又ダツタト思フ。

問 泰西ニ關シテ何カ豫定セル計畫アリシヤ。

答 アツタ様ニ思フ。即チ同以トノ友好關係ノ強化ニ關シテアツタ様ニ思

フ。此レヨリ前即チ一九四一年五月九日、日本ハ泰、佛印間ノ國境紛

争ヲ仲裁シタコトガアル。

問 佛印ノ占領ヲ計畫セル事ハナカツタカ。

答 ソシテ事ハ全然ナカツタ。日本ハ一九四一年七月一日、佛印ノ安定ヲ

企圖セル共同防禦條約ヲ締結シタ。

問 コレヨリ前日本草テ、佛印ヘ進駐セルモノガアツタカ。



シ、佛蘭西トノ交渉ヲ續行スルコトニ決定シテ居タノデアアル。

問

日本ガ、一九四一年七月ニ南方進出ヲ決意セル眞ノ理由ハ、原料ヲ必要シタカラテハナイノカ。

答

是ハ勿論第一ノ理由デハナカッタ。第一理由ハ、日支間ニ戦争ガ行ハレテキル限リハ、佛印ニ於イテ安定ヲ維持スルコトガ必要デアツタカラデアアル。併シ亦日本ハ中國ニ於ケル戰鬪ヲ繼續スル爲ニハモトヨリ國內生産ヲ補強スル爲ニモ平和的貿易ヲ尤ニ必要トシテキタ。米國ハ對日貿易ヲ既ニ停止シテキタ、從ツテ日本ハ南方カラ、平和的貿易ニヨリ、油、鐵礦、(ボーキサイト)、錫及食料等ヲ獲得スル必要ガアツタ。

問

印度支那ノ安定ニ關シテ、一九四一年七月ニ御前會議ヲ召集スルニ至ツタ緊急理由ハ何デアツタノカ。

答

日支紛争ハ尙進展中ニシテ、日本ハアラユル努力ヲ盡シ、擧ゲテ其ノ圓滿解決ニ努メテキタノデアアル。從ツテ其ノ南方地域ニ何ラカ紛擾ガ







Def Doc No. 1690

64-223  
**REF ID: A66230**

**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

逓 東 郵 政 省 郵 務 局

亞 米 利 加 合 衆 國 其 他

對

荒 木 貞 夫 其 他

宣 香 供 送 券

供 送 者

西

浦

邊

自分様我國ニ於ハルル方式ニ従ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣香券爲シタル上  
次ノ如ク供送致シマス

一、私ハ一九三一年十月以迄一九四一年八月十日迄此ノ間一九三四年四月ヨリ一九三七年二月迄ノ海外駐在ヲ除キ陸軍省軍務局軍務課ニ於テ陸軍軍備ニ關スル業務ニ従事シテ居リマシタ。一九四一年八月十日ヨリ一ヶ月余ヲ病氣ノタメ入院シ其間ハ軍務局ノ仕事ハ致シマセン、同年十月陸軍大臣秘書官ニ轉出翌一九四二年四月再ビ軍務局ニ入り軍務課長トナリマシテ一九四四年十二月迄同課ノ任職ニ從ヒマシタ

二、先ヅ第一ニ申上グマスコトハ太平洋戦争ニ使用セラレタ陸軍々備ノ大部ハ元來滿洲防衛ノ爲メ計畫セバ對謀防衛ノタメ滿洲方面ニ於テ使用スルコトアルベキナリト爲シテ從來カラ建設セラレタル軍備及日露事變ノ爲メ其進行中ニ嚴密的ニ豫定セラレタル軍備カラ抽出シテ用セラレタルモノデアツテ始メヨリ太平洋方面ニ使用ヲ豫定シテ豫定セラレタル軍備デハナカツタトイフコトデアリマス

昭和十六年度ノ動員計畫ハ昭和十六年三月迄ニ策定セラレタモノデアリマスガ其ノ際ノ我が作戦部隊ノ増強モ

a 時疫不毛地ノ作戦ヲ考慮シテ造大ナル海軍後方機関ヲ有スル  
コト

b 百箇ノ編制ハ悉ク之ヲ滿洲ニ於ケル機動兵團タラシムル  
如ク整備セラレテ居リ南方島嶼用等ノ機動兵團ヲ編成セルモ  
ノナキコト

。兵站物資ヲ所製馬匹ハ悉幹馬（三分モ一）以外ハ滿洲馬ヲ以  
テ充足スル計畫ナリシコト

等ハ注目スベキコトデアリマス。從ヒマシテ此等モ兵團ヲ南方ニ  
使用スルタメニハ其モ直前ニ機動兵團ノ編制改正ヲ行ハザルヲ得ズ  
然モ尙賦に不更ナ片輪ノ編制ヲ以テ出動セシメザルヲ得ナカツタ  
ノデアリマス

又作戦資料ノ配賦ハ其作戦企圖ヲ示知セシムルモノデアリマスガ  
一九四一年終戦ニ於ケル中央直前モ作戦資料中モ海軍及航空用運  
送油ノ配賦状況ニ於テ見ルト云々左ノ通りデアリマス

海 薬

南 洲	二〇%
中 洲	三〇%
内 地	五〇%
臺灣、佛印	〇%

航空用揮發油

南 洲	一六%
中 洲	四〇%
内 地	八〇%
臺灣、佛印	〇%

右ニ加ヘテ更ニ規模擴張ニ伴フ南蘇州境防衛強化ヲ目的トスル所  
 離「阿特頓」ニヨリマシテ一九四一年七、八月頃ヨリ國內ニ果有  
 シテ居リマシタ作戦資材ノ相當數ヲ南洲ニ所送テシテ居リマス  
 球藥ニ就テ言ヘバ全數ノ二七%ヲ航空揮發油ニ就テ言ヘバ一四%  
 テ南洲ニ送シテ居ルノデアリマス。

三 一九四一年九月上旬ノ製鐵決定ニヨリ電力需米外交々渉ノ妥結ニ  
終ムルニ状況異ニ已ムヲ得ザル場合ハ對米英戰争ヲ停セザル決意  
ノ下ニ於テ十月下旬ヲ以テ終テ試導進導サニフコトトセラレタ  
ノデアリマスガ勤クトモ製材ノ面ニ於テハ既ニ本英ノ全面的討伐  
ヲ受ケテ新ニ量的増加ノ余地ハナク對米英戰ノ軍備充實ト申シマ  
シテモ儘カニ既存ノ製材ノ配量ノ變更、萬一南方作戰發生ノ場合  
ノ南方既存資源ノ開發用製材人員ノ進導等ニヨリ満足シテケレバ  
ナリナイ狀況デアリマシタ。

前記作戦製材ニ用シテモ一九四一年九月ヨリ十二月迄ノ期間ニ始  
メテ理英及航空機燃料ニ對シテ警ハバ谷々一〇%及一二%ヲ蓄積及  
弗即六割ニ移送サレタノデアリマス。

三 以下更ニ若干説明ヲ補足スルタメニ太平洋進導争期前約十年間ノ  
陸軍々補充軍ノ深層ヲ中流ベマス。

一九三一年九月滿洲事變ガ勃發後シマシタ當時ニ於ケル日本陸軍  
ハ十七ヶ師團余リト發行二十六中隊數ヲ裁幹トスルモノデアリマ





然シ實ニ於キテハ先ツ攻上ノ副討ハ依然トシテ國ク辛クシク  
タチハナクナリテ加シテ先ツ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有  
トシテモ在リ兵力ヲ海加シテ先ツ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有

東部「モハ」ハ兵力ヲ海加シテ先ツ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有  
聯邦ト禁スル南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有

然シ午ヲ日太女南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有  
就ニ南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有

ナル南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有  
用時ニ於キテハ先ツ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有

シテモ其ノ南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有  
南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有

此ノ南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有  
南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有

一 南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有  
南洋ノ防ヲ整ハシテ更ニ南洋ノ北邊ニ國シテ安全感ヲ有

年々減少ナル在滿兵力ノ増加ヲナシ得タ程ニアリマシテ其例ヲ當  
時日本陸軍トシテ最も急速向上ヲ要シマシタ航空機ニ就テ見マシテ  
モ年産總額一億圓程度ノ生産ヲ實施シ得タニ止マリ全陸軍ノ航空部  
隊モ一九三一年二六中隊ナリシモノガ一九三六年半ウジテ五十隊中  
隊ニナツタ程度デアリ其内容モ貧弱テ到底進取作戰等ハ考ヘラレ  
ナイ状態デアリマシタ  
參謀本部トシテハ少クモ聯邦ト高一事ガ起リマシタ場合聯邦ノ  
東亞ニ於ケル險惡使用兵力ノ三分ノ二程度ノモノヲ以テ對抗シナク  
テハ日滿ノ防衛ハ不可能ト考ヘテ居タ様デアリマスガ到底實際ニ於  
テハ此ノ如キ兵備ヲ整ヘルマニハ出來マセンデシタ  
況ンヤ中國ヲ敵トシテ之ト全面戰爭ヲナス如キ場合ノ兵備ハ考ヘテ  
モ居ラズ一九三七年滿洲橋事件發生當時迄此種ノコトヲ前提トシテ  
ノ軍備充實等ハ參謀本部ヨリモ何モ東京アツタコトハアリマセンデ  
シタ  
當時ノ軍備充實ニ關スル權限トシテハ專ラ第一聯邦一團ヨリ優等

ヲ受ケタトキノ對應ノタメノ措置デアリマシテ揮發油ヲ始メトシ  
各種ノ戰時所要資源中日滿ヲ通ジテ不足スルモノハ米英ヲ始メト  
シ中國ヨリモ輸入可能ナルコトヲ前提トシテ行ハレタモノデアリ  
マシテ中國又ハ米英等ヲ戰爭相手トスルコトハ考ヘテハ厩リマセ  
ンデシタ

一 一九三七年春頃私ガ歐洲駐在ヨリ帰朝シ得ビ軍務局ニ勤務致シマ  
シタ當時ハ丁度右ノ對蘇防衛ニ及ルタル昭和十一年以降ノ軍備充  
實計畫ノ實行ニ着手サレタ時デアリ又他面日滿産業經濟ノ向上ヲ  
測スルタメ日滿生産力調査計畫ガ取リ上ゲラレ盛ニ討論セラレテ  
● 厩リマシタガ此ノ計畫ニ對シ軍事上ノ要求ヲ照シ合セテ見マサル  
● 二對蘇戰發生ノ場合ノ燃料ノ供給ニ一例ヲ取テ見マシテモ假ニ此  
等ノ計畫ガ計畫其儘ニ實現シタトシテモ日滿内ニ於テハ補給ハ不  
可能デアリ然モ平時ヨリ特別ニ戰時所要量ノ貯藏モ考ヘテ厩ラズ  
● 一戰時戰發生ノ場合デモ米英、中國等トハ友好關係ヲ保ツテ行  
クトイフ前提デ仕舞チシテ厩タノデアリマス。

右ノ如キ空氣中ニ於テ突然一九三七年七月盧溝橋事件ガ發生致シ

マシタ。事件ハ日本側ノ不諒大方針ノ努力ニ拘ラズ次々ニ進展シ  
テ去リマシタ。我屬ノ發展ハ逐次豫期シナイ兵國ノ動員派遣ヲ余  
儀ナクセラルルニ至リマシタ。其ノ程度ノ如キモ一九三七年夏ヨ  
リ秋ニカケテ三回ニモ小刻ミニ要求成立スル狀態デアリマシタ。  
又之レ若シ角對禦防禦ノタメニ漸ク苦心シテ蓄積シカケマシタ  
村ニ關分對中國戰ノタメ消費セラレマシタ。更ニ滿洲方面ニ使用  
ヲ決定シテ居タ師團ヲ中國方面ニ使用セバナクナリ編制變  
備モ多現地ノ實情ニ合セズ苦勞ヲ重キマシタ。例ヘバ華中方面  
デハ野砲ノ使用ハ不便デアリ山砲ノ方ガ使ヒ易イノニ日本ノ師團  
ハ多クハ野砲師團デアリ已ムヲ得ズ舊式ノ山砲デ之ヲ編成換エテ  
シタリナドシマシタ。

更ニ國場ノ消耗ハ生産ヲ上廻ルモノニアリ軍需工業動員モ其發足  
間モナキタノ真事實ニ任セズ全ク豫期シナカツタ中國方面ノ大作  
戰ハ一面之ガ莫大ナル戰爭費ガノ消費ヲ伴フト共ニ他面ソレデナ

クテサへ危険ヲ感じテ居マシタ爾洲北邊ノ脅威ヲ爾ガ上ニモ大ナ  
ラシムルニ至リマシタ

尙特ニ一九三八年夏ノ櫻霞臺事件次第翌一九三九年ノ「ノモンハン」  
事件ノ突發ハ全ク我皇軍準備ニ關シ強烈ナル反省ト教訓トヲ與フル  
ニ至リマシタ。

櫻霞臺事件ニ於ケル我砲隊ノ缺乏ハ爾後戰國ガ擴大シタトナルト  
僅カニ七ヶ師団半ノ補充ヲ行ヒ得ルニ過ギナイコト「ノモンハン」  
事件ニ於ケル我軍ノ大ナル航空機甲兵力及ビ之ガ補充能力ニ對  
比シテ我ガ航空、機甲ノ補充能力ノ劣勢等ハ何ントシテモ萬難ヲ  
辨シテ對策準備ヲ向上スルノデナケレバ到底安心シテ日露事變ノ  
遂行ヲ出來ナイトイフコトヲ痛感スルニ至リマシタ。

一方日露事變モ日本ノ早期解決ノ焦慮ニモ拘ラズ迄々長期化ノ策  
大ナルニ至リマシタノデ昭和十四年秋軍ヨリ立案ヲ始メ昭和十五  
年ヲ第一年トシテ對支戰線ノ補充ト對北方安全感ノ増大ニ對スヘ  
キ軍備充實トテ合スル戰軍々諸準備ヲ三ヶ年間に亘リ増強整備ス

ルは横が出来て居りました。其結果ハ約百餘國デアリマス。ソシテ其結果〇%ヲ消費補給ニ、自給ヲ以テ滿洲兵備等ニ充テルコトニシタノデアリマス、又對露戰ノ場合チ百餘シテ軍需工業施設ヲ電力増強ニ進進セシムルコトヲ圖リ滿洲工廠等ヲ奉天其他ニ建設スルコトトセラレマシタ

當時ハ正參軍薩ノ沈黙ニ急ナルノ余リ糧食工業タル兵器加工部門ハ如も發達ノマシタガ其ノ基礎トナル發源培養トイフ點ハ著シク露トナリ得ニ日本ノ戰爭資材ノ内液体燃料特殊鋼ノ配合金屬「ボキシサイト」「ゴム」等ハ戰時所製兵力ノ擴大、從テ此等資源ノ生産量ノ擴大ト共ニ一層進取言セバ華米等ヘノ依存性ヲ擴大フル結果トナリマシタ。即チ將來萬一對露戰ガ發生シタ場合米英等ノ物的後援ヲ絕對ノ條件トシテ活タノデアリマスガ此ノ程度ガ露ニ一層深刻トナツタノデアリマス、

當時ノ露軍トシテハ尙之ヲシモ忍ンデ北方ノミテ考慮シタ此ノ三年間露ヲ立脚シタノデアリマス。

八日米穀の進行一其ニ勢ノ定ク所逐次米穀ノ對日經濟壓迫ヲ勝  
過スルニ至リマシタ。従ニ一九四〇年夏頃カラ其狀態ハ教化シテ  
キマシタ。

然シ乍ラ我國軍トシテハ對米英關係ヲ當局ニ急キマシテハ前述ノ  
如ク口封鎖等を行ニモ支障ヲ來シ又其背後ニ現貨ニ屢々起リマシ  
タ米穀動搖ノ武力威嚇等ヲ顧慮シテ、滿洲防務ノタメノ軍需充實  
ノ急務ヲ急キヨリ取リテモハリマシ又從來對米英等  
國等ハ念頭ニ在リマシタノデ何ントカシテ此ノ危機ハキ  
ク分進ラレルモノト考ヘ仲々對米英等國等ノ軍需充實ヘノ意ノ  
漸次ハ出テマシタ。

專ら對米英關係ハ對米英關係ヲ唱ヘ其當局トシテハ其對米上  
等一ノ場合  
ヲ考ヘ之ニ對スル進路ノ實全テ期スベキデアリマシタデセウガ永  
イ固ノ進軍ノ動向トモイフベキ對米關係一語破リノ觀念ト一方對  
米英等ノ場合或等資源ノ點ニ於テ少シク内部ノ事情ヲ知ルモノニ  
對テハ或等進行上容易ナラマシタ。

本氣ニナツテ準備チスル方向ニハ向ヒマセンデシタ又當時我軍  
トシテハ日露事變ノ解決及對露防衛戰備充實ノタメ手一杯以上デ  
アリマシテ假ニ上司ヨリ對米英戰爭準備ノタメ軍備充實ノ企畫ヲ  
命ゼラレタト致シマシテモ具體的ニハ之ヲ行フダケノ資材、豫算  
等ノ余裕モナカツタデアリマス

一九四一年中頃以來情勢ハ日ヲ逐フテ急迫シテ終リマシタガ陸軍  
トシテハ極力外交々渉ノ妥結ヲ促進シ以テ此ノ危局ヲ回避スヘシ  
トイフノガ一致シタ意見デアリマシテ此ノ如クニシテ前ニ論マ  
シタ加ク一九四一年夏ニ至ツタ次第デアリマス。



昭和二十二年（一九四七年）五月二十八日 於 東京府際事裁判所

供 証 者

西 浦

進

右ハ被告立会人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ証明シマス  
同 日 於

立 会 人

西 浦

進

一

部

Def Dec 10 1890.

宣

署

書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコト  
ヲ誓フ

署名捺印

西

浦

道

*Reflected*

DRF. DOC. #2105

Exh. 3028

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

**FILE COPY**

**RETURN TO ROOM 361**  
(Translation)

Deponent ;-- YOSHINAGA, Yoshitaka.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am YOSHINAGA, Yoshitaka. My residence is No. 226, Unogi-cho, Chofu, Ōta-ku, Tokyo. I was commissioned as Army Artillery 2nd Lieutenant in 1926, and was engaged in the ordnance research work of various nations at the Army Technical Headquarters from 1932 to 1934. From 1936 to the end of war, I was engaged in the planning of research and in the ordnance research of various nations at the Army Technical Headquarters (later the Technical Department, Army Ordnance Administrative Headquarters.)

2. The study of ordnance technique in the Army was made exclusively with consideration for cold-region operations in line with the Anti-Soviet operations. I was after the occupation of the Southern French Indo-China that the Southern operation, that is, the tropical-zone operation were taken into consideration.

3. The fundamental policy of the ordnance research work was directed by the War Minister in 1937 or so, and this policy remained unchanged until 1943. Nothing was indicated in this policy to give consideration to operations in the Southern area.

Consequently, the importance has been attached to the adaptability of weapons in the cold zone. The principal weapons were tried in the cold-zones in North Manchuria every year since 1932 or so, and those weapons which did not

REF. DOC. #2105

pass the tests were not adopted as regular weapons. However, the adaptability in the tropical zone was never taken into consideration.

4. After the occupation of the Southern French Indo-China, it was emphasized that the adaptability of weapons in the tropical zone be also considered in the research work, and the ordnance technicians were sent to Formosa in August, 1941, to test various weapons.

A tropical zone test room for weapons was completed for the first time towards the end of October, 1941.

Thus, the war broke out when the research work regarding the adaptability of weapons in the tropical zone was in its early stage and incomplete.

As a result, the defects of the various kinds of weapons became apparent in the Southern theater of war.

For example, there was a tremendous amount of unusable ammunitions due to the insufficient damp-proof device, and the local units preferred to use captured weapons.

The tanks also had no cooling system, and the research in this line was made only after the war broke out. With regard to railroad, the research had been made as to the various gauges in the Continent, but as to those in the southern regions nothing was done. For the first time in May, 1942 the study of railroads in the South was initiated

5. Since no training was given to the units in handling weapons in the tropics, a part of the units were given a very short unit-to-unit training since around November 1941.

On this 19 day of August, 1947

At the Compound of I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT /S/ YOSHINAGA, Yoshitaka (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: /S/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

3024

3

DEF. DOC. #2105

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ YOSHINAGA Yoshitaka (seal)

443025

Def. Doc. No. 1710

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

ARAKI Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: YOSHIDA, Tosuke

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Affidavit

1). I, Yoshida, Tosuke graduated from the Law Department, Tokyo Imperial University in 1926, and immediately entered the Finance Ministry. I was Chief, Treasury Section, Finance Bureau, Finance Ministry, from January, 1941 through October, 1942. Therefore, I have full knowledge of the procedure concerning military notes. At present, I am the Director of the Kobe Custom House.

2). Military notes were for the use of the armed forces while in military operations, and in no way belong to the ordinary currency, but, in view of their bearing upon the obligations of the national Treasury, their hand-

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Def. Doc. No. 1710

ling had been placed under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Section of the Finance Bureau of the Finance Ministry, so far as the matters concerned were interna , and except when handled by the military itself.

3). In January, 1941 (the 16th year of Showa), the Army requested the Finance Ministry to take steps for printing and manufacturing military notes with denominations in foreign currencies of the southern Regions. Whereupon, in the same month, a Finance Ministry decision on the preparation for the issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations was made, and a printing and manufacturing order was placed with the Printing Office, a Government organ under the direct supervision of the Cabinet. Around May of the same year, a certain of the said military notes had been printed and manufactured. Printing and production of same was also continued thereafter.

4). About the middle of October of the same year, the Army requested the Finance Ministry to take necessary measures for dealing with said military notes. We, the staff the Finance Ministry were working on the draft measures relating thereto. In the meantime a Cabinet change took place on 18 October, 1941, with Mr. Okinori Soga as the new Finance Minister

On 23 October, we completed the drafting of a document entitled "the issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations", which was to be submitted for approval to the Ministers concerned. The draft was passed upon by the respective Bureaus concerned in the Finance Ministry and went to

Def. Doc. No. 1710

Mr. Kaya, the new Minister.

Mr. Kaya showed deep concern about the passage in the summarized particulars relative to the issuance of the military notes with foreign currency denominations in the said draft that reads: "military notes with foreign currency denominations shall be issued, preparing for the eventuality of our taking military operations in South Seas Regions, when they shall be used by the armed forces concerned, in their payment of military expenditures."

He warned "mabe, this passage is not erroneous, but it is inadequate to fully express what the drafting authorities are intending. The Army requests that the military notes prepared beforehand, probably because it fears that exigencies can not be met by setting about the business in a hurry, just when the hostilities have begun. But our country has by no means decided to wage any war. The meaning of drafting this document, therefore, shall be that we want to be provided with measures relating to military notes, in advance, just as a sort of general preparedness to cope with an unexpected eventuality. The document shall make clear the above-said purport and record what is truly meant by the drafters.

Upon this, the Ministry, on 29 October made out and decided upon a document recording the import of Minister Kaya's remark, and annexed it as a reference to the end of



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the above mentioned document for approval, entitled, "the issuance of military notes with foreign currency denomination." This was sent round to and approved by the respective Minister concerned. After being thus approved, the document including the said reference was kept in the Treasury Section, where I worked.

5) The "issuance" of military notes, as mentioned in the abovesaid document, means the crediting by the Bank of Japan to the "other Government deposit" at the Bank, of the amount of military notes manufactured by the Cabinet Printing Office and received by the Bank from the said Office.

On this 13th day of Feb. 1947  
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT YOSHIDA Tosuke (seal)

I, TANAKA Yasumichi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo.

Witness (signed) TANAKA Yasumichi (seal)

Def Doc No. 1710

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

JOSEPH L. BOSQUE (sccl)

5

Def. Doc. #1711

43024

(Military Secret)

(Ko) 29 October, the 16th year of Showa. (1941)

The issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations for the use in the Southern Area military operations.

In view of the present international situations and in case when war plans in the Southern Area are made for an unexpected eventuality in the future; and considering a necessity which may arise in that contingency, the issuance of military notes in foreign denomination shall be made as preparatory measures in order to provide for payment of military expenditures of the unit concerned according to the following general outlines.

Note: The issuance of military notes in the past were decided upon by the Cabinet conference, due to the fact that they were issued just at the time of their actual use. The present issuance, however, being a more preparatory measure conceived for an unexpected eventuality in the future, is decided upon by the Ministers concerned only, pending report to the Cabinet conference if by any chance an emergency truly happens to necessitate their actual use.

1. Military notes with foreign currency denominations shall be issued, preparing for an eventuality of our military operations in the South Seas Regions, when they shall be used by the armed forces concerned, in their payment of military expenditures.

2. When necessary, the military notes shall be converted into Japanese currency.

3. The handling procedures relative to the above two paragraphs shall be established by the Minister of Finance, upon consultation with the Ministers of War and Navy.

Authentication of a certain document

I, the Chief of the Bureau of Finance, the Ministry of Finance, the Japanese Government, hereby certify that the accompanying document, written in Japanese, consisting of one page, and entitled "The issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations for the use in the Southern Area military operations," is a true and correct copy of a document annexed as a reference to the end of a document submitted for approval and duly approved, which is entitled "The issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations," drafted on 22 October, 1941, and approved on 31, same month, same year, and which is in a file kept by the National Fund Sub-Section, the Treasury section, the Bureau of Finance, the Ministry of Finance, the Japanese Government, and entitled "The military notes, the 16th year of Showa (1941)"; and further that the said document submitted for approval and duly approved was delivered to the counsels for the Prosecution at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, at the request of them, in 1946, of which the reference document entitled "The issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations for the use in the Southern Area military operations" was returned to us by the said counsels in 1947.

/s/ Mitsuo KUSHIDA (seal)  
Chief, the Bureau  
of Finance, the  
Ministry of Finance.

At Tokyo

---April, the 22nd year of Showa (1947)

Er 3026

Def. Doc. 1711

I herewith certify that the above signature was added and the seal affixed  
in my presence.

Witness: /S/ Yoshio ISHIDA (seal)  
Chief, the Treasury  
Section, the Bureau  
of Finance, the  
Ministry of Finance.


At same place as above.

On same day as above.

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EX. 3027



ERRATA SHEET

Defense Document No. 1661

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	
2	3rd line fr. bottom	Add "Burma" before "India"
3	9th line fr. bottom	change "defense plan" into "defensive operational plan; strike out (This sentence is not clear)
3	last line	insert "had" between operation and not.
9	14	Change "occupation of" to "advancement of troops into"
12	last line	Change "resolve to fight" to "not to evade war".
11	end of first paragraph	insert (Exhibit 588)
13	6th line fr. bottom	delete "the territories of"
14	11-12	"material oil is great change completely different" shall read "strategic material, oil is completely different"
16	Para #4 line 2	delete "advance" add "attained"
14	15	"Lee IV" should be stricken out.
15	9	Change "complition" to completion
17	1st line	delete "initial"
18	6	change "very" to "vary"
20	1st	change "occupational) to "go ahead"
21	4th	change "its Sub-divisions" to "High Command"
22	7th fr. bottom	change "fine" to "time"
24	2nd	insert after "in" "Formosa"
24	5	change . . . "camouflaging and arriving" to "fitting out and equipping"
25	7	change "selfs" to "self"
27	2nd fr. bottom	insert after "were" "to" and delete "made" and insert "out"

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PAGE   LINE

29       3

change "attached" to "attacked"



Ex 3027

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: TANAKA, Shinichi

1. Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Tanaka, Shinichi. I am an ex-Lieutenant-General and now live at 2042 Yokoseko, Mizusawa-mura, Miye-gun, in Miye Prefecture.

I was on duty as chief of the first section (operations planning) in the General Staff Office from 12 October 1940 to 7 December 1942. Now I shall depose here about the operational plan and preparations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in which I took part in the past.

2. First I shall explain the operational plan and preparations for the year 1941. In the conference for the 1941's peace-time operations plan held in the winter of 1940, the Chief of the General Staff adopted a draft for the Southern operations, which was almost the same in contents with that of the previous year. In other words, the draft was a purely technical provision for defensive operations, a program which the Supreme Command used to make annually as a part of general peace-time national defence plan. This draft has been burned and is not available for the present. However, I am sure I can tell the following facts according to my recollections.

a. A major part of the peacetime operations plan for the Japanese army consisted of defensive preparations against the Soviet Union, in point of quantity as well as quality.

Therefore in deciding upon an annual peacetime operational plan, the thing to be done first of all was usually to define an outline of the anti-Soviet defensive plan (its rough projects, forces and materials needed for it, etc.) laying aside all other considerations for the time being. It was only after this was finished that the operational plan for the South came up for consideration.

It was as if it were secondary and supplementary in importance. No stress was laid upon it, sometimes it was nothing more than a paper plan in rough and abstract form. It was not too much to say that nothing concrete was found in the operational preparations for the South. The plan projected for the year 1941 was also of the same nature.

b. According to the design in the above program, if a war should break out between Japan and the United States, measures to be taken were limited to the occupation of the Philippines and Guam and in consequence the capture of American military bases in the Far East. It never contained in any sense detailed plans or preparations against possible attack from the mainland of the United States which might have been expected to follow as a necessary consequence in such an event.

An Anti-American operational plan would have been projected as against a possible over-all attack by the main forces of the United States. If it were so, the extent and scope of the plan would have been wider and more complicated in anticipation of a protracted war. In this case the question when and where would be the end of the war would have been a key point to decide beforehand.

The Japanese operations plan, however, never referred to this essential point and touched only upon operations against the American military bases in the Far East. Even offensive actions against Hawaii, not to speak of the mainland, was not taken into account in the plan. The reasons were that priority was given to the defensive plan and moreover that our national power could not stand such operations. Another important reason was that Japan's sole aim was to drive away the imminent threats. It was entirely unnecessary further to wage war with the United States. This was the fundamental attitude of the Japanese army in making up the year 1941's plan and had been so in the annual programs that preceded it. As to Britain the following was the measures to be worked out by 1941's plan, in case a war should break out with her: It is true that we had the idea, in case of war to capture first her military bases in the Far East, such as Singapore or Hongkong, but no concrete plans were prepared for that. India, Australia and other British territories were never contemplated in the plan. It was the same also with the Netherlands East Indies. The actual conditions did not

allow Japan to plan simultaneous operations against more than two countries including the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, as she had not sufficient military forces and national resources to venture such a war. On the other hand, inasmuch as it was very difficult to foresee the development of such a many-sided war it was admitted that in such a case we should have somehow to combine the separate plans originally designed as against individual nations into an over-all plan of operation. The Supreme Command, however, had of course an idea to take some political measures as far as possible not to launch such simultaneous operations.

c. The above mentioned strategy meant that we should, at the outset of war, check their attack in a passive way for a while and afterwards take an offensive and thus maintain defensive attitude. Of course, we expected that, according to the progress of operations, in some cases it might be necessary to cope with the offensive of the enemy, to give up fruitless passiveness and to turn to an effective counter attack as soon as possible.

However, in view of the insufficiency of operational preparations that could be expected within 1941, it was quite clear at the beginning of that year that not only in the earlier months but also as late as at the end of the year we would be still unable even to carry out the passive formulae of operation, not to speak of checking at once an offensive attack from some country. In this connection, detailed accounts shall be given in a later paragraph.

It was generally admitted that the preparations had to be completed only through steady and continual efforts over a long period, because of Japan's poor condition in strategic resources war funds and munitions production. It was because we had no capacity to meet the need of a crisis, if once it happened, with drastic measures on a grand scale. So the incompleteness of preparations meant complete impossibility to make operations. These facts clearly show that the plan for the year together with its preparatory programs could not meet even the requirements of the defense plan for 1941. (This sentence is not clear)

d. The peacetime operations program for 1941 was drafted and decided upon by the General Staff Office as stated in the foregoing explanations, but a further study was never attempted for framing a concrete policy. No permanent army headquarters had yet come into being standing on a permanent foothold to be in charge of execution of Southern operations in case of a crisis. Even divisions necessary for the operation not yet been designated.

3. Here I am going to explain some facts in relation to the drafting of peacetime operational plan for 1941.

a. The core of the peacetime operational plan for 1941 lay in the basic policy of Japan to: avoid, in view of the current state of things both within and without, any over-all war with other countries so that Japan might devote all her efforts to the solution of the China Incident; to try to bring the South Problems then pending between Japan and other countries to a prompt settlement by some means short of war; and above all to block the so-called Aid-Chiang routes of the Third Powers. These were the points which General Sugiyama Gen., Chief of the General Staff, who was in charge of command over the General Staff Office as whole and of national defense and tactics pointed out as essential to the drafting of operational plans, when he gave an instruction to me, chief of the first section (in charge of operations) as well as to Lt.-General Tsukada, Osamu, vice-chief of the General Staff Office (who was in charge of controlling general affairs and of adjusting policy and strategy).

b. Why war should be averted from strategical points of view was clear from the following circumstances: In the winter of 1941 at the drafting conference of the plan for the following year, the number of forces needed for war-time emergency was estimated by the War Ministry at forty-eight divisions in total. If they were divided into a few groups which would be dispatched each for one quarter, namely about thirty divisions for anti-Soviet defence, about ten divisions for the China operations five divisions for guarding against the United States and Britain and a few divisions in reserve for the Imperial Headquarters, there would have been no doubt big shortage of forces in every quarter. It was true especially with regard to the amount of tanks, motor-cars, communication facilities and liquid fuels. Further, in anticipation of a crisis with the United States and Britain in the future, considerable increase was required above all in the number of army corps for defensive purposes in this direction, amounting to at least a little more than ten divisions in the early period of emergency. Therefore, there should have been prepared about ten divisions for the China operations, a little more than twenty divisions for the anti-Soviet defense and a few in reserve for the Imperial Headquarters. The Chief of the General Staff recognized that, in such a case, shortage of armed forces and war materials would be much more acute and such a war would compel us to leave the China Incident completely fruitless. The chief further concluded that Japan should keep up a policy to avert a wholesale war from the viewpoints of both politics and strategy. In this respect, I understood, the War Minister also had agreed in opinion with the chief.

(c) Besides, in framing the plan, the following matters underwent special examination in an interview I had with the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in my capacity as Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff. The question was in what the strategy of the Japanese Army would be affected by the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. The discussion was held in November of 1940, and the result was as given below:

The general view held by the Vice-Chief was mainly that Japan should by every means avert any resort to arms in so far as the justice and fame of our nation be maintained, however imminent the compulsion of the Tripartite Pact. I agreed with him on this point. The conclusion, of course, was a result of consideration from a purely strategical point of view. The final decision whether to resort to arms or not was a matter left to our state policy. The question whether or not any of the contracting parties to the Tripartite Pact was really attacked by the United States, was a matter for future judgement which was to be decided in relation with the circumstances at that time and from a fair and independent viewpoint. We ought to keep up this attitude with a firm belief and make a due judgement in view of the whole destiny of our nation. In case Japan should be attacked from the United States, Germany would, of course, give us a military aid of some sort. However, considering the fact that Germany was then absorbed in the European wars and that her military power was never limitless and besides in view of the circumstance that Germany was not a big naval power and situated remote from East Asia and the Western Pacific, (an expected battlefield in case of a war between Japan and the United States), the Japanese Army could not expect a strategical aid from Germany. On the other hand, in case Germany should be attacked by the United States, Japan would be obliged to give aid to Germany by arms. Japan, however, could not afford to engage in military operations against the United States exclusively for the purpose of aiding Germany. On the contrary, she had to devote herself to her own independent operations in order to complete a general national defense. In case a war should break out between the United States and Germany, we should find out some measures or other to meet the circumstance. It was especially the case at that time when the Japanese Army had no surplus in armed forces.

These were the gist of the conclusion.

The Chief of the General Staff approved the above conclusion and made clear his views in agreement with the Vice-Chief that the 1941 peacetime operations plan should be designed and established from an independent viewpoint; that it should not be restricted or given any support from outside; and that it should not be influenced in strategy by the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance Pact. The 1941 peacetime operations plan was founded upon this principle.

C. As to preparations accompanying the 1941 peacetime operations plan, I recognized that they were lacking in thoroughness, for the Southern operations (for defense) were left out of consideration in the plan and therefore these areas remained untouched or without defense.

(a) For the South, even the study prerequisite for the defense of that area was left incomplete or untouched as to organization, equipment, materials and training of forces to be employed for landing and tropical operations.

For although the most urgent and immediate need of the time was to reform the organization and equipment of a part of army forces and give them special training so that they might be used for the Southern operations against the United States and Britain as provided in the peacetime national defense plan, it could hardly be expected that

these preparations would be finished even in their crude form by the summer of 1941, if it be set about at once.

In the 1941 mobilization plan, emphasis was laid on the completion of defense in Manchuria against the Soviet by reorganizing each division so as to adapt it to operations in continental climate, especially in the cold wildernesses of North Manchuria. The organization and equipment thus prepared for the troops were entirely opposite in nature to those for the South. Particularly, transport goods to be accommodated for each division was of a great amount, and a majority of horses for transport and communication was expected to be Manchurian ponies. From this it was clear that the Japanese Army laid greater stress upon the defensive operations against the Soviet Union than upon those against the United States and Britain, even at the beginning of the period covered by the 1941 operations and mobilization plan, that is, in April 1941. As for the equipment of army airplanes, only sixty or seventy percent out of the original mobilization plan was expected to be reached before August, 1941. Among them, especially, heavy bombers which had been originally designed for defensive purposes for the Manchurian-Soviet frontier, had but a small flying range and were not well fitted for Southern operations. As stated in the above paragraph, aviation facilities on the whole were not available for Southern operations.

(b) As regards the stock of ammunitions for operational purposes, only a small amount was piled up for the Southern operations during the period between the spring and the summer of 1941. At the end of September and later in October, there was accumulated an additional amount and afterwards, until December, it reached in total barely to the amount available for some ten divisions at the most. The accumulation, however, had not been calculated in the aforesaid preparations which had been based upon 1941's peacetime operations plan, but it was carried out chiefly after the determination of national policy.

(c) As mentioned before, the preparations in the 1941 plan meant chiefly: reorganization and training of several divisions so as to fit them for the guard and defense in the South; study of tactics in the tropics; study of landing tactics; collection of information and strategical materials. They were essential matters of study for framing a peacetime national defense and were not the prerequisites for the execution of wars against the United States, Britain and Holland. Moreover, it was too late in commencement and was not rapid in progress. In addition to this, information concerning the South, particularly military conditions, weather, topography, land and marine meteorology were found incomplete and no bases were prepared for aviation, sea-transport and communication activities.

(d) In view of the actual condition as above stated as well as the expected progress of preparations within the designated year, even passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect. Much more difficult was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive actions or an instant counter-attack against the enemy's offensive.

We tried, however, to meet at least the minimum requirements of defensive preparations in an effort to make up for such shortages in the preparations.

There were many difficulties found in the way of execution due to the want of military funds and materials in the Army Ministry and the insufficiency of investigation by the Supreme Command. It was not before September of the year that preparations in organizing armed forces and war materials were first launched. They were to a greater extent

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applications from those originally prepared for the defense against the Soviets, or some such modifications for meeting an emergency.

III. I shall state here about the plan and preparations which were adopted after the decision on a national policy was arrived at as a result of the Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941, (Exhibit 588).

A. On 2 July, immediately after the decision of a national policy, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the General Staff gave the following explanations to the chiefs of all sections in his staff in connection with the problem of the United States and Britain, which had been fully discussed at the Conference. Above all, he stressed the need of propelling the once-fixed policy and accordingly the study and preparations for moving into South French Indo-China.

(a) The fixed principles should not be changed fundamentally as to the solution of the China Incident. We should however, strengthen pressure upon Chungking from the South and check up the routes for helping Chiang Kai-shek. While, on the other hand, if circumstances admit, we should exercise belligerent rights against Chungking and take over hostile foreign settlements into our hands. We must pay utmost vigilance to every circumstance, especially to the United States and Britain, in taking up such measures. The pressure upon Chungking from the South had to be effected also by the practical application of policies already established toward French Indo-China. It was an urgent need to dispose of the hostile foreign settlements in China, as they were presenting a great obstacle in the way of settling the China Incident. It was more desirable to solve it through diplomatic means, but, if circumstances do not admit, we should have to take them over by force through the New Central Government of China. In that case, there would be some danger of strained relations with the Anglo-Americans. Something more serious than the occupation of South French Indo-China might happen in diplomatic relations with those countries. Therefore, we must never be in haste in the solution. This was the reason why foreign settlements in China were decided to be taken over, if the case required it. Anyhow we must be ready, if the worst comes, not to evade a defensive war against the Anglo-Americans.

(b) The Southern policy was made up generally on the basis of the once-fixed national policy and aimed at the advancement of troops into South French Indo-China. The policy especially confirmed the need of maintaining readiness for a war against the United States and Britain. Nevertheless, it did not mean Japan was determined to make a war. It only admitted that, if Japan should suffer a military interference from the United States and Great Britain in the way of executing her policy toward Siam and French Indo-China through peaceful and diplomatic means, she would never shun operations for self-defense in those areas. In that case, every effort was to be paid to avoid armed forces entering Siam. As to the real purport of the expression of "not to evade war towards Britain and America" in the above decision, it has been understood from the atmosphere of the Imperial Conference itself and the real intention of the Navy, that by them it was expected that Japan would successfully carry out her policy in peace toward French Indo-China and Siam, without causing any trouble with the Anglo-Americans, if she paid possible efforts for the cause. The expression that Japan was not afraid of war with the United States and

Britain meant only that we would not be in danger of stimulating a war by taking a policy toward French Indo-China; however, any interference or challenge from Anglo-Americans, if they were turned toward us, might cause an unexpected situation; thus, we should make a careful preparation for carrying out a policy toward French Indo-China and should have a firm determination to get ready for the worst. We also foresaw a future time on the side of the Army, when our defensive activities would be greatly enlarged to permit us a more careful consideration of Southern problems, as our preparations were not ready as compared with those against the Soviet Union and China. Anyhow, in view of the situation where Japan's sphere of defense was enlarged up to French Indo-China, the first step to be taken was a practical study of operations plan against the United States and Britain from various points of view.



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(c) The outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union was making extremely pointed the relations between Japan and the Union. In addition American aid to the Soviet Union and the construction of military bases by the United States in the Soviet territory in the Far East were making the Japanese-Soviet relations more intricate and serious. In this respect, special consideration must be given in connection with the Anglo-American problems.

(d) In the conference held on 2 July, every member in attendance expressed the same desire to carry out a peaceful advancement following the international treaties as far as possible. The War Minister also disclosed his intention to do his best in order not to cause any trouble at the time of advancement, as had happened formerly in North French Indo-China last autumn. The Supreme Command, calculating on this intended to dispatch the Imperial Guard Division then stationed in South China to French Indo-China in order to complete the advancement. For this cause, we decided to make good use of the results of investigation made last June and establish and intimate cooperation and communication between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff, especially in adjusting the relations between politics and military operations.

(a) The Chief of the General Staff, who had agreed in view with the Government and the Army General Staff late in June 1941, pointed out that the aim of advancement of South French Indo-China, was both to cut the Chiang Kai-shek route formerly established there and thus to contribute to the establishment of economic autonomy of Japan. He further stressed that with this in view, we should first of all secure friendship and reliance from French Indo-China. Moreover, he stated to the following effect:

Both the Central authorities of the Army and the troops on the spot should pay full respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity and other rights of France with an understanding that the Japanese Embassy in French Indo-China and the troops on the spot must not fail to make control and communication between themselves, and in connection with this a decisive measure for control must be taken among the stationed troops. Even common soldiers must be fully aware that every misunderstanding or disagreement should be avoided by both peoples due to the difference in manners, customs and languages of the two nations. This he emphasized at the conference for the mapping out of the advancement program.

B. I give the following as a supplement to the above statement in relations to the stationing of troops in South French Indo-China.

(a) As to the possibility of peaceful advancement into South French Indo-China, General Sugiyama, the Chief of the General Staff, clarified his view early in July that Japan did not take French Indo-China for an enemy and the advancement was not of a military occupation. He concluded that there was a favorable prospect on the side of France to admit a peaceful advance, on condition that we could convince them of the purpose of our stationing of troops, though it would not be an easy task. Early in July, it was informed that Britain might march into French Indo-China beforehand, as she was aware of our intention to make advancement there. Anxiety would prevail among us if this would cause any untoward accident at the time of our occupation. The Chief believed that our attitude, if maintained just, fair and firm, would not give rise to any trouble by the conduct of British Armies.

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(b) The invasion of Chinese Armies into North French Indo-China was at this time a matter of great concern for the Central authorities of the Army and for the dispatched forces stationed in South China and French Indo-China. Early in July, information reached us that three divisions of Chungking's Army, hitherto stationed near the border

between China and French Indo-China, received an order to enter into French Indo-China. In order to meet this situation, the first section of the General Staff made a secret study of a plan of reinforcing one regiment of infantry, if needed temporarily, and moreover even to despatch one division then stationed in Canton. On the other hand, early in 1941 the General Staff gave out information to the effect that Chinese forces amounting to four armies or about 16 divisions were stationed in face of French Indo-China, in the districts of Lungchow, Tsinghsi and Mongtze, Chinese territories adjacent to the districts of Langson and Laokay, situated at the northeast border of French Indo-China.

C. As already mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff asked on 2 July 1941, shortly after the Imperial Conference, to make a thorough investigation upon the strategy toward the United States and Britain. Following this, at the end of July, when the occupation of South French Indo-China was put into operation, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the first section were urged by the Chief of the General Staff for the promotion of the study. The results of the investigation at that time were like below:

(a) The preparations generally required at the time, were put into practice within the limits of the already-fixed plan established early in the year. They were: -- studies in various fields of operations, studies of defensive plans to meet a critical situation on the basis of the present annual plan; and new investigations and preparations for the defense of French Indo-China on the principle of Franco-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreement.

Detailed accounts of preparations were made also within the scope of the established policy including the promotion of training, equipments, supplies and sanitation. It was an urgent need to make up for the loss suffered in the operations in China.

(b) The decision of national policy reached on 2 July and its consequent result, the Franco-Japanese military cooperation for the mutual defense of French Indo-China, had its aim in the protection of that area from the United States and Britain. The matter had never been imagined in the past annual operations plans. It was a new theme claiming a totally different study and preparations on the part of the General Staff. Our armed forces stationed in French Indo-China after the occupation of the Southern part of that area amounted to one brigade and one flying corps (two companies) for North French Indo-China and one division (in order not to interfere with the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations, no forces except the airplane engineers corps were stationed there in addition to the above one division) were assigned for the defense of French Indo-China from the threat of invasion by the United States, Britain and De Gaulle regime or the invasion or other aggressions by the Chinese forces. The General Staff, not going farther beyond the limit of an informal study on the reinforcement of units which had been reserved for crisis in China and Formosa, left further measures to the Army on the spot. While, construction of air bases and installation of communication facilities were going on according to the provisions of official agreement reached between Japan and France, other measures were also taken into consideration as shown in the above statement.

(c) It was likely that Japanese operational measures for self-defense against the United States and Britain which might follow the mutual defense agreement with French Indo-China or other similar circumstances, would naturally cover the main areas (such as Malaya, the Philippines), and would develop into military operations necessary for defending the Japanese homeland. Therefore, it became a pressing need to propel a further study in the operational plan in anticipation of a future situation. The Chief of the General Staff then requested the Vice-Chief and the Chief of the First Section to promote the study on the plan,

including the study of operations in the tropics, on the sea, in the air and of landing in areas such as the Philippines, Malay, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Bismark Islands, Guam, etc. Likewise, the Chief of the Second Section was asked to collect informations and materials on military affairs in the South and the Chief of the Third Section was given an instruction to speed up a study on the war materials for ocean and landing operations.

IV. I shall now explain matters in connection with the operations plan and preparations after the decision or national policy made as a result of the Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941.

A. In early September 1941 the Chief of the Army General Staff at a meeting attended by the Vice Chief of Staff and chiefs of departments explained the items in the above-mentioned national policy which related to the United States and Great Britain, the gist being as follows:

In short, it was a request for reconsideration of the operations plan and the furtherance of or the making of a new start in the operational preparations in order to cope with the situation.

1. The national policy decided on 6 September reflects a strong consciousness of the critical importance of national defense. In other words, the question of how to cope with the present critical situation, especially the offensive actions of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands toward Japan and of how to cope with the reality of the daily diminishing resilience of our national strength in the face of the Anglo-American freezing of our assets, especially the embargo on oil, the complete loss of which is now but a matter of time -- how to cope with this critically grave situation and how to save the fate of the nation -- these are questions

which our country must answer. In order to solve these questions and in crying need as our country is of measures to surmount the difficulties, ever in the event of our falling into the worst possible situation, it has been decided to pursue our diplomacy in all seriousness on the two-fold policy of diplomacy and war preparations with an attitude of making efforts for peace, but ready to fight if peace fails. This is what the national policy decision provides for. For this purpose it was decided that, while seeking the attainment of the objectives of the negotiations with a time limit on the one hand, completion of war preparations with a time limit shall be made with a resolve to meet possible eventualities when war against the United States (Great Britain and the Netherlands) is unavoidable from the standpoint of self-preservation and self-defense. The nation's position on peace or war is to be decided in the early part of October (1941). These are the matters the aforementioned national policy decision provides for. In short, the decision on national policy both in name and in fact is not a decision resolving on war, but a decision whose object is to bring about a new turn in the situation through diplomacy. The hastening of defensive war preparations is directed against the offensive actions of the Powers against Japan with a will and resolve to fight in case war cannot be averted.

It should be emphasized that the primary principal of the decision is to attain our objective through diplomacy.

2. In comparing the decision of 2 July and that of 6 September there are differences in the fundamental points.

(a) With respect to what might be the cause for conflict between Japan and the United States and Great Britain the earlier decision was limited to the problem of Siam and French Indo-China, especially the latter, where as the later decision reflects the fact that the area and actuality of friction between Japan and the United States and Great Britain have become greatly enlarged and far more serious as a result of the American-British-Dutch offensive against Japan, the embargo and the situation with regard to the resilience of Japanese national strength. In other words, Japan was to demand by sheer force of circumstances that the United States and Great Britain refrain from interfering in and obstructing the solution of China Incident, and from threatening Japan's national defense, and offer their cooperation in acquiring raw materials. She further was to demand of the United States and Great Britain recognition of the special relations between Japan and French Indo-China, the non-establishment of military interests in the territories of Siam, the Netherland East Indies, China and the Soviet Far East, and confirmation that there will be no military reinforcements in the Far East. Moreover, the later decision also provided that Japan naturally would agree to concessions to a considerable degree in return for the foregoing demands.

(b) Should by any chance military operations be undertaken under the earlier decision, the objective was to carry out measures concerning French Indo-China, while in the later case, the nation's self-preservation and self-defense would be the motive.

(c) Whereas the former decision considered French Indo-China as essentially the center of the area of operations, the area of operations under the latter would expand widely.

(d) Accordingly, it is only natural that there should be differences in the strategical concept.

(e) The situation regarding the strategic material oil is great change completely different from what it was at the time of the July decision. Now the much feared danger signal that our national defense would be rendered powerless can be seen in this single item. (See IV. refer to IV, F).

3. As this decision on national policy is a demand for acceleration of operational preparations directed toward the South, the General Staff is required urgently to complete the actual plan on an overall basis. In connection with operational preparations the fixed annual peacetime plan and the supplementation made after 2 July, shall be further accelerated and perfected. In addition necessary operational preparations shall be begun anew. The Supreme Command feels especially the need for a deep reconsideration of the fact



that the annual plan for the year 1941 is insufficient, incomplete and impractical and the accompanying preparations for defense betrays weakness and lack of thoroughness, In view of the situation, the chief of the General Staff have given directions to the Vice-Chief and the chief of the First Division on the following matter as an operational formula to be newly adopted. It is, in substance, that the national policy decision of 6 September is an order for the completion of operational preparations on a general scale regardless of whether or not they are offensive or defensive in nature. As the first operational formula to be adopted, Japan shall in the early stage counter passively the attacks of the American, British and Dutch forces singly or severally and then after completing operational preparations turn to the offensive to secure the defense of our land. In such a case we must recognize that we cannot avoid carrying out continuously operations necessary for our self-preservation and defense, and preparations toward this end shall be completed. As to the second operational formula, although we shall counter the attacks of the opposing party, we shall without falling into a defensive position undertake repulsive actions by counter-attacking from the very outset and then carry out the strategy indicated in the first formula, as to which of the above two we should rely on or whether other plans

(such as special defense in some particular spot) should be adopted, the choice would naturally be determined by the situation within and without our country at the time of the commencement of hostilities and the degree of completion of our national policy in meeting that situation as well as the state of our military and naval preparations. At such a time the various conditions surrounding the navy would have a decisive importance. As for the army Supreme Command, it was directed that whatever may be the circumstances, the army's objective was to carry out operations which, if possible would immediately repulse the opposition's initial attack and that various studies and preparations be carried forward with this in view.

4. Although the formula of operations to be adopted and the aim of preparations to be advanced are, as stated above, there is no alternative at present than to undertake defensive operations at first. In other words, while on the one hand we must undertake to perfect all emergency measures in planning and preparing our strategy of defense, we must, on the other as operational preparations are gradually pushed to completion make it our principle to plan and prepare urgent matters in an orderly manner so that there will be no miscarriage in the execution of our defensive or offensive strategy which ever it may be. This, from this day on ward, has become the important subject of study especially of the

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Supreme Command. At the same time, the possibility of initial  
an initial attack by the opposition before the completion  
of Japanese preparations by the latter part of October, is  
a matter worthy of deep caution and prudent consideration  
on the part of the operation authorities.

B. About the middle of September, the General Staff decided upon a plan of defensive strategy to be adopted for the time being in the South, based upon the September national policy decision and prepared according to the following mental attitude:

1. The defensive strategy for the South to be taken by the Japanese army shall vary according to the stage of progress of operational preparations, but on the whole, it shall be on a very small scale. In the final analysis its primary object will be the defense of French Indo-China itself from the attack of the opposition. From the actual state of our present operational preparations we cannot engage in operations in other areas in the Southern region. Hence, in such an event grave difficulties would arise in the defense of Japanese territory and protection of our marine transportation.

2. As such operations as the foregoing amounts to a great failure from the standpoint of national defense, we should quickly abandon such a passive and harmful operational formula and turn from a purely defensive position to a passive offensive. This requires speedy progress in our operational preparations such as would permit a change over to emergency operational command for our self-preservation and defense.

3. In case such operations are unavoidably given rise to, much

against our wishes, the principle of operational command and other methods as are deemed proper shall be established in accordance with the actual state of progress of operational preparations. In this connection, no directions in advance are deemed necessary to be given to the forces on the spot (forces stationed in French Indo-china). This is regarded as disadvantageous to us.

C. Since about this time, the General Staff, was constantly apprehensive lest there be a possible attack initiated by the United States and Great Britain, considered it highly necessary to prepare fully against it. Hence there was great concern in our defensive operational command in this period when preparations for operations in the South were incomplete. On 6 November, 1941, the Imperial Headquarters sent to the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army an order to prepare for the capture of strategic points in the Southern Region.

This order permitted him, in the event of an initial attack by the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands or one of them, to meet the attack with the forces under his command for purposes of self-defense. In an order issued on 1, December, 1941 the Imperial Headquarters directed that in the event of a serious initial Anglo-American attack the Supreme Commander shall, in cooperation with the navy, commence

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offensive (occupational) operations at a proper time. As can thus be seen, these orders were issued out of a deep concern over a possible initial attack by the United States and Great Britain. There were also grave apprehensions over a possible British invasion of Siam.

D. The state of operational preparations about the middle of September was generally as follows: In connection with the preparations both under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry and the joint jurisdiction of the Ministry and its Sub-divisions all matters were vigorously advanced through cooperation between them, but delay could not be avoided. This was principally due to lack of materials and shipping.

1. Although it was the plan of the General Staff gradually to release units of the 5th and 18th divisions from the China operations for employment in the French Indo-China area, their education, training and equipment having recovered to some extent about this time to enable them to engage in operations, yet their recovery and perfection especially preparations which would accord with the requirements of operations in the South were far from sufficient. (These divisions were at first being concentrated for return to Japan and demobilization, but in view of the situation in the South, Their return home was called off and they were made to stand by in China.)

These divisions had been on duty maintaining public peace and safety in China (near Shanghai and Canton). In addition, they were primarily engaged in military training. Even in case an incident with the United States and Great Britain should suddenly occur and these divisions are dispatched to cope with it, they would require nearly two months before they could actually engage in defensive actions, the time being necessary to complete concentration, transportation and other various preparations.

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In addition, to the above, several more divisions engaged in the China operations were scheduled to be transferred to the Southern operations in accordance with future requirements, as well as three additional divisions in Japan proper and Formosa.

2. Ammunition for the Southern operations for approximately 10 divisions to engage in battle was scheduled to be stocked up in Formosa and French Indo-China and it was planned that as a part of the scheme the first stock pile be created in Formosa about the end of September, but its execution was extremely doubtful because of the shortage of shipping. Conditions were such that even if all difficulties were overcome in transporting and accumulating the entire stock, the accumulation could not be completed until the end of December. The ammunition to be stocked up was for general operations and not as equipment for the forces. My subordinates were able to learn of the above from their contacts with the various bureaus of the War Ministry which were concerned with these matters. Moreover, about this time the Standard amount of ammunition to be used for the Southern operations was considered to be one and one-half times the general standard and it was on this standard that the basis for the stock-piling of ammunition was set up.

3. After the middle of September, 1941, a part of our forces was despatched to the South from Manchuria and the Japanese Homeland. The newly despatched forces were: One division a tank regiment an independent anti-tank unit, air force ground crews, signal corps, and



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supply forces for South China, a tank corps headquarters, a tank regiment, an independent anti-tank-unit, an air corps, artillery corps, signal corps, and supply forces for Formosa; and an independent mixed regiment, air force ground crews and supply forces for French Indo-China.

4. Since about this time, aviation and shipping installations were being reinforced or newly created in French Indo-China and South China; supply bases were being established in South China, Formosa and French Indo-China; the requisitioning of shipping and the camouflaging and arming of ships were begun or their effectuation being facilitated; and necessary training of army corps and air forces intended for use in the operations was being accelerated.

E. In the meantime, I learned from the Replenishment Bureau of the War Ministry about the actual situation relative to preparations pertaining to liquid fuels, the gist being as follows:

Assuming that Japan would continue the China Incident through 1941 and 1942 generally under the international situation now prevailing, her holdings of aviation gasoline and heavy oil in 1943 after dedicating the amount expected to be consumed in these two years would be extremely small and sufficient to meet the requirements of no more than one year of military operations. The reserve of heavy oil especially is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Navy to conduct decisive operations for no more than half a year. The foregoing estimates are based on the total reserves within Japan. Furthermore domestically produced crude oil, synthetic crude oil, alcohol etc., are far from sufficient to have any effect on the general situation, while with respect to synthetic oil there was no prospect of obtaining them in great volume. In other words if the present conditions remained unchanged during the two years, it was clear that our defensive strength would

diminish as a matter of course to a state of complete powerlessness.

F. In the Army department of the Imperial Headquarters an overall operation plan against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands was being formulated on the basis of past studies, experience and collected data, but the chief of the General Staff conceived of the plan of operations to capture strategic points in the Southern Region in order to establish Japan's position of self preservation and defense by breaking through and covering the ABCD encirclement immediately in the event Japan is provoked and challenged after the early part of October 1941 and on this basis issued directions for the formulation and study of initial operations against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. This draft plan obtained the approval of the General Staff late in October, and in the middle of November, was definitely established as a plan both in name and in fact. The foregoing does not mean, however, that the Japanese army, had after the early part of October, the intention to capture key points in the Southern Region or that there was such a possibility. It merely indicated the course of development of the study of plans of operation. At the same time, it was but a natural expression to cope with the situation caused by extreme difficulty of adjusting Japanese-American relations and the strengthening of the encirclement of Japan in East Asia. Moreover, it was but a result of a study of means by which to meet a situation in which Japan might be compelled unavoidably

to act for her self defense even at the risk of throwing herself into the very jaws of death.

G. The preparations started on the basis of decision of 6 September, 1941, were to be suspended, in the event peace was decided as the national policy on the occasion for the decision for peace or war which was scheduled to be made in early October. If, on the contrary, a decision for war was adopted at that time, formal preparations were to be vigorously pushed forward and completed by the end of the same month. However, the preparations actually did not progress as rapidly as had been expected. This was because the decision for peace or war as a national policy had not been made on early October as scheduled and a period of indecision continued until the advent of the TOJO Cabinet in the middle of October. Then from shortly after the formation of the TOJO Cabinet until early in November, Japan's policy vis a vis the United States and Great Britain had been returned to a clean slate. Meanwhile operational preparations in this period were unavoidably slowed down or their effectuation held in abeyance. In this period the mobilization of troops, the requisitioning of shipping, and the establishment of military bases were greatly retarded. However, as I will state, later, operational preparations proceeded on a full scale after the Liaison Conference in early November indicated the outline of national policy.

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H. Japanese foreign policy and operational preparations based upon the decision made as a result of the Imperial Conference on 6 September, 1941, were coordinated according to the following consideration:

1. On the day before the Imperial Conference on 6 September, a complete mutual agreement was reached between the Prime Minister and the Army and Navy chiefs of the Supreme Command on the point that the first principle of the National policy decision was to obtain Japan's objectives through diplomatic negotiations and therefore from the theoretical standpoint Clause Two of the decision should come before Clause One and that war was not desired but was to be resorted to only if absolutely unavoidable, that the essence of the decision lied in diplomatic negotiations.

2. Full consideration should be paid in the carrying out of preparations so as not to hinder the diplomatic negotiation. With this in view the armed forces to be sent into South French Indo-China in addition to those already stationed there should be limited only to ground crews of the air force.

3. Necessary mobilization to follow the decision on national policy of 6 September was, even after it was put into effect, to be suspended, if the diplomatic negotiations made a turn for the better. The foregoing items, 1 and 2, were to be decided by the consultation between the chief of the General Staff and the War Minister.

4. All operational preparations were to be carried made on the principle that it will not to impede or obstruct the diplomatic negotiations.

V. I shall now speak of matters relating to the operational plan and preparations after the adoption of Proposals A and B, vis a vis, the United States reached after the Imperial Conference of 5 November, 1941.

A. The explanations made by the Chief and Vice Chief of the Army General Staff on the same day, 5 November 1941, to the chiefs of various divisions of the General Staff Office, were in substance as follows:

At the Liaison Conferences held daily from the latter part of October to the early part of November, prior to the decision of 5 November, it was recognized that the relations between Japan and the United States were at last approaching the final stage where a choice had to be made between peace or war, but it was agreed that efforts will be continued to effect a diplomatic settlement while maintaining, as heretofore, the two-fold policy of diplomacy and war preparations as a means of tiding over the critical situation. However, there was a time limit on both the diplomatic steps and war preparations. Operational preparations were to be carried forward with the resolve that if a settlement could not be reached through diplomatic negotiations, then an appeal to arms would be made as a last resort and preparations hereafter were to be on a full scale. The decision was explained as being the same as that of 6 September in that a resolution for war was not made. With regard to when operational preparations should be completed, the Chief of Staff on this same occasion, expressed the view that that goal should be set for the end of November or beginning of December.

B. With the intensification of a crisis in the relations between the two countries, full scale preparations were launched after 5 November on the two-fold principle of diplomacy and preparations with the intention to leave no stone unturned in the consideration of measures with which to cope with the worst eventuality. I am familiar with these matters as they were in my line of duty and their gist is as follows:

(1) In addition to the vigorous advancement of the preparations, which were hitherto being made, mobilization and deployment of troops, requisitioning of ships and the establishment of military bases were carried out with the utmost effort. The Army's operational preparations for the initial phase of operations were being completed with the end of November as the goal.

(2) The overall plan of operations of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were under study and discussion parallel with the government's diplomatic efforts. It was late in October that it became a final plan and it was formally adopted both in name and in fact in the middle of November (about the 15th). (See C below). The establishment of the plan of operations for the General Army for the Southern Region and other armies under it in the field took place later.

(3) The organization of operational armies, namely, the order of battle of the Southern Army and the order pertaining to important personnel including the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army and others under him were issued on 6 November, and on the same day an Imperial Headquarters order concerning the operational preparations of the Southern Army was transmitted. The gist was that the Supreme Commander shall prepare for the capture of key areas in the South from bases in French Indo-China,

South China, Formosa and the Southwest Pacific Islands, employing his main forces and in cooperation with the Navy. In case he is attacked by American, British and Dutch forces, he is empowered to meet the attack with the forces under his command.

(4) On 8 November, in Tokyo, an agreement for joint operations was made between the Headquarters of the Southern General Army and the combined fleet.

(5) On 15 November the Imperial Headquarters notified the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army of the outline to be followed in the operations to capture and occupy key areas in the South. The areas to be captured and occupied were the Philippine Islands, British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and a part of southern Burma. It was further directed that the stability of Siam and French Indo-China be maintained with all possible effort.

(6) It was after 5 November that operational army corps to serve under the Southern General Army left for their areas of service from Japan, China, and Formosa. These army corps were to be returned home at any time, when the negotiations between Japan and the United States reached a settlement. In this connection, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave direct instructions to Gen. TERAUCHI, the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army, and the latter readily acknowledged it.

(7) As to the supply, the necessary preparations were generally nearing completion after the middle of November.

(8) All the full scale war preparations stated above were not the result of a decision for war. Hence, if the Japanese-American negotiations were successfully consummated, all the preparations were to be halted and returned to a clean slate. In this respect there was a complete agreement between the General Staff and the War Ministry as well as the Naval Supreme Command. The suspension of preparations was a matter of considerable difficulty and required coolness and boldness of will and speedy and organized handling of business relating thereto. At that time the Chief of the General Staff was full of confidence in this respect.

C. Although both the original and copies of the operational plan for the Southern Region which was established in the middle of November, 1941, were destroyed by fire, the general outline thereof which I retain in my memory is as follows:

(1) The outline of the plan is given in paragraph 1 and onward, but it is to be borne in mind that it was to be abandoned if the diplomatic negotiations reached a settlement before the outbreak of war.

(2) The areas of operations in the South were to be the Philippine Islands, Guam, Hong-kong, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Bismark Islands and Dutch Timor.

(3) Operations were to be commenced simultaneously against the Philippines and British Malaya through close cooperation between the Army and Navy and completed in the shortest possible time.

(4) Armed forces to be employed in the operations were to consist of 11 divisions, 9 tank regiments, 2 aviation corps and other units under the army's direct command. The division of these forces into army corps and their areas of assignment were scheduled as follows:

The 14th Army of the Southern Army, consisting of two divisions as its mainstay and assigned to the Philippines area; the 15th Army,

consisting of two divisions was assigned to maintain stability in Siam and operations in Burma; the 16th Army, consisting of three divisions (of which two divisions were to be transferred after the end of other operations) were assigned to the Netherlands Indies area; the 25th Army, consisting of four divisions, was assigned to engage in operations against Malaya and Singapore; the air force was to consist of two air corps as its mainstay; the 23rd Army under the command of the China Expeditionary Forces, was assigned to operations in the Hong-Kong area, with one division as its mainstay; detachments in the Southern sea area under the directed command of the Imperial Headquarters were to consist of three infantry battalions as their mainstay and assigned to operations against Guam, the Bismark Islands, etc., and another division was to be assigned to maintain stability in French Indo-China.

(5) The date for the commencement of operations was to be fixed after the decision for war was made. As set forth above, the operational plan and preparations of the Japanese Army varied in the scale of their objective, the degree of precision and their strength in accordance with the relaxation or intensification of the international situation and the demands of defense during the period between spring and early winter in 1941. In every case it was a stipulation of operational technique and naturally not a war plan. Moreover the Japanese Supreme Command had nothing which can be called a war program in time of peace. The same was the case with the Japanese Government. This concludes my testimony.

On this 16th day of May, 1947, at IMTFE.

DEPONENT

TANAKA, Shinichi (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date - At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, MIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of The Chief of Archives Section, 1st Demobilization Office, Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the following 4 documents were burnt at the termination of War and that they are in the custody of 1st Demobilization Office Documents are as follows:

The plan of Imperial Military Operation of 16th year of Showa (1941)

The command concerning, "Preparation for attack on Important Southern Regions" which was issued by the Imperial Headquarters Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army, on the 6th of November 16th year of Showa (1941)

Operational order concerning "Attack on Important Southern Regions with holding plan of Attack" which was issued by the Imperial Headquarters to the Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army, on the 15th of November 16th year of Showa (1941).

Imperial Headquarter order concerning opening of hostility, on the 1st of December, 16th year of Showa (1941).

Certified at Tokyo

on the 25 day of July, 1947.

MIYAMA, YOZO  
Chief of the Archives Section,  
the 1st Demobilization Bureau.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on the same date

Witness:

KIYOSE, Ichiro

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ソノハハ及「ソノ」及「ソノ」之ニ依ツテ米國ノ極東ニ於テヤ  
白作戦計画ニ於テハ米國ノ極東ニ於テヤ

リテ又

ト謂フモ言フナキ状態ヲツク。昭和十一年陸軍省方作戦計画  
ノモリ計画ノ概要且抽象的ヲリ作戦準備ヲ具スルニシテ  
計画及準備ノ概シテ後述スルニシテ、然レモ、陸軍省方作戦  
方作戦ノ諸ハ第一種ノ時ニ於テハ、陸軍省方作戦計画ノ  
且自主的ニ決シテ、陸軍省方作戦計画ノ規程（兵力、物資、  
先ヅ「對ソ」防衛作戦計画ノ規程）ノ先ヅ（準備先  
ハ「知野」作戦ヲツクテ、從テ、陸軍省方作戦計画ノ規程  
日、本陸軍省方作戦計画ノ一部ヲツクテ、陸軍省方作戦計  
画ニ付テハ、口トシテ、確シテ、律ニ即チ



ルニ在リ是以外ニ米國ト戦フヘキ何等ノ必要ヲ認メサリシニ依ル。是レ従来及昭和十六年度作戰計畫立案ニ対スル日本陸軍ヲ基本的態度ヲアツタ。又昭和十六年度作戰計畫書ニ於ケル対英關係事項ハ英國トノ間ニ作戰勃発スル場合我ハ香港、シンガポール等極東ニ於ケル英國ノ軍事根據ヲ攻略スヘキ着想ハ存シタルモ其具體策ハ立テラレテ居ナイ。尚緬甸、印度及濠洲ニ対スル作戰計畫ヲ有セス其他英領ニ対シテハ之ヲ有シナイ。次ニ蘭印方面ニ対スル作戰ハ全然考究セラレテナイ。尚米英等ニ國以上ニ対スル同時作戰ニ就テハ十分ナル國力及戦ハヲ有セサル実狀ニ於テ之カ計畫ノ立案ハ至難ノコトニ屬シ又一方此ノ如キ情勢ノ生起ハ之ヲ豫想スルコトスラ至難ナリシヲ以テ萬一此クノ如キ場合ハ対一國作戰ノ計畫ヲ綜合應用シテ適宜作戰スルノ外ナシトノ趣旨ヲ採擇セラレテアツタ勿論右ノ如キ作戰殊ニ數國同時作戰ノ発







ニ依ルノデアル

(2)

昭和十六年度平時作戰計畫策定ニ関聯シタ次ノ数件ヲ供述スル

(1)

昭和十六年度平時作戰計畫策定、根據ハ國家内外ノ情勢上日本ハ全

面的ニ戰爭ヲ回避シテ專ラ支那事変ノ處理ニ邁進シ又南方問題ノ第一

國上戰爭ニ至ラサル限度ニ於テ之カ解決ニ努ム此際特ニ英三國ノ機密

禁絶ノ實現ヲ圖ルトイフ國家政策ノ根本方針ニ存シタ之ハ昭和十五年

十一月初參謀總長ハ參謀本部全部ヲ指揮シ國防用兵ニ關スル責任者

杉山元大將カ次長ハ參謀本部全般ノ事務統轄及政策上作戰上ノ調整ノ

担任ニシテ次長ハ塚田攻中將ハ及第一部長ハ作戰ニ關スル事項担任

タル予ニ對シ作戰計畫立案審議ノ根本的態度トシテ示サシタモノテ

ツタ

(4)

作戰の見地ヨリニスル戰爭回避ノ要請ハ次ノ如クテアツタ、即チ昭和







独ニ対スル作戦的援助ノ期待ハ當然問題外トスルノ外ハナイ又独乙カ  
米國ノ攻撃ヲ受ケタル場合ニ於テハ日本ハ独乙ニ対シテ武力的援助ヲ  
発動スルノ義務ヲ負フコトナルノテアルカ日本陸軍トシテハ特ニ對  
独武力援助ヲ目的トマル對米作戦行動ハ之ヲ考慮外ニオキ一般國防ノ  
範圍内ニ於ケル日本ノ自主的作戦計畫ヲ策定スヘク萬一米独開戦ノ場  
合ノ措置ハ其時ノ情勢ニ依ツテ善處スベキテアル時ニ日本陸軍ノ兵力  
ニ余カヲ有シナイ実情ニ於テ特ニ然リトスルトイフノデアツタ。

參謀總長ハ以上ヲ是認シ且次長ト共ニ昭和十六年度平時作戦計畫ハ三  
國同盟條約ノ存在ニ依リテ作戦上奇襲ヲ受ケ又ハ影響ヲ受ケル等ノコ  
トハ全然考慮外ニオキ何等ノ控束又ハ支援ヲ受クルコトナキ自主的立  
場ニ於テ之ヲ立案策定スヘシトノ見解ヲ明カニシタ。而シテ昭和十六  
年度平時作戦計畫ハ此ノ趣旨ニ徹底シタノデアリマシタ。

〆ニテ滿洲方面に對シテハ「ハ」の對等ノ完結ヲ圖ルニ由リテ大ニマシムカニカニ於テ  
 此ノ作戦ニ適應スルニ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ  
 カツタ又昭和十六年夏期ニ於テハ非サレハ通リ初メ其ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ  
 シテ昭和十六年夏期ニ於テハ非サレハ通リ初メ其ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ  
 此ノトシテハ非サレハ通リ初メ其ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ  
 部ノ一節ヲ南ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ  
 未著手ノ狀態ニ於テハ非サレハ通リ初メ其ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ  
 應ルニ部ノ一節ヲ南ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ  
 即チ先ヅク才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ  
 在リテハ非サレハ通リ初メ其ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ

(3) 昭和十六年夏期ニ於テハ非サレハ通リ初メ其ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ此ノ對等ノ才力ヲ延ハシテ下ニ於テ

師團ノ編成裝備カ南方作戰向キトハ全然對蹠的ナリシハ勿論特ニ陸大ナル輜重ヲ有シ且兵站輜重ノ所要馬ノ大部ヲ滿洲馬ニ仰ク計畫テアツタリ此コトニ於テ明カナル如ク昭和十六年度作戰計畫及動員計畫ノ発定期ノル同年四月頃ニ於テモ日本陸軍ノ作戰準備ハ對ソヒ防衛至上ニアリ米英ノ對象トスルモノテハ無カツタ。又陸軍航空ノ裝備ハ昭和十六年八月頃マテ二年度動員計畫ノ裝備ノ六乃至七割ノ整備ヲ豫想シ得ルニ過キナカツタノミナラス而カモ陸軍飛行機就中重爆撃機ハ專ラ滿ソレ國境方面ノ防衛ヲ考慮シテ設計セラレタル關係上航続距離小ニシテ南方ノ作戰ニ適應シテ居ナカツタ事例ニ見ル如ク航空全般ヲ通シ南方向キテハナカツタ。

(四) 作戰用彈藥ノ集積ノ經過ニ就テ見レハ昭和十六年春夏ノ時期間南方作戰用ノ集積ハ零テ下リ同年九月末及十月頃ニ於テ一部ヲ集積シ次テ

同十二月迄ニ既集積ノモノヲ加ヘテ通計約十師團會戰分余ヲ集積シタ  
ニ過キナカツタカ而カモ是等集積ハ十六年度平時作戰計畫ニ基ク作戰  
準備事項ニ非ス昭和十六年九月六日ノ國策決定ノ後ニ主トシテ措置セ  
ラレタモリテアル

(ハ) 以上ノ如ク昭和十六年度平時作戰計畫ニ伴フヘキ作戰準備事項トシ  
テハ主トシテ南方防衛警戒ニ充當ヲ豫定スヘキ數個師團ノ編成改正及  
之カ訓練 熱地ニ於ケル戰鬪法ノ研究 上陸戰鬪法ノ研究 情報ノ收  
集 兵器資料ノ收集等テアツタカ何レモ平時一般國防ノ範圍ニ屬スル  
モノテアリ何等對米 英 蘭作戰ノ實現ヲ前提トスルモノテハナカ  
ク而カモ其著手進捗共ニ遅々タルモノテアツタ 加フルニ南方ノ情  
報特ニ軍情 天候 地形 氣象 海象等ノ兵器地誌ノ資料ハ極メテ不  
備ナリ航空 海運及兵站ノ基地ノ設備ヲ有シアラヌ又実情テアツタ



(二) 以上ノ如キ実情ニ鑑ミ特ニ年度内ニ於ケル作戰準備進捗ノ狀況ヲ設  
想スルトキハ昭和十六年度ニ於テハ差當リ消極的專守防衛作戰スラ実  
行困難ノ状態テアリ況ンヤ防勢ノ後攻勢ニ出テントスル受勳攻勢ノ如  
キ更ニ相キハ先制攻撃ニ対シ即時反撃ノ実行ノ如キハ不可能ノ実情テ  
アツタ

而シテ以上ノ様ニ作戰準備ノ不備致陷ヲ是正シテ防衛守勢ノ最小限  
充實ヲ圖ラントシタノテアルカ之ハ陸軍省カ之ニ應スヘキ豫算及資材  
取得シアラサルコト及從來ノ統帥部ノ研究調査ノ不備ニ依テ至<sup>大</sup>ナル製  
時ヲ受ケツツアツタ殊ニ兵力及資材方面ニ於テ眞面目ニ作戰準備ノ実  
現ニ著キシ得タノハ主トシテ昭和十六年九月以降テアリ、ソレモ從來  
對ソ防衛ノ為建設セシレツツアツタ兵力及資材中ヨリ所要ノモノヲ捻  
出シ且少要ニ應シテ之ニ應急的ノ補備是正ヲ加ヘタモ其大部分テアツタ

第三 昭和十六年七月二日御前會議ヲ經テ國策決定ヲ見タル後ニ於ケル作戰ノ計畫及準備ニ關係スル事項ニ就テ述ベマス。

(中) 昭和十六年七月二日國策決定ノ直後、即チ七月二日三日ノ頃ニ參謀總長及次長カ其部下タル各部長ニ對シ右國策中對米英關係ニ付イテ説明ヲ與ヘタコトハ、次ノ厚旨テアリマシタ。而シテ之ハ作戰準備ノ既定方針ヲ推進スルト共ニ作戰ニ関スル研究ヲ徹底スルコト並南部佛印進駐ニ伴フ事項ヲ準備スルコトヲ要求スルモノテアリマシタ。

(イ) 支那事變處理ニ就テハ之ハ既定ノ方針ト其ノ根本ニ於テ何等異ルコトハナシ。唯其方法手段ニ於テ南方諸域ヨリノ對重慶壓カヲ強化シテ援將阻止ノ徹底ヲ圖ルト共ニ將來ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ場合ニ依ツテハ對重慶交戰權ノ行使及敵性租界ノ接收ヲ考慮スル而シテ此ノ實行ハ諸般ノ情勢特ニ對米英關係ヲ考慮シ極メテ慎重ナルヲ要スル又南方諸域ヨリ對

重慶壓迫ヲ強化スル方策ハ主トシテハ既定ノ對佛印施策ノ実行ニ依リテ期待セラルル、敵性租界ノ存在ハ支那事変解決ノ為大ナル障壁ヲ為シツシアルカ故ニ之ヲ何トカ解決スルヲ要スル、而シテ之ヲ外交的ニ解決スルコトハ最モ希望スル所テアルカ己ムヲ得サケレハ情勢ノ推移ニ應ジテ支那新中央政府ニ依テ強制接收ヲセネハナラス、此場合ニ於テハ或ヒハ對英米ノ紛争ヲ起ス虞カアリ時トシテ南部佛印進駐以上ノ對米英國交上ノ懸念カ生スリカトモ考ハラルルカ故ニ勿論輕々ニヤルヘキテナシ、是等ニ情勢ノ推移ニ應ジテ支那ニ於ケル敵性租界ヲ接收スヘキ旨ノ決定ヲ見タ所以テアリ、又之ヲ実行スルニ方テハ萬一ノ場合英米ニ對スル防衛戰ヲ辞セサル位ノ覺悟ト壯トヲ必要トスルデアロウ。

(ロ) 對南方政策ハ主トシテ既定國策ヲ再確認シタモノテアツテ其實体ノ

小サカ力萬一英米材言及至ハ掛興成態度ニ於リテ思フニハ  
 此下口ト一息透ミ下ル即チ佛印格策ニ依テ戰ヲ惹起スル  
 突ヲ生スルコトハ日本ハ佛印及英ニ對シテ政策ヲ和的ニ遂行  
 及海軍側ノ實意ニ復スルニ要口下ラシク此方策ヲ盡スニ於テ  
 二對米英戰ヲ敢ハサレ權リナリヤ否ヤニ就テ今ハ金體ノ均  
 ニ場合ニ於テ王極力サケル對米英戰ヲ許セヌトノ下カ果シテ  
 情下ルニ要スルコトハ但ニ英ニ對シテ部隊ヲ入ルルコトハ如何  
 勢ヲ受ルニ方ツテハ佛印ニ於テ日本ノ勢ヲ作興セテ又體  
 極力平和外交的手段ニ依テ實現ヲ企圖スルニ方ニ若シ米英ノ  
 米英戰ヲ決意シクノ下ハ論テ日本カ既定ノ對英印格策ヲ  
 米英戰ヲ許セザル體格ノ下ルコトヲ示シテ英ニ留意ヲ要スル  
 大英分ハ南英印區對テ下ルニ而シテ之カ實行ノ急ムコトヲ得サ  
 對一

事態トナラヌ一モ限ラサルヲ以テ我トシテハ佛印施策ノ実行ヲ最モ慎  
 重ナラシムル反面露憲ノ情勢ニ處スヘキ覺悟ノ程ヲ示シタモノカ即チ  
 対米英戦ヲ辭セストノ表現テ下ル。陸軍トシテモ萬一佛印地区ニ於ケ  
 ル戦武カ一依ル防衛行為カ真劍ニ且擴大シタ場合ヲ設想スルトキハ対  
 コソレ国防又對支作戰ト對照シ特ニ南方作戰準備ノ未完ノ実情ニ鑑ミ  
 慎重ナ考慮ヲ要スル向レニシテモ日本ノ防衛圈カ今ヤ現實ニ一應  
 佛印マテ擴大セラルル狀況ニ鑑ミ先ツオ一段トシテ對米英作戰ニ関  
 スル諸般ノ實際的研究ニ徹底セネハナラヌ

ハ 俄コソレ戦ノ發生ハ日コソレ關係ヲ極メテ微妙ナラシメツツアルコ  
 トハ事實テアリ也ノルニ米ノ對コソレ援助若ハ極東コソレ領ニ於ケル  
 米ノ軍事基地設定ノ危險ト相俟テ日米ノ關係モ亦逐次複雑深刻化シツ  
 ツアル。此處對米英關係ニ就テハ特ニ慎重ヲ考慮ヲ要スル

(三) 南部佛印ニ対スル兵力進駐ニ就テ七月二日ノ會議ニ於テハ各員齊シク極力條約ニ依ル平和進駐ヲ實現スルコトヲ要望シ又同會議席上陸軍大臣ハ兵力進駐ニ方小昨秋ノ北部佛印ニ突發シタルカ如キ行違ヒヲ出サヌ平和進駐ヲ爲萬全ヲ盡スヘキ旨表明シタ。右ニ基キ統帥部トシテハ南支ニ在ル江口陸軍ヲ進駐兵團トシテ之カ進駐ヲ計畫スル之カ爲メ六月末ノ研究準備ノ成果ヲ活用シ且陸軍省及軍令部トノ連絡共同ヲ密ニシ特ニ政略ト軍事行動トノ調整ニ萬遺憾ナキヲ期スル

(四) 尚此際參謀總長ハ昭和十六年六月下旬ニ於テ政府及軍令部ト共ニ意見一致シアル如ク南部佛印進駐ノ目的ハ南部佛印方面ヨリスル援將ヲ分断スルコト及日本ノ自給自足經濟ノ態勢確立ニ資セントスルノニ處ニ存スルコトヲ指摘シ且此目的達成ノ爲ニハ先ツ佛印ノ友好ト信頼トヲ得ルコトヲ切要ナルコトヲ強調シタ。又特ニ陸軍中央當局及現地

軍共ニ日本軍ヲ進駐カ決シテ軍事占領ニ非サルコトヲ確認シテ佛國ノ  
主權領土權利ヲ尊重セネハナラヌ又内政干渉ニ涉リテハナラヌ 之の  
為在佛印大使府ト現地陸軍部隊トノ事務ノ調整連絡ヲ誤ラヌ様ニスル  
ト共ニ以上ノ諸件ニ因シテ現地軍隊ノ指導ヲ的確ニスルヲ要スルコ  
ト及彼等ノ用命 習慣 言語ノ相違等ヨリ生スル誤解行違ヲ生セサル  
コトニ関シテハ二兵ニ到ルマテ徹底サセルコト等ヲ強調シ以上ヲ前提  
條件トシテ兵力進駐ヲ計畫スルコトヲ要望シタ。

(2) 南部佛印進駐ニ関聯シテ次ノ供逐ヲ補足致シマス。

(4) 南部佛印平和進駐ノ能否ニ関スル身透ニ就テハ七月上旬杉山參謀總長ハ佛印ヲ敵トスルニ非サルコト及軍事占領ニ非サルコトヲ明カニシ我進駐ノ目的ヲ充分理解セシムルコトカ出来レハ案トハ言ハサルモ稱ラシテ平和進駐ヲ應諾セシム得ル見込アリト判断シテ居ツタ。又七月上旬英ハ我カ佛印進駐ノ意圖ヲ察知シタルモノノ如ク英カ機先ヲ制シテ佛印ニ兵力ヲ進駐セシムルヤノ情報アリ進駐ニ方リ却テ之カ流血ノ慘ヲ招ク因トナル恐キヤトノ懸念アリタルモ參謀總長ハ我ノ態度カ公明正大且毅然タラハ英ノ行動ハ左程心配スルコトモナカルヘシト判断テ居ツタ。

(5) 又此頃北部佛印ニ對スル支那軍ノ侵入ニ就テハ陸軍中央部、南支佛印、現地軍共ニ相當ニ憂慮シアリタル所ナリ七月上旬ニ於テ從來佛印國

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境附近ニ在ツタ重慶軍ノ内三個師カ既ニ佛印侵入ノ命令ヲ受ケアリト  
ノ情報ガアツタノテ之カ対策トシテ北佛印ニ一時要スレハ歩兵約一聯  
隊ヲ増加スルコト及情勢危急ナルニ方ツテハ在廣東地区ノ一師團ヲ派  
遣スルコトヲ參謀本部第一節ニ於テ内研究ヲシツツアツタ。

尚昭和十六年初頭ノ參謀本部ノ情報ニ依レハ佛印ノ東北境方面「ラン  
ソン」及「フオハイ」方面ノ地区ニ相對スル支那領ナル龍州、靖西、

蒙自方面ニ在テ佛印ニ對峙スル支那軍ハ四個軍約十六個師團ニ達シタ。

(3) 既述ノ如ク昭和十六年七月二日御前會議直後參謀總長ヨリ對米英作戰  
ニ關スル研究ノ徹底ニ就テ要望カアツタ。次テ七月末南部佛印進駐ノ頃  
更ニ參謀次長及第一部長ハ右研究ノ促進ニ付參謀總長ヨリ指示セララル  
所カアツタ。此前後ニ於ケル作戰ノ計畫及準備ニ關スル研究ハ概ネ次ノ  
如ケテアツタ。

(イ) 此頃ニ於ケル一般方針トシテ作戰準備ハ概本年度初頭既定ノ範圍ヲ基準トシテ其実行ヲ促進スルコトトシテ特ニ作戰諸般ノ研究ニ力ヲ注グコト就中万一ノ場合ニ亘スル為平時年度作戰計画ニ拘ラス之ヲ基礎トシテ現下情勢ノ緊迫ニ即應スル防衛的作戰計画ノ具剣ナル研究ニ着手スルコト及曰佛共同防衛ニ基ク佛印防衛ニ就キ新メナル研究及準備ヲスルコトデアツタ。而シテ作戰準備事項トシテハ既述ノ如ク年度初頭既定ノ範圍ノ事項ニ付之等ヲ一層具體的ニシ且佛印防衛充當予定即固ノ訓練、裝備、給養、衛生等ノ範圍ニ亘ツテ對支作戰ニ基ク創獲ノ恢復ヲ急務トシタ。

(ロ) 七月三日國策ノ決定及之ニ基イテ起ツタ佛印共同防衛ニ関スル曰佛軍事協力ハ即チ佛印ヲ米英等ニ對シテ防衛スルコトデアリ之ハ從來年度作戰計画ニ於テハ設想シ非ル所ナリシヲ以テ參謀本部トシテハ新規

ニ研究準備ヲ要スル新課題ニアツタ。即チ南部佛印進駐後ノ我在佛印  
兵力即チ北佛印ノ約一個旅団及飛行機一隊（二中隊）南佛印ノ約一個  
師団（石師団ノ外南佛印ニ對シテハ日米外交交渉ニ支障ヲ與ヘ又爲飛  
行場設定部隊以外ノ兵力ヲ進駐セシメナカツタ）ノ兵力ヲ以テ米英下  
トスルモノテ南佛印本部トシテハ方一ノ場合要スレハ支那及台灣ニ在ル  
若干軍隊ノ佛印ニノ増援ニ付内航空ヲシタル範圍ニ止メ其他ノ任務達  
成ノ作戰的方法ニ對テハ内地軍ニ一任シテアツタ。又佛印防衛ノ必要  
ナル航空基地ノ施設、兵站ノ設備等ハ日佛兩國ノ公式ノ協定ノ示ス所ニ  
從ツテ實施セラレ、其他ノ事項ハ既供述第三ノ(1)ノ(イ)ノ趣旨ニ從ツ  
テ措置スルコトヲ要ス。

(2) 佛印ノ共同防衛ノ部ヲ發シ若ハ其他ノ事情ニ依ツテ發生スルコアル

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の計画は準備三箇月を以てして進行せしむ。

昭和十六年六月六日御前會議ヲ經テ國策決定ヲ見ケル後ニ於テハ作戦

ノハ渡及上陸作戰ヲ用テテノ研究ヲ進メテ指示カシク。

之ハ南方ニ於テハ必要資料及軍事情報ノ収集ニ付又第三部第三時ニ對シ

テ戰及航空戰ノ研究ヲ進メテ就テ必要カシク今時ニ對シ第三時ニ對シ

テ今ノ南方諸國ヲ對テテノ作戰特ニ熱地作戦、渡洋作戦、上陸

ニ對シ「馬來」ハ「マ」トシ「ホ」トシ「フ」トシ「ム」トシ等

ヲ進ルヲ要シク即チ（二）基テテ於テ「長」トシ「身」トシ「果」トシ「果」トシ

ハ「三」此種ノ戰ノ想ニ對シテ「推」テ「進」シ「化」ス「ハ」キ「究」テ「推

進」ノ「防」ノ「局」ニ對シテ「至」ル「場」ニ「至」ル「場」ニ「至」ル「場」ニ「至」ル「場」

然レ「自」然「的」ニ「自」然「的」ニ「自」然「的」ニ「自」然「的」ニ「自」然「的」ニ「自」然「的」

ハ「山」ヲ「守」ル「ニ」テ「守」ル「ニ」テ「守」ル「ニ」テ「守」ル「ニ」テ「守」ル「ニ」テ「守」ル「ニ」

昭和十六年九月上旬參謀總長カ次長及各部長ヲ会同シ右國策中対米英  
關係事項ニ就テ説明ヲ与ヘタコトハ次ノ要旨デアリマシタ。而シテ是ハ  
作戰計劃ノ再檢討ノ情勢ニ即應スヘキ作戰準備ノ促進若ハ其新タナル發  
足ヲ要求スルモノナラツタ

(1) 九月六日決定ノ國策ハ緊迫シタ國防的意義ヲ濃厚ニ有スルモノデア  
ル即チ現下ノ急迫ナル情勢時ニ米英蘭ノ対日攻勢ニ対シ如何ニ善処ス  
ルキヤ殊ニ帝國カカノ彈撓性カ日ニ月ニ窮迫シツツアルノ現實時ニ米  
英ノ資金凍結等ニ行利禁輸ニ直面シタ帝國カ國防ノ彈撓力ヲ失ヒ盡サ  
シトナレバ其時如何ニ同題トナレル超重大時局ニ対シテ國家ノ運命ヲ如  
何ニシテ助却シテ行クハキヤノ諸課題ニシテ此課題ヲ解決スル爲メ回  
家トシテ最悪ノ情勢ニ陥ル場合ニ於テ如何トカシテ之ヲ切り抜ケルノ  
措置ニ窮ケラレシカ爲メ外交上戰爭準備ノ二本建政策ノ下ニ和戰兩様ノ

態度ヲ以テ真劍ナル外交ニ臨ムコトヲ規定シタモノカ本國策デアル之  
カ爲メ期限付外交ヲ以テ交渉目的ノ達成ヲ図ル外他面自存自衛上對米  
(英蘭)戰ヲ辭セサル万一ノ決意ヲ以テ戰爭準備ヲ期限付キテ完整ス  
ルコトトシ且和戰何レニ決スヘキヤノ國家ノ態度ハ昭和十六年十月上  
旬ニ於テ決定スルコトヲ規定シタモノデアル要スルニ本國策ハ名實共  
ニ戰爭決意ヲ決定スルモノニアラス外交ニ依ル打開ヲ本筋トスル唯列  
國ノ對日攻勢ニ對スル爲防衛戰爭準備ヲ戰爭ヲ辭セサル決意ト覺悟ノ  
下ニ於テ急速促進セシムコトヲ主眼トスルモノアル但シ外交ニ依ル目的  
達成ヲ第一義トスルコトハ所銘ヲ要スル

(四) 去ル七月二日決定ノモノニ對シ<sup>全圖</sup>金剛印ナ九月六日決定ノ内容ヲ對照  
スルニ其根本的事項ニ於テ異ナルモノカアル即チ先ツ (a) 日米英蘭  
際ノ契機タリ得ヘキ事項カ前者ハ泰佛印時ニ佛印問題ニ主トシテ限定

セラレタカ後者ニ於テハ米英蘭各国ノ対日攻勢、対日禁輸及帝國国力ノ彈性ノ現実ニ基キ日米英蘭ノ摩擦ノ範圍及爭鬭カ著シク拡大シ且深刻トナルルコトヲ示シアル即チ日本ハ已ニ巴マレス米英ニ対シテ米英ノ支那事変解決ニ対スル不容喙、不妨害、帝國国防ニ対スル不脅威我カ物資獲得ヘノ協カヲ要求シ更ニ日佛印間特殊關係ノ容認、泰、蘭印、支那及極東ノ領ニ軍事的推益ノ不設定、極東ノ兵備不增強ノ確認ヲ米英ニ対シテ求ムルモノデアアル而シテ之ニ應シテ日本ハ勿論相等限度ノ讓歩ヲ約諾スヘキコトヲ規定シテ居ル。(A)方一作戰行動起ルトスレハ前者ハ佛印政策ノ遂行カ其目的デアリ後者ハ國家ノ自存自衛カ動機トナルタリウ。(C)作戰地域ニ就テハ本質的ニハ前者ハ佛印中ニテアルヘク後者ハ更ニ擴大スル虞カ大デアアル。(D)從テ作戰構想ニ自ラ相違スルノカ当然デアル。(2)戰略資源タル石油ノ実情ハ

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其要旨ハ公明六日決定國策ハ攻防何レタルヲ問ハシ全面的ニ作戰準備  
 採用スルモ自費ノ方式ノ次ノ件ヲ次第長及第一節ニ指示シテ之即  
 于大個ニ及至要入ルカ下ノトニ鑑ミ決然懸念ヲ斷ルニ  
 伴ハキ一般防衛的作戰準備ノ體存且不徹底ナリ事更ヲ變勢野部  
 此時三昭三和六午度化戰計國ノ不備未熟且非實際ナリト下野計國  
 主ノ要三促進急ス外此要ナル作戰準備ヲ新整スルコトトス  
 入ル又作戰準備ハ年度平時計國既定ノモ及七月二日以降補充要  
 故ニ參謀本部ノ下ノ實際的作戰計國ヲ至急統合的ニ完成スルヲ要  
 (1) 本國策ノ決定ハ南方ニ對スル作戰準備ノ促進ヲ要求スルノヲ以テ  
 觀ルハキテ下ル

ントスル想ハ人キ危險信与力茲ニ揭ケテラシク(6)参照(モ)ト  
 七月廿九日陸ノ際ト際ト金然使ヲ罪ニシテヤ此一事ニ於テ我國防ヲ無ク化セ



7  
16  
備定終身命スルモノテアル之カ爲採用スヘキ作戰方式ノ其一トシテ差シ  
一当リ先ツ米英蘭軍ノ其一乃至數国軍ノ攻撃ニ対シ我ハ初期受動的ニ対応  
シ次ニ作戰準備ヲ正ヘタル巨攻勢移転ニ依テ我国土ノ防衛ヲ確保スル作  
戰方式ヲ確立スルコト尙此際引續イテ国家ノ自存自衛ニ必要ナル作戦  
実施ヲ避ケ得ヘカラサルモノナルコトヲ確認シ之ニ対スル準備ヲ整フ  
ルコト又作戰方式ノ其二トシテハ對手側ノ先制攻撃ニ対シ先ツ之ニ対  
應スルモ徒ラニ受動的態勢ニ陥ルコトナク初期ヨリ反撃ヲ以テ反動的  
行動ニ出テ爾後前記其ノ一ノ如キ戰略ヲ実行スル方式ヲ確立スル事ヲ  
アツタ又上記一書ノ例レニ據ルヘキヤ將タ又他ノ策案ハ例ヘハ一地ノ  
專守防衛ハ如キモノヲ採用スヘキヤハ一ニ開戦當時ニ於ケル国家内外ノ  
情勢及之ニ対応スヘキ当面ノ我國策及陸海軍作戰準備ノ整備如何等ニ  
關聯シテ自然ニ決定セララルモノテアリ特ニ此際我海軍側ノ諸條件カ

ツテ却テ拒守方ノ反撃ヲ受ケルコトヲキヤハシテハ作戦當局トシテ慎重ナル  
 ヲクノテアテ北又十月未ラテ目途下スル本ノ作戦準備ヲ見整スルニ先五  
 トセハナラマシテ又是レハ今日以後ニ於テ特ニ統帥部ノ重要ナル宿題トナ  
 知ラシムルニ謀ニ緊急ノ事項ヲ遂テテ遂テテ計画シテ準備スルコトヲ要則  
 ツ他面作戦準備ノ逐次見成ニ伴テテ攻防両野ノ可レノ果施ニテ支障  
 準備ハ先ツ陣下ノ防衛守勢ノ防衛的措置ニ置キテハ國リツ  
 差之リ當リ防衛守勢ヲ取ルハ外ハ即テ差ノ上ニ作戦計画及作戦  
 準備記作戦諸方式ノ採擇及作戦準備ノ窮極ハ以上ノ如クテ平ルカ現在

イノ指示ヲテツク

果行シ得ルコト下ノ目途下シテ諸般ノ研究及準備ニ邁進スヘキテアテ下  
 場合ニ於テモ在テ得ルハ相手方ノ先制攻撃ヲ即時及專シテ得入シテ作戦ヲ  
 之ニ対スル決定的地態ヲ持ツテ平ルカ陸軍統帥部トシテハ如何ナル

用心下牽引ナル戒也下二偈スルコト示アル。

(2) 九月中旬頃ニ至リ前記國策決定ニ基キ當面差當リ南方ニ於テ採用スルコトアルヘキ防衛守勢戰略ニ於テハ次ノ如キ心構ヲ以テ對處スヘク參謀本部ノ腹案ヲ決定シタ

(1) 日本陸軍ノ採用スルコトアルヘキ對南方守勢戰略ハ作戰準備進涉ノ段階ニ依リ異ルヘキモ概シテ言ヘハ極メテ小規模ノモノニ止マリ結局多分ハ相手方ノ攻襲ニ對シテ佛印自体ノ防衛ヲ主トスルモノニ限定セラルヘク之ヨリ進シテ爾他ノ南方要域ニ於ケル作戰ニ應スルコトハ我作戰準備ノ現況上概シテ望ミ難イ從ツテ右様ノ場合我ハ日本國土ノ防衛海上交通ノ保護ニモ重大ナル支障ヲ生ズルニ至ルテアラウ

(2) 以上ノ如キ作戰ハ國防上ノ大過失ニ屬スルヲ以テ相手方ノ攻襲ニ對シテハ速カニ此種ノ消極有害ナル作戰方式ヨリ脱却シテ防衛守勢ヨリ受動攻勢ニ轉移シ我自存自衛ヲタメ緊急ナル作戰指導ニ移リ得ル様ニ作戰準備

備ノ急速ナル進歩ヲ要スル

(イ) 右様ノ不本意ナル作戰ヲ殆起スルノ已ムヲ得ヌ場合ニ於テハ現奥ノ作戰準備進歩ノ狀況ニ應ジ適宜作戰指導ノ要領及其他ノ方法ヲ定メルコトトシ之ニ就イテハ事前ニ現地部隊(在佛印部隊)ニ対シ特ニ指示スルカ如キ必要ハ認メナイ寧ロ之ヲ不利トスル

(3) 此項以降參謀本部ハ米英側カ先制攻惠ノ拳ニ出スヘキコトヲ常ニ顧慮シ之ニ対シ十分ナル準備ヲ要スルモノト考ヘタ 從テ日本陸軍ノ對南方作戰準備未充時期ニ於ケル我防衛守勢作戰ノ指導ニハ大ナル憂慮カ存シタ 昭和十六年十一月六日大本營ハ南方軍總司令官ニ与ヘタ南方要域攻畧準備命令ニ於テ米英蘭軍又ハ其一國軍ノ攻惠ヲ受ケタ場合ハ自衛ノ爲所在ノ部隊ヲ以テ之ヲ邀惠スルコトヲ許ス旨ヲ示シ又昭和十六年十二月一日ノ命令ニ於テ大本營ハ米英ノ眞面目ナル先制攻惠ヲ受ケタル場合ハ

海軍ト協同シテ適時進攻(進駐)作戰ヲ開始スベキ旨ヲ示シテ居ル如キ

ハ何レモ米英ノ先制攻撃ノ顧慮尠ナカラヌカ故デアツタ

又英ノ泰國侵入ノ危険ニ付キ終始憂慮シツツアツタ

(4) 九月中旬頃ニ於ケル作戰準備ノ狀況ハ概テ次ノ如クデアツタ

而シテコノ陸軍省ノ所管ニ屬シ又ハ省部間既事項ニ就イテハ省部ノ協調運轉ノ下ニ大イニ促進ニ努メタカ選々タルヲ免ムナカツタ之ハ主トシ

テ資材及船腹ノ不足ニ依ルモノデアツタ

(5) 參謀本部ノ腹案トシテ對支作戰カヲ隨時解放シテ佛印方面ニ使用シ得

ベキモノト定メタ5D 8Dノ部隊ハ此頃教育訓練裝備モ一應恢復シテ作

戰ニ胸算ニ得シタカ、裝備ト訓練ノ恢復充實殊ニ南方作戰ニ即志ス

ベキ諸準備ハ尙大イニ不充分デアツタ

以上ノ師団ハ當初内地帰還動員解除ノタメ集結シツツアツタカ南方ノ

D.D. NO 1661

7  
情勢ニ鑑ミ歸還ヲ中止シテ支那ニ待機スルコトトヒラレタモノデアツ  
タ 而シテ右各師団ハ支那ニ在ツテハ現地（上海及廣東附近）ニ於  
テ治安警備ニ任スル外主トシテ訓練ニ邁進シツァツタカ万一对米英  
等ノ事件突発ニ當リ之ヲ應急派遣スルドシテモ各師団共ニ其集結ノ完  
了輸送其ノ他ノ諸準備ノタメ實際ノ防衛行動ニ就キ得ルタメニハ約二  
箇月弱ノ日子ヲ必要トシタ尚以上ノ外对支作戰中ノ数ヶ師団ヲ將來ノ  
必要ニ應シテ南方作戰ニ充當ヲ予定シ、又別ニ在内地台灣ノ三ヶ師団  
ヲ南方作戰充當予定ニ胸算シタ

④ 南方作戰用彈藥約十ヶ師団會戰分余ヲ台灣及他印ニ集積スルコトヲ予  
定シ其ノ内ノ一部ヲ第一次トシテ九月末頃先ツ台灣ニ集積セラルハ計  
画トナツタカ其ノ実行ハ船腹不足ノ關係上頗ル疑ハシイモノデアツタ  
尚右全量ノ輸送及集積ハ萬難ヲ排シテ実行ニ當ルモ十二月末ニ至ラナ

ケレハ之ヲ身承ノ克シテ身ハサルハ能ハサルハ能ニ在ツタ以上ノ彈藥ハ作戰  
用ニシテ前降裝角用ノモノハ之トハ別テアル、以上ハ私ノ部下力陸軍  
省関係局トノ連絡ニ依ツテ知得シタ所テアツタ

尚此頃南方作戰ニ於ケル彈藥使用量ハ一般標準ノ一倍半ヲ以テ基準ト  
スルコトトシ之ニ依テ彈藥ノ集積ヲ律スルコトトナツタ

- (ハ) 昭和十六年九月中旬以降滿洲及内地ヨリ一部ノ兵力カ南方ニ派遣セラ  
レタ、即チ當時新タニ南支ニ派遣セラレタモノハ、一師團戰車聯隊、獨速  
隊、航空地上部隊、通信部隊、兵站部隊、又台灣へハ戰車團司令部、戰車聯  
隊、獨速隊、航空部隊、砲兵部隊、通信部隊、兵站部隊、又佛印へハ  
獨混聯隊、航空地上部隊、兵站部隊テアツタ
- (ニ) 此頃以降新タニ台灣、佛印及南支等ノ航空及海運施設ノ增強新設、南  
支、台灣、佛印ノ兵站基地ノ設定、船舶徵備及機裝、兵裝ノ実施ニ着



能

ケレハ之ヲ集積ノ完シニ具ル能ハサルハ悉ニ在ツタ以上ノ彈藥ハ作戰  
用ニシテ前降裝角用ノモノハ之トハ別テアル、以上ハ私ノ部下力陸軍  
省関係局トノ連絡ニ依ツテ知得シタ所テアツタ

尚此頃南方作戰ニ於ケル彈藥使用量ハ一般標準ノ一倍半ヲ以テ基準ト  
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(ハ) 昭和十六年九月中旬以降滿洲及内地ヨリ一部ノ兵力カ南方ニ派遣セラ  
レタ、即チ當時新タニ南支ニ派遣セラレタモノハ一師團戰車聯隊独速

隊 航空地上部隊通信部隊兵站部隊 又台灣へハ戰車團司令部 戰車聯  
隊 独速隊 航空部隊 砲兵部隊 通信部隊 兵站部隊 又佛印へハ

独混聯隊 航空地上部隊 兵站部隊テアツタ  
(ニ) 此頃以降新タニ台灣、佛印及南支等ノ航空及海運施設ノ增強新設、南

支 台灣 佛印ノ兵站基地ノ設定 船舶徵備及機裝 兵裝ノ実施ニ着

手シ若ハ実行ノ促進ヲ図リ且作戰使用予定兵團及航空部隊ニ所要ノ訓練ヲ促進シツツアツタ。

(5) 此頃マテニ予カ陸軍省整備局當局ヨリ液体燃料準備ノ実情ニ就テ聴取シタ要旨ハ次ノ如クテアツタ。

即チ昭和十六年及十七年ニ於テ概不現下ノ如キ國際情勢下ニ於テ日本カ支那事變ヲ遂行スルノミトシテ、此二箇年ニ於ケル予想石油消費量ヲ差引キタル結果ニ依レハ昭和十八年ニ於ケル航空揮発油及重油ノ保有量ハ僅カニ作戰一年間ノ所要ヲ充足シ得ルニ過キナクナル特ニ右重油保有量ハ海軍決戦半年ノ需要量ニ過キナイ而シテ右ハ國內「ストツク」一切ヲ基準トスルモノテアル。又國産原油、人造原油、「アルコール」等ハ此ノ大勢ヲ左右スルニ足ラナイ。尙人造石油ノ大規模大量取得モ成算ナイトノコトテアツタ。



ナリ且東亞ニ於ケル列國ノ対日包圍ノ強化ノ情勢ニ反撓スル自然ノ現ハレテアリ又將末万々ノ場合自衛ノタメニハ自ラ死中ニ投シテ茲ニ活ヲ獲ルノ方策ニ出ツルノ己ムナキ情勢ニ應セントスル研究ノ一結果デアツタ。

(7) 昭和十六年九月六日ノ決定ニ基イテ殆足シタ作戰準備ハ十月上旬ニ於ケル和戰決定ノ機會ニ於テ國ノ政策ニシテ和ニ決スレバ之ヲ中止シ又若シ政策ニシテ用戰決意ヲ採擇シタ場合ニハ爾后最強力ニ本格的作戰準備ヲ実行シテ同月末之ヲ完整スル筈デアツタ 然ルニ實際ニ於テハ右予定ノ如ク進捗シナカッタ、何トガレバ十月上旬ニ於ケル和戰ノ決意ハ何レトモ國家意志ノ確定ヲ見ズシテ結局十月中旬東條内閣ノ登場マテ政策ノ低迷時期ヲ現出シ次テ東條内閣登場直后ヨリ十一月初マテノ尙ハ一切ノ対米英政策ノ白紙還元時期ヲ副シタルカ故デアル 即チ此ノ尙ニ於ケ

ル作戰準備ハ極メテ低調カ然ラスンハ実行保留トイフ不本意ノモノタルヲ免カレナカツタ特ニ此ノ時期ニ於テハ兵力ノ動員展開船舶ノ増徴基地設定ナドニ於テ甚タシク其ノ進歩ヲ妨ケラレタ然ル處十一月初ニ至ツテ連絡會議ノ結果カ國策ノ大綱ヲ指示スルニ及ンテ作戰準備ハ本格的ニ推進セララルルニ至ツタコトハ右ニ供述スルカ如キテアル

(8) 昭和十六年九月六日御前會議ヲ經テ決定シタル國策ニ基ク日本ノ外交ト作戰準備トハ次ノ要領ニ依テ調和スル如ク措置セラレタ

(1) 九月六日御前會議ノ前日總理及兩統帥部長ノ間ニ於テ右國策ノ決定ハ外交ニ依テ目的ヲ達成スルコトカ第一義チアル 從ツテ理論上ヨリ見レハ右決定ノ第二項ト第一項トカ其位置ヲ代フルヘキモノテアル旨並決シテ戰爭ヲ好ムニアラス 唯避クヘカラサル場合ニ対応スルノミ

要ハ外交々渉ニ<sup>依</sup>スルヘキ旨ニ付相互克全ナル諒解ニ達シタ

㊦ 作戰準備ノ実施カ外交々渉ニ支障ヲ与ヘヌコトヲ十分考慮スル之

カタメ南備印ニ兵力ヲ入レルハ曩ニ既ニ進駐シアル部隊ノ外航空地上  
設備部隊ノミニ制限スルコトトスル

㊧ 九月六日決定國策ニ伴フ必要ナル動員ハ発動后ト雖外交々渉カ好転  
セハ中止スルコトトスル

右(㊦)及(㊧)ハ參謀總長ト陸軍大臣トノ協議決定ニカノルモノテアル

㊨ 一切ノ作戰準備ハ外交々渉ニ支障妨害ヲアタヘサル範圍ニ於テ之ヲ  
実行スルコトヲ原則トスル

DD NO 1661

此際村米英蘭作戦準備ヲ何時ニテモ準備スルニ  
 尚トテ下ツタ 尚此際村米英蘭作戦準備ヲ何時ニテモ準備スルニ  
 南ノ決意ヲ為シテ下サルコトニ就テハ九月六日決意ノ場合ト同様ニ  
 許ル決意ノ下ニ作戦準備ヲ進メ具作戦準備ノ趣令本格的ニ行ハレ  
 外交作戦準備ニ期限ヲ付シ且外交的ニ解決出来サシハ敢テ戦争ニ  
 本陣ニ依ル租税面ノ捕ノ下ニ外交的解決ヲ図ルコトニ努力スルニ  
 下ツツテルコトヲ認メ此難局打開ヲ為依然トシテ外交及戦争準備  
 口ノ連絡會議ニ於テハ白米ノ因縁ハ愈々租税及最良ノ因縁ニ達著  
 十一月五日、右決意ニ先ツ十一月十日ヨリ一月十二日行ハレタ  
 各報文ニ對シテ閣下ノ示シタル要旨ハ次ノ如クマツタ即チ  
 (一) 昭和十六年十一月五日村米英蘭ノ決意ニ因テ參謀總長及次官ヨリ  
 計画及作戦準備ノ閣下ノ要項ニ就テ迷ハズ  
 昭和十六年十一月五日御前會議ヲ終テ村米英蘭ノ決意後作戦

マニ就テ總長ヨリ十一月末乃至十二月初頭ヲ完整ノ目途ト爲スハシトノ  
見解ヲ明白ニセラレタ

(2) 日米ノ国交緊迫ノ増大ニ伴ヒ外交及作戰準備ノ二本建ノ原則ノ下ニ十  
一月五日以降本格的作戰準備ニ着手實現シテ以テ最悪ノ場合ニ対応スハ  
キ措置ニ考慮トキヲ期セラレタ 予ハ職務上之ヲ承知シテ居ルカ其概要  
ハ次ノ如クデアツタ

(1) 従来ノ作戰準備ハ更ニ強力ニ推進セラレタ外部隊ノ動員、展開、船舶ノ  
徴傭基地設定等カ強力ニ行ハレタ 而シテ作戰初期ニ対スル陸軍ノ作  
戰準備ハ概シテ十一月末ヲ基準トシテ完整ニツツアツタ。

(2) 米英蘭ニ対スル大本營陸軍部ノ綜合的作戰計画ハ政府ノ行フ外交ト  
併行シテ研究審議ニツツアツタカ成案トナツタノハ十月末日頃デアツ  
タ 而シテ是ノ員ニ名實共ニ確定セラレタノハ十一月中旬(十五日頃)



(内) 十一月十五日南の總司令官に對し大本營の南の支隊の對峙の要

閉之は行ハレタハ十一月八日東京ニ於テマツタ

(二) 陸軍の南の總司令官に對し海軍の聯合隊の向ニ陸軍共同作戦ニ

トコ規程シタマフ

タル聯合ニ於テハ陸軍の總司令官に對し南の支隊の對峙の要

隊の向ヨ南の支隊の對峙の要ニ準備スルハ及米英陸軍等ノ攻ヲ受

總司令官ハ海軍上協同ニ主カヨ以テ印度支那、南支那、北支那、南支那

又ハ大本營命令ニ據テ下進トシタ其要ハ次ノ如クニテマツル即チ南方軍

官以下諸人等、茲に十一月六日マツル同日南方軍ノ作戦準備ニ因

(三) 米英艦ニ對スル作戦の總司令官に對し及南方軍總司令

此後ニ於テマツル

ナラタタ(三) 茲に(三) 陸軍の南の支隊の對峙の要ニ據テ

ナラタタ(三) 茲に(三) 陸軍の南の支隊の對峙の要ニ據テ

ナラタタ(三) 茲に(三) 陸軍の南の支隊の對峙の要ニ據テ

ナラタタ(三) 茲に(三) 陸軍の南の支隊の對峙の要ニ據テ

準備スヘキ要項ヲ示シタ 其ノ要旨ハ如クテアツタ 即チ攻略占領

スヘキ地域ハ比律賓、英領馬來、葡領印度ノ各要域、南部緬甸ノ一部ト

スル又努メテ泰國及海印ノ安定ニ確保スヘキコトヲ示シタモノデアル

(1) 南方軍各方面ノ作戰兵団ヲ戰略展開ノ為内地支那台灣等ヲ出航出發シ

タノハ例シモ十一月五日以降デアル 而モ比等ノ兵団ハ日米交渉ノ妥結

ニ伴ヒ何時ニテモ帰還ノ途ニ就カシムルコトトセラレテ居タ 之ハ參謀

總長ヨリ南方軍總司令官寺内大将ヘ直接指示シタルニ付シ後着ハ快ク之

ヲ諒承

(2) 補給ノ關係ハ十一月中旬以降諸般ノ準備ヲ概テ完整シツツアツタ

(4) 右ノ本格的作戰準備一切ハ開戦ノ決定ニ基クモノテハナカマダ 從テ

日米交渉カ妥結セハ一切撤回セラレテ白紙ニ還スヘキモノトシテ參謀

本部ハ陸軍省及海軍總帥部トノ間ニ完全ニ意見ノ一致ヲ見タモノデアツタ



之ヲ短明同ニ作戦ヲ完成スル  
 三) 本作戦ニ使用スル陸軍兵力ハ一師団十一箇戰車隊九箇飛行集團三箇  
 其ノ他砲臺部隊ヲ基幹トシ其ノ兵團区分並ニ使用方面ヲ左ノ如ク豫  
 定スル

南方軍ノ第十四師団、二箇師団ヲ基幹トシ比律賓方面ニ作戦スル第十五  
 軍、二箇師団ヲ基幹トシ素、安定及緬甸作戦ニ充テスル。第十六軍、  
 三箇師団(内三箇師団、他ノ作戦終了後轉用スル)ヲ基幹トシ蘭印  
 方面ニ作戦スル。第十七軍、四箇師団ヲ基幹トシ馬來及新嘉坡方面ニ作  
 戦スル。航空ハ飛行集團二箇ヲ基幹トスル又支那派遣軍隷下第三十三軍  
 ハ一箇師団ヲ基幹トスルニシテ以テ香港方面ニ作戦スル又大本營直轄  
 南海支隊、北兵三箇大隊ヲ基幹トシ臺灣島トシマズル之ノ諸島等ニ作  
 戦スル別ニ一箇師団ヲ以テ屏印、安定ヲ圍ム

以上ヲ以テ私ノ供テ読ムコトアリマス又

画トイフモ、日本総帥ハ之ヲ有クナク、政府亦シテツツク  
ノ作戦技術ノ想ヲ以テ、興者トシテハ、又中時ニ於テ戦者ト  
粗、強弱ヲ異ニシルニ足ル。タノルカ、何ナルカ、合ニ於テ是ハ一

ニ至ル。同時局ノ緩急及防衛ノ要請如何ニ依テ、其範圍内各ノ廣狹、精  
以上ノ如ク日本陸軍ノ作戦計画及作戦準備ノ點ヲ和十六年ノ春ヨリ初々

(\*) 作戦開始期日ハ、戦決意後別ニ定ムル

昭和二十三年（一九四七年）五月十六日 於極東國際軍事裁判所

供 述 者

田 中 新 二

右當左會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日 於

左會人

清

賴

一

郎

D D No 1661

宣誓書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ求ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セス又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

(署名捺印)

田中新一

證明書

昭和十五年度同十六年度平時作戰計画

昭和十六年十二月中旬大本營ニ於テ樹立セル作戰計画

昭和十六年十一月六日南支那軍總司令部ニ與ヘタル作戰命令

右三種類ノ文書、終戦ノ際、陳捷成ニ現任復員寮第一復員局ニ保存シテ了ラサル

ト証明ス

昭和三十三年五月二十七日

於東京  
第一復員局文書課長 美山 要 藏

右類ノ抄本、自今ノ面前三於テ為サシタルモノナルコトヲ証明ス

同日 於國府

支會人 清 頼 一 郎



横 要 山 美 後 一 第

昭和十二年七月二十五日 果 於

昭和十六年七月二十五日 果 於

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昭和十六年七月二十五日 果 於

D.D. NO 1661

石署名捺印ハ自今、面筋ニ於テ為サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス  
同日於同所

立會人 清瀨 一郎

石署名捺印ハ自今、面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日於同所

立會人

清

瀨

一

郎

右署名捺印ハ自今ノ面筋ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日於同所

立會人 清 瀨 一 郎

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

**THE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: MIYAMA, Yuzo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am MIYAMA, Yuzo. At present I am Chief of the Documents Section of the First Demobilization Bureau. My present address is No. 8, 1-chome, NAGATA-cho, CHIYODA-ku Tokyo Prefecture. I was adjutant of the War Ministry from March 6, 1945 (20th year of Showa) until it was abolished.

2. I was the responsible person for the handling and custody of secret documents of the War Ministry except those kept by respective bureaus and sections.

Handling of secret documents of the Army was proscribed by the Army Regulations, for handling such documents.

Part 2 of article 46 stipulates that official impedimenta will be used as containers for secret documents to be taken to the front or to the spot of trouble, and that in case of emergency, measures will be taken to burn the important documents, if necessary. Furthermore Article 52 of the Army Criminal Code provides for imprisonment of the custodians of military secret documents and articles for a period of not more than five years if in case of emergency he does not endeavor to safeguard them from the enemy. (Ref. Appendix No. 1 and No. 2)

3. At the time of termination of hostilities as surrender was considered a special circumstance the War Minister specially issued an order to burn the secret documents on the basis of his responsibility and authority. That order, by command of the Minister, was drafted by his adjutant, and procedure for sanction was executed by myself.

I remember, the main points of the order were as follows:

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"Secret documents and similar documents as mentioned in the Army Regulations for handling secret documents should be burned immediately. This telegram by order should be burned upon receipt."

This order was issued on August 14, 1945, as a notification from the adjutant-general of the War Ministry. The original of this order was burned, and as all units burned theirs in compliance with the order.

There exists no original now.

The main points of this order have already been reported to SCAP.

A copy of this report was submitted to the Allied Forces and none is in our possession now.

This order was despatched to all schools, government offices, and army forces larger than independent units having custody of secret documents. At the War Ministry on the afternoon of August 14, the recipients of the order were assembled and I had my subordinate adjutant verbally instruct them as to the order and commence the burning that evening.

The burning was carried out by the respective bureaus and sections.

The reason for this was that the chiefs of the bureaus and sections were held responsible for the handling and custody of the secret documents kept in each respective bureau and section.

The burning took place in the inner yard of the present Court of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East and several other places.

Owing to the extraordinary excitement and confusion due to the surrender, the above order to burn only secret documents was not strictly obeyed, and as each bureau and section burned them instinctively in the shortest possible time as was customary of in ordinary times, not only secret documents but also ordinary books were burned without being checked with the record.

On the night of the 14th, the flames rose so high into the sky that the local fire-brigade stations mistook them for an ordinary fire. The burning lasted until the 18th. Only toward the evening of the 17th, each bureau and section found out that even ordinary books were burned.

The Great Diary, the Proclamation of Councillors, various laws promulgated since the establishment of the army, documents relating to the war of (1877)(10th year of Meiji), Diary of the Sino-Japanese War, Diary of the Russo-Japanese War, Documents relating to the Siberian Expedition, Documents in connection with the prisoners of war in the Russo-Japanese

Def. Doc. No. 1903

War and World War I, the League of Nations, Reduction of Armament and the Peace Treaty, and the annals and the original records of the advance and retreat of the deactivated divisions, brigades and regiments, all being valuable historical materials which had been transferred to the army warehouse at HACHIOJI, YUKI, YUKI-MURA, MINAMITAMA-GUN, TOKYO Prefecture, during the period from December, 1944 (19th year of Showa) to March, 1945 (20th year of Showa), to avoid possible damages from air raids. Some of them were burned but the remainder were kept in custody under a strict surveillance of guards in accordance with Directive No. 2 of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers on September 3, 1945 (20th year of Showa).

After that at the request of Major Duncan Macferren, Chief of the Documents Section of the Allied Forces Washington the documents were transferred directly by eight trucks of the First Demobilization Bureau to the First Army Arsenal at OJI on January 8th and 9th, 1946 (21st year of Showa), and delivered to the Washington Document Section (W.D.C.) there.

The Explanation of the classification of documents issued and the Great Diary in the War Ministry is as in the attached supplement. (Ref. Appendix No. 3)

The burning was commenced in the evening of the 14th by each respective unit, government office and school and I suppose it was completed in a short time.

#### Appendix No. 1

Extract from the Army Regulations for Handling Secret Documents.

1933 (8th year of Showa) Army normal No. 950;

1939 (13th year of Showa) Army normal 979 revised:

Article 46; paragraph 2

Official impedimenta shall be used as containers to be taken to the front or the spot of an incident by the mobilized forces and measures shall be taken for the destruction of the important documents in case of emergency, if the necessity arises.

#### Appendix No. 2

Extract from the Army Criminal Code:

April 10, 1903 (41st year of Meiji).

Law No. 46:

February, 1942 (17th year of Showa)

Law No. 35 revised:

Article 52:

When the custodian of military secret documents and articles does not endeavour to safeguard them from falling into enemy hands, in case of emergency, he shall be liable for imprisonment for a period of not more than five years.

Explanation of Classification of Published Documents and the Great Diary in the War Ministry.

I. Classification of published documents in the War Ministry. All documents issued in the War Ministry have issue numbers according to the following classifications.

1. Military Command, number ---  
Joint Army and Navy Military Command, for the public.
2. Military Command A, number ---  
Military Command relating to secret matters common to both the Army and Navy and not for the public.
3. Military Command B, number ---  
Military Command relating to secret matters common to both the Army and Navy and not for the public.
4. Military Command, Army A, number ---  
Military Command relating to top secret matters in the Army and not for the public.
5. Military Command, Army, B, number ---  
Military Command relating to secret matters in the Army, and not for the public.
6. Army Top Secret, number --  
Commands, notifications etc. other than military command, Army A relating to top secret matters.
7. Army Secret, number ---  
Commands, notifications etc., other than Military Command B relating to secret matters.
8. Army Ordinary, number ---  
Commands and notifications other than those of the previous numbers relating to ordinary matters.
9. Army, Top Secret, Manchuria, number ---  
Documents falling under Army Top Secret relative to the Manchurian Incident.
10. Army Secret, Manchuria, number ---  
Documents falling under Army Secret relative to the Manchurian Incident.
11. Army Ordinary, Manchuria, number ---  
Documents coming under Army Ordinary relative to the Manchurian Incident.
12. Army Top Secret, China, number ---  
Documents coming under Army Top Secret relative to the China Incident.
13. Army Secret, China, number ---  
Documents coming under Army Secret relative to the China Incident.
14. Army Ordinary, China, number ---  
Documents coming under Army Ordinary relative to the China Incident.
15. Army Top Secret, Asia, numbers ---  
Documents falling under Army Top Secret relative to the Pacific War.



16. Army Secrets, Asia number ---  
Documents falling under Army Secrets relative to the Pacific War.
17. Army Ordinary, Asia number ---  
Documents falling under Army Ordinary relative to the Pacific War.

In addition to the above, during the First World War and the Siberian Expedition, classifications of issued documents such as "Europe" and "Siberia" were included.

The materials compiled into the Great Diary consist of the items listed above from item 6, and the Military Commands were filed separately but were burned at the termination of the war.

II. The kinds and names of the Great Diaries:

The documents issued in the War Ministry were classified as permanent-storage documents and five-years-storage documents. These were preserved as Great Diaries.

(1) Names of the permanent-storage Great Diaries.

Certain year Great Diary, A compilation from the first class to the sixth.

Certain year Great Diary, B compilation from the first class to the fourth.

Certain year Secret Great Diary.

Certain year Army Top Secret Great Diary (certain year Military Top Secret Great Diary).

Certain year Army Ordinary, Manchuria Great Diary.

Certain year Army Secret, Manchuria Great Diary.

Certain year Army Top Secret, Manchuria Great Diary.

Certain year Army Ordinary, China Great Diary.

Certain year Army Secret, China Great Diary.

Certain year Army Top Secret, China Great Diary.

Certain year Army Ordinary, Asia Great Diary.

Certain year Army Secret, Asia Great Diary.

Certain year Army Top Secret, Asia Great Diary.

Besides the above there were the European Great Diary (relative to the First World War) and the Siberian Great Diary (relative to the Siberian Expedition).

(2) Names of the five-year-storage Great Diaries.

Certain year Great Diary 1

Certain year Great Diary 2

Certain year Great Diary 3

Certain year Great Diary 4

Certain year Great Diary 5

III. The Contents and Classifications of the Great Diaries.

The contents of the Great Diaries were compiled and classified as follows:

- (1) Compilation A (classified from class 1 to class 6: Ordinary documents relative various regulations, the issue numbers indicated as army ordinary number --, and also exchange documents relative to this and classified as follows:--
  - Class 1 -- Organization, discipline ceremonies, marriage, dress regulations, and decorations.
  - Class 2 -- Military service, recruiting, enlistment, ranks, appointments, service, vacation, roll, documentary reports.
  - Class 3.-- Pension, relief, reward.
  - Class 4 -- Education, maneuvers, security, requisition, punishment.
  - Class 5 -- Ordnance, transportation, communications, sanitation, horse administration, miscellaneous.
  - Class 6 -- Relating to the Diet.
- (2) Compilation B (divided in to four classes: Ordinary documents with concrete contents other than compilation A, the issue number indicated as army ordinary number ---; also intercommunication relating thereto).
  - Class 1 -- Imperial visits, ceremonies funerals, Imperial inspection, acceptance of official calls, reward, punishment, and personnel.
  - Class 2 -- Land, buildings, ordnance, clothing, horses, veterinary supplies transportation and communication materials, books, articles, expenditure, and contributions
  - Class 3 -- Inspection, special examination, education, correspondence.
  - Class 4 -- Disaster, miscellanies.
- (3) Secret Great Diary  
Instruction, addresses, administration, regulations, reward, grant of money, organization, military service, operation, mobilization, dispatch, transfer, security, travel on official mission, dispatch, acceptance of official calls, personnel, thought, training and maneuver, emergency, inspection, censorship, investigation, survey, requisition of munitions, air permit fortification, ordnance, horse administration, land, buildings, accounting, clothing, food, sanitation supplies, veterinary supplies, transportation, communications, shipping, books, opinion, diplomacy, foreign information (China) information (European and American countries) and miscellanies, all identified as Army Secret number --, and the

- documents falling there-under.
- (4) Army top secret Great Diary:  
Mobilization, operation, fortification, ordnance, material and supplies, clothing, ships, communications, all identified as Army Top Secret number --, and intercommunication documents falling corresponding therewith.
  - (5) Army Manchuria ordinary Great Diary:  
Ordinary documents relative to the Manchurian Incident, and the contents under (1) and (2), these identified as Army Manchuria ordinary number -- and intercommunication documents relating thereto.
  - (6) Army Manchuria secret Great Diary:  
Secret documents relative to the Manchurian Incident, and the contents under (3) and these identified as Army Manchuria secret, number --, and intercommunication documents relating thereto.
  - (7) Army Manchuria Top Secret Great Diary:  
Top secret documents relative to Manchurian Incident, and the contents under (4), these identified as Army Manchuria Top Secret number --, and intercommunication documents therewith.
  - (8) Army China ordinary Great Diary:  
Ordinary documents relative to the China Incident and the contents chiefly under (1) and (2), these identified as Army China ordinary number --, and intercommunication documents therewith.
  - (9) Army China secret Great Diary:  
Secret documents relative to the China Incident, and the contents chiefly under (3), these identified as Army China secret number --, and intercommunication documents therewith.
  - (10) Army China Top Secret Great Diary:  
Top secret documents relative to the China Incident and the contents chiefly under (4), these identified as Army China Top Secret number --, and intercommunication documents therewith.
  - (11) Army Asia Ordinary Great Diary:  
Ordinary documents relative to the Pacific War and the contents under (1) and (2), identified as Army Asia ordinary number and intercommunications therewith.
  - (12) Army Asia Secret Great Diary:  
Secret documents relative to the Pacific War, and the contents under (3), these and identified as Army Asia Secret number --, and intercommunications therewith.
  - (13) Army Asia Top Secret Great Diary:  
Top secret documents relative to the Pacific War, and

the contents under (4), these identified, as Army Asia Top Secret number --, and intercommunications therewith.

(14) Five-year-storage documents:

Ordinary documents to be on file for several years, the identification being Army ordinary number --, and intercommunications therewith; classified according to the issuing offices.

Great Diary 1: Correspondence of the Cabinet, departments, boards prefectures, various organizations, and companies.

Great Diary 2: Correspondence of the War Ministry, Army General Staff Headquarters, Army Inspectorate-General of Military Training, Headquarters of the Tokyo Garrisons, Headquarters of the Formosan Army, and Headquarters of Military Police.

Great Diary 3: Correspondence of the Korean Army, China Garrison Army, Technical Headquarters, Transportation Section Headquarters of the air Forces, and contents related to the budget, land, buildings, personnel, ordnance materials and clothing.

Great Diary 4: Correspondence of each division (contents the same as the above).

Great Diary 5: Correspondence of the Ordnance Central Depot, Army arsenals and Main Clothing Depot, Woolled Factory, Veterinary schools.

June 5, 22nd year of Showa (1947)  
Tokyo.

Deponent: /s/ MIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi hereby certify that the above deponent swore and affixed his signature and seal in the presence of this witness.

On the same date and at same place.

Witness: /s/ BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

INTERROGATION OF TOJO, Hideki  
11 March 1946

3-29

- Q. What war preparations were pushed?
- A. We were surrounded by Britain, America, and the Dutch. Preparations for an attack at any time by them were pushed.
- Q. What preparations were made of an offensive nature during that period?
- A. The nature of the preparations was defensive.
- Q. When were the first steps taken to prepare for any of the four offensive operations which later were executed, as you have stated?
- A. Preparations of a defensive nature were begun from the time of the 6 September conference.
- Q. Regardless of the question of whether they were offensive or defensive, is it not true that preparations for the four attacks, that you have previously referred to, were begun immediately after the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941?
- A. No, not at all. From the time of the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, we did not know when we would be attacked by England, America, and Holland, therefore preparations to resist attack were planned. It was not until after the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941 that the various surprise attacks were planned. Strategically, Japan was on the defense; tactically, she was on the offense. Japan was surrounded by much greater forces than she herself possessed. The big picture was that of defense. In actual fighting, she attacked./Read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness./
- \*\*\*\*\*
- Q. In connection with the four operations, which you have mentioned, who gave the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff orders in connection therewith?
- A. The orders were issued by the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy or the advice of the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff. These have the responsibility of assisting the Throne and, by virtue of this responsibility, go to the Emperor with orders prepared and ask for his assent. When this is given, the orders are given to the Army commanders or, in the case of the Navy, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. The responsibility is that of the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff from first to last.

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- Q. On whose advice do the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff write and present such orders to the Emperor?
- A. The Chiefs of Staff have section chiefs under them. The section chiefs draw up the plans and, if approved by the Chief of Staff, they are presented to the Emperor. This is an important matter. The Imperial Conferences come in here. For example, when the Imperial Conference of 1 December decided upon war, the Chiefs of Staff then prepared the orders and took them to the Emperor for approval and the cabinet also made various preparations.
- Q. Do you mean to say that no action had been taken nor orders issued relative to the four operations, which you have mentioned, until after the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941? Do you understand the question fully?
- A. I understand the question all right. The national will for war was decided for the first time on 1 December 1941. I do not believe, as Premier, that any orders were issued for war previous to that time.
- Q. The question does not refer to orders in connection with war, but to orders or action taken in connection with the four attacks. Were such orders given or actions taken before the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941?
- A. I believe, as Premier and as War Minister, that it is unlikely that any orders were issued in connection with those four attacks previous to the decision for war that I have mentioned. I believe that it is improbable that orders were issued to carry out these attacks prior to the national decision for war./Kokka no senso ishi no kettei zen ni kogaki jisshi no meirei wo desu hazu nashi to shinzu./
- Q. Do you mean to say that everything in connection with those four attacks, including planning, deployment, and execution, took place within the one week following the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941?
- A. With regard to their execution /jisshi/, I do. As for plans, that is something else. Every national state has a plan of defense. This plan is revised from time to time in accordance with the situation. There was a great deal of tenseness just before the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941. The situation was changing all the time and the plans were changed accordingly, but the orders for

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execution of those plans, I believe, were not issued until after the decision for war.

Q. What about deployment?

A. You must remember that there were other objectives too. The China Incident was in progress and there were troop movements in connection with the joint defense of French Indo-China. For those purposes, a variety of dispositions were required. However, the carrying out of attacks against England or America would not, I believe, have preceded the decision for war. Defense against possible British-American-Dutch attacks also had to be thought of in connection with the national plan of defense. I think that the attacks against England, America and Holland would probably have to have followed the decision of 1 December 1941, which expressed the national will.

\*\*\*\*\*

643030

Def. Doc. 164

Translated by  
Defense Language  
Branch

General IIMURA

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPCNENT: IIMURA, Minoru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached  
sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed  
in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

6742

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RETURN TO ROOM 361



I was Director of the Total Warfare Institute from January 1941 to October of the same year.

There were institutes in other countries similar or kindred to the "Total Warfare Institute". Following their example, the Total Warfare Institute of our country was founded in the autumn of 1940 (the 14th year of SHONA).

In the government organization regarding the Total Warfare Institute, it was prescribed that, under the Premier's control, it shall take charge of the fundamental investigation and research into total warfare, and the education and training of officials and others concerning the nation's total warfare. However, its actual operational management was as given in the following articles.

All the Ministries, the army and navy, not to speak of Premier KOMOYE who was responsible for administrating this Institute and was my direct superior, were scarcely interested in this Institute; therefore, during my incumbency, I received no instruction, advice, or suggestion concerning the business of this institute from any of the above-mentioned quarters or persons. Consequently, its business, in accordance with the stipulations of the above-mentioned government organization, was carried out from an independent standpoint.

As the first step, education and training were undertaken. In instructing its students, the conventional memorizing cramming system was ignored; developmental and practical education was sought after.

The main subjects of education and training comprised lectures on fundamental knowledge concerning various fields such as politics, economics, thought and military science, physical education; theoretical (hypothetical) exercises, inspections and tours were utilized simultaneously.

Even when I first joined the Institute, there existed the training program in theoretical exercises which was one of the annual functions of this Institute. In carrying out this plan, no person, except staff members of this Institute, gave instruction or guidance. The apportioned term was about one month.

The reason why current conditions were adopted in our hypotheses given at the beginning of the theoretical exercises was that if the circumstances of a period other than the current had been adopted, it would have been difficult for the students to imagine themselves operating under assigned circumstances and to imagine the hypothetic operations, particularly the intricate numerical basis.

The various conditions arising from the hypotheses were no more than suppositional situations adopted for the sake of exercises. The object of the exercises was, not the suppositional situations themselves, but training in co-ordinated actions based on those situations.

The hypotheses and the consequent suppositional situations have no connection with the actual policies of the authorities concerned. It was because actual matters of this sort were known to no one except the authorities concerned who would never have divulged them.

As these exercises were partly open to the public, it was impossible and not permissible to utilize the actual policies of the government.

The reason why the accounts of the exercises were marked "strictly confidential" was because they contained some secret national statistics.

In accordance with the administrative procedure of the institute, the result of this research was probably reported to the Cabinet which was directly in charge of this Institute, but

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never reported it to other quarters to say nothing of the other ministries or the military; we were never instructed by them.

As anybody will see from a glance at the documents, the utilization of the results of this study in actual policies was out of the question because of the lack of time necessary for scrutiny and because of the above stated aims.

Students of this Institute, who were first selected by all Ministers and certain civil organizations at the request of this Institute, then examined by the Institute and submitted to the Cabinet, were selected and formally appointed by the Cabinet as students of this Institute.

They were all young men whose average age was about 32, and none held a responsible position in any Ministry. There was one judge among them but he was also a young man like the others and was in a low grade.

The budget of this Institute was ¥160,000 a year and a half of it was for personnel expenses and the other half for office expenses. The budget was too small for making any activity possible.

In short, this Institute would seem to be considerably important so far as its name and stipulations in the organization were concerned, but it was, in fact, nothing but an institute for educating junior officials. And from various standpoints it was not possible to educate them successfully. Not a single result of their study was utilized in drawing up practical policies or war plans.

With a view to obtaining assistance from various quarters, a councillor system was adopted by this Institute in May or June, 1941; but these councillors were entirely nominal personnel registered only as members.

We received no direction or suggestion from the accused KIMURA, SUZUKI, or HOSHINO in connection with business of this Institute.

On this 1st day of December, 1946

At No. 501 2-Chome,  
Nishigaya, Setagaya-Ku,  
Tokyo

DEPONENT: IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

I, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At same place

Witness: (signed) SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan  
Date: 4 March 1947

Ex. 3030 Def doc 164

No. 1

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

對

荒木良夫 其他

宣言供述書

供述者 飯村 穰

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ニ通リ宣言  
ヲ爲シタル上次、如ク供述致シマス

△



Def doc 164

尚想定ニ就テ各種ノ情況ヲ演習シ、爲メ方便トシテ軍ニ假定情況  
ニ適シテ演習スル演練ノ対象ニ此等想定情況ノ主体トシテ  
タリ之等ノ假定ニ基テ協同動作ヲ訓練セリ  
コト想定及情況ニ關係當局ニ實際政策トシテ全ク無關係ナ  
リトスルノ理由ハ、種々事情ハ各關係當局者以外、誰モ知ス  
又各當局ニテ漏洩スル者モ下ラセ  
コト演習ハ半公開的ナリトシテ、現行政策ヲ利用スルコトハ、未  
モモズ又許シテモセリ

演習記事ニ「極秘」トアリ、中ニ國家的機密數字カツ  
クモアリ

コト研究結果ハ本研究所カテ上級官廳ヲツテ内閣ニ事務的恒  
例に従ヒ提出シカモ知ラセガ其他ハ政府ト言ハ、軍部ト言ハ  
全然提出シテコトモナク、又此等カテ指示ヲ受テコトモ下ラセ  
目的ハ上述ノ通りナリ、且短時日ヲ檢テ、余裕モナク關係上  
之等ノ現象、政策ヲ利用スルコトハ、思ヒヨラヌ所ナリトシテ、書  
數ヲ一見スルハ何人モ諒解セザル所ナリ

一研究員ハ各省及民間團體ニ委嘱シテ選定シテモ、更ニ研  
究所ニ審査シ、内閣ニ具申決定シテ発令スルコトナリ

年令ハ平均三十三才位、若年者ヲ各省等、責任ハ地位ハ者  
一人トナリ、中ニ判事ガ一名アリ、之ガ外モ他ノ者ト同様ニ  
若年者ヲ其地位ハ低クテ下リ

一豫算ハ年額十萬圓ナリ、中約半分ハ人件費ナリ、  
半分ハ事務費ナリ、豫算ハ極ク少ク、何等  
活動モナクナリ

No. 3





No. 4

Ref Doc 164

- 一 要スルニ本研究所ハ其ノ名稱及官制上ノ規定カミシ、相當重要ナモノ、様ヲリテガ實際ニ上ハ少壯官吏、教育機關ヲクニスベシ。ソ、教育モ色々ノ關係ヲ思フ様ニキマセシテシタシ。
- 其ノ研究ノ結果ヲ現實ニ國策又ハ戰爭計畵策ニ利用セラレタモハアリセシ。
- 一 昭和十六年(一九四一年)五月頃各方面ノ援助ヲ受ケル目的ヲ本研究所ニ參與制ヲ設ケシタカ、金々有名無実ニ終リ、早ニ員ニ備ハルミテアリシ。
- 一 報告ヲルニ木村、鈴木、星野等カラハ本研究所ノ業務ニ關シ、一回モ指導モ示唆モ受ケラセハアリセシ。

Ref Doc 164

昭和三年九月廿五日 於東京教皇谷立祖師谷三子一

供述者 飯村穰 (印)

在立會人面前宣誓且署名捺印之  
證明之

同日 於東京教皇谷立祖師谷三子一

立會人 塩原時三郎 (印)

No. 5

No. 6

22 of Dec 1844

附加也ナルニ下ヲ折言フ

良心ニ彼巴真実ヲ述之何事ヲモ黙秘セ又何事ヲモ

宣折言書

飯村讓



Doc. No. 626 A-1

Extract from  
Interrogation of Hideki TOJO  
30 January 1946  
p. 2-3

44 3032

Ex. 2750

- A. Yes. The former did influence the latter. You must remember that the military setup in Japan is very different from that in America. The Chief of Staff is independent of the War Department in matters of command, and also from the point of view of organization. He is not subordinate to the War Minister but is equal to him. Hence, this atmosphere which permeated the Army was undoubtedly communicated to the War Minister by the Chief of Staff and communicated to Cabinet deliberations by the War Minister. However, I repeat again that this was not a clique or a faction. I might explain to you the Japanese system as regards the position of the Emperor, the Chief of Staff, the War Minister, and the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Army. All matters of command passed from the Emperor to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. All matters of military administration passed from the Emperor via the War Minister to the Commander in Chief. The Emperor could also issue Imperial ordinances [choku rei]. At this time, the China Incident was in progress and therefore a great many decisions passed from the Emperor through the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff was an exceedingly important individual. The relevance of this explanation to the question which was asked is as follows: The Chief of Staff was naturally cognizant of the pro-Axis feeling in the Army and necessarily informed the War Minister of the fact. The latter then introduced the subject of the Army's feelings into the Cabinet discussions where they had some influence upon the decisions taken. In Japan, the position of the Chief of Staff is not at all the same as the position of the Chief of Staff in America. The Chief of Staff in Japan, it is true, does not attend cabinet meetings. However, his view on a multitude of matters relating to strategy are conveyed to the Cabinet via the War Minister and, generally speaking, he is of equal standing with the War Minister and not subordinate to him.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

64 3033

Defense Document 626-A-8

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki TOJO

Date and Time: 13 March 1946, 0935-1215 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hideki TOJO  
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator  
Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter  
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Fihelly

\*\*\*\*\*

Q. This is all very helpful to us as we are attempting to fully understand the Japanese political and military systems, and we thank you for your assistance.

A. This matter of the relation of the cabinet authority to that of the Supreme Command is very basic. If it is not understood, nothing will be understood.

Q. As Premier and War Minister, were you a member of the Supreme Command, the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and of the Supreme War Council?

A. As War Minister, I was not a member of the Supreme Command, but I was a participant (sankaku sha). I was concerned with military administration but not with the conduct of operations or tactics. I was not a member of the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. However, I was, along with the Chiefs of Staff, a member of the Supreme War Council.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

I am saying what follows here, not by way of excuse or to avoid responsibility because I hate the idea of trying to avoid responsibility. I wish to take full responsibility, but this is only a factual explanation of a real situation in order to assist you in your investigation. When Prince KONOYE was Premier, it was very, very difficult for him because of the fact that his sphere of authority included only the civil sphere. When I became Premier, since I was concurrently War Minister, I had, in addition, a voice in purely military matters, to wit: in military administration. When I became Chief of Staff on 22 February 1944, soon after the fall of the Marianas, I had an additional segment of authority in regard to purely military affairs. In fact after that, only the purely Naval matters were outside of my authority. As Premier, I had full responsibility for civil affairs; as War Minister, I had the additional military function of military administration; as Chief of Staff, I had the further High Command functions of operations and tactics /sakuson yohei/.

This whole matter of the actual system in Japan is basic to the understanding of such things as the China Incident and the matters in southern Indo-China that we have talked about. At the first, the government policy in regard to the China Incident was that of localization. However, due to the fact of the independence of the High Command, the fighting kept spreading as they strove for victory. Premier KONOYE had a terrible time.

One other thing I think is important: Under the Japanese system, the Emperor was assisted by the following officials: Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal /Naidaijin/; the Lord Chamberlain /jiju Cho/; and the Imperial Household Minister /kunai Daijin/. He also had a Chief Aide-de-Camp /Jiju Bukan Cho/. The Lord Privy Seal was the Emperor's advisor on matter relating to civil affairs. The Grand Chamberlain and the

Imperial Household Minister had no direct connection with either the civil government or the Supreme Command. The Grand Chamberlain was adjutant to His Majesty; as such, he had a variety of duties. However, neither he nor the Imperial Household Minister had any direct connection with either the civil government or the High Command. This was particularly true in the case of the former, since he was a civil official and not a military man. The Emperor's Aide-de-Camp, being a full general, had some unofficial access to the Supreme Command, but, under the government system itself, he had actually no authority for direct liaison.

The Emperor did confer directly with the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. However, this body was not very active since most of the members were of advanced years. Therefore, in practice, the Emperor was in a difficult position. He had no one on his staff to help him on High Command matters. When the Premier and the various cabinet members reported to the Emperor on civil matters, he could consult the Lord Privy Seal. When the Chiefs of Staff reported to him in regard to command problems, he had no body to consult except the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals.

The responsibility of the Premier and the Foreign, War, and Navy Ministers, and the President of the Planning Board, together with the Chiefs of Staff, for advice to the Emperor, through the instrumentality of the Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences, was of tremendous importance. To return to the China incident, for example - the Government policy was a policy of non-enlargement of the Incident; nevertheless, because of the fact that the civil government had no authority over the Supreme Command, the fighting was in fact, enlarged and the civil government was powerless to prevent it.

693034

terms. Which class of the German and Japanese decorations (second class, third class, cross, grand cross) was to be recommended depended in pursuance of the statutes of the orders, first and foremost upon the rank of the officer to be honored and not on his more or less important personal merits. This fact created a paradox in that it was impossible to decorate German or Japanese lieutenant-colonels because the German and Japanese Foreign Office had not been able to agree how to classify them, whether as colonels or as majors.

In regard to the German Embassy's telegram of May 17, 1942, the wording of the telegram was not made by me. I had handed Ambassador Ott my proposals for orders to be conferred upon Generals SUJIKAWA, Lt. Gen. KIMURA, Lt. Gen. MUTO, Maj. Gen. MATO, and some other officers not entered into this telegram.

I had proposed these officers more on account of their position in the Japanese army than because of their special accomplishment in favor of the German army. Other officers in corresponding positions, for instance Maj. Gen. OHSUDA, who then Chief of Staff in charge of G-2 Department of the General Staff, had not been recommended by me as they had already received the German decoration.

That I asked for a decoration for Lt. Gen. KASAHARA, I do not remember. I do not remember the wording of my proposals for the aforementioned four officers handed by me to the Ambassador but it must have been close to the wording chosen by him in paragraphs 5-6 of the telegram. In order to overcome the German Foreign Office's reluctance, I regarded the superlative to be necessary where the positive would have been more correct and more correspondent to the simple reality. And the Ambassador added superlatives in his additional explanations.

A. F. Kretschmer

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

A. F. Kretschmer (signed)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of April, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

Bernard A. Harwood (signed)  
1st. Lt. Inf.  
Administrative Officer  
Defense Division, Legal Section

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



Def Rec No. 1501

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

Aizawa, Genzo, et al

Witness

Name: Alfred F. Kraibonhik

Address: Ranko Hotel  
Atsugi, Japan

Concerning German decorations for Japanese Army officers.

I was German military attaché in Tokyo from December 4, 1940 until May 2, 1945.

The German Foreign Office was competent to grant my request made through the German Ambassador for the bestowal of German decorations upon Japanese Army officers. The German Foreign Office was very reserved in granting such orders. Its reluctance was caused by two reasons:

1. It wished to limit as much as possible the number of German decorations bestowed upon foreigners in order to increase the value of the Order of the German Eagle, it being the only decoration destined to be granted to foreigners in diplomatic courtesy routine.

2. The German Foreign Office aspired to gain reciprocity from the Japanese side. The German request was refused by the Japanese Foreign Office which always pointed to the fact that the different classes of the German Eagle were bestowed upon foreigners only while on the other hand the Japanese decorations, Rising Sun and Sacred Treasure, were worn by Japanese as well as by foreigners.

Neither the German Ambassador nor I regarded the maintenance of reciprocity in number between German and Japanese decorations which was so strictly required by the German Foreign Office as essential. I was much more interested in the creating and maintenance of a favorable atmosphere surrounding the Japanese officers who were assigned to work with me. The desired atmosphere was enhanced by the bestowal of occasional decorations. Sometimes the Japanese War Ministry or General Staff mentioned to me which officers they wished to be distinguished by a German decoration. Most times such hints coincided with my own intentions. Usually the Japanese officers thus mentioned to me for a German decoration did not know anything about it themselves and were often surprised when they received the order. I regarded these mutual German and Japanese decorations neither as a reward nor as a bribe but as an act of diplomatic courtesy without such significance.

To overcome the aforementioned resistance of the German Foreign Office, I regarded it necessary to work the arguments for German decorations upon Japanese officials in somewhat exaggerated

- 1 -

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

DEFENSE DOCUMENT NO. 2131 (Revised) EXHIBIT # 3035

IPS DOC. No. 851A

The under-signed, duly authorized by their respective Governments,  
agree as follows:

1. In order to cope with the urgent situation in the East Asia, Thailand shall give to Japan the permission of passage by the Japanese Forces through the Thai territory and giving of all necessary facilities for the said passage as well as immediate execution of measures to avoid every possible conflict which may arise between the Japanese and the Thai forces.

2. The particulars for the execution of the precedent paragraph shall be agreed upon between the military authorities of the two countries.

3. Japan shall guarantee that the independence, sovereignty and honour of Thailand be respected.

Done, in duplicate, at Bangkok on the 8th December 1941

/S/  
The Thai Minister of Foreign  
Affairs.

/S/ .T.T.  
The Japanese Ambassador

2.

- 1 -

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

At Bangkok,

Dec. 8, 1941

Your Excellency TSUBOKAWA, Teiji, The Japanese Ambassador:

I have duly received Your Excellency's note dated this day notifying me to the following effect.

I hereby inform you for caution's sake that I have affixed my signature to the agreement which has been signed this day between the Governments of Japan and Thailand .

And I suggest that the Government of Japan will take adequate measures necessary for confirming the above agreement as soon as possible.

Again submitting my highest esteem of courtesy to Your Excellency,

Thailand Ministers  
of Foreign Affairs

DEFENSE DOCUMENT NO. 2131  
IPS DOC. No. 851A

2035 3

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaori, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the documents hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 8th December, 1941, and described as follows: Military Alliance between Thailand and Japan permitting the passage of Japanese troops through Thailand; letter dated 8th December, 1941 from the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador and confirmation of Military Alliance signed by the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Ambassador dated 11th December, 1941

I further certify that the attached records and documents are an official document of the Japanese Government, and that they are part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign office

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of November, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ H. Emura

Chief of Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d. Lt. Eric W. Fleisher 0935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of Nov., 1946.

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher. 2d.Lt.  
AUSM

NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis 2nd. Lt.

Investigation I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

44 3036

Def. Doc. #1665

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: - KANE, Kazuo.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly a Captain in the Navy.

From September, 1941, to August, 1943, I was staff-officer of the Shanghai District Naval Base Force and concurrently staff-officer of the Shanghai Special Landing Force, both of which units were under the command of the China Area Squadron, I participated in the planning of operations in general, in the Shanghai area.

2. The opening of operational movements involving the above forces on 8 December 1941 was as follows.

a. In compliance with orders issued by the Commander of the China Area Squadron, internal preparations had <sup>been</sup> made a few days before the outbreak of <sup>WAR</sup> to provide against emergencies. All forces were standing by for immediate action. However, absolutely no information was provided as to date and hour on commencing operations, until such time as orders were received from Commander of the China Area Squadron.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. #1665

The hour to commence operations was to be indicated separately.

- b. The occupation of the International Settlement in Shanghai was conducted chiefly by units attached to the Shanghai Special Landing Force from around 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. 8 December (Tokyo Time; the same hereinafter merchantmen in waters around Shanghai was carried out by units attached to the Shanghai District Naval Base Force from around 5:00 a.m. the same day.

I was senior staff-officer of both the Landing Force and Naval Base Force, and the commencement of operations was effected after orders to commence action had been received (by phone) from China Area Squadron Headquarters.

3. From memory, I can explain on a sketch map as hereto attached the condition of the waterfront area of Shanghai, before and after the day when operations began.

On this 23rd day of May, 1947  
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT /S/ KANE, Kazuo (seal)

I, TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: /S/ TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu (seal)

Def. Doc. #1665

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ AKANE, Kasuo (seal)

Translation Certificate


I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 21, 1947

SKETCH MAP.



5991 Dec. # 1665

Changed mooring point upon receiving orders to commence action.



Def Doc No 1665

極東口隊軍醫裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫等

宣誓供述書

供述者

東京部世田谷區千川與野町一ノ三五

河益一夫

明治三十七年一月二十九日迄

自分誠我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓シテ爲シタル上  
次ノ如ク供述致シマス

一、私ハ元海軍大佐ヲ昭和十六年（一九四一年）九月ヨリ昭和十八年（一九四

三年）八月迄支那方面艦隊麾下ノ上海方面艦隊北支隊隊長上海海軍特別団

艦隊參謀トシテ上海方面ノ作戰計畫全般ニ關與シマシタ。

二、昭和十六年十二月八日ノ同隊關係作戰開始ハ左ノ通デアリマシタ

(1) 支那方面艦隊司令長官ノ命令ニヨリ開戦ノ数日前カラ第一準備ヘテ作戰

ノ内的準備ヲ爲シ待機姿勢ヲ取ツテ居リマシタ、併シ何日ノ何時ソレガ

開始セラルルヤハ同艦隊司令長官ノ命令アル迄全然知ラツレテアリマセ

ヌデシタ、發動ノ時機ハ別ニ下令セラレル事ニラレテアツタノデアリ

マス

(2) 上述共同組界ノ接収ハ十二月八日午前十時又ハ十一時頃（東京時間）以下

列シヨリ主トシテ上海海軍特別艦隊ニ屬スル兵力ヲ以テ行ヒ、上海

方面ノ海江上ニ於ケル艦船ノ捕獲準備ハ同日午前五時頃ヨリ主トシテ上

海方面艦隊艦隊ニ屬スル兵力ヲ以テ行ヒマシタ

且分ハ双方部隊ノ首尾聯繫デアリマシタガ、其ノ發動ハ何レモ支那方面

艦隊司令部ヨリノ發動指令（上述）ニヨリ開始ソレタノデアリマシタ。

Def Doc No 1665

D46c #1665

三、私ハ自分ノ記憶ニ基キ當日作以行動謝知則後ノ上海江面ニ於ケル状況ヲ別  
紙圖面ノ如ク指示スルコトガ出來マス。



昭和二十二年（一九四七年）五月二十三日於

共 述 者 岡 金 一 夫

右ハ嘗立會人ノ西前ニテ宣讀シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證シマヌ

同日 於

立會人 岡 金 一 夫

1645 200 \* 1665

5

Dati Noe #1165

宣  
信  
書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ訣泌セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ言フ

可  
金  
一  
夫

6

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: MIYAMA, Yozo

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose as follows:

1. The following documents are shown to me for identification:

The first is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. I. I mark it as "Document A".

The second is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. VI. I mark it as "Document B".

The third is the File of Permanent Records of the War Ministry, 1931, Otsu, Section 3. I mark it as "Document C".

The fourth is Item No. 379 (1 bundle), according to the number given by the Washington Document Center. It is entitled as the Army-Asia-Secret-Great-Diary, 1942, Vol. V. I mark it as "Document D".

The fifth and sixth are the Manchuria-Incoming-Great-Diary ordinary of the War Ministry, 1931, parts I and III. I mark them as "Documents E and F".

The seventh is the Manchuria-Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. I. I mark it as "Document G".

The eighth is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. II. I mark it as "Document H".

The ninth is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. III. I mark it as "Document I".

The tenth is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. V. I mark it as "Document J".

2. I certify hereby that all the above documents were formerly kept at the War Ministry and later delivered to the Washington Document Center.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to state the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

DEPONENT MIYAMA, Yozo (signed & sealed)  
August 28th, 1947 at Tokyo

The above is sworn by the deponent who signed and sealed in my presence on the same day at the same place as above written.

WITNESS: OKAMOTO, Toshio

Def. Doc. # 1666

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Defendant: YAMAMOTO, Yoshio

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly a Rear-Admiral. On 8 December 1941, when war broke out I was Staff Officer of the Chinese Area Squadron and stationed in Shanghai.

2. At the outbreak of war, an instruction received from Imperial Headquarters addressed to the Chinese Area Squadron was to the following effect:

"Military operations by the Chinese Area Squadron will commence subsequent to confirmation of report on the initial attack by the Combined Squadron".

3. In conformity with this order, the Chinese Area Squadron passed instructions to forces under its command, to commence operations only after direct report on the Pearl Harbor attack by the Combined Squadron had been received.



Def. Doc. # 1666

4. Prior to issuing this instruction, preparations were made to cope with any emergency which may arise. However, the date and hour to commence military operations was kept in absolute secrecy to all forces under our command. Therefore, all forces under the command of the Squadron, made preparations and stood by in readiness until orders to commence operations were received.

5. As I have already stated, we had received orders strictly prohibiting the beginning of operations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. Therefore, we acted in obedience to that order.

It was after report had been received by radio at Squadron Headquarters, to the effect that, "we were successful in the attack against Hawaii", when orders to commence operations were communicated to forces under our command.

6. I shall next make a statement on the attack against the British warship Petrel.

Around 0520 hours 8 December 1941 (Tokyo Time; following hours will be the same.) the Commander of the Chinese Area Squadron dispatched emissaries to the U.S. warship Wake and the British warship Petrel. The emissaries explained to the effect that Japan had entered a state of war with the U.S. and Britain. They advised the commanding officers of these warships to surrender their ships and crew. Moreover, if our

terms were not accepted they warned them of an inevitable attack.

As the Petrel did not accept our terms it was attacked and sunk. VIZ: Around two hours prior to the attack, Japan and Britain had entered a state of belligerence. Despite the fact sufficient measures were dealt out to avoid any unnecessary bloodshed, due to the reason the commanding officer of the Petrel refused to accept our terms, the attack was unavoidably effected.

The U.S. warships Wake, which faced exactly the same predicament escaped the attack because it accepted our lawful disposal.

As a result of this attack, three naval service men on board the Petrel were killed. If it is true, it should be considered as "casualties suffered as a result of legitimate acts of warfare". It was not murder or man-slaughter inflicted by measures other than legitimate acts of warfare.

7. To explain details concerning the attack, it is as follows.

A few minutes after 0330 hours on 8 December 1941, the Chinese Area Squadron Headquarters received confirmed reports on the Pearl Harbor attack and the landing operations on the Malayan Peninsula. Immediately, two emissary boats were prepared at the wharf in front of our headquarters. Commander Inaho Otani and Lt. Commander Sakuji Matsumoto, who

were both Staff Officers attached to Squadron Headquarters, boarded the emissary boats. Hoisting a flag of truce the emissaries departed at 0515 hours for the British warship Petrel, and the U.S. warship Wake. Commander Oteri who headed for the Petrel reached the ship a few minutes before the other emissary. He presented to the commanding officer of the Petrel, a letter written in English to the following effect.

"Today, just now, Japan has entered a state of war with the U.S. and Britain. We advise you and your ship and crew to surrender to the Japanese Navy. If you refuse to accept our terms we shall immediately commence hostile actions".

That was the contents of the letter of advice addressed to the Commanding Officer of the Petrel from the Commander of the Chirexe Area Squadron, Admiral Koga. The report made by the emissary was as follows.

"The Captain of the Petrel was absent when we arrived. An officer who apparently was (but not certain) the second-in command was on duty as senior officer on board. His reply was, "The Captain of this ship is away at present and we cannot answer". Whereupon our emissary said, "In the absence of the Captain, the senior-officer who is present should naturally take charge of the ship. Is it not the same with the British Navy?". Our emissary requested an answer. The senior-officer present replied, "No, we will not surrender" and refused to

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accept our surrender terms. Therefore, the emissary said, "Then we shall attack". He left the ship and immediately fired a red flare pistol according to previous arrangements.

When members of the Squadron Headquarters saw this signal, it was contrary to general expectations and some even thought the signal was a mistake.

But upon confirming it was not a mistake, order to open attack was communicated to all nearby forces. At the order to open fire, the gunboat Toba, destroyer Hase, etc. went into action and within two or three minutes the Petrel burst into flames.

The officer commanding the attack was Vice-Admiral Makita, Commander of the Shanghai Base Corps. After first firing a few shots, the Commander (Vice-Admiral Makita) ordered a temporary cease-firing. The attack was soon resumed. In approximately 10 minutes, the Petrel sank. According to the report from Vice-Admiral Makita later on, I learned the reason why he ordered a temporary suspension of firing. It was to ascertain whether or not the Petrel would then surrender, and thereby refrain from unnecessary shelling.

However, the guns mounted on the Petrel were being trained against our ships and her crew was observed taking a defiant attitude and so the attack was resumed.

8. Emissary Lt.-Comdr. Matsumoto reached the U.S. warship

"ake only a few minutes after Commander Otani reached the Petrel. It was witnessed by the members of Squadron Headquarters. The report of the emissary to the U.S. warship "ake is summarized as follows.

"In almost the same manner as in the case of the Petrel the letter advising surrender was delivered to the Captain of the "ake. (I remember the Captain of the "ake being present.) The Captain of the "ake hesitated at first to make a reply, but after a while answered "Yes", and accepted our terms. Therefore, our emissary left the ship and fired a white-signal very-pistol. Members of the Area Squadron Headquarters breathed a sign of relief when they saw the signal.

9. Later on, according to the story of one crew member of the Petrel, when the attack began, the crew members jumped into the river and swam ashore to seek shelter on nearby "Paoton". The greater majority of the crew was saved but it was said that three were either killed or wounded. (Memory or figure of deaths and injuries is uncertain.)

10. Summarizing the whole situation, the operation of hostile actions against the British warship Petrel at Shanghai was carried out fair and square, faithfully abiding by international law. Moreover, utmost effort had been exerted with a view to minimize the inflicting of unnecessary casualties.

11. Now I shall state about the advance upon the international settlement south of the Soochow River.

Around 0700 hours on Dec. 8, 1941, in order to make a previous arrangement with the authorities of the Shanghai Municipal Council concerning the advance on the international settlement, Consul-General Horiuchi, as delegate of Japan visited the Municipal Council, accompanying Colonel Sakata, staff-officer of the 13th corps and Rear-Admiral Hara, sub-chief of staff of the China Sea Fleet, in the capacity of representatives of the army and navy respectively.

About one hour later, together with the Commander-in-Chief, I heard the report of Rear-Admiral Hara. According to his report the authorities of the Municipal Council agreed to our intention to advance the troop, peacefully and further expressed the intention to the effect that the Municipal Council itself would endeavor to preserve public order and also would cooperate with us in advancing. The arrangement fixed 1100 hours as the time of starting of advance.

In conformity to this prearrangement, at 1100 just the military and naval troops crossed over the Soochow River, entered the international Settlement and seized the buildings necessitated. Even if the troops were in arms, they advanced as in usual marching formation.

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Thanks to the cooperation of the Municipal Council the public order was observed so perfectly that the advance was carried out quite peacefully without causing any trouble between the troops and citizens.

On this 23rd day of May, 1947:

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ YAMAMOTO, Yoshio (seal)

I, TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ YAMAMOTO, Yoshio (seal)


- 8 -

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )  
et al )  
vs )  
ARAKI, Sadao, et al, )  
Defendants )

AFFIDAVIT OF  
MATSUMOTO SHUN-ICHI



Having first duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in the year 1921, and was in the office of the Director of the Bureau of Treaties from September, 1940, to October, 1942.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, matters concerning prisoners of war as well as civilians held in the theater of operations were under the charge and control of the Army or the Navy, while civilians of the enemy countries interned in Japan Proper were under that of the Home Ministry and those in the overseas territories, such as Formosa, Korea and Saghalien, under that of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs. In this connection, the liaison business with foreign countries, so far as it was transacted through the Foreign Ministry, was carried out chiefly by the Bureau of Treaties until 1 November 1942.

2. When the war broke out, Foreign Minister TOGO frequently expressed to the officials of the Foreign Ministry concerned his hope that civilian internees and prisoners of war might be treated with humanity and lenience. Pointing out that the fate of Japanese residents, amounting to several hundred thousands, in the enemy countries would be affected by the treatment by Japan of those prisoners of war and civilian internees, he urged us to take whatever steps might be possible for the realization of his hopes. We transacted business in conformity with the Foreign Minister's wishes in our daily contact with the competent officials of the other Government offices concerned.

3. On 27 December 1941 the United States Government addressed an inquiry through the Minister of Switzerland to the Japanese Government concerning the Treaty of 1929 for treatment of prisoners of war (The Geneva Convention). The United States being a signatory of the Convention, it inquired whether the Japanese Government intended to abide by the Convention during the present war despite Japan's not having ratified it (Exhibit 1468). With respect to the treatment of prisoners of war, Japan had been a signatory to the Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, concluded in 1907. That Convention has in its appendix seventeen stipulations regarding prisoners of war, and the principles of humanity are, moreover, stressed in its preamble. In accordance with Foreign Minister TOGO's opinion that our country should, out of humanitarianism, abide by the Geneva Convention (which expressed in full detail the stipulations of the Hague Convention) to the maximum extent that circumstances permitted, I discussed the matter with Uemura, Director of the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau, and other Army and Navy officers concerned. As a result, the reply



was made to the United States Government on 29 January 1942 (Exhibit 1469), in accordance with the answer of the War Ministry, which was in charge of the matter (Exhibit 1958), to the effect that although Japan had not ratified the Geneva Convention, and therefore was not bound by it, Japan would apply the Convention mutatis mutandis with respect to American prisoners of war under Japanese control. In response to the same inquiry made by Great Britain through Argentine Charge d'Affaires on 3 January of the same year (Exhibit 1494) a similar reply was made on 29 January (Exhibit 1496). As Great Britain proposed on 5 January 1942 through the Argentine Charge d'affaires that national and racial customs be taken into consideration, on a reciprocal basis, with respect to the supplying of food and clothing to prisoners of war (Exhibit 1495), the Japanese Government expressed agreement to that proposal also, in the same reply dated 29 January (Exhibit 1496). As the United States Government subsequently made inquiry on this matter point (Exhibit 1492), a reply similar to that to Great Britain was sent (Exhibit 1493).

Japan had not ratified the Geneva Convention, by reason primarily of the relations between the provisions of domestic law with those of the Convention; and the problems growing from this inter-relation would still have given rise to much difficulty in the event of an undertaking to apply the Convention completely and unconditionally. Moreover, it was anticipated that great difficulties in practice would result, as large-scale warfare spread over East Asia, if we were to apply strictly all the stipulations of the Geneva Convention, which Japan had not ratified. It was for these reasons that it was replied that the stipulations of the Convention were to be applied mutatis mutandis. It was the intention of Japan with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war that the stipulations of the Geneva Convention be applied so far as circumstances permitted; in other words, unless there were hindrances or obstacles which made its application impracticable.

It has to be noted that Japan did not at that time formally ratify or join the Convention in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 or Articles 94 and 95 thereof. What the Japanese Government did was only to communicate its intention in response to the inquiries made by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, through the countries representing their interests in Japan respectively; it did not take any of the domestic steps necessary for ratifying or entering the Convention, nor did it submit to the Government of Switzerland its ratification or notification of entrance, in accordance with the aforesaid provisions. For this reason the Swiss Government never notified the member-nations of the Convention of Japan's ratification or entrance into the Convention.

The Japanese Government, moreover, had never taken the view that the Geneva Convention become part or evidence of the laws and customs of war by reason of its signature by 47 nations, including Japan, and its ratification by more than 40 nations, but adopted the view that the fact that the Soviet Union, who is not a party to the Geneva Convention, refused to apply it during the present war showed that the Convention did not automatically bind nations as an established international custom.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Matsumoto Shun-Ichi (seal)

On this 17th day of February  
1947 At Tokyo.

DEPONENT Matsumoto Shun-Ichi (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement, was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo  
17 February 1947.

Exp 3040

Def. Doc. No. 2233

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants -

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RETURN TO ROOM 361  
AFFIDAVIT  
KUDO Tadao

Having first duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in June 1924, and was the Chief of the Third Section of the Bureau of Treaties from 8 January to 31 October 1942. The said Section was in charge chiefly of the business concerning international cooperation including international conferences, international treaties, etc. When I was the Chief of the said Section, the contact of the Foreign Ministry with foreign countries in connection with prisoners of war and civilian internees was transacted chiefly in my Section.

2. It was the desire of my superiors that prisoners of war and internees be treated as leniently as possible in order to lessen their difficulties from the standpoint of justice and humanity, to say nothing of the observance of the stipulations of the treaties to which Japan was a party. We officials of the Foreign Ministry, although we had no authority actually to deal with the matters, exerted our utmost efforts to see the realization of the desire entertained by the Foreign Minister and other superiors.

3. The Foreign Ministry received inquiries and protests from the diplomatic representatives of Switzerland or Argentina acting on behalf of the United States of America or Great Britain respectively in connection with the treatment of prisoners and internees, and we transmitted these representations to the authority concerned without delay, and on the receipt of the opinions or information from them never failed in transmitting them without delay to the countries concerned.

Generally speaking, when I was in charge of these matters, the treatment being fairly good, if not ideal, we received few complaints or protests from any country in connection with the treatment of prisoners or internees in Japan Proper. Probably it was partly due to the fact that the war was still in its earlier stages and food and clothing were not so scanty as in the latter stages. As to the treatment of prisoners and internees in the occupied territories we received some protests, but receiving replies from the authorities concerned to the effect that they were receiving fair and equitable treatment, and having no means of directly investigating them ourselves, we could only believe what was reported in these replies.

At any rate, we endeavored earnestly and sincerely to alleviate the difficulties of the prisoners and internees as far as possible. Here are some instances which were dealt with by the Foreign Ministry when I was in the Bureau of Treaties.

A) Visits to the internment camps.

The International Red Cross Committee at Geneva requested in the middle of February 1942, that the delegates of the Committee be allowed to visit the internment camps. The Bureau of Treaties conveyed the request to the competent officials of the War Ministry, as well as other ministries concerned, and strove for its realization. As the result of this effort, the visits of the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee were realized as mentioned hereunder:

(a) Camps for prisoners of war.

ZENTSŪJI	on 12 March 1942.
TŌKYŌ	on 21 August 1942
HONG KONG	towards end of May 1942
SHANGHAI	on 18 August 1942

(b) Camps for civilian internees.

SUMIRE GAKUIN, Tōkyō	on 16 May 1942
YOKOHAMA	on 30 May 1942
SHIROYAMA, Nagasaki	on 11 June 1942
MIYOSHI, Hiroshima	on 13 June 1942
KŌBE	on 15 June 1942
SENDAI	on 19 June 1942
HONG KONG	towards end of May 1942

I recall also that the members of the Swiss Legation and Consulate visited various camps on several occasions, although I do not remember the details at present. The above list is a list of the Red Cross visits in my time, but I understand that visits by the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee as well as of the countries protecting the interests of the belligerent countries were made from time to time thereafter.

In connection with these activities of the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee, the Railway Ministry issued free tickets and rendered various other facilities in accordance with our request.

Visits to the internment camps in the occupied territories, however, were not permitted by the military authorities concerned when I was in that office, for the reasons that those regions constituted the theater of operations.

B) Treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan.

We requested the authorities concerned to accord as lenient treatment as possible to the prisoners and internees, and we were always told by them that the treatment was good and equitable. In fact, the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee, after visiting various camps as mentioned above, reported that the conditions there were "good", "favorable", or "excellent", as shown by the Defense Document No. 2009.

The Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo, informed the Swiss Minister of the ration of food being supplied to the internees in Japan, on 13 February 1942 (Exhibit 1491) as an instance that the internees were receiving food better than those of the Japanese in general. It was the statement of the condition actually being accorded at that time, not a commitment for the future.

C) Treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the occupied territories.

The Foreign Ministry had little knowledge concerning the condition of the prisoners and internees outside of Japan. When we received an inquiry or protest about this matter, we transmitted it without delay to the authorities concerned, requesting them to supply us necessary information, and on the receipt of the reply from them, we transmitted it immediately to the countries concerned. I recall that communications of this nature were made on the conditions of prisoners of war and internees in Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines. The information we received at that time on these questions was promptly transmitted to the countries concerned. The Foreign Ministry, having no means of investigation, had to rely upon the information supplied by them and could not do anything further than drawing the attention of the authorities concerned to the necessity of accordng fair and equitable treatment to the prisoners and internees of enemy countries, especially taking into consideration the residence of Japanese in enemy countries.

Such being the circumstances, nothing was known to us with respect to the ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees in the occupied areas unless we were informed by the military or naval authorities concerned or by the adversary belligerent countries. As to the prisoners and internees on Wake Island, we received some inquiries from the Swiss Minister in Tokyo in the beginning of 1942, but they were inquiries about conditions and not protests nor complaints, and we did not fail in transmitting them to the authorities concerned, and upon receipt of reply from them, we immediately sent the information obtained at that time to the Swiss Minister, as shown in Exhibit 2034, and a further communication was made to him on 10 August. (Exhibit 2040). It was not known to us at all that ill-treatment was carried out there as testified by Mr. Stewart on 10 January 1947. The so-called "Death March of Bataan" was also a matter unknown to us in those days. As for the Thai-Burma Railway, the matter being exclusively the Army's concern, we did not hear of any plan for its construction, much less, of the employment of prisoners in its construction, when I was in the Bureau of Treaties.

D) Relief of prisoners and internees.

Early in 1942, the British Government made a proposal to send a Red Cross ship from Australia to bring relief goods to the prisoners and internees at Hong Kong and Singapore. The United States Red Cross also made a similar proposal for the benefit of the American prisoners and civilian internees at various places in East Asia. The Foreign Ministry approached the Navy on this matter, but they maintained that the safety of navigation of the ship could not be guaranteed in the light of the war situation in the southwestern Pacific. Thereupon, we exerted ourselves, with success, to receive food, medicine and other relief goods, taking advantage of the voyages for the exchange of diplomats and some civilians, which were then being arranged between Japan and the United States of America and Great Britain. The Asama-maru, the Tatsuta-maru, the Amakura-maru transported the relief goods of about 4,500 tons in total, and these relief goods were distributed to the prisoners and internees through the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee in Japan, at Shanghai and at Hong Kong, and through the competent official at Singapore and Manila where no such delegates were stationed.

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E) Exchange of information concerning prisoners of war and civil internees.

On 9 December 1941, the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva notified the Japanese Government that the Central Bureau for the Information of Prisoners of War of the Committee would act as an intermediary for information concerning prisoners of war and civilians under detention of both belligerent powers, and requested coöperation on the part of the Japanese Government. The Foreign Minister notified the Committee of our compliance. From that time onward, we exerted our efforts, always in concert with the competent authorities of the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau, the Home Ministry, the Communications Ministry, etc., to offer all information obtainable to the Central Bureau at Geneva as quickly as possible.

In this connection, we further rendered our services so that similar information might be supplied to the representatives of Switzerland and Argentina, then acting as protecting powers on behalf of the United States of America and Great Britain respectively. In some cases delay in supplying information took place, but it was said to us by the authorities concerned that it was owing to the difficult conditions prevailing in the areas of military operations and to the difficulties of communication with the remote regions, and not to their bad faith.

I wish also to add that the Foreign Ministry informed the Swiss Minister that "Regarding the American civilian internees, we are ready to reply to every individual inquiry after the fullest possible investigations," and requested him to supply us the names of persons of whom information was required (Exhibit 2040). This suggestion was made in order to conform more fully with the desires of those concerned in expediting the investigation by the authorities concerned.

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O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kudō Tadao

On this 26th day of August 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT Kudō Tadao (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo  
26 August 1947

Def 400 No. 2233

EXHIBIT #

22110

22

總 覽 例 文 書 第 二 二 三 三 號

極 東 國 際 軍 事 法 院 所

亞 米 利 加 合 衆 國 其 他

到

荒 木 貞 夫 其 他

宣 告 供 述 者

供 述 者

工 藤 忠 夫

自 分 機 教 團 二 行 ハ ル ル 方 式 二 從 ヒ 先 ツ 別 紙 ノ 通 リ 宣 告 ヲ 爲 シ タ ル 上 次 ノ  
如 ク 供 述 致 シ マ ス

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一、私は一九二四年六月外務省に入り一九四二年一月八日から同年十月三十日迄外務省條約局第三課長の職にありました、同課は國際會議、國際條約等國際的協力に關する事務を主として管掌して居りました、私の條約第三課長時代は俘虜抑留者に關する外務省の諸外國との交渉事務は主として私の課で取扱つて居りました

二、俘虜及抑留者の取扱に付ては上司は日本の加入せる國際條約の規定を遵守するは勿論正義人道に立脚して之等不幸なる人達の困難を軽減する爲出來得る限り寛大なる取扱ひがなされる様希望せられ私共外務省員は本問題を實行する權限はありませんでしたが出來得る限り大臣其他上司の希望の實現を見る様努力しました

三、外務省は俘虜抑留者の取扱ひ問題に關し英米兩國の利益代表國たるスイス、アルゼンティンの外交代表者より照會又は抗議に接したことがありましたが之等照會又は抗議は遲滞なく之を關係國へ轉達したのであります乃至報復に接するや遲滞なく之を關係國へ轉達したのであります一般論として私の在任中は日本内地に於ける俘虜抑留者の待遇は理想的とは云ひ得ないとするも相當良好でありましたので之に付大した苦情も抗議も受けませんでした、蓋し之は昔時戦争當初の事でもあり衣料及食料は戦争の末期に於けるが如く缺乏して居なかつた爲でもありません、

尙占領地に於ける俘虜及抑留者の取扱に付ては若干の抗議がありました。が關係官廳からは公正なる取扱を受け居ることの回答がありましたので直接調査の方法なき晉々としては之に信賴するより外に方法がありませんでした。

何れにしても私達は俘虜抑留者の困難を軽減する爲熱い且誠實に努力した次第であります。

私は條約局在職中外務省が俘虜抑留者に行務力した二、三の實例を左に述べます。

イ、俘虜抑留者收容所の訪問

一九四二年二月中旬、蘇府赤十字國際委員會から在本邦代表の俘虜抑留者收容所訪問許可方要求がありましたので條約局は陸軍省及他の關係省の當該關係官に連絡して原現方に努力しその結果國際赤十字代表の訪問は左の通り實施せられました。

イ、俘虜收容所

上	本	東	神	通	一九四二年三月十二日
			海	港	同 年八月二十一日
			京	寺	同 年八月十八日
					同 年五月下旬
					同 年八月十八日

民間抑留所

學院 (東京)

一九四二年五月十六日

瀨 濱

同 年五月三十日

長崎、城山

同 年六月十一日

鹿島、三次

同 年六月十三日

神 戸

同 年六月十五日

仙 臺

同 年六月十九日

香 港

同 年六月下旬

尚詳細のことは記憶しませんが瑞西公使館及領事館員も致度諸所の抑留所を訪問したことを記憶して居ります

前記の表は私の條約第三課長在職中に於ける赤十字の訪問表であります。すがその後も國際赤十字代表並びに交戦國の利益保護國代表の訪問は屢々行はれた邊であります。

右赤十字國際委員會代表のかかる活動に關しては無料パスの發給その他の便宜供與方鐵道省に交渉しその實現を見たのであります。

併し私の在職中は占領地の收容所訪問は作戦地域であるこの理由で軍當局の許可が得られませんでした。

(5) 内地に於ける俘虜抑留者の待遇

(注) 占領地に於ける俘虜抑留者の待遇

外務省は日本以外にある俘虜抑留者の状況については殆んど知る所がありませんでした。之につき照會又は抗議に際した時は之を關係當局に移譲して必要な情報を要求しその回答接受次第直ちに之を關係國に傳達しました。此の種の照會がグラム、ウエイキ島及びライリツピンの俘虜抑留者の状態についてなされた事を記憶して居ります。之等の問題につき當時受領した情報は直ちに關係國に傳達しました。外務省としては自ら調査が出来ませんのでその接受せる情報

俘虜抑留者に對し出來得る限りよき待遇を與ふる様屢々關係官廳に要請しましたが常に關係官廳からは彼等に對する待遇は公正に行はれてゐる旨語られて居りました。移住赤十字國際委員會代表も前述の各抑留所を視察し續體側文書第二〇〇九號に記載の通りその状態を良好さか、要務方では報告して居ります。因に一九四二年二月十日三日外務大臣より瑞西公使に對し内地抑留者に對する食料供給等を通稱し(法廷第一四九一號)彼等が一週日本人よりもよき食料を受け居ることの一例として居りますが之は當時に於ける待遇の實情を通知したものでありまして降参に對する約束ではありませんでした

に信頼し關係當局に對しては特に敵國在留日本人の事も考慮に入れて敵國の俘虜及抑留者に對し公正な待遇を與ふる事の必要につき注意を喚起する以上に措く事は出来ませんでした

かかる事情で占領地に於ける俘虜及抑留者の「待」に付ては關係陸海軍官憲又は敵國側より情報を受けざる限り何等知る所がありませんでした「ウエーク」島の俘虜及抑留者に關して一九四二年始め在京瑞西公使より照會を受けた事がありますが之は俘虜及び抑留者の状態に關する照會で抗議でも苦情でもありませんでした、我々は此の照會を遲滯なく當該官憲に移送し其の回答に接するや否や法廷證第二〇三四號の如く直に當時得た情報を瑞西公使に送付しました。本問題に關しては更に八月十日瑞西公使に通報がなされました（法廷證第二〇四〇號）「スチユワート」氏が一九四七年一月十日證言したるが如き「虐待が同地で行はれたのは全然我々の聞知しない所でありました、所謂「バダアン」の死の行進」も當時我々の知らない所でありました。泰緬鐵道に對しては之は専ら陸軍の關係事項で私の條約局時代にはその建設計畫を知らず況んやその建設に俘虜を使用することは何等聞く所がなかつたのであります

(二) 俘虜抑留者の救恤

(注)

一九四二年始め英國政府から香港、シンガポールに居る俘虜抑留者に救恤品を送付する爲に歐洲から赤十字船派遣の提議あり又米國赤十字からも東亞各地に於ける米人俘虜抑留者の爲に同様の提議がありました。外務省は之に付海軍と相談しましたが海軍側から西南太平洋に於ける交戦状況に鑑み右船舶に對する航行安全は保障出來ない旨の主張がありましたので我々は當時日米兩國間に話合中であつた外交官及一般人の交換船を利用して食料、藥品、其の他の救恤品を受領する機努力し後は成功を以て報ひられました即ち淺間丸、龍田丸及鐵倉丸は總額約四五〇〇トンの救恤品を輸送し此の救恤品は日本上海及香港に於ては赤十字國際委員會代表の手で又右代表の居ないシンガポール及マニラでは當局の手で俘虜及抑留者に配布されました

俘虜抑留者に関する情報交換

一九四一年十二月九日舊府赤十字國際委員會から同委員會俘虜情報中央部は兩交戦國の俘虜抑留者に関する情報の仲介を行ふ旨を通知越し右につき日本政府の協力を要請して参りましたが外務大臣は同委員會へ承諾の旨を通知しました。爾來私達は俘虜情報局、内務省、逓信省等の係官と絶えず連絡し成るべく早く入手し得る總ての情報が右俘虜情報中央部に提供ある機努力致しました

この點に關して同様の情報かその當時米國及英國各國のために利益代表國として行動してゐたスキス及びアルゼンチンの代表に對しても提供される様に我々は努力したのであります而して時に情報の供給が遅延したこともありますが之は作戦地域に於ける困難なる情況及び遠隔の地域との通信の困難に原因するもので當局の不誠意に依るものではないとの説明を受けて居りました

尙外務省は瑞西公使に對し「米國人非戦國員に關しては個々の問合せある時は出來得る限り取調の上回報すべきこと」を通告し情報を希望する人達の姓名を通知する様要請した（法廷證第二〇四〇號）ことを附言致します之は關係官憲に依る調査を促進し以て關係者の希望を一層よく達成せしめんとする豫旨をもつてなされたものであります

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月二十六日於 東京

供 述 者 工 藤 忠 夫 印

右ハ特立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立 會 人 西 春 彦 印



(署名印)

工

藤

忠

夫

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良心ニ従ヒテ眞實ニ述ベシ何事モ秘テ又何事モ附加セザルコトヲ

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THE RED CROSS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

Geneva

The Red Cross International Committee

June, 1942, pp. 382-383

The delegation in Japan.

On the occasion of his visit paid to the camp of Sumire Jogakuin in Tokyo on May 16, Dr. Paravicini found 16 citizens of the United States, 10 Britishers, 11 Canadians, 5 Dutchmen, 2 Belgians and 1 from Honduras. The two thirds of them are missionaries, all of local origin, who arrived, in succession, at the camp established on December 8. In his telegraphic message addressed to the International Committee, Dr. Paravicini describes the very salubrious situation of this camp, and the excellent conditions of lodging and nourishment. He points out that all those interned are made to undergo a medical examination once a month, and that, in case of need, they are sent to better hospitals. Dr. Paravicini adds the following informations: the Catholic and Protestant religious services are celebrated in this camp; the interned have a library with some newspapers and amusements at their disposal; there is none that is indigent among them; the commander, inspector of the service of the foreigners of the Metropolitan Police gives a good treatment to these interned, who, represented by four trustworthy men, have an

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excellent discipline and morale. The delegate writes, in conclusion, that this camp is an exemplary camp. The sole desire expressed by the interned is about the calls to the outside world, which they wish to be allowed to pay more frequently.

The delegation in Shanghai.

According to an information sent to the International Committee by its delegate Mr. Egle, the 67 nurses from Corrogor, all sound and safe, are interned in the University of Manila, where they are treated well. Mr. Egle informed also that about 13,000 civilians were interned in St. Thomas's, and that the letters received from 200 among them show that the treatment and the conditions of life there are excellent.

July, 1942, pp. 465-466

The delegation in Japan.

Dr. Paravicini visited the camp No. 2 of Yokohama Koncho, on May 30. Established on the seashore, on an artificial ground constructed of stone and argillaceous soil taken from the neighbouring hills, well-drained, sunny and well-ventilated, the camp comprised 18 Englishmen, 7 citizens of the United States and 2 Greeks of local origin. It was opened on December 18, 1941 like the camp No. 1. The building is two-storied. The treatment, the discipline and the morale there are good, and the delegate

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of the International Committee received only few complaints from some of these interned suffering from depression.

On that same day, the delegate of the International Committee visited the camp NO.1, situated in the southern part of Yokohama, at a half kilometre from the sea, which sheltered 19 Englishmen, 16 citizens of the United States, 11 Greeks, 3 Dutchmen, 1 Irishman, 1 Canadian and 1 Norwegian. The treatment, the discipline and the morale here are good.

On June 11, Dr. Paravicini visited the camp of Shirayama, Nagasaki, where were found 1 American and 1 American woman, 6 Englishmen, 1 Englishwoman, 10 Canadians, 4 Dutchmen and 2 Belgians. Established on the summit of a well-drained clayey hill, in a climate which has an excellent reputation, the camp enjoys the fertility of the country. The treatment, the morale and the discipline here are good, and the delegate of the International Committee heard no complaint on the part of the interned. Dr. Paravicini points out, however, that they desired to have some books, cards and playthings, and that the Japanese Red Cross was applying itself to getting them for the interned. In conclusion, the delegate declares that the camp is excellent.

On June 13, he visited the camp of Miyoshi, Hiroshima Prefecture, which was opened on December 13, 1941. There were 13 citizens of the United States, 4 Britishers, 3 Belgians and 1 of the Irish nationality, of whom 18 were women and 3 men. Two hours by train to the north of the seat of the prefectural government of Hiroshima, the camp is situated in the neighbourhood

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of two towns. In 1935, an American mission established a sanatorium here, three hundred metres above the sea-level, surrounded by cultivated fields, by parks and by hillocks covered with forests. The climate here is salubrious. The buildings are solid, sunny and well-ventilated. A good morale reigns in the camp, and no complaint was made to the delegate of the International Committee. The commander, a sympathetic man, is satisfied with the discipline of the interned as well as their spirit of comradeship.

On June 19, Dr. Paravicini visited the Sendai camp, which was opened on December 9, 1941. Twenty two citizens of the United States had vacated the camp, two days before the call of the delegate, on their own demand. The interned are lodged in a neighbouring house, while there remain in the camp 2 American women, 1 Englishman, 1 Englishwoman, 1 Dutchman and 23 Canadians. The camp stands isolated in a wood in the midst of the university town of Sendai. The vegetables and fruits, as well as the marine products, are abundant. The conditions under which the interned are lodged and fed are very favourable.

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DEF. DOC. #2009

November, 1942, p. 807

The delegation in Japan.

A telegram received from Tokyo provides us with information on the war prisoners' camp at Zentsuji.

Established in 1914 to lodge war prisoners and accommodated again to the purpose after it was abandoned in 1919, this camp is formed of wooden barracks. One notices that it is not surrounded, unlike some camps in other countries, by a high girdle of barbed wire. It has, as hosts, some American, British and Australian war prisoners for the present.

Those who are interned there have named it "University of Zentsuji", on account of the deepened lessons founded here: courses of commerce, of engineering, of stenography, of navigation of Japanese language, all given by the prisoners themselves. The theatrical performances take place on Sunday evening, and a conference on Thursday evening.

On Sunday morning, the religious services are celebrated by Anglican and Protestant chaplains, of whom two are Americans and the other one is an Australian.

The health service is secured by American, British and Japanese physicians.

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Def. Doc. 2009

國際赤十字雜誌

薛府

國際赤十字委員會

一九四二年六月 三八二—三八三頁

視察團ノ日本訪問—五月十六日パラヴィツチニ博士は東京の眞女學  
園收容所を訪問した。同所には米國人十六名、英國人十名、カナダ人十  
一名、オランダ人五名、ベルギー人二名、ホンドウラス人一名を收容し  
ているが、其中三分の二は布教師で、またいづれも該地方居住者であ  
り、十二月八日同收容所開設以來逐次收容されたものである。

パラヴィツチニ博士は國際赤十字委員會宛電報中左の通り述べてい  
る。收容二所在地は非常に健康地で宿舍及食料の狀況も極めてよい。收  
容人はいづれも一ヶ月一回醫師の診断を受け、要すれば一流の病院に送  
られる。尚カトリック及新教の懺禱も行われまた圖書館があつて、日刊  
新聞及遊び道具も備へつけてある。困つた様子をして居る者は一人も見  
當らない。此處の所長は警視廳外人係の警部で收容者に對し、非常に親





同時に聞かれ、待遇、規律、精神もよく國際赤十字代表は憂鬱性に悩む  
或收容人からいくらかの苦情を聞いたに過ぎない。

同日國際赤十字代表は檳榔嶼の南部、海から半キロ米陸れて居る第一收容  
所を訪問した。同所には英人十九名、米人十六名、ギリシヤ人十一名、  
オランダ人三名、アイルランド人一名、カナダ人一名、ノールウエー人  
一名が收容されて居るが待遇も、規律も、精神状態もいい。

バラウキツチニ博士は六月十一日長崎廣山收容所を訪問した。そこには  
米人一名、米婦人一名、英人六名、英婦人一名、カナダ人十名、オラン  
ダ人四名、ベルギー人二名が居た。收容所は粘土質の丘の上にあつて排  
水もよく、また氣候は有名ないい處で地方の農産物に恵まれて居た。待  
遇といい、精神状態といい、規律といい、いづれもよく赤十字代表は、  
收容者個からの苦情を一つも聞かなかつた。もつともバラウキツチニ  
博士は收容者が本、カード、遊び道具を欲しがつて居り、日本赤十字が  
之を入申すべく盡力中の旨を指摘して居る。

六月十三日廣島の三好收容所を訪問した。此處は一九四一年十二月十三



しく良い。

一九四二年十一月 八〇七頁

代表の日本訪問

東京からの電報によれば、普通寺の俘虜收容所の様子が伺われる。即ち本收容所はもともと一九一四年俘虜を收容する爲に造られた物であるが一九一九年一旦廢棄されたのを再び造營したものである。敷棟の木造バラックより成り立つて居るが注意すべきは、よく外國にある様に高い鐵條網で圍らされていゝ事である。

目下米英及濠洲兵が收容されてゐる。收容者は之を普通寺大學と稱してゐるが其の理由は此處で色んな學問をさせられるからで商業機械速記航海日本語等何れも捕虜自身が勤へてゐる。毎日晝夜には芝居があり木曜の夕には講演會が行はれて居る。

又日曜の朝は英教會及プロテスタンの牧師によつて宗教上の儀式が行はれてゐる。牧師の中二名は米人で一名濠洲人である。保健については英米日醫師が其任に當つてゐる。

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Def. Doc. 2277 RETURN TO ROOM 361 EXHIBIT # 3042A

EXCERPT FROM "RED CROSS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW"

Geneva

The Red Cross International Committee

January, 1942: pp. 7-8

Extension of the Conflict to the Pacific Area

The conflict being extended to the Pacific area, the International Committee has--as it had already done for the other countries which had entered the war--telegraphically placed the services of the Central Bureau of Prisoners of War at the disposal of the belligerent states, asking them if they were disposed to exchange by the intermediary of the Central Bureau of Geneva lists of information on prisoners of war, and insofar as possible on civil internees whom they should detain.

That communication was addressed to the Governments of the United States, Japan, the Netherlands in London, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador.

The Committee furthermore had brought the above steps to the knowledge of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and the Union of South Africa.

The International Committee received, by 12 January, answers by which the United States, Japan, Guatemala, Haiti and Nicaragua declared themselves ready to proceed to the transmission of informations and to the exchange of news.

. . . .

April, 1942: p.217

The Delegation in Japan

Dr. Paravicini telegraphed on 4 February that the Guam and Wake prisoners had expressed their gratitudes to the Japanese authorities for the good treatment which had been accorded to them.

Accompanied by a colleague of the Information Bureau of the Japanese Red Cross, Dr. Paravicini on 12 March visited a prisoner-of-war camp which is situated in a fertile plain between hills covered with pine trees; the climate is healthy there, and the delegate indicates that there are no endemic diseases. The space of the camp is three hectares; it contains two solid Army barracks built of wood, capable of receiving several hundreds of prisoners.

. . . .

Translation Certificate

I, Saito Chu, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the French and English languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Saito Chu

Tokyo  
27 August 1947

Def. Doc. # 2125

Exh. No. 3043

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Secretariat Secret No. 1984-C. November 15th, 1934

To Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Esq.  
From Vice-Minister of Navy.

Our reply to Your Note with regards Recommending to the Throne the Ratification of "the Treaty signed on the 27th of July, 1929, pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War".

With reference to the above subject, enquired in your note of JO-I-KIMITSU-GO No. 3091 dated August 9th, we replied by our letter of Secretariat No. 1984-B at that time. But as the result the study which we made later, we, the Navy Ministry, reached the conclusion that it is advisable to refrain from recommending to the Throne the ratification of the said treaty.  
(Our opinions are attached herewith in the annexed papers.)

Our opinions on this treaty

1. The Japanese soldiers do not expect any possibility of becoming war prisoners. On the contrary the soldiers of the foreign countries do not necessarily consider in the same way as the Japanese. Therefore, although this treaty appears reciprocal in its form, it is unilateral in its substance causing obligations on our side only.
2. This treaty is to guarantee the lenient treatment to prisoners, hence, e.g. in case enemy forces attempt to make air raids taking into consideration that they would become prisoners after achieving their aims, the range of action of enemy planes might be doubled. Thus, it is feared, the extent of the danger of being air raided would naturally be enlarged and so forth, bringing about consequent disadvantages upon our naval operations.
3. That, under the provisions of the Article 86, representatives of third powers be allowed to have interviews with war prisoners without observers is harmful from the military point of view.
4. The provisions of this treaty concerning the punishment of war prisoners give war prisoners more advantages than the those which Japanese soldiers will receive under Japanese laws. This fact will necessitate, the amendment of such codes and laws as the Navy Disciplinary Law, the Navy Penal Code, the Navy Court-Martial Law, and the Navy Ordinance concerning imprisonment.

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Such revision is not advisable in the light of the principles of the said laws, the purpose of which is to maintain the military discipline.

On the ground above said, We are of opinion that we had better not to recommend to the Throne the ratification of the said treaty.

Def. Doc. # 2125

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, URABE, Katsuma who occupy the post of the assistant Chief of the Archives and Documents Section of Foreign office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "The Reply to the Subject of Petitioning the Emperor for his Ratification concerning the Treaty concluded on the 27th of July in 1929 pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 15th day of August, 1947.

/s/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on this same date.

Witness: /s/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)

Def. Doc. # 2126

Exh. No. 3044

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Army Secrecy No. 521

September 6th, 1934

To: Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, SHIGEMITSU,  
Mamoru, Esq.

From: Vice-Minister of War, HASHIMOTO, Toranosuke

The following is our reply on the subject of petitioning the Emperor for his ratification of the Geneva Treaty concluded on 27th of July, 1929, for the improvement of the conditions of wounded and sick members of armed forces at the front, and a treaty of the same date relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.

Concerning your letter of inquiry, (JO-I-KIMITSU-GO No. 3091) dated 9th of August, we have no objection to petitioning the Emperor for his ratification of the Geneva Treaty concluded on 27th of July, 1929, for the improvement of the conditions of wounded and sick members of armed forces at the front, but in regard to "the treaty on the same date relative to the treatment of prisoners of war", in the opinion of War-Ministry, we would like to refrain from petitioning the Emperor for his ratification thereof. Therefore we wish you act in our favour at your discretion.

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Def. Doc. # 2126

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, URABE, Katsuma, who occupy the post of the Acting Chief of the Archives Section of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Reply on the subject of petitioning the Emperor for his sanction concerning Geneva Treaty concluded on 27th of July in 1929 for the improvement of the conditions of wounded and sick members of armed forces at the front, and a treaty, on the same date relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. (Official letter of the 6th of September, 1934 despatched from Vice-Minister of Foreign Ministry SHIGEMITSU to Vice-Minister of War, HASHIMOTO)" is an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 15th day of August, 1947

/S/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)

Ex 3046

Def. Doc. 1589

April 9th, 1942

War Ministry, Asiatic Affairs, Confidential. No. 1108.

Public Document Concerning Treatment of POW's

Article 2 of the regulations concerning the treatment of POW's (cf. the preceding number) provides that the POW Control Bureau should transact business concerning the treatment of POW's and the internees at the front. The scope of this "business concerning the treatment of POW's and those interned by the Army" is determined as follows:

1. Matters concerning general plans for treatment, such as accommodation, discipline, exchange, release, employment (for labor propaganda, etc), punishment and general allowances of POW's and those interned by the Army at the front.
2. Matters concerning labor of POW's.
3. Matters concerning correspondence of POW's.
4. Matters concerning punishment of POW's.
5. Matters corresponding to the preceding items No. 2 and 3 in the case of those interned by the Army at the front.

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Def. Doc. #1589

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, OYAMA, Ayao, who occupy the post of The Chief Judicial Investigator of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Administrative Matters concerning POW Treatment" as an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the 1st Demobilization Section of the Japanese Government.

certified at Tokyo,

on this 5 day of May, 1947

(signed) OYAMA, Ayao (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: (signed) ABE, Akira (seal)

No. 1

Def.

Doc

44 3046  
/ 5-89

第一復員局 法務調査部長

昭和二十三年九月五日

本書は復員、取扱関係の事務、件、  
本文と相違点の点を証明す。

大山文雄

第一復員局  
法務調査部長  
印

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No. 2

Def. Dec 15-89

昭和十七年四月九日  
陸軍部第一〇八號  
俘虜，取扱ニ関スル事務，件

- 一 俘虜，取扱ニ関スル規定(前條照參第二條ニ於テ、俘虜管理部、六、俘虜及戰地ニ於テ、柳留者、取扱ニ関スル事務ノ外、ノ下ナリ、此レ、後擧及軍柳留者、取扱ニ関スル事務，内容ヲ定メ、取報ニ関スル事務，内容ヲ定メ、取報ニ関スル事務，及戰地ニ於テ、軍柳留者，收容，取締，交換，解放利用(此役宣傳等)懲罰，待遇等取扱一般の諸計畫ニ関スル事項
- 二 俘虜，取扱ニ関スル事項
- 三 俘虜，通信ニ関スル事項
- 四 俘虜，懲罰ニ関スル事項
- 五 戰地ニ於テ、軍柳留者，前條ニ及ビ第三條ニ關スル事項

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Notification to the Chief of the Prisoner  
of War Control Bureau from the Adjutant.

Dated November 22, 1942

This is to inform you that it has been decided to entrust the decision regarding the following matters to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Control Bureau.

(a) Matters of minor importance concerning the accommodation, handling, allowances, transfer, labour and punishment of prisoners of war and internees at the front.

(b) Matters concerning correspondence of the prisoners of war and internees at the front.

(c) Matters concerning the relief of prisoners of war and internees at the front.

(d) Matters of minor importance concerning granting to foreigners entrance of prisoners of war camps and the military detention houses.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. No. 1590

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clark, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clark (seal)

Tokyo, Japan

Date 21 May 1947

---

May, 1947

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached is concerning the matters which were entrusted to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Control Bureau.

I may add that no matters were entrusted for decision to the Vice-Minister of War concerning prisoners of war.

/s/ MIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

Chief of the Archives and  
Document Section,  
First Demobilization Bureau

Def. Doc. #1590

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, MIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of The Chief of the Archives of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese; consisting of 1 page and entitled "Note from the Adjutant to the Director of POW" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the 1st Demobilization Section of the Japanese Government.

certified at Tokyo,

on this 5 day of May, 1947

(signed) MIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: (signed) ABE, Akira (seal)



DEF. LOC. #1907

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER COUNTRIES

against

ARAKI, Sadao and others

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: SUZUKI, Kunji

Having first duly sworn an oath <sup>as</sup> on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, SUZUKI Kunji, was born in Hyogo Prefecture on 6 January 1893. After graduating from the Military Academy in 1913, I served in various military offices, and I was the Chief of the Tokyo War Prisoners' Camp from September 12, 1942 to April, 1944.

I am now confined in Sugamo Prison.

I will state as follows about "Instruction of the War Minister to the new Chiefs of the War Prisoners' Camp". (Exhibit 1962).

1. September 29, 1942, when joint education of the newly appointed Chiefs of the War Prisoners' Camp and its staff was given at the War Ministry, which I attended as the Chief of the War Prisoners' Camp. Lt. General K. MIMURA, Mikio, the Chief of the Prisoners' of War Control Bureau read the War Minister's instruction for the Minister.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Neither War Minister TOJO nor Vice- Minister KIMURA was present at the lecture.

2. Lt. General KAMIMURA, after reading the instructions, explained it as follows:

a. "In regard to the treatment of the war prisoners, it is natural that you should be faithful to its righteous execution according to the rules, so that you should manifest the impartial attitude of the Empire as it really is, to the world; nevertheless, you must supervise them rigidly insofar as you do not become inhuman - - - " expressed in the instruction, means as follows:

The treatment of war prisoners ought to be carried out according to the War Prisoner Treatment Rule and its by-law. Especially, "War prisoners must be treated with the spirit of benevolence and should never be insulted or ill-treated" provided in Article 11 of the War Prisoner Treatment Rule, should be observed. But great care must be taken so that no untoward incident should happen. In short moderation and refraining from both warm treatment and ill treatment is essential in the treatment of war prisoners.

b. "War prisoners should not pass <sup>even</sup> a day eating the bread of idleness, but their labor and skill must be used for the purpose of increasing production - - - " expressed in the instruction, means as follows:

Today we, the whole nation of Japan, regardless of sex and age, are exerting ourselves according to our abilities to the utmost to increase production in the country, trying to overcome pressing shortages of labor. Therefore, the war prisoners also should render service to the increase of production, filling the shortage of labor, in proportion to their health, ability and special skills, respectively.

Viewing from existing pressing shortage of labor, it is good that the war prisoners do not pass even a day eating the bread of idleness. But it is not good that they be forced to work without consideration for their health, ability or special skills. Technical experts and skilled hands should be considered so as to be given the opportunity to display their special skill or ability and kept away from fatigue duties.

The present war will not easily come to an end. It will perhaps be a long war. Therefore, we should make it our motto that we make a reasonable and efficient use of war prisoners, refraining from force and impatience. For that purpose we must take their health and ability into consideration and allow them reasonable holidays.

If we mistreat them, and cause sickness or death, it will be most unfavorable to Japan.

c. At the closing, Lt. General KAMIMURA emphasized that in brief the cardinal principle of the treatment of war prisoners depended upon impartiality in treating them based on the principle laid down in the above-mentioned Article 11 of the War Prisoner Treatment Rule. KAMIMURA said that the instruction of the War Minister is therefore nothing but enlargement of this principle.

3. When I met Lt. General KAMIMURA, he told me as follows:

"The Chiefs of the war prisoners' camp such as you, well know that war prisoners should be fairly treated, according to the War Prisoner Treatment Rule and War Minister's instructions. But needless to say that you must be always be cautious of things which attract the Japanese public's attention. You must beware of causing feelings unfavorable to the war prisoners, among the people who are having great difficulties in getting daily commodities, by making it appear that prisoners are enjoying too good treatment. But you should never fail in treating them justly.

For instance, recently a number of the municipal assembly men visited the Paymasters' Department of the Imperial Guard Division and asked, "Why is it that we, the citizens of Tokyo, cannot eat a bit of meat while meat is given to the war prisoners?" Before this time the citizens of Tokyo had seen pork being transported in a truck for prisoners' food. The Chief of the Paymasters' Department barely succeeded in mollifying them by earnestly explaining the circumstances. I UEMURA have also experienced cases of this kind. I hope you will all see through these delicate mental conditions of the citizens and beware of exciting the Japanese people without reason.

4. Upon the other part of the Minister's instruction, I, SUZUKI, put my interpretation as follows and put it into practice:

a. "As to the treatment of war prisoners there is a difference between the way of our country and those of European and American countries due to inconsistent ideas as to the war prisoner." ---expressed in the instruction, means that though in the countries in Europe and America the war prisoners

DEF. DOC. #1907

are regarded and treated as "honorable war prisoners", in this country they are treated throughout with sympathy and pity as "pitiful war prisoners".

In our country it is considered from old time the greatest disgrace that we, the Japanese, be taken prisoners. But as to enemies who surrendered giving up their arms, it is thought to accord with the spirit of the "Bushido" that we treat them throughout with benevolence and pity.

b. "You must endeavor to make the people in the occupied areas know the superiority of the Japanese race and believe that they consider it the highest honor to be Japanese subjects sharing in the boundless benevolence of the Emperor." --- expressed in the instruction, is in brief that the Japanese are required to display their excellent character, not to insult the war prisoners or to be puffed up with pride.

Among foreigners and even Japanese there are some who think that the Japanese nation is inferior to the European and American nations in a moral sense. So we must make them know that the Japanese people are not inferior insofar as morality and sense of justice is concerned and further, it is necessary to maintain the know the world-wide beneficence of the Japanese Emperor through the fair treatment of prisoners of war.

I, as the Chief of the Tokyo War Prisoners' Group, have been discharging my duty in the treatment of the war prisoners for a year and a half. While in office I did always my best, observing Lt. General KAMAMURA's explanation on the War Minister's instruction and my own views, to say nothing of conforming to the War Prisoner Treatment Rule and other provisions. I will show you some examples:

1. In order to drive home the foregoing instruction of the War Minister, I often summoned the Chiefs of the Branch War Prisoners' Camps to call their attention to it and never failed to seize the opportunity to inspect the places where the war prisoners were working, so that they might not be subjected to unreasonable imposing of labor. On account of this measure, I never found in any camp any prisoner who was forced to labor in disregard of his rank, health or ability.

2. As to food rationing, we gave more than the fixed quantity by rules, which was 420 grams for officers and 570 for other ranks. Those figures actually given varied to the following figures as the supplies varied:

786 gram -- 650 gram -- 690 gram --

786 gram -- 660 gram -- 740 gram --

All prisoners, officers and other ranks got the same rations. Compared with the ration of the Japanese at that time, A-Class -- 330 gram, B-Class -- 390 gram, and C-Class (heavy workers) -- 540 gram, even the minimum quantity to the prisoners was 110 gram more than what was allotted to the Japanese heavy workers. In addition, the prisoners were each given a rice ball a day which was about 70 gram on the average at his post, so the quantity which was given substantially, was never less than 720 gram.

3. It was the food for the sick persons that we most worried about. We gave them bread of the best quality which was made by the Meiji Cake Producing Company; those in serious condition were given particularly milk and eggs though the quantity was small, which were supplied for neither the old nor sick persons among the Japanese except that women in pregnancy or

childbirth were apportioned a small amount.

4. As to the laboring of officers and non-commissioned sublieutenants in main camp, I permitted them to engage in arranging the mail for the prisoners, according to their wishes. Major Francor who was a senior officer as the head of the group, distributed the business among the other officers and they all were glad to work every day. At some branch camps, poultry farming, raising of rabbits and fish or gardening was allowed according to the officers' wishes. I think such kind of labor that was permitted the officers as above-mentioned was rather a consolation or an amusement than a labour.

There was not a camp where the officers and non-commissioned sublieutenants were engaged in the same kind of work done by the other ranks.

5. As the sporting goods of baseball and volleyball, checkers, cards and some musical instruments were sent as comfort goods from the Red Cross Society, they were distributed among the branch camps and were used freely by the officers and others for amusement.

When I permitted those who wanted to buy musical instruments, they were very glad and organized a brass band. On Christmas, 1943, a band concert was held to which I was invited.

6. It was about the end of the year 1943, I think, when War Minister TOJO visited the Tokyo War-Prisoners' Camp one day about 4 P. M. without notice. He inspected the entire camp and kitchens for about half an hour and gave prize money to the staff of the camp expressing his satisfaction over our arrangement.

childbirth were apportioned a small amount.

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There was not a camp where the officers ~~and non-commissioned sublieutenants~~ were engaged in the same kind of work done by the other ranks.

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When I permitted those who wanted to buy musical instruments, they were very glad and organized a brass band. On Christmas, 1943, a band concert was held to which I was invited.

6. It was about the end of the year 1943, I think, when War Minister TOJO visited the Tokyo War-Prisoners' Camp one day about 4 P. M. without notice. He inspected the entire camp and kitchens for about half an hour and gave prize money to the staff of the camp expressing his satisfaction over our arrangement.



On this first day of July, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT SUZUKI, Kuniiji (seal)

ie, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo and ABE, Akira hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo  
(signed) ABE, Akira (seal)

O.TH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUZUKI, Kuniiji (seal)

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6 3048

REF LOC # 331

Translated by Defense  
Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES AMERICA, et al

- Against -

ARAFI, Sadat, et al

Affidavit of Ishii Masami (translation)

Deponent: ISHII, Masami

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

1. My name is Masami Ishii
2. I live at Ichigaya, Ushigome-ward, Tokyo city.
3. I was born on Dec. 1, 1895
4. My brief career is as follows:

On Sept. 19, 1941, I was appointed an attached officer of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters, and leaving Canton, the place of my former post, arrived at Tokyo on Sept. 23, 1941.

On Nov. 6, 1941, I was appointed a staff officer of the Southern Army.

On Nov. 27, 1941, I left Moji to depart for the front.

On March, 18, 1943, I was appointed a professor of strategy in the Army Staff College. On March 22 in the same year, I left Shonan (T.N. Singapore) and returned to Tokyo.

5. The instruction attached hereto was drafted by myself according

DEF DOC # 381

to the directives given by General Terauchi, the Commander-in-chief of the Southern Army, and Lt-general Tsukada, the chief of staff of this Army, and was approved by them. On Nov. 20, Commander Terauchi called a meeting in Tokyo of all the commanders under his command, including Major-general Kawaguchi, Commander of the Kawaguchi Detached Corps and transmitted the above-mentioned instruction. The commander himself read the instruction to them, and afterwards made it printed and handed it to them. I was in attendance on the occasion.

#### Instruction

At this critical moment of our national advancement, I, Terauchi, was unexpectedly appointed to the responsible post of the Commander-in-chief of the Southern Army. Nothing is more honourable and grateful for me. I am anxious to discharge<sup>r</sup> the heavy responsibility now placed on me, chiefly depending on the loyalty and bravery on the part of all our commanders and their men.

All the officers and men should grasp the true meaning of the present sacred war, impress your heavy responsibilities on your minds and do your best with an indomitable will.

Both the Army and the Navy always on good terms and in close collaboration with each other should prove their true strength and accomplish the aim of the present campaign in the shortest length of time never faltering in the belief that the Japanese nation can never lose in the war.

Try to appease and enlighten the innocent local peoples by showing

DEF DOC # 381

the true virtue and dignity of the Japanese Army through your own behavior and always refrain from resorting to violence. I especially wish you to exercise self-restraint and fight bravely in view of the hot climate and prevailing pestilence at the front.

Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army Court Martial

On thirteenth day of January, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT ISHII IASAMI ( )

I BANNO Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) BANNO Junkichi (seal)

oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ISHII, IASAMI (seal)

Ex 3048

REF. DOC. # 1-907

辯護側文書第一九〇七號

鈴木 木 著 眞實供述書正誤表

- 三頁八行目「急ガズ」ノ次ニ「焦ラズ」ヲ入レル
- 四頁十二行目「出願シ」ヲ「出願シ」ニ改ム
- 五頁一行目「市民ノ必理状態」ヲ「市民ノ心理状態」ニ改ム
- 六頁六行目「野蠻人」ヲ「野蠻民族」ニ改ム
- 八頁五行目「將校及准士官」ノ内「及准士官」ヲ削除ス
- 八頁六行目「整理物ノ整理」ニ當ラセ「ノ内」物ノ整理「ノ四字削除
- 八頁十二行目「將校准士官ノ兵等」ノ内「將校」ヲ「將校ヲ下士官兵等」ニ改ム

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. No. 1696

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
UNITED STATES AMERICA, et al.

v.

YAMAZAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: YAMAZAKI, Shigeru.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I, YAMAZAKI, Shigeru, was born in NAGANO Prefecture on January 16 of the 24th year of MEIJI (1891), and am presently living in UWABORI, KAMIKAWA-MURA, CHIISAGATA-GUN, NAGANO Prefecture. After I was graduated from the Military Academy in the 2nd year of TAISHO (1915) I filled various posts successively and, then, was appointed Secretary of the War Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau in January, 1942 (the 17th year of SHOWA) and was commissioned to hold concurrently the additional post of a member in the War Prisoners Control Department in April of the same year, continuing in the above posts until February, 1945 (the 18th year of SHOWA).

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Def. Doc. No. 1696

2. I will make a statement as follows on instructions, dated June 3 of the 16<sup>th</sup> year of SHOWA (1941)<sup>972</sup>, concerning labor-duty for officer and warrant officer prisoners of war.

(Exhibit No. 1961):

- A. These instructions were made with the desire of having the prisoners work voluntarily and were well-meaning taking the war prisoners' health into consideration, they absolutely did not have any meaning of compulsory labor.
- B. These instructions were issued from the Director of the War Prisoners Control Department to the units concerned, namely, the army commanders or garrison commanders who controlled the war prisoners' camps in accordance with article III of the War Prisoners' Camp Regulation, but was not directed to the heads of the war prisoners' camps themselves. Accordingly, the phrase, "it is desired that proper guidance be rendered," at the end of the text refers to the camp heads as leaders and does not directly point to the prisoners.
- C. These instructions were issued personally by the Director of the War Prisoners Control Department as an authorized matter.

3. I will make a statement on the War Minister's instructions to the newly-appointed heads of the war prisoners' camps on June 25 of the 17<sup>th</sup> year of SHOWA (1942) (Exhibit No. 1962)

and on the War Minister's instructions to the newly-appointed heads of the war prisoners' camps on July 7 of the same year (Exhibit No. 1963):

- A. These two instructions were made out personally by Lieutenant General KAMIMURA, the then Director of the War Prisoners' Control Department, on his own initiative;
- B. These two instructions were read by the above Lieutenant General KAMIMURA as proxy at the conference of the heads of the war prisoners' camps at which both Minister TŌJŌ and Vice-Minister KIMURA were not present.

On this 23<sup>rd</sup> day of June (TN: probably May), 1947  
at UVAORI, HAMIKAWA-MURA, CHIISAGATA-GUN, NAGANO Prefecture.

DEPONENT Shigeru Yamazaki (seal)

I, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at the same place.

Witness: (Signed) Tokisaburo Shiobara (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Shigeru Yamazaki (seal)



D. H. F. D. O. C. N. 169 6

Ex 3049

二風十力「即第第」「即第第」「即第第」

辨證文卷一第廿六號  
直察併送靜正觀裝

War Prisoner Labor Regulation

(September 10, 1904, Army Instruction No. 139)

(Revised 1905, by Army Instruction No. 40, 1914, by No. 34)

Article 1. War prisoners may be employed as workers with discrimination according to their status, ranks and abilities, but those ranking above non-commissioned officers shall be exempted from this provision.

Article 2. In addition to the preceding Article, war prisoners may be permitted to work in behalf of public offices, private persons, or for their own sake.

Article 3. The labor to be imposed upon war prisoners shall not be too heavy, nor shall it be such a work as disgraces the positions, military or civil, which they hold in their country or relates directly to the plan of operations against their country.

Article 4. Whenever war prisoners are to be set to work outside the war prisoner camp, it is necessary besides complying with the procedure prescribed in Article 6 of the Specific Regulations concerning the Treatment of War Prisoners, to prepare a set of rules necessary for control, and to get the approval of the War Minister.

Article 5. Whenever a public office or a private person

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Def. Doc. #2033

desires to employ war prisoners for labor, the garrison commander shall make necessary arrangements concerning the kind of labor, place, hours and wages and set the approval of the War Minister. When war prisoners are employed by Government offices, their wages shall be seven sen a day in the case of sub-officers or those ranking with a non-commissioned officer and four sen a day in the case of privates. But those who work with special technique for instance, in baking, sewing, or shoe-industry, may have their wages increased up to sixteen sen according to their abilities, diligence and working hours.

Article 6. The garrison commander shall order the intendant officer of the war prisoners camp to keep the wages of war prisoners and earnings they have got through their labor as provided under Article 2. But what is given by the Government offices to the war prisoners besides their wages shall be delivered in advance to the national treasury in part as a compensation for the expense of feeding and clothing them.

The sum to be delivered to the national treasury will be indicated according to the demand.

Article 7. The money kept in accordance with the provision of the preceding Article shall be entered in the book separately for every prisoner and kept accounts of by the order of the garrison commander.

Def. Doc. #2033

Article 8. The money in the custody of the intendant officer in accordance with the provision of Article 6, belongs to the war prisoners and shall be appropriated for the expense of refreshments to be given to them or to improve this condition in the camp. If there remains surplus, it shall be allowed at the discretion of the garrison commander to them for free use or shall be given them when they are sent back to their country.

Def. Doc. #2033

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of The Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "War Prisoner Labor Regulation" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (the First Demobilization Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,  
on this 4th day of August, 1947

/S/ MIYAMA, Yōzō (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place, on the same date


Witness: /S/ ABE, Akira (seal)

4

744

Ex. 3051

Ref. Doc. #2007



Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

V.3 Excerpt from the War Prisoners' Information  
Bureau's Monthly Report.

Improvement of PW Administration

I hereby certify that the above document is an exact excerpt from  
an official document in the custody of the War Prisoners' Information  
Bureau.

On this 20th day of May, 1947

/s/ NAKANISHI, Sadayoshi  
Acting-Chief of the War  
Prisoners' Information  
Bureau

THE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 3051

Ref. Doc. #2007

Re Improvement of PW Administration  
(March 3, 1944 ARMY ASIA SECRET No. 696)

Notice from the Vice-Minister of War  
to the Units concerned.

In the PW administration the use of PWs for labor has been stressed heretofore. Although this has directly helped to increase our fighting strength and has produced other good results, the average PWs health condition is hardly satisfactory due to the inevitable shortage of materials, etc. Their high rate of death must be brought to our attention. In the light of the recent intensified enemy propaganda warfare, if the present condition continues to exist, it will needlessly ~~add~~ the hostile feeling of the enemy and it will also be impossible for us to expect the world opinion to be what we wish it to be. Such will cause an obstacle to our prosecution of moral warfare. Not only that, it is absolutely necessary to improve the health condition of PWs from the standpoint of using them satisfactorily to increase our fighting strength. In view of these facts, you are requested at this time to deal, in accordance with the following, in regard to prompt improvement of the health conditions of PWs. I hereby give instructions.

It should be added that, although efforts must be exerted to utilize spaces on ships in transporting war prisoners, it is necessary that, the purport of the Despatch, ARMY ASIA SECRET No. 1504 of 1942, (Its copy hereto attached) thoroughly understood in handling war prisoners at this juncture.

1. Foods and clothings to be supplied to PW's should be given according to the degree of their labor as provided in various regulations.
2. Dispensaries for the PW camps (branch camps or detached camps should be equipped with proper facilities for medical treatment and the main camps should be equipped with attached medical wards of reasonable standard) should be immediately established to give satisfactory treatment for the patients among PW's. For this purpose, the necessary funds, materials and sanitary supplies should be procured or delivered upon each request.

Def. Doc. #2007

3. Not only efforts should be made to fully facilitate the sanitary work by using the medical personnel among the enemy, but also, if particularly needed, such measures as requesting the War Minister to have Army hospital medical officers or medical officers attached to units serve concurrently at the PW camps should be taken. Thus the medical care for the PWs can be more solidly administered.
4. In order to increase the rate of labouring PWs statistically, to use sick PWs in need of rest or to assign heavy labor tasks to patient workers or to physically weak must be avoided. Thus, attention should be paid to the sanitary care of PWs. Moreover, consideration must be given to the physical condition of each individual PW in the light of local climate and if necessary individuals should be confined in different places alternately or transferred so as to increase substantially their efficiency in labor.
5. As to the domestic matters of PWs, their health, especially their relaxation, must be considered so long as the security and control permit from the standpoint of the administration of PWs. This will increase their efficiency in labour.
6. If the health condition of PWs gets worse due to an inadequate care on the part of their employer, an order of suspension or restriction of the employment of PWs will be issued, so it is requested that the situation be reported.



Def, Doc, No, 2007

Exh, No, 3057

口 披 第 一 號

U A 8

仔 身 情 報 局 月 報 ヨリ 抜 萃

仔 身 管 理 改 善 ニ 関 ス ル 件

右 は 官 局 に 保 管 し 有 る 書 類 の 正 確 な 抜 萃 で あ る 事 を 證 明 す る

昭 和 二 十 二 年 五 月 二 十 日

仔 身 情 報 局 長 官 専 務 取 扱

中 西 貞

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

仔身管理改善ニ關スル件（昭和一九三三  
陸軍密 六九六）

陸軍次官ヨリ關係部隊へ通牒

從來仔身管理ハ勞務利用ヲ重視シ來レル處直接戰力増強ニ對スル寄與其ノ他  
良果ヲ齎セル點渺カラザルモ物資ノ逼迫等ノ避クベカラザル影響ヲ受ケ之ガ  
衛生状態ハ一般ニ良好ト謂ヒ雖ク其ノ死亡率ノ高層ナルハ注意ヲ要スルモノ  
アリ最近敵宣傳戰ノ激化ニ鑑ミ現状ヲ以テ放置センカ徒ニ敵ノ戰意昂揚ニ資  
スルノ結果トナル世界ノ輿論亦漸次不測ノ展開ヲ示スコトナキヲ保シ難シ斯  
クテハ我道義以遂行ニ支障ヲ生ズルノミナラズ我戰力増強勞務ニ對スル仔身  
ノ徹底的利用ニ方リテモ先ツ衛生状態ヲ良好ナラシムルコトノ必須條件ナル  
點ニ鑑ミ此際特ニ仔身衛生状態ノ急速ナル改善ニ就キ左記ニ依リ又計相成度  
依命遵服ス

追テ仔身ノ海上輸送ニ方リテハ船腹ノ利用ニ努ムルハ勿論ナルモ此際ニ於  
ケル仔身ノ取扱ニ就テハ昭和十七年陸軍密第一五〇四號（別紙寫添付）  
趣旨ヲ更ニ徹底セシメラレ度申添フ

左記

一、仔身ニ給スヘキ糧食、被服等ハ勞務ノ度ニ應シ諸規則ニ定メアル定量ヲ支  
給ス

二、速ニ俘虜收容所病室（分所派遣所等ニ適當ナル治療設備設置クル外本所ニ相當程度ノ附屬病室ヲ設ク）ヲ設置シ俘虜罹病者ノ根本的治療ヲ實施ス、之ガ爲メ所要ノ經費、資材及衛生材料ハ別途請求ヲ俟テ令達又ハ交付セララル

三、敵國衛生人員ヲ協力活用シ衛生業務ノ充實ニ努ムルト共ニ特ニ必要トスル場合ハ陸軍病院又ハ部隊附屬醫科校ノ俘虜收容所兼勤方ヲ陸軍大臣ニ上申スル等ノ方策ヲ執リ俘虜ノ衛生管理ニ對スル指導ノ強化ヲ圖ル

四、俘虜業務ニ於テ形式的就勞率ヲ昇サシメ爲ニ患者ニシテ休養ヲ必要トスル者ヲ勞務ニ服セシメ又ハ就業患者若クハ虛弱者ニ過激ナル勞務ヲ課スル等ノコトヲ避ケ俘虜ノ衛生管理ニ留意スルト共ニ所在地ノ氣候、風土等ニ應シ俘虜ノ個人的體質ニ勘考ヲ加ヘ要スレハ收容個所ヲ交替又ハ變更セシムル等ノ措置ヲ講シ以テ勞務能率ノ實質的向上ヲ圖ル

五、俘虜ノ管理上内務的事項ニ就キテハ取締懲戒ニ支障ナキ限り衛生管理特ニ休養ニ留意シ以テ勞務能率ノ向上ヲ圖ル

六、俘虜使用者側ノ施策ノ不十分ニ基ク俘虜衛生状態ノ惡化ニ對シテハ俘虜使用ノ停止又ハ制限ヲ指令セラルベキニ付狀況具申セラレ度

3052

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deposant: Yamamoto Chikao

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose for the questions of witness Iurawa Tatsuo as follows.

Question: State your name, address and occupation.

Answer: YAMAMOTO Chikao; Niya-aura, Kita-gun, Ehime-ken.

No occupation.

Q.: State your post and rank at the time of demobilization.

A.: Rear-Admiral; Commandant of the 11th Air Squadron.

Q.: State main posts you occupied since around the outbreak of war till its termination.

A.: Chief of First Section, Administrative Division, Department of Naval Aeronautics from September 1941 to December 1942;

Chief of First Section, Naval Department of Imperial Supreme Headquarters from January 1943 to December 1944; and Chief of Staff, 10th Air Fleet and Commandant, 11th Air Squadron from January 1945 to the end of the

Dof. Doc. # 1397

war.

Q.: What sort of a job was assigned to you from January 1943 to December 1944?

A.: I was in charge of the affairs concerning overall operational conduct of the Japanese Navy under the control of the Chief of the First Division, Naval Department of the Imperial Supreme Headquarters. To fulfill this duty I was to direct the members of the First Section in drawing up plans as well as drafting orders and directives for the overall operational conduct of the Navy.

Q.: Have you ever taken part in drawing up the plan for submarine warfare or in drafting orders or directives for the same?

A.: I took part in these affairs, both exclusively for submarine operations and for the problem of overall operations inclusive of submarine warfare.

Q.: What sort of plans and orders of submarine operation were they that you took part in?

A.: What I participated in was the overall naval operations of the period since the latter part of March, 1943, that is, the period for the so-called Third Phase of the Campaign. As regards submarine warfare, this period could in turn be broken down into three minor periods. The first minor period covered from the latter part of March, 1943 to October of the same year. The highlights of the operational policy for this minor period were:

- (1) Destruction of maritime traffic constituted the key point of the operation. In this respect this minor period made no difference from the preceding stage of campaign which extended from June 1942 to March 1943.
- (2) To cooperate with the German submarines in operations in the Indian Ocean area.
- (3) Supply to outlying bases shall be carried out by means of a portion of the submarines.

Results of operations up to that time led us to believe that submarines could be more effectively employed against enemy sea traffic than against enemy naval forces. Increasing activities of enemy aircraft in the Solomon Islands and Rabaul areas, however, made the supply by ordinary surface transports to these outlying bases more and more difficult, a situation which compelled us to employ submarines for the transportation of supplies.

The method of forwarding supplies by means of submarines was subsequently extended to New Guinea, the Mandated Islands and the Aleutian Archipelago areas. This necessitated numerous submarines to be diverted from the field of maritime traffic destruction, leaving in the latter field only a scanty force of submarines, a situation which made the prospect of achieving the results at first visualized very remote.

The operational plan for this minor period is what was indicated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMMOTO

Isoroku by the Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO Osami on 25 March 1943 as Naval General Staff Directive No. 209, in the drafting of which I myself took part as the Chief of the Section in charge of the planning.

The second minor period began in October, 1943 with the principle in operation unaltered. But the advent of German submarines in the Indian Ocean necessitated the drawing of the demarcation between the fields of operations of Japanese and German submarines. This line of demarcation was indicated by the Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO Osami to Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral KOGA with Naval General Staff Directive No. 282 dated 4 October 1943.

The operational agreement concluded with Germany regarding to the field of operations in the Indian Ocean setting 70°E longitude as the line of demarcation was indicated to the units concerned by Naval General Staff Directive No. 282 of 4 October 1943 for the first time. Prior to that date nothing was shown to them concerning this matter.

This was because, I suppose, it had not been deemed necessary to issue such directive until the activities of the German submarines became actually seen in the Indian Ocean, though the agreement with Germany on the matter had been already concluded.

This Naval General Headquarters Directive was drawn up by LY-





Naval officers residing in Germany or any German official ever notified to Tokyo the German request for something like that about the cooperations of the Japanese and German submarines?

A.: No, Nothing of the sort.

Q.: German U-boats successfully pursued the policy of killing all of the persons on board the Allied vessels except only few of them useful for getting information when they sank these vessels. Do you know the fact that the Germans requested to Japan for the adoption of such policy around 1943?

A.: No, I have never heard of any such thing.

Q.: Has the principle of the annihilation of the crew members of a sunken vessel ever been adopted in the plan of operations drawn up in the Imperial Supreme Headquarters?

A.: The Japanese Navy have never adopted such a principle; absolutely never. On the contrary, though it is a matter of course, the strict observance of international laws and the high regard to human lives have been held among the traditional spirits which have guided the Central Authorities of the Japanese Navy. For instance, in Naval General Staff Directive NO. 15 of 30 November 1941 and in Naval General Staff Directive No. 60 of 1 March 1942 it is enunciated as a matter of warning that in carrying out submarine warfare ample time for safe retirement should be given to the crew members and passengers of Allied vessels, unless circumstances might otherwise dictate.

This humanitarian spirit of the Navy had been maintained unchanged throughout the war.

Q.: What fleet was in command of the submarines which operated in the Indian ocean from around October 1942 to around October 1944?

A.: A division of submarines was placed under the command of the South-Western Area Fleet since 10 July 1942, and operated in the Indian Ocean till October 1943. In October, 1943 the Eighth Submarine Squadron joined forces with the aforesaid division. Both of these submarine forces were placed under the direct control of the Commandant of the Eighth submarine Squadron, who in turn was under the command of the South-Western Area Fleet.

Since August, 1944, every submarine of the above Squadron diverted to other area from the Indian Ocean.

Q.: What fleet was in command of the submarines that operated in the Pacific Ocean -- in Samoa-Fiji area in particular -- from 1942 to around 1944?

A.: They were commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the sixth Fleet.

Q.: By whom was the First Submarine Force commanded as of 20 March 1943?

A.: Belonging to the Sixth Fleet, it was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

Q.: In the relation between the 1st Submarine Squadron and the submarine forces operating in the Indian Ocean, was the one in command of the other regarding the operational matters?

A.: No, they had no direct connection at all between them. Although both ~~the~~ the Sixth Fleet and the South-Western Area Fleet were under the command of the Combined Fleet, the Submarine forces operating in the Indian Ocean which belonged to the South-Western Area Fleet, and the First Submarine Force belonging to the Sixth Fleet had nothing in common between them regarding the matters pertaining to command.

Q.: Where were the bases and how extensive were the theaters operations? Tell me the bases and the theaters of operations of the submarine forces belonging to the South-Western Area Fleet and of the submarine forces attached to the Sixth Fleet.

A.: The submarine forces of the South-Western Area Fleet had their base at Penang and the theater of their operations was the Indian Ocean (since October 1941, the theater was limited to the Indian Ocean only east of 70°E longitude); while the submarine forces of the Sixth Fleet had their base at Truk with the Pacific Ocean as the field of action.

Q.: When was MITO Hisashi transferred to the Navy Ministry from the office of the Commandant of the First Submarine Squadron?

A.: It was on 29 March 1943.

Q.: Do you know who succeeded him and what sort of orders were given to the successor?

A.: He was succeeded by Rear-Admiral KOUDA Takeo. The First Submarine Squadron was ordered to turn to the Northern Pacific and was assigned another duty in Kiska-Attenu area in the middle of April.

Def. Doc. # 1897

Q.: To what extent and scope did the directive prescribe which was issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet?

A.: The directive specified in minute detail such matters as were deemed necessary for the fleet to conduct operations in accordance with the Imperial Supreme Headquarters Naval Order, which was in fact an order issued by the Chief of Naval General Staff as ordered by the Throne.

The directive covered in the main:

1. Master Principle to be observed in the direction of operations.  
For instance: In waging submarine warfare, the utmost importance should be attached to the destruction of maritime traffic, and the key area should be the Indian Ocean; and the like.
2. The Strength of the forces to be used might be indicated in case where circumstances might so dictate. But such matters were preferably left to the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.
3. Matters agreed upon over the conference table between the Army and Navy Supreme Commands of the Imperial Headquarters concerning a cooperation of the fleet with army field forces (These were usually called as "Central Agreement.")

In other words the directive covered: (1) basic principle deemed necessary for the Chief of Naval General Staff to instruct the Commander-in-Chief regarding the latter's execution of the duty given by the

Def. Doc. # 169;

Imperial Supreme Headquarters Naval Order; and (2) what the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet had not been empowered to do by himself (i. e., "Central Agreement" for the main).

Further, in drafting these directives care was exercised to mention only two main principles to be followed, or save such things and to abstain as far as possible from going into detail. This was to allow the Commander-in-Chief in wide latitude of discretion in his planning and practice, encouraging him to stage operations in close conformity with actual situation of the theater.

Q.: Have you ever witnessed what is called Top-secret First Submarine Squadron Order No. 2 issued by the Commandant of the First Submarine Force on 20 March 1942?

A.: No. I have never.

On this 22nd day of May, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ Yamamoto Tatsuo (seal)

I, Inagawa Tatsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date At Tokyo

Witness: (Signed) Inagawa Tatsuo (seal)

DEF. DOC. # 1897

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Yamamoto Tatsu (seal)

Ex 3052

東京国際通商銀行

正興利加合衆國其他

對

宛 本 頁 夫其他

宣 傳 供 送

供 送 者

變 換 縣 署 多 部 行 爲 出 山 球

自分發受圖ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ州縣ノ通り宣傳ヲ行シタル上立合  
入酒川激進ノ圖ニ從ヒ先ノ如ク供送者シマス

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

問 貴方の姓名、住所、職業如何

答 山本 雄雄、愛媛縣喜多郡新谷村、無職

問 復員當時の貴方の地位と階級は何ですか

答 海軍少尉、第十一航程隊司令官

問 復員前より終戦迄の貴方の取組の大要を述べて下さい

答 一九四一年九月より一九四二年十二月迄海軍航空本部総務部第一課

長

一九四三年一月より一九四四年十二月迄大本營海軍参謀部第一課長

一九四五年一月より終戦迄第十航程隊司令官及第十一航空隊司令官

同 一九四三年一月より一九四四年十二月迄貴方はどういふ仕事を擔當

しましたか

答 大本營海軍参謀部第一課長の指揮下にあつて日本海軍の作戦全般に

關することを擔當して居り私の権限は第一課員を指揮して作戦全般



に關する命令指示の起算等を行ふこととあります

問 第一機長在職中潜水艇作戦の計畫及其の命令指示の起算に關與した  
ことがありますか

答 潜水艇作戦文けの場合と潜水艇作戦を含む全般作戦同様に關與した  
事があります

問 貴方の關與した潜水艇作戦の計畫並に命令とはどういふものですか  
答 私の關與したのは一九四三年三月下旬以降の全般作戦で此の期間は  
所謂第三段作戦期間と呼稱されてゐたもので潜水艇作戦に關しまし  
ては更に此の期間を三期に區分することが出来ます

第一期は一九四三年三月下旬より同年十月迄の間で此の期間の作戦  
方針の要點は次の通でありました

(1) 作戦の要點を海上交通線に處かれた事は第二段作戦として考へ  
られた一九四二年六月以降一九四三年三月迄の場合と變化はない  
こと

(2) 印度洋方面では獨逸潜水艇との協同作戦を実施すること

(3) 一部潜水艇で前道基地に對する補給を実施すること

潜水艇は當時迄の作戦經過に鑑み掃隊作戦に使用するよりも交通破断に使用する方が一番有效であると考えられました。但しソロモン、ラポール方面の敵飛行機の行動が活潑となり之等前道基地に對する輸送船に依る補給は逐次困難となつて來ましたので止むを得ず潜水艇を補給に使用する様になりました

潜水艇による補給は其後ニューギニア、南洋群島、アリューシャン方面にも実施することになつたが潜水艇の多数が此の方面に使用されたので海上交通破断に從事した兵力は少數となり所期の効果を擧ぐる事が出来なくなりました

此の期間の作戦は一九四三年三月二十五日軍令部總長永野修身より連合艦隊司令長官山本五十六に對し「大海指第二〇九號」として指示されたものであり私が責任艦長として起案に關與したものであります

第二期は一九四三年十月以降の作戦であります。此期間の作戦方針



太平洋兩方面共此の目的の爲行動してゐた潜水艦は存在しなくなりました

問 印度洋で日獨伊潜水艦の協同作戦が大本營で計畫されたのは何時ですか

答 一九四三年三月二十五日軍令部總長より山本運合總司令長官に對し第三隊作戦に關する「大海指第二〇九號」の指示が發せられ豫としたとき何れ近い將來日獨伊軍協定に基き獨伊潜水艦が印度洋で作戦を開始するかも知れぬと豫想しましたので本指示に協同作戦に關する項目を初めて挿入することになつたのであります然し實際に其の必要が生じたのは相繼期間後でありましたので一九四三年十月四日初めて部隊に對して指示されたのであります雙方が大本營海軍參謀部第一隊長在職中日本側獨逸隊在者又は獨逸側より日獨伊潜水艦の協同作戦に關し獨逸側の要望等を傳達して來た事がありますか

答 ありません

問

貴方は一九四三年頃獨逸Uボートが連合軍艦船を撃沈した場合其の乗員中情報を獲得するに足る少数者を除き他は徹底的に撃滅する方針を採用して成功したので之の方針を日本に於ても採用する機獨逸側より要請があつたといふ事を承知してゐますか

答

左様な事は聞いた事ありません

問

大本營の作戦計畫に撃沈せる艦船乗組員の徹底的撃滅といふ事が採用された事がありますか

答

日本海軍に左様な方針が採用されたことは絶対ありません

寧ろ當然な事ではあります。「或手法規範重」「人命最重」の思想は日本海軍中央の傳統的傳統でありまして一九四一年十一月三十日「大海指第一五號」、一九四四年三月一日「大海指第六〇號」には何れも生氣的事項として潜水艦の作戦實施に當つては情況已むを得ざる場合の外は連合國艦船の乗員船客に對し避退の猶豫を與ふべきことを明記して居り此の海軍の精神は戰爭中變更されては居りません

問 一九四二年十月頃より一九四四年十月頃迄の印度洋作戦に従事し

た潜水艦は何處の艦隊の指揮下に在りましたか

答 一九四二年七月十日より潜水艦一隊が南西方面艦隊の指揮下に入

り一九四三年十月迄印度洋作戦に従事しました

一九四三年十月に第八潜水艦隊が前記の潜水艦と共に印度洋作戦

潜水艦隊として南西方面艦隊司令長官の指揮下の第八潜水艦隊司

令官の直接指揮の下に作戦しました

一九四四年八月以降は前記何れの潜水艦も印度洋に作戦せず他の

方面に移りました

問 一九四二年より一九四四年頃迄の間に太平洋殊にサモア、フィジ

ー方面の作戦に従事した潜水艦は何處の艦隊の指揮を受けました

か

答 第六艦隊司令長官の指揮を受けて居りました

問 一九四三年三月二十日當時第一潜水艦隊は何處の指揮を受けまし

たか

答 第六艦隊に属して居りましたので第六艦隊司令長官の指揮を受け  
て居りました

問 第一潜水部隊と印度洋作戦の潜水艦部隊とは作戦上何等か指揮關  
係はありましたか

答 全然關係はありません、第六艦隊と南西方面艦隊とは何れも連合  
艦隊の指揮下に在りますが南西方面艦隊に所属してゐる印度洋潜  
水部隊と、第六艦隊に所属してゐる第一潜水部隊とは何等指揮關  
係はありません

問 南西方面艦隊と第六艦隊の潜水艦の基地と作戦行動範囲は何處で  
すか

答 南西方面艦隊の基地はペナンで其の行動範囲は印度洋（一九四三  
年十月四日以降は東經七〇度線以東の印度洋）、第六艦隊の基地  
はトラックで其の行動範囲は太平洋でありました

問 第一潜水部隊司令官三戸壽が海軍省に専任となりしは何時ですか

答 一九四三年三月二十九日であります

問 後任者及それに対する命令を承知してゐますか

答 後任者は古宇田武郎海軍少將でありましたが第一潜水部隊は北方  
艦隊の命を受け四月中旬キスカ、アッツ方面の別の任務に就きま  
した

問 軍令部長より連合艦隊司令長官に対する指示はどんな範圍の事  
までしますか

答 移動命令として發せられる大命所謂「大海令」により作戰實施上  
の細項に関する事項を指示するのです

其の內容の標準は次の通りです

一 作戰指導上の方針

例へば潜水艦隊の方針は交通線等を最も重視すとか、其の重點  
を置く可き海面は印度洋にするとか

二 必要の場合には使用兵力の標準を示すこともありますが成る可く  
此の様な事は連合艦隊司令長官の自由裁量に委ねられて居ります



(四) 陸軍部隊との協同作業上大本營陸海軍部間で協定（所謂中央協定）した事項

以上の様に「大海令」で與えられた任務の遂行上指示して置く必要があるに考へられる作戦の具體的方針の大綱と連合陸隊司令長官では出來ない事項（主として中央協定）に關し指示が爲されませんでした

而も指示の内容は出來る丈け細目に亘らないで効めて方針的な事に丈け限定して連合陸隊司令長官の總量で計畫實施が出來る範圍を廣くし實情に即した作戦實施が容易に出來る様に効めたのであります

問 一九四三年三月二十日第一海軍水部隊指揮官の發した機密第一海軍水部隊命令第二號といふのを見たことがありますか  
答 ありません

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）五月二十二日 於東京

供 出 者 山 本 雄 雄

右ハ菅立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於 東京

立會人 菅 川 龍 雄

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欲秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ  
誓フ

直

(署名捺印) 山 本 雄 雄

43-53A  
Ref Doc 1943

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

自分、土肥一夫ハ復員廳第二復員局資料整理部史  
實班長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル  
日本語ニ依ツテ鑒カレ一三頁ヨリ成ル大海指第二  
〇九號ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（復員廳第二復員  
局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ抜萃ノ正碁ニシテ眞實  
ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月十日 於東京

土 肥 一 夫 (印)

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同 日 於 同 所

立會人

宗 官 信 次 (印)

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Ref Doc 1943

大漢密二〇九號

昭和十八年三月廿三日

軍令部部長 永野 修 身

山本聯合艦隊司令長官ニ指示

一 大東亞戦等第三段作戦帝國海軍作戦方針別紙第

一ノ通り定ム

ニ 聯合艦隊司令長官ハ別紙第二作戦方針ニ準據シ

作戦スベシ

別紙第一

大東亞戦等  
第三段作戦帝國海軍作戦方針

第一 襲來突入作戦

一 第三段作戦ニ於ケル帝國海軍作戦目的ハ東亞海  
域ニ來攻スル以テ艦隊及流型兵刀ヲ擧げシ且戰艦  
上艦選隊ヲ破滅スルト共ニ進ニ帝國自軍必勝ノ  
戦略態勢ヲ確立シ以テ彼ノ威意ヲ破滅スルニ在  
リ之ガ爲

(一) 流型艦ニ於テ先ツ進ニ必勝態勢ノ確立ヲ期ス

(二) 領空は艦隊ヲ其ノ前進根據地等ニ奇襲攻撃シ

且所長戦時長山ヲ攻め又ハ奇襲破滅シ其ノ進

攻企口ヲ未然ニ破滅スルト共ニ彼艦隊ノ誘出

ヲ圖リ之ヲ捕獲撃滅ス

(三) 戦時長期ノ防備ヲ進ニ強化シ彼來攻ヤバ海上

及流型兵刀ノ擧行ナル協同ノ下ニ之ヲ先制撃

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敬ス

(甲) 海上交通保護ノ以テ、兵刀身並ニ備給  
シ、通商ノ其ノ概延長ヲ促進ス

(乙) 海上交通保護ノ以テ、別ス

(丙) 以テ、守口本土強固ニ對シ、警備ヲ設ニス

二 防 備

防備ノ責任ヲ正ノ通り定メ、内海方面ニ在リテハ

該管ノ警備ヲ主トシ、外海方面ニ在リテハ、船ニ所

在、陸軍部隊ト密接ニ連絡ヲ保持シ、以テ、突如、匪止

近ニ該管ノ突如ニ當面シ、置キ、防備ニ任ス

鎮守府警備府部隊（海軍警備府部隊ヲ除ク）

各所管警備區

第四艦隊 南洋海軍區「ギルバート」諸島

「ナツル」 「オースチン」 大島

島、大宮島、及、津ノ島、島

第五艦隊 「アリュウシヤン」 方面、占領區

區

南東方面艦隊 西英領「ニユルキニヤ」以

東ノ南東占領區

南西方面艦隊 西英領「ニユルキニヤ」以

西ノ南西占領區

支那方面艦隊 支那沿岸占領區

三 海上交通保護

(一) 鎮守府部隊、警備府部隊、支那方面艦隊、南

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一 作戦方針ノ大體  
蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ニ於ケル  
日艦隊ノ作戦目録ハ蘇赤共交作戦ノ目録ヲ總成  
スルト共ニ其部ノ期ニ於ケル日艦隊及蘇赤共兵

二 蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針

一 蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針  
一 外島其ノ通船部隊ニ對スル補給部隊ニ對シテ

二 先島其ノ通船部隊ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

三 蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

四 外島其ノ通船部隊ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

五 蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

六 外島其ノ通船部隊ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

七 蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

八 外島其ノ通船部隊ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

九 蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

十 外島其ノ通船部隊ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

十一 蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

十二 外島其ノ通船部隊ニ對シテハ既ニ蘇赤共交作戦甲ノ期ト關係スル場合ノ作戦方針ニ對シテ

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ヲ要領シ且北洋太及渤海加万石ノ兵隊ヲ攻守確  
保スルニ在リ之ヲ爲

(一) 海軍軍艦ヲアル協同ノ下ニ開戦勇更爲シ得ル  
限リ大兵ヲ以テ先制攻撃ヲ加ヘ是期同ニ作  
戦目酌ヲ達成スルニ努ム

(二) 海軍艦ニ於テハ先制攻撃ニ依リ艦ニ損傷  
無兵刀ヲセシムルヲ以テ海陸作戦ノ進展ナル進展  
ヲ阻トテ我後方艦隊及重要施設ノ安全  
確保ヲ期ス

(三) 海ノ各艦隊ニ對シテ是等ノ作戦ニシテ之ヲ先  
制攻撃スルニ努ム

(四) 米ノ運給進出ニ努ム

(五) 該米支作戦ハ先制作戦方針ニ準テ之  
ヲ執行ス

二 防備海上交通線及海軍補給等

(一) 露口長江ノ防備等ニ該艦隊ヲ隊ニシテ及露  
海峽、津輕海峽及宗谷海峽ヲ扼シ露艦隊ノ進  
出ヲ阻止ス

(二) 本邦太平洋沿岸支那沿海及南方占領地トノ海  
上交通保護等ニ我ガ本土及支那方面ヨリ則  
及四京州ニ至ル海上交通ヲ確保ス

(三) 資源地使居區分ヲ定メノ通線定ス  
第三艦隊ヲ基幹トスル部隊作戦初期須賀  
港及大湊長港作戦中期以降須賀港及大湊長



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其ノ他ノ部隊 銀行家ヨリ分ニ同ク

Aug Dec 1943

別紙第二

大東亞戰爭第三段作段帝國海軍作段方針ニ基キ  
聯合艦隊ノ率據スベキ作段方針

第一、對米英支作段

一、航空作段

(一) 直ニ敵航空兵力ヲ捕提擊滅シ航空權ヲ確立スルニ  
努ム

(二) 基地航空兵力ノ主力ヲ西太平洋方面ニ一部兵力ヲ  
南西方面ニ配備シテ敵航空力及進攻部隊ヲ捕提擊  
滅スルト共ニ敵ノ前進基地ニ對スル補給艦送降ノ  
攻撃遮斷ヲ徹底ス

(三) 一部兵力ヲ本邦北部ニ配シ本邦東方及北方ヲ警戒ス  
母艦航空兵力ノ主力ヲ太平洋方面ニ一部兵力ヲ機  
宜南西方面ニ配シ適時機動作段ヲ實施スルト共ニ  
集散離合ヲ適切ナラシメ遊撃作段ヲ以テ敵ノ艦隊  
ヲ擊滅スルニ遺憾ナキヲ期ス

二、潜水艦作段

(一) 潜水艦隊ノ重點ヲ敵海上輸送ノ破壞ニ指向シ敵ノ  
進攻企圖ヲ阻止スルト共ニ敵隊力ヲ殺傷シ以テ其  
ノ屈伏ヲ促進スルニ努ム

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- (一) 南太平洋方面ニ於ケル海陸軍緊密ニ協同シ努メラ主動的作戦ヲ實施シ  
南太平洋方面ニ於ケル戰略態勢ヲ確立スルト共  
ニ之ガ擴充ヲ圖ル
- (二) 印度洋西部ニ於ケル獨逸ノ潛水艦隊ト緊密ナル連  
絡ヲ保持シ協同作戦ノ實ヲ發揚スルニ努ム
- (三) 印度洋東部ニ於ケル對印度並ニ對蘇聯艦隊ノ遮斷ニ  
主眼ヲ置キ敵情及使用兵力等ニ依リ適宜其ノ責務  
指嚮方向ヲ定ム
- (四) 海上輸送破壞隊ハ南太平洋ニ於ケル米線連絡及印  
度洋東部ニ於ケル對印度並ニ對蘇聯艦隊ノ遮斷ニ  
主眼ヲ置キ敵情及使用兵力等ニ依リ適宜其ノ責務  
指嚮方向ヲ定ム
- (一) 潛水艦飛行機及水上艦艇等各種兵力ヲ以テ極力敵  
海上輸送破壞隊ヲ強化ス
- (二) 海上輸送破壞隊ハ南太平洋ニ於ケル米線連絡及印  
度洋東部ニ於ケル對印度並ニ對蘇聯艦隊ノ遮斷ニ  
主眼ヲ置キ敵情及使用兵力等ニ依リ適宜其ノ責務  
指嚮方向ヲ定ム
- (三) 機宜一部兵力ヲ以テ敵艦隊又ハ要地ニ對スル奇襲  
作戦ヲ行フ
- (四) 敵艦隊主力ヲ牽制スル爲メハ之ニ偽接ヲ保持シ敵勢  
ヲ減殺スルニ努ム
- (一) 潛水艦飛行機及水上艦艇等各種兵力ヲ以テ極力敵  
海上輸送破壞隊ヲ強化ス
- (二) 海上輸送破壞隊ハ南太平洋ニ於ケル米線連絡及印  
度洋東部ニ於ケル對印度並ニ對蘇聯艦隊ノ遮斷ニ  
主眼ヲ置キ敵情及使用兵力等ニ依リ適宜其ノ責務  
指嚮方向ヲ定ム
- (三) 機宜一部兵力ヲ以テ敵艦隊又ハ要地ニ對スル奇襲  
作戦ヲ行フ
- (四) 敵艦隊主力ヲ牽制スル爲メハ之ニ偽接ヲ保持シ敵勢  
ヲ減殺スルニ努ム

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(ロ) ソロモン群島方面ニ於テハ「イサベラ」島以西ノ要地ヲ確保シ海上及航空兵力ヲ以テ同島以東ノ敵兵力ヲ討殺スルト共ニ同方面ニ策動スル敵海上及航空兵力ヲ先制殲滅ス情況之ヲ許セバ別ニ定ムル所ニ據リ機ヲ見テ「ガダルカナル」島以東ノ諸島ノ奪回ヲ策ス

(ハ) 東部「ニューギニヤ」ニ於テハ「ラエ」「サラモア」以西ノ要地ヲ確保シ同方面ニ於ケル作戦根據地ヲ確立スルト共ニ同方面ニ於ケル敵兵力ヲ討殺スルニ努ム別ニ定ムル所ニ據リ機ヲ見テ「モレスビー」攻陥ヲ策ス

(ニ) 機宜敵要地ノ攻陥又ハ奇襲夜襲ヲ行フト共ニ前進根據地ニ據レル敵艦隊ヲ奇襲殲滅ス

(ホ) 敵補給輸送路ノ攻陥遮断ヲ徹底的ニ實施ス

(三) 中部太平洋方面

南洋群島「ギルバート」諸島大島島方面ノ防備並ニ南洋群島東方海面ニ對スル哨戒ヲ嚴ニシ敵ノ反撃ヲ先制殲滅ス

(四) 北太平洋及本邦東方海面

(イ) 海陸軍協同シ「アリューシヤン」群島西部ヲ確

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- 保シ北方面ヨリスル敵ノ進攻阻止ニ努ム
- (ロ) 主トシテ航空兵力及積永艦兵力ヲ以テ敵海上及  
航空兵力ヲ捕捉殲滅スルト共ニ極力敵補給艦船ヲ  
路ノ破壞ニ努ム
- (ハ) 本邦東方海面ノ哨戒監視ヲ嚴ニシ敵ノ帝國本土  
ニ對スル奇襲ニ備フ
- (以下次頁へ續ク)

Dec 1943

(甲) 南西方面

(イ) 海陸軍緊密ニ協同シテ南万占領地ノ防備ヲ隊ニシテノ奪回及強襲ヲ阻止ス

(ロ) 深州北西郡ニ對シ進時流強襲ヲ實行シ同方面ヨリスル敵ノ反攻全口ヲ未然ニ回避スルニ努ム

(ハ) 「ベンガル」海軍部ニ於ケル海上及側面艦ヲ確保シテ「ビルマ」ニ對スル輸送艦隊ヲ安固カラシムルト夫ニ同方面ニ對スル敵ノ反撃ノ先制撃破スルニ努ム

(ニ) 別ニ定ムル所ニ依リ機ヲ見テ「ニューギニア」南郡ノ長進ヲ警戒ス

(乙) 印度方面

(イ) 沿水陸及陸軍水上艦隊ヲ以テ印度沿海及亞州西岸ニ於ケル海上輸送艦ヲ攻撃ス

(ロ) 領土國軍ト協同シ「ココス」島ヲ攻撃シ及海陸隊及長進ニ對シ奇襲攻撃ヲ行フ

丙 防 備

(一) 海陸軍緊密ニ連携ヲ保持シ擔任區域及占領地ノ防備ヲ隊ニス

(二) 外部長進ニ對シテハ各方面毎ニ防衛地帯ヲ設定シ兵刀配備及備施設ヲ適合アラシメ以テ頑強ナル防衛態勢ヲ確立ス

第一 課案案在案甲ノ功上組織スル編制 (乙作成)

第一 段 作 成

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新徳ヲ攻めス  
(4) 爾他ノ部ニテ以テ第一以テ是ヲ以テ履行シ米英  
ニ對シテメテ是種ノ政變存以テ行フ

終



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Naval General Staff Directive No. 209

Date: March 25, 1943.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGANO, Osami.

To : Commander-in-Chief, Admiral YAMAMOTO

1. The Imperial Naval Operational Policy for the Third Phase of the Pacific War is decided as set forth in Annex I.
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall conduct operations in accordance with the Policy of Operations as defined in Annex II.

ANNEX I.

IMPERIAL NAVAL OPERATIONAL, POLICY FOR THIRD PHASE  
OF PACIFIC WAR.

Chapter I

The Campaigns against the United States, the  
British Commonwealth, and the Chinese Republic.

The aim of the Imperial naval operations for the 3rd phase of the war is to demolish hostile naval and air forces encroaching upon the east Asiatic waters, to destroy enemy sea traffic lines, and to establish speedily the strategical structure of the Empire so firmly as to insure her self-consolidation and ultimate victor, and thereby to frustrate the fighting volition of the enemy. In order to realize these:

1. First of all the foundation of never-failing victory shall be obtained in aerial warfare.
2. Enemy fleets shall be destroyed by surprise in their advanced bases or elsewhere as may be feasible, enemy positions of strategic importance shall be taken or destroyed by surprise as required, and thus the offensive designs of the enemy shall be forestalled; at the same time attempts shall be made to draw out enemy fleets to meet them and destroy.
3. The defense of our strategic positions shall be speedily consolidated, and when enemy forces are seen approaching to our

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areas they shall be destroyed by the closely concerted actions of our sea and air forces which shall initiate attack in ahead of the enemy.

4. By means of intensifying sea traffic destruction warfare the lines of enemy reinforcement and supplies shall be disrupted thus to contribute to a speedy frustration of enemy's fighting morale.

5. Efforts shall be made to protect our lines of sea communications as fully as possible.

6. Stern vigil shall be maintained against enemy's airraid upon the homeland of the Empire.

## II Defense

The defense shall be executed in accordance with the below stated division. And the special emphasis of the defense shall be put upon anti-submarine and anti-air measures in the case of the interior lines of the defense, and upon the measures to checkmate invading enemies in close cooperation particularly with local army forces as well as the measures of anti-submarine and anti-airraid protections in the case of the exterior defense lines.

(The forces of the major and minor naval stations

(The forces of the Hainan Minor Naval Station is excepted) ...; the patrol areas under their respective charge;

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The 4th Fleet ... the Mandated South Sea Naval District,  
and the areas including the Gilbert Islands, Nauru

Island, Ocean Island, Wake Island, Guam, Douglas Reef;

The 5th Fleet ... the occupied area in the Aleutian  
Islands;

The Southeastern Area Fleet ... the occupied areas  
to the east of and including of British New Guinea;

The Southeastern Area Fleet ... the occupied areas  
to the west of and including Dutch New Guinea; and

The China Seas Fleet ..... the occupied territories  
along the China Coast.

### III. The Sea Communication Protection

1. The all Major Naval Station Forces, the all Minor Naval Station Forces, the China Seas Fleet, and the Southeastern Area Fleet, the Southwestern Area Fleet, the 4th Fleet, and the 5th Fleet shall protect the lines of sea communications in the waters around Japan, along the China coast and in the vicinity of the occupied territories respectively in accordance with the division of their assignment.

The sea lanes stretching between two or more jurisdictional waters shall be protected by a special force to be designated as situation may demands.

2. Besides the above, units belonging to front line forces shall

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be made to cooperate with the local forces originally assigned to each specific area in the anti-submarine hunt while operating in such area, if their original mission permits as well as if situation so demands.

#### VI. Transportation and Supply

1. In transporting supplies to the outlying bases for front line field forces, the ships to be employed, the routes of the sailing, and the time of supply shall be adequately selected, and necessary guarding measures shall be taken against the attacks by hostile naval or air forces, in order to insure safety of the supply activities to those front line field forces.
2. Bases situated at the very head of front lines shall be supplied by means of submarines or the like combatant vessels if occasion demands.
3. Every possible assistance shall be made in transporting supply to army units disposed on outflung positions.

#### Chapter II

In case War Breaks Out With U.S.S.R. During War

With U.S.A., British Commonwealth, And China (Campaign B)

##### 1. Basic Principle of Operational Policy

The strategical aims to be attained by the Imperial Japanese navy in case war breaks out with the Union of Soviet Socialist

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Republics while we are at war with the United States, the British Empire and the Chinese Republic shall be in the demolition of the hostile naval and air forces in the eastern part of the U.S.S.R. and in the capture and secure possession of strategically important positions in the Kamchatka and northern Sakhalin area aside from the fulfillment of the strategical ends original to the campaign against the U.S.A., the British Commonwealth, and the Chinese Republic.

For this purpose:

1. It shall be striven to attain the operational aims in a short time by means of instituting attack ahead of the enemy at the very beginning of the war using as large forces as possible in close cooperation with the army.
2. In aerial warfare a speedy and complete demolition of enemy air power shall be accomplished, especially through initiating attack ahead of the enemy, in order to pave the way for a speedy favorable development of our operations, both on land and sea, and in order to securely protect the supply routes and important establishments behind the front lines.
3. Special precautions shall be vigilantly maintained against various obstructive measures by the enemy and efforts shall be made to forestall them.
4. The connections between the United States and the U.S.S.R. shall be disrupted as fully as possible.
5. The campaigns against the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Chinese Republic shall be continued almost in accordance with the operational policy now in operation.

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II. Defense, Sea Traffic Protection  
Transportation and Supply, Etc.

1. The important positions of our Empire shall be defended tight and firm, especially against air attack; and the Tsushima Straits, the Tsugaru Straits, and the La Perous Straits shall be blocked against the passage of the enemy vessels.
2. The lines of communications in the waters along the Pacific coast of the Japanese mainland, and along the China coast and in the interior sea area between the above mentioned waters and the occupied southern territories shall be secured laying special emphasis upon the routes from our mainland and China to Korea and Kwantung Peninsula.
3. The following is the schedule for the division of the use of operational bases:

The forces with the 5th Fleet as the main strength

..... in the early stage of the campaign: --

the major naval port at Yokosuka and the

• minor naval port at Ominato; and later than

the middle stage of the campaign:- the major

naval port at Maizuru and the minor naval port

at Ominato.

The other forces ... same as those now observed.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHI, Kazuo, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Historical Section of the Material Readjustment Branch of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 13 pages and entitled "Naval General Staff Directive No. 209" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 10 day of July, 1947

/S/ DOHI, Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)



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Def. Doc. No. 1943-A

ANNEX II.

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

POLICY OF OPERATIONS TO BE OBSERVED BY  
COMBINED FLEET AS BASED ON IMPERIAL  
NAVAL OPERATIONAL POLICIES FOR THIRD  
PHASE OF PACIFIC WAR.

#### Chapter I.

The Campaigns against the United States of  
America, the British Commonwealth, and China.

#### I. Air Operations

1. Speedily catching and destroying enemy air powers, the Combined Fleet shall strive to establish our control of air.
2. Disposing the main body of our shore-based air forces in the Southern Pacific Area and a portion of them in the Southwestern Pacific and Indian Ocean Area, the Combined Fleet shall catch and destroy enemy air units and other approaching forces of the enemy on the one hand and shall attack and disrupt the enemy route of supply to their advanced bases to the full extent on the other hand. A part of these air forces shall be disposed in the northern section of the Empire to maintain vigilant watch to the east and to the north.
3. Maintaining the major portion of carrier-borne aerial forces in the Pacific Front while disposing a part of them in

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the Southwestern Pacific and Indian Ocean Area as may be required, and thereby carrying out maneuvering operations at any opportune moment as well as securing their concentration and dispersal to the best advantage of each stage, the Combined Fleet shall have nothing left for the thorough destruction of enemy naval strength by means of receiving campaign.

## II. Submarine Campaign.

1. The stress of the submarine campaign shall be placed upon the destruction of the sea traffic of the enemy so as to forestall the enemy's design of invasion as well as to reduce his fighting strength with a view to hasten the surrender.

2. As may be thought fit a portion of the submarine forces shall be used for surprise attacks upon enemy fleet or positions of strategic importance.

3. Some of the submarines shall be employed to transport supplies to outlying bases.

4. In case the main forces of the enemy fleet are approaching toward us the submarine forces shall keep contact with the enemy fleet and strive to reduce the strength on the way.

## III. Sea Traffic Destruction Warfare.

1. The Combined Fleet shall intensify the warfare to destroy enemy's sea traffic to the utmost extent employing various available forces such as submarines, aircraft, surface vessels, etc.

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2. The main emphasis of the sea traffic destruction campaign shall be directed against the American and Australian communication route in the Southern Pacific Ocean and the traffic routes to India and Australia in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean, shifting the emphasis from one to another as may be thought wise in accordance with the conditions of the enemy as well as the strength of our forces available.

When the development of war so demands, a portion of submarine forces shall be employed in the destruction of the enemy sea traffic in the waters along the west coast of the United States or in the vicinity of Hawaii.

3. A close connection shall be maintained with the submarines of Germany and Italy so that the operational cooperation will be effected.

#### IV. Operations by Areas.

1. The South Pacific Area.

- a. The Combined Fleet shall keep close cooperation with the army forces and whenever possible take the initiative of operations over the enemy so that our strategic foothold will be consolidated and further extended.
- b. In the Solomon Islands area, firmly holding the strategic positions to the west of and including Isabella Island, and employing sea and air forces, the Combined

fleet shall forestall the activities of the enemy force in the area to the east of the island and at the same time shall initiate attack ahead of the enemy to destroy his air and sea forces moving about in the area. If situation permits, attempt shall be made to recover Guadalcanal Island together with the islands to the east of it in opportune moment in accordance with a directive as instructed separately.

- c. In the eastern part of New Guinea, the strategic positions to the west of and including Lae and Salamaua shall be firmly secured so as to consolidate our operational bases, and efforts shall be made to forestall the activities of the enemy in the area. In opportune moment an attempt shall be made to take Moresby in accordance with a directive as instructed separately.
- d. When considered appropriate strategic positions of the enemy shall be destroyed by surprise or captured. Surprise shall also be made to demolish enemy fleet harbored in a advance base.
- e. Enemy's supply route shall be attacked and disrupted in a thorough-going manner.

2. The Mid Pacific Area.

The Mandated Islands, Gilbert Islands, and Wake Island shall be strongly defended, and the sea areas to the east of the Mandated Islands shall be vigilantly watched and patrolled. And

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thereby enemy's counter offensive shall be forestalled through initiating destructive attack in advance of the enemy.

3. The North Pacific Area and the Sea Area to the East of Japan.

- a. Firmly securing the western part of the Aloutian Islands and cooperating with the army forces, the Combined Fleet shall strive to arrest the advancing of the enemy.
- b. Employing chiefly air forces and submarines, the Combined Fleet shall search out and destroy the enemy's sea and air forces. At the same time every available effort shall be exerted to destroy the supply lines of the enemy.
- c. Stringent watch and patrol shall be maintained in the sea area to the east of Japan to safeguard the mainland of the Empire against the surprise, attack by the enemy.

4. The South Pacific Area.

- a. Closely cooperating with the army the Combined Fleet shall defend firm and tight the southern occupied territories forestalling the recapture by the enemy as well as destroying the enemy's airraid forces.
- b. Aerial offensive shall be conducted against the North-western part of Australia in any opportune moment so as to forestall and destroy the enemy's attempt of counter offensive.
- c. The control of the sea and air shall be secured in the

eastern section of the Bay of Bengal with a view to safeguard our line of supply to Burma. Efforts shall also be made to forestall and destroy the counter offensive of the enemy to that area.

- d. As separately instructed strategic economy positions in the southern part of New Guinea shall be captured in opportune time.

5. The Indian Ocean Area.

- a. Submarines and sometimes surface vessels shall be employed to destroy the enemy's sea traffic in the Indian coast and the west coast of Australia.
- b. Cooperating with the army, the Combined Fleet shall take Cocos Island as considered advisable. The Combined Fleet shall also launch a surprise attack upon enemy fleets and his strategic positions to destroy them.

V. The Defense

1. In a close cooperation with the army the Combined Fleet shall defend its jurisdictional areas and occupied territories tight and firm.

2. In outflung positions of strategic importance several separate zones of defense shall be established by areas with adequately disposed forces and appropriately installed establish-

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ments of various sorts so as to build up a tough and enduring defense system.

## Chapter II.

### In Case War Breaks Out With USSR During War With USA, British Commonwealth and China (Campaign B).

#### 1. First Phase of the Campaign.

1. Employing a portion of the shore-based air forces and a greater part or a portion of the carrier-borne aerial units the Combined Fleet shall crush the enemy air strength based in the area in Kamchatka and the southern part of Sikhotealin at the very beginning of the war. When this operational objective has been almost attained enemy surface strength in the eastern part of the USSR shall be searched out and destroyed.

The aerial offensive against Kamchatka shall be conducted in cooperation with the army depending upon circumstances.

2. A force with the 5th Fleet as its main strength shall be so employed as to capture by surprise Okha and Petropavlovsk at the very beginning of the war in cooperation with the army; depending upon circumstances Sovgavanai shall also be included in the above mentioned scheme of surprise capture though the details will be decided separately. This force shall also be used

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to search out and destroy enemy's surface fleet moving out in the Okhotsk Sea and in the Aleutian area.

3. Employing a portion of the submarines forces the Combined Fleet shall destroy the enemy's sea traffic with a view to block the Russo-American sea communication.

4. The forces other than mentioned above shall be always kept ready to meet the forces of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and China in a manner of offensive defense and be made to strive to check their invasion as well as to weaken the strength of their forces.

## II. The Second Phase of the Campaign.

1. Employing a force with the 5th Fleet as the nucleus and a portion of the shore-based air forces, the Combined Fleet shall maintain the command of the sea and air of the area to the west of and including the western part of the Aleutian Islands, and at the same time strengthen the defense system of occupied areas; in opportune moment the force shall be employed to take Vladivostok in cooperation with the army.

2. The other forces shall be employed to continue the operations prescribed for the first phase of the campaign and to launch vigorous offensive operations against the forces of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and China, so long as situation permits.



Ref. D. c. 1944

文藝ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

自分、土肥一夫ハ復員廳第二復員局資料整理部史  
實班長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セラレタル  
日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ四頁ヨリ成ル大海指第六十  
號ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（復員廳第二復員局）  
ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル  
寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月十日 於東京

土 肥 一 夫 (印)

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ  
同 日 於 同 所

立會人 宗 官 信 次 (印)

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ref Doc 1944

大海指第六十號

昭和十七年三月一日

軍令部總長 永野 修 身

山本聯合艦隊司令長官ニ指示

爾今海上交通破壊作戦ハ左ニ準據シ實施スベシ

一 作戦方針

太平洋及印度洋並城ニ互リ極力徹底上交通線ノ破壊擾亂ヲ許ルモノトシ主トシテ左ノ如ク作戦ス

(一) 先遣部隊

先遣部隊潛水艦ヲシテ太平洋方面南洋上交通線破壊ノ任務ヲ兼ネシメ當時布哇近海ニ行動セシムルト同時ニ機宜歐洲東岸新西爾沿海岸米國西岸、南太平洋洋島嶼長地巴察馬方面等へ派遣シ布哇米本土間及米洲西岸、歐洲東岸間ノ

(二) 南方部隊

南方部隊配屬ノ潛水艦ヲシテ印度洋方面南洋上交通線破壊ノ任務ヲ兼ネシメ主トシテ印度洋北部及歐洲西岸方面ニ行動セシムルト共ニ

(三) 機宜

機宜其ノ一部ヲ南阿東岸方面へ派遣シ太平洋印度洋間ノ連絡ヲ遮斷スルニ努ム

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(三) 特設巡洋艦若干ヲ主トシテ本作戰ノ爲使用シ  
機算潜水艦ト協同巴奈馬、南阿或ハ南米西岸  
方面等ニ行動セシメ敵交通線ノ破壊擾亂ニ任  
ゼシム

(四) 巡洋艦航空母艦等ヲ以テ各種ノ機動作戦ヲ實  
施スル場合兼テ敵海上交通線ヲ破壊擾亂スル  
ニ努ム

ニ 船舶取扱上準據スベキ事項

(一) 船舶取扱上純中立國ト認ムベキ諸國ヲ左ノ通  
トス

蘇聯邦 西班牙 葡萄牙

「アルゼンチン」 知利 土耳其

瑞典 佛蘭西 (「ドゴール」政權治下ヲ除ク)

瑞西

(二) 前項記載國以外ノ中立國船舶ハ之ヲ敵國船舶  
ニ準ジ取扱フモノトス

(三) 潜水艦及航空機ノ作戰實施ニ當リテハ第(一)項  
記載ノ中立國船舶ナルコト一見明瞭ナル場合  
ノ外國籍ノ如何ヲ問ハズ無警告撃沈ヲ行フコ  
トヲ得但シ日本近海、露領沿岸及「ペルレー」  
以南ノ南米沿岸等ニ於テハ努メテ船舶ノ國籍  
ヲ確認シタル後攻撃ヲ加フベキモノトス

(四) 水上艦船ノ作戰實施ニ當リテハ出來得ル限リ

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正規ノ手續ヲ履キ歸旗スルヲ立前トス。  
 情況巴ムヲ帶テ墜沈シタル場合ハ爲シ得ル限  
 リ人命ノ救助ニ努ム

(丑) 緩慢艦船ハ爲シ得ル限リ救助シ之ヲ内地港灣

ニ廻航セシムルヲ立前トス 情況之ヲ許ササル

場合ニ在リテハ適當設備ノ隊方港灣ニ回航セ

シムルカ若クハ人員搬貨ヲ處理シタル後處分

(ホ) 敵國艦ニ對シテ聯介石政待遇ノ年人軍用ノ高級船員

救済者及政府要人等ハ之ヲ捕虜トスルヲ立前

トス

(附 行)

大澤指第三十三號同第二十八號及同第三十一號

ハ之ヲ感ス

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Def. Doc. #1944

Naval General Staff Directive No. 50

Date: March 1, 1942.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral MCGAWO Otsu.

To: Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet, Admiral YAMAMOTO.

The sea communication destruction warfare shall be conducted in accordance with the following:

1. Operational policy.

With the ultimate view to attain the destruction and disturbance of the hostile sea lanes as thoroughly as possible in the entire area of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the operations shall be executed in the following manner:

- a. With an added duty of destroying the enemy's sea communication in the Pacific area Submarines of the Advanced body shall be made always active in the Hawaiian waters; while on the other hand a portion of the submarine forces shall be despatched from time to time to the waters of such areas as the eastern coast of Australia, the coast of New Zealand, the west coast of the United States, the southern Pacific islands of strategic importance, and the Panama Canal area in order to disrupt the enemy lines of communications between Hawaii and the main land of the United States as well as between the west coast of the American continents and the east coast of Australia, and at the same time in order to destroy and disturb the enemy lines of communications in the waters along the

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west coast of the American continents and near Australia, with a view to confuse the enemy naval forces through arousing the public sentiment of the peoples of the enemy.

b. With an added duty of destroying the enemy's sea communications in the Indian Ocean area the submarines attached to the Southern Body shall be made active chiefly in the northern part of the Indian Ocean and the Australian west coast area, while a portion of the said submarine forces shall be despatched from time to time to the waters of the east coast area of South Africa in order to disrupt the line of communications between the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

c. Sole converted cruisers shall be used mainly for this traffic destruction warfare and be made active from time to time in the waters of those areas such as Panama, South Africa, South American west coast, etc., in cooperation with submarine forces in order to destroy and disturb the enemy's lines of communications.

d. In case cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc. are to be used for various maneuvering operations, they shall endeavor concurrently after the destruction and disturbance of enemy sea communications.

## 2. Standard Guides to the Treatment of Shipping.

a. In dealing with shipping the following countries shall be deemed as purely neutral:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Spain,

Portugal, Argentina, Chile, Turkey, Sweden,

France (the domains under the De Gaul regime excepted),

Swiss.

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b. The shipping belonging to those countries other than above mentioned shall be dealt with similarly to that of the enemy countries.

c. In the conduct of operations with submarines or aircraft, vessels regardless of their nationality may be sunk without warning unless they are easily recognizable as the vessels of those neutral countries as stated in Paragraph 1 above, provided that such attack shall be made after confirming the nationality of the vessels as far as possible in the case of the waters near Japan, near the Russian territorial coast, near the west coast of South America to the south of and including Peru, etc.

d. In the operations by surface craft it shall be made a rule as far as possible that such attack be preceded by duly processed visit and search, and every possible endeavor shall be made to rescue human lives if circumstances warrant the sinking of the vessels.

e. As a rule hostile vessels shall be captured and be brought to a port of Japan Proper whenever possible. When such is not feasible captured vessels shall be either made to sail to the nearest friendly port or be destroyed after having taken proper measures for the personnel and cargoes on board.

f. As a rule persons of armed forces, both armed men and civilians, higher graded mariners, technicians, important government officials, and the like who are belonging to enemy countries and the Chiang Kaishek regime shall be taken prisoners of war.

(Attached directive)

The Naval General Staff Directives Nos. 13, 28, and 31 are hereby abolished.

Def Doc. #1944

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHI, Kezuo, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Historical Section of the Special Readjustment Branch of the Demobilization Section of Demobilizations Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 pages and entitled "Naval General Staff Directive No. 62" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization of Rehabilitation Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,  
on this 10 day of July, 1947.

/s/ DOHI, Kezuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /s/ SOMIYA, Shintzi (seal)

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHI, Kazuo, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Historical Section of the Material Readjustment Branch, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Naval General Staff Directive No. 107" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 10 day of July, 1947

/S/ DOHI, Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: /S/ SOMIYA Shinji (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1941

of Japan, off the coast of the Russian territory, off the coast of South America to the south of and including Peru.

(Attached directive)

The Naval General Staff Directive No. 60 is hereby abolished.

to operate in those areas as the Indian Ocean, and the southeastern part of the Pacific Ocean.

d. A force with surface combat vessels as its nucleus shall be employed to operate in such areas as the southwestern coast of Australia, the Bay of Bengal, and the sea area to the east of Australia, as considered appropriate, to destruct and disturb the enemy sea traffic.

e. When surface vessels are employed for this purpose, vessels of hostile nature shall as far as possible be captured and made to sail to friendly ports.

2. The Guide to the Treatment of Shipping.

a. The countries that are to be deemed as neutral in the matter of dealing with shipping shall be as follows:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Chile, Turkey, Sweden, France (the domains under the De Gaul regime excepted), and Swiss.

b. The shippings of the neutral countries other than listed above shall be treated similarly to those of the enemy countries.

c. In the case of operations by submarines and aircraft vessels may be sunk regardless of their nationality without warning unless easily recognizable as the vessels belong to those neutral countries as listed in Paragraph a. above, provided that "effort shall be made" to verify the nationality of the vessels before launching an attack in those waters such as in the vicinity.

Def. Doc. # 1941

Naval General Staff Directive No. 107.

Date: June 22, 1942.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGANO Osami.

To : Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet, Admiral YAMAMOTO.

The sea communication destruction warfare shall hereafter be conducted in accordance with the following:

1. Operational Policy.

a. Utilizing every available forces and opportunities to such an extent as not constituting hindrance to other operational activities every possible effort shall be exerted to destruct and disturb hostile sea communications with the ultimate objective to enhance the subjugation of the enemy.

b. A greater part of the submarine forces shall be chiefly employed for this purpose with the concurrent duty to attack enemy combat vessels whenever good opportunities are offered. The emphasis of the offensive shall be directed to the sea areas where enemy's sea traffic is crowded in the order of the follow for the time being:

(1) The south eastern coast of Africa, the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean, and the Bengal Bay area.

(2) The eastern and southern coasts of Australia and the Cook Straits area.

c. Either cooperating with submarines or independently as the case may be, some of the converted cruisers shall be employed

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By Dec 1941

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ由ルニ付

自來ノ主尾一夫ハ彼員ニ於テ局長資澤登理郎氏  
ニ送呈ノ後ニ居ル者ナリ且、茲ニ添付セラルル  
日本書ニ係ル者ハ三頁ヨリ則チ大塚信一  
七編ノ送呈ノ後ニ自來氏（彼員資澤局長）  
ノ保管ニ付ル公文書ノ送呈ノ正誤ニ付テ誤實ナ  
シキナルコトヲ認メ

昭和二十二年七月十日 於東京

主 尾 一 夫 (印)

右書ニ係ル者ハ自來ノ送呈ニ於テ為ナルコト  
既 自 於 同 所

立 書 人 宗 官 信 次 (印)

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Def. Doc. # 1942

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Naval General Staff Directive No. 61

Date: March 1, 1942.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral HIGASHI Osami.

- To : Commander-in-Chief of China Seas Fleet, Admiral MATSUURA;  
 Commander-in-Chief of Iure Naval Station, Admiral TOYUDA;  
 Commander-in-Chief of Yokosuka Naval Station, Vice Admiral HIRATA;  
 Commander-in-Chief of Maizuru Naval Station, Vice Admiral IOBAYASHI;  
 Commander-in-Chief of Sasebo Naval Station, Vice Admiral T. NIMOTO;  
 Commander-in-Chief of Chinkai Minor Naval Station, Vice Admiral  
 SAKAMOTO;  
 Commander-in-Chief of Bako Minor Naval Station, Vice Admiral YAMAMOTO;  
 Commander-in-Chief of Omigoto Minor Naval Station, Vice Admiral  
 OKUDA;  
 Commander-in-Chief of Osaka Minor Naval Station, Vice Admiral  
 IOBAYASHI.

In dealing with the shipping of enemy countries and general neutral countries the following shall be the guide hereafter:

1. The sea area under your respective charge shall be patrolled, and the ships of enemy countries and those of the neutral countries that are to be treated similarly to the ships of enemy countries shall be captured or detailed.

2. The following countries shall be treated as purely neutral in the dealing of shipping:

- Union of Soviet socialist Republics; Spain; Portugal;
- Argentina; Chile; Turkey; Sweden; France (the domains under the De Gaul regime excepted); Swiss.

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3. The shippings of the neutral countries other than the countries above listed shall be tentatively treated similarly to those of the enemy countries.

4. In dealing with foreign shipping in general due process shall as a rule be taken in accordance with the provisions of laws. If a sinking is made "without enabled to go through prescribed process" because of some forced circumstances, every possible means shall be taken to rescue human lives after the sinking.

5. As a rule persons of armed services, either armed men or civilians, higher graded mariners, technicians, government officials, etc. who are belonging to the enemy countries or to the Chiang Kai-shek regime shall be taken as prisoners of war.

(Attached Directive)

The Naval General Staff Directives Nos. 14, 15, and 28 are hereby abolished.

Def. Doc. # 1942

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHI, Kazuo, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Historical Section of the Material Readjustment Branch of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Naval General Staff Directive No. 61" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 10 day of July, 1947.

/s/ DOHI, Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date.

Witness: /s/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

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COPY

自分、土肥一夫ハ復員局第二復員局資料整理部史  
實班長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル  
日本語ニ就クテ書カレ三頁ヨリ成ル大正陸第六十  
一號ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（復員局第二復員局）  
ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ該等ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル  
爲ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月十日 於東京

土 肥 一 夫 (印)

石井宗信印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同 日 於 同 所

立書人 宗 官 信 次 (印)

Ref Doc 1942

大澤摺第 六十一號

昭和十七年三月一日

軍令部 總長 永野 修身

- 古賀支那方面艦隊司令長官
- 豐田吳鎮守府司令長官
- 平田橫須賀鎮守府司令長官
- 小津舞鶴鎮守府司令長官
- 谷本佐世保鎮守府司令長官
- 坂本鎮海軍備府司令長官
- 山本馬公奮備府司令長官
- 大熊大湊海軍備府司令長官
- 小津大阪海軍備府司令長官

V 三指示

爾今我國艦二一隊中立國船舶ノ處理ニ關シテハ亦ニ  
 準據ニベシ  
 一 所管海域ノ哨戒ヲ實施シ我國船舶並ニ之ニ對スベキ  
 中立國船舶ハ之ヲ拿捕スルハ拘留ス  
 二 純中國船舶トシテ取扱フベキ點國ヲ左ノ通りトス  
 蘇聯邦 西班牙、葡萄牙「アルゼンチン」  
 知利、土耳其 瑞典 佛蘭西（「ポロニ」敵  
 艦泊下ヲ除ク） 瑞西

Ref Dec 19/1923

- 三 前項記載國以外ノ中立國船舶ハ一應之ヲ敵國船舶ニ準ジ取扱フモノトス
- 四 一號外國船舶ノ取扱ニ關シテハ法規ノ定ムル所ニ從ヒ正規ノ手續ヲ履ムヲ原則トス、情況巴ムヲ待ス正規ノ手續ヲ履ムコト能ハズシテ一之ヲ擧沈シタル場合、爾後諸ノ渡リ人命ノ救助ヲ務ム
- 五 敵國並ニ將外石敢社員ノ軍人、軍醫、高意船員、技術者及隊局長人等ハ之ヲ捕虜トスルヲ立前トス

(附令)

大澤指第十回號、同第十五號及同第二十八號ハ之ヲ廢ス

Exp 3055

第1455号

陸軍取扱規則

(明治三十七年二月十七日)

陸軍第三十三號

(改正) 昭和十六年

第七號

陸軍取扱規則左ノ通り定ム

陸軍取扱規則

第一條 陸軍取扱者及係員又ハ陸軍取扱者ニ依リテ取扱ヲ受クヘキ者ヲ指シ

ヘタルトキハ後ニ其ノ陸軍取扱品ヲ検査スヘシ

第二條 陸軍取扱品中兵器彈藥其ノ他軍用ニ供セラルルモノ物件ハ陸軍

之ヲ陸軍取扱スルカ又ハ便宜本人ヲシテ之ヲ携帶セシムルハ

陸軍中將校ニシテ其ノ名譽ヲ保持セシムルノ必要アルモノ陸軍

軍指撥官ハ本人所有ノ刀劍ヲ佩用セシムルコトヲ得、此ノ場合ニ於テ

ハ其ノ氏名及ヒ佩用ヲ海軍大臣ニ報告スヘシ

前項ニ依リ佩用ヲ許シタル刀劍ハ陸軍取扱所ニ於テ佩用スヘキモノト

ス

第三條 前二條ノ手續ヲ終リタルトキハ陸軍取扱者ノ氏名、年令、身分、階級

本籍地、本國所屬ノ陸軍官職及ヒ受傷ノ年月日、場所ヲ陸軍取扱所ニ

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Dec 4, 1945

シ 罰金ニ付没収若ハ没収シタル物件ニ付キ物品目録ヲ調製スヘシ  
第四條 作隊ハ之ヲ撤去同和作官及下士卒ニ區別ス（軍人目録ニシテ其ノ

従事シタル職務及地位ニ應シ適宜之ヲ區別ス以下同シ）其ノ氏名及

軍隊ノ整頓ニ對シ該員ニ答ハサル者ハ其ノ地位ノ犯罪アリタル者ニ對

シテハ此ノ限ニ在ラス

第五條 作隊不從順ノ行爲アルトキハ監禁制其ノ他必要ナル手段ヲ施

スコトヲ得

作隊逃走ヲ圖リタル場合ニ於テハ必要ニ應シ兵力ヲ用キテ之ヲ防止ス

ルコトヲ得

五條ノ二 作隊逃走ヲ圖リ其ノ他紀律ヲ紊ル行爲アリタルトキハ之ヲ

懲罰スルコトヲ得

前項ノ二條ハ海軍懲罰令第十條乃至第十四條第二十二條乃至第二十四

條及第三十一條乃至第三十六條ノ規定ニ準シ之ヲ行フ

作隊ニ對スル懲罰ハ現ニ作隊ヲ收容スル海軍官憲ノ長之ヲ行フ

第五條ノ三 陸軍部ヲシタルトキハ現一年度ヲ收容スル陸軍官制ノ海軍司法警察官職務執行者トシテ之ヲ取調ハタル后最寄ノ軍法會議警察官官立案件送致スルシ

第六條 海軍指揮官ハ任職名簿、任職日誌、配備物件及物品目録ヲ添へ任職ノ任職所、整備所其ノ他陸軍部官制ニ引渡スヘシ

其ノ引渡ヲ終ル迄ノ間ニ任職死亡シタルトキハ其ノ遺留品、任職名簿其ノ他一切ノ書類物件ヲ引渡スヘシ

第七條 海軍指揮官其ノ他作戦地ニ於ケル海軍官制ノ長ハ便宜ト認ムル

トキハ陸軍部又ハ兵站若ハ運輸通信官制ニ協議シ之ニ任職名簿、任職日誌、配備物件及物品目録ヲ添へ其ノ捕ヘタル任職ノ引渡ヲ爲スコ

トヲ得、此ノ場合ニ於テハ將校同相管官及下士官ニ區別シ其ノ引渡シタル任職ノ員數ヲ直ニ海軍大臣ニ報告スヘシ

第八條 留守府司令長官警備府司令長官其ノ他海軍官制ノ長任職ノ引渡ヲ受ケタルトキハ將校同相管官及下士官ニ區別シ其ノ員數ヲ直ニ海軍

大臣ニ報告スヘシ



1000/1255

海軍大臣前項ノ報告ヲ受ケタルトキハ陸軍ノ官廳ニ引渡  
スヘキ場所及ト海ヲ指定ス

第九條 領守府警備府其ノ他海軍官廳ニ於テ陸軍ノ引渡ヲ受ケタルトキ

ハ之カ幹線又ハ引渡ヲ爲ス途ノ間之カ逃走ヲ防止スルニ足ルヘキ便宜

ノ取容所内ニ收容スヘシ

第十條 陸軍ヲ收容シタル場所ハ海軍將校等ノ下ニ守衛ヲシテ之ヲ

取極ムシムヘシ

第十一條 陸軍自體ヲ以テ嗜好品其ノ他日用ノ物品ヲ購買センコトヲ申

出ルトキハ監督者ニ於テ差支ナシト認ムル場合ニ限り之ニ相當ノ便宜

ヲ與フヘシ

第十一條ノ二 陸軍ニ面會ヲ許ス場合ニ於テハ其ノ面會ノ場所、時間等

ニ關シ取締上相當ノ制限ヲ爲シ且監督者ヲシテ之ニ立會ハシムヘシ

第十二條 陸軍ノ發受スル電信及郵便物ハ監督將校ニ於テ檢査之ヲ檢閲

シ差支ヘナキモノハ之ヲ許可シ暗號ノ使用其ノ他嫌疑アルモノハ其ノ

發送ヲ禁シ又ハ之ヲ沒收スヘシ

第 14 号 1955

第十三條 佐官ノ發受スル郵便物ハ條約ニ依リ郵便免除ノ特典アルヲ以

テ佐官ノ引渡ヲ受ケル海軍官憲ハ其他所在ノ郵便局ニ協議シ之ニ關

シお當ノ手續ヲ爲スヘシ

第十三條ノ二 海軍病院又ハ其ノ他ノ治療所ニ於テ傷病官憲ヲ收瘞シタ

ルトキハ様式ニ從ヒ佐官患者表ヲ作成スヘシ

第十三條ノ三 佐官ノ葬送ハ身分階級ニ應ジ相當ノ儀式ヲ用ユヘシ

第十四條 佐官ノ遺言書ハ帝國海軍軍人ノ遺言書ト同一ノ取扱ヲ爲スヘ

シ

第十四條ノ二 佐官ノ遺留品及遺言書ハ第六條ノ規定ニ依リ引渡ヲ受ケタ

ル許官ヨリ之ヲ佐官情報局ニ送付スヘシ、但シ遺留品中保存ニ堪ヘサ

ル物アルトキハ之ヲ毀却シテ其ノ代金ヲ送付スヘシ

前項ノ送付ヲ爲シタルトキハ海軍大臣ニ報告スヘシ

第十五條 留守府司令長官、警備府司令長官其ノ他海軍官憲ノ長ハ指定

セラレタル場所ニ於テ佐官名簿、佐官日誌、領物物件及物品目録其ノ

他一切ノ書類ヲ派ヘ佐官ヲ駐屯ノ佐官受領員ニ引渡スヘシ

16-14/455

文書の出所竝に成立に関する説明書

自分、今村了之介は復員部第二事務局文書課長の職に居る者なる所茲に添付せられたる日本語に依つて書かれ三葉より成る「俘虜取扱規則」と題する書類は元海軍大臣官房保健に係る圖書の抄本之正確にして眞實なる點なることを證明す

昭和二十二年三月五日 於東京

今村了之介

6

右署名捺印は自分の御前に於て爲されたり

同日於同所

立會人 宗 宮 信 次

Def. Doc. #1455

3055

REGULATIONS:

THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

(Naval Ministerial Notification, No.33, 17 February 1904  
Amended By Notification No.407, 1941)

Article 1.

The personal belongings of enemy combatants or of the persons who are to be accorded the treatment of prisoners-of-war by virtue of international treaties and customs shall be inspected forthwith upon their captivity.

Article 2.

Arms, ammunitions, and other articles of military use in the possession of a prisoner-of-war shall be confiscated. All other articles shall be either left in the possession of the prisoners for convenience or received for deposit.

The commanding officer of a naval unit is empowered to allow only those (prisoners-of-war) who are officers in rank and who are deemed especially necessary to keep their dignity to wear their own swords. In such cases their names and reasons for such special treatment shall be reported to the Navy Minister.

The swords permitted to be worn as mentioned above shall be retained at the prisoner-of-war Camp.

Article 3.

A prisoner-of-war, upon completion of the procedures prescribed in the preceding two articles shall be interrogated as to his name, age, status, rank, permanent domicile and affiliated vessel or office, and time and place of injury if any. Moreover a prisoner-of-war journal shall be kept daily and an inventory of the articles of prisoners-of-war confiscated or received for custody, shall be prepared.

Article 4.

Prisoners of war shall be classified into officers (including those of corresponding ranking) and enlisted men (non-military personnel shall be classified according to their status and work in which engaged). However, this shall not apply to any person who will not answer truthfully to interrogations regarding his name and rank, or to any person who is guilty of other offences.

Article 5.

In case a prisoner-of-war is guilty of an act of disobedience he

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may be subjected to confinement, binding or any other measures deemed necessary:

In case a prisoner-of-war attempts desertion, the force of arms may be used for its prevention, if necessary.

Article 5-- 2.

A prisoner-of-war who attempts desertion or performs undisciplined acts shall be subjected to disciplinary punishment.

The preceding punishment shall be effected according to the regulations stipulated in Naval Disciplinary Punishment Ordinance, Art. 10-14, Art. 22-24, and Art. 31-36.

The disciplinary punishment of a prisoner-of-war shall be enforced by the chief of the naval officials who is then in charge of the internment of the said prisoner-of-war.

Article 5 - 3.

When a prisoner-of-war has committed a crime, the Naval authorities who are then in charge of his internment shall examine the case in the capacity of proxy of a naval judicial police and after the examination, shall forward the case to the prosecutor of the nearest court-martial.

Article 6.

The naval commandant shall deliver prisoners-of-war with their roster, the prisoner-of-war journal, their articles kept under custody and the inventory of these articles to a naval station, minor naval station, or to the nearest naval authorities.

Should the prisoners of war die during the delivery, their roster, personal belongings, and all other documents and articles shall be delivered.

Article 7.

The commanding officer of a naval unit or the chief of other naval offices in the operational areas, when he considers it convenient, may deliver prisoners-of-war under his custody together with the prisoners-of-war roster, prisoners-of-war journal, prisoners-of-war articles and the inventories of the articles under his custody to such army units as combatant forces, quartermaster departments, or transportation and communication departments after due negotiation with those units.

In this case the number of prisoners-of-war, classified separately into officers (including those of corresponding rank) and enlisted men, shall be reported immediately to the Minister for the Navy.

Article 8.

The Commander-in-Chief of naval stations, naval minor stations or the chief of other naval authorities, on receiving the delivery of prisoners-of-war shall promptly report the number of the POWs delivered, divided into officers (including those of the corresponding rank) and men to the Minister for the Navy. The Minister on receiving the above report shall designate the place and date to deliver prisoner-of-war to the army authorities who are to receive those prisoners-of-war.

Article 9.

Naval stations minor stations or other naval authorities, on receiving the delivery of prisoners-of-war shall detain them in any temporary camp available which has adequate facilities to prevent them from desertion until such time as when transportation or redelivery is possible.

Article 10.

The place where prisoners-of-war are being interned shall be controlled and guarded by guards under the supervision of a naval officer.

Article 11.

When a prisoner-of-war requests the purchasing of his favorite edibles or daily necessities at his own expense, the supervisor shall afford him necessary convenience if the request is deemed unobjectionable.

Article 11 - 2.

When a prisoner-of-war is allowed to be interviewed by a visitor, some restrictions necessary from the standpoint of supervision, shall be imposed in the way of place, time, etc. and a guard shall be placed to be present at the interview.

Article 12.

Telegrams or mail sent or received by a prisoner-of-war, shall be examined beforehand by the supervising officer. Those found unobjectionable shall be permitted but the use of code messages and other suspicious correspondence shall be prohibited or seized.

Article 13.

In view of the fact that mails sent or received by a prisoner-of-war are exempted from postage dues by international treaty, naval authorities made responsible for the care of prisoners-of-war, shall negotiate with the post office in the locality on the required procedure so as to put this into effect.

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Article 13 - 2.

When prisoners-of-war are accommodated at a naval hospital or clinic, a list of the prisoners-of-war patients shall be made according to form.

Article 13 - 3.

The funeral for a prisoner-of-war shall be held with appropriate ceremony befitting his rank and position.

Article 14.

The will of a prisoner-of-war shall be handled in a manner not different from that of a member of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Article 14 - 2.

Articles or will left behind by a prisoner-of-war shall be forwarded by the official in charge to the prisoner-of-war Information Bureau in accordance with provisions set forth in Article 6. However, in case there are articles impossible of preservation, these shall be sold and the money forwarded instead.

When the forwarding is done as in the above paragraph, the fact shall be reported to the Minister of the Navy.

Article 15.

Commanders-in-chief of naval stations, Commanders-in-chief of minor naval stations or other naval authorities shall hand over at the place designated prisoners-of-war under their care together with the prisoners-of-war roster, prisoners-of-war journal, prisoners-of-war articles under custody, inventory of these articles and all other document to the army authorities who are to receive the Prisoners-of-war.

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, IMAMURA Ryonosuke, who occupy the post of the Chief of Document Section of the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "The Treatment of Prisoners of War", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (former Ministers Secretariate.)

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 5 day of March, 1947

/s/ IMAMURA Ryonosuke (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /s/ SOMIYA Shinji (seal)



Def Loc No. 1455 (Revised)

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, IMAMURA, Ryonosuke, who occupy the post of the Chief of Document Section of the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "The Treatment of Prisoners of War", is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Former Ministers Secretariate.)


Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 5 day of March, 1947

/S/ IMAMURA, Ryonosuke (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)



Def. Doc. # 1456

2056  
Translated by Defo  
Defense Language Branch

TO: GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER  
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.  
(Attn: Legal Section)

FROM: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT: POW Camp Administration.

C.L.O. No. 414(1.2)

27 January 1946

With reference to the check sheet No. 558 LNO of the Legal Section dated 10 January 1946 on the above subject, the Central Liaison Office wishes to submit herewith the required report as per separate papers.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

(T. Katsube)  
Chief of Liaison Section  
Central Liaison Office.

- Encl. 1. On POW's Camp Administration in Army.  
2. On POW's Camp Administration in Navy.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

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Encl. 1

ON POW'S CAMP ADMINISTRATION IN ARMY

I. Establishment of POW's Camp.

1. The War Minister will establish or close POW's Camp under the Imperial Ordinance No. 1182 (Ordinance establishing POW's Camp) issued on December 23, 1941.

Organization of POW's Camp is to be designated by the Army Orders.

2. In some instances, however, Army Commander or Garrison Commandant had established temporary camps in order to hold POW's before being sent to POW's regular camps to be established under the said Ordinance.

II. Administration of POW's Camp.

1. Administrator of POW's Camp.

An Army Commander or Garrison Commandant, as to be appointed by the War Minister will take charge of POW's Camp under the POW's Camp Ordinance.

2. Management of POW's by chief of POW's Camp.

Each head of POW's Camps may establish Branch Camp, Labor Detachments, and Dispatch Camps in consideration of prisoners' management, housing, and Labor etc..

To the offices of heads of the said Branch Camps, Labor Detachments, and Dispatch Camps, officers, who will be given as much authority as company commanders, may be assigned,

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3. In temporary camps installed by Army Commanders or Garrison Commandants the same rules and regulations as above will be applicable for.
4. Appended hereto is the list No. 1, indicating an outline of channel of control of POW's.
5. All departments and bureaus are assistant organs to the War Minister as the Commander of POW's managements, to which specific duties are allotted, but none of them has any authority or a direct administrative power over POW's.

Especially, POW's Administration Division, which was established on March 31, 1942, is one of the said staff organs.

Appended No. 2 is the list of duties allotted to POW's Administrative Division.

6. The War Minister has no Jurisdiction over any POW's held by the Navy.

III. Ordinances and regulations providing for the authority and duties concerning POW's Administration.

All of the following important ordinances and regulations are extracted from a "Collection of Ordinances and Regulations concerning Treatment of POW's were already submitted to JAG of your General Headquarters.

- A. The Army Orders:
- B. Ordinances for POW's Camp.
- C. Regulations concerning treatment of POW's.
- D. Detailed regulations concerning treatment of POW's.
- E. Regulations concerning allowance for POW's.
- F. Regulations concerning services of POW's.
- G. Regulations concerning dispatch of POW's.
- H. Regulations concerning treatment of dispatched POW's.
- I. Regulations concerning punishment of POW's.


Def. Doc. # 1456

Attached Table No. 1.

OUTLINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM  
OF POW'S CAMP.

Note: (====> Commanding system.  
(-----> System of Liaison, Information and Enquiry.

(War Department Regulation,  
(22; May 2, 1943.  
(POW Labor Regulations.)



Encl. 2

ON POW'S CAMP ADMINISTRATION IN N.V.

In principle, all prisoners of war captured by the Navy were to be handed over to the Army; but until such time, there were cases when they were placed under temporary naval supervision in improvised camps. At these camps, the prisoners of war were placed under regulations of war based on international agreements, to be treated the same as regular prisoners of war.

Control of these temporary camps was effected along the following lines:

1. (a) The name of each organization, which had policymaking or administrative authority or responsibility with reference to such prisons:

That party designated by the Commander-in-Chief of a Major or Minor Naval Station or the Commander of an operational force and which, for convenience, we shall here call A. (It was customary in such cases to designate the commander of the Defense area in question)

A in his turn designated another party (usually a Junior Officer whom we shall here call B, who commands a group of petty officers including hygienist seamen and other necessary personnel) as well as interpreters and other civilian employees whom we shall, as a group call C.

(b) The exact limits of the authority or responsibility of each such organization:

A performs direct supervision over the camp under orders from the

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Commander-in-Chief of a Major or Minor Naval Station or the Commander of an operational force.

B carries out actual management of the camp under orders from A concerning the supervisions of POW.

C. work under orders from B.

(c) Re orders, status, regulations or other sources of such authority or responsibility:

A issues necessary instructions for the direct supervision of the camp.

B, on the basis of orders from A and with his approval established necessary regulations for the supervisions of prisoners of war in Temporary Camp.

2. Outline of the administrative organization of POW camps.

Minister of the Navy

(Controls the Administration of Temporary POW Camps).

Commander of operational Forces

Commander-in-Chief of Minor Naval Station

Commander-in-Chief of Naval Station.

(Supervises temporary Pow Camps)

(Supervises temporary POW Camps)

Party Designated by above

Party Designated by above.

(Carries out Direct Supervisions of temporary camp.)

(Carries out Direct Supervision of temporary camp)

Commander of POW Camp

Commander of POW Camp

(Carries out actual management of temporary camp)

(Carries out actual management of temporary camp)



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N. B. For particulars concerning the supervisions of prisoners of war captured overseas, the Naval Section of the Imperial Headquarters consults the Ministry of the Navy when there is any connection with operations.

REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF WAR PRISONERS

( Riku - a - mitsu 1034 )

31 March 1942.

Notice from the Minister to the units concerned.

Regulations concerning the treatment of war-prisoners are as follows.

Regulations concerning the treatment of war-prisoners.

1. All business concerning the treatment of war-prisoners in the Ministry of War will be conducted under these regulations.
2. In order to conduct the business concerning the treatment of war-prisoners and internees in the war zones, the War-Prisoners Administration Bureau is established in the Ministry of War.  
The War-Prisoners Administration Bureau shall have a director, Officer-personnel, NCO's, and civilian officials of "hannin" rank.
3. The posts of director, officer-personnel, NCO's and civilian officials of "hannin" rank, will be held concurrently by those who hold their principal official posts. The full number of the staff is specified as in the attached list.
4. The Director will be Subjected to the direct command of the Minister of War in taking charge of all business in the Bureau. The all officer-personnel will be Subjected to the Command of director in conducting the business.

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5. The NCO's and the civilian officials of "hannin" rank are to engage themselves in the business, under command of the superiors.

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Attached List

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List of the Full Number of the Staff of Army POW  
Administration Bureau

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Director	Lieutenant (or Major) General	1
Officer-personnel	Field-and Company-officers	5
NCO's and "hannin" officials		5

---

N. B.

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1. Some field-and company-officers who hold their principal official posts in other bureaus may be added to the above list.
  2. The positions of the NCO's and the "hannin" officials may be filled with employees.
- 

Subject: "The duties concerning the treatment of POW.", contained in Article II of the regulations concerning the treatment of POW (April 9, 1942. "Riku-Mitsu" (Army-Asia-Confidential) No. 1108.

The duties concerning the treatment of POW., contained in Article II of the regulations concerning the treatment of POW are provided as follows:-

Daf. Doc. # 1456

1. Matters of general plans for the treatment of POW and internees by the army at the front, such as internment, superintendence, exchange, discharge, employment (labour, propaganda etc.), punishment, payment etc.
2. Matters of labour of POW.
3. Matters of communication of POW.
4. Matters of punishment of POW.
5. Matters in connection with the above 2 and 3 items, concerning the internees by the army at the front.

Def Doc No. 1456 ( Add to Def. Doc. # 1456 )

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, SHIBA, Katsuo, who occupy the post of Liaison Officer, Liaison Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English consisting of 9 pages and entitled "POW Camp Administration" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Liaison Office).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30 day of January, 1947

SHIBA, Katsuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,  
on this same date

Witness:

INAKAWA, Tatsuo (seal)

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. #1945

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Question: What is your name, address and occupation?

Answer: TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi

No. 1792 Hiyoshi-Honcho, Kohoku-Ru, Yokohama C'ty.

Formerly <sup>REAR</sup> ~~NAVY~~ admiral, at present studying history.

Ques: What post did you hold at the time you were demobilized?

Ans: Chief of the First Division, Naval General Staff.

Ques: Give us a general outline of posts you occupied after around December 1941?

Ans: From October 1940 to January 1943 Chief of the 1st Section, Naval General Staff. From January 1943 to 5 November 1944 service on the seas and at the front lines. After December 1944 Chief of the First Division, Naval General Staff. Until the termination of war. During which period I was promoted to rear admiral in November 1943.

- 1 -

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ques: What duties were you in charge of as Chief of the 1st Section, Naval General Staff?

Ans: The 1st Section comes under the command of the Chief of the First Division, Naval General Staff. It takes charge of general military operations of the Japanese Navy and my duties were to command the members of the 1st Section and conduct the planning of general military operations as well as drafting the orders and instructions concerning the operations.

Ques: In early October 1942, did you dispatch Lt.-Comdr. Sadatomo OKADA, Staff-Officer of Naval General Staff, to Kwajelin Island?

Ans: Not only to Kwajelin Island but few other places.

Ques: Please state the purpose of the mission, areas dispatched to, etc.

Ans: In early October 1942, it was decided at Imperial Headquarters to organize a combined inspection party from both the army and navy with the purpose of inspecting the front lines, mainly to re-examine the defense projects in the Pacific Ocean area. They were to be sent to Marshalls Group, the Marianas Group, the Carolines Group, the Solomons Group, New Britain Island etc. From the Naval General Staff, I gave orders to Sadatomo OKADA, who at the time was Lt.-Comdr. and staff-officers, to be dispatched to the above mentioned areas as member of the inspection party.



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He was my subordinate as staff-member of the 1st Section and was mainly in charge of defense preparations. From the Navy Ministry, Kunataro N.K.O. Comdr. and member of the Education Bureau was dispatched to go along with Staff-Officer OKADA as specialist because he was experienced in actual defense preparations.

Ques: Who gave orders to Sadatomo OKADA?

Ans: I gave the orders.

Ques: Did you give the purpose and duties of the mission to OKADA?

Ans: I, as Chief of the 1st Section, Naval General Staff, personally and directly gave purpose and duties at all times whenever a member of the Section was sent out. In the case of OKADA, it was no exception, and I gave him purpose and duties of the mission.

Ques: Did you give to OKADA, orders for Vice-Admiral ABE, Commander of Kwajelin Island, concerning prisoners-of-war?

Ans: The 1st Section of the Naval General Staff does not handle matters dealing with prisoners of war. It was outside my competence and I have not given any order or instructions.

Ques: At the time, did you know that Vice-Admiral ABE, Commander of Kwajelin Island held prisoners of war in custody?

Ans: I did not know.

Ques: Were there prisoners of war in the areas where you dispatched OKADA at the time?

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Ans: I knew by reports that there were prisoners of war at the Fourth Fleet in Truk Island and at the 8th Naval Base Corps in Rabaul.

Ques: Vice Admiral ABE has stated that he was informed by Staff-Officer OKUDA that the disposition of central authorities was to execute prisoners where they were captured and not send them to Japan.

Can you recall anything related to his statement?

Ans: Nothing. It is something we never knew about. Vice Admiral ABE's statement differs greatly with the Japanese Navy's Official forms for forwarding orders. In our navy, orders are issued in the forms of telegrams or documents other than giving oral orders directly to the receiver. There is positively no form such as forwarding an order orally through a third person. I also do not know any case when an order or instruction was forwarded directly to an unit under the command of a naval fleet from the naval General Staff without first going through the fleet headquarters.

Ques: What was the name of the unit stationed on Kwajelin Island and what were its direct and immediate system of command?

Ans: The 6th Naval Base Corps was stationed on Kwajelin Island and at the time Rear Admiral Koso ABE was commander. The unit was under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Shigemi INOUE, commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet.

Ques: Give the procedure on how orders and instructions were forwarded

Def. Doc. #1945

from the Naval General Staff to the Commander of Kwajelin Island.

Ans: Positively in no case would an order or instruction be sent directly to the Commander of Kwajelin Island from the Naval General Staff.

Orders and instructions issued by the Naval General Staff are sent to headquarters of the Combined Fleet. Normally they are forwarded to units under the command of the Combined Fleet in the form of orders from fleet headquarters itself. Exceptions are when orders and instructions from the Naval General Staff are concurrently sent to headquarters of the Combined Fleet and to headquarters of the Fourth Fleet. There are positively no precedents in the Japanese Navy when an order was sent directly from the Naval General Staff to the Commander of the 6th Naval Base Corps or when headquarters of the Fourth Fleet merely acted as intermediary in communicating an order to the Commander of the 6th Naval Base Corps.

Ques: Does the Navy Ministry ever give orders directly to a member of the Naval General Staff?

Ans: No.

Ques: When did Staff-officer OKADA return?

Ans: Approximately one month later after completing the objects of the mission.

Ques: Did you receive OKADA's report?

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Ans: I did.

Ques: Was there anything concerning the prisoners of war on Kwajelin?

Ans: Nothing whatsoever.

Ques: Where is OKUDA now?

Ans: He was killed in action in the Philippines on 26 December 1944. Kumotaro NAKAO who accompanied OKUDA and a naval commander in rank at the time was also killed in action on 16 May 1945 on board the warship Haguro in the Malacca Straits.

Ques: During the war have you ever participated in planning operations for submarines and also drafting orders etc?

Ans: I have.

Ques: What was the length of period?

Ans: From November 1941 to January 1943, and from early December 1944 till the termination of war.

Ques: During the war what course did the Japanese Navy take in submarine warfare?

Ans: Classifying the course into roughly three stages.

They were:

- (1) The period when they worked havoc on communication lines coordinating with fleet operations doing a side-job.
- (2) The period when major force was devoted to destruct lines of communication.
- (3) The period when they engaged in menacing communication lines as well as supplying the advanced bases.

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Ans: I did.

Ques: Was there anything concerning the prisoners of war on Kwajelin?

Ans: Nothing whatsoever.

Ques: Where is OKADA now?

Ans: He was killed in action in the Philippines on 26 December 1944.

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- (2) The period when major force was devoted to destruct lines of communication.
- (3) The period when they engaged in menacing communication lines as well as supplying the advanced bases.

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Ques: State the change in each stage in operational policies for submarine warfare.

Ans: From the outbreak of war to June 1942 was called the first stage of operation.

The policy of operation for this period was indicated to Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Y.M.M.OTO by the Chief of Naval General Staff in "Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 15".

It pointed out the course of submarine operations in relation with general sea warfare in the primary stages at the outbreak of war, and items to be observed in dealing with shippings. This was drafted on 30 November 1941 by order of the Chief of the First Division, Naval General Staff in preparation should war break out with the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands in the future.

The plans of operation for this period attached importance on offensive operations in the southern regions and therefore in the Pacific Ocean area, the primary object of submarine warfare was to watch and pursue the movements of the U.S. fleets and the destruction of communication lines was of secondary importance.

Operations for submarines attached to forces operating in the south placed primary importance on duties involving offensive operations in the southern region and the destruction of communication lines was of secondary importance.

Especially, the sea communication line destruction warfare in the

Indian Ocean area had been instructed to strengthen activities after operations in the southern region has reached a certain stage.

Furthermore, in performing the destruction of communication lines the sentiment of the Japanese Navy respecting human lives and abiding by warfare laws and rogulation is clarified in Imperial Headquarters Naval Department Instructions of 30 November 1941 and I March 1942. This policy has not been altered throughout the whole period of war. The next period was called the second stage of operations.

It lasted from June 1942 to March 1943. The characteristics of this period was putting primary importance on destruction of maritime communication lines.

During the First Stage of Operations the offensive strategy in southern areas reached a definite stage and so importance was attached to communication line destruction warfare. Cruisers and other surface crafts were employed along with the submarines to work havoc and confuse the enemy. The bulk of the submarine force were allocated for this purpose. Main water-areas for submarine attacks were in the following order.

- (a) Southeastern coast of Africa and northwestern part of the Indian Ocean.
- (b) Eastern coast of Australia and Cook's Strait area.

In the Pacific Ocean area the emphasis of destroying communication lines was laid on severing the supply route to the U.S.

forces in the southern areas by blockading the communication sea lanes between the U.S. and Australia.

The operations for this period was indicated to Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO from the Chief of Naval General Staff on 22 June 1942 as Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 107. It was drafted during my term of office.

The third stage of submarine warfare was based on a policy issued on 25 March 1943. It was planned and drafted by my successor Chikao YAMAMOTO in the form of Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 207. Characteristics of this order are:

- (1) Emphasis of the operation was put on destruction of maritime communication lines, which is the same as in the second stage of operations.
- (2) Supplying advanced basis by using a part of the submarine force.
- (3) Performing co-ordinated operations with German submarines in the Indian Ocean area.

What I have stated so far was the general policy and changes of submarine operations adopted by the Japanese Navy during the recent war.

Ques: During the recent war, was an operation policy either planned or indicated by the Imperial Headquarters to annihilate the crew members, except for a few necessary to obtain information when sinking enemy shippings by submarines.



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Ans: Such a thing was never planned nor indicated by Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instructions. If it were indicated, it should be recorded in the file of Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instructions. Not only is there no such record but is very far from the spirit of the Japanese Navy.

Ques: Did the German authorities ever make any such request?

Ans: Not when I was at the Naval General Staff.

Ques: Have you ever read or heard about the First Submarine Force Order issued by the Commander of the First Submarine Flotilla on 20 March 1943?

Ans: No, I haven't.

Ques: What instructions did the Japanese Navy give as regards respecting human life and abiding by international laws and regulation in submarine operations?

Ans: It was indicated in Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 15 issued 30 November 1941 to the effect that, "it is lawful to attack unarmed enemy merchant-ships only in waters 300 nautical miles from the enemy coastline and in the areas between Hawaii and the west coast of the U.S. mainland. In other cases otherwise than above, unless circumstances are unavoidable, time must be given for crew and passengers to seek safety." As for dealing with shippings of neutral countries, instructions were given to take measures as provided in international laws and regulations with the exception of

Dof. Doc. #1945

the four nations of Panama, Norway, Denmark and Greece.

Further in Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 60 issued 1 March 1942 it gave instructions on the following points.

(1) In performing operations on surface shippings take formal procedures to the extent possible, and always inspect the ship. However, due to unavoidable circumstances if the ship was sunk, endeavor to rescue human lives.

(2) Capture hostile shippings whenever possible and escort them to our port or harbor.

However if circumstances do not permit the above, take expeditious measure and escort ship to nearest port or harbor, or also, dispose of the ship after crew and cargo are removed.

(3) Service-men, civilians attached to the armed-services, merchant-ship officers, technicians and Government high-ranking personnels of the Chiang Kai Shek regime shall be arrested as prisoners of war together with nationals of belligerent nations.

In this war, considerable attention was devoted in respecting human lives and to abide by international law and regulations.

On this 10 day of July, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: TOMIOK., Sadatoshi (seal)

Def. Doc. #1945

I, INAGAWA, Tatsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: /s/ INAGAWA, Tatsuo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (seal)

803078A

Naval General Staff Directive No. 15 (1st)

Date : November 30, 1941.

From : Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGANO Osami.

To : Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet, Admiral YAMAMOTO.

In case when war breaks out with the United States, the British Empire, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the policy stated in the annex shall be the guide to the conduct of the sea communication destruction warfare for the time being.

-7-

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, LOHI, Kazuo, who occupy the post of Chief of the Historical Section, Material Readjustment Branch, 2nd Demobilization Office, Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Naval General Staff Directive No. 15 (Gist)" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document, which is an answer made through the Nakamura-kikan to questions put forth to the Former Japanese Navy by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces through Col. Manson (Phonetic) of the Supreme Headquarter Allied Forces on November 1945.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 21 day of June, 1947

LOHI, Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,  
on this same date

Witness:

SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

Y900 E 11  
BY PROSPECT NATION

DEF. DOC. # 2294

64 3059

C L A S S I F I C A T E

1. I, YOSHI, Michinori, now hold the post of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section, Second Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Office and am in charge of the documents of the said Bureau.
2. The original of "Instructions, Navy Department, Imperial Headquarters", which were issued during the Pacific War, were in the custody of the Adjutants' Office, Navy Department, Imperial Headquarters, but was lost by fire during an air-raid by American planes which lasted from the mid-night of May 25, 1945 until the dawn of the following day.
3. Since then a set of copies of the said Instructions which were kept at the First Department of the Naval General of Staff have been used in place of the original, and are at present being kept and used by the Historical Section of the Material Preparation Department. But among these copies, those issued in 1941, i.e., the Instructions No. 1 to No. 35 were destroyed during the above-mentioned air-raid and are not in existence.
4. In November, 1945 there were inquiries from SCAP as to the said Instructions No. 1 - No. 35, and we investigated all the offices to which they were distributed. However, as none was available, we made a summary of these instructions by combining what were remembered by the people concerned and replied to the inquiries of SCAP.

I hereby confirm that the above statement is true.

On August 27, 1947  
At Tokyo

/s/ YOSHI, Michinori (seal)

The above signature and seal were affixed in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place

Witness: /s/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

4-1-050A

Def. Doc. #2208

Exh. No.

Directive No. 282, Naval Department.

Imperial General Headquarters.

From: NAGAIWO Osami, Chief of the Naval General Staff.

To : KOGA, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

It is directed that the following items should be adhered to in executing submarine operations in the Indian Ocean:

1. The boundary between the operation area of the submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy and that of the German submarines is set on the longitudinal line of seventy (70) degrees east as a general rule, the east side of it being allocated to Japan and the west of it to Germany.  
In case of necessity, however, they can operate anywhere irrespective of this boundary.
2. The submarines operating in the Indian Ocean are forbidden to make any anti-submarine attack.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. #2208

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHI, Kazuo, who occupy the post of the chief of the Historical Subsection in the Data Arrangement Section, 2nd Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization Department, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "DAI-KAI-SHI No. 282" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the 2nd demobilization Office of the Demobilization Department).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 23rd day of August, 1947

/s/ DOHI, Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /s/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)




3061

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



Sworn Deposition

Deponent: OOHASHI, Tatsuo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Q.- Your place of residence, name and date of birth please.

A.- 57, 4-Chome Den en chofu, Oota Ward, Tokyo City.

Tatsuo Oohashi

Date of birth: 31st August 1891 (24 Meiji)

Q.- What was your rank at the time of the Surrender?

A.- Rear-Admiral in the Reserves.

Q.- Please give a short history of your service in the Navy.

A.- I served as submarine captain, commander of a submarine squadron, As a staff member of the submarine section of the NURU arsenal, 1st and 2nd Section Chief of the KURU Military Supplies Section, Captain of the submarine tender Noshima. In August 1941 (Showa 16) I was appointed

Commander of the 14th Gunboat Squadron and in April 1942 (Showa 17) was relegated to the reserves. On the very same day of my relegation however, I was recalled into service. During the Pacific War I held the following posts.

From May 1942 (Showa 17) till September 1943 (Showa 18)  
Captain of the Rio de Janeiro Maru.

From September 1943 (Showa 18) till December 1943  
(Showa 18)

Commander of the Rio de Janeiro Maru. (The same boat  
having been converted into a transport.)

From March 1944 (Showa 19) till January 1945 (Showa 20)  
Transport Commander of 1st Escort Fleet.

From January 1945 (Showa 20) till the Surrender.  
Naval Attache at Moji.

Q.- What type of ship was the Rio de Janeiro Maru?

A.- She was a diesel-engined passenger-transport ship displacing 10,000 tons and capable of a maximum 16 knots, owned by the Osaka Shosen (O.S.K.) which had assigned her to its South American Service. The Navy had conscripted this ship and had converted her into an auxiliary submarine tender.

Q.- What was the outward aspect of the ship?

A.- She was a two-masted, single-funneled ship of the passenger type.

The upper parts of the masts and of the funnel were painted green, the rest of the ship being painted grey.

Q.- Why are such colors adopted?

A.- Its was to avoid long-range detection by enemy submarines.

Q.- Please give an account of the activities of the Rio de Janeiro Waru after you assumed her command.

A.- In April 1942 she sailed to Kwajelin there to stand by for the Midway operation, but in June of the same year she returned to Sasebo. After leaving Sasebo for Penang in July of the same year, she was attacked by an enemy submarine en route off the coast of French Indo-China and damaged. She entered Singapore harbor for repairs. On completion of repairs in December 1942 she sailed for Surabaya.

From January till October 1943 she was occasionally engaged in transport duty, using Surabaya as base for her activities.

Q.- Why was she used for transport duty?

A.- As Surabaya was a submarine base, unless submarines required use of advanced bases, there was no need for tenders. On the other hand there was a shortage of ships.

Q.- What did she transport?

A.- Personnel and military supplies.

Q.- Would weapons and ammunition be included in the above?

DPF. DOC. # 1954

A.- Of course they would be included.

Q.- In what areas did she operate?

A.- In Java, Borneo, Celebes, New Guinea, Anbon, the Philippines, the Small Sunda Archipelago. Timor etc.

Q.- Did you ever transport patients?

A.- No, never.

Q.- When did you touch Anbon?

A.- The 1st time was in the middle of January 1943. If I remember rightly, we touched at that port about twice between that time and March of the same year.

Q.- What was the object in stopping at Anbon?

A.- It was for purposes of local transportation of personnel and military supplies.

Q.- For approximately how many days did you anchor at Anbon when you stopped there?

A.- Always for a day or two.

Q.- Were POW's used by the local troops in the loading and unloading of freight?

A.- I do not remember.

Q.- Did you ever take patients aboard at Anbon?

A.- Never.

Q.- What approximately was the crew of the Rio de Janeiro Maru?

A.- Approximately 300.

DRF. DOC. # 1954

Q.- Was the crew armed?

A.- The necessary personnel were armed.

Q.- Under what command was the Rio de Janeiro Maru subordinate?

A.- In April 1942 she was under the direct command of the Combined Fleet, and belonged to the 5th Submarine Squadron. But from June 1942 onwards she was attached to the Submarine Unit of the South Western Fleet.

Q.- What happened to the Rio de Janeiro Maru after September 1943?

A.- As in September 1943 she was turned over to the auxiliary transport category, she was sent back to the Japanese mainland for refitting.

After that for a time she was in the HARIMA Dockyards being refitted. I hear that she was sunk in Truk in February 1944 after completion of the refitting. I left her in December of the same year.

Q.- Did the Rio de Janeiro Maru ever assume the Red Cross insignia during the time you were aboard her?

A.- No, she never did.

When I read in the papers that an Australian POW or it may have been a POW of another nation, stood as a witness in the International Tribunal to testify that the Rio de Janeiro Maru had used the Red Cross sign at Anbon, I

could not help but wonder how such a mistake had been possible.

Q.- Was there a naval hospital ship by the name of Rio de Janiro Maru?

A.- I never heard mention of such a ship.

On this 10 day of July, 1947  
at Tokyo

DEPONENT /S/ Ohashi Tatsuo (seal)

I, SOMIYA, Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: /S/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Ohashi Tatsuo (seal)

D. W. D. C. # 1954

、如ク供述致シマス

自分機我引ニ行ハルル方式ニ従ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り直覺子會シタ

供述者

東京都大田區田圃布四丁目五七

大橋 貞夫  
明治二十四年八月三十一日生

直覺 供述者

荒 木 貞 夫 其他

逕 東京 警察 署 裁判 所

直 采 利 加 合 衆 司 其他

對

PLEASE RETURN TO ROOM 1001

昭和十九年（一九四四年）五月より昭和二十年（一九四五年）一月まで 第一艦隊特選航路練習官

昭和二十年（一九四五年）二月より終戦まで 海軍 武官

門司 海軍 武官

同 同

大阪商船所有で噸位一〇、〇〇噸、最大速力約十六節、アイゼンシュタインの貨客船で南米航路に使用されてゐたのを海軍に徴用され待費、海水母港に改装された船であります

其の船は如何なる外装をしてゐましたか

答 二層一煙突の客船型で上端と煙突の上端を灰白色に塗り真鍮船体は各部電色であります

同 何かその様な色形を取りましたか

答 水筒よりの窓廻り等を塗る爲めであります

同 貴方が海軍になつてからのリオデジャネーロ丸の行動を述べて下さ



昭和十九年（一九四四年）三月より昭和二十年（一九四五年）一月まで 第一機雷艇隊選航指揮官

昭和二十年（一九四五年）一月より終戦まで

門 司 海 軍 武 官

同 リオデジャネロ丸といふ船は如何なる船ですか

答 大阪商船所有で噸位一〇、〇〇〇噸、最大速力約十六節、ディー

ゼルエンジン等の貨客船で南米流路に使用されてゐたのを海軍に徴

用され特設潜水母艦に改装された船であります

同 其の船は如何なる外装をしてゐましたか

答 二層一煙突の客船型で上層と煙突の上を灰白色に塗り其他船体

は全部黒色でありました

同 何故その様な色彩を取りましたか

答 敵潜水艇よりの遠距離探知を避くる爲めであります

同 貴方が隊長になつてからのリオデジャネロ丸の行動を述べて下さ

い

答

一九四二年四月ミッドウエイ作戦の爲クエゼリン島に回航し待機して居りましたが同年六月佐世保に帰航しました  
同年七月佐世保を發しペナンに向け航行中第卅沖で敵潜水艇の攻撃を受け損傷し修理の爲シンガポールに入港一九四二年十二月修理完了スラバヤに回航しました  
一九四三年一月以降十月迄はスラバヤを基地として時々回送任務に従事しました

問

何故回送任務に従事しましたか

答

スラバヤには潜水艇基地があつたので潜水艇が前進基地を使用しない限り餘り母港の必要がなく又一面船腹の不足の爲めであります

問

如何なるものを回送してゐましたか

答

人員及軍需品であります

問

兵器、彈薬を含みますか

答

勿論含みます

問 如何なる地方に行動しましたか

答 ジャワ、ボルネオ、セレベス、ニューギニア、アンボン、比島、

小スンダ列島、テモール等であります

問 患者搬送をした事がありますか

答 ありません

問 アンボンへ入港したのは何時ですか

答 第一回は一九四三年一月中旬であり以後同年三月迄の間に二回程

入港したと記憶します

問 アンボン入港の目的は何ですか

答 人員及軍需品の局地搬送です

問 アンボンには何日位入港してゐましたか

答 何時も一日か二日位です

問 入港中荷物の荷揚げ荷卸しに現地部隊が作業を従用してゐました

か

答 記憶して居りません

同 答 アンボンから慰着を乗船させた事がありますか

同 答 ありません

同 答 リオデジヤネロ丸の乗組員はその位ありましたか

同 答 約三〇〇名です

同 答 乗員は武装してゐましたか

同 答 必要なる者は勿論武装してゐました

同 答 リオデジヤネロ丸は何處の管轄を受けて居りましたか

同 答 一九四二年四月當時は津浦海軍隊直屬の第五潜水隊に屬して居り

ました

一九四二年六月以降は南西方面艦隊所屬の潜水部隊に屬して居り

ました

同 答 一九四三年九月以降リオデジヤネロ丸はごうじましたか

同 答 一九四三年九月待機運送船に艦種を變更せられましたので改裝の

爲同船を内地に回航し私は十二月退任しました

其後此の船は特設造船所で改裝してゐましたが完了後一九四四年

二月トラツクに於て沈没したと聞いて居ります

同 貴方が乗船中リオデジャネイロ丸が赤十字章を使用した事がありますか

答 左様な事は絶対ありません

私は国際裁判の法廷で澳洲か或は他の何處かの俘虜であつた人が  
. 艦人に出てリオデジャネイロ丸がアンボンで赤十字章を使用してゐ  
たといふ事を述べた事新聞で讀み何うしてその様な間違が起つた  
かと思ふに堪えません

同 海軍の病院船にリオデジャネイロ丸といふのがありますか  
答 左様な船は聞いた事がありません

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）七月十日於東京

供述者 大橋龍男

右ハ被告立合人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス  
同日於東京

立合人 宗宮信次 8

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ誤秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

署名捺印 大橋 龍男

Ex 3062

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAMI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: OKOCCHI, Darshichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am a former Vice-Admiral.

2. On 2 November 1944, I arrived in Manila and assumed my duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Area Fleet and concurrently of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet.

However, by the latter part of December, 1944, we had lost the greater part of our naval force and our air power too had diminished considerably.

Consequently, after that, I took command of the remnants of the (naval) <sup>units</sup> ~~units~~ <sup>whose but</sup> in the Philippines Area. ~~ever~~ these ~~units~~ were soon placed under the command of the Army as far as the land operations were concerned. Therefore, I merely directed and supervised personnel affairs and accounts.

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3. In January, 1945, when U.S. forces commenced landing operations at Lingayen, I left Manila on the 5th and moved to Barrio. This was due to circumstances which arose from the necessity of taking command of over-all military operations. The naval forces left behind in Manila at that time were placed under the Command of General Yamashita as far as land operations were concerned, from zero hours, 6 January. After that I was only able to give moral encouragements indirectly, I for no longer possessed authority to take command over naval landing forces in land warfare.

4. From then on, all communication between us and the forces in Manila was made by wireless. As time elapsed the efficiency of the wireless communication greatly decreased, but still it was continued for a considerable time. The progress of the battles in Manila was therefore reported to me as well as to General Yamashita. With the information I then received, I was able to picture the desperate situation of the Japanese units in Manila when the U.S. forces besieged the city. From what I can recall today, I shall mention a few examples.

- (1) Enemy shelling and bombing were extremely intense and the whole area was completely devastated.
- (2) Guerrilla activities were intensified and even women and children harassed our forces, greatly hindering our operations.

(3) Ammunition ran short.

Thus, externally, our forces faced the furious gunfire of the U.S. forces, while internally they were harassed by guerrillas. It was evident that our units were fighting under great difficulty and disadvantage. Around 20 February, communication with Manila was completely cut, and I judged that the entire garrison in Manila had been killed.

5. Besides the progress of the battle in general as I have stated above, details as to the internal condition of our units were entirely unknown and the so-called "Manila atrocities" were something I did not ever dream of.

About 13 April a message from Tokyo in the name of the Vice-Minister for the Navy was received, which said, "Spain has recently severed diplomatic relations with Japan on the ground that Japanese troops massacred Spanish nationals in the battle of Manila. Report on the matter is requested."

It was the first time that I felt some incident must have occurred.

However, since all personnel involved in the alleged incident had been killed, there was no way for us to conduct an investigation. I also enquired of the Army Headquarters under General Yamashita, but they too did not know anything about the incident and therefore I cabled a reply to Tokyo to that effect.

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As I have stated, the Warila Incident without either General Yamashita's or my knowledge.

I learned about the particulars of the incident for the first time after the surrender, from the indictment against General Yamashita.

On this 15th day of March, 1947  
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ OKOCHI, Denshichi (seal)

I, SO'ITYI, Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date. At Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ SO'ITYI, Shinji (seal)

G TH

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ OKOCHI, Denshichi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 27, 1947.

By 9022

昭和廿二年（一九四七年）三月十五日 於東京

供述者 大川 内 傳

右ハ特立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且者名捺印シタルコトヲ證明

同日 於東京

立會人 宗 官 信 次

FILE COPY  
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眞  
智  
智

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ誤秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザル  
コトヲ言フ

〔署名  
捺印〕

大川内傳七

かの事故ありたるを伝知せる次第でありました。  
然れども關係員全部に死せる爲め其の際調査の方法もなく、又陸軍山下司令部に問い合せて見ましたか同様に何も知つて居りませんので其の旨東京に返電した旨であります。  
以上の通りでありましてマニラ事件は山下大將も私も全然知らない間に生じたものであり私達は山下大將の起訴状により初めて其の内容を知つたものであります。

(終)

と併行して私の方にも進軍して来ました。それによりますと米軍がマニラを包圍するや非常に苦戦に陥いつた状況が察知されたのでありまして今私が記憶して居ります内にも次の様なものがあります。

- (一) 敵の砲撃爆撃猛烈を極め附近一帶焦土と化して一草一木もなし
- (二) ゲリラの跳梁甚だしく婦女子に至る迄我を苦しむる甚だしく戦國を極めて困難なり

(三) 弾薬も残り少くなれり  
即外米軍の苛烈なる熾火の猛攻を受け内ゲリラの砲撃に苦しみつゝ非常な苦戦をして居た事が窺はれました

二月二十日頃から遂にマニラよりの通信社絶しましたので私は同守備

部隊全部は戦死したものと判別致しました。  
以上の全体的戦況の外其の内部の詳細は元より全然不明でありまして所謂マニラ惨劇事件の如きは私達の夢想だにしたかつた處であります然る處四月十三日頃東京より海軍次官の名に於て「此度西班牙國はマニラの戦國に於いて日本軍隊が西班牙人を屠殺せりとの理由により對日外交を断絶せり、其の事情報告あり度し」との電報あり甫めて何等



一 私は元海軍中將であります。

二 私は昭和十九年十一月二日南西方面艦隊司令長官兼第三南遣艦隊司令長官としてマニラに赴任し其の職を執りました。

然るに同年十二月末頃迄に海上兵力の大部を失ひ又航空勢力も著しく減耗して爾後比島方面に於きましては主として瀕存の陸上部隊を統率する事になりましたが、それ等の部隊も陸上作戦に臨しては逐次陸軍の指揮下に入れましたので私は其の人事、經理等を指揮監督するのみとりました。

三 昭和二十年一月米軍のリンガエンに上陸作戦を開始するに及び私は全作戦指揮の都合上同五日マニラを激退してバギオに轉進しましたが當時マニラに残留しました海軍部隊は同六日零時を期して陸上作戦に臨して山下大將の指揮下に入れ爾後私は精神的な側面的激勵等を行つたのみで之に對する陸上戦術の命令は持つて居りませんでした。

四 其の後私の方とマニラ部隊との通信は一切無線電信によつたのでありまして其の能力は時と共に非常に低下しましたが尙相當期間持続して居りました。従つてマニラの状況は山下大將に報告さるゝと同時に之

極東國庫軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木 貞夫 其他

宣審供述秘

供述者

東京都大田區南千束町三三五

大川 內 傳 七

明治十九年九月二日生

目分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣審ヲ爲シタル上  
次ノ如ク供述致シマス

613063

DFP. DOC. #1256

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent : -- ARIMA, Gen

born: August 13, 1900

SUIKOFEN No. 1 1-Chome

NAKAMEGURO MEGUROKU,

Tokyo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I. I am at present Chief of the Medical Section of the Second Demobilization Bureau.

II. The outline of my official career is as follows:  
September 15th, 1938 member of the Medical Bureau of the

Navy Ministry

June 1st, 1942

Chief of the Quarantine Section of the Sanitation Bureau of the Civil Government under the South-west area fleet.

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November 1st, 1942	Surgeon Captain
November 20th, 1943	Chief Medical Officer, the First Fleet dispatched to the South.
May 9th, 1945	Chief of the First Section, the Medical Bureau of the Navy Ministry.

III To begin with, the authority of handling prisoners of war was in the hands of the army, and the navy was not supposed to keep and manage prisoners of war; therefore, we had no special stock of medical goods for prisoners of war. Accordingly, when the navy interned prisoners as a temporary step during the period between their capture and their transfer to the army, the unit which was in-charge of managing them was supplied with medical stores for the total number of soldiers in the unit and prisoners, and all medical treatment for them was carried out without discrimination treatment for prisoners was on the same standard as the sick and wounded of the unit; seriously ill prisoners were allowed to enter a navy hospital exactly as Japanese officers and soldiers.

Thus, the navy neither treated them particularly warmly because they were prisoners nor treated them especially coldly. Medical treatment for them was carried out strictly and fairly, in accordance with "Navy Regulations for Handling Prisoners of War".

IV As to the stock of medical stores, it was a fundamental principle of the Navy to keep materials which would last for a year for peacetime national defense, out of necessity caused simply by the fact that it has forces under it. However, it was a basic standard regardless of the sort of enemy country or the term of the probable war. In the case of the last war, therefore, the outbreak of the war found us provided with this quantity.

In other words, concerning medical stores, we had no particular instruction to take steps to enable us to wage war for four years against America, Britain, Holland, and others. For we learned about the outbreak of the last war and its scale only from ordinary news, reports and, as far as medical materials were concerned, we faced the war unprepared.

V. As to the disposition and numerical increase of surgeons and medical men following the increase of prisoners, the navy had no plan to manage prisoners of war as previously mentioned; therefore, the number of men in a unit which was in temporary charge of prisoners was increased. In view of this, a step to increased surgeons and medical men to cope with the increase of its number was adopted. However, on account of the rapid increase in the army's strength and the unexpected organization of various troops after the outbreak of the war,

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the increase in number of surgeons and medical men, who must have special education, could not meet the necessity.

VI A plan for distribution of medical materials, providing for the supply of the basic quantity for the total number of the unit plus the estimated quantity made necessary by the particular duties and sanitary conditions of its station, was adopted in accordance with the account and Supply Regulations of Medical Stores. (refer to Notice no. 237 issued in July 1941).

The person responsible for distributing these materials was the chief of the medical stores section of the medicine bureaus of the respective navy hospital. Otherwise the apothecary officer of a navy hospital ship supplied them at the request of a medical officer or a surgeon in charge of handling the military materials of a unit.

Even though a demand be made, it was impossible to supply it when there was no stock in the navy stores or Japan proper. At distant places sometimes supplies did not arrive because of sinking. When communications and traffic between many points on the battle-front were stopped or were strained as in the latter half of the war, it was impossible to supply demands.

VII The chain of command concerning medical business in the navy included the chief of the Medical Bureau of the Navy Ministry, who was an assistant to the Minister and commanded or ordered his subordinates not directly but only

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in the name of the minister. Regarding military administration, commanders-in-chief of naval districts, guard districts or fleet headquarters were under the control of the Minister. Each of the staffs of these commanders included a chief medical officer, who was an assistant to the commander-in-chief.

Under a commander-in-chief, there were war-ships, units, schools, naval hospitals, etc. Temporarily-keeping and managing prisoners of war, till the time of handing them over to the army, was done by the above mentioned war-ships and units. Prisoners who needed medical treatment were received into the infirmary of the unit. In that case, the person directly responsible for their treatment was the surgeon in charge of that infirmary, who was under the control of the chief medical officer. The chief medical officer was directly subordinate to the unit commander; accordingly, he received orders from the unit commander. Sometimes he received suggestions and advice on medical affairs from a superior medical officer who was the staff-officer of the commander-in-chief, but they were not commands or orders.

Those who are seriously ill among the prisoner patients belonging to the infirmary of a unit were transferred to a navy hospital, just as Japanese officers and men were.

This may be shown in Diagram No. 1 on the separate sheet hereto attached.

VIII Regarding general health problem, especially those concerning dwellings, clothes, and labor, the Medical Bureau of the Navy Ministry paid particular attention in the earlier days of the war mainly to problems in the tropics; and in the latter days of the war, mainly to maintenance of the physical strength of soldiers in the homeland following food and fuel shortages; searching for a scientific method as the subject of special war-time study made by the Research Section of the Navy Medical School and unofficial scientists, we exerted ourselves to the utmost to put our conclusions into practice on troops but under the situation, it was most difficult to carry out.

Our national strength at that time was quite insufficient to meet the general demand. For example, we were in such a condition that even when the "penicillin cure" was needed, we could by no means use it for the general clinic as we had such a small quantity that it could be used only for clinical study. And when we wanted D. D. T., we had only a test tube of it as study material and even though we thought of using it universally as the Occupation Forces are doing, we could not realize this goal.

IX Concerning medical treatment, now the death of prisoners from diseases in Japan proper is the subject of grave discussion but a large number of Japanese soldiers died from diseases in the various stages of the war.



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Under conditions existing in our country after 1944, the ration for soldiers deteriorated in quantity and quality until, if computed in calories per day, it dropped below 1,700 calories, and even below 1,500 calories.

On the other hand, owing to fuel shortage, there was no heating in winter season, warm baths became impossible, clothes and bedclothes which were necessary for warmth were wanting and, in general, maintaining body warmth was impossible; consequently, a disproportion arose between calories absorbed and calories consumed per day, and the number of calories consumed was always larger this fact resulted in loss of physical strength and nourishment. Such condition of illness seldom broke out among older soldiers who were accustomed to military life but often broke out among younger ones who were not accustomed to military life. This kind of general physical weakness caused many persons to suffer from such complications as pneumonia and diarrhea. This retarded their convalescence.

The navy called it "Prostration resulting from inability to adjust oneself" and decided to distinguish it statistically from malnutrition in the overseas war front.

The number of cases of this disease reported to the central authorities at that time was more than 6,000 in the navy alone throughout the country. Of this number more than 500 patients died; however, it is inferred that the actual number was more than 10,000, of which more than 1,000 patients died, Erroneous diagnoses of these cases called pneumonia or

diarrhea, which were actually only complication of the disease, the major disease and prostration only a result was observed.

X. As to the death of prisoners from disease, we must keep in mind the difference in resistance to bacteria in the case of foreigners.

Concerning the comparative ability of war prisoner and Japanese to resist disease, we have made no experiment or study and I am consequently in no position to draw a scientific conclusion. However I am of the opinion that from study and experiment on animals and epidemiological observation, it is possible to state as follows:

(a) Animals brought up in a favourable environment have less resistance to bacteria infection than animals grown in a natural environment.

(b) Men exposed to bacteria from their childhood in an unfavorable environment have greater resistance to bacteria than men who have grown in a favorable environment from their childhood, it may be inferred that prisoners were more susceptible to bacterial infection than the Japanese. In addition, such handicaps may be supposed among the prisoners as the following:

(1) spiritual restlessness, (2) inability to acclimatize, (3) unfamiliarity with Japanese food, (4) difference in customs, (5) lack of communication with the Japanese due to the language barrier. As the result of these difficulties, it is possible to infer that patients had trouble and took a longer period in recovering from a disease. - 8 -

Dai. Doc. No. 1256

The result of experiment on animals and the epidemiological fact which formed the foundation of this conclusion are as follows:

1. Examples of experiments on animals;

- (a) When a domesticated mouse and a wood-mouse living in natural surroundings were compared, the former died with less bacteria for its weight than the latter.
- (b) When a canary and a wild Japanese white-eye were compared as to resistance to "bird malarial protozan", the canary was more strongly infected with it than the white-eye; that is, the former showed less resistance to bacteria than the latter.

2. Epidemiological observation on human beings:

- (a) It often happens that when persons who have grown in a rural district where there are few tuberculous bacteria come to a city; later, come in contact with many people with active tuberculosis and fall ill suddenly, they die in a short period. On the contrary, when persons who have grown in a city from their childhood and often resisted tuberculosis infection, fall ill, they pass into a chronic state and in many cases their convalescence is better compared with that of the former.
- (b) In case of malaria, the same result as the above

was observed.

When a tribe grown in a place where malaria prevails becomes immunized racially from malaria for a long period, they seldom die of acute malignant malaria. But when inhabitants of the temperate zone who have never been infected with malarial protozoa enter the place where malaria prevails they are immediately attacked by acute-malaria and their condition grows serious.

(c) In the case of dysentery, the same tendency may be observed.

XI. The sanitary environment of Japan must be regarded as a reason for weakening the prisoners' resistance. As to Japan's climate, it may be said that the summer is that of subtropical climate and the winter is severely cold. Even if a person grew up in Japan from his childhood, he would have much trouble until he became acclimatized. On account of this, many weak persons are attacked in their childhood, by various kinds of diseases and die. Besides, during the wartime, even the Japanese accustomed to Japanese food were not satisfied, due to the shortage of food materials, especially of albumin and fat. Furthermore, owing to the lack of chemical fertilizers, human manure was used by private homes for cultivation of vegetables; consequently the

density inside the bowels of parasites such as intestinal worms and hook-worms was raised. Thus even the resistance of the Japanese to diseases was generally lowered; and cases of dysentery typhoid fever, eruptive typhus, pneumonia, and tuberculosis increased. Thus as an environment, Japan was in a considerably unfavorable condition. I am afraid that large number of health troubles arose among prisoners coming to such an environment.

XII. I think the difficulty in understanding medical English in Japan was a considerable handicap in medical treatment of prisoners of war.

As to difficult medical terms, especially difficult phrases in the Japanese language that even the Japanese except physicians, do not understand are frequently used. In interpreting them into English, even a professional interpreter will find himself unequal to the task. On the other hand, education for physicians was carried on by medical scientists of the German school, so that surgeons in the army and navy were quite ignorant of medical English. This being the case, it is inferred that if prisoners complained about their illness, the Japanese did not understand the details of their complaint and even if Japanese surgeons or medical men gave medical advice to them, the prisoners often failed to understand what they meant.

On this 10th day of December 1947  
at Tokyo.

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DEPARTMENT RIKA, Gen (seal)

Def. Doc. No. 1256

I, INAKAWA, Tatsuo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo


Witness: (signed) INAKAWA, Tatsuo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ARIMA, Gen (seal)

Naval Chain of Administrative Command (Medical Affairs line)



Note:  
Shows the Chain of Command

6. 3. 63

De f. Doc. #1256

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者

東京都目黒區中目黒一ノ一 水交園

有馬 明治三十三年八月十三日生

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ  
如ク供述致シマス

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



一 自分は現在第二復員局醫務課長をして居ります  
二 自分の戦歴概要は左の通りです

昭和十三年九月十五日 海軍省醫務局員

十七年六月一日 南西方面艦隊民政部衛生局防疫課長

十七年十一月一日 海軍々醫大佐

十八年十一月二十日 第一南遣艦隊軍醫長

二十年五月九日 海軍省醫務局第一課長

元來俘虜の管理は陸軍にありまして海軍としては俘虜を保有管理する建前になつて居らぬ爲、豫め特に俘虜に充當すべきものとしては治療品の準備をして居りません随つて俘虜を捕獲して陸軍に引渡す迄の暫定處置として海軍で俘虜を收容する場合には其管理に當る部隊の將兵數に加算した員數に對する治療品の供給を受け治療一切は其部隊の傷病兵と同一基準で差別なく行はれ重症患者は日本人將兵と同様海軍病院に入院も出来ました

従つて海軍では俘虜なるが故に特に優遇もしない代り特に冷遇も與へた事はありません。海軍俘虜取扱規則に従ひ嚴正公平に醫務的取扱は爲さ

れて居りました

海軍としての醫療品の準備について軍隊を保有してゐる以上平素國防に關し大体一ヶ年分を保有するのが原則であります而て之れは相手國の如何、豫想戰爭期間等とは全然關係のない基準準備量であります。今度の戰爭でも此の準備量で開戦を迎えました。換言すれば治療品の準備に關しては米英蘭其他を相手に四年間戦争出来るだけの手段を構する様特別の指示は受けて居なかつたのであります。如何となれば私達は今度の戦争開戦並に其の規模等に關しては一般「ニュース」で始めて承知した次第で醫療品については全く無準備で戦争に臨んだ次第です。

俘虜の増加に伴ふ醫官、衛生兵の配置増加も前に申した如く海軍としては俘虜を管理する建前にないので暫定的に俘虜を管理した部隊に於ては結局部隊自体の人員が増加したことになるので増加に相當する醫官及衛生兵を増加する方針を採られました。只開戦后兵力が急に増加し豫め豫期してゐない部隊が澤山出來たので特殊教育を必要とする醫官及衛生兵の増加は常に所要に追隨出來ない状態でありました

六 衛生資材の分配は治療品經理規程（昭和十六年七月達第二三七號参照）の定むる所により部隊の總人數に對する基準量に其部隊の任務及駐屯地の衛生狀況を加味したものを供給する方針を採つて居りました。之等の分配責任者は各海軍病院藥劑部療器科長又は海軍病院船の藥劑官が各部隊の兵備品取扱主任である所の軍醫長又は軍醫官の請求を俟つて供給して居りました。

此の場合請求しても海軍又は國內に在庫品の無い時は供給不能でありましたし又遠隔の地では月々海没等の爲め不着であり又戦争後半の如く戦線各地間の通信交通の杜絶し或は不如意なる場合は供給出来ませんでした。

七 海軍に於ける醫務關係の指揮系統を申しますと海軍省醫務局長がおりますが之れは大臣の輔佐機關であり直接下に對して命令指揮はしません。大臣を通じて命令指揮をすることになつて居ます。鎮守府、警備府及艦隊司令長官は軍政事項に付いては大臣の指揮を承けます。此の幕僚中には軍醫長が居りますが之は司令長官の輔佐機關であります。司令長官の下に艦船部隊學校、海軍病院等があります。陸軍側へ引

渡す迄の一時の處置としての俘虜の保有、管理は右艦船部隊によつて爲されます。俘虜が治療を要する場合は其部隊の病舎に收容されます。その場合の直接の醫療責任者は其病舎擔當の軍醫であり其上に軍醫長がおります。軍醫長は部隊長に直屬します。従つて指揮命令は部隊長から受けます。司令長官の幕僚である上級の軍醫長から醫務的事項に付き希冀的指示乃至忠告を受ける事はありますが之れは指揮命令ではありません

此の部隊の病舎に屬する俘虜患者中重症者は日本の將兵同様海軍病院に入院させます之れを區で表すと別紙第一の通りです

海軍省醫務局として一般衛生問題殊に任居、衣糧勞動等につき開戦初期には主として熱帶地に於ける此等諸問題につき又戦争末期には主として内地に於ける食糧不足燃料不足に伴ふ兵員体力の保持等に關し特に留意し海軍々醫學校研究部及部外學者による戦時特別研究等の課題として科學的對策を求めてその結晶を極力實施部隊に適用する様努力しました。が四圍の狀勢上其實現は至難でありました

又當時の吾國の國力としては大勢如何とも爲し難く例へば「ベニシリ



ど発生しませんで軍隊生活に慣れない新兵に専ら発生しました。又此の全身衰弱が因となつて肺炎下痢を併發する者も多數に昇り疾病の豫後を一層悪化しました

海軍に於ては之れに「不馴化性全身衰弱症」と云ふ病名を附し外地戦線に於きまする栄養失調症と統計上區別することにした。當時中央當局に判明した數は海軍だけで全國六、〇〇〇名以上の是等の患者が発生して居り其中五〇〇名以上が死亡して居りますが實數は患者一〇、〇〇〇名以上と死亡一、〇〇〇名位と推定せられます。その理由は本病に併發した肺炎や下痢を主症状と思ひ全身衰弱をその結果と見た診斷上の誤りがあると思はれるからである

一〇

伴診の病死に付いては一面人種を異にした場合の細菌に對する抵抗力の差と云ふ事も考へなければならぬと思ひます。伴診と日本人との病氣に對する抵抗力の強弱に付いては双方を研究材料として如何なる問題をも實驗研究した事が無いから學問的に斷定し得る結論を述べる事は出来ないのですが唯動物に對する實驗研究と人類の疫學 (Typhoid fever) 上の觀察から次の事は云ひ得ると思ひます

● 環境の良い所に育つた動物は自然環境に育つた動物に比し細菌感染に對する抵抗力が弱い

○ 環境の悪い所で幼時から細菌に曝露してゐた人間は幼時より良い環境に育つた人間に比較して細菌感染に對する抵抗力が強い

件處は概して日本兵に比較し幼時より環境の良い所に育つた文化人と思はれるから細菌感染に對し日本人より弱かつた事が推定出来る

加ふるに俘虜には (イ) 精神的不安 (ロ) 氣候に慣れない (ハ) 日本食に慣れない (ニ) 習慣が異なる (ホ) 語學上の缺陷から来る日本人との意思不通

等の「ハンデキャップ」が致想されるから病氣に罹つた者は一層苦痛も多く治療するまでに長時日を要したであらうことが推定出来る

推定の根據とした動物に對する實驗成績と人類疫學上の事實は次の通りであります

(一) 動物を用ひた實驗例

● 人に飼はれた二十日鼠と自然に生活する野鼠とを比較すると二十日鼠の方が体重の割合にして少量の菌で斃死した

○ 「カナリヤ」と野生の目白とを用ひ「鳥マラリヤ原虫」に對する

抵抗力を比較した處「カナリヤ」の方が強度に罹患した、即ち「カナリヤ」の方が抵抗力が弱かつた  
○ 飼兎と野兎とを比較しても細菌に對する抵抗力は飼兎の方が強いことが判つた

(二) 人類の疫學的觀察

a 結核菌の全く存在しない田園に育つた人が後日都會に出て多數の結核菌者に接すると急に發病し短期間に死亡することが屢々ある之れと反對に幼少から都會に育ち、結核菌の感染に堪えた人は後日結核を發病しても慢性に経過し豫後は前者に比較し良好な場合が多い

b 「マラリヤ」でもそれと同様なことか認められた  
マラリヤ流行地に生育した民族は水の間マラリヤに對する種族免疫が出來てゐるので急性惡性型のマラリヤで急死することは少いがマラリヤ原虫に一回も感染した事のない温帶住民がマラリヤ流行地に入ると速かに急性のマラリヤを發病し症狀も重かつた  
○ 赤痢でも右の傾向が認められる




一、日本の衛生的環境と云ふ事も俘虜の抵抗力を弱めた原因として考へられなければなりません。日本は氣候から見ても夏季は亞熱帶氣候であり冬は寒帯である幼時その日本はの爲め種々の疾病を發して死亡するものが多し。加ふるに戰時中は食糧不足で特に蛋白質と脂肪は少くなり日本食に馴れた日本人でさへ満足出來なかつた。其の上更に化學肥料が缺亡した爲め人糞肥料を各家庭でも野菜の栽培に使用するやうになつたので蛔虫十二指腸虫等腸内寄生虫の感染濃度が高くなつた。斯くして日本人でさへも疾病に對する抵抗力が全般的に減少して赤痢、腸チブス、發疹チブス、肺炎、結核等の病人が増加して居たので環境としては相當悪い状態にあつたのであります。斯る所へ俘虜が住むやうになつたのですから保健上は相當無理が起つたものと思ひます

二、日本の醫用英語の難解と云ふ事も俘虜の醫療的處置に對しても相當な「ハンヂイキャツプ」があつたと思ひます

日本の醫用語は日本語としても特別にむづかしい熟語が使はれて居りますので日本人でも醫師以外には難解で判らないのであります。之れを英語に譯する時には專業の通譯でも仲々出來ない。一方醫師た

るべき●の教育は獨乙系統の醫學者によつて行はれて居たので軍醫も  
醫用英語(Medical English)は全く知らなかつたのであります  
右の様な状況でありましたので浮遊が羨望に付いて断えても細い處ま  
で日本人に判らなかつたのであります。又日本の軍醫や衛生兵が療  
養上の注意を與へても浮遊に如何の意味か判断出来なかつた事が多か  
つたではないかと思ひます。



「別紙第一」

軍政に關する海軍指揮系統（醫務系統）

昭和二十一年（一九四六年）十二月十日於東京

供 述 者 有 馬 玄

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日 於東京

立會人 稻 川 龍 雄

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Exp 3064

Def. Doc. # 1896

C. L. O. No.

(S. D. H. No. 40)

6 December 1945

From: Minister of the I. J. 2nd Demobilization  
Ministry.

To : General Headquarters of The Supreme Commander  
For the Allied Powers.

Subject: Reply regarding the sinking of merchant ships  
in Indian Ocean.

With reference to your letter dated 19 November 1945,  
our statement is herewith presented.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. # 1896

Reply regarding the sinkings of  
merchant ships in Indian Ocean.

With regard to the cases on the above subject requested by your Memorandum dated 19 November 1945, protests were filed during the war by the respective governments except for the Norwegian S.S. Scotia; and whereas at each time of the protest we investigated the matters through various reports and telegrams as well as the returned persons from the operated areas, in none of these cases positive results was obtained, and accordingly the governments interested were notified to that effect.

Because of the loss of almost all Japanese submarines then operating in the Indian Oceans, remaining very few survivors, and because of the destruction by fire of all relevant records, reports and telegrams, the renewal of the survey has now become very difficult, and accurate results cannot be expected at present. But we have conducted our investigation as far as possible based upon the inquiry of the majority of the surviving crews and of those persons who occupied key posts in submarine warfare; and the result of the investigation so far obtained is as follows:

1. Names of submarines in question together with the outline of the movements thereof.

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The submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy that operated in the Indian Ocean during the period relative to the sinkings of merchant ships described on the protests filed against the Imperial Japanese Government, i.e., from the end of 1943 through August 1944, were:

I-8, I-26, I-27, I-37, I-162, I-165, I-166,

Ro-110, Ro-111 ..... Total 9 submarines.

While their duties lay in destruction of communications, reconnaissance of strategic places, as well as supplying to German submarines, etc., priority was given to the reconnoitring the key points in such areas as Maldive Ids., Chagos Ids., Diego Suarez, Mombasa, Aden Bay, and the north-western part of Australia. The carrying out of these reconnaissance duties caused these submarines to operate dispersing all over the length and width of the Indian Ocean. Except the I-162, the remaining eight submarines have all reported as missing in the Indian Ocean or during subsequent operations, in other theatres, and as for this survived I-162, its commanding officer during the operations in question was killed in action in July 1944 in southern Pacific. Under these circumstances, though the accuracy cannot be guaranteed, the movements of each of these submarines have been described, based upon the memories of the surviving crews, on the annexed Table No. 1 and on the attached chart. It should be added in this connection



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during that period considerable number of German submarines were engaging in commerce destruction in all spheres of the Indian Ocean paralleled to our submarine activities there. And since the summer of 1943 the dividing line between the German operational area and ours as well as the limitation of periods of operations was rescinded owing to the earnest desire of the German Navy.

2. Judgement concerning the submarines responsible for the sinkings of the steamers.

Since there is no one who can recall to his mind the names in question among those of sunken vessels, the only way for us to do is to make a comparison between the movements of each of our submarines as explained in the preceding paragraph on one side and the date and place of the sinking of each victim steamer stated in the protests from the respective Governments on the other; and this overall comparison is shown on the Annex Table No. 2. But as is clarified in this table we can identify no submarines which may be suspected of the inquired sinkings with the reservation regarding Nos. I-27, I-166, and Ro-110. These last named three submarines, with all of their crews, have failed to return to their base from their operations in the Indian Ocean, and therefore if ever they might be responsible for any of the sinkings, there is no means for us to continue the investigation any further.

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Such being the situation it is a matter of regret that we cannot herewith specify the names of the responsible submarines.

As for the Scotia, it is desired, the information concerning the date and place of the sinking of this Norwegian vessel will be revealed to us as soon as possible, because without these data we cannot get any clue to the probing of this case.

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Annex No. 1

Chart of Submarines Manoeuvres

Name of Ship	Operational Duration (Leaving and Returning Base)	Field of Operation	War Results		Remarks
			Date of Sinking	Place and Count of Sinking	
I-3	From Mar. 20, 1944 To May 5, "	Central & South Indian Ocean	March 30, 1944	1 Sunk (12°-0'S) (81°-0'E)	Proceeding to (Penang) first decade of March 1944 from Japan proper.
	From July 10, 1944 To Aug. 20, "	"			
I-26	From Dec. 10, 1943 To Feb. 20, 1944	Northwest Indian Ocean	Dec. 29, 1943	(20°-0'N) (59°-0'E)	Advancing to (Penang) first decade of Dec. 1943 from Japanese homeland. Returning home first part of May 1944 for repairs.
	From Mar. 20, 1944 To Apr. 25, "	Central Indian Ocean	Dec. 31, 1943	(19°-0'N) (59°-0'E)	
			Jan. 2, 1944	(21°-0'N) (60°-0'E)	
I-27	From 3rd decade of Oct. 1943 To 3rd decade of Dec. 1945	Central & West Indian Ocean	From Nov. to Dec. 1943 (War results undisclosed since Feb. 1944)	5 Sunk in Aden Bay and Arabian Sea	Reported missing while in action late May 1944, & confirmed as sunk.
	From 1st decade of Feb. 1944	"			
I-37	From Sept. 27, 1943 To Dec. 5, "	Southwest Indian Ocean	Oct. 23, 1943	(16°-0'S) (40°-0'E)	1 Sunk
	From Mar. 10, 1944 To Apr. 27, "				
I-162	From Oct. 5, 1943 To Nov. 10, "	Central Indian Ocean	About Oct. 16, 1943	(9°-0'N) (74°-0'E)	Returning back home for repairs first decade of April, 1944.
	From Feb. 20, 1944 To Jan. 20, "	"			
	From Feb. 20, 1944 To Mar. 25, "	"			

I-165	From Oct. 24, 1943	Northwest			Because of the ship har-age. much time required for putting into shape. Since July 24, 1944, operating in New Guinea area:
	To Nov. 27, "	Australia			
	From Jan. 2, 1944	Central Indian			
	To Jan. 22, "	Ocean	Jan. 16, 1944	(10°-0'N) (83°-0'E) 1 Sunk	
	From Mar. 31, 1944	Northwest			
	To May 4, "	Australia			
	From May 31, 1944				
	To July 5, "				
I-166	From Oct. 10, 1943	Central Indian			Missing after leaving Penang and Confirmed as sunk.
	To Nov. 10, "	Ocean			
	From Dec. 10, 1943	"			
	To Jan. 10, 1944	"			
	From 3rd decade of Jan. 1944	"			
	To 3rd decade of Feb. 1944	"			
	From 2nd decade of Mar. 1944	"	(War results un-		
	To 2nd decade of Apr. 1944	"	disclosed)		
	From 1st decade of May 1944	"			
	To 1st decade of June 1944	"			
From 3rd decade of June 1944	"				
To 1st decade of Aug. 1944	"				
	3rd decade of Aug. 1944	"			

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	From 1st decade of Dec.1943	Bay of Bengal			Advancing to Penang from home- land at first decade of Dec. 1943
	To 3rd decade of Dec.1943		Dec. 1943		Reported missing while in action; then con- firmed as sunk in March, 1944.
Ro-110	From 1st decade of Jan.1944	"	(War results unknown since Feb. 1944)	1 Sunk in Bay of Bengal	
	To 3rd decade of Jan.1944				
	From 1st decade of Feb.1944	"			
	From 1st decade of Dec.1943	Bay of Bengal			Proceeding to Penang from Japan Proper in mid-Nov. 1943.
	To End of Dec. 1943		Dec. 24, 1943	Southeast Ceylon	Returning back home at the end of March 1944.
	From Jan.10,1944	"			
	To Jan.20, "		Feb. 1944	1 Sunk in Bay of Bengal	
Ro-111	From 1st decade of Feb.1944	"			
	To Feb.20,1944				
	From 1st decade of Mar.1944	"	March 1944	1 Sunk in Bay of Bengal	
	To 3rd decade of Mar.1944				

Comparison between the Dates and Locations of the Sinkings of  
the Steamers and the Movements of the Japanese Submarines.

Sunkon Ships	Daisy Miller	British Chivalry	Sutley
Date	1943.12.13	1944.2.22	1944.2.25
Lat	Lat. 18°-21'N	Lat. 0°-55'S	Lat. 0°-0'S
Long	Long. 82°-33'E	Long. 65°-0'E	Long. 70°-0'E
I-8	Japan Proper	Japan Proper	Japan Proper
	(Penang)		
I-25	Arrive Penang from homeland first part 22 Feb. 1944	(Penang)	(Penang)
I-27	Maneuvering in Arabian Sea, but entirely separate from sunken spot of Daisy Miller	Maneuvering in Central & West Indian Ocean (Details unknown)	Similar to left
I-27	(Penang)	(Singapore)	(Singapore)
I-162	(Penang)	Leaving Penang on Feb. 20, 1944, heading to southwest of Ceylon, but extremely far-away from the sunken spot of British Chivalry	Maneuvering in south- west of Ceylon. Extremely far-away from the sunken spot of Sutley
I-165	(Singapore)	(Singapore)	(Singapore)
I-166	Leaves Penang first part of Dec. 1943 while en route to southwest of Ceylon, but extremely far- away from the sunken spot of Daisy Miller	Maneuvering Central Indian Ocean (Details unknown)	Returning to Penang late Feb. 1944; ex- tremely far-away from sunken spot of Sutley
Ro-110	While maneuvering in Bay of Bengal sunk 1 ship Dec. 1943 but time and place un- identified	Maneuvering in Bay of Bengal, but greatly isolated from the sunken spot of said ship	Similar to left
Ro-111	Tough maneuvering north of Bay of Bengal, sank no ships at that time	(Penang)	(Penang)
	Ro-110 considered to be on the spot but further investigation impossible because of death of all crew. No other subs sus- pected of said incident.	While I-27 and I-166 considered to be maneuvering at the time of sinking of British Chivalry, further investi- gations impossible due to the deaths of all crew.	While I-27 supposed to be maneuvering at the time of Sutley sinking, further investigations impossible due to the death of crew. No other subs involved.

Sunken Ships	Ascot	Nancy Moller	Tjisalak
Date	1944.2.29	1944.3.13	1944.3.28
Place	Lat. 30° 10' S Long. 62° 50' E	Lat. 2° 14' E Long. 78° 20' E	600 miles south of Ceylon
I-8	Japan Proper	(Penang) Arriving Penang from homeland early March 1944.	Threatening halfway between Ceylon and Australia. Extremely far-away from the sunken spot of Tjisalak.
I-26	(Penang)	(Penang)	Maneuvering to the southwest of Ceylon, and heading to Maladive Is. for reconnaissance; sank no vessel in this area.
I-27	Maneuvering in Central & West Indian Ocean (Details unknown)	Similar to left	Similar to left
I-37	(Penang)	En route to Madagascar from southeast of Ceylon but extremely far-away from sunken spot of Nancy Moller; sank no ship then in this area.	Maneuvering west of Ceylon, but greatly isolated from the sunken spot of Tjisalak.
I-162	Maneuvering in southwest of Ceylon, but extremely far-away from the sunken spot of Ascot.	While en route to Penang via southeast of Ceylon. Sank no ship.	(Penang)
I-165	(Singapore)	(Singapore)	(Singapore)
I-166	Returning to Penang latter part of Feb. 1944; but greatly isolated from the sunken spot of Ascot.	Maneuvering Central Indian Ocean (Details unknown)	Similar to left
Ro-110	Maneuvering in Bay of Bengal, but greatly isolated from the sunken spot of said ship.	Ro-110 confirmed to have sunk March, 1944	
Ro-111	(Penang)	Maneuvering in Bengal Bay but extremely far-away from the sunken spot of Nancy Moller.	(Penang)
Find- ing	Though I-27 being supposed to be maneuvering at time of Ascot sinking; further investigation impossible due to crew's total deaths. No other subs involved.	Although I-166 and I-27 supposed to be maneuvering at time of Nancy Moller's sinking, further investigation impossible due to crew's total deaths.	Though I-27 and I-166 supposed to be maneuvering at time of Tjisalak sinking, further investigations impossible due to crew's total deaths. No other subs involved.

Sunken Ships	Richard Harvey	Jean Nicolet	Scotia
Date	1944.3.29	1944.7.2	
Place	Lat. 16°-40'N Long. 64°-30'E	Lat. 3°-0'S Long. 74°-30'E	
I-8	Maneuvering halfway between Australia and Ceylon but extremely isolated from sunken spot of Richard Harvey.	(Penang)	
I-26	Maneuvering around area of Maldive Is., but greatly separated from sunken spot of Richard Harvey	Japan Proper (Returning to homeland first part of May 1944)	
I-27	Maneuvering in Central & West Indian Ocean (Details unknown)	(Said sub confirmed to have sunk May 1944)	
I-37	Maneuvering west of Chagos, but greatly isolated from the sunken spot of Tiselak.	(Penang) Under repairs owing to the damage caused by mines April 27, 1944	Even estimation impossible because of uncertainty of date and place of sinking
I-162	(Penang)	Japan Proper Returning to homeland first part of April 1944	
I-165	(Singapore)	Returning from Northwest Australia to Sourabaya but extremely isolated from sunken spot of Jean Nicolet.	
I-166	Maneuvering Central Indian Ocean (Details unknown)	Similar to left	
Ro-110			
Ro-111	(Penang)	Japan Proper (Returning to homeland end of Mar. 1944)	
	Though I-27 and I-166 supposed to be maneuvering at the time of Richard Harvey sinking, further investigations impossible due to the death of all crew.	Though I-166 supposed to be, maneuvering at the time of Jean Nicolet's sinking, further investigation impossible due to the death of the whole crew. No other subs involved.	

Remarks: 1. Date and place of the sinking of vessels are based on the protests raised by the Governments concerned during War,  
2. Memories of crew survivors are used as basis in compiling the column for findings.



Def. Doc. # 1896

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, OISHI, Muneji, who occupy the post of Liaison Officer  
of the Second Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization  
Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached,  
written in Japanese, consisting of 10 pages and entitled "Reply  
regarding the I.J. submarines which sank merchant ships in Indian  
Ocean" is an exact and authorized copy from an official document  
in the custody of Japanese Government (Liaison Section, 2nd  
Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization Ministry),

Certified at Tokyo,


on this 26 day of May, 1947.

/S/ OISHI, Muneji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were  
affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: /S/ INAGAWA, Tatsuo (seal)



I  
Details on  
the captain

BALUCHISTAN

ARABIA

HINDI

AFRICA

MALDIVE

MADAGASCAR


CHAFOS  
Moved in this  
area 15 April

23 to 28 July  
1st refuelling  
spot

For the purpose of refuelling the Ro 501  
which was brought homeward after  
being transferred to Japan from  
Germany we waited for it here,  
but did not meet


8

unknown because  
was killed





We were waiting for the Ro501 in order to  
 refuel it but as it happened that it did  
 not appear after the arranged time, made  
 towards the base at about 12. Aug  
 after searching for it in at right angles  
 to the steamer's course.



126














# I 166

As all of the crew were killed  
the details are not clear




CHAGOS




# Ro III

From Dec 1943 to Jan 1944




From Feb 1944 to March 1944



# TABLE OF RESULT

Oct 1943 to Sep 1944



x (18) March 30 1944

Ex 3064

Def. Doc. #1896

C.L.O 第 號

(S.D.M 第四〇號)

一九四五年十二月六日

帝國第二復員省大臣發  
聯合軍最高司令部宛

件名 印度洋ニ於ケル商船擊沈ニ關スル件回答

一 一九四五年十一月十九日附貴翰ニ關スル回答左ノ如シ。

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

印度洋ニ於ケル商船擱沈ニ關スル件回答

一九四五年十一月十九日附貴通牒ニヨリ要求セラレタル主題ノ件ニ關スル事件ニ關シテハ、ノルウエー汽船スコチア號ニ對スルモノヲ除クノ外各政府ヨリ夫々抗議提出セラレタリ。抗議ヲ受クル毎ニ當局ハ諸種報告、電報作取地區ヨリ歸來セルモノノ實等々ヲ綜合シ調査ヲナシタルモ一トシテ抗議ニ該ルモノナク此ノ旨關係各政府ニ通報セリ。


當時印度洋作取ニ從事セル日本潜水艦ハ大半失ハレ生殘乗組員少ナク且關係調査、報告、電報等ガ全テ燒却セラレタルタメ現在ニ於テハ調査ノ再開甚ダ困難ニシテ正確ナル結果ヲ期シ難シ

然レドモ當方ハ生殘乗組員及當時潜水艦ニ重要ナル位置ヲ占メタルモノノ大部分ニ對スル至聞ニ基キ極力調査ヲ行ヒソノ結果ヲ左ニ記載ス

一、關係潜水艦名並ニソノ行動概要

日本帝國政府ニ提出セラレタル抗議中ニ擧ゲラレタル商船擱沈ニ關係アル期間即チ一九四三年末ヨリ一九四四年八月ニ至ル間印度洋ニ於テ行動シタル日本帝國潜水艦左ノ如シ

乙海軍ノ關心ヲ要望ニ依リ一四三九三夏以降止セラレタリ。  
 且獨乙作段ノ區域及吾方作段ヲ從事シタ境界ハ兩軍時期ノ區分ト共  
 括ニ動ニ並行シ同期キ附表第一及附表第二ニ擧ガシテ於テ吾方積水艦  
 右ノ關連ニ基キ於テ其ノ正確ハ保シ難キモ右等諸水艦ノ行動ヲ乘  
 茲ノ狀況ノ下ニ於テ其ノ於ケル戰國ニ死シタリ。  
 四年七月兩太平洋ニ於ケル戰國ニ死シタリ。  
 且右ノ方面ニ於テ復ハ印度洋等ノ要地ヲ偵察スルニ對  
 シテ作段ノ營偵察ヲ行ハシメタリ。一六二號ニ於テ西ノ諸島ノ偵察及乙積水艦  
 之ヲ作段ノ他ノ方面ニ於テ復ハ印度洋等ノ要地ヲ偵察スルニ對  
 シテ作段ノ他ノ方面ニ於テ復ハ印度洋等ノ要地ヲ偵察スルニ對  
 カレタリ。營偵察ヲ行ハシメタリ。一六二號ニ於テ西ノ諸島ノ偵察及乙積水艦  
 右積水艦ノ任務ハ交通網ノ破壞ヲ作段ノ要地ノ偵察及乙積水艦ニ對  
 一八號。二六號。一〇一號。一〇二號。一七號。一三七號。一六二號。一六五號。計九隻



ニ 汽船撃沈ノ實ヲ負フベキ潜水艦ニ關スル判斷。

本件ニ關係スル被撃沈船舶ノ船舶名ヲ思ヒ出シ得ルモノナキ爲小官等ハ前節ニ説明セラレタル各日本潜水艦ノ行動ト各國政府ヨリノ抗議書ニ擧ゲラレタル犠牲船舶ノ撃沈ノ場所及時日ノ比較ヲ行フノ外ナカリキ。右比較綜合表ハ附表第二ニ掲ゲラル。然レドモ本表ニ明ナル如ク小官等ハイ二七號、イー六六號、ロー一〇號ヲ除キ照會ノ撃沈ニ關スル疑アル潜水艦ニ該當スルモノヲ發見スルコト能ハザリキ。右三潜水艦ハソノ乗組員全員ト共ニ印度作戦ヨリ遂ニ歸還セズ依ツテ彼等ガ撃沈ノ或ルモノニ責任アリトスルモ小官等ニハ最早之レ以上ノ調査ヲ繼續スベキ手段全ク無キモノナリ。右様ノ事情ナレバ遺憾乍ラ小官等ハ撃沈ニ責任アル潜水艦名ヲ茲ニ明示スル能ハザル次第ナリ。スコチア號ニ關シテハ本ノルウエー船舶ノ撃沈ノ場所及時日ニ關スル詳報ヲ可及的速カニ小官等ニ與ヘラレタシ。右ノ時日ヲ缺ク時ハ本件ノ證明ニ關シ小官等ハ何等ノ端緒ヲモ得ザルヲ以テナリ。



附表第一

潜水艦作戦要圖

艦名	作戦期間 出航及 帰航ノ日時	作戦地域	戦果		摘要
			撃沈日時	撃沈ノ数及場所	
イ3號	一九四四年三月二十日 同 五月五日 一九四四年七月十日 同 八月二十三日	中部及南部 印度洋 同	一九四四年 三月三十日	撃沈一 内緯一二度〇分 東經八一度〇分	一九四四年三月初旬日本本土 ヨリビナンニ向ケ進航中
イ26號	一九四三年十二月十日 至 一九四四年二月二十日 一九四四年三月二十日 同 四月二十五日	北西印度洋 中部印度洋	一九四三年 十二月二十九日 一九四三年 十二月三十一日 一九四四年 一月二日	撃沈 北緯二九度〇分 東經三九度〇分 計三隻 北緯二度〇分 東經六〇度〇分	一九四三年十二月初旬日本本土ヨリビナンニ向ケ進航中 一九四四年五月初メ修理ノタ メ本土ニ歸還
イ27號	自一九四三年 十月下旬 至 一九四三年 十二月下旬 自一九四四年 二月初旬	中部及西部 印度洋 同	一九四三年 十二月十二日 一九四四年 二月 以降戦果不明	撃沈五隻 於アテン海 アラビヤ海	一九四四年五月後半戦中 行衛不明ト報告セラレ沈没確 認サル。

イ 165 號			イ 162 號			イ 37 號		
自一九四四年 五月三十日 至同七月五日	自一九四四年 三月三十一日 至同五月四日	自一九四四年 一月二日 至同二月二十七日	自一九四三年 十月二十四日 至同十二月二十七日	自一九四四年 二月二十日 至同三月二十五日	自一九四四年 一月二十日 至同二月二十日	自一九四三年 十月五日 至同十一月十日	自一九四四年 三月十日 至同四月二十七日	自一九四三年 九月二十七日 至同十二月五日
	北西 オーストラリア	中部印度洋	北西 オーストラリア	同	同	中部印度洋	同	南西印度洋
	一九四四年 一月十六日	一九四四年 三月五日	一九四三年 十月十六日	一九四三年 十月十三日				
	北緯一〇度〇分 東經八三度〇分	北緯一〇度〇分 東經七十四度〇分	北緯九度〇分 東經七十四度〇分	北緯一〇度〇分 東經七十四度〇分	北緯一〇度〇分 東經七十四度〇分	北緯九度〇分 東經七十四度〇分	南緯十六度〇分 東經四〇度〇分	北緯一〇度〇分 東經八三度〇分
	艦沈一	計二隻	艦沈	計二隻	艦沈	艦沈	艦沈一	艦沈一
	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠
	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠	艦沈ノタメ基地ニ歸リ 修理ノタメ歸遠
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口... 110 號		1 166 號						
自一九四三年 十月初十日	自一九四三年 十二月十日	自一九四三年 十二月十日	自一九四三年 十二月十日	自一九四三年 十二月十日	自一九四三年 十二月十日	自一九四三年 十二月十日	自一九四三年 十二月十日	自一九四三年 十二月十日
自一九四四年 二月初旬	自一九四四年 一月初旬	自一九四四年 一月初旬	自一九四四年 一月初旬	自一九四四年 一月初旬	自一九四四年 一月初旬	自一九四四年 一月初旬	自一九四四年 一月初旬	自一九四四年 一月初旬
同	同	同	同	同	同	同	同	同
於ペンガル 繁沈一		不明 不明						
一九四三年十二月初旬本國ヨリ ビナシニ進航中。戰國中行衛不 明ト報告セラレ一九四四年三月 沈没確認。		ビナシ出航後行衛不明沈没確認						

口  
111  
號

至 三 月 下 旬 四 年	自 三 月 初 旬 四 年	至 二 月 二 十 日 四 年	自 二 月 初 旬 四 年	至 同 一 月 二 十 日	自 一 月 十 日 四 年	至 十 二 月 末 三 年	自 十 二 月 初 旬 三 年
同	同	同	同	同	同	ベ ン ガ ル 海	ベ ン ガ ル 海
		一 九 四 四 年 三 月	一 九 四 四 年 二 月	一 九 四 四 年 二 月	一 九 四 四 年 二 月	一 九 四 三 年 十 二 月 二 十 四 日	一 九 四 三 年 十 二 月 二 十 四 日
		於 ベ ン ガ ル 海	於 ベ ン ガ ル 海	於 ベ ン ガ ル 海	於 ベ ン ガ ル 海	兩 東 セ イ ロ ン	兩 東 セ イ ロ ン
						一 九 四 三 年 中 頃 日 本 本 土 ヨ リ ビ ナ ン ニ 向 ケ 進 航 中 一 九 四 四 年 三 月 末 歸 還 。	一 九 四 三 年 中 頃 日 本 本 土 ヨ リ ビ ナ ン ニ 向 ケ 進 航 中 一 九 四 四 年 三 月 末 歸 還 。

附表第二。

汽船擧沈ノ時日及場所ト日本海内水艦ノ行動比較表

被擧沈船	日時	場所	イ8號	イ26號	イ27號	イ37號	イ162號
テイジー、モラー	一九四三年、十二月十三日 東緯一八度二一分 東經八二度一三分	日本本土	日本本土	ビナン。一九四三年十二月初メ本國ヨリビナンニ到着。	アラビヤ海ニ於テ行動中ナルモテイジー、モラー擧沈地點ニ全く離隔シアリ。	ビナン	ビナン
ブリチツ、シユ、シヴァルリー	一九四四年、二月二十二日 南緯零度五六分 東經六八度〇分	日本本土	日本本土	ビナン	中部及西部印度洋ニ於テ行動中ナルモ詳細不明	シンガポール	一九四四年二月二十日ビナン出航セイロン南西ニ進路ヲ取レルモブリチツシユ、シヴァルリー擧沈地點ニハ甚シク離隔シアリ
サトレー	一九四四年、二月二十六日 南緯八度〇分 東經七〇度〇分	日本本土	日本本土	ビナン	同上	シンガポール	セイロン南西部ニ於テ行動中サトレー擧沈場所ニ甚シク離隔ス

イ 號	イ 號	ロ 號	ロ 號	判定
シンガポール	<p>一九四三年十二月初メビナン出航セイロソ南西部へノ連続ニアルモチイジ、モラ、墜沈場所ニ甚シク離隔ス</p>	<p>一九四三年十二月ベソガル灣ニ於テ行動中一船ヲ墜沈セルモ時日及ビ場所符合セズ</p>	<p>ベソガル灣北部ニ於テ行動中ナルモ當時一船モ墜沈セズ</p>	<p>ロ一〇號が墜沈場所ニアリタリト思料セララルモ乗組員全員死亡ノタメソレ以上ノ調査不能ナリ他積水艦ハ本件ニ關シ疑フノ余地ナシ</p>
シンガポール	<p>中部印度洋ニ於テ行動中ナルモ詳細不明</p>	<p>ベソガル灣ニ於テ行動中ナルモ同船墜沈場所ト甚シク離隔ス</p>	ビナン	<p>一二七號及一六六號がフリチツシユ、シザアルリ、墜沈時行動シアリト思料セララルモソレ以上ノ調査ハ乗組員全員死亡ノタメ不可能ナリ</p>
シンガポール	<p>一九四四年二月晚期ビナンニ墜。サトレ、墜沈場所ニ甚シク離隔ス</p>	同上	ビナン	<p>一二七號がサトレ、墜沈時行動シアリタリト思料セララルモ乗組員ノ死亡ノタメソレ以上ノ調査不可能ナリ。他ノ積水艦ニハ關係ナシ</p>

イ 165 號	イ 162 號	イ 37 號	イ 27 號	イ 26 號	イ 8 號	時 日 場 所	被 擧 げ ら れ た 船 名
シンガポール	セイロン南西方ニ於テ行動中ナルモアスコット擧沈地點ヨリ甚シク離隔ス	ビナン	中部及西部印度洋ニ於テ行動中 詳細不明	ビナン	日本本土	一九四四年二月二十九日 南緯三度一〇分 東經六二度一〇分	アスコット
シンガポール	セイロン南東ヲ經テビナンニ向ケ航行中ナリシモ一船モ擧沈セズ	チヤゴス南東ヨリマダガスカルニ向ケ航行中。ナンシー、モラ擧沈地點ニ甚シク離隔ス。且コノ區域ニテ一船モ擧沈セズ	同上	ビナン	ビナン。一九四四年三月初メ本國ヨリビナンニ到着	一九四四年三月十三日 南緯二度一四分 東經七八度二五分	ナンシー、モラー
シンガポール	ビナン	チヤゴス西方ニテ行動中。チザラツク擧沈地點ヨリ甚シク離隔ス	同上	セイロン南西方ニ行動中。偵察ノタメマルヂイヴ諸島ニ進路ヲ取ル。コノ地區ニテ一船モ擧沈セズ	セイロン、オーストラリア中間ニ於テ行動中。チザラツク擧沈箇所ヨリ極端ニ離隔ス	一九四四年三月二十八日 セイロン南方六〇〇哩	チザラツク

判定	ロ 111 號	ロ 110 號	イ 166 號
<p>アスコット艦沈時イ27號ガ行動シアリタリト思料セラルルモ乗組員全員死亡ノ爲ソレ以上ノ調査不可能ナリ。他潜水艦ハ關係ナシ</p>	<p>ビナン</p>	<p>ベンガル海ニ於テ行動中ナルモ同船艦沈地點ヨリ甚シク離隔シアリ。</p>	<p>一九四四年二月後半ビナンニ歸航中。而レドモアスコット艦沈地點ヨリ甚シク離隔ス</p>
<p>ナンシー、モラー艦沈時イ一六六號、イニセ號行動中ナルモノト思料セラルルモ乗組員全員死亡ノタメソレ以上ノ調査不可能ナリ</p>	<p>ベンガル海ニ於テ行動中ナルモナンシー、モラー艦沈地點ヨリ甚シク離隔ス</p>	<p>ロー一〇號ハ一九四四年三月沈没確認セラル</p>	<p>中部印度洋ニ於テ行動中。 詳細不明</p>
<p>チザラツク艦沈時イニセ號、イ一六六號行動シアリタルモノト思料セラルルモ乗組員全員死亡ノタメソレ以上ノ調査不可能</p>	<p>ビナン</p>		<p>同上</p>



イ 162 號	イ 37 號	イ 27 號	イ 26 號	イ 8 號	場所	日時	船名 被沈 船
ビ ナ ン	チャゴス西方ニ於テ行動中ナル モチザラツク聲沈地點ヨリ甚シ ク離隔ス	中部及西部印度洋ニ於テ行動中 詳細不明	マルデイブ諸島周辺地區ニ行動 中ナルモリチャード、ハーヴェ ー聲沈地點ヨリ甚シク離隔ス	オーストラリアセイロン中間ヲ 行動中ナルモリチャード、ハー ヴェー聲沈地點ヨリ甚シク離隔 ス		一九四四年三月二十九日 北緯十六度四〇分 東經六四度三〇分	リチャード、ハーヴェー
日本本土 一九四四年四月初期本國ニ歸還	ビナン 一九四四年四月二十七日震雷ニ 依リ毀リタル損害ノタメ修理中	一九四四年五月同艦聲沈確認	日本本土 一九四四年五月上旬 本國ニ歸還	ビ ナ ン		一九四四年七月二日 南緯三〇度〇分 東經七四度三〇分	ジャン、ニコレット
							スコチア

聲沈日時及場所不明ノタメ何  
等ノ推測ヲモナシ得ズ



文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

自分大石宗次ハ復員廳第二復員局連絡部部員ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル一〇頁ヨリ成ル印度洋ニ於テ汽船ヲ墜沈セシ帝國潛水艦ニ關スル件同答ト題スル替類ハ日本政府(復員廳第二復員局連絡部)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス、

昭和二十二年五月二十六日 於東京

大石宗次

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 相川龍雄

NO. 1896

Details on the caption


BALUCHISTAN

HIND.

ARABIA

AFRICA

MADIVE



CHANGES

1st and 2nd  
areas 15 April


22 to 28 July  
1st refueling  
spot

For the purpose of refueling the Ro 501  
which was brought forward after  
being transferred to Japan from  
Greenery, we visited for it here,  
- but did not visit


MADAGASCAR

3

unknown because  
was killed



We were waiting for the Ro501 in order to  
refuel it, but, as it happened that it did  
not appear after pre-arranged time, made  
toward the base at about 12, Aug.  
after searching for it in at right angles  
to the scheduled course.



CHARTS



APR 15 1944  
 Received order to be returned to Pacific Ocean Submarine Force, and toward the course to Hong Kong

AFRICA

Sank a steamer


ARABIA

Sank a steamer Jan 2  
 Sank a steamer Dec 21  
 Dec 31

126

996





ARABIA

AFRICA


MADAGASCAR

Engaged Operation in  
Gulf of Aden and Arabia Sea  
Sunk 5 merchant ships about  
in a month, and received  
a certificate of merit  
(1st Movement)

MALDIVE

CHAFOS


Some were died  
not clear





1<sup>st</sup> movement  
Started Penang latter part  
of Oct 1943  
Returned Penang latter part of Dec

2<sup>nd</sup> movement  
Started Penang early part  
of Feb 1944  
Did not returned to its  
base. So that the results  
in this movement remain  
unknown







Oct to Dec 1943

HINDU TAN

Left Penang  
Oct 24 1943

Reached Penang Dec. 18 1943

Arrived Singapore Nov 29  
and  
Started there Dec. 16

CEYLON


MALAY

SUMATRA

JAVA

Engaged Operations  
of these area 6 to 17 Nov

AUSTRARIA



Jan to July 1944

Merchant ship Jan 16  
Operation

Returned Penang Jan 22

Started Penang Jan 21

MALAY

Started Penang Jan 28  
Arrived Singapore Feb 1  
Started Singapore March 31  
Arrived May 4

Started Singapore May 17  
Arrived Surabaya May 20

SUMATRA

Started July 24


JAVA

To New Guinea

Started Surabaya May  
Returned Surabaya


Engaged Operation  
in these areas  
from 10<sup>th</sup> to 25<sup>th</sup> APRIL  
and  
from 5<sup>th</sup> to 30<sup>th</sup> June

AUSTRALIA



# I 166

As all of the crew were killed  
the details are not clear




Because it did not come back after it sailed  
out for assault leaving Penang in Aug.  
and the crew were all killed




# Ro III

Fr. Dec 1943 to Jan 1944





From Feb 1944 to March 1944



20 110

all of the crew were killed  
the details are not clear



The operational movements were limited  
in Bengal Bay. About 10 Dec it engaged  
in mine-laying on the estuary at the  
Irrawaddy River. In Dec. carried a  
steamer sink. Information about it  
was later left unknown since it left  
Ponang at the beginning of Feb (3rd move-  
ment)


OS

14 P.

(Indonesian)

# TABLE OF RESULT

Oct 1943 to Sep 1944



x (18) March 30/1944

C-3065

Dof. Doc. #2128

Exh. No.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

YAMAGI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: YAMAGI, Toshitane

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. Q. Briefly state the posts held by you.

A. From July 1, 1935, to November 15, 1937, I was on the staff of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, and had charge of matters connected with naval organization and personnel.

Thereafter I was staff officer of the fleet in the China waters, commander of the aircraft carrier "Soryu" and staff officer of the Second Fleet. After that from November 15, 1940, to July 14, 1942, I assumed the post of Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, and had charge of matters relating to naval armament and naval administration.

After that I served as staff officer of the Third Fleet, staff officer of the Combined Fleet, commander on the staff of the Combined Fleet and Assistant Chief of Staff of the Navy Combined Forces. From July 15, 1945, up to the termination of the war I was Deputy Director, Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, and had charge of matters relating to the navy's preparation for war. I was a rear admiral when the war ended.

2. Q. What sort of office routine was handled in Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry?

1-

TOP SECRET  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

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- A. 1) Naval preparations and matters relating to general naval administration.
- 2) Matters relating to warships, vessels, units, offices, and organization of schools and duties.
- 3) Matters relating to organization of warships, ships and units and service duties.
- 4) Matters relating to naval discipline and public morals.
- 5) Matters relating to maneuvers.
- 6) Matters relating to censorship.
- 7) Matters relating to ceremonies, etiquette, regulations on uniforms and garniture.
- 8) Matters relating to warships, vessels and ordnance and other war supplies in general.
- 9) Matters relating to martial law and defense.

The foregoing are items provided for in the Regulations Pertaining to the Organization of the Navy Ministry, but the nature of the duties are set out in detail in the Regulations Pertaining to the Functions of the Navy Ministry. Also the contents thereof were also classified in detail in the Table of the Division of Duties Navy Ministry Personnel.

3. Q. Since December 8, 1941, what section in the Navy Ministry handled matters pertaining to prisoners of war?
  - A. Section one of the Naval Affairs Bureau handled them.
4. Q. Were there any provision stating that matters relating to prisoners of war came within the jurisdiction of the Naval Affairs Bureau?
  - A. The words "prisoners of war" were not particularly used in the Ordinance on Organization of Ministry of Navy and Regulations Pertaining to the Functions of the Navy Ministry. But since matters relating to prisoners of war were embraced within the general matters concerning naval administration, (a) the task of preparing a draft for the establishment or revision of the various regulations concerning the handling of P.O.W. (b) Liaison Work within Japan in connection with P.O.W. was undertaken by Section One Naval Affairs Bureau, and for that purpose regular personnel was assigned.

Furthermore, with respect to the handling of the prisoners of war as a matter of international routine affair, Section Two of the Naval Affairs Bureau acted as a reception organ.

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5. Q. What were the standard of rules and customs in the Navy upon which the prisoners of war were handled?
- A. It was based on international law, which was the standard upon which the Navy handled prisoners of war.

Regulations Pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. These were the procedures provided for until the prisoners of war captured by the Navy were turned over to the army.

It had been the practice since the Meiji Era and there were various regulations pertaining to it for the Navy to turn over the prisoners of war captured by it to the Army, and they were interned in the prisoners of war camp under the control of the War Minister.

6. Q. What sort of concrete measures were taken by the Navy so that it could work on the basis of international law?
- A. On October 7, 1914, the Rules of Naval Warfare were promulgated. Article One provides:

"During wartime the Imperial warships may, according to this order, or other rules, regulations and provisions of treaties, capture at sea, and take all necessary measures against other acts of hostility in order to attain the object of the war. With respect to matters which are not provided for herein, the principles of international law shall be applied."

These were the basic rules and regulations.

The Japanese Navy had been giving suitable lectures in connection with international law at various schools conforming with the educational standard of such schools. Moreover, specialists in international law were dispatched to the fleet and gave lectures there on.

There were two civil officials in the Navy who were conversant with international law, and they were attached to the secretariate of the Navy Minister. They handled matters relating to international relations, and the opinions of these civil officials were not only respected, but if it became necessary either one of them, or a specialist like Dr. Junpei Shinobu was dispatched to the fleet and he gave the necessary advice in the

disposition of questions involving international relations. After the outbreak of the China Incident the Navy Ministry frequently issued reference books advisory memorandum, telegrams of warning, etc. to the various naval units in connection with international law. The following were some of the principal books which were published and distributed to the various warships and naval units:

Outline of Wartime International Law  
Tables appended to above  
Supplement to above  
Commentary on Naval Ministerial Order Guiding Men-of-War's  
Conduct in High-Sea and Foreign Territorial  
Various Problems Pertaining to Rules of Naval Warfare  
Laws & Regulations Relating to Naval Warfare of Various  
Nations in the War of 1939-1940 (12 volumes)

Among the various laws or reference books referred to above there was contained various treaties, advisory matters relating to prisoners of war.

7. Q. What authority had the Navy Minister in connection with the administration of P.O.W.?
- A. The Navy Minister had authority to the rules for the administration of the prisoners of war. He drafted the Rules and Regulations Pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and provisions Relating to Supplies & Allowances of Prisoners of War. The Director of Naval Affairs Bureau, Director of Accounts and Supplies Bureau and Director of Legal Bureau were aides to the Navy Minister in connection with the adoption, revision or abolition of these rules and regulations.

The commander-in-chief of the naval station, commander-in-chief of guardship and commander-in-chief of the fleet were in a position to enforce the administration of the prisoners of war on the basis of the regulations drafted by the Navy Minister. When prisoners of war were captured by any unit under the command of the foregoing commanders, the necessary regulations concerning their administration were fixed.

8. Q. I wish to ask you about the relations between the Navy Minister and the operation force. Was the Navy Ministry consulted by the Naval General Staff in connection with the operation orders issued to the operation force?

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- A. He was not consulted at all with regard to pure operations.
9. Q. Was the Navy Ministry ever consulted with regard to the submarine operations in the Pacific War?
- A. Never.
10. Q. With regard to matters concerning the prisoners of war at the zone of operation, were they disposed of as naval administration matters?
- A. In case of an actual engagement with the enemy, or in the case of an emergency corresponding thereto existing the matters were disposed of as operational matters.
11. Q. Under which of the foregoing matters did the administration of the prisoners of war in the various islands take form when Japanese troops were actually subjected to enemy attacks or constantly exposed to the dangers of enemy assault?
- A. It was disposed of as operational matter.
12. Q. What was the date when the Japanese force occupied Wake island in the early stage of the war?
- A. As I remember, it was on December 23, 1941.
13. Q. Were there any prisoners of war on the said island when it was occupied, and how many were there?
- A. I remember that the number of war prisoners was unexpectedly large, which surprised me. However, I do not remember the number.
14. Q. When and by whom was that report made?
- A. I recall that soon after the occupation, the commander of Wake island operation force telegraphed to the commander-in-chief of the 4th fleet, and the commander-in-chief of the combined fleet. At the same time, the information was sent to the Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry.



- 15 Q. Who was the garrison commander on Wake island, and how many men were under his command?
- A. The garrison commander on Wake island during my tenure as chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, was Navy Capt. Suzumu Kawasaki, who was under the command of Vice Admiral Narumi Inouye, commander-in-chief of the 4th Fleet.
16. Q. What steps were taken to handle the prisoners of war on Wake island?
- A. It was decided to transport them to Japan and deliver them to the army. In early part of January 1942 the Nitta Maru was dispatched to Wake island, and the prisoners of war placed on board.
- 17 Q. Was this regarded as a naval administration matter or an operational matter?
- A. That it was inconvenient from the point of view of supply to leave a large number of prisoners of war on the islands in mid ocean so it was better to transport them quickly to Japan, was a naval administration matter. Whether or not it would hinder the general operations to send such a large type ship as the Nitta Maru to Wake island immediately after the opening of hostilities, or whether defense against enemy attack on the Nitta Maru could be prevented was an operational matter. That is to say, whether the Nitta Maru should be dispatched to Wake island or not was a matter which must be considered from both the naval administration and operation.
18. Q. Who ordered the movement of the Nitta Maru?
- A. As I recall the Mobilization Bureau, an aide organ to the Navy Minister, drew up the plan of the movement after having obtained the approval of the sections and bureaus concerned in the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff, and the Navy Minister issued the command for its movement.
19. Q. What were the movements of the prisoners of war after they had been taken aboard the Nitta Maru?

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- As I remember, the Nitta Maru arrived in Japan about the middle of January, but pursuant to the request of the army the prisoners from Wake island were placed in a temporary prison camp in Shanghai, and they were transported to Woosung direct from the Nitta Maru.
20. Q. Were the prisoners of war transported on the Nitta Maru all from Wake island? How many were there?
- A. They were not all. As I recall those transported on the Nitta Maru ran up to considerable number, but I do not know how many.
21. Q. What was the the reason for the entire prisoners not being transported on the Nitta Maru?
- A. At the time the Nitta Maru reached Wake island (I do not remember the exact time) we received a telegram from the commanding officer on the spot saying that there were many prisoners of war whose transfer was difficult on account of their being ill, while there were quite a number who voluntarily wished to remain there. Subsequently the Navy Minister studied the problem of supply and international law questions. According to the opinion of a specialist in international law attached to the Navy Minister's Secretariat, the prisoners of war could remain after they have voluntarily signed a contract agreeing to engage in work which was not connected directly with combat. Therefore, we answered by cable to such effect and have each prisoner sign such an agreement which should be dispatched to the Navy Ministry. Furthermore, I recall that we received instructions which were issued, that as for those who were ill and could later be removed, and others who have completed their work and desired to be transported to Japan, could be so transported as soon as transportation was available.
22. Q. Did those contracts reach the Navy Ministry, and what became of the prisoners of war who had remained thereafter?
- A. Up to the time of my resignation as Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, that is July 14, 1942, these contracts did not reach us. Except for an episode, which I

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heard, concerning the prisoners of war remaining on Wake island, I do not recall receiving any report.

Q. What was that episode?

23. A. The occupation force on Wake island discovered huge amounts of construction materials and engineering machinery and construction engineers on the island. They were surprised to find an enormous quantity of these together with precision construction machinery. They immediately tried to use them and started to operate the bulldozers, but could not do so. While they were at a loss what to do, one of the American engineers, who was watching, by sign language waved aside the Japanese soldiers and skillfully operated the bulldozer. The story was that this was the motive which prompted some of the prisoners to remain there.

24. Q. Do you know anything about the fact that several prisoners of war who had been placed on board the Nitta Maru were executed enroute from Yokohama to Woosung between the middle and the end of January 1942?

A. I do not know anything about it. At that time not only was there no reply, but I do not recall hearing of any subsequently.

25. Q. What was the situation with respect to meting out of punishments to the prisoners of war?

A. There was a law called the P.O.W. punishment law, and the Naval Regulations Pertaining to the Treatment of War Prisoners which clarified following point, namely .

If it was a disciplinary measure the commander of the naval authorities who actually had the prisoners interned applied the provisions of the Naval Disciplinary Regulations. In case of a penal measure, the naval authorities investigated as executive naval judicial prosecuting officer (kaigun shiho keisatsu kan), turned over the case to the prosecutor of the nearest court-martial who would try the case.

26. Q. Did you see the detailed Regulations for the Punishment of Prisoners of War established by the transport commander of the Nitta Maru, or did you receive a report thereof?

A. We knew nothing about it at that time, nor did we become aware of it until recently.

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Q. What was that episode?

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A. We knew nothing about it at that time, nor did we become aware of it until recently.

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27. Q. Who set up the temporary prison camps and selected their sites?

A. The commanders-in-chief of the fleet, naval station and minor naval station, who received the prisoners of war, set up the prison camps pursuant to the Regulations for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

28. Q. Who set up the Ofuna temporary prison camp? Do you know what was the occasion when you became aware of its establishment?

A. The Ofuna temporary prison camp was established by the Yokosuka Naval Station. I learned of it for the first time when the Yokosuka Naval Station submitted the papers to the Navy Ministry requesting appropriation in connection with the construction of the Ofuna temporary prison camp. I remember that it was a short time before I resigned as Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau.

29. Q. Did you, during your tenure in the Naval Affairs Bureau, receive reports or protests that the prisoners of war at Ofuna temporary prison camp were mistreated or driven to hard labor, or that patients were not given adequate medical treatment?

A. There were absolutely no reports on such matters, nor have I heard it from other sources.

On this 27 day of Aug, 1947  
at Tokyo

Deponent /s/ TAKETA, Toshitane (seal)

I, Somiya Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
at Tokyo

Witness: /s/ SOIYA, Shinji (seal)

DEF. DCC. #2128

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing adding nothing.

/s/ TAKATA, Toshitane (seal)

Def. Doc. # 2142

Exh. No. 3066

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent :- YAMAMOTO Yoshio

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

YAMAMOTO, Yoshio 443, 2-chome Koenji, Suginami-ku,  
Tokyo.

1. Q. What posts did you occupy since December 8, 1941?
  4. I was staff officer of the Fleet in the China Waters ON: December 8, 1941. On February 5, 1942 I was in the Naval General Staff and concurrently the Navy Ministry. From February 12, 1942, I was ordered for duty in the Naval Affairs Bureau and was engaged in studying the reorganization of the naval system. On July 14, 1942, I succeeded my predecessor TAKI, Toshitane, and assumed the post of Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, and held the said post until July 9, 1945. At the time of the war's end I was Rear Admiral of the Navy.
2. Q. During the wartime did the Navy Ministry issue any instructions concerning the handling of the prisoners of war?
  4. Instructions were issued by telegrams and correspondence with respect to the handling of the prisoners of war.



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3. Q. Where were these directed to by the Navy Ministry?

A. Headquarters of the Naval Base. Headquarters of Minor Naval Station and Headquarters of the Fleet.

4. Q. Do you know where these original telegrams were filed and if they are now available?

A. The originals were in the custody of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry, but they were all lost in the fire in the air raid on May 25, 1945.

5. Q. Can you recall the substance, their contents?

A. I can recall the following facts from memory:  
Orders were

a) issued on December 1941. The supervision of the prisoners of war was to be in the hands of the Army, and the Navy was to administer them until they were turned over to the Army.

This was set forth in Regulations were Pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, but the orders been made to call attention to the existence thereof.

b) As prisoners were captured in the southern combat zone from January 1942 to February, instructions were issued to transport them to Japan.

c) As there were quite a number of deaths among the prisoners of war due to influenza at the Saseho temporary prison camp from December 1942 to the spring of 1943, orders were issued to the Saseho Naval Station two or three times to make an investigation of the state of affairs. Moreover attention was called respecting the food situation, which was reported as law.

d) October 1943. Directions were issued to transfer to the Army a considerable number of prisoners from Saseho.

e) December 1944. Instructions were issued to make a survey and report on the condition of the prisoners of war held outside of Japan. The condition of the prisoners outside of Japan was to have been reported in accordance with the Regulations Pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, but due to the difficulties encountered in traffic and communications many of the reports did not reach Tokyo

and caused the office routine in handling them to bog down. Therefore in order to straighten out the materials anew instructions were sent out to make a survey. Despite the foregoing instructions reports did not arrive.  
still

f) March 1945. If prisoners were interned by the troops stationed abroad they were instructed to turn them over to the nearest army units as quickly as possible.

6. Q. Do you know where the prisoners captured by the Navy were placed during the war?

A. I understand that the prisoners captured by the Navy were stationed at Wake island, Rabaul, Ambon, Macassar and Haiphong. However, most of the prisoners on Wake island were first sent to Woosung, Shanghai, in early 1942, and later one portion was transported to Japan and delivered to the Army, and a small portion remained to engage in engineering works. I also understand that the prisoners in Rabaul were sent to Japan and turned over to the army.

7. Q. Do you know whether there were prisoners held in other area?

A. I do not know as there were no reports received from any other place.

8. Q. Had you <sup>received any reports</sup> <sup>those maintained</sup> that the prisoners in <sup>the</sup> area had been mistreated?

A. No.

9. Q. Do you know that under date of August 21, 1943, the American Government dispatched a list of 40 names of prisoners on Wake island whose whereabouts were unknown.

A. No. I do not.

10. Q. Do you know that the American Government has made inquiries about the tidings of the prisoners of war on Wake island as follows:

Letter dated October 8, 1943  
Memorandum dated December 10, 1943  
" " February 14, 1944  
" " September 25, 1944  
" " November 1, 1944  
" " March 15, 1945  
" " May 15, 1945  
" " July 27, 1945.

A. I receive no information concerning such inquiries.

11. Q. Did you ever see  
any other inquiries with regard to the tidings of  
the prisoners on Wake island?

A. I do not recall any inquiries from any place other than the  
reply to the inquiry from the Japanese Office that there were  
a few prisoners remaining on Wake island, which was made by  
my predecessor in office in 1942.

12. Q. Was there a report from Rear Admiral Sakaibara, Commander  
of the Wake Garrison, about October 1943, with regard to the  
prisoners who remained on that island?

A. Report came directly to the Fourth Fleet, but at the same time  
telegraphic report came to the Navy Ministry, Naval General  
Staff and the Combined Fleet.

13. Q. What was their nature of the request?

A. At that time there was a <sup>bombardment</sup> of Wake island by the  
American task force. The situation was such that with the  
continuance of the bombardment the landing of American  
troops was expected, in consequence the American pris-  
soners of war thereupon started a mass  
riot, therefore they were shot. That was the substance of the  
telegram.

14. Q. With respect to this <sup>report</sup>, what sort of action was taken by the  
Navy Ministry?

- Q. As for the Navy Ministry it was not in a position to take any direct measure so no action was taken. However, it was watching what action would be taken by the superior officer, the commander-in-chief of the 4th Fleet.
15. Q. Where was the headquarters of the 4th Fleet at that time?
- A. Truc.
16. Q. What was the condition of traffic and communications between Wake, Truc and Tokyo at that time?
- A. There were contacts by wireless, but sea-borne traffic could not be conducted unless at considerable risk of danger.
17. Q. Was there any report from the 4th Fleet with respect to the conduct of the commanding officer on Wake island later?
- A. There were no report, whatever. From the end of 1943 the South seas islands were being attacked by the American air force and navy, therefore the 4th Fleet was exposed to severe, desperate battles. In view of this state of affairs it was impossible to press for reports and cause investigations to be made.
18. Q. Was a court-martial set up in the 4th Fleet at that time?
- A. Yes.
19. Q. Did the 4th Fleet take any step in putting this case before the court-martial?
- A. As for the Navy Ministry its position remained indefinite because there was no report. With the capture of the various south sea islands one after another, the occupation of Wake island became imminent and despite the fact that the entire garrison was prepared for a mass self-destruction, there was no way in which the combined fleet or the 4th fleet could rescue this garrison unit. In view of these circumstances we could not summon the commanding officer to the headquarters of the 4th fleet for the purpose of investigation, or to shift the commander and place him before a court-martial for trial.

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20. Q. Do you know Commander OKADA . . . staff officer of the Naval General Staff?

A. Yes, I do.

21. Q. In the early part of October 1942, did you or any one orally in the naval affairs Bureau instruct or send word to Vice Admiral Abe, commander on Kwajalein island, through staff officer Okada or some other member of the Naval General Staff to execute the prisoners in Kwajalein on the spot?

A. Absolutely not. The Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Minister was not concerned with staff officer Okada's trip to the south seas. Also the Naval Affairs Bureau was not aware that there were prisoners of war on Kwajalein island at that time.

As for the Navy it always issues orders or instructions by telegrams or in writing, and has absolutely never entrusted anybody with verbal orders. Also according to the setup in the navy the Navy Ministry could not give orders or instructions direct to Rear Admiral Abe as the commanding officer on the spot.

22. Q. Were protests received in connection with the sinking of allied powers' merchant ships by Japanese submarines in the India; Ocean during the war and the perpetration of atrocities on the survivors?

A. I do not remember the date and the number of times the protests were received, but we did receive some.

23. Q. What steps were taken at the time of the receipt those protests?

A. The parties in charge of the submarines were asked to make an investigation of those connected with it. Inasmuch as the matter involved operations the investigation was required to the Naval General Staff and the fact was thoroughly investigated. But as they reached the conclusion that since the Japanese submarines were not involved in the protests we replied to such effect to the Foreign Office.

24. Q. Was any investigation made after the war with respect to the foregoing facts.

A. There was an inquiry from GHQ, so the principal parties of the surviving submarine crew and those connected with the matter at the time were investigated but such fact could not be established and we replied to that effect. The text of the documents and appended table dated Dec 5, 1945, signed on behalf of Bureau Chief Nakamura, en

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titled "Reply to the Matter of the Merchant Ship, sunk in the Indian Ocean by the Imperial Japanese Submarines" addressed to Col. Allen of GHQ, was our reply.

25. Q. Who administered the temporary prison camp in Ofuna?  
A. Yokosuka Naval Station.
26. Q. Who appointed the superintendent of the prison camp?  
A. I do not know the details, but I think commanding officer of the Minor Naval Station in Yokosuka under the jurisdiction of the Yokosuka Naval Station appointed some suitable subordinate.
27. Q. Was the appointment of the prison camp superintendent reported to the Navy Ministry?  
A. Such a matter was within the province of the Yokosuka Naval Station and no report was made to the Navy Ministry.
28. Q. What sort of a report was made by the Yokosuka Naval Station?  
A. There was a report on the personnel in the prison camp, their names, ranks, and other matters designated in the Regulations Pertaining to the Handling of the Prisoners of War.
29. Q. Did you ever receive any report that the prisoners in the Ofuna temporary prison camp were mistreated, or that the prisoner patients did not receive adequate medical attention?  
A. No. such report ever came in during my tenure in office.

On this 15 day of August 1947

At Tokyo.

Deponent /S/ YAMAMOTO, Yoshio (seal)

I, SOMIYA, Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ YAMAMOTO, Yoshio (seal)

Exhibit 3066

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

荒木貞夫其他

宣 誓 供 述 者

供 述 者 山 本 啓 雄

東京都杉並區高円寺二丁目四三番地

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ元ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上辯護人  
宗宮信次ノ附ニ對シテ次ノ如ク供述スルマシマス。

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一、問一九四一年十二月八日以後に於ける貴方の職歴は

答一九四一年十二月八日當時は支那方面艦隊參謀一九四二年二月五日軍令部出仕兼海軍省出仕となり同年二月十二日から軍務局勤務を命ぜられて制度改革の研究に従事し同年七月十四日前任者高田利禎の後を受け軍務局第一課長を命ぜられ爾後一九四五年七月九日迄同職に居りました、終戦當時の階級は海軍少將です。

二、問戦時中俘虜の取扱に關し海軍省は何か指示をしたことがありますか  
答電報や文書で取扱に關する注意や指示をしたことがあります。

三、問それは海軍省より何處に對して為されましたか

答鎮守府司令部舊備府司令部艦隊司令部等であります。

四、問それ等電報文書は現在何處にありますか

答原本は海軍省軍務局第一課に任りましたが昭和二十年五月二十五日の戦災により焼失して終ひました。

五、問それでは其内容は現在想起することが出来ませんか

答私の記憶から次の様な事例が申述べられます  
(イ)一九四一年十二月發



- の主管理は陸軍で海軍は陸軍に引渡す迄暫定的に管理するものである、その手續及び取扱は斯くすべしと指示したものがあ  
るこれは俘虜取扱規則に記載してあることであるが注意を喚  
起する爲になされたものであります。
- (ロ) 一九四二年一月から二月に亘り南方作戦地で俘虜を得たので  
内地方面へ輸送するよう指示されました。
- (ハ) 一九四二年末から一九四二年春にかけて佐世保の相当と言ふ  
所の假收容所で俘虜が流行性感冒で死亡するものが多かつた  
ので佐世保留守府に對し二、三回實情の調査を命じ且つ設備  
食糧等につき注意を喚起しました
- (ニ) 一九四三年十月  
佐世保相當の俘虜を陸軍に移管すべく指示しました
- (ホ) 一九四四年十二月  
外地に於ける俘虜状況を調査報告すべきことの指示が爲され  
ました外地に於ける俘虜の状況は俘虜取扱規則に依つて報告  
することとなつてゐましたが交通通信困難の爲め報告の到着  
しないものが多く事務處理上不都合が多かつたので新に資料

を整理する爲め調査を指示されたものであります併し右指令にも  
かわらず依然として報告は集りませんでした。

(へ)

一九四五年三月

外地部隊にして若し俘虜を收容し居るものあるときは成る可く速  
かに最寄陸軍部隊に移管すべきことを指示されました等でありま

六、問 貴方は戦時中海軍の拿捕した俘虜は何處と何處にあつたか承知して  
ゐますか

答 「ウエーキ」島「ラポール」「アンボン」「マカツサル」及び海南

島に海軍の拿捕した俘虜が居つたことは承知して居りました

但し「ウエーキ」島の俘虜の大部分は一九四二年の初め上海吳淞に  
其の後又一部を内地に輸送して陸軍に引渡し少數のものが残つて土  
木工事に従事してゐました。又「ラポール」のものも内地に送られ  
て陸軍に引渡されたことを知つて居ります

七、問 其の他の地域にあつたか何うかは知つてゐましたか

答 何處からも何等報告がなく承知して居りませんでした

八、問 貴方の知つてゐた地区の俘虜が虐待を受けたことを聞きましたか



十二、問一九四三年十月頃ウエーキ島守備隊指揮官酒井原少將より残留し

てゐた俘虜に付いて何か通知がありませんでしたか

答直接は第四艦隊へ報告されたものであるが海軍省軍令部聯合艦隊

へは同時に通報の電報が参りました

十三、問其内容は

答「當時「ウエーキ島に對し米國海軍機動部隊の艦砲射撃あり其情

況は砲撃に引續き米軍の上陸を豫期せられたる處米國人俘虜は右に呼籲し集團暴動の行動を開始せり仍て之を射殺せりといふ趣旨の電報でありました

十四、問之に對し海軍省はどういふ措置を採りましたか

答海軍省としては之に對し直接措置を構はずべき立場になかつたので措置を採りませんでした併しその上司である第四艦隊司令長官がどういふ措置をするかについては注意をしてゐました

十五、問當時第四艦隊の司令部は何處ですか

答「トラツク」です

十六、問當時「ウエーキ」「トラツク」東京との交通及通信は如何なる状況でありましたか

答 無線連絡はありましたが海上交通は非常な危険を冒すに非らざれば  
決行し得ざる状況でありました

十七、問 其の後ウエーキ島指揮官の行動に對して第四艦隊より何等か報告が  
ありましたか

答 何も報告がありませんでした、一九四三年末頃から南洋群島は米空  
海軍の攻撃を受け第四艦隊は非常な苦戦に陥つてゐたので當時の情  
況として報告を督促し調査をさせる様なことは出来ませんでした

十八、問 當時第四艦隊に軍法會議の編成はありましたか

答 ありません

十九、問 第四艦隊は此の事件を軍法會議に附する等の措置を採らなかつたか  
答 海軍省としては報告がないので判然しません併し南洋諸島が次々と  
攻略せられ「ウエーキ」島攻略も目前に迫り守備隊全員玉碎を覚悟  
してゐたに拘らず聯合艦隊としても第四艦隊としても此の部隊を救  
援する方法の無かつた當時の情況として此の事件調査のため指揮官  
を第四艦隊司令部へ招致したり或は指揮官を第四艦隊司令部へ招致  
したり或は指揮官を更替して之を軍法會議の審理に附すると言ふこ  
とは實際上當時の情況の急迫と苦戦とは鑑み出来なかつた情況であ  
る

りました。

二十、開軍令部參謀海軍少佐岡田貞外茂を知つてゐますか

答 知つてゐます

皇方又は皇軍務局の誰か、口頭

二十一、岡一九四二年十月上旬岡田參謀又は軍令部の他の部員に對し「ク

エゼリン」島の俘虜を現地で處刑する様「クエゼリン」島の指

揮官阿部中將に指示又は傳言等を依頼したことがありますか

答 左様な事はありません岡田參謀が南洋に出張したのは海軍省軍

務局には無關係であります又當時「クエゼリン」島ニ俘虜が居

ることを軍務局では承知して居りませんでした

海軍としては命令や指示を爲すには電報又は書類を以てし口頭

で之を他人に依頼したりすることは絶対にありませんでした又

海軍省が直接現地指揮官たる阿部中將に命令や指示を與へるこ

とは制度上出来ないものであります

二十二、開戦争中日本潜水艦が印度洋に於て聯合國商船を撃沈し乗員に對

し殘虐行爲を爲したといふ抗議を受領した事がありますか

答 抗議を受けた時期並に回答は記憶してゐませんが其事實はあり

ます

備隊の指揮官が部下の過激な言動を聞き、思ひますの横須賀警

二六、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

二五、問 大船は容須賀守府にあり居りますか

答 大船は容須賀守府にあり居ります

二四、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

二三、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

二二、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

二一、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

二〇、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

一九、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

一八、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

一七、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

一六、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

答 容須賀守府は誰か任し居ります

一五、問 容須賀守府は誰か任し居りますか

二十七、問收容所長の任命は海軍省へ報告がありましたか  
答左様な事は横須賀鎮守府限りの事でありまして海軍省へ報告は

ありませんでした

二十八、問横須賀鎮守府よりはどよういふ事が報告されましたか  
答收容人員氏名階級其他俘虜取扱規則所定事項の報告がありました

た

二十九、問管理状況はどようでしたか

答只今具体的に記憶に残つて居りませんが別に鎮守府長官に注意を要すべき點があつたとは記憶して居りません寧ろ給養關係は

規則以上の取扱をしてゐたといふ記憶が残つてゐます

三十、問大船収容所の俘虜が虐待酷使を受けたとか俘虜慰養が充分な程

察を受けなかつたといふ報告が非難を聞いたことがありません  
答私の在任中左様なことを聞いたことはありません

報告を受けたことも非難

以上



昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月十五日 於東京

供述者 山 本 善 雄

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣讀シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス。

同日 於 同 所

聽取人 宗 宮 信 次

宣  
審  
書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺秘ヒズ又何事ヲモ附加ヒザルコトヲ  
審フ

署名捺印  
山  
本  
善  
雄

Def. Doc. # 2106

Exh. No. 3067

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARUKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Depositor : - KONDO, Jotaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, KONDO, Jotaro, am presently living in Tokiwa-Machi, Urawa-City, Saitama Prefecture.

I was born in Nagano Prefecture on the 13th November, 1894, and graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University in July, 1920. From January, 1942 to July, 1944, I was the Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture.

I wish to make the following statements concerning Exhibit No. 1969, "the Report concerning Labour Conditions of the Prisoners of War."

(1) This is a copy of the report which I had sent to the Eastern Army Commander for his reference. This report was made originally in my name to the Home and Welfare Ministers whose jurisdiction I was under as the Governor of KANAGAWA Prefecture.

I was under no obligation to report to the Eastern Army Commander.

I presume that the headquarters of the Eastern Army transmitted to the War Ministry, the report which I had sent there for reference.

(2) The report gave the fact that the employment of the PW's for labor brought about a favorable impression upon the Japanese people especially labourers.

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(3) Written in the last paragraph of this report is the following:  
"Of course, we did not make any public announcement the employment of the PW's for labor, but the people found out that the PW's, were at work by unintentional observation of their trips between the work shop and the camp .....<sup>"</sup> As such, it was the personal opinion expressed casually by some passer-by who happened to witness the PW's on their way to and from work.  
It was never intended to use the PWs for public display.

I had never received any instruction or suggestion from my superiors and others to expose the PWs for public view. I gave no such instruction or suggestion to the local parties concerned.

(4) In short, this report was made to the Home and Welfare Ministers, the higher authorities, by the prefectural government, compiling informations received customarily from various local organs.  
A copy of this report was sent to the Eastern Army Commander just for his reference. No special significance was attached to this report.

On this 15th day of August, 1947.

At 10-28, Tokiwa-Machi, Utsawa-City.

Deponent /S/ KONDO, Jotaro (seal)

I, ABE, Akira, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ ABE, Akira (seal)

OATH.

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KONDO, Jotaro (seal)

DEF. DOC. #1921

EXHIBIT #

3068

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Depoent: SUGITA, Kazuji.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet  
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my  
country I hereby depose as follows.

DEF. DOC. #1921

Affidavit of SUGITA, Kazuji

1. I am SUGITA, Kazuji, by name, born on 31 March 1904, living at present at No. 174 Kitazawa 2 Chome, Setagayaku, Tokyo. I entered the preparatory course of the Military Academy and besides studying in the U.S. and Britain, I served various posts before the outbreak of the Pacific War, when I became a staff officer of the 25th Army under the command of General YAMASHITA and kept the post till I got a new appointment as a staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters on 23 April 1942.

During that period, I held the post of the Chief of the Intelligence Staff till 16 March 1942 and then the officer with the British Army for about a month after the fall of Singapore.

Since the middle of March 1942, till my transference to Tokyo I was the Chief of the Operation Staff.

2. The instructions issued by the Commanding General of the Army YAMASHITA at the start of the Malayan Campaign emphasized the foremost principle of making friends with the native people. On the fall of Singapore we were made to see to it that an exemplary occupation work should be carried out with no hitch in taking over the city in consideration of the great repercussion of the fall of the city

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not only over the southern native people but to every nation in the world. (His instructions were burned up). While we were acting upon the instruction, the General urged General Percival to surrender early instead of going on with their resistance that involved so much bloodshed of townfolks in his written summons to surrender, which, I think is in the hands of the British Army. A promise was also made on the occasion of the interview between General YAMASHITA and General Percival that the British noncombatants and womenfolk would be protected.

3. During the attack on Singapore, the Japanese Army also sustained much loss (50% of that throughout the whole Malayan Campaign) and tension between Britain and Japan was so intense after the fall of Singapore, general sentiment of our soldiers against Chinese merchants grew worse as the Chinese obstructed our operations a great deal as the operation proceeded.

The following are examples of Chinese merchants' obstructions:

a. Toward the end of December 1941, a hundred or more of armed Chinese merchants took stand in a northern forest with the aim of disturbing commissary lines and burning our munitions as well.

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B. In the end of December 1941, during the battle near Cambar, frequent signal shells were seen shooting in the night from around our troops. And upon investigation it was learned that this was done by Chinese merchants.

c. In the middle of January 1942, in the battle near Guemasa (TN?) and Soganot (TN?) as well as at the time of the enemy air raids on Kuala Rumpur, signal shells were again shot up to show the way for enemy fire and planes, which were later made clear also to have been the tricks of Chinese merchants.

Also in the middle of January 1942, when the Japanese Imperial Guards Division was crossing river, they helped to guide enemy planes on night raids.

d. In the middle of January 1942, when the aforesaid Division was fighting near Maracca and Batbahat (TN?), Chinese merchants aided enemy submarines lying off the coast. They sheltered, guided and defended the secret agents who came from the submarines, making the enemy fire from the Maracca Sea easy and advantageous.

e. At many places military communication wires were cut up. All through the while the commanding General of the Army did not make any change in the instruction given at the start of war, but only put more stress on the strict punishment



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of those whose obstructions of our operations were beyond doubt.

And his attitude was stern toward ill behavior of Japanese officers and men. An investigation made after the termination of war disclosed that the army commander issued an order on 17 February 1942. This order was purely an operational one with the aim of mopping up the Chinese merchants of enemy character lurking in and around the city, and intending to deal them a decisive blow.

As for me, I witnessed neither the actual mopping up nor even a single corpse. I have heard that there was some evidence that 5,000 Chinese were killed but Japanese officers told me that 5,000 was a much too large an estimate. I heard later that the General Headquarters of the Japanese Forces in the Southern Regions thought that the mopping up tactics should not have been used and was not ordered by them. Lt. General MUTO, who came to the Southern Area in the latter part of March 1942, expressed his view that the mopping up tactics should not have been used, also.

I don't remember anything of my interview with Major General Newbegin (TN) and Colonel Wilde on 22 February 1948 about which Colonel Wilde testified.

Immediately after the fall of Singapore conferences and arrangements were so frequent in order to prevent mishaps,

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divergences, and misunderstandings between Japan and Britain (in view of lack of experience of occupation works on our side and language difficulty) that it was the latter part of February before the occupation operated smoothly.

In the island of Singapore, the British Forces were allocated for internment to Changi and Indian soldiers to Nieson (TN) and other areas and there existed considerable confusion.

It was highly difficult task to concentrate the British soldiers stationed on separate islands, but efforts were made to prevent accidents in conformity with the order of the Commanding General of the Army. The British Forces, if my memory serves me right, carried foodstuffs in good quantity for themselves, using their own automobiles (some 10), trucks (some 50) and hydro-automobiles (some 10).

They were driving about 20 trucks a day to carry foodstuffs by themselves from the wharf of Singapore, but those trucks (except a few) were, I heard, confiscated about the middle of March.

The ordinary townsfolk as well as womenfolk detained in private houses in the northern part of Singapore at the beginning were taken toward the end of February to the Changi Prison. At that time Japanese Forces were so pressed in the preparations for the next operation while British POW's were quite at leisure that some of the Japanese soldiers asked, "Which is the winner?"

I remember, too, of General YAMASHITA's inspection

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in the camps about the beginning or middle of March 1942, when he shook hands with Lt. General Percival who expressed thanks to General YAMASHITA. Till the first part of February or March 1942, the great majority of the prisoners were engaged in improving the prison and in preparing for cultivation of crops to support themselves, bathing at intervals in the sea. Since the beginning of March hundreds of prisoners were coming back and forth by autos from Changi all the time for the purpose of cleaning the city of Singapore, which proved so inconvenient that the plan was changed so as to transfer part of them to

the city from Changi and preparations for it were under way. What became of it, however, I cannot tell, for then I shifted to different post and in addition I travelled to Sumatra on official business.

5. Of the Hospital Alexander incident, I got no information at that time. About 12 or 13 March, the date on which Colonel Wilde testified that this occurred, the front line was not advanced as far as the said hospital.

6. I acknowledge the Exhibit 476, namely the document consisting of "Outline of the investigation on inhumanities during the Malayan Campaign" and other four parts, except the part made of two leaves of Japanese paper copied from excerpts of Diary of 18 February. These documents were availed of by the 4th squad of Prisoners Investigation

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Committee. Among them, "the State of Punishment of Chinese merchants at Singapore (23 October 1942)" was written mainly by myself at first. But as it proved insufficient further study was made and it was revised as "Outline of the investigation on inhumanities during the Malayan Campaign of 23 November written chiefly by myself, assisted by Major HASHIZUME,

But a number of insertions and cancellations on the documents were made by other hands. I drafted them and presented them, as noted on the first page, to the Central Prisoners Investigation Committee and to the Prisoners Investigation Board. Whether these organs adopted them or not I cannot ascertain from the documents. I am not sure of whose hands are those notes such as "deleted" or "see attached papers" entered with pencil on the documents.

On this 24th day of July, 1947  
At Defense, I.M.T.F.E., ICHIGAYA,  
Tokyo.

DEPONENTS: SUGITA, Kazuji (seal)

No. 174 KITAZAWA NI-CHOME, SETAGAYA\*  
Ward, Tokyo-City.

I, SUGITA, Kazuji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date  
At Defense, I.M.T.F.E., ICHIGAYA,  
Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KORETSUNE, Tasumi (seal)

DE 7. DOC. #1921

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUGITA, Kazuif (seal)

8

DEP. DOC. #1921

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUGITA, Kazuji (seal)

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

宣誓供述書

供述者 杉 田

次

荒 木 貞 夫 其 他

對

亞米利加合衆國 其 他

極東國際軍事裁判所

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

一私ハ杉田一次

明治三十七年三月三十一日生レ、現住所ハ東京都世田ヶ谷區北澤二丁目一七  
四番地大正十年陸軍士官學校予科ニ入學米英ニ留學スル外各種ノ任務ニ服シ  
タ後、太平洋戦争開始ニ方ハテハ第二十五軍（指揮官ハ山下大將）ノ參謀ト  
ナリ昭和十七年四月二十三日大本營參謀ニ轉任ノ命ヲ受ケマシタ。

此ノ間ニ於ケル私ノ任務ハ昭和十七年三月十六日迄ハ情報主任參謀デアリ、  
新嘉坡陷落後約一ヶ月間ハ英軍トノ連絡將校ヲ務メマシタ。

昭和十七年三月中旬以後東京轉任迄ノ間ハ作戦主任參謀デアリマシタ。

三馬來作戦開始ニ當リ山下軍司官ノ下サレタ訓示（燒却セラレタ）ニハ現住  
民トノ友好ヲ第一トスル方針ナル旨ヲ強調サレ又新嘉坡陷落ニ當リテ二月八  
日頃新嘉坡ヲ接收スル方針トシテ、新嘉坡陷落ハ南方各民族ノミナラズ世界  
各國ニ與ヘル影響大ナルモノアリマスカラ專故ヲ起サズニ模範的ニヤルコト  
ヲ定メラレテ居リマシタ。我々ハ其ノ方針ニ遵ツテ行動シテ居リマシタ。又  
山下大將ハ其ノ降伏勸告文（英軍側ニアルト思フ）ニ於テパーシバル將軍ニ



市民ノ大量ニ上ル殺傷ヲ招ク抵抗ヲ止メテ早く降伏スルコトヲ勸メラレテ居リ又、山下、バーシバル兩將軍ノ會見時ニモ英國市民及婦女子ヲ保護スルコトヲ約束サレマシタ

三、新嘉坡島攻戰間日本軍ニモ相當大ナル損害ハ馬來軍作戦間ノ二分ノ一ノ損害アリ一ガアリ陷降後日英同ノ空氣ハ不良デアリ又華僑ニ對スル日本軍將兵ノ氣分ハ全作戦ノ進ムニツレ華僑ノ作戦妨害ニヨリ段々惡クナツテ來テ居リマシタ。華僑ノ作戦妨害ノ例ヲ申上ゲマスト次ノ様デアリマス。

(イ) 昭和十六年十二月末頃「タイピン」北方山林中ニ於テ華僑百數十名ハ武器ヲ持チテ立籠リ我カ兵站戰ノ擾亂軍需品ノ燒夷ヲ企圖シマシタ

(ロ) 昭和十六年十二月下旬「カンバル」附近ノ戰鬪ニテ夜間屢々我ガ部隊附近ニ信號彈上リ搜索ノ結果華僑ノ所爲ナルコトガ判明シマシタ

(ハ) 昭和十七年一月中旬「ゲマス」及「セガマツト」附近ノ戰鬪並ニ「クアララ」ンブール」ニ對スル敵ノ空襲時ノ飛行場附近ニ同ジク信號彈ニヨル敵砲火又ハ敵機ノ誘導ヲナシタノハ華僑ノ所爲ナルコト判明シマシタ。又一月中旬「ムー

ル。附近ノ近衛師團ノ渡河ニ際シ華僑ハ敵機ノ夜間爆撃ヲ誘導シマシタ。

(三) 昭和十七年一月中旬及下旬近衛師團ノ「マラツカ」  
「バトバト」附近ノ  
敵回國華僑ハ「マラツカ」海上ノ敵潜水艇ト通謀シ潜水艇ヨリノ謀者ノ侵入  
誘導、保護ニ任ジ「マラツカ」海上ヨリスル敵ノ陸砲射撃ヲ容易且ツ有利ナ  
ラシメマシタ。

(四) 軍用通信線ガ華僑ニヨリ破壊セラレタ其ノ数ハ多クアリマシタ  
此ノ間軍司令官ハ開戦當初ノ訓示ヲ變更セラルルコトナク唯作戦ヲ妨害セル  
コト同ラカナルモノニ對シテハ嚴罰ヲ以テ處ムベキコトヲ強調セラレテキマ  
シタ又日本軍將兵中惡イコトヲシタモノニ對シテハ嚴格ナル態度ヲ臨マレマ  
シタ。

1921.  
終戦後ノ調査ニ依リ軍司令官ハ昭和十七年二月十七日軍命令ヲ下達セラレタ  
Def. Doc. コトガ判リマシタ。  
本命令ハ純作戦命令ニヨリ敵性華僑ヲ掃蕩スル爲市内外ニ逃避セル華僑ヲ處  
断セラレタノデアリマス

又薩島ニ英兵ヲ散在シテ居リマシクカカラシク之ヲ收メテ非ニ因テ感  
 地ヲ收奪セラルコトナリマシクガカガ相シテ容メテシマシク。又  
 新嘉坡内ニ於テハ英軍ハ「ヤシヤシ」ニ印シテ二月下旬ヲリマシク「其  
 行ハルニ於テ軌道ニ乘ルヤクニナリマシク止メテハ二月下旬ヲリマシク  
 不幸ナル事發シ生放ニ致セテ此等ノ收ノ仕舞ニ價レテナシテ「私ノ  
 四、新嘉坡直後ハ此等ノ收ノ仕舞ニ價レテナシテ「私ノ仕舞ニ價レテ  
 將及」ヲ下大佐ノ私トシク九四二年二月二十日ノ「私ノ仕舞ニ價レテ  
 」ヲ下大佐ノ私トシク九四二年二月二十日ノ「私ノ仕舞ニ價レテ  
 居ラレト私共ハ開キマシク。三月下旬頃自方ニ來ラシク武蔵中將モ  
 三月下旬頃自方ニ來ラシク武蔵中將モ敵性ヲ掃蕩シテ反對ノ意ヲ向  
 南方領司合ニヨルト「反對ノ意ヲ向シテ」ハ命合シテ「反對ノ意ヲ向  
 リ得ク報ヨル」ト「反對ノ意ヲ向シテ」ハ命合シテ「反對ノ意ヲ向  
 事ハ約五千ノ人ト「反對ノ意ヲ向シテ」ハ命合シテ「反對ノ意ヲ向  
 私トシテハ其ノ現場ハ勿論ノコト「死」トシテ「反對ノ意ヲ向シテ」ハ命

ジマシタ。然シ軍司令官ノ方針ニヨリ事故ヲ起サナイコトニ努力シ英軍側ニ  
於テハ其所有セル自動車(十数臺)「トラツク」(五十数臺)、水車十数位ア  
リタルト思フ一等ヲ利用シ食糧等モ相當運ンダト記憶シテ居リマス  
又毎日二〇臺位内外ノ「トラツク」デ新嘉坡ノ埠頭方ヲ自ラノ手デ食糧ヲ運  
デ居リマシタガ、三月中旬頃ト思ヒマスガ自動車「トラツク」若干臺スモ  
取上ゲルヨウユナツタト聞イテ居リマシタ。

一般市民及婦女子ハ當初新嘉坡東北部民家ニ抑留セラレテ居リマシタガ二月  
ノ下旬頃「チャンギ」監獄ニ收容セラルルコトユナリマシタ。當時日本軍  
ニ於テハ次ノ作戦ニ多忙デアリマシタユ反シテ英國側ノ人々ハ谷氣ナ状態デ  
アリ日本ノ將兵中ニハ「何レガ戦ユ勝チタルヤ」ナドト皮肉ヲ言フモノアリ  
又三月上旬、中旬頃ト記憶シマスガ山下大尉ハ收容所内ヲ觀察セラレ「パーシ  
バル」中將トモ握手セラレ同中將ヨリ感謝ノ言葉ガアリマシタ  
一九四二年三月上旬頃大部分ノ俘虜ハ收容所ノ修繕、自活ノ爲ノ耕作準備ヲ  
ヤリ時々海水浴ヲヤツテ居リ又三月上旬頃ヨリ新嘉坡ノ清掃ノ爲數百人ノ人

タガ「チヤンギー」カラー々自動車ヲ往復シテ居リマシタガ不便ヲ自動車ガ  
又スル爲一部ヲ市内ニ收容スルコトニ計畫ヲ變更シテ其ノ準備ヲシテキタ様  
ニ思ヒマスガ其ノ後ドウイフ状態デアツタカ私ノ任務カ變更ニナリ一スマト  
ラ」ニ出張シタリシタイマシタノヲ知リマセン

五「アレキサンダー」病院事件ハ當時ハ何モ情報ヲ得テキマセンデシタ。三月  
十二日三日頃ニ起ツトイノ「ワイルド」大佐ノ證言ノ三端ヨリ聞クハ當時

日本軍ノ第一線ハ「アレキサンダー」病院迄進ンテ居リマセンデシタ。  
六法廷第四七六號即チ「馬來作戦圖」於ケル非人道的行爲ニ關スル調査概要」

以下五部ヨリ成ル内容ノ内、日記披露二月十八日ヨリ記載ノ日本軍二枚ヨリ  
成ル部分ヲ除イテハ私ハ承知シテキマス。是ノ内容ハ昭和二十年十一月二十  
二日停戦調査委員合第四班ヲ使用シタモノデソノ内デ「シンガポール」於ケ  
ル「華僑」断状況」ハ昭和二十年十月二十三日「トイウ」ハ初メ私ガ主トシテ  
作成シマシタガソレガ不十分ナル爲ニ研究ノ上、同年十一月二十二日「馬來  
作戦圖」於ケル非人道的行爲ニ關スル調査概要」ト改定シ橋詰少佐ノ援助ヲ

得テ主トシテ私ガ旨イタモノデアリマス  
但シ多数ノ搜入削除ハ外ノモノガシタノデアリマス之レヲ起案シテ此ノ書類  
ノ第一頁ニアル通り俾野中央調査委員会及俾野関係調査部へ提出シマシタガ  
之ノ委員会尙ユ調査部ヲ之レヲ採用シタカ否カハ此ノ書類カラハ分リマセン  
又此ノ書類ノ中ユハ鉛筆字ヲ削除又ハ別紙等トノ旨込ミガアリマスカ誰ガシ  
タノカ私ユハ分リマセン

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）七月廿四日 於

東京都市ヶ谷

東京國際刑事裁判所

辯護人室

供 送 者

東京都世田ヶ谷區北澤二丁目一七四

杉 田 一 次

右ハ營立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

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REF DOC # 545

3067

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

(Cover)

Instructions to Japanese Soldiers  
at the Front

Consented by the War Ministry (TN: 194)  
January 20, 16 the year of Showa

(1st leaf)

Army Order. No. 1

Let this book be used as a guide in raising moral at  
the front.

War Minister, TOJO, Hidoki

January 8, 16th year of Showa (TN: 1941)

Instructions to Japanese Soldiers  
at the Front

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Instructions to the Japanese Soldiers  
at the Front

Introduction

The battle-field is the place where the Imperial Army, in obedience to the Imperial command, should deeply impress the enemy, with the august virtue of His Majesty by displaying its true spirit, capturing whatever it attacks, gaining victory whenever it fights, and propagating widely KODO (The way of the Imperial grace) wherever it goes.

All soldiers at the front, therefore, are expected of to firmly comply with the mission of our country, strictly observe moral principles of the Imperial Army, and exalt the prestige of our Empire throughout the world.

The essence of the soldiers spirit is clearly shown in the Imperial Instructions to the soldiers and a basic outline on fighting and training are given in the General Principles of the manual. However, the actual conditions at the front are such that the soldiers, often become too absorbed in matters of the present and are apt to forget the essentials and fall short of their duties and dignity as military men. We must be well guarded against this pitfall. From our past experiences, therefore, it is now desired to show the standard of actual behavior expected of all the men, in hopes that perfect observance of the Imperial Instructions at the front shall be observed thereby enhancing the morals of our Imperial Army.

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Such is the true aim of the following instructions.

### Essentials Part I

#### I KOKOKU (TM: Imperial Land)

YAI NIPPON is the KOKOKU (TM: -- an Empire reigned over by His Majesty the Emperor), a country ruled over by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal, and reigning forever in accordance with the Imperial policy which was established at the time of the foundation of the Empire. The Imperial grace and majesty reaches over entire humanity and envelops like the sun the whole universe. We the subjects, on our part, have adhered from generation to generation to the virtues of loyalty, filial piety and bravery, and have rendered service in the fulfillment of the Imperial mission and the vindication of the moral way of our Empire. United in one body with the Emperor, we have worked out our national growth and prosperity.

All officers and men at the front, realize the intrinsic spirit of our national policy, and maintain an indomitable belief in it, so that you may devote yourselves to the fulfil-<sup>ment</sup> of your great duty to protect and maintain this glorious Empire

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of His Majesty.

## II The Imperial Army

The Army is under the supreme command of His Majesty the Emperor, and by embodying the spirit of "SHIMBU" (TN: martial spirit of god) in its action, charges itself with the duty of enhancing the majesty and virtue of our Empire and maintaining the prosperity of our Imperial Throne.

The spirit which is righteous, brave and benevolent, and which, ever in compliance with His Majesty's mind, strives for the realization of world harmony, is the very spirit of "SHIMBU". Martial spirit should be resolute, and benevolence impartial. Should an enemy resist our Imperial Army, wield the sword bravely to their utter submission. Even though your military might overcomes the enemy, your martial virtue will not be perfect if you are devoid of the virtue of benevolence to forgive those who submit and to love those who obey. Martial spirit should not be haughty and benevolence not ostentatious. The virtues of bravery and benevolence are noble only when they flow naturally and spontaneously from one's self. The true province of the Imperial Army lies in the execution of justice tempered with mercy so that the universal virtues of His Majesty shall be looked up to by all.

## III Military Discipline

The pith of the Imperial military discipline exists in the sublime spirit of absolute obedience to His Majesty the Commander-in-Chief.

Every person, high or low, should realize wherefrom comes the majesty of supreme command. The higher should be strict in the execution of the entrusted Imperial Command, and the lower sincere and loyal in the obedience thereto. The vital requisite to victory and for securing public peace is the firm unity of the Army obtained through its single-hearted loyalty to the Emperor and perfect consolidation and coordination under a single, supreme command.

The front is especially the place for military men to put utmost practice to their sublime spirit of absolute obedience. What enables our military men to conduct themselves duly in the face of a life-and-death struggle and, at a command, to march forward joyously to death, to the silent consummation of their supreme obedience and self-sacrifice, is the quintess<sup>ence</sup> of our Imperial martial spirit.

#### IV Unity

The Imperial Army looks up to His Majesty the Commander-in-Chief as its head. All military men should comply with His Majesty's gracious mind, and by attaining harmony among themselves through their unanimous loyalty to the Throne, should realize complete unity of the whole Army.

Each unit in the Army should, in conformity with the basic principle of supreme command, establish a strong unity in it, permeated, however, with a peaceful harmony, with its commander as its center. Military men of all ranks, high or low, should be strict in discharging their several duties and obedient to their commander's will, and while trusting in others and

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standing aloof from cares of earthly life and interests, should be ready to sacrifice their individual selves for the sake of the whole.

#### V Co-operation

All soldiers should be united in discharging their several duties and at the same time should be ready to sacrifice themselves joyfully for the sake of the victory of the whole Army.

Each unit should reciprocally respect the duty and honor of other units. Put trust in and give assistance to one another. Take up difficult tasks voluntarily, and through co-operation and harmony, make every effort for the accomplishment of the common aim.

#### VI Fighting Spirit

Fighting should be done resolutely and dauntlessly always consistent with fighting spirit.

In attacking, be positive and decisive, always take the initiative, and fight it out with a hardy and indomitable spirit until you completely overcome your enemy. Even when on the defensive, you should keep alive the edge of offensive spirit and never fail to secure the initiative in action. Do not yield your position to the enemy even if it means death. Pursue the enemy resolutely and thoroughly to the very end.

Be daring and courageous, and fear nothing. Meet hardships with boldness and composure, overcome difficulties with an indomitable spirit and surmounting every obstacle, devote yourselves to reach your final goal of victory.



VII Faith of Victory

Faith is might. One who fights dauntlessly with firm faith always wins.

Faith in certain victory arises from a constant and indefatigable self-training of determination to the death. In your time by all means devote yourselves to the utmost to the cultivation of unfailing power for winning victory.

The issue of the present war will decide the future of our Empire. Bear in mind your duty and responsibility to the tradition of a "Hundred battles, a hundred victories, reflect<sup>UPC.1</sup> the gloryfilled history of your army and never cease fighting until victory is won.

## Essentials Part II

### I Piety

Divine spirits witness our deeds from above. Ever be just, honest and upright and be loyal to the Emperor and dutiful to parents, so that you may be deserving of divine protection from Heaven.

### II Filial Piety

The essence of loyalty to the ruler and filial devotion to the parents is the essence of our national morality, and this explains the fact that those who are loyal to the Emperor invariably are dutiful to their parents.

When you are at the front, bear your parent's wishes deeply in mind and devote yourselves to the cause of loyalty to the Emperor, therewith rendering illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

### III The Salute and Deportment

The salute manifests the genuine spirit of obedience and is the indication of the unity of superiors and subordinates. Especially, punctilious salutes are required at the front.

Punctiliousness and uprightness of deportment which issues from a courteous personality is the proof of one's greatness as military man.

### IV Comradeship

Comradeship is the way for all military men to unite in one in life and death--putting trust in one another, cultivating

moral strength through mutual and constant contact, and giving assistance in cases of need, and warning against wrong and mistakes--all for the fulfilment, in cordially co-operation, of their duties as military men.

#### V Exemplification by the Leaders

Those of higher ranks should, in all circumstances, set themselves as examples for their subordinates. If the superiors are not proper, disorder would necessarily follow among the subordinates.

Action is valued at the front. Lead the men personally with firm determination.

#### VI Responsibility

Duty is sacred. Responsibility is grave. Do not slight a single task, a single duty. Devote your soul, exert your over effort and use all the means in your power for the best possible accomplishment of your duties.

The one with the strongest sense of responsibility is truly the most courageous man in the battle-field.

#### VII View on Life and Death

That which annihilates the bounds between life and death is the sublime spirit of self-sacrifice and service.

Transcend life and death, and devote yourselves to the fulfilment of your duty. Rejoice in the life of ever-lasting loyalty and patriotism which is to be attained through the serenity of the soul reached after the supreme exertion of all bodily and mental efforts.

VIII Honor

A man of honor is strong. Keep always in mind the honor of your families and native communities, and strive hard to fulfil their expectations.

Prefer death to a shameful life of captivity. Never leave a disgraceful name behind you at death.

IX Simplicity and Fortitude

Regulate your life at the front with stern simplicity, and promote thereby the spirit of fortitude and military morale.

Life at the front must necessarily be plain in mode. Practice economy and self-denial in everything, remembering that privation and inconvenience are common in the battlefield. Luxury slackens a valiant spirit.

X Integrity and Purity

Integrity and purity is the basis of our chivalrous ideal. How can a man unable to restrain himself from worldly desires, offer himself to the cause of our Empire?

Control yourself with coldness and severity. Be fair and just in dealing with matters. Act with a clean conscience in the sight of gods and men.

Essentials Part III

I Allocations at the Front

1) Calamity falls on one's unguarded moments. Be always prepared against unexpected contingencies.

Do not despise the enemies and natives, neither be content with a small measure of success or neglect your further duties. Mind that misfortune comes also from negligence.

2) Be careful in guarding military secrets. Spies are always about you.

3) The duty of a sentry is grave. He is charged with the fate of an army, and represents the military discipline of a unit to which he belongs. He should thoroughly understand the gravity of his duty and fulfil it with a stern sense of responsibility. Again a sentry's status should be deeply respected.

4) Ideological warfare plays an important role in modern war. Have an unshakable conviction in the Japanese Empire and exert yourselves not only to confound the enemy's deceitful propaganda but to take an active part in the vindication of our KODO (The Imperial Way).

5) False rumors have their origin in lack of conviction. Do not waver but always be firm. Have confidence in the real power of the Imperial Army, and trust your superior officers.

6) Pay regard in the custody of enemy assets and properties. Requisition, confiscation and destruction of supplies should be carried out always only on orders of the commanding

officer according to regulations.

7) Following the basic principle of the Imperial Army, love and protect innocent native people with benevolence.

8) While at the front, never become addicted to sensual pleasures or forget yourselves <sup>by</sup> being carried away by selfish desire, so that you will not mar the prestige of the Imperial Army or spoil your honor offered in service of the Emperor. Be strictly prudent and make every effort not to stain the integrity and purity of our military men.

9) Control your anger and discontentment. "Think of anger as an enemy." says an old teaching. A momentary fit of passion often results in lingering repentance.

The severity of Military Law aims especially at the maintenance of the honor of military men and upholding the prestige of the Imperial Army. Always remember the determinat<sup>ti</sup> and deep emotion you had embarking for the front; think of the sincere affection of your parents, wife and children; and even as a joke do not expose yourself to crime.

## II Etiquette and Good Behavior at the Front.

1) According to the tradition of our military spirit, devote yourselves constantly to cultivating martial virtues and skill.

"Never get tired of whatever you are engaged in," said a certain general of the old days.

2) Free yourselves from family cares for the sake of concentrated devotion to the Imperial cause, and always keep your person and personal possessions clean and orderly so that

you may, on your death, leave good impressions behind. All military men should be ready to die in the battle-field, and your families should be given previous warnings not to be disturbed even if your remains fail to be sent home.

3) It is to be most regretted for military men to die of diseases at the front. Be strictly careful about your health so that you may not fail through intemperance in the performance of your public service.

4) Be as prudent as the ancient warriors who valued their swords as their own souls and horses as their own treasures. At the front, always treat your arms and other supplies with respect, and take good care of horses.

5) Morality at the front is the source of fighting power. Be considerate always of the convenience of other units also and never monopolize on lodgings and supplies.

It is said that, "A fowl that takes off from water never leaves it muddy." We desire to leave honorable and everlasting fame of the valiant and admirable Imperial Army even in the remotest regions of foreign countries.

6) It is a lofty character desired in military men not to boast of their own meritorious deeds but to credit others with honor.

Never be jealous of the advancement of others. Do not begrudge if your merits are not appreciated but think of the deficiency of your own sincerity.

7) Be sincere and honest in every matter and be ashamed of telling lies and exaggerations.

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8) Always maintain unanimity befitting a citizen of a great nation, and by taking up the cause of justice, exalt the prestige of our Empire throughout the world.

International etiquette should also be duly observed.

9) In case you are allowed to return home by Imperial order after living through many fatal battles, think first of <sup>all</sup> of those who died sacrificing themselves for the sake of the Empire. Set good examples to the public by your prudent conduct and speech and redouble your resolution to render further service to the Imperial Throne.

#### Conclusion

All of the foregoing are based on the spirit of the Imperial Instructions to Military Men and aim at serving the supreme end of the same. Therefore, these should be held as the standard of practical morals at the front thereby attaining full observance of the Imperial Instructions.

All officers and men at the front should firmly comply with the purpose of this book and, excelling in devotion to public service, should fulfil their duties as military men so that they may respond to the profound and gracious favor of His Majesty the Emperor.



REF LOC # 345

Certificate of the Distribution of Document

I, chief of the Documents Section, the First Demobilization Bureau, the Demobilization Office, certify that the "Instructions to Japanese Soldiers at the Front" appended herewith, consisting of thirty-two pages, and printed in the Japanese language, is a document distributed to officers and men of the entire army as Army Order No. 1. on July 8, 16th year of Showa (TN: 1941).

The sixth day of the first month, the twenty-second year of Showa (TN: 1947).

Tokyo: MIYAMA, Yozo

Chief of the Document Section, the  
First Demobilization Bureau.

I certify that the above seal and signature were affixed in my presence.

On the same day and at the same place:

Witness: TANAKA, Keiji

Certificate of the Formation of Document

I, chief of the Documents Section, the First Demobilization Bureau, the Demobilization Office, certify that the publication entitled "Instructions to Japanese Soldiers at the Front" appended herewith, consisting of thirty two pages and printed in the Japanese language, is one of many documents compiled and published by the War Ministry of the Japanese Government.

The twenty-first day of the first month, the twenty-second year of Showa (Feb. 1947)

Tokyo: MIYAMA, Yozo

Chief of the Documents Section,  
the First Demobilization Bureau.

I certify that the above seal and signature were affixed in my presence.

On the same day, at the same place:

Witness: TANAKA, Koji

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan  
Date 7 Feb. 1947

"Instructions to Japanese Soldiers  
at the Front"

Def. Doc. # 415

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- v -

ARAJI, S. Kuo, et al.

## Spec. Deposition

Deponent: ICHINOHE, Kiriya.

Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

- (1) My name is ICHINOHE, Kiriya.
- (2) My present residence is c/o TAKAHASHI, No. 426, MATSUBARA-CHO-4-chome, SHIBUYA Ward, TOKYO Metropolis.
- (3) I was born in the 3rd day of July, the 38th year of Meiji (1905).
- (4) The outline of my career is as follows:
  - a. On the 26th day of January of the 18th year of Showa (1943), finished a special course at the military college.
  - b. On the same day, commissioned a staff officer of the Imperial Guard Division.
  - c. On the 14th day of February of the same year, arrived at BENDU, SUMATRA Island.
  - d. On the 13rd day of September of the 18th year of Showa (1943), commissioned a staff officer to the Fourth Division.
  - e. On the 22nd day of September of the same year, mobilization was ordered to the Fourth Division and I reported, in SUMATRA.

- 1 -

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Island, for the arrival of the division as an advance staff-officer.

On the 10th day of November the 18th year of Showa (1943),  
I arrived at PADANG, SUMATRA Island.

On the 10th day of June, of the 19th Year of Showa (1944),  
commissioned a military staff-officer of the Imperial Headquarters.

On the 27th day of June of the same year, arrived at Tokyo,

- (5) At the time when I was on duty in the SUMATRA Island, copies of the Imperial Rescript given to the soldiers and the instruction in the war field had been distributed to every corps stationed there. At the headquarters of the Imperial Guard Division, all members of its respective department met on one spot every morning and held morning parade. All members of the headquarters of the Fourth division did also likewise. At the morning parade a senior officer or his deputy officer read in turn, the Imperial Rescript or "The Instructions to Army Officers and Men on Conduct and Behavior in Battle Fields", and gave instructions or directions based on them, so that the Rescript and instructions may well be diffused and put into practice.

On the festival and memorial days, the same thing was performed performed previous to its ceremony.

In every corps assigned to the both division too, the same effort was made in the same way to diffuse and put into practice the Imperial Rescript and the spirit of "The Instructions to Army Officers and Men Conduct and Behavior in Battle Field".

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I know it by the reports from the corpses and also by my personal attendance on the spot on the festival and memorial days.

On the 23rd day of January, the 22nd year of Showa(1947),  
IN TOKYO.

Deponent, ICHINOHE, Kuniya (seal)

I, BAINO, Jurkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same day,

At the same place.

Witness, BAINO, Jurkichi (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ ICHINOHE, Kuniya

243070

東京国家軍事裁判所

亞木利加合衆国其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣子共進書

供述者 一 伊 戸 公 哉  
一 伊 戸 公 哉

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手ノヘキミヤ

一私ノ姓名ハ一戸公哉デアリマス

二私ノ現住所ハ東京部世田谷區松原町四丁目四二六番地高橋方デアリマス

三私ノ生年月日ハ明治三十八年(一九〇五年)七月三日デアリマス

四私ノ経歴ノ概略ハ次ノ通りデアリマス

昭和十八年(一九四三年)一月二十六日陸軍大學校専科卒業。同日近

衛師員參謀ニ補セラル。同年二月十四日「スマトラ」島「メダン」着。

昭和十八年(一九四三年)九月二十三日「スマトラ」島ニ補セラル。同

年九月二十二日第四師團動員下令。元駐参謀トシテ「スマトラ」島ニ

在リテ第四師團ノ同島進駐ヲ準備ス。

昭和十八年(一九四三年)十一月十日「スマトラ」島「パタン」着。

昭和十九年(一九四四年)六月十日大本營ニ参謀ニ補セラル。同年

六月二十七日東京着。

五「スマトラ」在勤當時各部隊ニハ勅諭ノ爲ト戦陣訓トガ洩レナク配布セ

ラレテ居リマシク。近衛師團司令部ニ於テハ司令部内ノ各部毎ニ第四師

司令部ニ於テハ司令部全員一所ニ集リ毎朝朝禮ヲシマシタガ其ノ高  
級尉級者クハ其ノ代理將校ニ於テ願者ヲ定メ勅諭或ハ戰陣訓ヲ授ク又之  
ニ基キ訓示ヲ與ヘ勅諭及戰陣訓ノ普及ト實踐トニ努メマシタ  
祝祭日及記念日ニ於テハ其儀式ノ前ニ必ず同様ノ行事ヲ致シマシタ。  
爾時口勅下都隊ニ於テモ同様ノ方法ニ依リ勅諭及戰陣訓ノ普及ヲ圖  
メタコトハ各部隊カラノ報告ト祝祭日又ハ記念日ニ現場ニ臨席シタコト  
ニヨツテ承知シテ居リマス。

(三七)



昭和廿二年（一九四七年）一月廿三日於東京

供 送 者 一 戸 公 裁

右ハ管立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ  
證明シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立 口 人 阪 谷 淳 吉

宣 書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ施ス何事ヲモ試秘セズ又何事ヲモ附  
サルコトヲ誓フ

捺 印 名 一 用 公 戦

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( ERRATA SHEET )

辯護側文書一五二〇號

A フクレッツチマー 宣誓供述書正誤表

三頁十一行目「回答ヲ受取リマシタル」次キ「ニツト」大使ハ日本外務省  
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

SHAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

Name: Alfred F. KRETSCHMER

Address: Yanko Hotel  
Atami, Japan

Concerning the treatment given to Prisoners of War  
who had fallen into Japanese hands

I was German Military Attache in Tokyo from December 4,  
1940 until May 8, 1945.

Between January 1941 and March 1944, I made official  
visits to the various Japanese fronts: Manchuria, Inner Mongolia,  
North China, Central China, Hongkong, French Indo-China, Siam,  
Malaya, Singapore, Dutch East Indies, Philippines. I have not  
seen the New Guinea front.

In March 1942 when all the Axis Military and Air Attaches  
visited part of the southern regions conquered by the Japanese  
army, in Singapore only we were invited to look over one of  
the local POW camps. We declined as we had already protested  
in Manila when we were led through a civilian internment camp  
there. Perhaps because of this, our strict refusal, no one

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North China, Central China, Hongkong, French Indo-China, Siam,  
Malaya, Singapore, Dutch East Indies, Philippines. I have not

In March 1942 when all the Axis Military and Air Attaches

of us were ever again invited to visit a Japanese POW camp.

In Singapore we happened to see Australian POW driving by us in trucks. They made a healthy impression, more happy than depressed, and seemed scarcely guarded. In December 1942 or January 1943, in reprisal for the chaining of German soldiers captured during an English commando raid on one of the Cherchel Isles, the German government as is known, had ordered a special number of British POW to be temporarily put in chains. The German Foreign Office had commissioned Ambassador Ott to ask the Japanese Foreign Office to join in on these reprisals as Italy had promised to do. Ambassador Ott, as well as we, Naval, Air and Military Attaches, detested the extension of such reprisals and besides this we were of the opinion that the Japanese government would reject this request as not corresponding to the Bushido spirit. Ambassador Ott, therefore, remonstrated to the German Foreign Office. The remonstrator was disregarded and Ambassador Ott asked me to approach the Japanese Army with the proposal. He himself would address the Japanese Foreign Office. I talked the matter over with Major YAMAZAKI of the War Ministry. The next day I received the War Ministry's answer that the Japanese Army would not join in on such German reprisals, they being contrary to the Bushido spirit. Ambassador Ott received a corresponding answer from the Japanese Foreign Office. In my conversation with the leading army circles, I learned that the desire existed among the Japanese to treat POW decently and

according to international law was done in the First World War with the German Tsingtao Garrison.

As to the civil internment camp in Manila which was shown us by Axis Military and Air Attaches in March 1942, I state that the quarters were somewhat crowded but the internees made a healthy impression. They were apparently allowed to govern and feed themselves.

Wherever I saw Japanese soldiers during my excursions mentioned above, they were in fair or good discipline.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/A. F. Kretschmer

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24 day of April, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ Bernard A. Hargader, 1st. Lt.  
Inf.  
Administrative Officer  
Defense Division, Legal Section

DEF. DOC. #1701

Translated by Defense

Defense Language Branch for use

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al - vs -

AKAKI, Sadao, et al.

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: INADA, Masazumi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Confidential Affidavit of INADA, Masazumi

My full name is INADA, Masazumi. My age is 52 and I am at present living in SUGAMO Prison.

At the time of the outbreak of the war, I was Vice-Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army in Manchuria and held the rank of major general. In the spring of the following year I became Chief of Staff of the same Army. In March, 1943, I became Vice Chief of the General Staff of the Southern Army in Singapore. In December of the same year I became commander of the Second Aircraft Base Force in New Guinea and Manockoeri. In April 1944 I became the 6th Air Division Commander, and in October of the same year, the 3rd Shipping Transport Commander at Manila. In April 1945 I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, in May of the same year I became Chief of Staff of the 16th Area Army in KYUSHU and, concurrently, of the Western Army. The close of the war came at that time.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

to state to 1943-1944...

...the ...

...DEF. DOC. #1701

...About July, 1943, in Singapore I had an interview with Lieutenant

General HAMADA, Chief of the War Ministry's Prisoner Control Department,

who was then on a tour of inspection of the conditions of war prisoners.

When he stated his wish to improve the treatment of war prisoners, I

answered to the following effect:

Supreme Commander TERAUCHI was irreconcilably opposed to cruel treat-

ment of war prisoners and was wont to call for more care in handling them.

The members of his staff were always seeing that the concerned officers and

men act according to his desires. They instructed, however, that war

prisoners should be treated in the same manner as ordinary armed units,

since special treatment better than that given the ordinary armed units

could not possibly be given to them. For example, the work on the railway

to connect Thailand with Burma, then in progress, employed ordinary armed

units, civilian laborers, and war prisoners. This work was not by any

means an easy task for them for various reasons. They were hard pressed

for provisions and medicine. However, the war prisoners were never cruelly

treated. All that could be afforded was done for them all alike so as to

maintain their working power.

Then, on the same occasion, Lieutenant General HAMADA told me that

he had inspected principal war prisoner internment camps in various parts

of the Southern Countries, such as Thailand and Burma, and had given in-



DEF. DOC. #1701

On this 28th day of May, 1947

At ILTFE.

DEPONENT /S/ INADA, Masazumi (seal)

We, KAZUMA, Isaburo, and OKAMOTO, Hisashi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at ILTFE.

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburo. (seal)  
" OKAMOTO, Hisashi. "

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ INADA, Masazumi. (seal)

44 3072

Def. Doc. #1701

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加台糸國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述書

供述者

緒田正

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタ  
如ク供述致シマス

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

上  
次

## 口 供 書

私ノ姓名ハ稻田正純デス

年齢ハ五十二才 目下ノ住所ハ集約拘置所デス

私ハ開戦當時滿洲ノ第五軍參謀副長デ少將デアリマシタ。翌年春同軍ノ參謀長トナリ昭和十八年三月「シंगाポール」ノ南方軍總參謀副長トナリ同年十二月在「ニューギニア」マノクワリ」ノ第二根據地隊司令官トナリ翌十九年四月第六飛行師團長ニ同三月十月在「マニラ」第三船舶隊送司令官ニ翌二十年四月中將トナリ同五月在九州第十六方面軍參謀長兼西部軍管區參謀長トナリ終戦ニ及ビマシタ

私ハ十八年七月頃當時俘虜狀況視察中ノ濱田軍省俘虜管理部長ト「シंगाポール」ニ於テ會見シタコトガアリマス其席上濱田中將カラ俘虜ノ待遇ヲ今少シ良クセヨト希望セラレタノデ私ハ「寺内總司令官ハ其性格上ヨリスルモ俘虜ヲ虐待スルガ如キコトハ大キライナリ其取扱ヲ慎重ニスル様常ニ要求セラレアリ幕僚モ亦其意ヲ体シテ關係者ヲ常ニ戒メツツアル、然シナガラ一般軍隊以上ノ特別待遇ヲ與ヘルガ如キコトハ出來ナ

イカラ之ニ準スル待遇ヲセヨト示シテラル、例ヘバ當時問題デアツタ泰  
緬連投鐵道工事ニハ一般軍隊モ労働者モ俘虜モ働イテ居リ諸般ノ關係上  
皆相當苦勞ヲシテラル給養上衛生上種々困難ハアルガ之ニ關シ特ニ俘虜  
ヲ以テ待サセタコトハナイ皆一樣ニ出來ルダケノコトヲシテヤリ作業力ヲ  
落サナイ様努力セシメツツアルトイフ様ナ意味ノ返事ヲシタコトガア  
リマス

尙其際濱田中將ハ南方各地即泰、ビルマ、馬來等ノ主ナル俘虜收容所ヲ  
視察シテ待遇改善ニ關シ指導シテ來タト申シテヨリマシタ

相

田

正

純

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）五月二十八日 於極東國際軍事裁判所内

供述者

稻

田

正

純

右ハ黨立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ説明シマス

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良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ

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64303

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: SAWADA, Shigeru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in our country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was born at No. 4, Kamobo, Kamoda-Mura, Tosa-Gun, Kochi Prefecture on 29 March 1887 (the 20th year of Meiji). My permanent domicile is No. 47, 5-Chome, Asagaya, Suginami Ward, Tokyo City, where I am still living.

2. The outline of my life history is as follows:

- June 1906: Appointed Sub-lieutenant
- March 1935: Appointed Major General
- March 1938: Appointed Lieutenant General
- July, the same year: Appointed Commander of the 4th Division
- October 1939: Appointed Vice Chief of the Army General Staff
- December 1940: Appointed Commander of the 13th Army (stationed at Shanghai)
- October 1942: Relieved of duties as the Commander of the 13th Army
- 15 November 1942: Placed on the reserve list.

In the period of my active service, I served mainly in the Army General Staff, the War College, and as an officer attached to the Japanese Embassies abroad.

3. From December 1940 till October 1942, I was at Shanghai as Commander of the 13th Army. The military occupation by the Japanese troops of the International Settlement at Shanghai, following the outbreak of the Pacific War on 8 December 1941, was effected in an orderly manner and under perfect discipline, amidst the admiration and praise of the whole citizens. There were no unfortunate happenings; nor was there a single shot fired.

Every precaution was taken to prevent any unfortunate happenings that often accompany the military occupation of a city. The following are the major steps taken:

a. The strength of the occupation force was reduced to a minimum, and it is my recollection that the number of soldiers did not exceed 500 at the most.

b. The occupation took place in the daytime. In other words, since we thought that the general office hour of workers following various professions and belonging to various classes within the International Settlement began at about 9 a.m., we commenced the occupation hour later, that is, at 10 a.m.

c. Prior to the advance of troops, our mixed military envoy composed of army, navy and foreign office personnel, visited the Shanghai Municipal Office and notified in advance of our military occupation in order that the authorities of the settlement might take all possible measures to prevent disturbances and unrest among the citizens.

d. The police units of the settlement were promptly stationed at various security positions, and in their presence the advance of the Japanese troops was started.

e. The troops, marching in orderly formation without being subdivided, reached the turf and the barracks formerly used by the U. S. Marine Corps, and there quickly closed up. Soldiers were strictly prohibited from dispersing.

f. Whenever there was any special duty to be performed, either a corps commanded by an officer or a group of specially chosen non-commissioned officers were appointed for the task.

g. Patrol parties were very frequently despatched to make a round of inspection with a view to preventing wrongs and misdeeds being committed.

h. Everywhere in the city notices were posted telling the citizens to set their minds at rest.

i. I summoned up all the commanders and gave them instructions that every possible precaution be taken against wrongs and misdeeds, and that military discipline be enforced with great strictness and severity. I also instructed them to discharge their duty without resort to arms.

j. Banks were not closed and were under special orders to carry on their business as usual.

k. Japanese nationals were prohibited from entering the city, except those with certificates issued by the Japanese Consul.

Because of such precautionary measures, not a single incident occurred. I started for a round of inspection through the city at about 3 p.m. and found nothing unusual. There was much traffic. Shops were carrying on their business as usual, not a single shop being closed.

The newspapers in Shanghai unanimously extolled the behaviours of the Japanese troops and went so far as to call them exemplary behaviours.

4. In Shanghai there were some 1,500 or 1,600 American and British prisoners of war who were in charge of the 13th Army under my command. I used to instruct the Chief of the POW Camp to be above all, compassionate, fair and just in his treatment of prisoners of war. Major General YUSE, Camp Commandant, meticulously abode by my instructions. When prisoners were assigned to some labour inside the camp, he used to share the work with them, whereby setting an example.

Major General YUSE, on his own initiative, used to come to my quarters once a week to report on the conditions in the camp. He was so devoted to his work that he at length succumbed to a disease and died while he was still in the same position.

The POW Camp was properly equipped and properly managed. Mr. Egley (TN: ?), a Swiss, delegated by the International Red Cross to inspect the camp, was highly delighted after he had inspected the camp, and immediately after his visit to the camp, took the trouble of writing me a letter of thanks.

Although it is regrettable that one of the interpreters at the camp has been indicted as a war criminal on the charge of some illegal act, yet the general conditions in the camp may be gathered from the fact that with the exception of this interpreter, neither the Camp Commandant nor any one of his subordinates has been put to trial.



We tried to be fair and just also in our treatment of hostile nationals. It was my intention to place no restraint upon peaceful citizens, who offered us no resistance, and to let them lead a normal life. Upon this line, we decided on the methods of treating these citizens. Consequently, during my tenure of office hostile nationals such as Americans, Britishers and so on were under no restraint whatsoever and were at liberty to reside and make a living in the city. They were allowed to follow their respective occupations. Even in the case of the officials in the Shanghai Municipal Office, those occupying leading positions were not removed but were allowed, in the interests of the settlement, to carry on their work until they themselves tendered their resignations on their own initiative (as I remember, towards March 1942).

Furthermore, bank deposits were not frozen, and for each individual person's living expenses a certain amount per month could be drawn from the bank. With regard to the treatment of hostile nationals and their properties, there was a committee consisting of delegates from the War Ministry, the Navy Ministry, the Foreign Office and the Asiatic Development Bureau, which after deliberation decided on various measures so that no one could take arbitrary and high-handed steps.

The authorities of the Foreign Office, I believe, know better than anyone else that in the Shanghai district a fair and just treatment was accorded to hostile nationals.

On this 16th day of January 1947

At the Sugamo Prison

Deponent: /s/ SAWADA, Shigoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SAWADA, Shigoru (seal)

643073  
Key Doc 1253

極真山除算奉談判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

供述者 堀 兵 衛

自分從我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣  
言ラ爲シタル上テノ如ク供述致シマス

一私ハ明治二十年三月二十九日高知縣土佐縣島田村

宇島郡四番地ニ生レ本籍地及親性所ハ東京都杉並

區阿佐ヶ谷五丁目四十七番地テアリマス

二私ノ經歷ノ大要ハ次ノ通りテアリマス

明治三十九年六月 少尉任官

昭和十一年三月 少尉任官

昭和十二年 三月 中尉任官

同 年 七月 第四師團長

昭和十四年 十月 參謀次長

昭和十五年十二月 第三軍司令部(上將)

昭和十七年 十月 第三軍司令部ヲ免ザラル

同年十一月十五日 豫備役

現役中ハ參謀本部、大學校、在外武官ニ主トシ

テ服務ス

三私ハ一九四〇年十二月カラ一九四二年十月迄第十

三軍司令部トシテ上海ニ在リマシタ、一九四一年

十二月八日太平洋戦争ノ開始時ニ於ケル上海共同

Def Doc 1253

租界へノ日本軍ノ武刀進駐ハ豈然タル秩序ト嚴肅  
ナル軍紀ノ下ニ何等ノ不祥事件モナク一發ノ銃聲  
モ聞クコトナク全市民庶蘇賞讃ノ程ニ行ハレタノ  
デアリマス

軍隊ノ市街進入ニ當リ往々生ズルコトノアル不  
祥事件ヲ未然ニ防グ爲ニ凡ユル手段ガ發サレマシ  
タガ其ノ主ナル處ヲ察ゲレバ次ノ通りデアリマス  
A、進駐兵刀ハ必要ノ最少限度ニ止メマシタ、從  
ツテ陸軍兵刀ハ多クトモ五百点ヲ越エナカツタ  
ト記憶シテ居リマス

B、進駐ハ夜間ニ行ハレマシタ、即チ租界ノ各處  
各級ノ廠長ガ各々其持場ニ就クノガ午四時頃  
デアルト考ハマシタノテ其ノ一時爾後ノ十時ニ  
進駐ヲ始メタデアリマス

C、兵力ノ進入ニ先チ陸軍、海軍並外務ヲ陸軍  
使カ工部局ニ到リ武刀進駐ヲ通告シテ租界當局  
ノ手ヲ以テ市民ノ動搖不安ヲ防グ爲テノ手段ヲ  
採ラシメマシタ

D、租界警察隊ハ直チニ警戒設備ニツキ其ノ下チ  
日本軍ノ進駐ヲ始メラレタデアリマス

E、軍隊ハ編分スル事ナク隊形ナル隊形ヲ以テ競  
馬場及舊米軍マリシ兵營ニ到ツテ直チニ集結シ  
各個ニ兵ノ分散ヲ禁シタデアリマス

F、特別ノ任務ノ爲ニハ將校ノ指揮スル部隊カ又

Ref Doc 1253

ハ遊技セル特別ノ下士官ヲ用ヒマシム。

○、巡察隊ヲ頻繁ニ派遣シテ巡視セシメ非常ノ注意ヲ防止シマシム。

Ⅱ、市中ニハ直チニ人心安堵ノ布告ヲ貼附セシマシム。

Ⅲ、各指揮官ヲ暴メ暴重ニ非常ノ發生ヲ戒メ注意ナル軍紀ノ遵守ヲ要求シ且一兵モ發砲スルコトナク任務ヲ擔サントラ要求シマシム。

Ⅳ、銀行ハ閉鎖セズ待ニ業務ヲ繼續サセマシム。

Ⅴ、偵察ノ範圍アル者以外ノ日本人ノ進入ヲ禁止マシム。

大體以上ノ如キ注意ヲ行ハレマシムノテ何一ツノ不禮暴行モ起リマセンテシム、私ハ午後三時頃ヨリ市内ヲ巡視シマシムガ市内ハ平常ト全ク同ジテ通行モ頻繁テアリ店舗ハ營業ヲ續ケテ店ヲ閉メテ居ルモノハ一ツモ見當リマセンテシム。

上海ノ新聞ハ一齊ニ日本軍ノ行動ヲ賞讃シ模範的ノ行動ヲ稱シマシム程デアリマシム。

四 上海ニハ米粟桴船凡ソ千五六百人位收容シテ居リマシテ其ノ管轄ハ私ガ司令官タル第十三軍デアリマシム、桴船ノ取扱ニハ同情ト公正トヲ主トスベキコトハ私ガ常ニ桴船收容所長ニ訓示シテ居タリデアリ所長湯淵少將ハ屢ニ私ノ訓戒ヲ守リ又所内ノ作業等ニ於テハ自カラ桴船ト共ニ之ニ從事シ卒

Ref Doc 1255

先シテ絶ッ示シテ居リマシク、  
 湯澤少尉ハ徳島一岡ヨリ私ノ所ハ茶ヲ所内ノ狀  
 況ヲ報告シテ居ルガ其ノ熱心ヲ行動ノ爲ニ中病ヲ  
 起シテ死亡スルニ至ツクノテアリマス、  
 然シテ坂谷少尉ノ被刺シタル等ハ正當ニ状態テアリマ  
 シテ尚且赤十字代表ニスイス人ニダレトハ同所ヲ  
 視察シテ非信ニ據ビ直チニ私ニ宛テ痛恨狀ヲ送ッ  
 テ來ル程テアリマシク  
 同坂谷少尉ノ通譯一行ガ不法事件ヲ疑犯者トアツ  
 クノハ疑念テアリマスガ隊長以下其ノ他ニハ一名  
 モ裁判ニ附セラレタル者ノナイコトニ依ツテモ一般  
 ノ状況ハ分ルコトト思ヒマス、  
 以テ自人ノ取扱ハ之亦公正ラシトシ私トシテハは  
 該行爲ノナイ平和ノ市民ニハ何等ノ拘束ヲ加ヘス  
 從來ノ自ノ生活ヲ續ケサストイフ事ヘテアリ之ヲ  
 三學トシテ取扱モ定メクノテアリマス、從ツテ私  
 ノ在職中ハ宋某等ノ以テ人ハ絶テ不拘束テ自由ニ  
 市内ニ居住シ生活シテ居リマシク、從來ノ職業モ  
 其ノ儘トシマシク、工部局職員ノ如キモ商會首領  
 部ハ其ノ儘トシテ等々目録内ニ附載ヲ申出ヅル迄  
 (一九三二年三月頃ト記憶ス) 租界ノ利益ノ爲以  
 同ノ起リ取付ヲ懸念シテ貴ツクノテアリマス  
 又銀行貯金等モ凍結スル事ナク個人ノ生活資金  
 ハ毎月定期ニ限リ支拂ヲ行ハシメマシク、同シテ

5

五  
百  
人  
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分  
公  
治  
印

Ref. Doc 1253

歐州人、以て其國ノ政權ヲニ付テハ國ニ、海軍、外  
務省、與軍院ノ代表者ヲ選出シテ作ツテ國ニ決定  
シテ取ル者ノ尋常積泰ニ歸ル事ヲ防止シテ居リマシ  
ク

上海租界ニ於テ歐州人政權ノ公正維持テアツタコ  
トハ外務省局ガ一巷ヨク知ツテ居ルコトト思ヒマス

一九四七年一月十六日 於東京海軍

海軍大臣 田 島 英

右ハ當立官人ノ面商ニテ宣旨シ且ツ右名シタルコト  
ヲ証明ス

同日於向所

6  
Ref Doc 1253

宣 告 行

良心ニ従ヒ良賢ヲ選ヘ何事ヲモ取捨セス又  
何事ヲモ附加セサルコトヲ誓フ

源 田 茂



Def. Doc. #1849

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

I, MARY ERVIA MARTIN residing at 21, Kensington Gate, W.8. in the County of London, England, make oath and say that the attached photostatic copy of the statement entitled Japanese in Hongkong, January to July 1945, given by me for use in evidence in the trial of major war criminals for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East now sitting in Tokyo, and that such statement is in all respects true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

SWORN by the said MARY )  
MARY ERVIA MARTIN at 21, )  
Kensington Gate, South )  
County of London this )  
29th day of April, 1947. )  
Before me,

(Signed) Mary Ervia Martin

(Signed) Edwin V. Leach  
Commissioner for Oaths.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Japanese in Hongkong, January to July, 1942.

- - -o o o- - -

Mrs A.J.Martin

The Japanese I met in Hongkong during the months my husband and I were prisoners there were all Foreign Office or Consular men and it was thanks to their care and protection that we received the very special treatment we did, and were never at any time in the hands of the Army or the Gendarmarie. They took very good care of us and did not.

My husband, Arthur J.Martin, was British Consul General in Chungking and we had gone to Hongkong on sick leave in November, 1941, where he had an operation early in December, at the Queen Mary Hospital. He was getting on excellently well, but the attack of the Japanese of Hongkong was followed by a complete breakdown of most services; no food, no medicines, a practical breakdown in so many directions including morale, that chances for survival for any except the most fit and hardy were slight and my husband died on the 7th of April, 1942.

During those months, from January until the end of June, when I was allowed to leave Hongkong on the repatriation ship, the Gripsholm, with the repatriated Americans, my husband and I, and later I alone, owed every bit of consideration and help which we received to certain Japanese officials, to whom I feel the deepest gratitude. The kindness they showed us meant that my husband's last days were at least peaceful, and that I am alive today. I was not prepared, after my husband's death, to face concentration camp life, and told the Japanese in charge of Foreign Affairs so. I was lucky that he realized I meant what I said. The kindness my husband and I received was also shown to various other people and I feel that the Japanese concerned should receive credit

Dof. Doc. #1849

for what they did.

The first we came in contact with is or rather was Consul in Hongkong, a Mr. Kimura. Colonel Macao was in Tokyo and Mr. Kimura was in charge during the first three months after the Japanese occupation of Hongkong, of the Consulate General although, naturally, he had no authority as the Army were entirely in control and treated him with the most open discourtesy. He was transferred to Peking in March.

When it became apparent that severe measures were being taken to control the foreigners in Hongkong, and that passes were required for any one moving about I wrote a letter for my husband, to the Japanese Consul General, asking for a pass, and for his assistance in obtaining diplomatic protection for us. We were then at the Queen Mary Hospital.

Mr. Kimura sent a vice-consul out next day, gave me his own card, and asked that I call on him the following day at his office in Hongkong. After a long and very irate conversation with two Japanese officers Mr. Kimura was able to get for me a military pass, on his own personal guarantee and my promise to report to him every ten days. I had a number of interviews with him, often chatting for nearly an hour. We discussed the war pretty thoroughly and I was of the impression that he was horrified at what had happened, although he was far too astute to say much. I do know, from eye-witnesses, that when the famous march down the Peak took place, all the residents walking down with what luggage they could carry in their hands, young, old, sick or well, Mr. Kimura rounded up every motor car he could get hold of and sent them up the peak to bring people down. He did so much to alleviate the awful conditions that Hongkong residents found themselves in

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that the Army authorities had him on the mat and threatened him with severe punishment if he did not cease his efforts, and forbade him seeing Dr Selwyn-Clark, and various other British still at large.

When he was about to be transferred I had an interview with him and he told me that Mr. Takio Oda was coming, as Chief of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, that he would have all the authority and power and freedom that he lacked, and that he would look after my husband and me and be in apposition to do much more for us. Mr. Kimura was a quiet very pleasant mannered man, most unaggressive, and felt very much the position he was put in by the Army, and his own inability to help us.

Mr. Oda, Takio Oda, was a much more aggressive personality. He was a most agreeable, good looking man, about 35 years of age, and was said to have studied at Amhurst College, while stationed at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. To insure his own authority as Chief of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs in Hongkong, he had had himself made a Colonel in the Army, although his suave good looks make an amusing contrast to the truculent apishness of a good many of the Japanese Army officers. He was also a member of the Black Dragon Society. He took over complete charge of affairs on his arrival, and immediately instituted the sending of parcels to Stanley Jail, where about 3,500 prisoners were interned. Conditions there, due to underfeeding and overcrowding were very bad and the parcels went a long way to alleviate conditions for the lucky few who were recipients. I understand about 500 parcels a week were the average. Those who had no friends in Hongkong were unlucky. Red Cross parcels were undelivered, and special grants of money were so whittled down and prices

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were so fantastic that they got very little.

Visits every week to the French hospital by two prisoners from Stanley, for medical treatment were also instituted by Mr. Oda, on the appeal of Dr Selwyn-Clark. This kept a link going between Stanley and the outer world.

The kindnesses shown by Mr. Oda to my husband and me were innumerable. He came out to see my husband personally. He lent us money out of his own pocket, and later a considerable sum from Japanese Government funds. He saw to it that I had a pass sealed by the highest army authorities. I had it translated by a Chinese friend who told me, "Well, you certainly are under very high protection." It meant I had courteous treatment from all sentries, who guarded all the roads everywhere in Hongkong. He spared no effort to protect us in every way, and on my husband's death sent a representative to the funeral, with a huge wreath from the members of the Foreign Affairs Bureau, and came personally to call the following day to express his sympathy. He never lost an opportunity to show me a kindness, although he was extremely bad tempered at times, particularly at the time when the Doolittle bombing of Japan took place and his own family were endangered. He did far more than could have been expected, with so much understanding, it is hard to believe at all, looking back now. He said to me one day, "Why do you worry when I am looking after you." I couldn't ask for more than that I suppose. And I was fortunate to get away on the Gripsholm, again with his help, before he was transferred from Hongkong.

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He hated the work, after two months there. He hated his own inability to relieve the suffering there. He told Father Joy, the head of the Jesuit Procuracy, who was a great friend of ours and told me. Father Joy would be an invaluable witness for the defence for all "good Japanese" in Hongkong. He got about everywhere and knows them all,

I understand that Mr. Oda was keenly interested in getting the Red Cross established in Hongkong. But Mr. Zindol, the representative, a Swiss, came to Hongkong after I left on the Gripsholm, or rather on the Asama Maru, which later transferred us to the Gripsholm, so I can not say anything about his activities there. I do know though that when I was leaving Hongkong, and went to say good bye to Mr. Oda, I asked him if he had any message to give Lord Halifax, or Sir Alexander Cadogan, both of whom I hoped to see and he replied, "Yes, tell them to get the British out of Hongkong, get them out as quickly as they can, to India, anywhere out of here." And I replied, "You will help, you have done so much already." "I will do everything I can," he replied. I do not believe anyone could have done more than he did, in the face of the attitude of the Army authorities, and the British owe a great debt of gratitude to him for what he did.

Mr. Fugita was one of the Vice-consuls in the Consulate General and was one of the first Japanese I met after the occupation. I can see him now, in the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, dealing out passes to 3rd Nationals, handling them all, and in particular the Norwegian Consul who made a scene because apparently he was not to have a pass, with

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such courtesy and tact it was hard to believe he was one of the hated Japanese. I met him several times, knew him slightly over a period of several months until he was relieved of his post and went away to Japan. He was always most kind, and finally left because he couldn't understand the friction with the Gendarmerie and his own inability to help people who so often desperately needed help. That is the story I was told, he couldn't stand seeing so much suffering, and being unable to help. Father Joy can tell you all about him. He did everything possible to help my husband and me, even giving me eggs one day, which he had received as a present from the New Territory, for my husband.

Colonel Yano was Consul General in Hongkong, and was away in Tokyo most of the time. He gave me his own personal calling card, to use in case of necessity with the message that if I found myself in any difficulties at any time, sentries were often making things difficult for people, I was to telephone him at once. He personally took Mrs. Tiertoff, the mother of Mrs D.G. Davis, whose husband was in the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, up to their house on the Peak, in an effort to get some clothes and personal belongings from their house. They at the SunHua Hotel with the other bankers. Colonel Yano helped her load up a big load of things in his own motor car and brought her down the Peak again. Somehow I cannot imagine a Consul General of any other nationality doing such a thing, queer people, the Japanese.

I met Mr. Nara the day I got my military pass from Mr. Kimura, at lunch at a very bad restaurant on the Queen's Road, where I had gone to get something to eat other than hospital fare, which was bad, to put it

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mildly. The food at the restaurant was bad too, and I looked up from the table I was sitting at, to see a pleasant faced middle aged Japanese sit down opposite me. He so politely inquired if I minded that when he ordered Beef Steak I remarked that it was really shoeleather and found myself in a conversation with him. He was curious to know who I was and how I happened to be out of Stanley Jail. He knew of my husband, and we found so many congenial topics to talk about that an hour and a half passed before the "lunch" was over, he insisting on paying for it, although I assured him that I was still solvent. He replied that I had better keep it, I would need it. My impression was that although he was advisor to the Japanese Army in Hongkong, he did not approve of the war. He had been agent for the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha. He inquired if he could do anything for us, and said to call on him if he could. I later found that he had spoken to Mr. Oda about us in an effort to help us. A very kindly pacific man, I thought.

The repatriation ship, the Asama Maru left Hongkong on the 29th of June, if I remember rightly. Things went very smoothly from the a Japanese crew including cabin stewards and stewardesses. Accommodations were extremely crowded, the ship was simply packed and to avoid complication the Japanese had requested the American Embassy officials to undertake the billeting of the passengers. This had been done most efficiently and everyone went to his appointed berth at once without delay. All one had was a berth and in our cabin four people were packed in a cabin intended only for three. We managed well enough however and there was a very good atmosphere in that tiny room.



Some bighearted person, in the Embassy I heard had the idea that the men on board should disregard self interest and give up their A and B deck cabins so that people of lesser importance, particularly the missionaries, with their large families of children should have the comfort of better accommodations. So, all members of the American Embassy and Consular Services, with the exception of Mr Southard, the Consul General from Hongkong, and the South American Diplomats vacated their cabins and went below to the steerage. There may have been others who held on to their good cabins, but I did not hear of it if they did.

Although there was a certain amount of grumbling by wives separated from their husbands who slept down below it was all done with considerable good spirit. Those who might possibly have objected vigorously under more normal conditions were held to discrete silence by popular opinion. I have since heard that Mr. Grew kept his cabin. This seems quite likely.

Arrangements on the Asama Maru were most efficiently planned and carried out as proved by the smooth running of everything during the month's journey from Hongkong to Lorenzo Marques. There was ample food such as it was, it was well cooked and served and on the 4th of July the Chief distinguished himself by serving amusingly oriental cake, large layer cakes, decorated with red, white and blue decorations to celebrate the day. I seem to remember some inscription on the cake on our table but cannot remember just what. I noted it at the time however and thought how typical and how rather nice. This in particular because those people on the Asama Maru, with few exceptions, hated the Japanese with a deadly hate, very often with the greatest justification

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and the Japanese were well aware of it. They did not dare say much, people spoke quietly when they spoke at all, because they could not be sure that they might be detained on the Asama Maru, and returned to Japan as prisoners. That fear did not lift until Lorenzo Marques was reached and we were off the Asama Maru.

Particular mention should be made, and credit given to the very charming Chief Deck Stewart who was the one and only Japanese on board who did not avoid the passengers. He did everything possible to make the journey comfortable and pleasant and saw to it that the deck games were always available and the decks as comfortable as possible under the crowded conditions. To my mind, his efforts were made with so much tact and kindness that I spoke to him a day or two before reaching Lorenzo Marques, saying that I for one wished him to know that it had been noticed and appreciated. He did not have much to say, but told me that he had been Chief Deck Stewart on one of the big Japanese liners on the U.S. Japan run for many years. Oscar of the Waldorf in New York couldn't have been more charming or efficient.

The month's journey on the Gripsholm was an entirely different affair. We arrived on board, 1,500 passengers, and were asked to sit around on the decks till cabins were cleaned and ready. That seemed reasonable enough and an excellent lunch, buffet, was served which cheered people up considerably as the long tables literally groaned under the loads of food such as we had not seen for months during our captivity.

We were told that the billeting officers were working on allotting the

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cabins and everything would be ready by late afternoon. Arrangement for food, diningroom arrangements and the food itself were at all times excellent. The allotting of cabins however was a fiasco, from the start to the finish. It was said later that two billeting officers had been flown out from Washington to make arrangements, and that they were too drunk to do the work. Whether this was true or not I am not in a position to say. I do know however that I sat around that ship the evening of the first day with friends and then queued up till four in the morning, and finally was given cabin 1.4. to find it occupied by Mr. Southard and two South American Consul Generals. As I am rather inclined to forage for myself I took my small suitcase, all we were allowed to have with us, and camped out in the first unoccupied cabin I could find. People slept on the floors, in the saloons, anywhere they liked.

The next day was a repetition of the first, queues of people, and still no cabin. I descended the decks and picked out a small two berth cabin and settled down there for two days, it was 3rd class accommodation, but better than nothing, and all good cabins were occupied by Embassy, Consular and other officials and their wives, and by the South American diplomats. After five days I was informed that I could not have the small cabin, or even a berth there and could go to Deck in an inside cabin, where I could have a top berth in an eight berth cabin with some missionaries. I objected to this as my husband was Consul General in the British Consular Service, and I was travelling at the expense of the British Government. Mr. Everett Durrant, a Secretary from the Embassy in Chungking was on board, had a most comfortable cabin on 4 deck, and ca c

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to the rescue. <sup>leading</sup> ~~me~~ his cabin for two days while I got the matter settled with an extremely autocratic person who seemed to be doing billeting. Just as well too, as I had developed a severe cold and inflammation in one ear which the doctor said threatened trouble, as a result of strain. The doctor filled me full of sulfanilic acid, which made me even more ill, but eventually cured the ear, and I finally was given a berth in an inside cabin on B Deck, with a school girl from Tsingtao and two missionaries. As billeting seemed to be done by seniority, or so they said it was done, and my husband had been a very senior official, I did feel that I rated a bit higher than that, I certainly had with the Japanese, but I had been so often brushed off by the Americans doing the billeting, with a tough aggressiveness that I had almost forgotten existed, being the wife of a senior official in China had perhaps accustomed me to more consideration, more courtesy, and perhaps spoiled me a bit, I decided to make the best of an extremely uncomfortable situation. Although I must confess, there were times when I really wished I were back in Hongkong, with Mr. Oda to look after me.

We were on our way home, we were leaving all the agony of those months in Hongkong behind us, that was something to rejoice over and I have since tried to forget that last month on the Gripsholm & thing has hurt you once, and it hurts you again, every time you think of it. So I try to forget it. As I look back it was the mental atmosphere as much as the physical discomforts that made the trip on the Gripsholm so bad. People had a pretty bad time, they were unhappy, they had worries and anxieties but I still cannot see what excuse some of them

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had for behaving as they did. Mr. Southard's "stable companions" left him a Rio de Janeiro, he had a de lux cabin to himself after that, with a private bath and he kept it to himself, although the ship was packed and since he had no hot salt water baths, and fresh water was not available, he filled up the bathtub with his luggage, and boasted of it. That was the crossing in sultry weather, In swealtoring weather, July, coming up through the West Indies. It makes no laugh now but it did not seem so funny then.

Cabin vacated by South American diplomats at Rio were immediately filled up by the clerical staff, ladies, who had made alliances for the voyage with various people in key positions. The whole ship laughed over that. And so it goes on, and is best forgotten, human nature in the raw just as the experience at the ~~prison hospital~~ was human nature in the raw, and Stanley Jail, the latter so raw that I would have committed suicide rather than go there.

I never was as glad of anything in my life really than the sight of New York as we sailed in that harbor. It seemed hardly possible that I really was there. That helped to take the taste of the journey out of my mouth was perhaps the very courteous treatment I had from the F.B.I. who had a long interview with me and asked a great many questions.

This is a very brief outline of my experiences. The five Japanese I contacted in Hongkong stand out most clearly. As I look back on it all, the utter aloneness, the feeling of being utterly abandoned, the help they gave us, practical efficient help, to the utmost of their ability, given with so much sympathy and kindness,

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makes me feel that all Japanese are not war criminals. Many are, many have caused unspeakable suffering to our people and must be punished. But among all the horrors these men stand out. They helped, they kept my morale up at a time when it would have been much easier to have quietly closed the book and said, "I've had enough, I'm having no more" and slipped away to a pleasanter world. I am grateful for what they did, and also for what the Japanese did on the Asama Maru to ease the journey as far as they could, they were efficient about it too, and if at any time a good word from me can be of any use to them I shall be only too glad of the opportunity to say it.

(Signed) Mary Erwin Martin  
Mrs A.J. Martin  
Widow of Arthur John Martin,  
CMB. British Consular  
Service China.

643075

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent; KOMODA, Koichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet  
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country  
I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on October 30, 1888 at No. 17, Chugercho,  
Kumamoto City.

My permanent residence is No. 160, Jonai Soejicho,  
Numazu City, Shizuoka Prefecture.

My present address is No. 682, 3-chome, Noboritocho,  
Chiba City.

Brief personal history:

1909. Graduated from the Military Academy.

1918. Graduated from the Military Staff College.

1935. Appointed Major General.

1937. Appointed Lieutenant General.

I was residing in the Kwangtung district as the commander  
of the 104th division from December, 1940 to July, 1942, and

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

after that I served as commander of the division area at Seoul, Korea until the surrender of Japan.

I served as commander of the 104th division stationed in the suburbs to the north-west of Kuangtung from December, 1940 to July, 1942.

In December 1941, the Japanese army carried out almost no military operations. It exerted all its efforts toward maintaining public peace and order in the Kuangtung district. Therefore, it is hardly possible to conclude that the Japanese army occupied the walled city on December 21, 1941.

When the Great East Asia War broke out on December 8, 1941, no more than one and a half divisions were garrisoned in the Kuangtung district. At that time Yu Han-mou, who took command of a force numbering 220,000, took the offensive against my division, and my division did everything in its power to defend itself against the attacks.

Though I resided in the Kuangtung district for no less than twenty months, I have never heard of such place names as Shihwohan, Uyarchiao, Shahsia, Shairuchang, Hopienfucheng, Shuehkung-hsjencheng, Chaohsian, Feimerwai, Hsimerkou, Paisha. I am firmly confident that strict military discipline was maintained in my division. For instance, I went so far as to dispatch judicaries twice a week to various units under my command in order to give training, aimed at the



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prevention of crimes on the part of my subordinates. Thus, we did our utmost to prevent such crimes, however slight they may be.

The strict military discipline of my division won the respect of the Chinese masses. I can say definitely that there was not a single case in which a Chinese person, male or female, young or old, was murdered by the subordinates in my division.

On this 18th day of June, 1947,  
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ KOMODA, Koichi (seal)

I, IMANARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ IMANARI, Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KOMODA Koichi (seal)

3078

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
Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-78-

ARAFI, Sadac, et al



Sworn Deposition

Depnent :- OKADA, Yoshimasa

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet  
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country  
I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on 27 June in the 36th year of Meiji (1903)  
at my permanent domicile, 46 Honcho, Marugamo-City, Kagawa-  
Prefecture, and my present address is 190, 2-Chome, Mabashi,  
Suginami-Ku, Tokyo.

2. My personal history is outlined as follows -

Graduated from the Military Academy in the 13th year of  
Taisho (1924)

Appointed Staff-officer (Major) of the Japanese Expe-  
ditionary Forces in China in the 14th year of Showa (Oct. 1939).

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

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Appointed Staff-officer (Lieutenant-Colonel) of the 23rd Army  
in the 18th year of Showa (June, 1943).

Appointed Staff-officer (Colonel) of the 6th Area Army,  
Hankow and I remained to be so up to the end of the  
war.

In January in the 19th year of Showa (1944),  
the Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary  
Forces in China ordered the 23rd Army to capture  
Liuchow, advancing from the Canton-Area.

The original document of the order is not  
existing now, because it was burnt when the War  
ended. But as I was one of the senior Staff-officers  
of the 23rd Army at that time, I knew quite well all  
the movements of the Army.

The 23rd Army was stationing in the Canton and  
the neighbouring Area. When the army got the order  
to capture Liuchow, instead of advancing directly  
towards Liuchow, the main force marched to the north,  
and the KOYASEKO force advanced to the south or to  
the opposite direction from Liuchow, concealing the  
operations plan.

The KOYASEKO force was a battalion under the  
command of the YONEYAMA Brigade, which advanced  
from Kowkong to Taishan. The force started its  
movement <sup>from</sup> Kowkong late in June and entered Taishan

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loading the van of the whole Brigade. By that time all the inhabitants of Taishan had already evacuated and not a soul was to be seen, and some soldiers of the Pacification Corps despatched by our Army burst into laughter saying "How can we pacificate people when there is not a soul to talk to?"

The KOYASEKO force tried to march towards Luchow from the point 30 miles south of Taishan toward north and along the Si-kiang (River), but there was a very strong position of the enemy at this point and the force had a fierce battle with the enemy which lasted from the early part of July till the latter part of the same month, and casualties of the force amounted even to several scores and the force had to waste much of its arms and ammunition. The aim of the KOYASEKO Battalion's action was not to fight, but to advance secretly to Wuchow as soon as possible and to sweep the mines laid by the enemy in the Si-kiang in order to help the main force which was coming up north.

For this purpose one of the minesweeper groups of our Navy accompanied us. Such being the case, therefore, we were quite at a loss when we were confronted with this unexpected battle. We wanted to get to Wuchow as soon as possible, but we got

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there five days later than we had expected due to the stubborn resistance of the enemy. After a hard battle, however, we drove back the enemy and advanced towards Wuchow, and all the inhabitants in the area had already taken refuge and none of them could be seen.

The force had an urgent duty of getting to Wuchow without wasting even a moment. And therefore it could not be possible that the force had time enough to murder inhabitants or set fire to their houses on its way to Wuchow. It had simply to continue its heavy march day and night.

Moreover, the Commander of the Army had strictly ordered all the soldiers to observe the "three don'ts" that is "don't burn", "don't kill" and "don't plunder".

Force Commander KOYASEKO had been the superintendent of the Military Preparatory School in Osaka until he was appointed Commander of the force.

It was the un-written rule of the Japanese Army that a superintendent of the Military Preparatory School was to be selected and appointed from among officers of noble character, considering the education of young boys. And therefore I

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cannot believe that there should have been any atrocities committed by the men of Commander KOYASEKO, who was an idealist and man of noble character of the Japanese officers. If there had been such misconducts, I should have been informed of it, but I firmly believe that there were no such facts.

I have attached a rough sketch of the map which shows the course that the KOYASEKO force followed from Canton towards Wuchow.

On this 5th day of April, 1947

at Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ OKADA Yoshimasa (seal)

I, OKADA Yoshimasa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depoent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ IMANARI Yasutaro (seal)

OATH


In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ OKADA Yoshimasa (seal)

Def doc No. 1781

⇓ 11A (from Hankow)

○ Kuei-lin



3076

EF .LOC.w1781

東京口隊宣事裁判所

宣替供進書

供進者


並米利加合衆口其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

岡田芳政

自分供進書ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ元ツ別紙ノ通り宣替ヲ爲シタル上次ノ  
如ク供進致シマス。





- 一、私ハ明治三十六年六月二十七日日本編摺香川県丸龜市本町四十六番地ニ生シ現在東京都杉並區馬場二ノ一九〇番地ニ住シテ居リマス。
- 二、私ノ経歴ノ大要ハ左ノ通りテアリマス

大正十三年（一九二四年）ニ皇土官學校卒業

昭和十四年（一九三九年）カ）支那派遣軍參謀（少佐）

昭和十八年（一九四三年）六）第二十三軍參謀（中佐）

昭和十九年（一九四四年）十一月）横口第六方面軍參謀（大佐）移城


ニ至ル

昭和十九年一月支那派遣軍ハ第二十三軍ニ對シテ廣東地區カラ柳州ヲ攻堵スベキ旨ノ命令ヲ下シマス。


右命令文ハ終戦ト同時ニ現地ニ於テ燒却サレテ現存シテホリアヒン當時私ハ第二十三軍ノ高級參謀ニアリマシタカラ第二十三軍ノ行動ニツイテハ總テヨク知ツテホリアス。

第二十三軍ハ廣東及其周邊地ニ進屯シテ居リマシタガ柳州攻堵ノ命令ヲ受ケルヤ部隊ハ直捷ニ柳州ニ進軍トス莫ノ作戦企圖ヲ秘匿シテ主

方ハ辰辰北方ニ向ケ進軍シ小辰辰部隊ハ柳洲ト反野ノ方向タル南方ニ  
向ツテ進軍シマシタ。  
小辰辰部隊ハ九江カラ台山ニ向ツテ進軍シタ米山旅団ノ部下ノ大隊デ  
アリマシテ六月下旬九江カラ行功ヲ進シ全旅団ノ先頭部隊トシテ台山  
ニ進入シマシタ。  
當時已ニ住民ハ全部逃亡シテ台山ニハ一人ノ住民モ居リマヒンデシタ  
ノデ且ヨリ殺害シタ宣撫班ガ相手ノ住民ガ一人モ居ラズニ宣撫ガ出來  
ルカト云ツテ笑ツタ事ガアリマシタ。  
小辰辰大隊ハ台山カラ南方三〇哩ノ地帯カラ北向シテ西江ニ沿ヒ柳洲  
ニ向フベク進軍セントシマシタガ台山南方約三〇哩ノ地帯ニ堅固ナ散  
陣地ガアリマシテ其處ヲ小辰辰部隊ハ散置ト激烈ナ戰鬥ヲ交ヘマシタ  
此ノ戰鬥ハ七月上旬カラ七月下旬ニ至ル間ノ戦闘デアリマシテ小辰辰  
部隊ノ死傷者十名ニモ達シ武備兵器ノ損耗モ非常ニ甚シカツタノデス  
小辰辰大隊ノ目的ハ戰鬥デハナク早く散置ニ知ラレヌ様ニ柳洲ニ到達  
シテ北向セル主力ノ爲ニ西江ニ渡ルル散置ノ掃蕩ニアリマシテ其



ノ爲ノ際皇ノ掃蕩政を圖行シテオツタノデスカラ此ノ恩ハサル以テハニ  
ハ益ク因却シ一日早ク格別ニ到着ヒソトシタノデスカ預然ノ憲統ノ  
爲ニ格別ニ到着ハ恩定ヨリモ並口通達シタ様ナ有様デシタ。  
爾ク案ノ既ヲ覽シテ格別ニ向テ遣イマシタカ途中ノ住民ハ益部迄  
亡シテ益ク蒙ノ養ヲ見ルコトハ出派マヒソデシタ。  
同部及ハ道カニ格別ニ到着スベキ証憑ガアツタノヲ途中住民ヲ殺害シ  
家門ニ延火スルナドノ余當ガアル旨ハアリマヒソ夜ナ日ニ次ヲ進行  
テ領ケマシタ。  
且司令官カラハ猶クナ豫スナ豫ルナ三豫ヲ自ニ示達シテアリ小島組  
長ハ同部及嬰ニ任セララルルハ大深ノ幼年學校ノ生徒皆テアリマ  
シタ。  
幼年學校ノ生徒皆ハ年少生徒ニ付スル教化ヲ考ヘテ輕人中ノ非常ナル  
人當者ノミヲ選任シテ任命セララルコトニナツテホリマシテ輕人中ノ  
糾紳家人格者ナル小島組長下ニ於テ豫行爲ガアツタナドトハ益ク信  
ぜラレマヒソ著シカカル疑義ガアツタナラバ私ノ耳ニ入ラヌコトハテ



リマヒン私ハカカル歸來ノ全ク無カツタコトヲ確信スルモノデアリマ  
ス。  
同紙幅ヨリテ察付シマシタ東カラ小島迫部隊ガ梧州ニ進ンダ途ヲ指示  
スルコトカ出来マス。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）四月五日於東京

供述者 岡 田 芳 政

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ直書シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ  
證明シマス。

同日於同所

立會人 今 田 泰 太郎

宣  
啓  
書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ爲スベク事ヲモ談秘ヒズ又何事ヲモ附加ヒ  
ザルコトヲ誓フ。

署名捺印  
岡田芳政

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, SADA0, et al

Sworn Deposition(Translation)

Deponent: KOYASAKO, Kaname

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

(1) I was born on May 21, 1897, at No. 1468, FUTASEMOTO, KASHIWA-MURA, AEO-GUN, KUMAMOTO Prefecture, which is my permanent domicile and where at present I am still living.

(2) The gist of my career follows:

In 1928, I graduated from the Army Cadet School.

From about 3 years beginning 1931 on, I was attached to Osaka Military Preparatory School.

From 1944 to the termination of hostilities, I held (as a major) the post of the commander of the 126th Independent Infantry Battalion and participated in the operations in South China.

(3) In June, 1944, my battalion, acting in coordination with the 23rd Army's attack on Luchow, advanced from the Canton

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district to the TAISHAN area and thence turning north northwards; operated in the Wuchow area, a strategic point on the River Sikiang. In this operation, which began in the early part of July, we made a forced march continuously for about a month. Owing to the unexpectedly stubborn resistance of the enemy, however, we were delayed despite our strenuous efforts for a rapid advance, and spent about five days longer than the directed schedule.

In this fighting, scores of our officers and men were killed <sup>or</sup> wounded and a large amount of munitions were consumed.

(4) My unit had always been under strict orders of our army commander and other superior officers concerned to maintain military discipline with strictness and severity.

Our slogan being the three don'ts of "don't burn, don't kill, and don't plunder," I am absolutely sure that no one in the unit violated the order. So thoroughly did my men adhere to the orders of superior officers that I hereby state positively that absolutely no one under my command ever killed any Chinese, or ever set fire on any Chinese houses.

(5) Although this has no direct bearing upon the action of the Japanese army, I may add in this connection that, we were then told that, in a valley some 3ri (TN<sup>2</sup> about 12km) north of TAISHAN, there were a group of villagers forming an armed body, called the SANSHANGSIANG self-defense corps and led by members of the communist traitors-slaying Party,



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that all the members of this body, amounting some 800, were armed either with rifles or with revolvers and that they constantly oppressed the neighbouring villagers.

(b) Late in June of the same year, my unit advanced towards the TAISHAN area and then was ordered to march farther.

At that time, the coolies we had employed in the Canton district expressing their desire to return home, we gave them sufficient wages, allowances, and even clothes and let them go. The coolies then released consisted of about a half of those who had followed us from Canton. I hear that when these coolies on their way home passed by the said communist village, they were assaulted by the villagers and were looted, massacred or captured, that thereupon they retreated to the TAISHAN district and obtaining the help of the neighbouring villagers, who had been oppressed by the communists they revenged themselves on their communist enemy and this occasioned some bloodshed. With regard to this affair, I know nothing beyond what I have said above because the Chinese alone were involved in the affair, <sup>and</sup> since we were busily engaged in operations to fulfill our duty to reach WUCHOW as soon as possible, we were hurriedly marching on. If any atrocity is reported to have been committed around TAISHAN, I am inclined to think that the report, by mistake, has mixed this occurrence up with the Japanese action. I definitely state that not a single act of atrocity was ever committed by my unit.

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(7) By the above statement, I believe that the actions of my battalion were of purely military nature and included no illegal actions.

(8) I hereto attach a sketch-map, which I believe will make clear the situation around TAISHAN.

On this 15th day of June, 1947,  
at Tokyo

Deponent: /s/ KOYASEKO, Kaname (seal)

I, IMANARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at Tokyo.


Witness: /s/ IMANARI, Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KOYASEKO, Kaname (seal)

Site of the Communist village  
called SANSHAN-SHIAN G.  
This charged coasties planned to go  
on foot to SANFOW, whence to take  
boat to their home province.



E13077

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

YAMAGUCHI, SADAO, et al

Sworn Deposition(Translation)

Deponent: KOYASAKO, Kazuo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

(1) I was born on May 21, 1897, at No. 1466, FUTASEMOTO, HIWA-MURA, ASO-CITY, KOMAMOTO Prefecture, which is my permanent domicile and where at present I am still living.

The gist of my career follows:

In 1928, I graduated from the Army Cadet School.

For about 3 years beginning 1941 on, I was attached to Osaka Military Preparatory School.

From 1944 to the termination of hostilities, I held (as a major) the post of the commander of the 126th Independent Infantry Battalion and participated in the operations in South China.

(3) In June, 1944, my battalion, acting in coordination with the 23rd Army's attack on Luchow, advanced from the Canton

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district to the TAISHAN area and thence turning north operated in the Wuchow area, a strategic point on the Sikiang. In this operation, which began in the early part of July, we made a forced march continuously for about a month. Owing to the unexpectedly stubborn resistance of the enemy, however, we were delayed despite our strenuous efforts for a rapid advance, and spent about five days longer than the directed schedule.

In this fighting, scores of our officers and men were killed <sup>or</sup> wounded and a large amount of munitions were consumed.

(4) My unit had always been under strict orders of our superior officers and other superior officers concerned to maintain military discipline with strictness and severity.

Our slogan being the three don'ts of "don't burn, don't kill, and don't plunder," I am absolutely sure that the unit violated the order. So thoroughly did my men adhere to the orders of superior officers that I hereby state positively that absolutely no one under my command ever killed any Chinese, or ever set fire on any Chinese houses.

(5) Although this has no direct bearing upon the action of the Japanese army, I may add in this connection that, we were then told that, in a valley some 30 miles (TN<sup>2</sup> about 12km) north of TAISHAN, there were a group of villagers forming an armed body, called the SANSHANSIANG self-defense corps and led by members of the communist traitor-slashing Party.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: TOSHIMA, Fusataro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on January 5, 1889 (the 22nd year of MEIJI) at my permanent domicile, No. 832-1, MUKOJIMA, OAZA, NAKAZEKI-cho, BOFU-shi, YAMAGUCHI Prefecture. My present residence is at No. 625, 1-chome, DAITA, SETAGAYA-ku, TOKYO-to.
2. The general outline of my personal-history is as follows:
  - 1910 Graduated from the Military Academy.
  - 1934 Was promoted to Colonel in March and appointed of MIYAKONOJO Regimental Commander.
  - 1937 Was promoted to Major General in December.
  - 1940 Was promoted to Lieutenant-General in August.
  - 1940 In October, was appointed Commander of the 3rd Division

- 1 -

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in China and went there.

1942 In the middle of January, was appointed Commander of the Imperial Guards Division.

1943 In October, was appointed Commander of the 2nd Army in New Guinea and while I was stationed in the Celebes the war ended.

3. By the summer of 1941, the Chinese Forces in the Changsha area had become very powerful and were beginning to take the offensive against the Japanese Forces who were beginning to sense a grave threat.

With the aim of delivering a hard blow upon these Chinese Forces in the vicinity of Changsha, it was decided ~~to have~~ the troops advance towards this area. The objective of the operations was not to occupy the area but just to crush the enemy forces. For this reason, it had been arranged that our forces return to their garrison station as soon as they attained their objective.

4. The 3rd Division under my command started operations in concert with the 4th, 6th and 40th Divisions and in early October of that same year, the 4th Division of the divisions mentioned above entered the town of Changsha and after staying there three days or so, immediately pulled out for their stationed area. As for my 3rd Division, we did advance as far as Chuchow, a short distance from Changsha, but did not

enter Changsha itself. From there we returned to our former camp near Hankow.

5. During the time of the operations, military discipline of the Japanese Forces had been exceedingly strict and I can rightly state that the actions of the Japanese Forces had been very fine and exemplary. The authorities of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China applied their utmost effort in the maintenance of strict military discipline. There is the case where around March, 1941, the Army Commander summoned together all the Divisional Commanders within the Army to Hankow where a meeting was held to talk over the maintenance of strict military discipline. On that occasion, the Army Commander delivered instructions which were both grave and firm. The gist of his speech was as follows: "The essence of the Japanese Army is not in just being strong. Every soldier must treat the inhabitants in the field of operations with sincerity and kindness, aid righteousness and punish the bad basing your actions on the true spirit of BUSHIDO. Even in time of operations, he who inflicts unnecessary injuries upon inhabitants or damages their property is acting very much contrary to the spirit of the BUSHIDO. Each Divisional Commander must make certain that there is absolutely no soldier under his command that would act contrarily to spirit of BUSHIDO."



All the Divisional Commanders got the men of their respective Divisions to faithfully obey the purport of the above instructions.

Prior to that time, there had been three taboos with the China Expeditionary Force: Do not burn! Do not kill! and Do not loot! The Japanese troops in China, in obedience to these orders of their superiors absolutely did not commit any deeds that would be a disgrace to a soldier.

While my 3rd Division was in the midst of operations a view was presented that we had better destroy enemy barracks by fire. However, I issued strict orders and prohibited soldiers from destroying even barracks of the enemy. This was because there private homes used by the enemy as and since distinguishing private homes from those used as barracks would be difficult not to mention the fact that there was doubt in the wisdom of allowing the soldiers to get into the habit of burning even barracks I prohibited rigidly this practise.

6. Another attack operations on Changsha was carried out from the end of 1941 to the beginning of 1942. The objective of this operation was the same as that of the previous one. This time the 3rd Division under my command in cooperation with the 6th Division made the attacks on the Chinese Forces in the area of Changsha. We returned, however, without

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going into Changsha, although we had advanced to a point near the city.

7. During my stay in China, in accordance with the intention of the Army Commander, I paid my utmost attention to the maintenance of strict military discipline. So far as my Division is concerned, I firmly believe that on this point, there is not a thing in which we are not unimpeachable.

On this 15 day of June, 1947  
at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ TOSHIMA, Fusataro (seal)

I, IMANARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: /S/ IMANARI, Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TOSHIMA, Fusataro (seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

IRAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent : . SUZUKI, Teiji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1) I was born on May 7th, 1887, at my permanent address, No. 179, SHIMO-HONGO, TOTSUKA-MURA, IWATA-GUN, SHIZUOKA Prefecture. At present I am living at No. 71, KITAHANTO-MACHI, SHIZUOKA city.

2) The outline of my career is as follows: Graduated from the Military Academy 1910; Promoted to major-general in 1939; promoted to lieutenant general in 1942; Appointed Commander of the 104th Division under the Kwantung, 23rd Army August, 1942; Appointed Commander of the 143rd Division in 1945, and was back in Japan proper, when the war ended.

3) I was Commander of the 104th Division from August, 1942 to March, 1945.

Towards the end of June, 1944, the 104th Division was ordered to occupy the LIUCHOW airfield. To conceal the movement of the division, at first I had the troops advance towards the banks of the LIENCHIANG in the northern districts of KIANGTUNG, and then had them turn around and advance towards WUCHOW.

Then we continued to march towards LIUCHOW.

We started action against the LIUCHOW airfield from its eastern and southern districts. Just at this time the 6th and 68th Regiments, both a part of the Central China army, were marching from the northern and eastern

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On this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1947

At \_\_\_\_\_

Deponent /s/ SUZUKI, Teiji (seal)

I, SUZUKI, Teiji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At \_\_\_\_\_

Witness: /s/ HORIUCHI, Hyogo (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUZUKI, Teiji (seal)

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Translated by Defense Language Br.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent : SUZUKI, Teiji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1) I was born on may 7th, 1887, at my permanent address, No.179, SHIMO-HONGO, TOTSUKA-MURA, IMATA-GUN, SHIZUOKA Prefecture. At present I am living at No. 71, AITANOTO-MACHI, SHIZUOKA city.

2) The outline of my career is as follows: Graduated from the Military Academy 1910; Promoted to major-general in 1939; promoted to lieutenant general in 1942; Appointed Commander of the 104th Division under the Kwantung, 23rd Army August, 1942; Appointed Commander of the 143rd Division in 1945, and was back in Japan proper, when the war ended.

3) I was Commander of the 104th Division from August, 1942 to March, 1945.

Towards the end of June, 1944, the 104th Division was ordered to occupy the LIUCHOW airfield. To conceal the movement of the division, at first I had the troops advance towards the banks of the LIENCHIANG in the northern districts of KWANTUNG, and then had them turn around and advance towards WUCHOW.

Then we continued to march towards LIUCHOW.

We started action against the LIUCHOW airfield from its eastern and southern districts. Just at this time the 6th and 68th Regiments, both a part of the Central China army, were marching from the northern and eastern

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districts of the LIUCHOW airfield, and in cooperation with them, we succeeded in occupying the airfield in the beginning of November, 1944. After staying there for about five days, we advanced as far as CHECHING, and then changed directions to return to KWANGTUNG. My Division entered the LIUCHOW airfield only, and we did not allow a single man to enter the city of LIUCHOW which was across the river.

In occupying the LIUCHOW airfield, only a single advance battalion from my Division fought against the remaining enemy, and we were able to enter the airfield easily, almost without battle worth speaking of.

4) During this battle, my Division strictly observed the three-point instructions of. "Do not burn. Do not kill. Do not plunder," which had been ordered by the Army Commander; we faithfully carried out the policy of extending love to the people, and behaved with our chief objective on pacification and securing peace in the rear areas.

As the enemy had given orders to the residents in general and had strictly carried out the military policy of evacuation for the battlefield, the residents in general had indeed all escaped and there were none who remained. When it became gradually known to them that Japanese army discipline was strictly maintained and that the Japanese army not only did not injure the residents but loved them, they returned one by one to follow their occupations.

I declare absolutely that the discipline of my Division was strictly maintained, and there was not a single instance of my men having killed any resident or having burned any of their residences.

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On this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1947

At \_\_\_\_\_

Deponent /s/ SUZUKI, Teiji (seal)

I, SUZUKI, Teiji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At \_\_\_\_\_

Witness: /s/ HORIUCHI, Hyōgo (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUZUKI, Teiji (seal)

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Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent :-- YONEYAMA, Yoneshika

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on July 30, 1888 at 4-chome AOYAMA, Tokyo. My home is 627, 3-chome AMANUMA, SUGINAMI-ku, Tokyo, and my present address is 24 JUMONJI, YODA-Mura, CHIBA-Gun, CHIBA Pref.

2. An outline of my career is as follows:

1910 Graduated from the military academy.

1941 Appointed major-general and Commander of the 52nd Infantry Brigade.

December, 1942 Appointed Commander of the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade, in which post in I served until the termination of the war.



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3. I, as commander of the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade, took part in attacking LIUCHOW from the KUANGUNG area.

My unit did not advance directly toward LIUCHOW, but began to advance south, toward LEICHOW Peninsula, in the opposite direction of LIUCHOW, in order to conceal the operation plan.

The KOYASEKO Battalion under my command commenced action at HSINHUI in the neighbourhood of KUANTUNG and marched to the vicinity of CHAOYANGLI, north of TAISHAN, at the end of June. All the inhabitants, beginning with those of TAISHAN, had fled; as the result, we saw none of them.

I did not permit the Japanese forces to enter the town of TAISHAN, except a small number of military policemen whom I sent to guard the evacuated houses. There were no incidents on the streets of TAISHAN.

4. Strictly abiding by the Army Commander's three strict commands "Don't burn, don't kill, and don't plunder", the Japanese forces maintained exceedingly strict military discipline. In the neighbourhood of TAISHAN, they never killed inhabitants or set fire to their dwellings. I can affirm that there was no such action among forces under my command.
5. We received fierce fire from numerous enemy watch-towers constructed at a place approximately 30 miles south of TAISHAN, the name of which I have forgotten, and met with stubborn resistance; consequently we suffered considerable loss and the artillery commander was killed.

6. When our unit started from KUANTUNG, we took with us several hundred chinese coolies employed in the neighbouring area of HSIHUI. As we came to the environs of TAIWAN, they wished to go back to their native place; after giving them ample wages, allowances, and clothes, we permitted them to do so. (Though a half of the coolies we had taken went home, the unit did not recruit new ones.)

However, I have been informed that when these coolies came by a communist village on their way home, they were arrested by members of a society by the name of CHU CHIEN TUN (TN. Organization for punishing traitors), who robbed them of their money and other articles and finally killed them. However, this happened among the Chinese and had nothing to do with the Japanese troops.

7. I never heard that the Japanese troops plundered, killed or set fire. I assert here that none of my subordinates was guilty of such action.
8. Battalion Commander KOYASEKO is a man of noble character; particularly he loved the Chinese people and stressed "respect for old people and love for children" as a motto. He won unusual confidence among the Chinese people.

On this 10th day of June, 1947

At Tokyo.

DEFONENT /S/ YONEYAMA, Yonoshika (seal)

I, IMANARI Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defonent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence

Def. Doc. # 1757

of this Witness.

On the same date at the same place.

Witness : /s/ IM.N.RI Yasutaro (soal)

o:TH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ YONEY.M., Yonoshiku (soal)

442000

極東國際電事談判所  
其他

亞米利加  
其他

對

荒木貞夫  
其他

宣  
誓  
供  
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一、私ハ明治二十一年七月三十日京都市青山四丁目ニ生レ本籍地ハ東京都杉並區天沼三ノ六二七番地デアリマシテ現住所ハ千葉縣千葉郡譽田村十文字二四番地デアリマス

二、私ノ經歷ノ大要ハ左ノ通りデアリマス

明治四十三年陸軍士官學校卒業昭和

昭和十六年陸軍少將ニ任ゼラレ步兵第五十二旅團長

昭和十七年十二月獨立混成第二十二旅團長トナリ終戦ニ至ル

三、私ハ獨立混成第二十二旅團長トシテ廣東地區カラ柳州ノ攻撃ニ

參加致シマシタ

私ノ部隊ハ直接ニ柳州ニ向ツテ進軍セズ企圖ヲ隠秘シテ柳州ト反對ノ方向ノ南方雷州半島ノ方向ニ向ツテ進行シ初メマシタ

私ノ部下ノ大隊タル小屋迫部隊ハ廣東近傍ノ新會ト云フ處カラ行動ヲ起シ六月末嶺山北方朝陽里附近ニ進ミマシタ。嶺山ヲ初メ住民ハ余全ク逃避シテ住民ノ姿ハ見ルコトハ出来マセンデシタ

私ハ嶺山ノ市街ニハ日本軍隊ヲ入城サセマセンデシタガ僅カニ憲兵

ヲ派シテ各空屋ノ保護ニ任セサセタノミデアリマシタ。臺山市街  
ニ於テ同遺ヒノ起ツタコトハアリマセン

四日本軍ハ軍司令官ノ嚴罰タル一死クナ。殺スナ。掠ルナ」ノ三  
訓ヲ嚴守シテ非常ニ嚴肅ナル軍紀ヲ維持シテオリマシタカラ臺山  
附近ニ於テ住民ヲ殺害シタリ住宅ヲ燒却シタリシタコトハ全クア  
リマセンデシタ。私ノ部下ノ軍隊ニカ、ル身質ハ全々無カツタコ  
トヲ斷言スルコトガ出来マス

五臺山南方三十里位ノ處テ地名ハ忘レマシタガ其處ニハ敵ノ望  
ガ數多ク出来テ居テ其處カラ猛烈ナ射撃ヲ受ケ死傷ナル抵抗ヲ受  
ケマシタ爲ニ我軍モ相當ナル損害ヲ受ケ砲兵隊長モ戦死致シマシ  
タ

六私ノ部隊ガ廣東ヲ出發スルトキニ新會近傍カラ支那人ノ苦力ヲ  
數百人借入レテテ之ヲツレテ臺山ノ近クマテ來マシタガ其ノ人夫  
道ハ其處カラ故郷ヘ歸リタガリマシタノテ部隊ハ彼等ニ充分ノ賃  
銀手當ヲ支拂ヒ衣服モ與ヘテ隨宅サセマシタ（返レテ行ク人夫ノ

半数

其處テ階ツテシマヒマシタガ其數部隊ハ人夫ノ補充ハ致シマセ  
ンデシター

處ガ此等人夫ガ階途或共產黨部落ニ差掛リマスト其處テ除奸圖ト  
云フ團體員ニ捕ヘラレ命品ヲ掠奪セラレ殺害セラレタト云フ報告ヲ  
聞イタコトガアリマシタガソレハ支那人間ノコトテ日本軍ハ何等  
關係ナイロトテアリマス

セ日本軍ガ掠奪ヲシタトカ殺人ヲシタトカ放火ヲシタトカ云フコト  
ハ全ク聞イタコトガアリマセン私ノ部下ニカカルコトヲシタ者ノ絶  
對ニ無イコトヲ此處テ確言致シマス

ハ小尾迫隊長ハ人格高潔特ニ中國民衆ヲ勸撫シ標語トシテ敬老慈幼  
ヲ強調シ中國民衆ノ非常ナル信賴ヲ博シテオリマシタ。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）六月十日 於 東京

供 送 者 米 山 米 屋

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明  
シマス

同日於同所

立 會 人 今 成 泰 太 郎



宣 誓 書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザル  
コトヲ誓フ

署 名 捺 印

米 山 米 鹿

Def. Doc. # 1705

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: KURODA, Shigenori

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I was born on 25, October, 1897, in the city of OMIYA, FUKUOKA Prefecture, which is also my permanent domicile. I am now in SUGAMO Prison.

- My past career is roughly as follows:
- Oct., 1937. Commander of Infantry of the 26th Division.  
(Maj. General)
  - Nov., 1938. Commander of the 4th Independent Garrison at MUTANKIANG, Manchuria.
  - Aug., 1931. Commander of the 26th Division (Lt. General)
  - Aug., 1941. Chief of Staff of the Department of Military Education.

Since then up to November 1944, I served first as the Chief of Staff of the Singapore Army and then as the Commander

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of the Manila Army. In December, 1944, I was placed on the reserve list.

III. Late in January, 1940, in my capacity as the Commander of the 26th Division, under the Central Mongolian Army commanded by Lt. Gen. OKABE Naosaburo, I was engaged, with the cooperation of our cavalry corps, in operations in the "TYUAN" district to suppress TIEN Tso-yi's forces there. Our troops advanced from PACTOW by motor vehicles and defeated the enemy. The battle ended in about ten days. The forces under my command evacuated the town of "TYUAN" immediately after occupation and after that the town was guarded by forces commanded by Lt. Gen. OKABE Naosaburo.

IV.. I used to warn my troops never to treat the nationals cruelly and this intention of mine was fully understood by all, from the regimental commanders down.

I instructed my troops to be kind towards the Chinese people. This instruction was obeyed faithfully by all. My 26th Division was noted for its discipline, and was known as the model division in North China.

V. For the following reasons, I definitely deny the accusation of the 2nd and 3rd of February, 1940, some of the soldiers of the 13th Regiment of the 26th Division, committed outrage and slaughter: --

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The battle of WUYUAN was fought on the open plain of WUYUAN, and no attack was attempted on the town. Moreover, all the inhabitants had taken refuge in the interior and there was not one left. Therefore, no such violence could take place. Besides, any such unlawful acts could not and in fact were not committed by my troops, nor by the troops of Maj. Gen. ADACHI, the Commander of the Infantry Corps and Col. ISHIGURO, the Commander of the regiment, both of whom were particularly scrupulous about discipline. If there had been any of such unlawful acts, they would have been reported to me for, thanks to the satisfactory communication with various localities at that time, I could receive and carefully examine all the reports coming from everywhere. However, no such cases of violence came to my notice. Moreover, if such an act had been committed, it would have been brought before a court martial for strict punishment, but no case of this nature was tried by a court martial.

I insist that there were absolutely no such incidents.

On the contrary, the fact was that, Japanese troops were massacred in the said Wuyuan district. Late in March, 1940, as the snow began to melt, a number of Japanese soldiers and officials of the OKUBO group, who were guarding the town of WUYUAN after the WUYUAN operations, were massacred by TIEN Tso-yi's forces who invaded the town.

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As that was the situation the allegation that the Japanese army or troops under my command committed outrage and slaughter etc. is absolutely untrue.

On this 15th day of July, 1947,  
at L.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT/s/ KURODA, Shigenori (seal)

I, IMANARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dep<sup>o</sup>nent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,

at SAME PLACE.

Witness: /s/ IMANARI, Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KURODA, Shigenori (seal)

Ex 3082

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al )  
 )  
 vs )  
 )  
 ARAYI, SADAO, et al )

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPARTMENT: ABE, Yoshimitsu

I, ABE, Yoshimitsu, having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in this country depose as follows:

1. I was born on April 10th, 1893, at Kanitoku, Tomita-Mura, Ochi-gun, Ehime. At present I live at Koyaura, Saka-Mura, Aki-gun, Hiroshima Prefecture.

2. An outline of my career is as follows:

(1) Graduated from the Military Academy in 1920, Second Lieutenant, Infantry.

(2) Staff-officer, North China Area Army, Major, Infantry.

(3) Attached to the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry.

(4) Chief of Staff of the 33th Division, Colonel, Infantry.

(5) Commander of the Army Railway Transport of the Hiroshima District. Major-General until the close of the war.

3. I took part in the battle of Hongkong in the capacity of Chief of Staff of the 33th Division. The said battle was started on command of the 23rd Army on the morning of December 8, 1941.

the outline of

4. I shall explain this battle of Hongkong in two stages -- the first is the attack on the Kowloon Peninsula and the second on the Island of Hongkong.

1st stage:

Our Division advanced into the Tanaoshan line after we first rushed through the western and southwestern sides of Tana for the purpose of seizing the enemy on the plain of Chinitia and we began to break through border positions from the eastern district of Hsien-Shuen. Then we prepared ourselves for attacks on the enemy's principal position. We focused our main attack on Chin-Shang from the western part of the reservoir near the cattle-gate and penetrated quickly into the northern line of the tip of the Kowloon Peninsula after breaking through the said principal position. One part of our troops further advanced to the southern tip of the Kowloon Peninsula.

2nd Stage:

Attack on the Island of Hongkong.

In regard to the landing operations against the Island of Hongkong we chose the beachhead point between the northern corner of the island and Sai-Niu Wang with the northern corner as the landing point for our main force. Our right flank made preparations for an attack near Tai-Tang, whereas our left flank prepared for the attack near Tsoy-Tang Shu. After the Artillery Corps of the 23rd Army and those of our Division had fired devastatingly on the enemy positions, we landed on the island. Upon completion of the landing, we immediately

advanced further to the lines of Mt. Chadenes (T.N. phonetic).

5. No air units were attached for the purpose of the battle of Hong-Kong. But there were planes attached to the 23rd Army and they joined in the operation under the command of that Army. At first they bombed enemy aerodromes and warships and later cooperated with us in our ground operations.

6. Excepting one battalion out of our divisional artillery which was assigned to the left flank, we united all the other artillery in the landing operations against the Island of HongKong and bombarded enemy artillery positions of automatic weapons, pillboxes and various obstacles laid along the water front between the north corner and Sui-Hiu Wang which was to our front and after the first landing was effected we ordered them to fire at the enemy behind these defenses. Consequently, we issued no orders to fire at water level objects. Particularly, were our artillery forces strictly forbidden to bombard the town in spite of great tactical disadvantage.

7. We did not receive any information that there were Soviet merchant ships at anchor in the harbor neither before nor during the landing operations. We did see three or four sunken ships in the harbor before our attack, however, but could not tell whether it was due to bombing by a chance shell fired either by the enemy or us or from scuttling. Our bombardment was concentrated on the enemy ground positions, obstacles and artillery positions in the vicinity of our landing point. We felt no need to fire at the ships in the harbor. And indeed there is no fact behind any accusation that we fired on the ships lying at anchor in the harbor. On the contrary, it is possible that an enemy shell might have hit the anchored ships as they were directing their fire at our landing craft in the course of the landing operation. The Japanese troops did not open fire within their landing barges until they landed. The thing they did was to put up a smoke-screen while the enemy fired at our landing barges.

The landing operation was commenced at about 2100 o'clock under cover of darkness so although the enemy used searchlights, their firing was so much hit and miss it is quite probable that some of those merchant ships which were within the zone of maneuver of our landing barges might have been hit by enemy shells.

We are positive that our army absolutely never committed such acts as to lock up the ships' crew, confiscate them of their belongings or their provisions, etc.

It cannot, however, be denied that the Chinese residents who were in the occupied area of the Japanese forces, after we succeeded in the landing operations of HongKong, plundered evacuated houses and warehouses at night and sometimes even in the daytime and used small junks to loot ships in the harbor. Since our Division was still occupied with all its strength in attacking interior positions on the island at the time it was very difficult for us to be tending to the suppression of such disorders.

8. There were many ships large and small lying at anchor in the eastern half of the harbor of HongKong, particularly, in the spot nearer to the Island of HongKong, Taiwan, and the eastern pier. But larger ones were not numerous and probably numbered less than twenty. Three or four ships were in a sunken state but their crew must have been refuge elsewhere as we saw nobody on the ships.

Our landing barges, therefore, were compelled to thread their way around these ships lying at anchor in the Port.

We could not recognize the nationality of the ships in port because they had no flags nor any other clear marks of identification.

9. In order to avoid further useless sacrifice of human lives, the 23rd Army twice despatched its Chief of Staff as a bearer of a flag of truce, to advise the British Army to surrender. Particularly, on the second occasion, we suggested to them to consider the evacuation of at least the women and children from the Island, which, however, was not accepted by the British Army.

10. With reference to prisoners of war, as our Division took charge of only disarming and keeping watch of them, I do not remember exactly how many British war prisoners there were, but I think there were about fifteen in Kowloon and about six thousand in Hongkong.

The British Army troops voluntarily disarmed themselves and gathered in their barracks, so it wasn't as troublesome as we had anticipated nor did any incident occur. Thereafter the handling of the war prisoners was completely under the supervision of the 23rd Army.

11. Regarding the non-combatants in Hongkong, the 23rd Army took charge of them, but they were small in number as the majority of the families of the British had evacuated Hongkong before the battle began. The remaining number continued to live in hotels or in their own homes just as they had been doing.

12. We were deeply moved by the Imperial Command which gave us the honor of capturing Hongkong and very conscious of the heavy responsibility and duties involved.

The Divisional Commander gave us instructions on several occasions, the gist of which was as follows:

"The attack on Hongkong differs from garrisoning in China. It is an attack on a fortress which has seen years of laborious preparation by the British, and it will be against an army which is one of the strongest forces in Europe. It is therefore, certain that the history of this battle will be closely examined and commented upon by future historians for a long time. We must pledge ourselves to stake all our lives upon a victory in this battle. Particularly, no act of illegal conduct should be committed throughout the battle, such as murder, atrocities, plunder and destruction, etc. Our attitude must be gentlemanly so that we may not suffer even the slightest criticism from the enemy as well as the third Powers."

Throughout the battle, we strictly obeyed, without the slightest variation the purport of the above instructions.

After our Division broke through the border and captured the enemy's principal position, tactical principles demanded that the whole army should immediately storm into the town of Kowloon so that the enemy garrison for the District of Kowloon might be prevented from retreating to the Island of Hongkong. However, as it was plain that the entry of a large number of soldiers into Kowloon would necessarily throw the city into confusion, the entire army was ordered to halt at the foot of a hill to the north of the city, and only two infantry battalions with the best training records in the Division were ordered to enter the town. As a consequence the whole town was completely saved from confusion.

During our landing operations on Hongkong, enemy artillery from their positions inside the town fired fiercely at us. But despite the intense firing by the enemy our troops were strictly forbidden to bombard the town, and were ordered to aim only at such pill-box positions as were located higher on the hill than the residential section. Needless to say this proved a great tactical disadvantage in our operations but in spite of it we did our utmost to protect Hongkong from war disaster. Because our troops were not permitted to attack inside of the city, Hongkong still remains today as it used to be and there were no casualties among its residents. After the enemy on the Island of Hongkong surrendered at least three battalions were needed ordinarily to maintain peace and order of the city as well as to disarm the enemy. But we selected only one of the best infantry battalions in the Division for this difficult task, cut the number of men to the least possible, placed them on their honor and they performed wonderfully.

Even after the capture of all of Hongkong, we stationed only three select infantry battalions in the town, because unforeseen incidents might possibly allow the entry of a mass of troops into the city and its vicinity. Our main forces, therefore, were concentrated in the suburbs to the north of the town of



Kowloon and restrictions were placed on the soldiers in entering the town. Thanks to these measures, no incidents took place although some complaints were heard among the soldiers.

13. Looting by Chinese refugees was perpetrated taking advantage of unguarded moments even during the course of battle; therefore, we strictly prohibited the public in general from going out at night. However, as these refugees broke into evacuated houses even during broad daylight to say nothing of at night, we had extreme difficulty in preventing such looting.

After the occupation, Chinese refugees opened markets in Kowloon and HongKong but the majority of their transactions consisted of stolen goods.

I am firmly convinced that there was absolutely no case of murder, atrocity and looting committed by the officers or men of our Division.

14. I do not remember exactly the number of British soldiers killed and wounded, but the wounded for the most part were taken care of by the British Army themselves.

Some of them were searched for and found by our front line troops in conjunction with the British Army. When the dead were discovered, they were buried respectfully at the spot where they were found; and the wounded were taken into hospitals.

On this seventh day of December 1946, at the First Demobilization Bureau in Tokyo.

DEPONENT: . ABE, Yashimitsu

(Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness at the same place at the same date.

WITNESS: IANARI, Yasutaro

(Seal)

C A T H

I swear according to my conscience to state the truth  
withholding nothing nor adding anything.

LEO, Yoshimitsu

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ノ如ク供述致シマス

自分僞我証ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シ

宣誓供述書

供述者

黒

田

重

徳

茂

貞夫

其他

對

亞米利加合衆國其他

極東國際軍事裁判所

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

一、私ハ一八八七年十月二十五日奈良地積岡天牟田市ニ生シ現在某職

監獄ニ居リマス

二、私ノ經歷ハ大隈左ノ通りチアリマス

一九三七年十月

第二十六師團歩兵團長（陸軍少將）

一九三八年十一月

滿洲國牡丹江ノ第四獨立守備隊司令官

一九三九年八月

第二十六師團長（中將）

一九四一年八月

教育總監部本部長

以後一九四四年十一月マデ、ソングガホール軍參謀長、マニラ軍司令官

ヲ經テ一九四四年十二月豫備役編入トナル

三、私ハ中藏厚岡部直三郎中村守下ノ第二十六師團長トシテ一九四〇年

一月下旬停作機ノ算ヲ打ツタメニ騎兵榮園ト共ニ五原地方ニ作戦シマ

リシタ。我軍ハ自動車を包圍カラ進軍シテ機ヲ撃破シ戦國ハ十日間位ヲ終

リ自分ノ軍ハ占領後直チニ撤退シ五原ノ町ハ其後岡部直三郎中將指揮

ノ軍ニ於テ守備ヲシマシタ

四、私ハ常ニ部下ニ對シ原任民ヲ虐待暴行ナドスルコトノナイ豫慮重ニ

敵メテ居リ此趣旨ハ聯隊長以下全軍ニ充分徹底シテ居リマシタ  
却ツテ支那ノ住民ニハ丁寧ニセヨト訓令シ管之ヲヨク守ツテ居リマシ  
タ。軍紀風紀ノ嚴正ナコトニ於テ第二十六師團ハ北支那方面デ第一ノ  
模範的師團ト言ハレテ居リマシタ

五、一九四〇年二月二日及三日ニ第二十六師團ニ屬スル第十三聯隊ノ兵  
ガ暴行屠殺ヲ行ツタトイフ漢テ事實ハ絶對ニナカッタコトヲ確言發シ  
マス。即チ此五原ノ戦ハ五原ノ大平原デ行ハレ町ニ對シ攻撃ハ加ヘマ  
センデシタガ住民ハ全部奥地ニ避難シ一人モ居リマセンデシタ從ツテ  
右ノ濫ナ事件ハ起リ得マセンデシタシ、私ノ部下デアリ侍ニ嚴格ナ歩  
兵團長ノ安冠少將ヤ聯隊長ヨシ大佐ノ部下ガ其濫ナ不法行爲ヲスル管  
ハアリマセンシ又事實其濫ナ行爲ハシマセンシタ。若シ不法行爲ガ  
アレバ全部自分ノ處ニ報告ガアル管デアリ地方トノ連絡ハヨク取レテ  
居リマスノデ何處カラデモ報告ハ全部私ガ受取ツテ必ズヨク嚴ミ調査  
ラシチ居リマシタガ右ノ濫ナ暴行屠殺ナドトイフコトハ全然報告サレ  
マセンデシタ若シ此濫ナ事實ガアレバ軍法會議デ必ズ裁判サレ嚴重ニ  
處分サレル管デアリマスガ軍法會議ニ於テ斯カル事件ガ裁判サレタコ

トモアリマセン。斯カル事實ハ全く無シタコトヲ斷言致シマス。  
右五原地方ニ於ケル事件トシテハ却ツテ日本軍ガ虜殺サレタ事實ガア  
リマシタ即チ五原事件ハ五原ノ町ヲ守備シテ居タ岡部直三郎兵團ノ多  
數軍人官吏ガ一九四〇年三月終頃雪融期ニ停作餓軍ニ侵入サレ虜殺サ  
レテシマヒマシタ。  
其後ナ次第デスカラ日本軍殊ニ私ノ部隊ガ支那人民ニ對シテ暴行虐殺  
ナドシタコトハ絶對ニアリマセン。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月十五日於極東口際軍事

裁判所

供述者 黒田重徳

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明

シ  
ス

同日 於 同所

立會人 今成泰太郎

Def Dog 17.5

審  
フ

心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲ生欲秘セス又  
審ヲモ附加セザルコト

直  
審  
檢

〔英名印〕

黒

白

重

徳



THE COPY

一、私ハ明治三十一年四月十日本籍地愛媛縣越智郡富田村字上徳ニ生レ

現在廣島縣安藝郡坂村字小屋浦ニ居住シテ居リマス

二、私ノ經歷ハ左ノ通りデアリマス

大正九年陸軍士官學校卒業

北支方面軍參謀

陸軍省寫字局御用掛

第三十八師團參謀長

廣島地區鐵道司令官

歩兵少尉

歩兵少佐

歩兵中佐

歩兵大佐

陸軍少將

終戦ニ至ル

三、私ハ第三十八師團參謀長トシテ香港攻略戦ニ参加致シマス

該攻略戦ハ昭和十六年（一九四一年）十二月八日戦第二十三軍ヨリ命

令ヲ受テ行動ヲ開始シタリマス

四、香港攻略戦ノ大要ニ付第一期ヲ九龍半島ノ攻略、第二期ヲ香港島ノ

攻略ニ通分シテ説明致シマス

第一期 我師團ハ深川東方地區ヨリ國境障地ヲ突破シ初メ綿田平地ニ

敵ヲ捕促スル目的ヲ以テ先ヅ大埔西側、同西南方ニ突進シタル後大帽山ノ線ニ進出シ、次テ主陣地ニ對スル攻撃ヲ準備シ重點ヲ城門貯水地西側ヨリ金山ニ向ケテ該主陣地ヲ突破シテ速カニ九龍北端ノ線ニ進出シ更ニ一部ノ兵ヲ以テ九龍半島南端ニ進出シタルデアリマス

第二期 香港島ノ上陸戰鬪ハ上陸點ヲ北角カラ水牛灣ニ至ル間トシ主力ノ上陸點ヲ北角附近トシテ右翼隊ハ大灣附近、左翼隊ハ層蘭樹附近ニ於テ攻撃ヲ準備シ第二十三軍砲兵及師團砲兵隊敵陣地破碎射撃ヲ實施シテ後ニ上陸シマシタ。上陸後ハ一擧ニ「シヤデネス」山ノ戦ニ進出シタルデアリマス

五、香港攻略戰ノ爲ニ我師團ニハ飛行隊ハ配屬セラレマセンデシタ  
飛行機ハ第二十三軍ガ持ツテ居リ同軍ノ命令ニヨリ行動シタルデアリマス。右飛行隊ハ當初飛行場及軍艦攻撃ニ、後ニ地上戰鬪ニ協力致シマシタ

六、香港島上陸戰鬪ニハ我師團砲兵ノ中ヨリ一個大隊ヲ左翼隊ニ配屬シ他ノ砲兵全部ヲ統一シテ上陸正面タル北角ヨリ水牛灣ニ至ル間ノ敵砲

兵、自動火器陣地、トーチカ及水際ノ障碍物ヲ射撃シ第一回ノ上陸成功後ハ其ノ背後ノ敵ヲ射撃スル機命ジマシタ、從ツテ水上目標ニ對シテ射撃ヲ命ジタコトハアリマセン、特ニ市街地ニ對シテハ戰術的不利ヲ忍ンデ之ヲ射撃スルコトヲ禁止シタノデアリマス

七、我々ハ蘇聯ノ商船ガ停泊シテ居ルトノ情報ハ香港攻撃前ニモ聞イタコトハアリマセンデシタ、香港島攻撃前、港内ニ於テ三、四隻沈没シタ船ヲ見マシタガ、飛行機ニ依ルモノデアルカ、又彼我執レカノ砲彈ニヨルモノデアルカ、或ハ又自沈シタモノデアルカ判リマセンデシタ我砲彈ハ上陸地附近ノ陸上陣地、障碍物、砲兵陣地ニ集中シマシタノデ停泊中ノ船ヲ射撃スル必要ガナク特ニ船舶ヲ射撃シメトイフ事實ハアリマセンデシタ

却ツテ我軍ガ小舟艇ニ依ツテ上陸戰闘スル際ニ敵ハ我小舟艇ニ對シテ火力ヲ向ケタノデ敵ノ彈丸ガ停泊中ノ船舶ニ的ツタコトモアリ得ル状態デアリマシタ

我小舟艇ハ上陸スル迄船内カラ射撃ハ致シマセンデシタ

唯敵ガ我舟艇ヲ射撃スルヲ妨害スルタメニ煙幕ヲ使用シタノデアリ  
マス

上陸開始ハ二十一時頃ニシタカラ敵ハ探照燈ヲ使用シマシタガ敵ノ砲  
彈ハ亂射ノ状態デアリマシタノテ上陸用舟艇ノ行動地帯ニ停泊シテ居  
タ商船ニハ敵ノ彈丸ガ的ツタカモ知レヌト思ハレルノデアリマス

我軍ハ船舶ノ乗組員ヲ拘禁シタコトハ網對ニアリマセン、又船員ノ所  
持品、糧食等ヲ掠奪シタコトモ網對ニアリマセン

然レ乍ラ香港島上陸成功以我占領地域ニアツタ支那住民ガ空家、倉庫  
ニ對シ夜間ノミナサズ時ニハ晝間ニモ掠奪ヲナシ、又港内停泊中ノ船  
ニ對シテハ小型「ジャンク」ニ依リ掠奪ヲ行ツタコトハ事實デアリマ  
スガ我師団ハ末グ島ノ陣地攻撃ニ全力ヲ用ヒテ居ル當時デアリマシタ  
カラ之ヲ取締ルコトカ困難グツタノデアリマス

八、香港ノ港内東半分ノ地區ニハ多數ノ大小船舶ガ停泊シテ居リ特ニ香  
港島寄り附近大灣附近並ニ東部地區ニ多數點在シテ居リマシタ、大型  
船ハ少ク其數ハ二十隻以下デアツタト思ヒマス、沈没シタモノ三、四

船アリ之等ノ船員ハ退避シタモント見受ケラレ人影ヲ認メマセンデシ  
マ

我上陸用舟艇ハ之等灣内停泊中ノ船舶ノ間ヲ縫フテ行動セネバナラヌ  
狀態テアリマシタ

停泊中ノ商船ノ國籍等ハ判定シ得ズ國旗其他ノ明瞭ナ標識ヲ認メマセ  
シモシタ

九、第二十三軍ニ於テハ無益ノ殺傷ヲ避ケル目的ヲ多田參謀ヲ軍使トシ

二回ニツテ降伏ヲ勸告シマシタ、特ニ其ノ第二回目ニハ島内婦女子

ノ退避ノミニテモ考慮シテハ如何カト勸告シタノテアリマシタガ英軍

ハ之ニ諒ジナカツタノテアリマス

十、俘虜關係ニ付テハ我師團ハ其ノ武装解除並ニ警備ノミニ任ジタノテ

アリマシテ其ノ遺物十數ハ記憶シマセンガ九龍地區ヲ十五名内外、香  
港島ヲハ千名程テアツタカト思ヒマス

武装解除ハ英軍自ラ之ヲ行ヒマシタノテ當初心配シタ程ノ手數モ掛ラ

ズ又英軍ハ自ラ各兵營ニ集合シテ居リマシタノテ何等ノ事故モアリマ

センデシタ

爾後ノ俘虜ノ取扱ハ總テ第二十三軍テ致シマシタ

十一、非戰國員ノ事ハ第二十三軍ニ於テ取扱ヒマシタガ英人等ノ家族ノ多數ハ開戦前ニ香港ヲ去ツテシマツテ少數シカ居リマセンデシタ、其ノ殘ツテキル者ハ各ホテルヤ自宅ニ其儘生活シテ居リマシタ

十二、香港攻略ノ大命ヲ受ケタ我々ハ其ノ名譽ニ感激シ其ノ責務ノ重大ナコトヲ感ジマシタ、師團長カラハ度々我々ニ訓示ガアリマシタ、其要點ハ大体左ノ様ナ趣旨デアリマシタ

「香港ノ攻略ハ支那ノ警備トハ異リ英國積年準備セル要塞攻撃デアリ且歐洲最優秀軍隊ト交戦スル次第ナルヲ以テ本攻略戦史ハ永ク後世史家ヨリ研究評論セラルコトハ必定ナリ、故ニ我師團ハ全滅スルモ其ノ攻略ニ成功ヲ齎フト共ニ特ニ一切ノ非道行爲（虐殺、暴行、掠奪、破壊等）ノ絶無ヲ期シ敵軍及第三國人ヨリ一點ノ非難攻撃ヲ受クルコトナキ様紳士的態度ヲ以テ臨マザルベカラズ」我々ハ以上ノ様ナ訓示ノ趣旨ヲ體シ戦闘中少シモ違フ所ナク之ヲ嚴守シマシタ

ソレテスカラ我師團ハ國境ヲ突破シ次テ敵ノ主陣地攻略後ハ九龍地區  
 敵守備部隊ガ香港島ニ退却スルコトガ出來ナイ様ニ全軍九龍市街地區  
 ニ一撃ニ殺到スルコトヲ戰術上希望シマシタガ多數ノ兵隊ヲ入レテハ  
 九龍市街内ハ混亂スルコト必至ナルヲ心配シテ全軍ヲ同市街北側高地  
 端ニ停止サセテ師團中最モ訓練成績優秀ナ步兵二ヶ大隊ヲ特ニ指名シ  
 同市街ニ入レマシタ、從ツテ市街ノ混亂ヲ完全ニ防ギマシタ  
 次ニ香港島上陸戰ノトキハ敵ノ砲兵ハ市街地ノ中カラ射撃ヲ盛ニシテ  
 來ニシタ、如何ニ敵カラ射撃サレマシテモ我軍ハ市街地ヲ射撃スルコ  
 トヲ禁シ、市街ト山地部トノ接觸點ヨリ高イ山地部ノ敵トナカト  
 陣地ノ射撃サセマシタ、其ノタメニ戰術的ニハ非常ナ不利ヲ忍ビ  
 香港島ノ保存ニ萬全ノ努力ヲシタノデアリマス、市内ノ攻撃ヲサセ  
 ンコトヲ望ム、香港市街ハ昔ノ儘現存シ又住民モ死傷セズニ濟ンダノ  
 チアリマス  
 次ニ香港島ノ敵ガ降伏シマシテ市街地警備並ニ武装解除ヲ行フニ當リ  
 マシテハドロシテモ約三ヶ大隊ノ兵員ヲ必要トスルノデアリマスガ特

十四 我ハ英軍死傷者ノ數ハ記憶シテ居リマセンガ死傷者ハ主トシテ英軍

自ラ收容シマシム

然シ其ノ一部ハ英軍ト共ニ我ガ第一線部隊ガ搜索發見ニ勉メマシタ  
死傷者ノ發見アレバ現場ニ於テ町重ニ埋葬シ傷者ハ病院ニ收容シマシタ



一九四六年十二月七日

於第一復員局

供述者 阿部芳光

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明ス

同年同月同日 於第一復員局

立會人 今成 泰太郎

Def, Doo 1257

宜  
誓  
誓

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ヘ何事ヲモ黙秘セス何事ヲモ附加ヤサルコト  
ヲ誓フ

阿  
部  
芳  
光

Def. Doc. No. 1977

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: SHIMODA, Chiyoshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I. I was born on June 7, 1902 (Meiji 35) at No. 29, Kami-machi, Narayama Motoshin-machi, Akita Prefecture. My permanent residence is No. 1741, Ekota 4-chome, Nakano Ward, Tokyo and my present residence is No. 648, Shimo-azabu, Kawasaki, Kanagawa Prefecture.

II. The following is an outline of my career.

1924 (Taisho 13) graduated from the Military Academy  
1936 (Showa 11) attached to the General Staff Office  
April 1940 (Showa 15) staff-officer of the 104th Division  
October 1941 (Showa 16) staff-officer of the 23rd Army  
March 1943 (Showa 18) staff-officer of the Kanto Defense Army  
April 1943 (Showa 18) staff-officer of the 3rd Imperial  
Guard Division and chief of the staff of  
the 152nd Division (Colonel)

- 1 -

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Termination of War.

III. From April 1940 (Showa 15) to October 1941 (Showa 16) I was a staff-officer of the 104th Division and served as the chief of operations and intelligence. In October 1941 (Showa 16) I was appointed a staff-officer of the 23rd Army (stationed in Canton and served as the chief of intelligence till March 1943 (Showa 18). I am, therefore, well aware of the movements of the 23rd Army which was stationed in Canton district about 1941 (Showa 16).

In about lunar December of 1941 (Showa 16), the Army stopped all operations and devoted all its energies to the maintenance of public order. It is, therefore, needless to say that it successfully entered the city without fighting. Since occupation of Hongkong the Chinese Army restored quite a calm attitude and the peace was maintained very well.

In Canton and vicinity, I have never heard of such places as Asihupan, Wuyenchiao, Shasia, Shaipuchang, Hopien, Fucheng, Hsuehking, Hsiencheng, Chaohsian, Peimenwai, Hsimenkou, Paisha etc.

If anything special had taken place in connection with the Japanese Army, I must have heard of it as I was the chief of intelligence. Even the matter which concerned the life of a Chinese was to be reported to the Army without exception, but I have no remembrance of receiving any such report at that time.

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I positively deny the fact that about 2,000 citizens were massacred by the Japanese Army at that time. Not only the commander but the leading staff of the Army were extremely strict on military discipline and repeatedly warned their subordinates to treat kindly the Chinese people, to respect their customs of the Chinese and not to interfere with the Chinese authorities. To the general soldiers, they showed such a brief motto as, "Do not burn, do not kill and do not plunder", and tried utmost to make it pervade the whole army that scarcely anyone disobeyed it.

Therefore, if the Japanese Army had ever massacred a Chinese, it would have been taken up as the serious problem of the Army.

The rumor that 2,000 Chinese people were massacred was merely a fiction and I definitely assert that such a thing did not take place while I served in the 23rd Army.

On this 27th day of June, 1947,  
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT: SHIMODA, Chiyoshi (seal)

I, IMANARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at the same place.

Witness: IMANARI, Yasutaro (seal)

Def. Doc. No. 1877

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SHIMODA, Chiyoshi (seal)

Def. Doc. # 2240

Exh. No. 204

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAJI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: OKABE, Eiichi

According to the usual custom of our country, I first swear as in the attached paper and then state as follows:

I was selected as managing director of the Manchurian Aircraft Manufacturing Co. Ltd. in December 1944. This company was the only airplane manufacturing company in Manchuria, and its head office and main factory were in Mukden.

Next to the main factory there was the factory of the Manchurian Machine-Tool Manufacturing Company where machine-tools were manufactured, and several American or British prisoners of war were working there. I was told that there were some who had high technical ability among them. While no prisoners of war were working in my factory, I asked the reason of the man who was in charge of the workers. He answered "We inquired, about the employment of prisoners of war, unofficially of a staff officer of the Kwantung Army before you came here. The staff officer replied that we can't let the prisoners of war work in airplane manufacturing work according to international law. This is the reason why we don't employ them."

At this answer, I first learned of the limitation of international law and the Kwantung Army's attitude toward the treatment of prisoners of war which carefully observed the limitations of international law

WRITTEN OATH

18, February 1947

I, hereby swear that I shall state nothing but the truth according to my conscience, neither concealing nor adding anything.

/s/ OKABE, Eiichi

I hereby certify that the above was duly sworn in my presence and signed at Tokyo, Japan this 18th day of February 1947.

/s/ KANEKO, Sumihisa

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Def, Doc, No, 2240

Exh, No, 3084

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣讀供述書

供述者 岡部榮一

自分機我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣讀ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

私ハ昭和十九年(一九四四年)十二月ニ滿洲飛行機製造會社ノ理事長ニ選任セラレマシタ、此ノ會社ハ滿洲ニ於ケル唯一ノ飛行機製造會社デアリマシテ本社及主要工場ハ奉天ニ在リマシタ  
此ノ工場ノ隣ニ滿洲工作機製造株式會社ノ工場ガアリマシテ其處デアラ工作機被ヲ製造シテオリ米英ノ俘虜ガ數百名働イテ居リマシタ、其ノ内ニハ

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COPY



技術的ニ優秀ナ者ガ居ルト云フコトデシタ、然ルニ私共ノ飛行機工場デハ  
俘虜ヲ使ツテ居リマセンデシタカラ私ハ其ノ理由ヲ示シテ答ヘマシタ處  
係ノ者カラ次ノ機ニ答ガアリマシタ。  
「滿洲飛行機製造會社デハ、アナタガ理事長ニ就任スル前ニ俘虜ヲ使フコ  
トニ就テ非公式ニ關東軍參謀ニ問合セタ處參謀カラ俘虜ハ國際法規ニ依リ  
飛行機製造ニ從事セシムルコトガ出來ナイノデアルト云フ返事ガアツタノ  
デ當社デハ俘虜ヲ使ハナイコトニシテアルト、此ノ回答ニ依リ私ハ  
初メテ國際法ノ制限ト之ヲ遵守スル關東軍ノ俘虜取扱ノ態度トヲ承知スルコ  
トガ出來マシタ。」

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月十八日於東京

洪述者 岡 部 榮 一

右ハ特立台人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日 於東京

立留人 池 田 純 久

宣 誓 書

良心ニ從ヒ己實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺詭セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

岡 部 榮 一

3085

Translated by Defense  
Language Branch

International Military Tribunal for the Far East  
The United States of America, et al.

-- Against  
ARAKI Sadao, et al.

*Affidavit (translation)*

By IKEJIRI Satoshi

I, being duly sworn according to the customary  
formality in this country depose and state:

**FILE COPY**  
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LET LJC 256

I) I was a major in the army. I arrived at my post as adjutant of the Army in the Burma Area on May 5th in the 19th year of Showa (1944). Since then until Aug. 15th in the 20th year of Showa (1945), I remained at the same post. Demobilized on July 21st of the 21st year of Showa (1946), I have since that time been working as a non-regular member of the ~~Business~~ Business Transaction Dept, of the southern Army.

II) In the middle of September in the 19th year of Showa (1944) General KIMURA Heitaro arrived at his post as Commander of the Army in the Burma Area and ever since then until the termination of the war, I took office as adjutant to him.

III) My main duties as adjutant in the Army of the Burma Area were: The handling of correspondence, books and confidential documents, affairs concerning awards, the handling of documents concerning prisoners of war and interness etc.

IV) Concerning the treatment of P.O.W.'s during the construction of the Siam-Burma railway, the Headquarters of the Burma Area Army had no connection at all, and more over it was a year after the railway construction had been completed that General KIMURA arrived at his post as Commander of the Army in the Burma Area.

v) The Pangoon P.W. Camp was one of the branches of the Malay P.W. Camp, and so came under the control of the Commander of the Combined Southern Army.

The chief of the Pangoon P.W. Camp was appointed and removable by the Chief of the Malay P.W. Camp. That is to say, although the chief of the Pangoon P.W. Camp and two non-commissioned

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officer formed the staff of that camp, they were dispatched from the Malay P.W. Camp. The army surgeon and the requisite number of guards were dispatched from the 73rd Headquarters of Line of Communications of the Burma Area Army and were under the Command of the camp commander.

VI) In the Army internment Camp in Tavoy, civilians of hostile nations (except P.O.'s) were held, and they were under the control of the Commander of the 24th Mixed Brigade, which was under the Burma Area Army.

VII) General KIMURA Heitaro, Commander of the Burma Area Army always directed his subordinates to treat the P.O.'s and internees with benevolence and never to insult nor mistreat them but to treat them fairly, observing the articles.

VIII) The condition and the treatment of the P.O.'s in the Rangoon(POW) Camp, while General KIMURA occupied the post of Commander of the Army in Burma, were approximately as follows:

a) The camp, former Rangoon prison, was a permanent building, fully equipped for living and sanitation with dispensary, sick rooms, showers, kitchen, <sup>ic</sup> exercise yard etc. The equipment of the internment camp was also in good condition.

b) Of the P.O.'s the healthy men of the rank of non-Commissioned officers and below were sometimes ordered to work when necessary, but the patients were allowed to rest within. The type of labour they performed was mainly work at the wharf and odd jobs in the supply departments and at their camp.

c) POW's were allowed to rest not only on Sundays but also on the public holidays of their countries. Additional supplies were provided to them from time to time.

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d) POW'S of the rank of warrant officer and above sometimes, of their own volition, in order to take exercise, came to the working places and gave directions and supervised the POW's engaged in their work.

e) The POW's were made to run a farm by utilizing the vacant land within the camp and they were also made to raise livestock by issuing to them cows, pigs, goats, ducks, etc, from official depôts for the purpose of obtaining fats. The surplus crops of their farm were sold on the Rangoon market and the receipts became their income, and were allowed to be appropriated for the purchase of luxuries at the market.

f) We occasionally sent the military band belonging to the Burma Area Army to that camp for the entertainment of the POW's.

g) As for amusements, we equipped the camp with a piano, books etc, making our utmost efforts to give what comfort we could within the limitations of the locality.

h) The prisoners were also allowed to obtain goods at the camp canteen to a reasonable extent and they bought a considerable amount of cigarettes, milk etc.

i) I never heard of any case of mistreatment of the POW's (prisoners) during General KIMURA's stay at that post.

I only remember that we reprimanded some of them on several occasions at the request of, Brig-Gen., HOBSON, their senior officer for their lack of obedience to his commands.

j) Both Brig-Gen. HOBSON and Maj. LORING, British officers representing the POW's on one<sup>or</sup> two occasions presented letters of

thanks to the camp commander for the fair treatment of the POW's and twice to the Chief of the camp, regarding the fair treatment of the P.W.'s. At the end of April in the 20th year of Showa (1945), on the occasion of the withdrawal of the Japanese Army from Rangoon, we told them that they would be released, whereupon these two officers delivered a letter of thanks to the Chief of the camp. I have not heard of the two officers since then.

k) The treatment of the internees in the Army camp in Tavoy was also ~~generally fair~~ *generally fair* in accordance with the provisions and I got no report any particular case of mistreatment. Letters of thanks were presented to the chief of the camp as many as seven or eight times.

l) In brief, while General KIMURA was in office, we had but very scanty supplies from the rear and the materials were running short, nevertheless we made as much effort as possible for the good treatment of the POW's internees, ~~and I believe the treatment was generally with fairness~~ *and I believe the treatment was generally with fairness*.

The facts above mentioned are based upon the reports from the Headquarters of the 73rd Line of communications and the Headquarters of 24th Mixed Brigade, and upon my recollections of information from Captain SHIRAKAWA, the former adjutant of the 73rd Line of communications Headquarters.

DEF LOC # 256

This 27 day of November, 21st year of Showa (1946)

At the office of Japanese Counsel  
in the International Military Tribunal  
for the Far East

by IKEJIRI Satoshi (seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned  
date.

Bernard A. Hargadon, 1st Lt. Inf.  
Administrative Officer

OATH

I swear according to my conscience to tell the truth  
with-holding and adding nothing

IKEJIRI Satoshi (seal)



TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached exhibit is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 20 Jan 1947

Ex 208 5

# FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

極東國際軍事裁判所

頭 米 利 加 合 衆 國 其 他

對

荒 木 貞 夫 其 他

室 管 供 述 書

供 述 者 池 尻 敏

自分儀我國ニ行ハル方式ニ從ヒ先可別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シ  
カレト次ノ如ク供述致シマヌ

一 自分ハ元陸軍少佐ニシテ、昭和十九年五月五日ヒルマ方面軍副官トシテ著任、爾來昭和二十年八月十五日迄、同地位ニ留マレリ。昭和二十一年七月二十一日復員シ、爾來南方軍業務整理部副官トシテ勤務中ナリ。

一 昭和十九年九月中旬、木村兵太郎大尉ハヒルマ方面軍副官トシテ著任セラシ、爾來終戦ニ至ル迄、木村閣下ノ下ニ於テ、自分ハ副官トシテノ責務ヲ敢リタリ。

一 ヒルマ方面軍ニ於ケル副官トシテノ自分ノ主タル業務ハ、圖書、演習、演習ノ取扱ト、恩賞勲章事務及榮典ノ御留者ニ關スル管理ノ取扱等ナリキ

一 養料倉庫ノ建設ニ際スル榮典ノ使用ニ就キテハ、ヒルマ方面軍司令部ハ何等ノ困難ヲ有セマ、且ツ木村閣下ヲヒルマ方面軍司令部トシテ著任セラシシ時ハ、該倉庫完成后翌年ノマトナリキ。

一 演習場倉庫所ハ、マレノ演習場倉庫所ノ一部分ニシテマレノ演習場倉庫所ハ南方軍司令部ノ管理ヲ受ケタリ。

蘭質學海收容所長ノ任務ハマレ一經身收容所長之ヲ行フ。即チ蘭質學  
海收容所長及下士官二名ハ收容所ノ警備員ナルガ、右ハマレ一經身  
收容所ヨリ派遣セラレタルモノナリ。而シテ、警備及所要ノ警備兵ハ  
ピルマ方面軍第七十三兵站司令部ヨリ派遣セラレ、所長ノ指揮ヲ受ケ  
タリ。

一、夕ボイ軍拘留所ニハ、警備ニ非ル敵性國人ヲ收容之ガ監禁ハ、ピルマ  
方面軍總下タル混成隊二十回旅團長ニ屬セリ

一、ピルマ方面軍司令官木村兵太郎大將ハ常ニ其ノ部下ニ博愛心ヲ以テ侍  
シ並ニ拘留者ヲ珍重トシ、決シテ侮辱ノ虐待セバカラフ、其規ニ違由シ  
適正ニ取扱フヤウ指示セリ

一、木村閣下ガピルマ方面軍司令官トシテ在任中ニ於ケル蘭質學海收容所  
ノ警備員被擄情況、概シテ左ノ如シ。

(イ) 收容所ハ警備員刑務所ナル永久建築物ニシテ、施設完備シ、日務室  
病室、浴洗、水溝、炊事場、運動場アリテ、居住並ニ衛生設備皆トマ  
リ。拘留所モ亦諸般設備良好ナリキ。

- (ロ) 俘虜ノ内、下士官以下ノ健康者ハ所要ニ應ジ、勞務ニ從事セシメ、慰者ハ所内ニ於テ休養セシメタリ。勞務ノ種類ハ、埠頭作業、補給諸成及所内ノ雜役等ガ主ナルモノナリキ。
- (ハ) 俘虜ハ、日曜日ハ休養セシメ、俘虜ニ屬スル國ノ祝祭日ニモ休養ヲ與ヘ、加給品ヲ支給セシメタリ。
- (ニ) 準士官以上ノ俘虜ハ自發ニ依リ、運動等ノ目的ニテ作業所ニ臨ミ、勞務ニ從事シマリシモノノ指導監督等ヲ爲セルコトアリ。
- (ホ) 俘虜ヲシテ、所内ノ空地ヲ利用シ、農園ヲ經營、食物産ヨリ家畜、牛、豚、山羊、フヒル等ヲ交附シ、飼養セシメ、通商食糧取ニ資セシメタリ。而シテ農園ニ於ケル農産物等ノ余剩ヲランダン市場ニテ賣却シ、ソノ代價ハ俘虜ノ收念トシ、之ヲ以テ、彼等ノ嗜好品ヲ一般市場ヨリ購入スルコトヲ學シメタリ。
- (ヘ) ビルマ方面軍所屬ノ軍樂隊ヲ同收容所ニ派遣シ、學藝ヲ演習シタルコトモアリタリ。
- (ト) 娯樂トシテハ、パツノ、國樂等ヲ流傳ケ、酒地トセテハ、出來ル文ケ

ノ費金ヲ集ムルトモ努力セリ。

(5) 同以迄所為ニ於ケル猶ほ、同會組織ノ改良ヲ利用セシム、同章、

半紙紙ノ購入を指導アリタリ。

(4) 同ニシテ、タル不遂原因ヲ末端大體ニ由ハリキマシ、同會組織ニ

ソシテ、同會ノ由緒ニヨリ、同會組織ニ於ケル不遂原因ニ對シテ、

同會組織ノ改良ヲ指導ス。

(3) 同會組織ニヨリ、同會組織ニ於ケル不遂原因ニ對シテ、

同會組織ノ改良ヲ指導ス、同會組織ニ於ケル不遂原因ニ對シテ、

同會組織ノ改良ヲ指導ス、同會組織ニ於ケル不遂原因ニ對シテ、

同會組織ノ改良ヲ指導ス、同會組織ニ於ケル不遂原因ニ對シテ、

同會組織ノ改良ヲ指導ス、同會組織ニ於ケル不遂原因ニ對シテ、

慮ハ知ラヌ。

一、夕ノ中、同會組織ニ於ケル同會組織ノ改良ヲ指導ス、同會組織

正ナル衣類ヲ備シタルモノニシテ、同會組織ニ於ケル同會組織

同會組織ニ於ケル同會組織ノ改良ヲ指導ス、同會組織ニ於ケル

出モ六八通ニ上ル。

下要スルニ、木村大將在陣中ハ後方ヨリノ補給殆ンド無ク、物資通過ヲ

ルニ拘ラフ際並ニ強御者ノ處遇ハ爲シタル限リノ努力ヲ精ハレタ

ルモノニシテ強御者正ニ行ハレタルモノト信マ。

以上ハ、前記第七十三兵站司令部及獨立混成隊二十四旅団司令部ヨリノ

報告並ニ第七十三兵站司令部白川大尉ヨリ傳キタル記載ニ基キ述べ

タルモノナリ

昭和二十一年（一九四六年）十一月二十七日

東京國庫二番事務所  
日本入籍課人部事務所

併 送 差 出 候 様

右ハ管立合人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ姓名捺印シタルコトヲ證

明シマヌ

同 日 於

立 合 人



貸 借 書

良心ニ從テ眞實ヲ辨ヘ何事ヲモ欺秘セテ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ察ス

池 尻 校

7



# EXHIBIT

Defense Doc. 1871

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

### SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: SAKURAI, Tokutaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I, SAKURAI, Tokutaro, ex-major general, was born June 21, 1897. My present address is Tsuno-machi Koyu-gun, Miyazaki Prefecture. I was in charge of defense of the Akyab area on the India and Burma border as commander of the Infantry of the 55th Division from September, 1943 to February, 1945. Then I served as chief advisor for the Burmese National Defense Army. Immediately after the Burmese National Defense Army rose in revolt, I was ordered to be attached to the Infantry School on 5 April 1945. Later, I became divisional commander and remained so until the end of hostilities.

2. It was after the military operation of Imphal which ended in failure, in mid-September 1944 that General KIMURA came into office. As the commander of the SAKURA Detachment, I took command of a force numbering about 3,700 consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and one cavalry regiment as its nucleus and was in charge of the frontal defense of Akyab, while the main force of the 55th Division moved to the Bassein area.

3. General KIMURA, after he assumed office, especially stressed and advised that we should strive to win the confidence of the people, to enforce strict military discipline and to raise the morale of the men. Later he delivered instructions several times to the same effect. In compliance with his instructions, we brought it home to our subordinates that very strict military discipline was the best way to win the confidence of the people. We did our utmost to behave as prudently as possible, so military discipline was very strictly maintained.

4. General KIMURA was so earnest about the promotion of friendship and harmony between the Japanese army and the Burmese and the stabilization of the latter's livelihood that he had his subordinates compile a pamphlet entitled "The Attitude to Take Towards the Burmese", and distributed them to the members of units under his command.

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We guided our subordinates on the basis of this pamphlet. Because of this, all the men in my garrison area behaved themselves well, adhering rigidly to "The Attitude to Take Towards the Burmese", and there was not a single case in which the Burmese were persecuted or maltreated. In addition, in order to raise the standard of the people's living, we made and gave agricultural implements, hatchets and boats to them, so that they were extremely grateful to us. Friendly relations between the Japanese and Burmese was very strong. Therefore, they were willing to help us with transportation in the rear areas and in the transportation of provisions and the sick even at the front voluntarily.

The Japanese Army particularly respected and protected the religion of the Burmese, so that they were very much in harmony with the inhabitants. The Burmese said that so far as the seashore was concerned they themselves would defend it and they did guard duty along the beach. When the enemy landed, they reported it to us by means of signals and the like. Once the village headman in the neighborhood of Inten (CN: phonetic) was killed in action while obstructing the landing of the enemy.

5. In February 1945, I left Akyab for Rangoon to become the chief advisor to the Burmese National Defense Army. Circumstances in the Rangoon area were different and public peace was not as good as in the Akyab area. At that time the main forces of the Burmese National Defense Army were located in Henzada, while powerful units were stationed in the vicinity of Toungoo, Pegu and Thaton.

On 15 March 1945, our army and the Burmese National Defense Army concluded an operational agreement and our army celebrated, holding a ceremony for their going out into the field. However, Burmese National Defense Army suddenly rose in revolt against us, at the end of March 1945, as the conditions of our Army became worse and worse day by day, not to mention the propaganda of the Anglo-Indian Army. With the sudden change of situation, I called on the Commander in Chief of the Burma Area Army, KIMURA, immediately, and talked it over with him regarding how to handle it. General KIMURA, after considering the former friendly cooperation between the Japanese Army and the Burmese and their standpoint, ordered me that our Army absolutely must not take any revengeful action against them. Furthermore, he ordered that we must protect all those who would pledge allegiance without regard to their past and carry out only the minimum punitive action necessary from the standpoint of operations.

On this 14th day of June 1947

At Tenno-machi, Woyu-gun  
Miyazaki Prefecture

DEPONENT: SAKURAI, Tokutaro, ( Seal)

I, KORETSUNE, Tatsumi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At the same place.

Witness: (signed) KORETSUNE, Tatsumi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAKURAI, Tokutaro (seal)

Interrogation of Captain TAZUMI, Genzo  
27 February 1947

My name is TAZUMI, Genzo. I was a captain attached to the Burma Area Japanese Army.

1. Q. Were you the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon in Burma at the time when General KIMURA, Heitaro was the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army?  
A. Yes.
2. Q. Was the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon receiving orders and directions from the POW Camp of Malaya? (If not, from whom the POW Camp of Rangoon was receiving orders and directions?)  
A. Although the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon was subject to the Commander of the POW Camp of Malaya, the former was being ordered and directed by the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army in connection with the execution of business.
3. Q. Did the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army give orders and directions to you while you were holding office as the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon?  
A. The Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon, no sooner than taking over the former Field POW Camp of Rangoon as the 6th Detachment of the POW Camp of Malaya, was placed under the command of the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army on 15 March 1944, and the latter in turn put me under the control of the Commander of the 73rd Line of Communications Sector of the Rangoon Line of Communication Department. Accordingly, it was that the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon received the immediate command, orders and directions from the Commander of the 73rd Line of Communications Sector.
4. Q. Had the General Headquarters of the South Area Japanese Army ever given any orders or directions to the Camp of Rangoon?  
If so, when and how far was it, explain in detail.

Def. Doc. # 1806

ERRATA SHEET

Interrogation of Captain TAZUMI, Genzo 27 February  
1947

Answer for Question 4 should be read

"A. No, they had not."

Def. Doc. No. 1806

5. Q. Were there any POW's who were sent from the Mangoon Camp out to the other camps? Explain it.
- A. There was none, so far as European POW's are concerned. I remember, it was toward the end of 1944 when I was once ordered to send 1st Lieutenant Peacock of the British Navy, to Japan proper, but as he was taken ill on the way he was sent back to the Camp. As for the Indian POW's, we transferred about 100 of them about January, 1945, to the HIKARI organ as required personnel for the Indian National Army.
6. Q. Explain in detail about the health and sanitary conditions of the POW's and their clothing, food and housing conditions.
- A. (a) State of health and sanitary conditions --  
As for the POW's state of health, there was a big difference in the degree of health among the POW's themselves. In other words, those who had excellent health always kept up the same conditions, and those who were of poor build were constantly weak and fell ill and no sooner than they left the hospital they would again enter the hospital. Judging from the number of patients it could not be said to be good. However, after around July 1944 the number of patients gradually decreased and the health of POW's took an upward trend.  
Jungle sores which were very frequent at the time of the taking over, was almost completely cured by around August 1944. The advance of health was more remarkable for the Indians than for the Europeans. On the other hand, in spite of various efforts made, it was impossible for us to see that the number patients of beriberi was notably reduced. As for the communicative diseases, two slight cases of smallpox had broken out around April 1944 but was completely cured immediately. I think it was in the middle of April when cholera suddenly broke out and there were about 10 genuine cholera cases. As a result of our utmost efforts to prevent the spreading it was put to an end before becoming serious. As for the hygienic conditions in general in the camp, it was impossible for us to keep them in a satisfactory condition on account of the shortage of



of medicine and inadequate equipment, but I consider that generally speaking the general hygienic situation in the camp was in good condition owing to sensible attentions and efforts of both camp staffs and POW's.

(b) Food, clothing and housing.

Though clothing was not so good, as compared with that of Changie and other places, of which I had previously been in charge, I was able to maintain the ordinary condition by getting Japanese goods for replenishment from time to time. As for eating, to which I as well as the staff had made the utmost efforts, I firmly believe that we did furnish a good supply to POW's. It is supposed that boiled rice was not liked by the European POW's as a regular diet, but that could not be helped. Instead, we made every possible effort to obtain fresh meats and eggs for them.

Housing was bare-looking itself because we appropriated a bare prison for the camp. The furniture and fixtures also were poorly equipped. However, with the small number of persons received and sufficient space for living, POW's were able to house at ease.

7. Q. How many hours a day had the POW's been demanded to work?  
A. Seven hours
8. Q. Explain in detail the manner of the executive staffs of the camp handling the sick and wounded POW's.  
A. As to the sick and wounded, we treated them very kindly. A few examples of them are as follows:  
a. In case a POW was wounded at the time when he was working within camp, we presented a gift in the name of the camp.  
b. Army surgeons as well as hygienic staffs who were in charge of treating the sick and wounded, engaged, kindly and earnestly on the duty day and night. As a remarkable example, there was a case of Lt. Peacock of the British Navy who was already mentioned in Answer 5. As he was scheduled to be sent out to Japan proper, after leaving the camp accompanied by the personnel of the Japanese Ministry Police, he suddenly took ill and it became impossible to make his way. Although treated in the Japanese Naval Hospital for some time, the progress of his illness was no good. At the time when he was sent back to

this camp, he was in such a condition as had serious difficulties in walking and could not take ordinary meals, that he came back lying on a stretcher. At that time Surgeon ONISHI devoted himself entirely to his treatment, he also gave articles of luxury at his own expense and he administered medicines of his own.

So, all the staff of the sanitation section headed by him took care of him in all kindness, carrying him out into open air in the shade of trees or helping him to walk.

When he returned, he was so haggard he could hardly be recognized and it was feared that he would not recover. But his health gradually improved to such a degree that he was able to participate in the four successive days and nights' march in company with the prisoners who were living in the common mass camps, on the occasion of the evacuation of the camps in April 1945.

9. Q. Where the wounded and sick prisoners properly treated?  
A. Generally speaking, I think they were under proper treatment. Owing to the lack of medicines and equipment as well, I am not positive to say it was perfect but nothing more could be done under the circumstances of that time.
10. Q. Were they demanded to labor?  
A. No, they were not.
11. Q. What was made of the incomes obtained from the vegetables and other products of the farms cultivated by the prisoners and the live stock of their raising.  
A. The vegetables and other products were supplied them for their ration. Hogs were not raised enough to meet the demand. But the fresh vegetables ran into a considerable surplus which were shipped to the military market with the understanding of the Superintendent Department of the Area Army in exchange for the special ration of pork, eggs and cooking oil. Those articles were added to the supply of the prisoners. (At the time the military market was suffering from the want of fresh vegetables to be doled out for the general units).

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12. Q. Were you answerable to General KIMURA for the management of the Prison? Or did you manage and supervise the said camp on your own responsibility and authority?
- A. I was responsible to the commander of the 73rd Commissary Sector Commander for executing the Burma Area Army's regulations for handling the prisoners and for supplying them as well as the service regulations of the 6th Branch of the Malay Prisoners Camps (namely, the Rangoon Camp) which were set forth by the 73rd Commissary Sector Commander.
13. Q. Has General KIMURA ever visited or inspected the Rangoon Prison? And, if he has, how was he impressed then?
- A. No, he has not while I was serving there.
14. Q. If you received letters of thanks from prisoners, what did you do with them? Who got the letters at Singapore?
- A. I received the letters of thanks from prisoners. But towards the end of 1945 when withdrawing from the camps our trucks encountered enemy and were burned down with all the official and private things. The last letters I got on the occasion of their liberation were snatched off by an unknown soldier along with a black leather purse containing them, when Australian soldiers plundered us at Singapore.

I have truly and faithfully interpreted the foregoing statement to the best of my belief and conscience.

Subscribed and sworn to before me on the 27th day of Feb., 1947.

/S/ David W. Parsons  
Captain, INF.  
Investigating Officer

603087

Def. Doc. # 1806

ERRATA SHEET

Interrogation of Captain TAZUMI, Genzo 27 February  
1947

Answer for Question 4 should be read

"A. No, they had not."



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私ノ名ハ田住元三デス。私ハ緬甸方面軍ノ大尉デアリマシタ。

一、問、貴下ハ木村兵太郎大將ガ緬甸方面軍司令官デアツタ當時ニ...

二、問、貴俘虜收容所長ハマレー俘虜收容所ヨリ命令監督ヲ受ケテ居ツタ...

三、問、緬甸方面軍日本軍司令官ハ貴俘虜收容所長トシテ在職中、貴下ニ...

四、問、南方派遣軍ハ貴俘虜收容所ニ命令監督ヲ與ヘタ事デアルカ。夫レ...

五、問、俘虜ヲ緬甸ノ收容所カラ他ニ送ラレタ者ガアルカ夫レヲ説明ヒヨ...

六、問、俘虜ノ健康、衛生状態及ビ其ノ衣食住ノ状態ヲ詳シク説明ヒヨ...

七、問、俘虜ハ一日何時間動クコトヲ要求サレタカ...

八、問、病傷俘虜ニ對スル收容所幹部營者ノ態度ヲ詳シク説明ヒヨ...

九、問、病傷俘虜ハ適切ナ醫療ヲ施サレタカ...

一〇、問、病傷者ガ勞動スルコトヲ要求サレタカ...

一一、問、俘虜ガ耕シタ畑カラ取レタ野菜ヤ糧食及ビ彼等ガ飼養シタ畜類ヨ...

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- リ取得シタ収入ヲ如何ニ處分シタカ
- 一二、問、貴下ハ木村大將ニ對シ收容所經營ノ責任ヲ持ツノカ又ハ本收容所ノ經營監督ニ關シテ獨自ノ責任ト責任ヲ持タヒラレタノカ
  - 一三、問、木村大將ハ會テ爾責任ヲ收容所ヲ訪問シ又ハ巡視シタコトガアルカ若シ然ル時ハ彼ノ受ケタ印象ハ何ウデアツタカ
  - 一四、問、若シ貴下ガ俘虜ヨリ感謝狀ヲ受ケタナラバ其ノ感謝狀ヲ何ウシタカ「シンガポール」デハ誰ガ夫レヲ貰ツタカ

一、答、ゾーデス

二、答、蘭領俘虜收容所長ハナレリ、俘虜收容所長ニ就任シテキマスガ業務ヲ實

施ニ圖リシテハ、蘭領方面軍司令官ノ命令ニ應ジテ受ケテ居マシタ

三、答、蘭領俘虜收容所長ハ從前ノ蘭領俘虜收容所ニ屬スル、英領俘虜收容所第

六分所トシテ引續クト同時ニ一昭和十九年三月十五日一蘭領方面軍

司令官ノ指揮下ニ入ラシメラレ、同司令官ハ之ヲ當時ノ蘭領兵隊第七

十三兵隊地區司令官ノ指揮下ニ入ラシメタ從ツテ直接ノ指揮命令並

監督ハ第七十三兵隊地區司令官ヨリ受ケタコトハ有リマセン

四、答、蘭方派遣總軍ヨリ直接命令ニ應ジテ受ケタコトハ有リマセン

五、答、白人俘虜ニ關シテハ、無シ昭和十九年ノ幕頃デアツタト思フガ、英領海

軍大尉ビーコックチ内地ニ送ルニ送ルニ命ジラレタコトガ、アツタガ送中

途病ノ爲メ又當收容所ニ送り歸サレタ。印度人俘虜ハ昭和二十年一月

蘭領約登百名ヲ印度國民軍要員トシテ光復區ニ移管シタコトガアル

六、答、イ、健康狀況並衛生狀態

俘虜ノ健康狀況ハ健康程度ニ非常ナ相違ガアツタ、其言スルト大

變立派ナモノハ常ニ夫レヲ待テシ貧弱ナ体格ノ持主ハ始終弱ク

テ退病シ退院シテモ又入院スルト云フ風デアツタガ病人ノ歩合

(ロ)

カラ言フト良好トハ言ヘナカツタ然シ昭和十九年六月頃以降遂次病人ノ致モ減少シテ同上ノ一途ヲ辿ソテ來夕移管當時非常ニ多カツタ外傷ヘチヤングルソーハ昭和十九年八月頃ニハ殆んど全治シタ健康状態同上ハ白人ヨリモ印度人ノ方方良好デアツタ一方脚氣患者ハ絶々努力シタガ夫レ程ノ減少ヲ見ルニ、ガ出カナカツタ傳染性疾患ノ發生ハ昭和十九年四月頃天竺等處無患者ガ二名發生シタガ同モ悉ク全治シタ同年五月頃デアツタト思フガコレガ發症前ニ發生眞性患者十名立出タガ極力防疫ニ努メ大專ニ至リスニ終シタ

所内一般ノ衛生状態ハ藥物不足ト設備不完全ノ故ヲ以テ充分ノ程度ヲ保持スルコトハ出来ナカツタガ職員俸給ノ確保アル注意努力ニ依ツテ概ネ良好デアツタト思フ

衣食住

衣服ノ程度ハチヤンキト其他私ノ前同ノ任地ノ狀況ト比較スルト良好デハナカツタガ時々ノ日本品更新ニヨツテ普通ノ狀況ヲ保持スルコトヲ得タ

食卓ニ就テハ私以下、職員ガ最も努力シタ所デアツテ概ネ良好ナ



給興ヲ實施シ得タト通信シテ居ル白人俘虜ニ對スル自炊飯ノ給  
具ハ彼等ニトウテ非常ナ苦痛ヲアツタト思フガ此レハドカニモ  
仕方ナカツタ其ノ代リ生感肉、卵等ノ入手ニハ速替ノ努力モソ  
タ居住ハ殺風景ナ刑務所ヲ充當シタ爲メ殺風景其ノ物ヲアツタ  
又什器家具等モ貧弱ヲアツタ然シ收容人員ガ少ナカツタ爲メ  
居ニハ充分ノ餘裕ガアツテユツクリ住フコトガ出來タ

七、管出門カラ入門迄七時間

八、管、病傷俘虜ニ對シテハ非常ニ親切ニ取扱ツタ其ノ要領ノ一、ニテ器  
ルト次、機テアル

イ、收容所ヲ勞務ニ服勞中負傷チシタ様ナ場合ハ收容所カラ見舞品  
ヲ贈ツタ

ロ、一役傷病者ノ治療ニ當ルル以下衛生部員ハ晝夜ノ區別ナク親  
切熱心ニ治療ニ從事シタ其ノ顯著ナ要領トシテハ第五項ニ記シ

タ内地送致ノ決定ヲアツタ英海軍大尉ビニコツクノ場合彼ハ日  
本内地へ送致サレルベク其ノ率領者タル憲兵ニ伴ハレ當收容所  
ヲ出テカラ急ニ愛護シタタメ送致出來ズ留ク日本海軍ノ病院ヲ  
治療トシモ甚適良好ナラズ再ビ當收容所ニ送り廻サレタ其ノ時

九、答、傷病俘虜ニ對スル醫藥ハ概ネ適切ニ實施ヒラレタト思フ藥物ノ不足

設備ノ不充分等ニヨリ完全デアツタトハ斷言出來ナイガ當時ノ狀況

下ニ於テハアレ以上ノコトハ出來ナカッタ

十、答、傷病者ガ勞動スルコトヲ要求サレタコトハ無イ

十一、答、彼等ガ耕働シタ野菜其ノ他ノ收穫物ハ現物ヲ彼等ノ糧食ニ支給シ

然シテ豚ハ需用ニ充タス程ノ成産ハ出來ナカッタガ青野菜ハ相當

量ノ餘菜ガ出來タノテ軍經理部ノ瞭解ノ許ニ軍市場ニ出荷シ一當

十二、客籍方面軍俘虜取扱規定同俘虜給養規定馬來俘虜收容所第六分所  
時軍市場デハ一設部隊ニ配属スル青野菜ガ品切テ困ツテキター代  
償トシテ豚肉鶏卵食油等特品ヲ受ケ俘虜ノ給與ニ増加支給シタ  
一軍員俘虜收容所ノ名一服給規定一第七十三兵站地區司令官ノ出  
定ヒルモノ一ノ實施ニ關シ第七十三兵站地區司令官ニ對シ責任ヲ  
持ツ

十三、答木村大將ハ私ノ在任間軍員俘虜收容所ニ訪問ヒラレタコト又ハ巡  
視ヒラレタルコトナシ

十四、答俘虜カラ感謝狀ヲ貰ツタコトハ有リマスガ昭和二十年四月末收容  
所前進ノ際貨物輸送自動車ガ敵ニ遭遇シ燒失ノ際公私物一切燒失  
ス  
最後ニ解放ノ際貰ツタモノハシンガポールデ歐洲兵ノ掠奪ニ會ヒ  
其ノ際黒草財布ニ收入シタ三名不明ノ兵ニ奪ハレタ

軍員刑務所ニ於テ

昭和二十二年二月二十七日

田 住 元 三

本陳述ハ能フ限り余ノ良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベタルコトヲ殿ニ誓フ

余ハ能フ限り余ノ信念ト良心ニ従ヒ忠實ニコノ陳述ヲ通シヒシコトヲ誓フ

フン、カン、ユイ

一九四七年二月二十七日余ノ面前ニ於テ陳述且宣誓セル事ヲ證ス。

調査將校、歩兵大尉　ダビッド、ダブリユ、パーソン

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Excerpts from Interrogation of Tazumi 27 May, 1947

Q. Had you any facilities for recreation and comfort for the prisoners in the Rangoon Camps?

A. Yes, athletic meetings for the white people only were held three times and concerts were held often and some 60 books were given them in two installments.

Q. What was the canteen like in the said camps?

A. Eats, drinks and daily necessities were bought for all of the prisoners from the canteen fund which was their Collective fund. Order and distribution of articles was in charge of officers among the prisoners. And the paymaster of the camp acted as the agency for finding ordered articles and kept connection with merchants. I forgot the volume of monthly sales.

Q. Did you allow them to rest on such days as Sunday and other holidays in accordance with the regulations?

A. Yes, we did, but since January 1945 the outdoor labor required so many men that all could not rest at once on Sundays and they took rest every day in turns.

Q. Was there unlawful acts inflicted by Japanese soldiers on the prisoners since the middle of September 1944? Or have they ever subjected prisoners to discipline?

A. I don't remember any of the unlawful acts toward the prisoners by Japanese soldiers. But the prisoners were punished.

Examples:

1. When some British soldiers refused to go out for labor. (It was reported by the British Chief of the building).
2. When an Indian officer would not act upon the administrative regulations for the prisoners.

Q. Was there any case in which the prisoners in the said camps were mentally and physically well treated?

A. Yes, there were. The examples are as follows:

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1. Upon the revision of the prisoners' payroll maximum wage rate was allowed them.
2. They had, near the camps, their own vegetable farms where the products were not only enough for them but were often bartered for rare foods in the military market.
3. They received a lot of cows and pigs which were slaughtered in the camps thereby increasing the supply of raw fresh meat.
4. During Christmas and New Year a lot of luxuries were given them.

Q. Were you a member of the staff of the 73rd Commissary Sector or an M.P?

A. No. I was not in the staff of the 73rd Commissary Sector, but was in the staff of the Malay Prisoners Camp. My branch of arms was artillery.

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Exh, NO

問三

「ラングーン」俘虜收容所内に於ける俘虜に對し娯楽、慰安等に付  
き何か施せしや

答三

然り。予の記憶する所にては娯技會（白人のみ約三回）演奏會（音  
樂會）旗々督物供與（二回に約六十冊）

問四

同收容所内に於ける酒保の状況如何。

答四

俘虜の出資により酒保資金を作り地方より飲食物日用品を共同購入  
す、注文、分配等はすべて俘虜將校これにあたり俘虜收容所經理官  
は注文品の同施並に地方との取次をなす。

問五

毎月の買上金額等忘失せり。  
同收容所内の俘虜に對し日曜、祝祭日等には規定通り休養せしめし  
や。

答五

然り。休養せしめたり但し昭和二十年一月以降は外勤務役に多人數  
を要求せられ日曜日一齊休養は不可能となり毎日交替に若干名づつ  
休養せしめたり。

問六

一九四四年九月中旬以后同收容所に於て日本兵に成る俘虜に對する

田 住 元

三

訊

問

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答六

不法行爲ありしや、又その他の理由により俘虜を懲罰に附せしことありしや。

日本兵に依る俘虜に對する不法行爲は記憶なし  
俘虜を懲罰に附せしことあり。

例（英人兵）外勤勞役に出向を拒む（英人隊長の申出により）

（印人將校）俘虜内務規定を守らず

其の他二、三件

問七

同收容所内に於ける俘虜に對し精神的物質的に厚遇を爲せる争例ありや。

答七

有り。

例（一）俘虜勞銀支給規定の改造に際し最大限有利なる支給をなせり。

（二）收容所附近に自營菜場を（蔬菜）營み充分の野菜を入手せし

みならず屢々軍市場と交渉して市場の珍らしき食物と物々交換せり。

（三）牛、豚の多重交附を受け所内にて屠殺し生肉類の給與歩合を向上せしむ。

（四）「クリスマス」正月には嶺山の加給品を與へたり

問八

君は第七十三兵站司令部の職員なりや、又憲兵なりや

答八

否自分は第七十三兵站の職員に非ず、馬來俘虜收容所の所員なり。兵種は砲兵なり。



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EXHIBIT #

3089

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent :- ICHIDA Jiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. ICHIDA, Jiro is my name.

I was born on December 29, 1894. My present address is Showa-dori, Nakama-machi, Onga-gun, Fukuoka-ken.

I entered the Military Academy in 1914.

In April 1944, after having been employed in various departments, I was appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the Burma Area Army, which office I held till the termination of the war. I was then a Major-General. My chief duty during this period was to assist the Chief of Staff.

2. I have no other information that General ...

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2. It was mid September 1944 that General KIMURA, Heitaro, arrived at his post as Commander of the Burma Area Army. Our Army there had suffered a crushing defeat in the Imphal campaign with its fighting strength weakened considerably, and since about August 1943, supplies had almost ceased to come from Japan.

3. General KIMURA, who arrived when things were in such an unfavorable state, issued a set of instructions to all the troops under his command enjoining them strongly to maintain military discipline and to try to win the confidence of the natives. When we had meetings in late October and in the middle of December 1944, and in late January 1945, the General summoned to the Army Headquarters the staff officers and unit commanders under his command and reminded them most carefully of the instructions he had previously given, (the draft of the instructions and other documents related to the same are not extant, having been either lost or burnt while retiring). While in office, General KIMURA constantly endeavored hard to see his instructions obeyed thoroughly by his troops, so that the Burmese people came to place a good deal of confidence in him.

The General met the Burmese State Ministers at least once or twice a month for the purpose of exchanging free and outspoken opinions. He welcomed the complaints against the Japanese and in the cases that he thought proper had the requested improvements made. Meanwhile the war situation had been developing unfavorably from day to day for us, entailing

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increasing hardships and suffering on the part of the natives. The General felt sorry for their plight. When he had occasion to meet the Burmese high-ranking officials he always expressed his gratitude for their good will and at the same time showed sympathy for their delicate circumstances. General KIMURA instructed his men to contribute to the stabilization of living conditions of the Burmese at the expense of the strategical requirements.

General KIMURA always took pains to promote good feeling and harmony between Japanese and Burmese. In order to prevent misunderstandings likely to arise because of the difference in the manners and customs and language, he had a two-volume booklet compiled, entitled "The Attitude to take toward the Burmese" and distributed copies not only among our men, but also among the greater part of the Japanese residents for their guidance and observance. (I tried to get a copy but so far haven't been able to lay hands on one.) At the same time he asked the Burmese Government to tell their people plainly of our readiness and desire to act in concert with them. The government on their part distributed the summarized translation of the general's request among the prefectural governors for their information. The result of the general's efforts was reflected in the fact that the friendly and harmonious relations between the army and the populace were notably improved and

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our men, appreciating their commander's spirit and intention, did their best to realize his wishes.

I used to attend the Japanese-Burmese Cooperation Conference as a representative of the Burma Area Army, and so I had ample opportunities to come in contact with the high governmental officials. Mindful of the general's care and the Burmese official thoughts and opinions, I took care to cooperate with the government in their undertakings in all ways, and to ensure the stabilization of the livelihood of the populace.

4. The general war situation during General KIMURA's tenure of office was:

His arrival at his post coincided with the concentration of the main force toward the River Irrawaddy following the crushing defeat we had suffered at Imphal. He had hardly assumed his new duty before he advanced to Maymyo, 18 September, 1944 and he devoted himself there to the conduct of military operations until around the 20th of October. The Japanese Army in Burma could barely manage to make preparations for the Irrawaddy battle by moving forward all the available troops to replenish the remaining strength of the 15th Corps that had taken part in the Imphal battle, though we were so circumstanced that it was next to impossible to leave behind any part of the general fighting troops requisite for the preservation of peace and safeguarding of the rear area. On the 3rd of February 1945,

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General KIMURA and his army advanced as far as Kalow where the General conducted the operations himself. He remained there 16th of February. Owing to our inferiority in fighting power, especially in equipment such as planes, tanks and fire-projectors, the Japanese lines were pierced all along, and again we were forced to retreat with heavy losses. The 15th and 33rd Corps managed somehow to set about the concentration operation to the Tanasserim area mid-May 1945, and completed the movement by their main bodies in June. The fighting strength of these armies was sadly diminished, with the best part of the arms

being lost, and the soldiers physically were most seriously deteriorated; in fact, more than ten thousand of them had to be invalided to Thailand. The 28 Corps had its retreat cut off and was obliged to stay in the Pegu district for about three months isolated from the others. In late July 1945, when the rainy season was at its worst, this disjoined army desperately charged into the enemy force, losing thereby the better part of its strength and the whole of its major arms. When the war came to an end the troops were still retreating without having met the main body.

The withdrawal of the Burma Area Army Headquarters from Rangoon to Moulmein commenced at the end of April 1945, the complete concentration being effected at the beginning of July. The headquarters, however, could not function as it should; its hasty retreat to Moulmein, the loss of communication and trans-

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transportation equipment and the important documents, the transference of many skilled staff-officers, the unsatisfactory replacements among the administrative personnel, frequent air raids by British-Indian planes and the fact that it was at the peak of the rainy season -- all these factors interfered with the satisfactory functioning of the Army headquarters. Above all, the air raids by the British-Indian planes which were conducted in the daytime and on moonlight nights as well, frequently compelled the headquarters to seek shelter in the outlying villages of Moulmein and attend to its duties there. And most of the soldiers, too, not to speak of the invalids, had to seek shelter in the jungles both day and night.

At the end of March 1945, with the state of things prevailing so unfavorably, the national defense army of Burma, numbering 6,000-8,000 rose against the Japanese and the guerrillas started a campaign of harassing our rear lines and were greatly menaced.

The Burma National Defense Army had seemed favorable to the Japanese, as an agreement was arranged at Rangoon with the Japanese army for united operations. The revolt was an unexpected one for the Japanese. Afterwards, it became clear that a secret declaration of war against Japan had been made and signed by Major General Onsan on 14 March 1945. For this purpose they had previously stationed numbers of men in the rear of the Japanese army, at the key strategic points, such as

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Toungoo, Pegu, and Thaton. The main body in Henzada, with the outbreak of the uprising, destroyed the means of communication and transportation at several places, assaulted the sentry-guards, squads of soldiers and gendarmerie squads at various places, murdering most of these officers and seizing the money and stores kept in their custody. Espionage was engaged in by the guerrillas so that the Headquarters of the Burma Area Army and the 28th and the 33rd Corps headquarters were subjected to serious bombings with heavy losses to us, and the Japanese officers in charge of the national defense militia were for the most part killed. Of the 200 odd Japanese nationals, including the interpreters and the commercial clerks who were in the Delta region, only a few were found safe at the end of the war and the rest are still missing.

However, General KIMURA sought no revenge. On the contrary, he stressed the importance of the friendship hitherto kept up between Japan and Burma and met the situation from a strategic point of view only. There were left no forces to meet the emergency. A small amount of troops and part of the 55th division which had been dispatched for aid in the quarter of Bassoin and Meiktila were used for the purpose of making a false show of strength.

From January 1945 there began to be formed one after another guerrilla parties of Karen and Kachin tribes in the

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mountain regions south of Komapow and Kaukarok area and in the regions south of Papun. What with the entry of the Indian educated Burmese, the arrival of Indians and British officers by means of parachutes and the replenishment by air of arms and munitions, the guerrillas grew rapidly in strength till the groups were scattered far and wide, working most actively in collusion with the rebels. The 31st and the 33rd Divisions were offered resistance at several places on their retreat from Komapow and sustained heavy losses..

In the strategical areas in general and Tenasserim Province in particular, we were constantly harassed till the end of the war by the activities of the rebels and the guerrilla groups. They sprang surprise attacks upon the Japanese armies inflicting heavy losses to the latter. And this was especially the case in the rainy season when small Japanese parties of troops, weary and exhausted, were in retreat. Then these troops were assaulted and deprived of their arms or of their lives. In late July 1945, as the 28th Corps, while trying to cross the Sittaung River, met with a stout resistance from the guerrillas and their associates on both banks of the river. In a nameless village on the western bank of the river, 40 or 50 kilometers to the northwest of Swo-gyin, ten Japanese Red Cross were assaulted and not one of them came back alive, (this, according to the report of the soldier who was with the

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victims at the time of the incident). For all of these cases of resistance on the part of the Burmese, General KIMURA always warned his troops against taking retaliatory measures.

Such being the case while General KIMURA was commanding, there was no chance whatever for us to take British-Indian troops as prisoners. Thus the situation of the Burma Area Army for the few months before the end of the war was a succession of defeats. In consequence of the defeats and the subsequent decline in the army's fighting strength, our men were demoralized; they were both physically and morally in a state of exhaustion. The Japanese troops who were scattered in small groups all over the operations areas were overpowered by a sense of defeat, and had their minds occupied only with the question of how to defend themselves against the Burmese rebel army and the guerrillas.

The harassing activities that these hostile groups were carrying on in the rear of our army, the loss and destruction of the means of communication, the lack of fresh supplies of dry cell batteries, traffic disturbances caused by British planes, the interruption of communications during the highest rainy season -- all these factors combined to all but paralyze the entire working system of the Burma Area Army, thus rendering it very difficult for the officers to lead and supervise their men properly. As the Burma Area

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Army Headquarters had been scheduled to break up before the end of August 1945, the retrenchment, reorganization and transference of the Army was planned, part of which was actually being executed. Meanwhile most of the Army Staff officers had been transferred, therefore we were obliged to make-shift with non-career staff officers for the time being. Naturally, the Army Headquarters which was busily engaged in making preparations to meet the intended attacks by the Allied armies by land and sea in the near future experienced much difficulty and inconvenience in attending to their business. It was while we were laboring under these difficulties that the war was ended. Unfavorably circumstanced as he was, Commander KIMURA had been endeavoring all this while to maintain and improve the discipline of his troops and also to win and keep up the trust of the populace.

5. Not one single instance of unlawful conduct allegedly committed by his men was ever reported to the Army Headquarters. I am certain that no orders were ever issued by KIMURA for the perpetration of the atrocious acts, evidence of which has been brought before the court. Such acts would not have been tolerated. As for the Kalagan village affair, the British Army Headquarters, several months after the close of the war, questioned General KIMURA about it; the general and I and the other staff officers as well had not known

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anything about it. It was in March 1946, if I remember right, that I heard about the affair for the first time and it was from Lt. General TANAKA, Nobuo, ex-Commander of the 33rd Division (He had been transferred to Thailand before this time) who happened to come to the Insein Camp in order to attend the Joint Anglo-Japanese War History Research Institute held at Rangoon.

6. As far as I know, the conditions of the prisoner of war and internment camps while General KIMURA was in office in Burma are as follows:

(1). The Burma-Siam Railway was under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of all Imperial Armies in the Southern Area, and it had been completed about one year before the arrival of General KIMURA. And so the Burma Area Army had no part in the construction, maintenance and operation of the railway in question.

(2). The prisoners of war camp in Rangoon, which was the 6th Detachment of the Malayan P.O.W. camp, was under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Malayan P.O.W. camp, who was under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Expeditionary Forces.

And the Commander in Chief of the southern Expeditionary Forces ordered the Chief of Malayan P.O.W. camp to set up one Detachment of Malayan P.O.W. camp in Rangoon and put it under the direction of the Commander of Burma Area Army.

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The Commander of Burma Area Army put that detachment of the 73rd Supply corps who was also the Commander of the Rangoon Rear Communication Headquarters.

(3). For about three months and a half after General KIMURA's arrival at his post, the Tavoy army internment camp was in charge of the commander of the Independent 24th Mixed Brigade. In December 1944, the Tavoy and Morgui army districts were, by orders from the Commander-in-Chief, of the Southern Expeditionary Forces transferred to the jurisdiction of the Thailand Area Army, and were placed under the direct control of the Tavoy unit under command of the Thailand Area Army commander.

(4). The Rangoon prisoner of war camp was originally the Rangoon Central Prison, where, if I remember right, about 600 persons were interned. The camp was a permanent building, fairly well fit to live in, being equipped with medical rooms, sick rooms, recreation hall, bath and wash rooms, kitchen, water supply, playground and so forth.

(5). For comfort and recreation the camp was provided with pianos, phonographs and books, and exercise was encouraged with many sorts of sport equipment being utilized. The military band was occasionally invited to afford the inmates entertainment.

(6). The depot supplied lots of cows, pigs, goats and ducks in several installments for the prisoners to tend to help supply nourishment.

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(7). The prisoners were permitted to lay out farms, both inside and outside the compounds, so that they might be interested in making themselves self-supporting. The result was that after a time they were able to produce more than enough and sell in the Rangoon market what was left over. The proceeds of the sales was used for themselves. The prisoners did not have their rations of staple food reduced; they were in fact better supplied than the Japanese in general, and therefore they were very grateful for this.

(8). Milk, tobacco and other daily necessities could be had at the canteen in the camp, for which convenience the inmates expressed themselves highly gratified.

(9). Sundays and prisoner's national holidays were set aside to be observed by the prisoners as days of rest on which occasions they were sometimes allowed additional rations.

(10). Working hours were gradually shortened, the average being six hours. The kind of work that they were required to do was, I was told, unloading ships, conveyance, and other general jobs.

(11). No news was ever brought to my ears that atrocities of any kind were ever practiced by the Japanese soldiers on the prisoners during General KIMURA's tenure of office, though I was told that punishment was meted out several times at the request of Brigadier Pepsen to those British-Indian soldiers who had shown themselves disobedient to him.

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(12). In June 1944, before General KIMURA's arrival, cholera broke out in the camp, which however was soon stamped out.

Since August 1943 medical supplies from home had almost ceased to arrive and even the Japanese troops themselves had to do without their rations. Medical treatments, therefore, left much to be desired, I was told. Despite these shortages, they did their best.

Captain TAZUHI, the then chief of the prisoner of war camp at Rangoon, who everyone agreed was the most excellent of the chiefs of the institution, received from Brigadier Popsen and Major Bellins letters of thanks on several occasions. This is what the captain told me himself.

When the Army Headquarters evacuated Rangoon, it was at first decided that the prisoners whose health would be impaired by removal and some whose services would be needed would be left at Rangoon, preparatory to their release, and that only those who were well and strong would be removed; but owing to the war situation the whole of the prisoners were released on the spot toward the end of April 1945.

About one hundred persons were accommodated in the military internment camp at Tavoy where the management in general was directed fairly and properly, so that the institution was favored several times with letters of thanks. These letters



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were attached to the reports and other documents submitted to the British Army after the surrender.

It was the practice for the Japanese Air Force in Burma to take charge of all allied airmen who were captured for the purpose of interrogations. The Burma Area Army had no command over the Air Force.

On this 13th day of January, 1947  
At Defense Counsel, International Military Tribunal for the  
Far East

Deponent: ICHIDA Jiro

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 13th day of  
January, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

Witness /S/ TATSUJI, Harotsuno

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the  
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ ICHIDA Jiro

Ex. 3088

Def, Doc, NO2207

Exh, NO

問三 「ラングーン」俘虜收容所内に於ける俘虜に對し娯楽、慰安等に付  
 き何か施せしや  
 答三 然り。予の記憶する所にては娯技會（白人のみ約三回）演奏會（音  
 樂會）廣々管物供與（二回に約六十冊）  
 問四 同收容所内に於ける酒保の状況如何。  
 答四 俘虜の出資により酒保資金を作り地方より飲食物日用品を共同購入  
 す、注文、分配等はすべて俘虜將校これにあたり俘虜收容所經理官  
 は注文品の同旋遊に地方との取次をなす。  
 問五 毎月の買上金額等忘失せり。  
 答五 同收容所内の俘虜に對し日曜、祝祭日等には規定通り休養せしめし  
 ゃ。  
 問六 然り。休養せしめたり但し昭和二十年一月以降は外部勞役に多人數  
 を要求せられ日曜日一斉休養は不可能となり毎日交替に若干名づつ  
 休養せしめたり。  
 一九四四年九月中旬以后同收容所に於て日本兵に成る俘虜に對する

田 住 元

三  
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RETURN TO ROOM 361

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Excerpts from Interrogation of Tazumi 27 May, 1947

Q. Had you any facilities for recreation and comfort for the prisoners in the Rangoon Camps?

A. Yes, athletic meetings for the white people only were held three times and concerts were held often and some 60 books were given them in two installments.

Q. What was the canteen like in the said camps?

A. Eats, drinks and daily necessities were bought for all of the prisoners from the canteen fund which was their Collective fund. Order and distribution of articles was in charge of officers among the prisoners. And the paymaster of the camp acted as the agency for finding ordered articles and kept connection with merchants. I forgot the volume of monthly sales.

Q. Did you allow them to rest on such days as Sunday and other holidays in accordance with the regulations?

A. Yes, we did, but since January 1945 the outdoor labor required so many men that all could not rest at once on Sundays and they took rest every day in turns.

Q. Was there unlawful acts inflicted by Japanese soldiers on the prisoners since the middle of September 1944? Or have they ever subjected prisoners to discipline?

A. I don't remember any of the unlawful acts toward the prisoners by Japanese soldiers. But the prisoners were punished.

Examples:

1. When some British soldiers refused to go out for labor. (It was reported by the British Chief of the building).
2. When an Indian officer would not act upon the administrative regulations for the prisoners.

Q. Was there any case in which the prisoners in the said camps were mentally and physically well treated?

A. Yes, there were. The examples are as follows:

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1. Upon the revision of the prisoners' payroll maximum wage rate was allowed them.
2. They had, near the camps, their own vegetable farms where the products were not only enough for them but were often bartered for rare foods in the military market.
3. They received a lot of cows and pigs which were slaughtered in the camps thereby increasing the supply of raw fresh meat.
4. During Christmas and New Year a lot of luxuries were given them.

Q. Were you a member of the staff of the 73rd Commissary Sector or an M.P?

A. No. I was not in the staff of the 73rd Commissary Sector, but was in the staff of the Malay Prisoners Camp. My branch of arms was artillery.

Ex 3088

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Exh, NO

問三

「ラングーン」俘虜收容所内に於ける俘虜に對し娛樂、慰安等に付  
き何か施せしや

答三

然り。予の記憶する所にては競技會（白人のみ約三回）演奏會（音  
樂會）旗々營物供與（二回に約六十冊）

問四

同收容所内に於ける酒保の状況如何。

答四

俘虜の出資により酒保資金を作り地方より飲食物日用品を共同購入  
す、注文、分配等はすべて俘虜將校これにあたり俘虜收容所經理官  
は注成品の向應に地方との取次をなす。  
毎月の買上金額等忘失せり。

問五

同收容所内の俘虜に對し日曜、祝祭日等には規定通り休養せしめし  
や。

答五

然り。休養せしめたり但し昭和二十年一月以降は外部勞役に多人數  
を要求せられ日曜日一齊休養は不可能となり毎日交替に若干名づつ  
休養せしめたり。

問六

一九四四年九月中旬以后同收容所に於て日本兵に成る俘虜に對する

田 住 元

三 訊 問 訊 書

扱 奉

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答六

不法行爲ありしや、又その他の理由により俘虜を慰問に附せしことありしや。

日本兵に依る俘虜に對する不法行爲は記憶なし  
俘虜を慰問に附せしことあり。

例（英人兵）外部勞役に出向を拒む（英人隊長の申出により）

（印人將校）俘虜内務規定を守らず  
其他二、三件

問七

同收容所内に於ける俘虜に對し精神的物質的に厚遇を爲せる事例ありや。

答七

有り。

例（一）俘虜勞銀支給規定の改竄に際し最大限有利なる支給をなせり。

（二）收容所附近に自營菜場を（蔬菜）營み充分の野菜を入手せしのみならず、車市場と交渉して市場の珍らしき食物と物々交換せり。

（三）牛、豚の多重交附を受け所内にて屠殺し生肉類の給與歩合を向上せしむ。

（四）「クリスマス」正月には嶺山の加給品を與へたり

問八

君は第七十三兵站司令部の職員なりや、又憲兵なりや

答八

否自分は第七十三兵站の職員に非ず、馬來俘虜收容所の所員なり。兵種は砲兵なり。


Excerpt from "Biennial Report of General  
George C. Marshall to the Secretary of  
War, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945"

(By General of the Army George C. Marshall,  
Chief of Staff, United States Army)

Pages 114-115

The Burma Campaign continued with intensity during the monsoon season of 1944. Chinese, American, and British troops were then disposed along the Chindwin River north of Kalewa and from the upper Irrawaddy to Lungling. It was planned to drive southward through Central Burma to Mandalay, and Admiral Mountbatten prepared for Operation DRACULA to seize Rangoon amphibiously from the south. At the close of the monsoon, Chinese, American, and British troops under the immediate command of General Sultan advanced southward astride the Irrawaddy, captured Shwegu in early November and by December had cleared the projected trace of the supply road to Bhamo.

The Japanese in Burma had never recovered from General Stilwell's thrusts and from the losses inflicted by British and Indian forces on their 15th, 31st, and 33rd Divisions in their abortive effort to sever the Bengal-Assam Railroad. As fast as the combat forces moved ahead, United States Engineers, commanded by Brigadier General Lewis A. Fick, shoved the road forward behind them, operating their bulldozers so far forward that they were frequently under fire. On January 28, 1945, a convoy of American



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trucks and materiel from India crossed the Burma-China frontier. The Stilwell Road was open.

In Western Burma the British broke south through Tiddim across the Chindwin against Japanese delaying actions. Southward in the Arakan, British operations cleared the Kaladan River delta on the Arakan Coast and provided air strips at Akyab and on Ramree Island.

The Japanese retreat in Burma was in full swing by the end of January 1945. General MacArthur's successive landings in the Philippines and United States fleet operations in the China Sea had cut the Japanese supply line to Burma. In mid-February, a British column crossed the Irrawaddy near Pagan and drove to Meiktila. The seizure of this road and rail center with its airfields undermined the whole Japanese position in Central Burma. In the meantime, other British-Indian forces were closing on Mandalay from the north and west. Japanese trapped in Mandalay held out against the British until March 21. Forty days later British airborne troops descended along the western shore of the Rangoon River south of the port and assault troops came ashore the following day. The Japanese had already fled Rangoon and the British forces entered on May 3. The port facilities were captured in good condition.

The Burma campaign had all out ended. A few Japanese units were able to withdraw eastward into Thailand and into the Koulmein area of Southern Burma, but thousands of the enemy were cut off in



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isolated pockets with little hope of escape. Admiral Mountbatten reported the fighting had already cost Japan 300,000 casualties of which 97,000 were counted dead.

Doc DOG NO 284

EXHIBIT #

3029

極東凶賊軍司令部裁判所

証米利加合衆國其他

謝

荒 木 貞 夫 其他

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自分機我國ニ行ハル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣審ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

# FILE COPY

## RETURN TO ROOM 361

一、私ノ姓名ハ一田次郎、明治二十七年十二月二十九日生レ、現住所ハ、  
福岡縣速賀郡中間町昭和通り大正三年陸軍士官學校ニ入學、爾來各種  
ノ任務ニ服シタル後、一九四四年四月「ビルマ」方面軍參謀副長ニ補セ  
ラレ、終戦ニ至ル迄、同職ニ留マリマシタ。  
終戦當時、陸軍少將デアリマシタ。此ノ期間ニ於ケル私ノ主タル任務ハ  
參謀長ヲ補佐スルコトニアリマシタ。  
二、木村兵太郎大將ガ「ビルマ」方面軍司令官トシテ著任セラレマシタノ  
ハ一九四四年九月中旬デアリマシテ、我が軍ガ「インパール」作戰ニ慘  
敗セル後デアリ、我軍ノ戦力ハ甚大ナル損害ヲ被ツテ居リマシタ。一九  
四三年八月頃ヨリ内地ヨリノ補給ハ殆ンド社絶ノ狀況デアリマシタ。  
三、斯ル凶惡ナル状態ニ在リシ時ニ著任セラレタ木村大將ハ著任早々部下  
全將兵ニ對シ、軍紀ノ振奮、民心●把握ヲ特ニ強調訓示セラレ、又一九  
四四年十月下旬、十二月中旬、翌年一月下旬ニ行ハレタル各種ノ會同ニ  
於テ、各軍ノ參謀、直轄部隊長等ヲ方面軍司令部ニ召集シ、重ネテ同  
旨ノコトヲ懇々訓示セラレマシタ。其ノ當時木村大將ノ爲シタ訓示ノ草  
稿、其ノ他訓示ニ關スル

審判ハ、退却中●<sup>大</sup>失又ハ燒<sup>大</sup>シテ現在ハアリマセン

而シテ木村大將ハ在任期間中終始此方針ノ貫徹ニ努力セラレマシタノデ、大ヒニ「ビルマ」人ノ信頼ヲ得マシタ。

木村大將八月エ一、二度ハ「ビルマ」國ノ各大臣等ノ要人ト會合シ、最も自由且ツ威威ナキ意見ノ交換ヲ行ヒ、特ニ日本側ニ於テ矯正改善ヲ要スル事項ニツキ「ビルマ」側ノ卒直ナル意見ヲ求メラレ、之ニ基キ直チニ關係者ニ命ジ實行ニ移サシムル等改善ニ意思ノ疎通ニ、又相互ノ理解ニ努力セラレマシタ。

木村大將ハ、又戦況ガ日々險惡トナリ「ビルマ」民衆ニ及ボス勞苦ノ累加ニ對シ常ニ非<sup>大</sup>ノ同情ヲ寄セラレ「ビルマ」要人トノ會同ニ於テモ心ヨリ同情ト感謝ノ念ヲ披瀝シ、作<sup>大</sup>上ノ要求ヲ一部犧牲ニスルモ民生ノ安定ニ寄與スベク部下ヲ指導セラレマシタ。

木村大將ハ、常ニ日緬間ノ融和親善ニ意ヲ用ヒ、風俗、習慣、言語等ノ相異カラ起ル誤解ヲ避ケル爲メ「ビルマ」人ニ對スル心得「ナル上下二部ヨリ成ル冊子ヲ作成セシメ（本冊子ハ入手努力中ナルモ未ダ入手シ

得ズ。況ク部下取返ノミナラズ、在留邦人ノ大部ニ配布シ、之ヲ遵守スベキコトヲ命ズルトトモニ、軍ノ「ビルマ」民衆ニ對スル協力的意思ヲ明瞭ニ民衆ニ傳ハラレ度キ旨ヲ「ビルマ」政府ニ依頼サレマシタ。「ビルマ」政府ハ其ノ大要ヲ翻譯シ、各縣知事ニ通達シマシタ。從ツテ、日緬間ノ融和親善ハ促進セラレ部下將兵モ其ノ意圖ヲ体シ、其ノ實現ニ努メマシタ。

私ハ日緬協力會議ニ「ビルマ」方面軍ノ代表ノ一人トシテ出席シ「ビルマ」政府要人ト話ニ接觸スル機會ガアリマシタガ、終始常ニ木村大將ノ意圖ヲ体シ、「ビルマ」政府ノ創意工夫ヲ尊重シ「ビルマ」政府ノ行フ諸施政ヘノ協力、民生ノ安定ニ特ニ意ヲ用ヒマシタ。

同、木村軍司令官在任間ニ於ケル一般ノ戦況ハ次ノ如リテアリマス、木村大將ガ著任セラレタ當時ハ「インパール」作戦遂行後方面軍主力ヲ「イラワヂー」河畔ニ集結セントスル時期デアリマシテ、木村大將ハ著任早々一九四四年九月十八日「メイミヨウ」ニ前進シ同年十月二十日頃迄同地ニ於テ作戦指導ニ専念セラレマシタ。而シテ、方面軍ハ「インパール」

作戦ニ従事セシ第十五軍ノ殘存戦力ノ補填ノ爲メソノ有スル凡有ルモノヲ前送シ、後方地域ノ治安維持ノ爲メニハ殆ンド一般戦斗部隊ヲ殘置シ得ザル實情ノ下ニ、辛ウジテ、所ク「イラワジ」會戦ヲ準備シ、木村大將ハ、一九四五年二月三日「カロー」ニ前進シ同月十六日迄作戦指導ニ任セラレマシタガ、彼我戦力ノ差、殊ニ飛行機、戦車、火炮ニ於テ隔絶セル爲メ、我戦線ハ到ル處ニ於テ分斷セラレ、支離破裂トナリ再ビ多大ノ損害ヲ蒙リ、混亂状態ノ下ニ至難ナル後退作戦ヲ實施シツ、第十五軍及ビ第三十三軍ハ辛ウジテ一九四五年五月中旬頃ヨリ「テナセリエーム」地區ニ集結ヲ開始シ、同年六月末頃迄ニ其ノ主力ノ集結ヲ完了シマシタガ、其ノ戦力ハ激減シ、特ニ大部ノ兵器、書類ヲ失ヒ、兵ノ体力ハ極度ニ衰ハ、療治方面へ後送セル患者ハ一万人以上ニ達シマシタ。又第二十八軍ハ道路ヲ遮断セラレ、約三ヶ月間「ベグー」山系附近ニ孤立スルノ止ムナキニ至リマシタガ、一九四五年七月下旬、最盛雨期間ニ至難ナル敵中突撃ヲ敢行シ、其兵力ノ半數ヲ失ヒ、主要兵器モ悉ク喪失シ、未ダ方面軍主力ト合スルニ至ラズシテ後退中終戦トナリマシタ。次

ニ「ビルマ」方面軍司令部ハ一九四五年四月下旬「ラングーン」ヲ撤退シ「モールメン」ニ後退シマシタガ其ノ集結完了ハ六月初旬ニ迄及ビマシタ。

「モールメン」後退後ニ於ケル方面軍司令部ノ機能ハ「モールメン」ハノ後退ガ匆卒ノ間ニ行ハレタコト、交通、通信機關、重要書類ガ喪失シタコト、熱心セル多数ノ參謀ガ轉出セルコト、事務補助人員ノ集結ガ意ノ如クナラザリシコト、及ビ英印軍飛行機ノ空襲被害ガ頻繁ニ行ハレタコト、竝ニ最盛雨期ニ際留セルコトナドノ原因ニヨリ著シク低下シマシタ。殊ニ英印軍飛行機ニヨル空襲ハ夜間ハ勿論夜間ト雖モ月明ヲ利用シテ行ハレマシタノチ「ビルマ」方面軍司令部ハ屢々「モールメン」ヲ離レタ郊外ノ村落ニ逃避シ執務セザルヲ得ヌ状態ナリ又患者ハ勿論兵員ノ多クモ夜ヲ過ハズ「ジャンクル」ニ退避ヲ余儀ナクサレマシタ。

上述ノ如キ悲惨ナル状況下ニ一九四五年三月下旬「ビルマ」國防軍（六千乃至八千名）ハ一齊ニ叛亂シ又「ゲリラ」部隊ハ我方后方擾亂ニ活潑ナル行動ヲ開始シ日本軍ノ后方ハ重大ナル脅威ヲ受クルニ至リマシタ。

一、ビルヤム防軍トハ一九四五年三月十五日ニ日緬兩軍ノ作戦協定ヲ一  
 ラングーシニ於ケル方面軍司令部ヲ實施セル程、ゲアリヤ、其ノ背  
 反ハ日本軍ノ益ク豫期セザル所ニシテ、至リ「オンサン」少將ノ署名ヲ  
 ニテ秘密裡ニ對日宣戦ガ一九四五年三月十四日ニ行ハレテ居ツタコトヲ  
 知リヤシク。而シテ叛亂軍ハ叛亂ニ先立ち豫メ「トングー」ベグー「  
 一タトシ」等、日本軍后方要地ニ少カラザル兵力ヲ配置シ主力ハ「ヘン  
 サヤ」方面ニテアリテ叛亂地后各方面ノ通信交通線ヲ破壊シ、各地ノ監視  
 小部隊、憲兵分隊等ヲ發隊シ其ノ多クヲ殺害シ其ノ集積保管シテリシ現  
 金物品等ヲ奪取シ又間諜行爲類發シ「ビルヤム」方面軍司令部第二十八軍  
 司令部及第三十三軍司令部モ大燒燬ヲ受ケ各々大ナル損害ヲ蒙リヤシク  
 而シテ「ビルヤム」防軍ノ指導ニ從軍シテ啓リヤシク日本軍將兵モ亦多  
 クハ殺害セラレヤシク。又當時「チルカ」地帯ニ出張中ノ日本商社員通  
 譯兵ハ二百余名ヲアリヤシクシテ終戦ニ至ルヤテニ復歸セルモノハ極メテ  
 少數ヲアリ其ノ他ハ今尙ホ行衛不明ヲアリヤス、併シ木村大將ハ是等ニ  
 對シ感情の報復ヲ避ケラレタルノミナラズ尙從來ノ日緬間ノ親善ヲ想ヒ



唯單ニ作戰的ニ處理セラレタノミデアリマシタ。即チ之レニ充テルベキ  
 兵力モナカリシタメ若干ノ后方部隊及ビ「メイクセイラー」方面へ増援  
 中ノ第五十五師團ノ一部ガ之ニ對シ示威的行動ヲ採ツタノミデアリマシ  
 タ。一方一九四五年一月頃ヨリ「ケマビユー」南方山地並ニ「コーカレ  
 イ」地域及ビ「バブン」南方地區ニ於テハ「カレン」  
 「カチン」人ヲ以  
 テ「ダリラ」部隊ガ編成セラレ、印度ニ於テ教育ヲ受ケタル「ビルマ」  
 人ヲ初メ印度人及英軍將兵ガ落下傘ニヨリ降下シ來リ空中ヨリスル武器  
 ノ補充トトモニ其ノ勢力ハ逐次増加シ各地ニ擴大分散シ叛亂軍ニ相呼應  
 シ活動スルニ至リ「ケマビユー」方面ヨリ~~X~~后迄セル第三十一、第三十  
 三師團等ハ所々ニ抵抗ヲ受ケ相當ノ損害ヲ蒙リマシタ。  
 以上ノ如キ狀況ニア我作戦地取一帯就中「チナセリユーム」地區ハ終戦  
 ニ至ルマテ叛亂軍ゲリラ部隊ガ活動シ日本將兵ハコレガタメ不意ニ襲撃  
 セラレ損害ヲ受ケシモノ相當多致ニ上リマシタ。特ニ此等ハ雨季ニ入り  
 疲勞極ニ達シ乍ラ後退シ來レル少人數ノ日本兵ヲ取ハ襲ヒ或ハ之ヲ殺害  
 シ其ノ武器ヲ採奪セルコトモ妙ナカラズアリマシタ。

又一九四五年七月末第二十八軍ガ「シツタン」河渡河ニ際シテハ彼等ハ其兩岸ニ於テ抵抗シ殊ニ「シユエジン」西北方四・五十軒同河西岸無名部落ニ於テハ我赤十字社看護婦十名ヲ襲撃シ「來スルモノハ一名モアリマセンデシタ」(同看護婦隊ト行動ヲ共ニセシ兵ノ報告)我軍ハ斯ル抵抗ヲ受ケ乍ラモ不村大將ハ是等ニ對シ報復的ナ行動ヲ執ツテハナラヌト常々部下ヲ戒メテ居ラレマシタ。

以上ノ如キ戦況デアリマシテ、英印軍ノ俘虜ヲ捕獲シウルガ如キ機會ハ全然アリマセンデシタ。

斯クセ「ビルマ」方面軍ノ終戦前數ヶ月間ノ狀況ハ、連續セル慘敗ノ後、戦力激減シ、志氣衰へ疲労困頓其極ニ達シ、當時作戦地域一帯ニ散在セシ日本軍ノ小部隊ハ敗戦ノ壓迫感ニ襲ハルルトトモニ、「ビルマ」叛亂軍、「ゲリラ」部隊ニ對シ自己防衛ニ戦々燒々トシテ居ル状態デアリマシタ。

上述ノ如ク、叛亂軍、及「ゲリラ」部隊ノ後方擾亂ト、我軍ハ其交通・通信機關並ニ重要目標ノ大部ヲ喪失シ、龍潭池ノ補給斷絶ノ爲ト、英軍

飛機<sup>行</sup>ニヨル交通妨害、並ニ最近雨期ニ於ケル交通杜絶等トニヨリ、「ピルマ」方面軍ノ神経系統ハ殆ンド麻痺状態トナリ、各級指揮官ノ部下ノ指揮、掌握モ甚タシク困難ニ陥リマシタ。加之一九四五年八月下旬「ピルマ」方面軍司令部ハ解散ノ豫定アリマシタノテ、軍ノ縮少、改編、轉送ガ企圖セラレ、實行ノ途上ニ在リ、方面軍參謀モ此間多クハ轉出シ、一時的參謀ノ尤當テ當座ヲ閉ニ合セテ居ツタ有様テ、方面軍司令部ノ業務モ甚シク困難ヲ極メ、且ツ、近ク聯合軍ノ海陸兩方面ヨリノ進攻ヲ迎ヘ作戦準備ニ忙殺セラルル等至難ナル狀況下ニ於テ終戦トナリマシタ。然シ乍ラ此間、不村方面軍司令官ハ特ニ軍紀ノ肅作向上ニ民心ノ把握ニ懸命ノ努力ヲ拂ハレマシタ。

五、而シテ木村大將部下ノ將兵ニヨル不法行爲等ニ關シテハ、「ピルマ」方面軍司令部ハ報告ヲ受ケタルコトナク、又現在當法廷ニ於テ示サレタル不法行爲ヲ命付セルコトハ勿論ナク、許容セルコトハ全然アリマセン。「カラゴン」村事件ノ如キモ、終戦後數ヶ月ヲ經テ、英軍司令部ヨリ木村大將ニ對シ質問ガアリマシタガ同大將並ニ私及其他方面軍參謀モ全ク

知リマセンデシタ。一ル四六年三月ト記憶シマスガ、「ラングーン」ニ  
於テ英日聯合戦史研究會ガ開催セラレ、之ニ出席ノタメ、偶々泰ニ轉移  
シテ居リマシタ元第三十三師團長田中信男中將ガ「インセン・キャンブ  
ニ來リシ際、同中將ヨリ始メテ「カヲゴン」事件ヲ聞イタ次第デアリマ  
ス。

六、木村大將在任間「ビルマ」ニ於ケル俘虜收容所及軍抑留所其他ニ關シ聞

知シテ居リマス情況ハ左ノ通りデアリマス。泰緬鐵道ハ南方總司令官ノ直轄セル處ニシテ、木村大將著任約一年前

(一) 泰緬鐵道ハ南方總司令官ノ直轄セル處ニシテ、本鐵道ノ建設、維持、運営ニ關シテハ、既ニ完成シテ居リマシテ、本鐵道ノ建設、維持、運営ニ關シテハ、

(二) 「ビルマ」方面軍ハ全ク關係アリマセン。馬來俘虜收容所ハ第六分所デ「ラングーン」ニ於ケル俘虜收容所ハ、馬來俘虜收容所ハ南方總軍司令官ノ

アツテ、馬來俘虜收容所長ノ轄下ニアリ馬來俘虜收容所ハ南方總軍司令官ノ

令官ノ轄下アリマシタ。而シテ一九四四年一月南方總軍司令官ハ馬來俘虜收容所長ニ對シ「ラ

シムヘク命令シ「ビルマ」方面軍司令官ハ同分所ヲ「ラングーン」ニシテ

(三) 戊辰令官タル第七十三兵站司令官ノ指揮下ニ入ラシメマシタ。二月「タボイ」

タル獨立混成第二十四旅團長ガ管理シテ居リマシタガ一九四四年十月

管轄ニ移リシ爲メ、其後ハ泰軍司令官ノ隷下部隊タル在「タボ」部隊ニヨリ直接管轄セラレマシタ。

(四)「ラングーン」俘虜收容所ハ「ラングーン」中央刑務所ヲ以テ充當セラレ、約六百名ノ俘虜ガ收容セラレテ居タト記憶シマス。此ノ收容所ハ水久建築デアリマシテ、居住施設ハ概ネ完備シ、醫務室、病室、娛樂室、浴洗施設、炊事場、飲料施設、運動場等ガアリマス。

(五)此收容所ノ慰安施設トシテハ「ピアノ」蓄音機、圖書等ヲ備付ケ運動ヲ奨励シ、各種運動具ニ依リ實施セラレテ居リマシタ。又軍樂隊ヲ同收容所ニ派遣シ、俘虜ヲ慰安セシメタコトモアリマス。

(六)貨物販ヨリ牛、豚、山羊、「アヒル」等多數交附シ、同收容所内ノ俘虜ヲシテ飼養セシメ、其ノ榮養ヲ補ハシメマシタ。

(七)同收容所ノ内外ニ俘虜ヲシテ農園ヲ經營セシメ、自給ヲ奨励シタル結果ニハ其ノ余剩ヲ「ラングーン」市内ニ於テ販賣シ其ノ利得ヲ以テ俘虜達ノ嗜好品ヲ購入スル便ヲ與ヘマシタ。

俘虜ハ主食ヲ減ゼラルルコトナク、一般日本人ヨリ給養ハ良好デアツ

テ此等感謝セラレマシタ。

(八) 同收容所内ノ酒保ニ於テ、牛乳、煙草、日用品等ヲ販賣シ、存貯ニ感謝セラレマシタ

(九) 日曜日及存貯ノ祝祭日ニハ休養ヤシメ、祝祭日ニハ加給品ヲ與ヘタコトガアリマス

(十) 勞務時間ハ逐次遞減セラレ、六時間勞働ヲ普通トシマシタ。勞働ノ種類ハ港湾ノ荷上運搬其他雜役ニ使用セラレタト聞キマシタ

十一 木村大將在任期間中、同伴隊收容所ニ於テ、日本兵ノ不法行爲アリタルコトヲ聞イタコトハアリマセン。

「ボブソン」准將ノ申出ニヨリ同准將ニ對シテ不從順ノ行爲アリタル英印軍兵ニ對シ、數回威罰ガ行ハレタコトヲ聞イタコトガアリマス。

十二 木村大將ノ著任前一九四四年六月頃同收容所内ニ「コレラ」ガ發生シマシタガ 其後間モナク終熄シマシタ。

醫藥藥品類等ハ昭和十八年八月以降殆ンド内地ヨリノ補給斷絶シ日本軍ニ對シテモ配給シ能ハサル狀況デアリ患者ノ治療上遺憾ノ點ガアツタガ其レデモ出來ル丈ケノコトハシタトイフコトヲ聞キマシタ。

而シテ當時ノ「ラングーン」ノ俘虜收容所長タリシ田任大尉ハ從來ノ所長ニ比シ、最モ良好ナル所長タリトノ定評ガアツタ人デ「ボブソン」准將及「ローリング」少佐ヨリ數回感謝狀ヲ受領シマシタ。此ノ事ハ私ガ田任大尉ヨリ聞イタコトデアリマス。

又方面軍司令部ガ「ラングーン」ヲ撤退スルニ際シテハ俘虜ノ内移動サセルコトガ俘虜ノ健康ニ悪影響ヲ與ヘルト認メラレル患者俘虜及所要ノモノハ「ラングーン」ニ残置シ釋放ノ處置ヲ請ジ、健康俘虜ノミ



移動セシメヨウトシマシタガ、戦況上兩者共一九四五年四月末前後現地ニ於テ全部釋放セラレマシタ  
又「タボイ軍抑留所ハ約百名收容セラレテ居リマシタガ、管理ハ概ネ適正ニ行ハレ致、度モ感謝狀ヲ受領シテ居リ、之レ等ノ感謝狀ハ終戦後英軍ヘノ報告書ニ添附シテ提出シマシタ。  
尙ホ在「ビルマ」飛行師團ハ捕獲セラレタ聯合軍飛行士ノ訊問ヲ取扱ツテ居リマシタガ「ビルマ」方面軍司令官ハ飛行師團ニ對シ何等ノ指揮權ヲモ有シテ居リマセンデシタ。

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同日於 例 所

立 會 人 是 恒 繼 兵

右ハ皆立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

供 述 者 一 田 次 郎

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）一月十三日於極東國際軍事裁判所  
辯護人室

17

宣  
行  
書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺秘ヤズ又何事ヲモ附加ヤザル  
コトヲ誓フ

署名捺印  
一  
田  
次  
郎

Exh.No. 3091

Def. Doc. No. 1928

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: YOSHIDA Gompachi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet  
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country  
I hereby depose as follows.

My name is YOSHIDA, Gompachi. I was formerly in service  
as Major General. I was born on January 18, 1894, and now  
live at No. 55, 5 chome, Noborito, Chiba-shi. Chiba Pref.  
In December 1915, I entered the Military Academy. After  
graduating from the Academy, I occupied various posts. I  
was appointed Commander of the Rangoon Air Defense forces in  
August 1943, and late in September 1945 Chief of Staff of the  
15th Army where I remained until the end of the war.

2. General KIMURA, Heitaro, came to the City of Rangoon to  
assume his office on September 12, 1944. The next day in the  
compounds of the Headquarters of the Burma Area Army, General  
KIMURA delivered an address to men and officers of the whole

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Army I being present. In his address he told us emphatically to encourage military discipline and morale, to apply due and prompt punishment and rewards, to promote friendship and good understanding between the two peoples, and to win the public favor. In obedience to the General's address and for the purpose of having my men well informed of his instructions, first of all I held an inspection of troops under my command. I also organized such various units specializing in specific tasks as follows: units to treat and rescue the Burmese people killed or injured in air raids; fire service units; and units for delivery of necessary medical articles.

At the time when I was appointed Chief of Staff of the 15th Army, the Army was in retreat toward the banks of the Irrawaddy following the failure of our Impahl operations. In his interview with me on my departure for my new post, General KIMURA instructed me in detail to the same effect as was stated in the General's first address following his arrival. Besides, he gave me strict orders to avoid taking scorched-earth tactics on our way of retreat and thus to keep the native populace out of the horrors of war; and especially to afford every possible facility to those government officials and civilians who wished to evacuate with the Japanese forces. On my arrival at the Headquarters of the 15th Area Army, I found telegraphic orders from General KIMURA to the above

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effect. Upon my assumption of post, I thought it was of initial urgency to make it thoroughly known to the whole Army of the intention of General KIMURA. The review of military discipline in our Army was carried out by the Commander of the 15th Army KATAMURA and myself, with a view to thoroughly informing the soldiers of the intention of the Area Army Commander. At that time, Commander KATAMURA took charge of the review of the major units directly attached to him, and I, in his place, took charge of the minor. The commanders of army corps under the 15th Army likewise executed review on their sub-units. In those days the 31st and the 33rd Divisions were retreating with extreme difficulty, but despite the situation, Commanders of both Divisions took pains to carry out the inspection of troops with regards to military discipline on the battlefield, and applied due and prompt punishment to unit commanders for neglect of taking good care of arms. As regards our relations with the Burmese people, the scorched earth tactics was, of course, prohibited and appropriate facilities for retreat were afforded to official and civilian evacuees. It was also ordered to avoid setting billets and any army camps in residential districts. In this way the forces at the front put up with all inconveniences to keep the people from suffering from the ill effects of war. Also after that, at the time of evacuation from Maymyo (about

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30 kilometers north-east of Mandalay) a special order was issued to ban the scorched earth tactics.

3. General KIMURA, who was very eager to promote good understanding and cooperation between the Japanese and Burmese, distributed among his forces a pamphlet in two volumes entitled "The Attitude to Take Toward the Burmese" and ordered it to be observed. We also made efforts to see to it that the order was carried out. The pamphlet contained articles on the differences in manners and customs between the two peoples to clear away any misunderstanding so it might contribute to the friendship between them. It is the regret of this deponent that the pamphlet and the Area Army Commander KIMURA's telegram to the 15th Army Headquarters, mentioned above, cannot be submitted to the Tribunal because they had been lost or burned at the time of our retreat through enemy lines after the failure of the battle of Irrawaddy.

Besides at the end of war all documents other than those concerning personnel affairs, accounts and supplies, and military sanitation, and particularly any document having any connection with strategy and policy were burned by order of superior authorities.

4. By the time of the opening of the battle of Irrawaddy, General KIMURA had held meetings at the Area Army Headquarters in Rangoon for the purpose of consulting with respective army

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staff officers and unit commanders about problems of strategy, education and self-government. At each meeting General KIMURA gave necessary instructions. At the meeting on strategy when I presented myself, he delivered repeated addresses in reference to the maintenance of military discipline and to winning public favor. It was also emphasized to the same effect at other meetings. We, as his subordinates, concentrated our efforts to carry them out in obedience to his intentions.

Because of racial similarities, from the very beginning, the Japanese Army and the Burmese people were well disposed toward each other. Generally the Japanese Army was cautious and prudent in action and enforced strict military discipline and thereby had won the confidence of the Burmese people at large. With the increasingly heavier pressure of troubles by war, an anti-war feeling was gradually stealing into the hearts of the Burmese people. Particularly since the latter period of the battle of Irrawaddy, in view of Japan's obvious defeat, an anti-Japanese tendency seemed to have been brought about among a certain portion of the people, from the time of the revolt of the Burmese National Defense Army.

6. After the failure of the operations in the Impahl zone, the 15th Army suffered heavy losses both in number of troops and arms. Remarkable decline was seen of morale and physical strength. More than that, a great number of soldiers were



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suffering from diseases. Thus it was quite difficult for the 15th Army to regain its combat power. Little supply was sent from the rear and we prepared with much difficulty for the coming battle of Irrawaddy. But about the middle of February 1945, a frontal attack by predominant British-Indian Forces was attempted. In parallel with this action, a flank attack was made by British-Indian Mechanized Corps which had broken into Burma by way of Meiktila early in March. As a result, our lines were cut off on all sides, and each corps was forced into an isolated position. Every means of communication by land was cut off and, owing to the want of electric batteries, wireless communication was barely available resulting in insufficiency of command and communication. Under such situation, it was decided to rearrange our lines on the Shan Heights ranging east of Meiktila, and orders were issued to respective corps to break through the enemy siege and to assemble troops near Kalow. However, during this time we again suffered losses of a great many men and arms. Since then we often encountered the enemy. Forced marches, covering long distances, were ventured; food was scarce and there were lots of patients to go with us; communication was entirely cut off for a long time. Under such conditions the 31st and 33rd Divisions moved to the Tenasserim zone for a short stay, and the Army Headquarters and the 15th Division continued on

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their way to Siam. The mountains which they had to go over were so rugged and steep that every soldier, taking with him nothing other than his portable weapon, retreated literally with bare life. Many of the soldiers died of disease on the way. It was difficult for a minor unit to pass the zone west of Roykow (TN?) and that south of Kamipow (TN?) for attacks by guerrillas obstructed the march so often that the troops were compelled to take up a challenge while retreating. Since May 7, 1945, the 15th Army gradually assembled its forces in the Tenasserim district. Owing to the forced march over a long distance and the attacks by the guerrillas and British-Indian Forces, our soldiers were entirely fatigued both mentally and physically and 70-80% of them were ill. A large part of arms was lost. There were almost no materials and apparatus for the use of communication, so that it was extremely difficult for every commander to keep his men under his command. The Headquarters was situated at the Mouchi (TN?) mines 14 miles east of Toungoo. Every night there we suffered from attacks by guerrillas. The guerrillas also waylaid those smaller units which passed the Toungoo and Kamipow (TN?) roads, to attack them from top of cliffs or by bridges and almost never failed to kill or would some of our soldiers.

Beginning early in June 1945, the communication by land was scarcely possible, as this was the heaviest rainy season.

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Such being the situation, the communication either between a commander and his subordinates or between one unit and another was also hardly carried out.

In addition, the activities of British-Indian planes and the disturbing attacks in the rear by guerrilla units of the Burmese National Defense Army made a vital menace to our forces. Soldiers in minor units and stragglers were in constant danger of life as a result of the pressure of defeat.

On this 30 day of June, 1947.

At Chiba.

DEPONENT /s/ YOSHIDA, Gompachi (seal)

I, KORETSUNE, Tatsumi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,

at Chiba.

Witness: /s/ KORETSUNE, Tatsumi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ YOSHIDA, Gompachi (seal)



Def. Dec. 684

No. 2

追ッテ路ヲ南キテ、前進ニ屢々砲火曝カル程アルド  
 ガ、前方迄本動カセタ。一五四年一月二十一日下、右方  
 トラツク及印度兵ヲ、物資、護送團ヲ緬支國境  
 ヲ越ス。スタイルル志補給路前カ、行テ  
 西部山岳ニ、攻軍、日軍軍、抵抗ヲ破リ、言テ  
 公ヲ通過シ、生ドウノ河ヲ經テ、南方ニ突進シタ。  
 南方ニ、アラガノ地方ヲ、攻軍、アラカノ海岸、  
 カラダノ河、南州ヲ、掃蕩シ、テ、及、ラ、行、  
 島ニ飛行場ヲ設ケタ。 (以下直)

Ref Doc 684

ビルマニ於ケル日本軍ハ一九四五年一月末ニ全面的十退却ヲ開始シテ二月マツクア・サー元帥陛下ノ米軍ノヒリツピン諸島上陸ト支那海ニ於ケル合衆國艦隊ノ作戦ハ日本ノビルマノ補給路ヲ切斷シメ、二月中旬ニ英軍ノ一隊ハ「ペイガン」近傍デ「イラワディ」河ヲ渡リ「メイクティラ」ニ進撃シタ。附属飛行場ヲ持チ且ツ鐵路交通ノ要點デアル「コ」道路ノ占領ハ中部ノビルマニ於ケル日本軍ノ全陣営ヲ危クシタ。

一方他ノ英印軍ガ北方及ビ西方カラ「マンドレイ」ニ進リツツアツタ。「マンドレイ」ヲ包圍サシタ日本軍ハ三月二十一日迄英軍ニ抵抗ヲ續ケタ。四月日後、英軍空中輸送部隊ハ「ラングリン」港南方「ラングリン」河西岸ニ着陸シ、ソノ翌日攻撃隊ガ上陸シタ。

日本軍ハ既ニ「ラングリン」ヨリ逃走シ、英軍ガ五月三日ニ入城シタ。港灣設備ハ損害ナク英軍ノ手ニ歸シタ。

ビルマ討伐ハ完全ニ終了シタ。少数ノ日本部隊ガ東方泰國内及ビ南部ビルマノ「ムールマイン」地區ニ撤退シ得タノミデ、多数ノ敵ハ各所ニ包圍サレ逃ゲ路ヲ遮斷サレタ。

マウントバツテン提督ハ戦闘ノ結果既ニ日本軍ニ死傷者三十万人、中死者九万七千ノ損害ヲ與ヘタト報告シタ。

No. 3

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent ; -- HIRAOKA, Junzo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. My name is HIRAOKA, Junzo. I was born in the Hiroshima Prefecture on January 1, 1890, the 23rd year of Keiji, and appointed second lieutenant in the Army on Dec. 25, 1912, the 1st year of Taisho. After having passed, since then, through ordinary courses in the Army, I was appointed an attache to the Commander of the Burma Area Army in March, 1943, and remained in the same post to the end of the war. I was Colonel at the time of surrender. I am now detained in Sugamo Prison.

2. In the last part of February, 1944, I was appointed to hold the additional post of the adviser to the Burmese Government and had, thereafter, comparatively many opportunities to contact

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in Burma became worse day by day and the living conditions of the Burmese people became worse also. So Gen. KIMURA often forewarned his staff officers that though they were preoccupied by pressure of severe operational demands, they must not forget the feelings of the Burmese people, and that they should not lose their popularity with the Burmese, even at the sacrifice of some part of the military operations, and had directed the release of some textile goods from the Japanese Army to the Burmese civilians, and the limitation of the quantity of grain purchased by the Japanese Army. Furthermore, I often witnessed the scenes in the Departmental Chief Conference or other occasions, in which he was urging the Chief of the Medical Department of the Army under his assignment to promote medical relief for the sick and wounded caused by bombardment, etc., among the Burmese people.

6. Listening personally to the peoples' voice through the Burmese leaders, Gen. KIMURA had, notwithstanding the scarcity of paper, a leaflet entitled "The Attitude to Take Toward the Burmese People" compiled, printed and distributed among soldiers and the Japanese residents. Furthermore, he had the Vice Chief of his Staff, etc., give lectures on the kindly treatment of the Burmese peoples to the important Japanese civilians in Burma.

7. Such sympathy and sincerity of Gen. KIMURA as above mentioned toward the Burmese people helped regain the Conference of the



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Burmese in the Japanese Army which has been lessening through her disadvantageous war situation in the whole Pacific battle area, especially in Burma, so that the anti-Japanese underground movements by some groups of Burmese who were arising since the rainy season of 1944 was temporarily stopped.

It was about November, 1944, that many Burmese leaders, comprising Dr. Bahmo, Mr. Takin Miya (Vice Premier), Mr. U Ton Aun (Minister of Cooperation), Mr. Takin Tanton (Minister of Demand and Supply) and Mr. Uba Win (Home Minister) told me that they were happy to have a benevolent Commander with good understanding good will and deep sympathy toward Burma, and that they expected that the anti-Japanese atmosphere which was appearing in some groups of the Burmese would probably be swept away.

8. In February, 1945, when the war situation in many districts was at a most adverse stage to Japan, the handcraft exhibition was held at Rangoon under the sponsorship of the Japanese and attracted the Burmese numbering from 50,000 to 100,000 every day. Furthermore, movie theatres in Rangoon City, numbering seven or eight in all, were almost packed every day and night even after the rebellion of the National Defense Army in the latter part of March of the same year.

9. At the time of evacuation of the Japanese Army from Rangoon, General KILURA, having deliberately decided not to

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incur the war disaster upon the Burmese people, prohibited, by order, the burning of the property of the Burmese people. At the evacuation, furthermore, he left the Burmese leaders to do as they liked and so a half of the ministers remained in Rangoon.

10. As the adviser to the Burmese Government, I sometimes heard the Burmese Government complain of the junior grade Japanese military men and civilians, but I never heard, during the tenure of my office, of the cruelty committed by the soldiers of the Burma Area Army spoken of by either Governmental authorities or the people.

On this 8 day of July 1947

At I. M. T. F. E.

DEPONENT /S/ HIRAOKI, Junzo (seal)

I, KORETSUNE, Tatsumi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: (signed) /S/ KORETSUNE, Tatsumi (seal)

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OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ HIRAKA Junzo(seal)

1541 is a mistake of 1451

1451

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Exh No.

3097

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

~~187797~~ to be used?

ARAKI Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: -- YAMAGUCHI, Eiji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

Certified at No. 132, Nicho-me, Nanjo-machi, Takat-shi, Niigata-ken on this 25th day of March, 1947 (the 22nd year of Showa)

Deponent: YAMAGUCHI, Eiji

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness:

At the same place

On the same date

Witness: KORETSUNE, Tatsumi

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YAMAGUCHI, Eiji

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1. I, YAMAGUCHI, Fijj, an ex-Lieutenant Colonel, was born on August 11, 1907. My present address is No. 134 Sanchoe, Nanjo-machi, Takata City, Niigata Prefecture.

After I graduated at the Military Academy in 1929 and the Military Staff College in 1938, I occupied several posts till July 8, 1944 when I was appointed staff officer attached to the Burma Army. I served as Chief Operations Officer until July 20, 1945, though I was ordered to be transferred to a certain other post on July 18 of the same year.

I shall relate the conditions before and after the withdrawal from Rangoon of the Burma Army Headquarters.

2. Contrary to our expectation, the British-Indian armies launched a drive, about mid-April 1945, against the outlying districts of Tongoo (Tung-ngu) north of Rangoon, which compelled our Headquarters to decide to retreat to Moulmein in Tenasserim. The attempt involved proceeding northward and then crossing the Sittang (Sitaung) river via Pegu. We were therefore confronted with the necessity to make a hasty retreat. However, it so happened that the Chief Staff Officer and the Operation and Information and Administration Officers were all absent, having gone to the Tung-ngu area, taking charge of the operations there. We waited for their return before we commenced the retreat. This meant the loss of the right moment to some extent and it was not before the end of April 1945 that we finally started. The

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rainy season had just set in, and the Kwao-Sittang road that ran along the western bank of the Sittang was then a veritable quagmire. This unexpected incident hampered our activity a good deal. Added to this, the lack of adequate ferrying facilities obstructed our crossing the river. The western bank was crowded with our troops, which British planes attacked fiercely and put them into utter confusion. We suffered tremendous losses and the great amount of automobiles and voluminous documents.

Exposed to the raids of the British-Indian air forces, the ferrying of troops and other activities in the daytime was much interfered with; it took us quite a long time to complete the withdrawal of our Army forces across the river toward its eastern area. This experience we had to go through again in crossing the Taton and the Salween rivers. Altogether, it was the work of over a month to effect the collection of the whole Army Headquarters.

3. Our withdrawal from Rangoon was so hasty that there had been no preparations made beforehand for the removal of the Headquarters to Moulmein, and consequently after our arrival in Moulmein we had to arrange as the occasion demanded for necessary facilities and equipment. Naturally it resulted that the working efficiency of the Army Headquarters declined to a considerable degree for some time.

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1. Toward the end of April 1945, the Commander of the Army arrived at Moulmein with some members of the staff, while the rest of the staff remained behind to see that the forces were ferried safely across the Sittang river or to attend to the withdrawal of troops on the road between the Sittang and Moulmein. Unexpected delay was seen everywhere in the arrival of many of the clerks who were in charge of the practical business of the Headquarters, the concentration of the most of the troops, the arrival of various sections of the Headquarters such as the Intendance, Ordnance, Veterinary and Judicial Sections, all the members of which had to retreat on foot. With all this delay

it was impossible for the Headquarters not to be further delayed in functioning. As for the conveyance of baggage by the troops and officers on their retreat to Moulmein, all that they could do was to take with them what little baggage they could carry for they had had the greater amount of motor cars they possessed destroyed by fire at Sittang and they had hardly any means of transportation available to them after they had crossed the river. Before the evacuation of Pangoon, Commander KIMURA had issued orders strictly forbidding his men to resort to "burning up tactics" policy in the city, so that the innocent citizens might not be molested. Orders to the same effect were also issued by

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him before this when the 15th Army was evacuating Imphal. As for the withdrawal of the Burmese leaders, it was left to their own choice. Those of the prisoners of war whose health it was feared would be affected by removal, were allowed to remain behind preparatory to subsequent release, while the others were ordered to be moved. However, the war situation caused us to release all the prisoners of war on the spot.

2. Commander KIMURA, some of the staff officers and a few assistants who were the first to arrive at Moulmein, took up their abode in several houses in the suburbs of Moulmein, about three kilometers south of the city and began to work in these buildings. However, the lagging behind of the majority of the assistants, the lack of camp furniture and business articles, and above all, our dependence upon scanty and worn-out communication apparatus, for which there was no fresh supply of batteries -- all these deficiencies combined caused a marked decrease in our communication capacity.

As for the means of transportation, the 24th Combined Brigade Headquarters at Moulmein had a few battered motor trucks and they were the only serviceable vehicles available to us. Before the war came to an end, the Army Headquarters had managed to secure about a hundred trucks in the Tenasserim area, which however were hardly enough to supply the first



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line with necessary provisions. Such being the means of communications and transportation, we had the greatest difficulty in maintaining commanding connection between the units.

By and by there arrived the rest of the Army Staff officers and members of the various sections of the Army Headquarters. They took up their abode in private houses, one or two kilometers apart from one another and began to conduct their regular business. They had to sit on the earthen floor of the house with wooden boards as desks to work at, with no telephones to communicate with one another.

3. Subsequent to the withdrawal of the Army Headquarters to Moulmein, aerial attacks by the British-Indian forces on Moulmein area became more and more frequent so that the Headquarters personnel were obliged to run to the improvised air raid shelters near by several times a day and stay there for an hour or two each time. These circumstances made it necessary for us to build shacks with all haste in the inconveniently located jungles in order to accommodate the staff officers. It often happened too that we had to go out for shelter into the small villages about half an hour's drive from Moulmein and there they stayed all day long attending to the business.

4. In July 1945, the regular rainy season and set in. The Tenasserim area is the rainiest region of all Burma and

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the country around Moulmein abounding in rivers and streams form a large paddy field zone. Throughout the three months before and after July, the rainiest month of the year, the surrounding flat country turns into a vast expanse of muddy water, so that even main road traffic often gets interrupted and the minor roads are rendered all but impassable. As it usually is at this time of year, so was it this year. The communication was naturally so much interfered with that it was by no means easy to keep up connections with one another and so each of us had great difficulty in effecting the proper command of his men. The Thai-Burman Railway was often interrupted. We could get supplies sent from the rear, but they were not sufficient to meet our needs; a meager amount of clothing was about the most that we could expect and in the matter of communication and transportation apparatus not a piece was supplied to us.

About this time, General KIMURA invited the following people to the Headquarters of Area Army one by one. Lt. General TANAKA, Commander in Chief of the 33rd Division; Lt. General KAWABE, Commander in Chief of the 31st Division; Lt. General TAKEHARA, Commander in Chief of the 49th Division; Lt. General AIDA, formerly Commander in Chief of the 24th Mixed Brigade; Major General SAKUMA, a later commander in chief of the 24th Mixed Brigade; KIDDER, Commander in Chief

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of Gendarmerie, all of whom had retreated to the Tenassarim area one by one after March 1945. He demanded strongly that they stress the importance of enforcing military discipline and that the proper treatment of the Burmese people should be kept in the minds of the Japanese officers and men. He had the same instructions conveyed to the other Commander in Chief of the area army by staff officers. And in the conference of the headquarters of the area army, he directed earnestly and repeatedly that the personnel of the headquarters observe military discipline and be careful that they properly treat the Burmese people. Furthermore he sent officers, especially judicial officers, in various places in his command for the purpose of making inspections of his command with regard to military discipline which included the proper treatment of Burmese.

5. About the time that we are speaking of, the guerrilla force in the Tenasserim area, enforced by the British-Indian paratroops, was steadily growing in power and strength. These paratroops nightly supplied the guerrillas with arms and ammunition. In addition to this, the guerrilla troops in concert with the Burman Rebel Army operating in the same area, launched brisk activities. Small contingents of Japanese troops, stragglers and soldiers retreating, were exposed to their frequent assaults, the means of communication and transportation were subjected to their destruction and secret

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agents were active. The rear of our force was most seriously menaced. In fact, soldiers in small groups or those that fell out of line were in constant dread of these ~~g~~ guerrillas. To cite a few instances, a party of Japanese guards were on the Moulmein-Messord road assaulted and sustained a heavy loss; near Thambizayet Japanese soldiers in small groups were several times raided; one Japanese staff officer was shot by a sniper on the Moulmein-Taton road and wounded; occasionally on the Moulmein Thambizayet road solitary line of communication soldiers were shot, quite a number of stragglers and soldiers retreating were killed. About this time bands of Burmese savages began to run riot so that the inhabitants of the locality were glad to seek shelter in the Japanese-garrisoned regions.

6. The task of the Army Headquarters at that time was one of extreme complication and therefore very subtle to execute, and we were so circumstanced that it was next to impossible to resort to any positive military operations. In anticipation of the possible frontal attack both from land and sea that the British-Indian army might make immediately upon the ~~on~~ set in of the rainy season, we had to make arrangements quickly preparatory to launching operations. For this purpose, our staff officers, beset though they were with traffic difficulties caused by the rain,

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had to undertake extensive topographical reconnaissance and look after the fortification works. Besides, it was incumbent upon us staff officers to see that the retreating soldiers who were arriving exhausted were well cared for. We bent our best efforts to this direction. Earlier we had been ordered by the South Army General Headquarters to remove the 15th Corps and the 37th, 33rd, 55th and 56th Divisions to Thailand; we were just then engaged in carrying out the orders. We were also occupied with the work of forming one corps, 3 divisions and 2 combined brigades from the rest of the forces, and of dissolving the Army forces headquarters and the 28th Corps Headquarters. We had therefore our hands quite full with the reformation of the Burma Army forces. But the 28th Corps which was to constitute the most important part of the intended reformed army was halted in the Pegu mountains in isolation and nothing was known about its fate. We had to make ready for the accommodation of these troops, which kept us very busy.

7. Since it had been decided that the Burma Army forces be dissolved before the end of August 1945, the Staff Chief, three senior Operations, Information and Administration Officers, two Operations Officers and two Administration Officers, all of whom were experienced members of the Staff had been transferred since June. One Operations Officer who had previously been dispatched to Thailand, stayed on there

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from May till the close of the war, while I, who was head Operations Officer, was transferred on July 20. Hence there was not one Operations Officer left with the Headquarters and the only staff officers that remained were the assistant Chief Officer, one head Information Officer and one Administration Officer. Even that one Administration Officer just mentioned had to remain at the front line till right before the war end, some staff officers were laid up with malaria, and even those who had been appointed temporarily failed to arrive from the front line as early as one could wish, and so it often happened that there were not more than two or three staff officers working in the Headquarters. At the height of the rainy season traffic was stopped and the facilitating communication were well-nigh destroyed, and this made it hard to keep in touch with the front line. During this time Commander KUMURA was frequently confined to bed with attacks of his chronic disease.-- neuralgia.

3. The troops which had retreated to the Tenasserim from the front line suffered defeat in every battle fought since the Battle of Irrawady. In fighting and while retreating they had sustained heavy losses and lost a good part of their arms. When they arrived at last after a long and hard retreat back across the mountains and marshes, they were both physically and spiritually worn out and most of them were invalids. The troops, arriving with only the clothes

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on their backs and no more arms than those which each carried had almost no means of communications. We were therefore very much inconvenienced in the matter of commanding the troops, the maintenance of connections between us and otherwise.

4. As for the alleged illegal actions of which a charge is laid before the Court, the Army Headquarters never ordered such illegalities to be perpetrated, nor did it receive any reports on the same; in fact, we knew nothing whatever about the cases. Accordingly, General KIMURA, Commander of the Area Army forces, had of course no knowledge whatsoever of those wrongs. The General circumstanced as he was thus painfully, made it a point of major importance to maintain the discipline of his forces and to win the goodwill of the natives and was bending his utmost efforts to this purpose. He took every possible measure to make his wishes known to his officers and so that discipline of his troops was on the whole well kept up.

5. The Air Division in Burma; The HIKARI Organ(which was in charge of liaison with the Indian Militaa); the Shipping Transport Corps; the Southern Field Railway Corps and the Naval Base force were joint forces whose duty it was to work in cooperation with the Burma Area Army forces, and were not under the command of General KIMURA.

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EXHIBIT #

3092

板東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣 告 供 述 書

供 述 者 ノ 平 岡 國 造

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣書ヲ爲シタル  
ク 供 述 致 シ マ ス

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361  
上 次 ノ 如



一、私ノ姓名ハ平岡造四治二十三年一月一日廣島縣ニ生レ大正元年十二月二十五日陸軍少尉ニ任官爾來各職ヲ經テ一九四三年三月緬甸方面軍司令部附トナリ終戦マデ同職ニ留マリマシタ。終戦時陸軍大佐デ目下巢鴨拘置所留置中ニシテ。

二、私ハ一九四四年二月下旬「ビルマ」國政府顧問兼勸ヲ命ゼラレ爾後「パノモ」博士以下「ビルマ」政府要人ト接觸スル機会ガ比較的多クアリマシタ。

三、木村大將ハ「インパール」作戰後軍事的ニモ政治的ニモ最も困難ナル時ニ機即チ一九四四年九月中旬ニ「ビルマ」方面軍司令官トシテ著任サレマシタガ「ビルマ」民心ノ把握ニハ特ニ重點ヲ置カレ著任早々ヨリ凡ユレ機會ヲ捉ヘテ部下軍隊並ニ「ビルマ」在留日本人ニ對シ之ヲ強固ニ訓示サレテ居リマシタ。

四、木村大將ハ一九四四年十月下旬頃以降「ビルマ」政府主要々人数十名ト數回ニ亘リ懇談サレ私モ同席シマシタガ毎回五、六時間ヲ費シテ胸襟ヲ

開イテ恩俸ナキ「ビルマ」側ノ聲ヲ傾慕サレマシタガ其内日本側トシテ改修  
スベキ事項ハ關係者ニ命ジ其部庶務ヲサレテキマシタガ

本會合ハ「ビルマ」要人全クカラ非常ニ喜バレ之ニヨリ「ビルマ」側ノ對日  
空氣ハ頗ニ改修サレタ感ヲアリマシタガ

耳本村大將石坂大佐「バーモ」博士ハ毎日少クモ一回ハ定例的ニ會談シテ意思  
ノ疎通ヲ圖ツテ居ラレマシタガ一九四五年二月ヨリ「ビルマ」ニ於ケレバ

況テ日々陰謀トナルニ伴ヒ「ビルマ」民衆ノ生活上ノ苦シムハ増シマシタガ  
本村大將ハ勿モスルハ作戦上ノ要求ニ感服サレ「ビルマ」民衆ノ苦痛ヲ考フ

ル限ナキ部下幕僚ニ對シ厚々警告ヲ發シ「作戦上ノ部ヲ犠牲ニシテモ「ビル  
マ」民心ヲ失フテハナラヌ」ト申サレ其ノ所持スル武器品ノ放出數額等ノ買

上其ノ制限等ニ關シ指示シテ居ラレマシタガ  
出爆區其他ニ依ル「ビルマ」民衆ノ傷痕疾病ニ關シ軍醫部長ニ對シ「治療救恤

ヲ督促シテ居ラレル場面ヲ部長會報其他ノ席上テ見受ケマシタガ  
大「ビルマ」側ノ聲ヲ「ビルマ」要人ヨリ直接聞カレタ本村大將ハ用紙甚ダ不

且ノ折衝ニモ拘ラズ直チニ「ビルマ」ニ對スル心得ナル冊子ヲ作製セシメ  
軍隊並ニ在留邦人ニ印刷配布遵守ヲ命ゼラレ且參謀副長等ヲシテ在留邦人  
力者ヲ對照トスレ「ビルマ」民衆愛護ノ爲ノ演習ヲ實施センメラレマシタ  
セ右ノ如キ「ビルマ」民衆ニ對スル木村大將ノ同情ト設意トハ全太平洋戰域特  
ニ「ビルマ」ニ於ケル我ガ軍ノ不利ナル戰況ニ依リ夫ハレントンツツアツタ  
日本軍ニ對スレ「ビルマ」人ノ信頼ヲ取り戻シ一九四四年雨期頃ヨリ抬頭シ  
テ居テ一部「ビルマ」人ノ反日地下運動モ一時中止サレタリテアリマシタ  
一九四四年十一月頃テアツタカト思ヒマスガ「パリ」モ「博士」タヤジ・ミヤ  
氏（副總理）ウ・トン・アウン氏（協力大臣）タヤン・タントン氏（需給  
大臣）ウ・パリ・ウイン（内務大臣）等多數ノ「ビルマ」兵人ハ前後シテ  
私ニ對シ異口同音ニ「ビルマ」ヲヨク理解サレ「ビルマ」ニ好意ト同情トヲ  
持ツヨイ司令官ヲ迎ヘタ目下「ビルマ」人ノ一部ニ抬頭シテ居ル反日空氣ハ  
悉ク一掃サレテアラウト語リマシタ  
八各地域ニ於テ日本軍ノ戰況極メテ險惡チアツタ一九四五二年頃「ラング

ン」ニ於テ開催サレタ日本側主催ノ手工業展覧會ガ毎日五万人乃至十万人ノ「ビルマ」民衆ヲ集メ又同年三月下旬ノ「ビルマ」國防軍ノ叛亂以後ニ於テモ「ラングーン」市内七八ヶ所ノ映畫館ガ殆ド滿員ノ盛況ヲ示シタル實情デアリマシタ

カ、「ラングーン」撤退時ニ於テハ木村大將ハ戰鬪ヲ「ビルマ」民衆ニ及ボサザルコトヲ深ク預慮セラレ命令ニヨリ焦土的戰術ヲ採ジラレタコトヲ「ビルマ」民衆ニシマシタ。尙其際「ビルマ」要人ノ行動ハ本人ノ自由意志ニ委セラレ大臣ノ約半数ハ「ラングーン」ニ留マリマシタ

一〇、私ハ「ビルマ」政府顧問トシテ「ビルマ」政府側ヨリ日本軍下級者及ビ日本人ニ對スル不平ハ時々聞カサレマシタガ「ビルマ」方面軍内ニ慘虐行爲ガアツタコトハ私ガ在職間政府カラモ民衆カラモ一度モ聞ニシタコトハアリマセンデシタ

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）七月八日 於 東京國際軍事裁判所

被告人控室

供 述 者 平 岡 國 造

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立 會 人 是

恒 遠 見

宣  
管  
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Excerpt taken from  
Volume XXV of the  
Trial Record in the case of  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-vs-

TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA

Testimony of KIKUO ISHIIAWA

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

KIKUO ISHIKAWA

called as a witness on behalf of the Defense, being first duly sworn through Commander Bartlett, was examined and testified as follows through Commander Bartlett, with the assistance of Major Pratt and Lieutenant Asano:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Reel) What is your name?

A (Through Commander Bartlett) Ishikawa, Kikuo.  
That should be Kikuo Ishikawa.

Q And your rank in the Japanese Army?

A Lieutenant Colonel.

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \*

Q When did you come to the Philippine islands?

A 27th of September of last year.

Q And what was your assignment here?

A Supply and Transportation.

Q And are you a member of the staff of general headquarters 14th Army group?

A. Yes

Q. Did you keep that assignment right on through to the time of surrender?

A. Yes.

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \*



Q You were in Kapangan at the time of your surrender?

A At the time of the surrender I was at No. 3 R.H.,  
or Rest House.

Q Now, at Fort Maximely and at Ispio and at Kapangan,  
were you in General Yamashita's headquarters?

A Yes.

Q Now, as staff officer in charge of supply and trans-  
portation, tell us briefly just what your duties were.

A With respect to supply, briefly, it was divided into  
food, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. With  
respect to transportation, just motor transport.

Q What was your connection, if any, with General Kira,  
the Intendance Officer?

A To explain by an example, General Kira would have  
charge of daily issue of rations at all times, whereas I  
would make plans concerning rations only during operations.  
The actual rations themselves were always under the control  
of General Kira.

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \*

Q And why would these matters of supply be routed to you?

A As examples, if a shipment in rice should arrive  
from Saigon, or, on the other hand, the extreme scarcity  
of rice made it necessary to cut the ration, or something  
of that sort, then it would come to my attention.

Q And in your capacity as transportation officer, were  
you concerned with the food supply?

A Very close connection

Q What was that, and why?

A For instance, if a ship should arrive in Manila, it was necessary to get it unloaded before anything happened to it, and as a result it was necessary to route all available transportation for discharging the ship and hauling the supplies to places of safety.

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \*

Q Now, from what you saw and what you know, what was the condition of food and supplies in so far as prisoner of war camps, internee camps, and the Japanese Army, were concerned?

\* \* \* \*

A (Through Commander Bartlett) In my knowledge, it was no difference whatever between the prisoner of war camps, internee camps, and the Japanese Army; they were the same.

Q (By Captain Reel) Now, what was the condition of the food supply between October and December, 1944?

A I will tell you the conditions in October first.

Q All right.

A When I arrived in October, although the standard ration for troops was 450 grams, they were actually receiving not more than 400 grams.

According to my memory, in November, on the 9th day, 10,000 tons of rice arrived from Saigon. Of this, approximately half was sent to Leyte. On the assumption that the remaining half must be stretched out over two months, the daily ration was again cut to 400 grams. As a matter fact, the actual ration received by the men was less than 350 grams.

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I will now speak of December. No food arrived by boat in December. All the ships were sunk by enemy action. As a result, the food situation deteriorated further and many organizations were actually receiving not more than 250 or 260 grams. Therefore, it appeared necessary to take steps to secure part of the new crop of rice being harvested at the end of December and early in January, and I brought this matter to the attention of the commander -- to General Kira's attention

\* \* \*  
\* \* \*

Q. (By Captain Reel) Now, you just stated that a ship arrived approximately the 9th of November, 1944, containing 10,000 tons of rice. Are you sure of that figure?

A Yes.

Q General Kira was on the stand and said that sometime in November 16,000 tons of rice arrived. Was he correct?

A I think what he said is a mistake.

Q Now, that 10,000 tons of rice, what was done -- strike that. What was done with the 10,000 tons of rice?

A Of the 10,000 tons, 5,000 tons were sent or lent to the navy --

CAPTAIN REEL: Was that 500 or 5,000?

INTERPRETER OISHI: Yes, 500.

THE WITNESS: The actual amount used in Manila was 4,000 ton. There was some spoilage.

Q Now, how many meals a day did the Japanese army soldiers get?

A Three times a day, but on occasions two times a day -

Q Now, was that general rule of three times a day cut to two times a day sometime in January of 1945?

A Yes.

Q That included yourself?

A Yes.

\* \* \* \*  
\* \* \*

Q Now, did you go on any inspection trips of prison or internee camps?

A Yes.

Q And on whose order did you make these inspection trips?

A The Chief of Staff.

Q That is General Muto?

A Yes.

Q Now, where did you go on these trips, which camps?

A To Santo Tomas Internment Camp, the Bilibid Internment Camp and McKinley Internment Camp; the three places in all.

Q Did you go to any others?

A No.

Q And what did General Muto tell you to do?

A The matters dealing with supply, particularly food.

Q And what did you find on your inspections to these three camps relative to food?

A The food supply was the same as those of the Japanese army but they were gradually diminishing. Ships had not come in. There were no fuels for transportation purposes so we had to borrow those items from the air force.

\* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

[Faint, illegible text]

[Faint, illegible text]

[Faint, illegible text]

[Faint, illegible text]

Q (By Captain Reel) Did you find that the Japanese army had to make local purchases in the vicinity of those three camps?

A They purchased vegetables but I doubt if they purchased rice.

Q Now, what were the dates upon which you visited those three camps, as near as you can recollect?

A I believe it was about November 20th, 1944.

Q As a result of those visits, did you make a report to General Muto?

A Yes.

Q What was the nature of that report?

A The food was the same as those of the Japanese army but it was meager.

Q Did you make any recommendations?

A Since ships didn't come in and we couldn't very well requisition any supplies from the locality something must be done to requisition them from Luzon.

\* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

Q (By Captain Reel) How would this requisition, as it has been interpreted, be done?

A I didn't mean "requisition"; "buy" is the word.

CAPTAIN REEL: Could I have the last answer?

(Answer read)

Q (By Captain Reel) Now, what was the recommendation that you make to General Muto relative to buying rice?

A First of all, even if we didn't buy rice we didn't have the fuel for automobiles. We should have arrangements made to obtain fuels from the air force.

Q In other words, you recommended getting fuel from the 4th Air Army?

A Yes.

Q And what did General Muto do when you reported that to him?

A He immediately dispatched myself and Deputy Chief of Staff Nishimura to this 4th Air Force.

Q For what purpose?

A In order to obtain gasoline.

Q And how much gasoline were you to obtain?

A A minimum of 10,000 drums.

Q Did you get it?

A No.

Q Did you make further trips and attempts to get gasoline from the 4th Air Army?

A I made about seven trips.

Q And did you finally get any gasoline from the 4th Air Army?

A On December 15th of last year I received 1500 drums.

Q Did you actually get 1500 drums in your possession?

A I actually received 600 drums.

\* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \*

Q (By Captain Reel) Where were the 600 drums that you did receive?

A We used that to transport munitions and food supplies from Manila.

\* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission interrupts. Let us drop this subject of gasoline. We grant that the transportation difficulties and gasoline shortage difficulties were present and that they were acute and that they affected their operations. We see no occasion for pursuing this any further. We will now take up some other subject.

CAPTAIN REEL: All right, Sir, The only purpose of going into the fuel question was because the lack of fuel was the bottleneck that prevented the shipment of food. That is its relationship to the food question, if the Commission please.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: We grant that.

CAPTAIN REEL: Yes, sir.

Q (By Captain Reel) Now, do you recall an order relative to the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees?

A Yes.

Q And tell us what that order was and who it came from.

A It came from Tokyo, from the Army Commander through Yamashita and it was issued to the various internment camps.

Q In other words, the order came from Tokyo but was passed on by General Yamashita, is that right?

A Yes.

Q When did the order first come to your attention?

A I believe it was about December 20th.

Q And what was the substance of the order from Tokyo?

A It first was to treat prisoners in a friendly manner and in case the Americans should approach to leave as much food and medicine as possible for the internees and prisoners.

The third item was not to treat the prisoners or internees in any atrocious manner whatsoever before retreating.

\* \* \*  
\* \* \* \*

Q Now, was that a written order?

A Yes.

Q And do you have that order with you?

A No.

Q What happened to it?

A I had to throw all the papers I had away at the Luzon P.W. Camp No. 1.

Q Did you have it until you got to the Luzon P.W. Camp No.1?

A Yes.

Q And why did you throw it away?

A There was instructions to that effect.

Q From whom?

A From one who is in charge there.

Q Somebody in charge of the prison?

A Yes.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission interrupts for clarification of words. I believe he said "throw away". Is that correct?

INTERPRETER OISHI: Yes.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Could it also have meant "surrender" or "give up"? because it seems inconceivable that American officers would ask prisoners of war to throw away official documents when their mission was to capture or gain possession of them.

MAJOR PRATT: Sir, the word which the prisoner used was "sutaru", which means to "discard" or "throw away".

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Very well.

\* \* \* \* \*

Q (By Captain Reel) Did you at any time either during your trips to Santo Tomas, Lilibid, Fort McKinley or at any other time hear any reports of cruelty and ill treatment of prisoners of war and internees?

A No.



CROSS EXAMINATION

\* \* \* \* \*  
CAPTAIN CALYER: All right, sir.

Q (By Captain Calyer) On your visits to Santo Tomas, Bilibid and Fort McKinley did you go into the dining rooms when the prisoners were being fed?

A At McKinley I happened to go there when they were just preparing the food, that is, when the food was ready to be served.

Q What was being prepared?

A They had rice together with fried potatoes, with some beans.

Q That was in December?

A Yes

Q What was the diet of the Japanese soldier at that time?

A Something very similar.

Q Did you inspect the storehouses at Fort McKinley?

A No.

Q Did you inspect the dining rooms at Santo Tomas?

A I went to Santo Tomas after they had already eaten supper.

Q Do you know what had been served?

LIEUTENANT ASANO: Hold it! He hasn't finished the answer.

CAPTAIN CALYER: Oh, I am sorry. Withdraw the question.

A (continuing) And I visited the warehouse.

Q (By Captain Calyer) What did you find at the warehouse with regard to supplies?

A They had food stored there similar to our standards.

Q What kind of food?

A Mostly rice.

Q Do you know what had been served with the meal before you got there?

A I do not know.

Q Did you examine or inspect the dining room at Bilibid?

A I arrived at Bilibid after meal also. I inspected the warehouse and the kitchen.

Q What did you find?

A I found that the rations were the same as those of the Japanese soldier.

Q On your trips to these three places did you talk with any of the internees about food?

A No.

Q Were any reports or complaints submitted to you by the camp committee at any of these places?

A No.

Q Did you talk with the Japanese officials in charge of the camp?

A Yes.

Q Were they satisfied with food conditions in their respective camps?

A They were not satisfied.

Q What was done about it?

A They requested more rice and more canned goods.

Q What did you do about it?

A I wanted to increase their rice and canned goods but, as far as the rice went, as I mentioned before, they were getting the same amount as the Japanese soldier and I do not remember now, but, as far as the canned goods are concerned, I believe I did something about those.

Q What did you do?

A I gave instructions to increase the amount of canned goods they were to get, but at that time there weren't many canned goods available and what the results of my instructions were I do not know.

Q Were those increases intended for the internees or for the Japanese garrison?

A What I have stated concerns the internees and the prisoners.

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

Q (By Captain Calyer) How many prisoners were at Bilibid at the time you made your inspection?

A About 2100.

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

Q (By Captain Calyer) How many prisoners were at McKinley at that time?

A About 300.

Q How much rice was being prepared for that meal?

A Since there are three kettles cooking, I assumed that it must have been about from half a sack to one sack.

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

Q Do I understand you to mean, then, that about 25 pounds of rice was being prepared for 300 people?

A I was referring to amount of rice from 50 to 100 pounds.

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

Q During any of these inspections, did you observe the internees?

A At McKinley I observed some, but other than that I wasn't able to observe them.

Q How did those whom you observed at McKinley compare in physical appearance with the Japanese guards at McKinley?

A I thought it was similar.

Q How did you happen to make these inspections?

A As I stated before, in the early part of November I was ordered to make an inspection tour concerning the shortage of rice and other food supplies.

Q Weren't you the staff officer in charge of prisoner of war affairs?

A I was in charge of provisions and medical supplies, as far as the prisoners were concerned.

Q Is that all that you had to do with prisoner of war camps?

A That is correct.

Q Did you have the same duties with respect to internee camps?

A Same.

Q Was that with regard to all prisoner of war and internee camps in the Philippines?

A Yes

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

(By Captain Reel)

Q One more question: On your inspection trip to Fort McLinley, when you saw a meal being prepared, how many pounds of rice did you see being prepared for that meal?

A Approximately anywhere from 50 pounds to 100 pounds.

\* \* \*

\* \* \*

EXAMINATION OF DEBALT OF THE COMMISSION

Q (By General Reynolds) While the witness was acting on General Yamashita's staff on prisoner of war matters, we wish to know whether any of the complaints filed by American prisoners of war and civilian internees were brought to his attention.

A No, I haven't.

Q Did General Yamashita's orders require that such complaints be forwarded to his headquarters?

A Yes.

Q As staff officer did you consider the overall responsibility for prisoner of war camps and civilian internees squarely on General Yamashita?

A I believe that the most responsible person is the commanding officer of the prisoner of war camp.

\* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \*

FURTHER RECROSS EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Calyer) Who prepared the regulations regarding the conduct of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the camps?

A The regulations pertaining to the conduct in prisoner of war camps was made by a discussion between the camp commander and the committee, and that is my understanding.

Q Were they approved by any higher authority?

A I don't remember, but probably it was so. At the time of my arrival things were put into practice already, and those things were decided long before my arrival.

Q As staff officer in charge of prisoner of war affairs did you ever inquire what regulations were in effect?

A Matters pertaining to the conduct within the P.W. camps were the responsibility of the camp commander, and I didn't have much to do with what was going on within the camp.

Q Did you ever inquire what those regulations were?

A Since those regulations were made by the inmates themselves I didn't think I should say or do anything about it.

Q Will you answer the question, please, whether you inquired what the regulations were?

A No.

Q Do you know who prescribed regulations with regard to the punishment of civilian internees and prisoners of war?

A I do not know.

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FURTHER EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION.

Q (by General Reynolds) "Who did the Japanese Government, the Japanese High Command at Tokyo, hold responsible for the administration of prisoners of war and civilian internees?"

INTERPRETER ASANO: "Will you read the question?"

(Question read.)

A Prisoner of war commander, the camp commander.

Q (By General Reynolds) Do you mean to tell me that the Japanese High Command in Tokyo held that General Yamashita did not have complete responsibility for prisoners of war under his control?

A No, I did not.

Q What did you mean?

A Direct responsibility with the prisoner of war camp commander.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Read the original question and ask the witness to be very careful in answering it frankly and fully. If the Interpreter wishes to do so he might write the question out.

(Question read)

THE WITNESS: I believe there are some responsibilities.

Q (By General Reynolds) What is that responsibility?

A As for carrying out the orders, that was the responsibility of the prisoner of war camp commander. However, the overall responsibility lies in the Army commander.

Q Who was responsible for the camp commander carrying out the orders?

-17-

A First, there was Lieutenant General Ko, and afterwards it was Lieutenant Colonel Hayashi.

Q And after that who was it?

A That is all.

Q And above Lieutenant Colonel Hayashi and Lieutenant General Ko, who was then responsible to see that the orders of Tokyo were carried out?

A The next responsible person is the commanding officer of the line of communications unit.

Q Who is the next one?

A After that the responsible person was myself, who was a member of the staff in charge of the I.W. affairs.

Q And who was next?

A The next person, the next responsible person, is the chief-of-staff.

Q And who was next?

A And the next responsible person is the commanding officer of the 14th Area Army.

Q What was his name?

A General Yamashita.

Q Of all the people he has named who had responsibility for the prisoners of war and civilian internees which of them was responsible to Tokyo for their administration?

A I believe it is the 14th Area Army commander.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Why should he believe it; doesn't he know it?



THE WITNESS: Since the prisoner of war camps are within the command of the Army commander, and since most of the administrative matters go through the Army commander, I believe it is his responsibility.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Any further questions?

CAPTAIN REEL: Yes, I have a question.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Reel) And who was next in command above General Yamashita?

A Marshal Terauchi.

Q And did all your communications to Tokyo go through the Supreme Southern Commander, Marshal Terauchi?

A Reports pertaining to prisoners were sent directly to Tokyo, to the office of information for prisoners.

Q And reports from Tokyo, did they go through Marshal Terauchi, the Supreme Southern Commander?

A I believe they came direct.

Q Did reports other than routine reports have to go through the Supreme Southern Commander?

A Yes.

Q And did reports other than more routine reports coming from Tokyo go through the Supreme Southern Commander?

A Yes.

CAPTAIN REEL: That is all.

CERTIFICATE  
STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, JOHN R. PRITCHARD, Captain, Infantry, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, in English, is a document excerpt from the Public Trial Record in the case of United States of America vs. Tomoyuki YAMASHITA, and is an exact and true copy of the official document which is in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 1st day of July 1947.

/s/ John R. Pritchard  
/T/ JOHN R. PRITCHARD

I hereby certify that the above signature was affixed hereto in my presence.

at the same place,  
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ William R. Bready  
/T/ WILLIAM R. BREADY,  
Major, Ordnance

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RETURN

詳説側文書 第二〇三五號

亞米利加合衆國對山下泰文事件の裁判記録第二十五卷よりの抜萃

石川 菊雄 の證言

護側證人として召喚されたる石川菊雄は先づパートルレット海軍中佐を連れて  
護側をなしたる上訊問に應じブラット陸軍少佐淺野陸軍中尉の援助のもとに  
パートルレット海軍中佐を通じて次の如く證言せり

直接 訊問

問 (リール陸軍大尉) 貴方の御名前は

答 (パートルレット海軍中佐を通じて) 石川菊雄 英語流に言へば菊雄石川

です

日本陸軍における貴方の階級は

陸軍中佐

貴方は何時比島に來ましたか

答 昨年の九月二十七日です

當地に於ける貴方の役目は

補給と救済です

貴方は第十四軍團總司令部參謀の一員ですか

答 そうです

問 貴方はその役目を降伏までずっと続けましたか  
答 やうです

問 貴方は降伏の時カバンガンにおられましたか  
答 降伏の時私は第三休養所にいました。

問 扱て、フォート マツキンレー、バギオ、カバンガンでは貴方は山下大  
答 將の司令部におられましたか

問 やうです

問 補給及輸送擔當の參謀として簡単に貴方の職務を話して下さい

答 補給について簡単に申しますとそれは食糧、武器、彈藥、醫藥品に分れて  
2 いました。輸送については、唯自動車輸送だけです

問 主計官吉良大將は何等かの關係があつたさういう關係でしたか  
答 例を舉げて説明しますと吉良大將が全期間を通じて毎日の食糧配給を擔  
當せられることになつて居つたのに對し、私は作戦中だけ食糧に關する

立案をやることになつてゐました。現實の糧食自衛は常に同大將の管理  
下にありました

問 それでは何故補給に關する此等の事項が貴方の所に廻つて來たのですか  
答 例として、米の荷が西貢から到着するさか又は之に反して極度の米不足  
のため食糧の切り下げが必要になるさかやういつた事が起るさ私の配屬

問 貴方はその役目を降伏までずっと続けましたか  
答 やうです

問 貴方は降伏の時カバンガンにおられましたね  
答 降伏の時私は第三休養所にいました。

問 扱て、フォート マツキンレー、バギオ、カバンガンでは貴方は山下大  
將の司令部におられましたか  
答 やうです

問 補給及輸送機營の參謀として簡単に貴方の職務を話して下さい  
答 補給について簡単に申しますとそれは食糧、武器、彈藥、醫藥品に分れ  
ていました。輸送については、唯自動車輸送だけです

問 主計官吉良大將は何等かの關係があつたさういう關係でしたか  
答 例を擧げて説明しますと吉良大將が全期間を通じて毎日の食糧配給を擔  
當せられることになつて居つたのに對し、私は作戦中だけ食糧に關する  
立案をやることになつてゐました。現實の糧食自給は常に同大將の管理  
下にありました

問 それでは何故補給に關する此等の事項が貴方の所に廻つて來たのですか  
答 例として、米の荷が西貢から到着するさうか又は之に反して極度の米不足  
のため食糧の切り下げが必要になるさうかやういつた事が起ると私の配屬

に入つてくるわけです

問 輸送官としての資格において、貴方は食糧補給に關係がありましたか

答 密接な關係がありました

問 その内容及理由は

答 例えば、マニラに船が着くさ事故が起らない中に船から荷を下す必要がありました、その結果として凡ゆる輸送機關を送つて荷揚げをし給品を安全な場所に移さねばなりませんでした

.....

問 扱つて、貴方が見出した所からみて、俘虜收容所、抑留者收容所及日本軍に

關する食糧補給の狀態は如何でしたか

.....

答 (パトリレット海軍中佐を通じて)私の知っている所では捕虜收容所、抑

留者收容所日本軍の間に何等の差別もありませんでした 皆同じでした

問 (リール陸軍大尉)扱つて、一九四四年(昭和十九年)十月一十二月の間に

於ける食糧補給の狀態は如何でしたか

答 先づ十月の狀態から申し上げます

問 結構です

答 十月私が入りました時、軍隊に配給する標準食糧は四百五十瓦でしたが、



三万噸の来はなかりましたか

答

一万噸の中五千噸は海軍に送つたか貸したかしました

(リール陸軍大尉)それは五百噸ですか又は五千噸ですか

(大石通譯)そうです 五百噸です

(證人)マニラで實際に使用した量は四千噸でした、秋月になつたのも

少しはあります

問

扱て、日本軍の兵隊は一日に何回食事をさりましたか

答

一日三回です、しかし時に二回のこともありました

問

所で、一日三回の原則が一九四五年一月中に一日二回に減らされましたか

答

そうです

問

醫方御自身もそうでしたか

答

そうです

問

扱て、貴方は俘虜收容所若しくは抑留者收容所を視察旅行に行かれましたか

答

参りました

問

誰の命令でその視察旅行をされましたか



答 参謀長です

武藤大將ですか

問 そうです

答 所で、貴方は何處に行かれましたか、どの收容所に

サント トマヌ抑留所、ピリビット抑留所、マツキンレー抑留所、全

部でこの三つです

問 何處か他の所に行かれましたか

答 参りません

問 武藤大將は貴方に何を命ぜられましたか

答 相給特に食糧に関する事柄です

問 この三つの收容所を視察して食糧について貴方が気がつかれたのはど

ういふことですか

答 食糧補給は日本軍のそれと同じでしたが段々減つていきました。船は

入つて来ませんでしたし、輸送用の燃料がありませんでしたのでそ

ういふものを空軍から借りなければなりません

。 。 。 。 。



答 自分ハ微發トハ申シ上ゲナカツタ積リデス。購入トイフノガ正シイノ  
デス。

リール大尉 最後ノ答ヲ讀ンデ下サイ

(答辯ガ讀ミ上ゲラレル)

問 (リール大尉) サテ貴下ガ米ノ購入ニ關シ武藤大將ニ具申シタ意見ノ  
内容ハ

答 何ロリモ先ツ吾々ハ米ヲ買ハナカツタトシテモ自動車用燃料ヲ持タナ  
カツタノデアアル。吾々ハ空軍カラ燃料ヲ手ニ入レル手筈ヲ取極メナケ  
レバナラナカツタ

問 吾ヒ極ヘレバ第四空軍カラ燃料ヲ得ルコトヲ進言サレタノデスネ  
サウデス

問 貴下ガソノコトヲ報告サレタトキ武藤大將ハドウサレマシタカ  
答 大將ハ直ニ私ト參謀長代理西村トチコノ第四空軍ニ派遣サレマシタ  
如何ナル目的デ

答 ガソリンニ對ル爲メニ

問 ドレダケノガソリンヲ得ル筈デアツタカ

答 最低價一万ドラム

問 ソレヲ手ニ入レマシタカ  
答 イハエ

第四空軍カラガソリンヲ得ル爲メニソノ他ニ出張ヲシタリ何カ努力ヲシ  
タリコトガアリマスカ

答 約七回出張シマシタ

問 結局第四空軍カラガソリンヲ入手シタサデスカ

答 昨年十二月十五日一五〇〇ドラムヲ受取りマシタ

問 一五〇〇ドラムヲ現實ニ入手シタノデスカ

答 實際手ニ入レタノハ六〇〇ドラムデシタ

問 (リール大尉) 費下ノ得タ六〇〇ドラムハ何處ニアツタノデスカ

答 吾々ハソノガソリンチ「マニラ」カラ軍需品及ビ糧食ヲ運ブ爲メニ使用  
シマシタ

レイノルド大將 委員會ハコ、ニ一ツ提案致シマス

此ノガソリン問題ハ之ヲ打テ切ロウデハアリマセンカ

吾々ハ輸送ノ困難及ビガソリン不足ノ惱ミノアツタコト、並ニソレガ概

メテ切實ナモノデアリ作戦ニモ影響ヲ與ヘタコトヲ認メル。吾々ハニシ

モハヤコレ以上コノ問題ヲ追及スル理由ヲ認メナイ、他ノ問題ヲ取リ上

ゲルコトニシヨウ。

リール大尉 承知シマシタ、燃料問題ニ立チ入ル唯一ノ目的ハ燃料ノ缺乏ヨ

ソ食糧輸送ヲ致命的ニ妨ゲタモノデアツタカラデアリマス、コレガソノ

食料問題トノ関連デアリマス

レイノルド大將 ソノ點ハ認メマス

リール大尉 承知シマシタ

問 (リール大尉) 貴下ハ俘虜及ビ民間抑留人ノ釋放ニ關スル命令ヲ記憶

シテキルカ

答 ハイ

問 命令ノ内容及ビ該命令ガ何人カヲ發セラレタカチ述ベテ下サイ

答 ソレハ東京カラ來タモノデ山下ヲ迎ジテ陸軍司令官カラ發セラレマシ

タコノ命令ハ各種ノ收容所ヘ發セラレタノデス

問 換言スレバ此ノ命令ハ東京カラ來タガ山下大將ヲ經由シタモノデア

ト考ヘテロロシイカ

答 ハイ

問 此ノ命令ヲ初メテ知ツタノハイツデシタカ

答 十二月二十日頃ト信ジマス

問 東京カラ今命令方英意ハ

答 生ツ俘虜ヲ友好的ニ取扱フベキコト次ニ若シ米兵ガ近ツイタ場合ニハ

抑留人同ニ對シ出來得ル限り多量ノ食物及ビ藥品ヲ發シテオクコト

第三兩日トシテハ万一後退ニ際スル場合ト雖モ俘虜及ビ抑留者ニ對シ

テ慘虐ナル而揚チナスベカラサルコトヲ命ズルモノモシタ

辯護側審額第二〇三五號

問 伺フガ、其ノ命令ハ記述サレテアツタカ？

答 然リ

問 現ニソレヲ所持シテ居ルカ？

答 否

問 ソレヲ如何シタカ

答 手持書類ハ全テ「ルソン」第一停處收容所ニテ捨てネバナラナカツ

タ 「ルソン」第一停處收容所へ行く迄ハソレヲ所持シテ居ツタカ？

答 然リ

問 何故夫ヲ捨てタノカ？

答 其ノ指示ガアツタカラデアアル

問 誰ガサウ指示シタノタ？

答 同所ノ責任者ニサウ云ハレタ

問 スルト誰ガ收容所ノ監督官ト云フ能カ？

答 然リ

レイノルツ將軍ハ言葉ノ意味ヲハツキリサセル爲ニ委員等ハ少シ申シ立テ

イコトガアル。彼ハ「スロウアウェイ」(捨てタ)ト云ツタヤウニ思フ

ガ、其ノ點間遺ナイカ?

大石通譯 然リ

ルイノルツ將軍ハ「サレンダー」若クハ「ギヴアップ」(何レモ手渡スノ意)トイフ意味ニモ解釋シテヨイダラウカ。ドウモ米國官憲ガ、新カ  
ル公文書ヲ押收若クハ手ニ入レルトイフノナラ其ノ使命カラ云ツテモ肯  
ケルノダガ、學府ニ「新カル書類ヲ捨テヨトイフノハテヨツトアリ得  
ナイコトノ様ニ考ヘラレルノダガ。・。・。・  
ブラット少佐、目下、只今學府ノ用ヒタ首業ハ明ラカニ「捨テル」即チ  
「デイスカード」若シクハ「スロウアウニイ」ノ意味デスガ。・。・。  
同將軍 ソレナラソレデヨロシイ

リール大尉質問

「下ハ「サントトマス」「ビリビット」「フオートマ  
ツキンレイ」ヘノ旅行途次ニ於テ、若クハ其ノ地如何  
ナル時ニ於テモ、學府並ビニ彼御留者ニ對スル暴虐、  
又ハ虐待ニモキ一頁デモ何ラカノ處ヲ耳ニシタデアラ  
ウカ?

答

以對尋問

カリヤ、大尉、承知、デハ始メル

問 (「コーヤ、大尉ニヨル尋問」) 貴方ガ「サントトマス」 「ピリビット」

並ビニ「フオートマツキンレイ」ヲ訪レテ、俘虜ノ食卓時間中ニ

食堂へ入レテ、コトガアルカ?

答 偶々「マツキンレイ」デハ丁度食卓準備ノ最中ニ行キ當ツタ。モツ

トハツキリ云フナラバ、正ニ食卓ノ用意ガ整ツタ時トイフ意デア

ル。ドノ様ナ食卓ガ用意サレテキタカ?

答 米食ニ「フライ」ト豆ガ少シ添ヘテアツタ

夫ハ十二月ノコトカ?

答 然リ

其ノ時ノ日本ノ兵食ノ状況ハ如何?

答 何方同ジ様ナモノデアツタ

問 「フオートマツキンレイ」デハ貯蔵庫等ヲ點検サレタカ?

答 否

問 「サントトマス」デ食堂ヲ見テマハラレタカ?

答 「サントトマス」へ行ツタ際ニハ既に彼ラノ夜食後ノコトデアツタ

ドノ様ナ食卓デアツタカ知ツテ居ラレルカ?

答 淺野中尉ハ、暫ク! 未ダ彼ハ答ヲ送ヘテキナイ



問答

トコカ之等ノ場所ヲ、收家所爲員カ、方ニ歸シ何カ報乃至ハ

問答

ヲ見ラシタカ？

問答

之等三箇所ノ新間ニ際シテハ、カト、御留等ト食卓ニ歸トテ歸シ

問答

何カ後トツク？

問答

各度トツク「テハ、私食ノ到テ、ハ、食卓ノ至ハ、後ヲツクシタカ？

問答

「ベリベリツト「テハ、食卓ヲ供サシテ、キカ、御手知カ？

問答

「ベリベリツト「テハ、食卓ヲ供サシテ、キカ、御手知カ？

問答

「ベリベリツト「テハ、食卓ヲ供サシテ、キカ、御手知カ？

問答

「ベリベリツト「テハ、食卓ヲ供サシテ、キカ、御手知カ？

問答

「ベリベリツト「テハ、食卓ヲ供サシテ、キカ、御手知カ？

問答

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問答

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問答

「ベリベリツト「テハ、食卓ヲ供サシテ、キカ、御手知カ？

問答

「ベリベリツト「テハ、食卓ヲ供サシテ、キカ、御手知カ？

問答

「ベリベリツト「テハ、食卓ヲ供サシテ、キカ、御手知カ？



同答問 「ヤツツ」等 同答問 「ヤツツ」等 同答問 「ヤツツ」等

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デアツタカ?

答 大体同一ナリト懸料シマシタ

問 コノ觀察チナシタル理由如何?

答 前述ベタル通り十一月初旬上司ヨリ米及ビ他ノ食料品ノ欠亡ニ關シ

視察旅行チナス豫命セラレタモノデアリマス

問 部下ノ捕虜關係事務ノ適當條ニアラザリシヤ?

答 捕虜關係ニ於テハ食料品及ビ醫藥ノ給與ヲ適當致シテ居リマシタ

問 捕虜關係ニ關シ適當シタルハソレシミナリヤ?

答 然リ 抑留者ニ關シテモ同様ノ任務ヲ適當シタルヤ?

問 然リ

答 ソレハ「ファイリツピン」全土ノ俘虜收容所並ニ抑留所ニ關シテナリ

問 ヤ?

答 然リ

問) 解 ( 問 )

キヤリヤリ ( 問 )

式) 解 ( 問 )

ニ 解 ( 問 )

山 解 ( 問 )

山 解 ( 問 )

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誰が收容所ニ於ケル浮房及一般抑留者ノ行動ニ關スル規則ヲコシラ  
ヘマシタカ?

答 浮房收容所ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ト委員ト協議テ  
シテ作りマシタ、私ハソウ考ヘテ居リマス

同 其規則ハ上司ノ承認ヲ受ケマシタカ?

答 記憶シマセンガ多分ソウデアツタロウト思ヒマス

同 記億シマセンガ多分ソウデアツタロウト思ヒマス

答 記億シマセンガ多分ソウデアツタロウト思ヒマス

同 記億シマセンガ多分ソウデアツタロウト思ヒマス

答 記億シマセンガ多分ソウデアツタロウト思ヒマス

本 答 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ  
ルカ調ベタコトガ有リマスカ?

同 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

答 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

同 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

答 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

同 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

答 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

同 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

答 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

同 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

答 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

同 收容所内ニ於ケル行動ニ關スル規則ハ收容所長ノ責任デアリマシテ

テ居リマスカ?

答 存ジマセヌ。

委員會代表者ニヨリナサレタ續行主訊問

問 (レイノルズ少將)

俘虜及一般抑留者ノ管理ニ對シテハ誰ガ責任ヲ有スルモノト日本政  
府、東京ニ於ケル日本ノ統帥部ハ考ヘテ居タノデスカ?

淺野通印 質問ヲ讀上ゲテ頂ケマセンカ  
(質問ヲ讀上ゲル)

答 俘虜指揮官、俘虜收容所長デアリマス

問 (レイノルズ少將)

貴下ノ言ハレル意味ハ東京ノ日本統帥部デハ、山下大將ハ其管轄内  
ニ在ル俘虜ニ對シテ全責任ヲ負フモノデハナイト考ヘテ居タトイフ  
事ニナリマスカ?

答 イーニ、ソウイフ意味デハアリマセンデシタ

問 ドウイフ意味デシタカ?

答 直接ノ責任ハ俘虜收容所長ニアルトイフ意味デス  
レイノルズ少將 最初ノ質問ヲ讀上ゲテ是人ニ對シ、ヨク氣ヲツケテ存

直且ツ充分ニ答ヘルヨウ願ンデ下サイ。質問ガ希望セラルルナラバ其質

問チ答テツテモ宜シイデス

(質問ヲ讀上グル)

證人 私ハ若干ノ責任ガアルト信ジマス

問(レイノルズ少將)

ソノ責任ハ何デスカ?

答 命令ヲ實施スルコトニツイテハ、ソレハ俘虜收容所長ノ責任デアリ

マシタ。然シ全般的ナ責任ハ軍司令官ニ在リマス

問 收容所長ガ命令ヲ履行シタコトニ對シテハ誰ガ責任ヲ負ヒマスカ?

答 最初ニハ高陸軍中將ガ居ラレマシタガ後ニハ林陸軍中佐デアリマシ

タ。

問 ソシテ其後デハ誰デシタカ?

答 ソレダケガ全部デス

問 林中佐及高中將ノ上司トシテハ其當時誰ガ東京カラノ命令ガ實施サ

レタノヲ見届ケル責任ヲ負フテ居タノデスカ?

答 其次ニ責任ノアル者ハ通信部隊指揮官デアリマス

問 其次ノ者ハ誰デスカ?

答 其次ニハ、責任者ハ俘虜關係事務擔當參謀デアツタ私デアリマス

問 其次ハ誰デスカ?



答 其次ノ者ハ其ノ責任者ハ參謀長デアリマス

問 其次ハ誰デスカ?

答 其次ノ責任者ハ第十四方面軍ノ指揮官デアリマス

問 其指揮官ノ名ハ?

答 山下大將デアリマス

問 證人ノ名前ヲ尋ゲテ居ルスベテノ者ノ中テ誰ガ停滯及一段抑留者ノ

事ニツイテ責任ガアリマスカ、其ノ中ノドノ者ガ彼等ノナシタ事ニ

就イテ東京ニ對シテ責任ヲ負フノデスカ?

答 第十四方面軍司令官デアルト私ハ信ジマス

レインolz少將 證人ハ何故ソウ信ゼネバナラヌノデスカ、證人ハソレ

ヲ知ラナイノデスカ?

證人 停滯收容所ハ軍司令官ノ指揮下ニ在リマスカラ、ソウシテ大佐ノ

是項事項ハ軍司令官ヲ通ジテ行ハレマス、カラ私ハ軍司令官ノ責任

デアルト信ジマス

レインolz少將 何カ他ニ質問ハアリマセンカ?

リール大尉 茲ニ質問ガアリマス

續行再直接訊問

リール大尉

山下大將ノ上司トシテ其次ニ指揮ニ當ツタノハ誰デスカ？

答 寺内元帥デアリマス

問 貴下ノ東京トノ往復文書ハスベテ南方總軍司令官寺内元帥ヲ通ジテ行ハレタモノデスカ？

答 停戦關係ノ報告ハ直接ニ東京ヘ、停戦情報局ヘ送ラレマシタ

問 東京カラノ通報ハ南方總軍司令官寺内元帥ヲ通ジマシタカ？

答 直接ニ東京ト信ジマス

問 常例的ナ報告以外ノ報告ハ南方總軍司令官ヲ通ジテ行ハレネバナラナカツタノデスカ？

答 ソノ通りデアリマス

問 單ナル常例的通報以外ノ通報デ東京カラ來ルモノハ南方總軍司令官

ヲ通ジテ來マシタカ？

答 ソノ通りデアリマス

問 リール大尉 以上デ終リマス

文書ノ出所並ニ確實性ニ關スル證明書

聯合軍最高司令部總司令部法務部勤務陸軍歩兵大尉デヨン・アール・ブリ  
ツチャードハ茲ニ添付シタル英文ノ文書ガアメリカ合衆國對山下泰文ノ  
公開裁判記録ノ抄本ニシテ余ノ保管スル公文書ノ正確且ツ真正ナル寫ナ  
ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

東京ニ於テ證明ス

一九四七年七月一日

(署名) デヨン・アール・ブリツチャード

(打字) デヨン・アール・ブリツチャード

上記ノ署名ハ余ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルコトヲ證明ス

同日、同處ニ於テ

證人 (署名) ウイリアム・アール・フレツヂイ

(打字) ウイリアム・アール・フレツヂイ

遠東少佐

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361  
Sworn Deposition

Deponent :- KOSHI Saburo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, KOSHI, Saburō, am living at No.1110, Nishiuzuhashi, Matsumoto City, Nagano Prefecture. I am thirty-six years of age. During the Pacific War I, as the assistant Resident of Asahan of the East Coast Residency, Sumatra, Netherlandish East India, was in charge of the general military government in this district for three years ranging from August 3, 1944 (Showa 17) to August 15, 1945 (Showa 20). And then from the termination of the war to the end of April in 1946 (Showa 21) when I was repatriated, I engaged myself in the arrangement of business at Tanjon Valley of Asahan Sub-Residency. Accordingly, I am one of those who have the best knowledge of the condition of the military government and the real state of the general detention camp, not only in Asahan Sub-Residency, but also in the East Coast Residency.

I. General treatment for war-prisoners and internees in Sumatra.

A. War-prisoners

At the time when I arrived at my post there (August 6, 1942 (Showa 17)), the European War-prisoners camp was in the vicinity of Medan. All the native soldiers had been released by that time except the soldiers who came from Ambon. They were kept under detention at Kota Chano because their religion and custom were different from others' and they had no occupation. I do not know about the internal affairs of the camp, for the administration of war-prisoners was under the direction of the commandant of the detention camp at Singapore

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and had nothing to do with the military government.

B. General internees

The policy concerning the treatment of the interned was always in accordance with humanity and the international law.

Provisions were supplied with food according to the rule, compulsory labour and mistreatment were prohibited, and punishments were all dealt in the light of the law. Besides, private things of the interned were permitted to be brought in to the greatest possible extent, and their remaining things and the property of legal persons were respectively kept and administered by the Administration Bureau of Enemy's Assets in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

For the sake of convenience for making statements, I should like to divide into three terms the period ranging from the time of my arriving at the post to the war-end.

The first term: From August, 1942 (Showa 17) to March, 1944 (Showa 19)

(a) During this term the detention camps were under the control of the Military Government Department. They were located in the cities of Medan, Blastagy Shantal, Binjay, Tanjon Valley.

- (1) Hospitals, hotels, churches and private houses (residences of European people) were used for camp buildings.
- (2) The ration of provisions, especially of staple-food, for the interned was much larger in quantity than that for general inhabitants. Even in the pre-war time Sumatra could not supply herself with sufficient food-stuff and was dependent upon the import from abroad. During the war-time, the lack of vessels and the damages sustained by the attack of submarine boats caused great difficulty in its importation of food. From a viewpoint of self-sufficiency, we were conducting a movement for a great increase in food-production, but we could not get any noticeable result. Due to the shortage of transportation capacity we encountered many difficulties in gathering crops. Accordingly we could not distribute food to inhabitants so well. But as for the ration of food for the interned, we did our best to maintain the prescribed quantity. When there was shortage of rice, we always made up for it with some other kinds of grain. Vegetables were raised and

- only by a few natives and some Chinese residents and that very little. So we encouraged vegetable-growing but the result was not so good.
- (3) General internees were at first allowed to carry some money in cash and other valuables. But this was restricted around May 1943 (Showa 18) due to various evils which took place in connection with them.
  - (4) The internees were allowed to go shopping on a duty system and the authorized merchants to enter the compound. Therefore the internees at first much enjoyed their lives. But as evils came to take place one after another, the authorities became more strict with them and at last those intercourses with outside were prohibited. So was the employment of maid-servants.
  - (5) Sanitation  
One European doctor was attached to every detention camp. Mild cases were looked after at the dispensary in the camp and those with serious disease were admitted to a hospital with the permission of the responsible persons. At that time medical articles and articles were kept in large quantities.
  - (6) Within the compound of the camp everything was transacted by the internees on an autonomous system. They could take recreation and other necessary measures for securing health at their own device. When there was anything that they found impossible for them to do, they used to send us their representatives and had them make proposals to us. They were allowed to buy sporting goods.
  - (7) The buildings of the detention camp were of European style and very good for health. Their life within the detention camp was totally autonomous and they carried on the education of their boys and girls for themselves.
  - (8) Considering distance and other matters we provided the greatest possible convenience for their interview and communication. On every national holiday they were permitted to see their families.
  - (9) Japanese personnel could not enter the camp without the permission of the responsible person.
- (b) Collaborators in military government.  
It was the policy of military government at that time to have those who were concerned in farms and doctors to voluntarily collaborate in the administration of farms and in sanitary business respectively. So several hundreds of European people worked outside the camp

and still enjoyed, almost the same life and status as before. Such persons were completely protected from being looted by the natives or from the dangers of life, and were vested with the authoritative power concerning the performance of their duties and this power was guaranteed. Some of them were made to stop collaboration and held in the detention camp through the prescribed formalities for such special reasons that they went into personal conflict with some Japanese, made friction with native people, did or might go against the aim of military government, or often took an action liable to be regarded as being against the aim. All others continued their life until the military situation became acute afterwards. All, except special persons, willingly collaborated in our task of military government. The heads of the military government office all recognized, admired and appreciated the good results of their collaborations.

The Second Term: From around April, 1944 (Showa 19) to October of the same year.

During this term the 25th Army was in direct charge of the detention camps. This was because the military situation in the Indian Ocean grew gradually strained, and one or two of the detention camps were removed to the inner land. The treatment of the interned was, in principle, the same as in the First Term. However, it appeared that Lieutenant-Colonel SATA who newly entered upon the duty and some few soldiers and civilians in military service were in some points inattentive, because they were not accustomed to the land and could not make themselves understood and the surrounding situation became tense. And yet the military government department ordered them to give perfect assistance to the interned. It was around this time when the general economic difficulty began to be shown and the business of the detention camp began to grow gradually difficult to be managed. The officials concerned made their best to gather food-stuff and other materials as well as to make connection with the military government department. Their efforts were very impressive.

Owing to the shortage of staff, part of the guard was filled by the native supplementary soldier.

Since then European people as collaborators were gradually being replaced by Japanese people or the natives because the war situation grew acute.

The Third Term: From around October 1944 (Showa 19) to the end of the war.

During this term the administering system was the same as in the Second Term. With the pressing of the war situation and the military requirement, the authorities hastily established at Shilingolingo and Airupaminke near Lamtprapat which was under my charge new detention camps in which all internees amounting to some 7,000 in North Sumatra Zone were to be held. The detention camp of Shilingolingo was for the male, while that of Airupaminke was for the female and children. The former was newly built for that purpose, and the latter were buildings which had been used by a certain farm.

It is true that in the both camps living, housing and sanitation were not in a satisfactory condition. The detention camp for the female and children was in a little better condition than that for the male.

I sympathized for the interned who were living a hard life as food and other materials became scarce. However, that was caused by the military situation, and we could not help it. II. When TANABE, Commander of the 25th Army, made an inspection (around June, 1945) (Showa 20), I happened to hear him and Division Commander KUNOMURA talking to each other. The improvement of the detention camp was the main subject of their talk. And soon after that time (about the middle of July, 1945 (Showa 20)) Chief Staff of the 25th Army, YAHAGI, on the occasion of his first inspection, delivered an address to the officials of the detention camp. I stood by him. In that address he made remarks generally and minutely on the treatment of the interned. Indeed, its contents were based upon humanity and the international law. He, pointing out the officials' inattentions one by one, rebuked them and showed clearly the rules of treatment to be followed. I listened to this address which deeply touched me. So far as I know, the order from above relative to the treatment of the interned was thoroughly based upon the international law and humanity. But I admit that, owing to the inattention of quite a few persons at the inferior-offices or to special situations of those days, there were cases where the orders were not perfectly observed.

I believe, however, that the detention camp was, as a whole, in a satisfactory condition prior to the Third Term. III. When I was in office, I was called a gentleman by European people, a Klamat by the native and a Tajon (a gentleman) by Chinese people. At the time when I left for Japan, I was specially given a farewell address by an English prosecutor to the following effect: "on behalf of each European people, I should like to express to you our deepest gratitude for your treatment of us European peoples during the war." I hear that witness Linhare acknowledged at this court the goodness of my treatment of the interned. In this connection, I must say that I owe all my honour to the guidance and instruction given by



Division Commander MUTO. Next, I will refer to my relations with Division Commander MUTO.

IV. Relations between me and Division Commander MUTO.

As military government in Sumatra was being performed by the military government department of the 25th Army, a division commander at the place had nothing to do with military government, nor had he a right to order the governor of each residency concerning military government. Accordingly, Division Commander MUTO had nothing to do with military government and the detention camp, nor had he any relations with me in the matter of order and direction.

I heard that Division Commander MUTO arrived at his new post on Sumatra in the middle of May, 1942 (Showa 17). He left Sumatra for his next duty early in October, 1944 (Showa 19). Accordingly, Division Commander MUTO stayed on Sumatra all through the period of the above-mentioned 1st and 2nd Terms. During this period North Sumatra was generally in a quiet condition except the food situation (above all rice). The policy of the treatment of the Third States' people and the interned was to have them collaborate in military government. The internment. The internment life was still in good condition. It was not long after I arrived at the post that I saw Division Commander MUTO for the first time. It so happened that I saw him when he took a rest at the official residence of Asahan Assistant Resident which was located in the city of Tanjong Valley. Now I should like to state what I remember of those matters instructed by Division Commander MUTO every time when I met and talked with him.

(a) August 16, 1942 (Showa 17)

(At the Assistant Resident's official residence in the city of Tanjong Valley)

It was right after my arrival, and I was just taking over the official duties from the predecessor, Army Lieutenant YAMADA. I told the Commander what I had known for myself since my arrival and the condition of the Sub-Residency which I had learned from the predecessor. Then I requested him to give me a word of instruction which I, as Assistant Resident, should bear in mind in order to carry on military government. In compliance with my request he told me as follows:

- (1) "During a short period of time following the occupation of Sumatra, a military officer was in charge of military government. But I hope that you, as a civil official, will do daringly what you believe the best regardless of precedents set by soldiers."

(2) "You cannot secure public peace without winning the natives' heart, nor can you realize any ideal without securing public peace. It is a matter of importance that you should pay full consideration and attention to this respect."

(3) "As the internees of the enemy nation are to be sympathized for, you must look after them with full compassion. The location of the detention camp must be made prudently for fear lest any of the native or any disgraceful one of the soldiers should commit unlawful acts upon the interned and thus you must secure its safety."

(b) January 25, 1948 (Showa 18)

(At the Division Commander's official residence in Medan)

Calling on Division Commander MUTO at his official residence, I set forth the following plans which I had made in accordance with his suggestion given to me on the occasion of his first inspections:

To get together at one place several detention camps then scattered over the city of Tanjong Valley.

To take measures concerning their life, sanitation and entertainments.

To have a Netherland doctor reside outside the camp with his family and have his work for the health of the interned and the native.

He looked much pleased with these plans and urged me to carry them out promptly. I added that it was uneconomical for us to let them idle away at the time when the food situation grew worse. Then he said to me, "Since compulsory labour is prohibited according to the international law, always encourage them to work voluntarily and do your best supply the proscribed quantity of food."

He also told me as follows:

"In any country a child is a treasure. So let not children in the detention camp merely play all day, but have them study for themselves. You may for them collect text books which they possibly possess in their respective homes."

He further told me as follows:

"The Imperial Army must maintain its strict military discipline. But since various kinds of army corps have come here to Sumatra, these days, I can not tell what kind of person is included in them. Whenever you find anyone act indiscreetly, let me know right away."

He also pointed out that we ought to treat as gentlemen all internees working in the plantation or in other places,

(c) Around August 1943 (Showa 18)

(When Division Commander MUTO inspected Wilholmina Fall. At the Assistant Resident's lodging at Kisaran)

I was looking forward to the inspection tour of Lieutenant-General MUTO. The Division Commander at his interview with me told the following matters:

- (1) "In order to carry out military government successfully, you must push Sultan forward. You must be always prudent when you make any revision of the old way of administration."
- (2) "Foodstuff (rice) is the most important to the people. So you ought to make great efforts for the increase of food-production. However, when control goes too far, the circulation of food-stuff will be hindered and people's productive desire will be oppressed."
- (3) "You should make full use of the economic activity of Chinese merchants. To this end you must have Chinese merchants feel easy."
- (4) You should expel bad Japanese people from your jurisdiction."

On Japan's politics which I referred to, Division Commander MUTO said, "I do not like the rightist wing. Japan's idea ought to have more universality. The Japanese must work more and observe the world."

(b) Around September, 1944 (Showa 19)

(At the time when Division Commander MUTO made inspections right before his start for his next post.

At Kisaran Assistant Resident's lodging.)

At the time when I saw him at Kisaran Assistant Resident's lodging, he expressed various opinions. Among them, I remember there were the following words:

"Japan's government has recently promised Indonesians' independence. But I feel extremely discouraged to see Sultans clinging yet to the feudalistic Sultan government. It is necessary for the military government officials concerned to lead them well."

Division Commander MUTO, as I mentioned just before, had nothing to do with me concerning the command system and the business system. Nevertheless, I personally and voluntarily requested Division Commander MUTO at every chance to express his opinions on the performance of military government. Based on these opinions I transacted the business of military government for more than three years and gained good results. Therefore, I am still very grateful to him for his guidance.

On this 12 day of June, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /S/ KOSHI Saburo (seal)

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I, HARA Seiji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ HARA Seiji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KOSHI Saburo (seal)

Def. Doc. # 2245

Exh. No. 196

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Translation of the Telegraphic Report to Geneva  
of his Inspection of the Prisoner of War Camp,  
Mukden, by Pestalocchi, Representative in Japan  
of the International Red Cross Society.

Telegram No. 824.

Re: Prisoner of War Camp, Mukden, Manchuria.

Mail address: Prisoner of War Camp, Mukden, Manchuria.

Capacity of camp, 1500.

Chief, Col. MATSUDA.

No. of prisoners,

Officers	: British	6,	Australian	1,	American	16
N.C.O.'s	: British	29,	Australian	5,	American	511
Privates	: British	49,	Australian	10,	American	647
Total	:	1274				

Of these 84 British & 16 Australians were transferred  
from Seoul and originally from Singapore.

1174 Americans were transferred from the Phillipines,  
mostly from Bataan and Corregidor.

Eldest : aged 57

Youngest : aged 21

Representatives : British Maj. PEATY  
American Maj. HUNKINS  
Representatives of N.C.O. British 1  
American 1  
Besides which Representatives of  
Privates British 1  
American 1

Date of inspection: 11 November 1941

Situated on a fertile plain outside the city of Mukden.  
opened on 20 October last year, quartering began on 11  
November of the same year. Transfer from the temporary camp  
to the present one completed in August this year.

Total area of the camp 49330 sq. mtrs.

Surrounded by a brick wall 2.6 mtrs. in height, high-  
tension wire contraption on the walls.

Area of the building for the use of prisoners 11550 sq.  
mtrs. two-storied brick building similar to a military

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barrack, tiled roof, connecting wash-room and lavatories, double paned windows, wooden floor.

Hospital, canteen, store-room, bath-room, boiler-room, odd-job room in separate building.

Furnished with electric lights, heating by Russian style pechika (brass pipes covered by bricks) similar to that of military barracks. Period of use from 10 November to 20 March ventilation excellent, equipped with fire-extinguisher.

Living quarters of the prisoners comprised of 3 buildings, each divided into ten compartments with upper and lower bunks. Capacity of each compartment 50, at present 42 to 46 men and 16 officers quartered.

Sleeping kit consists of 1 straw mattress, 6 army blankets, 2 sheets, 1 pillow, 1 pillow-case, and in the summer-time a mosquito net. Orders are issued in English translated from Japanese. Hygienic equipment, wash-room, latrine, 120 water taps, 72 Japanese-style lavatories pulled out every week, 3 concrete bath-tubs 3 mtrs. long 5 mtrs. wide & 1 mtr. deep showers, connected to the main building. Men allowed to bathe every other day, officers every day. Change room for those assigned labor with coat-hangers, 48 water-taps, excellent drainage, flush toilet, disinfection by lime, mats disinfected by dipping them in disinfectant, water provided from well within the camp, drinking water boiled before use. (water-distributing tower under construction)

Meals morning, noon, and evening. Each person rationed in grams, wheat flour 400, kao-liang 80, maize 190, special ration for those assigned labor, meat and or fish meat 52 to 100, fat 25, vegetables including potatoes 600, soya beans 200, some apples and oranges, sugar 60, flavorings such as curry, pepper, soy sauce, salt a little, kao-liang tea 20, average calories 3800. For the invalid and those assigned labour 4120 calories, Japanese army 3457 calories.

At lunch-time Pestalocchi sampled vegetable soup, sweet-potatoe pie, potato-onion-and-bean pie, corn bread, ordinary bread and kao-liang tea. All of excellent quality. Prisoners are satisfied with the food but in the long run they feel the monotony.

Personal weight in Dec. 1942 64.7 kilos

Today 69.1 kilos

Prisoner's cooks 49, including baker, head cook with 24 years experience. 24 large pans, 3 ovens in the bakery, area of

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vegetable garden 5300 sq. mtrs., at present spinach is planted over 3500 sq. mtrs. Two rooms for storing vegetables carrots, cabages, and turnips storable till May 1944 stored.

Health conditions, when first quartered between 700 to 800 severely ill. By the efforts of the Headquarters Kwantung Army, General Army Hospital, and the Red Cross Hospital, health improving and the present conditions can be said excellent.

A well-equipped sick-room within the compound supplied with medical apparatus and other necessities that are supplied to places recognized as army hospitals. Calls to patients are made by doctors among the prisoners and surgeons. Dentistry at the General Army Hospital Mukden.

As an extraordinary measure, the entire prisoners were injected against typhoid, para-typhoid A and B, dysentery, and smallpox. Roentgen rays, blood examination.

As doctors, 1 Japanese surgeon, 3 N.C.O. medical orderlies, 3 privates, 5 civilian nurses. Prisoner doctors, 4 surgeons, medical orderlies N.C.O.s and privates totaling 29. Number of patients, infections dysentery 6 isolated, malaria 5, beri-beri 13, influenza 2, acute enteritis 17 and 26 others total 69. Out of which 43 in the camp hospital over an extended period, 3 short and 23 exempted from duty. Since opening of the camp, number of death, at Mukden 154, on the way to and at Fusan 62, at Takao 6. The worst month being December 1942, death rates gradually receding after that month. Death caused by acute enteritis, beri-beri, dysentery, acute pneumonia and malaria.

Clothing provided every summer, winter and in extreme winter. Extreme winter clothing consisting of wool-lined overcoat, boots, wool cowl, woolen gloves, socks and underwear. Besides which working clothes, cap, cowl, and boots. Prisoners brought their own raincoats and summer clothing, officers only bringing clothing for all seasons. For laundry a special washing equipment, soap provided. Financial conditions, officers' private savings ¥7,346.00, the rest ¥734.00 Officers were paid the equivalent pay the Japanese officers received.

Roll-call at 7 o'clock, lights out at 21 o'clock. Work voluntary and unconstrained, no work on Sundays and holidays. Work consisting of maintenance and control of the camp and workshops. Men paid up to 25 sen a day. A boot repair shop. 4 sewing machines in the sewing room. Metal and lumber workshops.

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At the canteen, cigarets, candies, everyday necessities, toilet goods and stationary sold. Open on Sundays and holidays. 4 barbers. Profits are used according to the prisoner's wishes. Men allowed 10 cigarets a day and officers more. Recreation-room annexed to the canteen.

English church service held every Sunday, service by Japanese clergyman.

In the large playing-ground outside baseball and football could be played, while on the other ground volley-ball and basket-ball could be played. Inside the house playing cards and chess possible. As books, novels, technical books, Bible, daily Nippon Times 120 copies, weekly Nippon Times 18 copies.

2 gramophones, a reasonable number of American records and a few Japanese records. No motion pictures nor radios. According to the representative, materials for mental enjoyment were entirely necessary. Regardless of kind, increase of books were looked forward to, especially texts for the study of language, machinery, agriculture and medicine.

Permissible communication per year, for an officer 3 letters, 3 cards, warrant officer 1 letter, 3 cards, N.C.O. 4 cards, private 3 cards. Beside which 20 radiograms allowed per month. Outgoing letters and cards via the P.C. Intelligence Bureau 1620 up to October 1943. Incoming letters and cards 431, and 11 cablegrams up to October same year. According to Maj. Peaty, the British representative, received his wife's letter dated 8 September 1942 on 8 September 1943. According to Maj. Hunkins, the American representative, American prisoners received no mail after May 1942, but 5 answers to cablegrams despatched were received. Have not been allotted any relief goods of the Red Cross Society yet. Received ¥1,500 contribution from the Varian Missionary with which money such things as musical instruments and clothing were procured.

From the words of the representatives and others, general condition of the camp satisfactory. Col. MATSUDA showed kindness, and on some points conditions are better than expected. No complaints. According to the Chief of the camp, discipline lacking on account of the fact that the prisoners were brought from different units. 160 penalty cases, for as obedience, petty theft, breachage of camp regulations especially the fire regulations. 3 deserters were



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condemned to death after being court-martialled for murder and violence.

Inspected the prisoners cemetery outside city of Mukden, on each grave is erected a plain wooden cross with name, rank, nationality, and identification number written. By next spring expects to be able to decorate with flowers, a part of the seeds of which have been sown already.

General impression excellent, Col. MATSUDA and his officers are doing their best. Utmost cooperation, favor and kindness from the Manchurian Red Cross Society, also untold favor from the Headquarters Kwantung Army.

Pestallocchi

Note: The spelling of names in this translation, Pestallocchi, Peaty and Hunkins, are the translator's version.

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Certificate

I hereby certify that this document is a correct copy  
of the document in the custody of the Prison of War Intel-  
ligence Bureau.

28th of March, 1947.

Secretary of the P.O."  
Intelligence Bureau.

/s/ KAMISAKA, Shinichi (seal)

Exh No.

Def. Doc. #2090(1)(12448)(3)

Action of our forces

(page 2)

It is clear that our forces engaged in sacred warfare should should be to the last the forces to protect the cause of righteous righteousness and not to move without that cause, in view of our the spirit of the foundation of the State-additionmission. This is the principle on which the use of force is based.

In view of the real meaning of the sacred war, it is natural that our forces should be ready to succour and enlighten those prisoners, sick and wounded, who abandon resistance or are incapable of resisting against them, and to favor them with the influence of our Imperial rule. This is the case with hostile residents and their properties, etc., and much more the case with the officials and people of a third power and their properties. The righteousness of our forces will be concretely understood by the hostile forces and people, and besides, by any third nationals until our forces are enthusiastically welcomed everywhere. Our forces, therefore, should act not only in accordance with international laws and conventions but also display spirit positively on their own initiative.

The principal articles of the international laws and covenants applicable to wartime are shown in Appendix I.

Military discipline in war-time

(page 18)

It is for the purpose of meeting war-time demands and producing good results that we are making every effort to maintain military discipline in both exercises and home duties in our peacetime training. But, once we meet with war or incident, we are apt to be less enthusiastic for the maintenance of military discipline. For example, we are apt to hesitate to discharge our duties on the pretext of damage, allow our men to make an excuse for taking an easy way, and neglect the strict observance of compliments regulations and proper dress, thereby committing an unconscious breach of military discipline.

It goes without saying that the environment in war-time is so different from that in peacetime that we cannot be physically so regular and orderly as in peacetime, but nevertheless we should expand our immaterial demands, all the more so because our forces receiving a great number of reservists not accustomed to military discipline, are lacking in solid unity, and there are many other disadvantages in regard to the maintenance of military discipline.

Def. Doc. #2090(1)(2)&(3)

#### Military discipline in the battlefield

Roughness of mind and demoralizing act and speech are apt to be found in the battle-field --- for example, such offences against military discipline as an act of violence against a superior or disobedience to orders, and other vicious offences such as looting and rape. This trend will be promoted especially by the dangerous and miserable conditions of the battle-field, imperfect housing facilities and poor supplies. So, in order to prevent this trend, it is necessary for the commander to take every opportunity to bring home the real meaning of the sacred war, and to stress education and training, to control and direct his men with fairness, to punish and discipline them properly, and to improve housing and maintenance facilities.

#### Fairness in deciding reward and punishment

In war-time, one is apt to feel so much sympathy with the men under his command as to subordinate justice to personal feelings and lose his desire to superintend and direct them strictly; While, on the other hand, such an idea is apt to spread among his men that, in the battlefield, a minor offence may be overlooked by their superior officer, and that an offence committed can be concealed with ease. These two factors will help correlatively to create an unfavorable environment for the maintenance of military discipline.

One must have the spirit to make a costly sacrifice in the cause of justice, realizing that it is not to love his men that one should be so much influenced by personal feelings as to bring about the idea that military discipline may be violated with impunity, and thereby making them commit graver offences.

Def. Doc. #2090(1)(2)&(3)

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 162 pages and entitled "Mannual of War-time Services" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (Department of Military Training).

certified at Tokyo,  
on this 14th day of August, 1947

/S/ MIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.  
at the same place, on the same date.

Witness: /S/ KA ZUMA, Isaburo (seal)

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: NISHIURA, Susumu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, NISHIURA, Susumu, after having been first duly sworn according to the custom of my country make the following statement:

1. I was formerly in service as Colonel and occupied the post of Chief of Army Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, from 20 April 1942 to December 1944. In the Ministry I was in charge of the establishment and institution of the army, I have a thorough knowledge of how the business of treating Prisoners of War was allotted in the army both in principle and in practice. I hereby state as follows:
2. Prepared for the purpose of making my statement understandable are attached to this document.
3. The system of business in the army concerning the treatment of Prisoners of War was regulated and practised as shown in the attached papers.  
After the capture of POW's by the Japanese Army, the following two steps were followed as to the treatment of POW's.

(1) Treatment within the troops in operations.

- (a) When a front force captured POW, after having made necessary investigation and having prepared a POW roll and POW diary, the prisoners were delivered to the nearest office of transportation and communication.
- (b) The commander of an army in operation who wanted to send prisoners to the rear reported to Imperial Headquarters as to the number of the prisoners to be sent and further the War Ministry was informed by the Imperial Headquarters.
- (c) When the War Ministry received a report about sending POW's to the rear, the Ministry advised the Imperial Headquarters as to the ports or other places where POW's should be sent, and the Imperial Headquarters informed the War Ministry of the date of arrival of POW's at the place assigned.
- (d) In accordance with the orders of the Imperial Headquarters, the office of transportation and communication would escort POW's to the designated place and deliver them to the receiver who had been designated by the War Ministry.
- (e) The commander of a force in operation would establish a provisional POW camp to house and supervise POW's until the time of delivery, (Exh. No. 1965, Regulations Concerning the Treatment of POW., Chapt II, Art XII, XIII, XV, XVI, XVII).

After this delivery to the receiver designated by the War Ministry, POW's come under the jurisdiction of the War Minister. Before that time, the treatment of POW's was in the hands of the troops in operations, so that any trouble occurring prior to the time of delivery to the receiver of the War Ministry was out of the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

- (2) Treatment within the Army Administrative system after coming under the jurisdiction of War Minister.
- After the receiver designated by the War Ministry received POW's, they came under the jurisdiction of the War Minister and were put in a POW camp established by the War Minister. (Ordinance concerning POW camps, Art II, Exhibit No. 1965). The POW camp was supervised by the army commander or defense commander designated by the War Minister. (Ibid Art III).
- During the Pacific War there were established a lot of POW camps at the front. In that case the field commander in operation and

the like, supervised the POW camps in his area and his supervision was put under the jurisdiction of the War Minister. As to the provisional camps mentioned above, the supervision thereof was beyond the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

The chief supervisor (i.e. army commander or defense commander) in conformity with the relevant regulations, etc., commanded and supervised the POW camp and laid down the POW camp service regulations, thus taking charge of all the supervising business concerning the POW camp. (Ordinance concerning the POW camp, Art V, Regulations concerning the Treatment of POW, Art XXI) The business under the jurisdiction of the War Minister was divided into several parts and assigned to the POW Administration Department and each Bureau in the War Ministry as shown in the attached Table.

As regards each allotted business also shown in the table, that of the POW Department was provided by the Regulations concerning the Treatment of POW and by the Adjutant's Notification (Defense Exhibit No. 1598), and that of each Bureau in the War Ministry indicates the chief business which had connection with the treatment of POW and allotted to the Bureau according to the regulated official system of the War Ministry.

The POW Administration Department as a chief office in charge of the business under the supervision of the War Minister concerning the treatment of POW managed the following business:

- (1) Matters concerning the general plans of treatment of POW and military internees at the front; detention, supervision, exchange, release, employment (labor, propaganda, etc.), punishment, treatment, etc.
- (2) Matters concerning the labor to be imposed upon POW.
- (3) Matters concerning the communication of POW.
- (4) Matters concerning the punishment of POW.
- (5) Matters concerning the labor and communication of military internees at the front.

The following are necessary explanations as to several important matters:

1. The POW Administration Department was established at the end of March, 1942, in accordance with the Regulations Concerning the Treatment of POW, mentioned above. I have



learned that in the past wars the business concerning the treatment of POW was allotted to the bureaus in the War Ministry. It was generally thought at the beginning of the last war that the above allotment of the business was practicable as in the past wars. The greatness in number of POW and the complicated and extensive business of treating POW made it necessary to have an office exclusively managing the business of the War Ministry concerning the treatment of POW. The POW Administration Department was arranged to be established in the Ministry to meet such demand, but was actually established as late as at the end of March, 1942, under such circumstances. As was already stated above, the business under the jurisdiction of the War Minister concerning the treatment of POW was conducted by the POW Administration Department as the responsible office. The POW Administration Department was on the same level with other bureaus of the War Ministry and was not in a position to be controlled or supervised by the Military Affairs Bureau or any other bureau in the War Ministry. In fact, during my tenure of office as Chief of the Military Affairs Section, I, at no time, gave orders to the said Department, for in my belief the business concerning POW should have been managed by the POW Administration Department.

B. The main business of which the Bureau of Military Affairs took charge concerning the POW, were as shown in the attached tables:

The main business conducted in accordance with the above were as follows:

- (1) To draw up the Ordinance for POW camps and the organization of POW camps.
- (2) To draw up the regulations concerning the establishment and organization of POW Administration Department.
- (3) To draft the reply of vice-minister concerning the application of the Geneva Convention.

C. Besides there was the so-called POW Information Bureau which was managed by War Minister. This was an organization specially established in accordance with the Hague Convention and was entirely separate from the War Ministry. This was altogether different from POW Administration Department established as one of the sections of War Ministry. Furthermore, Chief of the POW Information Bureau was not subject to the control or supervision of Chiefs of the

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Bureau of Military Affairs or other bureaus of War Ministry. According to the regulation governing the POW Information Bureau, the same bureau, the same bureau had a right to ask for various information from the operating forces.

(4) Mistreatment of POWS:

The so-called mistreatment of POW's in Malaya and Bataan Peninsulas were cases which took place during or immediately after the fighting and the POW's were not yet brought under the jurisdiction of the War Minister--namely, they were still under the supreme command system. Those prisoners engaged in the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway were, for the most part, under the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

The construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was carried out by the Commander-General of the Southern Army by order of the Chief of the General Staff.

The War Ministry was consulted by the Chief of the General Staff about this construction order. The various bureaus were consulted according to the division of business stipulated in the Official System of Organization. The Military Affairs Bureau took charge of the budget for construction; the Maintenance Bureau, communication, materials and labor; and the POW Administration Department, labor, etc. Each Bureau and Department was consulted according to the business in its charge, and the result

*is credited and the* Minister and Vice-Minister ~~are~~ jointly responsible ~~for the consequences.~~

The Southern Area Army undertook to carry out the construction work, and the General Staff took the lead in shortening or lengthening the term of construction, alleviating transportation facilities and increasing the forces, etc. The Director of Transportation and Communication Bureau undertook to direct the construction work, as previously testified by Lieutenant-General WAKAMITSU, the then director of that bureau. (Court Record in Japanese, PP 14-15)

As the prisoners engaged in the construction work were under the jurisdiction of the War Minister, he dispatched HAMA, Director of the POW Information Bureau and Chief of the POW.

On this 10 day of Aug, 1947  
At Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ NISHIURI, Susumu (seal)

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I, KAZUMI, Isaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ KAZUMI, Isaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)

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Organization Concerning P.O.W. Affairs in  
the War Ministry (Diagram No. 2)

In addition, the personnels of POW Supervision Bureau and Dispensary Bureau were dispatched to inspect the actual circumstances, thereby taking all possible reform measures.

War Minister --- Vice-Minister of War

Secretariate --- Affairs concerning the handling of documents and other general business.

Personnel Affairs Bureau --- Affairs concerning appointments and dismissals and other personnel affairs.

Military Affairs Bureau --- Affairs concerning organization, control of budget, arrangement of units, various wartime regulations, and international covenants.

Military Service Bureau --- Affairs concerning gendarmerie, military discipline and morals, punishment, air defense, prevention of espionage, and military police.

Bureau of Equipments --- Affairs concerning munitions production, military labor, communication and transportation.

Bureau of Accountants --- Affairs concerning budgets, money, clothing, food, building, and various war-time regulations for the accountants' Department.

Bureau of Medical Affairs --- Affairs concerning sanitation, prevention of epidemics, hospitals, medical supplies, and various war-time regulations for the Medical Department.

Judicial Affairs Bureau --- Affairs concerning military administration of justice, amnesty, execution, and various war-time regulations for the Judicial Affairs Department.

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P.O.W. Administration Department --- Affairs concerning general plans of handling of P.O.W.s and military internees at the front such as accommodation supervision, exchange, release, utilization, punishment, and treatment; communication and punishment for P.O.W.s and military internees at the front; and P.O.W.s labor.

Note:

1. The War Minister supervises the P.O.W.'s Camp and controls the P.O.W. Information Bureau.
2. The vice-Minister of War assists the War Minister and arranges departmental affairs and takes charge of affairs of Secretariate, each Bureau and the P.O.W. Administration Department.
3. The chief of each Bureau and the P.O.W. Administration Department supervises the business in his own bureau or department according to the order of the War Minister.
4. With regard to the affairs of each Bureau, we quote here only important items which have connection with the treatment of P.O.W.s.
5. The above are based on the Official Organization of the Cabinet (Exhibit #70), the Official Organization of the War Ministry (Exhibit #74), regulations for P.O.W.s and Riku-A-Mitsu (Army Asia Secret) No. 1108, the adjutants of War Minister's note in the War Ministry.

二、軍ノ行動

聖戰ニ任ズル我が軍ハ建國ノ精神ト其ノ使命トニ鑑ミルモ明カナル如ク飽ク迄正義擁護ノ軍隊タルベク軍ノ進ム處必ズ正義ナカルベカラズ

是我ガ武力行使ノ根本ナリ

俘虜、敵ノ傷病者等既ニ我ニ對スル抵抗ヲ斷念シ又ハ其ノ能力ナキ者

ニ對シ軍ガ進ンデ之ヲ救恤シ之ヲ蒸化シテ皇化ニ浴セシムルハ我ガ聖

戰ノ本義ニ鑑ミ當然ニシテ敵國住民、財産等ニ對シテモ亦然リ況ンヤ

第三國官憲人民財産等ニ對スルニ於テヲヤ斯克シテ我ガ軍ノ正義ノ師

タル具體的事實ハ敵軍ニ、其ノ國民ニ將又第三國人ニ理解セラレ遂ニ

ハ尊食齋菜シテ我ガ軍ヲ迎フルニ至ルベキナリ故ニ軍ノ行動ハ國際法

規ニ準據スルハ固ヨリ進ンデ其ノ精神ヲ積極的ニ發揮スベキモノトス

戰時適用スベキ國際法規中主要ナル事項附錄第一ノ如シ

二、戰時ノ軍紀

平時ノ教育内務等ニ於テ百方手段ヲ盡クシテ軍紀ノ振作ニ努力シアル所以ノモノハ他ナシ戰時ニ於ケル諸般ノ要求ヲ充足シ其ノ精華ヲ發揚センガ爲ナリ然ルニ一度戰時、事變ニ際會スルヤ動モスレバ軍紀ノ維

持ニ對スル熱意一般ニ低下シ易シ例ヘバ損害ニ藉口シテ任務ノ遂行ヲ  
 躊躇シ或ハ擅ニ口實ヲ設ケテ安キニ就カントスルヲ默過シ又ハ敬禮ノ  
 勵行、諸規定ノ嚴守、所定ノ服裝等ヲ等閑ニ附シテ省ミズ不知不識ノ  
 間軍紀ヲ破壞シアルガ如キ即チ然リ固ヨリ平時ト戰時トハ其ノ環境ヲ  
 異ニスルニシテ六ナルヲ以テ形而下ニ於テハ平時ノ如ク整然タラシメ得  
 ザルモノアルベシト雖モ形而上ノ要求ニ於テハ寧ロ益々之ヲ擴充スベ  
 キモノトス平素軍紀ニ憤懣セザル多數ノ在郷兵ヲ加ヘ部隊ノ團結亦強  
 固ナラザルモノアル等諸般ノ關係軍紀維持上不利ナルモノアルニ於テ  
 特ニ然リ

2、戰場ノ軍紀

戰場ニ於テハ動モスレバ氣分荒々不軍紀ナル言動即チ上官暴行、抗命  
 違令等ノ軍紀犯及掠奪強姦等ノ惡質犯ヲ發生スルコトアリ特ニ戰場ノ  
 危險悲慘ノ狀、居住施設ノ不完全、給養ノ不良等ハ益々其ノ傾向ヲ増  
 大スルニ至ルモノトス故ニ指揮官ハ有ユル機會ヲ捉ヘテ聖職本義ノ徹  
 底、教育訓練ノ勵行、監督指導ノ公正及刑懲罰ノ適正ヲ期スルト共ニ  
 居住、給養及施設ノ改善等ニ努メ之ヲ奮防スルニト緊要ナリ

三、信賞必罰

戰時ニ於テハ部下ニ對スル情義ヲ感知スルコト特ニ大ナルヲ以テ動モ  
スレバ私情ニ驅ラレテ大義ヲ滅シ監督指導ヲ嚴正ナラシムルノ意氣ヲ  
缺クニ至リ易ク而モ戰場ニ於テハ小ナル犯行ハ之ヲ上官ヨリ黙過セラ  
レ或ハ犯罪ヲ犯スモ之ヲ容易ニ隱匿シ得ベシト爲ス思想瀟漫シ易ク兩  
者相倚リ益々軍紀維持上不利ナル環境ヲ作ルニ至ルモノトス  
苟モ姑息ノ愛ニ陥リ軍紀ヲ犯スモ平然タルノ思想ヲ養成シ不知不覺ノ  
間益々犯行ヲ深入リセシムルガ如キハ眞ニ部下ヲ愛スル所以ニアラザ  
ルニ思フ致シ涙ヲ拭ツテ馬綬ヲ斬ルノ概ナカルベカラズ



Def, Doc#2090

文 件 代

文書成立ニ關スル證明書

自分ハ第一復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セル日本語  
ニ依リ印刷セラレ一六二頁ヨリ成ル戰時服務提要ト題スル印刷物ハ日  
本政府（教育總監部）ノ編纂ニ係ル文書ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年八月十四日 於東京

第一復員局文書課長 柴 山 要 藏

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日 於 同 所

立會人 柴 馬 伊 三 郎

4

Def. Doc. # 2470

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: YASUDA, Tsuneo,

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am a former Army Medical Colonel. I stayed in Singapore as a member of the Medical Department of the Southern Army General Headquarters during the period from October 19, 1942 to July 5, 1944, and was in charge of medical and sanitary affairs assisting Medical Lieutenant-General AOKI, Kuichiro, Chief of the Medical Department.
2. On the occasion of the proposed construction of a railway linking up Thailand and Burma, I stressed that the sanitation measures were very important in this enterprise and the success of the construction work depended directly on sanitary conditions in view of the bad sanitary conditions prevailing there, the speedy accomplishment of the work being held in contemplation.

Commander in Chief of the Southern Army TERUCHI paid special

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attention to this point and I made every effort to investigate sanitation matters and made every preparations for that, before and after the start of the work.

3. Limiting chiefly at malaria, cholera, dysentery and black plague in the investigation, I despatched Medical Captain MOMI, member of the Medical Department, to the area with the Surveying Corps at the end of 1942 and had him study general sanitary conditions over there, collecting material for the purpose of establishing definite sanitary measures. And in January, 1943 I also despatched Dr. MORI Nanzaburo, member of the Research Institute of Formosa on Tropical Medical Science and an authority in research work of the malaria-mosquito, as a non-regular civilian official attached to the Army in company of eleven persons to Thailand first and then to Burma later, and had them investigate malaria in the areas of construction. I made more effective the execution of prevention and extermination of malaria based on their reports.

After that I carried on investigations further, with Water Supply and Purification corps at the area as the centre of activities; and at the same time took charge of the prevention of malaria and other communicable disease and the water supply.

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4. In order to enforce strongly the sanitation measures to cover this construction work, the main body of the Southern Army's Water Supply and Purification Department, which was most powerful in the said Army's operation area, and the overwhelming majority of the medical services directly attached to the said Army as well as other medical services of the Army Corps at the front were attached to the Railway Construction Commander, forming the Medical Unit of the Railway Corps. Medical Colonel KITAGAWA, Commander of the Water Supply and Purification was appointed commander of the said medical unit and he strived to give it full swing.

5. Despite such careful investigations and preparations with which the construction was embarked upon, the rainy season set in about the middle of April, 1943, nearly a month earlier than expected, before foodstuffs, drugs and medical supplies were sufficiently accumulated in the hinterland, turned the construction ways into a quagmire and traffic came almost to a standstill cholera which broke out among the Burmese natives spasmodically found ways into the construction district in Thailand and became more and more prevalent. It reached its peak in June, defying all the medical services' devoted efforts which were greatly handicapped by the blocked traffic in penetrating into the hinterland. The Medical Department Chief himself went to tr

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area and took over supplying as much medical supplies (454 Sanitary water filters and other supplies) as he could from the Southern Army's reserve stocks. Then again he had Medical Department personnel dispatched time and again to the area and did all he could to check the diseases.

Further the situation was reported to Commander in, Chief TERAUCHI and the all construction work was suspended for a time and all efforts were concentrated on stamping out the epidemics.

6. The fact that malnutrition, dysentery, malaria and tropical ulcer increased in proportion to the progress of the construction work may also be thought to have been result of the bad sanitary conditions by the rainy season as well as by the dearth of foodstuffs caused by the blocked roads. Against these epidemics, it goes without saying that the activities of the medical services and supplying of drugs were stimulated, while the all important supply of essential foodstuffs and increase of supply of mosquito nets and blankets were appealed to concerned officers, but these could not easily be improved on account of transport difficulties over the area.

On this 2nd day of Sept. 1947

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT YASUDA, Tsuneco(seal).

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I, KAZUMI, Isaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date .

At the same place.

Witness:(signed) KAZUMA, Isaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ YASUDA, Tsuneo(seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent : KOBAYASHI, Shujiro,

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, KOBAYASHI, Shujiro, live at KITAIDE, SHIMMEI-MURA, IMADACHI-GUN, FUKUI Prefecture and am 48 years old.

In July of the 19th year of SHOWA (1944), I arrived at Manila as the Staff-Officer of the 14th Area Army in the Philippine Islands. When the SHIMBU Group under the command of the said Army was formed at the close of that year, I was ordered to be attached to the Group and, until the termination of war, engaged in the campaign in the region east of Manila. As the Senior Staff-Officer, my main duty was to control the operations and the rear-service. When I arrived at my post, the Commander of the Army was Lieutenant General KURODA. He was succeeded by General YAMASHITA early in October of the 19th year of SHOWA (1944). The U.S. Army started landing in LEYTE on October 18 of the 19th year of SHOWA (1944). Two days later, on October 20, Chief of the Staff MUTO arrived at his post.

I will make a statement as follows on the real state of affairs of this time.

1. I will explain the plan of operations in the vicinity of Manila and the intention of the Commander of the Area Army toward Manila City.

A. As regards the operations in LUZON Island, the policy before October of the 19th year of SHOWA (1944), was to fight decisive battles in the LINGAEN and BATANGAS fronts, especially in their seaside regions. However, not only did the LEYTE campaign deplete our force but also the experience taught us that decisive battles were disadvantageous. The policy was therefore changed to that of delaying tactics, taking up a position in mountain region. The new plan in the middle and southern parts of LUZON Island was that the army in this district would occupy the mountainous region east of Manila with its main force, a part of which were disposed in the BATANGAS Province and that, in Manila, the troops (some 2,500 strong of the army forces) should be stationed for the sake of mere guard and of covering munitions. It was early in December of the 19th ('22 of the original is surely a mistake -- T.N.) year of SHOWA.

It was a serious subject of study whether or not Manila should be defended to the last. But General YAMASHITA decided on a plan of its abandonment. Concerning this problem, Lieutenant General MUTO, the Chief of the Staff, insisted on a plan of abandonment from the outset and gave this opinion to General YAMASHITA. The reasons for his insisting it were as follows:

- (1) The difficulty in supplying food-stuffs for the million citizens of Manila and preventing them from becoming victims of battles;
- (2) Possible danger of reducing the centre of civilization in the Philippine Islands to ashes by the spread of the flames due to a great number of wooden houses in the City;
- (3) The impossibility of establishing solid air defences owing to subterranean water running near the surface of the land.
- (4) The impossibility for the existing Japanese forces of defending the City lying on the seaside plain and requiring a large number of divisions for its defense.

Since, however, it was impossible to remove in a short time the pile of war supplies for the whole of the Southern Army and numerous military establishments from in and around Manila City, it was at first decided to station there a part of the forces to have them transport, carry out and escort the munitions as well as maintain public peace. Some 30,000 tons of munitions remained in Manila early in January of the 20th year of SHOWA (1945).

(B. In order to carry out the above policy, the Area Army Commander took the following steps, besides the disposition of the forces:

- (1) He had the Philippine Government remove to BAGUIO on December 22.
- (2) He manifested the idea of abandoning Manila by means of removing the Army Headquarters from the MCKINLEY Barracks to IPO, about 30 kilometers north-east of Manila on December 26, and expedited transportation of the forces and munitions which had been delayed by indecisive movement from around Manila to the mountainous region.
- (3) Since about the middle of December, he especially ordered me to visit the headquarters of the forces stationed on the west side of the Manila -- MONTALBAN Road (the entrance to the mountainous region, approximately 20 kilometres north-east of Manila) and to urge them on the spot to hurry into the eastern mountainous region;
- (4) He ordered the Manila Defense Headquarters in charge of guarding the City until then, promptly to MONTALBAN north-east of Manila and named the forces the KOBAYASHI Group, after the name of the commander so as to make soldiers change their way of thinking;
- (5) He sent a staff-officer early in January of the 20th year of SHOWA (1945) to the Commander of the Air Forces, who still remained in the City of Manila on account of illness, to hurry him away to the Northern LUZON;
- (6) He gave strict instructions to the forces in Manila, forbidding any action of inflicting harms to the citizens as well as prohibiting them from putting any building to warfare use, except that simple works for works for air defense and self-defense were permitted on the MCKINLEY Barracks



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mand on the buildings near the seashore then under the army's use and that preparatory works for destruction of the 3 bridges were permitted for the purpose of preventing the enemy forces, in case of their marching nothward from BATAANGAS quarters, from using them.

In 4

In this respect, I endeavoured, as the staff-officer left behind at the place east of Manila, to have our forces thoroughly understand the above effect. For instance, at the meeting of staff-officers and adjutants of every group and unit under the command, held at MONTALBAN about the middle of January, I communicated it exactly to them and explained, adding that, even if its result should handicap them in fighting, they should act so as to realize the intention of the Area Army Commander. They all appreciated it and left. Lieutenant YOKOYAMA, the Commander of the SHIMBU Group, as well attached importance to the intention of the Area Army Commander in this connection. He, accordingly, gave instructions early in January to all the officers and men under his command, emphasizing that, as the world was watching every act of our forces fighting in the vicinity of Manila, the international city, they were required to maintain in particular strict discipline and to take such good and just actions that they might not be laughed at by posterity.

2. In regard to the progress of battles in the vicinity of Manila, I will explain the actual condition of the Japanese army.

A. On the morning of February 4, I was informed of the following condition at MONTALBAN 20 kilometres north-east of Manila:

On the evening of the 3rd, the last day, Manila was totally surprised by the U. S. forces advancing from the north which immediately occupied the north side of the River PASSIK. The enemy consist of automobile units with numerous tanks, though their power is uncertain.

B. Toward the evening of that day, one marines battalion, in charge of guard of the vicinity of SAN JUAN DELMONTE north-east of Manila, was defeated and ran toward the east. At that time, the both banks of the River MARIKINA were in a state of confusion.

C. Putting together informations from various sources, we found:

(1) That the U.S. forces, led by guerilla units, thread their thread their way through gaps of disposition of our forces without taking the main road along the seashore and advanced from the west side of ILOILO toward the north-east of Manila;

(2) That, in front of our sentries, a guerilla unit on an automobile passed hoisting our general's flag, and following it there appeared unexpectedly U.S. tanks accompanying auto-tracks, on which were many guerillas;

(3) That the enemy strength remained uncertain and could not be estimated;

(4) That a number of barely armed officers, men and civilians in the military service who had been billeted in Manila City and engaged in commissary service including transportation were attacked and butchered by guerilla and by "inhabitants" hostile to the Japanese.

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In short, at the outbreak of the Battle of Manila, the sudden attacks of the enemy threw our soldiers and residents in Manila into complete confusion and disorder, and made accurate informations impossible.

D. Meanwhile, as for our main force stationed in the mountainous region east of Manila, piles of munitions having been burnt by the enemy's air-raid, traffic suspended, they dragged into their positions the provisions and other materials which had some time ago been carried to the front of their positions and built roads and positions. Thus they were awfully dismayed.

E. Toward the 7th, we were informed that the U. S. forces penetrating into Manila were not so mighty the main force of which was at QUEZON and SANJUAN DELMONTE (the north-eastern suburbs of Manila) and that the traffic and communication between the units in the vicinity of Manila and those in the east quarters became difficult owing to the irregular hostilities opened between both sides at the PAKO station (located near the centre of Manila City and many storehouses for our war supplies) and to the advanced enemy forces on the north bank of the River PASSIK on the north of MCKINLEY. So we intended, before everything, to get out of this difficulties, to transport the munitions which had been being carried forward in the vicinity of the River MARIKINA to the eastern mountainous region and to restore the communication with Manila. For these purposes, it was decided to make a part of the forces sally out from the eastern mountainous region and the order was given to that effect. However, it was too late to equip them for the sally, especially, it was hard work to make the troops, prepossessed with the idea of taking the defensive in the mountains, sally out to the plain. Finally, the operations was postponed until the morning of the 24th.

But, since they had no fire-arms under the domination of the enemy air force, not only did they lose vigour and become slow in their sallying movement but also provisions ran short, and thus they were idling away their time. Meantime, the troops in the City of Manila were urged by the Area Army Commander to immediately withdraw from the City to the eastern direction, but while the communication with Manila City ended in failure, the sallying unit withdrew to the former position on the 21st. Such being the case, our forces (mainly the navy) in the City of Manila found it difficult to escape from the City besieged by the enemy. Thereafter, repeated telegraphic orders nor the boats for crossing the River of MARIKINA and the troops dispatched to cover their picking up into the boats proved effective, but a report was received saying, 'The enemy's complete siege and incessant illumination around us enable none of us to escape here.'

In the meantime, however, there was a certain section of our army forces in the City of Manila which escaped there under cover of darkness led by a company commander. And there was a naval force stationed in the vicinity of MACKINLEY retreated to the east since about the 15th.

F. After all, it can be concluded that our forces in Manila, suffering from surprised attacks, were in chaos from start to finish, owing to the activities of a large number of guerilla, panic-stricken refugees, confused commissary units and hospitals, etc. still remaining

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unarmed in the City, irregular struggles by the naval forces unaccustomed to land fighting etc. Meanwhile, the SHIMBU Group Headquarters remaining in the mountain of MONTA LEAN endeavoured to obtain every available information, though they could not ascertain the actual condition due to still deficient networks of communication and observation in the mountain. It was on February 18 that they came to confirm the general progress of battles. Yet the details of the state in the City remained uncertain for them. Some liaison men we had sent there did not return in the end.

3. I will refer to the state of affairs in the BATANGAS Province and thereabout.

The former 8th Division which had been stationed in this district removed, led by the Divisional Commander, to the east of Manila at the close of December. And the remaining troops were left under the command of a colonel. As it was difficult to communicate with them due to their separation by the Lake RAGNA from the main force, we were informed of the condition in this district only through wireless reports.

Up to that time, the guerilla had been considerably active in this district. Now that our force decreased, their activity seemed to have grown in violence. It was inferred from the wireless reports that they were in great difficulties fighting with "the American-Philippine army" and "the superior enemy and Guerilla" forces, nevertheless the details were of course uncertain. As their area of operations was thus separated, they took actions as an independent detachment to which the SHIMBU headquarters could hardly give orders while they fought. The troops in this district were ordered, as their duty, "to hold in check the enemy's landing and advance, taking up the established positions in the vicinity of BATANGAS, and then to occupy the height on the south bank of the Lake RAGNA in order to cover the left flank of the main force of the Group."

4. I will dwell upon the actions taken by the Area Army Commander toward the Philippine inhabitants.

A. General YAMASHITA was rigid particularly in the military discipline. In respect to avoiding troubles to the inhabitants, he ordered the troops, even in case those stationed in the towns until then as well as those reinforced from Japan were removed for the purpose of operations, to restrain (almost prohibit) themselves to the utmost from using any private building and to make it a fundamental rule to be in camp. Besides, he always confirmed this point when he sent us to the place concerned and also he, since his arrival at his post in Manila, used barracks or those similar to them for his residence in order to set an example in person.

B. They were also required in general to pay the inhabitants for their food-stuffs, utensils, etc. which they had used and, in an unavoidable case, to give an I.O.U. in place of them and, besides, to obtain their consent. Even when the Group ran out of provisions in May of the 20th year of SHOWA (1945) in the operations among the mountains east of Manila, I saw that the Commander ordered the troops under his command, by a bulletin, to carry out the instructions from the Area Army Commander and that commanders under him also ordered their men to that effect.

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C. In case of purging and suppressing the guerilla, he instructed the whole army to carefully discriminate through precise information between guerilla and peaceable people in order to avoid any such action as mistaking peaceable one for the enemy. For this purpose, "Armed guerilla" was definitely indicated suppressive operations.

D. "How to Escape from War Disasters' for the inhabitants," especially, "How to Escape' for the citizens of Manila" were put in writing and also arrangements were made for their course of escape in order to prevent them from being mixed with our troops on their taking refuge. Not only that, in the City of Manila, staff-officers of the Manila Defense Headquarters who had good experience in taking care of the citizens in the past were left behind, in consideration of preventing them from causing misunderstanding with our army.

5. I will explain how we directed the treatment of war prisoners and of internees of the hostile Powers.

A. About the middle of December of the 19th year of SHOWA (1944) when the indications of the U.S. army's attack against IJUZON became clear, the divisions concerned were instructed to deliver war prisoners and internees peaceably to the U.S. army when they arrived there, to have them carry provisions for one month at least with them, and to escort them against bandits. The SHIBU Group, in accordance with the above instructions, delivered some 4,000 in Manila and SAINT THOMAS and 3,000 in LOSBAGNIOE to them.

B. Delivery at Manila.

On the evening of February 3 when Manila City was surprised by the American-Philippine forces and the Camp was besieged by the U.S. tank corps, Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI, the Head of the Camp, with the intention of avoiding eventual spread of disaster to the internment buildings, mustered his staff (I remember they numbered 30 or so.) in the main office and negotiated with the U.S. army. The U.S. army, on the other hand, proposed to him that, though they would comply with the delivery of all the internees, the Japanese forces should wholly be disarmed. The Head of the Camp expressed himself that, although his main duty would conclude with peaceable delivery of the internees, yet they could not stand immediate surrender as the Japanese soldiers and that either they would remove to the Japanese positions individually in arms or, if there was no alternative, they all preferred to fight to death. After negotiations were repeated and as the representatives of the internees gave the U.S. army an advice, saying, "These Japanese looked after us very well," the U.S. army replied that they would comply with the Japanese proposal and that they would immediately lead the way to a safety zone. Accordingly, the Head of the camp ordered some of his men to be in full arms, had them put the Camp buildings in order and took a roll-call of his men, and they departed there, bidding farewell to the internees. For fear of a possible surprise attack by the U.S. army after going out of the gate, they went forward, making preparations ready to fight. While on the contrary, a colonel of the U.S. army, who guided us was so gentlemanly (a man of BUSHIDO after a Japanese expression) that he warned the Japanese

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troops against misunderstanding by the ordinary U.S. troops and told them to walk along either side of road. He, at the head of them in person, led them safely to outside the disposition of the U.S. army and then shook hands with the Head of the Camp. The Head expressed his gratitude to the colonel for his kindness. They bade farewell, wishing each other good health. The above was the personal report of the Head of the Camp after his return.

C. Delivery at LOSBAGNIOS.

It seemed that, as this district was located at a long distance from the SHIPBU Group Headquarters, there was misunderstanding for while due to the difficulty of communication. As a result, about the middle of January, the Head of the Camp tried without leave, to set the internees free and to retreat to a safety zone. So the Commander ordered him, in accordance with the intention of the Area Army Headquarters, to protect them in safety and to supply them with food until the arrival of the U.S. army. The Head of the Camp again took them in the former place and later, when the U.S. army arrived there, sent a messenger to KALABA to propose their delivery to the U.S. army. In the end, the purpose was accomplished by setting them free at LOSBAGNIOS.

D. Transportation of the U.S. war prisoners to Japan.

War prisoners were to be transported to Japan by order of the Army Minister and on the ships assigned by the Imperial Headquarters. Early in October of the 19th year of SHOWA (1944), war prisoners were ordered to be transported to Japan. So healthy prisoners of the KABANATSEAN Camp were gathered at Manila where they awaited the order, but there was no assignment of ships. They were left there as they were. After the LEYTE operations, however, successive access of the U.S. army to LUZON Island made us wary ourselves, when those war prisoners were ordered about December 10 to sail on board the OYOKU-MARU by which the Japanese women and children were to be sent home and they departed from Manila on board the ship. This transportation was carried out by the order given by the predecessor to General YAMASHITA at as early as the beginning of the year. The staff of the Headquarters including General YAMASHITA were ignorant of these circumstances until the OYOKU-MARU was air-raided by the U.S. air forces.

6. I will make a statement on the condition of our knowledge of the real state of the forces in various districts and on the real condition of communication.

Lack of preparations for the operations, especially, inferiority in wireless equipment; the complete command of the air in the daytime by the U.S. army; the difficulty of traffic within our province cut to pieces by the enemy and guerilla; and, in addition, the disorder of our forces, which fought in the vicinity of Manila, being hastily formed including those troops in rear-service, patients discharged from hospitals; and, moreover, abrupt joining by the air and naval landing forces which had no former connection with us. These circumstances prevented us to get from them available reports as desired. Consequently, the Headquarters took great pains. As a striking instance, it was when we read a magazine of the U.S. army in the camp after the termination of the war that we for the first time learned the fact that, as early as on February 4 or 5,

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the powerful U.S. forces had advanced from the south to the southern side of Manila City. An it was beyond all our imagination that an accident had occurred in Manila and BATANGAS districts. Accordingly, we neither received any report on such a matter nor made any report to the superiors.

On this 26 day of AUG. 1947  
At I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT KOBAYASHI, Shujiro (Seal)

I, OKAMOTO, Shoichi, heroby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At the same place

Witness: /S/ OKAMOTO Shoichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KOBAYASHI, Shujiro (seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES, et al

-fs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361  
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: /S/ KODAMA, Kyūzō (seal)

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I. I, KODAMA, Kyūzō, served in the War Ministry as Chief of the Military Service Section, Military Affairs Bureau, during the period between March, 1940, and June, 1944. The duties of the Military Service Section covered matters concerning military discipline, punishment, regulations of various sorts relative to military service, and the proper duties of individual soldiers, etc.

II. Inasmuch as discipline was the backbone of the army, all army forces as well as the central authorities concentrated their best efforts on its enforcement. The central authorities annually called to Tokyo all the division commanders in the homeland as well as the staff chiefs and chief judicial officers of forces stationed at home and abroad in order to give them instructions through the Three Heads of the Army who never failed to lay special stress on the enforcement of military discipline. Moreover, sometimes staff chiefs were called to a special meeting for the exclusive purpose of enforcing discipline.

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Appendix I, 1--3, are specimens of such instructions.

I.I. In Japan primary importance was attached above all to the strengthening of command power as the basis of military discipline. By emphasizing this point, it was held, it was possible to keep the members of the army away from possible misbehavior and to change for the better the characters of those who had committed any such misbehavior. In time of war, however, more immediate and concrete measures were taken in addition to this in order to prevent such mis-conduct as might result from the abnormal circumstances at the front as well as the lowered moral standard of the troops owing to the increase in army personnel.

In the following paragraphs I shall describe measures taken by the central authorities in relation to those types of mis-conduct which are now being tried by military tribunals at various places.

IV. Education and guidance given by the military at the time were as follows:

(1) Manuals: --

Enforcement of military discipline and raising of morale are emphasized in every manual. Especially, the training manual clearly points out the way thereto. It requires soldiers, right from their start for the front, to be careful about the maintenance of military discipline, and the necessary example to be shown to the natives in fighting areas for the heightening of the prestige of the Japanese forces.

(2) As for international law and regulations, both officers and <sup>men</sup> were given necessary training in a sensible way. For instance, teaching concerning the Red Cross Treaty was given in Military Training Manual



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No. 60, and the law text-book for the Military Academy Preparatory School (Appendix No.7) dealt with Land Warfare Regulations. In order that the said international laws and regulations be strictly observed, concrete instructions were given concerning operational movements -- such as the action of a sentry, instructions concerning billeting, and requisition of materials -- and also about the treatment of prisoners of war.

The central authorities did not receive any formal information whatever concerning such cases as appeared before the military tribunals. Consequently, the measures taken by the central authorities were not in most cases adequate for the actual cases to which they were applied. However, in view of the prolonged warfare and the declining tendency of the character and intelligence of troops, necessary principles regarding the education, control, and guid of forces were given, attention was called to them, and other necessary military measures were taken..

1. Wartime Service Manual was compiled and distributed to the officers at large to be used as their reference material and guide-book during their service at the front. Its compilation being deemed necessary, was carried out in 1938 (Showa 13) by the Inspectorate-General of Military Training in view of experiences gained up to that time through service abroad.

2. Military discipline and morale Investigation Corps were sent out for investigation and guidance. Staff members of the central authorities were specially ordered in 1939 (Showa 14) to make an inspection tour to various spots in China for a period of some two months. After their return, the central authorities gave all units a guide to rigid enforcement of military discipline and morale, and adopted military administrative measures for

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the sake of the enhancement of recreation facilities and adequate methods of replacement.

3. Articles brought back from abroad by the military men and civilians in the military service on their return to their homeland, were strictly inspected and controlled by every unit, at every port of embarkation, landing spot in the homeland, as well as by the home unit, thereby to discover and prevent breaches of discipline and, above all, plundering in the battle-field.

(4) The copies of the "Instructions to the Men at the Front" were distributed in the 16th year of Showa (1941) for the heightening of morality at the front. As the war was prolonged, a fear of the decline of morality and especially of possible plundering and violations came to be felt. To meet the situation, the said "Instructions" was compiled by the central authorities and distributed in the name of the Minister of War. Every military man at the time always carried a copy of it with him, and by respectfully reading it day and night, exerted himself to comply with the teachings given in it.

(5) In the 17th year of Showa (1942), a part of the Army Criminal Code was revised by Law No. 35. By this change, necessary provisions were newly added or amended in relation to military offences, for the sake of the strengthening and rigid enforcement of military discipline.

It is especially notable, in these changes, that the crime of rape at the front was prescribed as a crime for which "prosecution may be instituted without any complaint by the injured party."

(6) The central authorities gave several times strict warning against

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private punishments. It was applied to the treatment of prisoners of war and the native population as well as to Japanese Military Men.

(7) Great care was taken by the central authorities as to the prevention of offences and crimes against the natives. A special term "offences against the natives" was invented, and a statistic study of crimes and misdeeds, was made, to which the authorities called the attention of every unit.

(8) The Military Administrative Order was revised in August, 18th year of Showa (1943). An item was added to it that the order was to be applied also to the forces at the front (The Order No.1), and regiment-commanders, it was stated, should give lessons and guidance to their subordinates about the rules for treating the natives. (The Order No.24)

(9) In order to pull back to the right course the mind of soldiers who unawares had become dissipated through prolonged service in the field and especially through disasters and dangers caused by fighting, adequate considerations were taken for affording every possible convenience for forwarding of letters and dispatches from their homes, forwarding comforts, sending out entertainment groups, as well as for the promotion of recreation facilities at the front, for instance, organization of film corps to make visits and establishment of Military Men's clubs, etc.

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On this 20th day of August, 1947

At I. I. T. F. E.

DEPONENT KODAMA, Kyūzō (seal)

I, INOUE, Masutarō hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

at I. I. T. F. E.

Witness: /S/ INOUE, Masutarō (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KODAMA, Kyūzō (seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent : -- MURATA, Shōzō.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. The outline of my political career is generally as follows:

The Minister of Communications in the Second KONOYE Cabinet (1940) (For a while I was concurrently the Railway Minister but later exclusively Minister of Communications)

Concurrently Minister of Communications and Minister of Railways in the Third KONOYE Cabinet. (1941) I resigned along with the resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet on October 14, 1941.

I arrived at my post as Advisor to the Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands on February 11, 1942.

After the independence of the Philippines on October 14, 1943, I was the Japanese Ambassador Plenipotentiary

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to the Philippines until August, 1944.

2. I will now make a statement on the political affairs of the Philippine Islands before and after her independence.

The Philippine Islands were under the military administration of the Japanese army when I arrived at my post there. At that time, the Army Commander was out in the field at the Corregidor and Bataan fronts and, as to political affairs, there was a military governor in Manila who was in charge of the military administration mainly bearing the responsibility of government. However, in so far as the domestic administration was concerned we entrusted it to the important persons of the Philippines who organized the Administrative Committee and were allowed to take charge of administration in accordance with the intention of the Japanese Army. The chairman of the Committee was Mr. Vargas. I recollect that the Administrative Committee was organized on January 23, 1942. The members of this Committee at first took an attitude of assisting the Japanese Army merely for the sake of maintaining peace in the Philippine Islands. But, Premier TŌJŌ's speech in the Japanese Diet on January 21, 1942, to the effect that Japan was willing to honor them with independence if the Philippines would henceforth understand the Japanese intention and act in concert with Japan, made a very favourable impression on the Filipinos and as they gradually grew to recognize the Japanese Army better, they

came to appreciate the true motives of Japan. And they (TN: the members of the Committee) gradually came to take a co-operative attitude towards the Japanese Army. Of course, since it was a period of military administration, things did not go as Filipinos desired completely. Moreover, not only were the Japanese troops fighting in Corregidor and Bataan but also former Filipino troops and troops of the U. S. army remained in various quarters. It was, accordingly, only natural that good government could not be expected, since the military administration was conducted on the field of battle. A little later, Bataan and Corregidor fell and the majority of the U. S. and Filipino troops there, both officers and men, were made war prisoners of war. But some of them escaped and filtered into various quarters who, together with the various people who had heretofore been there, all changed to wage guerilla warfare. Things, therefore, came to such a pass as to compel us to make an effort in mopping up the guerillas in their various quarters. The administration in Manila on the part of the Filipinos, however, greatly improved, as Manila was the centre and was the pivot of everything. In January of the following year, the 18th year of SHŌWA (1943), Premier TŌJŌ issued a concrete statement in the Diet to the effect that Japan would grant independence to Philippines in the near future and as a result of which the Philippines

became independent on October 14 of the same year. The Philippines thus became independent, and they first began with the revision of the Constitution, essential to independence. In revising the Constitution, the Army appointed as Chairman of the Constitution Revision Committee Mr. Laurel, who had the established reputation of trustworthiness as well as being conversant with the Constitution and an authority on the legal affairs of the Philippine Islands. The Revision Committee was created according to Mr. Laurel's opinion. The Constitution Revision Committee was hereupon formed with all of the members of the aforementioned Administrative Committee (Chairman Mr. Vargas) together with other civilians of excellent character. The Constitution was revised by these members and, on October 14 of the 18th year of SHŌWA (1943), the Philippines became independent and an independent government, was established. At this time, the National Assembly was called in accordance with the new Constitution. Owing to the pressing of time, however, the new Constitution provided for provisional regulations for electing the Assembly members, according to which the members assembled and, in that session, conducted the Presidential election and elected Mr. Laurel President. Then President Laurel personally selected the Cabinet members and put the administrative machinery into operation according to the constitution. Towards the revision of the



Constitution, Japan assumed a non-interference policy. That is, the republican form of government was adopted as before as the form of government for the Philippine Islands and both the national flag and territory were left just as before. Some of the Japanese people were said to be of the opinion regarding territory, "We hope Mindanao Island will be reserved for Japan in view of future military and other purposes." Premier TŌJŌ strongly maintained this must absolutely not be done. "We should not lay our hands on it in the slightest." As a result, the entire territory became that of the Republic of the Philippines.

As for the national language of the Philippines, the TAGALOG language became the official language after the independence, whereas it was English and Spanish prior to independence. For instance, President Laurel made speeches in the TAGALOG language. And the Foreign Office which did not exist prior to independence was created thereafter, and a most influential man was appointed Foreign Minister. Moreover, American procedure was followed in the Philippine Assembly as to either the form of bills introduced by members or their method of introduction. And in these bills, it seemed to me that Japan did not interfere hardly at all. Afterwards, even when some of the bills were not particularly desirable, they did not seem to have

been interfered with so much.

Not only that, the Japanese advisors to the Philippine Government numbered three, each of whom was respectively in charge of finance, police, and scientific matters, respecting the wishes of President Laurel. In short, I think this course of action was not contrary to the central policy of Japan of having Filipino have their own way in government and having them independently administer the affairs of state from their own will. With such ideas as mentioned above, we did various things for the benefit of the Philippines towards their independence. Let me mention a few within my knowledge:

- A. The birth-place of RIZAL, who had advocated the independence of Philippines since the time of Spain's reign and whose statue was situated at the place of his execution, had been forgotten by the Filipino people. A house was built at his birth-place just as it was when he was born, to encourage the spirit of independence in the Filipino people;
- B. Aiming at cultivating men of ability necessary for an independent state, outstanding youths were selected twice a year and were sent to Japan to study, entering the schools of their own choice;
- C. At the first anniversary of Philippine Independence, the Japanese Government donated 500,000 pesos as the Ambassador's gift in honor of the occasion, suggesting that

it be spent for the purpose of educating the young people of the Philippines and that everything would be left to the Philippines as to its use. Both the President and the Minister of Education were over joyed.

D. Agricultural improvement in the Philippine Islands was of the first consideration for an agricultural nation like the Philippines and great effort was put forth in this field ever since the time of the military administration. We had the Director of the Agricultural Affairs Bureau of the Philippine Government inspect Formosa accompanied by 5 or 6 accomplished scientists of agriculture. The Government-General of Formosa gave them free rein and allowed them to inspect wherever they wished. And we had them compare the condition of the Philippines developed under U. S. control for 40 years, with the results of Japan's efforts in the administration of Formosa for 40 years since she got possession of it. On inspecting Formosa, they were greatly surprised at and lost in admiration with the results, uttering in the end even such words, as, "I don't care even if someone thinks we received a bribe from Formosa;"

E. As Advisor to the Army, I also set up an inquiry committee on industry, economy, culture, education and the various matters for the sake of contributing to the independence of the Philippines. There were extensive findings made by the U. S. A. of course but they

were naturally made from an American point of view, and I maintained that we must draw up ones based upon an Oriental viewpoint. But Army Headquarters would not agree with me stating that it was not the proper time. So I went to Tokyo to consult with Premier TŌJŌ and he approved it. On the one hand a search was made for outstanding scholars from the general public and on the other, aid was solicited from the presidents of various universities. In the end, the scholars, RŌYAMA, TŌHATA, SUGIMURA, ŌSHIMA, SUKAWA and ITŌ, all came over to the Philippines with their able assistants and took up the survey.

As originally Philippine Islands was entirely dependent on U. S. A. as her possession; it was indeed impossible speaking only from the industrial point of view for her to be independent without relations with America. For instance, the Filipinos are very fond of smoking cigarettes: but they produce only a lot of cigar leaves and no tobacco-leaf and import cigarettes from America. Rice was also insufficient and about 10 percent had to be imported annually. The Philippines was in such a condition and she hardly had qualifications for an independent state, until she was able to produce <sup>herself</sup> for before anything, daily necessities as food first of all, clothing, and others necessities. Therefore, the

technical experts in various fields were sent there from Japan by the military administration to encourage the growing of cotton, yellow tobacco, Formosan rice, etc., looking beyond into the future since as early as the time of the military administration. As for cotton, though it had been grown to some extent since former times, there was some dispute about whether it would grow or not. So we engaged university professors who were experts in cotton to have them study the matter. As they reported that cotton-growing would be possible in some areas, we had them carry it out. Of course it had to be carried out with the understanding of being prepared to take losses for 3 or 5 years at least. We, accordingly, tried to have influential cotton spinning companies or colonization companies, having the capacity to bear the burden, grow excellent cotton after designating these areas for it. As a consequence, these various companies paid heavily but for which they were prepared from the outset. As for tobacco, some districts got very good yields of the yellow leaf variety used in cigarettes. It can be thought that up to now, although it was possible to have been grown, they didn't allow them to and had them depend rather upon import. The Formosan rice crop turned out well in the first year but not so well in the second year.

It was because Japan agreed to protect the Philippines in accordance with the treaty of alliance that an army was not organized at the time of the independence. The constabulary in charge of maintaining internal peace was already established and was reorganized by the Japanese Army. The war situation in the South-Western Pacific area was unfavorable to Japan after the independence of the Philippines. The situation was where there was no knowing when the Philippines might be attacked. Consequently, we are not able to say that the affairs of state were conducted entirely according to the intention of the independent Philippine Government. Moreover, there was the agreement between the Philippines and Japan as mentioned above, to the effect that Japan would assume the defense of the Philippine Islands. At that time, since the Japanese Army was in the position where it had to discharge its own primary military duty on the one hand and to protect the Philippine Islands on the other, the independence of Philippines could not be considered a complete one immediately. The President was well aware of this fact. That the Army would be withdrawn when the war was over was declared by the Commander of the Army and the fact that Premier TOJŌ was of the same opinion was not only known very well by the President but also by myself.

G. Premier TŌJŌ's statement on the independence of the Philippines created such a sensation in the Philippine Islands that the Filipino people were greatly concerned at the time of the resignation of the TŌJŌ Cabinet. I therefore, invited the reporters of the Filipino and Japanese newspapers and told them." Even with resignation of the TŌJŌ Cabinet Japan's policy will not change. Philippine independence shall be recognized as in the past. The declaration at the Greater East Asia Conference is a permanent and immutable one." They were greatly relieved. They thought that well of TŌJŌ in connection with her independence.

Let me give an example which indicates how Premier TŌJŌ was adored by the Filipino people. It happened when he visited the Philippine Islands. Premier TŌJŌ, on alighting from the airplane, directly went to the Ministers, assembled to meet him, and shook hands with them all. As this was completely different from the attitude of the Army Commanders etc, they were very pleased. On the next day, after he spoke to a large audience numbering hundreds of thousand, he returned on foot without taking a waiting automobile to the hotel near by through a crowd of people greeting them as he went along. This was an expression of his attitude to show he was for the Filipino people, without a thought

of personal danger, and they were delighted. Premier TŌJŌ's speech on this occasion gained great popularity. His speech was made at LUNETTA Park in the city of Manila. When the Mayor of Manila expressed his desire, on one occasion, to name it TŌJŌ Park in token of the Philippine people's gratitude, Mr. TŌJŌ refused, saying, "Please don't."

4. As the Commander of the Japanese Army, HOMMA, TANAKA, KURODA and finally YAMASHITA were appointed successively due to various reasons, but Chief of Staff WACHI arrived at his post one or two weeks after my arrival and was in office until YAMASHITA's arrival. He won great popularity as Chief of Staff and as military administrator of the time. He was so zealous in making the Philippines worthy of an independent state by all means that such songs as 'WACHI March' appeared among the people.

3. Now I will make a statement on the "Death March."

I don't think it is clear whether "Death March" is a term to apply to the Filipino war prisoners or to the American war prisoners. I witnessed the American war prisoners on the "March", landing from Corregidor and marching toward the internment camp from the street but there didn't seem to be any deaths in the procession. It was, however, true that there were some deaths among the Filipino war prisoners who marched separately.



of personal danger, and they were delighted. Premier TŌJŌ's speech on this occasion gained great popularity. His speech was made at LUNETTA Park in the city of Manila. When the Mayor of Manila expressed his desire, on one occasion, to name it TŌJŌ Park in token of the Philippine people's gratitude, Mr. TŌJŌ refused, saying, "Please don't."

4. As the Commander of the Japanese Army, HOMMA, TANAKA, KURODA and finally YAMASHITA were appointed successively due to various reasons, but Chief of Staff WACHI arrived at his post one or two weeks after my arrival and was in office until YAMASHITA's arrival. He won great popularity as Chief of Staff and as military administrator of the time. He was so zealous in making the Philippines worthy of an independent state by all means that such songs as 'WACHI March' appeared among the people.

3. Now I will make a statement on the "Death March."

I don't think it is clear whether "Death March" is a term to apply to the Filipino war prisoners or to the American war prisoners. I witnessed the American war prisoners on the "March", landing from Corregidor and marching toward the internment camp from the street but there didn't seem to be any deaths in the procession. It was, however, true that there were some deaths among the Filipino war prisoners who marched separately.

I will now relate the state of affairs when I visited the headquarters of the Japanese Army on Bataan soon after the surrender of the U.S. army there. I witnessed then war prisoners lying on the wayside who, after surrendering at Bataan, had fallen out of the march on their way to camp. When I had a talk with the Commander of the Army, I asked him about this. He answered, saying, "Little did I expect that there were so many. Contrary to my expectations that those who offered to surrender would number 30 or 40 thousand, there were as many as 70 or 80 thousand and I had great difficulty in transporting them. First of all, we had no trucks which, accordingly, compelled us to have them walk. Neither had we so much in the way of rations. Moreover, they were suffering from malaria or other diseases, so we had a very hard time escorting them to the camp." This was the actual state of things. Although it may appear to have been done deliberately to be called the "Death March," I think its results were unavoidable.

This is something I heard from a Filipino of some war prisoners who were deeply moved by the fact that Japanese soldiers on duty in prisoner of war camp, for instance, lived under the same roof and ate the same meals with the war prisoners.

Various kinds of leaflets were said to have been distributed from airplanes during the Philippine offensive

of Commander HONMA. Among these leaflets, was printed, "The Filipino people who will swear allegiance to us shall not be looked upon as our enemy." I think General HONMA entertained this idea to the last, because he released war prisoners one after another in spite of the continuation of the war. This greatly pleased the Filipino people. There are other cases as having helped in getting employment for them, assisting them in their education, etc, but as they would come under hearsay I shall refrain.

On this 6th day of June, 1947

At I.S.T.F.P.

DEPONENT Murata, Shozo (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) Ichiro Kiyose (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

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- 14 - Murata Shozo (seal)

自 次 如 供 巡 行 ハルニ 行 ハルニ 式ニ 從ニ 從ニ 先ツ 紙ノ 通リ 直ニ 標ニ 認シ ンカ  
 自 次 如 供 巡 行 ハルニ 行 ハルニ 式ニ 從ニ 從ニ 先ツ 紙ノ 通リ 直ニ 標ニ 認シ ンカ  
 自 次 如 供 巡 行 ハルニ 行 ハルニ 式ニ 從ニ 從ニ 先ツ 紙ノ 通リ 直ニ 標ニ 認シ ンカ

直 野 供 巡 警

荒 木 直 津 真 他

警

照 米 利 加 合 衆 國 其 他

東 國 防 軍 警 裁 判 所

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一私ノ政治的經歷ハ大凡次ノ通りデス、

第二次近衛内閣（一九四〇年）ノ遞信大臣（一時鐵道大臣兼任、  
後遞信大臣專任）

第三次近衛内閣（一九四一年）ノ遞信大臣、鐵道大臣兼任、一九

四一年十月十四日近衛内閣總辭職トトモニ辭任

一九四二年二月十一日「ヒリツピン」ノ日本軍顧問トシテ着任、

一九四三年十月十四日「ヒリツピン」ニ獨立後「ヒリツピン」ニ

對スル日本ノ室權大使トシテ、一九四四年八月迄在任ス。

一次、三、「ヒリツピン」ノ政治事情ヲ、「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ノ前  
後ニ亙リ述べマス。

私ノ兼任シタ當時ハ「ヒリツピン」ニ軍政ヲ布イテ居リマシタ。

當時軍司令官ハ「コレヒドール」「バタアン」ノ戰地ニ行ツテ居

リマシタ、政治方面ハ軍政畑ガアリ「マニラ」ニ於テ軍政ヲ擔

當シ主トシテ政治ノ衝ニ當ツテ居リマシタ。併シ國內的ノ政治ハ

「ヒリツピン」ノ重要ナル人々ニ委セテ、行政委員會ヲ作り日本

軍ノ意思ノ下ニ政治ニ當ラセマシタ。ソノ行政委員會ノ委員中ハ、

「バルガス」氏デアリマシタ。行政委員会ハ、一九四二年一月二十三日ニ組織セラレタト思ヒマス。此行政委員会ノ委員達ハ、最初ハ單ニ「ヒリツピン」ヲ治安維持ノ爲ニ日本軍ニ助カフ與ヘルトイフ風デシタガ、一九四二年一月二十一日ノ日本ノ機会デ東條總理ガ「ヒリツピン」ガ今後日本ノ意思ヲ了解シテ、日本ト同調スルニ於テハ、獨立ノ光榮ヲ與フルニ吝カデナイト云フ演説ヲセラレタノガ「ヒリツピン」人ノ多大ノ好感ヲ以テ迎ヘラレ、又日本軍ニ對スル諒解ニ段々深マツテ來ルニツレテ、日本眞意ヲ了解スルヤウニナツテ來マシタ。而シテ段々彼等モ日本軍ニ協力的態度ヲ採ル様ニナツテ來マシタ。勿論、之ハ軍政時代デアリマスカラ、「ヒリツピン」人ノ思フ様ニハ行キマセヌ。而モ、日本軍ハ「コレヒドール」「パタアン」デ戦争ヲシテ居ルノミナラズ各方面ニ「ヒリツピン」ノ從來ノ兵隊、或ハ「アメリカ」ノ兵隊ガ殘ツテ居リ、從ツテ軍政ハ戰場化シテ居ル處ニ行ハレテ居ルノデ、立派ナ政治ガ出來ナイノハ當然デアリマスガ、其後暫ク經ツテカラ、「パタアン」ト「コレヒドール」ガ陷落シ、其處デ「アメリカ」及「ヒリツピン」ノ將兵ノ大部分ハ俘虜オナリマシタガ、其ノ一部ガ抜ケ出シテ各方面ニ潛行シ、從來カラ居ツタ各

方面ノ人々ト共ニ、皆「ゲリラ」ニ轉化シマシタ。從ツテ、各地方ノ「ゲリラ」ノ掃蕩ニカテ盡  
 サネバナラヌ状態ニナツテ來マシタ。併シ「マニラ」ニ於ケル「ヒリツピン」側ノ行政トイフモノハ、中央デモ  
 アリ又凡有ルモノノ中心デモアリ之等ガ非常ニロク成ツテ來マシタ。翌昭  
 和十八年一月ニ、東條總理ガ議會ニ於テ近ク「ヒリツピン」ニ獨立ヲ與ヘ  
 ルト言フコトヲ具體的ニ聲明ヲ發シ、其結果同年十月十四日ニ「ヒリツピ  
 ン」ハ獨立シタノデアリマス。斯様ニシテ「ヒリツピン」ハ獨立シタノデ  
 アリマスガ先ズ獨立スル爲ニ必要ナ憲法ノ改正ヲ行ヒマシタ。此憲法ノ改  
 正ニハ、豫而憲法ニ精進シ「ヒリツピン」ノ法制通デアリ且ツ人物ヲ確リ  
 シタ點ヲ定評ノアル「ラウレル」氏ヲ起用シ、憲法改正委員長ニ、軍ガ任  
 命シマシタ。「ラウレル」氏ノ意見ニヨリ改正委員會ガ出來マシタ。其委  
 員ハ先程申述ヘマシタ行政委員會（委員長「バルガス」氏）ノ委員全部ト  
 其外ニ民間ノ立派ナ人選ヲ加ヘ、茲ニ憲法改正委員會ガ成立シタ。譯デアリ  
 マス。是等ノ人々ニヨツテ憲法ハ改正セラレ、昭和十八年十月十四日「ヒ  
 リツピン」ガ獨立シテ獨立政府ガ出來マシテ其時ニ此新憲法ニヨツテ議會ヲ  
 召集シタノデアリマスガ時間ガナカツタモノデスカラ此新憲法デ極ク暫定



的ノ議員選舉法ヲ定メ、ソレニヨツテ議員ガ集マツテ來テ其ノ議會デ大統領ノ選舉ガ行ハレ「ラウレル」氏ガ大統領ニ選舉セラレタノデアリマス。ソレカラ「ラウレル」大統領ノ考ヘテ閣員ヲ決メマシテ、政治機構ヲ憲法ニ從ツテ行ツタノデス。

此憲法ノ改正ニ方リマシテハ、日本ハ何等ノ干涉ヲ行ハナイト云フ方針デアリマシタ。

即チ「ヒリツピン」ノ政体トシテ、共和政体ガ其儘採用セラレ、又國旗モ領土モ其儘デス。此領土ニ就テハ日本ノ一部ノ人々ハ「ミンダナヲ」島ハ日本ノ將來ノ軍事上、其他ノ爲メ日本ニトツテ置キ度イ」ト云フ意見ガアツタソウデスガ、東條首相ハ、「之ハ斷ジタイケナイ、少シモ手ヲツケテハナラヌ」ト主張セラレ、其結果領土モ全部「ヒリツピン」共和國ノモノニナリマシタ。

ソレカラ「ヒリツピン」ノ國語ハ獨立前ハ英語、「スベイン」語ガ公用語デアリマシタガ獨立後ハ「タカログ」語ヲ公用語トスルニ至リマシタ。

現ニ「ラウレル」大統領モ「タカログ」貽テ演説ヲシテ居リマス。又  
獨立後ハソレ迄ナカツタ外務省ヲ設ケ、最モ有力ナル人ヲ外務大臣ニ  
充テタノデス。ソレカラ「ヒリツピン」ノ議會ヲ議員ノ提出スル議案  
モ又其提出ノ仕方モ「アメリカ」風デアリマスガ此議案等ニ對シテモ  
日本ハ殆ンド干涉シナイヤウニ私ニハ見エマシタ。其ノ議案ノ中ニハ  
少シ其後面白クナイモノモアツタヨウデスガ、余リ干涉ヲサレナイヤ  
ウデアリマシタ。

又「ヒリツピン」政府ノ日本人顧問ハラウレル大統領ノ新思ヲ尊重シテ財政、警察、科擧ノ方面ニ各一人ツツ三人デアリマシタ。要スルニ「ヒリツピン」人ヲシテ自分勝手ニ政治ヲサキ又「ヒリツピン」人自身ノ考ヲ獨立<sup>立</sup>シテ國政ニ當ラセルト云フ日本ノ中央ノ方針ニ反シテ后ナカツタト私ハ思ヒマス。以上ノヨウナ考ヘノ下ニ「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ニ對シテハ我々ハ私々「ヒリツピン」ノ爲メナルコトヲシマシタ。

私ハ知ル限リノコトヲ二三申上ケマス

(一)「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ヲ「スペイン」時代カフ提唱シテ居タ「リサール」ノ銅像ハ其ノ處刑サレタ地ニ樹ツテ居ルケレドモ生レタ所ハ忘レラレテ居タノデスガ、ソノ生誕地ニ彼ガ生レタ時ノ儀ノ跡ヲ遺テ、「ヒリツピン」人ノ獨立心ヲ鼓舞シタコトガアリマス。

(二)獨立ニ必要ナル人材ヲ養成スルタメ年ニ二回ニ亘リ優秀ノ青年ヲ選抜シテ、日ニ六ニ留學セシメ六人ノ志望スル學校ニ入學サセマシタ。

(三)「ヒリツピン」獨立後第二年目ニ祝意ヲ表スルタメ大使ノ贈物トシテ日本政府カラ五十萬「ペソ」ノ金ヲ寄贈シ「ヒリツピン」ノ青少年教育ノ爲

ニ使ツテ且レ、使途ニツイテハ一切オ發セスルト申出デマシタ處、大統領モ  
文部大臣モ非常ニ喜ンダコトガアリマス。

四「ヒリツピン」ニ於ケル改革ノ改訂ハ、發見タル「ヒリツピン」トシテハ  
ハ何ヨリ大切ナル先決問題デアリ軍政時代ヨリ引ツツキ非常ヲ努力チシマシ  
タ。「ヒリツピン」政府ノ農務局長ヲシテ農事ニ堪能ヲ學者、大人ヲ從ヘ  
テ臺灣ノ視察ヲサセマシタトキ、臺灣總督府デハ彼等ノ希望ニ從ヒ何處デモ  
自由ニ解放シテクレマシタ。ソシテ「ヒリツピン」ガ四十年間「アメリカ」  
ノ支配ノ下ニ開放サレタ状態ト日ニガ臺灣ヲ領有シテ四十年間、臺灣ノ治政  
ニ努メタ結果トヲ比較サセタノデアリマスガ彼等ハ臺灣ヲ視察シテ非常ニ驚  
キ嘆稱ノテ「自分ガ臺灣カウ賄賂ヲ貰ツタト思フ人ガアツテモカマワヌトサ  
エ言ツテ居リマシタ。

(五)私モ、貴ノ顧問トシテ「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ニ資スル爲メニ産業經濟文化  
教育ニ關スル調査命ヲ作り種々調査チシマシタ。勿論「アメリカ」ガ作成シ  
タ廣大ナル調査ハアルケレドモソレハ「アメリカ」ノ目ヲ以テ見タモノデア  
アルカウ、矢張り東洋ノ目ヲ以テ見タモノヲ作ラネバナラナイト私ニ主張シ

又「ヒリツピン」政府ノ日本人顧問ハラウレル大統領ノ新思ヲ尊重シテ財政、警察、科擧ノ方面ニ各一人ツツ三人デアリマシタ。要スルニ「ヒリツピン」人ヲシテ自分勝手ニ政治ヲサセ又「ヒリツピン」人自身ノ考デ獨立シテ國政ニ當ラセルト云フ日本ノ中央ノ方針ニ反シテ居ナカツタト私ハ思ヒマス。以上ノヨウナ考ヘノ下ニ「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ニ對シテハ我々ハ私々「ヒリツピン」ノ爲メナルコトヲシマシタ。

私ハ知ル限リノコトヲ三申上ケマス

(一)「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ヲ「スペイン」時代カフ提唱シテ居タ「リサール」ノ銅像ハ其ノ處刑サレタ地ニ樹ツテ居ルケレドモ生レタ所ハ忘ラレテ居タノデスガ、ソノ生誕地ニ彼ガ生レタ時ノ儀ノ實ヲ確テテ、「ヒリツピン」人ノ獨立心ヲ鼓舞シタコトガアリマス。

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極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

對

荒 木 貞 夫 其 他

宣稱供述替

供述者 村 田 省 藏

自分候我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ於紙ノ通り宣稱ヲ爲シタル上  
次ノ如ク供述致シマス

一私ノ政治的經歷ハ大凡次ノ通りデス、  
第二次近衛内閣（一九四〇年）ノ遞信大臣（一時鐵道大臣兼任、  
後遞信大臣専任）

第三次近衛内閣（一九四一年）ノ遞信大臣、鐵道大臣兼任。一九  
四一年十月十四日近衛内閣總辭職トモニ辭任

一九四二年二月十一日「ヒリツピン」ノ日本軍顧問トシテ着任、  
一九四三年十月十四日「ヒリツピン」獨立後、「ヒリツピン」ニ

對スル日本ノ全權大使トシテ、一九四四年八月迄在任ス。

一次、「ヒリツピン」ノ政治事情ヲ、「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ノ前  
後ニ亘リ述べマス。

私ノ赴任シタ當時ハ「ヒリツピン」ニ軍政ヲ布イテ居リマシタ。  
當時軍司令官ハ「コレヒドール」「パタアン」ノ戦地ニ行ツテ居  
リマシタ。政治方面ハ軍政區ガアリ「マニラ」ニ於テ軍政ヲ擔  
當シ主トシテ政治ノ衝ニ當ツテ居リマシタ。併シ國內的ノ政治ハ  
「ヒリツピン」ノ重要ナル人々ニ委セテ、行政委員會ヲ作り日本  
軍ノ意思ノ下ニ政治ニ當ラセマシタ。ソノ行政委員會ノ委員長ハ、

「バルガス」氏がアリマシタ。行政委員会ハ、一九四二年一月二十三日ニ組織セラレタト思ヒマス。此行政委員会ノ委員選ハ、最初ハ單ニ「ヒリツ」治安維持ノ爲エ日本軍ニ助力ヲ與ヘルトイフ風デシタガ、一九四二年二月二十一日ノ日本ノ議會デ東條總理ガ「ヒリツ」ガ今後日本ノ意思ヲ了解シテ、日本ト同盟スルニ於テハ、獨立ノ光榮ヲ與フルニ吝カデナイト云フ演說ヲセラレタノガ「ヒリツ」人ノ多大ノ好感ヲ以テ迎ヘラレ、又日本軍ニ對スル諒解ニ段々深マツテ來ルニツレテ、日本眞意ヲ了解スルヤウニナツテ來マシタ。而シテ段々彼等モ日本軍ニ協力的態度ヲ採ル様ニナツテ來マシタ。勿論、之ハ軍政時代デアリマスカラ、「ヒリツ」人ノ思フ様ニハ行キマセヌ。而モ、日本軍ハ「コレヒドール」「バタアン」デ戰爭ヲシテ居ルノミナラス各方面ニ「ヒリツ」ノ從來ノ兵隊、或ハ「アメリカ」ノ兵隊ガ殘ツテ居リ、從ツテ軍政ハ戰場化シテ居ル處ニ行ハレテ居ルノデ、立派ナ政治ガ出來ナイノハ當然デアリマスガ、其後暫ク経ツテカラ、「バタアン」ト「コレヒドール」ガ陷落シ、其處デ「アメリカ」及「ヒリツ」ノ將兵ノ大部分ハ俘虜ナリマシタガ、其ノ一部ガ抜ケ出シテ各方面ニ潛行シ、從來カラ居ツタ各



方面ノ人々ト共ニ、皆「ゲリラ」ニ尊化シマシタ。從ツテ、各地方ノ「ゲリラ」ノ掃蕩ニ力ヲ盡  
 サネバナラヌ状態ニナツテヌマシタ。  
 併シ「マユラ」ニ於ケル「ヒリツピン」側ノ行政トイフモノハ、中央デモ  
 アリ又凡有ルモノノ中心デモアリ之等ガ非常ニ日ヲ成ツテ來マシタ。翌昭  
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 ルト言フコトヲ具體的ニ聲明ヲ發シ、其結果同年十月十四日ニ「ヒリツピ  
 ン」ハ獨立シタノデアリマス。斯様ニシテ「ヒリツピン」ハ獨立シタノデ  
 アリマスガ先ズ獨立スル爲ニ必要ナ憲法ノ改正ヲ行ヒマシタ。此憲法ノ改  
 正ニハ、豫而憲法ニ精進シ「ヒリツピン」ノ法制通デアリ且ツ人物ヲ確リ  
 シキ點ヲ定評ノアル「ラウレル」氏ヲ起用シ、憲法改正委員長ニ、軍ガ任  
 命シマシタ。「ラウレル」氏ノ意見ニヨリ改正委員會ガ出來マシタ。其委  
 員ハ先程申述ヘマシタ行政委員會（委員長「バルガス」氏）ノ委員全部ト  
 其外ニ民間ノ立派ナ人選ヲ加ヘ、茲ニ憲法改正委員會ガ成立シタ事デアリ  
 マス。是等ノ人々ニヨツテ憲法ハ改正セラレ、昭和十八年十月十四日「ヒ  
 リツピン」ガ獨立シテ獨立政府ガ出來マシテ其時ニ此新憲法ニヨツテ議會ヲ  
 召集シタノデアリマスガ時間ガナカツタモノデスカラ此新憲法ヲ極ク暫定

的ノ議員選舉法ヲ定メ、ソレニヨツテ議員ガ集マツテ來テ其ノ議會ヲ大統領ノ選舉ガ行ハレ「ラウレル」氏ガ大統領ニ選舉セラレタノデアリマス。ソレカラ「ラウレル」大統領ノ考ヘテ議員ヲ決メマシテ、政治機構ヲ憲法ニ從ツテ行ツタノデス。

此憲法ノ改正ニ方リマシテハ、日本ハ何等ノ干涉ヲ行ハナイト云フ方針デアリマシタ。

即チ「ヒリツピン」ノ政体トシテ、共和政体ガ其儘採用セラレ、又國旗モ領土モ其儘デス。此領土ニ就テハ日本ノ一部ノ人々ハ「ミンダナヲ」島ハ日本ノ將來ノ軍事ト、其他ノ爲メ日本ニトツテ置キ度イ」ト云フ意見ガアツタソウデスガ、東領首相ハ、「之ハ斷ジタイケナイ、少シモ手ヲツケヤハナラヌ」ト主張セラレ、其結果領土モ全部「ヒリツピン」共和國ノモノニナリマシタ。

ソレカラ「ヒリツピン」ノ國語ハ獨立前ハ英語、「スペイン」語ガ公用語デアリマシタガ獨立後ハ「タカログ」語ヲ公用トスルニ至リマシタ

現ニ「ラウレル」大統領モ「タカログ」語ヲ演説フシテ居リマス。又  
獨立後ハソレ迄ナカツタ外務省ヲ設ケ、最モ有力ナル人ヲ外務大臣ニ  
充テタノデス。ソレカラ「ヒリツピン」ノ議會ヲ議員ノ提出スル議案  
モ又其提出ノ仕方モ「アメリカ」風デアリマスガ此議案等ニ對シテモ  
日本ハ殆ンド干涉シナイヤウニ私ニハ見エマシタ。其ノ議案ノ中ニハ  
少シ其後面白クナイモノモアツタロウデスガ、余リ干涉ヲサレナイヤ  
ウデアリマシタ。

又「ヒリツピン」政府ノ日本人顧問ハラウレル大統領ノ意思ヲ尊重シテ財政、警察、科擧ノ方面ニ各一人ツツ三人デアリマシタ。要スルニ「ヒリツピン」人ナシテ自分勝手ニ政治ヲサセ又「ヒリツピン」人自身ノ考テ獨立シテ國政ニ當ラセルト云フ日本ノ中央ノ方針ニ反シテ后ナカツタト私ハ思ヒマス。以上ノヨウナ考ヘノ下ニ「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ニ對シテハ我々ハ私心知ル所リノコトヲニ三申上ケマス

(一)「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ヲ「スペイン」ノ時代カフ提唱シテ居タ「リサール」ノ銅像ハ其ノ處刑サレタ地ニ樹ツテ居ルケレドモ生レタ所ハ忘レラレテ居タノデスガ、ソノ生誕地ニ彼ガ生レタ時ノ益ノ家ヲ建テテ、「ヒリツピン」人ノ獨立心ヲ鼓舞シタコトガアリマス。

(二)獨立心ニ必要ナル人材ヲ養成スルタメ年々二回ニ百リ優秀ヲ青年ヲ選抜シテ、日本ニ留學セシメ六人ノ志望スル學校ニ入學サセマシタ。  
 (三)「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立後第二年目ニ祝意ヲ表スルタメ大使ノ贈物トシテ日本政府カラ五十萬「ペソ」ノ金ヲ寄贈シ「ヒリツピン」ノ青少年教育ノ爲

ニ使ツテ辱レ、使途ニツイテハ一切オ藝セスルト申出デマシタ處、大統領モ  
文部大臣モ非無ニ喜ンダコトガアリマス。

四「ヒリツピン」ニ於ケル藝事ノ改革ハ、皇親國タル「ヒリツピン」トシテハ  
ハ何ヨリ大切ナル先決問題デアリ軍政時代ヨリ引ツツキ非常ヲ努力チシマシ  
タ。「ヒリツピン」政府ノ農務局長ヲシテ農事ニ堪能ヲ學者ヲ、大人ヲ從ヘ  
テ臺灣ノ田察ヲサセマシタトキ、臺灣總督府デハ彼等ノ希望ニ從ヒ何處デモ  
自由ニ解放シテクレマシタ。ソシテ「ヒリツピン」ガ四十年間「アメリカ」  
ノ支配ノ下ニ開放サレタ狀態ト日本ガ臺灣ヲ領有シテ四十年間、臺灣ノ治政  
ニ努メタ結果トチ比較サセタノデアリマスガ彼等ハ臺灣ヲ觀察シテ非常ニ驚  
キ嘆稱ノ語「自分ガ臺灣カラ賄賂ヲ貰ツタト思フ人ガアツテモカマワヌトサ  
エ言ツテ居リマシタ。

五「私モ、貴ノ顧問トシテ「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ニ資スル爲メニ産業經濟文化  
教育ニ關スル調査會ヲ作り種々調査チシマシタ。勿論「アメリカ」ガ作成シ  
タ廣大ナル調査ハアルケレドモソレハ「アメリカ」ノ目ヲ以テ見タモノデ  
アルカラ、矢張り東洋ノ目ヲ以テ見タモノヲ作ラネバナラナイト私ニ主張シ

マシタガ同司令部デハマダ時松デナイト云ツテ賛成シナカッタガ、上京シテ  
東條總理ニ既スト、東條總理ハ賛成シテ呉レマシタノデ一面民間ニ於ケル優  
秀ナル學者ヲ物色シ他面各大學ニ行ツテソノ各總長ニ依頼シテ結局臘山、東  
畑、杉村、大島、末川、伊藤、等學者連ガ皆立派ナ助手ヲ運レテ來比セラレ  
調査ニ當ツテ呉レマシタ。

元來「フィリッピン」ハ「アメリカ」ノ屬領トシテ全然依在シテ居ツタ  
 ノデ「アメリカ」トノ關係ヲ離レテハ産業上ヨリ云ツテモ獨立ハ事實上  
 不可能デアツタ。一二ノ例ヲ舉ゲマスト「ヒリッピン」人ハ「シガレツ  
 ト」ヲ非常ニ好ミマスガ良葉ハ全々作ラナイデ、唯「シガー」ハ「アメ  
 リカ」カラ輸入シテ居リマシタ。米モ不足デ年ニ一割位輸入シナケレバ  
 ナラナイ。期極ナ状態デアリマスカラ、衣料、食料ヲ初メ日用品ノ如キ  
 先ヅ第一ニ自分ヲ作ラナケレバ、獨立國トシテノ資格ヲ殆ンド具備シ得  
 又状態デアリマシタ。從ツテ棉花、黃色良葉、蓬來米等ノ栽培ノ獎勵ヲ。  
 軍政時代カラ將來ヲ見越シテ軍政ノ下ニ各方面ノ技師ヲ日本ヨリ運レテ  
 來テヤラセマシタ。棉花栽培ハ從來ニ多少ヤツテオリマシタガ、出來  
 ルモノカ台カニ就テ栽培者ガ有リマシタノデ、專問ノ大學教授ヲ招聘シテ  
 調査シテ實ヒマシタ處場所ニヨツテハ棉花ノ栽培ハ可能デアルト云フ報  
 告ガアリマシタノデ、此ノ棉花栽培ヲ行ハセルコトニシマシタ。勿論三  
 年々五年ノ間ハ缺損承知ノ上デシナケレバナラヌノデ其負擔ニ堪ヘ得ル  
 有力ナ紡績ニ社拓殖會社ニ其地畝ヲ指定シテ立派ニ棉花ヲ作ラセヨウト

シマシタ。之ガ爲メ各社ハ大キナ犠牲ヲ謝ヒマシムガ此ノ犠牲ハ始メカ  
ラ覚悟シテ居ツルノデアリマス。植草ハ「シガレット」用ノ黄色イ葉モ  
或ル地方デハ非常ニヨク出来マシム。之ハ今迄寧ロ、出来ルノヲ作ラセ  
ナイデ輸入ニ俟ツテ居々嘆ニ思ハレマシタ。遂來米ハ初年目ハ良クツタ  
ケレドモ二年目ハ余リ豊クナカツタ。

「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立當時、軍隊ノ編成ヲシナカツタノハ同盟條約ニ基  
イテ日本ガ「ヒリツピン」ヲ防禦スルトイフコトニナツテキタカラデ、  
國內治安ニ任スル警察隊ハ出来テ居テ軍デハ之ガ再編成ヲ行ヒマセタ。10  
「ヒリツピン」獨立後ニ於ケル南西太平洋方面ニ於ケル戦局ハ我方ニハ  
不利デ、ツタ。「ヒリツピン」ハ何時攻撃サレルカモ知レヌト云フ状態  
デアリマス。從ツテ、全然「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立政府ノ意思デノミ政治  
ガ行ハレヌト云フコトハ出来マセン。而モ前途ノ如ク「ヒリツピン」ト  
日本軍トノ間ニハ日本ガ「ヒリツピン」ノ防禦ニ當ルト云フ約束ガアリ  
マス。當時日本軍ハ一面ニ於テ日本軍隊自身ノ使命ヲ察サネバナラヌ又  
反面「ヒリツピン」ノ防禦モシナケレバナラヌ立論ニアルノデアリマス



カ、ラ「ヒリツピン」ノ獨立ハ當時區チニ完全ナモノト云フ事ハ出來ナイ  
此點ハ大統領モ良ク承知シテ居リマシタシ、歐爭ガ済メバ軍ハ引上ケル  
トイフコトハ軍司令官モ證明シテ居リマスシ、東條總長ガ同様ノ考ヘデ  
アツタコトハ大統領ノミナラズ私モ疑シク聞イテ居リマス。

(内)比島獨立ニ就テノ東條總理ノ聲明ハ「ヒリツピン」デハ大シタ評判デアリ、ソレガタメ東條内閣ガ能メタ時「ヒリツピン」人ハ非常ニ心配シテ居リマシタノデ、私ハ「ヒリツピン」及日本ノ新聞記者ヲ招ンデ「東條内閣ガ代ツテモ日本ノ方針ハ變ラナイ。「フイリツピン」ノ獨立ハ依然トシテ認メル。大東亞會議——ノ宣言ハ永久不變ノモノデアルト申シマシタ處、首女心シテ笑レマシタ。ソレ程「フイリツピン」獨立ニ就イテハ東條氏ヲ德トシテオリマシタ。

東條總理ガ如何ニ「ヒリツピン」人ニ敬慕サレテ居タカラ示ス一例ヲ舉ゲマセウ。東條首相ガ「ヒリツピン」ニ來ラレタ時ノコトデアリマス。東條首相ガ飛行機カラ降りテ直グ大西連ガ出迎ヘノタメ集合シテ居ル處ニ行キ一同ト握手ヲシタガ之ハ軍司令官等ト全然異ツタ態度デ彼等ハ非常ニ喜ビマシタ。其翌日十數万人集ツタ所デ演説ヲシタアト近クノ「ホテル」迄待テ居タ目撃者ニ乘ラズ群衆ノ中ヲ曾懸シナガラ歩イテ歸リマシタ。之ハ危險ヲ念頭ニ置カズ「ヒリツピン」人ト一語ニヤロウトスル態度ノ現ハレデ「ヒリツピン」人ハ心カラ之ヲ喜ビマ

シタ。

其時ノ東條首相ノ演説ハ大シタ人氣デアリマシタ。其演説ヲシタ場所  
ハ「マニラ」市ノ「ルネタ」(Suneta)公園デアリマス。マニラ市長  
ガ「フイリツピン」人ノ感謝ヲ表ハスタメソノ公園ヲ東條公園ト命名  
シタイト或ル被留ニ東條氏ニ面シタ所ガ東條氏ハ「ヤメテ呉レ」ト祈  
リマシタ。

(内)又軍司令官ハ、僅々ノ軍情ヲ本間、田中、黒田、野後ニハ山下ト代リ  
マシタガ、參謀長ノ和知氏ハ私ガ彼地ニ赴任シテカラー、二週間後ニ  
來任シ、山下氏ガ來ル迄任シテ居リマシタガ、參謀長トシテ、又當  
時ノ軍政官トシテノ和知氏ハ非常ニ評判ガ良カッタ。彼ハ如何ニシテ  
モ「ヒリツピン」ヲ立派ナ獨立國ニシ度イトノ熱意ガアリマシタ。ソ  
ノタメ和知マーチナソノ軟弱ガ彼等ノ間ニ出來マシタ。

一、次ニ「デス・マーチ」トイフコトニ就テ流ベマス。

「デス・マーチ」ト云フコトハ、「ヒリツピン」ノ俘虜ニ當ハメルコ  
トカ、或ハ「アメリカ」ノ俘虜ガ「コレビドール」カラ上ツテ收容所

進行ク其ノ「マーチ」ハ私ハ街ニ立ツテ傍観シマシタガ、其ノ行列ニ  
ハ死人ハナカッタヤウニ思フ。併シ、別ノ行進デアル「ヒリツピン」  
ノ俘虜ノ中ニハ死人ガアツタノハ事實デアリマス。

「バタアン」米軍ノ降服後程ナク「バタアン」ノ軍司令官根據地ニ行  
ツタコトガアリマスノデ其時ノ事情ヲ由シマスト「バタアン」デ降伏  
シタ俘虜デ收容地マデ行進中道端ニ倒レテ居ルモノモ其隊目斃シマシ  
タ。私ハ軍司令官ト話ノ内ニ此擧ニ付テ尋ネタ、軍司令官ハ「コン  
ナニキルトハ思ハナカッタ。降伏スルト言フカラ、人数ハ三、四萬ト  
思ツテ居ツタノニ七、八萬モ居リ實ニ測フノニ困ツタ。第一「トラツ  
ク」モナイシ歩カスヨリ仕方ガナイ、食料モソナ用意ハシテ居ラヌ。  
又彼等ハ「マラリヤ」其他ノ病氣ニ罹ツテキル。ソレヲ收容所マデ送  
ルノニ随分困ツタト云ハレマシタ。之ガ現狀デス。死ノ行進ト云フト  
ワザワザサセタヨウニ見エマスガ、止ムマザル結果ダト思ハレマス、  
ソレカラ之レハ「ヒリツピン」人カラ聞イタ話デスガ、日本ノ兵隊デ  
皆俘虜收容所ノ益ナソハ俘虜ト一擧ニ廢却キタ共ニシ食勿ナソモ同

ジモノダト感敵シテ語ツタ件勝ガアツタト云ヒマス。  
ソレカラ本間軍司令官ガ比島攻撃當時飛行機カラ色々な傳單ヲ撒布シ  
タソウデスガソレニハ「ヒリツピン」人ニシテ我ニ恭順ノ意ヲ表シ來  
ルモノハ敬トシナイ」ト言ツテ居リマス。  
其ノ後今日最後迄、本間將軍ハ待ツテ居ツタト云フノハ戰爭繼續中ニ  
モ解ラズ俘虜ノ逐次釋放シテ居ツタカラデアリマス。之ガ非常ニ「ヒ  
リツピン」人ヲ喜コバセマシタ。其他彼等ノ教育等ニツイテ種々  
心配シタコトナゾニ付テハ傳聞エナリマスカラ述ベマス。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）六月六日於 東京國際立憲裁判所構内

供 送 者 村 田 省 政

右ハ菅立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於

立 會 人 清 瀬 一 郎

宣 誓 書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ

誓フ

署名捺印 村 田 省 茂

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Yasuji WATANABE

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Yasuji WATANABE. I was formerly a captain in the Japanese Navy. From June 1942 until April 1945 I was assigned to the Navy Ministry, Naval Affairs Bureau, and from May 1945 until the termination of the war I was assigned to the Maritime Supervision Board. My duties chiefly encompassed matters concerning the schedule of merchant shipping.

1. At the outbreak of war Japan possessed approximately 6,300,000 tons of merchant ships. This calculation is based on vessels of 100 tons or more in capacity. Largely because of the action of United States submarines against Japanese shipping, in August 1945 this tonnage was reduced to approximately 1,500,000 tons. Since this figure included grounded ships, those requiring repairs and others not capable of immediate sea duty, only 500,000 tons could actually be operated in homeland waters.
2. Ships sunk or damaged by United States submarine activity, aircraft and mines amounted to approximately 1,100,000 tons in 1942, 2,100,000 tons in 1943, 4,100,000 in 1944 and 1,500,000 in 1945 until the end of hostilities. This was a total of approximately 8,800,000 tons.

In spite of a 4,000,000 ton increase in merchant vessel construction, captured ships, etc., there was a great decrease in over-all total tonnage as shown in Annexed Document Number One. The ships newly constructed were inferior in structure and slow in speed thereby hampering the efficiency of the transportation.



3. The commodities carried by these merchant ships varied from time to time, but consisted largely in foodstuffs and those products needed for the war effort. There were service vessels, which consisted of those requisitioned by the military, and civilian vessels, operated without the direct supervision of the military. The service vessels largely confined their activities to the South Seas Area, Malaya and Netherlands Indies, while the civilian vessels ran between China, Manchuria and Japan together with some in the Malayan, French Indo-China and Philippine areas. The merchant traffic consisted of coal, petroleum, grain, iron ore, bauxite, lumber, cement, salt, etc.

4. In order to remedy the situation caused by heavy shipping losses, General Headquarters set up a revised and strengthened convoy escort. But due to lack of necessary escort warships the plan was not effective and a priority was given to the escorting of those convoys carrying petroleum and bauxite. The importation of iron ore from Saipan Island had to be ceased together with the importation of food stuffs from French Indo China. Then in June 1944 after United States troops landed on Saipan the maintenance of the southern sea routes became most difficult. A Maritime Commission composed of military and civilian representatives was set up to seek a solution to the dangerous problem then facing us. The losses had resulted in a miserable condition reflecting heavily on the people's livelihood. Shortages of fertilizer caused a decrease in the harvest of grain and an accompanying 10% cut down in distribution of staple foodstuffs.

Hence the food supply of Japan decreased and the supply of our armed forces overseas likewise became a serious problem. I am able to give the percentage of decrease of supplies to our forces overseas if the Tribunal desires it and have not done so here in order to save time.

5. In 1945 the transportation districts were limited to Manchuria, Korea and Northern China. In addition to enemy submarine activity our loss of merchant shipping became even more acute due to mine laying operations by B-29's. Sea routes were practically restricted

to Japanese home waters and resort had to railway transportation. In view of the prevailing conditions in May 1945 the Maritime Service Supervision Board was set up as an over-all organ to supervise military and civilian water transport but it was too late to do much with the situation since the transportation capacity had been reduced 75% since the outbreak of war. Circumstances of that time are explained in Annexed Document Number Two which shows the amount and kind of cargo carried among the Japanese Islands and to and from Japan proper.

To sum up the whole situation, sea transportation in the latter half of the war was devoted to raw materials for munition industries with a heavy effect upon the people's livelihood. In the final stage of the war, in order to secure a minimum of food commodities to sustain the people, the import of raw materials for war manufactures was almost eliminated. The transportation capacity was then only 21% of the pre-war strength.

On this 29th day of August, 1947  
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: Yasuji WATANABE

I, Yasuji WATANABE, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At the same place.


Witness (signed) AKATANI, Kan (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Yasuji WATANABE (seal)





IRON ORE  
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GRAINS  
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SALT  
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1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

Reference document - 11

# AMOUNT OF MATERIAL TRANSPORTED BY SHIP (AVERAGE AMOUNT MONTHLY)

## LIST II


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
100.000

FERTILIZER  
肥料

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80.000





Def Doc 2171

Exh NO 3103

自分機我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上  
次  
ノ如ク供述致シマス

供述者 渡邊安次

宣誓供述書

荒木貞夫 其他

對

亞米利加合衆國其他

極東國際軍事裁判所

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 661



私は渡邊安次と申します。私は元海軍大佐で一九四三年六月より一九四五年四月迄海軍省以務局に一九四五年五月より終戦時迄海軍總監部に勤務しました。たが右兩期間を通じ主として商船運輸の事にたづさはつて居ました。

一、開戦時日本の保有してゐました百噸以上の商船船腹は約六百三十萬噸ありましたが主として米國潜水艦の攻撃により終戦時には約百五十萬噸に減りました。此の百五十萬噸の中には擱坐船や要修理船等を含むて居りましたので當時實際内地方面に在つて動き得るものは僅かに約五十萬噸に過ぎませんでした。

二、米國潜水艦、飛行機、機雷に依つて沈没損傷した船腹は一九四二年には約百十萬噸、一九四三年には約二百十萬噸、一九四四年には約四百十萬噸、一九四五年の終戦時迄には約百五十萬噸合計屋八百八十萬噸に達しました。新造船拿捕船其他による増加は約四百萬噸ありましたが全体船腹の減少した蒙子附録一に示しました通り莫大であります。

三、新造船は船質が悪くて低速であつたので輸送能率を著しく阻害しました。これ等の船で運ばれた物は時により變化はありましたが主に食糧と軍醫生産に必要な物資でありました。當時船腹は軍徴備船と民用船とに區分されてゐました。軍徴備船は主として東方地區、マレー、蘭印地區へ運航し、民用船は主として日滿鐵に運航し一部、マレー、佛印、菲島方面に運航しました。

民用船で輸送した主なるのは石炭、石油、穀類、鐵鑛石、ボーキサイト、木材、セメント等でありました。

四 船腹の大損害による窮乏を打開する爲に海上護衛總司令部が出来ましたが、  
護衛艦の不足に依り全體的に護衛を強化することが出来なくて特に石油及  
ボーキサイト、船腹を常駐的に護衛することになりました。そして海軍島の

鐵鑛石、佛印の穀類の移入も断念せねばならなくなりました。

角

一九四四年七月米軍がサイパン島に上陸以來、東方航路の維持が非常に困難になりました。そこで友民合同の聯合輸送委員會が設けられてこの難局  
打開に努めました。當時船腹の損失は國民生活の上に甚大なる影響を與へ  
ました。夫は肥料不足による穀類の收穫減少と共に國內の主食配給量を一割  
削減するに到つたことであります。國內への食糧移入と海外部隊への食糧  
補給は共に重大問題となつて來ました。私は茲で時間の節約上、海外部隊  
に對する補給量の減少した「パーセンテージ」は申し上げませんが若し、  
必要とされるならば提出することが出來ます。

五 一九四五年には輸送區域が滿洲、朝鮮、北支と壓縮されました其の上敵潛  
の跳梁の外に日二九による機雷攻撃が加はり商船の損失は益々深刻になり  
ました。そして航路は日本近海に限られる様になりましたので海上輸送は

極力鐵道輸送に轉換せられる様になりました。此の様を狀況を打開する爲に一九四五年五月に軍民船舶輸送を統一する機關として海軍總監部が設けられました。が時既に遅く當時の輸送量は開戦より十五%も減少してゐました。此の狀況は附録第二に示してあります。之は日本内地間及日本海外間に輸送された貨物の親類と量の推移を示したものであります。之を要しまするに戦争後半期間の海上輸送の狀況は國民の生活必需品を犠牲にして兵器を造る原料を輸送して居たのであります。が遂には國民の最低食糧確保の爲に兵器生産用原料の移入も出来なくなつた次第で輸送力は開戦時の二十一%になつて戦争は終つたのであります。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月二十九日於 東京

供 証 者 渡 邊 安 次

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シ  
マス

同日 於

立 証 人 赤 谷 登


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
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AMOUNT OF MATERIAL TRANSPORTED BY SHIP  
( AVERAGE AMOUNT MONTHLY )

LIST - I






IRON ORE  
数値石

GRAINS  
穀類

SALT  
塩

1941

1942



1943

1944

1945



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AMOUNT OF MATERIAL TRANSPORTED BY SHIP  
(AVERAGE AMOUNT MONTHLY)

LIST II

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
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
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DEF. DCC. #2078 RETURN TO ROOM 1361 Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Regulations concerning the Dispatch of POW's .

(21 October 1942 War Ministry ordinance No. 58)

Parts amended, added and deleted by War Ministry Ordinance  
No. 23, 1943.

Dispatch of POW's is, hereby, stipulated as follows:

Regulations concerning the Dispatch of POW's.

- Art. 1 'Dispatch of POW's'; as used in this ordinance, means dispatch of and giving quarters to POW's outside a POW camp in order to assign them to labor tasks. 'Dispatched POW's' means those prisoners who are thus dispatched.
- Art. II Any person other than the Army personnel who desires to have POW's dispatched within the Empire (areas other than Japan Proper, Korea, Formosa not included) shall submit an application for the dispatch of POW's, as shown in the attached form, to the War Minister in order to obtain his approval. The same procedure shall be followed if the applicant desires to change particulars in the application for the dispatch of POW's or in the application already approved by the War Minister.
- The procedure of submitting the above application for the dispatch of POW's shall be given separately.
- Art. II-2 When the War Minister approves the forgoing application, the Minister shall decide the number of prisoners, to be dispatched, and their housing, supervision, labor tasks (location, type of work, working hours, period of labor, etc.), supplies (including wages and canteen facilities), medical treatment, etc. and shall inform the Army Commander or the Garrison Commander who is in charge of the POW camp. (Such person shall be referred to as POW, Camp administrative Chief in the following paragraphs).
- Art. II-3 The POW, Camp administrative Chief shall, on receiving the above mentioned notification, make necessary regulations thereof and shall dispatch the prisoners.

DEF. DOC. #2078

- Art. II-4 Any person other than the Army personnel who is not in the limits of the Empire and desires to have POW's, dispatched shall submit an application for the dispatch of POW's, as shown in the attached form, to the POW Camp Administrative Chief in order to obtain his approval. The same procedure shall be followed if the applicant desires to change particulars in the application for the dispatch of POW's or in the application already approved by the POW Camp Administrative Chief.
- Art. II-5 The POW Camp Administrative Chief shall, on approving the above mentioned application make necessary regulations thereof and shall dispatch the prisoners.
- Art. II-6 When the POW Camp Administrative Chief despatches prisoners in accordance with the preceding article, he shall promptly report to the War Minister the number of dispatched prisoners, their housing, supervision, labor tasks (location, type of work, working hours, period, of labor, etc.), supplies (including wages and canteen facilities), medical treatment, etc.
- Art. III. In case of a public organization or a juridical person submitting an application for the dispatch of POW's a representative thereof shall submit the application.
- Art. IV Any person who is authorized to have prisoners dispatched (such person shall be referred to as employer of dispatched prisoners' in the following paragraphs) shall receive instructions from the chief of the POW Camp who dispatches the prisoners (such person shall be referred to as chief of the POW Camp in the following paragraphs without any modifying clause) with regard to the following: the enforcement of the regulations which were made by the POW Camp Administrative Chief in accordance with Article II-3 or Article II-5; and the particulars in the application for the dispatch of POW's which were approved by the war Minister or by the POW Camp Administrative Chief in accordance with the provisions of Art. II or Art. II-4. Regarding the enforcement of the above, the employer of dispatched prisoners shall be visited at any time by the chief of the POW camp for inspections.
- Art. V. The employer of dispatched prisoners shall make rules and obtain approval of the POW Camp Administrative Chief concerning the enforcement of the regulations which were made by the POW Camp Administrative Chief in accordance with article II-3 or article II-5 and the particulars in the application for the

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dispatched of POW's which were approved by the War Minister or by the POW Camp Administrative Chief in accordance with the provisions of Art II or Art. II-4. The same approval is also required for the employer in changing the rules.

Art. VI The employer of dispatched prisoners shall provide and maintain the facilities necessary for the prisoners, housing and supervision.

The above mentioned facilities shall generally be in proportion to that of the POW camp.

Art. VII The employer of dispatched prisoners shall provide a necessary number of guards to supervise the dispatched prisoners and place them under the command of the personnel from the POW camp which sent the prisoners. (Such camp shall be referred to as POW Camp in the following paragraphs without any modifying clause)

The number of the above mentioned guards shall be one for about every 30 prisoners.

Art. VIII The employer of dispatched prisoners shall supervise the prisoners' labor tasks.

The above supervision of labor tasks may be assumed by the guards mentioned in the preceding article.

Art. IX The employer of dispatched prisoners shall be responsible for providing the entire or part of the provisions, beddings, heating fuel, daily necessities, traveling expenses (including expenses required in sending and returning prisoners) and other supplies for the dispatched prisoners. Such supplies shall generally be in proportion to those given within the POW camp, with the following exceptions:

Salaries for the officer prisoners and the enemy medical personnel dispatched; clothings to be supplied to the prisoners when their worn-out clothings can no longer be used.

Art. X The employer of dispatched prisoners shall pay the required wages to the Chief of the POW camp each month by the date fixed by the chief of the P.O.W. camp.

Art. X-2 The employer of dispatched prisoners shall provide a canteen in accordance with the relevant regulations made by the chief of the POW camp.

Art. XI As regards the medical treatment of dispatched prisoners, the employer of dispatched prisoners shall be in charge of the matter.



With regard to the medical treatment of dispatched prisoners who need to be hospitalized, the matter will be ruled by the chief of the POW camp.

Art. XI-2 The employer of dispatched prisoners may offer to the chief of the POW camp money or commodities in order to encourage the dispatched prisoners in their labor tasks or to help to lighten their hardship.

When the chief of the POW camp considers such contribution to be harmless from the standpoint of the control of prisoners, he shall approve the above contributions and shall offer them to the dispatched prisoners as the case may require.

Art. XII In case a dispatched prisoner dies, it shall be so reported that the date of the deceased's return to the POW camp be the date of his death.

Art. XIII The employer of dispatched prisoners' shall keep a diary in accordance with the relevant regulations made by the chief of the POW camp and shall record all necessary matters concerning the dispatched prisoners.

Art. XIV The employer of dispatched prisoners' shall report to the chief of the POW camp in accordance with the relevant regulations made by the chief on 10th, 20th and at the end of each month as to the condition of dispatched prisoners (results of labor tasks, health condition, and any other important matters).

Art. XV In case the employer of dispatched prisoners' violates the regulations which were made by the POW Camp Administrative Chief in accordance Article II-3 or Article II-5, or the particulars in the application for the dispatch of POW's which were approved by the War Minister or by the POW Camp Administrative chief, in accordance with the provisions of Art. II or Art. II-4, the War Minister (if outside the Empire, the POW Camp Administrative Chief; same applies in the following paragraphs) may retract his approval of the dispatch of POW's.

Apart from the cases stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the War Minister may, retract this approval of the dispatch of POW's whenever it is deemed necessary.

The entire expense required for the return of prisoners due to the retraction as stipulated in the first paragraph shall be paid by the employer of dispatched prisoners'.

Under no circumstances the employer of dispatched prisoners' can claim compensation for damage incurred from the retraction of approval mentioned in the first paragraph.

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- Art. XVI The employer of dispatched prisoners' shall not impose upon the dispatched prisoners tasks beyond the regulations of this ordinance, except in special cases authorized by the War Minister.
- Art. XVII Omitted.
- Art. XVIII The above regulations shall apply when dispatching POW's to any army units other than POW camps.

Additional regulation

The present ordinance shall come in force on and after the date of its promulgation.

Additional regulation (The War Ministry Ordinance No. 23, 1943).

Any person who has POW's dispatched in accordance with the earlier regulations shall submit to the War Minister an application for the dispatch of POW's in accordance with Art. II or Art. II-4 within 30 days (or 60 days if outside the Empire) after the date of enforcement of the present ordinance.

Annexed sheets (omitted)





第二條ノ三 伴房收容所管理長官前條ノ趣ヲ承ケタルトキハ之ニ基キ所要

ノ取締法ヲ定メ伴房ヲ派遣スルモノトス

第二條ノ四 帝國外ノ陸軍部外ニ於テ伴房ノ派遣ヲ受ケントスル者ハ別紙

様式ノ伴房派遣許可願ヲ伴房收容所管理長官ニ提出シ其ノ許可ヲ受クベ

シ伴房派遣許可願又ハ伴房收容所管理長官ノ許可シタル伴房派遣許可願

ノ記載事項ヲ變更セントスルトキ亦同ジ

第二條ノ五 伴房收容所管理長官前條ノ願ヲ許可シタルトキハ所要ノ取締

法ヲ定メ伴房ヲ派遣スルモノトス

第二條ノ六 伴房收容所管理長官前條ノ規定ニ依リ伴房ヲ派遣シタルトキ

ハ一派遣伴房ノ人員、居住、取締、勤務（勤務ノ場所、種類、時間、

期間等）、給與（賃金、酒保ヲ含ム）、糞尿等ニ關スル事項ヲ陸軍大臣

ニ報告スベシ

第三條 公共團體又ハ法人ノ伴房派遣許可願ニ在リテハ其ノ代表者ヨリ之

ヲ提出スベシ

第四條 伴房ノ派遣ヲ許可セラレタル者（以下單ニ派遣伴房使用者ト稱ス）

ハ本令ノ趣規定、第二條又ハ第二條ノ四ノ規定ニ依リ陸軍大臣又ハ伴房

收容所管理長官ノ許可シタル伴房派遣許可願ノ記載事項及第二條ノ三又

ハ第二條ノ五ノ規定ニ依リ伴房收容所管理長官ノ定メタル取締法ノ實施

ニ歸シ伴房ヲ差出シタル伴房收容所長（以下單ニ伴房收容所長ト稱ス）ノ指示ヲ受クベシ

派遣伴房使用者ハ前項ノ實施ニ關シ隨時伴房收容所長ノ巡視又ハ盜賊ヲ受クベシ

第五條 派遣伴房使用者ハ本令ノ附規定、第二條又ハ第二條ノ四ノ規定ニ依リ陸軍大臣又ハ伴房收容所管理長官ノ許可シタル伴房派遣許可願ノ記載事項及第二條ノ三又ハ第二條ノ五ノ規定ニ依リ伴房收容所管理長官ノ定メタル取締法ノ實施ニ關スル附規程ヲ定メ伴房收容所長ノ承認ヲ受クベシ之ヲ變更セントスルトキ亦同ジ

第六條 派遣伴房使用者ハ派遣伴房ノ居住、取締ニ要スル設備ヲ整備維持スベシ

前項ノ設備ハ概ネ伴房收容所ニ準ズルモノトス

第七條 派遣伴房使用者ハ派遣伴房ノ取締ノ爲所要ノ警戒員ヲ差出シ伴房ヲ差出シタル伴房收容所（以下單ニ伴房收容所ト稱ス）ヨリ派遣セラレタル警戒員ノ指揮ヲ承ケシムベシ

前項ノ警戒員ハ派遣伴房概ネ三十名ニ付一名トス

第八條 派遣伴房使用者ハ派遣伴房ノ勞務指導ニ任ズベシ  
前項ノ勞務指導ハ前條ノ警戒員ヲ以テ之ニ當ラシムルコトヲ得

第九條 派遣伴房ノ糧食、腰具、被室用薪炭、日用品、旅費（伴房ノ派

遣及復歸ニ要スル旅費ヲ含ム）其ノ他ノ給與ハ其ノ全部又ハ一部ヲ派

遣伴房使用者備出シ概ネ伴房収容所ニ準ジタル給與ヲ爲スベシ

但シ將校タル派遣伴房及敵國軍衛生人員ノ俸給應ニ伴房著被服使用

ニ堪ヘザルニ至リタルトキ之ニ貸與スベキ被服ハ此ノ限ニ在ラズ

第十條 派遣伴房使用者ハ毎月伴房収容所長ノ定ムル朔日迄ニ所定ノ賃

金ヲ伴房収容所長ニ納付スベシ

第十條ノ二 派遣伴房使用者ハ伴房収容所長ノ定ムル所ニ或リ酒保ヲ設

置スベシ

第十一條 派遣伴房ノ留賦ニ關シテハ派遣伴房使用者之ヲ擔當スベシ

但シ入隊ヲ公スル派遣伴房ノ收賦ニ關シテハ伴房収容所長ノ定ムル所

ニ依ル

第十一條ノ二 派遣伴房使用者ハ伴房収容所長ニ封シ派遣伴房ノ勞務

勲又ハ勞務給與ノ用ニ供スル爲金或物品ノ寄附ヲ甲山ツルコトヲ得

伴房収容所長收領上差支ナシト認ムルトキハ前項ノ甲山ヲ許可シ所安

ニ應ジ之ヲ派遣伴房ニ支給スルモノトス

第十二條 派遣伴房死亡シタルトキハ死亡ノ日ニ廻リテ伴房収容所ニ復

歸ノ手續ヲ爲スモノトス

第十三條 派遣俘虜使用者ハ俘虜收容所長ノ定ムル所ニ依リ日誌ヲ備ヘ派遣俘虜ニ關シ必ズナル事項ヲ記入スベシ

第十四條 派遣俘虜使用者ハ俘虜收容所長ノ定ムル所ニ依リ毎月十日、二十日及月末ニ於テ派遣俘虜ノ狀況（勞務ノ成績、衛生狀態其ノ他主要ナル事項）ヲ俘虜收容所長ニ報告スベシ

第十五條 派遣俘虜使用者本令ノ附規定、第二條若ハ第二條ノ四ノ規定ニ依リ陸軍大臣若ハ俘虜收容所管理長自ノ許可シタル俘虜派遣許可願ノ記載事項又ハ第二條ノ三若ハ第二條ノ五ノ規定ニ依リ俘虜收容所管理長自ノ定メタル取締法ニ違反シタルトキハ陸軍大臣（帝國外ニ在リテハ俘虜收容所管理長官以下同ジ）ハ俘虜派遣ノ許可ヲ取消スコトヲ得

前項ノ外陸軍大臣必要ト認ムルトキハ俘虜派遣ノ許可ヲ取消スコトヲ得

第一項ノ取消ニ由ル俘虜ノ復歸ニ要スル一切ノ費用ハ派遣俘虜使用者ノ負擔トス

第一項ノ場合ニ於テ派遣俘虜使用者ハ許可ノ取消ニ因リテ生ジタル損害ノ賠償ヲ請求スルコトヲ得ズ

第十六條 派遣俘虜使用者ハ派遣俘虜ニ對シ本令ニ規定ナキ事項ヲ行フコトヲ得ズ但シ時ニ陸軍大臣ノ許可シタルモノハ此ノ限ニ在ラズ

第十七條 削 除

第十八條 前條ノ規定ハ俘虜收容所以外ノ陸軍部ニ俘虜ヲ派遣スル  
場合ニ之ヲ準用ス

附 則

本令ハ公布ノ日ヨリ之ヲ施行ス

附 則 (附一八陸軍省令二三)

従前ノ規定ニ依リ俘虜ノ派遣ヲ受ケアル者ハ本令施行ノ日ヨリ三十日、  
(帝國外ニ在リテハ六十日)以内ニ第二條又ハ第二條ノ四ノ規定ニ依リ  
俘虜派遣許可願ヲ陸軍大臣ニ提出スベシ

別 紙  
略

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Defense Language Branch

105

Regulations for the Handling of Dispatched Prisoners of War (The War Ministry Notice No. 74, Oct. 21, 1942), revised, added and deleted by the War Ministry Notice No. 41, 1943.

The Regulations for the handling of Dispatched War Prisoners provide as follows:

Art. 1. Dispatched prisoners of war shall be handled in accordance with the Regulations Governing the Handling of Prisoners of War, the Detailed Regulations for the Handling of Prisoners of War, and other related regulations in addition to the Regulations for the Handling of Dispatched Prisoners of War and this Notice.

The provisions of articles 1, 19 and 20 of the Regulations for Prisoner of War Labour shall be applicable to dispatched prisoners of war.

Art. 2. Rescinded.

Art. 3. Except when specifically stipulated in the Regulations for the Handling of Dispatched Prisoners of War and this Notice, the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp, who sends out prisoner of war shall handle matters concerning dispatched prisoners of war.

Art. 4. When the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp dispatches prisoners, he shall be required to make minute investigations into, and observations of not only their abilities but also of their characters, ideas as well as careers etc., to undertake to prevent desertion or possible unforeseen mishaps among prisoners of war and prior to the prisoners of war's departure make them swear a solemn oath on the essential matters.

Art. 5. When the Superintendent of the Prisoners' Camp dispatches prisoners of war, he shall have them accompany by a necessary number of his staffs, and assign them the duties of supervising and watching the dispatched prisoners of war.

派遣俘虜取扱規則

(昭一七二〇二〇)  
陸 達 七 七 四

改正加除 昭一八四四一

派遣俘虜取扱規則左ノ通定ム

派遣俘虜取扱規則

第一條 派遣俘虜ノ取扱ニ關シテハ俘虜派遣規則及本達ニ依ルノ外

俘虜取扱規則、俘虜取扱細則及其ノ他ノ關係諸條規ニ依ル

俘虜勞務規則第一條、第十九條及第二十條ノ規定ハ之ヲ派遣俘虜

ニ適用ス

第二條 例外

第三條 派遣俘虜ノ取扱ニ關シテハ俘虜派遣規則及本達ニ別段ノ規

定アルモノヲ除クノ外之ヲ差出シタル俘虜收容所長(以下單ニ俘

虜收容所長ト稱ス)ニ於テ處理スルモノトス

第四條 俘虜收容所長俘虜ヲ派遣スルニ方リテハ其ノ有スル技能ノ

外特ニ其ノ性質、思想、經歷等ニ就キ周密ナル調査、觀察ヲ爲シ

逃走及不慮ノ災害等ノ豫防ニ努メ且派遣ニ先チ所要事項ニ關シ嚴

肅ナル宣符ヲ爲サシムルモノトス

第五條 俘虜收容所長俘虜ヲ派遣スルニ方リテハ所要ノ職員ヲ附シ



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Regulations for the Handling of Dispatched  
Prisoners of War (The War Ministry Notice No.  
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The provisions of articles 1, 19 and 20 of the Regulations for Prisoner of War Labour shall be applicable to dispatched prisoners of war.

Art. 2. Rescinded.

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Art. 4. When the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp dispatches prisoners, he shall be required to make minute investigations into, and observations of not only their abilities but also of their characters, ideas as well as careers etc., to undertake to prevent desertion or possible unforeseen mishaps among prisoners of war and prior to the prisoners of war's departure make them swear a solemn oath on the essential matters.

Art. 5. When the Superintendent of the Prisoners' Camp dispatches prisoners of war, he shall have them accompany by a necessary number of his staffs, and assign them the duties of supervising and watching the dispatched prisoners of war.

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Art. 6. The following items shall be observed in the control of the dispatched prisoners of war:

1. Especially by strict measures for the supervision and surveillance of prisoners of war, efforts shall be made against espionage. At the same time, the desertion and unforeseen mishaps on the part of dispatched prisoners of war shall strictly be prevented.
2. Unless there is a special reason dispatched prisoners of war shall not be permitted to go outside. In case they do, guards shall be assigned to them.
3. All telegrams and mail sent to or received by dispatched prisoners of war shall pass through the hands of and censored by the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp.
4. Interview with dispatched prisoners of war and the visits to places to which they are dispatched, etc. shall not be permitted to any except to those having by permission of the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp.
5. When dispatched prisoners of war express a desire to purchase luxury items or articles of daily use with their own money at place other than the canteen provided for them by their employer they may be permitted to do so in accordance with the rules determined by the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp.

Art. 6. When any one desires to give money and (or) articles to dispatched prisoners of war, he may do so in accordance with rules determined by the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp.

When dispatched prisoners of war desire to send out money and (or) articles, they shall do so through the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp who shall make an inspection of the same.

Art. 7. The Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp shall make occasional rounds or carry out inspections of dispatched prisoners of war from time to time.

Art. 8. The Superintendent General of prisoners of war camps may order from time to time shifts of dispatched prisoners of war.

Exh, NO 3105

Def, Doc 2078-B

派遣俘虜取扱規則 (昭一八陸達四一) 改正加除 昭一八陸達四一

派遣俘虜取扱規則左ノ通定ム

派遣俘虜取扱規則

第一條 派遣俘虜ノ取扱ニ関シテハ俘虜派遣規則及本連ニ依ルノ外  
俘虜取扱規則、俘虜取扱細則及其他ノ關係諸條規ニ依ル  
俘虜勞務規則第一條、第十九條及第二十條ノ規定ハ之ヲ派遣俘虜  
ニ適用ス

第二條 削除

第三條 派遣俘虜ノ取扱ニ関シテハ俘虜派遣規則及本連ニ別段ノ規  
定アルモノヲ除クノ外之ヲ差出シタル俘虜收容所長ハ以下單ニ俘  
虜收容所長ト稱スニ於テ處理スルモノトス

第四條 俘虜收容所長俘虜ヲ派遣スルニ方リテハ其ノ有スル技能ノ  
外特ニ其ノ性質、思想、經歷等ニ就キ周審ナル調査、觀察ヲ爲シ  
逃走及不慮ノ災害等ノ豫防ニ努メ且派遣ニ先チ所稟事項ニ関シ嚴  
肅ナル宣誓ヲ爲サシムルモノトス

第五條 俘虜收容所長俘虜ヲ派遣スルニ方リテハ所要ノ職員ヲ附シ

派遣俘虜ノ取締警戒ニ任ゼシムルモノトス

第六條 派遣俘虜ノ取締ニ關シテハ左ノ各號ニ依ルモノトス

一 特ニ取締警戒ヲ殿重ニシ防禦ニ努ムルト共ニ派遣俘虜ノ逃走及不慮ノ災害等ヲ防止スルモノトス

二 派遣俘虜ノ外出ハ特別ナル事由アルニ非ザレバ實施セザルモノトス又外出ノ際ハ必ず監視人ヲ附スルモノトス

三 派遣俘虜ノ發受スル電信及郵便物ハ總テ俘虜收容所長ヲ經由シ其ノ檢閲ヲ受クルモノトス

四 派遣俘虜ニ對スル面會及派遣場所ノ視察等ハ俘虜收容所長ノ許可ヲ得タルモノノ外之ヲ行ハシメザルモノトス

五 派遣俘虜自費ヲ以シ嗜好品其ノ他ノ日用品等ヲ派遣俘虜使用者ノ設置シタル酒保以外ヨリ購入センコトヲ申出ヅルトキハ俘虜收容所長ノ定ムル所ニ依リ之ヲ許可スルコトヲ得

六 派遣俘虜ニ對シ金錢物品ヲ寄贈セントスル者アルトキハ俘虜收容所長ノ定ムル所ニ依リ之ヲ許可スルコトヲ得

派遣俘虜ヨリ金錢物品ヲ發送セントスルトキハ俘虜收容所長ヲ經由シ其ノ檢査ヲ受クルモノトス

第七條 俘虜收容所長ハ隨時派遣俘虜ニ對スル巡視又ハ査閲ヲ實施スルモノトス

第八條  
得 俘虜收容所管理長官ハ隨時派遣俘虜ノ交替ヲ命ズルコトヲ

DFP Doc. #2028-C

FILE COPY

Ex = 106  
 File No.

RETURN TO ROOM 36

Translated by  
 Defense Language Branch

Subject: Frugal Consumption of Provisions, etc.  
 [Army-Asia-Secret No. 3827 May 6, 1944(Showa 19)]

From : the Vice-Minister of War.

The following notification is sent by order:

In order to carry out operations and supply satisfactorily and also to cooperate with the spirit of the Principles of Emergency Measures for Decisive Battles under the prevailing situation of demand and supply of provisions, etc., it has been decided that the supply of provisions to the army forces and the sale of food and drink at post exchanges shall be executed for the time being after June 1st of this year as follows:

1. The basic ration of rice and wheat of the Army forces (including Defense Units) in Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Manchuria (including the Kwantung Leased Territory) shall be, regardless of the seventh diagram contained in the Detailed Regulations of the Greater East Asia War Army Supply Ordinance, as follows:

NAME OF ARTICLE	RATION PER DAY					REMARKS
	BASIC ARTICLE		SUBSTITUTE			
RICE	UNPOLISHED RICE	540 grs.	HARD TACKS	either of them	690 grs.	In case the basic articles are provided, the differences due to the revision of the ration shall not be given, but the supplementary price of 3 sen per day shall be given instead.
WHEAT	CLEANED WHEAT	165 grs.	CONDENSED RATIONS		690 grs.	

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Ten per cent of the above-mentioned rations of unpolished rice and cleaned wheat shall, as a rule, be substituted by other cereals or potatoes. In this case, the rate of the quantity of substitutes and the method of readjustment etc. shall follow the notification Army-Asia-Ordinary No. 807 of June, 1943 (Showa 18) (Matters Concerning Use of Unpolished Rice and Enforcement of Mixing Other Cereals, etc.)

The Army Commander, according to the actual circumstances of each unit under his command, may further curtail the ration and have the food thus reduced allotted and supplied to other units.

2. Each unit shall make efforts to intensify self-support on the spot by making most of vacant or unutilized land, etc., as well as supply nutrition by utilizing substitute foods, especially edible oils and fats. The supplementary price stated in the preceding item 1, the price for rice and wheat of the quantity reduced according to the second paragraph of the preceding item 1, as well as the fixed amount of charge for board shall be appropriated for the expenses involved in the foregoing.

3. The following restriction shall be put on the sale of food and drink at post exchanges in the Army units (including Defense Units) in Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Manchuria (including the Kwantung Leased Territory):

Sweets	per capita per month	¥1,00
Liquors	- do -	2,5 <u>go</u> (about 1 pint (American))
Cigarettes	- do -	7 pieces


The sale of such things to those who reside outside the barracks shall be suspended for the time being.

4. Even units and works depots within the zone of operations shall endeavor to ~~retard~~ reduce the consumption, as stated herein, in accordance with the spirit of the Principles of Emergency Measures for Decisive Battles.

5. With the revision of the basic rice and wheat rations the price of rice which competent chiefs of the intendance departments determine shall be based upon that of unpolished rice; provided, however, in case the price for the first half of 1944 (Showa 19) has already been officially announced it shall be effective during the same period.

Def. Doc. # 2078-2D

Exh. No. 3107



Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Subject: Proper Adjustment of Supplies  
of Daily Necessities to P.O.'s

(7 Feb. 1935)  
(Furo No. 8)

Notification from the Chief of P.O.'s Superintendence  
Bureau to all units concerned.

Recently, there has been a deterioration in the physical strength of prisoners of war, not to speak of the many cases of under nourishment which prevents them from demonstrating their capacity as laborers. Even though this is due to the general domestic food situation which has rendered difficult the furnishing of supplies, the problem of providing prisoners of war supplies as would be sufficient to maintain proper standards of health cannot be neglected in order to maintain labor power.

The turn of the war situation is such that an increasingly pressing food situation must be expected. Such being the case it is directed that prompt measures be taken to improve supply conditions, especially to effect a proper adjustment of supplies of daily necessities by strengthening hereafter the position of self-sufficiency in food stuffs and that proper guidance be given as would be in full accord with the principles of the army's plan in transferring prisoners of war to our homeland for labor purposes.

In order to strengthen the position of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, you are directed not only to reclaim waste lands or to encourage the employers of prisoners of war voluntarily to offer cultivated land, but also to take positive planned measures to divert a part of the prisoners of war engaged in production to work directly related to their livelihood. You are advised to abandon supplementary small-scale methods and directed to produce results.

With regard to the principles for effectuation of food self-sufficiency you are to comply with Riku Mitsu (Army Secret No. 10).

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RETURN TO ROOM 361



WY 3107

伴野管理部長ヨリ關係部段へ通牒

伴野ノ給養適正化ニ關スル件（昭一〇、ニ、セ、  
勞、八、一）

近時伴野ノ體力減退少甚係部段多致ノ榮養失調者ヲ出シ勞務者トシ  
 テノ能力ヲ發揮シ得ザル者アリ之固ヨリ國內食糧事情一般ノ關係上  
 給養ノ追隨困難ナル事由ニ依ルモノナリト雖伴野ノ健康ヲ適正水準  
 ニ維持スルニ足ル給養ノ實施ハ勞務力ノ維持ノ爲忽ニスヘカラサル  
 問題ナリトス

而シテ賦屬ノ推移ハ愈々食糧事情ノ逼迫ヲ豫想サルヲ以テ速カニ給  
 養ノ改善特ニ今後ニ於ケル食糧自給自足ノ態勢ヲ強化シテ給養ノ適  
 正ヲ圖リ以テ伴野ヲ勞務者トシテ内地等ニ移入セル軍施策ノ精神ニ  
 副ハシムル如ク指導相成度

尙食糧自給自足態勢ヲ強化スル爲ニハ不毛ノ地ヲ開墾シ或ハ伴野使  
 用者ヲシテ進テ耕作地ヲ提供セシムル如ク獎勵スルノミナラス事情  
 ニ依リテハ一部生産勞務ニ從事シアル伴野ヲ本自活勞務ニ振り向ク  
 ル等積極的且計畫的方策ヲ講シ從來ノ附錄的箱庭的方法ヨリ脱却シ  
 以テ之カ成果ヲ期セラレ度

食糧自給自足實施要領ニ關シテハ陸密第三〇一號ヲ準用セラレ度

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Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, YOKOI, Takaharu, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section, Prisoners of War Information Office, hereby certify that the following seven documents hereto attached entitled "Laws and Regulations Concerning Prisoners of War, written in Japanese, each consisting of respective number of pages indicated in brackets, are exact and true excerpts from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Prisoners of War Information Office):

- A 1. Regulation concerning the Dispatch of P.O.'s (4 pages)
- B 2. Regulations concerning the Treatment of Dispatched P.O.'s (2 pages)
- C 3. Economy of Provisions, etc. (2 pages)
- D 4. Appropriate Supplies for P.O.'s. (1 page)
- E 5. Labor tasks to be assigned to Officer and Warrant officer Prisoners (1 page)
- F 6. Relief to be Given by the P.O.'s Employer when a Prisoner Dies. (1 page)
- G 7. Facilities for P.O. camps (2 pages)

Certified at Tokyo  
On this 13th day of August, 1947.

(signed) YOKOI, Takaharu, (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place  
On the same date

Witness: (signed) KAZUMA, Kozaburo (seal)

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

On Relief for the Dead and Injured Prisoners  
of War by their Employers.  
(June 4, 1943, Regulations for Prisoners of  
War. Article 7. Clause 32)

Notification from the Chief of the Prisoners  
of War Administrative Section to the respective  
Armies in Japan Proper and the Korean, Formosan  
and Kwantung Armies.

You will instruct the employers of prisoners of War  
(including employers of despatched prisoners), that  
prisoners (including despatched prisoners; the same here-  
after) who die or become injured through accident for  
which he is not responsible (excluding those of unavoidable  
nature etc.) during his duties at the factory or plant,  
etc., to contribute relief-money to them, in conformity  
to the Prisoners of War Labor Regulations Article 15 or  
Regulations for Despatch of Prisoners Article 11 Clause 2  
Generally by the following standards:

1. When injured requiring sick leave from work.  
To contribute the same sum of money as wages (excepting  
the amount for national taxes) corresponding to the number  
of days of leave.

2. When injured resulting in permanent disability  
or death. To contribute the equivalent amount of money  
as the accident or family compensation amount based on  
the Factory Law and the Mining Law.

The basic wage, in this case, will be one yen.

In addition it is instructed that the fund donated  
to the dead prisoners shall be handled as part of their  
personal effects left behind.

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Def. Doc. # 2078-E

On Internment Facilities for Prisoners of War.  
(February 3, 1944 Prisoners Facilities No. 1)

Notification from the Chief of the Prisoners of War Administrative Section to the units concerned.

The internment facilities for Prisoners of War (does not included dispatched areas) on work outside of the army are prescribed in Note No. 2 in the attached document to the Prisoners Labor Regulations, Army, Secret, Asia, 1942, No. 5353 "The maintenance of Quarters for Prisoners of War". But, as there seems to be some doubt on the details, the following note is issued for the sake of precaution:

In addition it is instructed that the following notes No. 1 to No. 4 be applied while the employers of despatched prisoners are in charge of all arrangements and maintenance of quarters and facilities for Prisoners of War (Regulations on Despatch Prisoners of War Article 6) where Regulations on Despatch Prisoners of War are applicable.

1. The initial establishment of the internment facilities for prisoners of war (henceforth will be designated only as facilities) will be in the charge of the employers only when there are special orders from the War Minister.

However, when the employers of prisoners of war feel a shortage of material just at the time, it is desirable that reasonable measures as mediating for them to the local authorities be taken concerning the acquisition of materials.

2. It is prescribed (Note No. 2 in the attached reference sheet to the Labor Regulations) that the establishment of facilities will be commenced after the War Minister's approval. But this approval can not be issued in view of the inadequacy of shipping space for prisoners of war so long as the shipping transport situation remains unsettled.

Accordingly this section, in consideration of the fact that there is little time in the establishment of facilities, will inform Army Headquarters long before the schedule to receive prisoners for service, so that preparations may be advanced and getting on with the construction of facilities started roughly from the said

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period on.

3. Although the responsibility of establishing facilities is with the employers of prisoners at the time of actual establishment the army and camp authorities will give the proper directions and instructions (for instance instructions to revise the design from the administrative point of view as guard control and sanitation or directions to alter the site in view of defense, etc.) and take care to prevent the occurrence of such incidents as the leakage of military secrets or the destruction of houses.

4. As soon as permission has been obtained for prisoner of war services and as soon as facilities are completed the employer of prisoners should present the army with the facilities.

This presentation means its loan without charge and the army and the employers shall conclude a definite contract concerning this.

5. Although thereafter it is prescribed that the army will be in charge of maintenance and preservation of the facilities (Army, Secret, Asia, 1942, No. 5353), as an added precaution the employer of prisoners will take charge where there were defects in the initial facilities and again naturally for having constructed the initial facilities.

3109

Def Doc No. 2173

Errata Sheet

Affidavit of ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ SHIMA, Keoru

Page 11,

Article 18. First paragraph, line 5 should read

"110,000 cases were reported, totaling 320,000."

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST


THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-VS-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent :-ODAJIMA, Tadao



Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I have occupied the posts of senior official in the Prisoners of War Information office and senior member of the Prisoners of War Supervision Department in the War Ministry since March, 1943. and held the rank of Colonel. The Prisoners of War Supervision Department was abolished in November, 1945.  
 During that period, I visited different POW's camps in the Home island, Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, etc. I not only know the fact about the supervision of P.O.W. but also many reports forwarded to the POW information Bureau by chiefs of POW's camps and POW's employers therefore I want to tell the facts relating to those matters.
2. At the beginning of 1944, due to the fact that the health conditions of POW's were not approvable, a notification concerning the improvement of administration of POW's, was issued to each Commanding General of the Army who was in charge of administration of POW's in the name of the Vice-Minister of War. (D.O. 207)
3. Due to the fact that the sanitary conditions of POW's aboard transport ships were not approvable, a notification was issued to the units concerned in December, 1942, in the name of the Vice-Minister of War and the Sub-Chief of the General Staff, so as to call forth their attention concerning transportation of POW's. The Attached is a copy of this notification, of which meaning was repeated in the said notification issued in March, 1944. (Lzh. 1965)
4. On Dec. 26, 1943, Maj.-Gen. Hamada, Chief of the POW's Administration Division, War Ministry, expressed the intention of the War Minister Tojo to the meeting of the commandants of POW camps as to the inadmissibility of inflicting (mistreatment) upon POW's by explaining to the

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following effect :

The purport of the address.

While admitting that the treatment of POW's must conform to the circumstances of respective localities, I believe that we ought to be very careful not to exceed the proper limit at all, prompted by a sense of hatred. As such is nothing short of the expression of antagonism in a petty manner, a thing which is contrary to our "Bushido" as well as to the first principle of the present Greater Asiatic War, which itself is a moral war.

Especially we must consider the unlimited evils of (mistreatment) as they, arising as they do from trivial personal feelings, will not only aggravate individual feelings on the part of the POW's but will also constitute a measure for the degree of culture of our country at large, and may help the POW concerned in promulgating anti-Japanese propogandas after his repatriation. Moreover, the most part of the motives of mistreatment can be attributed to the language difficulties and the improper understanding of rules and regulations on the part of those in charge of POW administration, and it sometimes occurred that some of them were knocked down by the enraged POW concerned in revenge. In such an extreme case our disgrace will not be redeemed by the penalty that the POW concerned will receive for his violence.

In this connection, I expect that you will be especially careful in directing those under your command, and improve every possible opportunity to make the purport of this address known to every unit concerned, and also to every unit or person employing POW's with a view to attain propriety in our treatment of POW's.

Note. I committed this purport of address to writing in accordance with my memory, as its original manuscript had been destroyed by burning.

5.

The Army Medical College is expected to perfect the measures for the prevention of epidemics among POW's, and to provide for their medical treatment. They also considered it proper to carry out the bacteriological as well as the scientific research of the malnutrition patients who were many among POW's, and so from February, 1943, they carried out various thorough researches, by a specially detailed research party, with the POW's detained in Tokyo POW Camp. They had their results published and thus contributed to the promotion of the general state of health of the POW's.

The circumstance of this investigation and study may be known from two documents, one is the document in the custody of the Japanese Government POW Information Bureau (Evidence No.3-1), and the other is my Evidence No.3-2, attached herewith.

Moreover, in accordance with the results of the above-mentioned investigation and study, the Tokyo POW Camp took immediate steps as described in my Evidence No.3-3. (D.D. 2006)

6.

General Umezu, commander of the Kwangtung Army, taking seriously to heart the POW's state of health and especially the number of epidemic cases among them, issued special instruction in February 1943, to the Chief Supply Officer of the Kwangtung Army and the Officer



in charge of the Kwangtung Army's Anti-infection and Water Supply Main Depot to the effect that the medical service at the Mukden POW Camp be strengthened by allotting or despatching many medical personnel to this camp, in order to take steps for the immediate restoration of the POW's physical strength, and to help and direct the medical service at this camp. (D.D. 2003)

The annexed (Evidence No.4-1.2) is the copy of the instructions and the account of the state in which the health service was carried out.

7. From a letter found among the effects left by the late Maj.-Gen. M.P. Backwith Smith, a POW, which was in the custody of the Japanese Government POW Information Bureau, the following fact was revealed;

In 1942, General Yamashita, the Commander of the 25th Army at Singapore at that time presented such articles of comfort as beer, butter and cheese along with a cordial letter of comfort to the general officer POW's who were detained at Singapore.

The attached is a copy of the letter. (Evidence No.6) (D.D. 2001)

8. In accordance with Art. 5 of the Regulations for the Treatment of POW's (Ex--) POW's enjoyed freedom of faith and were allowed to attend the religious services of their respective sect. Moreover, at some POW camps, ministers were specially asked to officiate the religious services at the camps.

And again at Christmas the greatest possible facilities were specially allowed to the POW.

As to the funeral ceremonies for a deceased POW it is laid down in Art. 37 of the Detailed Regulations for the Treatment of POW's (Exh (Ex - -) that proper ceremonies be observed according to the rank and status of the deceased, and so at each POW camp such ceremonies were carried out most solemnly and wreaths were invariably offered on such occasions.

The ashes of deceased POW's were also carefully placed under proper custody. The attached news account and photograph are the record showing how Colonel Murata, Commandant of the Osaka POW Camp kept the ashes of some deceased POW's most properly and reverentially, from a true human spirit that surpassed such minor sense as friend or foe. (Evidence No.7) (D.D. 2000)

9. The feelings of the nation toward POW's cannot be declared to have been cordial. As air-raids became more intensified, and as the number of those who had lost their kins in the war became more numerous, it was considered that these feelings were more aggravated.

In consequence the proper treatment of the POWs by the Army was censured everywhere that the Army was according too good treatment to the POW's. And again POW camp staffs, who were directly concerned in the treatment of POW's were looked upon by the nation at large with apathy, and were criticised by them as if they were unpatriotic to the state. There were instances that such staffs were disturbed by some of such unthinking people in the execution of their duties in connection with the POW administration.

The attached shows some examples of such censures and disturbances. (Evidence No.8) (D.D. 2113)

10. With a view to rectifying the nation's feelings towards POW's, the Army, before quartering POW's at respective camps, used to send some members of the staffs concerned to the localities where such camps were situated to explain to the officials and people of the localities, especially to those who had been granted by the Army to employ the POW's, how to treat the POW's until they understood so thoroughly that there were no fear that undesirable troubles might occur in this connection. Even after POW's were quartered, the staff concerned improved every opportunity to rectify the people's ill feelings towards POW's.

And again at some POW camps, liaison conference between the POW camp authorities and the organizations employing POW labour were held once or more a month, in order to prevent the occurrence of any unpleasant troubles in the treatment of POW's. (the reports of various POW camp commandants have been consulted in drawing up this article).

The attached is a copy of record written by some member of the Port of Osaka Coast Stevedores Union according to his memory about the remarks made by Colonel Murata, the Commandant of the Osaka POW Camp at the time. (Evidence No.9) (D.D. 2114)

11. The rule laid down in the International Treaty (General conference of 1907) that the ration for POW's is to be the same as issued to the members of the captor's army, was observed in the Japanese Army. The annexed table (Evidence No.10) shows the comparison of the amount of staple food supplied respectively to POW's, the Japanese Army and the Japanese nation.

The ration for POW's at every POW camp was almost all supplied by the Army, and so there was no case of supply of such ration having ever failed to be carried out.

The subsidiary foodstuff for POW's, different from the case of the staple food, was issued to POW's from the Army, not in kind, but in fixed allowance amount. The POW camp authorities supplied necessary foodstuff to POW's by purchasing it from dealers or markets with this fixed allowance. But as the nation's feelings towards POW's gradually aggravated, some people, seeing that there were considerable difference between the rations issued to the nation on one part and the POW's on the other, and that the POW's were daily supplied with fish etc., things not to be obtained by the general public, became envious, and they either blamed the POW camp staffs, who were doing their best in feeding the POW's or, as in the case of some of them, went so far as to interfere with their purchase of foodstuff.

But the POW camp staffs continued their efforts single-mindedly in securing the amount of foodstuff required for maintaining the POW's under their charge in a healthy condition, in the face of such undeserved blames and interference. At every POW camp, the staffs, in their effort to obtain the required foodstuff smoothly, maintained a close contact with the distributory organizations, and the city, town or village authorities, police stations or agricultural societies, and when they found that some one concerned were unreasonable, they did their best in leading them to the right path.

The staffs, when they succeeded in obtaining the required stuff, paid attention to such details in carrying such foodstuff into the camp.

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camps as to cover it over, or to do the carrying in at night, in the sole hope of not exciting the general public's antipathy.

As the food situation at home became so acute, that it was difficult to secure enough foodstuff through legitimate distributory organization, the POW camp authorities had to increase their efforts in this connection.

At every POW camp hitherto unutilized land was quickly turned into kitchen gardens in the hope of growing corn or vegetables to help the self-supply of at least a portion of the foodstuff required. Sometimes the staffs had to go out far, with trucks or, in the extreme case, with waggons manned by the staffs themselves, to purchase foodstuff. At other times the staffs went to a fishing port before dawn and there waited long for the arrival of fishing boats to buy fish from them at black market prices. Thus they left no effort untried for obtaining foodstuff even in violation of the food distributory system.

Some troubles occurred between a POW camp Commandant and the organizations employing POW labour, when he approached the responsible persons of the companies or factories with requests to supply some reasonable amount of supplementary food to the POW's.

But most employers of POW labour supplied, out of their foodstuff in stock, such supplementary food as macaroni, rice-balls, soups or bread to the POW's in their employ. And some such employer even supplied to the POW's a part of such food which was originally intended to be issued to the Japanese workmen. The attached (Evidence No.11) shows the result of the investigation made at the main localities in Japan proper about the condition of the supplementary food issue. (D.D. 1998)

But the strenuous efforts of the POW camp staffs and the cooperation of the POW labour employers, the feeding of POW's was carried out smoothly, and the ration issued to an individual POW amounted to 3,000 calories or more in nutrition value, and this was considered to be approximately sufficient for maintaining a POW's health.

Of course, as with the special local circumstances or the effect of the current season, a part of POW camps felt it extremely difficult to obtain subsidiary foodstuff, with consequent decrease in the amount of food issued to POW's. But this was only a temporary phenomenon and could by no means be properly attributed to any negligence in duty on the part of the POW camp staff concerned.

According to a document in the custody of the Japanese Government POW Information Bureau, the calculation of the amount of nutritive value of staple and subsidiary food as issued to POW's is shown in the attached copy. (Evidence No. 12) (D.D. 1997)

The attached table (Evidence No.13) shows the comparison of nutrition value of food issued respectively to POW's, the Japanese Army, and the civil population. (D.D. 1999)

As to "taking POW's national and racial customs into consideration", every POW camp was very careful, and especially they paid attention to the issue of bread ration, animal albumen and fat as well as to the manners of cooking. At many POW camps, baking ovens were provided with, and they had their yeast prepared by their own cooking detail. At some other POW camps POW's were allowed to do their own cooking and they were also consulted in preparing their menus. This Evidence No. 14 is a copy of menu of a certain day at the Hiroshima POW Camp.

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12. As to the medical treatment of POWs, every POW camp staff made enormous efforts. Especially when, with the progress of the War, medicaments gradually became so scarce that the supply from the Army proved insufficient, they were compelled to make especial efforts for the maintenance of POWs' health, as for instance, to obtain medicaments from druggist or to go to mountains or fields for collecting herbs.

The employers of POW labour also co-operated with us in the utmost degree. Some of the examples of such co-operation are shown in the attached. (Evidence No. 15-1,2) (D.D. 1994)

(1) Colonel Murata, Commandant of the Osaka POW Camp, seeing that many of POWs under his charge were suffering from undernourishment, instructed Surgeon Lieutenants Nosu and Chasiki, to carry out a thorough study and investigation of the situation. The two surgeons obtained useful materials for information and published them, and they also established a measure of cure for this kind of disease. The attached is the essay born from their investigation. (Evidence No. 15) (D.D. 1995)

(2) At the Tokyo POW Camp, "penicillin", which was then very difficult to obtain even by the Japanese Army, not to speak of the civil population, was once applied to a POW in that camp for his treatment.

(From the report by Col. Sakaha, commandant of the Tokyo POW Camp).

(3) In spring of 1945, Captain Numajiri, commander of Ashio Branch Camp, believing it to be most adequate measures judged from the condition of the patients, that those serious patients of beriberi, namely Niso, Porter, Carril, Gutzman, Muraby and three others, totaling eight persons, should be transferred to an infirmary attached to the Tokyo Main Camp as soon as possible, and relying on the excellent skill of Surgeon Captain Tokuda, Chief of the infirmary, succeeded, after conducting difficult negotiations with various parties concerned despite many objections and blames were raised against the measures, in preparing a special automobile for the transport of these patients. At last, these patients were transferred all the way from Ashio to Tokyo by the automobile, and were confined in Shinagawa Infirmary where they recovered.

It is some 90 miles far from Ashio to Tokyo, and if it had been case of the Japanese patients, such warm treatment as stated above could not have been expected to receive from him judging from the traffic situation prevalent at that time.

I was told the above information directly from Captain Numajiri.

(4) In last of 1944, an army sergeant AIZAWA and an ambulance man KUBOTA of Niigata P.O.W. Camp who had in critical condition

owing to an acute pneumonia case and they sat up with the sick P.O.W. throughout three days and nights and at last they made the P.O.W. an escape from the jaws of death, in this connection, P.O.W. senior officer Fulmer Richard B. expressed an appreciation representing all of the P.O.W.s to the Camp authorities.

- (5) On 11 October, 1945, the Osaka P.O.W. Camp received unexpectedly an order for the internment of P.O.W. who had been transferred to Japan Proper aboard "Risbon" Ibru, having been fatigued due to shipwreck. Due to many cases of dysentery, acute colitis and diphteria among them, these P.O.W.s could not be transferred from Miji, the landing place, to Tokyo as scheduled.

Therefore, following the instruction of the senior officer, these prisoners of war were en bloc taken into Osaka POW Camp. Thereupon, staff personnel of Osaka POW Camp assumed the charge of internment and disposition of these patient POWs, furnishing them with gauze, newspapers and toilet-paper, etc. which were gathered from the homes of the staff personnel, regardless of dangers for infection with these diseases upon themselves.

(Report of Col. Murata, Commander of Osaka POW Camp)

- (6) Many factories which employed Prisoners of war, such as, Nihon Seitotsu Kamishi Seitetsusho, Hirohata Seitetsusho, Kamishi Kogyosho, Kamioka Kogyosho, etc. Sent a great quantity of medicines to P.O.W.'s Camp, as gifts, and tried to help them.
13. Cases where Prisoners of War administrator and civilians concerned received letters of thanks, addresses of thanks or letters of gratitude wherein prisoners of war expressed gratitude for their fair treatment of Prisoners of War; and for their efforts made for the sake of POW's happiness, are too numerous to be mentioned. One of the representative cases is shown in the documental evidence No. 16, 1-3. (D.D. 1991 - 1293)
14. The text of statement made by the Apostolic Delegation in Japan in its report to the Pope concerning the treatment of Prisoners of War by the Japanese, is shown as follows:  
This is a copy of document in the custody of POW Information Bureau. (Documental Evidence No. 17)
15. Officer Prisoners of War have never been ordered or enforced to be employed on work.  
"Officer Prisoners of War may be allowed to be employed on work of their own choosing". This is a provision provided for in Article 1 of the Regulations on the Work of Prisoners of War. (Ex---)  
In each camp, they encouraged officer Prisoners of War to be

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In each camp, they encouraged officer Prisoners of War to be

employed on work of their own choosing with various reasons. With respect to the work of officer Prisoners of War notification, dated June 3, 1942, was made from Director of POW Administration Division of War Ministry to the units concerned, requesting that officer Prisoners of War should be employed on work of their own choosing.

In the said notification, it was added that the following types of work were appropriate for the officer Prisoners of War to be employed, also it was requested that their ranks and positions were taken into consideration, and imposition of hard work or the like was avoided.

1. Various works wherein techniques and sciences being utilized.
2. Agriculture.
3. Raising of live stocks and domestic fowls.
4. Supervision for the general labor Prisoners of War.
5. Description of data for the history of War.
6. Affairs of propaganda.
7. Other works which are deemed appropriate to employ them.

How the officer Prisoners of War were encouraged to be employed on work is shown as follows:

- (1) Officer Prisoners of War were encouraged to be employed on work for the purpose of health.

It is more harmful than good for health to lead an idle life, and suffering from ennui would cause them to be spiritually weak, therefore, encouragement was given to them to engage in slight farm work or raising of live stocks.

- (2) Also for the purpose of rectifying the Japanese people's feeling toward Prisoners of War, they were encouraged to be employed on work.

It was afraid that the fact that those officer POWs who were not employed on work were allowed to receive much more ration than that of Japanese nationals and Japanese Military officers, would be the cause of aggravating national ill-feelings toward POWs; which would, in consequence, be the cause of occurrence of bad influence upon administration of whole POWs.

Thereupon, explaining that, under the state of war, every country in the world had deep anxieties respectively regarding the food distribution, and that, even though they were in captivity, it was their human duty to be employed more or less in the work of self-supporting, they were encouraged to be employed on work.

- (3) From a parent's heart whose desire was that an increased ration be given to officer Prisoners of War, considering the food situation in Japan, officer Prisoners of War were so encouraged to be employed on work.

With the development of the war, the food situation in Japan



became more and more difficult, and the staple food for both military personnel and nationals were inevitably decreased, besides, it became difficult all the more to obtain subsidiary foodstuff.

This state of affairs inevitably affected Prisoners of War. Whereas, up to June 1944, officer Prisoners of War had received 420 grams of staple food ration and non-commissioned-officer and private Prisoners of War had received 570 grams (however, additional amount of ration up to 220 over 570 grams was increased in accordance with the type of work and condition of individual health), on and after June 1944, the amount of staple food for officer Prisoners of War was decreased to 390 grams, and for those non-commissioned-officers and privates who were employed on hard work was decreased to 705 grams, and for those who were not employed on hard work, was decreased to 570 grams. Decreased staple food, however, would be no harm to health provided that the subsidiary foodstuff was supplied sufficiently. It became gradually difficult, as stated above, to obtain those subsidiary foodstuff; above all, the nutritive value which officer Prisoners of War who were not employed on hard work could take, showed gradually a declining trend. Nevertheless, the nutritive value taken by these Prisoners of War was much higher than that of the Japanese people. In view of the health condition of officer Prisoners of War in Zentsuji POW Camp in which many officer Prisoners of War were interned, a plan was made to increase especially the staple food of officer Prisoners of War up to 500 grams for which investigation had been made carefully under the central military authorities concerned. The plan, however, ended to a mere attempt proving that to distribute one and a half times more staple food for Prisoners of War than that for the general Japanese people, was not deemed to be adequate in view of food situation in Japan and from the point of view of proper guidance of the Japanese nationals. Thereupon, with the intention to supply the same quantity of staple food for the officer Prisoners of War as that for the noncommissioned-officers and privates, treating the officer POWs as if being employed on hard work by assigning a slight self-supporting work for maintaining their health, also with another intention to grant them an additional allowance of crops grown by farm work, they were encouraged to be employed on work. It was neither with any intention to exploit the labor facility of Officer Prisoners of War in order to relieve the shortage of labor facilities in Japan, nor with any intention to offer an insult to them without making much of their positions as officer, but with the parent's heart of the Prisoners of War administrators concerned who encouraged the officer POWs, for their own happiness,

Officer Prisoners of War were employed on work.

An actual case where Officer Prisoners of War were employed on work of their own choosing, is described in a document in the custody of POW Information Bureau as shown in the separate sheet. (Documental evidence No. 18)

16. Violence on Prisoners of War.

The Japanese are generally short-tempered and are in the habit of getting excited at trifles. Also, it was especially the case with military units that, despite the strict supervision and instruction of the senior officer, habit of inflicting the so-called private punishment, by assaulting the subordinate, from a slight cause was not extinct. Therefore, in a case where misconduct was committed by a Prisoner of War, for instance, failure in acting up to regulations or assuming a disobedient or hughty attitude, illegitimate punishment was liable to be inflicted on the Prisoner of War without discrimination.

These were the factual cases for which I must express my sincere regret.

It is presumed that in most cases this violent behavior would not have been conducted if our officers had been acquainted with their manners and customs and had understood their languages.

For instance, when a certain non-commissioned-officer scolded a Prisoner of War at a POW camp, the Prisoner of War replied "I think so and so." Eye-witnessing the tongue put out naturally when he said "think", the non-commissioned officer inflicted a blow on him with rage in a moment presuming that he was insulted by the behavior of the Prisoner of War; when some Prisoners of War were scolded by others, the former would gaze at the latter's face folding their arms, unlike a Japanese custom, which was liable to be regarded by the Japanese, as a very haughty attitude.

Of course, in Prisoner of War Administration Division they prepared notifications on manners and customs of Prisoners of War and transmitted them to Prisoner of War Camps as an aid to put out troubles to be caused from misunderstanding.

The trials presently conducted at the Yokohama Military Tribunal testify to the fact that cases of some of the POW Camp Staff members having had inflicted violence upon POWs.

But on the other hand, it was always with a sense of respect that I witnessed, while my visits of observation to POW camps, the staffs of such camps concentrating all their efforts, in the face of various abuses and interference of the nation who had no cordial feelings toward the POWs, in obtaining foodstuff, medicaments, or in completing their arrangements for the protection against cold or damp, being inspired by a sense of genuine friendship toward the POWs.

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A certain N.C.O., now being detained at the Sugamo Prison was alleged to have assaulted the responsible person of an organization, which then was employing POW labour, out of his indignation for the employer's lack of enthusiasm towards the POWs under his employ. The injured person lodged a protest to me personally against the N.C.O. on the occasion of my visit to that organization. At other times the fact came to my knowledge that a certain interpreter attached to a POW camp, though he had the habit of striking a POW from a slight cause, would, when a POW happened to fall sick, attend on him whole-heartedly almost without taking any rest or food, with the natural result that he was always popular with the POWs in spite of his bad habit. From these facts I can assure you that the POW camp staffs were real guardians for the Prisoners of War under their charge.

On this 22th day of August, 1947

At IMTFE

Deponent: /S/ ODAJIMA, Tadashi (seal)

I, \_\_\_\_\_ hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At \_\_\_\_\_

Witness: /S/ \_\_\_\_\_ (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ \_\_\_\_\_ (seal)

正 誤 表

待望 例文 第 二 一 七 三 號

小 田 島

口 供

左ノ通り訂正願マヌ

第一頁九行目「各軍司令官」ヲ「各軍司令官」

第二頁四行目「隠モルト」ヲ「潜ソル所」ノ間ニ左記文ヲ挿入

「苟モ憎悪ノ感情ニ奔リ其ノ以テ起ルカ如キハ敢憐心ノ小乘的發露ニ過ギ  
ズンテ我ガ武士道ニ反シ又道義段クル今次大東亞戰ノ本義ニ悖ルモノナルヲ  
以テ深ク戒心セサルベカラサルモノト信ズ

「私的關係ハ些細ナル私情ニ發シナガラ其ノ影響ハ以テ個人的感情ノ悪化  
ニ止マラス我ガ門全段ノ文野ヲトスル資料トモナリ彼等情同後ノ惡宣傳等ヲ」  
第八頁六行目「怠慢チアルコトハ」トハ「惰ズルコトハ」トアルヲ「怠慢チアルトハ」  
ズルコトハ」ト訂正

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RETURN TO ROOM 361



極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

計

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述者

供述者 小田島

ロダシ  
董

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク  
供述致シマス

私は昭和十八年三月より昭和二十二年八月まで俘虜情報局高級事務官兼陸軍省俘虜管理部長で當時大佐の階級でありました。但し陸軍省俘虜管理部長は昭和二十年十一月殿止となりました。私は其の間内地、朝鮮、臺灣等各地の俘虜收容所を訪問して俘虜管理の實情を知つてをるばかりでなく、各俘虜收容所長並に俘虜使用去側より俘虜情報局に提出せられたる報告を承知してをりますので、以下此等に関係ある事實を申述べます。

一 昭和十九年初め俘虜の健康状態が香しくないので陸軍次官の名を以て俘虜管理改革に関する通牒が俘虜管理長官たる各軍司令官に通牒されました。これはその抜萃であります。(證據第一號)

二 遠征船内に於ける俘虜の衛生状態が良くないので昭和十七年十二月陸軍次官、参謀次官の名で夫々関係部隊に通牒し、俘虜の輸送に關して注意を喚起されました。これはその抜萃であります。(證據第二號)

尙本通牒は昭和十九年三月三日の前述通牒の際更に繰返されました。

三 昭和十八年十二月二十六日俘虜收容所長會議席上で陸軍省俘虜管理部長濱田少將は真條陸軍大臣の意圖を承けて次の如く口演し、俘虜に對して私的制約

の不可なる所以を説明されました。  
その説明の要旨は次の通りであります。

口 演 要 旨

伴房ノ取扱ヒハ現地ノ情勢ニ即應セザルベカラズト雖モ考フル時ハソノ幣  
 審固リ知ルベカラズ。而シテ私的制裁ノ動機ハ官語不通ト我ガ當事者ノ規  
 則理解ノ不十分ニ歸スベキモノ多クソノ結果伴房ノ憤慨報復ニヨリ打倒セ  
 ラル、者アルニ至リテハソノ恥辱伴房ノ受刑等ヲ以テ償ヒ難キモノアリ  
 之ニ門シ特ニ部下職員ノ指導ニ留意セラル、ト共ニ機會アル毎ニ關係部  
 使用部除發ニ使用者等ニ本意旨ヲ普及シ伴房取扱ノ道正ヲ期セラレ度  
 五 陸軍軍醫學校にては伴房に對する防疫の徹底を期し診療の合理化を圖り、併  
 せて多發した瘧疾失門症梅毒患者の細菌學的並に理學的檢索を實施するを道  
 ト認めまして、昭和十八年二月以來特に調査班を編成して東京伴房收容所に  
 收容中の伴房に對し綿密なる諸檢索を實施しました。そしてその結果を公表  
 して伴房の健康増進に寄與しました  
 此の調査研究の状況に關しては伴房情報局保管の資料に此の（證據第三號ノ  
 一）如く記載せられてある也此の（證據第三號の二）の如くであります。



尚以上の調査研究に基き直に東京俘虜收容所で（證據第三號ノ三一）の如く處  
置して居ります。

六 同東軍司令官梅津大將は俘虜の健康特に傳染病患者の多發したことを心配し  
まして昭和十八年二月特に隸下の同東軍補給隊、同東軍防疫給水部本部長に  
對し多數の衛生部員を奉天俘虜收容所に配屬又は派遣して此收容所の衛生勤  
務を強化し、速に俘虜の体力の恢復を圖らせ、且收容所の防疫業務を援助指  
導する様にと命令を出されました。

之はその命令の寫し並に防疫實施状況の記事であります

（勝城第四ノ一、二）

七 昭和十七年當時「シンガポール」で第二十五軍司令官であつた山下大將は「  
シンガポール」に收容されてゐた俘虜將官に懇篤なる慰問文に添へて「ビー  
ル・バター・チーズ等の慰問品を寄贈せられたことが俘虜の情報局に保管し  
てあつた死亡したエム・ビー・ベックウイズミス少將の遺留品中から發見  
されました。

之がその手紙の寫してあります。（證據第六號）

八 俘虜に對しては俘虜取扱規則の第五條に規定せられてある如く、信教の自由

その宗門の禮葬式に參與することを許してありました。そして或伴屍收容所に於ては特に教師を收容所内に招き素教儀式を司祭させました。

又特に「クリスマス」には出來得る最大限の便宜が與へられました。

伴屍の死せした時の儀式に關しては伴屍取扱細則第三十七條にその階級身分に應じ相當の儀式を行ふ様に規定せられて居るが、各收容所共花輪等を供へ町直に執り行はれました。又遺骨も丁寧に保管されました。此新聞記事並に寫眞は大坂伴屍收容所長村田大佐が敵味方の觀念を超越し眞の人間味より伴屍の遺骨を大切に保管した記録であります。(附録第七號)

九 國民の對伴屍感情は決して好かつたと申すことは出來ません、空襲が激しくなり、或は身内の者を殺争の爲に奪はれた者が増加して來るに連れまして益々甚しくなつた様に感ぜられました。

爾而軍が伴屍を公正に取扱ふことを以て伴屍を侵遇するものぞとの非難が到る處に起り直接伴屍を取扱つて居つた伴屍收容所職員は一般國民より白眼視され恰も非國民なるが如く我はれ、その管理業務に就ても種々妨害を受けたことが屢々ありました。

その非難・妨害の例は次の様でありました。(附録第八號)

一〇

國民對俘虜感情を是正する爲に軍は豫め俘虜を收容するに先立ちまして關係職員を現地に派遣してその地方の官民特に使用者側の者を集めて懇々と俘虜の取扱振り等に關し納得の行く様に説明させ、いざこざの起らぬ様にしてから俘虜を運出し、收容後にも關係職員はあらゆる機会に俘虜に對する悪感情の是正に努力しました。

又收容所によつては毎月一回以上收容所側と俘虜使用者側との連絡會議を開き俘虜取扱に就て間違ひの起らぬ様に留意しました。(各俘虜收容所長の報告による)

之は大阪港沿岸荷役組合の者が當時大阪俘虜收容所長村田大佐の注意を聞いて記憶してゐた記録であります。

(證據第九號)

一一 俘虜に對する糧食は國際條約の示す捕獲國の軍と同一量たるべしとの規定は日本軍に於ても行はれました。俘虜と日本軍隊、國民との主食配給比較はこの表の通りであります。

(證據第十號)

此俘虜に對する主食は殆んど各收容所共軍より支給せられた故缺配する様な事はありませんでした。

俘虜に支給する副食物は主食と異なり、からは現品を交付せず定額を

支給されました。收容所側では之に依つて民間から必要な品物を購買して俘虜の給與をして居つたのであります。

然るに國民の對俘虜感情が悪化するに伴ひ國民の一部に於ては國民と俘虜との食糧配給量に甚しく差があり又一般國民の口にすることの出來ない魚肉などを俘虜が常時給與せられて居ることを羨み俘虜の給養に凡ゆる努力を擴つてゐる收容所職員に色々と非難を加へたり又は食糧入手に妨害を加へた者すらあります。

收容所職員は常に此非難妨害を物とせざ一意俘虜の健康保持の爲必要量の食糧獲得に奮闘して参りました。何處の收容所に於ても收容所職員は其他の配給機關、市町村當局、警察署、農業者などと緊密に連絡をとり、或は之等關係者の無理解を説得して食糧が圓滑に入手し得らるる様に努力したのであります。

そして入手し得た品物も一般國民を刺激せぬ微服を冠せて收容所内に搬入したり、或は夜間を利用して運び込んだりする様な細い點に迄心を配りました。

國內食糧事情が逼迫するにつれ正當なる配給機轉のみを道ざる丈では十分な食糧を入手することが困難となつて來ましたので各收容所共空閒地は余す所なく農園化して食糧の自給を圖つたり、又トラツクを以

て、甚しきは收容所職員自ら荷車を曉いて遠方へ買出しに出かけたり、漁船が港に着くのを朝暗い中から待構へて魚を問買ひしたりするなど配給設備を紊して迄食糧入手に努力しました。

又收容所長は俘虜を使用して居る會社、工場等の責任者に對し相當の補食の提供を要求したりして使用者側との間にいざこざの起きたこともありました。

然し大抵の使用者はストックの食糧を以て俘虜にウドン、握飯、スープ、パンなどの補食を給しました。或使用者は日本人工員に支給する分迄を俘虜に横流したこともありました。此補食を貸施した状況を日本内地主々要個所で調査したのが之であります。

(證據第十一號)

此俘虜收容所職員の努力と俘虜使用者側の協力とによつて俘虜の給與は圓滑に行はれ大體俘虜の健康を保持するに足る養價三〇〇〇カロリー以上を給することが出来ました。勿論土地の特殊の事情、季節の影響等に因り一部の收容所に於ては副食物の入手が極めて困難であつて俘虜の給與量が低下したことがありましたが之は一時的の現象であつて俘虜收容所職員の怠慢であることは疑ふことは適當でありませぬ。

俘虜情報局に保管されて居る記録によれば俘虜に對する主食、副食の養價（カロリー）算定は此寫しの通りであります。（證據第十二號）又俘虜、日本軍隊、囚民との養價の比較は此表の通りであります。

（證據第十三號）

「俘虜の囚民的、民族的習慣を考慮すること」に關しましては各俘虜收容所共深く注意を拂ひ、特にパン食の給與、動物性蛋白質、脂肪の攝取、調理の工夫に配慮しました。又パン籠を熟備したり、イーストを自製したりした俘虜收容所も多數ありました。又炊事調理は俘虜をしてやらせ献立表の如きもけしと相談して作つた所もありました。之は廣島俘虜收容所の某日の献立表の寫であります。（證據第十四號）

一二、俘虜に對する清潔に關しては俘虜收容所職員は非常なる努力を拂ひました。特に戦局の進むに従ひ乗物は段々と缺乏して参り軍よりの補給

だけでは不足でありましたので民間から薬物を買入れたり山野に出向いて薬草を採取したりして俘虜の健康保持に努力しました。

俘虜使用者側も最大限の努力を盡しました。

1 大阪俘虜收容所長村田大佐は俘虜中に栄養失調症が多いのに鑑み部下の野須、大橋軍医中尉をして徹底的に研究調査をやらせました。兩名は有益なる研究資料を發表し之が治療對策を立てました。之がその研究論文であります。

(證據第十五號)

2 東京俘虜收容所の俘虜に對して當時國民は勿論日本軍隊でも入手が出來なかつたヘニシリソ病をやつたことがあります。

(東京俘虜收容所長酒葉大佐報告)

3 昭和二十年春足尾分所長沼尻大尉は重症の脚氣患者ナイズ。ポーター、カリン、グッツマン。ムラビー及他三名計八名を急速に東京本所の附屬病室に移送することがその症狀より觀て極めて極當であり又附屬病室長徳田軍医大尉の優秀なる手腕を信賴して連々の反對非難があつたに拘らず各方面と面倒なる交渉を遂げてわざわざ自動車を仕立てること成功し到頭脚氣患者を連々足尾から東京迄運送して品川俘虜病室に入室せしめ彼等の生命を噴止たことがあります。

足尾から東京迄は約九〇哩あり日本人患者ならは當時の交通事情よりして到底こんな手厚い取扱ひは受けることが出来なかつたであります。  
右事情は沼尻大尉より直接聞知しました。



昭和十九年の未頃、新潟分所の藍澤厚曹及、久田衛生兵は急性肺炎の爲  
危篤となつた俘虜を三日三晩一生懸命看病し、遂に死地を脱せしめた  
ことがありました。之について同分所の俘虜先任將校フルマーリチャ  
ード、ビー少尉が全俘虜を代表して、感謝の言葉を述べたことがあり  
ました。

(東京俘虜收容所長酒葉大佐報告)

昭和十七年十月十一日大坂俘虜收容所では突然に俘虜の收容を命ぜら  
れたことがありました。此俘虜は「リスボン」丸で内地に送られて來  
たものであるが難船の爲に苦勞し赤痢、急性大腸炎、チフテリア患者  
が多く豫定の如く入港地門司より東京迄の輸送が出来ず上司の命令で  
大坂俘虜收容所に全部引取られることになつたのであります。  
そこで大坂俘虜收容所、職員は我身に之等の病氣が傳染することなど  
問題させず所長以下家庭に在つたガール、新聞紙、便所紙などを持参  
して收容、處置に當りました。

(大坂俘虜收容所長村田大佐報告)

日本製鐵釜石製鐵所、廣畑製鐵所、釜石鑛業所神岡鑛業所其の他の  
多数の俘虜使用者側より多量の醫藥品を俘虜收容所に寄贈し俘虜の醫  
療に努めました。

一三 俘虜から俘虜の管理者並に關係のあつた民間人が俘虜を公正に取扱つたこと、或は彼等の幸福の爲に努力したことなどを感激する意味で禮狀や謝辭や、或は感謝文を之等の人々に送つたりよこしたりした例は枚舉に暇がありません。

一四 ローマ法王駐日使節は其の法王に對する報告中に日本の俘虜待遇につき其の代表的なものを舉げます。(證據第十六號ノ一―三) 次の如く述べて居ります。 之は俘虜情報局に保管されてある書類の抜萃であります。

(證據第十七號)

一五、伴虜將校を勞役に従事する様命令したことも強制したこともありません。

伴虜勞務規則第一條には將校たる伴虜は其發意に基き之を勞務に服せしむることを得と規定してあります

各收容所では種々の理由によつて彼等が自發的に勞務に従事する様に勸奨したことはありません

伴虜將校の勞務に關しては昭和十七年六月三日陸軍省管理部長より關係部に對して伴虜將校をして自發的に勞務に就かしむる様指導せられ度と通牒したことがあります

其通牒には伴虜將校の勞務は次の如きものが適當であると附加へ其階級身分を考慮し且重勞働を避けさせてあります

一、技術學術等を利用する諸勞務

二、農 業

三、家畜、家 畜の飼養

四、一般勞役伴虜の監督

五、戰史資料の記述

六、宣傳業務

七、其他適當と認むる勞務

俘虜將校の勞務を勸奨した経緯は次の様でなりました

1 保健の目的で勞務を勸奨したこと

無爲徒食は保健上百害あつて一利なく又無聊に苦しむ結果動もすれば精神的にも病弱者となるを以て解易な農園作業、家畜等の飼養等に從事する様勸奨されました

2 國民の對俘虜感情是正の爲にも勸奨されました

勞務に従事しない俘虜將校が日本國民、日本將校よりも遙に多い食糧を配給せられて居る事實は國民の俘虜に對する悪感情發達の原因となり延いては全般の俘虜管理に悪影響を生ずる事と懸念されました、それで戦時下世界各國共食糧配給に就ては深刻なる悩みを持つて居る事情を説明し幾分でも自活自給勞務に従事することが假令俘虜の身分にしても人間の義務ではないかと説明して勞務に従事する様勸奨したのであります

3 國內の食糧事情よりして俘虜將校の給與費を増加してやりたいといふ親心より勞務に従事する様勸奨したこと

戦局の進展につれ、國內食糧事情は益々逼迫し、食糧國民共に主食配給費を減らさなければならず副食物の入手は愈々困難となつて來ました

此事は必然的に俘虜にも影響し昭和十九年六月迄俘虜の主食配給量は將校に對しては四二〇瓦下士官兵には五七〇瓦（但勞務、健康の狀況により二二〇瓦以内を増加）でふつたものが昭和十九年六月よりは將校には三九〇瓦、下士官兵中力業に従事する者には七〇五瓦、力業に従事せざる者には五七〇瓦になりました。然るに主食を減らされても副食物が十分であれば保健上支障がないのであるが此副食物の入手は前述の通り段々難しくなり特に力業に従事しない俘虜將校の攝取し得る養價は段々に降る許りでした然しそれでも其養價は日本國民に比較すると遂に上位でありました

軍中央部では多數の俘虜將校を收容して居る普通寺俘虜收容所の俘虜將校の健康状態に鑑み俘虜將校には特に主食を五〇〇瓦に増加する筈に案を作り慎重に研究して見たが何の勞務にも従事して居ない者は一般國民の一倍半も多く主食を配給することは國內食糧事情から見ても國民指導上からも適當でないといふ事になつて沙汰止みとなり實現に到りませんでした。

そこで俘虜將校に對し保健を兼て輕度の自活勞務を課し以て力業に従事せる者として下士官と同量の主食を配給し且幾回作業に依つて得た收穫物を増加してやる目的で勞務に従事することを勸誘したのであります。

以上の如く俘虜將校を勞務に従事させたのは國內勞務力の不足を緩和させる爲に俘虜將校の勞務力を搾取するとか或は將校たる身分を無視して彼等

に侮辱を興えようなどの考の下になされたのでもなく、寧ろ彼等將校の幸福の爲に執られた俘虜管理關係者の親心であつたのであります。俘虜將校が自發的に身務に従事した例は俘虜管理局保管符券に別紙の如く記されてゐる。

(證據第十八號)

一六、俘虜に對する暴行に就て

日本人は一般に氣が短くて些細の事にも激昂する風があり、又殊に軍除に於ては上官の辱罵たる監督、訓戒が亦たにも拘らず些細の事柄を理由に下級者を歐打する所謂私的制裁が跡を絶たないので、偶々俘虜の非行即ち俘虜が規定を履行しなかつたり不服従或は不遜の態度に接したりすると前後の見境がなくなり、遂に俘虜に非合法的懲戒の手段に出た次第であつて誠に遺憾に堪えません

此の暴行沙汰も彼等の風俗習慣を知つて居り又言葉が通じて居れば起らなかつた場合が多かつたと思ひます

例へば某收容所で或下士官が俘虜に對して小言を喰はしたがその俘虜が *Chin* . . . . . と答へてその *Chin* と發音する際自然に舌が出たのを見て自分を侮辱したとしてカツと逆上して遂に手が出たとか、或は彼等が他人から叱られた時、日本人の習慣と違つて腕を組んでジツと相手の顔を見つめること等日本人から見れば如何にも不遜の態度としか受取れないのであります

勿論俘虜管理部では彼等の風俗習慣を研究して一つの注意警を作り俘虜收容所に送つて理解から生ずるイザコザをなくする事に努めました

俘虜收容所の職員等が俘虜に暴行を加へたことは目下執行されて居る

横濱の軍事裁判所に依つてその事實がみつたことを確認しますが私が各收容所を訪問して各收容所職員が俘虜に對して決して良い感情を持つて居ない一種の國民から種々非難、妨害を受けながらも眞の俘虜の味方として食糧の獲得、藥物の入手に、或は防寒防温施設の完備に努力して居る姿を此眼を以て觀察し常に敬意を培つて居る次第であります。目下巢鴨刑務所に拘禁されて居ります某下士官が俘虜に對する使用者側の熱意が不十分であると使用者側の責任者に暴行を加へたとて私の訪問中其被害者から私に訴へた例もあり又某收容所の某通譯が些細の事でも俘虜を殴打する癖があるが、俘虜が病氣に罹ると廢食を忘れて此病俘虜を看護して常に俘虜から親しまれて居るといふことも聞いたりに致しました位に私は俘虜收容所職員は眞に俘虜の保護者であるといふ事を斷言致します。



昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月二十二日 於 板東國際民事裁判所

供 述 者 小 田 島

董タカシ

右ハ營立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ聲明シマス

同 日 於

立 會 人

宣  
言  
書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ缺秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

(署名捺印)

小田島

葦原

RETURN TO ROOM 361

正 誤 表

辯護側文書第二一七三號小田島董供述書追加中左ノ通り訂正願マヌ

第一七項中第十三行目ノ「以外に少く」ノ「以」ヲ意ト改ムルコト

第一八項中第四行目ノ「約十萬總計三」ヲ「約十一萬總計三

二万」ト改ムルコト

特設委員証第ニ一七三号山田自、重要供進書百一十八頁の次に左を追加され度

一七〇〇 軍密第二二五七號情勢の推移に應ずる俘虜處理要領の狙ひは次の二

點にあります

1、俘虜を極力敵手に渡さないことと空襲に對する俘虜の損害を極力減少する爲俘虜收容位置の移動を行ふこと

2、狀況眞に已むを得ず俘虜に對して非常手段に出る場合の處置を誤らしめないこと

此通牒は只今申述べました通り俘虜處待の意味で作られたものではなく全く俘虜を保護する爲めに作られたものであります

即ち空襲に對する俘虜の損害を極力減少する爲日本内地の俘虜約一万名に就きまして比較的強襲の虞ある京濱、名古屋、大阪、神戸、

函館室蘭地區等の俘虜を比較的強襲の虞のない東北、北陸、北海道内郡地區等に配置轉換を実施しました

之が爲強襲の爲めに俘虜が死亡致しました数は以外に少く百名にも達して居りません、事實東京大阪地區に於て他に移動し終つた元の俘虜

會が空襲された個所は十三ヶ所以上にも達して居るのであります

俘虜情報局が俘虜の狀況に關する通信を開始したのは昭和十七年三月からでありまして終戦時たる昭和二十年八月迄通信した俘虜及軍抑留

者数は約二十一萬昭和二十年八月以後昭和二十二年八月迄の通報数は約十萬總計三十一萬であります、又俘虜及軍抑留者の死亡通報数は約四萬五千であります、

Def. Doc. #2173 Addition

俘虜情報局に於ては敵國戰死者の通報をも行ひました昭和二十二年八月迄通信した數は約一萬一千であります又俘虜情報局に於ては俘虜に關する有ゆる照會に對しては忠實に回答致して居りまして昭和二十二年八月迄に回答した數は約一千件であります

Ex 3110

Exh No.

DEF. DOC. #2006

Evidence #3-1

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

An Excerpt From The Monthly Report Of The Prisoner  
Of War Intelligence Bureau May, 1945 (Showa 18)

I heroby certify that the document entitled as  
above is an exact excerpt from an official document in  
the custody of the Prisoner of War Intelligence Bureau.

On this 11th day of June, 1947

/s/ NAKANISHI, Sadayoshi

Acting Chief of the Prisoner  
of War Intelligence Bureau.

**FILE COPY**  
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DEF. DOC. #2006

Evidence #3-1

An Excerpt From The Monthly Report Of The  
Prisoner Of War Intelligence Bureau Issued  
In May, 1943

Since last February the Army Medical College, having organized an investigation squad, has conducted the physical examination of the prisoners of war interned at the Tokyo POW camp with views of preventing epidemics thoroughly and rationalizing medical treatment, and at the same time making a bacteriological and scientific examination of the quasi-malnutrition case which has frequently broken out among the internees to observe it in comparison with the so-called war malnutrition case and to make a study on the difference due to the racial difference between both cases from a pathological point of view and to obtain referential knowledge about the prevention and medical treatment of the said disease and to get some idea medical topographical data in the field of operations.

The items of study and investigation were as follows:

1. Stool Test

(a microscopic test and an examination of protozoan and parasite eggs)

2. Blood Test

(an investigation of malarial protozoan-

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carriers)

3. Blood Test
  - a. . Widal Reaction
  - b. Weil Felix's Reaction
  - c. Syphilis Reaction
4. Examination of diphtheria bacilli
5. The measurement of precipitation of red blood-corpusele
6. Blood-Type Test
7. Blood-image Test
8. Tuberculin Reaction
9. Examination of excooration and tuberculosis bacilli
10. General Test

It is of great significance that the various pathogenic examinations mentioned above, have enabled us to discover various diseases of the prisoners in their earlier stage, especially to find out the greatly contagious conditions of amoebic dysentery and a high percentage of carrying intestinal canal protozoan and to take proper steps immediately to prevent these contagious, and thus to contribute to the thorough prevention



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of epidemics and the rationalization of medical treatment. Furthermore, it is also a highly noticeable result that these examinations made the hostile nationals realize to the fullest extent the superiority of the Japanese military medical science. In addition, it is understood that they gave an important suggestion for the consideration of sanitary condition in the South Sea areas.

Def. Doc. # 2005  
Evidence # 3-2

Exh. No. 3 / / /

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Suggestions Regarding Improvement of Health  
Conditions of Prisoners of War Camps  
(Investigation Squad of Army Medical College)

Despite the fact that in the treatment of prisoners of war we follow international law and other pertinent stipulations, sometimes regrettable events do take place and give enemies material for propaganda, because the persons concerned are not well acquainted with the customs of the enemy countries and often allow misunderstandings to arise. Especially about daily matters such as food, clothing and habitation, disputes rise the more frequently.

When our people are going through hardship and deprivations there is no need to satisfy to the full the desires of the prisoners of war whose countries have been satiated with natural wealth. It would be enough to guarantee for them the lowest standard of living allowable from the humane standpoint. On the other hand, however, when we face the question from the point of view of the utilization of their labour it proves necessary to preserve their health and ensure their working ability by creating good living conditions which will improve their labour efficiency.

We also fear that those prisoners of war who have lived under unhealthy conditions in the fighting zone and have contracted various diseases might carry epidemics to our people on their being transported to our homeland and put to work in all areas as labour material. It is not only for their health ~~we should give thorough consideration to~~ that we should give thorough considerations to maintaining them in good health.

From the above point of view, we studied the conditions of the P.O.W. Camps in Tokyo and now make the following suggestions for the improvement of their health conditions:

(1) Generally speaking, the prisoners of war are pale and under-nourished. Especially not a few of the patients in hospitals have lost 20 to 30 per cent of their pre-war weights. There may be many causes for this poor under-nourished condition, but the most decisive of them seems to be the lack of proper and sufficient supply of nutriment. These nutrition troubles seem to have originated mostly during the fighting and the subsequent P.O.W. camp life in

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the occupied areas. Though we recognize a general tendency for gradual recovery after their landing in Japan, there are not a few cases of malnutrition growing worse and causing death.

When we study the causes of the prisoners' lack of proper and sufficient nutriment, we find that, despite its sufficient caloric value, Japanese diet causes, because of a fundamental difference of food customs, a comparative lack of albumen and fat and over-supply of carbohydrate, and as a result, the prisoners suffer from want of main nutrition and vitamins, and begin to show symptoms of unbalanced nutritions.

Accordingly, what we must do seems to be to obtain for them such food as suits their food customs and have them cook it to their taste. It seems also necessary to prepare for sick people in the P.O.W. camps and hospitals special food suiting their taste. (They seem not to like rice-gruel.)

As vitamin B deficiency diseases are most noted unpolished rice and barley should be given for their main food; and for those who show marked cases of neuritis or beriberi, an additional ration of rice-bran should be effective.

(2) Prisoners of war are generally in dirty, ragged clothes and many carry lice. It must also be noted that a considerable number of them have died of pneumonia very likely because of their weak resistance to the cold Japanese winter, and of their light clothing meant for the warm climate of the tropics, where most of them were originally stationed. It is necessary to have them mend and wash their clothes often enough and to provide them in necessary seasons with more clothes even though they may be of rough material. Especially for those who work in the cold regions it could be better somewhat to modify their mode of clothing so that their labour efficiency might be increased. As for their habitation, care must be taken to prevent draughts from coming in and thereby to have as few cases of influenza as possible develop among them.

(3) Their skins are generally dry and atrophied and many suffer from eczema and the itch. According to an English doctor who is a P.O.W., they severely suffer from a skin disease called the "rice itch," caused by their living on rice. This, however, seems merely a logical result of their losing skin vitality through malnutrition and having no chance

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for bathing and resorting to scratching until they develop eczema all over the body this being aggravated by lice and mites. Those who have serious mite itches are extremely filthy, abscesses covering the entire body.

For preventing the above, it is recommended to have them take a cold baths frequently, or hot bath if possible, as often as we can afford to have them take, keep their clothes clean and dry, and have their hair cut short. Effort should be made to segregate those who have the itch, have them take medicated baths or apply ointment over the entire body so that they may quickly recover.

(4) On examining faeces of P.O.W. at a few camps, we got the results of 21.7% at Yokohama, 11.2% at Kawasaki, and 6.8% at Tsurumi, of carriers of dysentery amoeba. Out of 2039 prisoners, 76 people, 3.73% had malarial infection in their blood. In the Hongkong Camp, many diphtheria cases have occurred since last June. There have also been some cases of diphtheria among the P.O.W. held in the homeland, and the Investigation squad has discovered 2.6% diphtheria carriers among them. From the above facts, we greatly fear that if we let these carriers work outside the camps and allow them to come in contact with the Japanese people, there will be a great danger of spreading an epidemic in the country. As preventive measures against the above, we should not only inspect them both before and after their landing in Japan and give them necessary treatment and isolation in order to prevent importation of germs but also give them frequent physical examinations in the camps so that the infected may be quickly discovered, isolated and properly treated and the diseases prevented from spreading throughout the camps. Against the coming summer when these epidemics, if left alone will surely rage, we must take preventive measures at the earliest possible time. When we are obliged to send germ-carrying P.O.W.'s among Japanese people, it is necessary to have measures taken for their isolation, treatment and prevention of mosquitoes and flies.

(5) Examinations of cases of serious nutrition troubles among P.O.W.'s show various complicated conditions, which, however, may be summarized roughly in the following categories:

- (A) Wasting after chronic dysentery or chronic enteritis. (extremely many)
- (B) Anæmic wasting after malaria. (fairly many)

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(C) Beriberi (comparatively few)

(D) Polyneuritis accompanying nutrition troubles.  
(This closely resembles beriberi of the wasting type, but, probably because of the racial difference, there are no such symptoms seen in the patients of this illness as shown by Japanese beriberi patients. Symptoms of neuritis such as pain and thinning of the legs (sometimes arms) are notable. Symptoms of papillitis accompany comparatively many cases. (This illness has not been noted so far independently in the list of illnesses caused by unbalanced nutrition.)

(6) Wasting after chronic dysentery or chronic enteritis has a high mortality rate and requires adequate and timely hospital treatment. Polyneuritis gives severe pain in the legs and especially in the soles. We have had a case in which we were obliged to amputate one leg because of the necrotic trouble that developed through the exposure of the pained leg to coldness which seemed to ease the pain. Though vitamin B-1 has some effect, it is completely powerless in serious cases. Early treatment is therefore absolutely necessary.

The present East II and SAGAMI HARA army hospitals are not adequate to accommodate all the sick or infected prisoners for adequate early treatment so that it is recommended to provide small-scale hospitals or enlarge dispensaries in the camps and utilize prisoner doctors for medical care of the patients, the last resource being in accord with the economizing of the P.O.'s labour requirements.

Polyneuritis is often accompanied by heart trouble or breakdown of the motor centre so that overwork for such a patient sometimes results in sudden death. This fact must be taken into consideration in assigning different kinds of labour and deciding the necessity of rest for prisoners.

(7) The attached table shows the cases of death, classified by the diseases:

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Table of deaths classified  
by diseases. Feb. 23

The medical office, Tokyo P.O.W. Camps

.....	Chief Camp		1st Branch Camp		2nd Branch Camp		3rd Branch Camp		5th Branch Camp		Total .....
	C.	H.	C.	H.	C.	H.	C.	H.	C.	H.	
Dysentery:		11		4		5					20
Enteritis	2		4		2		18	4			30
Neuritis		1									1
Unbalanced nutrition		2			1						3
Pneumonia	1	1	1		4		1				8
Septicæmia		1			1						2
Hirnobolie			1	1							1
Jaundice and hepatitis			1	1					1		2
Beriberi			1		10				2		13
Enccephalitis				1							1
Malaria			1		1						2
Mental diseases			1								1
Diphtheria							1				1
Total	3	16	9	5	20	5	20	4	3		85

Note: 1. C represents deaths at camps and H represents deaths at hospitals.

2. The fourth branch camp has no patients as it has just been opened.

Def. Doc. # 2005  
Evidence # 3-2

U.S. Army  
Language Branch

Certificate

"Suggestions Regarding Improvement of Health  
Conditions in P.O.W. Camps (Army Medical  
College Investigation Squad)"

It is hereby certified that the above is a true and  
exact copy of a document in the custody of this section.

7, June 1947.

Medical Section Chief,  
Works Department  
No. I Demobilization Bureau

/s/ INOUE, Yoshihiro (seal)

Def Doc No. 2004

Evidence No. 3-3

Certificate of Authenticity

I, who occupy the post of Acting Chief of Prisoners of War Information Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached and entitled "Excerpt from TOKYO P.O.W. Camp monthly reports, May issue, 1943" is an exact excerpt from a document in the custody of this office.

On this 11th day of June, 1947

NAKINISAI, Sadaki (seal)

Excerpt from TOKYO P.O.W. Camp Monthly report  
May issue, 1943

Through general examinations for bacterial infections given since January this year at the Army Medical College for the prisoners of War (Confined at this camp, and at the first, second, and fifth branch camps) it was found that 133 prisoners had dysentery amoebas, (7.9 per cent), 2 prisoners had dysentery germs (0.09 per cent), one prisoner had paratyphoid-B germs (0.04 per cent), 57 prisoners had diphtheria germs (2.4 per cent) and 77 prisoners had malaria germs (5.3 per cent).

In consequence, the prisoners with such disease germs were immediately isolated in each branch camp, and strict preventive measures were taken. At the same time, every effort is being exerted in treating the prisoners and checking the spread of diseases. However, the isolation of the prisoners with disease germs in every separate branch camp can not sufficiently be carried out due to the fact that it will add extra duties to the medical officers and that the building and repairing facilities within the camps and the disease preventive equipment are inadequate.

Consequently in order to successfully carry out the preventive measures, it was decided best to assemble and isolate all the prisoners who have disease germs in one place.

A report to this effect has been made to the authority and the preparation to establish attached wards has already begun.

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中西貞喜 東京電報局長官署取扱

昭和二十二年六月十一日

本局は管領管轄の正確なる取扱を證明する。

昭和十八年五月五日東京電報局長官署取扱

電報第三號三三

RECEIVED

昭和一八、五、東京俘虜收容所月報抜萃

本年一月以來陸軍軍醫學校に於て收容俘虜（本所、第一、二、五分所）に對する諸菌検査を實施せるに赤痢「アノーバ」保有者一八三名（七、九％）赤痢菌保有者二名（〇、九％）B型パラチブス菌保有者一名（〇、〇四％）「デフテリヤ」菌保有者五七名（二、四％）「マラリヤ」原虫保有者七七名（三、三％）を検出せるを以て取敢へず之が病原體保有者は各分所毎に隔離し防疫處置を嚴重に實施せしむると共に之が傳染防止並に治療に全力を傾注しあり然れ共病原體保有者の各分所別隔離は醫官の兼務所内營繕の施設防疫器材の不充分なる現況等に鑑み完全なる防疫徹底上之が病原體保有者は一ヶ所に集合隔離するを適當と認め上司に意見を具申し附屬病室設置の準備に着手せり。

KWANTUNG GENERAL OPERATION ORDER NO. C 98

Kwantung Army Order

February 1, 1300 hrs, Hsinking.

This is to certify that the following is a copy of a document in the custody of this section.

/s/ ENCUME, Yoshihiro (seal)  
Secretary  
Chief, Medical Section,  
Affairs Department  
1st Demobilization Bureau

May 22, 22nd Year of Showa(1947)

Mobilization Board

Kwantung General Operation Order No. C 98.

Kwantung Army Order.

February 1, 1300 hrs, Hsinking.

1. The Chief supply officer of the Kwangtung Army shall despatch as soon as possible the following number of persons from the battalion under his command to the MUKDEN prisoner of war camp and they shall be under the command of the Chief of the said camp.

Medical Officer	1
Medical Petty Officers	2
Medical orderlies	10

2. The Chief of the MUKDEN prisoner of war camp shall strengthen the hygiene service and exert yourself to restore physical of the prisoners of war immediately making use of the above persons.

3. The Chief of the Kwangtung Army HQ shall dispatch as soon as possible about the following number of persons to the MUKDEN POW CAMP and they shall assist and direct the sanitary service of the said camp.

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Officers	5
Petty Officers	5
Men	about 10

4. As to the details, in addition to obtaining the direction of the Chief of the Army Medical Services, the commanders concerned shall make arrangement.

General, UMEZU  
Commander in Chief  
Kwantung Army

Method of Communication:

Delivery of printed matter (Deputy-Inspector, HQ, Sanitation and Water Supply, MUKDEN POW CAMP.

Distribution:

Written Departments of Vice-Chief, Vice-Officials (1. Medical Officer.  
Directive of Chief of Army Medical Services based on  
Kwantung Genral Operations Order No. C 98.

1. In order to prevent epidemics in the MUKDEN POW CAMP, this should be laid upon the importance of examination of the POWs for infection.

Firstly search for intestinal origin, dysentery bacillus, amoebic dysentery of the chronic diarrhea cases which are at present so prevalent. Secondly search for the original germs of malaria and make other necessary examinations.

2. The materials necessary for search for infection will be obtained from the HQ, Sanitation and Water Supply Branch of the Kwantung Army.

3. Any of the above-mentioned research requiring heavy expenditure should be requisitioned for in advance.

February 1, 18th Year of Showa (1943)

Lt. General KAJITSUKA  
Chief, Medical Services,  
Kwantung Army.

Def. Doc. # 2002

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

The Second of No. 4th, Certification.  
V. 24 From November, SHOWA 17, 1942  
to December, SHOWA 18, 1943.

Excerpt from the Mukden-Report.

Preventive Measures against epidemics adopted in  
the Mukden P. O. W. Camp.

I here by certify that this document is the correct excerpt from  
the documents under the custody of our government.

June, 27th, Showa 22.

/S/ NAKANISHI Sadaki  
The secretary of the  
Chief of P.O.W. Investi-  
gation Bureau.

Def. Doc. # 2002

MONTHLY REPORT OF THE MUKDEN P.O.W. CAMP.

Excerpt from number 2 of  
the Monthly report.

Report of work situation of the temporal  
prevention epidemics squad.  
Feb. 21st, SHOWA 18 (1943)

I. Situation of the work: --

The temporal Prevention Epidemics Squad of "the Kuan-Tung Army Water Supply and Purification Department" organized according to "No. 98, C, of Kuan-Tung Army General Work order" arrived to Mukden on Feb. 14th, and immediately established its work-place in the Mukden P.O.W. Camp, and the practical work was opened on 15th. The work was promoted smoothly by the effort of the Chief and members of the squad and by the positive aid of the Mukden Military Hospital, and on 19th the investigation of pathogens of the intestinal system of isolated-patients was finished; accordingly attaching importance to diarrhoea-patients, the pathogens of all prisoners was investigated.

II. Conditions of the patients:--

Diarrhoea-patients are 247 among 1305, total number of prisoners. (This number is those who had passages more than three times a day, 19th) Those who were put in isolated-ward as diarrhoea-patients through the diagnosis of the Surgeon of the P.O.W. Camp are 124, (In the present time, 19th, there are 90 diarrhoea-patients) Other 123 patients who had diarrhoea are living together with men of healthy condition, for they are only slightly conscious of the symptom of their own illness. The number of the dead from February 13th to 21st was five.

III. Situation of the pathogene-investigation:--

1. The result of investigation of pathogene of intestinal system for 124 patients who were in isolated ward is as follows:--

Pathogene	Number of positive patients	% for persons who were examined
Dysentery-Bacteria	33	26%
Dysentery-Amoeba	15	12%
Tricomonas	11	9%
Xylomachiz	1	

Def. Doc. # 2002

The dysentery-Bacteria is mainly of different typo-Bacilli.  
But it seems that there are some regular Bacilli, now under further investigation.

2. Cases of mixed infection of intestinal system pathogene is as follows:--

Dysentery-Bacteria, dysentery ameba and Tricomonus, ...1.  
Dysentery-Bacteria and dysentery ameba .....4.  
Dysentery-Bacteria and tricomonus .....1.  
Dysentery-ameba and tricomonus .....3.

3. . The result of investigation of pathogene of all prisoners shall be reported later.

4. At the examination of 117 prisoners who have had Malaria-an-annosis fever protozoa was proved among 18 persons and Tropical fever-protozoa was proved among two persons on 3rd.

5. In another case, "A. type-para-typhus bacillus" was found in his blood and excrement.

IV. Some opinions on autopsy:--

Nine cases of autopsy were visually judged that they were bacterial dysentery or ameba-dysentery. Among three cases of investigation of protozoa about contents and etc. in colon; one case of dysentery-ameba, the case of A. type para-typhus-bacillus and one case of dysentery-ameba were found.

V. Clinical condition of illness:--

It is as another document.

VI. Situation of prevention epidemics.

According to the plan of preventive measures against epidemics, as attached elsewhere, we are in excusion of the third term of the preventive method.

Dof. Doc. # 2002

About the blind situation of so called malnutrition-patients in the Mukden P.O.W. Camp Feb. 17th, Showa 18 in Mukden.

Mr. Nagayama, the Chief of the Medical Section.

Anglo-American officers and men surrendered and taken captive by the formidable onslaught of Japanese army at Corregidor and Bataan were in a condition of being extremely worn out by desperate fight, lacking in food-materials and suffering from pestilence. For a certain purpose, it was decided that 1485 prisoners of them be put in the Mukden P.O.W. Camp. (Colonel Nagamatsuda) Since December of last year, they were in transportation and during the difficult voyage, being constantly menaced by enemy's submarines the food-supply turned out inevitably very bad, consequently the general health-situation of prisoners became much worse, and on the way, at Fushian and other places, 57 persons died. At present, those who are under treatment in the squad are 160 persons, epidemic-patients (mainly A. type para-typhus) in the Mukden military hospital are 8 persons and those who are healthy and engaged in daily work are no more than about 300 persons. Being guided by the head of P.O.W. Camp and his subordinates, I examined the general clinic situation of patients in the squad with Mr. Tomura, the chief of the squad, and also being guided by Lieutenant surgeon Kuwashima and sublieutenant surgeon OKI of the squad and in company of Surgeon Major Kobayashi and others who had come for a study and prisoner-surgeons of America and Britain as assistants examined in detail about 20 cases of typical diseases among in-patients. Now the outline of the clinic views are described as follows.--

The main clinic condition of this disease is the headstrong dysentery causing gauntness in high degree, anemic Marasmus, general prostration and tendencies of abdominal dropsy.

External features:--

Nutrition becomes extremely bad; gauntness is so strong as if the bone is covered nothing but skin, especially gauntness is seen distinctly in the limbs.

Complexion is pale; eye-sockets fall down, eye-light grows dim; nose-top becomes sharp; languid in passive way and thus latent chronic marasmus disease can be traced from some time past.

Temperature:--

Close examination of temperature shows; no high fever; the pulse, of most patients are normal; no distinct slow pulse; in some serious cases the number of pulse increases but



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regular; generally speaking, feeble; in some serious cases, often intangible.

Consciousness:--

It is seen that even in serious cases there are no distinct obstacles in Consciousness; no brain-disease and etc.; responses to questions are generally distinct; but serious patients pass urine unconsciously; according to the report of surgeon, many of them were clear in their consciousness until the last moment when they suddenly succumb. The conjunctives and the mucous membrane manifest anemia more than the middle degree in accordance with the progress of the disease. Pupil shows tendencies of the middle sized dilatation or contraction; reflection of light seems to be slow; what slow; obstacles of the sight is not apparent; but there are some cases where after cornea-disease (cornea-softening disease) white spots appeared in cornea; on night-blind; hearing is not obstructed.

Visible mucous membrane inside of mouth:--

This mucous membrane is pale caused by anemia; in the pharynx no congestion; in pale palate is seen the enlarged blood-vessel; no bleeding, injury and etc.; tongue is rather flat; papilla drooped and the surface of tongue is flat, smooth and moist; the degree of drooping is in parallel with epidemic condition; sometimes there is injury, the kind of "AFER", around of tongue. No sore generally felt in lymphatic gland of the cervical region by several touching.

The Chest:--

In chest, the long and slender collar bone and the ribs are arisen and can be counted; by tapping generally low feeble sounds is heard resounding.

Lung and Liver: regions are between the fifth and sixth ribs along the right mammary gland; no traces of dilatation of the heart. Respiratory Sound; no distinct change except rough in a few cases; in one or two cases exist symptom of bronchial pneumonia; but cordial sound, common to accidental combined illness is generally low especially in the case of serious patient; sometimes it is heard monotonously; at the apex of heart it rises to the first sound in impurity or into soft noises or the second Sound in vibrating nature; accordingly the second Sound is heard distinctly. At the bottom of the heart, it rises into the second lung-artery-sound or sometimes the second-artery-sound.

The abdominal regions:--

No distinct corpulent by visual-examinations, but in some cases bowel-pulse is somewhat strong; among serious patients, bowel sinks

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sometimes clearly in the shape of a boat; abdominal wall-vein is enlarged clearly, and sometimes by touching examination, undulation proved suggesting the existence of ascites.

Spleen:--

Sometimes spleen is felt in a degree that its dull-sound region is enlarged, but no tangible example. The edge of Liver can but be slightly felt but not felt entirely in many cases. The liver rim is slightly felt but not felt in most cases; There are some patients who feel oppressive sore in the part of the Liver. The dull-region of the Liver suggests a little rise of Lung and Liver regions but the lower region is not clearly felt in many cases; at the time of touching-examination, the strain of abdominal wall was found in many cases, accordingly no feeling such as touching soft air-cushion or cotton. The main condition of disease is that astring rope-like thing often felt in the bone-hollow of left bowels. The rope-like-thing can be touched distinctly through thin abdominal wall; it does not move, but is nervous against pressure; there are some other cases that the above mentioned rope-like-thing can not be touched, but there are some cases when the bone-hollow of left bowels grows nervous by "Deuphause pressure"; sometimes partial pulse of bowels is felt in the bone-hollow of the left bowels; in right side neither sore nor swelling was found. No distinct sudden pain before evacuation nor gripping pain after passage, but at the beginning of excretion-feeling, some feel a slight colic.

Tendon-repulsion (the Klæe-pan) rises distinctly in almost half the cases; in almost  $\frac{1}{3}$  it decreased. The clonus of foot is not found. Kelrig-condition of disease is positive in some cases. Oppressive-pain in the head-region of spleen-intestinal muscle exists 100%. Abnormal Peripheral sense of limbs is more or less in some cases. The sound of artery in the elbow-hollow and in thigh is of degree of audible only when stethoscope is pressed strongly in the case of almost  $\frac{1}{2}$ . But in one example it was easily and distinctly heard.

Bleeding and its tendency in one case; (serious case) -- a slight extravasation-region in skin was found in almost palm-sized space spreading over the upper part and lower part with heart-hollow part as its centre; Rumpelrode-phenomena is atonic in one example; blood-pressure in one case dropped to be 95-70; showing descension of highest blood-pressure; in the case of serious patients, this tendency is found.

Besides, skin is generally dry and is of epidemic feature and have many wrinkles. (face is seen old in comparison with their age) In the latter period of the disease anasarca appears at the end of limbs back back of hand and foot. (there is a tendency of producing anasarca together with ascites).

No blister in testicles; no jaundice; prisoner-surgeon diagnosed

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illness of the Brown moss-like skin (Scale-itch-like-moss) in lower thigh as Perogra, but it needs more investigation for its decision. In another case, there were two examples which seemed to be Ray-disease (in nether limbs) or specially caused gangrene; there were some patients who complained nervous irritation at the end of their lower limbs. The main complaint was diarrhoea and incessant thirst (the middle condition of disease, they drank water three litres in a day) and powerless feeling; in many cases, they had rather good appetite comparatively.

Urine is from several times to about 20 odd times in a day; water-like-excreta (sometimes mix mucus); blood-excreta rather rare; mixes sometimes foam; the quantity of urine is not recorded, but seems to be of considerable quantity; especially some patients said that the quantity of their urine was increased in the night. On the point of their constitution, (primary cause) according to the chief of the squad, these prisoners were inferior in their physical power, for the reason that they were technical experts especially chosen for the job. by our examination, it seems that ordinary paralysis-type and consuming-energy-type may occupy large part of them at least.

The above is the condition of disease morely in the case of regular type condition and serious cases. By increasing examples, more or less addition may be needed. To conclude the above, the patients may come under so called "Losing-flesh-type-was-malnutrition-disease".

(1) Fundamental symptom of this disease is mainly chronic colitis type-diarrhoea, and stress must be put on the investigation of infections disease of intestinal system, especially bacterial dysentery and Améba and other protogene. It is of course necessary to pay special attention to the mixed infection.

(2) They that have malaria-anamnesis are not few. No spleen-hypertrophy, but latent malaria shall be regarded carefully.

(3) Some have neuritis, the symptom of beriberi, But the present condition is not of the main cause of a mere malnutrition or avitaminose as prisoners themselves are inclined to think.

(4) Haemorrhage and its tendency and anasarca (abdominal dropsy) are the type seen in serious chronic dysentery.

(5) Some patients are in serious condition, and their prospects are bad, but others can be assured recovery from illness by careful medical treatment.

(6) The clinic treatment shall be as follows:--

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(1) It is necessary to take off obiyalbumia. (It is necessary to give albuminous nourishment of the quality of good absorbtiveness. Milk is the best. Among all, incessant transfusion of blood is necessary.)

(2) Liver-Protection-Treatment: (Injection of Insulin, Vitamin O and B or giving them through mouth and giving Lemon-Liver Preparation)

(3) The Cause-Treatment:-- Yatren-drug for Malaria, Anaba-dysentery and etc. That is to say, Emetia, Quinine, Racton etc.

(4) Binding-drug: (Atropin and Morphia-opium drug).

(5) General Nutrition Treatment: (Drug for stimulating digestion; drug for promoting the secretion of digestive fluids and Lactic ferments-drug).

(6) Water-Supply : (Especially Cranis bill-drug).

(7) Others: ( Adrenal Grand Cortex-drug. VL, VD, and Heart-Stimulant).

(8) Convalescence period-Treatment: (Arsenic ferrous Medicament; each kind of vitamin and etc.)

DEF. DOC. #2001

Ev 3/15

Syonan.

July 7th 1942

Major-General Beckwith-Smith.

Dear General Beckwith-Smith,

As a small token  
of my personal interest in your welfare,  
and a practical contribution to your own  
comfort, I send you thirty tins of butter,  
thirty tins of cheese, 150 bottles of  
beer and a bottle of sherry.

With compliments and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) Lieut-General Yamashita.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

DEF. DOC. #2001

Certificate

I hereby certify that the attached photo-copies (4 sheets in all) are the true photo-copies of the pictures which were found among personal effects left by the deceased POW, Major-General M.B. Bechwith Smith, of the British Army.

(Re: The original pictures were already forwarded to family of the deceased, on Feb. 25, 1946.)

March 24, 1947.

/s/ S. Nakanishi  
Sadayoshi Nakanishi,  
Acting Director,  
Japanese Government,  
POW Information Bureau.

wp 3116

Dof. Doc. #2113

Evidence No. 8

Case of reproof and of rude act

(The Report of Colonel HOSOI, the Head of HAKODATE Prisoners' Camp)

(a) On 11th of March, 1945, HAKODATE Gendarmerie Detachment received the following letter.

"Which do the military authorities take more care of --- prisoners of war? or the people? Japan can not win the war so long as she neglects her people and cherishes the prisoners of war, can she? We are engaged in labor more than 12 hours a day, with the rationed rice not more than 3 'go'. If such state of things lasts any longer, we should be very anxious about the future of Japan".

(Report of Colonel MATSUDA, the Head of USAKI Prisoners' Camp)

(b) It occurred once that a number of Japanese who happened to cast furtive glances at the supplementary food to be supplied to prisoners at each place of working in Umeda Branch, Osaka, of the Japan Transportation Company, assaulted a squad-head, one of the Japanese leaders on the spot, saying, "Despite the fact that we, Japanese people, are rationed daily less than the additional food allotted to the prisoners for a time, the prisoners are provided with such plentiful addition besides their daily meals. They are too well treated".

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Def. Doc. #2113

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Evidence No. 8

Cases of Reproof and of Rude Act

Excerpts from the materials presented at the  
conference of HAKODATE-OSAKI Prisoners Camps' Heads

I, NAKAMISHI, Teiki, who occupy the post of the acting director  
of "Prisoner Information Bureau", hereby certify the document hereto  
attached is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official docu-  
ment in the custody of the said Bureau

certified on 11th of June, 1947

/s/ NAKAMISHI, Teiki (seal)



Def. Doc. # 2114

Exh. No. 3117

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: TAKAGI, Noboru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. My permanent domicile is No. 2, 2-Chome, Oimatsu-Cho, Kita-Ku, Osaka City, and my present address is No. 15, Shingu-Tanpin-Shita, Nishinomiya City, Hyogo Prefecture I am now 52 years of age.
2. I have been in the service of the Osaka Longshoremen's Control Guild since April of the 16th year of Showa (1941).
3. I hereby vouch for the fact that, MURATA, Sotaro, ex-colonel and commander of the Osaka POW Camp called up to a meeting those concerned in POW's labor-supervision in about September in the 18th year of Showa (1943), to the Head Office of the Osaka POW Camp in Minato-Ku, Osaka City, where he gave them instructions as per appended papers.

Instructions

- A. The prisoners of war are of course enemy nationals, but they are fine soldiers. Now taken prisoner, with freedom lost and without arms, they are like infants. Therefore, private punishment will not be applied to them either by use of force or by other means. If there is any offender, he will be given just punishment at this POW Camp according to international law. So you must treat them as good people.

Def. Doc. # 2114

B. It is my desire that, lest they should suffer from ill-health as a result of labor, that those to whom they are allotted labor, for work take every possible care about their food, drink and sanitation and supply them with abundant calories.

On this 13th day of May, 1947

At No. 36, Kawaguchi-Cho, Nishi-Ku, Osaka City.

Deponent: /S/ TAKAGI, Noboru (seal)

I, NISHIMURA, Ryoichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: /S/ NISHIMURA, Ryoichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TAKAGI, Noboru (seal)

REF. DOC. #2001

42 3/15  
Syonan.

July 7th 1942

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Sakayoshi Nakanishi,  
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war 5116

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certified on 11th of June, 1947

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Def. Doc. # 2114

Exh. No. 3117

Translated by  
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

FILE COPY

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Def. Doc. # 2114

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At the same place

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/S/ TAKAGI, Noboru (seal)



DDef. Doc. # 1997

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Excerpts from Vols 7, 12, 57, 58, 76

the P.O.W.s' Rations Investigation List

the Prisoners of War Camps of Tokyo, Osaka, Zentsuji and Fukuoka

I hereby certify that the present document is an exact excerpt  
from the document in the custody of our office.

NAKANISHI, SADAHI

Acting-Director of the P.O.W. Information Bureau

May 26, 1947

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Table of Staple Foods and Subsidiary Foods  
Tokyo P.O.W.'s Camp

(Tokyo P.O.W.s' Monthly Report, April, 1944, Appendix No.6)

Calculation Table of Food Value  
April, 1944

Classification Staples and subsidiaries	Locality	Calorific value				Grand Total
		Protein	Fat	Sugar	Total	
Main P.O.W. Camp.	Staple	390,070	313,935	1,975,000	2,677,005	3,281,853
	Subs.	116,328	245,507	243,013	604,848	
Attached Hospital	Staple	288,648	76,113	1,789,749	2,154,510	3,009,818
	Subs.	209,600	206,705	432,995	849,300	
1st Branch	Staple	390,070	313,935	1,973,000	2,677,005	3,057,549
	Subs.	96,960	103,685	179,899	380,544	
2nd Branch	Staple	390,070	313,935	1,973,000	2,677,005	2,256,320
	Subs.	216,865	197,918	164,541	579,324	
3rd Branch	Staple	390,070	313,935	1,973,000	2,677,005	3,333,088
	Subs.	232,513	207,044	216,526	656,083	
4th Branch	Staple	390,070	313,935	1,973,000	2,677,005	2,282,460
	Subs.	204,995	180,758	222,070	706,455	
5th Branch	Staple	390,070	313,935	1,973,000	2,677,005	3,277,026
	Subs.	153,784	178,051	268,186	600,021	
1st Sub-Br.	Staple	390,070	313,935	1,973,000	2,677,005	3,323,189
	Subs.	187,370	305,393	151,721	646,184	
2nd Sub-Br.	Staple	390,070	313,935	1,973,000	2,677,005	3,132,784
	Subs.	140,703	117,774	197,302	455,779	
3rd Sub-Br.	Staple	390,070	313,935	1,973,000	2,677,005	3,195,291
	Subs.	169,107	179,213	169,966	518,286	

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4th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 147,930	313,935 282,804	1,973,000 223,311	2,677,005 654,045	3,331,050
5th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 121,123	313,935 118,704	1,973,000 160,505	2,677,005 400,337	3,077,337
6th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070	313,935	1,973,000	2,677,005	
7th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 196,631	313,935 285,625	1,973,000 269,739	2,677,005 751,995	3,429,000
8th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 154,653	313,935 204,754	1,973,000 278,710	2,677,005 638,117	3,315,122
9th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 136,777	313,935 108,122	1,973,000 267,228	2,677,005 512,127	3,189,132
10th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 202,849	313,935 335,714	1,973,000 201,603	2,677,005 740,166	3,417,171
11th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 228,255	313,935 233,022	1,973,000 171,161	2,677,005 632,438	3,309,445
12th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 73,486	313,935 122,922	1,973,000 162,140	2,677,005 358,548	3,035,553
13th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 193,085	313,935 133,935	1,973,000 133,467	2,677,005 504,918	3,181,923
15th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 201,087	313,935 164,061	1,973,000 151,207	2,677,005 516,355	3,193,360
16th Sub-Br.	Staple Subs.	390,070 200,882	313,935 177,683	1,973,000 202,090	2,677,005 580,655	3,257,660
Suru- gadai Tech.R.I.	Staple Subs.	390,070 196,105	313,935 83,975	1,973,000 535,899	2,677,005 815,979	3,492,984

Note. Sub-Br. - Sub-branch  
 Tech.R.I. Technical Research Institute  
 Subs. Subsidiary

Table of Standard Rations  
and Food Values

Osaka P.O.'s Camp

(Osaka P.O.'s camp Monthly Report for May, 1944,  
Appendix No. 8.)

Item	Class	Ration	Calory	Remarks	
Staple Foods	unpolished rice (foreign)	150 (gr.)	501.400	polished rice; Unpolished rice; foreign rice etc. (TN-last word, unintelligible)	
	Polished wheat	150	497.400	polished wheat; barley meal; pressed barley; etc.	
	Soya-beans	80	319.100	Soya-beans; Pressed Soya-beans; polished beans etc.	
	Kholiang bread	80 240	272.700 2670.300	Kholiang; Maize etc. bread (280 gr. of bread is calculated as 240gr. of rice or wheat)	
	Total	700	2260.900		
Subsidiary Foods	meat & fish	fresh meat	10	52.300	beef; pork; rabbit-meat; chicken; whale-meat; eggs; Canned beef;
		fish	50	86.300	Sea-fish; river-fish; shell-fish; slabs of pounded fish;

Subsidiary Foods	vegetables	greens		31.900	radish, stone-leek, egg-plant, melons, greens, cabbage-onion, spinach, turnip, peas, konnyaku.
	vegetables	roots	200	105.200	burdock, carrot, lotus-root, taro, yama-imc, yatsugashira.
		flours	10	32.800	wheat flour; rice flour; dogtooth violet starch; dried macaroni; wheat vermicelli; dried buckwheat etc.
	vegetables	peas and beans	20	79.700	Soya-beans; red beans; mottled kidney-beans; white kidney-beans; legumes; peas, roku-mame etc.
	dried	seaweeds and others			undaria pinnatifida tangle; mushroom; dried gourd shavings; dried strips of radishes; dried vegetables etc.
	beans from beans	fried bean-curd	20	51.500	thin fried bean-curd; thick fried bean-cured; name-age; bean-curd fried with condiments etc.
		bean-curds (tofu)	200	11.300	bean-curd (tofu); broiled bean-curd; frozen bean-curd etc.

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Subsidiary Foods	Condiments	pickles	20	5.800	Pickled radish; radish pickled in bean-paste; radish preserved in sake-les; pickled greens; pickled melon; pickled egg-apple; pickled garlic; pickled seasoned in sake-les; vegetables in thin slices and preserved with soy-sauce; vegetables preserved in mustard etc.
		Bean-paste (miso)	50	25.700	bean-paste ( <u>miso</u> ); <u>kinzanji-miso</u> <u>tekka-miso</u> ; <u>powdered-miso</u> etc.
		soys (bean-sauce)	25	5.400	soys; vinger-sauce; powder-sauce
		sugars	10	39.300	white sugar; black sugar; yellow sugar; wheat gluten.
		oils & fats	30	279.000	beef-tallow; pork-tallow; butter; rapo-seed oil; other edible oils & fats (animal and vegetable) etc.
		salt	20		
		teas; confectionery; fruits & others	23	8.700	tea; confectionery; fruit; spices; curry etc.
		Total	228	864.500	
Grand total		1.428	3,125.400		

The Table shows the Standard Ration for Class A (those who do outdoor labor).

Def. Doc. #1997

Zenkoji P. O. W. Camp

Table of Rations

(Staple foods and Subsidiary foods)

Zenkoji P. O. W. Camp Monthly Report for Dec. 1944, appendix  
Table No. 7, and

Zenkoji P. O. W. Camp Monthly Report for March, 1945, appendix  
Table No. 7

P. O. W.'s Food Value Calculation Table Dec. 1944 (VA 59) and  
March 1945 (VA 58)

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class locality	Diet for laboring soldiers			Ordinary Diet (A)			Officers' Diet			Special Diet for Patients		
	Staple	Side	Total	Staple	Side	Total	Staple	Side	Total	Staple	Side	Total
Main Camp.	2.443 (2.431)	275 (279)	2.718 (2.710)	7.985 (7.985)	275 (279)	2.361 (2.264)	1.363 (1.367)	275 (279)	4.1738 (2.615)	(1.985)	(279)	(2.264)
1st Sub-Br.	2.365 (2.348)	287 (455)	2.652 (2.804)									
2nd Sub-Br.	(2.373)	(433)	(2.806)									
3rd Branch	2.397 (2.397)	307 (326)	2.704 (2.723)	1.938 (1.938)	307 (326)	2.145 (2.164)	1.326 (1.326)	307 (326)	1.633 (1.652)			
4th Branch (Sub-Br.)	2.397 (2.397)	409 (522)	2.806 (2.919)	(1.938)	(522)	(2.460)	(1.326)	(522)	(1.848)			

Note: The food value shown on the present Table is calculated according to the Table of Military Food Value Calculation prepared on Jan. 28, 1941.

Sub-Br. = Sub-Branch.



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Fukuoka P.O.W. Camp

Table of Rations

(Staple Foods and Subsidiary Foods)

An excerpt from Nos. 8 and 10 Tables appended to the Fukuoka P.O.W. Camp Monthly Report for February, 1945

Class Locality	Staples				Subsidiaries	
	Fixed Ration	Average Daily Ration Quota			Standard Quantity	Ration Quantity
		rice; wheat; kaoliang	Substitutes	Total		
1st Branch	705	459,4	229,6	689,0	1013,0	608,5
2nd Branch	"	689,9	29,2	719,0	"	807,1
3rd Branch	"	619,0	69,5	688,5	"	671,0
4th Branch	"	468,9	228,5	697,4	"	588,6
14th Branch	"	662,0	84,0	747,0	"	863,4
17th Branch	"	489,0	176,1	660,1	"	688,0
21st Branch	"	457,8	239,0	696,8	"	896,5

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22nd Branch	"	782,0	24,2	707,2		880,3
23rd Branch	"				"	
24th Branch	"				"	
25th Branch	"	454,4	233,6	688,0		877,5
13th Sub - Br.	"	604,2	53,5	693,7	"	873,0
1st Sub - Br.	"	491,3	90,9	582,2	"	236,5
2nd Sub - Br.	"	544,0	188,5	732,5	"	725,5
3rd Sub - Br.	"	633,0	58,8	691,8	"	1937,0
4th Sub - Br.	"	455,5	189,7	645,2	"	948,1
5th Sub - Br.	"	399,0	373,0	772,0	"	496,0
6th Sub - Br.	"	300,0	468,1	768,1	"	766,0
8th Sub - Br.	"	512,4	0	512,4	"	1006,1

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9th Sub-Br.	"	472,0	192,8	664,9	"	792,6
10th Sub-Br.	"	644,0	60,8	705,0	"	1021,0
11th Sub-Br.	"	548,0	166,3	714,3	"	804,0
12th Sub-Br.	"	720,3	0.	720,3	"	742,0

Sub. Br. = Sub-Branch

O.O. No. 1995

67 3119

TABLE OF MENU SCHEDULED & CARRIED OUT From 1, April, 1945. HIROSHIMA P.O.W. CAMP  
To 10, April, 1945. 2nd detachment

Day	B R E A K F A S T		D I N N E R		S U P P E R																																																																
	SCHEDULE	ACTUALLY GIVEN	SCHEDULE	ACTUALLY GIVEN	SCHEDULE	ACTUALLY GIVEN																																																															
Div. No.	NAME	QUANTITY	PRICE	NAME	QUANTITY	PRICE																																																															
1, Apr (SUN)	MISO-SOUP	100	2.53	WELSH ONION	100	1.20																																																															
	Carrot	76	1.62	Radish	100	1.20																																																															
2, Apr (MON)	MISO-SOUP	100	2.53	WELSH ONION	100	1.20																																																															
	Carrot	76	1.62	Radish	100	1.20																																																															
3, Apr (TUE)	MISO-SOUP	100	2.53	WELSH ONION	100	1.20																																																															
	Carrot	76	1.62	Radish	100	1.20																																																															
4, Apr (WED)	MISO-SOUP	100	2.53	WELSH ONION	100	1.20																																																															
	Carrot	76	1.62	Radish	100	1.20																																																															
<table border="1"> <tr> <td>COMMANDER</td> <td>CHIEF</td> <td>COMMITTEE</td> <td>INTENDANT</td> <td>MEDICAL OFFICER</td> <td>Board Charges Scheduled Per Head, A Day</td> <td>Y 0.3940</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SEAL FOR SCHEDULE</td> <td>SEAL FOR CARRYING OUT</td> <td colspan="3"></td> <td>Board Charges Actually Needed Per Head, A Day</td> <td>Y 0.4005</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="5"></td> <td>Difference Between The Scheduled &amp; Actually Needed</td> <td>Y 0.0065</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="5"></td> <td>Cooking &amp; Bathing Charges To The Board Charges Per Head, A Day</td> <td>Y</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="5"></td> <td>AVERAGE SUPPLY</td> <td>AMOUNT PER HEAD A DAY</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="5"></td> <td>Meat &amp; Buttery</td> <td>Scheduled</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="5"></td> <td>Fish</td> <td>Actually Given</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="5"></td> <td>Vegetable</td> <td>3.388.036</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="5"></td> <td>Dried Foods</td> <td>3.388.036</td> </tr> </table>							COMMANDER	CHIEF	COMMITTEE	INTENDANT	MEDICAL OFFICER	Board Charges Scheduled Per Head, A Day	Y 0.3940	SEAL FOR SCHEDULE	SEAL FOR CARRYING OUT				Board Charges Actually Needed Per Head, A Day	Y 0.4005						Difference Between The Scheduled & Actually Needed	Y 0.0065						Cooking & Bathing Charges To The Board Charges Per Head, A Day	Y						AVERAGE SUPPLY	AMOUNT PER HEAD A DAY						Meat & Buttery	Scheduled						Fish	Actually Given						Vegetable	3.388.036						Dried Foods	3.388.036
COMMANDER	CHIEF	COMMITTEE	INTENDANT	MEDICAL OFFICER	Board Charges Scheduled Per Head, A Day	Y 0.3940																																																															
SEAL FOR SCHEDULE	SEAL FOR CARRYING OUT				Board Charges Actually Needed Per Head, A Day	Y 0.4005																																																															
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TOTAL PER HEAD PER DAY	43.420	43.420	116.010	116.010	306.028	306.028																																																															
TOTAL PER HEAD PER DAY	43.420	43.420	116.010	116.010	306.028	306.028																																																															

5, Apr. (THR)	MISO-SOUP	Rape Bean-mash Salt Tea Fish powder	50 20 2 3 10	0.80 0.65 0.02 2.98	4323 92.21	SCH	SCHEDULE	182	VEGETABLE SOUP	Onion Rape Radish Soy Dried sea-slug Pickled radish Salt	100 100 100 40 40 40	2.53 2.53 1.20 0.93 0.69 0.02 2.98	18.713 20.53	145.17	SCHEDULE	182	BOILED MEAT & VEGETABLES	Meat Onion Rape Soy Salt Pickled radish Fish meal	20 100 100 40 40 40 10	1.20 2.53 2.53 0.93 0.69 2.98	52.58 127.05	SCHEDULE	182	TOTAL ¥45.39	45.39 45.39 116.46 116.46
6, Apr. (FRI)	MISO-SOUP	Welsh onion Onion Bean-mash Salt Tea Fish powder	100 100 20 2 3 10	2.53 1.86 0.69 0.02 2.98	45.265 806	SCHEDULE	SCHEDULE	182	VEGETABLE SOUP	Welsh onion Rape Onion Dried sea-slug Pickled radish Salt	100 100 100 40 40	2.53 2.53 1.20 0.93 0.69 0.02 2.98	18.713 84.11	84.11	SCHEDULE	182	BOILED MEAT & VEGETABLES	Meat Radish Rape Soy Salt Pickled radish Fish meal	20 100 100 40 40 40 10	1.20 2.53 2.53 0.93 0.69 2.98	55.61 100.528	SCHEDULE	182	TOTAL ¥36.67(S/C)	36.67 36.160 36.160 119.717 119.717 296.723 296.723
7, Apr. (SAT)	MISO-SOUP	Welsh onion Onion Bean-mash Salt Tea Fish powder	100 50 20 2 3 10	2.53 0.93 0.69 0.02 2.98	42.263 99.429	SCHEDULE	SCHEDULE	182	VEGETABLE SOUP	Welsh onion Rape Radish Soy Dried sea-slug Pickled radish Salt	100 100 100 40 40	2.53 2.53 1.20 0.93 0.69 0.02 2.98	42.883 150.862	150.862	SCHEDULE	182	BOILED MEAT & VEGETABLES	Meat Onion Rape Soy Salt Pickled radish Fish meal	20 100 100 40 40 40 10	1.20 2.53 2.53 0.93 0.69 2.98	56.933 88.412	SCHEDULE	182	TOTAL ¥39.01	39.01 39.320 39.320 142.011 142.011 338.703 338.703
8, Apr. (SUN)	MISO-SOUP	Welsh onion Onion Bean-mash Salt Tea Fish powder	100 50 20 2 3 10	2.53 1.20 0.60 0.02 2.98	41.648 95.693	SCHEDULE	SCHEDULE	182	VEGETABLE SOUP	Onion Rape Radish Soy Dried sea-slug Pickled radish Salt	100 100 100 40 40	2.53 2.53 1.20 0.93 0.69 0.02 2.98	13.324 125.280	125.280	SCHEDULE	182	BOILED MEAT & VEGETABLES	Meat Onion Rape Soy Salt Pickled radish Fish meal	20 100 100 40 40 40 10	1.20 2.53 2.53 0.93 0.69 2.98	94.309 108.000	SCHEDULE	182	TOTAL ¥39.79	39.79 39.820 39.820 179.881 179.881 328.982 328.982
9, Apr. (MON)	MISO-SOUP	Rape Onion Bean-mash Salt Tea Fish powder	100 50 20 2 3 10	1.60 2.49 0.69 0.02 2.98	50.11 97.527	SCHEDULE	SCHEDULE	182	VEGETABLE SOUP	Onion Rape Radish Soy Dried sea-slug Pickled radish Salt	100 100 100 40 40	1.60 2.49 1.20 0.93 0.69 0.02 2.98	27.880 131.202	131.202	SCHEDULE	182	BOILED MEAT & VEGETABLES	Meat Onion Rape Soy Salt Pickled radish Fish meal	20 100 100 40 40 40 10	1.20 2.49 2.49 0.93 0.69 2.98	56.211 107.873	SCHEDULE	182	TOTAL ¥37.91	37.91 38.120 38.120 136.106 136.106 336.602 336.602
10, Apr. (TUE)	MISO-SOUP	Rape Onion Bean-mash Salt Tea Fish powder	100 50 20 2 3 10	1.60 2.49 0.69 0.02 2.98	53.017 109.911	SCHEDULE	SCHEDULE	182	VEGETABLE SOUP	Onion Rape Radish Soy Dried sea-slug Pickled radish Salt	100 100 100 40 40	1.60 2.49 1.20 0.93 0.69 0.02 2.98	18.713 80.369	80.369	SCHEDULE	182	BOILED MEAT & VEGETABLES	Meat Onion Rape Soy Salt Pickled radish Fish meal	20 100 100 40 40 40 10	1.20 2.49 2.49 0.93 0.69 2.98	57.564 223.119	SCHEDULE	182	TOTAL ¥39.08	39.08 39.020 39.020 129.354 129.354 513.311 513.311

REMARKS 1. In the columns of albumen and caloric are to be written upon calculation the total amounts for the even days in the first 10 days.  
2. In the name column, field cooking is to be marked @, season cooking O, and treat foods ⊕.

1 letter revised (seal)

I hereby certify that this Table is an exact excerpt from the Document SB 2 which is in the custody of our Bureau. 12, June, 1947.

NAKANISHI Sadako,  
Acting Chief of the P.O.W. Information Bureau.

Def. Doc. # 1994

Exh. No. 3120

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

CAUSES OF AND COUNTER-MEASURES FOR THE  
CHRONIC CASES OF DIARRHOEA AMONG THE  
PRISONERS OF WAR.

RETURN TO ROOM 361

FILE COPY

BY

Surgeon Lieutenant NOSU, Shoichi

Surgeon Lieutenant OHASHI, Hyojiro

OSAKA CONCENTRATION Camp and

the Attached Infirmary.

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## I. Introduction

The present thesis deals with the statistical observations on the causes and the counter-measures of the chronic diarrhoea very peculiar to the POW patients, based upon the latest clinical experiences of the physicians in the Osaka POW Camp and its Attached Infirmary have had.

The diseases the POWs are apt to suffer do-not differ, roughly to say, much from those found in the Japanese Military Hospitals when classified according to the kind of diseases. Summing them up, however, by setting an item under the designation of chronic diarrhoea, the large majority of the POW patients come under the case in which the patients complain of the diarrhoea as their main complaint. The patients under this designation show very high percentage especially at the beginning of their captivity on the field, amounting, for instance, 80% of all POWs at a certain camp in the Philippines. Fortunately, it is seldom to see such a high percentage among those transferred to Japan Proper.

The Osaka POW Camp, nevertheless, has experienced a considerable number of the cases of chronic diarrhoea since its opening to date. As the latest case, in the early summer of the 19th Year of Showa, the number of sufferers from diarrhoea in several detached camps amounted to about 50% of all patients.

Though the Attached Infirmary to the Osaka POW Camp has not yet been sufficiently equipped, as not so much time elapsed since its opening, the medical officers noticed that, out of their daily experiences in treating the POW patients, the frequency of the chronic diarrhoea ranked first. Having deeply felt that it will be of help in promoting the working efficiency and bettered of the POW to investigate the causes and to devise the counter-measures thereof, we beg herewith to summarize our observations in a small volume for the reference of our comrades in the Army Sanitary Department.

## II. On the Cause.

By the term diarrhoea we mean an abnormal frequency of the intestinal excrements. It is unnecessary here to repeat pathologic-anatomical discussion of its causes. The diarrhoea peculiar to the POWs engaging works can roughly be summarized into the following categories:



Paragraph One: Infectious Diarrhoea

1. Amoebic and Bacterial Dysenteries
2. Cholera
3. Typhoid and Para-typhoid
4. Intestinal Tuberculosis
5. Intestinal Parasites

It is generally known that the infectious diseases of the digestive organs, especially of the intestines are the most common causes of diarrhoea.

Of the diarrhoeas, one most peculiar to the POW patients is dysentric diarrhoea

(1942)  
In the 17th Year of Showa, 30% of 3,600 inmates at a certain POW Camp in the Philippines were found to be suffering from the amoebic diarrhoea. It is obvious that still higher percentage of sufferers would have been detected if the bacteriological examinations were made, by the staining method.

During a period of from April to September, the 19th Year of Showa (1944), there occurred many cases of diarrhoea in several detached camps within the jurisdiction of the Osaka Concentration Camp. The examination of feces showed that about 2% of all the POW and 13% of all diarrhoea cases were found to be suffering from amoebic dysentery.

Though we made the examination assuming that the germ-carrier of the amoebic dysentery to be the important factor in causing the chronic diarrhoea, the facts showed, as above mentioned, to the contrary to our supposition that only about 2% of the POWs transferred to Japan Proper were, luckily to say, found to be germ-carriers.

Since the opening of this infirmary, we had, luckily, no case of bacterial dysentery, cholera, typhoid and para-typhoid. As to the intestinal tuberculosis, we have, at present, several cases in some detached camps and their attached infirmaries; but they can not be recognized as the cause of chronic diarrhoea peculiar to the POWs; On the other hand, intestinal parasites, especially Ascaris (roundworm) is causing here a chronic diarrhoea, and we detected that 6% of all diarrhoea cases in our attached infirmary, as of September, the 19th Year of Showa, were caused by ascaris, making the patients throughly recover from the condition of diarrhoea by vermicide treatments.

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**Paragraph Two: DIARRHOEA due to Toxic Poisoning.**

Food and medicinal poisoning are also wellknown causes of frequent typical symptoms of acute diarrhoea. In the instances of the POW's, especially, mass food poisoning often occurred abruptly as the result of almost unavoidable greedy taking of deteriorated food owing to the food shortage overwhelming to meet and the excessive labour, common state to almost all POW Camps nowadays. Rotten protein, especially rotten fish, is its most common cause and drinking of infected water in summer is also one of the important factors.

We have experienced several cases of this kind of diarrhoea in some detached camps since the opening of the Osaka POW Camp. In a certain camp, for instance, in September, the 19th Year of Showa, we found that about 50% of all internee suffered from it.

**Paragraph Three: FOOD DEFICIENTIOUS or MALNUTRITIOUS DIARRHOEA**

1. Malnutrition
2. Beriberi
3. Pellagra
4. Peripheral Nervous Inflammation
5. Scorbutus

These are main causes of diarrhoea among the POW. According to a survey made in September, the 19th Year of Showa, about 25 to 30% of all diarrhoea cases were found to be due to food deficiency. One thing here to mention specially, however, is that, since this May the food allotment for the POWs has been considerably improved and the index number for the nutritive value of the POWs' food in the detached camps is now gradually going upward and does not sink below 3,000 calories in general. So we can now reasonably expect a gradual decrease in number of Malnutritious diarrhoea cases in the future, and the eradication of this sort of causes may be attained very soon.

If it is presumed that a POW takes food of about 2,000 calories a day and consumes, at least, over 3,000 calories a day, then the digestive and absorptive power of his intestinal mucous membrane will considerably be deteriorated as the result of the conspicuous consumption of the physical composition, and the decline of the general

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resisting power and obstinate chronic diarrhoea will be incurred. It brings about the deficiency in protein and oedema too, causing thus often chronic diarrhoea.

Generally speaking, the food deficiency is accompanied by the partial deficiency of certain nutritious elements, especially that of vitamins.

We could often detect, in the cases of the POW food deficiency, the combined symptoms of beriberi, pellagra, peripheral nervous inflammation and scorbutus etc. In the case of the POW at least, the above mentioned symptoms of vitamin deficiency can not be considered apart from food deficiency in general. Thus, we must always keep in mind that the vitamin deficiency case of the POW always accompanies the chronic diarrhoea as the main complaint.

#### Paragraph Four: NON-TYPICAL DIARRHOEA

1. Sudden transition from Foreign Diets to Japanese Ones.
2. Side-dishes of Fibrous Food
3. Laxative Food (especially Soya-beans as Staple Food)
4. Diathesis of the POW against (2) and (3)
5. Mental Influence of the Captivity.
6. Climatic Influence of Japan Proper

Those three kinds of causes above mentioned are the most typical of, and not confined merely to the POW. The similar cases can often be found in Japanese Military Hospitals. We must especially mention, however, that the chronic diarrhoea peculiar to the POW are incurred by miscellaneous causes to be summarized under the designation of non-typical diarrhoea beside the above mentioned three items. These non-typical diarrhoea reveal no particular clinical symptom in daily life. The patients are in comparatively good nutritious condition and so vigorous that they are not necessarily to be kept in door at their early stage of disease, though they complain several times or over ten times of fluid-like stool. They will be able to bear certain degree of labour so far as careful countermeasures be taken. A survey in September, the 19th Year of Showa detected about 20 to 25% of all diarrhoea cases to be of this kind of non-typical diarrhoea.

III. On the Countermeasures.

We have so far described in brief the causes of the chronic diarrhoea prevailing among the POWs. Recently, we have studied the countermeasures against them at the Osaka P.O.W. Camp and since July, the 19th Year of Showa (1944), the number of diarrhoea patients showed the tendency of gradual decrease.

(1) Infectious Diarrhoea

Concerning this item, the health officers' attention was directed, following generally the instances at the Military Hospitals in Japan proper, to the readjustment of the sanitary services and equipments, cultivation of ideas on sanitation and preventive infection at the time of their reception. Further to say about the personal hygiene, body and clothes-cleaning, hand-washing and gargling are strictly enforced in any camps and we have experienced no epidemic outbreak of infectious diarrhoea since the opening of the Osaka POW Camp, whose record we wish to keep unaltered with the utmost precaution.

One thing to be noticed, however, is that germ-carriers, especially of amoebic dysentery, are often detected among the POW patients; the fact suggesting the necessity of incessant faeces-examination and quick isolation in every camp in the future.

We beg herewith to offer, to the reference of the concerned, a brief description of the sanitary equipments and countermeasures against the chronic diarrhoea devised with the joint research of the army surgeons on duty at the attached infirmary of the Osaka Concentration Camp as follows.

(Handwritten insertion by a MIZUTANI which reads as follows:--  
As the summer draws near, I will transmit this to every detached camp by means of monthly bulletin etc., and expect not to fail in every respect.)

A. General equipments for personal sanitation.

(a) The following methods of table-ware disinfection as applied in the field operation shall easily be applied in any camp, namely, to put three drums of 50 gallon content on small fire range and fill the first drum with hot soap-water and the other two with clean-hot-water and let every team take the process of disinfection and rinsing after every meal.

(b) Further effort shall be made regarding the cleaning of body and clothes, especially to enforce washing hands with soap before every meal and after soiling the lavatory.

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(c) Considering the fact that there are many diarrhoea patients, we advocate to abolish the present bathing equipments in every camp and, instead thereof, to conduct hotwater by iron pipe from the main tank so that everyone can use it by first receiving it into a bucket.

(d) Overcrowded meeting shall be prohibited and diarrhoea patients shall be isolated.

(e) Clothes and shoes shall be changed timely and custodian's attention shall be directed to the maintenance of suitable temperature in the camp and infirmary in winter.

#### B. Sanitary Equipments

(a) So long as the water-flushing lavatory and the drainage purifying tank are not equipped, the following arrangement shall be taken for flycatching, namely (1) to drain up the lavatory tank incessantly, (2) to furnish sufficient fly-traps and papers and (3) to fit the cover to each seat of lavatory.

(b) As to the kitchen, the following points shall be observed, namely (1) to expell germ-carrying cooks from the kitchen by way of the pathological examination, (2) to take effective measure of fly-prevention, (3) to fit the cover to all table-wares and (4) to have army surgeon supervise cooks strictly.

#### C. Water Supply Equipments.

Wherever service water is not available, boiled water or potassium chlorate treated water shall be supplied.

#### D. Disposition of Drainage and Garbages.

(a) All drain ditches should be straightly laid out and drained at a competent distance from the living quarters and fitted with the cover.

(b) Garbage boxes should be fitted with the covers and the garbages should be promptly disposed.

(2) Toxic Diarrhoea

Selection of foodstuffs and way of cooking are the most important factors in preventing toxic diarrhoea and the degenerated protein, especially decaying fish, is often the main cause of intoxication. Cases of Toxic diarrhoea hitherto experienced at the Osaka POW Camp were all slight, and even in the case of September, the 19th Year of Showa, in which about 30% of all internee of a certain detached camp suffered, all patients recovered in three or five days. Toxic death has never been experienced in this Camp.

Toxic diarrhoea, however, always breaks out abruptly and prevalently and has much influence upon the health and labour-supply. Therefore, selection of foodstuffs, devices on the way of cooking and tasting on menu heavily fall on the shoulders of the surgeons as their responsibilities. Whenever, a toxic diarrhoea case is found to be slight, then the drug treatment is unnecessary, and the most recommendable treatment is to take care of keeping him warm, to let the patient lie in bed fasting for 24 hours and then to feed him beginning with liquid food. In case when the intoxication is serious with high fever and heart-disease, it is, of course necessary to take such suitable measures in time as stomach-washing, higher intestines-washing, dosing of purgatives and heart-medicine, injection of Ringer's solution or blood-transfusion. We have, luckily, never experienced such a serious case of toxic diarrhoea since the opening of this Camp.

(3) Food deficientious malnutritions diarrhoea

It is necessary to feed POW workers with food of over full 3,000 calories a day, namely, 550 gram of carbohydrate, 57 gram of fat and 70 gram of protein, not to mention suitable quantity of various elements of nutrition. It is especially to be mentioned that this degree of nourishment is not only necessary to the POW workers but absolutely indispensable to the POW patients resting in the attached infirmary. It is almost needless to emphasize on the necessity of alimentotherapy or dietary cure in the treatment of disease in general. Most of the POW patients have in especial been suffering already from the food deficiency and there is no other way of cure than the alimentotherapy.

It must be said to be a great advancement in the dietary treatment of POW's that considerable improvements in dietary accommodation were made in all detached camps since May, 1944, especially

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after the introduction of special preparations of soya-beans bones and viscera of cows and fish-meals for protein supply; as a result gradual decrease of the food deficient diarrhoea. The food deficient diarrhoea can be cured with dietary treatment as its best countermeasure lies in the improvement of the nutritive value, sufficient supply of protein, in especial.

It is noteworthy, however, that the food deficiency prevalent among the POWs often accompanies the symptoms of partial deficiency of various nutritive elements, especially of vitamins. We very often clinically detected the cases of malnutrition accompanying beriberi or pellagra. In such cases, if we pay too much attention to the concurrent symptoms and treat by giving vitamins, neglecting to take care of the principal disease then it would eventually lead to an undesirable prognosis.

Our recent experience showed that, in not a few cases, stress dietary treatment for considerably serious patients of malnutrition with beriberi lead to the cure of serious beriberi alongside with the recovered nutrition.

When we found many cases of malnutrition with beriberi or peripheral nervous inflammation among the POWs newly transferred from abroad to the AMAGASAKI Detached Camp this August, we applied not vitamin pills, but merely a countermeasure of devices on recovery of nutrition, dosing of rice-bran and moderate sun-bathing with the result that they could be cured in a very short time. This is obviously a noteworthy instance.

#### (4) Non-typical Diarrhoea

The causes of diarrhoea peculiar to the POWs, as mentioned here under the designation of non-typical diarrhoea, are various and multilateral, the influence of climate and weather the cooking and combination of food and individual physical constitution, taste and customs are the important factors. Our special attention must be paid to the fact that the mental influence of the POW life often constitute a cause of diarrhoea as cases of hypochondria and high degree hysteria are frequently found among them. Consequently, it is rather necessary, as the countermeasure, to console and treat them with a certain degree of generosity, for their mental worry and physical sufferings are very great in this strange land. Especially, in the case caused by mental influence, the suggestive treatment had often remarkable

effect. Recently, in the attached infirmary, we had army surgeons exclusively engaged in the study of the treatment of this sort of chronic diarrhoea without the help of pharmacotherapy with considerable success.

As the characteristic symptoms of non-typical diarrhoea any subjective or objective symptoms are hardly discerned except the fluid-like stool for several or over-ten times a day as main complaint. When the diarrhoea be protracted, it sometimes incurs general prostration, but at the beginning, the patients are generally in very high spirit and have no trouble to work. We shall be able to cure them while they are working by a suitable mental guidance.

#### IV. Summary.

We have herewith devised the countermeasures against the chronic diarrhoea aiming at the fact that special attention is requested to be paid for their alimentation, considering that they are mainly employed in the productive area in the domestic front with the gradual increase of the number of the POWs nowadays. The causes of this disease should be in the ordinary days, attributed to the infectious intestinal disease. In the cases of POWs, however, infectious diarrhoea occupies only 10 percent of all patients of diarrhoea and their majority are of food deficiencies and non-typical diarrhoea which occupy about 90% of all cases. So the first counter-measure against the diarrhoea is to enforce strict feces-examination and quickly to isolate the germ-carriers.

The next step is to classify all non-germ-carrying diarrhoea patients roughly into two kinds of food deficient diarrhoea and non-typical diarrhoea. In the case of the former, the deliberate attention shall be paid for their diet alongside with the pharmacotherapy, picking up the serious ones in the infirmary to give treatment for rather longer time. In the case of the latter, however, the sufferers are not necessarily to be treated as patients. Some times we can employ them in works with no fear, paying special attention for their mental consolation with due consideration for their adaptability to the foreign climate and weather, and their individual physical constitution, custom and taste. It is needless, however, to mention that the long POW life often incurs the hypochondria and hysteria necessitating to send them to the infirmary.



V. Conclusion.

(1) The POWs are apt to suffer from the chronic diarrhoea and we sometimes found that about 80% of all inmates at the beginning of the captivity on the field, and about 50% of them in Japan proper afflicted with the disease.

(2) Most of the POW patients suffer from the chronic diarrhoea concurrently and the examination in September, the 19th Year (1944) of Showa showed that the percentage of the diarrhoea to all patients was about 80%. Since May, the 19th Year of Showa, however, an attempt to improve the diet has been made in the Osaka Detention Camp and as the result the percentage of the chronic diarrhoea showed a tendency to consider decrease considerably...

(3) Only 10% of the chronic diarrhoea cases among the POWs are found to be attributable to the infectious intestinal diseases.

(4) It would be premature to attribute all cases of the chronic diarrhoea among the POWs to the food deficiency, though they are largely caused by food deficiency (nutrition deficiency)

(5) We could often clinically detect the non-typical case of chronic diarrhoea among the POW patients. These were peculiar to them and amounted to 20% all diarrhoea cases.

(6) The countermeasures taken by sanitary officers in treating the chronic diarrhoea among the POWs may be summarized as follows:

(a) Strictly examination of faeces and the speedy isolation of the germ-carrier.

(b) The classification of all diarrhoea patients other than the germ-carriers into two classes of those due to food deficiency and those who suffer from non-typical diarrhoea, and then establish the respective means of treatment for each.

(c) In the case of food-deficient diarrhoea, the taking care of the diet and employment of the pharmacotherapy concurrently and even when complication was detected attention was always paid

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to the principal disease.

(4). In the case of non-typical diarrhoea, sensible treatment was taken and for the slighter ones mental induction was requested to be applied in order to let the patient willingly set to work.

Def. Doc. # 1994

Certificate of Authenticity

I hereby certify that the printed matter hereto  
attached is the thesis compiled and published by me.

Certified at the National Hospital,  
WADA Village, HIDAKA County,  
WAKAYAMA Prefecture.

June, 1947.

/S/ OHASHI, Hyojiro (seal)

Exh No. 3121

Def. Doc. #1991

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

An Excerpt from the Monthly Report  
on the Prisoner of War (Doc. No. 12)  
issued on 31 Dec. 1944.

Gratitude Expressed by the Prisoners of War  
At the Tokyo POW Camp.

5. Commander Mayer, a senior officer to this internment camp  
tendered the following letter of appreciation in behalf  
of the internees to express gratitude for the various  
entertainments given on Christmas day, 25 December.

Letter of Appreciation

TO: Col. SAKARA

Dec. 26, 1944

Chief of the Tokyo POW Camp

In behalf of all the prisoners of war in the Tokyo POW  
Camp, I wish to express our warm appreciation for being  
allowed to enjoy a wonderful Christmas day. For us prisoners  
here this day means so much and the fact that we are able  
to celebrate this day according to the customs of our country  
is indeed a privilege.

The majority of prisoners here, who are separated so far  
from their homes and families, have already observed Christmas  
twice in this camp but I am certain that this was the merriest  
of all. Had it not been for the Japanese military authorities  
we would not have been able to enjoy this day.

I wish to express again our heartfelt appreciation to  
Colonel SAKARA and his subordinates for their efforts in  
making our Christmas so enjoyable.

Mayer, Commander, U.S.N.

**FILE COPY**  
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Def. Doc. #1991

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Evidence No. 16-3

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached, entitled "Gratitude of the Prisoners of War in the Tokyo POW Camp" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (The Prisoner-of-War Information Bureau).

On this 16 day of June, 1947

/s/ HAKANISHI, Sadao  
Acting Chief of the Prisoner-  
of-War Information Bureau.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
SITTING AT TOKYO, JAPAN

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, Paul M. Lynch, Clerk of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, do hereby certify that the annexed and foregoing 2 pages of writing is/are a true, correct and compared transcript of Exhibit No. 3121, including language corrections, if any, as the same appears on file in this office.

I further certify that this exhibit was admitted into evidence on the 8th day of September, 1947 as shown by the daily record at pages 27843 of the proceedings entitled:

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of this Tribunal on this 20th day of Feb., 1948.

/s/ Paul M. Lynch  
Paul M. Lynch, Court Clerk  
International Military Tribunal  
for the Far East

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY :

*H.C. Bishop*

H.C. BISHOP  
CAPTAIN, QMC

(SEAL)  
International Military Tribunal  
For the Far East, General  
Secretary  
United States of America  
China, Great Britain  
Russia, Australia, Canada  
France, Netherlands,  
New Zealand, India  
Philippines

Def, Doc, No, 1991

Exh, No, 3121

目録第十六號ノ三

東京俘虜收容所俘虜ノ感謝

本會は貴局保管書類の正確なる抜萃なる事を知り、明する

昭和二十二年六月十六日

俘虜清原局長官事務取扱

中西

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昭和十九年十二月三十一日停戦月報（十二月第十二號）ヨリ抜萃

東京俘虜收容所俘虜ノ感謝

十二月二十五日「クリスマス」當日實施セル講行禮ニ對シテ本所收容中ノ先  
任將校「ノート」中佐ハ左ノ感謝狀ヲ贈リ感謝ノ意ヲ表セリ

感

謝

狀

東京俘虜收容所俘虜一同ヲ代表致シマシテ素情ヲシキ「クリスマス」ノ一日  
ヲ過サセテ頂キマシタ事ヲ厚ク感謝致シマス。我々俘虜ニトリマシテハ此ノ  
一日ハ特ニ意義深キ日デアリマシテ我々ノ國ノ習慣ニヨリマシテ祝フ事が出  
來ル事ハ我々ニ何ヨリノ恩典デアリマス。  
我々及家族ヲ慮ク儘シテイル俘虜ノ大多数ハ今迄三二回以上ノ「クリスマス」  
ヲ過シマシタガ彼等ニトリマシテ此ノ「クリスマス」ノ一日ハ今迄ニナク大  
キナ事シマデアッタ事ト確信致シマス。



日本軍物資局ノ御協力ヲナケレバ斯ル業シミヲ持ツ事ハ出来ナカッタデアリ  
マセウ。  
改メテ我々ノ「クリスマス」キ阪メテ染シキモノタラシムルニ御協力下サイ  
マシタ酒葉大佐殿並ニ部下ノ方々ニ心カラナル感謝ヲ表明致シタイト思ヒマス  
ス。

一九四四年十二月二十六日

茶田中佐

東京俘虜收容所長 酒葉大佐 殿

Def. Doc. #1993

OSAKI P.O.W. CAMP  
Hirohata Sub-Camp  
Hirohata, Japan

20. 8. 22.

To: The Medical Director and Staff, Seitetsu Hospital, Hirohata, Japan.

From: Sidney E. Seid, Captain, Medical Corps, U.S. Army.

For almost two years I have been the Prison Camp surgeon at the Prisoner of War Camp at Hirohata. During this time you have helped care for the Prisoner of War Camp at Hirohata. During this time you have helped care for the prisoners. You have equipped our dispensary with medical and surgical instruments. You supplied us with medicines and surgical supplies, and were relatively generous with them, even when those items were very scarce and difficult to obtain. Your staff physicians gave medical and surgical consultations. You loaned me medical reference books, You also x-rayed our patients when it was required.

I know how busy your staff has been, and I know how scarce medical supplies have been in Japan. Therefore, I can and do appreciate what you have done for us.

I am writing you this letter as I leave Japan, so that you and whoever else reads this letter may know that I acknowledge the fine spirit in which you acted toward us. You and your staff have treated us so much more fairly and honorably than others. that you deserve commendation for it.

May the scars of war soon heal. May you and your staff have success and happiness in the years to come.

/s/ SIDNEY E. SEID  
Capt(AC), U.S. Army

Def. Doc. #1993

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HIROTA, Teruki, who occupy the post of the medical director of HIROHATA SEITETSU SHO HOSPITAL, NIPPON SEITETSU Co., Ltd. since August 1939 (13th year of Showa) hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in English consisting of 1 page is a exact and authorized letter of appreciation given to me personally from P.O.W.'S who were interned at HIROHATA Branch, OSAKA F.O.W. Camp.

Certified at No. Ko-1625 Eika, Shikamaku, Himejishi, Hyogo-Prefecture

/s/ HIROTA, Teruki  
The director of hospital,  
HIROHATA SEITETSU SHO, Nippon  
Seitetsu Co., Ltd.

I hereby certify that the above <sup>signature</sup> and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place

At the same time

/s/ KANEZUMI, Masuo

2

Def. Doc. #1969

Exh. No. 3/23

Evidence #18  
Excerpts from VA 1. 2. 13

"Examples of Officer POWs' Voluntary Work"

1. The four men voluntarily engaged in knitting fishing-nets for use in the north-sea fishing area have proven to be very efficient. (an excerpt from "Laboring Officers", the monthly report of Hakodate POW Camp, April issue 1944)
2. In the Second Detachment, Captain ZEKURAI and Second Lieutenant May among other officers at labor, have worked voluntarily with eagerness and seriousness. Their results were far better than those of the average Japanese workers. Their great contribution was recognized by the firm and after many conferences it was decided that a sum of money for encouragement was to be given to the two officers as a reward. (an excerpt from the monthly report of Hakodate POW Camp, June issue, 1943)
3. The Officer POWs who were transferred and assembled at the detachments of Ikuno and Ooyama, are actively engaged in farming. Particularly in the Ooyama Detachment they raise wheat, potatoes, sweet potatoes, and vegetables for themselves and before long they are expecting to harvest as much as 8 sacks (T.N. about 16 bushels) of wheat. (an excerpt from the monthly report of Osaka POW Camp, May issue, 1945)
4. The officer POWs who were transferred from Hiroshima POW Camp to Rokuroshi Military Training ground, have volunteered to do farming, and have been working diligently since the end of last month. (an excerpt from the monthly report of Osaka POW Camp, June issue, 1945)

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Def. Doc. #1989

I hereby certify that this document is composed of exact excerpts  
from the document in the custody of this office.

July 1, 1947

/s/ NAKANISHI, Sadayoshi  
Acting Chief of POW  
Information Bureau

一、北洋漁場用漁網ノ編網作業ニ自發的ニ従事シアル四名ハソノ能率ニ於テ大イニ見ルベキモノアリ

(十九年四月號函館收容所月報「將校勞務」ヨリ拔萃)

二、第二分所ニ於テハ將校就勞者中セクラ一尉、メイ少尉ハ自發的ニ作業ニ服シ熱心且眞面目ニシテ一般日本人側工員ニ比シソノ成績ハ極メテ優秀ニシテ増産ニ資ル所大ナルハ合社側ノ認ムル所トナリ種々協議ノ結果右二名ニ對シ賞トシテ獎勵金ノ供與方ヲ決定ス

(昭和十八年六月號函館收容所月報ヨリ拔萃)

三、生野、大江山兩分所ニ移管集結セシ俘虜將校ハ積極的ニ農作ノ勞務ニ従事シ殊ニ大江山分所ニ於テハ小麦、ジャガ芋、甘藷、野菜ノ自作ヲナシ、小麦ハ近ク約八俵ノ收穫ヲ得ントスル良況ニアリ

(昭和二十年五月號大阪俘虜收容所月報ヨリ拔萃)

四、廣島俘虜收容所ヨリ移管ヲ受ケ六呂師演習場ニ收容セル將校俘虜ハ自發的ニ農耕ヲ志願シ月末以降孜々トシテ努力シアリ

(昭和二十年六月號大阪俘虜收容所月報拔萃)

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COPIES

證據第十八號

VA 1、2、13より拔萃

伴將校が自發的に勞務に従事した例

本卷は世局保管書類の正確なる拔萃である事を證明する

昭和二十二年七月一日

伴情報局長官事務取扱

中

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3104

Def. Doc. # 2109-A

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Excerpt from the "Tokyo Prisoners of War Internment  
Camp Monthly Report" (March, 1943)

1. Ordinary diet.

The staple food for the captives of non-commissioned officers and under were rationed 570 grammes at first, but it was gradually increased, in proportion to the amount of their labour, to 690 grammes by January 1st of this year. As the hours of their labor were extended in March, the last reserved quantity of 96 grammes were added, making it 786 grammes, which were the largest regulated amount and the equal quantity of ration allowed Japanese soldiers.

Moreover, from the view point of preventing beri-beri, more cleaned wheat was used so that their staple food was composed of at the rate of 410 grs. of polished rice and 376 grs. of cleaned wheat.

Moreover, efforts were made to supply them with subsidiary articles of diet containing much albumen and fat so that they might be free from deficiency diseases and raise power of resistance to diseases.

2. Diet for patients.

To those sufferers from diarrhoea, bread and eggs, etc. have hitherto been given, and to the sufferers from beri-beri, vitamin and rice-bran were supplied and thus an early recovery of the patients was taken care of from the point of view of nutrition.

3. Efforts are being made to increase the sales of daily necessities in the canteen to the extent that no undue pressure may be brought upon the demand of the general public, in order to have prisoners find comfort and hope in this direction so that they may display the maximum ability in their labor.



Def. Doc. # 2109-A

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, YOKOI, Kōji, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section in the Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau, hereby certify that the printed matter hereto attached, printed in Japanese, consisting of two pages and entitled the "Tokyo Prisoners of War Internment Camp Monthly Report" (March, 1943) is an exact and true copy of an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (The Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau).

At Tokyo,  
on this 18th day of August, 1947.

/s/ YOKOI, Kōji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: /s/ KAZUMA, Isaburō (seal)

東京俘虜收容所月報抜萃（昭和十八年三月）

1 普通食

俘虜下士官兵以下の主食定量は當初五七〇瓦なりしも労働量の増大に伴ひ逐次増加し本年一月一日六九〇瓦とせしも三月に入り労働時間の延長と共に最後に最後の豫備量たりし九六瓦を増加し規定の最高量たる七八六瓦を給し星草食と同定量の給與額に達したり  
尙脚氣疾患豫防上より精麥混入量を増加し精米四一〇瓦精麥三七六瓦の割合とせる外 白質脂肪多量副食物の給與に努め榮養失調症の預防及病氣に對する抵抗力の増加に努めつつあり

2 患者食

下痢患者に對しては從來「パン」食、鶏卵等の支給をなし脚氣患者には「ビタミン」一、米糖等を使用し榮養方面よりする患者の早期恢復に努めたり  
酒保に於ては民需を壓迫せざる範圍内に於て日用品の販賣量を増加し此の方面より慰安と希望とを與へ勞務に最大能力を發揮せしむべく努力中なり

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文藝成立ニ關スル證明書

自分ハ伴慶情報局調査課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付ナル日本語ニ依リ印刷セラレ二頁ヨリ成ル東京伴慶收容所月報（昭和十八年三月）ト題スル印刷物ハ日本政府（伴慶情報局）ノ保管ニ係ル文藝ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年八月十八日 於東京

井 孝 治

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日於同所

立會人 數 馬 伊 三 郎

福岡俘虜収容所月報抜萃（昭和十九年六月）

昭和十九年陸軍密第三八二七號其等の適用に關する件及昭和十九年  
陸軍密五五一一號俘虜の米麥給與定率に關する件に基き新たに改定俘虜  
糧食給與計畫を改定六月一日より之に基據し給與を實施す其の定置左の  
如し

勞役に服する俘虜 米麥一人一日 七〇五瓦

力業に服せざる准士官以下俘虜 三七〇瓦

將校同相當官 三九〇瓦

米麥拂出は全俘虜七〇五瓦を以てし勞務便宜の状況により前記の分配を  
なし分配による差額は勞務徴出、健康低下の俘虜に給與し適正を計り其  
の成績は概ね良好なり

炭屑勞務に關しある派遣所に於ては地方團給與より同一勞務に従事  
しある邦人勞務者と同計の配給米麥七一〇瓦を受け施設豆類混入を行ひ  
無ね分所に準じ給與を實施しあり

ハ 米麥配給の額より各分へ派遣所共給與計畫に基き米麥代用食の混  
入率を三分比を以て給與しあり

ニ 久留米師團よりの小麥粉の割當六月分なく各所共にパン食給與に支障  
を來し師團に對し之か割當方交渉中にて來月より入荷の保證なり

2 副食

イ 主食減量と補食代金三割の交付とにより栄養補給は副食に負ふ所大となりたる爲副食調給に努力すると共に現均自治に依り勞務に對する健康維持に遺憾なきを期しあり

ロ 副食物の取得は証ね回滑順調にして付に生野菜の入手良好なり生魚類の入手は証ね順調なるも獸肉類は月間二、三、十四、十七分所にては取得困難なり

ハ 献立は停食は停食の嗜好を考慮し、カレー粉、胡葱、食油等の使用を多くし副食は一日所費を交付の上停食をして爲さしめあり

ニ 各分派遺所月間平均一日熱量三〇九二、八四カロリー平均体重六〇斤一五三にして詳細左表の如し

所 名	一日平均	所 名	一日平均	所 名	一日平均	平均カロリー
第一分派	三、一五〇	第十四分	三、六三七	第六派	三、九八四	
第二分	三、一五〇	第十七分	三、一一〇	第八派	三、一二四	
第三分	三、五七六	第二十二分	三、一一〇	第九派	三、八〇六	三、〇九二カロリー
第四分	三、八四二	第三派	三、二一九	第十派	三、〇一三	
第一派	三、〇二三	第四派	三、〇一〇	第十一派	三、二五七	
第二派	三、〇三二	第五派	三、八一〇	第十二派	三、五〇〇	

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ付スル證明書

(三號)

自分、横井考治ハ存心情報局調査課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、竝ニ添付セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ 三 頁ヨリ成ル 昭和十九年六月ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(存心情報局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ抜萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年八月十八日 於東京

横井考治

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日 東京 事務所

立會人 武田 馬 伊 三 郎

DEF. DOC. #2109-B




Exhibit # 3125

An Excerpt from "The Fukuoka War Prisoners  
Camp Monthly Report" (June, 1944)

a. With reference to the notice upon the frugal use of provisions regulated by the Army Sub-secrecy Order No. 3827, 1944 and the notice upon rations allowed to war prisoners in rice and wheat regulated by the Army Sub-secrecy Order No. 5511, 1944 the revised plan of rationing war prisoners was newly established, and in conformity therewith rations were allowed on and after June 1st as follows:

	rice and wheat per head a day
Individual war prisoners under labour	705 gs.
Individual war prisoners below the non-commissioned officer free from labour	570 gs.
Individual commissioned officer and similar ranking officer	390 gs.

As a general rule, delivery of rice and wheat to all war prisoner is based on at the rate of 705 gs. per head but is to be adjusted by actually allowing the foregoing rations to each one in accordance with the nature of labour and physical conditions and by supplying the remaining amount, if any, to the war prisoners either under hard labour or in bad health. The result is generally satisfactory.

b. At the sub-branch where war prisoners are employed in labour of coal-mining, each one is given by the local organ of distribution 710 gs. of rice and wheat which are the same amount as Japanese miners are allowed under the identical work. The ration, with mixtures of cereals and pulse, is allowed generally after the method of the branch.

c. Taking demand and supply of rice and wheat into consideration, all branches (sub-branches) are rationing their war prisoners at a mixture rate of 30% of substitute food for rice and wheat acting up to the plan mentioned above.

d. There having been no distribution of wheat flour through the month of June which was to be done by the Kurume Division, all the branches faced difficulties in rationing bread, and so they are now in course of negotiations with the Division thereof. Fresh supply is expected from next month.

2. Subsidiary Food.

a. As the matter of nutrition has become much indebted to the volume of subsidiary food in consequence of less supply of staple food and paying 3 sen to each war prisoner for making up thereof we are making every effort to keep war prisoners in good health enough to let them work, as well as to prepare and arrange subsidiary food, sticking to the principle of self-support at each locality.

b. Generally speaking the subsidiary foods are secured with smoothness and regularity, especially so with green vegetables. Fresh fish generally come to hand with regularity. Meat, however, was not easy to be gotten by the 2, 3, 14, 17, sub-branches during this month.

c. In view of war prisoners taste, the diet is prepared with much use of curry powder, pepper and edible oil, and cooking is to be done by war prisoners themselves with their daily required amount of materials.

d. At each branch and sub-branch of the War Prisoners Camp during this month, the daily average calories taken by a war prisoner is 3,092,84 calories, his average weight being 60.153 kilogrammes, the particulars of which are given in the following list.

names of branches and sub-branches	calories taken per day	calories on an average
the 1st Branch	3,166 cal.	
the 2nd Branch	3,150 cal.	
the 3rd Branch	3,576 cal.	
the 4th Branch	2,842 cal.	
the 1st Sub-branch	3,023 cal.	
the 2nd Sub-branch	3,032 cal.	



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the 14th Branch 2,637 cal.

the 17th Branch	3,110 cal.	
the 21st Branch	3,120 cal.	
the 3rd Sub-branch	3,219 cal.	
the 4th Sub-branch	3,010 cal.	
the 5th Sub-branch	2,810 cal.	3,092
the 6th Sub-branch	2,984 cal.	cal.
the 8th Sub-branch	3,124 cal.	
the 9th Sub-branch	2,806 cal.	
the 10th Sub-branch	3,013 cal.	
the 11th Sub-branch	3,257 cal.	
the 12th Sub-branch	3,500 cal.	

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, YOKOI, Kōji, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section in the Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of three pages and entitled "An Excerpt from the Fukuoka Detention Camp Monthly Report" (issued in June, 1944) is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 18th day of August, 1947

/S/ YOKOI, Kōji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place

on this same date

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburō (seal)

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Exhibit # 312

An Excerpt from "The Fuzhoka War Prisoners  
Camp Monthly Report" (June, 1944)

a. With reference to the notice upon the frugal use of provisions regulated by the Army Sub-secretary Order No. 3827, 1944 and the notice upon rations allowed to war prisoners in rice and wheat regulated by the Army Sub-secretary Order No. 5511, 1944 the revised plan of rationing war prisoners was newly established, and in conformity therewith rations were allowed on and after June 1st as follows:

	rice and wheat per head a day
Individual war prisoners under labour	705 gs.
Individual war prisoners below the non-commissioned officer free from labour	570 gs.
Individual commissioned officer and similar ranking officer	890 gs.

As a general rule, delivery of rice and wheat to all war prisoner is based on at the rate of 705 gs. per head but is to be adjusted by actually allowing the foregoing rations to each one in accordance with the nature of labour and physical conditions and by supplying the remaining amount, if any, to the war prisoners either under hard labour or in bad health. The result is generally satisfactory.

b. At the sub-branch where war prisoners are employed in labour of coal-mining, each one is given by the local organ of distribution 710 gs. of rice and wheat which are the same amount as Japanese miners are allowed under the identical work. The ration, with mixtures of cereals and pulse, is allowed generally after the method of the branch.

c. Taking demand and supply of rice and wheat into consideration, all branches (sub-branches) are rationing their war prisoners at a mixture rate of 30% of substitute food for rice and wheat acting up to the plan mentioned above.

d. There having been no distribution of wheat flour through the month of June which was to be done by the Kurume Division, all the branches faced difficulties in rationing bread, and so they are now in course of negotiations with the Division thereof. Fresh supply is expected from next month.

2. Subsidiary Food.

a. As the matter of nutrition has become much indebted to the volume of subsidiary food in consequence of less supply of staple food and paying 3 sen. to each war prisoner for making up thereof we are making every effort to keep war prisoners in good health enough to let them work, as well as to prepare and arrange subsidiary food, sticking to the principle of self-support at each locality.

b. Generally speaking the subsidiary food are secured with smoothness and regularity, especially so with green vegetables. Fresh fish generally come to hand with regularity. Meat, however, was not easy to be gotten by the 2, 3, 14, 17, sub-branches during this month.

c. In view of war prisoners taste, the diet is prepared with much use of curry powder, pepper and edible oil, and cooking is to be done by war prisoners themselves with their daily required amount of materials.

d. At each branch and sub-branch of the War Prisoners Camp during this month, the daily average calories taken by a war prisoner is 3,032,84 calories, his average weight being 60.153 kilogrammes, the particulars of which are given in the following list.

names of branches and sub-branches	calories taken per day	calories on an average
the 1st Branch	3,166 cal.	
the 2nd Branch	3,150 cal.	
the 3rd Branch	3,576 cal.	
the 4th Branch	2,842 cal.	
the 1st Sub-branch	3,023 cal.	
the 2nd Sub-branch	3,032 cal.	

DEF. DOC. #2109-B

the 14th Branch 2,637 cala.

the 17th Branch 3,110 cala.

the 21st Branch 3,120 cala.

the 3rd Sub-branch 3,219 cala.

the 4th Sub-branch 3,010 cala.

the 5th Sub-branch 2,810 cala.

3,092  
cala.

the 6th Sub-branch 2,984 cala.

the 8th Sub-branch 3,124 cala.

the 9th Sub-branch 2,806 cala.

the 10th Sub-branch 3,013 cala.

the 11th Sub-branch 3,257 cala.

the 12th Sub-branch 3,500 cala.

**FILE COPY**  
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Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, YOKOI, Kōji, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section in the Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of three pages and entitled "An Excerpt from the Fukuoka Detention Camp Monthly Report" (issued in June, 1944) is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 18th day of August, 1947

/S/ YOKOI, Kōji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place

on this same date

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburō (seal)

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4.3.126

Def, Doc, NO2109-0

善通寺伴房收容所月報抜萃（昭和十九年十一月）

イ、獸、魚、鳥、肉は依然配給圓滑ならさるも疎米類は本月中旬以來逐次其の出廻りも軌道に乗りたるもの、如く何等民需を壓迫することなく合法的なる調辨を爲しつゝありて各所共に一日一人約六〇〇瓦以上を給し得る状態にあり加ふるに今回伴房月報局の斡旋に依り赤十字救恤食料品の寄贈を受けたるを以て副食物に關しては當分樂觀し得る状態となれり

ロ、糞に發せられし昭和十九年八月二十二日附善即經衣第二二七一號「主食代用大豆等の補給中止に關する件通牒」に依り爾來主食代用として大豆の配給は途絶し、本分所に於ては在庫品を以て之か補充を爲しつゝありしか本月に入るや之も全く佛此し現在には粟、高粱、綠豆、小豆及季節柄甘藷を主食代用として定數を確保しつゝあり、尙紛末給與の見地より俛白を調辨し之か趣旨に副はしむべく準備せり

ハ、本所に於ける收容伴房の大部を占むる伴房將校の糧食給與に關しては將校伴房自給勞務の強化を圖り又伴房炊事班に伴房主計將校を參加せしめ之をして獻立表を立案せしむる等伴房將校の削減工夫を喫

校に於ての特外に特別甚治し病きとの主(食)現在立七〇(互)に對し新に支給し規定しつ、伴、め、將



文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

自分横井孝治ハ伴房情報局調査課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ二頁ヨリ成ル普通寺仔以收容所月報抜萃（昭和十九年十一月）ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（伴房情報局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ抜萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年八月十八日 於東京

横井孝治

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人數馬伊三郎

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Excerpt from the Monthly Report by the ZETSUJI  
War Prisoners' Camp (November, 1944)

1. Though the supply of meat and fish is not enough as before, vegetables seem to have been placed on the regular channel since the middle of this month. We are getting them by lawful means without sacrificing any civilian demand; we are now supplying more than 600 grams of vegetables per capita a day in every camp. In addition, thanks to the relief food from the Red Cross, through the good offices of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau, condition has become satisfactory for the present as far as meat and vegetables are concerned.

2. Soy-bean which has been supplied as a substitute for staple-food was stopped since the No. 2271 financial notice of the ZETSUJI Division, "Instruction pertaining to the Stoppage of Supply of Soy-bean etc. As Substitutes for Staple-food" dated August 22, 1944 was issued; we have been making up for the deficit with our stock. But since the beginning of this month the stock has all gone. So at present we are securing necessary quantity from millet, kaoliang, green-peas, red bean and sweet-potato, which is now in season, as substitutes for rice or wheat. We have installed hand-mills, providing for the necessity of supplying pulverized food.

3. Regarding the food supply to officer prisoners forming a greater part of the war prisoners in our camp, we are trying to improve the labor for the self-supporting of officer prisoners, making accountant officer prisoners cooperate with the War Prisoner Cooking Section in planning meals. Besides encouraging the originality of officer prisoners for their own cooking as above mentioned, we have newly provided for a "Special Meal for Recuperation (570 gram of staple-food)" which will be supplied to those who are especially in weakened condition (at present about 10 persons).

Doc. # 2109-C

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOKOI, Koji, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Investigation Section of the War Prisoner Information Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Excerpt from the Monthly Report by ZENTSUJI War Prisoners' Camp" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the War Prisoner Information Bureau)

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 18th day of August, 1947

/S/ YOKOI, Koji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburo (seal)

Def. Doc. #2093

Exh. No. 3127

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

EXHIBIT COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: KUBOTA, Tokujiro

Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am KUBOTA, Tokujiro. I am presently living in KUMAKURA, SHIMOTSUGA-Gun, TOCHIGI-Prefecture. I was born in Osaka on the 14th day, July, the 24th year of Meiji (1891). I was the President of the Manchurian Engineering Machinery Company Ltd. (MANSHU KOSAKU KIKAI KABUSHIKI KAISHA) from June, the 17th year of Showa (1942) to February, the 19th year of Showa (1944).
2. The matter of using prisoners of war concerning court exhibit No. 1970-A took place when I was the President of the Manchurian Engineering Machinery Company Ltd., so, I shall depose as follows

Def. Doc. #2093

Exh. No. 3127

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

RAKI, Sadao, et al

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 261

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: KUBOTA, Tokujiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am KUBOTA, Tokujiro. I am presently living in KUMAMURA, SHIMOTSUGA-Gun, TOCHIGI-Prefecture. I was born in Osaka on the 14th day, July, the 24th year of Meiji (1891). I was the President of the Manchurian Engineering Machinery Company Ltd. (MANSHU KOSAKU KIKAI KABUSHIKI KAISHA) from June, the 17th year of Showa (1942) to February, the 19th year of Showa (1944).
2. The matter of using prisoners of war concerning court exhibit No. 1970-A took place when I was the President of the Manchurian Engineering Machinery Company Ltd., so, I shall depose as follows

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concerning the real circumstances of the use of the prisoners in connection with this case as the said president at that time.

(1) Although, there arrived at Mukden approximately 1,300 prisoners of war towards November, the 17th year of Showa (1942), it was about February, the 18th year of Showa (1943) that the said company commenced to employ the POWs, and their number was about 50. Thereafter, the number of P.O.W.s were gradually increased, and their peak reached about 600. According to the first plan, we were going to use about 1,000 P.O.W.s, however, the percentage of actual workers was 60% at the highest rate. This was due to the fact that as a consequence of an investigation of the P.O.W.s abilities, we found out a number of them were farmers and that there were fewer experienced mechanics than we had expected. Also because of the fact that we did not work them improperly taking into consideration such things as the P.O.W.s health, ability, rank etc.

~~By the way,~~ The employees of our company numbered approximately 300 Japanese and about 700 Manchurians --- totalling about 1,000, when we first began to use the P.O.W.s; at the peak we had approximately 800 Japanese and about 1,200 Manchurians --- totalling about 2,000.

(2) Our company manufactured machinery belonging to the category

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of enlarging productive power, and as far as I know there were no plans established either by the Army, or by Manchukuo or by our company also, to make the company a military factory, and not a single order was received by our company from any arms manufacturing factories in Manchuria, Japan proper and other places, to produce arms or parts thereof. Consequently, our company never used the P.O.W.s to engage in work related with the manufacture of arms or with work directly concerned with the operations of war.

3. As mentioned above, there were so few technically experienced workers among the prisoners of war, contrary to our first expectations, that at first, although they attended the factory every day they did not do any work worth mentioning. In the meantime, in compliance with the desire of the majority of the POWs we decided to teach them the techniques of machinery manufacture. We purchased about five tons of pig iron and steel materials from the 918th Army unit in Manchuria at that time, to be used as material for the educational program and we classified the P.O.W.s into mechanics, finishers, fitters, tool makers, blacksmiths, carpenters, draftsmen, designers, warehouse-keepers, automobile repairmen etc. and taught them the techniques of machinery manufacture under the leadership of the company's engineers and skilled workers. As a result of this, after my

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resignation as president of the company, an automatic lathe was made.

4. Colonel MITSUDA, Chief of the internment camp in Mukden, inspected our company frequently and instructed all the Japanese and Manchurian employees to treat the P.O.W.s with charity and tolerance. Consequently ~~there~~ <sup>there</sup> was ~~no~~ <sup>no</sup> discriminatory treatment between the Japanese, Manchurian and the P.O.W.s, ~~and with us~~ <sup>there was</sup> ill feeling. They were able to work with pleasure in perfect harmony as one.
5. The prisoners of war were idle and felt awkward doing no work whatsoever during the interval and before reporting to the factory after their arrival at Mukden but, they used to visit the factory now and then as they desired. A party for the P.O.W.s was held in the main dining hall of the factory on Christmas Eve, 1942 in accordance with the P.O.W.'s desires. Though various materials were not easily available at that time, we bought tobacco, Candy, apples, oranges etc. by all possible means and distributed them to the P.O.W.s; and the P.O.W.s themselves contributed to the party by putting on skits and other entertainment.

On this 5th day of August, 1947

At Nippon Industrial Bank, Shinjuku-ku, Chiyoda-Ward, Tokyo.

DEPONENT: KUBOTA, Tokujiro (seal)



I, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: /S/ SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ SHIOBARA, Tokujiro (seal)

3128

REPORTS ON TREATMENT OF P.O.W. IN PRISONER'S  
CAMPS IN JAPAN PROPER

I.

PURPORT

This report has been prepared for the purpose of clarifying how the Japanese personnel in charge of the prisoners' camps in Japan Proper committed illegal acts in the treatment of the prisoners of war of the Allied Forces and how the Japanese authorities dealt with these culpable personnel, and explaining the actual circumstances at the time which led to these events.

As this report has been and is being drawn up according to the returns which have been or are being made by chiefs of camps, additional reports on these cases will be made later on.

II.

THE FACTS WHICH WERE REVEALED ON THE  
ABOVE CASES AND MEASURES TAKEN.

Upon inquiries among the prisoners' camps in Japan Proper, it was revealed that, with few exceptions, atrociously and inhuman acts of violence were never done deliberately upon the prisoners of war.

However, there were certain cases where improper measures were taken in the dealing or treatment of the POW, such as some unauthorized punishments which was inflicted upon the P.O.W. by some Japanese personnel who were carried away by their emotions and misunderstanding of customs. Such cases were caused through the difference of languages and the lack of efforts on our part, or sometimes some unavoidable circumstances, which resulted in a lot of illness and deaths among the P.O.W., and the carelessness on the part of the employers of prisoners caused accidents while the prisoners were being employed on P.O.W. labor.

Although most of these cases took place under unavoidable circumstances, we keenly regret that we were to blame for it. And in case the treatment of the P.O.W. was unfair, we did justice to our faults and every time gave strict warnings to those concerned, and the offenders were all dealt with by their superiors as mentioned in the affixed list.

And instructions were given to the military district commanders that they should make a close examination of each case and deal fairly with the offenders, clarifying where the responsibility rested, so more reports will be made on our fair dealings as they have been disclosed.

III.

EXPOSITIONS: "STATEMENT"

Our basic policy of the treatment of the prisoners of war aimed at giving a just and fair treatment to them according to various regulations relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.

Our superintendents of the prisoners of war strictly observing this basic policy made every effort to treat them fairly. However, it was really a matter of regret that some supervisors directly in charge of the prisoners dealt out illegal punishment which the Japanese are apt to practise by habit and sometimes treated them unfairly under various circumstances at home or owing to some unavoidable accidents. The circumstances at the time under which the above cases took place will be explained below.

1. Illegal punishment inflicted upon Prisoners of War.

- 1) Illegal punishment is not only one of the chronic evil practice in our army, but also one of the national defects. Generally the people of this country make light of the evil of this practice. They never regard it so gross an insult as Europeans and Americans do. They have such erroneous views that a kind man would rather chastise an offender with a blow of his fist and let him go than punish him formally according to the law putting him to shame before the public or bringing disgrace upon his family, and that discipline will be maintained by illegal punishment. We deeply regret that such an evil practice brought troubles upon the prisoners of war.

The authorities of the Army had already been cognizant of the serious evils of such private punishment which trampled upon human rights, or disturbed military discipline, or became an obstacle to education in various lines, and made every effort to remove such an evil practice, repeatedly giving strong warnings, but with all their efforts conditions failed to improve as much as expected.

Besides, the Japanese are generally quick-tempered. They easily get excited over trifles. Especially when a trouble takes place on account of the difference of languages or customs. They are too impatient to inquire into the rights and wrongs of the case or chastise offenders by lawful means which are possible, and, carried away by their excited feelings, deal out private punishment at once on the spot. But later when they become calm they repent of their violent acts.

11) Motives for private punishments.

The examination of the real facts of such private punishments inflicted upon the prisoners of war shows that in almost all cases, the punishers did such private dealings not for venting their own rancor but simply for the purpose of correcting the misconduct of the prisoners of war, or in self-defense, or on account of their misunderstandings, which were produced by the difference of languages, that the prisoners were insulting or resisting them.

On the other hand, some prisoners of war were really irreclaimable, lacking in moral sense, and some of them were shunned by the rest of the prisoners, who sometimes asked us to chastise them by our hands.

111) Supervision and guidance in preventing private punishments.

Most of these unjust acts were done by men lower than non-commissioned officers and very few officers committed such offences.

Careful consideration was paid in selecting lower officials such as watchmen, leaders, and guards who were usually in touch with the prisoners, and much care was taken for the supervision and guidance over these lower officials. But almost all the watchmen were disabled ex-servicemen because at the time the recruitment of the army was more urgent. And a comparatively large number of these disabled ex-servicemen were prejudiced and mentally defective because of their physical defects, and they were liable to treat the prisoners unfairly. So we always had a close supervision over those guards. Those who were extremely wrong were fired at a moment notice. As leaders and guards were selected and recommended by the employers of prisoners of war, and all these personnel were not so good in character, much care was taken in selecting them, and the closest supervision and careful guidance were exercised over them.

On the occasion of the Council of the Chiefs of the P.O.W. Control Bureau of the War Ministry, which was held on December 26, 1943, Major General HAMADA, Chief of the P.O.W. Control Bureau (Concurrently Chief of the P.O.W. Information Bureau), delivered an address calling the attention of those concerned.

Gist of Major General HAMADA's Address

17-2-44  
Although the prisoners of war should be treated in accordance with the actual condition of the places where they were, we must be very careful not to treat them too badly in our excess of hatred. Unfair treatment of prisoners of war is nothing but an exhibition of narrow animosities and contrary to the spirit of Bushido or the cause of justice for which we are now waging this Greater East Asia War. Especially a private punishment, although it is originally a matter of trifle personal feeling, will not only hurt the personal feeling of the prisoners of war, but also furnish misleading data for surmising the general state of the treatment of P.O.W. in this country. If they should carry out pernicious propaganda about the ill-treatment of the P.O.W. in this country after their return home, the evil effects will be really beyond measure. I understand that in nine cases out of ten the difference in languages and the lack of understanding of the rules and regulations on the part of our officials concerned were the motives of such private punishments. I hear some prisoners were incensed at it so much as to knock down the punishers in reprisal. At this we cannot remove shame with the mere punishment of the prisoners.

You will please pay special attention to guiding your men in regard to the treatment of the P.O.W. and at every possible opportunity make every effort to make this point perfectly understood by all the units concerned, the units which employ the P.O.W., and other employers of the P.O.W. so as to give a due and fair treatment to the P.O.W.

iv) Feelings of officials of P.O.W. Camps toward  
the P.O.W.

Generally the Japanese are very simple and honest by nature, and easily taken in by propaganda. They are liable to be instilled with bitter hostility against the enemy through propaganda especially by foreign newspapers and magazines. During the Greater East Asia War, they harbored serious hostility against the enemy, but they treated those who had surrendered rather warmly, displaying hostility no longer. However, it cannot be denied that some of our officials failed to treat the prisoners of war fairly through a sense of superiority at heart. But, as mentioned above, it was not through such hostile feeling that the officials of the P.O.W. camps acted unfairly in treating the prisoners, but officials who were comparatively ill-educated and lacking in moral sense practised such unjust acts under wild excitement when troubles happened.

(1) Number of Deaths and Invalids; Classification of Disease.

The total of the POW who were transported to Japan Proper was 35,000. Thirty five hundred out of these prisoners of war, 10% of the total number, died. The number of invalids was from 2,000 to 3,000 per month on average. We are really sorry that we cannot justify ourselves for this, although this was due to various unavoidable circumstances.

The monthly total of deaths is shown in the Affixed List No. II.

The diseases which caused these numerous deaths and invalids were chiefly chronic enteritis, beriberi, pneumonia, and dystrophy, almost all of which are mainly due to the unaccustomed food or climate. Few of the prisoners suffered from infectious diseases.

(2) Efforts made of Improvement of Health Conditions.

(a) As mentioned above, those who were in charge of the POW were all very much concerned at the health condition of the prisoners. At every opportunity they tried to improve it, urging officials in direct charge. Every possible scientific measure were taken for the improvement of the sanitary conditions of the POW, especially for the proper assignment of labor according to health condition, the adjustment of supply, labor, and rest, the establishment of POW hospitals, the utilization of provincial hospitals or army hospitals, the improvement of equipment and the procurement of medical supplies. And for the last enormous expenses were paid.

(b) However, in spite of such unremitting efforts of the officials concerned, medical supplies came to run short as an inevitable consequence of the development of the war. Consequently, to our keenest regret, there were brought a materially ill effect upon the management of the affairs of the POW's health.

A close examination of the causes of such miserable health conditions of the POW showed that the more or less improper treatment of the POW during the transportation to Japan Proper, and the sudden change of the climate caused by their move from the tropical zone to the cooler zone were among the main factors of the poor health condition of the POW.

During the voyage, the commanding officers of troops in transit together with other officials made their best effort for the sanitation of the POW.

But these transport ships were very often wrecked, being attacked by the airplanes and submarines of Allied Forces or sometimes obliged to be at sea much more days than scheduled to avoid such attacks, consequently supplies running short, the POW were gradually exhausted and many of them died or suffered from dystrophy, and those who had been in very good health were found in poor health condition when they landed on Japan Proper. And this brought a very bad effect on their health condition afterward.

In December 1941, the War Vice-Minister and the Vice Chief of the General Staff issued a note for the purpose of exercising proper supervision over the POW in transit for Japan Proper, urging officials in charge to pay much attention to the treatment of the POW. The note is shown below:

Subject: Transportation of POW.

It is reported that there are found a number of invalids (and deaths) among the POW who have arrived in Japan Proper of late on account of the improper treatment in transit. In the light of this fact; it is brought to your notice by order that closer attention should be paid to the treatment of the POW who are to be transported to Japan Proper, that is, the selection of the POW, quarantine, allotment of the medical staff, preparation of necessary medical and food supplies in transit, proper supervision during the transportation, arrangement to meet the convenience of the POW transport ships at each port of call, and adequate supply of clothing.

The transportation of these POW being from the tropics to the cooler districts, special care was taken in deciding the time for their journey. However, owing to some circumstances; such as irregular shipping traffic or others, some of the POW got to Japan Proper in winter which some times brought ill effects upon the health of the prisoners (T.N. original not clear & underlined portion) .

(c) On March 3, 1944, a note regarding the establishment of hospitals for prisoners of war was issued in the name of the War Vice-Minister to call the attention of the officials concerned to the following points:

i) Prisoners of war shall be supplied with food and clothes according to the nature of work. The quantity of these supplies shall be in accordance with the various regulations relative to the treatment of POW.

ii) Each prisoners' camp shall have sick wards attached to it as soon as possible. (Branch camps and labor detachments shall be equipped with necessary medical supplies and instruments, and each main camp shall have an infirmary with sufficient equipment), so that sick prisoners may receive sufficient medical treatment. Expenditures, materials and medical supplies necessary for these institutions shall be delivered on demand.

iii) Enemy medical personnel shall be employed most effectively to improve sanitary work in each camp. And shall ask the [unclear] of military hospitals or those attached to army units as medical personnel in prisoner camps concurrently so as to have better guidance in sanitation in camps.

iv) It should be avoided to employ on work sick prisoners who need rest, or to assign to heavy work those who are slightly sick and fit for light work or those who are of poor constitution merely for the purpose of achieving a high percentage of attendance merely for form's sake. To increase the practical efficiency of POW labor, much care shall be taken for the sanitation of POW and due consideration shall be paid to the fitness of the constitution of each prisoner for the climate of the place where he is working, and, if necessary, his removal to another camp shall be granted.

### (3) Medical Treatment.

#### i) Equipment for Medical Treatment:

Every possible care was paid to the medical treatment of the POW, establishing dispensaries or like medical institutions attached to prisoner's camps or labor detachments for short term treatments, and for those requiring long term treatments there were sick wards attached to main prisoners' camps. Sick prisoners who were admitted to appointed military hospitals of the Army for further medical treatments were found in considerable numbers.

#### ii) Medical Personnel:

Each camp had full-time medical staff, including specially excellent medical officers who were in charge of the sanitation, prevention of epidemics and medical treatment. And necessary medical personnel were sent to these dispensaries from Army units stationing near camps so as to give satisfactory medical treatments. And what is to be mentioned here with hearty thanks is that POW medical personnel rendered a remarkably great service to the sanitation of the camps, willingly assisting Japanese medical personnel.

#### iii) Medical Supplies:

Medical supplies were delivered to POW infirmaries, like other Army units, from the headquarters of the Army to which camps belonged the demand of the Chief of each POW camp. Besides, the medical supplies donated by the International Red Cross Society were also used. In addition, to give sufficient medical treatment, penicillin, the famous wonder drug, the study of which had been initiated and completed in this country, was also given to sick prisoners, although the general Japanese armies had had no supply of it.

### 4. Counter Measures for Prevalent Disease.

#### a) Beriberi.

It seemed that generally the prisoners had very weak resisting powers to beriberi which has been prevalent in the East. Many a case was found among prisoners. Generally speaking, more serious cases of this disease were found among the prisoners than among the Japanese soldiers.



As this was partly due to the change of food, firstly the improvement of food supplies was planned. To have a better absorption of nourishment, bread was recommended in every camp. Although the food problem was really acute at home, every effort was made for the adequate supply of meat and fats. Besides vitamin preparations (both internal medicines and injections) were supplied in very large quantity. Wakamoto and Yeast were given at meals.

Consequently in Japan Proper there is seen a remarkable decrease of beriberi cases of late, and those who are now suffering from beriberi are mostly old cas

## b) Dysentery.

This disease is, as a rule, very prevalent in the Southern Regions. And it was noticed that more amoeba dysentery cases were found among the prisoners than among the Japanese troops. As these prisoners were undernourished, their condition was comparatively serious.

The following table shows the result of the microscopic examination of the most serious dysentery cases which was made at the Mukden Prisoners Camp immediately after their removal from the Southern Regions at the end of February, 1943 (Including bacilli-carriers).

	No. of cases Examined	Positive Reaction	Percentage
Dysentery Bacilli	1,303	62	4.8
Dysentery Amoebae	363	31	8.5
Para-typhus Bacilli	1,303	3	0.2

Some of the protozoan carriers had a considerable number of trichomonis mixed with protozoa. As to dysentery amoebae, we mostly used "cetren" (T.M. spelling not sure) as the supply of "emccin" was not sufficient on account of its short production.

When the prisoners arrived in Japan Proper, there were found a considerable number of capsule-carriers among them, but gradually the number of these capsule-carriers decreased.

(c) Diphtheria

The prisoners were idiosyncratic to this disease, especially to dermatic diphtheria which was very prevalent. At first the cases were found in large numbers at Hongkong, and also in Malaya. A considerable number of these cases came into this country later. As counter-measures, we conducted bacteriological examinations, disinfection of clothing, enforcement of gargling and the use of flu masks. Most of the cases received diphtheria serum treatment, as we got an ample supply of the serum.

(d) Pneumonia

In Hokuriku district a considerable number of prisoners suffered from pneumonia on account of the cold there.

As precautionary measures, we took such steps as stated below, and as to the cases, we removed them to warmer districts for the best possible treatment.

5. Measures for Protection against Cold in Cold District.

As the prisoners had very poor resisting powers, especially against the cold, the following steps were adopted.

(a) Increased Supply of Blankets.

In each camp every prisoner was supplied with five or six blankets (ordinal supply 4), no blanket being left boarded. In some places where it was severely cold employers of prisoners gave a donation of "futons" (T.N. Bed covers and mattress wadded with cotton) to prisoners at the suggestion of the camp authorities.

(b) Prisoners' rooms were sealed up to protect them from draught. To keep warmth, entrances of their barracks were fitted up with double doors of blankets or mattings, and floors of their rooms were covered with straw, straw bags, "tatamis" (T.N. thick straw mattings) "usuberis" (T.N. thin straw mattings).

(c) Heating Arrangements.

All the rooms or sick wards of prisoners camps were furnished with stoves. These stoves were used in camps from September, a little earlier than in our barracks. In some camps rooms were warmed from midnight or early in the morning (3 a.m.).

(d) Other Arrangements.

The best possible protections against cold were provided, for example, windbreaks in front of the entrances of the barracks, double windows on the north side of buildings, recreation rooms, with glass windows on the south side, serving as sun-rooms, warmed rest rooms near working places, partition of large rooms, ceiling of rooms, and regular supply of warm food.

In some camps, all the prisoners were supplied with hot-water bottles.

## 6. Food Supply

Both for the maintenance of health and enjoyment of life, the most careful attention together with the most serious efforts were made toward the adequate supply of food for prisoners, and concerning their meals, we always respected their national customs, and gave much thought to their taste, physique and constitution. The calorie of their ration, which was fixed according to that of our Army, was usually not under 3,000, special care being taken for the supply of albuminous food and fats. Consequently, the prisoners' rations were much more than those of the Japanese at large, and even more than those of our special heavy workers.

The rations of the prisoners, the Japanese Army and the average Japanese are shown in the annexed list No.3.

Serious endeavors were made to secure this rate of their rations under the most unfavorable condition of food supply at home. And among our people there were some who felt envy at such rations of the prisoners.

With the development of the war, the acquisition of materials, especially articles of food, became more and more difficult. As to rations prisoners were never treated with discrimination because of their being prisoners. The fact is that the people at large found themselves in such a sad plight that they could not maintain health with the regular ration only. Some of them attempted black-marketing and some went far away into the country for purchasing food articles.

It was not only the people at large but also the end of 1944 there were found many a distrophy or beriberi case among the soldiers, and these cases increased one after another. Therefore, at the beginning of 1945, the self-supplying system of food articles was encouraged among the army units for the purpose of procuring the adequate supply of nourishment for the personnel of the Army. Such being the case, it was not only the prisoners that were suffering from malnourishment.

Under such circumstances, the personnel of prisoners' camps endeavored to obtain adequate supplies of food for prisoners, overcoming various difficulties. Sometimes they went out at night after daytime work to get food articles, and sometimes went to market drawing carts themselves, sometimes to some distant places, say more than ten miles away from their camps; sometimes they went around mountain sides for getting vegetables. Sometimes they had to persuade the prejudiced personnel of district organs. But it was really a matter of regret that these unremitting efforts of the personnel of camps produced no good result. The situation became worse and worse, with the result that the health of prisoners was affected so much.

7. Equipment in Camps.

Every possible means was taken, as far as circumstances permitted, to obtain materials for the equipment of camps, which had directly or indirectly more or less effect upon the health of prisoners. But such circumstances as shown below, brought upon a condition which was not so desirable.

Building business was confronted with serious difficulties at home as early as before the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War. In 1929 ordinary building works became almost impossible. With the lapse of time, the situation became more and more aggravated. Since the outbreak of the war all the new construction works except those having direct connection with the operations of war, were not permitted to set about. And even those which were indispensable were mere makeshift buildings just like triangular barracks or trench barracks which were seen in the first line.

As the prisoners' camps were built and equipped under such circumstances they could not be said to be satisfactory. The short supply of building materials such as timbers, nails, cement, panes, metal fittings, sheet-zinc, bricks, slates, as well as the shortage of laborers such as carpenters and plasterers, made it difficult not only to start a construction of new camps but also to convert old buildings into prisoners' camps.

8. Accidents which Happened While Working at POW Labor, etc.

(a) Thirty-six cases of such accidents have become clear so far. The details are shown in the affixed list No. 4.

(b) Although these accidents took place under unavoidable circumstances, most of them were partly due to the carelessness on the part of the employers of the prisoners. So that strong warnings were given repeatedly, and sometimes special trainings were given to the prisoners (T.N. not clear) so as to avoid such accidents.

(c) We suggested the employers of prisoners to make adequate counter-measures against such unhappy accidents, and take some steps to console the injured prisoners.

As to the means of consolation and condolence, rules were provided as follows:

Measures for Relief on the Part of Employers of Prisoners in Case of Accidents.

In case prisoners (including prisoners despatched from outside. The same with the "prisoners" in the following.) should be killed or injured in any accident for which they are not responsible (excluding those which are inevitable) while they are at work in factories or other working places, you will suggest the employers of prisoners (including employers of despatched prisoners) to make donations according to the following standard in accordance with Article 15 of the Regulations governing the P.O.W. labor and Clause 2, Article 11 of the Regulations governing the Despatch of Prisoners.

- (1) Prisoners who lay off on account of their wounds.

Employers shall donate the sum correspondent to injured prisoners wages according to the number of their off-days.

- (2) Prisoners crippled or killed as the result of their wounds.

Employers shall donate the sum correspondent to the accident allowance or the allowance to the surviving family in accordance with the Factory Law and the Mining Law. In this case the base wage shall be 1 Yen.

P.S. The money offered to dead prisoners shall be disposed as articles left by the deceased.

APPENDIX NO. 1

(A) Hakodate Camp

Outline of the Affair

On 4 April, 1943, the Japanese beat a prisoner of war with bamboo stick because of the prisoner evaded work.

Assailant and the Punishment imposed Upon him by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman, TAKESHITA, Toshio. 2 day's domiciliary confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

In January; 1945, while the Japanese was standing sentry as a guard, the prisoner used violent languages. In addition, when the Japanese patrolled, the prisoners were using prohibited stove. Then the Japanese beat prisoners.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed upon him by the Superior

Civilian Service Man, SAITOH, Terukichi, Four days heavy domiciliary confinement.

Outline of the Affair

In April, 1943, as the prisoners forced themselves into the dispensary and stole some medicines, the Japanese beat them and admonished them. Later, the Japanese beat them for several times.

Assailant and the Punishment imposed upon him by the Superior

Ambulance Pvt. 1st Class. KANAMARU, Matsuzo. Five days confinement for serious case.

OUTLINE OF THE AFFAIR

On 20 July, 1943, the Japanese beat a prisoner because the prisoner stole a cucumber at the munitions dump.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed Upon him by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman, TANAKA, Junichiro. One day confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair and Others

same as above.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed upon Him by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman. NAGAMINE, Masayoshi. Four day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 3 September, 1943, the Japanese slightly beat a prisoner because the prisoner forced himself into the warehouse of canteen and stole something.

Assailant and the punishment Imposed upon Him by the Superior

Corporal ITOH, Kunio. Five days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 12 September, 1943, the Japanese got angry and beat prisoners because the prisoners were late several times to their work.

Assailant and the punishment imposed upon them by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman WATANABE, Sadao. Two days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 20 September, 1943, as a prisoner hummed loudly at the clinic, the Japanese warned him, who, however, did not take any obedient attitude. And then the Japanese slapped and admonished him. The Japanese also beat the prisoner after that.

Assailant and the Punishment by the Superior.

Ambulance Pvt. 1st Class. IMAI, Kiyomi. Five days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 4 February, 1944 while patrolling, the Japanese found the prisoner smoking out of the fixed place and beat him slightly.

Assailant and the Punishment by the Superior

Civilian serviceman NAGAMINE; Masayoshi. Seven days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

In December, 1943; the Japanese found the prisoner, who was to keep vigil, sleeping on bed, and beat him slightly. The same Japanese beat the prisoners three times, as the prisoner smoked out of the fixed place or did not obey orders or instructions.

Assailant and the Punishment imposed by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman SUDA, Kiyomatsu. Seven days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 10 January, 1944, while the Japanese was on patrol-sentry, the prisoner not only neglected to salute, but



laughed scornfully, so the Japanese slightly beat the prisoner. In addition, the Japanese slightly beat the prisoners who had a smoke after the "light out".

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman MIYAGAWA, Nobuhiro. Five days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 19 June, 1944, the Japanese beat the prisoners on the head who deliberately neglected work. Moreover, the Japanese warned prisoners of war of their unfairness in the distribution of mess, and beat with leather belt those who refuted.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman TAKESHITA, Toshio. Ten days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 23 July, 1944, the prisoner night watchman whom the Japanese appointed was not on duty and other POW was on duty. Its reason was not clear and their attitudes were very impolite, and so the Japanese beat them.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Surgeon Lt. SHIBA, Tsutomu. Seven days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On the morning of 14 August, 1944, at the roll call, the prisoner of war who was not sick wore overcoat. So he was beaten by the Japanese.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Sgt. MASATOSHI, Eiji. One day confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 10 December, 1944, as a prisoner exchanged official issued boots with tobacco possessed by a Japanese worker, he was beaten.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman KARIYA, Yoshiaki. Five days attention.

Outline of the Affair

In January, 1945, the Japanese was insulted by a prisoner who also violated the rules of night-watch duty. So the Japanese beat the prisoner.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Civilian serviceman, SAITOH, Terukichi. 4 days attention.

Outline of the Affair

On 6 February, 1945, a prisoner out an officially issued bed sheet and, with it, made gloves and pants. So he was beaten by the Japanese.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Sgt. ASATOSHI, Eiji. Five days attention.

Outline of the Affair

On 8 February, 1945, the Japanese slightly beat the prisoners who disobeyed the order, for the sake of caution for other POW's.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Ambulance Sgt. ARAKI, Kuniichi. Three days attention.

Outline of the Affair

Same as above

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Civilian serviceman, WATANABE, Sadao. Admonition.

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Outline of the affair

In May, 1944, resenting against the prisoner's violation of rules and impolite attitudes, the Japanese beat him.

Assailant and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman, TANAKA, Junichiro. Five day's heavy attention.

Outline of the Affair

On 20 April 1945, a prisoner entered the warehouse violating the rules of warehouse and took meal at the section of the warehouse, so he was beaten by the Japanese.

Assailant and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman KOSHIZU, Iwao. Two day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

Same as stated above.

Assailant and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman, YAMMOTO, Katsumi. Two day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1945, a prisoner entered kitchen without permission and neglected salutation, so he was beaten by the Japanese.

Assailant and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman KIKUCHI, Kenichi. Two day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

On 1 August 1945, the Japanese beat the prisoners who were always slow in action and, in addition, did not obey instructions.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman WATANABE, Sadao. Seven day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

On 8 July 1945, the Japanese was indignant at the insolent attitudes of prisoners of war, when he interrogated them on the charge of something wrong, and beat the prisoners.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Chief Pte. TAKEDA, Nobumasa. Two days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

On 10 August 1945, when the Japanese interrogated the prisoners who committed thefts at vegetable garden, the prisoners did not confess the truth on one pretext or another, taking bad attitudes. So the Japanese beat the prisoners.

Offender and the punishment by the superior

Chief Pte. KUDO Goh. Five days heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

On 27 July 1945, while the Japanese was on duty as the chief of sentry, he warned and beat the prisoners who neglected salute.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Chief Pte. KIMURA, Keigoro. One day's heavy attention.

Def Doc No. 1435

Outline of the affair

On 3 March 1943, after the work finished, as the result of an inspection, the Japanese found some prisoners having tools in their pockets and beat them.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Guard ROKUTSU, Takoo. Discharged as a guard. Salary for five days was reduced.

Outline of the affair

On 2 February 1943, the Japanese beat a prisoner of war who smoked ignoring rule and was lazy.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Guard ENDO, Hidoo. Suspension of attendance for five days.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1945, the prisoners took defiant attitudes against the Japanese leadership of work, and so the Japanese beat them.

Offenders and the punishment by the superior

Clarks of Akazawa Line. SUGISHITA Sadami, NAKAZUMA Chiyosaburo (the above two were discharged) and ONO Shuichi (Admonition and five day's suspension of attendance).

Outline of the affair

On 17 September, 1944, during the work, the Japanese and prisoners beat each other owing to the unskillfulness in the work and the lack of understanding due to language difficulty. At that time, the Japanese slightly injured the prisoners right leg.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Coachman MATSUZAKI Yonokichi. Admonition and discharge.

Outline of the affair

In April 1945, at roll calls, the prisoners assumed very insolent attitudes despite repeated warnings. In addition, the prisoners stole things from civilians houses for several times.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Guard KINOSHITA Kinzo. Discharge.

Outline of the affair

In June, 1945, the Japanese ordered the prisoner of war to repair a cart, which the prisoners refused under the pretext that he did not break it. Then the Japanese beat the prisoner.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Coachman ONO, Ichiro. Admonition. Discharge.

Outline of the affair

The manner of service was bad. There were rumours that this Japanese embezzled things for prisoners of war. Moreover, he beat prisoners.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Interpreter of the Company SHIOMI Haruo. Discharge.

Outline of the affair

A POW stole herrings while working in the warehouse and was beaten by the Japanese.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Guard IMANO Miyaichi.

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(B) SENDAI CAMP

Outline of the affair

At the farm, the Japanese beat prisoner on his head with some instrument.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman TSUDA Koji. Three day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

The Japanese beat prisoner of war as a man in charge of provisions and fodder.

Offenders and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman M.TSUURA Saburo and S/SAKI Toraji. Three day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

The Japanese punished prisoners of war privately.

Offenders and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. MIURA Sohichi and Civilian Serviceman OSANAI Shigeru.

Strict Admonition.

Outline of the affair

The Japanese punished prisoners of war privately because of prisoner's neglects of their duties.

Offenders and the punishment imposed by the superior

Guard of the company. TAKUSARI Suteoa and SATOH Shin-nosuke.

50 percent reduction of salaries for twenty days.

Outline of the affair

There was something unfair in the Japanese's distribution of articles.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. OHTA Kaichi. Three days heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

The Japanese beat prisoners on their head.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Servicemen YONEMURA Fukufi (discharge) and TAKASAGO Ikutada (5 day's heavy attention).

(C) TOKYO CAMP.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1945, this Japanese was very earnest and especially careful in the management of the prisoners of war. On the contrary, however, he was too strict to administrative duties of the prisoners of war and his treatment of them was also extremely severe. Above all, when he ordered prisoners of officer's rank some work, they did not obey, so he beat and kicked them.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

The camp commander of the fifth branch. Lieutenant KATOH Tetsutaro. Three day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese forced work on sick prisoners who were suffering slightly. This Japanese's disposals of seized goods and stocked articles were not certain. This Japanese carried out inoculation without any knowledge of medicine (allegations by the prisoners of war).

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Lieutenant NISHIZAWA Masao. As he had been transferred to other unit, his whereabouts is now under investigation to interrogate the actual state.

Outline of the affair

In June, 1945, this Japanese was positive and earnest on the path of his duty, but he was also of quick-tempered and very often restrained prisoners privately, and took violent action. So he was strictly admonished and was transferred to other branch. Still, however, his repentance was not satisfactory.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. WATANABE Mitsuhiro. Four day's heavy attention and sent back to his original unit.

Outline of the affair

While this Japanese was in charge of clothings, there everyday was shortage of articles issued to prisoners. So, this Japanese, setting too much importance on the officially issued articles, inflicted private restraints on the prisoners.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman KONDO Seigo. Five day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1945, this Japanese was in charge of labours and had been earnestly and diligently engaging in his duty. However, while he was assuming leadership of labour, there very often were the acts on his part that should be considered as "severe". Above all, this Japanese was indignant about the indifferent attitude of a prisoner and violently beat him on his face.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman KIMURA Iwao. Three day's confinement for serious case.

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Outline of the affair

In December, 1942, this Japanese had always been a supporter of the prisoners and he treated the prisoners with kindness. However, if there had been someone whose fulfillment of duty was unsatisfactory or whose attitude lacked rigidity, he was so relentless that he inflicted private restraint repeatedly. Above all, when he acknowledged that a prisoner's movements in his daily life were very rough and insolent, he beat him on his face on the pretext of admonition.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Interpreter, Chief Private KURIYAMA Michio. Three day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

While this Japanese was with the cooking section of the first branch, there were signs that he stole prisoners belongings and rations, but no positive proof was produced about it. According to what was stated by the representative of prisoners, he mistreated prisoners in order to conceal his crime. This Japanese, actually, again and again mistreated prisoners severely.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman MIYAZAKI Hiroshi. Three day's heavy attention.

(D) NAGOYA CAMP

Outline of the affair

Between April and July, 1945, there were prisoners of war who broke the key of the provisions warehouse and stole rations, who, in their own section, were cooking the soybeans which they stole, who concealed flours, rices, etc. that they stole under the floor at the time of the inspection of administrative duty and who did not request the repair of clothings. This Japanese beat those prisoners for four times, poured water over them and beat them even with leather belt.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman SHIMODE Ryoichi. Three day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

Between April and July, 1945, this Japanese several times beat prisoners who stole bean paste while they were carrying it, who broke the key of warehouse and stole rations and "sake" wine which should be distributed to the Japanese staff, who stole fishes, etc.



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stole rations and "sake" wine which should be distributed to the Japanese staff, who stole fishes, etc.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman NAKASAI Matsujiro. Three day's confinement for serious case

Outline of the affair

Between August, 1944, and June, 1945, this Japanese repeatedly beat prisoners whose attitudes at the time of muster, lining up, etc. were very bad, the prisoners of officer's rank who, anticipating Japanese defeat, adapted insolent attitudes, prisoners who stole lunch at the place where they were working.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman HOSBI Setoemon. Three day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

Since approximately May, 1945, this Japanese beat the prisoners who stole Japanese "sake" wine, who were under suspicion of stealing the comfort and relief articles, etc. and furthermore beat other prisoners for several times.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman TAKENOUCHI Kazuhiro. Five day's confinement for serious case

Outline of the affair

In July and August, 1945, this Japanese beat the prisoners who sneered at the Japanese members of the camp, declaring that the Japanese defeat would be decisive and also beat officers on the pretext that the officers supervision over the prisoner was unsatisfactory. Moreover, this Japanese beat them for several times.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman KAWAMURA Kamoki. Five day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

Between April and July, 1945, under the pretext of insufficient supervision over the prisoners, this Japanese beat respectively the American prisoners of officer's rank who ordered prohibition from smoking, who chattered during the work, etc.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman TOYAMA Fusao. Two day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

In May and June, 1945, this Japanese beat prisoners who neglected their labours and who stole edible oil from the factory, respectively.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman KATOH Genzo. Two day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1945, having been informed that there were some prisoners who stole provisions from the factory of the company, he called the American officers who were controlling prisoners account and beat them.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman TANAKA Tokuchi. Three day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1945, this Japanese beat prisoners who stole rice from the spot of their work and a prisoner, who having been under confinement on the charge of a theft, stole rations again while he was on duty of miscellaneous jobs.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

C.S. NAKAGAWA Tatsunaru. Two day's confinement for slight case.

Outline of the affair

In June and July, 1945, this Japanese beat the prisoners who went out to glean oya beans after lunch, ignoring rules, who were impolite in their salutes and attitudes, who pocketed materials while measuring them, etc.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

In approximately July and August, 1945, this Japanese beat prisoners, for several times, who, shamed weight while measuring, who sang or whistled in the midst of their work, who cooked soya-beans that they stole from the spot where they were working.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

C.S. YASHIKI Seiji. Two day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

In August, 1945, this Japanese beat the section-chief of prisoners who were lazy in his work, and roused prisoners antipathy by making a strong statement that the

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POW officer's steps were improper concerning the works of prisoners. This Japanese also roused POW officer's antipathy by exchanging tobacco with shoe cream, safety razor, etc. possessed by POW, in answer to the prisoner's request.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Clerk of the Company in charge of liaison. ITOH Akira. After informing to the company, he was discharged by the company.

Outline of the affair

In June and July, 1945, this Japanese beat POWs, on their logs, who neglected their duty. This Japanese also beat prisoners or leave them standing for about 30 minutes beside the electric furnace when these prisoners did not appear at the workshop after their recess expired.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

A worker of the company. MAKINO Umataro. Admonition and reduction of salary for August.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese beat prisoners when he took the leaderships of their works.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Workers of the company. TOKAI Kosaku and WASEBI Katsuji. Admonition and the reduction of salary for one month.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese was punished because of insufficient control of Ito Akira, who exceeded his authority against the prisoners of war while he was engaged as a contract worker.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Chief of the Iwase branch of the Nippon Tsunan Company H. SHIZUME Takejiro. The Company voluntarily admonished him. How to admonish was still pending.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese's control over his subordinative staffs concerning treatments of the prisoners of war was so insufficient that civilian servicemen, etc. under his control repeatedly beat or mistreated.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

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Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

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Commander of the Branch Camp. Lieutenant KOJIMA Chotaro. Seven day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair, offenders and the punishment

Charged by the same offence as stated above, the following officers were also punished as stated below:

2nd Lt. OKADA Mishiroku (five day's attention).

Lt. HAYAKAWA Yuji (two day's attention).

Captain NAKAHARA Keiji (Three day's attention).

Outline of the affair

This Japanese's grip of subordinate concerning the treatment of prisoners of war was insufficient, so that his subordinates frequently mistreated prisoners by beating, etc.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

The Commander of the Nagoya POW Camp. Colonel OHTAKE Michiji. Ten day's heavy attention.

(E) OSAKA CAMP.

Outline of the affair

Between about November, 1944 and February, 1945, this Japanese, for the purpose of reforming misbehaviours, misused, against several American prisoners, moxibustion which should be made good use for medical treatment.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. MANTANI Kichinosuke. Ten day's attention.

Outline of the affair

In approximately September, 1944, this Japanese stole a part of the comfort and relief articles for the prisoners (towel, soap, grape, cube sugar, etc. etc.).

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman SHIGEI Takeichi. Six months imprisonment and was discharged at the same time.

(F) HIROSHIMA CAMP

Outline of the affair

On approximately 20 December, 1944, the sugar for cooking was stolen. In the

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Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. MATSUDA Kichinosuke. Ten day's attention.

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Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

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(F) HIROSHIMA CAMP

Outline of the affair

On approximately 20 December, 1944, the sugar for cooking was stolen. In the

course of investigation into the offender, this Japanese compelled prisoners to confess by piercing the prisoner's thigh with gimlet or by heating the prisoner's buttocks with electric small kitchen-range, or by beating them.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. MIYAWAKI Yoshikatsu. This man became missing since about 10 September, his whereabouts are now under search.

Outline of the affair

The manner of treating prisoners of war by this Japanese was generally severe. Once, in winter time, he left a prisoner who was under detention in the guard room for a serious offence nearly bare.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Captain MURAKAMI Takuji. Reproof.

Outline of the affair

In February, 1944, while this Japanese was serving at the main prisoner's camp in Zentsuhi, he greatly insulted officer-prisoners and roused their antipathy. But it seems that he did not mistreat any prisoner.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Interpreter KOBAYASHI Yasuo, was transferred to other place after being acknowledged not to be suitable for camp duty.

Outline of the affair

Between June, 1943 and December of the same year, while he was with the camp detachment at Makojima, he mistreated POWs frequently.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman ARIMA Shigeru. Though being admonished and asked to give a written explanation, there still was no sign of his reform. So he was discharged.

(3) FUKUOKA CAMP

Outline of the affair

In February, 1945, the Japanese summoned a British officer, Jinkens, to his own room, mistreated by himself the prisoner by reason of neglecting in the work at the self-support garden and roused antipathy.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Interpreter SUMIOKA Harutaro. He was admonished strictly and was transferred in the sense of relegation.

Outline of the affair

In April, 1945, at a plant where POWs were working, a prisoner stole a lunch of a Japanese worker. That prisoner had committed the same for several times in the past. Sgt. Maj. YASUJAKE, who was the NCO of the week, in an attempt to control this prisoner on his own authority, imprisoned him and gave him nothing but water for the next day. In the meanwhile, he let a Dutch doctor-prisoner examine the imprisoned, and no unsoundness was acknowledged. However, on the third day, the prisoner suddenly took a serious turn and, though every possible measures had been taken, he died of heart-failure. This prisoner of war was suffering from a chronic disease of heart and his usual behaviours were very bad, getting the worst reputations among the prisoners of war themselves. The prisoners chief of his room frequently requested the punishment upon this prisoner.

In passing, Sgt. Maj. YASUJAKE was an honest soldier with fine spirit, and when the prisoners were liberated, they thanked him very much saying that he had done greatly for the good of them. (The copy of the death certificate for this prisoner was submitted in accordance with the request by the Chairman of the Receiving POW Committee, Colonel Kurechim.)

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. Maj. YASUJAKE Hideo. Twenty Day's heavy disciplinary confinement.



Captain NOZAKI Gentoku, the commander of the Branch, was sentenced to ten day's heavy domiciliary confinement on the charge of insufficient control of subordinate and delay of report.

Outline of the affair

Since the spring in 1943, as this Japanese had supplied the prisoners of war with more food than the fixed quantity, rations ran short. In an attempt to make up the deficit and to adjust it, the Japanese supplied the prisoners with rations below the fixed quantity for a long period between November, 1943 and about March, 1944. This fact reduced the physical strength of the POWs, endangering their health and lives.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Lt. Colonel KAMATA Torajiro. As the result of the investigation of the actual state, the Japanese was accused to the prosecution of the Court Martial as a criminal case. And the nominal crimes for him were:

- 1) Abuse of authority.
- 2) Injury.

Outline of the affair

About the middle of July, 1945, when the Japanese interrogated prisoners who were in the very act of stealing vegetables from the prisoner's self-support garden, this Japanese beat the prisoners on their heads with bamboo sword. A prisoner was nudged in his breast which resulted the fracture of his ribs.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman GOTO Toshio.

- 1) Presented a purse of Yen 100.-for the fracture of ribs.
- 2) Accused to the prosecutions of the Court-Martial.

Nominal Crimes: 1) Violence. 2) Injury.

Outline of the affair

On 15 August, 1945, when the Imperial rescript for the termination of hostilities was issued, the attitudes of the prisoners of war had changed completely with the overflow of the victorious mood. Then this Japanese could not control his excitement so that he summoned all the officer-prisoners and beat some of them.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. KURIBAYASHI Yoshinari. Five day's domiciliary confinement for serious case. Additional punishment by the camp commander was fifteen day's domiciliary confinement for serious case. Additional punishment by the army commander was ten day's domiciliary confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

Between January and May, 1945, this Japanese reduced the ration of the prisoners of war under the confinement. As the result of it, there were two cases of complication of diseases. There was another case that a prisoner under confinement had to be

hit leg for frost-bite due to the above.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Captain FUKUHARA Tsutomu. He was accused to the prosecution of the Court-Martial. Nominal Crimes: 1) Abuse of authority.  
2) Death resulting from injury.

Outline of the affair

After the liberation of the prisoners of war, some of the prisoner's articles which had been in the safekeeping of the Japanese authority were missing. Lt. YAMADA, former commanding officer of the Branch, and Sgt. Irie, the responsible person for the safekeeping, had had each one of the missing articles. But all the other missing articles were not found.

Offenders and the punishment imposed by the superior

Lt. YAMADA Kenzo and Sgt. IRIE Yoshiaki. accused to the prosecution of the Court-Martial. Nominal Crime. Seizure taking advantage of the authority.

Remarks:

- 1) As many punishments described in the above chart seems to be unfair, now the relative superiors are investigating their contents.
- 2) There had been some punishment inflicted in addition to the abovementioned punishments.
- 3) The results of the above two columns will be added to this chart.

ADDITIONAL CHART NO. 4

THE SURVEY OF THE INJURIES POWS SUFFERED  
DURING THEIR WORK OR OTHER CASES.

(A) HAKODATE CAMP

Sufferer

British Pte. MORRISON. Suffered a burn for the lower-half of the body.

Outline of the accident

In May, 1944, at the powdered-coal division of the Kamiso Works of the Asano Cement Company, a great explosion suddenly occurred owing to the ignition to the powdered coal during the operations. As the result of it, three Japanese workmen were killed immediately and a prisoner of war who was near that place got burnt.

Action taken by the authorities

This prisoner was immediately carried to the hospital attached to the company, and underwent emergency medical treatment by the doctor of the hospital who cooperated with the prisoner-doctor. The he was admitted to the hospital of the camp and had undergone medical treatment by both Japanese Military doctor and the prisoner-doctor. At first, the prisoner was in very critical condition, but as the result of the medical treatment with all the doctor's might, he had gradually improved. And now it could be diagnosed as improving on the whole though the functional disorder would be unavoidable.

Sufferer

British Warrant Officer ADWARD DARRENT. Instant death.

British Corporal Alexander ENGIS. Instant death.

Outline of the accident

In June, 1945, there was a removal of POW's camp and, while the prisoners were carrying cargoes on their shoulder, these two prisoners were run over to death by the train moving forward at that time. We had a strong wind mingled with drizzle on that day. In addition, as the prisoners were wearing rain coat with hood and carrying goods on their right shoulders, they were in a position from where it was difficult to look through the rapidly oncoming train from the right hand.

Action taken by the authorities

As soon as the accident took place, the Japanese military doctor rushed at the urgent report, and as it was decided to be "instant death" as the result of an inquest, the bodies were immediately carried to the Branch and lay in state courteously. On 4 July, a pastor was called and an impressive farewell service was held for the honours of their memories with the attendance of all the Japanese soldiers and the prisoners of war.

Sufferer

British Pte. HALLOWELL. Bruise.

Outline of the accident

In July, 1945, while prisoners were working at the Mitsui Miuta Mineral Factory, there was a sudden cave-in and a part of the falling rocks hit the waist of the prisoner and injured him.

Action taken by the authorities

The prisoner was rescued immediately and carried to the dispensary to make assurance doubly sure of the medical treatment. And on August, he was admitted to the hospital of the mineral factory for undergoing further treatment and is progressing favourably. Thereafter, the company has been warned so that further efforts would be made about the investigation of the cave-ceiling.

(B) SENDAI CAMP

Sufferers

Four prisoners burned.

Outline of the accident

Owing to the breakage of the bottom of the smelting furnace of the company, the melted pig-iron exploded and four men were burned.

Action taken by the authorities

As the result of thorough medical treatment at the dispensary, they made complete recovery without remaining any mark.

Sufferer

BERKARL JOHNE Died.

Outline of the accident

In July, 1944, while American prisoners of war were working in the Kotaki pit of the Ashio Copper Mine, a prisoner was killed after being severely hit on his head by a mineral ore which was thrown by another prisoner who was working on the upper step.

Action taken by the authorities

According to the Factory Law, the ¥850.- was given as solatium.

Sufferer

A prisoner of war.

The amputation of right leg from under the knee.

Outline of the accident

In August, 1945, at the Ashio Mineral Refinery, a prisoner was on the platform for driving machineries. Because of his own carelessness, he squeezed his right leg between winlasses, causing complicated fracture. He then had his right leg amputated from two inches below the knee.

Action taken by the authorities

He was immediately admitted to the hospital, where a prisoner ambulance man was attached to him to look after him. And, according to the Factory Law, ¥400.- was given as pension.



Sufferer

One died. British FOURLOUGH FIELD, and ALFRED EDWARD.

Outline of the accident

A cave-in killed a man. On 27 April, 1945, while the prisoners of war engaged in the work were taking a rest, rocks fell from the ceiling so suddenly that they could not take shelter and got wounded.

Action taken by the Authorities.

There is no report about the disposal of this case.

(C) TOKYO CAMP

Sufferer

JASBROFS

The loss of eyesight of left eye.

Outline of the accident

In May, 1944, while engaging in the boring work at the copper mine in Asio, as a Dutch prisoner thrust the drill into the hole where old explosives were still remaining, an explosion occurred and the prisoner lost the eyesight of his left eye.

Action taken by the authorities

The employing authorities let him enter the hospital and undergo medical treatment, According to the factory law, ¥160.- was delivered to the prisoner as solatium.

Sufferer

BEKARL JOHNE Died.

Outline of the accident

In July 1944, while American prisoners of war were working in the Kotaki pit of the Ashio Copper Mine, a prisoner was killed after being severaly hit on his head by a mineral ore which was thrown by another prisoner who was working on the upper step.

Action taken by the authorities

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Sufferer

A prisoner of war.

Amputation of right leg, leaving one third of thigh.

Outline of the accident

In December, 1943, while working at the Ome Factory of the Hokuriku Electrification Company, a prisoner of war was dashed from behind by a car loaded with ores and was bruised and lacerated about right knee. Later the wound took a change for the worse. Then an amputation on was performed with one third of thigh left.

Action taken by the authorities.

The authority made an artificial leg at ¥350.- and gave him it. In addition to this, the prisoner was given ¥956.- as the injury pension.

Sufferer

Sgt. Edward A. Cohen died.

Outline of the accident

In October, 1944, while working at the ore mountain, an American prisoner of war was hit on the back of the head with an ore of about ten kilograms fell from a slope about ten metres high and killed.

Action taken by the authorities

¥100.- was paid as an allowance to the bereaved family. To prevent the damage thereafter, the numbers of the fall-rock watchers were increased.

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Sufferer

Amputation of right leg.

Outline of the accident

In November, 1944, while working at the ore mountain, a prisoner of war got wounded and caused complicated fracture on the right leg and had the leg amputated later.

Action taken by the authorities:

₩956.- was paid as pension. Thereafter, the authorities stopped to use prisoners at the work of the ore mountain and replaced them with Korean labourers.

Sufferer

Complicated fracture of the left knee.

Outline of the accident.

In November, 1944, while working at the ore mountain, a prisoners of war had complicated fracture on his right leg and had it amputated.

Action taken by the authorities:

₩750.- was paid as pension.

Sufferer

Cross G. Joseph. Amputation from the knee.

Outline of the accident,

In March, 1944, while working at the Yamanoshita Steel Works in Niigata, an American prisoner of war was wounded on his right leg, and after undergoing medical treatment, it was improved properly. However, later the tetanus was developed and he was amputated from the knee.

Action taken by the authorities.

He was immediately admitted to hospital and was amputated by Doctor Shirai. At one time, he was in a dying condition, but, thanks to the endeavours by the doctor and other staffs in charge, he made a good recovery. As a man on duty, he was given a solatium of Y300.--. Moreover, an artificial leg was given to him and later he was paid wages equally with people at work.

Sufferer

Three men died.

John Foster. Olica Clanter.

Outline of the accident

In March, 1945, while the prisoners were working at the electric-furnace in the course of manufacturing carbide, they were carrying a pot filled with carbide, when the bottom of the pot dropped, and as the streaming carbide was close to the puddle, an explosion broke out and ignition to the clothes of three working prisoners followed. As the result of

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it, three of them were seriously burned while one another was slightly burned. The three serious wounded died afterwards.

Action taken by the authorities:

The three seriously wounded prisoners were immediately admitted to the hospital attached to the company, and, though having undergone medical treatment under careful nursing by a doctor, nurses and prisoner-ambulance man, they died. Then a grand funeral was held and ¥400.- each was given to each dead as solatium.

Sufferer

Warrant Officer Dott. Instant death.

Outline of the accident

In July, 1945, while a Canadian prisoner of war was on his way to a amouflaged ship, his working place, together with his coacher, he was passing the quay where the very ship was at anchor. By chance, when he reached just under the chain in the lifting operation, a hatch-boat dropped because of the breaks of hemp rope binding the boat. The prisoner got under the boat and died instantly.

Action taken by the authorities

As soon as the accident took place, the commanding officer of the detachment immediately went to the spot. Asking the Kempeitai and the

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police station to investigate the cause of the case, and after listening the situation from the responsible person, the commanding officer requested the employer the dealing of the person who was directly responsible for the accident, the consolation for the victim and the prevention of future accident, as the result of his request, the employer carried out the reprimand, transfer and the salary-reduction of the directly responsible person. In addition to these actions, Eight Hundred Yen was presented to the bereaved family of the dead.

Sufferer

A prisoner of war sustained laceration on his forehead.

Outline of the accident.

In October, 1944, at the Moyoyama mining ground of the Hidachi Mine, a prisoner of war sustained laceration on his forehead on account of a falling of a rock. He was sent to the hospital attached to the Mine and made a complete recovery after a month. Thereafter, he was engaging in some light works.

Action taken by the Authorities:

The wounded was immediately admitted to the hospital, when a expert surgeon sewed up the wound. Thereafter, the Japanese expert surgeon, a prisoner-doctor and prisoner ambulance-soldier cooperated in looking after the wounded.

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(D) NAGOY. CAMP

Suferer

The U.S. Army Corporal Casber Harvert. Death.

Outline of the accident

On 14, April, 1945, while driving an electric tractor for carrying the powdered coals from the workshop, a sand-slide broke out and the prisoner was pinioned between the tractor and the rocks on the embankment. As the result of it, the prisoner sustained the contusion of abdomen, internal haemorrhage, the fracture of the lower part of right thigh, and a laceration of right thigh just below penis. Then he died.

The action taken by the authorities

The wounded was immediately carried to the dispensary and was treated by medical staffs and prisoner-doctors to the best of their abilities, while on the spot, investigation was made regarding the cause and the state of the accident. Furthermore, careful inspection and control was requested to the responsible person of the company.

Suferer

U.S. Army soldier Grigo. I. Hoso. Death.

Outline of the accident



On 2 July, 1945, when the prisoner left his bed for going to latrine and was on the way to ladder, as it was just under the air-raid alarm and black-out, he lost his footing from the bed and fell. As the result of it, he sustained the fracture of skull, internal haemorrhage and concussion of the brain. Then he died.

Action taken by the authorities

There was no report about the action as to this case.

Sufferer

U.S. Navy Warrant Officer. Aloins William Chronine. Death.

Outline of the accident

When the prisoner was about to receive a gunny containing 90 kilograms of soya beans which had been being unloaded by derrick from a ship, the prisoner lost his foot and was knocked down by the cargo. As the result of it, sustaining the fracture of sternum internal haemorrhage and the fracture of left ribs, he died.

Action taken by the authorities

He was immediately carried to the dispensary and undergone infallible treatment by the medical staffs. Later, the cause and the state were investigated and the responsible person of the company was requested the inspection of the workshop and the good control of it.

(E) OSAKA CAMP.

Sufferer

C. Chroide Macmurrey. Death.

Outline of the accident

On 24 February, 1944, at Kanzaki station, the prisoner touched with an electric car on account of his own fault and died.

Action taken by the authorities

Because of the politeness of the treatment after the death of this prisoner, the chief-secretary of the prisoners sent a letter of thanks to the Japanese Authorities.

(F) HIROSHIMA CAMP

Sufferer

A.P.F. Corporal R.H. Hindel. Instant death.

Outline of the accident:

On 30 September, 1944, while working at the shaft of the Bessi Copper Mine, which was his workshop, the prisoner was killed instantly owing to the falling of rocks.

Action taken by the authorities

He was immediately dug out and his instantaneous death was confirmed. Then the authorities made the company that had been employing the prisoners

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pay relief fund according to the Law of Mine and left the fund as his lost articles.

Sufferer

Dutch soldier. A.J. Smith. Death.

Outline of the accident:

On 28 April, 1945, when this prisoner was engaged in chimney-sweeping at the Sumitomo Chemical works, his workshop, the ash-furnace which was left at the yard broke down and the prisoner was buried and wounded. And, afterwards, the prisoner died.

Action taken by the authorities.

He was immediately dug out after undergoing the first medical treatment at the medical relief station of the company, received treatment at the dispensary attached to the branch. However, he died about four hours after getting injured. The Japanese authorities made the company pay relief fund according to the Factory Law and left it as his lost article.

Sufferer

British soldier. R. Barbwhistle. Death.

Outline of the accident

On 23 June, 1945, while engaging in the mining coal at the gallery in the Motoyama Mine, the prisoner got injured on account of the falling

of rocks and died.

Action taken by the authorities.

He was immediately treated at the hospital of the company and furthermore undergone medical treatment at the dispensary of the camp, but he died. The company paid the relief fund according to the Mine Law and made it the prisoner's lost article.

(G) PUNUOKA CAMP

Sufferers

Twelve soldiers as stated below:

A. Vine, D. Ban, Deen Van, B. Foot, B. W. Bravest,  
Clumel Mashus, Edward Rongard, George Smiton, J.W. Philips  
T.H. Genois, V.G. Williams, and A.O. Williams.

Outline of the accident

As work at night is requested by nature of the  
of shipbuilding work, there were many men who erroneously fell  
during the work and died instantly or died after being  
seriously wounded.

Action taken by the authorities

Immediately the sufferers were carried to the Kawakami Hospital  
and were treated to the best of authorities's ability. On the  
other hand, in close cooperation with the management of the  
company and coaches of the workshop, the authorities endeavoured  
to provide proper safety

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device in order to meet with the conditions of the work shop which would change at all times.

Sufferer

France Hickoo. Death.

Outline of the accident

While engaging in unloading work, attin dropped and injured the prisoner on the head.

Action taken by the authorities.

Five Hundreds Yen of condolence money and an obituary gift were presented to the dead.

Sufferer

Terry Andrews. Death.

Outline of the accident

Without permission the prisoner evacuated between two goods-waggons, when the waggons moved and he was run over and killed.

Action taken by the authorities.

After the inquest, the dead body was carried to the camp by an ambulance car. The employing authorities called the responsible persons and addressed so that such an accident ~~would never break~~ out in the future, while the prisoners were also warned against violation of various rules so that

Never again such incident would happen.

Sufferer

D. Francis Zenkins. Death.

Outline of the accident

This prisoner fell from the upper floor at night and died.

Action taken by the authorities

In addition to the installation of hand-rails all along the upper floor, all the prisoners were warned against the recurrence of such accident.

Sufferers

Six men as stated below:

Zabis Peter Dypansy, Stuart James Morris, Fred Moore,  
George Fabenton, Howard Bent and Clement Saia.

Outline of the accident

On 7 September, six prisoners died because of Methyl-cloochism.

Action taken by the authorities

In cooperation with prisoner M.P., the Japanese Authorities and public body made efforts to investigate the affairs and to expose the seller. Doctors and hospital on the side of the employer exerted themselves in the medical treatment and relief and received thanks from the prisoners of war.

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Sufferer

A. Lawrence Davico. Death.

Outline of the accident

There were many dying owing to the accident in the shaft such as cave-in, affairs in regard to coal-car.

Action taken by the authorities

Whenever such accident happened owing to employer's fault, the Chief of the Branch made the authorities punish the responsible person and, by explaining the situation to all the prisoners, gained their understandings.

Sufferer

A prisoner. Wounded.

Outline of the accident

The prisoner mistook the driving of the elevator of the shaft and fell from a higher point of about three meters high and sustained fractures of the heels of his both legs.

Action taken by the authorities

According to the Factory Law, a solatium was presented.

Outline of the accident :

While the prisoner was driving horse-wagon, his horse ran amuck, and he fell, was run over and wounded, sustaining fractures of his waist and thigh.

Sufferer:

Wounded: A POW.

Action taken by the authorities :

Same as stated in the corresponding line of the above case.

Outline of the accidents:

In the shaft, owing to the breakdown of the headlight, the prisoner's leg was pinched between the coal-wagon. Then he got wounded and had his left leg cut.

Sufferer:

Wounded. Amputation of left leg.

Action taken by the authorities:

A solatium of ¥ 1,400 - was presented to the sufferer.

Outline of the accident:

While engaging in the electric furnace operation, an explosion suddenly broke out. Though being warned immediately, owing to the language difficulty, a prisoner was burned very much on his face and limbs.

Sufferer:

A POW sustained burn.

Action taken by the authorities:

Emergency treatment was given to the wounded at the dispensary of the employer, then he was carried to the dispensary of the branch and underwent medical treatment.

Outline of the accident:

Owing to the small cave-in, a few prisoners of war were slightly wounded in the back. Though Japanese coacher warned the prisoner of the danger, owing to the language difficulty, the prisoners were wounded.

Sufferer:

Wounded.



Action taken by the authorities:

The Commander of the Branch decided to let coaches have papers in which a few necessary vocabularies of English were stated.

Remarks:

The cases which are entirely due to the fault of the person in question are all omitted from this list.

SURVEY OF THE PRIVATE PUNISHMENT

(A) HAKODATE CAMP

Outline of the case:

Resenting that the prisoners did not obey the order, on 5 March 1943, this Japanese beat the prisoners.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman, KARIYA, Yoshitaka. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 20 April 1943, this Japanese beat the prisoners who forced their way into the provisions warehouse and stole rice and barley.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman NISHIOKA, Shigeru. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 1 May 1943, this Japanese beat a POW as the prisoner smoked beyond ranges of stipulated time and position.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior:

Corporal ASATOSHI, Eiji. Reproof.

Outline of the case:

Because a prisoner gave women workers tobacco, he was beaten for caution by the Japanese.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman, SANKAI, Matsuzo. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 14 September 1945, while being on duty of cookery, a POW stole

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bread and ate them, and then he was beaten.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Sgt YAMAGUCHI, Seiji. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

This Japanese beat a POW because the prisoner neglected work during working hours and did not obey the order of the chief guard.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman SANKAI, Matsuzo. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 24 August 1944, a POW was beaten by this Japanese because he stole salmon during working hours.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman MIYACAWA, Nobuhiko. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

This Japanese beat POW's who, feigning illness laid off and did not obey the order for work.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman SANKAI, Matsuzo. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 10 April 1945, this Japanese beat a POW who did not obey order during sweeping.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Ambulance Pte 1st Class TERABAYASHI, Tomokiichi. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 20 May 1945, this Japanese beat a POW for four times because the prisoner not only did not obey the order for sweeping, but showed defiant attitude.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Chief Pte IKI, Kashin. Admonition.

Outline of the cases

On 20 May 1945, while patrolling the camp yard, the Japanese struck a POW who neglected salute, with the butt of the rifle.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Pte 1st Class ISHIBASHI, Masaharu. Admonition.

Outline of the cases

On 23 June 1945, a POW was slightly beaten by this Japanese because he rejected work showing insolent attitude.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman KADOTAKI, Masao. Admonition.

Outline of the cases

On 1 July 1945, though having been warned very often, the prisoner did not obey and so he was stricken with the butt of the rifle.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Corporal OH-HASHI Kenichi. Admonition.

Outline of the cases

In July 1945, a prisoner was beaten because he entered kitchen without permission and, moreover, omitted to pay his compliments.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman KIKUCHI Kenichi. Two days' heavy good behavior.

Outline of the cases

On 7 August 1945, this Japanese struck with the butt of the rifle a prisoner who was late for the working lining up.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Corporal OHSAKA Masaharu. Admonition.

Outline of the cases

On 20 February 1944, a prisoner was beaten because he did not obey the order and evaded work.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Chief of guard KANAOKA Kishiro. Good behavior after admonition.

Outline of the case:

In May 1945, this Japanese beat a prisoner because of smoking while working.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Guard TAKAHASHI Keinojoh. Two days' suspension of attendance.

Outline of the case:

In March 1945, this Japanese beat a prisoner because the prisoner interrupted the work during work.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

OBIKAWA Ushimatsu. Admonition and the reduction of a holiday.

Outline of the case:

On 29 October 1944, at a factory while manufacturing rice, the prisoner was not obedient despite warnings for many times, and so he was beaten by the Japanese.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Guard SAKIMURA Kenematsu. Admonition and one day's reduction of Holiday.

Outline of the case:

On 11 August 1945, this Japanese beat a prisoner who was going to steal rice and barley.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Guard MIYUJI, Takejiro. Two days' suspension of attendance.

Outline of the case:

On 14 July 1944, while leading prisoners' ranks to the workshop, a prisoner very often broke the ranks and did not obey in spite of repeated warnings. So the Japanese beat this prisoner.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Guard-leader NOZAKI, Tadamori. Reduction of one-third of salary for one month.

Outline of the case:

This Japanese beat a prisoner, with stick, who was working.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

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Employee MATSUBASHI Kenzaburo Admonition and let him apologize to the prisoner.

Outline of the Case

In June 1943, while POW's were engaging in loading of salt, this Japanese beat some of them who stole salt.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

The Chief Guard KAMASAWA Masao. Reproof.

Outline of the Case

In October 1944, while loading coal, some prisoners were found stealing eggs and were beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Guard SASAKI Kohichi. Admonition.

Outline of the Case

In September 1944, while carrying frozen fishes into the warehouse, a prisoner was found stealing a salmon and was beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Guard TANI Yutaka. Admonition and reproof.

Outline of the Case

In May 1945, while loading coal a prisoner of war was found stealing beans from a steam-and-saildriven boat and was beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

The same man as stated above. Reduction of 15 percent of his salary.

Outline of the Case

In May 1945, while loading coal this Japanese beat POW's who either stole raw herrings or were lazy at duty.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior.

Guard TAKASHIMA Sadahiehi. Reproof.

Outline of the Case

In August 1943, while engaging in loading job, a prisoner forced himself into the kitchen and stole cooked rice, so this Japanese beat the prisoner at that time and at several other times.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior.

Guard ISHIGURO. Koichi. Admonition for four times.

Outline of the Case

In April 1945, while carrying cement to the warehouse, a prisoner stole herrings at the same warehouse and was beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Guard TANIGUCHI Tetsuo. Reduction of 25 percent of salary.

Outline of the Case

In July 1943, while POW's were producing salt, this Japanese beat few prisoners who stole rice or who were lazy in their work.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Guard MORIYA Sakae. Reduction of 20 percent of salary.

Outline of the Case

In May 1945, while working at the Kanamori Warehouse, a POW was found stealing eggs and was beaten.

Offender and the Punishment inflicted by Superior

Guard NAYA Takeshi. Reproof.

Outline of the Case

In April 1945, while carrying goods to the warehouse, few prisoners were found stealing and eating herrings and were beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Guard AZUMA Shozaburo. Good behavior.

Outline of the Case

In December 1944, when POW's were lining up for the allotment of job, few of them were beaten because of haughty attitudes.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Coacher IKEDA Kyuzo. Admonition.

Outline of the Case

In May 1944, few POW's were beaten because they did not obey the advices about work and order and because of language difficult,

Offender and the punishment by Superior

Coacher KAMISAKA Tetsuo. Admonition.

Outline of the Case

On 11 August 1945, this Japanese beat prisoners who returned home without completing their duties.

Offender and Punishment by Superior

Clerk in charge of mine at Akahara KONUMA Toshio. Good behavior for two weeks.

(b) Nagoya Camp

Outline of the Case

Between April 1945 and July of the same year there were prisoners of war who stole "miso" while carrying provisions, who stole foodstuffs after breaking lock of the provisions warehouse, who stole Japanese wine that was to be distributed to the Japanese staff of the camp, who stole fish while carrying provisions, etc. Together with other civilian servicemen, this Japanese beat these prisoners of war. This Japanese also beat the prisoners individually with belt, or let the prisoners sit straight for one hour.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman NAKASAI Matsujiro. Three days heavy imprisonment.

Outline of the Case

There were officer-prisoners who took insolent attitude before foretelling Japanese defeat. There were prisoners of war whose attitudes were considerably bad at their salute, muster, or at line up. There also were prisoners of war who stole Japanese or Korean's lunch. This Japanese beat these prisoners every time such misbehavior happened.

Offender and Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman ~~W~~ ~~S~~ ~~mon~~. Three days heavy imprisonment.

Outline of the Case

On 10 July 1945 seven or eight American prisoners of war stole foodstuffs from the warehouses both of company and camp. Civilian Serviceman TANAKA, who was on day-duty, after receiving report about this case, called the supervisor of the American POW's, Captain Lybce, to account and beat him.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman TANAKA Tokuichi. Three days heavy imprisonment.

Outline of the Case

Between June and July 1945, there were prisoners of war who, setting the rules at naught at their workshops, went out to the railway tracks to pick up soya beans which lay scattered there. There also were prisoners of war whose salutes, attitudes, etc. were bad at the rest-room of guards, and who cheated the coacher while measuring materials. The under-mentioned Japanese beat these prisoners with bamboo sticks or slapped them.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman KOBAYASHI Yonemitsu. Two days heavy imprisonment.

Outline of the Case

In July and August 1945 there were prisoners of war who were in an uproar by singing or by whistling on their way to and from the workshops, who stole soya beans at workshops, who cheated weight while measuring with the balance. The under-mentioned Japanese beat these prisoners with bamboo sticks. He also slapped two prisoners.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman YASHIKI Seiji. Two days heavy imprisonment.

(C) Osaka Camp

Outline of the Case

The under-mentioned Japanese stole some of comforts, wine and soap for POW's.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman SHIGEI Takeichi. He was condemned to six months imprisonment.

Outline of the Case

When the camp commander inspected the camp, the commander witnessed this Japanese mistreating a prisoner restinging that the prisoner did not obey his order.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman TANAKA Ichiro. Admonition and discharge.

Outline of the Case

It was learned that the under-mentioned Japanese stole few of comforts for POW's.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman HASEIMOTO Takeshi. Five days heavy good behavior.



Outline of the Case

Saying that he would buy Japanese-English dictionaries for POW's, this Japanese received some money from the prisoners and did not buy. This fact was heard by the superior, so he was interrogated and was punished.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Interpreter, a certain Japanese. Admonition and discharge.

Outline of the Case

In June 1945, while the under-mentioned Japanese had been with the camp he frequently beat POW's who seemed to be lazy in work. He therefore received prisoners' antipathies.

Offender and the punishment by superior

Civilian Serviceman OGANAI Shuichi. Discharge.

Outline of the Case

Between December 1942 and January 1945 the under-mentioned Japanese promised an American prisoner of war to buy the Japanese bond for the prisoner and seized money without buying bond. It was found by superior.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman KOMIYAMA Gisaburo. Discharge. The case of seizure was transferred to a police station.

Outline of the Case

Between November 1944 and February 1945 the under-mentioned Japanese made a wrong use of moxocautery for improving prisoners' misbehaviors.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Sgt. MANTANI Unosuke. Heavy good behavior for ten days.

Outline of the Case

In connection with the above-mentioned moxocautery case, this Japanese was punished on the charge of lack of supervision.

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Offender and the punishment by superior.

The Commander of the Branch, Lieutenant KOJIMA, Chotaro.  
Heavy good behaviour for five days.

Outline of the case.

In January, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese tortured a POW by making him stand beside a furnace.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Warrant Officer, KINARI, Ichiji. Seven days heavy good behaviour.

(D) HIROSHIMA CAMP

Outline of the case.

Having random and positive nature, the undermentioned Japanese frequently insulted the prisoners-officers. At that time, staffs of the camp reported this matter to the POW control department. As the result of it, this Japanese received a warning letter from Lt. Colonel YASUDA. Immediately after that, this Japanese was transferred by the order of War Ministry.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Interpreter KOBAYASHI, Yasuo. Transferred.

Outline of the case

The undermentioned Japanese was of loose character and it seemed that his treatment of prisoners of war was generally very unfair. He is now undergoing interrogation.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Guard HARA, Mokichi. Under interrogation.

Outline of the case.

The undermentioned Japanese was of too serious cast, so that he did not overlook prisoners' small faults and very frequently clashed with prisoners officers.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman NISHIMOTO, Shigeyoshi. He was admonished very often by other camp staffs.

Outline of the case.

The treatment of the prisoners of war by the undermentioned Japanese especially his punishment of POW's, was severe. For instance, in case of the detention in the guardroom of a prisoner in a rigorous winter, he did not give the offender any clothings and bedding. So it seemed that prisoners were far more fearful of the detention than the court martial.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Commander of the Branch, Captain MURAKAMI. Admonition.

Outline of the case.

In addition to the suspicion of torturing prisoners of war at the Yamane Detachment, this man's treatment of prisoners were generally severe and he was very often admonished by the superior.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Sgt. MIYAKAWA. Strict admonition.

Outline of the case.

In addition to the fact that the treatment of the prisoners of war by the undermentioned Japanese was generally severe, it seemed that there were something dishonest in his dealings of the comforts for the prisoners and the provisions. He is now under interrogation.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Interpreter, concurrently Intendance Chief Private OKADA. Under investigation.

Outline of the case.

While the undermentioned Japanese treated POW's, he very often mistreated prisoners. Though he was admonished and was called to account, there was no indication that he would express sorrow.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman SAITOH, Takeru. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

The undermentioned Japanese frequently lynched the prisoners of war.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman SOYA, Genichi. Discharge.

FUKUOKA CAMP

Outline of the case.

At the latter part of February, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese called an British officer JINKIS to his private room, and, saying that the officer was lazy in the clearing work, mistreated him. In addition, he called some soldiers and let the soldiers beat the British officer, too, and roused a big antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Interpreter YAMAOKA, Harutaro. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

On 28 March, 1945, an American prisoner of war stole Japanese worker's lunch at the factory. This prisoner committed this crime several times in the past. ABE, who was the week-NCO at that time, confined the prisoner in the guard-room to supervise the prisoner on his own authority. On the following day, he gave the prisoner only water. During this time, the Japanese let a Dutch prisoner-doctor examine the prisoner and the prisoner was entirely sound. However, on the day after the following day, the prisoner suddenly fell into a critical condition, and though every possible endeavours, died from the heart-failure. Having the lifelong the prisoners usual conducts were very bad, creating very bad reputation (prisoner) very often requested the punishment of him.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Sgt. YASUTAKE, Hideo. Twenty day's heavy good behavior.

Outline of the case.

In May, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese was found by the branch camp commander lynching prisoners of war and was punished.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman YUYAMA. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

In February, 1945, while being on guard duty, the undermentioned Japanese lynched a prisoner of war for supervision and was admonished by superior.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman TOYAMA, Sakari. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

On 22 August, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese frequently mistreated prisoners of war while he was on cooking duty.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman TAUCHI, Yukio. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

On 22 August, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese frequently lynched prisoners of war.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman OHNO, Taro. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

On 30 January, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese beat a prisoner of war who went out of the row-call line without permission. By this reason, he roused a little antipathy of the prisoners, so he got angry and thrust the left shoulder of the prisoner with bayonet and hurt him slightly.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman MATSUI, Tomo. Five days heavy good behaviour.

Outline of the case.

In August, 1945, while on week-duty, the undermentioned Japanese beat prisoner-officers and roused antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

NCO YAMAMURA, Sanji. Strict admonition.

Outline of the case.

In August, 1945, while changing clothings and while being week-duty, the undermentioned Japanese beat prisoners whose fulfillment of his instruction and regulation were uncertain.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

NCO NAGAI, Tadashi. Strict admonition.

Outline of the case.

With the obscurities of comforts for the prisoners of war that

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were dealt by the undermentioned Japanese and his lynchings, he roused proper antipathies of the prisoners.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Army doctor YAMABATA, Akitaro. Strict admonition.

Outline of the case.

The undermentioned Japanese had a nature of drunken madness. And whenever he was drunk, he lynched prisoners. So many prisoners had very bad feelings against him.

Offender and the punishment of by superior.

NCO. NAKAYAMA, Bin. Strict Admonition.

Outline of the case.

The undermentioned Japanese was punished in December, 1943, He was very short tempered and his treatment of the prisoners of war was very harsh. He punished prisoners with trifles. When he found a prisoner-doctor passed water into a bottle at a camp room, he made the doctor stand carrying the bottle in front of the guard room and mistreated him. In addition to it, he called one prisoner to his own room by the reason of insulting himself and punished the prisoner.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

NCO TANUMA, Mitsuo. Strict admonition.

Outline of the case.

There had been many theft cases of tabaccos, etc. while the undermentioned Japanese was on guard duty. The way of investigation by this Japanese was so eccentric that he awoke all the sleeping prisoners, took off blankets of all prisoners, or, in one case, beat prisoners with wooden pieces.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman NAGAI, Chu. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

Extremely excited by the Imperial Rescript of the suspension of war, the undermentioned Japanese was eccentric enough to gather up all the prisoners of war and beat them. It was on 17 August, 1945.

Offender and the punishment by superior

Sgt. Kurihara Yoshinori. Five day's heavy good behaviour.

Fifteen day's heavy good behaviour was plused by the camp commander. Further more, the Army Commander added more ten days.

Outline of the case

Insufficient control of the abovementioned case and delay of report.

Offender and the punishment by superior

Captain NOZAKI Gentoku. Ten day's heavy good behaviour.

Outline of the case

In June, 1945, at the time of the period of increased production of coal, this Japanese extended by his own authority the working time of the prisoners to from twelve hours to fourteen hours (including hours necessary for the return trip to the workshop). Furthermore, with the motto of "those who do not work must not eat", this Japanese reduced the rations of patients and roused prisoner's antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior

Officer TAZAKI Shiro. Strict Admonition.

Outline of the case

At the time of the liberation of the prisoners of war, prisoners submitted a report of damage stating that the undermentioned Japanese seized some articles of the prisoners while the Japanese was with the camp. Apart from this, this

Japanese was said to treat POW's very harshly - he tortured and lynched prisoners very frequently by making prisoner sit on square wooden bar.

Offender and the punishment by superior

NCO EGUCHI Hirokichi. Transfer.

Outline of the case

On 15 July, 1945, because of the lack of understanding due to language difficulty, the undermentioned Japanese punished a prisoner-doctor-major by force and roused prisoner's antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior

Ambulando Pto 2nd Class KODEISHI Shigeku. Three days heavy good behaviour.

Outline of the case

By reason of that prisoner's salute and their fulfilment of the rules of billet administration were bad, the undermentioned Japanese beat prisoners and roused proper antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior

NCO KOJIMA Hajime. Pte. NOMIYA and Pte. SUGIKAWA. Strict admonition.

Outline of the case

As the undermentioned Japanese frequently lynched prisoners of war by reason of trifle matters, he was strictly admonished. So it was thought that he was made reform. However, according to the prisoner-senior-officer after the liberation, this



Japanese received Yen Hundred and Forty Five from the prisoners of war under a promise of not mistreating prisoners. As the very Japanese is now missing after being mobilized, he whereabouts is now under investigation by the competent police station.

Offender and the punishment by superior

Civilian Serviceman SAITO Kunikichi.

Strict admonition. About the bribery, it is now under investigation.

Outline of the case

Owing to the misunderstanding due to the language difficulty, the undermentioned Japanese threw instrument upon a prisoner and injured his slightly.

Offender and the punishment by superior

Employee, worker. FUKADA Taro.

Strict admonition and was called for account.

- Remarks: 1) As the punishment stated in the above list are not always proper, the relative superior officers are now making further investigations of the contents.
- 2) Apart from the punishment of the Japanese stated on the above list, there were also some cases that these Japanese were punished.
- 3) The results of the above two articles will be added to this list further.

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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached consisting of 36 leaves, was prepared by the Central Research Committee of P.O.W. Affairs by order of the First Repatriation Bureau.

Certified at Tokyo

On this 25th day of April, 1947

/s/ YOSHIYAMA, Yozo  
The Chief of the Archives Section  
of the First Repatriation  
Bureau (Seal)

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極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣 審 供 述 審

供 述 者 久 保 田 篤 次 郎

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如ク供述致シマス

RETURN TO ROOM CO  
COPY

私ハ久保田篤次郎デアリス。現在栃木縣下都賀郡桑村ニ住ソチオ  
 リマス。私ハ明治二十四年七月十四日大阪府ニ生レ昭和十七年（一九  
 四二年）六月ヨリ昭和十九年（一九四四年）二月マデ滿洲工作機械株  
 式會社ノ社長デアリス。タ。

法廷證一九七〇號▲ニ關連スル俘虜使用ノ件ハ私ガ滿洲工作機械株  
 式會社々長當時發生シタモノデアリスノテ當時ノ社長トシテ本件俘  
 虜使用ノ實情ニ關シ左ノ如ク陳述シマス。

昭和十七年（一九四二年）十一月頃奉天ニ約一、三〇〇名ノ俘虜

ガ到着シマシタガ滿洲工作機械會社子俘虜ヲ使用シ始メタノハ昭和  
 十八年（一九四三年）二月頃テソノ人員ハ約五〇名デアリス。タ。  
 其後人員ガ漸次増加シ最モ多イ時ハ約六〇〇名ニ達シマシタ。當初

ノ計畫子ハ約二、〇〇〇名使用ノ予定デアリス。タガ實際ノ稼働率  
 ハ最高六〇名デアリス。タ。ソノ理由ハ俘虜ノ技能調査ノ結果多敬  
 者ハ農夫子機械工業經驗者ガ予想ヨリ少ナカッタコト及俘虜ノ健康  
 能力並ニ階級等ヲ十分考慮シ不當ノ勞働ヲ爲サシメナカッタ爲デア  
 リマス。

因ニ當會社ノ従業員總數ハ俘虜使用開始當時ニ於テ日本人約三〇〇  
 滿人約七〇〇名計約一、〇〇〇名ヲ最多數ノ時ニ於テ日本人約八〇  
 〇名滿人約一、二〇〇名計約二、〇〇〇名ヲアリス。タ。

滿洲工作機械會社ハ生産力擴充部門ニ屬スル工作機械ヲ製作スル

會社デアツテ私ガ知ツテイル限デハ陸軍ニ於テモ滿洲國ニ於テモ將又會社側ニ於テモ同社ヲ兵器工場トスル計畫ヲ樹テタルコトモナク又同社ニ對シ滿洲、日本内地其他ノ地域ニ所在スル兵器工場ヨリ兵器又ハ其ノ部分品製作ノ註文ヲ受ケタコトハアリマセンデシタ。從ツテ兵器製造其他直接作戰行動ニ關係アル業務ニ俘虜ヲ使用シタコトハアリマセン。

三 前述ノ如ク當初ノ期待ニ反シ技術的經驗者ガ非常ニ少ナカツタノデ始メノ中ハ毎日通勤シテ來ル俘虜モ仕事ヲシイ仕事ニハ從事シマセンデシタソノ中大多數ノ俘虜ノ希望モアリ機械製作ノ技術的職業指導ヲスルコトニナリマシタ當時ノ在滿九一八部隊カラ銃鋼材約五純ノ拂下ヲ受ケ之ヲ教育材料トシテ俘虜ヲ機械工、仕上工、組立工、工具工、鍛工、木工、製圖手、企圖手、倉庫手、自動車修理工等ニ區分シ工場技師及就練工ヲ指導員トシ工作機械製作ノ技ヲ教ヘマシタコノ結果私カ社長ヲ退職後自動旋盤ガ出來テ來マシタ。

四 奉天俘虜收容所長デアツタ松田大佐ハ屢々工場ヲ視察セラレ日滿從業員全部ヲ集メ博愛心ヲ以テ俘虜ヲ寬容ニ取扱フ様ニ訓示サレマシタ從テ工場デハ日滿人、俘虜ノ間ニ何等ノ差別待遇モナク惡感情ヲ懷クモノモナク全部渾然一體トナツテ愉快ニ仕事ヲスルコトガデキマシタ。

五 俘虜ガ奉天ニ到着後當工場ニ出勤スルニ迄ノ間俘虜ハ何モ仕事ガ

ナク手持不沙汰子因ツライマシタガ俘虜ノ希望子時々工場ニ見學ニ  
來テオリマシタ。一九四二年ノ一クリスマスノ時ハ俘虜ノ希望ニ  
ヨリ工場内大食堂子俘虜ノ慰安會ヲ催シマシタ當時ハ物資不足ノ折  
柄チハテリマシタガ凡有手段ヲ購ジ、煙草一キヤンデー一林檎、密  
柑等ヲ買集メ之ヲ俘虜ニ分配シ又俘虜自身モ種々ノ余興ヲ演ジ慰安  
ニ努メタコトガテリマシタ。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月五日於東京都千代田區丸ノ内  
日本興業銀行ビル内

供 述 者 久 保 田 篤 次 郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於

立 會 人 鹽 原 時 三 郎

宣  
審  
審

フ 良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ審

署名捺印

久保田篤次郎



# FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ref Doc 1433

本書類拾六枚ハ第一復員省デ俘虏關係調査中  
中央委員會ニ調製セシメタモノニ相違ナイコトヲ  
聲明スル

昭和二十二年四月二十五日

第一復員局文書課長 美山 要 蔵

印

内地俘虏收容所ニ於ケル俘虏取扱ニ關スル件

調査報告

俘虏關係調査中央委員會

内地俘虏收容所ニ於ケル俘虏取扱ニ關スル件調査報告  
一、要 旨

本報告ハ内地各地俘虏收容所ニ付我方ノ  
俘虏管理若カ收容セラレアル聯合國俘虏  
ニ對シ非違行為ヲ爲セル旨情並石ニ對ス  
ル我方ノ採リタル處置ノ狀況ヲ明カニス  
ルト共ニ斯クナラシメタル其ノ前後ノ情  
勢ヲ陳述セルモノナリ  
尙本報告ハ逐次提出セラレ又ハ提出セラ  
レツツアル各俘虏收容所長ノ報告ニ基キ

Doc / 433

誠實ナルモノナラ以テ此種事件ノ報告ハ  
今後更ニ追加セララルニ至ルベシ

### 第二判明セル事實ト我方ノ探リタル處置

内地各停房收容所ニ付調査セル結果事件ヲ  
除キ停房ニ對シ特ニ意識シテ惡虐非道ノ暴  
行ヲ敢テセル事實始トナシ

但シ言語ノ不通、習慣ノ相違等ニ起因シ或  
ハ一時ノ感情ニ驅ラレ合法的手段ヲ逸脱シ  
テ停房ニ對シ私的制裁ヲ加ヘタル事實、努  
力ノ不充分ナリシト實ニ避クヘカラサル事  
由ニ因リ多量ノ死亡若並患者ヲ出セル事實  
停房勞務ニ從事申停房使用者側ノ不注意等  
ノ爲傷害ヲ受クルニ至ラシメタル事實等停  
房ノ取扱、處遇當ヲ失シタル事件アリ

右ハ固ヨリ多分ニ避クヘカラサリシ事實存シタ  
リト雖モ我方ノ手落ニ對シテ探ク遺憾ノ意  
ヲ表スル次第ナリ

如斯停房ノ取扱、處遇當ヲ失シタル事件ニ  
關シテハ當方ニ於テモ其ノ非ヲ認メ常ニ嚴  
重戒告シテ處ニシテ此等ノ非逸ヲニ對シ

Ref Doc 1443

テハ既ニ別表ノ如ク關係各上官ニ於テ處分  
セリ  
尙俘虜ヲ管理スル軍管區司令官等ニ對シテ  
ハ各事件ノ内容ヲ深ク檢討精査セシメテ其  
ノ處置ヲ適正ナラシメ且其ノ責任ノ所在ヲ  
明確ナラシムル如ク指示シアルヲ以テ我方  
ノ公正ナル措置ハ判明次第逐次追加報告ス  
ヘシ

第三陳述

我方ノ俘虜取扱根本方針ハ俘虜ニ關スル諸  
條規ニ遵由シ之カ適正ヲ期シ以テ俘虜ニ對  
シ公正ナル待遇ヲ與フルニ在リ  
然シテ俘虜管理者等ハ本方針ヲ堅持シ俘虜  
ノ取扱ニ最善ノ努力ヲ拂ヒ來レルモ直接管  
理者中日本人ノ習慣上陥リ易キ私的制裁ノ  
弊ニ出テ或ハ口内ノ各種事情ニ妨ケラレ或  
ハ避クヘカラサル事情等ニ依リ俘虜ノ待遇  
當ヲ失シタル事件アリシハ遺憾トスル所ナ  
リ以下本件ニ關シ前後ノ事情等ニ關シ陳述

ス

一 行爲ニ對スル私的制裁ニ就テ

一 私的制裁ハ我國章ノ傳統的惡習ナルノミナラズ  
 ス皆ニ國民的缺陷ニシテ一般ニ日本人ハ私的  
 制裁ヲ輕視シ本制裁ハ歐米人ノ如ク甚シク相  
 手ヲ侮辱凌辱セリトハ考ヘス寧ロ相手カ刑懲  
 罰ニ處セラレぬヲ衆ニ嗤ラシ或ハ家門ノ名譽  
 ヲ傷クルヨリハ拳骨一ツニテ勸辨シテヤル方  
 親切ナリ。或ハ私的制裁ニ依リ規律ハ維持セ  
 ラルヘキモノナリ等ノ誤解ヲ有スル者多ク此  
 種非行カ浮屠ニ迄及スニ至リシハ深く遺憾ト  
 スル所ナリ  
 我國章ニ於テモ夙ニ本私的制裁カ人相ヲ蹂躪  
 シ、或ハ軍紀ヲ破壞シ或ハ各種教育ヲ妨害ス  
 ル等其ノ弊害極メテ大ナルニ歸ミ常ニ之カ僕  
 流ニ勉メ屢々嚴重ナル戒告ヲ寫シツツアル所  
 ナルモ采々改善セラレサリシ狀態ナリ  
 又一般日本人ハ性極メテ短氣ニシテ些細ノ事ニ  
 ニモ激昂シ殊ニ言語ノ不通、習慣ノ相違等ニ  
 ヲヨリ不都合ヲ生シタル際深ク其ノ善惡、理非  
 ヲ考フルコトナク又合法的手段ヲ以テ懲戒シ  
 得ヘキニ拘ラス之ヲ待ツノ餘裕ナク其ノ場ニ

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Apr Dec. 143

テ感情ノ激スル儘ニ私的制裁ニ出ル若少ナカ  
ラス、而シテ時間ノ經過ト共ニ冷靜ニ復スル  
ヤ亦リニ前非ヲ後悔スルヲ例トス

### ニ 私的制裁ノ動機

然シテ俘虜ニ對スル私的制裁ノ事實ヲ究明ス  
ルニ殆ト全部個人的怨恨ナク、又故ラニ俘虜  
ニ苦痛ヲ與ヘテ之ヲ凌辱セントスルカ如キ惡  
意ヲ有セス、真ニ俘虜ノ非行ヲ矯正センカ爲  
正營防衛ノ爲、言語不通等ヨリ俘虜ヨリ侮辱  
セラレ又ハ反抗セラレタルモノト解シタルカ  
爲、私的制裁ヲ加ヘタルモノナリ  
又俘虜中ニハ道義心爾ル低ク眞ニ度シ難キ不  
良ノ徒モアリ且他ノ全部ノ俘虜ヨリ嫌惡セラ  
レ却テ彼等俘虜仲間ヨリ制裁方被罰セル事實  
モアリタリ

### 三 私的制裁ヲ防止スル爲ノ監督、指導

非行ヲ犯セシモノハ下士官以下ノ下級行ニ多  
ク尉校ノ犯セル件數極メテ少シ  
俘虜ニ朝夕接觸スル下級職員タル監視員、指  
導員、警戒員ノ人選ニハ特ニ考慮ヲ拂ヒ之等

Nov Dec 14 33

ノ指導監督ニハ常ニ細心ノ注意ヲ傾注セシ所  
ナリ然ルニ監視員ノ殆ト全員運動員ノ充足ヲ  
優先トセシ爲傷痍軍人ヲ充テシモノナルモ之  
等傷痍軍人中ニハ傷痕ノ結果癩ニ根性ヲ有シ  
精神的飲酒了ル者比較的多ク、俘虜ニ對シ非  
行ヲ爲ス者アリシヲ以テ監督指導ヲ嚴重ニシ  
非行ノ強シキ者ハ即座ニ解雇シ來レリ、又指  
導員ヲ警戒員ハ俘虜使用若側ヨリ差出サレタ  
ル者ナルカ必スシモ素質良好ナラサルヲ以テ  
常ニ人選並之ヲ監督指導ニハ厳ニ留意シテリ  
シ所ナリ

本件ニ關シ陸軍省俘虜管理部長（兼俘虜情報  
局長官）預野ハ一九四三年十二月二十六  
日全俘虜監視員會議席上左記ノ如ク口演シ注  
意ヲ喚起ス

口 演 要 旨

俘虜ノ取扱ハ現地ノ情勢ニ即應セサルヘカラ  
ス、雖モ苟クモ憎惡ノ感情ニ奔リ莫ノ域ヲ越  
スルカ如キハ敵愾心ノ小泉的透露ニ過キスシ  
テ我カ武士道ニ反シ又道義戰タル今次大東亞  
戰ノ本義ニ悖ルモノナルヲ以テ深ク戒心セサ

May Dec 14

ルヘカラサルモノト信ス  
 特ニ私的偏執ハ些細ナル私情ニ發シナカラ其  
 ノ影響ハ單ニ個人的感情ノ惡化ニ止マラス我  
 カ自公認ノ分時ヲトスルノ資料トモナリ彼等  
 歸國後ノ惡宣傳等ヲ考アル時ハ其ノ弊害闢リ  
 知ルヘカラス。而シテ私的制裁ノ動機ハ言語  
 不達ト我カ營業者ノ規則理解ノ不十分ニ歸ス  
 ヘキモノ多ク其ノ結果俘虜ノ憤慨報復ニヨリ  
 打倒セラルル者アルニ至リテハ其ノ恥辱俘虜  
 ノ受刑等ヲ以テ償ヒ難キモノアリ  
 之ニ對シ特ニ部下職員ノ指導ニ留意セラルル  
 ト共ニ機會アル毎ニ關係部隊。使用部隊並使  
 用者等ニ本趣旨ヲ普及シ俘虜取扱ノ適正ヲ期  
 セラレ度

四 俘虜收容所職員ノ對俘虜感情

元來我國民ハ性單純素朴ニシテ容易ニ宣傳ニ  
 感服シテ熾烈ナル敵意ヲ生シ殊ニ外國ノ新聞  
 雜誌等ニ現ハルル記事ニヨリ宣傳セラルルコ  
 ト多ク大東亞戰爭間旺盛ナル敵愾心ヲ有セシ  
 反面隣ヲ乞ヘル者ニ對シテハモハヤ對敵觀念

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ヲ捨テ寧ロ憐憫ノ情ヲ以テ接セシモ中ニハ内  
心憂越感ヲ抱キ取扱丁學ノ度ヲ失シタルコト  
ナキヲ保シ難シ然レドモ前述ノ如ク俘虜收容  
所職員中俘虜ニ對シ非違行為ヲ爲セルハ此敵  
愾心ノ發露ニ非スシテ實ニ比較的無知且道義  
心低キ者カ某一事件ニ對シ感情ノ激スル儘ニ  
越軌ノ學ニ出タルモノナルコトヲ諒トセラレ  
度

### 其二 多數ノ死亡者並患者ヲ出シタル

#### 事實

#### 一 死亡者及患者數並主要ナル病類別

内地ニ移送セル俘虜總三五、〇〇〇名中其ノ  
一〇〇ノ三、五〇〇名ノ死亡者並月同平均二  
〇〇〇乃至三、〇〇〇名ノ患者ヲ出セルハ各  
種避クヘカラサル因子アリタルモノナリト雖  
モ寔ニ申言ナシ死亡者月別一覽附表第二ノ如シ  
此多數ノ死亡並患者ノ主要ナル病類別ハ慢性  
腸炎、脚氣、肺炎、營養失調症等ノ食生活並  
氣候ノ變化等ニ主因ヲ有スルモノ多ク傳染病  
ニ因ルモノ比較的少シ

#### 二 衛生狀態改善ニ努力ノ狀況

(イ) 如斯俘虜ノ衛生狀態ニ就テハ俘虜管理者ノ



Ref Doc / 433

悉ク憂慮セシ所片シテ有ユル機会ニ於テ俘虜管理管見者ヲ督勵シ其ノ改善向上ニ努力セル他管理管見者モ有ユル科學的保健策ヲ講シ特ニ健康ト勞務トノ調節、勞務ト休養給與トノ調和、俘虜病院ノ設置、陸軍並地方病院ノ利用、莫大ノ費用ヲ投シテ地方ヨリ藥物ノ購入、或ハ施設ノ改善等懸命ノ努力ヲ拂ヘリ

(ロ) 然ルニ如斯俘虜管理者ノ努力ニモ拘ラス戦局ノ進展ハ必然的ニ藥物ノ窮乏ヲ告ケ俘虜ノ衛生管理ニ甚大ナル悪影響ヲ與フルニ至リシハ返メス返スモ残念ナリ、尙如斯俘虜ノ衛生状態ヲ招來セシ原因ヲ探及スルニ俘虜ヲ内地ニ移送途中ニ於ケル管理ニ稍無理アリシコト並熱帶地ヨリ寒冷ノ地ニ移動シタルカ爲環境ノ急激ナル變化ニ因リシコトモ亦主要ナル原因ナリ、航海中ニ於テハ輸送指揮官以下俘虜ノ衛生管理ニハ最大ノ努力ヲ拂ヒタルモ屢々聯合軍ノ飛行機、潜水艦ノ攻撃ヲ受ケテ遭難シ

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或ハ之ヲ避ケンカ爲多大ノ日致ラヌニ遂ニハ  
 給養モ窮乏ヲ告ケ忤辱亦疲勞累加シ多敷ノ死  
 危、榮養失調症ヲ生スルニ至リ元來頑健ナリ  
 シ者モ内地上陸ノ際ハ健康ヲ傷ヒ居リタルコ  
 トハ爾後ニ於ケル彼等ノ健康状態ニ影響ヲ與  
 ヘシモノナリ  
 一忤辱内地輸送ニ當リ特ニ其ノ管理ヲ適正ナ  
 ラシムル爲昭和十七年十二月陸軍次官及參謀  
 次長ヨリ左ノ如キ通牒ヲ發シ注意ヲ拂ハシメ  
 タリ

(以下次頁ニ續ク)

Ref Doc 11133

停務ノ管轄ニ關スル件

最近内地ニ輪船をラレタル停務ノ管轄中ニ於ケル  
 以テ中道管テラサルモノアリ爲ニ患者(死亡者)  
 多量ソアリ就テ内地ニ輪船スヘキ停務ノ選定、  
 以テ、停務衛生人長ノ報告、輪船中疾病ノ醫藥、  
 酒類ノ準備、船中ノ管理及衛生等ニ於ケル便宜  
 供具、被服ノ交付等ニ關シ更ニ徹底セシメラレ長  
 官命ニ照帶ヨリ奉令ノ地ニ移通スルヲ以テ時季  
 ノ選定ニハ特別ノ考慮ヲ加ヒタルニ付、船中  
 合等ニ依リ巴ムヲ待ス一部ヲ冬期内地ニ到着シ停  
 務ニ懸念ヲ具スルニ至リシコト無シトセシ  
 (ハ)停務ノ醫藥ヲ盡カシムル爲メ停務病院ノ設置  
 他ニ關シ昭和十九年三月三日陸軍大臣官廳ヲ以テ  
 左ノ如ク注意ヲ促シセリ  
 一 停務ニ於テスヘキ糧食、被服等ハ身寄ノ長ニ應ジ  
 該規則ニ定メアル通りテ支給ス  
 二 船中停務長官所病室(分所、法遊所等)ニ適當ナ  
 ル治療設備ヲ設ケル外ニ本所ニ相當程度ノ附屬病  
 院ヲ設ケテ該所ニ停務員病者ノ収容ニ當テシテ  
 實効スルカ爲メ所長ノ健康、被服及衛生材料ハ別  
 途請求ヲ俟テ奉給スルハ交付セラル  
 三 隊内衛生人員ヲ選定シ活席ソ衛生業務ノ充實ニ努  
 ムルト共ニ(四)不潔ノハ陸軍病院又  
 ハ部隊内衛生員等ノ付シ救急所兼助方ヲ陸軍大  
 臣ニ上申スル等ノ方策ヲ採リ停務ノ衛生管理ニ

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Recd Nov 14 33

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諸スル諸般ノ煩悩ヲ口ル

則 停職等ヲニ於テ形既同職身單ヲ擲ケツカ爲

ニ慮者ニツテ亦カヲ必長トスル者ヲ勞勤ニ

厭セツメ又ハ職棄息若テハ進退若ニ絶獄ナ

ル勞勤ヲ厭スル等ノコトヲ進ケ停職ノ行自

管理ニ留意スルト共ニ所犯自ノ氣候ノ風土

等ニ應ツ停心ノ個人酌量ニ動カテ加ハ其

スレハ一紙審判所ヲ裁奪又ハ其責モツムル

等ノ措置ヲ斷ツ以テ其初階ノ實費同向上

ヲ口ル

停職

源

I 停職地獄

停職ノ地獄ニ罰ツテハ各停職地獄所遊ニ其ノ

分派地獄ニ天々山初羅又ハ之ニ準スル治罪觀

罰ヲ課ケテ其罰地獄ニ就メ其刑罰費ヲ負スル

者ノ罰ニハ各地獄ニ同罰地獄ヲ完備ツテ其罪

ノ高低ヲ別セリ、又其罪ニ示罰セラレ其罪

罪刑地獄ハノ入地獄地獄ヲ行ヒテ之カ地獄ニ就メ

其ノ以ハ福地獄ニ成ハリ

2

懲罰人員

各級審判ニ付ニ其勞ナル等自其被以下罰地獄

員ヲ稱爲シ停職ノ保護ノ地獄ニ從テモ

ツメタル外其ニ其審判官等罰地獄ヨリ其長ノ罰

地獄員ヲ兼勤モツメ「懲罰ノ普及」ニ遵禮ナ

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キツ期セリ又管衛生部長ハ其ノ業務ヲ以テ  
指揮因ニ日本軍醫將校以下ノ業務ニ勵力シ診  
察成果ノ昂揚ニ資スル良道大ナリシハ遺憾ニ  
思ハス

3 衛生材料

衛生材料ニ關シテハ陸軍省衛隊局長  
ノ長官ニ依リ臨時に收容所管掌司令官ヨリ補  
給シタルノ外ハ赤十字社ヨリ寄贈セラレタ  
ル材料ノ利用セリ夏ニ日本ニ於テ研究完成シ  
其ノ卓效ヲ認めラレタル「ペンシ」ノ如  
キモ一般軍隊ニ供給シ難ハザルニ付ニ補給シ  
難ノ衛生材料セリ

4 多量赤血ノ調査

(1) 脚氣

従来東洋ニ多量ナル脚氣ニ關シテ管掌ハ一般ニ  
抵抗刀傷キモノ如ク重症一般ニ日本兵ニ比  
シ若干爲短アル者多シ  
之カ原因ハ赤血生活ノ變化ニ由ルベキヲ以  
テ之カ爲ニハ先ツ營養ノ改善ヨリ「ペンシ」  
食ヲ普及シテ健康率ノ良好ヲラシメ且内食  
糧事情逼迫セル時期ニ於テモ努メテ肉類ノ品  
防類ノ營養ヲ以テ夏ニ「ビタミン」類(内食  
及注射劑)ノ大量補給ノ外「補血上」ニ於テ  
モ若葉「イースト」等ノ給與ヲ行セリ

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新クシテ内池ニ在リテハ近時若シク其ノ發症  
 減少シ現ニ在ノ患者ハ殆ント奮息ノミナリ

(ロ)

南方ニ於テ一級ニ多量シ殊ニ日本軍ニ比シテ  
 停務ハ「アメリカ」赤痢比較的輕重ナル症狀  
 ヲ呈シタリ  
 尋常停務收容所ニ於テ昭和十八年二月末阿万  
 ヨリ移送直後ノ極メテ不良ナル状態ニ在リシ  
 モノノ菌検査ノ成績在ノ如シ

(保菌者ノ合ム)

	保菌人員	陽性	百分比
赤痢 菌	一、三〇三	六二	四八
赤痢 アメリカ	三六三	三一	八五
A型パラチアス菌	一、三〇三	三	〇二

尙原由保菌者ハ相當多ク「トリコモ」アス  
 ヲ混合シテ保菌セル者若干アリ、赤痢「アメリカ」  
 「バ」ニ試シテハ「エメチ」ノ生産量少ニ  
 シテ補給困難アラザル為「セトレン」ヲ主ト  
 シテ用ヒ内池移送後露島島嶼者相當アリタル  
 モ「新」次少セリ

(ハ)

停務ニ付與ニシテ停ニ度「アメリカ」アリ  
 相当多量セル者初番港ニ多量シ馬奈万口ニモ同  
 様ノ發症ヲ見内池ニモ相當量侵入セリ又カ減

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策トシテハ保菌者ノ感染、被服ノ消毒、含嗽ノ施行「マスク」ノ着用等ヲ勵行センメメリ、患者ノ治療ニハ主トシテ「デフテリア」血清ヲ豊富ニ補給シ治療セリ

(二) 肺 炎

北區方面ニテ寒冷ノ爲肺炎ヲ發生セル者相當アリ  
之等ノ預防ニ試シテハ後述ノ處置ヲ請フ位患者ハ爲シ得ル限り温暖ノ地ニ移送シ治療ニ勉メケリ

三 寒冷ニ於ケル防疫ノ處置

停房ハ特ニ寒氣ニ對スル抵抗力ニ乏シキ者ヲ以テ左ノ處置ヲ請セリ

(イ) 毛布ノ増給

各收容所共毛布ヲ死藏スルコトナク各人ニ五枚乃至六枚ヲ支給セリ（定數ハ四枚ナリ）又特ニ寒冷ノ地ニアリテハ使用者ヲシテ毛布ヲ寄贈セシメケリ

(ロ) 各室ニハ目張りヲナシ鼠ノ侵入ヲ防止スルノ外各バラツク出入口ヲ毛布、藁等ヲ以テ二重扉ヲ作製、雪床ニハ敷蓋及被又ハ疊、ウニベリヲ使用シ保温ヲ圖レリ

(ハ) 暖房施設

各收容所共各室及浴室ニ對シ「ストーブ」ヲ

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設置セリ 筒俵船ノ時刻ハ日云算ヨリ早クシ  
 九月頃ヨリ 開始シ又夜間及早期(三時)ヨリ  
 俵房ニ努メタル船所モアリ  
 (三) 冥ノ他  
 パラツク出入口ノ舢舨ヲ探、其北側ノ二重  
 窓、依養堂層知ラ硝子窓ニシテサツルム式  
 窓トシ、其初層所ニ是キ依養堂、大室ノ間仕  
 切、天井張り等ノ通風、其ニ窓給養ヲ施ス  
 等養氣満集ニハ有ユル手段ヲ講セリ  
 筒收管所ニ依リテハ益員ニ湯メソボラ、天給セ  
 ル所モアリ  
 又食糧事情  
 停船ノ便屢ヲ保特シ、其ノ生活ヲ樂シマシムル爲  
 我乃ニ於テハ停船ノハ長岡習慣ヲ趣意シ、其ノ略  
 好ト休宿、休宿ノ趣意シテ正ナル給養ノ設備ニ  
 細心ノ注意ト兼テ、大ノ努力ヲ切ヒテ、  
 即チ食糧ハ自給ヲ遊學トシ、兼テハ常ニ三、〇〇  
 〇カロリイラフヲサツメサル如クシ、特ニ蛋白質、脂  
 肪ノ攝取ニハ特別ノ注意ヲ執レリ、仍テ停船ノ  
 食料ハ其ノ量ト質ニ於テ一様ニシ、人ノ食料ヲ送  
 カニ後編シ、且日云人特別費、荷者以上ノ食料ヲ  
 支給セラレタリ  
 停船ノ日云、其ノ民以ノ食糧支給状況附表第三ノ  
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而シテ邂逅セル日内食糧等市ノ下ニ於テモ停務  
 ニハ信ニ此定立ヲ確保スルコトニ有ユル努刀ヲ  
 拂ヒシ結果一部日民中ニハ停務ノ配給量ヲ減ム  
 若モアリメリ  
 展局ノ進展ニ伴ヒシ食糧ニ食糧ノ取得ハ愈々其  
 ノ困難ノ度ヲ増加シ致テ停務ナルガ故ニ差等ヲ  
 設ケシモノニアラス、一般日民中間行爲、或ハ  
 寇匪ノ買出シ等續出シ正當ナル配給量ノミニ  
 テハ健康ヲ保持シ得サル状態ニ立テ至レリ  
 尙此状態ハ單ニ一般日民ノミニ限ラヌ日軍又  
 同様ニシテ昭和十九年長末頃ヨリ軍隊内ニ多量  
 ノ栄養失調症、脚氣續出セシヲ以テ昭和二十年  
 初頃ヨリ軍隊ノ食糧自活態勢ヲ強化シ兵員ノ俵  
 背給養ノ適正化ヲ企圖セシ程アリ從テ停務ノミ  
 ニ限ラレタルモノニアラサルコトヲ了解セラレ  
 展  
 如新狀況下ニ於テモ停務收容所職員ハ或ハ夜間  
 食糧ノ取得ニ勉メ、或ハ收容所職員自ラ食ヲ燒  
 キテ市場ニ至リ、或ハ十餘里ノ地ニ買出シニ赴  
 キ或ハ山野ヲ往ケ廻リテ山菜ノ取得ニ勉メ或ハ  
 頭迷ナル川万機回ヲ再三、再四ニ亘リ説得ニ勉  
 ムル等有ユル困難ヲ克服シ以テ停務ノ適正ナル  
 給養ノ實施ニ最大ノ努刀ヲ拂ヘリ然ルニ停務ノ  
 給養ハ而シテ停務收容所職員ノ努刀ニ伴ハス懸化

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ノ道程ヲ通り延テ停虜ノ徳原ニ移置スルニ至リ  
ツハ寒ニ耐徳トスル所ナリ

停虜ノ保徳ニ直接ノ保護ニ移置スル故審所  
ノ施設ニ因ツテハ其筋其他事情ノ許ス限リ高登  
ラ期ツタルモ以下述フルカ如キ事情ニ依リ必ス  
シモ満足スヘキ状態ナラサリシ次第ナリ

自前ノ建築事節ハ大真直城等間海面ヨリ早クモ  
建造状態ニ陥リ昭和十四年ニハ一親ノ建築ハ殆  
クト不可能トナリ此ノ事情ハ年ト共ニ深刻化シ  
大真直城等開始城築ハ區々作城ニ關係スル建築  
切以外ハ殆クト新築ハ許容セラレサルニ至レリ

又此等必要不可成ノ建築切ニ於テヌラ三角兵舎  
土客兵舎等無採用セラレ第一親ノ急造兵舎程長  
ノモノナリキ

以上ノ如キ状況下ニ故審所ヲ新築又ハ整備セシ  
次第ナルヲ以テ有ユル努力ニ拘ラズ必クモ満足  
スル程度ニ至ラサリシモノニシテ且ツ建築費用實  
材タル木筋、釘、セメント、硝子、金具、直鋸  
引掛板、煉瓦、スレイト並建築大工、左官等ノ  
勞務ノ不足ハ故審所ノ新築ハ勿論、從來ノ既設

建築ノ改造利用スラ甚クキ困難ラ生セリ  
其三 停虜比身申並其ノ他ノ聯合被害ヲ受ケシ被害  
一 現任判明セル此種被害ハ三十六件ナリ其状況附表

第四ノ如シ



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ノ遺孀賃金ハ一圓トス  
遺ツテ停屍死亡者ニ寄附セラレタル金員ハ  
之ヲ本人ノ遺孀金トシテ處理セラレ度申添



昭一九、二、一〇官給軍靴ヲ						
テ息ヲ以テ六段打ス	昭一九、八、一四 ヲ以テ六段打ス	〃	軍 曹	浪 利 英 二	一頁	龍 日慎
打ナラズ且シテ且長不道ナルニ依リ	昭一九、七、二三 且長不道ナルニ依リ	〃	軍 曹 中 尉	芝 勉	七〃	日 日
テ意分意昭	昭一九、九、六 テ意分意昭	〃	〃	竹 下 敏 雄	一〃五〃	日 日
九龍昭	昭一九、九、一〇 九龍昭	〃	〃	宮 川 信 廣	五頁	龍 日慎
同筆定符	昭一九、八、一二 同筆定符	〃	〃	須 田 喜 代 松	七〃	日 日
スニ昭	昭一九、二、四 スニ昭	口 信	軍 曹	長 嶺 將 義	七頁	龍 日慎
リ波ヲ與ヘタルモ其盾モ尙嚴打セ						

リ日 既打ス 江ノ員ノ爆草ト交セセルニ依	面	價	軍	員	刈谷 義 晃	五	重	證	日	候
リ既打ス 一ノ一皇巴ヲ傳辱セルト不 既打ス ノ規定ニ違反セルニ依	"	"	"	"	狩 藤 照 吉	四	"	"	日	
ルニ既打ス 手ニ既打ス 六官精城布ヲ切斷 一ツ一ツヲ作製シタメ	"	"	軍	首	鏡 利 夫 二	五	"	"	日	
同 既打ス 他ノケメ既打ス 八命令ニ反シタル	"	"	衛	生 官 長	荒 木 國 一	三	"	"	日	
同 既打ス 五規定違反ト不遵ヲ	"	"	軍	員	渡 邊 貞 夫	訓	"	"	戒	
既打ス 既打ス 三ノ三ノ八金知是ニ反 既打ス 既打ス 既打ス	"	"	"	"	田 中 原 一 郎	五	重	證	日	候
同 既打ス 既打ス 既打ス 既打ス	"	"	"	"	小 清 水 石 坊	二	"	"	日	
且ツ既打ス 七次幕ヲ以テ既打ス 既打ス 既打ス	"	"	"	"	山 本 勝 美	"	"	"	日	
シテ既打ス 江ノ一帯ニ働 既打ス 既打ス	"	"	"	"	渡 邊 貞 夫	七	"	"	日	
リ既打ス 既打ス 八非難ノ既打ス 既打ス	"	"	兵	長	武 田 信 正	二	重	營	日	倉

3. 3. 3.

















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<p>昭一九、九月頃停身救恤品へ手拭、石炭、薄荷、角砂糖)ノ一部ヲ窃取セリ</p>	<p>昭一九、二二、二〇頃飲器用ノ砂糖粉取セラレ之カ犯人同左ニ當リ停身ニ目白ヲ強要シ鐵ヲ以テ股ヲ刺シ又電氣コンロヲ以テ管ヲ焙ル等ノ行爲ヲナシ又ハ股打スル等ノ行爲ヲナセリ</p>	<p>停身ニ試スル懲罰處分迄ホ奇蹟ニシテ冬期ノ真營倉處分ニ於テ停身ヲ死下凍死ノマ、拘禁セルコトアリ</p>	<p>昭一九、二月警邏寺收容所本所ニ勤務中停身ヲ校ニ侮辱ヲ與ヘルト云シク其ノ反感ヲ買ヒタリ但シ私的制裁ハナカリシモノノ如シ</p>	<p>昭一八、六月ヨリ十二月ノ間ニ於テ向島派遣所ニ勤務中私的制裁ヲ加ヘタルコト多シ</p>
<p>〃</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>〃</p>
<p>眞 島</p>	<p>眞 島</p>	<p>眞 島</p>	<p>眞 島</p>	<p>眞 島</p>
<p>眞 井 武 二</p>	<p>眞 島</p>	<p>眞 島</p>	<p>眞 島</p>	<p>眞 島</p>
<p>崇 鈿 六 月 (同時解雇ス)</p>	<p>官 脇 芳 勝</p>	<p>眞 島 大 尉 村 上 宅 次 郎 實</p>	<p>眞 島 大 尉 小 林 康 男</p>	<p>眞 島 大 尉 在 岡 茂</p>
<p>本人ハ九月十日頃ヨリ所在不明ナルヲ以テ目下其ノ行方ヲ捜査中ナリ</p>	<p>收養所勤務不道任ト認メ他ニ轉勤</p>	<p>説諭シ始末ヲ取りタルモ改悛ノ情ヲ認め得ズ解雇セリ</p>		

<p>昭二〇、二英特夜「ジンキンス」中尉ノ自活機新作業怠慢ナリトテ自室ニ閉居シ自ラ私的備後ヲ行ヒ反慮ヲ范カシム</p>	<p>龍岡</p>	<p>通</p>	<p>澄岡 晴太郎</p>	<p>後ニ訓諭シ左行ノ目的ヲ以テ爲ラセシム</p>
<p>昭二〇、四、一各工務ニ於テ工員ノ差當ヲ初取セリ同人ハ過去致同同類ノ非行アリ通番下士官タル安武ハ前時之ヲ取附ル爲營倉ニ留置シ翌日水ノミヲ與ヘタリ此ノ間自直書ヲシテ視察セシメ異狀ナカリシモ翌々日ニ至リ突然重傷ニ陥リ百方手段ヲ盡セルモ心臓麻痺ニテ死亡セリ</p> <p>該停屍ハ心臓固疾ヲ有シ平常行狀不良停屍間ノ評判最モ悪ク室長ヨリ屢々處罰ヲスル如ク其求モノナリ、因ニ安武室長ハ誠實ニシテ精神正派ナル眞人ナリ我々ノ爲ニ盡力サレタリトテ解放ノ際停屍ヨリ感謝サレタリ</p> <p>(停屍死亡診断書ノ寫ハ停屍受領委員長「クリイヒン」大佐ノ其求ニ依リ提出セリ)</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>自直書長</p>	<p>安武 日出雄</p>	<p>五重溪 二十日 分所長國算大尉 時元徳八部下 監査不行同日報 告追送ノ科ニ依 リ其處罰 十日</p>

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<p>昭一八、寒以來定最以上ヲ停職ニ給シタルヲ以テ越殊ニ不足ヲ生シタルニ依リ之カ穴理監理ヲ思ヒ立テ同年十一月ヨリ一九、三月頃迄長務同ニ且リ定最ヲ減シ給食シタル爲停職ノ体力ヲ低下セシメ健康生命ニ危害ヲ與ヘタリ</p>	<p>昭二〇、七月中旬停職自括農園ノ野察盜難事件ノ現行犯停職取罰ニ當リ竹刀ヲ以テ其ノ頭部ヲ毆打一名ハ其ノ胸部ヲ突ケリ之レカ爲肋骨骨折ヲ生セシメタリ</p>	<p>昭二〇、八、一五終夜六時下ルヤ停職同ニ毆傷氣分溢レ其ノ態度一變シタルヲ見テ昂奮ノ余リ感情ヲ制シ得ス八月十六日停職持松全員ヲ集メ内致名ヲ毆打セリ</p>	<p>昭二〇、一、一五月ニ至ル間入倉停職ニ對シ減食シタル爲餘病發生スルニ至ラシメタル件一入倉中稟衝ニ依リ足ヲ切斷セル事件一</p>
<p>福岡</p>	<p>"</p>	<p>"</p>	<p>"</p>
<p>監獄中佐</p>	<p>草 尾 後 藤 利 夫</p>	<p>監獄官</p>	<p>監獄大尉</p>
<p>浦 田 寅 治 郎</p>	<p>泉 原 吉 生</p>	<p>福 原 勳</p>	<p>福 原 勳</p>
<p>事實調査ノ結果犯罪事件トシテ且法會該檢察官ニ告發ス 職權濫用 1 職權濫用 2 傷害罪</p>	<p>肋骨ヲ折リタル件ニ關シテハ見舞金一八〇圓ヲ賜ル且法會該檢察官ニ告發ス 罪 名 1 暴行罪 2 傷害罪</p>	<p>真意偵 五日 所長加罰真意偵 十五日 軍司令官加罰真意偵 十日</p>	<p>且法會該檢察官ニ告發ス 罪 名 職權濫用 傷害致死</p>



附表第四

作野野中其ノ他ノ適合傷者ヲ受ケシ事例調査

事故ノ概要	所 局 収容所名	事故者氏名	収容所又ハ會社ニ於テ採リタル處
<p>第一九、五號身セメント上機工場粉 炭工場ニ於テ作業中同工場内粉炭ニ 引火突然大爆発ヲ起シ日本人工員三 名即死同所附近ニアリタル作野一名 火傷ヲ負ヒタリ</p>	<p>口 館</p>	<p>英兵 モリスン 下等火傷</p>	<p>直ニ階層病院ニ搬入シ同病院ニ並 ニ併置直下機方之レカ應急治療ヲ ナシ自動車ニテ本所病院ニ収容皇軍 軍醫並ニ併置直下機方ノ治療ヲ行ハシメ タルニ依リ當初ハ其ノ生命ヲ氣ツカ ハレシモ全力ヲ盡ケテ治療ニ努メタ ル結果漸次快方ニ向ヒ機能障害ヲ止 ムルモ完全恢復スルモノト判定ス</p>
<p>昭二〇、六收養所移向ノタメ浴場廣 場ヲ暫ク移向新カラ進行シ來レル 列車ニ乗込セラレタリ當日ハ強風且 ツ細雨ヲ交ヘ且外被差用頭布ヲ覆リ 右肩ニ貨物ヲ擔ヒマリシ爲右側方ヨ リ落進シ來レル列車ノ通過困難ノ狀 況ニアリタリ</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>英兵曹 エドワード ダラント 即死</p>	<p>事故發生ト共ニ急報ニ依リ皇軍軍醫 隊付ケ檢診ノ決果即死ト決定シタル ヲ以テ直チニ分所ニ搬入直下機方ニ處置 シタル上六月四日牧師ヲ招キ皇軍隊 員共全員參列ノ上盛大ナル告別式ヲ舉 行シ兩名ノ靈ヲ慰メタリ</p>
<p>同 右</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>即死 英伍長 アレキサンダー ニンデス</p>	

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<p>昭一八、一二北直轄化育工場ニ於テ          枕骨中後方ヨリ進行シ來レル原石積込          車ニ追突右膝打撲受傷其後病狀悪化六          腿部三分ノ一ヲ切斷ス</p>	<p>東京</p>	<p>大腿部三分ノ一ヲ切          シ断</p>	<p>三五〇圓ヲ以テ義足ヲ作製給與セ          ル外          傷害扶助料九五六圓支給</p>
<p>昭一九、一〇米俣房一八原石山ニ於テ          作業中高度十米ノ斜面ヨリ約一坪ノ原          石落下之ヲ後頭部ニ受ケ死亡ス</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>死亡          コーヘン・エドワド</p>	<p>遺族扶助料一〇〇〇圓支給          爾後ノ危害豫防ノタメ落石監視員          ヲ増加セシム</p>
<p>昭一九、一一原石山ニ於テ枕骨中ノ俣          房一八右下腿部複雑骨折其後切斷ス</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>右下腿部          切斷          左脛骨複雑          骨折</p>	<p>扶助料九三六圓          爾後原石山ノ作業ヲ中止シ半島房          務者ト交代セシム          扶助料七五〇圓          右</p>
<p>昭一九、三三釜谷二八新湯山ノ下製鋼          工場ニテ作業中右足頸ニ受傷シ治療ノ          結果快方ニ向ヒタルモ波瀾風ヲ併發際          ヲリ切斷ス</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>ジョセフ・デイクロス          膝ヨリ          切斷</p>	<p>直ニ入院セシメ白井博士執刀ノ下          ニ切斷シ一時ハ生命危フマレシモ          醫師及係員ノ努力ニ依リ快復公認          者トシ見舞金三〇〇〇ヲ支給尙義足          ヲ支給シ枕骨中ノ同様ノ負金ヲ支給サ</p>
<p>昭二〇、三「カーバイト」製造電機作          業中熔鑄セル「カーバイト」ヲ充満セ          ル鍋ヲ運搬中鍋底部落下シ流出セル          「カーバイト」附近ノ水溜ト接觸燃焼          シ作業中ノ俣房四名ノ被服ニ引火三名          直傷一名輕傷ノ火傷ヲ負ヒ直傷三名ハ          之レカ爲其後何レモ死亡セリ</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>三名死亡          バツカン・ジョン・フォド          フオスター・ジョン          クラウテル・オリヴァ</p>	<p>直傷ノ三名ハ直ニ會社附屬病院ニ          入院セシメ醫師看護婦俣房衛生員          ニテ手厚キ看護ノ下ニ治療セシメ          タルモ遂ニ死亡セリ          依テ盛大ナル葬式ヲ行ヒタルト共          ニ各四〇〇圓ノ慰勞料ヲ贈呈ス</p>



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<p>船内ヨリ起重機ニテ揚國中ノ九十斤入大豆袋ヲ受取ラントシ踏ミ誤マリテ荷物ニ跳ネラレ胸椎骨折内出血兼肋骨左脛骨折ノタメ死亡</p>	<p>昭一九、一一、二四神崎島ニテ本人ノ過失ニヨリ電柱ニ倒レ死亡セリ</p>	<p>昭一九、九、三〇勢新上カナル別子山坑内ニテ作業中落盤ニ依リ即死ス</p>	<p>昭二〇、四、二八勢務場在友化学工場ニ於テ短棒持除ニ從事中ノ管内ニ残存スル灰燼崩壊シ埋没受傷後死亡ス</p>	<p>昭二〇、六、二三本山嶺内坑道ニ於テ採炭作業中落石ノ爲受傷後死亡セリ</p>
<p>〃</p>	<p>大阪</p>	<p>屏島</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>〃</p>
<p>米海軍兵曹長 クローニン・ ウイリアムアロイ ンス 死 亡</p>	<p>マツクムリ タロイタシー 死 亡</p>	<p>森田伍長 ヒンテル・エツチ ・アール 死</p>	<p>山 兵 スミス・ジエー・ エー 死 亡</p>	<p>英 兵 ハートワイツスル ・アール 死 亡</p>
<p>直チニ負傷者ヲ醫務室ニ搬送シ衛生部員ヲシテ萬全ノ處置ヲ當ヲナサシメタル後原因並ニ状況ヲ調査シ會社責任者ニ對シ勞務場ノ點檢及監督方ヲ要求セリ</p>	<p>死後ノ處置丁寧ナリシ故停業事務長ヨリ感謝狀ヲオクラレタリ</p>	<p>直チニ發掘自死ヲ確認ス使用會社ヨリ嶺山法ニ依リ救恤金ヲ寄附センメ本人ノ遺留金トセリ</p>	<p>直チニ發掘會社救護所ニ於テ初療ヲ施シタル後分所附屬病室ニテ治療ヲ加ヘタルモ受傷後約四時間ニテ死亡セリ會社ヨリ工場法ニ基ク救恤金ヲ寄附センメ本人ノ遺留金トセリ</p>	<p>直ニ會社側病院ニ於テ治療ノ後所内休養室ニ於テ加療センモ死亡セリ。使用會社側ヨリ嶺山法ニ依ル救恤金ヲ寄附本人ノ遺留金トセリ</p>

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<p>日 本 創 自 國 家 及 公 共 國 家 之 發 展      日 本 創 自 國 家 及 公 共 國 家 之 發 展</p>	<p>六 名</p>	<p>"</p>	<p>中 二 〇 一 九 〇 七 名 七 名 七 名 七 名 七 名 七 名      「 二 〇 一 九 〇 七 名 七 名 七 名 七 名 七 名 七 名 」</p>
<p>ル 放 子 全 體 保 護 手 続 及 其 他 手 続      放 子 全 體 保 護 手 続 及 其 他 手 続</p>	<p>死      一 名</p>	<p>"</p>	<p>上 野 三 郎 君 之 死</p>
<p>在 別 守 護 院 中 之 死 亡      在 別 守 護 院 中 之 死 亡</p>	<p>死      一 名</p>	<p>"</p>	<p>自 身 死 亡 之 死 亡      自 身 死 亡 之 死 亡</p>
<p>伊 賀 金 五 百 回 及 其 他 事 業      伊 賀 金 五 百 回 及 其 他 事 業</p>	<p>死      一 名</p>	<p>"</p>	<p>伊 賀 金 五 百 回 及 其 他 事 業      伊 賀 金 五 百 回 及 其 他 事 業</p>



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<p>坑内事故（落硬、炭車事故）ニ依ル死亡ハ再三アリタリ</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>テイハンシー・ピーター・サビス モリス・ゼイムス ステュアート モナラレット フアベントン・ジョージ ベント・ハワード サイナクレメント</p>	<p>發病室等ニ盡力又復用者側醫師並ニ病院ハ患者ノ診察看護ニ奔走停息ヨリ感謝ヲ受ケタリ</p>
<p>堅坑ノ昇降機ノ廻轉ヲ誤リ約三米ノ高所ヨリ墮落兩脚口ヲ骨折レリ</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>負傷 ダビス・ローレンス・エー 死亡</p>	<p>分所長ハ其ノ都度使用者側ニ不注意アリタル時ハ其都度責任者ヲ處罰セシメ停處前段ニ事情ヲ説明諒解セシメタリ</p>
<p>會社側以場ニ於テ馬車軌車中狂奔走ニヨリ墮落傷シ腰部及大腿部ヲ骨折セリ</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>同右</p>
<p>坑内ニ於テ「ヘットライト」故障ノ爲石炭運搬車ノ間ニ脚ヲ挟マレ受傷左足ヲ切断セリ</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>負傷 左足切断</p>	<p>見舞金一四〇〇圓ヲ贈呈セリ</p>
<p>電燈作業ニ於テ突然燈發ヲ起シ降時停息ニ注意ヲ與ヘタルモ言語不通ノ爲一</p>	<p>〃</p>	<p>火一傷名</p>	<p>使用者側醫務室ニ收容應急處置ノ後分所醫務室ニ搬送治療</p>

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<p>手足ニ大火傷ヲ負フ</p>	<p>坑内小幸頼ノ爲背部ニ傷セルモノアリ 指導員ハ危険ノ旨報告セルモ會話不通 ノ爲負傷スルニ至レリ</p>
<p>負傷</p>	
<p>セリ</p>	<p>分所長ハ必要ナル單語抜語ヲ記載 セル紙片ヲ指導員ニ持タシムル如 クナサシメタリ</p>

備考

全ク本人ノ過失ニ因ルモノハ本表ニ掲載セス

私的制裁ニ關スル調査表

事件ノ概要	所屬	收容所名	身分	氏名	上司ノ探リタル處
昭一八、三、五命令ニ從ハ サリシヲ償還シ毆打ス	西	信	軍	川谷義晃	訓 戒
昭一八、四、二〇酒肆庫ニ侵入 米麥ヲ取セルニ依リ毆打ス	"	"	"	西岡 茂	訓 戒
昭一八、五、一規定時間外定位 擅外ニ於テ喫煙シタルニ依リ毆 打ス	"	"	伍 長	淺利 英二	誡 責
邦人女勞務者ニ煙草ヲ與ヘタル ヲ戒ノタメ毆打ス	"	"	"	三海松 三	訓 戒
昭二〇、九、一四停廢法專當卷 ニ當リ「パン」ヲ盜食セルヲ毆 打ス	"	"	曹 長	柳田 清人	訓 戒
就勞中勞務ヲ怠リ尙舊戒長ノ指 示ニ從ハサルヲ以テ毆打ス	"	"	軍 屬	三海松 三	訓 戒
昭一九、八、二四就勞中錠ヲ切 取セルヲ毆打ス	"	"	"	官川 信辰	訓 戒

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昭二〇、五作業中脱煙セルニ依リ毆打ス	昭二〇、三作業中作業ノ防害ヲ計リセルニ依リ毆打ス	昭一九、一〇、二九工場ニ於テ煙管製作ヲ爲スヲ再三注意セシモモハサルニ付毆打ス	昭一八、一一米袋ヲ盗ミ出ス停摩ヲ毆打ス	昭一九、七、一四作業場ニ引卒中隊列ヲ離ル、ヲ以テ再三注意セルモ肯ンセサルニ依リ毆打ス	作業中ノ停摩ヲ「ステツキ」ヲ以テ毆打ス	昭一八、八脱煙出作業中毆打ヲ取セルニ依リ毆打ス	昭一九、一〇石炭荷役作業中玉子ヲ窃取セルヲ發見毆打ス	昭一九、九冷凍魚倉入作業中籠一尾ヲ窃取セルヲ發見毆打ス
"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
警戒員	警戒員	警戒員	警戒員	警戒員	警戒員	警戒員	警戒員	警戒員
谷 豊	佐々木高一	釜澤正雄	松橋健三郎	野崎忠盛	三原武次郎	中村兼松	帯川丑松	高橋貞之丞
計戒 廣告	戒 告	體 資	訓戒ヲ與フ 謝罪セシム	減 一ヶ月間三分ノ一 給	出 務 停 止 二 日	"	體資シ慰勞休暇一 日ヲ減ス	出 務 停 止 二 日

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昭二〇、五石炭荷役中機見打ス	昭二〇、五石炭荷役中機見打ス	昭二〇、五金森倉庫ニテ作業中玉子ヲ窃取セルヲ發見打ス	昭一九、六監作業中依ヲ窃取セルモノ及作業怠慢ナルモノヲ發打ス	昭二〇、四セメント倉入作業中同倉庫内ノ依ヲ窃取セルヲ發打ス	昭一八、八荷役中依ヲ竊取セル外依ニ目リ打ス	昭二〇、五石炭荷役中依ヲ窃取セルモノ、及作業中怠慢ナルモノヲ發打ス	昭一九、一二取場配直ノ爲並列セシメタルニ態度不遜ナリシニ依リ打ス
"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
指導員	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
池田久藏	東省三郎	納屋武	守屋榮	谷口香雄	石黒小市	高島定七	谷 豊
訓 戒	訓 戒	隨 責	百分ノ二〇	副 停 百分ノ二五	四 隨 同 責	隨 責	副 停 百分ノ十五

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昭二〇、ハ、一、一作泰ヲ完遂セ  
スシテ師所セル停影ヲ取打ス

銀赤  
務  
係平

小  
沼  
利  
雄

諱二  
週  
間

(以下次頁ニ續ク)









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<p>停 り ニ 精 シ 長 々 私 的 に 説 ヲ 加 へ</p>	<p>停 り テ 取 換 其 ノ 他 ニ 私 的 に 説 ヲ 加 へ テ リ ム ル コ ト 多 シ 後 ノ 行 動 ニ 改 メ ス</p>	<p>停 り テ 取 換 其 ノ 他 ニ 私 的 に 説 ヲ 加 へ テ リ ム ル コ ト 多 シ 後 ノ 行 動 ニ 改 メ ス</p>	<p>停 り テ 取 換 其 ノ 他 ニ 私 的 に 説 ヲ 加 へ テ リ ム ル コ ト 多 シ 後 ノ 行 動 ニ 改 メ ス</p>	<p>停 り テ 取 換 其 ノ 他 ニ 私 的 に 説 ヲ 加 へ テ リ ム ル コ ト 多 シ 後 ノ 行 動 ニ 改 メ ス</p>	<p>停 り テ 取 換 其 ノ 他 ニ 私 的 に 説 ヲ 加 へ テ リ ム ル コ ト 多 シ 後 ノ 行 動 ニ 改 メ ス</p>
・	・	・	・	・	・
・	軍 長	主 計 兵 長	軍 長	分 所 長	軍 長
宗 谷 法 一	佐 岡 茂	岡 田 兵 長	官 長	村 上 大 尉	橋 本 重 義
同	同	同 在 中	同	同	同

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<p>略二〇、二下旬、夫、校、一、ジ、ン、キ、        ナ、ス、ル、兵、ヲ、進、行、シ、目、ヲ、私、約、的、に、メ、タ、リ、        ナ、ス、ル、兵、ヲ、進、行、シ、目、ヲ、私、約、的、に、メ、タ、リ、</p>	<p>略二〇、三、二、三、六、が、カ、リ、        小、人、ハ、去、ル、同、行、ノ、ア、リ、        以、テ、下、官、タル、武、官、ハ、之、ヲ、        ノ、ミ、ル、官、倉、ニ、シ、テ、日、ハ、水、        テ、日、ニ、シ、メ、タ、リ、其、心、ヲ、シ、テ、        手、日、ニ、シ、セ、ル、心、ヲ、シ、テ、死、        亡、セ、リ、必、須、ノ、有、シ、テ、行、        長、不、良、ノ、間、ノ、評、判、モ、シ、テ、        長、不、良、ノ、間、ノ、評、判、モ、シ、テ、        長、不、良、ノ、間、ノ、評、判、モ、シ、テ、        長、不、良、ノ、間、ノ、評、判、モ、シ、テ、</p>	<p>略二〇、五分、所、受、ハ、出、カ、私、        加、ヘ、タ、リ、二、行、兵、初、中、取、上、私、        加、ヘ、タ、リ、二、行、兵、初、中、取、上、私、</p>	<p>略二〇、八、二、二、二、二、二、        略二〇、八、二、二、二、二、二、</p>
<p>通 向</p>	<p>長</p>	<p>草 馬</p>	<p>・</p>
<p>通 向</p>	<p>安 武</p>	<p>湯 山</p>	<p>・</p>
<p>山 岡 廣 太 郎</p>	<p>日 出 男</p>	<p>某</p>	<p>田 内 行 雄</p>
<p>停 居</p>	<p>二 重 十 日 候</p>	<p>停 居</p>	<p>・</p>

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昭二〇、八、二二ニ私的偵察ヲ加ヘタリ	昭一〇、一、三〇許可ナクシテ 昭一〇、一、三〇許可ナクシテ 昭一〇、一、三〇許可ナクシテ 昭一〇、一、三〇許可ナクシテ 昭一〇、一、三〇許可ナクシテ 昭一〇、一、三〇許可ナクシテ	昭二〇、八、二二ニ私的偵察ヲ加ヘタリ	昭二〇、八、二二ニ私的偵察ヲ加ヘタリ	昭二〇、八、二二ニ私的偵察ヲ加ヘタリ	昭二〇、八、二二ニ私的偵察ヲ加ヘタリ
"	"	"	"	"	"
下士官	下士官	下士官	下士官	下士官	下士官
中山 徹	中山 徹	永井 正	山村 三次	松井 知	大野 太郎
"	"	"	辰 彦	五重 龍 日 儀	"

ワ シ カ ム	カ シ ム	カ シ ム	カ シ ム	カ シ ム	カ シ ム
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643129

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF  
ARABIC TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by Japnl Section.

Military Police Report No. 252 (Third Higher)

Report on the Matter Concerning  
the Investigation of the American  
Airmen Who Raided the Japanese Homeland.

FROM: Military Police Commander WAKAMURI, Akito.

TO: Chief of General Staff SUGIYAMA, Gen.

26 May 1942.

Attached is the report of the investigation of the eight officers  
and men of the American planes who took part in the raid on JAPAN  
proper on 18 April and were forced down at NANCHANG and NING PO in  
CENTRAL CHINA.

FORWARDED TO: Minister of War, Vice-Minister of War, Chief of the  
Bureau of Naval Affairs, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Chief of  
Home Defense. (3).

Chief of General Staff, Vice-Chief of General Staff, Chief of  
1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section,  
Chief of General Affairs Bureau. (3).

- 1 -

FILE COPY  
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DEF. DOC. #1027

Since the bombing was done without making various preliminary surveys of the objective, I was resigned to the fate that a certain amount of damage to residential areas and injuries to civilians would be inevitable. On the other hand, I also thought that this was a good opportunity to carry our so-called guerilla type of air raids. However, at the time of the actual bombing, I was seized with fear and I had no thought other than to unload the bombs indiscriminately and escape to safety as quickly as possible. I believe it would be unreasonable to expect any degree of accuracy in the bombing carried out at that time.

Ques. No. 6. Did you do any strafing while getting away from NAGOYA?

Ans. Heretofore, I haven't revealed any information on this point, but the truth is that about five to six minutes after leaving the city we saw in the distance what looked like an elementary school with many children at play. The pilot steadily dropped altitude and ordered the gunmen to their stations. When the plane was at an oblique angle, the skipper gave firing orders, and bursts of machine gun fire sprayed the ground. Of course since all this took place in a moment's time, I have no idea as to the extent of the damage inflicted.

22 May 1942.

TOKYO Military Police Headquarters.

Prisoner of War: FARROW, William G. (Age 23)

Ques. No. 3. State your duties on this bombing raid.

43129

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF  
ATTACHED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by Legal Section.

Military Police Report No. 352 (Third Higher)

Report on the Matter Concerning  
the Investigation of the American  
Airmen Who Raided the Japanese Homeland.

FROM: Military Police Commander YUKAMURA, Akito.

TO: Chief of General Staff SUZUKI, Gen.

26 May 1942.

Attached is the report of the investigation of the eight officers and men of the American planes who took part in the raid on JAPAN proper on 18 April and were forced down at NAKZHANG and NING PO in CENTRAL CHINA.

FORWARDED TO: Minister of War, Vice-Minister of War, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Chief of Home Defense. (3).

Chief of General Staff, Vice-Chief of General Staff, Chief of 1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section, Chief of General Affairs Bureau. (3).

- 1 -

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Chief of Naval General Staff, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff,  
Chief of 1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence)  
Section, Chief of 5th Bureau.

Navy Minister, Vice-Minister of Navy, Chief of Bureau of Naval  
Affairs (3) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Defense.

INTERROGATION REPORT

(Only the important points are recorded)

Interpreter of War: HITE, Robert L.\* (Age 23).

Ques No. 3. State your duties on this bombing raid.

Ans. Pursuant to orders received from Colonel DOOLITTLE to bomb  
OSAKA, (I was co-pilot on plane No. 16, a North American B-25  
Medium bomber, piloted by FARROW), we penetrated into the Japanese  
homeland, but enroute, we changed our course to NAGOYA because of  
the difficulty in bombing OSAKA. We reached NAGOYA about 1400 hours,  
and after dropping four incendiary bombs on the various military  
installations we made an attempt to escape to safety, but were forced  
to make an emergency landing near NANCHANG, CHINA.

Ques No. 4. What were the conditions during the bombing raid over  
NAGOYA?

Ans. Because we had to make an unexpected change in our course, it  
was like blind flying and therefore I felt that as long as we dropped  
our bombs on the center of the factories and tanks, it was all right.

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Since the bombing was done without making various preliminary surveys of the objective, I was resigned to the fate that a certain amount of damage to residential areas and injuries to civilians would be inevitable. On the other hand, I also thought that this was a good opportunity to carry our so-called guerilla type of air raids. However, at the time of the actual bombing, I was seized with fear and I had no thought other than to unload the bombs indiscriminately and escape to safety as quickly as possible. I believe it would be unreasonable to expect any degree of accuracy in the bombing carried out at that time.

Ques. No. 6. Did you do any strafing while getting away from NAGOYA?

Ans. Heretofore, I haven't revealed any information on this point, but the truth is that about five to six minutes after leaving the city we saw in the distance what looked like an elementary school with many children at play. The pilot steadily dropped altitude and ordered the gunmen to their stations. When the plane was at an oblique angle, the skipper gave firing orders, and bursts of machine gun fire sprayed the ground. Of course since all this took place in a moment's time, I have no idea as to the extent of the damage inflicted.

22 May 1942.

TOKYO Military Police Headquarters.

Prisoner of War: FLEWELL, William G.\* (Age 23)

Ques. No. 3. State your duties on this bombing raid.

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Ans. Pursuant to orders received from Colonel DOOLITTLE to bomb OSAKA, as pilot of plane No. 16, a North American B-25 Medium bomber, in command of a crew consisting of HITE, co-pilot, BARR\*, navigator SIEGEL\*, machine gunner, and DESHAGER\*, bombardier, I proceeded to carry out my mission. We approached the Japanese homeland, but because bombing of OSAKA was extremely difficult, while enroute, we changed our course and headed for NAGOYA. We reached NAGOYA at about 1400 hours, and after dropping four incendiary bombs on the various military installations of that city, we made our escape but were forced to make an emergency landing near NANCHANG, CHINA.

Ques No. 4. Your claim that the military installations were your objectives, but didn't you actually bomb innocent civilians?

Ans. I don't know what excuse to make for that other than to state the fact that, we were a temporary crew with inadequate training. I cannot make any assertion that we bombed our targets and nothing else. Moreover, at that time the Japanese anti-aircraft guns were especially active, and since our only thought was to drop our bombs quickly and make a hurried dash for safety, I believe it is natural that some damage was inflicted on residences, and some civilians may have been killed. On this score, as commander of the plane, I am fully cognizant of my responsibilities.

Ques. No. 5. Wasn't that point made clear in Colonel DOOLITTLE's order?

Ans. No. We saw the decisions regarding the selection of the primary,

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objective of the air raid was really to demoralize the Japanese people, it was natural as far as we were concerned, that the bombings of innocent civilians would be one of the methods. Furthermore, since our pre-designated objective, OSAKA, was unexpectedly changed to NAGOYA, I could only guess at the location of our target.

Ques. No. 6. While heading out to sea from NAGOYA, didn't you strafe children of an elementary school?

Ans. There is truly no excuse for this. I have made no mention of this incident before, but after leaving NAGOYA, I do not quite remember the place - there was a place which looked like a school, with many people there. As parting shot, with a feeling of "damn these Japs", I made a power dive and carried out some strafing. There was absolutely no defensive fire from below.

22 May 1942

TOKYO Military Police Headquarters.

'Prisoner of War: HALLMARK, Dave Edward\* (age 27).

Ques No. 3. State your duties in the bombing attack.

Ans. After receiving orders for the bombing of TOKYO from Colonel DCOLITTLE, I, as pilot of plane No. 6 a North American B-25 Medium bomber, took off from the aircraft carrier HORNET about 0900 hours, 18 April 1942, and headed toward TOKYO, with two steel mills as my specific bombing objective.

Ques. No. 4. State in further detail, the contents of the order.

Ans. The order designated my plane as plane No. 6 in the TOKYO bombing group. Insofar as the targets were concerned, Colonel DOOLITTLE made the final decisions after consultation with each pilot as to the appropriate targets selected from a map drawn to a scale of 1:100,000 and after an orientation session, as can be seen from the foregoing, the decision was made after I selected my target from some 300 odd plotted targets.

Ques No. 5. What were the precautions taken for the bombing?

Ans. The Imperial Palace was not to be bombed. This did not signify any special respect but its significance was in the adverse effect that would have followed from doing it.

Ques. No. 6. Then did you presume that you only had to avoid the Imperial Palace and that it was permissible to bomb the homes of the general public?

Ans. They did not especially specify the bombing at random, but in this method of hit-and-run air attack it is inevitable that homes would be damaged to some extent. Therefore, I believe that Colonel DOOLITTLE did not give us precautions against this because he was aware of such an eventuality.

Ques. No. 7. How did you confirm the results of the bombing?

Ans. As I just said, I'm not stating that we especially attempted to destroy the steel mills. On the whole, we thought it would be

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all right to drop bombs in the heart of the location of the steel mills and individual plants, but we did not confirm anything. Moreover, since anti-aircraft fire was rather active, and we were quite apprehensive about the arrival of Japanese fighter planes, our sole concern was to unload our bombs and make a hasty escape.

Ques No. 8. From your technical experience, what did you honestly think of the bombing methods used on that day?

Ans. In all probability there was a considerable amount of indiscriminate bombing.

Ques. No. 9. What are you thinking of after killing and wounding so many innocent people?

Ans. Since it was our intention to bomb TOKYO and escape to CHINA quickly, we also dropped bombs over objectives other than those targets specified, and made a hasty escape. Therefore, we also bombed residential homes, killing and wounding many people.

22 May 1942.

Prisoner of War: SPATZ, Harold L.\* (Age 20).

Ques No. 3. Relate your duties in connection with this air raid.

Ans. Upon receiving orders from Colonel DOOLITTLE, to participate in a raid on the city of OSAKA, I was assigned to plane No. 16, a North American B-25 Medium bomber, as a mechanic and machine gunner. At 1400 hours, I presumed that we were over the city of OSAKA and in



DEF. DOC. #1027

accordance with the original orders, we dropped four incendiary bombs on the city with military installations as the objective. After the bombing we fled toward the sea and made a forced landing in the vicinity of NANCHANG, CHINA.

Ques. No. 4: What do you think of the fact that your plane bombed innocent civilians?

Ans. Since I am a gunner and am not actually concerned with the bombing I have no idea as to the method of bombing or its results. However, if the objective was to demoralize the general populace, even if the bombing was directed at residential areas, etc. then personally I do not give a hoot as to how we did it.

Ques. No. 5. After the bombing of NAGOYA, did you not actually carry out strafing?

Ans. It was an extremely inexcusable deed. Shortly after leaving NAGOYA, while flying southward along the coast, the pilot immediately upon perceiving a school, steadily reduced altitude and ordered us to our stations. I aimed at the children in the school yard and fired only one burst before we headed out to sea. My feelings at that time were "dam these Japs" and I wanted to give them a burst of fire. Now I clearly see that this was truly unpardonable and in all decency should not have been committed.

22 May 1942.

TYO Military Police Headquarters.

Prisoner of War: **DEXHEGLA, Jacob D.\* (Age 29)**

Ques. No. 3. State your duties in connection with this bombing.

Ans. Pursuant to orders received from Colonel DOOLITTLE to bomb OSAKA, five of us including the pilot, boarded the plane with the specific mission of bombing the petroleum tanks at OSAKA.

Ques. No. 4. How did you participate in the bombing?

Ans. I am the bombardier but I carried out the bombing in co-operation with three men and the pilot. We dropped four incendiary bombs on the oil tanks and on residential areas.

Ques. No. 5. State the conditions at the time of the bombing.

Ans. Since I saw two or three large petroleum tanks, I presumed it was the city of OSAKA - later I learned that it was NAGOYA. Since we dropped incendiary bombs while flying at an altitude of 500 feet above the city, direct hits were scored on the petroleum tanks and residential areas.

Ques. No. 6. Why did you bomb residential areas in addition to the specified objectives?

Ans. Since in this type of bombing it is inevitable that the bombs will scatter to the residential areas from the beginning I expected

such an eventuality and acted accordingly. As far as we were concerned, the quicker we discharged our bombs and caused a lot of casualties and escaped, the better it was for us. Colonel D. LITTLE AND THE Other ranking officers, as well as our pilot did not especially call our attention to these things. Of course, since the primary objective was the petroleum tanks, the surrounding residences were clearly discernible.

Ques. No. 7. Even if you were instructed by the pilot to drop the bombs properly, didn't you as the bombardier, think that in the name of humanity you shouldn't have bombed innocent civilians?

Ans. With our technique and methods used in that air attack such things, even if we thought about them, would have been impossible.

22 May 1942.

TOKYO Military Police Headquarters.

Prisoner of War: NIELSEN, C. J.\* (Age 25).

Ques. No. 3. State your duties in connection with the bombing.

Ans. Pursuant to orders received from Colonel DOCLITTLE to bomb TOKYO, I was assigned to plane No. 6, a North-American B-25 Medium Bomber, as a navigator.

Ques. No. 4. 2d Lieutenant NIELSEN, in what capacity did you participate in the bombing?

Ans. Since I was responsible for the navigation of plane No. 6, I made plans for our escape to CHINA after raiding Japan. When we approached Tokyo

the bombardier and I worked together in dropping our bombs.

Ques. No. 5. State the conditions at the time of the bombing.

Ans. At that time I was mainly observing the situation outside from the windows. At an altitude of about 1,500 meters, as soon as we crossed the NAKA River in the northeast part of Tokyo, the pilot essentially ordered the bombing. In general the main objective was the factories, but with such a bombing method, I believe we missed it completely.

Prisoner of War: MEADER, Robert T. (Age 24).

Ques No. 3. State your duties in the bombing raid.

Ans. I received the orders to bomb Tokyo from Colonel BOOLEY, who lead the bombing raid on Japan. I was co-pilot of plane No. 6, a North American B-25 medium bomber. As far as the bombing was concerned, we received orders to bomb two steel plants which were indicated on the map.

Ques No. 4. As Lieutenant MEADER, what was your part in this bombing raid?

Ans. Since the pilot was operating the plane, I was chiefly concerned with locating the objective. Presently we passed BOCO Peninsula. As soon as we crossed the NAKA River, I spotted the particular factory in question, and called the pilot's attention to it. The pilot immediately ordered dropping of the bombs, one after the other. However, because of the heavy anti-aircraft fire from below our sole interest was in trying to make a safe escape, so we never did confirm the results of our bombing.

Ques. No. 5. You not only bombed the factories, but you also bombed homes of innocent civilians and killed many people. What are your reactions in that respect?

Ans. It is natural that dropping bombs on a crowded place like TOKYO will cause damage in the vicinity of the targets. All the more so with our technique of dropping our bombs while making a hit and run attack, so I believe it was strictly unavoidable. Moreover, Colonel DOOLITTLE never did order us to avoid such bombings and neither were we particularly worried about the possible danger.

Ques. No. 7. Don't you feel sorry for even the innocent women and children who were injured?

Ans. Personally, I am extremely sorry, but in modern warfare such things cannot be helped. Inasmuch as demoralizing the spirit of the people is one of the objectives, there is no alternative other than to ignore our feelings.

22 May 1942.

Prisoner of War: BARR, George\*, (Age 25).

Ques No. 3, What was your part in this bombing raid?

Ans. I received Colonel DOOLITTLE's orders to bomb OSAKA. I was the navigator on plane No. 16, a North-American B-25 Medium Bomber.

Ques. No. 6. Did you not strafe an elementary school while headed out to the sea after the NAGOYA raid?

Q. 103. #1047

A. I am quite sure that was done. Only when the pilot steadily  
dropped altitude, and the rickling was executed was I aware of it.

Ex 3130

Def. Doc. # 1027-B

Copy of Excerpts from the Text of a Telegram.

FROM: Chief of General Staff.

TO: Commanding General of the CHINA Expeditionary Force.

10 October 1942.

The verdict issued by the military tribunal concerning the punishment of the American airmen who raided the Japanese homeland is considered to be fair and just.

However, upon review we believe that with the exception of both pilots and the gunner, SPAATZ, the death sentence should be commuted.

It is recommended that the death sentences of these men be commuted to life imprisonment.

On the 13th of this month. Lieutenant-Colonel TAKAYAMA will depart from FUKUOKA in connection with the case, and we shall appreciate it if you will keep him informed as to the execution of the sentence, etc.

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Do f. Doc. #1027-B

電報文拔萃寫

參謀總長 發

支那派遣軍總司令官 宛

一九四二年十月十日

日本々土ヲ空襲シテガ行士ノ處罰ニ關スル軍事裁判所ノ決ハ正  
ダト考ヘラル。

然シ乍ラ檢討ノ結果、機銃士及ビ射手スパーツ以外ハ死刑ヲ減刑スベキ  
モノト信ズル。

之等ノ者ノ死刑ニ終ニ禁錮刑ニ減刑サレルコトヲ報告ス。

今月十三日、本件ニ關シ、高山... 出發スル、判決ノ執行其ノ他  
ニ付同中佐ニ絶エズ通報セラレ、ハ幸甚デアル。



EX 3132

Def. Doc. #1027-H

十七年

十月二十二日十二時五十分發

十月二十二日十三時五十四分着

宛名 參謀長

發信人 參謀總長

參謀本部、電報第四五三號

殘虐行為ヲ爲シタル敵航空兵ハ軍法會議ニ附スベシ。將令到決ニ關スル公表ハ悉ク大本營ヨリ發セラレベシ。尙處罰地點ニ關シテニセラレタシ。

電報配布先

「コ」「ナミ」「ロ」「シヨ」

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Exp 3132

Def. Doc. # 102<sup>7</sup> - H

DISPATCHED: 22 October, 1250 hours.  
RECEIVED: 22 October, 1354 hours.

TO : Chief of Staff  
FROM: Chief of General Staff  
General Staff, Wiro No. 483

Enemy airmen who commit acts of atrocities shall be committed to a military tribunal. In the future, all announcements as to the verdict will be made by Grand Imperial Headquarters. Moreover, absolute secrecy as to the place of disposition must be maintained.

Distribution of telegram:  
Ko  
Nami  
Ro  
Sho

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辯護日文書一〇二七A、B、C

D  
E  
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COPY

FILE

RETURN TO ROOM 361

證 明 書

自分ガンナード・オーバードは左記事項を證明致します。

一、私は聯合軍最高總司令部の國際檢察局文書部長代理でありまして右檢察局の入手せる凡ての文書の原文並びに寫しを所持、保管及び管理してゐます。

二、右文書中には、日本陸軍次官木村から參謀本部長後宮に宛てられた日本本土、滿洲國及び日本作戰地域を襲撃する敵國飛行士の處置に関する陸軍一般命令第二一九〇號（秘）の寫しがあります。

三、アテイス文書六七八九號は上海輕戰爭犯罪裁判に於ける證據物件の一つであり在上海の右法廷が保存してゐる日本語文書の原文を翻譯したものであります私共の所蔵して居ります右翻譯は聯合軍最高司令部の法律局より入手したものであります。

昭和二十二年四月九日

ガンナード・オーバード（署名）

Def. Doc. # 1027-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H

私は前記訂正文はアテイス文書第六七八九號の眞實なる寫しである事を證明  
致します。

通信部隊長

ジヨヒフ R・パール（署名）

31/11

Def. Doc. # 1027-C

Measures for the disposition of the American Airmen who raided the homeland.

Your approval on this matter is respectfully requested.

FROM: Chief of General Staff SUGIYAMA, Gen.

TO: HATA, Sanroku, Commanding General, CHINA Expeditionary Force.

10 October 1942.

1. Sentenced to death.  
HALLMARK, Dave Edward<sup>1</sup>, pilot  
FARROW, William D.<sup>2</sup>, pilot  
SPAATZ, Harold A.<sup>3</sup>, machine gunner
2. Death sentence commuted.  
MEADER, Robert J.<sup>4</sup>, Co-pilot  
NIELSEN, C. J.<sup>5</sup>, Navigator  
HITE, Robert L.<sup>6</sup>, Co-pilot  
BARR, George<sup>7</sup>, Navigator  
DESHAGER, Jacob<sup>8</sup>, Bombardier
3. Time of execution.  
About 15 October. (The staff officer of the China Expeditionary Army will keep us posted as to the details).
4. Matters concerning the disposition of the airmen whose death penalties were commuted.

The five whose death sentences were commuted shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. As war criminals, their treatment shall not be that accorded ordinary prisoners of war.

Even in the event of an exchange of war prisoners they may not be repatriated to the United States forces.

DWF. DCC. #2201

Concerning Punishment of P.O.W.

(Feb. 28, 1905 Law No. 38)

Article I. If a prisoner of war offers resistance or violence to supervisors, guards, or escorts of prisoners of war he shall be punished with imprisonment with hard labor. The offender whose offence is light shall be punished with imprisonment without hard labor for not less than 6 months and not more than 5 years.

Article II. If a number of prisoners of war conspire to commit the offences specified in the preceding article, the ringleader shall be punished with death, and the remainder of the offenders shall be punished with exile for a term. He whose offence is slight shall be punished with imprisonment with hard labor.

Article III. If prisoners of war conspire and make a mass escape, the ringleader shall be punished with exile for a term. The offender whose offence is serious shall be punished with death. The rest of the offenders shall be punished with imprisonment with heavy labor. The offender whose offence is slight shall be punished with imprisonment without heavy labor for not less than 6 months and not more than 5 years.

Article IV. If a prisoner of war on parole breaks his parole, he shall be punished with imprisonment with hard labor. If a prisoner of war, breaking his parole, makes resistance with a weapon, he shall be punished with death.

Article V. If a prisoner of war, after giving his parole not to try to escape, breaks the parole, he shall be punished with imprisonment with heavy labor.

Article VI. The provisions specified in Article I--III shall not apply to offences committed while they were previously prisoners of war by those who have been taken prisoner of war again.

Article VII. When a prisoner of war is placed on trial by court martial, provisions applicable to soldiers and sailors of the Imperial Army shall be applied to him according to his rank.

DEF. DOC. #2201

Exh. No.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, MIYAMA, Yozō, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Concerning Punishment of P.O.W's (Feb. 28, 1905 Law No. 38)" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the First Demobilization Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 22nd day of August, 1947

/s/ MIYAMA, Yozō  
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /s/ ABE, Akira  
(seal)

3133

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

Exh. No.

自分美山要嶽ハ第一復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ審カレ貳頁ヨリ成ル停務處罰ニ關スル件(明三八ニニハ法律三八)ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(第一復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正雜ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年八月二十二日 於東京

美 山 要 嶽

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同 日 於 何 所

立會人

安 部 明

DsfDo002201



3133

停務處刑ニ請スル件 ( 第三八二八 )  
法律 三八

- 第一條 停務處刑者、監視者又ハ入道者ニ對シ反抗若ハ暴行ノ所爲アル者ハ重懲ニ處シ其ノ情狀キ者ハ六月以上五年以下ノ輕懲ニ處ス
- 第二條 停務共謀シテ多衆前條ノ所爲アルトキハ前條ハ死刑ニ處ス其ノ他ノ者ハ有期流刑ニ處シ其ノ情狀キ者ハ重懲ニ處ス
- 第三條 停務共謀シテ多衆逃走ノ所爲アルトキハ首魁ハ有期流刑ニ處シ其ノ情狀重キ者ハ死刑ニ處ス其ノ他ノ者ハ重懲ニ處シ其ノ情狀輕キ者ハ六月以上五年以下ノ輕懲ニ處ス
- 第四條 宣誓解放ヲ受ケタル停務宣誓ニ背ク者ハ重懲ニ處シ其ノ宣誓ニ背キ兵器ヲ濫リ流散スル者ハ死刑ニ處ス
- 第五條 停務逃走セサル宣誓ヲ爲シ之ニ背ク者ハ重懲ニ處ス其ノ他ノ宣誓ニ背ク者ハ輕懲ニ處ス
- 第六條 第一條乃至第三條ノ規定ハ再ビ停務トナリタル者ノ前ニ停務タルリシトキニ犯シタル刑ニ之ヲ適用セス
- 第七條 本法會議ニ於テ停務ノ犯罪ヲ審判スルトキハ其ノ情狀ニ應ジテ罰金人ニ請スル規定ヲ適用ス

Ex 3134

Def. Doc. # 1817

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Depoent: OYAMA, Ayao

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I was examined as a witness at the court of the I.M.T.F.E. on May 7, this year. On that occasion, I was asked by Prosecutor Comyns Carr about the original formal record of the statistics list entitled "the List of the POW's punished by Army Court-Martial from December 8, 1941 to August 15, 1945" (Exhibit No. 1998) which I had produced on July 17, 1946, at the request of Prosecutor Monaghan.

In replying to the question, I said that the list was compiled according to a list of statistics which was in custody of my Division, that is, the Legal Investigation Division of the First Demobilization Bureau. But a subsequent investigation showed that this was utterly a misunderstanding on my part.

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This statistics list was compiled by my subordinate officials by consulting the copies of written findings Army Court-Martials which were submitted by various Army commanders to the War Ministry. I wish to correct my answer regarding this point.

In the above questioning, I replied to the prosecutor that I supposed the copies of written findings of Army Court-Martials which had been submitted by the Army Commanders to the War Ministry and which had furnished the basis for the statistics list then in our custody had been destroyed by fire. This was also an error due to my misunderstanding. Later I found that these copies of the written findings for POW's had been preserved. I wish, consequently, to correct this point, too.

I found later also the copy of the writer verdict for the Wells case about which I was specifically questioned by the prosecutor. That was a report of the NADA 9801 Unit or Headquarters of the 37th Army to the War Ministry.

At that time I had no remembrance about the details of the findings in the Wells case, and could therefore not answer Prosecutor Comyns Carr's question: "Do you think it was just that Mr. Wells was sentenced to 12 year's imprisonment and hard labor merely for spreading rumors?"

When I discovered and read the copy of the written findings in the Wells case I found that the crime of the same Wells was not merely an act of spreading rumors. Actually, Wells was

sentenced to 12 years of penal servitude for having committed a set of concurrent offences prescribed in Art. V-1, and the latter paragraph of Art. XI, of the PO" Penal Code, and Art. XCVIIII of the Army Criminal Law or Art. C of the Navy Criminal Law.

Art. V-1 of the PO" Penal Code provides, "Whoever resists or disobeys the order of persons who are responsible for supervising, watching, or guarding prisoners of war shall be punished with death or penal servitude or imprisonment for life or for not less than 1 year."

In Art. XI of the same Code.

"Whoever forms a group with the purpose of committing disobedient acts shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment for not less than 6 months and not more than 5 years; the ringleaders shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment for not less than 1 year and not more than 10 years."

Both in Art. XCVIIII of the Army Criminal Law and in Art. C of the Navy Criminal Law.

"Whoever spreads rumors about military affairs in time of war or of an incident shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than 7 years."

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I wish to make it clear that I believe that the verdicts sentencing Wells to 12 years of penal servitude on the basis of these provisions are just.

On this 17 day of June, 1947,  
at Tokyo,

DEPONENT /s/ OYAMA, Ayao (seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at the same place.

Witness: /s/ BANNO Junkichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ OYAMA, Ayao (seal)

Decision

War prisoner Captain Lionel Collins Mattuce. Thirty one years old. Born at Steppy, Suburb of Adelaide, South Australia, Australia. Formerly attached to the Communication Corps of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

War prisoner Lieutenant Roderick Graham Wells. Twenty four years old. Born at Tachiyura Victoria, Australia. Formerly attached to the Communication Corps of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

War Prisoner Sergeant Alfred Stevens. Thirty years old. Born at the City of Perth, West Australia, Australia. Formerly attached to the A Company of the 19th Machine Gun Corps of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

War prisoner Corporal John Allan McMillan. Thirty eight years old. Born at Ceura South Wales, Australia. Formerly attached to the headquarters of the 22nd Infantry Regiment of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

War prisoner Corporal Walter Jeffrey Roffie. Thirty years old. Born at Jones Becksie New South Wales, Australia. Formerly attached to the 84th Automobile Repairing Corps of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

Due to the charges of spy, pernicious designs on the country, violation of the war prisoner punishing law and fallacious rumour concoction brought upon the said Mattuce, those of fallacious rumour

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concoction and violation of the war prisoner punishing law of the said Wells and Stevens and that of violation of the war prisoner punishing law of the said McMillan and Roffio, this court martial after the trials duly processed under Judge Captain of Legal Affairs ~~W. T. N. B. E.~~, Haruo pronounced its sentences as follows:

#### Text

Defendant Lattuce shall be put to death.

Defendant Wells shall be imprisoned with hard labour for twelve years.

Defendant Stevens shall be imprisoned with hard labour for five years.

Defendants McMillan and Roffio shall respectively be imprisoned for one and half a year.

One six shot revolver seized (Evidence No. 1) shall be confiscated.

#### Reasons

The oforesaid five defendants were respectively attached to the above-mentioned corps and joined the Greater East Asia War and on February 15th, 1942, they were made <sup>WAR</sup> prisoners by the Imperial Navy at Singapore and since then they had been kept in the First Branch of the Borneo Prisoner Camp at Sandakan East Coast State of North Borneo from July 18th of the same year.

1. The defendant Mattuce was very strong in his fighting spirit, even after his surrender. He was very reluctant to remain as a prisoner and was always on the very alert to escape from the camp.

(1) Since he arrived there and during his engagement in his farming work in the nearby fields, taking advantage of the lenient surveillance, from about August of 1941, he began to make access to Mr. Abin, a Dosun and the head of the Branch Police Office, situated at the 8 mile point of the Rabock road, Sandakan and his under officials, Mr. Matsop, a Dosun and keeper of the pasture belonged to the Agricultural Experimentation Station of the East Coast State, situated at the eight mile point of the said road, Mr. Alexanderfan, a Chinese farmer, residing at the 7 mile point of the above road and some others and at last he made acquaintances with them all.

In about October of the same year, in the full knowledge and against the order given by Lieutenant HOSHIJIM, Susumu, Chief of the camp, prohibiting any of their communication or contact with the outsiders of the camp, he still continued his access with outsiders and even hinted at future possibility that once the afflicted area would be regained by the hands of Great Britain, any assistance given to him would warmly be rewarded and instigated the said Abin and others. Thus, during the months from the middle of March to July of the same year, his offences were continued and



the above-noted fields and their neighbourhood were made their places of meeting. Almost once every week, he secretly met the said Amin and made the latter the intermediary to communicate with the outside. Besides, he often met the rest of the people above referred to for similar designs and purposes.

- (2) Probably for the purpose of providing for the escape some other day, in about August of 1942, he asked the above mentioned Alexanderfan to draw up one map each of the former British territories, North Borneo and Sandakan and its neighbourhood and actually received them and on that occasion, as soon as he had heard from Alexanderfan a rumour that a large number of U.S. Philippine Army staying at the Sulu Islands were going to attack Sandakan, he expected sure its realization and planned to assemble all the prisoners interned to destruct the camp in order to join the said U.S. Army upon the above supposition. Nearly at that time, he entreated Alexanderfan to let him have a revolver and six shots in the latter's possession and he further made the latter promise to come near to the fence of the camp and to blow the whistle, as soon as he learned the arrival of the U.S. Army and he further delivered the latter a letter, asking for their deliverance by the hands of the U.S. Army, attaching thereto a sketch, describing the topographical features of the camp and its vicinity and entrusted the delivery of the letter to him and

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talked his plan then being hatched to him and requested him to comply with him so that when the prisoners stood up in defiance, five rifles and 150 shots provided in the police office should be delivered to them. Thus every preparation possible was secretly being carried on, while in order to benefit the expected arrival of the U.S. Army and since the information to them, he endeavoured to learn and collect all possible news in general about the movement of the Imperial forces. Again, at about the end of August of the same year, he asked Alexanderfan to draw up and deliver him a drawing or local map, minutely describing the arrangements of the Imperial forces staying at Sandakan and in about December of the same year, he asked a Dosun named Maginal in the clerical service of the said Agricultural Experimentation Station to draw up and deliver him a drawing or local map of the said station and prisoner camp and their neighbourhood. Furthermore, at about the end of September of the same year, through the afore-mentioned Matsop, he made a health official named Rai Kifuku of the Sandakan Citizens' Hospital draw up a map, describing the billeting condition and the number of the Imperial troops and Japanese at Sandakan and he actually received it. Besides, on several occasions, when he met Abin, he listened to the changes of the condition of the Imperial army and the internee Britishers and Americans, the condition of the incoming and

damages by the air-raid offered by the combined forces of Great Britain and the U.S. and also that the Japanese had unfavourable results in other directions.

(b) Then from December, 1942 to July, 1943, on a score occasions, he forwarded the news in writing to a British doctor called Tailor in the service of the Sandakan Citizens' Hospital who was then confined to home to the effect that the U.S. forces attacked the Japanese transports in the sea near the Bismark islands and sunk twenty-two ships, shotting down at the same time a large number of the Japanese planes and that the Japanese forces had many damages in other fields of battles.

(c) Again, from May, 1943 to the middle of July of the same year, on several occasions, he forwarded the news in writing to a Britisher named Philips who was then confined to home situated at five mile point of the Rabock road, outside of the City of Sandakan regarding the above Solomon and New Guinia news and also the other unfavourable news toward the Japanese forces.

(4) From May, 1943, imitating the manner of the said Weinton, he himself attempted to assemble parts and make up a radio receiving set in order to listen into the news broadcast by the British and American sides and he disclosed his intention to Weinton and Wells and in collusion with them, through the said Amin, the required parts were being gradually collected and

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outgoing ships at the port of Sandakan and also the condition of demand and supply of daily necessities of the inhabitants.

(3) In about November, 1942, when the prisoners of the same camp, named Weinton and Ricars, secretly began to listen in to the war news broadcast by the British and States sides, by making up a radio receiving set and to circulate the said news in turn to the rest of prisoners in the camp, he became gladdened, as the news contained some unfavourable things toward the Japanese forces and he secretly forwarded it on to Britishers and Americans, either detained or confined in home in the same district in order to accelerate the defying spirit. Besides, in full expectation that the similar news might easily be spread among the inhabitants at large, he asked Weinton to get one copy each of the news each time. Thus he continued his sinister practice, each time when he met Amin, through the intermediary of Weinton and Ricars.

(a) From the middle of November, 1942 to the end of February, 1943.

a dozen times, he forwarded the war news in writing to the former governor Smith of North Borneo who was then detained in Bahara island in the throat of the Bay of Sandakan and the other detained Britishers to the effect that as the result of the fierce battle between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Navy at the Solomon islands, the Japanese had severe losses and damages and in New Guinea also, the Japanese suffered great

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evading the surveillance of the warden, in the same camp and under the direction of Wointon, up to July of the same year, he was engaged in assembling parts with the assistance of Wells, but it could not be perfected and the scheme was discovered.

2. The other defendant Wells was also very strong in his antagonistic spirit and was very much abhorring the situation of his prisoner.

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(1) As above stated, being well informed by the orders of the officer in charge of P.O.W. Camp about October 1942 that all the prisoners were strictly prohibited from having any correspondence or contact with the inhabitants outside, he, notwithstanding, communicated when he heard from the defendant Stevens in about May 1943 that the Englishman named Haver who had been detained there was now an electric engineer in Sandakan Electric Power Station. To this Haver the news of the present situation of the war broadcast<sup>ed</sup> by English and American authorities. With continual criminal intent he kept contact with Haver approximately once a week towards the middle of July in order to stimulate his spirit of resistance, using as medium the aforesaid Stevens. Chen Ping, a workman and others of the electric power station attached to the camp. They had decided previously a cryptograph using numerals and Roman letters by which they exchanged messages. He communicated approximately ten times the news, which he had heard from the said Winton and others, of the American air force that attacked a large Japanese transport fleet near the Bismark Islands, that it sank the majority of the fleet and shot down a large number of airplanes, together with a number of pieces of "news" altogether quite to the disadvantage of the Japanese Army.

(2) About May 1943, on being invited by the accused Mathius to collaborate with him to make a radio receiving set, he consented, and with mutual connection and eluding the vigilance of warders, he engaged in making the receiving set with Mathius

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until about July under Wainton's instructions.

(3) In the beginning of June 1943, when Wainton was punished and put into the Camp. prison, he used on his behalf the radio receiving set, caught the American and British broadcast for several days, and with continual criminal intent communicated orally or by letters to officer prisoners and other prisoners in the Camp the news to the disadvantage of Japanese Army; for instance, he communicated the news that the Japanese Army in Rangoon had sustained a great loss by the bombing of English and American Army and that the Japanese Army in China was fighting a hard battle everywhere owing to the resistance of Chungking side.

III. The accused Alfred Stevens had been ordered, since towards the end of November, to operate the machine in the electric power station attached to the camp situated outside the premises.

While he was engaged in his business, knowing well the instructions of the officer in charge that they were strictly prohibited from holding communication with the people outside as above stated, committed the following offences with continual criminal intent.

(1) From about January to July 1943 he communicated to Wu Ka Kuang, Chen Ping and other workmen in the station several times many pieces of information altogether to the disadvantage of

the Japanese Army, among which was news of British and American broadcast received by the accused Wells and others, namely, the American Air force attacked a large group of Japanese transport ships near the Bismark Islands.

(2) From about May to July 1943, using Macmillan, Roffie, Chen Ping and others as medium he helped exchange of about twenty letters between the defendant Wells and the aforesaid Haver and handed to Wells several parcels sent by Haver containing Radio requisites and other articles. Toward the end of June he helped three times the communication between the prisoner Mathius and Abin the guard.

IV. The accused Macmillan from about September 1942 and Loffe from about February 1943 were engaged in collecting firewood outside the premises of the Camp. Knowing well by the orders of the officer in charge that they were strictly prohibited from holding any contact with the people outside, they committed the following offences with continual criminal intent by taking advantage of the rather lenient surveillance.

(1) From toward the end of May to the middle of June 1943 Macmillan twice received from Stevens and Chen Ping the letters and parcels sent by Haver and delivered them secretary to Wells. He also handed the letters of Wells to Stevens and Chen Ping and made them deliver the letters to Haver.

(2) From the middle of June to the middle of July in the same



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year poff received from Wells three letters for Mavor. He handed them to Stevens and Chen Ping and made them deliver the letters to Mavor. He received from Stevens Mavor's letters and parcels for Wells and delivered them to Wells.

The court accept the above-stated fact (leaving out the point that they were committed with continual criminal intent) by putting together the following records and evidence :--

- o The deposition in this court of these five defendants.
- o The affidavit of Matus to the questions of Military Police.
- o The deposition of Wainton to the questions of the prosecutor contained in the record of the case of Alexander Gordon Wenton and other four defendants concerning violation of War Prisoners Punishing Law and fallacious rumour concoction. (the document number 16 of the record 1943)
- o The deposition to the question of the Prosecutor of the defendants Abin Angon, Matus bin Gungao, Alexander Pan, De. Marginal Lai-Kuei-fu, Wa Mokwang, and Chen Ping contained in the record of Ernestragon and 39 others' case of the breach of military discipline brought here from the record of Nade No. 9901 unit tribunal of military discipline.
- o The deposition to the question of Military Police of the defendant Mavor, James Taylor, Alfred Phillips in the record

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Gerald "Aver and three others" case (Doc. No. 22 1943)  
of the same source.

o Evidence No. 1 -- 4.

One six-shot revolver impounded.

One receiving set of radio with 13 requisites, also  
impounded.

One diary, impounded.

.....

The continuation of the criminal intent can be perceived  
by the fact that similar crimes were committed successively  
within comparatively short duration of time. According to law,  
the act of the defendant "athus stated in I(1) falls within  
the purview of Art. 5, Clause 1 of the War Prisoners Punishing  
Law. The act of spy in (2) comes within the purview of Art.  
35, Clause 1 and Art. 60, of the Criminal Code. The act of  
preparation with pernicious designs on the country fall within  
the purview of Art. 88, and Art. 86, of the Criminal Code.  
The act stated in (3) falls within the purview of Art. 99, of  
the Military Criminal Code and Art. 100, of Navy Criminal Code.  
The act stated in (4) falls within the purview of the latter  
part of Art. 11, of the War Prisoners Punishing Law. The  
offences of (1) (2) and (3) being committed by one act which  
falls within the purview of several Articles of crime, and the  
offences (1) and (3) being committed with one continual

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criminal intent, we apply Art. 54, clause 1, 1st part, Art. 55 and Art. 10, of the Criminal Code and decide the punishment to be that of spy, which being the gravest among the said offences, and sentence the capital punishment. The offence of (4) which is violation of War Prisoners Punishing Law, and the above stated offences are the concurrent offences that come within purview of Art. 45, 1st part, of the Criminal Code. But since the capital punishment is chosen for the said act of spy, it is not necessary, according to Art. 46, Clause 1 of the Criminal Code, to condemn to the other punishments.

The act of II (1) of Wells comes within purview of Art. 5, Clause 1, Art. 99, of the Military Criminal Code and Art. 100 of the Naval Criminal Code, and the offence (1) and (5) have been committed by one act which comes within purview of several articles and altogether committed with one continual criminal intent. So, by applying Art. 54, first part of Clause 1, Art. 55, and Art. 10 of the Criminal Code the court sentence penal servitude for a term owing to violation of War Prisoners Punishing Law, it being the gravest among his offences. For his offence stated in (2) penal servitude is chosen. The above stated offences are concurrent offences in Art. 45, part 1., so the court apply Art. 47, Art. 10, Art. 14 of the Criminal Code, and sentence Wells to penal servitude of twelve years owing to violation of War Prisoners Punishing Law with increase of punishment according to the Criminal Code. The act of Stevens in III (1) and (2) comes within purview of

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Art. 5 Clause 1st of the War Prisoners Punishing Law. His fallacious rumour concoction falls within purview of Art. 99, of the Military Criminal Code and Art. 100 of the Naval Criminal Code. The above stated offences were committed by one continual criminal intent and by one act which falls within purview of several articles. So, by applying Art. 54, Clause 1, Art. 55, and Art. 10, of the Criminal Code, penal servitude for a term is sentenced owing to violation of War Prisoners Punishing Law which is the gravest offence that has been committed by these people; and according to the law, the court sentence Stephens to five years penal servitude, Macmillan and Loffe to one year and a half penal servitude, as their act stated in IV comes respectively within purview of Art. 5, Clause 1, of the War Prisoners Punishing Law according to which penal servitude for a term should be sentenced. One six shot revolver (Evidence No. 1) that has been seized should be confiscated according to Art. 19, of the Criminal Code because the accused Mathius gained it through the said preparation of pernicious act on the country, and because it does not belong to anybody but the defendant. So the court decides as stated in the text.

2nd March 1944

Nade 9801 unit Special Military  
Tribunal.

The presiding judge. Lieutenant Colonel  
EGAMI Sobei

The Judge, Major  
NISHIHARA Shuji

The judge, Captain  
TSUTSUI Yoichi

3135

not read

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

JUDGEMENT

P.W. Captain Lionel Collin MATHEWS, 31 years old.

Place of birth: Stepney, in the suburbs of the City of Adelaide,

Southern Australia, Australia.

Formerly attached to: Signal Corps of 8th Division, Australian Army.

P.W. 1st Lieutenant Roderick Graham WELLS, 24 years old.

Place of birth: Town of Tatura, Victoria, Australia.

Formerly attached to: same as above.

P.W. Sergeant Alfred STEVENS, 30 years old.

Place of birth: City of Perth, Western Australia (otherwise unknown).

Formerly attached to: A company of 4th Machine-gun Corps, same Division  
as above.

P.W. Corporal John Alan MCMILLAN, 38 years old.

Place of birth: Town of Caura, New South Wales, Australia.

Former attached to: Headquarters of 22nd Infantry Regiment, Division  
as above.

P.W. Corporal Walter Geoffrey LOFFY (PHONETIC), 30 years old.

Place of birth: John Street, Town of Bexley, New South Wales,  
Australia.

Formerly attached to: 84th Automobile Repair Corps, same division  
as above.

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With regard to the criminal case of MATHEWS, accused on the charge of espionage, preparations for the enemy's invasion, violation of the War Prisoners Penal Law and spreading false reports and wild rumors; of WELLS and STEVENS, accused on the charge of spreading false reports and wild rumors, and violation of War Prisoners Penal Law; of MacMILLAN and LOFFY (PHOENIX) accused on the charge of violation of War Prisoners Penal Law, this court-martial has, with the participation of the Prosecutor, Judiciary Captain WATANABE Haruo completed trials and hereby gives judgment as follows:

Text of the Judgment.

The accused, MATHEWS shall be punished with death.

The accused Wells, shall be punished with 12 years' imprisonment with hard labor.

The accused STEVENS, shall be punished with 5 years' imprisonment with hard labor.

The accused MacMILLAN, and <sup>the</sup> accused LOFFY, shall respectively be punished with 1 year and six months imprisonment with hard labor.

One six-chambered revolver (Exhibit No. 1) which was seized shall be confiscated.

Reasons.

The five defendants, who participated in the Greater East Asian War, respectively attached to the above-mentioned units or corps, were taken prisoners by the Japanese forces at Singapore on the 15th of February in the 17th year of SHOWA (1942). Since July 18th same year

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they have been detained in the 1st Branch of the Borneo War Prisoners Internment Camp, located at Sandakan, Eastern Province, Northern Borneo, I. Lionel Collin MATTEWS, whose hostile feeling was so strong even after surrender that he could not reconcile himself to the life of war prisoner was secretly looking for a chance of escaping from the camp.

(1) After his arrival at the camp he was every day engaged in cultivating the camp farm situated outside the camp. About August 1942, availing himself of the comparatively slack surveillance, he approached, and formed friendship with, ABIN (PHONETIC) a Dusunese (PHONETIC), and Chief of the Lubbock Road 8th Mile Branch of the Sandakan Police Station, and a few policemen under the Chief MATSUP (PHONETIC) a Dusunese and keeper of the Ranch attached to the 8th Mile Experimental Farm of Eastern Province, Alexander PAN (PHONETIC); a Chinese farmer, residing at 7th Mile on, the said Lubbock Road, and several other inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Notwithstanding he was well aware of the fact that about October the same year communication and contact with inhabitants outside the camp had been strictly forbidden by the order of Chief of the camp, 1st Lieutenant BOSHIIJIMA Susuma, MATTEWS kept in touch with them, and seduced ABIN, and others, saying that those who would give every assistance to himself and other prisoners, would be favorably treated in the future, when the British administration was re-established. Continually holding criminal intent from about the middle of March, 1943 to about July the same year, he chose the neighborhood of the said farm as a rendezvous, where he secretly met ABIN and made the latter relay communications with

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the outside, as stated below. MATTHEWS also had frequent meetings there and kept in contact with other inhabitants.

(2) About August in the 17th year of Showa (1942) he asked the said Alexander FAN to draw a map each of British Northern Borneo and the vicinity of Sandakan with a view to using them at the time of escape, when receiving the maps he heard from the said FAN about the rumour that U. S. and Philippine forces of considerable strength were stationed in Sulu Archipelago and there were signs of their shortly making an attack on Sandakan.

Believing in the possibility of its realization, MATTHEWS, entertained a design, in the event of the attack, to pull together all the prisoners and destroy the camp in response.

He asked the said ALEXANDER and obtained a revolver together with six cartridges, which were owned by the Chinese.

Besides, he made ALEXANDER promise to come to the outside of the camp and blow a whistle immediately when the U. S. and Philippine forces should arrive. He also handed the same person a letter addressed to the commanding officer of the U. S. and Philippine forces, in which he drew a topographical map of the camp's vicinity and stated



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a request that the prisoners be saved from the camp. He also confided his design to the policeman ABIN, and asked him and obtained his consent to put 5 guns and 150 cartridges, with which the branch station was provided at the prisoners' disposal on the occasion of their uprising. Thus he was secretly making preparations.

In addition, with a view to reporting to U. S. and Philippine forces, when they might invade, he made strenuous efforts to collect general information regarding the Japanese forces. Towards the end of August in the same year, he asked ALEXANDER to draw a map of the Sandakan area showing the details of <sup>a</sup> disposition and strength of the Japanese forces stationed in Sandakan; and about December the same year, he asked MAJINAL (HIONETIC) a Dusunese (HIONETIC) employed as clerk of the Experimental Farm, to draw a map of the vicinities of the said Farm and the Internment Camp and received the map and, at about the end of September the same year, he got the said MATSUDA to persuade LI Kuoifu, a nurse of the Sandakan Citizens Hospital, to draw a map showing quarters and numbers of Japanese occupation forces and residents at Sandakan. Besides receiving these maps, MATHEWS, during his several meetings with ABIN, heard, from the

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letter whether there were any movements of Japanese forces as well as the British and American internees, concerning the vessels coming in and out Sandakan harbour, and regarding the demand and supply of daily necessities for the inhabitants.

(Phonetic)

(3) About November 1942, when WAINTON and RICARD, prisoners of the said camp, secretly manufactured a radio receiving set and listening to British and American news, circulated it among the prisoners, and as it contained much that was unfavorable to the Japanese, MITCHELS contemplated transmitting it secretly to the British and American internees and residents under surveillance in the area to stir up hostile feeling among them. In anticipation that such news might be propagated among the general inhabitants of the same region through such Britishers and Americans, he asked WAINTON and got a copy each of news. Thus he kept with his treacherous designs and through the policeman ABIN, endeavored the dissemination of news as follows:

(a) From the middle of November 1942 to the latter part of February the following year, he sent news in writing more than ten times to Smith, ex-Governor of British Northern Borneo, interned in Bahala Island at the entrance of Sandakan Bay and other

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British internees, stating, that the Japanese Navy had suffered a heavy loss as a result of a severe Japano-American naval battle in the Solomons, and that the Japanese forces in New Guinea had sustained immense losses from the British and American air raids, and also giving many other reports of the war situation which were unfavorable to the Japanese,

(b) Over twenty times from about December 1942 to about July 1943, he furnished TAILOR, an English doctor, who was then ordered to work at the Sandakan Citizens' Hospital under surveillance, with various reports about the war unfavorable to Japan, including the news that the U. S. Air forces had attacked Japanese transports in the adjacent seas of the Bismarck Archipelago, sinking 22 transport ships and shooting down a large number of Japanese airplanes.

(c) Several times from around May 1943 to the middle of July the same year he also gave HILLIP, an Englishman who then was confined under surveillance in his own house at 5th Mile, Lubbock Road, in the outskirts of the City of Sandakan, some news unfavorable to the Japanese, concerning the war situation the Solomons and New Guinea.

(d) From about May 1943 MITCHEWS attempted, following the example of WAINTON to manufacture a radio-receiver for himself, and listen to the British and American broadcasts. He disclosed his intention to WAINTON and WELLS; and in collusion with them gradually procured necessary parts through the policeman ABIN and with WELLS was secretly engaged in assembling them under WAINTON'S guidance until about July, when they were detected by the watchman and failed to accomplish this purpose.

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II. The accused, RODERICK GRAHAM WELLS had also a strong hostile feeling and felt a great repugnance for his lot of being a prisoner.

(1) Notwithstanding he knew very well that the prisoners, as stated above, had been strictly prohibited about October 1942 by order of the Camp chief to correspond or to keep in contact with any inhabitants residing outside the camp, WELLS, about May 1943 secretly sent war news to the Englishman MAYVER, who, he heard from the accused, STEVENS, was then resident under surveillance and employed as electrical engineer at the Sandakan Power Plant. Till about July the same year, with the view of stirring up MAYVER'S hostile feeling, WELLS continued to exchange correspondence with MAYVER once a week through the intermediary of STEVENS and CHEN Ping, a worker of the power plant attached to the internment camp, with a code consisting of the Roman alphabet and arabic figures. By this means WELLS sent to MAYVER about ten communications concerning the above mentioned reports, conveyed by WAINTON, that the U. S. Air forces had attacked the Japanese transports and convoy off the Bismarck Archipelago and the greater part of the Japanese warships and transport vessels had been sunk and many Japanese airplanes shot down, and other news unfavorable to the Japanese.

(2) About May 1943 WELLS acceded to the persuasion of MATTHEWS to work together on the manufacture of a radio-receiver as stated above. And, till about July the same year, he was engaged in constructing the radio-receiver in collusion with MATTHEWS under WAINTON'S guidance, eluding the watch of the guards.

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(3) At the beginning of June 1943, while WILTON was confined in the guard-room as punishment for violating the disciplinary regulations, WELLS used the radio-receiver and listened to <sup>the</sup> British and American broadcasts for him for a few days.

Thus he continued his treacherous intent and spread among the war prisoners below the rank of officer, either in writing or verbally, the news that the Japanese forces in Rangoon area had sustained serious losses by the bombing of the British and American air forces, and that the Japanese forces in China had also been fighting hard battles against the Chungking troops who put up stiff resistance at different places, and some other news regarding the war situation, which was adverse to the Japanese Army.

III. About the end of October 1942, the defendant ALFRED STEVENS was ordered to operate the machinery of the camp power plant outside the camp premises. Notwithstanding he at that time knew well that contact and correspondence with any inhabitants residing outside the camp had been strictly prohibited by order of the camp chief as already stated, he performed the following acts.

(1) Several times from about January 1943 to July the same year, he told WU Hokuang (HIONETIC) and Chen Ping, electrical workers in the power plant, as told by WILTON, that the U.S. air forces had attacked the Japanese transports and convoy in the adjacent seas of the Bismarck Archipelago and had sent Japanese <sup>vessels</sup> to the bottom and gave other news of the war unfavourable to the Japanese Army.

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(2) From about May 1943 to about July the same year, he acted as intermediary some twenty times between the accused, WELLS and MAYVER, delivering the correspondence exchanged between the two and forwarding the parcels of radio-set parts sent from MAYVER to WELLS, through the defendants McMILLAN, defendant LOFFY, and said CHEN ping. Further, towards the end of June the same year, he thrice conveyed messages between MATHEWS, the prisoner, and ABIN, the policeman.

IV. The defendant McMILLAN, from about September 1942 and, the defendant LOFFY from about February 1943, were respectively engaged in gathering firewood in the outskirts of the Internment Camp, and in spite of the camp chief's order forbidding all communication and contact with inhabitants outside the camp, they continued their treacherous intent and slack availing themselves of the surveillance committed the following offences.

(1) From about the end of May 1943 to about the middle of June the same year, they twice received the letters and parcels of MAYVER, referred to above, from STEVENS and CHEN Ping and handed them to the addressee WELLS, and also they handed WELLS's letters to the said STEVENS and CHEN Ping to be delivered to the addressee, MAYVER.

(2) From about the middle of June 1943 to about the middle of July the same year, LOFFY thrice received from WELLS letters addressed to MAYVER and handed them to STEVENS and CHEN Ping to be delivered to MAYVER. Also, receiving from STEVENS the letters and parcels of MAYVER addressed to WELLS, he delivered them to WELLS. The above-mentioned facts, excepting that of the continuation of criminal intent, are deemed conclusive judging collectively from the statements which were made respectively by the five defendants at this court; the military judicial

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(3) At the beginning of June 1943, while WILTON was confined in the guard-room as punishment for violating the disciplinary regulations, WELLS used the radio-receiver and listened to <sup>the</sup> British and American broadcasts for him for a few days.

Thus he continued his treacherous intent and spread among the war prisoners below the rank of officer, either in writing or verbally, the news that the Japanese forces in Rangoon area had sustained serious losses by the bombing of the British and American air forces, and that the Japanese forces in China had also been fighting hard battles against the Chungking troops who put up stiff resistance at different places, and some other news regarding the war situation, which was adverse to the Japanese Army.

III. About the end of October 1942, the defendant ALFRED STEVENS was ordered to operate the machinery of the camp power plant outside the camp premises. Notwithstanding he at that time knew well that contact and correspondence with any inhabitants residing outside the camp had been strictly prohibited by order of the camp chief as already stated, he performed the followings acts.

(1) Several times from about January 1943 to July the same year, he told WU Hokuang (PHONETIC) and Chen Ping, electrical workers in the power plant, as told by WILTON, that the U.S. air forces had attacked the Japanese transports and convoy in the adjacent seas of the Bismarck Archipelago and had sent Japanese <sup>vessels</sup> to the bottom and gave other news of the war unfavourable to the Japanese Army.

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police hearings on the defendant MATTHEWS; the prosecutor's hearings on the ALEXANDER GORDON WAINTON in <sup>the</sup> records (Records No. 16, 1943) of the criminal case of WAINTON and four others on the charge of violation of the War Prisoners Penal Laws and of spreading false reports and wild rumors; the prosecutor's hearings on the defendants, ABIL BINJACON (PHONETIC) MATSUF BEIGUNLO (PHONETIC), ALEXANDER E.L.N, DAI MAGINAL (PHONETIC) LAI Kueifu, WU Hokuang, and CHEN Ping, in the records (Records No. 21, 1943) of the criminal case of ERNEST GAGAN (PHONETIC) and thirty-eight others on the charge of violation of military regulations, obtained from the Military Discipline Council of NAF No. 9801 Unit; the military judicial police hearings on the defendants MAYVER, JAMES TAILOR, and ALFRED PHILLIPS in the records (Record No. 22 1943) of the criminal case of GERARD MAYVER and three others on the charge of violation of military regulations; one six-chambered revolver, one radio receiving-set, 18 radio accessories and one diary (Exhibits No. 1-4) which were seized. And, as regards the continuation of criminal intent, it is hereby judged to be conclusive from the fact that similar offences were repeatedly committed by the defendants in short periods of time. Of the defendant MATTHEWS' acts mentioned above those referred to in I (1) come under Article 5 paragraph 1 of the War Prisoners Penal Law; acts of espionage in I (2), under Article 85, paragraph 1, and Article 60 of the Criminal Code; the preparations for the enemy's invasion mentioned in I (3), under Articles 88 and 86 of the same code; the acts in I (3) under Article 99 of the <sup>Criminal Code and</sup> Military Article 100 of



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the Naval Criminal Code; those in I (4) under the latter part of Article 11 of the War Prisoners Penal Law.

The two crimes referred to in (1), (2), (3) are a single kind of act but are against several laws; and in addition, they were committed with the continuation of criminal intent. Therefore, the provisions of the first half of Article 54, paragraph 1, and Articles 55 and 10 of the Criminal Code are applicable to the two crimes of (1) and (3), and out of the prescribed penalties death penalty, the severest punishment for the crime of espionage shall be selected and imposed on the accused. And, although this crime and that of the violation of the War Prisoners Penal Law are concurrent offences according to the first half of Article 45 of the Criminal Code, yet, no other penalties shall be inflicted upon the accused according to Article 46, paragraph 1 of the same code, because a death penalty shall be imposed on the accused for the said crime of espionage.

As regards the accused WELLS acts mentioned above, those in II (1) fall under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the War Prisoners Penal Law, Article 99 of the Military Criminal Code, and Article 100 of the Naval Criminal Code; those in III (2) under the latter part of Article 11 of the War Prisoners Penal Law; and those in II (3) under Article 99 of the Military Criminal Code and Article 100 of the Naval Criminal Code.

However, as the offences in II (1) and (3) are the same act forming several offences, and there was continuation of criminal intent in these two crimes, penal servitude for a term, i.e., the severest penalty

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the severest penalty provided for in the War Prisoners Penal Law shall be imposed in accordance with the first part of paragraph 1, Article 54, Article 55, and Article 10 of the Criminal Code; as regards the offence in II (2) penal servitude shall be chosen; and as the above offences form concurrent crimes as provided for in the first part of Article 45 of the Criminal Code, the accused WELLS shall be sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with hard labour within the limit of the term legally aggregated on the severer penalty, by applying Articles 47, 10, 14 of the Criminal Code.

The acts committed by the accused STEVENS, as mentioned in III (1) and (2), come under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the War Prisoners Penal Law; and the act of spreading false reports and wild rumors under Article 99 of the Military Criminal Code and Article 100 of the Naval Criminal Code. However, because the above offences are one and same kind of act and form different crimes, and there was the continuation of Criminal intent, the P. W. Penal Law, in accordance with the first part of paragraph 1, Article 54, Article 55, and Article 10 of the Criminal Code; shall be applied, and selecting penal servitude for a term according to the provision for violation of the War Prisoners Penal Law the accused STEVENS shall be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment with hard labour within the limits of the term prescribed in the Law.

The offences committed by the defendant McMILLAN and LOFFY, as referred to in IV above, come under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the War Prisoners Penal Law and Article 55 of the Criminal Code, and selecting

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penal servitude for a term according to penal provisions of the laws, MacMILLAN and LOFFY shall be sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment with hard labour within the limits of the term provided for.

One six-chambered revolver (Exhibit No. 1) shall be confiscated in accordance with Article 19 of the Criminal Code on the ground that the said revolver was obtained by the accused MATTHEWS in committing crime of preparations for the enemy's invasion and belongs to no other people than the convict concerned. In accordance with the reasons stated above, we give decision as in the text.

On this 2nd day of March in the 19th year of Showa (1944)

A Provisional Court-Martial

of

NAL. No. 9601 Unit.

Chief Judge: (President) Lieut. Colonel UCHI, Sohei,

Judge: (member) Military Judiciary Major NISHIBARA, Shuji.

Judge: (member) Captain TSUBOI, Yoichi

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Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

I hereby certify that the copy of Judgment hereto attached,  
is one that was submitted to the War Ministry by the MDA No. 9801  
Unit, that is, by the Headquarters of the 37th Army, as a copy of the  
original judgment which had been given at a provisional court-martial  
by the MDA No. 9801 Unit, and was actually in the custody of the 1st  
Demobilization Bureau.

On this 17th day of June, the 22nd, year of Showa (1947)

/s/ Syukuro Fumio (seal)  
Chief of the Judicial Investigation  
Section, 1st Demobilization Bureau.

613/35

本添付の判決寫は離第九八〇一部隊臨時軍法會議に於て裁判したる判決原本の寫として離第九八〇一部隊即ち第三十七軍司令部より陸軍省に報告したもにして現に第一復員局に保存しありたるものなる事を證明す

昭和二十二年六月十七日

第一復員局法務調査部長 大山文雄

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

判 決

出生地 濠洲府「オーストラリア」州「アデレード」市外「ステツプニー」町  
元 所 屬 濠洲陸軍第八師團 通信隊

俘 虜 陸軍大尉 ライオネル、コリン、マテユウス  
當 三十一年

出生地 濠洲「ヴィクトリア」州「タチユラ」町  
元 所 屬 同 前

俘 虜 陸軍中尉 ロデリック、グラハム、ウエルス  
當 二十四年

2

出生地 濠洲西「オーストラリア」州「バース」市以下不詳  
元 所 屬 前同師團第四機関銃隊 ▲ 中隊

俘 虜 陸軍軍曹 アルフレッド、ステイーヴンス  
當 三十年

出生地 濠洲「ニュウサウスウェールズ」州「カウラ」町  
元 所 屬 前同師團歩兵第二十二聯隊本部

俘 虜 陸軍伍長 ジョン、アラン、マックミラン  
當 三十八年

出生地 濠洲「ニューサウスウェールズ」州「ベクスリイ」町「ジョーン」街  
元所屬 前同師團第八十四自動車修理隊

俘虜 陸軍伍長 ウォルタージョフレ、ロフイ

當 三 十 年

右「マテユウス」ニ對スル間諜、外患豫備、俘虜威罰法違反造言飛語「ウエルズ」及「ステイヴンス」ニ對スル各造言飛語、俘虜威罰法違反「マツクミラン」及「ロフイ」ニ對スル俘虜威罰法違反被告事件ニ付當軍法會議ハ檢察官陸軍法務大尉渡邊春雄干與審理ヲ遂ケ判決スルコト左ノ如シ

主 文

被告人「マテユウス」ヲ死刑ニ

同 「ウエルズ」ヲ懲役十年ニ

同 「マツクミラン」及「ロフイ」ヲ執レモ懲役一年六月

ニ各處ス

押收ニ係ル六連發拳銃一挺（證第一號）ハ之ヲ沒收ス

理 由

被告人等五名ハ夫々肩書部隊ニ屬シテ大東亞戰爭ニ參加シ昭和十七年二月十五日新嘉坡ニ於テ帝國軍ニ俘虜トナリ同年七月十八日ヨリ北「ボルネオ」東海州「サンダカン」所在「ボルネオ」俘虜收容所第一分所ニ收容中ノモノナルトコロ

第一、被告人「ライオネル、コリン、マテユウス」ハ投降後モ抗戰意醜強烈ニシテ俘虜生活ヲ屑々セキ密カニ脱出ノ機ヲ窺ヒヒ居タルカ

（右收容所到着以來連日同所外邊ノ附屬農園ニ於テ農耕作業ニ從事中監視ノ嚴重ナラサルニ乘シ昭和十七年八月頃同所ニ近キ「サンダカン」警察署「ラボツク」路八哩分署長「ドスン」人「アピン」竝其ノ部下タル巡警數名東海州立八哩農事試驗場附屬牧場番人「ドスン」人「マトソツプ」及右「ラボツク」路七哩居住農業支那人「アレキサンダー、ファン」其ノ他附近ノ現



地住民數名ニ接近シテ知己トナリ同年十月頃同收容所長陸軍中尉星島進ノ命ニ依リ收容所外一般住民トノ通信又ハ連絡ヲ嚴禁セラレタルコトヲ知悉セルニ拘ラス之カ接觸ヲ中止スルコトナク被告人等俘虜ノ行動ヲ援助スルモノハ將來英政府復活ノ後必ス厚遇ヲ受クヘキ旨ヲ示唆シテ右「アビシ」等ヲ煽動シ同十八年三月中旬頃ヨリ同年七月頃ニ至ル迄犯意繼續ノ上前記農園附近ヲ連絡地點ト定メ概ネ每週一回宛右「アビシ」ト密會シ同人ヲシテ後記ノ如ク外部トノ通信等ヲ仲介セシメタル外爾餘ノ前示住民等トモ屢々會合連絡シ

(四) 同十七年八月頃他日逃走ノ用ニ供センカ爲右「アレキサ」  
「ンダーファン」ニ依頼シ舊英領北「ボルネオ」及「サンダカン」附近ノ地圖各一葉ヲ作成セシメテ受領シタルカ其ノ際同人ヨリ「スールト」諸島中ニ米比軍多數駐屯シ在リテ

同地方ノ地團一蕪ヲ右「マレカサソク」ニ同十年十二月頃前  
 頃「サソク」駐也ノ等國軍ノ兵力配ヲ詳知ニ記入セ下  
 以テ帝國軍ニ關スルニ一般情報ノ探知爲ニ努メ同年八月下旬  
 備テ進メ居タルカ更ニ米比軍ノ來ノ際之ニ通報スルノ目的ヲ  
 倭軍ニ提供スルカ要トシテ之ヲ及器セシムル等カニ爲  
 告ケ俾テ起ノ筋ハ回分尋付ノ小銃五挺同彈五百五十發ヲ  
 スルト共ニ他方前巡警「ソモ其ノ頃同様右企圖ヲ  
 ル米比軍ニ指揮官收容所附近ノ地形放出依頼シテ官軍ヲ記セ  
 子約セシメ收容所外ニ來リ呼テ吹鳴シテ之ヲ通報スルコトヲ  
 遠カニ收容所發テ受ケ且米比軍ノ來テ見テ同ノ人ニ於テ  
 捷同彈藥六發ヲサシ「一」ニ呼テ同ノ所持セシテ於テ一  
 其ノ頃右「ソク」破シテ境シ、米比軍ニ呼應セシメテ同ノ人ニ於テ  
 シテ收容所ヲ破シテ境シ、米比軍ニ呼應セシメテ同ノ人ニ於テ  
 其ノ實ニ現可ナシ「二」ニ來ルノ形勢ヲ知ルニ至ルヤ  
 近ク一「ソク」ニ來ルノ形勢ヲ知ルニ至ルヤ

記農事試驗場並俘虜收容所附近ノ地圖一葉ヲ當時同試驗場  
記トシテ勤務中ノ「ドスン」人「マジナル」ニ夫々依頼シテ  
作成交付セシメ又同年九月末頃前示「マトソツブ」ニ意ヲ含  
メ同人ノ勸誘ニ依リ「サンダカン」市民病院看護士頼貴福ヲシ  
シテ同地駐屯ノ帝國軍隊及在留邦人ノ宿舍、人員數等ヲ記入  
セル地圖一葉ヲ作成セシメテ之ヲ受領シタル外、前掲「アピ  
ン」ト連絡ノ折同人ヨリ數回ニ亘リ帝國軍隊及抑留英米人等  
ノ移動ノ有無「サンダカン」港出入船舶ノ狀況同地住民ノ生  
活物資供給ノ狀況等ヲ聽取シ  
同十七年十一月頃同收容所内ノ俘虜「ウエイントン」及「  
リカーズ」等カ密カニ「ラヂオ」受信機ヲ製作シテ英米側放  
送ニ係ル戰況「ニュース」ヲ聽取ノ上之ヲ同所内ノ俘虜等ニ  
流布スルニ至ルヤ數「ニュース」カ帝國軍ニ不利ナル事項多  
數ヲ包含シアルヲ幸ヒ同地方ニ抑留又ハ軟禁中ノ英米人等ニ

之ヲ密送シ其ノ抗戰意識ノ昂揚ヲ圖ルヘク且同人等ヲ還シ該「ユース」カ同地一般住民ノ間ニ傳播セララルコトアルヘキヲ推知シナガラ爾來右「ウエイントン」ニ請ヒ各「ユース」寫一部ノ交付ヲ受ケ犯意繼續ノ上前示ノ如ク巡警「アピン」等ト連絡ノ際ヲ利用シ同人等ヲ介シ

(イ) 同十七年十一月中旬ヨリ同十八年二月下旬頃迄ノ間十數回ニ亙リ當時「サンダカン」灣口「バハラ」島ニ抑留中ノ元英領北「ポルネオ」總督「スミス」其ノ他ノ抑留英人等ニ對シ「ソロモン」方面ニ於テ日米兩海軍激戰ノ決果日本軍ハ莫大ナル損害ヲ蒙リ「ユウギョア」方面ニ於テモ英米側ノ空爆ニ依リ日本軍ノ損失甚シト旨其ノ他帝國軍ニ不利ナル戰況「ユース」多數ヲ

(ロ) 同十七年十二月頃ヨリ同十八年七月頃迄ノ間二十數回ニ亙リ當時「サンダカン」市民病院ニ勤務ヲ命セラレ軟禁中ノ英人醫師「テラー」ニ對シ米空軍ハ「ピスマーク」諸島近海ニ於テ日本軍

輸送船四隻攻撃シ艦船二十二隻ヲ撃沈飛行機多數ヲ撃墜シタル旨其ノ他帝國軍ニ不利ナル戦況「ニューヨーク」多岐ヲ

(ハ)同十八年五月頃ヨリ七月中旬マデノ間數回ニ亘リ當時「サンダカン」市外「ラボック」路五哩ノ自宅ニ攻撃中ノ英人「フイリツプス」ニ對シ前記同様「ソロモン」及「ニューギニア」方面等ノ戦況ニ關シ帝國軍ニ不利ナル「ニューヨーク」若干ヲ夫更支那ニ依リ送付通報シ

(四)同十八年五月頃ヨリ前記「ウエイントン」ニ倣ヒ自ラ「ラヂオ」受信機ヲ製作シ英米側放送ヲ聴取センコトヲ企テ同人及被告人「ウエルス」ニ其ノ意ヲ告ケ共謀結托ノ上前示巡警「アビシ」ニ依頼シ所製ノ部分品ヲ逐次蒐集入手シツツ同收容所内ニ於テ監視者ノ目ヲ盜ミ「ウエイントン」指嚮ノ下ニ同年七月頃ニ至ル迄「ウエルス」ト共ニ之カ組立ニ從事シタルモ完成スルニ至ラスシテ發覺シ

第二、被告人「ロデリック、グラハム、ウエルス」モ亦敵愾心旺盛ニシテ且自己ノ俘虜タル境遇ヲ深ク憐忌シ居タルカ

〔前記ノ如ク昭和十七年十月頃收容所長ノ命ニ依リ俘虜一般ニ對シ外部現地住民等トノ通信又ハ連絡ヲ嚴禁セラレタルコトヲ知悉セルニ拘ラス同十八年五月頃被告人「ステイヴンス」ヨリ當時軟禁中ノ英人「メーヴァー」カ「サンダカン」發電所電氣技師トシテ勤務シアル由ヲ聞知スルヤ英米側放送ニ係ル戰況「ニューズ」ヲ同人ニ密送シ其ノ抗戰意識ノ昂揚ヲ圖ルヘク犯意ヲ煽動シテ爾後同年七月中旬頃ニ至ル間艦ホ毎週一回宛被告人「ステイヴンス」及同收容所附屬發電所職工陳平等ニ仲介セシメテ右「メーヴァー」ト連絡シ羅馬字及數字ヲ用フル暗號ヲ協定ノ上該暗號文ニ依ル通信ノ交換ヲ爲シ且其ノ際約十回ニ亘リ自己ガ收容所内ニ於テ前掲「ウエイントン」等ヨリ奪取セル米空軍ハ「ピスマーク」諸島方面ニ於テ日本軍大輸送船団ヲ攻撃其ノ艦船大部分ヲ擊沈シ且飛行機多數ヲ墜陸シタル旨其ノ他帝國軍ニ不利ナル前示戰況「ニ



命セシレ爾來同所ニ勤務シ居タルカ其ノ頃前記ノ如ク收容所長ノ命ニヨリ壇ニ外部現地住民等ト連絡又ハ通信ヲ爲スコトヲ嚴禁セラレタルヲ知悉セルニ拘ラス犯意難察ノ上

〔同十八年一月頃ヨリ同年七月頃迄ノ間放回ニ亙リ同收容所内

ニ於テ被告人「ウエルス」等ヨリ英米側放送ニ係ル戰況「ニ島  
ース」トシテ聴取セル米空軍ハ「ピスマーク」諸島近海ニ於テ

多數ノ日本軍機送船回ヲ襲ヒ其ノ艦船ヲ擊沈シタル旨其ノ他帶

國軍ニ不利ナル事項多數ヲ右發電所内ニ於テ電氣工夫支那人吳

可光同陳平等ニ申傳ヘ

〔同十八年五月頃ヨリ同年七月頃迄ノ間合計約二十回ニ亙リ被

告人「ウエルス」ト前記「メーヴアー」トノ間ニ於ケル往復書

信並「メーヴアー」ヨリ「ウエルス」ニ提供セル「ラヂオ」部

分品等在中ノ小包數箇ヲ被告人「マツクマラン」同「ロフイ」

及前示陳平等ヲ通シテ各仲介送付シ尙同年六月下旬頃三回ニ亙



リ 伴 婦 「マテユウス」ト 巡 警 「アビン」ト ノ 間 ニ 於 ケル 通 信 連 絡 ノ  
仲 介 ニ 當 リ

第 四 、 被 告 人 「マツクミラン」ハ 昭 和 十 七 年 九 月 頃 ヨリ 同 「ロフイ  
」ハ 同 十 八 年 二 月 頃 ヨリ 夫 々 收 容 所 外 ニ 於 ケル 新 採 取 作 業 ニ 從 事 中  
前 記 ノ 如 ク 同 所 長 ノ 命 ニ ヨリ 外 部 住 民 等 ト ノ 連 絡 又 ハ 通 信 チ 嚴 禁 セ  
ラ レ タ ル コト チ 知 悉 セ ル ニ 拘 ラ ス 監 視 充 分 ナ ラ サ ル チ 奇 貨 ト シ 各 犯  
兼 帶 給 ノ 上

(一) 「マツクミラン」ハ 同 十 八 年 五 月 下 旬 頃 ヨリ 同 年 六 月 中 旬 頃 ニ 卒  
ル 間 各 三 回 ニ 亙 リ 前 示 「メイヴァー」ノ 差 出 ニ 係 ル 書 信 及 小 包 チ 被  
告 人 「スライヴンス」及 前 記 陳 平 ヨリ 受 取 リ 「ウエルス」ニ 交 付  
シ タ ル 上 「ウエルス」差 出 ノ 書 信 チ 右 「スライヴンス」及 陳 平 ニ  
交 付 シ チ 「メイヴァー」ニ 到 達 セ シ メ

(二) 「ロフイ」ハ 同 年 六 月 中 旬 頃 ヨリ 同 年 七 月 中 旬 頃 迄 ノ 間 各 三 回  
亙 リ 「ウエルス」ヨリ 「メイヴァー」宛 ノ 書 信 チ 受 取 リ 「スライヴンス」

「メーグアア」に到着セシメタル上  
右「メーグアア」ヨリ「ウエルス」宛ノ書信及小包ヲ「ステイ  
「ウエルス」ヨリ受領シテ「ウエルス」ニ交付シ  
タルモノナリ

右ノ事實中各犯意繼續ノ點ヲ除キ爾餘ノ事實ハ被告人等五名ノ

當公廷ニ於ケル各供述暨司法警察官ノ被告人「マテユウス」

ニ對スル聽取録「アレキサンダー・ゴードン・ウエントン」外四名

ニ對スル俘虜刑罰法違反者飛語等被告事件記録（昭和十八年

肥第十六號）中檢察官ノ右「ウエイントン」ニ對スル聽取録

第九八〇一部隊軍律會談ヨリ取寄ニ係ル「アーネストラガン」

外三十八名ニ對スル軍律違反被告事件記録（昭和十八年肥第二

十一號）中檢察官ノ被告人「アビンビン・アヌボン」同「マトソ

ツ・ビン・グンガオ」同「アレキサンダー・ファン」同「デイマジ

ナル」同頼貴同吳町光同陳平ニ對スル各聽取録同「ジエラル

ドメーザアール」外三名ニ對スル軍律違反被告事件記録（昭和十八年記第二十二號）中陸軍司法警察官ノ被告人「メーザアール」同「ジエームステラー」同「アルフレツドフリッブス」ニ各陳取書押收ニ係ル六連發拳銃一挺「ラデオ」受信機一臺同部分品十八點及日記帳一冊（以上證第一號）乃至第四號）ヲ綜合シテ之ヲ認メ各犯意繼續ノ點ハ夫々短期間内ニ同種犯行ノ反覆累行セラレタル事跡ニ徴シ之ヲ認ム

法律ニ照スニ被告人「マテユウス」ノ判示所爲中第一ノ（一）ノ點ハ俘虜處罰法第五條第一項ニ同（一）ノ間諜ノ點ハ刑法第八十五條第一項第六十條ニ外患豫備ノ點ハ同法第八十八條第八十六條ニ同（一）ノ點ハ陸軍刑法第九十九條並海軍刑法第一百條ニ同（一）ノ點ハ俘虜處罰法第十一條後段ニ各該當スルトコロ右（一）及（二）ノ各罪ハ一個ノ行爲ニシテ數個ノ罪名ニ觸レ且（一）及（二）ノ兩罪ハ各犯意繼續ニ係ルヲ以テ刑法第五十四

條第一項前段第五十五條第十條ヲ適用シ最モ重キ間 罪ノ刑ニ從ヒ  
其ノ所定刑中死刑ヲ選擇處斷スヘク尙之ト同(一)ノ俘虜處罰法違反ノ  
罪トハ刑法第四十五條前段ノ併合罪ナカモ前記同 罪ニ付死刑ニ處  
スヘキヲ以テ同法第四十六條第一項ニ從ヒ他ノ刑ヲ科セス被告人「  
ウエルス」ノ判示所爲中第二ノ(一)ノ點ハ俘虜處罰法第五條第一項陸  
軍刑法第九十九條並海軍刑法第百條ニ同(一)ノ點ハ俘虜處罰法第十  
條後段ニ同(一)ノ點ハ陸軍刑法第九十九條並海軍刑法第百條ニ各該當  
スルトコロ右(一)及(二)ハ夫々一個ノ行爲ニシテ數個ノ罪ニ觸レ且兩罪  
犯意繼續ニ係ルヲ以テ刑法第五十四條第一項前段第五十五條第十條  
ニ則リ最モ重キ俘虜處罰法違反罪ノ刑ニ從ヒ有期懲役刑ヲ選擇スヘ  
ク同(一)ノ罪ニ付テハ懲役刑ヲ選擇シ以上ハ刑法第四十五條前段ノ併  
合罪ナルヲ以テ同法第四十七條第十條第十四條ヲ適用シ重キ前者ノ  
刑ニ法定ノ加重ヲ爲シタル刑期範圍内ニ於テ被告人「ウエルス」ヲ  
懲役十二年ニ處シ」被告人「ステイーンズ」ノ判示第三ノ(一)及(二)

ノ所爲ハ俘虜處罰法第五條第一項ニ同(一)ノ中道會飛語ノ點ハ陸軍刑法第九十九條並海軍刑法第一百條ニ各該當スルトコロ以上ハ一個ノ行爲ニシテ數個ノ罪名ニ觸レ且犯意繼續ニ係ルヲ以テ刑法第五十四條第一項前段第五十五條第十條ニ則リ最モ重キ俘虜處罰法違反罪ノ刑ニ從ヒ有期懲役刑ヲ選擇シ其ノ所定期間範圍内ニ於テ被告人「ステイヴンズ」ヲ懲役五年ニ處シ被告人「マツクミラン」及「ロフイ」ノ判示第四ノ各所爲ハ執レモ俘虜處罰法第五條第一項刑法第五十五條ニ該當スルヲ以テ夫々所定期間中有期懲役刑ヲ選擇シ其ノ刑罰範圍内ニ於テ右被告人兩名ヲ各懲役一年六月ニ處スヘク押獄ニ係ル六連發拳銃一挺(證第一號)ハ被告人「マチユウス」カ判示外患懲罰ノ犯行ニ因リ得タルモノニシテ犯人以外ノ者ニ屬セザルヲ以テ刑法第十九條ニ從ヒ之ヲ沒收スヘキモノトス

仍テ主文ノ如ク判決ス

昭和十九年三月二日

裁判官 陸軍少佐 西江  
 陸軍中佐 陸軍中佐 原上  
 陸軍大尉 陸軍大尉 井原  
 陸軍大尉 陸軍大尉 與兵衛  
 陸軍中佐 陸軍中佐 三橋

陸軍中佐 陸軍中佐 陸軍中佐

第九八〇一部隊臨時軍法會審

裁判長	陸軍中佐	江上	敏兵衛
裁判官	陸軍法務少佐	西原	周二三
裁判官	陸軍大尉	筒井	與市

Excerpt from the International Inspection of the  
Red-Cross. No. 301, January 1944 pp. 10, 11

Delegation to Japan -- On November 13,\* Mr. Max Pestalozzi has visited the camp of prisoners of war at Mukden, Manchukuo, which confined Britishers, Australians, Americans, in total, more than a thousand prisoners of war.

The dwellings are satisfactory; they are the brick -- buildings, well-constructed and well-equipped, the prisoners there are provided with straw mattress and a complete bedding. As for clothing, the prisoners possess two suits of clothing; one for summer and one for winter. The prisoners of war are satisfied with the nourishment, however they find it a little monotonous in the long run.

The sanitary arrangements are sufficient. The camp has an infirmary attached to it, full-equipped, which, considered as military hospital, is given all necessary things. The dental cares are also much appreciative. All the prisoners have been inoculated against typhoid, paratyphoid and dysentery, and vaccinated.

A large sport ground and many indoor games are available to

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\* November 13, 1943



Def. Doc. No. 1931

prisoners , but prisoners who desire are given books, as much instructive as recreative.

In regard to correspondence, the prisoners can send a plenty of messages.

The discipline is somewhat relaxed, because the prisoners came from several units of Army and Navy.

The delegate of the International Committee express much satisfaction of his visit and the kindness of the Red Cross of Manchukuo and signalize at the same time that the officers attached to the camp are making the utmost effort in order to ameliorate the treatment of the prisoners of war.

Excerpt from the International Inspections of  
the Red Cross. No. 315.  
March 1945 -- pp. 132, 133

On December 6 again, Mr. Anst has made the second call at the camp of prisoners of war at Mukden, which assembled more than a thousand Americans, approximately a hundred Britishers, several Australians and a French.

The measures to protect against aerial attacks have been taken; the hygienic institutions are satisfactory and the camp is disinfected whenever it seems to be necessary.

The rations correspond in quantity to those which are distributed to the camp-guards, but the quality of them looked better; the energy values attained about 3500 calories.

The supplemental foods are prepared for the prisoners who do heavy labours and for the patients, as well as in the special occasions as, for example, certain fete-days.

The hospital of the camp is a brick-building, which can receive one hundred and fifty patients; it is composed of a separate ward, a tuberculosis patients' room, a room of test, operation, X rays, pharmacy and a recreation room. The medical and surgical equipment is complete, and only the patients suffered from special diseases are transferred to the Mukden Military Hospital, which gives equally dental care. The medical inspections take place three times a week and the patients receive the doctors' visits every day. All the prisoners have been vaccinated for

small-pox and inoculated against typhoid, paratyphoid, dysentary and cholera.

The money which they use is given them out of their own savings.

It is above all expended at the canteen, where they are informed that these pocket moneys serve to buy musical instruments, sporting goods, seeds and toilet articles: the prisoners also can send the funds to their families, if they wish.

Most of the people are able to work. The duty hours are eight hours a day, with recesses of morning, noon and afternoon; Sunday is holiday; some men work in factory and the rest are occupied in conversations in the camp.

There is no chaplain in the camp; the religious services are celebrated in English by a Japanese clergyman.

The prisoners can play sport, music and cards; visitors from outside are not admitted, no more than the visits to outside are not authorized, but they can go out of the camp to visit the graves.

The camp commander has reported to the delegate that their morale and spirits have been, on the whole, ameliorated, and that the relations between the camp authorities and the prisoners have been satisfactory; and with the camp-guards they

have talked in a like manner; the stato of health have been  
equally ameliorated and they have soemed also to be satisfied  
with the fact tha; they can have those special considerations  
given thom at that time.

4

Def. Doc. #1931

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, ASTSUMI Totsuzo, who commissioned by Japanese Red Cross, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in French, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Extrait de la Revue International de la Croix-Rouge No.301 Janvier 1944" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of (Japanese Red Cross).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 18 day of August, 1947

/S/ ASTSUMI Totsuzo (seal)  
Japanese Red Cross No.5  
Shiba Park Tokyo

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ ABE Akira (seal)

Def. Doc. #1931'

443136

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Shiba Park Tokyo

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ ABE Akira (seal)

**FILE COPY**  
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Def. Doc. # 2111

Exh. No. 3137

Deposited by  
Department of Defense Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al,

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 360  
SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: " Charles Ream Jackson,  
048583, Commissioned  
Warrant Officer, U.S.  
Marine Corps.

Having been duly sworn, does hereby depose and state as follows:

My name is Charles Ream Jackson, and I am a Commissioned Warrant Officer of the United States Marine Corps. I have been in the military and naval service more or less continuously since 14 June, 1917. Prior to entering the Marine Corps on 3 September, 1927, I had some eight years service in the Infantry and Coast Artillery of the Army, rising to the rank of First Lieutenant. I resigned, with an honorable record on 27 July, 1925; was commissioned a First Lieutenant in the Officers Reserve Corps, Infantry, with a certificate of capacity for Captain. I resigned this commission to enter the Marine Corps.

In the Marine Corps I rose to the rank of Sergeant Major, the highest an enlisted man could go, and at the outbreak of war was serving as the Battalion Sergeant Major of the Second Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment. I served through Bataan and Corregidor, was twice wounded and twice awarded the Purple Heart, and was awarded the Silver Star decoration for gallantry in action against the enemy.

As a prisoner, I was confined mainly in Cabanatuan Prison Camp, leaving there about the middle of August of 1944, and arrived in Hanowa Camp, Akita Prefecture, Honshu Island, Japan, shortly after the 1st day of September, 1944.

I had suffered from bacillic dysentery, amoebic chronic dysentery, edema and neuritis beri beri, ambliopia -a sort of dimness of vision

✓ Def. Doc. # 2111

caused by starvation -, ulcers, malaria, pellagra, and general malnutrition, among other ailments. At the time I arrived in Hanowa my main sicknesses were chronic amoebic dysentery, recurrent malaria, pellagra, and both types of beri beri. I weighed about one hundred twenty five pounds, some fifty pounds underweight. I had about recovered from my wounds.

I consider my mental condition perfectly normal, considering the conditions of my captivity.

At the time of our arrival, a young Second Lieutenant of the Imperial Army was in command of the camp - I recall not his name - and he was replaced some six weeks later by one First Lieutenant Asaka of the Japanese Infantry.

There were five hundred enlisted prisoners, Captain Elmer P. Fleming, Field Artillery Reserve, First Lieutenant Richard T. Pullon, Coast Artillery Reserve, Major Jackson of the Army Medical Corps, and First Lieutenant John E. Lany, likewise of the Medical Corps. There were some eight Army Medical Corpsmen, all enlisted, included in the five hundred.

For the first ten days we loafed and rosted, with extra rice, but never enough food for our starved bodies. Camp details were set by Captain Fleming, and rosters prepared. We were organized into one group to work on the top side of the copper mine, working muck, another group to work in the machine shop, about four groups to work beneath the ground, mining ore, a group in the smeltery, and the aforesaid camp detail group. This last was the prized and desirable detail, and was set by Captain Fleming.

The Mitsubishi Mine People had gone to considerable expense and trouble to receive us, and had built a new barracks to house us. It was better made than the ordinary construction in the village, as I could see. It was obvious, since we had all been processed at Bilibid Prison in the Philippines, and marked "fit" by American doctors - the sick were taken off the detail - that the Mine folk expected five hundred able bodied men. However, as I said, I was by American standards a sick man, and so were most of the others.

A Japanese Doctor whom we called the "Black Prince" came in after we had been there for a month or less. Major Jackson was a too kind hearted man, and had placed about three hundred and fifty of these prisoners on quarters, meaning they were too sick to work. He was no diplomat, hated the Japanese, and refused to back down from his position that if these men went to work, they would soon die. The "Black Prince"



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shook most of them off the list, all but forty, whom he considered very sick. The rest were sent to the Mine. It was obvious that the Army authorities and Mine folk wanted to know why those men were not working, and pressure was put on Lieutenant Asaka to get them back to work.

The Doctors were relieved from all duties, and a medical sergoant, whom we called "Cyclops", ran the sick call. He gradually let the quarters list increase to nearly eighty men. Lieutenant Fullen, who knew a little Japanese, was sick call interpreter. "Cyclops" was totally ignorant of his duties, and was putting smooth malingerers of long practice in such on the quarters list, and sending sick men to work. Around November 20 he sent a Private of the Army named Miller up to the Mine to work, and Miller died on the way back of pneumonia, aggravated by malnutrition. At the same time a Japanese Inspection Party was in the camp. As a result, Doctor Jackson was sent to some Tokyo Hospital or other; Doctor Lery partly resumed medical duties, supervised by "Cyclops" - a not subdued and chastened man - and some two weeks later, we got Doctor Dan Golenternek, Captain of the Army Medical Corps, in as Camp Surgeon. This man was a splendid physician, and a master diplomat in working with the Japanese. He took full charge, and in a short time, as the bitter cold came upon us, around three hundred or more were on the quarters list.

Lieutenant Asaka even had in civilians for heavy work, such as clearing snow off the roofs, and emptying the latrines, assisted in this latter, partially, by the prisoners.

"Cyclops" got up a sort of forty bed hospital, and things began to get better. From what I personally observed of the adjacent Chinese and Korean prisoners, and the free Japanese Mine workmen, by Oriental standards we were treated very well. By our American standards, we were badly treated. But then there was a war on, and our captors were Oriental.

Punishments were handed out, as far as possible, by Captain Fleming, who, as far as I know, never reported a man to the Japanese. These were of a minor nature, mainly forfeiture of the small tobacco ration for theft from each other and from the common food supply. The Japanese punished on the spot with a slapping that hurt mostly our dignity for petty offenses, such as not saluting properly, being out of uniform in freezing weather, and petty thefts, when detected.

It was several months before Asaka put any one in the Brig, and practically every man who went in there richly deserved it. They stole from fellow prisoners, or from the common food supply. The

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Brig was a tough place, with no heat, and Asaka let most of them out in the cold weather on recommendation of Doctor Golenternek before their sentences had expired.

I considered Asaka very lenient in punishment. Men sold in the Mine Japanese Army blankets, shoes, and other articles issued them by the Army and Mine people. In most cases, they were reissued new clothes, and nothing much was done about it.

However, he required a rigid military etiquette - these prisoners refused, almost to a man to cooperate - and his guards slapped people around plenty, but with no brutal beatings. However, some of the civilian "Guides" were very brutal at the Mine, out of sight of Asaka, who always stepped in to stop such practices in my opinion, as far as I could see. Sergeant Ralph Pope, Engineers, Army, had his arm broken by a "Guide" known as "The Rat", whether an official report was ever made to Asaka I do not know.

After Lieutenant Colonel Walker, Aviation, took over as Senior Officer Prisoner, he threatened to report men to Asaka, and did so for theft. One Technical Sergeant Lebeau went into the Brig, with the hearty approval of all of us, for confirmed and repeated thieveries, around the end of March, and stayed there, except for occasional hospital treatment, until nearly July, 1945. Colonel Walker recommended him to Asaka for such punishment, and told us he had done so, for Lebeau rated it.

The only beatings I ever saw the "Cyclops" hand out were at the beginning of cold weather, when he ordered men to be fully clothed outside barracks, as a health measure. They blithely ignored his orders; one afternoon he laid for them, and slapped those he caught out of uniform. On one other occasion, marching us around for "Bango" dismissal as Senior Noncommissioned Present, we refused, in our hatred and stubbornness, to do it with snap and precision, and several men were lightly slapped.

On the whole, "Cyclops" was our friend. He gave the sick meager gifts, for his pay was very little, and got that hospital going. They relieved him around late March, and his going was regretted. His successor was a nondescript "buck passer", who did little for or against the prisoners. "Cyclops" even thought enough of his former patients to come back and pay them a visit at his own expense later on in the summer, and this should be credited him as a good mark.

First Sergeant Jack Boyd, Army Infantry, having been informed by Captain Fleming, who got it from Asaka, that all prisoners were

to be executed in the event of a major landing on any one of the four home islands, and several other prisoners, stole dynamite, caps, and fuses from the Mine in order to make a last ditch defense when the shooting started. There must have been forty pounds secreted under the floors of the barracks. Around the end of April, as we came in from the Mine, we heard it had been discovered, and there would be an investigation. In the Philippines we would have been shot first, and investigated later. At evening "Bango", Asaka, who spoke English, but never condescended to use it to the prisoners, addressed us through the Camp Interpreter. To our relief, he said no one would be punished, but the next time there would be a court martial, and probable death penalty.

The prisoner rations were entirely separate from those of the Guards, though cooked in the same galley. Captain Fleming, and later, Colonel Walker, supervised the distribution. Those officers tried their best to make a fair distribution, but the men stole from the food supply, to eat themselves, and sell the rest for tobacco.

From what I personally observed, the Guards had about half as much more to eat as we did, and the Mine civilians had about the same amount, or possibly a little more, than us. What Asaka, Takahashi (First Sergeant and Second in Command), Sanhai (Police, Quartermaster, and Mess Sergeant), and "Cyclops" had to eat I cannot say, but I saw this much - they lost weight, day by day, and I make a guess that the loss averaged twenty pounds per man. It would have been very easy for them to have eaten all they wanted, and I credit them for their honesty in this matter.

Christians came, with Red Cross packages, four twelve pound boxes per man. To us these were the rarest of delicacies. We counted these precious packages as they were unloaded at the railroad station, we knew exactly how many there were. I am positive that outside of some thefts by the prisoners, no Japanese ever stole any of them. We bitterly hated Asaka because he tantalized us by issuing them in increments - maybe Doctor Golenternek was back of that - but this was the best thing for all of us, starved as we were.

The Japanese Guards would have given anything for those packages, and it was a source of great trouble and worry to Asaka to keep those packages properly guarded.

Asaka began to short us on the rations to build up a storeroom. The impression we got from the Japanese was the war was to be a ten year one, of attrition, and we had better save food for next

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year. The Army, suffering from the blockade, might not have enough for us. He prudently built up quite a lot. After surrender, before the planes dropped us "K-rations", he gave us all we could eat, and more besides.

Once, with Captain Fleming, Takahashi was talking about the general treatment of prisoners, and I heard him say, "Oh, you cannot kill these prisoners. The Commandant (Asaka) is responsible for their lives and well being."

All in all, from personal observation, I considered Asaka hard and strict, a true professional soldier, who took care to safeguard lives and health. He had little food and medicines to do it with, and condoned repeated thieveries from the line of fuel, trading with the civilians, and violations of Army orders.

There were periodic inspections by the high command from Tokyo of the prisoners. Soldier-like, Asaka had the camp cleaned up, and prisoners dressed their best, just like inspections in our own Army. However, as far as I know, no prisoner was permitted to interview the inspecting officers and state grievances.

In this particular camp, only eight men died. One was the result of a mine cave-in, Private Werner, U.S. Marine Corps, one was tuberculosis, First Sergeant McCarthy, of the Army and I think the rest were plain pneumonia, aggravated by general malnutrition and dispondent heartbreak. Out of five hundred and sixty men, for we had received an increase of British prisoners, this seems to be pretty good, from what I have heard of other camps. There was positively no sadistic tortures or aggravated brutality, such as I saw in the Philippines. Outside of the Brig, and the slappings from the Guards, there was not much to complain of in the way of punishments.

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA,

This 11th day of August, 1947.

DEPONENT: /S/ Charles R. Jackson

I hereby certify that the foregoing was duly sworn to, signed and sealed in the presence of this witness.

At the same place, on the same day.

Witness: /S/ Samuel L. Roberts  
Defense Counsel

Def Doc No. 2076

EX 3138

Sender: Swiss

Receiver: "



Aug. 1945

PRESS INTERCROIXROUGE GINEVL

CAMPREPORT 2129 CONTINUATION 2128 INTERVIEWED PRESENCE

CAMPCOMMAND USARBY MAJOR FE FELLOWS BRACKET SEE HURYOJONOKYOKU

AM/39 UNBRACKET SENIOROFFICER POW REPRESENTATIVE FOR LAST

TWO YEARS QUOTE SITUATION AS GOOD AS THEY CAN EXPECT

COMFORTABLY WELL HOUSED FED AND CLOTHED MEDICINES SUFFICIENT

CURRENTNEEDS BUT ANXIOUS KNOWING WHETHER FURTHER REDCROSS

SUPPLIES AVAILABLE. GOT THROUGH LAST WINTER VERY NICELY

ONLY ONE DEATH WERE KEPT WARM ALL IROC RELIEF TURNED

OVER TO THEM FOR DISTRIBUTION. HEALTH CONDITIONS CONSIDERABLY

IMPROVED SINCE LAST YEAR NO SERIOUS ILLNESS NOBODY ON

DOWNGRADE MEN BECOMING ACCLIMATIZED WEIGHTS IMPROVED OVERALL.

WEIGHTINCREASE HALFKILO HOWEVER FIVE TO SIXKILOS FOR

FIRST ARRIVALS NEW SHOES PROBLEM AS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE

GETTING LARGE ENOUGH SIZES REMAINING CLOTHING ISSUED

REP/IRMATERIAL ADEQUATE FOOD GOOD GOOD FRESH VEGETABLESUPPLY

BASICRATIONS KEPT UPTO SPECIFICATION RECREATION LIMITED BY

TWO FACTORS FIRSTLY AVAILABLE TIME AFTER WORK SECONDLY

SPACE WHICH INSUFFICIENT FOR GAMES SUCHAS BASEBALL HAVE

GOOD ORCHESTRA BUT COULD STAND ANOTHER CRAMOPHONE LIBRARY

RECEIVED ONLY ONE SHIPMENT DURING LAST FOURTEEN MONTHS

OF LESS THAN FIFTY VOLUMES SHOULD LIKE SEEING MORE BOOKS

GREAT TIMELAG IN COMMUNICATING WITH FAMILIES TRANSITTIME

APPROXIMATELY ONEYEAR EITHER WAY WROTE MIDDLE OCTOBER

EX. 3138

Def. Doc. # 2076

RECEIVED ONLY ONE SHIPMENT DURING LAST FOURTEEN MONTHS  
OF LESS THAN FIFTY VOLUMES SHOULD LIKE SEEING MORE BOOKS  
GREAT TIME LAG IN COMMUNICATING WITH FAMILIES TRANSITING  
APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR EITHER WAY WROTE MIDDIE OCTOBER  
FORTYTHREE RECEIVED ANSWER MAY FORTYFIVE WHEREAS ALREADY  
HAD REPLY TO RADIOGRAM DISPATCHED SEPTEMBER FORTYFOUR  
IF MAIL COULD BE SPEEDED UP WOULD MEAN BIG LOAD OFF  
MENS MIND RECEIVED AMGROSS BULLETIN FIFTEEN MONTHS AGO  
WHICH GREATLY APPRECIATED AS MEN LIKE HEARING THINGS OF  
LOCAL INTEREST NONE SINCE BRACKET COPIES OF AMGROSS NEWS  
NUMBER THREE FOUR SEVEN READY FOR DISPATCH AT TOKYO MAIN CAMP  
UNBRACKET RECEIVED COMMUNICATIONS FROM US GOVERNMENT CONCERNING  
FAMILY MAINTENANCE AND INSURANCE NOTHING SIMILAR FROM  
CANADIAN BRITISH NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENTS ALTHOUGH RELATIVE  
POW KEENLY INTERESTED ESPECIALLY REGARDING ALLOWANCES PAID  
FAMILIES SHOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUCH INFORMATION WE MAY  
HAVE OR RECEIVE FOR PUBLICATION TO MEN AS CAPTAIN  
WOULD HAND IT OVER TO HIM PROMPTLY NOTHING BEING KEPT  
BACK STOP CONTINUED

INTERCROSS

HCA/HM

Def. Doc. # 2076

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOKOI, Koji, who occupy the post of The Chief Investigator of the Information Bureau of P.O.W., hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Despatch from Suez on Aug. 1945, The Information of International Red Cross. Geneva." is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document entitled "Reports file concerning P.A.S. call" in the custody of Japanese Government (The Information Bureau of P.O.W.)

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 13 day of Aug., 1947.

/s/ YOKOI, Koji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ SHIKISHIMA, Isaburo (seal)

3139

DEF. DOC. No. 2256

Saturday the 25th August 1945

To: 1st Lieut. Hiraishi, Hiroki  
Camp Commander  
No. 21 Prisoner of War Camp Fukuoka.

Sir,  
It is my privilege as Commandor of the British and Australian troops, at present here under your protection convey the appreciation of all ranks for the concern which you have shown for, and the efforts which you have made to roleive the monotony of our short stay here.

Since our arrival here on the R 1st June 1945 we have realized something of the increasing difficulties under which you have performed your duties; but the tolerance of your Command in the past, and your immediate consent to my request for organized excursions out of the Camp, has earned for you the profound respect of all ranks.

We hope for your continued co-operation, and look forward to the progressive improvement of our relation during the yest of our stay here.

U.S. Divies  
Warrant Office in charge of  
British and Australian Groups  
**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



DEF. DOC.No. 2296

Camp Commandant  
No. 1 Prisoner of War Camp, Fukuoka.

Sir,  
It is the desire of the under-signed British Warrant Officers to express our gratitude for the gentlemanly manner in which you have conducted the affairs of this Camp since taking over the role of Commandant.

The policy which you adopted has, in our opinion, saved many lives and eased so much of the misery we all experienced in the past.

We extend, on behalf of the British soldiers in this camp, our heartfelt thanks and pray good health and happiness to you and yours in the days to come.

Signed R. While  
W.O.II(BSM) R.A.

Signed F. Smith  
W.O.II(BSM) R.A.

No.1 Prisoner of War Camp  
Fukuoka,  
31st August, 1945

DEF. DOC. No. 225

To whom it may concern;

This will certify that Mr. Tsukasa, Furusho, commander of Fukuoka Prison Camp No. 23, is deserving of any consideration possible due to his fair and considerate treatment of the American War prisoners under his control.

We consider him a loyal Japanese subject and a true officer of the Imperial Army He has always conducted himself as we would like to conduct ourselves under the same circumstances.

Frank M. Turner  
Captain, U.S. Army

Thomas R. Taggart  
Captain, U.S. Army

DEF. DOC. No. 2296

Please convey our best wishes to Mr. Eriwitchi and other members of the staff with whom we have come in contact and trust that only the better times shall remain in our memories, and that henceforth peace shall always be maintained between your country and ours.

Would you please convey a message of heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Nagasawa; from Pte. Ross (No. 289) for the timely and utmost assistance when he received the injury to his leg as work recently.

Wishing you all peace and happiness for the future, on behalf of the members of No. 2 furnace squad, and in particular.

Yours Sincerely

SGT. H.H. HALLAM  
W.O.II.F.D. WILLIAMS

DEF. DOC. No. 2296

Mr. Mizaki,

Now that hostilities have ceased between our countries it is only a short time before we will be going home to our own country, back to our dear people at home.

We would like to take this opportunity, through the courtesy of the Japanese staff at our barracks, to thank you sincerely for all you have done to assist us whilst we have been employed in your department of stainless factory.

During the 2½ years we have been working in No.2 furnace shed, your attention and assistance to all our needs and difficulties has been given with heartiness and promptitude which has been greatly appreciated by all, and has helped us considerably to carry on this period of our internment which was quite strange and unfamiliar to our normal occupations.

Def. Doc. No. 2296

From: Sgt. S. Falcus, 6596966  
9th Loyal Northumberland  
Fusiliers c/o G.P.O.  
London, England.

To: The Manager,  
The Dressing Mill,  
Iraqi.

Dear Sir,

I am writing to thank you on behalf of the men who worked in your mill as prisoners of war, for your thoughtfulness and kindness toward us. Your personal interest in our welfare, and the care you took in instructing us in our individual jobs, employing each man in the capacity in which he was most interested and happy, did much to dispel any gloom from our minds, and made us feel like ordinary working men. I must also mention your kindness and sympathetic attitude toward anyone who was sick during working hours. All members have expressed the desire to possess a copy of your permanent address, so that they may communicate with you. If you can let me have a copy I will ensure that everyone become acquainted with it.

I must also mention the workmen who were our instructors, they deserve our thanks, especially, and I hope you will convey

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this to them, Minami of the 4th Floor, Takino of the vacuum, and  
Tunada of the 6th Floor stores.

Goodbye and good luck to you Sir,

Sincerely Yours

S. Falcus.

Iruka

25th August, 1945

DEF. DOC. No. 2296

Toyama, Nippon  
August 25, 1945

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Corporal Jiro Ikeda, Imperial Nipponese Army, has been on duty as Sergeant Major at this Prisoner of War Camp No. seven (7) from June 2, 1945 to date during which time I have been Prisoner Commander.

Corporal Jiro Ikeda has performed his duties efficiently and fairly with exceptional courtesy to all Prisoners of War at a time when this was not the normal attitude of our guards.

I feel personally indebted to Corporal Jiro Ikeda for his courtesy to myself and my men. I speak for all one-hundred ninety-five Americans here in requesting such courtesy and consideration as you can grant him.

GUY H. STUBBS  
Lt. Col. CAC  
U. S. ARMY

DEF. DOC. No. 2200

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Excerpt from SB-5

A letter of appreciation from POW.

I certify that the above document is a correct and true copy of the documents in the custody of this bureau.

On August 27, 1947.

/S/ IIDA, Yukio (seal)

The acting-chief of POW  
Information Bureau.



3139

Def. Doc. 2296-1

Letter of Thanks  
To the Chief of the POW Camp, Mukden

1. On behalf of all the American prisoners of war here in this camp, I wish to express my gratitude for the efforts made by all the personnel who are engaged in health inspections for the purpose of investigating the causes and the present conditions of our bad health, and thereby, deciding measures for its improvement and cure.

2. All of us are much impressed by the most painstaking and thorough-going method and attitude taken by these experts. We believe that in spite of the difficulty of their task they will surely achieve satisfactory results.

3. We have received very kind treatment since we came to this camp. It was beyond our expectation to have such concern shown for our welfare. I firmly believe that all of us concerned are so grateful that they will never throughout their lives forget this experience.

S. H. Hankins (TN Phonetic) Major, USA  
Chief of American Liaison Section  
POW Camp, Mukden

17 February 1947

. . . . .

Excerpt from the March Mukden POW Camp Monthly Report

IX Health

4. Sanitary Measures

Concerning sanitary measures, we are aiming at their perfection by carrying out, continuing from the previous month, the third-term preventive measures, according to the regulations pertaining thereto.

We entrusted the Mukden Army Hospital with the examination for enteritis infection of the 191 hospitalized patients. This was conducted on the four days from March 16th to 19th. The results were as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Material Inspected</u>	<u>Object of Search</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>No. of persons examined</u>
From March 16	Faeces	Bacteria	One case of	191
To March 19		causing inflammation of intestines	positive re-action to dysentery germ test	

We are planning to have, in April, a second examination for infection by the Sanitation and Water Supply Squad (the Water Supply and Purification Squad).

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Excerpt from the April Number of the Mukden  
POW Camp Monthly Report

XII Health

5. Sanitary Measures

For the prevention of epidemics, the third-term preventive measures were carried out continuing from the previous month. The Sanitation and Water Supply Squad of the Kwantung Army organized its Second Special Inspection Corps for our camp. The corps carried out its examination of faeces and serum and skin reactions, starting their work from April 16. The results show an overwhelming number of cases of negative reaction, as is shown in the following table. We therefore closed the third-term preventive measures.

Results of Inspection for Infection  
(Only In-patients were examined twice)

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of persons examined</u>	<u>Material</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>Reference</u>
April 16	196	Faeces	Positive 2 (F Y)	In-patients
April 17	310	"	Negative	Healthy
April 18	268	"	"	"
April 19	255	"	"	"
April 20	227	"	"	"
April 21	205	"	"	In-patients
Total	1461		Positive 2	

## List of POW Camps Inspected in 1942

File Number	Permission Number & Date	Date of Inspection	POW Camp Inspected	Visitor
(23) 18	Mil. Ord. No. 1327 March 6	March 12	Zentsuji	Dr. F. Paravicini Rep. to Japan Int. Com R. C.
31	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 276 Apr. 27	Sometime after May 20	Hongkong	Edward Egro Rep. to Shanghai R. C. Int. Com
34	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 250 Apr. 17	Apr. 21	Zentsuji	August Kengerbach Swiss Leg. Off.
(49) 48	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 390 May 28	May 30	Zentsuji	Nils E. Erikson Swed. Leg. Off.
(219) (67) 59	Mil. China. Secret tel. No. 143 Aug. 10	Aug. 18	Shanghai (Woesung)	E. Egro Rep. to Shanghai R.C. Int. Com.
(230) 73	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1430 Dec. 4	Dec. 7  Mid-Dec.	Tokyo (includ- ing Kawasaki and Yokohama) Korea (includ- ing Chemulpo)	Dr. F. Paravicini Rep. to Japan R.C. Int. Com.
76	Mil. Asia Ord. Tel. No. 88 Dec. 8	Mid-Dec.	Hongkong	Tindelo Rep. to Hongkon; R.C. Int. Com.
82	Mil. Asia Ord. Tel. No. 1523 Dec. 18	Dec. 28	Zentsuji	Max Postalcozi Asst. Rep. to Japan R. C. Int. Com.
85	Mil. Asia Ord. Tel. No. 1424 Dec. 3	Dec. 14 Dec. 15	Tokyo (Main Camp and Yokohama)	Hilde Brand Swiss Rep.
85	Mil. Asia Ord. Tel. No. 1424 Dec. 3	Dec. 14	Zentsuji	Angst Swiss Rep.
85	Mil. Asia Ord. Tel. No. 1424 Dec. 3	Dec. 18 Dec. 19	Korea (Main Camp and Chemulpo)	Angst Swiss Rep.
85	Mil. Asia Ord. Tel. No. 1424 Dec. 3		Hongkong	Kengerbach Swiss Rep.

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## List of POW Camps Inspected in 1943

File Number	Permission Number & Date	Date of Inspection	POW Camp Inspected	Visitor
7	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1520 Dec. 17	Jan. 10	Shanghai	William Schilling Swiss Vice-Consul, Shanghai
2	Mil. Asia Ord. Tel. No. 2 Jan. 11	Jan. 13	Shanghai	Edward Egge Rep. to Shanghai R. C. Int. Com.
(32) (33) 3	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 122 Jan. 23	Jan. 25 Jan. 26	Tokyo (Main Camp) (Kawasaki) (Yokohama)	Nils Erikson Swed. Leg. Off.
(47) 14	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 279 Feb. 27	March 24	Shanghai (U.S. airmen visited)	Edward Egge Rep. Shanghai R. C. Int. Com.
(51) 15	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 280 Feb. 27	March 8 March 9 March 10	Osaka (Main Camp) 8th, 9th (1st, 5th) (1st, 6th)	Paravicini Rep. to Japan R. C. Int. Com.
(139) 15	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 280 Feb. 27	March 14 March 17	Fukuoka (7th, 10th) (6th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th)	Max Pestalozzi Asst. Rep. to Japan R. C. Int. Com.
(52) 19	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 281 Feb. 27	March 16 & 17	Osaka	E. B. Gaur Swed. Dep. Min.
(52) 19	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 281 Feb. 27	Mid-March	Fukuoka	E. B. Gaur Swed. Dep. Min.
(27) 23	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 336 March 16	March 23	Tokyo (Ronan visited)	Paul Marela Pope's Env.
(46)	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 336 March 16	Apr. 16	Tokyo (TN: name illegible) Indian POW visited	Norbert Berschet Asst. Naval Attache to German Emb.
(44) 39	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 411 Apr. 1	Apr. 9 " 10 " 11	Osaka (M.C. 8th, 9th, 1st, 5th, 6th)	Swiss Leg. Off. Kengerbach
	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 411 Apr. 1	Apr. 14 Apr. 21	Fukuoka (7th, 10th, 8th, 9th, 6th, 11th)	Swiss Leg. Off. Kengerbach
42	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 509 Apr. 17	Apr. 22	Tokyo	Paravicini Rep. to Japan R.C. Int. Com & Pestalozzi Asst.
(60) 55	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 559 May 5	May 8 May 9	Tokyo (M.C., 1st, and 2nd)	Paul Marela Pope's Env.

(65) 55	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 559 May 5	May 17 " 18 " 19	Osaka (M.C., 8th, 9th, 1st, 5th, 6th)	Paul Marala Pope's Env.
(65) 55	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 559 May 5	May 21	Zontsuji	Paul Marala Pope's Env.
56	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 601 May 13		Hongkong	Tindale R. C. Rep. to Hongkong
61	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 6, 110 May 17	June 1, 4, 8, 10	Formosa	Paravicini R. C. Rep. to Japan
(73) (79) 66	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 682 June 1	June 10	Osaka	E. B. Gaur Swed. Deputy Minister
(73) (79) 66	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 682 June 1	June 15 June 17	Fukuoka 75th 14th	"
(82) (86) 67	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 713 June 4	June 19	Shanghai	Edward Egro R. C. Rep. to Shanghai
(80) 72	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 806 June 15	June 30	Tokyo	Max Pestalozzi Asst. R. C. Rep. to Japan
(111) 90	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1131 July 24	Aug. 11 " 14	Hakodate Main Camp 2nd	" "
(112) 90	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1131 July 24	Aug. 21	Tokyo	"
(122) 106	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1408 Sept. 9	Sept. 22 " 23	Formosa M.C., 5th, 6th. 2nd.	Maurice Champaut Swiss Hon. Consul at Kobe & Nils Erikson Swed. Leg. Off.
"	"	Sept. 24 " 28	Formosa 4th 3rd	"
(140) 124	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1654 Oct. 31	Nov. 13	Mukden	Max Pestalozzi R. C. Rep. to Japan
(140) 124	"	Nov. 16	Korea	"
(134) (135) 128	Mil. Asia Sec. Ret. Tel. Oct. 25	Nov. 4	Shanghai	Von Tannel Swiss Con. Gen. at Shanghai
130	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1738 Nov. 11	Dec. 16	Hongkong	R. Tindale R. C. Rep. to Hongkong

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(143) 132	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1990	Nov. 13 15 18	Hakodate	Nils. E. Erikson Swed. Dep. Min.
(146) (147) 133	Oct. 31 No. 1763 Nov. 16	Dec. 3	Shanghai	Edward Egge R. C. Rep. to Shanghai

## List of POW Camps Inspected in 1944

File Number	Permission Number & Date	Date of Inspection	POW Camp Inspected	Visitor
142	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 2026 Dec. 30	Jan. 6	Tokyo	Alphonso Pvoaspero, Rossi, Carol Bohem, Fascist Party Branch Reps.
4	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 78 Jan. 21	End Jan.	Tokyo	Principini Ital. Fascist Rep.
6	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 230 Feb. 27	Mar. 4	Osaka	"
27	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 461 Apr. 8	Apr. 14	Tokyo	Pestalozzi R. C. Rep. to Japan
"	"	Apr. 24 Apr. 25	Fukuoka	"
"	"	Apr. 27 Apr. 21	Zentsuji	"
30	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 458 Apr. 8	Apr. 28	Tokyo	Gaber Swed. Leg. Off.
35	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 614 May 2	May 6	Osaka	Elwin Bernard Swiss Leg. Off.
"	"	May 9	Tokyo	"
47	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 652 May 9	June 2, 3, 4, 5	Formosa	Heinrich Angst R. C. Rep. to Japan
"	"	June 7 June 9	"	"
(18) 20	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 617 May 2	July 10	Tokyo	Elwin Bernard Swiss Leg. Off.
	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 617 May 2	Aug. 10	Hongkong	R. Tindale R. C. Rep. to Hongkong
(18) 27	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 862 June 22	July 10	Tokyo	Elwin Bernard Swiss Leg. Off.
(20) "	Mil.Asia Ord. No. 862 June 22	July 6	Osaka	Angst R. C. Rep. to Japan

(21) "	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 925 July 4	July 28 " 25	Fukuoka Zentsuji	Gaber Swed. Leg. Off.
(25) 33	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1056 Aug. 10	Aug. 28 " 31 " 29	Hakodate	Bornard Swiss Leg. Off.
"	"	Aug. 18 " 19	Tokyo	Gaber Swed. Leg. Off.
"	"	Aug. 18	Osaka	Angst R. C. Rep. to Japan
"	"	Aug.	Tokyo	Paul Marela Pope's Env.
(25) 36	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1078 Aug. 15	Sept. 15	Shanghai	Egro R. C. Rep. to Shanghai
41	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1167 Sept. 12	Oct. 4 " 5	Osaka	Bernard Swiss Leg. Off.
"	"	"	"	Gaber Swed. Leg. Off.
"	"	Sept. 16	Hakodate	Angst R. C. Rep. to Japan.
"	"	Oct. 4 " 5	Osaka	Paul Marela Pope's Env.
(31) 48	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 130 Sept. 20	Nov. 26	Shanghai	Lyon Tannel Swiss Con. Gen. at Shanghai
(29) 56	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1369 Nov. 9	Nov. 28	Osaka	Paul Marela Pope's Env.
57	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1369	Nov.	Hongkong	R. Tindale R. C. Rep. to Hongkong
(27) (28) 58	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1403 Nov. 19	Nov. 29 Dec. 6	Korea Mukden	Angst R. C. Rep. to Japan
64	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1505 Dec. 24	Feb. 9, 1945	Hongkong	Henri Vartore Bishop of Hongkong



List of POW Camps Inspected in 1945

File Number	Permission Number & Date	Date of Inspection	POW Camp Inspected	Visitor
(3) (5) 3	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 85 Jan. 25	Feb. 10	Shanghai	Edward Eyre R. C. Rep. to Shanghai
(1) 2	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 100 Jan. 30	Feb. 7	Tokyo	Gaber Swed. Leg. Off.
(2) 4	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 110 Feb. 1	Feb. 19	Tokyo	Bornard Swiss Leg. Off.
(6) 9	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 168 Feb. 15	Mar. 7	Tokyo	Bierfinger R. C. Rep. to Japan
11	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 12 Mar. 19		Shanghai	Nicholas Cotty Pastor
57	Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1529 July 16	July 27	Tokyo	Angst R. C. Rep. to Japan

(TN: Personal names being transliterated from KATAKANA are largely phonetic.)

(Excerpts from PAIO)

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached  
is an exact excerpt from a document in the custody of our office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 25th day of August, 1947.

YAMAMOTO, YOSHIO

Specially Commissioned Official

(Full-time Non-Regular Member) of

the POW Information Bureau

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal  
were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: SUZUKI, MASAOKI

Specially Commissioned Official

(Full-time Non-Regular Member) of

the POW Information Bureau

3141

Def. Doc. #2141

Delegatio Apostolica  
in Japonia

Tokyo 7 August 1947

FILE COPY  
MEMORANDUM

RETURN TO ROOM 301

Under the instructions of the Holy See, this delegation occupied itself during the war in assuaging the lot of prisoners of war and civil internees in Japan as well as of Japanese civil internees abroad.

To this end an information service was organized; the list sent by the Japanese General Staff to the International Red Cross served as a card index. As requests for information arrived by mail or by special broadcasts over the Vatican radio these indexes served to identify the person more accurately and to find his internment camp as well. Requests for family correspondence were then routed through the Foreign Ministry and the Japanese military mail service. There even went out sums of money destined for prisoner of war camps outside Japan, in accordance with the instructions of the Holy See.

Overtures were made to obtain for the Apostolic Delegate authorization to visit prisoner of war camps and to bring to all, irrespective of their religion, the consolation within his power. International agreements did not recognize this right except on the part of the International Red Cross and representatives of the protecting powers, but permission was nevertheless given. This was a simple favor which did not give me as a matter of course either the right or the duty to see to the observation of international conventions or to protest in the event of their contravention. The object was purely humanitarian: to console the prisoners.

During the years 1943 and 1944 I visited in this manner some thirty camps in the interior of Japan between Fukuoka and Sendai, accompanied each time by a functionary of the Foreign Ministry to help me on the trip and in my relations with the police and the military authorities. Almost everywhere I was cordially received by the camp authorities who regulated the programme of visits to the best of their instructions. Usually this commenced with the reading of a report on the general situation of the camp, the number of inhabitants, and health, sanitation, food and clothing conditions. There then followed a quick inspection of the surroundings and an interview in the presence of the officers and an interpreter, of someone or other representing the camps. The other prisoners were then usually at work.

Naturally the prisoners could hardly speak openly under these conditions. Nevertheless, there were cases when prisoners praised the efforts made by their overseers to render their

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life less hard.

In addition to these visits it would have been nice to distribute provisions and clothing as is done in other countries by the representatives of the Holy See, but everything was severely rationed and it was impossible to obtain anything of this sort. As the most frequently expressed desire of the prisoners was to obtain something to read, a certain number of works, particularly in English were purchased on the Tokyo market, but only a small number reached the prisoners as far as I can make out. This was not because of the authorities desire to cause suffering but the consequence of an exaggerated sense of responsibility. No book could be sent to the prisoners without being examined line by line by censors who knew little English, and who were few in number and very busy and who above all could not arrive at an opinion as to whether to pass a book or not.

Another desire of the prisoners was to get news of their families. They were permitted to write three or four times a year but many letters were lost and replies came rarely. I strongly demanded that they be as generous as possible in the matter of correspondence.

I lived a long time in Japan before the war and more or less shared the fate of the Japanese people in the course of the hostilities. By making use of this experience I should like, without seeking to excuse or justify anything, to explain the mentality of the country insofar as it concerns as it concerns prisoners of war. Apart from every atrocity and abuse, the condition of the prisoners in respect of quarters and clothing was entirely that of the common people. The discipline was that of the Japanese army which in certain respects is extremely hard.

In Japan the standard of living was always much lower than usual, but during the war it dropped extremely still and the people had almost nothing to eat and could buy clothing only with the few clothing coupons allotted to them for one year. They were housed one on top of another and the government provided space of only two yards square per person for Japanese workers in war factories. Such conditions naturally became insupportable and cruel for members of the allied armies without affecting the Japanese to the same extent.

In order to arrive at an impartial judgment it is necessary to add that the Japanese do not have the idea of a prisoner that a long Christian culture has given us. They naturally despised this class of person and no Japanese soldier was permitted under any circumstance to allow himself to be captured. Officers, by the way, used to state that what they were doing in favor of allied prisoners was absolutely one-sided, for they themselves would never have any prisoners.

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The fact of being entirely assimilated by the Japanese and submitted to their customs, often contrary to our own, led to the belief in deliberate humiliations when such was not at all the idea: communal Japanese bath, the practice of working almost naked etc.

The wide difference in religion, furthermore, led to the fact that through simple ignorance the special spiritual needs of the prisoner were not taken into account and this was one of the points upon which this Delegation had to insist most in order to persuade the camp authorities that such needs were real and supreme. Certain results were obtained but circumstances often prevented much from being done. As far as Catholic priests were concerned, for example, they were not permitted access to the camps except in the case of those who were Japanese alone and they were very few, overloaded with work and few among them knew English sufficiently well. Nevertheless they did their best to answer the calls of the camp commanders, but in accordance with the Japanese mentality they were called more often to preside at funerals than to assist the dying.

To sum up! The general impression is that apart from the atrocities and abuses of certain individuals the great and real suffering of the prisoners was largely the result of a fate which allowed them to fall into the hands of a people so different in manners and mentality rather than being due to a premeditated plan of humiliated plan of humiliation and torture.

At Tokyo this 7th day of August 1947,

Archbishop

SEAL

Def. Doc. #2141

Exh. No.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants -

in their own defense

A F F I D A V I M E N T :-

I, Archbishop Paolo Marella, being duly sworn, hereby depose and say:

That I am the duly accredited apostolic delegate in Japan and reside at Tokyo.

I hereby declare that the attached document entitled "Memorandum", written in French and dated at Tokyo 7 August 1947, consisting of five pages, was written by me and is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/S/ Paolo Marella

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 21st. day of August 1947, at Tokyo.

/S/ David W. Parsons,  
Capt. Inf. Investigating  
Officer

Def. Doc. #2244

Exh. No. 3142

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Sentenced on July 30, 1943  
Put into effect on the same day

Judgment

The Makden P.O.W. Camp

P.O.W. Joe Bill Chestin (24)  
American  
Marine Sergeant  
Formerly a member of  
K Company, 3rd Battalion,  
4th Marine Regiment.

The Makden P.O.W. Camp

P.O.W. Ferdinand F. Mehringolow (21)  
American  
3rd Warrant Officer  
Formerly a member of  
the crew of the Canovas,  
aircraft carrier.

The Makden P.O.W. Camp

P.O.W. Victor Palioty (23)  
American  
Marine Corporal  
Formerly a member of  
B Company, 1st Battalion,  
4th Marine Regiment.

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After trial at this Court Martial with Judiciary Captain NAKAJUJI, Kotero, a prosecutor, as an advisor, a decision has been given to the cases against the above named defendants: the defendant Chestin on charges of being a ringleader of collective escape, theft, murder, and attempted murder; the defendant Mhringgolow on charges of collective escape, theft, murder, and attempted murder; the defendant Palioty on charges of collective escape, murder, and attempted murder.

The decision is as follows:

#### Text of Judgment

The Court sentences the defendants Chestin, Mhringgolow, and Palioty to death.

The seized articles --- a map of Manchoukuo, a compass, and a knife (Exhibit 1 - 3) shall be confiscated.

#### Reasons

The defendants Chestine, Mhringgolow, Palioty were all taken prisoners by the Japanese Army in the battle of Corregidor, the Philippines on May 6, 1942, in consequence of the surrender of the American Army Commander. They were at first interned in the P.O.W. camp on the spot, and later on Nov. 11, 1942 removed to the Mukden P.O.W. Camp. The defendant Chestin was strongly built, dauntless, and intrepid. After his internment as a prisoner, very soon he became a latent power among his mates, always taking their leadership. While he was a marine, he was instructed by his superiors that in case he should be taken prisoner he should seize every opportunity to escape from the enemy's hand and come home to America, and that he should not do anything in the interest of the enemy. So he always watched for a chance to escape from the camp, intending to go north-ward and come home by way of Russia. The defendant Mhringgolow, a boxer of the American Fleet, was also strongly built, but being loose and reckless by nature, he detested the camp life. On May 1, 1941, he attempted to escape from the camp, but was arrested then. He was sentenced to 30 days' close confinement. But he had no mind to change his way and watched a chance for escape. The defendant Palioty also detested the interned life in the camp and secretly desired to get himself free as soon as possible.

(No. 1) About June 10, 1943, the defendant Chestine revealed his intention to Palioty and Mhringgolow and suggested them to escape from the camp with him. The two willingly agreed with him.

At that time, the defendant Chestine had every opportunity and



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After that they met together secretly at every opportunity and talked about the plan for escaping, and all the time Chestin took their lead. He ordered the defendants Mehringgolow and Pelioty to arrange necessaries for escaping and travelling. After they had finished the preparations, about noon on the 21st of the same month Chestin called the two into the bathing room in the camp and told them to carry out the plan after the roll-call that evening, taking advantage of darkness as it was moonless that night and appointed the time and place to meet. About 10 o'clock that evening the three met at a hollow place near a storehouse behind the dispensary in the camp. They crept toward the barbed wire entanglements about 50 metres east of the hollow place. About 10:50 they succeeded to pass under the entanglement then they went on foot north-west ward toward Russian territory, helping each other with a compass (which belonged to the defendant Chestin --- exhibit 2) and a map of Manchukuo (which belonged to the defendant Mehringgolow --- exhibit 3) as their guides. But about 6:30 p.m. on July 2, 1943, they were arrested about 3 kilometres south-west of a mongolian village of Liangchiatzu, Putonhargonmtok, Korchin Tsuayii-hochi, West Hsingan Province by members of the vigilantes of the above-mentioned village.

- (No. 2) With the intention of getting necessary tools for the plan,
- (1) in March (the day not clear) of the same year, the defendant Chestin stole 2 knives at two times, with the same criminal intention each time, from the kitchen of the Machine Tool Manufacturing Company, 2nd Block, Changin Street, Tatung Ward, Mukden, where he was working on duty as cook at that time. The knives belonged to the above company.
  - (2) about June 1, 1948 the defendant Mehringgolow stole a knife (the owner was unknown) placed on the shelf in a room of the camp-affairs section in the camp.
  - (3) While escaping they were pinched for food and went together to a house in which lived Tuasampu (31), an assistant police inspector and Chief of the branch police station at Liangchiatzu. The three asked him for some food without knowing that he was a policeman. Tuasampu, harboring suspicion in his mind, put them a few questions the three tried to put him off with false explanations in a dumb-show that they were German fliers and that their plane had crashed on their way home from Japan, three of their comrades being killed on the spot, and that they were going to the station of the Japanese Army, the assistant police inspector demanded them to accompany him to the

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crash scene, and the three defendants were compelled to go there with him. About 4 that afternoon the three left the village with the assistant police inspector followed by Patuten (56) and Kao Fengshan (56), both Mongolians and vigilance men of the village. On their way the defendant Chestin suggested the other two, Mehringolow and Palioty, to kill the assistant police inspector and the two Mongolians. Mehringolow and Palioty agreed with him at once. At this they decided by mutual consent the defendant Chestin would kill the assistant police inspector, the defendant Mehringolow Patuten, the defendant Palioty Kao Feng shan. About 5 that evening when they came to a sandy place 2 kilometres south-east of the village, the defendant Chestin suddenly attacked Tuwasampu, stabbing his abdomen with the carving knife which he carried with him. Tuasampu made resistance. Chestin reportedly stabbed his abdomen the wounds were fatal. At the same time the defendant Mehringolow also attacked Patuten with his knife (Exhibit-3) stabbing Mehringolow's back and breast and Patuten fell on the spot. Tuwasampu died from the wounds in the abdomen at 7:30 p.m. at Yongchiatzu Putonhergennutok on the day. They failed to kill Patuten, although he had to receive a three weeks treatment for his wounds on the breast and back. Kao Fengshan, seeing the scrimmage, immediately took to flight.

- We have recognized the foregoing to be true judging fr.
- (1) the defendants' depositions made at this court.
  - (2) the Army Judicial policeman's statement concerning the reasons of the arrest of the defendants, which was stated by Hsiechiaosuhai.
  - (3) the inspection statement prepared by the above Judicial policeman.
  - (4) Kao Fengshan's interrogatory prepared by the judicial policeman.
  - (5) the written explanation submitted by YOKEMOTO, Haruo, the Chief of the P.O.W. Labor Division of the Manchurian Machine Tool Manufacturing Company.
  - (6) the attestation of Tuwasampu's corpse and Patuten's diagnosis prepared by Surgeon Lt. YAMAMOTO, Shiro.
  - (7) the seized articles, a map of Hanchoukuo, a compass, and a knife (Exhibit 1 - 3)
  - (8) the defendant Chestin's offenses of the same nature repeated during a short time.

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According to the laws, as to the defendant Chestin as the crime of being a ringleader of the collective escape of P.O.W. shown above (in No. 1) comes under the first clause, Article VII of the Penal Law of P.O.W., we decided to condemn him to death --- one of the penalties provided in the law the crime of theft shown above (in No. 2-(1)) comes under Articles CCXXXV, and LV of the Criminal Law, the crimes of murder and attempted murder shown above (in No. 3) come under Articles LX, CXCIX, and CCIII of the Criminal Law. But in the present case as one act has constituted two crimes of murder and attempted murder, penalty should be laid on the more serious crime, murder, according to the first clause of the first paragraph of Article LIV and Article X of the Criminal Law. And his crimes shown above are considered to be concurrent crimes, which were provided in the first clause of Article XLV, but as we have decided to condemn him to death on a charge of his being a ringleader of the collective escape, no more penalties are not imposed upon him on charges of the other crimes.

As to the defendant Mähringgolow, as the crime of collective escape shown above (in No. 1) comes under the latter clause of Article VII of the Penal Law of P.O.W., the crime of theft shown above (in No. 2-(2)) comes under Article CCXXXV, and the crimes of murder and attempted murder shown above (in No. 3) come under Articles LX, CXCIX, and CCIII. But in the present case as one act has constituted two crimes of murder and attempted murder, penalty should be laid upon the more serious crime, murder, according to the first clause of the first paragraph of Article LIV and Article X of the Criminal Law, accordingly we have decided to condemn him to death --- one of the penalties provided in the law. But we condemn him to death on a charge of murder, no more penalties are not imposed upon him on charges of the other crimes.

As to the defendant Prioty, the crime of the collective escape as shown above (in No. 1) comes under the latter clause of Article VII of the Penal Law of P.O.W.; the crimes of murder and attempted murder shown above (in No. 3) comes under Articles LX, CXCIX, and CCIII of the Criminal Law. But in the present case one act has constituted two crimes of murder and attempted murder, penalty should be laid upon the more serious crime, murder, according to the first clause of the first paragraph of Article LIV and Article X of the Criminal Law, accordingly as we have decided to condemn him to death, no more penalties are not imposed upon him on charges of the other crimes.

The seized articles, a map of Manchoukuo, a compass (Exhibit 1-2) were used when they committed the crime shown in No. 1, and the other seized article a knife was used when they committed the crimes shown in No. 3. All these articles do not belong to any person other than the defendants, these shall be confiscated according to Article XIX of the Criminal Law.

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Hereby we decided to give judgment as shown in the text.

On this 30th day of July, 1943

Special Court Martial of Kwantung Army

Presiding Judge:

Major ICHIKAWA, Einoshin

Judge:

Judiciary Captain IMANARI, Ichiro

Judge:

Captain SHIGENO, Kotaro

The above is a copy of the judgment.

On this 30th day of July, 1943

Special Court Martial of Kwantung Army

Clerk: NAKAJIMA, Takeishi

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I certify that this document is an correct copy of the document in the custody of the Prisoner of War Intelligence Bureau.

15 of January, 1947.

P.O.W. Intelligence Bureau

/S/ YOKOI, Koji (seal)

Defense Language  
2734

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent ; -- SAITO, Yoshie

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, Yoshie Saito, under oath testify the following facts:

I was born in 1880, and live in Shoto, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo-to. After graduating from the Tokyo Imperial University, I entered the Foreign Office, was stationed as diplomatic and consular attache in Peking and Tientsin, China, became Secretary of Embassy in Washington under Ambassador Shidehara, became Director of the Bureau of Commercial Affairs of the Foreign Office; after resigning in 1926, I became a Director of the South Manchurian Railway Co., Ltd., in July 1940, upon formation of the Konoze cabinet, at the request of Foreign Minister Matsuoka I became adviser to the Foreign Office and held that position until I resigned in July 1941

1. I was on intimate terms with Mr. Matsuoka for 30 years; at

- 1 -

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy, as advisor to the Foreign Office I stayed day and night at the private residence of Foreign Minister Matsuoka where the negotiations were taking place, and throughout the entire period I was responsible for the technical side of the negotiations concerning this pact. Due to this, I am comparatively accurately informed regarding the ideals, and motives on the Japanese side which led to the conclusion of the pact, and the circumstances concerning the conclusion of the pact.

2. Before entering into details I would like to testify as to Mr. Matsuoka's general idea concerning the method to bring about peace throughout the entire world. Mr. Matsuoka was of the opinion that it was impossible to establish world peace through the power of the League of Nations, and he considered a separate formula was necessary; this he often spoke of before he became Foreign Minister. When Mr. Matsuoka was President of the South Manchurian Railway Co., and when I was advisor to the S.M.R., I once called on him at his villa at Gotemba concerning company business, he spoke as follows after finishing the company business:

"The world is too large. Races, national sentiments and policies are different, and the past ideas of establishing world peace through a centralized and unique organ is a mistake when dealing with such a world. For this, I can think of no better method than that friendly neighbouring countries with mutual interests should form a union, then a larger union should be formed among these unions, and among these larger unions peaceful relations

should be established, and finally this should be spread through the world. Should I become Foreign Minister, I intend to realize this idea. However, this will not be easy, and sufficient study must be made of the problems. I would like you to think about it."

When I met him again at Gotenba, in the spring of 1937, as I recall Mr. Matsuoka said:

"Well, have you studied my idea? A union including Japan, Manchuria and China and their neighbouring countries must be formed. However, unfortunately, this cannot be hoped for considering the present situation of long-standing disputes between Japan and China. So, I, as President of the SMR and as a man with many Chinese friends, am in a good position to take steps to further Sino-Japanese peace as a private individual, and I should like to go to China some day soon and see what can be done. Therefore, I wish to request you to go to China, and make thorough observations on the situation."

I had been studying Chinese affairs for many years, and since I considered this my life-work, I went to China in accordance with Mr. Matsuoka's suggestion with great pleasure:

The reason why Mr. Matsuoka said that Japan should form a union with the East Asiatic countries was according to what he often told me, because he thought that these countries are neighbours with similar races, and both from a historic and realistic view-point, are as closely related as cogs in a machine;



therefore these countries could comparatively easily construct a new order on the basis of mutual interests. Then the reason for his urgent desire to solve Sino-Japanese conflicts was not only in order to realize Sino-Japanese economic collaboration, but also because he considered it was absolutely necessary for the construction of an East Asiatic new order as one stage toward world peace.

3. After Mr. Matsuoka resigned his post as President of the S M R, in March 1939, for a time he lived a leisurely life, and during this period he spoke to me from time to time of his opinion concerning inter-states unions as a method of establishing world peace. In July 1940 when he became Foreign Minister he made me an advisor to the Foreign Office, and he gave much thought to the method to be taken to establish world peace. Mr. Matsuoka decided to conclude the Tripartite Pact in August 1940 when he received a telegram from Ambassador Kurusu saying that Mr. Stahmer had left Germany for Japan. His motives were:

- (1) to realize his above-mentioned concerning the establishment of world peace,
- (2) to solve the China Incident.
- (3) current Japanese-American relations were in such a bad condition that they could not be improved by ordinary diplomatic methods due to the extremely strong American attitude, and no other method could be found.

These were the 3 circumstances behind his decision, and this I

was told by Mr. Matsuoka two or three days after the negotiations were begun concerning the conclusion of the pact.

4. First, on the content of Mr. Matsuoka's idea for establishing world peace, I have already given a rough idea. Mr. Matsuoka considered, according to what he told me that it was necessary first of all to construct an inter-states union in the East based on the mutual interests of the various countries. The area to be covered by this inter-state union was to be decided in accordance with the attitude taken by the countries concerned, and Mr. Matsuoka's ideal was that Japan, Manchuria and China should form the core, and that it should include the whole of East Asia. Moreover, if interests identical to the mutual interests of East Asia, forming the basis of this inter-state union, should exist in other parts, these countries should of course join the union-- this was Mr. Matsuoka's opinion. The meanings of mutual interests are too broad to be defined in one word, but, for example, one of the ideas was economic co-existence and co-prosperity. Mr. Matsuoka thought that all the treasure lands of the East Asiatic countries were either the colonies of the European and American Powers or else were of a semi-colonial nature, and in cases where the territorial or colonial policies of the European and American Powers did not necessarily coincide with the interests of the East Asiatic countries themselves, then it was to the mutual interest of East Asiatic countries that these policies should be appropriately modified. In other words, Mr. Matsuoka thought

that amendment of the policies of these European and American countries to a certain extent had to be asked if the new order in East Asia should really be established. However, Mr. Matsuoka never told me that it was inevitable that the European and American Powers would have to be excluded in order to construct the East Asiatic new order. Surely, the European and American Powers with territory in Asia would not utterly oppose some changes in their policies if this was to the benefit of the inhabitants of the territory and also to the benefit of world peace, Mr. Matsuoka's thought was that, even if these changes could not take place rapidly, it was not impossible to make gradual changes after due discussions. At the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Matsuoka did not have the intention of using force in order to improve this situation. He was not so vain as to suppose that Japan had so much actual strength.

The first time this idea of an East Asiatic new order was announced to the public was in the preamble to the Tripartite Pact. In it it reads:

"The Government of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and to co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe wherever it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to

promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the people concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Government to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized"

This English text was written and proposed personally by Mr. Matsuoka, and German side did only accept it.

As such was what happened, leaving aside the question of how Germany and Italy regarded the Tripartite Pact. Japan was firmly convinced that it was one way to establish world peace. The so-called "new order in East Asia" referred to in this pact indicated the situation which would be brought about once the peaceful region in East Asia was established.

5. The second Japanese motive for concluding the Tripartite Pact was the Chinese question. To say the truth, Japan was greatly troubled by the Chinese question. At that time, Japan was worried over her extraordinary increase in population, and there was no solution except the encouragement of industry. Therefore, Japan thought that on Sino-Japanese economic collaboration depended the very existence of the nation. However, due to the irresponsible anti-Japanese movement in China many difficulties were created to prevent its realization, in addition to the Japanese vested interests were violated, and the lives and properties of Japanese residents in China were

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continuously threatened.

Even after the China Incident broke out in July 1937, Japan intended to withdraw her forces as soon as possible. For example, an order was issued to the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces (which later became the China Expeditionary Forces) not to advance beyond the Soo-chow River, which flows through Shanghai, and also that permanent measures should not be taken in the Shanghai area. (this order was issued in or about August 1937). The reason why this order was not strictly obeyed was because Chinese resistance was so strong that Japanese forces could not halt at this line.

In this way, after the Japanese Army occupied Nanking, and after further advances were made, the situation continued to deteriorate. Therefore Japan was in a hurry to end the China Incident, and turned to various measures. The statement that no dealings would be made with Chiang Kai-shek, the pronouncement of the three Konoye principles, the emergence of Wang Chingwei, all these measures were taken for this purpose. On the other hand, Japan earnestly desired to open direct discussions with General Chiang Kai-<sup>shek</sup> on the entire peace question, and military personnel, diplomats and private experts on Chinese affairs who were thought to have formerly been on familiar terms with the Chiang Kai-<sup>shek</sup> clique took every available step, unfortunately all of them ended in failure. Although there may have been many reasons for the failure, Japan considered that at the time America, Britain and other countries wholly sympathized with China, and did not hesitate to

offer concrete and abstract assistance. By obtaining Anglo-American assistance, General Chiang Kai-<sup>shek</sup> maintained his position and did not shift one iota his thorough anti-Japanese policy, this was thought to be the main reason on the Japanese side: To be frank, Mr. Matsuoka and others on the Japanese side thought that it was the intention of America and Britain to have General Chiang Kai-<sup>shek</sup> bitterly oppose Japan, and then taking advantage of the weakening of Japanese strength, to overpower Japan by force. Therefore, on one hand, facing Japan, they argued that peace was profitable, and repeated strong protests based on the stipulations of treaties were made, on the other hand, toward General Chiang Kai-<sup>shek</sup>, material and moral support was given, and efforts were made to prolong, as long as possible, the Sino-Japanese armed conflict--this was considered to be the Anglo-American policy vis-a-vis Japan. Setting aside the question of whether this opinion was false or not, Mr. Matsuoka believed in view of this situation that Japan's power would necessarily have to be strengthened by allying herself with other Powers in order to settle the Chinese question. By doing so, America and Britain could be checked and their policy toward Japan would be changed, thus leading to the early solution of Sino-Japanese questions. This was one of the motives leading to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

6. The third reason why Mr. Matsuoka was forced to conclude the Tripartite Pact was the so-called A B C encirclement problem. Among these, Mr. Matsuoka was most concerned over

the American attitude. At that time, America, Britain and China combined and formed the so-called A B C encirclement front, and planned to crush weak Japan--this was the problem which caused endless concern to the Government and the people of Japan. Setting aside the question of whether America and Britain actually had this idea in mind, the pressure put by these 3 Powers on Japan actually increased daily, and unless some means were found to break through the encirclement, Japan would be faced with the danger of extinction--this was the opinion held by Mr. Matsuoka and many other informed Japanese at that time. Mr. Matsuoka was constantly bothered by this problem, and continuously worried about how it could be possible to dissolve this encirclement. Especially, the fact that America concentrated the larger part of her navy--the largest in the world--in the Pacific greatly stimulated Japanese feeling as it was considered to be a threat by force. Again, the rumour that America possessed bases in Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma, etc., and the American naval vessels would in the near future enter Singapore, was becoming stronger from day to day. Therefore, Mr. Matsuoka and many other informed Japanese becoming increasingly worried over the danger that Japan would soon be attacked by the combined Anglo-American forces. On the other hand, America abrogated the Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911, and trade with Japan was in reality extremely curtailed, thus causing Japan to suffer under military and commercial pressure. Mr. Matsuoka was constantly concerned

over this, and one day said to me:

"If Japan and America should ever go to war, it would be most unfortunate for Japan, and it would inevitably have the most disastrous results for Japan. Not only that, but the culture of the human race would be completely destroyed, and the world would become darkened. To prevent this is something that I, as Foreign Minister, cannot forget even in my dreams."

Mr. Matsuoka, day and night, studied measures concerning this problem. In fact, Mr. Matsuoka often told me:

"If it were possible to dissolve America's high-pressure policy, the problems of Japan, America and Britain, and the Sino-Japanese problem would be naturally easy to solve. Moreover, if this were realized, it might even be possible for Japan to take a step forward, and could alone, or together with the Soviet Union, act as arbitrator in the Anglo-German war. However, since American policy is so high-handed, Japan cannot oppose America single-handed with her own power, so Japan must shake hands with some other strong Powers."

To express what Mr. Matsuoka told me then in a simple way, the countries he had in mind by saying to shake hands with some Powers were the Soviet Union and Germany. However, to combine with the Soviet Union would probably irritate America, and it was certain that the Soviet Union would immediately refuse Japan's proposal to shake hands with her. So, Mr. Mats'



reached the conclusion that there was no other measure for the time being but to associate with Germany.

7. Another motive besides the above-mentioned three which Mr. Matsuoka had in concluding the Tripartite Pact was to attempt to adjust Russo-Japanese relations through the good offices of Germany. At the time, although there did exist a small dark cloud over Soviet-German relations, at any rate they were on friendly terms. So Mr. Matsuoka thought to shake hands with the Soviet Union by utilizing, if possible, Germany after associating with her. Mr. Matsuoka thought of shaking hands with the Soviet Union for a considerably long time. When Mr. Matsuoka was President of the S M R he said to me:

"I was a great favorite of Count Shimpei Goto who was a well-known Russophile and made all sorts of efforts to realize a Japanese Soviet rapprochement." Recently, he has gone himself to Russia and carried on negotiations. I believe that I myself am responsible for making Count Goto a Russophile. In this way, my pro-Sovietism is considerably old, and now that I have become President of the S M R, I am even more impressed by the necessity."

In this manner, he based his opinion on the actual conditions of Japan, and went on to discuss world currents, speaking in a logical way of Soviet-Japanese friendship.

Long after that, when he returned from his trip to Europe in 1941, he spoke to me of the events which occurred on his departure from Moscow where he had stayed and said:

"Mr. Stalin came to the station to see me off. Both Soviet officials and Ambassador Tatekawa assured me that this was without precedent. He appeared to be sincerely reluctant to say goodbye to me, and when I was about to leave he hugged me and kissed me very hard. And he said to me, "The Russian race is not a European race. They are real Asiatics. Since they are both Asiatics, shouldn't Japan and the Soviet Union be good friends?" So I thought utilizing this opportunity to delay my departure, and carry on further negotiations concerning Soviet-Japanese friendly relations beyond the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. However, since arrangements had been made on affairs to follow my return to Japan, I thought that to postpone my return would have a delicate effect on the international situation. So I reconsidered, and thought that I could again come at some appropriate time."

At the time, since it was urgent for Japan to settle the Chinese question, as mentioned above, and the Soviet Union had a important influence on this question, if friendly relations could be established with the Soviet Union, it would naturally minister to the solution of the question. From this view-point also, it was necessary to establish Soviet-Japanese friendly relations. Mr. Matsuoka once said to me:

"The China Incident is less a problem having to do with China, than it is a problem concerning America and the Soviet Union."

From this view-point, Mr. Matsuoka attempted to realize his cherished plan to establish Soviet-Japanese friendship by

shaking hands with Germany, and utilizing her good offices. This was also one of the motives behind the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. In addition, Mr. Stahrer told Mr. Matsuoka at the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact that Germany was prepared to act as intermediary.

8. As stated above, the Tripartite Pact was not concluded in preparation for war. However, since an association was formed with Germany and Italy then actually at war with England, Mr. Matsuoka was aware of the danger of Japan being forced against her will into the war by Germany and Italy notwithstanding Japan's desire not to enter the war. So, he thought of making reservations at the very beginning of the negotiations concerning the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, and made two reservations in connection with the negotiations. One was that Japan would remain outside of the war waged by Germany and Italy against Britain, and the second was that the European War would be prevented from spreading to America and East Asia. Mr. Matsuoka told both Mr. Ott and Mr. Stahrer at the beginning of the negotiations that Japan considered that the most important mission of the Tripartite Pact was to establish peace throughout East Asia, therefore, Japan should not be forced into the Anglo-German war because of the Pact, and a German guarantee on this point was desirable.

He demanded that the following two points be promised:

- (1) Germany would not interfere in the political questions of East Asia, and Japan would not interfere in the political

questions of Europe;

(2) The European war should be carried on by Germany and Italy alone and Japan's aid should not be sought, on the other hand, the military operations against China would be carried out by Japan alone and Germany's aid would not be sought.

The German side immediately agreed to this. Concerning the policy of improving the relations with the United States and

of preventing America from entering the war, agreement was reached almost in the same procedure. In the summer of 1941, the Soviet-German war broke out, and shortly thereafter Mr. Ott

brought Ribbentrop's personal message to Mr. Matsuoka, which I also saw and read at that time. This was a fairly short note; one sheet typed in German, but its contents were very important. Its point was that Japan should speedily attack the Soviet Union from the rear. Its wording was impolite, and to the point, moreover its contents were in violation of the promises given at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. When Mr. Matsuoka saw it, he was very angry, and utterly declined to give any consideration to the proposal as it was in contravention to the mutual understandings exchanged at the time of the Tripartite Pact. Another thing, after Mr. Matsuoka had returned from his trip to Germany and the Soviet Union, I asked Mr. Matsuoka about the information I had received that he had been advised by Hitler and Ribbentrop to attack Singapore. To this Mr. Matsuoka replied:

"There was such talk. I was Foreign Minister, and not one of the Service Ministers. So no matter how earnestly this was recommended to me, I was not in a position to assent to the proposal. Moreover, concerning the use of armed force by Japan to further the development of the European war, reservations were made at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Whether Japan should attack Singapore or not was a matter concerning which Germany had no right to say anything. I am absolutely opposed to conquest. As you know, my motto is non-conquest, non-aggression, non-exploitation. I did modify my words. For example, I said that if Japan were to be presented with a chance that came only once in a thousand years, Japan would fight. I also said that if Japan were to fight, the sooner the better. This was only because I wished to prevent further conversation on the same line. However, I did not make any promise with reference to an attack on Singapore, nor did I say anything to commit myself, so you needn't worry."

9. At the time of the conclusion of the pact Mr. Matsuoka said to me:

"The Tripartite Pact may temporarily worsen Japanese-American relations, and may lead to a very dark phenomenon. In half a year, however its darkness will fade, and world peace will be more firmly established. I must pour all my wits and abilities into it for this object. I do not even dream of fighting with America, and I must not do so."

Again Mr. Matsuoka had often declared in the Diet that

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the Tripartite Pact was a means to the establishment of world peace. The following happened at the time of the 2nd Kenoye Cabinet. The question of Japanese-American negotiations was put before a Cabinet meeting, and I was instinctively present at the conference. ~~Then~~ the Home Minister, Baron Kichiro Hiranuma spoke in detail for about 30 minutes opposing war from all angles, and said that Japan must not fight for any reason whatsoever. All of the other Ministers remained silent. Only Mr. Matsuoka spoke and said:

"I agree with Baron Hiranuma. War must be avoided at all costs." That day after Mr. Matsuoka returned to the Foreign Office he said to me in the Minister's office:

"I am in entire agreement with what Baron Hiranuma had to say today. The very fact that Baron Hiranuma, who is usually silent, should have spoken in detail against war must have been because of the importance of the matter, and because he came prepared to deeply impress all the Ministers with a thorough sentiment against war. Coming from his mouth, anti-war opinion carries much more weight than if it were voiced by someone else."

10: Since Mr. Matsuoka was well aware that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact might greatly irritate American nerves, he paid much attention <sup>on</sup> to this point. He repeatedly persuaded Admiral Nomura, who was reluctant, to finally accept the post of Ambassador to America, and this was because he considered as I

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heard from him that the post must be given to a man who would be welcomed in America, and that Admiral Nomura was the best person. To this Admiral Nomura he begged that all efforts be made to improve Japanese-American relations. Again, for the same purpose he tried to dispatch Count Kabayama, who had many friends in America, to America. He tried to dispatch Mr. Toyohiko Kagawa, an American-type missionary who was considered to have the best comprehension of America, to the United States. He was very polite in his conversations with Ambassador Grew. One day (the date I have forgotten) after Ambassador Grew had returned, I asked Mr. Matsuoka how the conversations went on. Mr. Matsuoka answered:

"Recently conversation have become somewhat difficult. Although the policy of giving absolute importance to Japanese-American friendship has not changed, at a time like this when the situation is critical, unless a strong attitude is shown, it can have no effect. At the same time, if the other party is angered, it will be disastrous, and to maintain a proper balance is difficult. So I was very careful in choosing my words."

At the end of 1940 Mr. Steinhardt, the American Ambassador to Russia, passed through Japan on his way to his post, and saw Mr. Matsuoka. At this meeting, Mr. Matsuoka spoke at great length of Japan's difficult position, and the necessity of Japanese-American friendship. Later in 1941, when Mr. Matsuoka went to Europe to visit Russia, Germany and Italy, he repeated

similar sentiments to Mr. Steinhardt in Moscow and consulted him on the means to attain Japanese-American friendship. This I learned from Mr. Matsuoka. Before his journey to Europe, he told me:

"My journey to Europe is, on the surface, in order to visit the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy, but hardly anyone knows that my hidden mission is to adjust relations with Soviet and America." At this time, he had already prepared and kept hidden a draft of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty, and was prepared for negotiations with America. On his departure he said:

"I intend to cut as short as possible my sojourn in Europe — and then go to America. I intend to indicate Japan's actual situation and a concrete draft of the basis of a Japanese-American understanding, and by negotiating directly with the Secretary of State to endeavour to improve Japanese-American relations."

On another occasion he said:

"It is regrettable that American sentiment towards Japan has grown greatly tense, owing to the Tripartite Pact. However, this I anticipated at the time of the conclusion of the pact. But this situation must not be neglected. I must go to America at any cost, and after directly bearing from the authorities America's real intentions, I must take appropriate measures."

So I spoke of my opinion and said:



"Since I believe that the tension of American sentiment toward Japan is due to the Tripartite Pact and the Chinese question, if a Japanese-American understanding is to be made possible, something must be done about the Tripartite Pact. The entire withdrawal of troops from China must also be considered. If these two things are possible, I think the other questions are secondary."

To this Mr. Matsuka replied:

"I agree entirely. As you well know, the Tripartite Pact is not for the purpose of waging war. If such a situation should be created that Japan might be forced into war, the way of thinking concerning the Tripartite Pact must be fundamentally changed. If a pact aimed at preserving Japan should become a pact leading to the destruction of Japan, drastic measures will have to be taken against the pact. Concerning the whole-scale withdrawal from China, if one were to advocate that at the present moment, it would not pass in Japan. In any case, I must first of all directly negotiate with the American authorities."

Then I asked:

"Have you confidence in your ability to influence America if you were to go there?"

Mr. Matsuka answered:

"I believe so. Americans do not indulge in intrigues nor in plots. They are fair and do not hamper themselves with what has passed or with barren logic. The reason why American diplomacy has always been so clear, is because of this. If I were to go and adequately

explain Japan's true intentions, and demonstrate Japan's sincerity, although it may be difficult to alter American opinion at one stroke, I do not think it impossible. For this, Japan must necessarily make great concessions, and I have prepared my own draft."

At that time in America, Mr. Matsuoka was looked on in an extremely unfavorable light, and in my opinion I thought it might be better if someone else were to go, but Mr. Matsuoka was confident that if he were to go himself there was hope that Japanese-American negotiations would be successful, Mr. Matsuoka was cared for by an American missionary and spent his early years in America so he was well acquainted with American circumstances and American sentiments. In fact, when he returned from his European journey in May 1941, he said he would go in spite of the fact that his lungs were already in a bad condition and repeatedly took council with Premier Konohe. Premier Konohe was opposed to it, and Mr. Matsuoka's trip to America was not realized. Soon, the third Konohe Cabinet commonly said to be a reshuffle to eliminate Matsuoka came into existence, attitude of the Japanese Government at the time of the third Konohe Cabinet towards the Tripartite Pact became cool. It was rumored that Foreign Minister Toyoda said that Japan did not exist for the Tripartite Pact, but that the Tripartite Pact existed for Japan. When Mr. Matsuoka heard of this he said that it was possible that things would go so far as the abrogation of the pact.

Further he said.

"There are many instances of abrogations of newly concluded

treaties of abrogations during the effective period of treaties. I should like to know on what grounds in international law this can be justified. When I visited Mr. Matsuoka, who was confined to bed, as soon as I learned of the outbreak of war between America and Japan on 8 December 1941, he said:

"So it finally ended in war."

Then for a short time he maintained a sorrowful silence, and continued:

"If I had remained, I should have made all efforts to avoid war." In September 1940 when Mr. Matsuoka resolved to conclude the Tripartite Pact he said to me:

"I am neither pro-Anglo-American nor pro-Italo-German. I am pro-Japanese, and believe in world peace. The Tripartite Pact, the policy of Soviet-Japanese rapprochement and the Japanese-American problem, all these were because I wished to bring about world peace, and because I thought about Japan. If Japan combines with Germany and Italy at this time, the public may say that I am pro-German. In foreign countries they may say that I support aggression. No matter what they may say, I do not care. However, I am absolutely against conquest. Not only am I opposed to Japanese conquest, but I am also opposed to conquest by other countries. If the Tripartite Pact should be used as a tool of aggression, such a pact must not be allowed to exist."

11. The Tripartite Pact was entirely separate from the negotiations among the three Powers which took place before Mr. Matsuoka's time, and was not a continuation of the former negotiations, which took place from the summer of 1938 to about August 1939 between Japan, Germany and Italy. As was informed to the American Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington at the end of August 1939, the former negotiations were absolutely dropped and have no connections with the Tripartite Pact of 1940. Mr. Matsuoka was a man with considerable self-confidence. Mr. Matsuoka was a senior member of the Foreign Ministry and the four or five Foreign Ministers preceding him were his juniors or were absolute amateurs. So Mr. Matsuoka did not think much of the men who preceded him. Mr. Matsuoka often told me as well as other people, that the Japanese diplomacy to date was utterly incompetent, and that fundamental reforms would have to be carried out. So when he became Foreign Minister, he immediately dismissed a large number of higher diplomats including Ambassadors and Ministers. Although this move was severely criticized by the public (some foreign papers called this mass dismissal a clean-out of the pro-Anglo-American school, but that was absolutely not so. Many people of pro-German tendencies were also dismissed), this measure was taken as an unavoidable step to reform diplomacy. Since that was his character, he disliked being bothered with events in the past concerning important diplomatic questions. So he never looked at the Foreign Office

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records concerning the former negotiations between the three Powers, nor did he order his subordinates to study them. At times, some persons spoke of the past negotiations, but he did not listen to them, and said that it belonged to the past and had no bearing on his diplomacy. In this manner, when Mr. Stahmer arrived in Tokyo in the autumn of 1940, at a meeting of the three persons Mr. Stahmer, Mr. Ott and Mr. Matsuoka, Mr. Matsuoka presented them with his own draft and the pact was concluded.

One of the reasons why Mr. Matsuoka conducted diplomacy on his own in the second Konoye Cabinet is due to the following circumstances: In 1940, when Prince Konoye was entrusted with the forming of the cabinet, immediately preceding the formation, a meeting known as the Big Four Conference was held for two or three days, with Konoye, Tojo, Navy Minister Yoshida and Matsuoka taking part at Prince Konoye's private residence. At this conference Mr. Matsuoka stressed that if he were to become Foreign Minister all diplomatic questions would be left to him. If other Ministers were to interfere he would not be able to accept the post. The other three leaders agreed to this. This fact was told to me by Mr. Matsuoka, and ever since, diplomacy was carried on solely by Mr. Matsuoka. These circumstances continued at least until about the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. One day at that time I saw Prince Konoye in the Japanese room at the Premier's official residence on official

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business at the order of Mr. Matsuka, and I remember that Prince Konoye complained about Mr. Matsuka's arbitrary actions.

In this city of Amul, 1947  
at Amul

DEPONENT: SAITO, Yoshie (seal)

I, USHIBA, Nobuhiko hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) USHIBA, Nobuhiko (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAITO, Yoshie (seal)

Ex 3144

Def. Doc. # 1936

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent :- MATSUMOTO, Shunichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, MATSUMOTO, Shunichi, state under oath as follows:

1. I was born in 1897. My present address is Yukigaya-machi, Ota-ku, Tokyo-to.

I entered the Foreign Office in 1921 after graduating from the Tokyo Imperial University, Faculty of Jurisprudence. I was Director of the Treaty Department of the Foreign Office from September 1940 until November 1942.

2. In September 1940 I was recalled from my post as the Councillor of the Japanese Embassy in China (Nanking) to Tokyo and appointed the Director of the Treaty Department of the Foreign Office. I was told by Foreign Minister Matsuoka about matters concerning the Japanese-German negotiations for the Tripartite Pact and was ordered by him to participate therein.

At that time a draft of the Pact had already been drawn up on the basis of

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the  
conversations of Foreign Minister with Mr. Stahmer and Ambassador  
Ott. I participated thereafter until the conclusion of the Pact  
on 27 September 1940 in the technical redaction of the details etc.  
As far as I know, the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact were conduct-  
ed on the Japanese side almost by Foreign Minister Matsuoka alone, and  
Mr. Saito, Ryooi, the Advisor to the Foreign Minister, and I advised  
him on technical matters.

2. Defence Document No. 1656, which is entitled "Outline of the Process  
of Drawing up of Various Drafts and of the Internal Procedure Pertaining  
to the Tripartite Pact of Japan-Germany-Italy", was compiled by me immedi-  
ately after the conclusion of the pact with the purpose of preventing  
the scattering and loss of pertinent documents and of preserving them  
as official records. A limited number thereof was printed in October  
1940 as an official record of the Foreign Office.

The description at the top of "1) Outline of the Process of  
Drawing up of Various Drafts of the Tripartite Pact of Japan-Germany-  
Italy and Pertaining Documents" was written by myself with the purpose  
of explaining the process of the drafting of various documents and their  
relation to each others.

On this 28th day of July, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ M. TSUJIMOTO, Shunichi (seal)



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I, UCHIDA, Fujio hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness : /S/ UCHIDA, Fujio (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ MATSUMOTO, Shunich (seal)

## IN THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al,

Defendants

AFFIDAVIT.

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I, Eugen Ott, after being first duly sworn on oath, do hereby depose and say that I was ambassador from Germany to Japan at some of the times when Ambassador Oshima was the Japanese representative in Germany.

## THE SINGAPORE QUESTION.

I made the survey on the possibilities of a Japanese attack on Singapore in early 1941 thru my own initiative and not in response to any instructions from my government. Oshima had no part in the discussions from the Japanese side.

## THE TRIPARTITE PACT.

In all of the discussions leading up to the Tripartite Pact there never was one word said about aggressive or offensive action, that is by the contracting parties. The main purpose of the agreement was to prevent the entry of the United States into the war. Oshima took no part whatsoever in any of the discussions.

## SUBMARINE TRANSFER.

The transfer of the two submarines was handled purely as a navy transaction. Never have I heard that the Ambassadors of either nation took any active part in the transaction. Their transfer was of no practical value to either country. The actual delivery took place after my tour of duty.

## LACK OF COOPERATION.

Never at any time during my tour of duty in Japan, either as Military Attache or as ambassador was there any real cooperation between the fighting forces of the two countries, Japan and Germany. General Marshal states facts when he says there was no collaboration, that they fought separate wars.

## MATSUOKA'S VISIT TO HITLER

I was with Matsuoka on his tour of Europe and Russia in 1941. The feeling was very cool between the Japanese foreign minister and Ambassador Oshima. No conferences were attended by them together with the exception of the preliminary introductory meetings. After that Oshima attended only the social and informal occasions.

## PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.

Since I was the ranking Germany official in Japan at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, any advance news of the event would have been brought to my attention. It came as a complete surprise to me as well as to the other members of my staff. I was officially informed hours after the occurrence. We Germans were never advised of Japanese Military or Naval plans until after the events took place.

CHINESE JAPANESE WAR.

It was the settled foreign policy of Germany while I was Military Attache and ambassador to help settle the conflict between Kiang Kai Shek and Tokyo. At times success seemed close. I spent considerable effort personally to bring Peace to the Far East by attempting conciliation. My efforts in this direction all failed. Germany cherished her friendly relations with China and valued highly her commercial possibilities. Germany was never favored over other nations in her commercial dealings with Japan, except during the World War II.

This statement was made on the day before my repatriation to Germany. Signed in Shanghai, China, on this 30th day of August, 1947.

EUGEN OTT

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of August, 1947.

ARTHUR R. ROSEN  
Vice Consul of the United  
States at Shanghai, China

極東國際軍事裁判所

近木利加台衆面其他

對

荒木貞夫其他 被告側

口供書

私ユウジエンオツトハ元ツ正當ナル軍醫ヲ行ヒタル後次ノ如ク供述  
チ私ハ大島大使ガ駐獨大使ヲマシ間シバラク駐日從逸大使デアツタ。

シンガポール問題

私ハ私ノ政府カラノ命令ニダヘテハナク只自分ノ考ハカラ日公ガ  
一年ノ初メニ「シンガポール」ヲ攻撃スル可能性ガアルカドウカラ  
々。大島ハコノ機關ノ日本側ニ關係シテキナカツタ。

三國同盟

三國同盟ヲ締結スルニ到ルマテニ行ハレタ練テノ協議ヲ通ジテ攻撃的トカ  
挑発的ト官業ハ締結國間テハ決シテ口ニサレナカツタ。ソノ協約ノ主ナル

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目的ハ合衆國ノ利益ヲ防止スルニアツタ、大島ハドノ協議ニモ少シモ關係シナカツタ

潜水艇ノ移送

潜水艇二隻ノ移送ハ全ク純粋ノ海軍ノ任務トシテ行ハレタ、私ハコノ任務ニ日獨ノドチラノ函ノ大使モ積極的ナ行動ヲトツタ事ハ少シモキイタ事ガナイ、コノ移送ハドチラノ函ニトツタモ實用的價値ハナカツタ、ソノ實際ノ引渡ハ私ノ外地勤務以後ニ行ハレタ

協力ノ排除

私ガ日本ヲ外地勤務中ハ大使館附武官ノ時モ大使ノ時モ決シテ日獨兩國ノ軍部間ニ本當ノ協力ハナカツタ、マーシヤル大將ハ彼等ハ別々ニ戦ツタノチアリ共同工作ハシナカツタトイツチキルガソレハ事實アアル

松岡ノヒットラー勅向

松岡ガ一九四一年歐洲及ロシヤニ旅行シタ時私ハ彼ト一室ニ居タ、日本ノ外務大臣ト大島大使トノ間ノ感情ハ非常ニ冷淡ナモノデアツタ、豫備會議以外ニハ彼ラハ一室ニ會議ニ出席シナカツタ、豫備會議後ハ大島ハ只社交的ナ又ハ非公式ノ場合ノミ出席シタ

Def. Doc. 247D

眞珠灣攻撃

私ハ眞珠灣攻撃ノ際日本ニ於ケル首席ノ劉逸官更デアツタカラコノ事件ニ就イテ何カ前以ツテノ知ラヒガ私ノ恚怒ヲ引イタ筈デアツタノデアル。シカシ他ノ感員ト同ジク私ニトツテモ之レハ余クノ志キデアツタノデアル私ガ公式ニ通告ヲ受ケタノハ事件發生後數時間タツテカラデアツタ殺々獨逸人ハコノ事件發生後迄ハ一言モ日本ノ陸軍ヤ海軍ノ計畫ニツイテ知ラヒテ受ケナカッタノデアル

日支戦争

私ガ大使館附武官デアツタ時モ又大使ダツタ時モ東京ト蔣介石間ノ争ヒノ解決ヲ助ケルコトガ獨逸ノ一員ヘル方針デアツタ時々威助ニ近ツイタカニミエル界モアツタ。私ハ個人的ニモ調停ヲシテ極真ニ平和ヲモタラス爲難當ノ努力ヲシタカシ私ノコノ方面ニ於ケル努力ハコトゴトク失敗ニ終ツタ獨逸ハ中國トノ友好關係ヲ尊重シ簡潔上ノ可能性ヲ高ク評價シタ獨逸ハ日本トノ商業取引上第二次世界戦争中ヲ除イテハ他國ヨリ決シテ好過サレハシナカッタ。

年八月三十日 署名

コノ陳述ハ私ノ獨逸顧問ノ前日ニ行ツタモノデアル中國上海ニテ一九四七年八月三十日 署名

ユウジ エン オット



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

## Sworn Deposition

Deponent: MURATA, Yachiho

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I, MURATA, Yachiho, hereby depose as follows:

(I) I served in the Bureau of Decorations of the Cabinet for more than nine years from February, 1928 (Showa 13) and at present occupy a high position in the Bureau next to the President.

(II) The granting of rewards comes under the charge of the Bureau of Decorations. I have personal knowledge of the rewards that were awarded after I entered the service such as those of the China Incident, and also I know of the rewards prior to the Incident in general since I investigated them as part of my duties.

(III) The extensive rewards granted as in the Manchurian and China Incidents were granted through the following procedure:

(a) First, the standing rules regarding rewards are made according to the decisions of the Cabinet meeting.

(b) Next, the Ministries concerned <sup>of persons</sup> apply to the Bureau of Decorations for rewards within the fixed number, and at the same time have their officials in charge explain to the Bureau their reasons orally.

(c) The Bureau of Decorations on its part expresses its opinion on the above.

(d) Thus, finally, as a result of deliberation on both sides, the rewards bill is drafted.

(e) The above bill is submitted to the Rewards Conference which is composed of fifteen regular councillors (besides two members of the Imperial family) and when the Conference passes the bill, it is presented to the Prime Minister.

(f) The Prime Minister reports of it to the Throne to obtain Imperial sanction.

(g) When Imperial sanction is given, the rewards are then granted.

(IV) Even with rewards on a small scale as the time of the anti-Comintern act, the same procedure as mentioned above was used with the exception that standing rules were not made.

(V) The rewards include the grant of decorations, cups and money.



(VI) Those who were granted rewards in the Manchurian Incident total 452,826. Among them, those who rendered distinguished services (given the Order of the Golden Kite) reached 9,096; those who performed meritorious service (chiefly given the Order of the Rising Sun) numbered 158,593 and those who rendered services (chiefly given the Order of the Sacred Treasure), 153,881. Among those who were awarded the rewards are WAKATSUKI, Reijiro (given a set of gold cups), SHIDEMURA, Kijuro (given a set of gold cups), General UGAKI, Kazushige (given a set of gold cups), HAYASHI, Ryujiro (given the 2nd Class Order of the Rising Sun), MORISHIMA, Morito (given the 4th Class Order of the Rising Sun, 2nd Class) and Major General TANAKA, Ryukichi (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 4th Class in the first awards and the 3rd Class Order in the second). WAKATSUKI, SHIDEMURA and UGAKI were given a set of gold cups respectively in lieu of decorations because they had already higher class decorations.

(VII) Those who were granted rewards at the time of the anti-Comintern Pact total 49; of which 11 were given decorations and 38 were given cups. Among those who were given decorations were ARIDA, Ichiro (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 1st Class, as Foreign Minister), MIKIYAKOJI, Kintomo (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 1st Class, as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Germany), HORINOUCHI, Kenjiro (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 2nd Class, as Vice-Foreign Minister) and KURAYAMA, Gungo (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 3rd Class, as Director of the Treaty Bureau in the Foreign Office). Among those who were granted silver cups were HAYASHI, Raizaburo (given a set of silver cups as the Minister of Justice) and IWAMURA, Michiyo (given a silver cup as the Director of the Bureau of Criminal Affairs).

(VIII) Those who were granted rewards in the China Incident total 3,319,548. Among them, those who rendered A-Class distinguished services reached 3,370 and those who rendered E-Class distinguished services, 132,992 (they were both given the Orders of the Golden Kite); next, those who performed meritorious service (chiefly given the Orders of the Rising Sun) reached 1,768,053 and those who rendered exceptional services (chiefly given the Orders of the Sacred Treasure) reached 605,173. Among those who were granted decorations were Lieutenant General ISHIHARA, Kanji (given the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 1st Class) and Major General TANAKA, Ryukichi (given the Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class, and the Order of the Rising Sun, 2nd Class).

(IX) There was no one who was granted rewards in recognition of their services in concluding the Triple Alliance on September 27, 1900. On the other hand, 15 persons were granted rewards in consideration of their services in concluding the Anglo-Japanese Pact in 1902 (Meiji 35) and a total of 29 were given rewards for their services in concluding the French-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Pacts in 1907 (Meiji 40).

(X) Formerly, some were created peers in recognition of their meritorious services in war and in conclusion of treaties. Creation of peerage, however, is in the charge of the Bureau of Peerage and Hereditary in the Imperial Household Department and is not within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Decorations, so I am not in a position to speak about the matter.

On this 19th day of August, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: MURATA, Yachiho (seal)

2,

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I, SAKUMA Shin, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: Defense Counsel at the IMTFE

/s/ Shin Sakuma (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Yachiho Murata (seal)

ERRATA SHEET

Cap 3147

Defense Document No. 2120

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	
1	2nd line sub-para (b)	Insert after "fixed number" - "of persons"
2	5th	Insert after "rendered" "exceptional"
2	9th	Add after "given the" - "4th Class"
2	10th	Strike out "2nd Class"
2	3rd para 4th line	Strike out "meritoriously" add "meritorious service"

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143/147

Leg. Doc.  
2/18/50

極東國際貿易裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫

其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 村田八千鶴

私、村田八千鶴ハ、本國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上、次ノ如ク供述致シマス。

(一) 私ハ昭和十三年二月カラ今日ニ至ルマテ前總約九在條内閣賞勳局ニ勤務シ、現在ハ賞勳局事務官トシテ、同局総裁ニ次グ地位ヲ占メテ居リマス。

(二) 行賞ハ賞勳局ノ管轄スル所デアリマス。私ガ賞勳局ニ勤務シタル以後ノ行賞切ヘバ支那並ニ行賞等ニツイテハ、私ハ直接的知識ヲ持ツテ居リマスガ、其レ以前ノ行賞ニツイテモ職務上取調べタノテ大体之レヲ知ツテ居リマス。

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Chief Dec. 2/21/21

(三) 滿洲、支那兩事變行賞ノ如ク大規模ノ行賞

ハ左ノ如キ手續ニヨリ行ハレマシム。

(イ) 先ツ閣議決定ニ依リ賞賜内規ヲ制定シ  
マス。

(ロ) 次テ關係各省ハ一定ノ人員ニ對シ行賞  
アリ度キ旨ノ申請書ヲ賞勳局ニ提出ス  
ルト共ニ、係官ヲシテ其ノ理由其ノ他  
ヲ口頭ヲ以テ賞勳局ニ説明致サセマス。

(ハ) 賞勳局側ハ右ニ對シ自己ノ意見ヲ表明  
シマス。

(ニ) 斯ク兩者協議ノ結果行賞案ヲ決定シマ  
ス。

(ホ) 右案ヲ議定官定員十五名（外ニ皇族二  
名）ヨリ成ル賞勳會議ニ付諮シ、同會  
議ガ之ヲ可決シタ時ハ、之ヲ内閣總理  
大臣ニ提出致シマス。

(ヘ) 總理大臣ハ右案ヲ上奏シ、御裁可ヲ奏  
請致シマス。

(ト) 御裁可アリタル時ハ之ニヨリ行賞ガ行  
ハレルデアリマス。

- (四) 防共協定行賞ノ如キ小規模ノ行賞ノ手續モ、  
賞賜内規ヲ作ラナイコト以外ハ石ニ述ベタ所  
ト同ジデアリマス。
- (五) 賞賜ノ内容ハ敘勳、賜杯、副金等デアリマス。
- (六) 滿洲移住テ行賞サレタ者ノ總數ハ四五二・八  
二六名デス。其ノ中殊勳（金鷄勳章ヲ賜ハル  
）ハ九・〇九六名、勳功（主トシテ旭日章ヲ  
賜ハル）ハ一五八・五九三名、勳勞（主トシ  
テ瑞寶章ヲ賜ハル）ハ一五三・八八一名デア  
リマス。石行賞サレタ者ノ中ニハ、若槻禮次  
郎氏（金杯一組ヲ賜ハル）、菅原喜直郎氏（  
金杯一組ヲ賜ハル）、宇垣一成陸軍大將（金  
杯一組ヲ賜ハル）、森島守人氏（勳四等旭日章ヲ  
賜ハル）、田中隆吉陸軍少將（第一次行賞ニ  
於テ勳四等旭日章ヲ、又第二次行賞ニ於テ勳  
三等旭日章ヲ賜ハル）等モ含まレテキマス。  
尙若槻、菅原、宇垣ノ三氏が各金杯一組ヲ賜  
ハツタノハ各氏共既に上級ノ勳章ヲ有ツテ居  
ルノチ勳章ノ代リニ金杯ヲ賜ハツタノデアリ  
マシタ。



Def. Dec 2/1900

(七) 防共協定ヲ行賞サレタ者ノ總數ハ銀勳十一名

賜杯三十八名計四十九名ナス。銀勳サレタ者

ノ中ニハ有田八郎氏(外相トシテ勳一等旭日

章ヲ賜ハル、武者小部公共氏(特命全權大使

(薩獨)トシテ勳一等旭日章ヲ賜ハル)、堀

内藤介氏(外務次官トシテ勳二等旭日章ヲ賜

ハル)、栗山茂氏(外務省條約局長トシテ勳

三等旭日章ヲ賜ハル)等モ含マレ、又銀杯ヲ

賜ハツタ者ノ中ニハ林彌三郎氏(司按大臣ト

シテ銀杯一組ヲ賜ハル)、岩村通世氏(刑部

局長トシテ銀杯一箇ヲ賜ハル)等モ含マレテ

居リマス。

(六)

支那軍艦ヲ行賞サレタ者ノ總數ハ三・三一

・五四八名ナス。其ノ中深勳甲ハ三・三七〇

名、深勳乙ハ一八二・九九二名(此ノ兩者ハ

金鷄勳章ヲ賜ハリマス)、次ニ勳(主トシ

テ旭日章ヲ賜ハル)ハ一・七六八・〇五三名、

勳勞(主トシテ瑞寶章ヲ賜ハル)ハ六〇五、

一七三名ナス。

石叟勳サレタ者ノ中ニハ石原莞爾中將(

勳一等瑞寶章ヲ賜ハル)、田中盛吉少將(功

三等金鷄勳章及ヒ勳二等旭日章ヲ賜ハル)等

1890 Dec. 2/26

モ含マレテ居リマス。

(九) 一九四〇年九月二十七日ノ三國同盟締結ノ功ニ依リ行賞サレタ者ハ全然アリマセン。之レニ反シ明治三十五年日英協約締結ノ功ニ依リ叙勳サレタ者ハ十五名デアリ、又明治四十年日露兩協約等締結ノ功ニ依リ叙勳サレタ者ハ合計二十九名デアリマシタ。

(三) 従前戦争、條約締結等ニ關スル功ニ依リ授賞サレタ者ガアリマシタガ、授賞ハ官内省宗秩寮ノ管掌スル所デアリ、叙勳局ノ所管ニ付シマセンノテ、私ハ其レニツキ何等卓上ゲルコトガ出来マセン。

昭和二十二年八月十九日 東京ニ於テ

供述者 村田 八千穂 (印)

石ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ直管供述シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス。

同日同所ニ於テ

立會人 板東山際三壽家判所辯護人  
辯護士 佐久間 信 (印)

5.



1

Nov Dec. 2/20

聖書

良心ニ従ヒ福音ヲ施ス者ハ其ノ手ヲ裁キテ又何事  
ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ欲ス

結 三 八 子 語 (17)

Def. Doof 2120

EXHIBIT #

31717

辯護側文書第 三二二〇 號

正 誤

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五百初めより 四百終りより二行目 五十六行目	頁數及び行數	田中降吉少將 田中降吉陸軍少將	誤
		明治四十年 日露兩協約	誤
		明治四十年日佛 及び日露兩協約	正

Def.Doc.# 2463

EXHIBIT # 3154

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT: BABA, Shachi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF BABA, SHACHI

1, I was born at my permanent domicile, No. 64 Shibamotomachi, Aza Shimogamo, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto City on August 18th, (the 27th year of Meiji); the present address is 545, Tatsumi-machi, Fujisawa City, Kanagawa Prefecture.

2. I went to Manchuria in 1936 (Showa 11) and studied the opium problem. I became executive manager of the Hsinking Central Anti-Opium Committee (central organ for anti-opium policy in Manchoukuo) in January 1940 (Showa 15). I was given policy in Manchoukuo in January 1940 (Showa 15). I was given the position of non-regular member of the Manchoukuo Anti-Opium General Bureau together with the position of secretary of the Manchoukuo Anti-Opium Society until the end of the war, and in the former capacity served in carrying out Manchurian anti-opium policies.

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In 1942 I travelled through Central, South and North China to investigate, according to instructions from the Manchoukuo government, the opium administration and general opium conditions. I was able to obtain materials of various kinds by which I investigated the general condition of opium in China. I was also present at the Manchurian and Chinese Liaison conference concerning this opium problem.

Concerning opium I wrote the following books:

"Outline of the History of Chinese Opium" 1940.

"The History of the Eastern Penetration of Opium" 1941

"Establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere in East Asia and the Opium Policy" 1943.

"The Race and Opium" 1944.

3. In 9th year of Kotaku (In 1942) I was ordered to investigate the condition of opium administration in North China.

I investigated the condition of opium in the provinces administered by the North China Political Council at that time the North China Political Council established the Anti-Opium General Bureau in Peiping with nine branches under its control and charged them with the anti-opium administration. Its policies were as follows:-

Application of addicts' registration system; sale of opium for the medical treatment of the registered addicts; medical treatment of the existing addicts, etc. The administration was still in a preparatory stage.

The opium policy in north China was similar to that of Manchoukuo in its principle of prohibition by gradually decreasing the amount of opium generally consumed. A perfect monopoly system had not yet been established. The whole sale buying and selling were entirely left to the Chinese a company named the Raw Opium Company of purely private management acting as the representative organ of the monopoly. Nevertheless, the raw opium which the government had the Raw Opium Company buy up was not enough to meet the demand; the government, therefore, bought about 3,500,000 Tael of raw opium (the unit of opium

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weight in North China is 31 grammes for one tael) every year from the Mongolian Government.

In North China many opium smokers did not register for several reasons. That is, there was no difference between the price of official opium and secretly sold opium, and those who registered had to pay a registration tax for opium lamps and opium pipes, while those who did not register could get prepared-opium without difficulty at the same price whenever they wanted to. Consequently, many did not register, thereby making the registration extremely uncertain. The number of chronic addicts of opium, by the Estimate of the North China Political Council, was thought to be not less than 3 per cent of the whole population that is, 2,225,000.

As to Anti-opium work, especially in the line of control, one nation or one district by itself cannot accomplish the purpose. Therefore, regarding control of smuggling done in the districts of Peiping and Tientsin, North China and Manchuria, since they all had difficulties in common they frequently held liaison conferences and made common in the hope of finding a solution.

The North China Political Council ordered nine sanatoriums under the branches of the General Bureau to apply Tungkuang Medicine Treatment and distributed the medicine to other noted hospitals, official and private; thus the healing and salvation of the patients was effectively started. The Tatung coal mine in Mongolia decided to apply this method to miners, in view of the good effect Tungkuang Treatment might have in enhancing efficiency of labor, with considerable success.

As a Manchurian official connected with the policy of opium prohibition, I am well informed of Japan's policy toward China concerning opium..

The Japanese Government adopted a non-interference policy in this point of opium administration, preferring that China herself deal with matters concerning China, and took an attitude of cooperating with the Chinese Anti-Opium Policy, based upon the spirit of the International Opium

Convention. The Japanese Government maintained a strong stand in rendering indirect help to the enforcement of the opium policy in China whenever requests were made by the Chinese.

#### Outline of Anti-Opium Policy Adopted by Manchoukuo

When it was first established, Manchoukuo decided to forbid the use of opium and other narcotics. In November 1932, the Anti-Opium Act was promulgated as an ordinance of the State Council, and at the same time a rescript was given to the people in the name of the Premier ordering them to break their national habit of the use of opium and other narcotics.

Simultaneously with the issue of the Opium Act, the new government set about the task of the long neglected administrative readjustment which was necessary for the enforcement of the new act. The 10-year plan for the anti-opium campaign was formed and officially announced on October 12, 1937.

In the execution of this 10-year plan the Manchoukuo Government paid the utmost attention to the practical method for effecting a radical cure of the registered addicts within 10 years.

It was natural that various plans for the medical treatment of the registered addicts, which were prescribed in the enforcement plans of the 10-Year Anti-Opium Policy, required a great expense and an enormously large-scale mechanism. At the outset five anti-opium hospitals were projected, but later their number was quickly doubled and further, plans were formed to build one hospital of this kind in each of the provinces, cities, prefectures and Mongolian villages.

Thus at the end of 1941 two national hospitals and 189 minor ones, including those established respectively by provinces, cities and Mongolian villages, had been completed and they were renamed "Kangsheng-yuans". The smaller of these hospitals were equipped with 30 beds and the larger with as many as 390 or more, each addict being permitted to receive hospital treatment, as a rule, for a month.

The number of the registered addicts that had amounted to over 700,000 in 1938 yearly decreased, and in 1944, they numbered 230,923.

The Manchukuo government, with the aim of furthering this 10 year Anti-Opium Policy, in January 1940 established the Anti-Opium Bureau by putting together the Anti-Opium Section (formerly in People's Welfare Ministry), and the Opium Section and the Opium Factory in the Monopoly Bureau. This new system, the unifying of organization and management -- greatly advanced the development of the opium administration of the country.

Though slight changes occurred now and then the general system of opium administration after 1940 was as follows:--

The central bureau was the Anti Opium Bureau and it had its branches in each of the provinces, cities, prefectures and Mongolian Villages, these being in one unified system. Among the 191 hospitals established for the cure of opium addicts, those of the state establishment were managed by the Anti Opium Bureau, the others were left by the government to the management of the provinces, cities, prefectures and Mongolian villages, with direct connection with the central bureau, thereby forming an effective part of the Anti Opium organization. Opium and narcotic were to be distributed only to registered addicts to be used as medicine till the cure was finished. What differed in Manchoukuo from other countries in this point of opium control was this:--

1. None but the registered persons could buy opium.
2. The government yearly decreased the amount of opium official sale until after 1942 no more than one parcel 1 gram a day was allowed to be sold to one person.
3. The return of the opium-ashes and parcel paper was made compulsory.

As above stated, Manchoukuo made a strict limitation on the official sale of opium, using the Opium Administration Offices directly managed by the Opium Administration Divisions in each of the cities, prefectures and mongolian villages.

When Manchoukuo decided, as stated above, to institute the Anti Opium Campaign, the greatest problem was how to deal with the registered Opium addicts, numbering more than 700,000 in 1938. By the expenditure of amounts in managing hospitals and by fully mobilizing materials as well as people, a system planned and carried out.

With these efforts, especially with the application of the Tungkiang medical treatment, the Manchoukuo Government was accomplishing the aim of the anti-opium campaign, which seemed about impossible at the beginning. In 1944, namely in the 8th year of the ten year anti-opium campaign, the number of registered smokers was only 230,000. It was expected that in the three provinces of Tungan, Chiontao and Lungkow opium sales could be suspended at the end of 1944, as opium smokers in those provinces should number zero by that time.

At the end of the eighth year of the 10-Year Anti-Opium Policy the Anti-Opium Association was established as a juridical person by an Imperial Ordinance. The whole people of the state thus stood together for the development of the Anti-Opium movement by putting together the forces of educational, cultural, religious and moral organization as well as of the government.

KU TSU-HENG, the Minister of Communications, who had an enthusiastic interest in the promotion of public welfare in Manchoukuo, used to tell me as follows: "The most successful of the policies taken by the Japanese in Manchoukuo is the anti-opium policy, and this has borne remarkable results."



Def. Doc.# 2463

On this 28 day of Aug., 1947

At I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT BABA Shachi (seal)

I, IMANARI Yasutaro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) IMANARI Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

BABA Shachi (seal)

Ep 3155

Def. Doc. No. 1801 and 1802-A to E

I certify that the above was prepared by the Land Survey Department from the investigations of the above investigators.

17 June 1947

Chief of the Geographical Survey Bureau  
of the Home Ministry

MUTŌ Katsuhiko (seal)

The above was signed and sealed in the presence of this witness.


The same date

Witness IDEDA Sumihisa (seal)

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C E R T I F I C A T E

1:100,000 Map of Manchuria

1. OBO-DO MIAO

Was issued by the Land Survey Department in 1935 (after revision of the print because a part of the map, the mail-road, was resurveyed by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army in 1934), based on a Russian map prepared in 1906 (rough survey, meaning that a map is prepared after basic points have been obtained through astronomical survey).

2. LAKE BOIR DALAI

Same as above

3. NOR-IN-BALTA

Print made and printed in 1936 by the Land Survey Department from a map surveyed and printed in 1935 by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army.

4. IHA-BUR-FUN MIAO

Print made and printed in 1933 by the Land Survey Department from a Russian map prepared in 1906 (rough survey, meaning that a map is prepared after obtaining basic points through astronomical survey).

5. JAN-JUN MIAO

Print made and printed by the Land Survey Department from a map surveyed and prepared by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army in 1935.

6. 1:500,000 Map of Manchuria

HAILAR SAPPA

Print made in 1932 from a map compiled and prepared by the Land Survey Department with 1:100,000 map of Manchuria as material.

7. The secret numbers on the back of the map were stamped by the Land Survey Department for the purpose of placing the secret maps in order.

17 June 1947

Investigators,

Home Ministry Engineer	FUJISHIRO SUZUTARŌ
Home Ministry Engineer	IKEDA TOKISABURŌ
Non-Official member	SATŌ SHIN-ICHI





C E R T I F I C A T E

1:200,000 Map of Manchuria

1. OBO-DO MIAO

Was issued by the Land Survey Department in 1935 (after revision of the print because a part of the map, the mail-road, was resurveyed by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army in 1934), based on a Russian map prepared in 1906 (rough survey, meaning that a map is prepared after basic points have been obtained through astronomical survey).

2. LAKE BOIR DALAI

Same as above

3. NOR-IN-BALTA

Print made and printed in 1936 by the Land Survey Department from a map surveyed and printed in 1935 by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army.

4. IHA-BUR-FUN MIAO

Print made and printed in 1933 by the Land Survey Department from a Russian map prepared in 1906 (rough survey, meaning that a map is prepared after obtaining basic points through astronomical survey).

5. JAN-JUN MIAO

Print made and printed by the Land Survey Department from a map surveyed and prepared by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army in 1935.

6. 1:500,000 Map of Manchuria

HAILAR SAPPA

Print made in 1932 from a map compiled and prepared by the Land Survey Department with 1:100,000 map of Manchuria as material.

7. The secret numbers on the back of the map were stamped by the Land Survey Department for the purpose of placing the secret maps in order.

17 June 1947

Investigators,

Home Ministry Engineer	FUJISHIRO SUZUTARŌ
Home Ministry Engineer	IKEDA TOKISABURŌ
Non-Official member	SATŌ SHIN-ICHI

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. No. 1801 and 1802-A to E

I certify that the above was prepared by the Land Survey  
Department from the investigations of the above investigators.

17 June 1947

Chief of the Geographical Survey Bureau,  
of the Home Ministry

MUTŌ Katsuhiko (seal)

The above was signed and sealed in the presence of this witness.


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Witness IDEDA Sumihisa (seal)


鄂博圖

3156

軍事機密



廣州上方分圖西北行北段其標高十六號



RETURN TO ROOM 361


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
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


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
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 RETURN TO ROOM 361







秘密 軍事

中華民國八十七年九月一日  
 陸軍第七九四口部 參謀長 吳

1. 本圖係根據...  
 2. 本圖之比例尺為...  
 3. 本圖之等高距為...  
 4. 本圖之投影法為...  
 5. 本圖之坐標系統為...  
 6. 本圖之繪圖日期為...  
 7. 本圖之繪圖人員為...  
 8. 本圖之繪圖地點為...  
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 18. 本圖之繪圖注意事項為...  
 19. 本圖之繪圖參考文獻為...  
 20. 本圖之繪圖其他說明為...

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




布哈伊

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軍機極秘


滿洲十分分圖西北八段且爾湖十七號



備考ハ本ノ以テ示ス  
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
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
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測人 和正 年八八八 月五十二 日...







I.

Е-4 3157

# КАРТА ВОСТОЧНОЙ ЧАСТИ

**СССР**

**С ПРИЛЕГАЮЩИМИ ГОСУДАРСТВАМИ**

СОСТАВЛЕНА И ИЗДАНА

ВОЕННО-ТОПОГРАФИЧЕСКИМ ОТДЕЛОМ

1884 г.

и исправлена Карт. Отделом УВТ в 1932 году






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Масштаб 1:50 000 в декарте


КАРТА ВОСТОЧНОЙ ЧАСТИ СССР С ПРИЛЕГАЮЩИМИ ГОСУДАРСТВАМИ

ГОРБАЧЬ

1951







PHILIPPINES

ЗАРПАЗЕНЕ БОРНИХ ТОГОПФОР



ЗАРПАЗЕНЕ БОРНИХ ТОГОПФОР

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
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
THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE  
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


УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ВОЕННЫМ Топографом

Великопольский уезд  
VI Новосибирский лист

В ЗАДАЧЕ ЧАСТИ СССР С ПРИНАДЛЕЖАЮЩИМИ ГОСУДАРСТВАМИ






1:50,000  
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY  
Topographic Map  
Scale 1:50,000  
1954 Edition  
Revised 1968

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U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY  
Topographic Map  
Scale 1:50,000  
1954 Edition  
Revised 1968

УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ВОЕННЫХ ТОПОГРАФОВ  
Великий Новгород  
VIII (ВЛАДИВОСТОК)

КАРТА АЗНАТСКОЙ ЧАСТИ СССР С ПРИЛЕЖАЮЩИМИ ГОСУДАРСТВАМИ





INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

H.G.W. Woodhead

H.G.W. Woodhead, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:

1. I have been acquainted with the former Ch'ing Emperor, sometimes known as Henry P'u-yi, for a great many years, and especially during the years that he resided in Tientsin I was a close friend, saw him often and was well acquainted with his personality and character.

2. In September 1932 I made a visit to Manchuria to study the situation. After brief visits to Dairen and Mukden I proceeded to Changchun, the new capital. I had hardly reached the hotel there when a young Chinese Foreign Office official called to say that the Chief Executive, Mr. P'u-yi, had heard of my coming, and would be pleased to receive me at 10:30 next morning. This young man, Mr. Ya, who can converse equally readily in Chinese, English, Japanese and Russian, called for me in good time and escorted me to the former Emperor's residence. After a wait of a few minutes in the official reception-room, a message was received that the Chief Executive would see me in his private apartments, to which I was immediately conducted.

3. The former Emperor greeted me with obvious pleasure, and had scarcely invited me to be seated before he remarked that on one of the last occasions on which I had seen him, in October 1930, at a private lunch in Tientsin, I had remarked that perhaps next time we met he might not be so accessible; that I might have to invoke the assistance of a Foreign Office official. "You see," he observed, "that your prophecy has been fulfilled." After I had inquired after the Empress, and he had asked for information regarding several of his former foreign friends in Tientsin, I told him that later I should like to put some formal questions to him for my newspaper articles, but asked whether first I might put some personal and unusually frank questions, as a friend. He answered that I might ask him anything that I liked.

4. I then said that it would be of interest to many of his friends to know whether he was really happy in his present position. He replied with emphasis that he was.

Was he busy?

Not, he said, so busy at the moment as he was a few months ago. The administrative machinery was now better organized, and though he devoted a considerable portion of every day to State business, he was not too busy to find time to see his friends.

5. I then remarked that the general impression that prevailed in Shanghai and indeed throughout China was that he had been coerced into his present position, and that he was not a free agent.



From this report he emphatically dissented. He had, he maintained, been actuated by a double motive in accepting the office of Chief Executive. First, on account of political reasons. When the Manchu Dynasty abdicated it had been with the avowed intention of restoring the sovereignty to the people. Twenty years had elapsed since, but what had been the result? The political power had passed not into the hands of the people, but of ambitious and grasping militarists. There had been incessant civil war and disorder. The welfare of the people had been entirely disregarded. They had been tyrannized over and oppressed. China's relations with Foreign Powers had grown steadily worse. And the pledge made in the Abdication Treaty that absolute equality would be maintained between the five races of China had been flagrantly violated.

Secondly, he was actuated by personal motives. Manchuria was his ancestral home. It was only natural that he should feel greatly interested in what was happening in this territory. Moreover, every undertaking to the Manchu Dynasty contained in the Abdication Agreement had been wantonly violated. The allowance to be paid to him by the State had been cancelled. His private property had been confiscated. He had been treated with studied disrespect by the Kuomintang. And the ancestral tombs had been violated, and no serious attempt made to secure the restoration of the treasures stolen from them.

It was only natural therefore, that when trouble occurred in Manchuria he should follow developments with great attention and wonder whether he was not destined to play some part in an attempt to improve the condition of his ancestral provinces. Emmissaries of the separatist movement called upon him in Tientsin and urged him to proceed to Manchuria. And at last he felt that if he were ever to go he must go forthwith or he might find it impossible to leave.

The possibility of a restoration movement, he said, was obviously known to and feared by General Chiang Kai-shek, who offered temporarily to restore the Conditions of Favourable Treatment if he (P'u-yi) would repudiate it. He had intimated, however, that material considerations would not influence him; that the Republican Government could best fulfill its responsibilities by concerning itself with the welfare of the people, by giving them good government, and by restoring internal peace. If it had Tls. 4,000,000 (the amount of the Emperor's annual pension, as stipulated in the Abdication Agreement) to spend, let it spend that sum on relieving existing poverty in China.

6. When he had decided to leave Tientsin for Manchuria he did not even take the Japanese Consul-General into his confidence.

"Then the story that you were kidnapped and sent to Port Arthur under Japanese escort on a destroyer is not true?"

Mr. P'u-yi, who understands English quite well, threw back his head and roared with laughter. "Kidnapped?" he said, "Kidnapped? No, No."

I told him that that was the version of his departure from Tientsin that was widely current and generally believed, and asked whether I might be told the actual details of his movements, adding that what he had told me up till then was confidential, but that as a matter of historical interest I should like to know exactly what happened when he left Tientsin.



Mr. P'u-yi replied that his movements had had to be kept secret for two reasons: first, because his departure from Tientsin might have been frustrated; secondly, because he would have been in considerable danger of assassination had his whereabouts been revealed.

He left Tientsin just as the trouble between the Japanese and Chinese in that city started, and traveled direct to Yinkow (Newchwang) on the steamer Awachi Maru. He left a letter behind to be delivered to the Japanese Consul-General informing him of the departure, and asking him to afford adequate protection to the Empress (who remained in his residence in the Japanese Concession) when she followed. From Newchwang he proceeded to Tang Kung Tzu (the hot springs between Liacyang and Tashihchao), where he remained only a couple of days, returning to meet his wife at Port Arthur. She also traveled on an ordinary steamer. The next few weeks were spent at that center, where he amused himself by studying the siege operations in the Russo-Japanese War and visiting the ruins of the former Russian fortifications. He and his wife then returned to Tang Kung Tzu, where they lived quietly until he proceeded to Changchun. When he was convinced that it was his duty to go north and assume the office of Chief Executive, he went straight through to Changchun by train. At no time, in Tientsin, in the Leased Territory, or in Manchuria, was he ever under any restraint, nor was any coercion applied to him.

7. The former Emperor emphasized that I had seen from my own experience how nonsensical the stories told about his position in Changchun were. Here we were, talking without restriction, with only a young Chinese present, who made no attempt to direct the course of conversation, and who only interpreted my remarks and questions when Mr. P'u-yi did not understand them, with no Japanese within hearing, and absolutely no restriction upon the topics discussed. Could I, he asked, really believe that he was virtually a state prisoner under such conditions?

8. I asked his views on the government of Manchoukuo, and he at once replied that he favored the adoption of the Wang Tao doctrine, based upon the teachings of Confucius. "Heaven," he said, "did not divide people into nations, but regarded them all as human beings and desired peace between them, and love. Competition and strife between nations only led to war and intense suffering. Confucius taught that governments should rule honestly, observe the golden rule toward each other, and work for humanity and peace. That crystallized the Oriental spirit. That was the spirit in which Manchoukuo had issued its declaration of independence. We are opposed to racial and national animosities. That is why we call this the Ta Tung (Great Equal) era. We should like to have the friendliest relations with Great Britain and all the other Powers. And we believe that we can contribute towards the realization of world peace. Our domestic policy will aim at making it possible to lead peaceful and happy lives. We shall have no political parties in the new State. They only make for disharmony. We shall do our utmost to show ourselves trustworthy in our foreign relations. I hope that the people of your country (Great Britain) will understand and appreciate our attitude. We shall welcome the investment of their capital in enterprises in Manchoukuo. We shall be pleased to have them come and dwell among us. For many years I had a British tutor (Sir Reginald Johnston), and I therefore acquired some knowledge of British history and civilization and principles. Therefore I have a special interest in fostering friendly relations between Great Britain and Manchoukuo. Your Sovereign, King George, has already been acquainted with my views."

.Def. Doc. 2483

9. Mr. P'u-yi admitted the gravity of the bandit situation, but said that though recently aggravated by external influences, it was not a new problem and required all to give all the assistance in their power to eliminate this evil. In this connection, he paid a very warm tribute to General Mutō, the Chief of the Japanese delegation to Manchoukuo. Very friendly personal relations had been established between them as a result of General Mutō's recent visit to Changchun to extend his Government's formal recognition to Manchoukuo. And he felt confident that General Mutō would help to smooth over past and present difficulties.

10. Mr. P'u-yi had informed me when I arrived that he would be at my disposal until noon and that he had ordered luncheon to be prepared for me, but that owing to the fact that he was on a diet in consequence of his infected foot, he would not be able to share the meal. He handed me over, however, to his younger brother, the former Prince P'u-chia, and then bade me farewell.

After lunch he once more took me upstairs where he presented me with his latest photograph and bade me revisit him at the earliest opportunity. Almost his last remark was that perhaps I had been able to convince myself by now that he was perfectly happy in his present office.

11. About seventeen months later I again paid a brief visit to Hsinking (Changchun) to be present at the enthronement of Mr. P'u-yi as Emperor of Manchoukuo. The actual ceremony by which he was installed upon the Throne of the earlier members of his Dynasty took place during the morning of March 1, 1934. The Emperor accorded me a private interview on February 28. I found him looking well and obviously pleased at the turn of events. He conversed with me freely for a quarter of an hour, allowed me to take several snapshots of him, and in the belief that I should broadcast a description of the ceremony to Great Britain, gave me a message to the British nation. (The arrangements for the broadcast were cancelled.) As I was leaving, the Emperor placed his hand on my shoulder, saying how pleased he was to see his "old friend", and invited me to come back for a longer talk later.

Further the affiant saith not.

H.G.W. Woodhead

Colony of Hong Kong )  
City of Victoria )  
Consulate General of the ) ss  
United States of America )

Colony of Hong Kong )  
City of Victoria )

Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authority, this 20th day of August 1947.

W. D. Boyd

Vice-Counsel of the United States  
of America

Def. Doc. #2239

Exh. No. 3159

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

**FILE COPY**

**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

Sworn Deposition

Deponent :-KASHIWA Toku.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I am KASHIWA Toku. I served in Jehol, Manchoukuo from December 1940 to February 1942 as the commander of the 9th Independent Guard Unit. The duty of the unit was guarding the railroad and maintaining order; the area under its jurisdiction was a part of Jehol Province and a part of West Heingan Prov.

At first I was under direct command of the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army; but from August 1941 I came under the command of the commander of the Kwantung Defense Army. Its strength was three Independent Guard infantry battalions and the number of men was a little less than 3,000. In Jehol Province there was, besides my guard unit, a military police corps, but no other Japanese troops were stationed there.

The unit headquarters was in Chengteh; the headquarters of the battalions were in Chengteh, Chihfeng, and Kupehkow, and each carried out its functions within its area. Each battalion was divided into smaller units which were stationed at various places. In Pingchuan, there was a small unit of about 40 or 50 men led by a company commander.

The Manchoukuo Army had a military district in Jehol Province and had its headquarters in Chengteh, and one brigade each was stationed in Chihfeng and Kupehkow.

At that time order was well preserved except for two or three thousand soldiers of the 8th Route Army who came and went

Def. Doc. #2239

around the Manchu-North China border with North China as their base. In June 1941 a sweeping campaign against the 8th Route Army was staged around the Sino-Manchoukuo an border. At this time my unit was temporarily reinforced with two battalions from the Kwantung Army, with which battalions campaign of subjugation was carried out within North China and around the border in cooperation with the North China Garrison.

As Jehol Province had opium plantations, the 8th Route Army came into the villages and sometimes did some harm to the natives in order to get opium for their military fund. In those cases the guard unit cleaned them up with the cooperation of the Manchoukuo Army and the provincial officials.

Peace and order were kept well in the Pingohuan district and force was never used as it was unnecessary. Even at the time of the cleaning up of the 8th Route Army in June 1941, was kept in normal condition. It is quite untrue that any massacre of natives happened around Pingohuan at about August 1941, and I have neither ever received any report of such an occurrence nor heard anything about it. Though it was specifically claimed that this massacre was performed by Japanese and Manchoukuo an troops, that is quite impossible because it was my principle always to avoid having Japanese and Manchoukuo troops at the same time in the same place and I always set the areas for troop movements for both armies and required them to act separately.

On this day of April, 1947

On this 8th day of April, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /S/ KASHIWA Toku (seal)

I, ONO Kisaku, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ ONO Kisaku (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KASHIWA Toku (seal)

Rev. Acc. # 2242 Ex 3/60

GROUP	COUNTRY	CHARACTER OF FACTS	TIME	INCIDENTS	APPROX.	DATE	GEN. ACROSS BOUNDARY
GROUP 1 - AGAINST PEACE	1	China & East Asia	1 Jan 1922 - 3 Apr 1927	Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	2	East Asia		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	3	Manchuria Mongolia		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	4	Manchuria		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	5	China		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	6	U.S.A.		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	7	BRITAIN		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	8	AUSTRALIA		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	9	NEW ZEALAND		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	10	CANADA		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	11	INDIA		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	12	PHILIPPINE		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	13	HOLLAND		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	14	FRENCH CHINA		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	15	SIAM		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	16	SOVIET UNION		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	17	INDONESIA		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	18	CHINA		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	19	USA		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	20	PHILIPPINE		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	21	BRITAIN		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	22	FRENCH INDO CHINA		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	23	SIAM		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
	24	CHANG KU FENG		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League
25	NORONHAN		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League	
26	INDONESIA		Subversion of the East Asian League		1922	East Asian League	

COMMON PLAN AND CONSPIRACY

PLAN AND PREPARATION

INITIATED WAR

GROUP 1 - AGAINST PEACE



Ref. No. A 2242  
 2/3/60

Country	Crimes & War Facts	Time	Important Incidents	Approach	Date	First priority assignment	Comments
1	Domination of whole East Asia (including Manchuria, Mongolia)	30 1937 - 2 45 1945	1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
2	Domination of whole China		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
3	16 countries among Asia Low		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
4	U.S.A		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
5	BRITAIN		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
6	AUSTRALIA		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
7	NEW ZEALAND		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
8	CANADA		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
9	INDIA		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
10	PHILIPPINE		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
11	HOLLAND		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
12	FRANCE		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
13	SIAM		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
14	SOVIE UNION		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
15	INDONESIA		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
16	CHINA		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
17	JAPAN		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
18	BRITAIN		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
19	FRANCE		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
20	SIAM		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
21	INDONESIA		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
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24	INDONESIA		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
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26	JAPAN		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	
27	INDONESIA		1. 7th March 1937 - Invasion of China 2. 21st April 1941 - Pearl Harbor 3. 7th December 1941 - Attack on Pearl Harbor 4. 1st September 1945 - Surrender of Japan		1937	Dom. Asia, War Facts	

COMMON PLAN AND CONSPIRACY

PLAN AND PREPARATION

INITIATED WAR

GROUP 1 - AGAINST PEACE





第一類 平和 三民主義

期	事	時期
1	抗戰全線起事	1928.1-1945.9.2
2	滿蒙支配	"
3	合中國支配	"
4	16ヶ國支配	"
5	極東支配	"
6	中國	"
7	極東	"
8	英國	"
9	澳洲	"
10	新西蘭	"
11	加拿大	"
12	印度	"
13	比島	"
14	荷屬	"
15	仲印	"
16	赤化	"
17	V形形	"
18	滿蒙	1931.9.18
19	中國	1937.7.7
20	美國	1941.12.8
21	北島	"
22	英國	"
23	佛印	1942.12.8
24	泰國	1941.12.8
25	蘇俄	1945.5.8
26	1-2-12	1945.8.15
27	滿蒙	1945.9.2

重要事件	附屬	年代	經歷	內
抗戰全線起事		1928.1-1945.9.2		
滿蒙支配				
合中國支配				
16ヶ國支配				
極東支配				
中國				
極東				
英國				
澳洲				
新西蘭				
加拿大				
印度				
比島				
荷屬				
仲印				
赤化				
V形形				
滿蒙		1931.9.18		
中國		1937.7.7		
美國		1941.12.8		
北島				
英國				
佛印		1942.12.8		
泰國		1941.12.8		
蘇俄		1945.5.8		
1-2-12		1945.8.15		
滿蒙		1945.9.2		

1919

1919

1919

37	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
38	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
39	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
40	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
41	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
42	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
43	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
44	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
45	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
46	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
47	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
48	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
49	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
50	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
51	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
52	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
53	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
54	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
55	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
56	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
57	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
58	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
59	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
60	南京	1941.12.18	40.8

61	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
62	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
63	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
64	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
65	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
66	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
67	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
68	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
69	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
70	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
71	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
72	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
73	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
74	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
75	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
76	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
77	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
78	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
79	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
80	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
81	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
82	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
83	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
84	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
85	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
86	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
87	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
88	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
89	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
90	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
91	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
92	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
93	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
94	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
95	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
96	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
97	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
98	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
99	南京	1941.12.18	40.8
100	南京	1941.12.18	40.8

第一類 敵人 第三類 通敵

64 3161  
page 38  
ministry



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT (Revised)

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

DEPONENT: ARAKI, Sadao

I, ARAKI, Sadao, make oath and say as follows:

- 1. Circumstances up to my acceptance of the post of War Minister

I served as the Chief of No. 1 Division of the General Staff from January 1928 to August 1928; President of the Staff College until August 1929; the Commander of the 6th Division in Kumamoto until August 1931, and Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education.

While I was in the service of those posts, I recognize from my experience in World War I and from my views on the morality of war, as well as from the basic principle in founding our army, the necessity of disassociating our army from the old Prussian style army, and so I devoted my whole hearted attention to the education and training of troops with the final object of promoting their moral standard.

The general situation in those days was by no means eventless. On the contrary, there was every sign of potential unrest. However, my view on the current problems was always different from the opinions of the leaders of Japan, including those of militarists, and I always remained unbiased to any of the movements which were opposed to each other.

It was on August 15, 1931 that I arrived in Tokyo to accept the post of the Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education. This was an advisory position to the Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.

The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident was known to me from the newspaper. I was told that the government had set up a non-expansion policy, and so I did not think much of this incident.

On the occasion of the October Incident, I happened to have been asked by War Minister MINAMI and Chief of General Staff KANAYA to subdue the trouble. I successfully discharged this task, but was informed nothing further as to the punishment of the people involved in this incident.

At that time, I was merely the Chairman of the committee

Def. Doc. #2488

of the entrance examination of the Military Preparatory School and the Military Academy, a position which was to be occupied by the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education as was regulated in that Department, and which had nothing to do with the current problems.

2. Circumstances around my acceptance of the post of War Minister.

At the end of 1931, I was the senior member of the Vice-Minister class, and because of this, I was asked on December 13th by Mr. Tsuyoshi INUKAI to become War Minister. As was customary with the army at that time, I reported this matter to and requested direction of the Three Chiefs of Army (War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.) The opinion of the Three Chiefs was unanimous and they instructed me to accept the post. Thus I went in my acceptance to Mr. INUKAI and became War Minister when the INUKAI Cabinet was formally organized on the same day. Mr. INUKAI at this Tribunal testified that my acceptance was made under some extraordinary circumstances, but not only was there any uncustomary procedure in connection with my acceptance, but neither my predecessor nor any person of importance at that time informed me of such circumstances.

On the following day of my acceptance of this new post and the subsequent day, War Minister MINAMI, my predecessor, Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA, and Chief of the General Staff KANAYA gave me the explanation of the state of affairs of Japan at that time, the outline of which was as follows:

(a) That since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, both the government and the army authorities strived to settle the trouble under a non-expansion policy, but that the condition in Manchuria which had been aggravated for many years in the past, was so complicated that both the Japanese civilian inhabitants in Manchuria and the Kwantung Army were still in danger. That the Government of the existing Manchurian regime had lost its grip, some of its influential personnel had absconded while the rest of them had established their own strongholds in various parts of Manchuria, and an absolute state of anarchy was revealed throughout Manchuria.

(b) That the army authorities, in view of their primary duty, was dually engaged to cope with this situation -- protection of the Japanese nationals and their rights and interests in Manchuria was one and self-defensive to insure the security of the Kwantung Army was the other. That the condition, as had been made clear by the second declaration of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet, was so aggravated that it was impracticable to return the Japanese troops to their original stations.

(c) That Chang Hsue-liang, who had established in Chinchow District a stronghold for violation of peace and order in Manchuria, did not keep his promise of evacuating all

all the troops under his command from the Chinchow District, and that there was not the slightest indication of sincerity to show that some day he might fulfill this promise.

(d) That the fact that the Japanese force from a desire for peaceful settlement had returned its troops from half way point of its campaign to Chinchow was utilized by Chang Hsue-liang for his propaganda. He was busy propagandizing that he and his troops won the victory in this campaign and by thus instigating the fighting spirit of the troops, caused them to cross the Liao River to appear and overrun the districts as far as near Mukden. That this very much endangered Japanese nationals and the troops at the foremost front.

(e) That while the League of Nations had not appreciated the actual situation in full, the recent councilors meeting decided to despatch a commission of enquiry and that it approved our rightful assertion of reserving our rights of pacifying bandits and other groups of turbulent elements.

The above were the outlines of the actual state of affairs explained to me by those three important people of the army, and their conclusion was that if the situation was left alone, and if it should cause any damage to the Japanese nationals or should the Kwantung Army suffer any serious damage from it, the hostility would expand all over China and would result in serious international relations.

### 3. Determination of government policy.

When I reported these matters to Premier INUKAI, he, in his capacity as the president of a political party, and being aware of the gravity of Japan's internal and external situations more fully than I, told me his opinion as follows:

(a) Self-defense and non-expansion should be the fundamental policy to cope with the situation, and based on this policy, the restoration of law and order and termination of hostilities in Manchuria should be immediately realized.

(b) It should be borne in mind that Chang Hsue-liang, the violator of law and order, was the man to deal with, and as such, the theatre of action must be extremely restricted, and on no occasion should it exceed the territory under his domination.

(c) Military action may be required to save the imminent danger to the Chinchow District, but even in doing so, a request should be first made for the withdrawal of the troops under Chang's command from that district so that the root of future evil will be eliminated.

(d) To the League of Nations and other countries which were related to Manchuria by treaties, a thorough explanation should be made in order to gain their complete understanding as to the real state of affairs of Manchuria.

These opinions of the Premier were discussed at the

Cabinet meeting and were made the basic policy of the INUKAI Cabinet. In accordance with this decision, I made the necessary contact with the ministers of Finance and Navy to make preparation for the War Office to discharge its sphere of duty. This decision was also conveyed by me to the General Staff so as to request them to act accordingly.

In connection with this decision of the Cabinet, there is an allegation in Exhibit No. 187 and No. 188 to the effect that I made a plan for the occupation of the Four Eastern Provinces. This is a mistake caused by the interpretation of an incompetent interpreter and it was entirely different from the fact. I shall refer to this matter at the latter part of this statement under 28.

I have never heard, not even as a rumor, that the Premier INUKAI had the intention of petitioning for an Imperial Command to withdraw the Kwantung Army, as was testified to by Mr. Takeshi INUKAI before the Tribunal. Premier INUKAI, as clever as he was, should have known quite well that the Emperor who was an ardent observer of the Constitution would not have granted an Imperial Command for the withdrawal of troops without first having the advice of the General Staff. I shall refute this allegation by a witness who will testify to the matters concerning the Supreme Command.

There is also an allegation by the Prosecution in Chapter 1 of Appendix A of the Indictment that after the INUKAI Cabinet was formed -- "The Japanese government which came into power on the 19th of December of 1931, and all subsequent Japanese governments adopted and continued this aggression and its gradual extension over other parts of China." That both the LIKI and SAITO Cabinets, while I was a member of them, had never made any such policy shall be fully shown by the several speeches made by the responsible members of the two Cabinets at public occasions, and several witnesses and documentary evidence which are to be submitted before the Tribunal will corroborate this.

#### 4. Pacification of Liao-si (West of the Liao River) District

The Japanese government, in conformity with the abovementioned policy, expected a peaceful settlement of the troubles in the Chinchow District through diplomatic negotiations, but almost a month had vainly passed since the commencement of the negotiation and there was not a sign of their withdrawing from the district. On the contrary, the activities of the bandits along the River Liao coast were more intensified and at the end of December 1931, the aggravated situation reached such a stage that the Japanese government had to resort to arms to wipe out the stronghold of the bandits and the lawless mobs in order to save the Japanese nationals from danger. I communicated this decision of the government to the General Staff. In the meantime, the government made a proclamation on the 27th to clarify the situation and explained to the world the difficulties that Japan was confronted with.

On the 29th of the same month, the General Staff despatched to Manchuria from Korea a divisional headquarters and a brigade, the main body of which began action at the very end of the month.

The Kwantung Army by this time, in view of the daily occurrence of various casualties, had taken several measures to cope with the situation, and had several times requested without response the withdrawal of Chang Sue-liang and his men from the Liao-si District.

However, the bandit troops, upon learning that Japan had decided to take a decisive measure, fled from the Chinchow District, together with the groups under Chang Sue-liang's command. Thus, a unit of Japanese troops under command of Lt. Gen. MURO made its ontry into the city of Chinchow on January 3rd, 1932, without resorting to bloodshed and the Japanese nationals were relieved.

After this campaign, the army undertook the task of maintaining law and order in that locality, leaving the rest of the activities to the diplomatic authorities. However, during the month of January, the troops of the garrison forces suffered several casualties inflicted by bandits in various parts of the locality, including the annihilation of KOGA Regiment at Chin-si, but the troops on the spot, observing the principle of non-expansion policy, endured it and did not take any counter steps.

#### 5. The First Shanghai Incident.

The cause of expedition and the policy of the Army.

The First Shanghai Incident was initiated when, in the middle of July 1932, a body of Chinese civilians assaulted a party of Japanese priests and either killed or wounded them. This incident induced a clash between the Japanese Navy and the Chinese 19 Route Army, and a great number of Japanese nationals in Shanghai as well as the navy itself were very much endangered.

The Navy authorities, in view of discharging their international duty in Shanghai as well as to save their own navy troops and protect Japanese nationals in that city, reported the case to the government and requested a detachment of army troops to Shanghai. The government knew the imminence of the situation and decided upon a policy of relieving the navy and protecting the Japanese nationals on the spot, and requested the army for a detachment of troops.

I consulted on this matter the Chief of the General Staff and we agreed to conform with the government policy by despatching a minimum force. The Chief of the General Staff reported the matter to the Throne and upon the approval of His Majesty, the expedition was finally decided upon.

By this time, the situation in Shanghai had become so critical that a mixed brigade was first despatched, in accordance with the request of the navy, by a destroyer.

and this brigade was on peace time footing on account of the shortage of time. Then the UEDA Division, also in a state of being immobilized, followed the brigade. The strength of the opponent at that time was said to be about 5,000.

In conformity with the policy of the government, I strived to settle this incident, as much as possible, in an amicable manner, and desired the Chief of General Affairs and Divisional Commander UEDA to follow this policy. This resulted in Divisional Commander's UEDA's advice to the opponent of the peaceful settlement, which will be shown in evidence in Dof. Doc. No.           . This attempt at peaceful settlement by Divisional Commander UEDA was not duly responded to, and on the contrary, it drove him into a considerable plight.

This request for peace and subsequent hesitation on the part of Divisional Commander UEDA, in immediately resorting to action, was interpreted and propagandized by the China side as their complete victory over Japanese forces, and the propaganda induced a situation whereby the Chinese force under the direct control of the Nanking Government joined the Canton 19th Route Army with whom the expeditionary force was confronted. Moreover, this new situation affected the situation in Manchuria and caused further aggravation of law and order there. Even the proposal made by the League of Nations to Japan served to enhance the spirit of the Chinese people. The situation became extremely serious, and the safety of more than 20,000 Japanese nationals was menaced. Thus China's side took advantage of our aspiration for an amicable settlement and created a new situation more dangerous to Japan.

Worried with this added difficulty, the government requested the army to immediately save this situation. It was either on the 7th or 8th of February that the advance party of the army expeditionary force landed on the spot. Divisional Commander UEDA arrived there in the middle of February and this new crisis was created at the end of the same month.

On account of this renewed request from the government, my position required me to devise measures to immediately save the situation by means of close cooperation between operational tactics and diplomacy, that is to say, the measures complying with the operational request of the General Staff on one hand, and conforming with the political principle of the the government on the other.

On this matter I consulted the General Staff and agreed to their appointing Colonel Binshiro OBATA (Lt. Gen. OBATA, who became Minister of State in the Prince KUNI Cabinet immediately after the surrender) the Chief of operations Section of the General Staff. We also agreed to recommend General SHIRAKAWA as the Supreme Commander of the Expeditionary Force as the most appropriate person with sufficient faculty who would maintain close cooperation with the local



diplomatic agent to take timely measures in terminating the hostilities. Then, in accordance with the suggestion of the General Staff, further reinforcement of two divisions was decided upon at the Cabinet meeting.

Various preparations were made for this reinforcement and at dawn of March 1st, the advance division of the expeditionary force made surprise landing at Tzi-liac-keu, a strategic point behind the enemy. The enemy after some insignificant resistance retreated beyond the 20 kilometer line and as the retreat was in conformity with the request that the expeditionary had previously made, Supreme Commander SHIRAKAWA immediately ordered cessation of hostility on the 3rd of March. The Chinese army followed suit on the following day.

Thus, due to the ingenious tactics of the operational force, the primary object of the expedition was achieved and the incident was settled while the main body of the reinforcements was still on board ship.

The Government and the central military authorities, hand in hand with the activities of the diplomatic authorities, endeavoured to settle the whole situation upon guarantee of the Chinese side to observe law and order in the future.

The Japanese troops voluntarily withdrew at the end of March to the rear line and one and one half divisions of the expeditionary force were subsequently returned to Japan. Then, through the valuable efforts of the committees of the U.S.A., Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China, a plan for international security and safety in and around Shanghai was set up and a truce agreement between Japanese and Chinese troops was signed on May 5th.

By virtue of the provisions of the truce agreement (Section 3, Appendix 2), the army had the right of stationing there a certain part of its force. However, from fear that it would turn out to be the cause of future trouble and because of respect for Chinese sovereignty, and, furthermore, as the primary object of the expedition had been accomplished, it was decided upon to withdraw, at the risk of various difficulties, all the troops from China and the withdrawal was completed by the end of May.

At that time, there were opinions among the people, however, in and out of office, that the over-all withdrawal was still premature. The opinions were regarded to be well grounded in view of past experiences, because both in Manchuria and at the early stages of the Shanghai Incident, our moderate attitude in the beginning seemed to have given cause to the enemy to make propaganda that they had won the victory, and that it succeeded to some extent in deceiving the people with a result that the over-all situation was made worse on account of this.

Nevertheless, the army, in view of its aspirations for peace, carried out the over-all withdrawal. Unfortunately, while giving a good impression among a part of the learned and well-informed classes of Chinese people, the over-all withdrawal did nothing more than to spur the Chinese general public and to create amongst them a contempt for the Japanese Army. In fact, it had a harmful effect over the situation in Manchuria and gave rise to further disturbances there. I may point out here that this was the most delicate part of the policy toward China, and both the government and the army authorities had many

difficulties on this particular point.

These circumstances will be fully shown by the government declaration, proclamations made by Divisional Commander UFEDA and Supreme Commander SHIRAKAWA, my several speeches made in the capacity of War Minister concerning the withdrawal of troops and also those made in the Diet sessions, all of which will be tendered in evidence.

6. Protection of Japanese nationals in and around Harbin.

HSI HSIA (a member of the Monarchist Party) who became the Governor of Kirin Province on September 30, 1931, subsequently declared the independence of his Province. However, after two months of this declaration, he caused some discord with TING-CHAO and LI-TU of Harbin, and because of this conflict, the general situation in and around Harbin was thrown into confusion, threatening, at the same time, the safety of Japanese nationals residing there.

The danger became more imminent when HSI HSIA, in January, 1932, determined to conduct his subjugation campaign toward the north and started fighting on the 27th. This urgent situation compelled the Japanese nationals to request the Kwantung Army for their rescue, and the Koreans and Manchurians of the same district also frequently made the same request.

In the meantime, it happened that four Japanese were murdered, several Koreans were taken away, and about 4,000 Japanese and 2,000 Koreans were placed under extreme danger. The Kwantung Army ordered an aerial reconnaissance of the district, but the aircraft had to make an emergency landing near Harbin, and the crew, who were commissioned officers of the Kwantung Army, were murdered.

The government had taken a cautious attitude toward this district, but as the situation became so serious the government considered it necessary to take measures to restore law and order in that district and to protect the Japanese residents.

However, while the Japanese residents were to be protected, the government made it a policy that the international relations, especially the relation with the Soviet Union, should not be endangered. The Chief of General Staff, in conformity with this policy, ordered some restrictions to the Kwantung Army as to its military actions.

The restrictions caused much difficulty to the Kwantung Army in its operation, and a corps of the Army finally succeeded, after considerable hardships, in reaching the outskirts of the City of Harbin.

As the object of this campaign was to protect the Japanese nationals in that district, and as the object was thus accomplished, the main body of the expeditionary force retraced its course without even entering the city of Harbin.

The explanatory speeches made by Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA on January 31, 1932, at the plenary session of the Privy Council and the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet,

the minutes of which will be tendered in evidence, will clarify the circumstances in which this campaign was carried out.

7. Independence declaration of Manchoukuo and its recognition: also the attitude of the Japanese central military authorities toward it.

Soon after the restoration of law and order in Chinchow, I think it was in the beginning of January, 1932, Staff Officer ITAGAKI of the Kwantung Army came to Tokyo and reported to me the situation in Manchuria, the picture of the independence movement and Commander-in-Chief HONJO's view of the general situation.

According to the reports I received, each Province of Manchuria had declared its independence and it was in such a precarious condition that a single false step would lead the whole situation into a state of chaos where each local regime held its own sphere of influence. On the other hand, there was an aspiration rapidly developing among the influential people all over Manchuria to found a new state. In fact, this aspiration was getting so irresistibly strong among them that it was almost impossible for the Kwantung Army, which was neither forcing a military administration nor was it provided with sufficient strength, to maintain law and order without seriously taking this new situation into consideration. In connection with this report, I further learned the following facts: That the unanimous opinion of those who were concerned in this independent movement was to have Mr. PU-YI as the ruler of the new state; that Commander-in-Chief HONJO's opinion was to leave the matter to them and not to take any measure which might interfere with the zealous aspiration of the Manchurian people.

On hearing this report, I thought of the necessity of paying attention to the international problems which might arise out of Manchuria's independence declaration. However, I reported this information to the Premier.

The Premier and known by that time what was going on in Manchuria and was of the opinion that the question of independence should be left alone, only he considered that the international problems as mentioned in the above should be studied.

The decision of the government on this problem was also to leave it alone to the Manchurian people and to make no interference with it inasmuch as the primary concern of the government was in preservation of law and order.

In the meantime the independence movement in Manchuria made further progress and then a decision for independence was reached on February 28th among the influential people of Manchuria with an additional resolution to ask Mr. PU-YI to become its ruler. Then, the independence was declared on March 1st, and Mr. PU-YI became its President on the 9th of the same month.

The Kwantung Army, whose primary duty was to secure the peace and order in Manchuria, wished that the newly born regime would respect, as it had declared, the international treaties and external regulations, and

would base its administration, internally, upon the people's will, so that an ideal nation where in the King's Way is fully observed under the harmonious collaboration of five races, a real happy land, free from all the unfortunate incidents in the past, should be realized. The attitude of the Kwantung Army was that of watching its development, but not to make any interference with it.

However, preservation of peace and order and protection of Japanese nationals, which were the main duties of Kwantung Army, had to be conducted in such a way as would correspond to the ever changing situation, and so the Kwantung Army had discussions with the new regime concerning those local matters exclusively.

These reports from the Kwantung Army to the central military authorities were reported to the government by the latter as soon as they were received. The government, in view of the actual state of affairs in Manchuria, reached the conclusion that there was no alternative but to leave to the discretion and judgment of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army the preservation of peace and order in Manchuria and decided to observe the further development of the situation.

I also followed this policy of the government and carefully watched the situation so that I should not make any mistake in the future when counter measures were to be taken.

The Foreign Office viewed this problem to be a case of a domestic split of a nation and that the independence was no an infringement of international law. Under the circumstances, all that the army could do was to follow the policy of the government and devote its efforts in successfully carrying out its original duty of preserving peace and order and securing the national defense of Manchuria.

In the meantime, the new regime gradually consolidated its foundation and so the government, with a view to avoiding further disturbances in Manchuria, decided to cooperate, whenever possible, with the new regime. The government made explanation of this new policy at the 61st session of the Imperial Diet. (Def. Doc. ).

I have never heard that Premier INUKAI dispatched Mr. KAYANO as a special envoy to the Nanking Government for a friendly understanding, as was testified to by Mr. Takeshi INUKAI. Even if it were true, it must have been of a private nature. Mr. INUKAI's further testimony that Premier INUKAI talked over the matter with a chief of a section of the General Staff and that the chief of the section, because of this talk, was relegated to an other post is entirely wrong. Mr. INUKAI did not mention the name of the Colonel, but from his testimony that the Colonel was relegated to the Commander of the RANAN Regiment and also from the testimony given by witness FUJITA, it is clear that he meant Colonel SHIGETO. Colonel SHIGETO was sent out of the central military authorities, together with other people, because of his having had some relation with the March and October Incidents, and because of this, he was made an object of the army's "purging shift" of military personnel. Witness FUJITA also gave his evidence to this effect.

I had several interviews with the Premier to discuss the Manchurian problems, but never had we any friction of opinion between us. I always dealt with the matters in accordance with the fixed policies of the government, and whenever a new problem arose, I fully discussed it with the Premier and followed his decision about it.

With regard to Premier INUKAI's attitude toward the international problems, I never perceived in him any sign of an aggressive attitude. Not only Premier INUKAI alone, but the Kwantung Army was eagerly wishing for the ideal progress of Manchoukuo and that was all that they desired for this new country. This fact has already been clarified before this Tribunal by the will of late General HONJO and other evidence.

PART II.

Next I shall refer to the question of official recognition of the state of Manchukuo. Primarily this question, which was purely an international diplomatic matter, was under the charge of the Foreign Office; accordingly, the Army did not take any step in this matter and except for those problems which concerned the maintenance of peace and order and problems of national defense that might arise therefrom, I respected the opinion of the Foreign Minister and left everything to his care.

Manchukuo, since its foundation, had gradually become a subject of discussion both in and out of Japan, and the House of Representatives, on June 15th, made a resolution at its plenary session that an official recognition should be given to this new state.

The government of Japan, after careful consideration of the matter, decided to follow the views of the Foreign Office, which suggested that the new state was the result of an internal split of an independent nation and that recognition of such state which acquired its legal independence would not in any way infringe international law. Necessary procedures were then taken and the formal recognition was given on September 15th, whereupon the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol was signed and an arrangement was made for the exchange of Ambassadors.

Upon this formal recognition, the Kwantung Army was charged with the new duty of garrison and joint defense of the new state. This new additional duty meant that the entire conduct of the Kwantung Army bore an international complexion by representing the two independent countries - Japan and Manchoukuo, and so they made it their rule to confer with the Manchoukuo authorities before they took any action in connection with the national defense and maintenance of peace and order.

Thus the situation made its natural development from its formation to formal recognition, and along with this development, Japan found it necessary to determine her attitude, toward this state of affairs. The government of Japan, from her desire for the sound development of Manchoukuo as her friendly neighbourer, decided to give Manchoukuo, in compliance with her request, all the necessary assistance in her power, and by doing so, to take measures to prevent activities causing disturbances in Manchoukuo.

That Japan had neither the intention of making Manchoukuo her cat's paw, nor violating international law can be easily ascertained from the speeches made by the Premier and the Foreign Minister at the Imperial Diet as well as from their answers to the interpellations at the Privy Council. This will also be seen in the speech broadcasted by Mr. Ting, Premier of Manchoukuo, on the first anniversary of Manchoukuo's foundation, in which he expressed his zealous ideal of founding a new state.

Personally I desired that Manchoukuo should develop soundly along the line as was indicated in her independence declaration toward the goal of becoming an ideal nation, and would acquire every necessary qualification for an independent country.

when  
In the spring of 1934, Mr. Henry Pu-Yi, Emperor of Manchoukuo, visited Japan, I was given an audience with him for several hours. Mr. Pu-Yi eagerly and strongly emphasized his desire of establishing a happy land of CDO (King's Way) and at a later stage of the conversation, he sent the interpreter away and talked to me face to face by way of writing on a sheet of paper, his ambition of becoming the Emperor of all China, thereby restoring his ancestral old Chin Dynasty there.

On this occasion I dared to give him advice and said that what the Emperor should do was to cultivate the virtue of Emperorship, as he had declared when he ascended the Throne, and to become worthy of confidence both in and out of the country.

As this conversation will show, there was not the slightest indication that Mr. Henry Pu-Yi would have become a tool of the Japanese government; on the contrary, there was even a sign that he would take the initiative to induce the Japanese government in the direction he desired.

The development of Manchoukuo after that was not quite as it should have been. Dissatisfied with this state, I refrained from attending the 10th anniversary celebration of its foundation, and I broadcast what I had in mind about the situation. My views and belief on Manchuria had been fully expressed in my talk with Lord Lytton and others.

As was explained in my speech at the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet, Chang Hsue-liang's activities, before the formal recognition of Manchoukuo, of causing disturbances in Manchuria were carried out to such an extent that it compelled Japan to take measures to settle the situation.

#### 10. Pacification of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol.

The pacification campaign of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol was somewhat different in nature, inasmuch as Manchoukuo had been founded and recognized by that time, and the military action was taken to discharge the army's duty to both Japan and Manchoukuo. In other words, the campaign was an action fulfilling the army's duty as was provided in the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol, and it was nothing but a domestic affair of Manchoukuo.

Pacification campaign by the Japan-Manchoukuo Allied Force over North Manchuria was executed because Ma Seng-shan who had once pledged his loyalty to Manchoukuo plotted a rebellion of Su Ping-wen in December, 1932, and Jehol at the end of February, 1933, because of a rebellion by Tan Wanglin.

In carrying out those campaigns, I drew the special attention of the General Staff to follow the government policy so that the expedition to Kholombail would not cause any bad influence over Soviet-Japan relations and warfare in Jehol would not expand itself over North Manchuria. I further requested them that their action should be based strictly on the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol and utmost attention be made in bringing about the termination of hostilities. I also requested the maintenance of a very close contact between the War Office and the General Staff.

In Kholombail district, we were assisted greatly by the good will of the Soviet Union and succeeded in safely saving the Japanese residents, and the pacification was ended at that.

In the Jehol campaign, the General Staff and the Kwantung Army made it their policy to stop the advance of troops at the line of the Great Wall, even at the risk of operational disadvantage. There was once an occasion when the troops marched over the Great Wall, but they were immediately ordered to return. This action caused another attack from the enemy, but our troops in a drive

after the retreating enemy, reached the Soo River and stopped there. Thus the policy of the government and the central army authorities was strictly adhered to by the troops of the Kwantung Army.

In the meantime, Chang Hsue-liang actually withdrew from all official positions and an agreement was reached, and the Tangku Truce was signed between HO YING-CHIN representative of the National Government and Major General OKAMURA, Vice Chief of Staff and the representative of the Kwantung Army. Further details of this will be given by witnesses ENDO, SABURO AND TAKEDA, Hisashi.

#### 11. Conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement.

In compliance with the request of Mr. HO YING-CHIN, Deputy Chairman of the Peking Sub-committee of the National Government Military Committee, on May 25th, 1933, cessation of hostility was discussed between Mr. HO and Major General OKAMURA, representative of the Kwantung Army, and the Truce Agreement was signed on the 31st of May of the same year. The agreement was confirmed by the governments of Japan and Manchoukuo in due course, and thus the hostilities in Manchuria virtually ended.

The Manchurian Incident was not primarily a war in the sense of definition of international law. Therefore, there was no such procedure as a peace treaty. Only an agreement was reached between the two parties as to several arrangements to prevent occurrence of further hostilities in the future.

Subsequently, the members of the government of Manchoukuo and those of China met at the DAIREN Conference to discuss practical routine matters concerning the maintenance of friendly relations between China and Manchoukuo. Some members of our government who were in charge of such matters also attended the conference, but as the matter did not directly concern the relations between Manchoukuo and Japan, I do not remember the details.

Thus the disturbances and hostilities which had been rampantly prevailing all over Manchuria at the time of the Wakatsuki Cabinet which had created a potential danger, such as would induce at any time an all out clash between China and Japan, were completely settled by me within one and half year of my acceptance of War Ministership to the INUKAI Cabinet which succeeded the Wakatsuki Cabinet, and the mission charged to the army of terminating hostilities was fulfilled.

#### 12. Policies I adopted after the Tangku Agreement.

My most important mission as War Minister which was settling the hostilities having been thus accomplished, I decided to take this opportunity to establish plans to stabilize several internal as well as external affairs. I set up the following three main principles and determined upon their realization.

1. Stabilization of domestic state of affairs which had been in absolute chaos since the beginning of the Showa Era.
2. Complete purification of the Army so as to base itself on the principle of the foundation of the Imperial Army.
3. Improvement of foreign relations, through which to secure peace of the world, and of the Far East in particular.

In June, 1933, when the Imperial Diet closed,



I set forth to establish a practical plan to execute these principles.

The first thing I intended to do was to purify the public mind by dispelling from Japan all the evil causes accumulated since World War I, paying at the same time special attention to the internal as well as external state of affairs and to the specific feature of Japan's national character. The best way to accomplish this task was to let the people appreciate the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor. One of the practical plans for this purpose was to petition for the grant of a general amnesty and to release both the right and left wing political criminals and other criminals with the exception of those whose crime was of particularly atrocious nature, and to give them firm warning not to repeat the same folly.

Secondly, I intended to stabilize the mind of people of the rural district and fishing villages by establishing means of relieving them from the extreme poverty in which they were at that time.

Thirdly, I thought it necessary to devise fundamental measures to settle the confusions and disturbances in political and ideological circles.

My fourth intention was to find means to secure the original character of the Imperial Army whose reason for existence was in practicing morals, and let it thoroughly understand the fundamental principles of founding the army, so that the occurrence of ominous incidents, which had been rather frequent in the past, would be prevented in the future.

Fifthly, Japan at that time was confronted with several difficult international problems. I considered it of urgent necessity to solve all of those problems by making the utmost concession that we could afford, while making full assertions on what we had to assert. What Japan needed then was to determine the minimum extent of her self-existence and protect her from being affected by the hitherto precarious state of affairs in Europe.

Under these circumstances, what should have been done before anything else was to secure peace in the Far East, and in order to do so, I determined to hold an international conference among the countries interested in Far Eastern affairs. My intention was first to establish peace in the Far East and on the Pacific after thorough deliberation upon pending matters among the participants of this international conference, and then make it the corner stone on which to secure the world's peace.

The matter was, however, too grave to be decided instantaneously. I spent the whole of July and August in studying practicability of this plan as well as in preparation of preliminary matters. In September I prepared a basic suggestion for this plan, and suggested to the Premier to make a definite plan based on my suggestions, so that it may be presented for deliberation at the Imperial Diet.

Petitioning for amnesty seemed to me the most difficult problem. On this question, I gained the approval of the Navy Minister, and the suggestion was put to the Premier as an agreed opinion of both Navy and Army.

There were several objections to the amnesty to be granted to the criminals of the extreme right and extreme left wings. I maintained that however wrong they may have been, their misconduct had arisen from their passion to improve the future of their country and community.

It was the unfortunate circumstances in which they were brought up or their narrow prejudice that had driven them to blindly rush to such an extreme ideal. They were nonetheless valuable subjects of His Majesty to whom His virtue of benevolence should equally be extended. I insisted that this was the characteristic feature of our national polity, and endeavoured to realize it.

The question having developed thus far, Premier SAITO ordered the people of the government in charge of this type of work to study the practical side of this plan, and, apart from this, he successively held conferences among the ministers who were related to the subject matter of the plan. Five Minister Conferences concerning foreign affairs and national defense were often held and other Five Minister Conferences concerning rural district problems being that they were a part of domestic political problems were also frequently held.

I attended these conferences together with Mr. MITSUCHI, Minister of Railways.

Both of these conferences met more than twenty times and the gist of the plan was thoroughly discussed by the end of the year. There were several matters of which even definite plans were set up.

The basic study of the plan showed due progress and a communique in the form of a memorandum was given on matters concerning foreign affairs and national defense in October 1933. Some very important decisions were reached concerning rural district problems which were part of the problems for the domestic council.

My intention was to establish definite plans for all the subject matters by the end of January 1934, when the Imperial Diet was expected to be convened, and to present them to the Diet for deliberation. The government, army and Diet should seek for the stabilization of internal affairs by their respective function, and these efforts, combined with the activities of the diplomatic branch would induce the whole situation to opening the Far Eastern Peace Conference. This was my intention and I did my best for its realization.

As I devoted my whole attention after conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement to this matter, I had not much interest in other problems and even when I had some objection or different opinion on some matters, I usually let them go at that.

On the First of January, 1934, while the plan was in the midst of deliberation, I fell seriously ill and was confined to bed. However, as I most eagerly wished to execute this plan at any cost, I recommended General HAYASHI as my successor, and I resigned from the post of War Minister.

By that time, the essential portion of my plan was still being discussed, part by part by the respective Cabinet Ministers but it was not yet ready to be presented to the Cabinet meeting. Such having been the case, when I was resigning from my post, I sent to the Premier this suggestion of my plan, together with a letter, expressing all my views and beliefs, and asked him to expedite the opening of the Cabinet Meeting for this plan.

Unfortunately, not only the general situation failed to develop as I had expected but the internal conditions of the army authorities changed radically. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs I decided to avoid being materially involved in any of the official matters. My successor, General HAYASHI, after four months' tenure of office, had to resign for personal reasons and recommended me as his successor, but because of this dissatisfaction, I persistently declined its acceptance.

In the meantime, things completely turned to the worse, and after two years from the time of my resignation, the 2.26 Incident forced myself and other senior members of the army to leave active service altogether.

For two years from my resignation from the War Ministry to retirement from active service, I occupied the post of a War Councillor, but not a single enquiry of important

nature was made to me, and so there is nothing to state about this period.

Further, this was the period when the internal condition of the army was in absolute chaos, and as I was always placed outside its central circles, I did not know the helm of military affairs at that time. All of these conditions will be shown by documentary evidence and witnesses.

### 13. International Treaty Problems.

Diplomatic affairs were not under the charge of the War Minister. As the War Minister, I only attended to what matters were under my charge and disposed of them in accordance with the policy determined by the government and so I did not know much of the diplomatic matters.

Decision of a diplomatic affair was usually done upon investigation and opinion of the Foreign Minister. When it had an important bearing upon other departments of the government, the Minister of such Department was consulted, and when it was sufficiently important as to be related to all Departments in a general way, it was usually discussed at the Cabinet meeting. Otherwise, most of them were disposed of by the decision of the Foreign Minister.

With regard to international treaties in connection with the Manchurian Incident, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet had already invoked the right of self-defense, and the Premier and Foreign Minister of the INUKAI Cabinet also several times declared the continuation of this right of self-defense.

I was told that our action was within the limit of action for self-defense, about which every signatory of the Non-Aggression Pact had reserved the right of execution, and a prominent scholar of international law defined, "The act of self-defense is conducted until pressure by violence and menace is removed." Moreover, there was a reservation made by Japan on December 10th 1951 at the Council Meeting of the League of Nations, which was approved by the Council, of the right of subjugating bandit troops and lawless elements. The army acted within the extent of this right based on the policy determined by the government.

As for the problems concerning independence of Manchoukuo and its subsequent recognition, Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets gave explanations at the Imperial Diet and the Privy Council. They said that the independence was a natural result of an internal split of a nation conducted by her own people and that the Nine Power Treaty had not provided any restriction on such action. They further said that the independence was realized upon the basis of the historical background in Manchuria. They quoted several opinions of some of the scholars of international law and said that there were several instances in which the presences of foreign troops contributed toward the realization of independence.

Those explanations convinced all other members of the cabinet and the army continued its action in conformity with this fixed policy until execution of the right of self-defense was no more required. As far as I remember, all of these details were contained in the Views of Japanese Government which were submitted to the plenary session of the League of Nations.

The relation with the League of Nations had already been considerably aggravated before the INUKAI Cabinet, perhaps due to lack of proper explanation of the situation. It was immediately prior to the formation of the INUKAI Cabinet that the League of Nations decided to dispatch its Enquiry Mission. This decision was quite satisfactory to us and the INUKAI Cabinet hoped that the Mission would

arrive at an accurate recognition of the situation based on the actual state of affairs. The army also expected that the Enquiry Mission would make an unbiased conclusion toward peace by having contact with the actual conditions on the spot in the light of the historical background.

As I have stated above, the policy of the INUKAI Cabinet toward Manchuria was immediate restoration and subsequent maintenance of peace and order, and it aimed at improvement of international relations by giving cooperation and correct understanding to the problems among nations.

The army, also in conformity with this policy, minimized its military action and devoted its efforts in immediately bringing about the termination of the hostilities. The manner in which the army settled the Shanghai Incident was a good indication of this policy of the army and its overall withdrawal from Shanghai served to improve, more or less, Japan's international relations. Encouraged with this fact, the army continued to concentrate its effort on this point.

The independence of Manchoukuo and its formal recognition was studied, as was stated above, by both the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets. By keeping a watch on the result of this study and on the prerequisite for peace and order in Manchuria, both cabinets followed the natural growth of this movement and when convinced of its healthy progress, decided to give it formal recognition. The army, in conformity with this policy of the government, strived to prevent actions disturbing the peace and order, which had barely been restored after several uprisings, and to discharge its new task of joint defense of the state of Manchoukuo.

With regard to the League of Nations, I knew that the government had tried to obtain its understanding by tendering them written views of the government on the complexity of the character of the Incident and its suggestions for the means of maintaining peace in the future. When Mr. MATSUOKA was dispatched by the government as its plenipotentiary, the government had decided its policy of staying with the League at all costs in order to seek a proper understanding, and I think Mr. MATSUOKA was instructed accordingly.

The army, also in conformity with the government policy, strived to bring about a situation in which Japan could remain with the League in order to afford them a correct understanding of the problem. However, there were continued disturbances and unrest in various parts of Manchuria and before these hostilities had been settled, the resolution of the plenary session of the League of Nations was reached. The hope of Japan's getting a true under-

standing from the League having been thus frustrated, Japan had no alternative but to withdraw from it in accordance with the provisions of Article I and 3 of its regulations. Nevertheless, Japan declared to the world by an Imperial Rescript and a government communique her determination of collaborating with the world. This will also be testified to by documents and witnesses.

14. My views and thoughts on foreign affairs.

While I was in office, foreign affairs did not come directly under my jurisdiction, and accordingly, I could not bring into practice my views on those matters. All I could do was to discharge the duty of the army in accordance with the fixed policy of the government. But in order to clarify the grounds on which my actions toward the international problems were based, I feel it necessary to state herewith my fundamental ideology on international problems and the subsequent steps that I undertook at that time.

(a) Relation with the Soviet Union.

I had been in Russia for many years and was one of those who had a fond feeling toward and a good understanding of that country. My article in the monthly magazine "Russia" correctly conveyed my true sentiment. Nevertheless, I could not advocate the world Bolshevization policy of the Third Internationale. My opposition to this principle and measures against it was more intensified when in 1923 and 1932 members of the Communist party plotted an assault on the person of His Majesty the Emperor.

In fact, from the end of the TAISHO Era (about 1923) to the earlier period of the SHOWA Era (about 1931), Japan was thoroughly subjected to clandestine activities of the Communist party manifested in the form of a labor conflict and other political struggles of sinister nature, and the existence of the country was endangered as it never had been before. A publication of Mr. Bezodovsky, the Soviet ambassador in Japan in 1926 and 1927, explaining the details of such activities, gave a deep warning to the world. I took it as the weakness in the ideological status of Japan, and did not take it so seriously as to consider that it strained the relation between the Soviet and Japan.

I may say that I am not inferior to the Communist party in the passion to relieve the poor class of people, which, I understand, is one of the tenets of that party. However, my belief is that if the administration under the Emperor based on the original doctrine of this country is realized, not only the poorer class of people, but the whole people in general can enjoy better welfare without being forced to anything. This was clearly manifested in the message of one of the Emperors who said, "Should there be a single person among the whole population who is not given his proper place, we are to blame for that." I believed that neither violence nor crafty measures was required in providing welfare to the people. My opinion was if the Soviet Union believed in communism, that was their affair and we had no reason to interfere with it. Every country is entitled to follow its own policy in accordance with the internal condition of that country. This having been my conviction, my opposition to the Third Internationale did not go as far as to advocate interference with the Soviet Union.

I felt at that time the necessity of taking self-defensive measures against the menace of eastward infiltration of the Soviet influence and of the very active policy of the Third International of bolshevizing the whole world, but never had I felt the necessity of preparation of any positive military action against the Soviet Union, to say nothing of taking such action.

To cope with this menace of the Soviet Union, there may have been several researches and suggestions among the people whose duty was to deal with such matters, and I believe those in charge of the matters would have devised measures within the extent of their duty, but I have reason to believe that such measures should not have exceeded the extent of research. The research alleged by the prosecution to have been made by KAWADE and KASAHARA would have been one of their opinions as members of the General Staff, but whatever it may have been, it had no relation with me. As far as I knew, no positive plan of the responsible authorities against the Soviet Union existed. On the contrary, the fact was that the army had once placed much expectation in the change of policy of the Soviet Union.

To the conclusion of that Non-Aggression Pact, I was not necessarily opposed in principle, but I seriously and carefully listened to public opinion that before signing such pact as the Non-Aggression Pact, all the pending problems between the two countries ought to be settled upon the basis of sincerity by both parties, as otherwise, the pact was destined to fail and was apt to leave cause for future trouble.

I do not admit the conclusions and the allegation tendered in evidence by the prosecution against myself. When I pointed out the obscurity of the borders of Outer Mongolia, it was not from an aggressive intention toward Soviet as it was a defensive precaution. This can be easily ascertained from the other parts of the sentence around that expression.

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(b) Relation between China and Japan.

With regard to the relation between China and Japan, we have been told since we were children how eagerly our seniors of high ideals and experiences endeavored, since the MEIJI Era, to secure a firm and healthy independence for China our good and friendly neighbour, and thereby to bring happiness to the people of our friendly nation. Such expression as DOBON DOSHU (same character and same race) and SHINSHI HOSHA (relation between lips and teeth, and wheels and axis) were often used to denote how the relation between China and Japan should be. This was how my original conception of China was formed, and I believe it was the same with all the people who had some interest in China. My article in the magazine BUNGEI SHUNJU entitled "To President Chiang Kai-shek and appeal to my brethren" expresses my view and conception in this matter.

I advocated that the cooperation of China and Japan should be based upon the promotion of Oriental culture which is further based on the union of eastern and western culture. I expressed this opinion of mine in 1925, when I had a chance of talking to some of the Chinese people in Shanghai who are now engaged in important tasks as leaders of that country. As for the means of bringing about perfect independence to China, I had the occasion of giving my personal suggestion to President Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1932, through the staff of the Chinese Legation in Japan.

China is destined to be our friendly neighbor. I most sincerely.

desire perfect independence for this country, but never had I dreamed of her division. This is the reason why I always quote the Outer Mongolian and Sinking problems for comparison.

I viewed the Manchurian Incident as a kind of explosion of a situation which had been brought to the bursting point by variegated historical background and the complicated state of affairs of Manchuria at that time, and the explosion resulted in the independence declaration by the people of Manchuria. In other words, it was the natural result, caused by the influence of the mass of the people, which could not have been stopped merely by the strength of a limited number of people, without first correcting its cause. If China wanted to get rid of this sinister incident, she should have devised adequate measures immediately after World War I and for a person like myself who was charged to deal with this Incident from its half way mark, the first necessity was to put an end to the hostilities. I considered that if Manchuria should turn out to be an ideal happy land, whether politically independent or not, and gained the approval of the world, its relation with China and peace in the Far East for that matter could be somehow readjusted in the future and I dealt with this matter along this train of thought. What I really had in mind was to welcome the creation of an ideal happy land on a part of Chinese soil, in anticipation of rehabilitation of its mother land.

When I saw the Manchurian people who had been under the hard rigors of living, I could not help praying for realization of an ideal happy land of ODO (King's Way) as had often been talked of by the leaders of Manchuria. It was not myself alone, but all the people of broader views who had the same opinion as above. The main thing was to bring peace immediately between China and Japan and let the world recognize the fact. Readjustment of relations between China and Manchoukuo could be thereafter easily accomplished.

With this view in mind, I considered as War Minister that what was required most urgently was to terminate hostilities. This was the reason why I evacuated all the Japanese troops from Shanghai, and advocated after the Tangku Truce Agreement, the opening of a Far Eastern Peace Conference. This will be proven by witness and documents.

The Marco Polo Incident occurred four years after the Tangku Truce Agreement. It would hardly be necessary to say that this Incident had no relation to the Manchurian Incident. I acceded to the request of Premier KONOYE, accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor and Education Minister in his cabinets. The object of the Premier was to let me find means to terminate the China Incident. I did my best to comply with the request of the Premier, but my power was not strong enough to bear any fruit along this line.

On the occasion of the Nanking campaign, I opposed the act of occupying the enemy capital. I thought it was detrimental to the feelings of the people of both countries in the future. This was why I declared the occupation of that city.

It was then I thought of the poem of seven steps of Tsao Tzu-kian.

It is my belief that if the leaders of China and Japan and the leading countries of the world had a little deeper appreciation of the relations between China and Japan, the Marco Polo Incident would not have had such repercussions as it did.

It was from these same views that before the occupation of Canton and Hankow, I made my suggestions and opposed the military action against those cities. However, at that time I was not a member of the army authorities, nor was I keeping contact with the actual state of affairs and so my hopes were not fulfilled. I have never dreamed of aggression against China and

never acted accordingly. In fact, I placed my utmost importance in the cultural and spiritual unity between China and Japan.

(c) Relations with the U.S.A. and Britain.

I am not a so-called pro-Anglo-Saxon, nor am I, of course, an anti-Anglo-Saxon. I am a Japanese. I can not bear the sight of Japan being held in contempt by others or being reduced to destruction. Moreover, I am of the opinion of obeying His Majesty the Emperor and bringing about peace and welfare upon the basis of the original doctrine of Japan. I believed so and I have practiced so. This was not an opinion formed from so-called divine-inspirationism or from dogmatic ultra-nationalism. On the contrary, I trust it is a most humane principle agreeable to the world's omnipresent natural law. With this principle in mind, I did not try to cater to the current trend of making omnipotent Germany and Italy. Because I did not do so, I was sometimes blamed and abused as a pro-Anglo-Saxon. It has not been my practice to flatter or favor upon others. I was sometimes unscrupulous in commenting upon what seemed to me wrong, and warned about the crime, but I was never reluctant in praising what I believed to be right. Above all, I cannot help feeling grateful throughout my life to the obligation under which I was once placed. On such an occasion, I always expressed my gratitude whatever the reason for the obligation may have been. It was in this sense that I opposed the suggestion that the monument of Commodore Perry in KURIHAM should be removed. I expressed similar types of opinions on several occasions. It was one thing I could not understand why, because of my above belief and attitude, I should have been called during the war by the opportunists and by those who were obsequious to the current trend to be an unpatriotic pro-Anglo-Saxon.

It was my consistent ideal that war should not be waged to satisfy meaningless desires. Except for some special occasions, war is apt to leave behind it certain aftereffects of personal feeling. Japan had never fought against the U.S.A. or Britain. On the contrary, it was my belief that Japan had been under the obligation of those two countries for the past ten years in connection with the crisis with which Japan had been confronted. Britain in particular was our ally for many years in the past, and to the U.S.A. while we had owed her much financially, there was not the slightest friction of feeling.

There had only been a slight unpleasant feeling between the two nations in connection with the racial problem and the Washington Conference. However, even on these matters, I think there was sufficient understanding among the people of learning and fame in the U.S.A. and Japan. Furthermore I did not take it any more than as a mere political problem, in which there was not the slightest factor of danger for the relations between the two countries.

To be quite frank, the relation between the U.S.A. and Japan after the Manchurian Incident had not always been a pleasant one. Of course each party must have had its own reason to remain so, but the main thing hinged upon sentiment and misunderstanding, and I believed it was not so deeply rooted as would completely destroy the friendly relation which had existed between the two countries.



PART III

During the time of the Manchurian Incident, I was one of those who was worried over the general situation of the world. I had had sincere faith in Britain's refined diplomacy and the U.S.A.' power of enforcement, and upon those I placed much expectation to save the world from the deteriorated situation facing it.

I expressed my opinion to many of the well-informed people of learning and fame in both Britain and America and wanted to adjust through those people the application of the sanctions of the League of Nations, and also, more importantly, to prevent the explosion of the general unrest which was then prevailing all over the world. I believed I was doing much good for the sake of world peace, and I repeatedly warned them that unless steps were taken along the line as I suggested, the situation in Europe was suggestive of a world war.

It was also from my fear of the above that I desired that those people improve the method of application of the sanctions of the League of Nations, based more upon the actual facts than anything else.

It looked to me that the U.S.A. had maintained an indifferent attitude having stayed outside the realm of the League of Nations, and therefore, was in a position to make a calm and unbiased judgment of the world's state of affairs and Britain was also, in my opinion, in the same position, because of her rich experience in dealing with important international problems. The rest of the countries were, I thought, too busy in rehabilitating the damages of World War I to do anything else.

Japan had been recognized as having the power of maintaining the security of the Far East, and so I considered that much could be contributed to the world's peace if those three countries, Japan, U.S.A. and Britain, discussed the basic policy of peace in the world without prejudice and bias.

Because of this conviction, I had deliberate discussions over the world's state of affairs since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident with Sir Lindley and other successive British Ambassadors to Japan and Major-General Piggot, British Military Attache and others. I also appealed to the learned American people to call their attention to the situation in the East. Mr. Releigh, lecturer of the Oxford University was another person with whom I had heavy discussion. I also appealed to a group of foreigners in my speech at Karuizawa in the summer of 1934.

In these speeches and discussions, I frankly indicated the points on which I thought there should be self-reflection and reconsideration on the part of the U.S.A. and Britain. It had not been my practice to flatter, nor was it my habit to commit myself to anything unreasonable, to say nothing of the abuse of armed force.

It had been my belief that world peace could only exist if people based their conduct upon warm-heartedness and justice of natural law, restricted their selfish desires and conceded to others to the utmost to such an extent as would not impair their self-existence.

At the time when the question of importation of Siamese rice was much discussed in Japan, I insisted that we should endure some economical disadvantages to accede to the request of Siam so that we could express our appreciation of the warm friendship that Siam had shown us for many years in the past. I explained this to the people of rural districts in order to gain their understanding of the question.

When we had an occasion of negotiating with Lancashire in connection with our exportation of cotton piece goods, I insisted that we should make the best possible concession in the negotiation and should not effect any undue pressure upon Lancashire, and that all international problems should be settled from a broad point of view. This conduct of mine was always based upon the belief as I have stated above.

It was my opinion that in facing the activities of the League of Nations or fulfilling the provisions of international treaties, Japan should always stand on this belief, that by no means should she lose sight of her ultimate object in selecting means. I advocated from the same belief that those who had power should be right and those who were right should have power. The idea of power to power principle was one thing I detested most.

I believed that all of these assertions could be fully understood by Britain and America, and heartily desired that by understanding them, they would contribute to the peace of the world. I feel ashamed in being even alluded to as a person advocating world domination or aggression and expansion.

### My Ideas

In 1895, I was much disturbed with an incident known as "Three Power Interference" which resulted in Japan's retrocession of Liaotung, and it caused me to join the army to defend the motherland.

I participated in the Russo-Japanese War when I was a Lieutenant. In World War I, I was with the Russian Army at the eastern front of Europe and had ample opportunities of witnessing the true nature of war among the civilized countries.

This experience affected greatly the views of war which I had had by that time, and became the second epochal period in the history of my ideology. The essence of my new ideology was that war, if inevitable, should be the war of human beings not the struggle among beasts. I came to have new ideas as to weapons, style of fighting and equipment for national defense, and with a view to lessen the war damage have made an appeal based on this idea to the people both in and out of Japan for the past twenty years.

Parallel with the above advocacy, I speculated over the basis of peace, namely, the means with which to avoid the occurrence of war. I came to the conclusion that the existing international treaties alone were not only virtually insufficient to avoid war, but they sometimes caused war, and I intended to improve this shortcoming.

There were numerous causes of war, but economic pressure, menace on self-existence, denial of the special characteristics of a nation and racial prejudice constituted their principal part and so far as they were not completely eliminated, war was unavoidable. The method of maintaining peace by way of keeping a certain balance of armament among the nations was nothing but a camouflaged peace, which could be easily broken by a miscalculation on the part of a nation over the balance of her armament and that of other nations. Once the peace was broken, the scale of equipment and installation for war and the selected arms of precision would give cause to boundless calamity. I, therefore, considered it the duty of a civilized nation to go a step forward to study the fundamental cause of war, and take every possible opportunity to propagate this idea to the people of the world.

There was another point to be considered. After World War I, a disruption took place in the world of thought dividing the whole world into three ideological circles, and each circle contested one another beyond the barrier of economy and living.

I perceived a danger of inducement to war in this conflict of thought. I drew attention of the people to the necessity of securing a fundamental ideal for establishment of peace, and in order to achieve this purpose, I advocated the amalgamation of eastern and western culture, enhancement of the spirit of mutual concession, and, in order heighten the sense of sympathy I advocated KODO (Imperial Way).

Thus, I endeavoured to harmonize the interests of the world to avoid the potential calamity, but unfortunately most of the countries of the world were indifferent to this advocacy because of their lack of recognition of this fundamental ideal and each rushed forward to expand its influence into the world according to its long entertained or newly harboured ideal.

After World War I, two world offensive movements occurred with the support of armed force, one was the World Bolshevizing Movement and the other was Nazism as a totalitarian nation. Japan's attention was drawn to this and the necessity of self defense impressed her. I personally considered that the most effective self-defense could be carried out by promoting the sense of morality and justice.

Primarily, my views of peace or views of life do not admit of territorial expansion. Amalgamation of a nation which had its own race and history was one thing I definitely rejected. I said it was one thing to protect the land of their ancestors and it was quite another to expand it. I considered that a land other than its own could be developed as a source of raw materials under the principle of mutual help. That was why I objected to the amalgamation of Korea and although I was abroad when it took place, I sent a letter to my senior, expressing my views, and insisted that Japan should cooperate with Korea by respecting its civilization.

Such having been my views, I can clearly declare that never in my life have I entertained an idea of aggression, to say nothing of world domination.

If I may be allowed to express my views, such ambition as territorial expansion is nothing but an infantile glory which is far from permanent welfare.

With regard to Manchuria, I accepted the post of War Minister when Manchuria was in a turmoil of disturbances. My whole-hearted attention was devoted to nothing but terminating the hostilities. As I was so deeply impressed solely with the miserable conditions in which the Manchurian people lived I took a sympathetic view in the establishment of a happy land of King's Way (KODO). Further, I was favorably impressed when, after the foundation of Manchukuo, by the zealous aspiration of the Manchurian people, the leaders of that new country made Confuciasm, a doctrine originated in China, their principle for creation of an ideal country. The complicated international problems of Manchuria had not slipped out of my mind, but since the independence had been declared, I wished from this sense of morality, the realization of an ideal nation.

However, as time passed, it did not develop in the way that I had hoped and several petitions and bitter criticisms of the Manchurian people reached my ears. Worried over this situation as I have stated in the above, I declined to go to Manchuria to celebrate her tenth anniversary of independence and did not attend the celebration held in Japan.

I have already stated that my views of war, nation and peace which I had had since my participation in World War I, were definitely opposed to imperialism, exclusive egoism and the coercion

control principle. My conduct was always coherent to this principle. I feared that the manner in which the powers, after World War I, dealt with Germany were portent of future trouble. Pressures which all the countries that won victory over Germany, (including Japan) imposed upon this defeated country as well as the attitude of the newly awakened Germany toward the world were quite precarious from the standpoint of world peace, and because of my aforementioned views, I expressed my desire, whenever I could, for the alleviation of such conditions.

Historically, the strained situation of Japan in the past has been continuous, but as far as I was concerned, I had my own ideas as above stated and because of this, I dissociated myself from the movements before and after my tenure of War Minister. I went my own way in accordance with my ideas, and did not take any action in concert with the people who had different views. On the other hand, I endeavored to propagate my idea of international morality and beliefs throughout the world.

#### 15. Armament and my policy in directing the Army.

The equipment and strength of our army was so poor that it was not even as good as that of Poland. In 1921 the army authorities desired to raise the standard of armament of the entire Japanese Army to only half of that of the other powers at the time of World War I. For this purpose, a bill of approximately 460 million yen for running expenses for ten years was presented to the Diet and was duly approved. However, the payment of the whole amount was successively postponed and in 1931, which was a year before the Manchurian Incident, the sum of 360 million yen was still left unused. That is to say, not even one quarter of the original plan was accomplished.

I had my own view toward the establishment of the army and war, which which I had harbored since World War I. I believed in the necessity of modern equipment for an independent nation, but I had never dreamed of completing armament for the sake of waging war. I regarded the army as a symbol of morality and placed more importance on its spiritual element. I felt the necessity of a completion of armament, but I never considered its completion in connection with preparation for aggression. On the contrary, my opinion was just the reverse. However, I could not bring this ideal of mine into practice, having been disrupted by the necessity of restoring the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents.

I It was also from this ideal of mine that in 1932 and 1933, I conceded the sum of 15 million yen and 10 million yen respectively from the Army budget to the Navy and cooperated with the Finance Office and Navy Office. I thought it would be detrimental to the credit of Japan if the army and navy disagreed with each other for a matter of a small amount in the budget and if, because of this, the Navy Minister should resign from his post. As far as the army was concerned, serving the country under the complete harmony of the army and navy was its first moral duty and accomplishment of this mission was considered by it much more impatient than a monetary question of ten or fifteen million yen.

The army budgets in 1932 and 1933, excluding the budget for the Manchurian Incident, was about one hundred and seventy million yen each and there are virtually no increases in comparison with those of preceding years. On the contrary, 1933 showed some decrease. New installations and equipment which had to be provided to cope with the incident were paid by appropriating the budget of the following year. Under such circumstances, any positive preparation of war was impossible.

The army budget for the Manchurian Incident while I was War Minister was one hundred and forty or fifty million yen each for the two successive years. After the recognition of Manchukuo, the army was charged with the added task of Manchurian national defense by the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol. Also, there was some reinforcement of railway guards in compliance with the expansion of the railways to be guarded, but this did not involve any material increase of expense. In attending to the joint defense of Manchoukuo, the military installations in Manchoukuo were limited to those of a defensive nature, and nothing was undertaken by way of offensive action.

Establishment of railway lines, unification of communication systems and exploitation of natural resources were the reasonable necessities for a new state on her way to development; also from the necessity of maintaining law and order. It was nothing more than an ordinary step that a newly born nation should take, and Manchukuo merely did it. It is definitely wrong and groundless to accuse that Japan made Manchuria a militaristic base for aggressive war. To further support this, the military installations in Manchoukuo were limited to those of defensive nature.

As I have stated before, my view of war and view of national defense, which I had harbored since World War I, was fundamentally different from those of other people. Therefore, armaments of powers did not attract my attention and I did not approve any imperialistic policy or immoral equipment, whether militaristic, ideological or economic. The armament was consequently carried out in view of this consideration.

In the administration of military affairs, I abolished discrimination in treatment between the rich and the poor. I also denounced the system of paying money to become a cadet and equalized the opportunity in military service. Because of this change some of the college students who wanted to become cadets, may have sought some preparatory military knowledge out of their desire for enlightenment. I contend that this cannot be called militarization of education.

I also established a policy which I believe to be the basic conditions for the purification of the army and intended for the improvement in the treatment of war wounded.

Since this was my principle even in armament, I can definitely say that there was not the slightest truth in the testimony of witness OUCHI that during my tenure of office as War Minister, I militarized school education.

The guiding principle in my direction of the army was first to make an army based upon morality, the principle upon which the army was founded and second to let it display its characteristics as an army which observed the Imperial Way. In order to realize this, refer to my purging in the aftermath of several disastrous incidents in the past. This was the reason why I conducted shifts of several of the military personnel. I did my best in quieting the young officers who had been dissatisfied with the situation and in the May 15 Incident, there was not one participation in it by any army officer and I am proud to say that throughout my tenure of office as War Minister, there was not a single case of any such unlawful action.

I further endeavored to eliminate the Prussian type from the army. I insisted that the troops should further the virtue of the army to such an extent that they would not cause grudge from an opponent, and to win the favor and respect of inhabitants wherever they might be stationed. Our army in those days was apt to be ideologically confused with the Prussian army and such conception needed correction. I, first of all, wanted some of the members of the cabinet to understand this spirit and with it to rectify the common misconception that armament was for the sake of waging war. I determined that this must be thoroughly understood by the whole public and whenever possible expressed my views in speeches and other writings.

With regard to the strained situation of Japan, I requested the earnest reflection of the people over the current problems and urged them to place their first importance in the promotion of morality.

The real meaning of my speech entitled "Emergency Japan" which was offered in evidence by the prosecution can be proved by many other speeches bearing "emergency" in their titles. If the whole of this speech is read without prejudice, I believe the real intention of mine will be understood. The process of manufacture of this film and the impression that this film gave to the spectators will also be a good indication of the intention with which I made this speech.

All of these speeches were made with a view to introducing my moral views which I gained through my experience in World War I.

That underlies the Imperial Rescript granted by the late Emperor MEIJI to the army and navy personnel is the sense of sincerity. The present Emperor showed in his Imperial Rescript granted when he ascended the Throne that the true principle of the foundation of Japan was based upon the spirit of benevolence. I advocated that the army should observe the principle of those Imperial Rescripts and should exert their best to discharge its duty. My intention was to enhance, by my advocacy, the virtue of benevolence of the Emperor among the people, and this was, I thought, the first step to let the troops completely become aware of the true spirit of the Imperial Army. By their efforts, I believe I succeeded, even in the slightest degree, in removing imperialistic thought from the Army and also from the people and prevented them from egoistical conduct.

16. Military discipline during the Manchurian Incident.

The Manchurian Incident arose from what had been vitally important to Japan. As the ultimate object of this incident was to bring peace and welfare to both Japanese and Chinese nationals, the officers and soldiers of the Japanese Army at the front as well as the general public in Japan were sympathetic toward the Manchurians and other people on the spot. The hostilities were not of the nature of a declared war, and so all the captives were immediately released and were given assistance to engage in peaceful work. Those who were in distress were given relief funds. These facts were made clear by the report of those who inspected conditions there. There was not a single case of massacre or violence, nor was there any report made to that effect. Lord Lytton's Report admitted this fact.

The incident which was reported by the Chicago Tribune as having occurred near SENKIANG was nothing but a minor skirmish between a small squad and a body of local bandits. This was exaggerated and made the subject of propaganda as was the usual practice with the Chinese people, and the propaganda was reported by Mr. Powell and was inserted in the paper as it was. This is clear by the testimony of Mr. Powell himself, and the same may be supported to some extent by the protest of the Japanese consul. The skirmish was too small to be reported to me, so I did not know of it.

17. The circumstances under which I became Cabinet Councillor in the First Konoze Cabinet.

Since my withdrawal from active service in March 1936, I had not been quite satisfied with the state of affairs and was leading a life of a retired man. During that time there was an occasion when, at the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937, I was extremely worried about the situation and suggested to Prince KONOZE my view on means of bringing about peace.

It happened in September 1937 that Prince KONOZE who was the Prime Minister at that time sent for me. When I saw him, he was very much worried about the China Incident and asked me if I had any idea as to the means of saving the situation. It was the time when the Second Shanghai Incident had broken out and the situation was really serious.

I told him that if a frontal clash between China and Japan should take place, it would not only be against the policy of our country, but would also cause great difficulty for Japan from the operational viewpoint. I suggested that he should ask Lt. Gen. OBITA's opinion about those matters, but he told me that he had had Lt. Gen. OBITA's opinion already and that from his opinion he was more convinced of the gravity of the situation. He said that it was the reason why he came to me and wanted my unreserved opinion for saving the situation.

I told him that since the state of affairs had developed to such an extent as those existing, it would require a person with strong influence among military circles, not a retired soldier like myself, to settle the affair. I added that in any case, Prince KONOZE would require a great deal of resolution to cope with the situation.

In the meantime, Premier KONOZE set up an organization of Cabinet Councillors and about ten people including myself were appointed the Cabinet Councillors. The object of this organization was to seek suggestions to check the expansion of the incident and to settle it.

18. The functions of the Cabinet Councillors and my suggestions to the Premier.

The Cabinet Council was not organized into a regular system of a council. Its members were to make their individual suggestions to Premier KONOZE and the Council had no recognized right of resolution. The Councillors were to meet regularly once or twice a week. However, it was to hear the latest information from the government or to exchange each other's views, and not to discuss any fixed agenda.

As the KONOZE Cabinet did not place much importance in this system, the Cabinet Council was gradually reduced to a nominal existence and a Councillor was an honorary post for which no pay or other form of treatment was given. At the time when this system was established, the China Incident had considerably expanded and the troops had reached somewhere near Nanking.



I submitted my opinion to the Premier saying that to attack and subsequently occupy the capital of China would only make the whole situation more serious than over and would create a considerable hindrance to the readjustment of China-Japan relations in the future. I suggested that peace should be sought before this campaign took place.

All the Councillors were of more or less the same opinion, and the government authorities seemed to have done their best in endeavoring to save the situation. However, what was lacking with the government authorities was a resolute determination to push through their policy, whereas the military action which was under the direction of the Supreme Command gained more influence every day and resulted in the further aggravation of the situation.

I think it was around this time that a peace negotiation was made through the good offices of Mr. Trautman, German Ambassador in China. All of the councillors were looking forward to the success of this negotiation, but the repeated efforts on the part of the Japanese government were frustrated. The Councillors did not participate in the deliberation of this peace negotiation and accordingly were not informed of its details. However, they eagerly expected the government, in an abstract manner, to accomplish this negotiation, until it proved in vain on the 16th of January.

Thus, the Councillors, whose duty from its inception had been nullified, became a mere nominal sinecure. The Councillors are charged with atrocities in Nanking, but they had neither the authority nor duty of controlling such an incident.

19. The circumstances in which I became Education Minister and the state of affairs during my tenure of office.

Prince KONOYE, from his sincere apprehension over the situation, and desiring to devise counter means against it, determined at the end of May to reshuffle his Cabinet, and selected as ministers the following members from the Cabinet Councillors. General UGAKI was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. IKEDA, Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry; and myself Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry; and myself Minister of Education. He then appointed Lt. General ITAGAKI as War Minister. I had some expectation for this renovated Cabinet, but Premier KONOYE, after the renovation made it his practice to confer on current problems only with the Five Minister Conference comprised of Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign and Finance, and other Ministers were not invited to the discussions.

At that time military operations were in progress, and as they were under control of the Supreme Command, the Cabinet had no authority to check them. Thus, while the Premier was indecisive military action gradually developed and reached as far as Wuchang, Hankow and Canton. During this time, the members of the Cabinet other than those of the Five Minister Council were not immediately informed of the latest state of affairs.



Under the circumstances, my position was merely the chief of the education administration, which was entirely outside the realm of current affairs, and all I did was to promote education and its administration.

20. My work as Minister of Education.

The Ministry of Education, as one of its fixed duties, shared with the Ministry of Home Affairs the task of keeping surveillance over the General Spiritual Mobilization Organization. Consequently, the Minister of Education had to write in magazines and make broadcasts in connection with educational matters, as part of his routine duties. The drafts of articles or broadcasts usually prepared by the staff of ministry in charge of such matter and the Minister only made them public. The work was executed along the customary line. I do not think there was anything which was planned with specific intention or departed from the customary practice.

Excerpts of some of my books were tendered to the Tribunal as prosecution evidence. To those I contend that if the whole book had been read, instead of excerpts, what I was aiming to explain would have been understood.

During the earlier period of my tenure of office as Education Minister, there were some in the Ministry who were inclined toward flattery or fanatically pleaded the true principle of the fundamental policy of our country; there were some who were inclined to agree with the Nazi ideology; on the other hand, there were still some submerged elements in the schools who followed communism.

This situation required competent persons who could regulate this confusion, and this was why I conducted personnel shifts among the Education Office Staff.

I also appointed competent people who could cope with confidence with the request from the military authorities and other government branches so that the evil practice of being obsequitous to such requests could be eliminated.

At that time, the Education Council had already been established (in 1937). This was the highest institution for the renovation of the education system and it comprised as Councillors the most prominent persons of learning and experience, both in and out of office. All the important problems of education were deliberate upon at this Council and the government policies on education were decided upon by its resolution.

The inception of the advocacy for compulsory education at the Youths School dates back to the beginning of the TAISHO Era when it was then only a Supplementary School.

In 1937, the Educational Administration Council made a report, in answer to the inquiry from the government about the question of Youths School. In January 1938, at the time of my predecessor, compulsory education was already decided upon at a Cabinet meeting. Then the question was again deliberated upon by the Education Council and according to its reply in July of the same year, it was arranged that an Imperial Ordinance be issued in April 1939 for its enforcement.

This new system was to give equal opportunity of education to all people and help to develop their natural gifts. It is entirely wrong to interpret this change as militarization of education.

The education system in Japan since the MEIJI Era had been formed after the European and American lives. While the system enjoyed certain popularity among the public, it offered more opportunity to the well-to-do class of people, and those of talent and faculty from the power classes found difficulty in developing their natural gifts. I perceived that this was contrary to our original program to let everyone gain his proper place, when the Educational Council submitted its decision that education in the Youths School should be made compulsory. I took this opportunity to develop the education of the working class of youths, and to give to those who showed good result in the Youths School ample opportunity to develop their talent.

The most serious apprehension of Japan at that time was the disturbance of ideological circles. There was a time when communism spread widely among the people and once it became the tide of public opinion; then there was a time, later when people followed Nazism or Fascism. This trend, gave rise to complications between the liberalism which had also existed at that time and caused a terrible state of chaos.

The several unfortunate incidents which arose from the current situation at that time were due to the disturbance of thought on the part of the people. On the other hand, the rise of the Nippon spirit tended to create a dogmatic nationalism, which from its lack of ubiquity, was apt to fall into extreme rightism and was pregnant of much danger. The cause of this defect was due to the fault of perfunctory education which had a tendency of making the people lose sight of ideological independence and lofty ideas. In order to reform this, I advocated that the imperial virtue of benevolence and tolerance, which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of our country, should be borne in mind and cultivate in it an ubiquitous character which was welcome in all the modern civilized countries of the world, Imperial admonition was my guiding principle when attending to this work, inasmuch as the imperial admonition was teaching us the basic principle of humanity with His Majesty's generosity, and I considered that that was the code that the people should observe. This principle which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of the Empire was entirely different from militarism not only was it just the contrary to militarism, but it was the one essentially required for the correction of the defect in ideological circles at that time.

#### 21. Military Training in Schools

The history of physical exercise in military style which was eventually turned into military training dates back many years ago, but I am not going into its detail now. I had heard of some conflict between the education institutions and the military authorities with regard to military training in the schools, but neither of the parties had my sympathy, inasmuch as the whole conflict seemed to be due to their narrow views.

It was quite natural that school education placed its importance in cultivating the spirit of discipline and cooperation by training. But as the result of the training depended on the character of the person who was in charge of training, there were instances when the training was executed in excess of the above object. On the other hand, there were several cases where, on account of lack of proper understanding on the part of the school authorities, liberalism was regarded as synonymous to a sloven life and students were left in an irregular and slatternly existence. Another fearful tendency was communistic ideology, which, combined with some of the political plotters caused deterioration of the student's ability by abetting them into the habit of disdaining such virtues as discipline, moderation, cooperation and diligence, all of which were indispensable to the promotion of the culture of a nation.

During the earlier period of my Education Ministership, these fearful tendencies were gaining influence, much to my regret. There were frequent occasions when students were arrested and detained by the police on the charge of disturbing public order. These types of students were given to slandering the training in the schools as being militarization of school education. There were some even among the teachers and professors who encouraged students toward such tendencies.

I changed the system of training in the schools in such a way so as to observe moderation between the above two extremes and with it I tried to promote the lofty ideals of the students.

The reformation of the system of the Youths School was an act of equalizing the right and duty of education. By the reformation, there was no increase in hours allotted for training and there was not the slightest evidence to show that the education was militarized.

Military training in the schools was a part of the school education and from the viewpoint of educational administration it should not have exceeded this category. This was my principle in coping with this training, and so any request from the army authorities which attempted to bring it out of this category met my refusal.

There were occasions when in compliance with the request of students and school authorities, the use of modern weapons was introduced in training, but this decision was an autonomous disposition of the school authorities in view of the students' request, and was not done by the request of the Education Ministry.

While I was Education Minister, I placed importance on cultivating the moral element rather than promoting the skill of combat. This moral element served to reveal the Emperor's virtue of benevolence.

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That is to say, by training I taught students to cultivate their morals rather than to cultivate the habit of depending on armed force.

### 23. National Spirit General Mobilization

The National Spirit General Mobilization system had been established at the time of the First KONOYE Cabinet and its object was to straighten the national spirit against the state of affairs after the outbreak of the China Incident. It had been established before I became the Education Minister.

Its central executive organ was civilian comprised of people of learning, fame and experience which had been placed under the charge of the Departments of Home Affairs and Education. Its main object was the improvement of the people's daily life and spiritual restraint.

Later, there was a tendency for the policy of this central executive organ to become dogmatic. The HIRANUMA Cabinet, desiring to follow its policy properly, established a committee system with the chairman of the committee to be selected from among the cabinet ministers, to pursue a basic policy, and all the people of learning and experience both in and out of office were requested to deliberate so that the committee could submit its opinion to the government.

In my capacity of Education Minister, I was recommended to the chairmanship of this committee, but most of the actual work was handled by the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet. The committee and staff included many civilians, especially women, and deliberated on renovation and curtailment of daily living.

However, in spite of its primary objective, the discussion tended to delve into current problems, diverting from its original purpose of cultivating the fundamental character of the people in order to be worthy of associating with the modern world.

What was most urgently required under the circumstances was to ask the people to undertake a severe introspection into their daily mode of living, concentrate upon the cultivation of the spirit of endurance and improvement of their daily life, respect social morality and help them to bring about efficiency in their work.

In order to realize the above, I established a day of self-introspection. I decided that the first day of every month be called the "Serving Day" and requested the people to lead a life of restraint on this day. There was an opinion at that time that in view of the current situation, the 7th of every month, the day of the outbreak of the China Incident would be a better day for

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"Servin? Day". However, my opinion was that "Servin? Day" should be disconnected with the current state of affairs. My intention was to use this day for permanently promoting the basic standard of living of the people, and in order to get the people to understand this principle, I made the first day of every month the day for self-introspection. Thus I tried to prevent everything from coming under the influence of the current situation.

I wish to add that the National Spirit General Mobilization was entirely different in nature from National General Mobilization and Student Mobilization. The National Spirit General Mobilization was merely a part of the daily life renovation movement.

24. International problems while I was the Education Minister.

My duty as Education Minister was limited mainly to education administration, and the general international problems were outside the scope of my work. I have no recollection whether such matters as Premier KONCYE's declaration of the Establishment of the New Order or Foreign Minister ARITA's declaration was debated at the Cabinet Meeting.

My non-association with the international problems was more conspicuous at the time of the HIRANUMA Cabinet. In fact, I knew nothing about those matters at that time, inasmuch as all the important problems were discussed and decided at the Five Minister Conference.

Japan-German Cultural Agreement was first proposed to me by the Foreign Office and then Japan entered into this agreement. The agreement concerned culture only and had no political significance.

Exchange of boys between Germany and Japan was planned and executed before my acceptance of the Education Ministership. The first group returned home after my assumption of office. I did not see in this party anything more than an ordinary social visit of a tourist party. I wanted to send a similar party not to Germany alone, but to all other civilized countries, but could not realize it.

The Khasan and Nomonhan Incidents were reported to the Cabinet Meeting as being mere skirmishes between the border garrisons of both countries. The Education Minister was not concerned in the disposal of such incidents. Only one thing was clear that the government desired an amicable settlement and the army acted from the beginning to end in conformity with this policy. That was why those incidents did not become serious subjects of discussion at the Cabinet Meeting.

I did not know anything about the Tripartite Pact and the Wang-Chin-wei government. I did not even know how they were discussed or made. As for the stationing of troops in French Indo-China and the problems concerning

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the Lesser Southern Group of Islands and Hainan Island, I had not the slightest idea of what was going on.

25. Cabinet Councillor at the ABE and YONAI Cabinets.

It was quite a long time after the formation of the ABE Cabinet that I was asked to become a Councillor of that Cabinet. (I think it was in December 1939). I had known that a Cabinet Councillor was merely a nominal post and that I could not be of any material service to that Cabinet, so I first declined to accept it but the Premier was so persistent that I had to accept it after all. The ABE Cabinet resigned en bloc after two months of my acceptance of this post, and so I did not even have a chance of talking to the Premier.

When the YONAI Cabinet was formed, I was asked to become its Home Minister. However, my view was as I have stated above, and furthermore, the state of affairs was so aggravated at that time that I considered it was impossible for anyone except those who held strong influence over the military authorities, to exercise an effective administration to cope with the situation, and so I refused to accept it.

Then I was asked to become its Cabinet Councillor, but as my view was unchanged since the ABE Cabinet, again I declined to accept it. But when I was persistently asked by him to list my name among the Councillors only for nominal purpose, I could not very well refuse it and became a Cabinet Councillor.

As my assumption of the post had taken place under such circumstances, I remained its nominal member and actually did not do any work. I did not even know what was going on in the cabinet. It was, however, conceivable that both the ABE and YONAI Cabinets were opposed to the Tripartite Pact and that they were eager to put an end to the China Incident.

26. My attitude toward the Second KONOYE Cabinet

It was in September 1940, about two months after the formation of the Second KONOYE Cabinet that Mr. Tomita, Chief Cabinet Secretary unexpectedly visited me and asked me to become a Cabinet Councillor of the Second KONOYE Cabinet.

I had been told that the establishment of the Grand Rule Assistance Association and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact were going to be disclosed shortly. These were the two important domestic and foreign problems, over which I had had serious apprehensions for some time in the past. Since those two problems were to be realized, it meant that my apprehension could not remain mere apprehension, but developed into something very serious. I decided that I could not assist the Cabinet which was to commit those mistakes. In fact, the things were so serious that I thought I had to make a very careful consideration about it. I confided these considerations to Mr. Tomita and told him that I could not accede to his request.

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On the evening of the same day, Prince KONOYE visited me at my house and repeated his request. We had a hot discussion for more than five hours. I explained to him that the state of affairs at that time indicated very grave consequences and I did not accept his request.

From March 1936 to October 15th, 1937, from September 1939 to November, 1939 and after July 1940, I was not in any official position and no public activity was undertaken by me during those periods. The incidents such as the Anti-Comintern Pact, outbreak of the China Incident, Stationing of troops in French Indo-China, Tripartite Pact and the Pacific War occurred during those periods, and so I do not think it necessary for me to state anything about those incidents.

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state of affairs. The interpreters themselves seemed to have conscientiously admitted their incompetence.

As I felt uneasy of this situation, I suggested that I should write the outline, if not the details, of what were asked of me. I said that if the prosecutors were to make interrogations based on my written statement, it would not only save considerable time, but also would help to convey my idea accurately and correctly.

This suggestion was duly agreed to by the prosecution and although I had not much time to elaborate on its contents, I made a statement concerning the settlement of the Manchurian Incident after my acceptance of the post of War Minister, and also, in answer to the question of the prosecution regarding the movement of young officers, I made another statement concerning the situation of Japan at the time of the Incident and the general outline of how I acted in it. The former was handed over to Mr. Hyder and the latter to Colonel Morrow, and I asked them to let me read the English translation of those two statements when it was ready.

I think this took place on or about 11th or 12th of February 1946. There is a remark in Exhibit No. 187-C, as having been said by the prosecutor, "I will bring you a copy of this translation.", and also as my statement, "All of these are written in the document that I gave you." refer to this conversation.

However, much to my anxiety, the translation was not shown to me, and the interrogation of the prosecutors continued. Of course the interrogation, which was carried out in the same manner as before, filled me with apprehension, but since I had already presented my written statement, it did not worry me too much. I only waited for the time when a proper interrogation based on my written statement would take place.



After the commencement of this trial, the translation of the documents in question was handed to me through my defense counsel, and the prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the record of my interrogation in evidence. On that occasion, my counsel tried to explain to the Tribunal the circumstances in which the interrogation was carried out, but my impression was that the explanation was not properly understood.

My counsel subsequently tried to take every opportunity to explain this matter to the Tribunal. He once tendered a copy of this translation in evidence under a general phase, but it was not admitted on the ground that it should be submitted under the individual phase. (document)

I contend that the written statement that I made at the Sugamo Prison is indispensable to the record of my interrogation and that they should be read together. I further suggest that even in that written statement, there is a slight mistake which occurred through misinterpretation of prosecutor's question.

3. Such being the case, the record of my interrogation contained several important mistakes and, furthermore, the contents are not consistent as a Japanese sentence, some of which, I shall point out in the following:

1. The allegation that during the Manchurian Incident, I established a plan for occupation of Manchuria. (Exhibit No. 188-A, 188-B, 188-C, among which 188-C is slightly better, but the other two do not make sense.)

This allegation is entirely different from the fact.

That this allegation is wrong can easily be checked by comparing the date of my interrogation, my written answer to the prosecutors and Exhibit No. 188-A, 188-B and 188-C.

The real state of affairs at that time has been fully Explained in my present statement, and the statement will be supported by the evidence which has been submitted by this time and also by those which will be submitted in the future.

2. The allegation makes us believe as if the Privy Council was the party which decided the national policy. That this is wrong is quite clear even from common sense.

3. It is also a great mistake, as can easily be ascertained, in the allegation that the War Minister dictated orders to the Chief of General Staff for the dispatch of troops.

4. The date when the INUKAI Cabinet decided the outline of its Manchurian policy was not the 17th of December. This mistake arose when the Prosecutor insisted that the plenary session of the Privy Council for the deliberation of "Issuance of Bond to cover the Emergency Expense to deal with the Manchurian Incident" was on that date.

5. My statement concerning the basic principle of dealing with the Incident was confused by the interpreter with my statement concerning the fact. By this I mean our conversation relative to whether or not the document in question is still kept, regulation of Cabinet meeting, whether or not attendance at the Cabinet meeting was compulsory.

6. The allegation is that I stated that the sovereignty over  
5 Manchuria rests with China. It may be so from general conception based on a map, but the fact was different, and my statement to that effect was mistaken as above shown.

7. The allegation that I directed the independence declaration of Manchuria and its subsequent recognition is entirely mistaken. This will be clarified by the allusion to the same in this statement as well as by other evidence which is to be tendered.

8. Conversations concerning the responsibility of Cabinet members, the declaration of the Foreign Minister, those who were responsible for the China Incident, and the circumstances in which I accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor were only partially recorded, and because of this, the record failed to convey the real meaning and is apt to mislead the readers. This will be clarified by documentary evidence and witnesses.

9. The extent of authority of the Supreme Command, which was in charge of the expedition, and that of the government was not thoroughly expressed in the record of my interrogation.

I merely stated an instance to show that in ordinary times, the government policy is shown to the Supreme Command by the government in order to make it a basis for the former to decide upon its movement, but by this I did not mean to specifically state the fundamental power and authority of those two organs.

When the warfare was started, or when the Supreme Command deemed it necessary from national defense point of view, it was entitled to make a direct access to the Throne, and so it can not be said that the dispatch of troops was done only when it was agreed to by the government.

2. Further refutation to other evidence of the Prosecution.

a) The Motion Picture "Emergency Japan."

"Emergency Japan" was the title of my speech which I made, in compliance with the request of the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper, on the subject of Emergency.

It was the time when Japan was unfortunate to have to withdraw from the League of Nations. An air of uneasiness prevailed throughout the country, and there was utter confusion both politically and ideologically.

I had an idea of my own, with which I wanted to appeal to my fellow compatriots. My afore-mentioned speech was to restrain the people from corrupt customs and from habits which prevailed throughout the country, and to encourage them to further their recognition of the international relations, and, by doing so, to quiet the people's mind which was apt to run to extremes.

I advocated in this speech that the real object of national defense is not in waging war, but in protecting and securing morals, and justice; that the troops of Japan should not make it their first object to blindly resort to armed force, but that they should place the first importance in securing morals, and thus I requested the self-reflection of the people over the circumstances in which they were, in order to enhance their culture.

I was not concerned in any way in the manufacture of this film. I trust the section of the War Office in charge gave necessary warning to the manufacturers to be very careful not to provoke international feeling by this film. The above intention of mine was clearly manifested in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th and 12th reels of this film.

I have used this expression of emergency on several other occasions and other documentary evidence bearing this title of emergency will clarify what I meant by this expression.

I made a speech in the summer of 1933 . . . . . in which I said, "what is needed by the people of emergency Japan is the watchword, don't reject others, don't abuse others, don't blame others, but cultivate your character." I also told the younger generations of Japan the state of mind that they should have, "don't be satisfied by finding yourself alone contented. Cooperate with and assist others in bringing about peace and welfare of the people. Don't criticize to fault of others. Be generous and broad minded. The peace of the world and your own welfare will be realized by observing the above. Be kind to foreigners and take into your consideration the welfare of the foreign countries. Let us teach the world the path of humanity to reach world peace."

I advocated these principles in connection with the expression "Emergency" and I tried to introduce this principle into the film when it was manufactured in dealing with the subject of the fundamental principle of the Japanese troops. By this I intended to show the aspiration of Japan of cooperating with the world in realizing peace on earth.

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There were some minor points which, due to technical reasons and because of the intention <sup>of the</sup> manufacturer to cater to the taste of the lower standard of people, were not quite up to my original intention, but as a whole, I considered that the film was faultless. I never heard from any one that the film made any acute impression on the spectators. (b)

(b) My articles in "Mombu Jiho" while I was the Education Minister and my speeches and broadcasts that I made during that period were nothing but the routine work of an Education Minister, and they were not delivered in connection with any incident in particular. The Prosecution depicted several words as being provocative, but I contend that the incident was going on at that time and expression of that kind was quite common with the general public and there was nothing strange in that. Those speeches and articles were prepared in such a way that one can really appreciate my purported principle only when he reads through the whole text. I never considered them as giving encouragement to the expansion of the incident or instigating aggression. Lastly, as can be seen from what I have explained, at no time did I conspire with anyone to commit nor did I commit myself personally, directly or indirectly any of the crimes charged by the prosecution. On the contrary I did every thing in my power to avoid war and the tragic consequences in which Japan finds herself today.

On this 25th day of August, 1947

At War Ministry.

DEPONENT ARAKI, Sadao (seal)

I, SUGAWARA, Yutaka, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence

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of this witness.


On the same date  
at War Ministry.

Witness: (signed) SUGAWARA, Yutaka (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ARAKI, Sadao (seal)





Handwritten Statement given Elton M. Hyder on  
February 11, 1946 by I.R.KI, Sadao.

(This is only a rough summary).

On December 13, 1931 I was appointed War Minister when I considered it most important to stabilize the situation by mapping out a general plan for the solution of various complicated problems which then existed both inside and outside this country.

At that time battles were being fought covering an extensive area in Manchuria. In northern Manchuria disturbances were once subdued, but owing to Ma Chan Shan's revolt the region was again thrown into scenes of war, and our army had already occupied Chichihai. Should the state of affairs have been left as it was, there was no telling how far the war disaster might have extended. Strategically speaking, our army was at war with Chan Hsin Liang's troops which were really powerful, and any slight error on the part of our army might have brought about an annihilation. Prior to this we had had bitter experiences of humiliation at Nikolayevsk, Chinan, and Nanking, though matters were a little different in the last named place. In order not to repeat a similar blunder, and at the same time to avoid an all-round clash between Japan and China and also to limit disaster to the least possible extent, the affair had to be dealt with promptly and decisively as the disaster already had reached far by that time; otherwise, I judged, it would go beyond control. In view of the fact that this incident had developed rather unplanned in the past it was necessary to make the following plan: I consulted the Premier, Finance Minister and the Chief Secretary and it was decided to restore public order, without delay, in the Liausi District which had been left in suspense and obscurity and at the same time to pacify the bandits who had still remained there disturbing public order. Because it was the time when the Diet was not in session, the necessary expense was decided to be drawn on the Emergency Expense account. When the Cabinet action was taken on this matter, necessary steps were also taken through the Privy Council and completed. It was some time between the 10th and the 20th of December.

The above mentioned plan was as follows:

1. Aim: To restore public peace in Manchuria promptly.
2. The opponent: The Chiefs of the Four East Provinces who were responsible for having put the land into disorder.
3. Area: Consequently the Four East Provinces under the control of Mr. Chiang.

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In the Privy Council the matter was discussed and two or three advisers who were present asked questions and after answering them this was approved.

Especially Advisor Egi said that the matter had been set forth logically consistent and clearly, and furthermore he encouraged me to go on with this plan and try to restore public peace at once -- so I remember. Thus the proposed expense (30,000,000 yen or 50,000,000 yen) was approved for payment. Immediately necessary procedures were taken and the Supreme Command Department actually started on operation. In those days Chiang Hsin Liang seemed to be at Chin Chou in Liausi district, and then he moved to Jehol.

In order to avoid an extension of the war disaster, I decided to limit the force to a minimum and to move the troops slowly, waiting for Mr. Chiang's reconsideration; so I did not give a real mobilization order to the troops on the field. However, the matter did not get any better. I suppressed our army force from going to a positive action till spring of the following year. Also we kept to the policy not to go beyond the boundary of the last province, under any circumstance, and stay within the line of the Great Wall. Although after the Jehol operation, the troops twice advanced beyond the Great Wall for operation, yet the Assistant Chief of the General Staff made an urgent trip to the field at the command of the Emperor and ordered them to retreat and stay within the Great Wall line. (This is the original sentence and this is changed later with pencil as follows:) Although after the Jehol operation, the troops twice advanced beyond the Great Wall for operation, yet it was decided that the Assistant Chief of the General Staff would make an urgent trip to the field at the command of the Emperor and order them to retreat and stay within the Great Wall line. However, the matter was settled before he left.

(The concluding sentence of this passage reads):

"That was about March 1933."

Notwithstanding the difficulty involved in these two retreats from the viewpoint of using forces, we dared to do it. During this time some army groups were sent out to Shanghai, owing to the Shanghai Incident, and after the fighting came to an end, part of them were authorized to garrison while the armistice treaty was worked on.

However, so that any possible future mishaps might be avoided we had all the groups withdrawn, and part of them we went to Manchuria to make a change in the front line.

Soon after this, in May, an armistice treaty was concluded at Taku between Japan and China and thus the fighting i.e. army operation of the Manchurian Incident was brought to an end. Then it was considered necessary to settle

general problems through diplomatic procedure and we waited for such activities.

Unfortunately, our relationship with the League of Nations had not yet been adjusted by that time, but diplomatic relations had been kept on as before, so I believed there was still room left for such. The difference in opinion then between the League and Japan are clearly stated in our Government explanation and declaration, therefore, I shall not give any details here. After all the difference lay in the viewpoints of the two, i.e., one was looking things at by rationalizing and the other standing on the actual situation.

Now in June 1935, Japan and China exchanged new ambassadors. Our Ambassador Arizochi went to China with a national (diplomatic) letter to Mr. Lin Sen, the head of China Republic. and for the time being friendly relationship between the two countries was recovered. I thought matters had reached a stage where diplomatic activities play the main part, so international peaceful relationship was expected to be favorably re-established.

In the end of 1936, there happened the Hsiang Incident. Chiang Kai Shek was imprisoned by Chiang Hwei Liang and forced to declare war against Japan -- so I hear. Also I hear that Chiang Kai Shek came secretly to our country and had visits with Mr. Toyama Mitsuru and other old friends of his, but I am not sure about the truth of it.

943163A

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

DIVISIONAL COMMANDER UEDA'S STATEMENT  
(Feb. 18, 1932)

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI INCIDENT (P. 83)

It is my ardent wish to accomplish my duty by the most, effective means and I notify your army of the following articles.

1. Your army is to stop fighting at once, complete the withdrawal of the front line troops from the present front at 0700 February, 20th. Withdrawal must be completed by 1700 February 20th, from the area (including the SHIHZELIN Fort) which is 20 Kilometers north of the settlement borderline, and which is a line connecting the west bank of the HUANGPU River and the northwest edge of the settlement, extending through FENG HOTUCHEN, CHOWCHLACHACHEN and PUSUNOCHEN, and which connects the east bank of the HUANGPU River and LAN\_NI\_TU and CHANG\_CHIA\_LOW\_CHEN.

Furthermore fortresses and other military facilities within the said area must be withdrawn, and must not be re-established.

2. The Japanese army will not shell, bomb, nor pursue your army after your army commences to withdraw. However, reconnaissance by planes will not be restricted. After the withdrawal of your army, the Japanese army will hold only the area in the HUNG\_KIU territory including the road area of the Municipal Police Office and the area around the HUNG\_KIU Park.

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請田部部長聲明（一九三二年八月）  
上海事件外交史（八三頁）

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植田師團長聲明（一九三二、二、一八）

上海事件外交史（第八三頁）

本職は最有效の手段を以て任務を達成せん事を熱烈に希望し爰に貴軍に對し左の各款を通告す。

一 貴軍は速かに戰鬥行爲を中止し二月二十日午前七時に現在の戰線より第一線の撤退を完了し二月二十日午後五時半迄に黃浦江の西岸より租界西北端を連絡し蕪河鐵鏈、周家橋鎮及び滬淞鎮の線より起算し黃浦江の東岸より爛泥浜及び張家巷の線より起算、各租界境界線より北へ向つて二十ヤロメートル（獅子林砲台を含む）地域より撤退し且つ該地域内砲台及びその他の軍事施設を撤退し之を新設すべからず。

二 日本軍は貴軍撤退開始後に於いて砲臺廢棄及び追撃を行はず。但し飛行機の偵察は此の限りに非ず。又貴軍撤退後は日本軍は僅かに虹口附近の工部局道路地域に虹口公園の周圍を含む地域を保持す。

三 貴軍第一線撤退完了後日本軍はその實行を確認する爲に陸衛兵を有する調査員を撤退地域に派遣すべし。該調査員は日本國旗を携帯して該別

す。  
四 貴軍は該撤退地域外にある上海附近の日本人の生命財産を完全に保護すべし。

之れ等の保護完全ならざるが如きに於いては日本側は適當の手段を執るべし。又便衣隊に對し最も有效なる禁止手段を執るべし。

五 上海附近へ撤退地獄を含むに於ける外國人の保護に關しては別に商議す。

六 併日運動の禁止に關しては一月二十八日吳市長の村井總領事に對しなせる約諾を廢に實行すべし。此の項に關しては別に帝國外務官憲は貴國上海行政長官と交渉する事あるべし。若し以上各項を實行せざる時は日本軍は貴軍に對し自由行動を執るも已むを得ざるところにしてその結果生ずる一切の責任は貴軍之れを負ふべし。

昭和七年二月十八日午後九時

大日本帝國軍司令官 畑 田 吉

第十九路軍司令官 蔣 延 禧 閣 下

白川軍司令官聲明 一九三三年三月一日

上海事件外交史

九十一頁

上海派遣軍を指揮し帝國海軍と協力し上海附近に在留する帝國臣民を保護せんが爲本日茲に到着せり。惟ふに帝國は遂に平和的手段を以て事を處理せんと欲し、凡ゆる努力を盡したるも其の甲斐なく遂に第九師團の武力行使となるや支那側は更に大兵を集めて取備を峻にし尙く迄我に抗せんとしつゝ、あり此處に於て帝國は當初の目的達成上必要なる兵力を増派するの旨なきに至れり。然れども好んで交戦を求め尋常の「紛糾」を欲するものに非ず、若し支那側に於て誠意を以て我が要求を容れ退かに其案を退撤するに於ては我等も逆時軍事行動を停止するに躊躇せざるべし又支那一般民衆に對しては隣邦人たるの友情をつくすべく關係列國とは協調を保持し其の權益を尊重すべきこと素より其所たり茲に皇軍を率ゐて新たに淞滬の地に臨むに當り我軍派遣の目的に鑑み努めて時局の擴大を避け戦局を最少限度に制限し速かに事態を收拾して以て帝國臣民の保護を完ふすると共に東亞の秩序を回復せん事を期す。石聲明す

昭和七年三月一日

上海派遣軍司令官

白川

大

將



Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

THE STATEMENT OF LIAISON COLONEL SHIRAKAWA

March 1, 1932

91 Diplomatic History of the Shanghai Incident.

I have just arrived here today, to take command of the Shanghai expeditionary army in order to protect our people residing in the Shanghai area in cooperation with the Navy.

Though Japan has made every effort to settle the matter by peaceful means, it has been all in vain, and now that the 9th division has taken arms at last, the Chinese are going to resist us with heavier preparations and a larger force. Thus being the case, Japan is obliged to increase in her forces necessary to accomplish her primary purpose. We, however, don't want to fight and to complicate the matter any more. If the Chinese accept our demands faithfully and evacuate their forces immediately, we shall not hesitate to cease military action. And it is obvious that we shall be faithful neighbors toward the common Chinese people and maintain harmony with all other countries concerned while respecting their rights and interests.

On the occasion of my arrival in the Shanghai area commanding the Imperial army, I intend to do my best to clear up this incident, in view

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643163A

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

DIVISIONAL COMMANDER UEDA'S STATEMENT  
(Feb. 18, 1932)

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI INCIDENT (P. 83)

It is my ardent wish to accomplish my duty by the most, effective means and I notify your army of the following articles.

1. Your army is to stop fighting at once, complete the withdrawal of the front line troops from the present front at 0700 February, 20th. Withdrawal must be completed by 1700 February 20th, from the area (including the SHIHZELIN Fort) which is 20 Kilometers north of the settlement borderline, and which is a line connecting the west bank of the HUANGPU River and the northwest edge of the settlement, extending through FENG HOUCHEN, CHOWCHIACHIACHEN and FUSUNCCHEN, and which connects the east bank of the HUANGPU River and LAE\_NI\_TU and CHANG\_CHIA\_LOW\_CHEN. Furthermore fortresses and other military facilities within the said area must be withdrawn, and must not be re-established.
2. The Japanese army will not shell, bomb, nor pursue your army after your army commences to withdraw. However, reconnaissance by planes will not be restricted. After the withdrawal of your army, the Japanese army will hold only the area in the HUNG\_KIU vicinity including the road area of the Municipal Police Office and the area around the HUNGKIU Park.

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Doc. #1899-D

3. After the front line withdrawal of your army is completed, the Japanese Army will dispatch investigators with guards to the withdrawal zone, in order to ascertain its execution. Those investigators will be recognized by bearing the Japanese Flag.
4. Your army must thoroughly protect the lives and properties of Japanese nationals residing in the Shanghai area outside of the said withdrawal zone. If the protection of those people is not complete, the Japanese will take appropriate steps. The most effective prohibitive measures will also be taken against guerillas.
5. Separate negotiations will be made concerning the protection of foreigners in the Shanghai area (including the withdrawal zone).
6. As for prohibiting anti-Japanese movements, you must carry out strictly the promise which Mayor WU made to Consul-general MURAI on January 28. The Japanese diplomatic officials will probably negotiate separately about this item with your Chief Administrator <sup>of</sup> Shanghai. If all the aforementioned items are not carried out, the Japanese Army will be obliged to take free actions against your army, and all the responsibilities arising as a result, will be borne by you.

2100 hours, Feb. 18, 1932.

To General TSUI TING-KAI, the Commanding Officer of the 19th Route Army.

From UEDA, Kenkichi, the Commanding Officer of the Japanese Forces.

903163A

Def. Doc. 41899-D

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植田師團長聲明（一九三二、二、一八）

上海事件外交史（第八三頁）

本職は最有効の手段を以て任務を達成せん事を熱烈に希望し爰に貴軍に對し左の各款を通告す。

一 貴軍は速かに戰鬥行爲を中止し二月二十日午前七時に現在の戰線より第一線の撤退を完了し二月二十日午後五時半迄に黃浦江の兩岸より租界西北端を連絡し蕪河鐵橋、周家橋鎮及び滬涇鎮の線より起算し黃浦江の東岸より爛泥坂及び張家浜の線より起算、各租界境界線より北へ向つて二十ヤロメートル（獅子林砲台を含む）地域より撤退し且つ該地域内砲台及びその他の軍事施設を撤退し之を新設すべからず。

二 日本軍は貴軍撤退開始後に於いて砲臺廢棄及び追撃を行はず。但し飛行機の偵察は此の限りに非ず。又貴軍撤退後は日本軍は僅かに虹口附近の工部局道路地域に虹口公園の周圍を含む地域を保持す。

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す。

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昭和七年二月十八日午後九時

大日本帝國軍司令官 畑 田 吉

第十九路軍司令官 蔡 廷 楷 閣 下



Doc. No. 1899-1

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

THE STATEMENT OF ARMY COMMANDER SHIRAKAWA

March 1, 1932

P. 91 Diplomatic History of the Shanghai Incident.

I have just arrived here today, to take command of the Shanghai expeditionary army in order to protect our people residing in the Shanghai area in cooperation with the Navy.

Though Japan has made every effort to settle the matter by peaceful means, it has been all in vain, and now that the 9th division has taken arms at last, the Chinese are going to resist us with heavier preparations and a larger force. Thus being the case, Japan is obliged to increase her forces necessary to accomplish her primary purpose. We, however, don't want to fight and to complicate the matter any more. If the Chinese accept our demands faithfully and evacuate their forces immediately, we shall not hesitate to cease military action. And it is obvious that we shall be faithful neighbors toward the common Chinese people and maintain harmony with all other countries concerned while respecting their rights and interests.

On the occasion of my arrival in the Shanghai area commanding the Imperial army, I intend to do my best not to enlarge this incident, in view

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Doc. No. 1899-2.

of the objective for which our army was sent, and to limit it as much as possible and settle it quickly in order to protect our people fully and at the same time to restore peaceful order to East Asia.

1932, March 1

Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army

SHIRAKAWA, Yoshinori

EXHIBIT 3164-A

S.P.S. Doc. No. 2406

THE UNITED STATES

# ADDENDUM

全日本國民に告ぐ (荒木貞夫) よりの抜粋

三頁 何のみの聯盟を

世界平和のみの聯盟ではなく、極東平和のみの  
幾ヶ國條約ではなく、欧米のみに都合のみの  
うな國際聯盟ならは眞正である。自國の利益  
のみ都合のみのやうな幾ヶ國條約ならは断りし  
る。

吾もその間に障害をなす者があれば、何と  
も押しつけて行くといふ精神のあつたらんを、改  
維己と亞米利加に知らせることが今日滿洲問題  
に討つべき第一の魂とならねばならぬ。

三頁

東亞の諸國は白色人種壓迫の對象となつてゐる。  
覺醒したる白皇國日本は舍以上には彼等の横暴を  
許容することは出来ぬ。河氷の強國の行動と雖  
も皇道に則せぬ限り断じてこれと排撃するが皇  
國日本の任務である。

三頁

いふまでもなく皇軍の精神は皇道と宣揚し國徳を布  
昭するにある。即ち一の彈丸にも皇道が籠るを、銃劍  
の先にも國徳が授けられてゐる。皇道國徳  
にありては、彈丸の銃劍を注射する。



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-VS-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

Basic Suggestions for the Emergency by ARAKI sadao,  
January 20th, 1934.

His Excellency the Premier,  
Viscount Minoru SAITO.

20th January, 1934

Your Excellency,

It is a matter of great congratulation for the Empire that Your Excellency and the members of the Cabinet are all in good health and are performing the important mission of being advisors to the Imperial Throne in order to cope with the present critical situation of our country.

At this grave moment I fell ill a fact, which fills me with trepidation concerning His Majesty; it also makes me ashamed of myself before Your Excellency and to the members of the Cabinet who are rendering important service as advisors to the Imperial Throne. I further feel ashamed of myself before all the people of this country.

Please accept my heartfelt gratitude for the valuable consideration that Your Excellency has extended to me while I was confined to bed. Fortunately, I am recovering day by day, and since yesterday I am permitted to meet a limited number of visitors. At present I am not conscious of any unusual symptoms. In fact, I feel I am greatly recovering my physical strength every day; but the doctor in attendance has advised me to take another four weeks rest cure, much to my disappointment.

In view of the present state of affairs, I am not inclined to idle my time away, more so when I consider the importance of the coming session of the Diet where several important military problems, including the Military Budget Bill as the most conspicuous issue, are to be debated. This very important Diet Session which deals with the outstanding problems of the day am I unable to attend --unable, at least, with the present condition of my health, for the former half of the session of the House of Representatives when the deliberation on the Budget Bill is to take place; I feel I am derelicting my duty as an advisor to the Throne

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on one hand, and as a Cabinet Minister to cope with the momentous nature of the coming Diet on the other, and so while appreciating the sympathetic consideration extended to me by Your Excellency, by members of the Cabinet, by the members of the Diet and others, I am not disposed to stay in my post under the circumstances, and, furthermore, I consider that the most proper way for me to deal with the important session of the Diet under the present emergency situation would be to recommend a suitable person to take over my post and let him fulfil the task of advisor to the Imperial Throne. In these circumstances, I now solicit that Your Excellency will kindly accept my resignation and will submit the same to the Throne.

In tendering my resignation, I feel exceedingly sorry for Finance Minister TAKAHASHI and Home Minister YAMAMOTO, who, despite their advanced ages and not too good health, exert their utmost day and night to achieve their mission as Ministers of State. I offer my most profound apology to these gentlemen;

Next I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to those who, since the ITUKAI Cabinet, have been my fellow Cabinet members for the past two years and also to those who have been with me in the present cabinet for the past one and half years; all of these gentlemen have kindly supported me through the various difficult problems that I was confronted with during those periods. I sincerely pray for their very good health and their successful activities in the future.

The present situation of Japan, both internally and externally, may appear in different ways to those who look at it from different angles, but if I may be allowed to tender my own appreciation, I firmly believe that this is not an emergency situation from a mere phraseological point of view, but a truly critical juncture at which the fate of our Empire is solely at stake. Opinions seem to differ among the general public as to whether or not a crisis in Japan will result, but real important affairs of a State are apt to arise without even a day's notice and my humble opinion is that a nation must be ready at all times, morally and materially, to avoid any possible portentous trouble and to secure a basis for her further development. This precaution, I may add, has been necessary throughout all ages.

From this viewpoint, I am not inclined to believe that we can afford to take a rose-coloured view of things. In fact, the potential danger of a nation is often made an actual one when people try to avoid tackling difficult problems and seek to comfort themselves by taking a light view of matters. Ill-informed though I am, this is how I feel when I trace back the history of the varied fortune of races.

I do not believe it a far-fetched opinion or an intentionally created pessimism if we forecast unseen difficulties in the immediate future of our country. On the contrary, I trust this is the very moment when national unity is most urgently required to bring about the prosperity of the Empire.

To cope with this important situation, I have in fact already expressed my views on various occasions, including that of the Five Minister Conference. However, as I regard it as a question of vital importance, I take the liberty of making my further suggestion, though it may partially overlap what I said before, under a separate cover, and solicit Your Excellency's valuable consideration over the future of Japan and that you kindly put it into practice.

It has not entirely slipped my notice that some

people are filled with misgivings concerning the attitude of the military authorities toward international problems. To this I may say that our attitude has been consistent and rigid in the past, and will remain so in the future, vis-a-vis those whose ideology and views on national polity are not reconcilable with the character of the national polity of our Empire. However, with my poor knowledge of international relations and also in an endeavour to maintain as close contact as possible with the relative branches of government authorities, I have been exerting what little service I could toward promoting our position among the powers and their confidence in us, explaining to them wherever possible the principle of the foundation of our Empire in connection with the national policies and principles of the present. My intention in doing so has been to seek either implicitly or explicitly for friends among the powers so that the Empire may not be reduced to a state of international isolation. I hope that Your Excellency will render your assistance in realizing closer relations between the foreign and military authorities, with whose cooperation, Japan may maintain her present superior position among the international communities, and her rightful claim may be duly complied with.

I am afraid I have not expressed myself quite clearly, on account of my being confined to bed, but I hope Your Excellency will kindly surmise what I intended to say, and will adopt my humble suggestions.

There are some more matters that I should very much like to allude to, but I have already exhausted myself and am not able to continue any further. Please accept my apology for having had to dictate this letter to another person instead of writing it myself.

Before I close, I wish to tender again my profound gratitude to Your Excellency and the members of the Cabinet, who have given me the most valuable guidance and direction in various matters. My sincere wish is that Your Excellency will be very careful of your health and will accomplish your great mission as adviser to the Imperial Throne.

I shall have the pleasure of expressing further views of mine when I had the honour of personally seeing you upon recovery from my illness.

Kindly give my best regards to all the members of Your Excellency's Cabinet.

I remain, Your Excellency,

Your obedient servant

Sgd  
Sadao ARAKI

C E R T I F I C A T E

- (A) A letter of Sadao ARAKI dated 20th January 1934, addressed to His Excellency the Premier Viscount Minoru SAITO.
- (B) Top Secret No. 20 - Basic Suggestions for Emergency Policy.

This is to certify that (A) mentioned in the above is a copy of a letter which War Minister ARAKI dictated to me, who was then his secretary, on January 20th when he was confined to bed. When this letter was dictated to me, I had it transcribed by a clerk and together with a copy of (B) mentioned in the above, which was completed in October of the previous year, it was handed over to Lieutenant-General Heisuke YANAGAWA, Vice-Minister of War, who, as an emissary of War Minister ARAKI presented them to Premier SAITO. I further certify that these are the true copies of the above-mentioned documents and that I have kept them in my hands since then until today.

Dated on August 1st, 1946

At No. 1252, 5-chome, Nishi Nakanobu, Ebara-ku, T OKYO.

Signed  
Masami MIYEDA

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It is a matter of urgency at present to inspire the people with the moral sense of our Empire and to reveal at home and abroad the essential qualities of its culture by means of perfecting its national power based on nation wide harmony, and moreover, to aim at strengthening the recognition of our national structure and furthering the peace and security of our national life internally, and to expedite the establishment of peace in East Asia and the Pacific externally.

Due to the international crises marking the 10th year of Showa (1935) and to the general tendency toward renovation running high among the jurisdictional courts and also among other circles, several unfavourable social trends are expected to be revealed in the proceedings of trials and in other aspects of social life, especially in public speeches, etc., and these are liable to produce general unrest among the people and among rural communities in particular.

Combined with the disturbance in educational circles and the unrest in the labor field will be aggravated and there is a fear that some, if not all of the army and navy personnel may be influenced by these unfavourable conditions and be led into restlessness.

The general situation at present seems to be in apparent tranquility, but it is my opinion that it would be impossible for the government to tide over the real difficult situation, both internal and external, unless means are devised completely to dispel the prevailing unrest in public feeling.

Now that these tendencies have gathered strength discord and unrest refuse to be driven away by any ordinary or mediocre measures.

I really think the affairs of state of Japan should be a matter of religious service. The fundamental aims should be to enable the people to live in peace & contentment by observing such virtues as due worship of gods, intimacy between the sovereign and his subjects and perfect harmony between the high and the low. Therefore, we should make it our noble cause to act in observance of various virtues peculiar to our Empire and to reject both Communism and Fascism. Government means adjustment of tendencies as well; a tendency should be adjusted after it is taken into consideration, and then directed so that it may take a proper course. Natural tendencies do not always take reasonable courses but sometimes go astray; therefore those in a position to govern must devote themselves to assisting in the Emperor's rule, in conformity with nature and by transcending reason, so as to bring about the development of our national power and let the people live a peaceful life. This is the true way to govern.

Since these tendencies have already gathered strength and the crisis of our country is impending, we must, acting upon the fundamental principle mentioned above, be prompt in judging where this trend will lead us to. We must sacrifice ourselves in order to render allegiance and assistance to the Emperor in compliance with the source of our government which aims at worship of gods, intimacy between the sovereign and his subjects and perfect harmony between the high and the low. Since appeal to His Majesty's benevolence and then to transgress His Imperial virtues, would constitute an act certainly deserving our inevitable death, we must petition His Majesty to grant amnesty to our brethren for their past crimes. Thus we may purify this bewildered phase of life and drive the offenders to devote themselves to a new



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way of living in expiation of their sin. Hereby we can effect a complete change of public feeling, and furthermore, without scruple, we must carry out a large scale reform in diverse fields of government. For this purpose we shall have to request the Imperial decision so that the people may be informed on the boundless august plan, and shall have to adjust this tendency which is apt to be distorted, on this the eve of the national crisis and thereby consolidate the basis of our Empire which is destined to be everlasting and noble. Thus establishing the basis of development of our national power, we must thoroughly discharge at this juncture, our great duty of being of assistance to the Imperial Throne.

According to the purport stated above, I hereby suggest the following policy.

### Policy

Petitioning the Emperor to exercise the Imperial prerogative in accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of the Constitution, we must, first of all, refresh public feeling and stir up popular sentiment by allowing our people to enjoy universally the boundless Imperial favours; whereby, next, we must urge the people to enter into the general spiritual mobilization to start our life all over.

We must make clear at home and abroad the great cause of our Empire and must strive with all the power of the nation, the power of unity, for the materialization and enforcement of various rules of government which are based on this great cause.

Thus we make it our fundamental principle to lay the basis of the prosperity of our Empire, by internally emphasizing the immutability of our national structure and securing the safety and soundness of our national life, and by externally securing the peace in East Asia and the Pacific.

Acting on the foregoing policy, the following provisions must be enforced.

1. The Revival of Public Feeling. We must revive public feeling, and with bright liveliness, by expelling all the past gloomy mud-flings, we shall lead the people to national unity. In order to attain this effect we should, according to the Imperial prerogative provided for in Article XVI of the Constitution, petition the Emperor for a general amnesty for various political criminals and other offenders in connection with them, which ought to be properly restricted to a certain limit in compliance with His Majesty's most benign will, and with due consideration of offences committed, their respective characters and their future activities, regardless of their past whether they belonged to the right wing or to the left. And at the same time, by petitioning the Emperor to issue an Imperial rescript, we must unify public feeling in the sole cause of assistance of the Imperial scheme and thus put the people's mind at rest; moreover we should lead the people, and together, devote ourselves to the cause of assistance and loyalty, and hereby pave the way to national revival and prosperity.

This article is to be put into operation first of all as the fundamental principle for the enforcement of our national policy. By such means we can awaken the whole national from the gloomy atmosphere, in which our people indulged in conventionalism and were unable to effect

166      6

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
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
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
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central and local administrations as well as to promote the prosperity of our rural communities and to stabilize our middle-class, all of which are partly the most urgent steps, to say nothing of general reforms in politics, economics, finance, education and armament. Thus, by taking such steps, we should establish the basis for general national spiritual mobilization and encourage its progress.

I have given in the foregoing only an outline of my suggested emergency policies. It is requested that the competent branches of government authorities should lay down their practical plans in conformity with the above, and those of importance should be passed by Cabinet channels, while those of less importance should be enforced forthwith.







Ex 3167

Def. Doc. No. 1882

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

The Official Gazette, Extra, 24 March, 1932,  
The Stenographic Record of the Proceedings of the 61th Session  
of the House of Peers in the Imperial Diet, No. 2  
Sitting Opened at 10:09 a.m., Wednesday, 23 March, 1932.  
Mr. ARAKI, Sadao, Minister of State.

(Omitted)

I should like to give an outline concerning the matters of the moment that are chiefly in my charge. The Anti-Japanese movement in China, which has been a great hindrance to permanent peace in the Orient and one of the most deplorable occurrences, has precipitately enlivened its activities of later years and the privileged rights of our country have not only been entirely ignored by the Manchurian authorities, but also great pressure has come to be laid on Japanese and Korean residents, until their insolence resulted in the slaughter of these people. This serious situation culminated in the murder of Japanese army officers. Our countrymen, as well as those living in Manchuria, that have tolerated these outrages with patience, have come to stand face to face with the imminent danger. This state of things has grown worse, and challenged by the riotous act of violence inflicted by Chinese soldiers under command of WANG I-CHE in the vicinity of

Def. Doc. No. 1932

PEITAIYING near MUKDEN, the Japanese troops have been forced to rise against their will for their own self-defense.

Since then, the Japanese army has faced with minor forces the outnumbering enemy, making continuous operation night and day and getting over various difficulties. On the other hand, as we have just received here in the assembly an encouragement resolution, we have met with such an enthusiastic support, born of nation-wide public wrath, as not experienced for many years. Thus in unity of the people many international crises have been faced with and borne through.

The Japanese Army, in half a year, have repulsed frequent attacks of ex-soldier bandits, mounted bandits and Chinese plain-clothes soldiers. At present, the Japanese forces now staying in Manchuria number less than 30,000 and are stationed in the vast area of Manchuria and Mongolia more than two times and a half as large as our empire and are directly charged with protection of the lives and properties of the 1,000,000 Japanese and Korean residents and indirectly with the preservation of peace and welfare of the 30,000,000 inhabitants. The soldiers have fulfilled their duty with unfailing rectitude to take up their stand on the life-line of national defence and safeguarded national security.

I consider the honorable members are already well aware of such information.



Def. Doc. No. 1882

At the time of the outbreak of the Incident, the Japanese Army forces were formed of the 2nd Division and the Independent Garrison numbering only 10,400 with the inclusion of those troops scattered in various localities. The forces in and about Mukden were only 4,000 strong at the time of the Incident. On the contrary, the Chinese army numbered approximately 220,000 in total and the forces stationed near Mukden were no less than 14,000. In consideration of this situation, at the outbreak of the conflict, the dispatch of a mixed brigade from Korea has been decided on and as is well known, other troops have been despatched from home and Korea to meet the requirement of various critical moments. In this manner, the minor Japanese forces have stripped Manchuria of the menace near LIAOHSI and swept away all disturbances in North Manchuria. Bandits have not merely been suppressed, but also they have been pacified with a view to the least casualties on the part of the Japanese Army. These endeavors have resulted in the present rest. On closer observation, however, the circumstances admit of no optimism and the authorities concerned are now in hasty endeavours for measures to cope with the situation. It is a matter of course that we hope for the preservation of internal peace in Manchuria and her development even from the standpoint of our own national defence and needless to say, for this purpose, the prevailing condition necessitates the

Dof. Doc. No. 1882

existence of the present strength of the forces, and the more, if possible. The respective authorities are now engaged in the examination of this case. Concerning the state of things in SHANGHAI and its vicinity, the Army perceived the necessity of taking up measures with deliberation, judging from its peculiar character different in its nature from the disturbances in Manchuria and watched further development, but at the end of February, to meet the need of the emergency, it was decided by the Cabinet council to send a brigade from Kyushu and a division reinforced to a certain degree on a program designed by the Supreme Command. In view of the specially complicated situation of SHANGHAI, the Army authorities wished for the immediate solution of the problem without any bloodshed from the start and repeatedly carried on negotiations with the Chinese authorities, which showed no sincerity and replied with bombardment. It is a matter of great regret that these circumstances compelled us to exchange fire.

The Chinese army reinforced their strength with the guards under the command of CHIANG KAI-SHEK in addition to the 19th Route of CANTON then in active position, the whole strength totalling 6 divisions, threatened to take the offensive. Therefore, in accordance with our prepared plan, two Japanese divisions and adjunct troops required for the area have been despatched and early this month, with one blow, have irretrievably defeated the main body of the enemy. At present the

Def. Doc. No. 1882

Japanese forces are assembled in a certain limited area in a state of suspension of hostilities with a view to restoring peace. In perfect harmony with the fundamental policies of the Imperial Government and in co-operative operations with the Navy, the Japanese Army in due consideration of the situation of the time has succeeded in the attainment of its object, evading the full-scale conflict between Japan and China. The object of sending our troops to the SHANGHAI area is the protection of the Japanese residents and the preservation of peace in the International Settlement. Consequently, so long as China does not menace with a large-scale offensive, the Japanese Army authorities have decided, acting on the intention of the Supreme Command, to withdraw the forces of their own accord. In the middle of this month, the 11th Division and the 24th mixed brigade have been given instructions for evacuation and stand-by at home and they are now under transportation. The above-mentioned is the outline of the important military affairs of which I am in charge. In view of the present conditions, at home and abroad, careful examination of the nature and development of the Incident shows that it is not only incomparable in its gravity and seriousness with our expedition to Siberia or with the Manchurian Incident, but also it may be said to in its importance even the Russo-Japanese War. It is simply natural that the morale of our soldiers and

Def. Doc. No. 1882

the nation has been enhanced as a result. It is our earnest desire to safeguard the security of the nation and the peace and welfare of the people by virtue of our loyalty to the country, unselfish devotion and exertion, and our strong unity and thus to see the glorious conclusion. The harmonious cooperation of the Army and the Navy demonstrated during the latest operations, in the excellence of which the Army may well take pride, is unrivalled in history and it should be particularly stated that it is worth our special attention. What with the august virtue of His Majesty and gods' grace, and what with the unrivalled devotion and loyalty of the soldiers, it has been clarified that the Army deserves the high regard of the countries of the world and that it can take its resolute stand on the unanimous support of the people. It is a matter of congratulation that the new dawning light of peace is now being noticed in the Orient. Impressed with the growing importance of the responsibilities, the authorities concerned are all determined, in consideration of our national structure, to tide over the crises by united efforts, to secure national defence to exalt the Imperial prestige abroad, to extend national virtues at home for the well-being of all the people, to abide by the KODO (The Imperial Way), instead

Def. Doc. No. 1882

of hereby, to make contribution toward perfect peace of the  
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our heavy responsibilities of guarding and maintaining Our  
Imperial Throne.

Def. Doc. #1882

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, MIYASAKA, Kanko, who occupy the post of The Chief of General Affairs Section, Upper House, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "The Official Gazette, Extra, 24 March, 1932, The Stenographic Record of the Proceedings of the 61th Session of the House of Peers in the Imperial Diet, No.2." is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The House of Peers).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 30 day of June, 1947

/S/ MIYASAKA, Kanko (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date

Witness : /S/ YAMADA, Itaru (seal)

The Chief of shorthand Section

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Exp 3, 167

Def. Doc. No. 1882

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Dof. Doc. No. 1832

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Certified at Tokyo, on this 30 day of June, 1947

/S/ MIYASAKA, Kanko (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date

Witness : /S/ YAMADA, Itaru (seal)

The Chief of shorthand Section

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43167

Doc No. 1382

官報 號外 昭和七年三月二十四日

第六回 貴族院議事速記録二號

昭和七年三月二十三日（水曜日）午前十時九分開議  
中略

○國務大臣（荒木貞夫君）私ノ主管事項中予當際ノ時局ニ關スル  
モノニ付キマシテ茲ニ 概チ申述ベタイト存ジマス  
眞洋永遠ノ平和ノ爲ニ大障礙デアリマシタ又最モ悲シムベキ事象  
ノ一ツデアリマシタル所ノ彼ノ支那ノ排日排貨運動ハ近年ニ至リ  
マシテ頗ニ熾烈トナツタデアリマス而シテ滿洲ニ於キマスル所  
ノ我ガ特殊權益ハ當時ノ滿洲政權ニ依リマシテ完膚ナキマデニ  
觸チセラレタルノミナラズ、遂ニハ我ガ同胞鮮人ニ對シマシテ非  
常ナル壓迫ヲ加ヘ更ニ是ガ進ミマシテ是等鮮人ノ虐殺ニ及ンダ  
デアリマス、遂ニ我ガ武官一行ニ對スル慘殺等ニ至リマシテ極日  
モ其ノ短度ニ達シマシタノテ隱忍ヲ重ネ來ツテ居リマシタル所ノ

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

我が在滿ノ同胞ハ固ヨリ、我が國民モ最早平靜ニ一日ヲモ慕シ難キ程度ニ至ツタノデアリマス、然ルニ事熊ハ更ニ悪化ヲ致シマシテ遂ニ昨秋ニ至ツテ奉天北大營附近ニ於キマスル所ノ王以哲配下ノ支那官兵ノ暴亂ニ依リマシテ、茲ニ已ムナク皇國自衛權ノ發動ヲ餘儀ナクセラレタノデアリマス、爾來皇軍ハ寡兵ヲ以テ衆敵ニ當リ、困苦ヲシテ夜行ノ不斷ノ活動ヲ續ケ來ツタノデアリマス、而シテ一面ニハ恐ラクハ過去ニ於テハ見ルコト稀デアツタト考ヘラレマスル程ノ、我が同胞ノ學國一致的ノ公憤ト、燃エルガ如キ熱烈ナル後援トニ依リマシテ、又先刻モ本院々議ヲ以テ激勵ノ辭ヲ戴キマシタヤウナ、斯機ヲ次第テ一致ヲ致シマシテ、幾多ノ國際難局ニ直面イタシマシツツ、克ク之ニ堪ヘ得マシテ、又茲ニ征戰半歲ニシテ、暴戾ナル兵匪馬賊竝ニ便衣隊等ノ迫害ニ打克チマシテ、今日ニ於キマシテハ、僅ニ三萬人ニ足ラザル在滿ノ將兵ハ、兎モ角モ、我が皇國ノ二倍半ニ餘ル廣チ有シテ居リマスル滿蒙ノ地域ニ駐屯ヲ致シマシテ、直接ニハ内鮮同胞百萬ノ生命財産ノ安固ト、間接ニハ在滿三千



萬民衆生活ノ康寧ニ寄與シツツアルノデアリマス。而シテ其本來ノ  
 第一使命デアリマスル所ノ、國防ノ第一線ニ立ツベキ任務ニ付キマ  
 シテハ、確實ニ之ヲ遂行イタシマシテ、其保障ヲ成ケテ今日ニ至ツ  
 テ居ルノデアリマス、以上ノ各部隊ニ付テハ、夙ニ各位ニ於カレ御  
 了知ノコトト存ズル次第デアリマス、備前ノ當初滿洲ニ駐屯ヲ致  
 シテ居リマシタル所ノ我が陸軍ノ兵力ハ、駐劄ノ第二師團ト獨立守  
 備トデアリマシテ各方面ニ散在イタシ、居リマスルモノヲ合シマ  
 シテモ、僅ニ一師團四百ニ過ギナカツタノデアリマス、又當時奉天附  
 近ニアリマシタモノハ四千餘ニ過ギナカツタノデアリマス、之ニ反  
 シマシテ在滿ノ支那軍ノ總兵力ハ二十二萬内外ヲ算シマシテ奉天附  
 近ニ居リマスルモノバカリデモ、僅ニ一萬四千ヲ有シテ居ツタノデ  
 アリマス、此實情ニ鑑ミマシテ、事件勃發後取敢ズ朝鮮ヨリ混成  
 一旅團ヲ派遣スルコトトナリマシテ、爾後引續キ御承知ノ如ク幾多  
 ノ位増ニ増進イタシマシタル爲メ、其都度緊急必須ノ要求ニ應ジマ

シテ、更ニ内地及朝鮮ヨリ所要ノ兵力ヲ増派セラレマシタコトデアリマス、斯ク致シマシテ寡少ノ兵力ヲ以テマシテ、克ク遼陽附近ニアリマスル所ノ滿洲ノ禍根ヲ除キ、北滿ノ不安ヲ一掃イタシ又一方馬賊、兵匪等ニ付キマシテハ之ニ討伐スルコトノ以外ニ、努メテ自軍ノ犠牲ヲ少カラシムル爲ニ、之ガ招撫ヲモ併セマシテ以テ今日ノ表裏ヲ招來シ來ツタノデアリマス、併ナガラ仔細ニ觀察ヲ致シマムルト、前途尙ホ樂觀ヲ許サザルモノガ多クアリマスルノデ、之ニ善處スル爲ニ、當局ハ目下焦聲警策ヲ講ジツツアル次ニデアリマス、元來國防上ヨリ見マシテモ、滿洲ノ平穩ヲ永遠ニ維持イタシマシテ、又滿洲ノ發展ヲ禁フコトハ勿論ノコトデアリマシテ、之ガ爲ニハ現在ノ狀態ニ於キマシテハ、少クモ現有兵力ニ必至トスルコトハ勿論デアリマシテ、尙ホ爲シ得ルナラバ現勢以上ノ兵力ヲ増強セシムルヲ必要ト思惟セラレマシテ、目下焦聲警策ニ於テソレゾレ研究イタシテ是ル次第デアリマス、次ハ上陸方面ノ事ヲゴザイマスガ、此方面ニ對シマスル陸軍部隊ノ派遣ハ

滿洲ニ對シマスルモノト其事體ガ全然異ツテ居リマスルガ爲ニ、  
 最も慎重ナル執ルノ必要ヲ認メマシテ、事案ノ推移ヲ靜觀シテ居  
 ツタノデアリマシタガ、二月ノ下旬ニ至リマシテ、情勢急ヲ告ゲ  
 マシテ、遂ニ廟議ノ決定ニ依リマシテ、海軍ニ協力シテ事件ヲ速  
 決スル爲ニ、陸軍ヨリモ派兵セラルルコトニナリマシテ、統帥部  
 ノ計畫ニ基キマシテ、取敢ス九州ヨリ一旅團ト、更ニ或ル程度マ  
 デ兵力ヲ充實イタシマシタル所ノ一師團トヲ派遣セラルルコトニ  
 ナツタノデアリマス、陸軍ト致シマシテハ、當初ヨリ上海ニ於ケ  
 ル所ノ特殊ノ關係ニ基キマシテ、努メテ流血ノ慘ヲ見ルコトナク  
 事件ヲ解決イタシタキ希望ヲ有シテ居ツタノデ、之ニ基キマシテ  
 曠々支那側ト交渉ヲ重ネマシタガ、支那側ノ態度ハ之ニ對シマシ  
 テ、確證ヲ以テ我が交渉ニ答ヘルト云フヤウナ、恣メテ不諒甚  
 シキモノガアリマシタノデ、遂ニ交戦ノ已ムナキニ至リマシタノ  
 ハ、誠ニ遺憾ニ存スル次第デアリマス、然ルニ支那側ニ於キマシ  
 テハ尙ホ、ラズシテ、當面ニアリマシタル所ノ、廣東ニ臨シマス

ル所ノ第十九路軍ノ外ニ、更ニ蔣介石直系ノ警備軍ヲ増加イタシ  
 マシテ、計六師團ヲ以テ却テ我ニ對シテ反撃ヲ加ヘムトスル勢ヲ  
 示シマシタノデ、豫メ準備シテ居リマスル所ニ從ヒマシテ更ニ充  
 實セラレマシタル所ノ二箇師團及同方面ニ必要トセラレマシタ所  
 ノ附屬部隊ヲ増派イタサレマシテ、本月初メ一舉ニ敵主力ヲ再起  
 シ得ザルマデニ壓境シ得タノデアリマス、而シテ爾來平和促進ノ  
 爲ニ、其兵力ヲ一定地域ニ集結ヲ致シマシテ、目下停戰ノ姿勢ヲ  
 執リツツアルノデアリマス。而シテ軍ニ於テマシテハ常ニ我が政  
 府ノ根本政管ト完全ナル協同ヲ遂ゲマシテ、又海軍トノ共同動作  
 ニハ、一斷ノ連携ナカラシムルヤウニ致シマシテ今日ニ至ツテ居  
 リマス、又一方ニハ作戦ヲ上海附近ニ局限ヲ致シマシテ、日支ノ  
 間ニ全面的開戦ノ不幸ヲ避ケル所ノ方針ニ着キマシテ、以上述ベ  
 タル如ク其目的ヲ達成シ得タ次第デゴザイマス、元來上海方面派  
 兵ノ目的ハ、居留民保護ト共同租界ノ康寧維持デアリマスノデ、  
 今更ノ範圍ノ結果支那軍ニシテ今後大規模ノ集中攻撃動作ニ出デ

子リテ、更ニ固ク安固ト致シ、唯此上ハ、泰公ノ手ヲ譲リテ、與トキニ於テ、キマテ、スルニ、陸海ノ協同、一ニテ、動ハ  
 以テ、固ク安固ト致シ、唯此上ハ、泰公ノ手ヲ譲リテ、與トキニ於テ、キマテ、スルニ、陸海ノ協同、一ニテ、動ハ  
 而シテ、固ク安固ト致シ、唯此上ハ、泰公ノ手ヲ譲リテ、與トキニ於テ、キマテ、スルニ、陸海ノ協同、一ニテ、動ハ  
 兵始メ、一以上ノ、蘇ノ、氣ノ、高シ、來リ、テ、モ、ト、考ヘ、ラ、ル、依、リ、テ、シ、ハ、其、性、ニ、於  
 觀、昔、時、以、上ノ、蘇ノ、氣ノ、高シ、來リ、テ、モ、ト、考ヘ、ラ、ル、依、リ、テ、シ、ハ、其、性、ニ、於  
 思、シ、テ、居、ル、ノ、底、に、在、リ、テ、年、ノ、西、比、列、ノ、兵、又、ハ、海、前、變、ト、全、ク、其、性、ニ、於  
 キ、テ、子、ハ、見、地、ニ、立、チ、テ、仔、知、シ、テ、皇、國、内、外、現、下、ノ、情、ト、ニ、對、シ、ツ、今、日、於  
 ノ、情、及、ビ、見、地、ニ、立、チ、テ、仔、知、シ、テ、皇、國、内、外、現、下、ノ、情、ト、ニ、對、シ、ツ、今、日、於  
 國、以、上ノ、時、局、ニ、對、シ、テ、目、下、其、國、選、任、ノ、大、要、ヲ、テ、リ、テ、在、ル、ノ、テ、只、今  
 子、待、候、ス、ル、コト、ニ、對、シ、テ、目、下、其、國、選、任、ノ、大、要、ヲ、テ、リ、テ、在、ル、ノ、テ、只、今  
 及、混、成、第、二、十、四、旅、團、等、ニ、對、シ、テ、現、地、ヲ、撤、收、シ、テ、御、下、命、ガ、テ、リ、テ、在、ル、ノ、テ、只、今  
 ス、ル、所、ノ、方、針、ヲ、探、ル、コト、意、見、ニ、基、キ、テ、マ、シ、テ、自、主、的、ニ、連、兵、力、ヲ、收、縮  
 サ、ル、限、リ、ハ、統、帥、部、ノ、意、見、ニ、基、キ、テ、マ、シ、テ、自、主、的、ニ、連、兵、力、ヲ、收、縮

古今ノ歴史ニ見ルコト稀ナル所デアリマシテ、蓋シ皇軍ト致シマシテ、世界ニ誇ルヘキモノノ一トシテ、深ク意ヲ強ウシテ居ル次第デアリマスコトヲ、特ニ茲ニ申上ゲテ僅キタイト存ズルノデアリマス、今ヤ上ハ陛下ノ御授成ニ依リマシテ、下ハ將兵ノ忠烈無比ノ奮闘ニ依リマシテ、其決意ト意氣ヲ中外ニ示シ胞與ツテ熱烈ナル後援ニ依リマシテ、其決意ト意氣ヲ中外ニ示シテ居リマス、逐次東亞ニ於ケル所ノ清新ナル和平ノ曙光ヲ認メツツアルコトハ、誠ニ感謝ト御同慶ニ堪ヘザル所デアリマシテ、當局ト致シマシテモ、益々愈々其責任ノ重大ナルヲ痛感イタシマシテ、勦力同心皇國ノ此難局ヲ打開イタシマシテ、我ガ國體ノ本源ニ基キマシテ、外ハ皇國宣揚ノ爲ノ國防ノ安固ヲ期シ、内ニアリマシテハ、萬民同福ノ爲ノ國徳布施ノ實ヲ舉ケマシテ、異業ヲ排シマシテ皇道ヲ踏ミ、以テ皇國ノ清新ナル和平ニ寄與イタシマシテ、宏猷扶翼ノ大任ヲ果スコトニ邁進スルコトヲ、一同ト共ニ期シテ居ル次第デアリマス。

中略

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書 (三號)

自分宮坂完孝ハ參議院庶務課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付  
セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ六頁ヨリ成ル官報號外、昭和七年  
三月二十四日第六十一回帝國議  
會 貴族院議事速記録第二編 ト題スル書類ハ日本政府 (貴族院) ノ  
保存ニ係ル公文書ノ抜萃ノ正譜ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ  
證明ス

昭和二十二年六月三十日 於 東京

宮 坂 完 孝

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日 於 同 所 參議院速記課長

立 會 人 山 田 到

Exp 3168

DEF. DOC. #1169

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

W.R. MINISTRY COMMUNIQUE (July 11, 1937)

At 8.00 p.m. on July 11 Chang Tsu-chung and Chang Yung-jung, representatives of the Chinese 29th army signed and handed the following conditions to Col. MATSUI, chief of our Peiping Special Mission as a means to effect a local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Our army still adheres to the principle of non-aggrandizement of the Incident and is keeping a strict watch on the manner in which the Chinese are fulfilling the agreement being always prepared for emergencies. However, it is a matter of profound regret that frequent provocative actions on the part of the Chinese Army such as shooting at our guard units, unlawful entry into the village of Marco Polo Bridge etc. are happening even after the conclusion of the agreement. In view of the above circumstances it is clear that the sole responsibility would rest with the Chinese side even if the Incident be aggrandized.

Full text of the solutions for the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (The so-called local agreement)

- (1) Representatives of the 29th Army hereby express their regret to the Japanese Army and announce their intention to punish those who are responsible for the Incident and to assume the responsibility for preventing future occurrences of similar incidents.

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- (2) The Chinese army is stationed too near the Japanese garrison in Fong-Tsi, which is apt to give rise to frictions. Therefore no Chinese troops shall be stationed within the wall of Marco Polo Bridge and Lung Wang Miao. Peace and order in the district shall be maintained by the Peace Preservation corps.
- (3) In view of the part played in the present Incident by various anti-Japanese groups such as the so-called Blue Shirt Society, the Communists and others, appropriate measures shall be taken to control them.

Every item enumerated above is accepted by us.

July 10, the 12th year of Showa (1937)

(signed) Chang Tsu-chung

(signed) Chang Yun-jung

Def Doc No. 1169

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by Nakajima, Masa o, consisting of 500 pages and entitled "China Memories Continued" is a book which was bought in 1942 Sept. at Tokyo, and which has been thenceforth in my custody.

certified at Tokyo,  
on this 11 day of April, 1947

Ono R., Shinichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,  
on the same date

Witness : Kizumi, Yasuo (seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR  
THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

DEPONENT: ISHIWATA, Sotaro

I, ISHIWATA, Sotaro, make oath and say as follows:

My address is No. 455 Seijo-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

From January until August 1939 and from February 1944 until February 1945, I was Minister of Finance; from January until July 1940 and from February until April 1945, I was Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; from April until October 1941, I was Chief of the General Affairs in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association; and from June 1945 until January 1946, I was Minister of the Imperial Household.

In July 1941 while I was Chief of the General Affairs in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (my resignation of the office was effected by the appearance of the TOJO Cabinet) I was requested by the Kokumin Press people to have a table talk with a certain person who would be chosen by me as the most suitable of the several persons suggested by them.

I replied to them that General ARAKI was the best partner to talk with if he would accept it, because I knew him to have an intention of non-expansion of the China Incident and also I know him not to agree to the Italo-German-Japanese Alliance, which intentions he expressed to me many times.

I understood that their idea was to make my talk a feature with General ARAKI's opinion inserted at several points.

About the end of July, I remember, we five, that is, General ARAKI and I, two from the Kokumin Press and a scribe (he did not take down in shorthand), met together at the Hokusui, a restaurant in Akasaka, sometime around six o'clock in the evening.

Most of the talk which lasted two hours was occupied by General ARAKI, I remember, who told his reminiscences at the time of the Siberian Expedition more than two decades before, when he was a field soldier. Most of it I heard for the first time and was much interested. The journalists, however, were much puzzled because it was not a conversation and could not be made an intended article.

Therefore they asked me later to agree to their making an article of their own composition out of the talk.

So I replied that it might be inevitable to alter the talk but that they must be very careful not to create a story from it lest it should cause any trouble.

But the article published in the paper was far different from the talk which we had that evening; my talk was increased much more than I did and General ARAKI's was omitted more than half.

Besides the dictation done at that evening was not very good and I remember that many parts of that article in the paper were not clear to me.

Especially on that evening General ARAKI compared the situation at the time of the Siberian Expedition with that of the current time (1941) and deplored the government for not having any definite policy of unifying the Army and the Navy, and then he worried deeply over the future of the nation.

So far as I remember, the gist of his opinion was that the government should act under principles based on the great cause of justice and make final decision in carrying out the schemes planned by the Army and the Navy without their interference.

But an article could not be permitted to appear in the newspapers stating all of the Army and the Navy and the government under the circumstances of that time (1941) therefore any opinion conflicting with them was struck out or shaded off by the editors. Consequently the article in the paper resulted in an incoherence.

General ARAKI after he resigned from the post of Minister of Education in the HIRAJUMA Cabinet in 1939, I observed conspicuously refrained from facing the public and was noted as a recluse from current events of the time. At the same time, the Army authorities were opposed to him.

In the HIRAJUMA Cabinet, Mr. ARAKI and I were Cabinet colleagues, I being Minister of Finance. At that time the Five Ministers Conference discussed current problems, chiefly foreign issues, and made decisions. Therefore, Minister of Education ARAKI did not participate in it at all. As to the NONOHAN Incident, even I was reported after its occurrence.

When the YONAI Cabinet was being formed, I made an earnest appeal to General ARAKI to take the office of the Minister of Home Affairs by order of Admiral YONAI, as the General was considered a man of self-respect, but he declined it on the grounds that he could not render any service as the currents of the time were against him.

As the situation at the time of the table talk was more critical than the time when the YONAI Cabinet was formed, General ARAKI's greatest anxiety with which he thought why the government did not establish a strong policy to suppress the Army and the Navy and work out a plan for the security of the nation, was manifested on the pretext of his old story of the Siberian Expedition, as far as I can recollect.

Under the various circumstances mentioned before, the article that appeared in the paper was much distorted and confusing and did not depict what General ARAKI's talk actually was.

---

ISHIWATA, Sotaro

Subscribed and sworn to before the under-signed officer  
by ISHIWATA, Sotaro, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo  
Japan, on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of August 1947.

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Ep 3169

DEF. DOC. #1956

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATE OF AMERICA et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: ARITA Hachiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

AFFIDAVIT

ARITA, Hachiro.

1. My career:

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs to the SAITO Cabinet.

Minister of Foreign Affairs to the First KONOE Cabinet.

Minister of Foreign Affairs to the HIRANUMA Cabinet.

Minister of Foreign Affairs to the YONAI Cabinet.

2.- Relations to Mr. ARAKI:

During the time of The SAITO Cabinet when Mr. ARAKI was Minister of War, I was Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and at the time of both the First KONOE Cabinet and the HIRANUMA Cabinet I was a Cabinet Minister with Mr. ARAKI who took the office of the Minister of Education. During the YONAI Cabinet Mr. ARAKI was Cabinet Councillor, and I was Minister of Foreign Affairs. After that both of us did not take any public office, but we met often at private parties.

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3. Five Ministers' Conference and Mr. ARAKI:

It was in the later period of the Cabinet that I took the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs to the First KONOE Cabinet.

This Cabinet held Five Ministers' Conference, consisting of Prime, War, Naval, Foreign and Financial Ministers for the purpose of debating on the important affairs of the situation; for instance, the problem of an reenforcement of the Anti-Comintern Agreement Pact (or the so-called Tripartite Alliance) was discussed at one of these conferences. But Mr. ARAKI of course did not attend the Five Ministers' Conference, because he was Minister of Education.

4. Mr. ARAKI occupied the office of the Chairman of the Committee of the General Spiritual Mobilization, because his official position of Minister of Education was closely connected with the national spiritual field, and so far as I remember he was appointed in the same way as ex officio.

5. Mr. ARAKI and Japan-German Cultural Agreement:

Japan had entered into a cultural agreement with Germany and Italy, and this kind of agreement was intended to be concluded but with as many other countries as possible. Therefore Japan entered into a cultural agreement with Hungary, Brazil and Siam besides the above mentioned countries.

Although there was not an existing agreement, Japan carried out the various culture exchanges with Poland, Portugal, Argentina and Belgium.

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As for the United State of America, Japan hold an old Japanese fine arts exhibition in the International Exhibition at San Francisco. As these agreements were cultural problems aiming at culture exchange in the world, as to the conclusion of an agreement and its enforcement the Foreign Office always conferred with the Ministry of Education. The business mainly consists of exhibition of fine arts and industrial arts and exchange of students and professors.

- Mr. ARAKI, Minister of Education, insisted on an exchange of culture of the wide world, emphasizing that it should not be limited to Germany and Italy, alone and the Foreign Office had the same opinion with him,

6. Mr. ARAKI and the Tripartite Alliance:

I heard many times at several private meetings that Mr. ARAKI had disagreed to the Tripartite Alliance and various kinds of control.

At the resignation of the HIRANUMA Cabinet due to Tripartite Alliance issue, Mr. ARAKI was considered one of the most agreeable successors to the head of the following cabinet, together with General ABE, Nobuyuki and Mr. IKEDA, Seihin. One of the principal reasons that Mr. ARAKI was pointed out as prospective successor, was that he had such an opinion regarding the Tripartite Alliance as I stated above.

On this 22 day of March, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT ARITA Hachiro (seal)

I, SUGAHARA Kunitaka hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) SUGAHARA Kunitaka (seal )



DEF. DOC. #1956

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the  
whole truth ~~withholding~~ nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ IRITA Hachiro (seal)

Ex 3170

自分機我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣蕃ヲ爲シタル上、次ノ如ク  
供述致シマス

宣蕃	供述者	石渡莊太郎
亞米利加	對	貞夫
其他	其他	其他

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私は石渡莊太郎と申します。

住所は東京都世田谷区成城町四五番地であります。

私は昭和十四年一月より八月迄及び十九年二月より二十年二月迄大蔵大臣十五年一月より七月迄及び二十年二月より四月まで内閣書記官長十六年四月より十月迄大政翼賛會事務總長二十年六月より二十一年一月まで宮内大臣を勤めました。

昭和十六年七月私が大政翼賛會事務總長（近衛内閣辭職と共に辭職）をして居た當時國民新聞社から人が来て二、三名を擧げて此等の人の中貴君の適當と思はれる方は對談會をして貰ひ度い云ふ話がありました私は度々荒木大將と話をした事があり荒木大將は支那事變の擴大にも反對の意向だし口獨伊軍軍同盟にも賛成でないことを承知して居たので私の對談會の相手には一番適當だと思つて同大將が承諾されるれば結構だと答へた新聞社の意圖は私の話を主にして夫れに荒木大將の意見を處々にはさむ計畫でありました。

七月下旬頃と記憶する赤坂の料理屋「白水」に六時頃から集つた。

荒木大將と私と國民新聞社の人と二人夫れに話を長く人が一人（速記法ではなかつた）都合五人だつたと記憶する。

私の覚えて居るのは結局二時間の大部分の時間は荒木大將の談話で終つてしまつた夫れも二十數年前のシベリヤ出兵當時荒木大將の佐官時代の懐舊談で

見て何れの縣であつたらんか、分らなからん。いふもなし。なつてしまつた。たゞ

併せな海軍の計を、昭和十六年（一九二一年）の頃、たゞの理由もなし。下情に於て、海軍の府の悪口が新聞に掲

故に大府の計を、府は堂々たる大義名分に基き、策の策の下行動し、故に大府の計を、府は堂々たる大義名分に基き、策の策の下行動し、故に大府の計を、府は堂々たる大義名分に基き、策の策の下行動し、

入前年の海軍の計を、府は堂々たる大義名分に基き、策の策の下行動し、故に大府の計を、府は堂々たる大義名分に基き、策の策の下行動し、故に大府の計を、府は堂々たる大義名分に基き、策の策の下行動し、故に大府の計を、府は堂々たる大義名分に基き、策の策の下行動し、

尙荒木大將は昭和十四年平沼内閣の文部大臣を辭職後際立つて世の中に出るのを厭はれ時勢に背を向けられた又陸軍も同大將に背を向けた程に思はれる又平沼内閣當時私は大藏大臣として荒木氏と同僚であつたが當時日獨伊軍事同盟を中心とする對外問題は主として五相會議で討議せられたが荒木文相は同會議のメンバーでなかつた  
ノモンハン事件につき荒木文相が積極的の發言をされた事は全然記憶ない  
米内内閣成立の際同大將の自取論者なるを思ひ米内大將の命を受け私は荒木大將に内務大臣に就任方を懇請したが時運非にして自分が出て何の御奉公も出来ないさ云つて遂に受けられなかつた  
對談會當時は米内内閣成立當時より時勢は一層急潮を示しを居たので同大將胸中の憂悶は非常に深く何故陸海軍を抑へて國家安全の政策を立てないのかさ云ふ考をシベリヤ出兵當時の物語に籍りて當夜表現されたものであります  
が以上述べた様な各種の事情より荒木大將の話の趣旨がゆがめられて結局何を語られたか譯が分らないものになつてしまつた

同日於

立會人 高 明

右ハ皆立會人ノ面前ニ于宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月二十三日 於

供 證 者 石 渡 莊 太 郎

宣  
字  
料

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ又何事ヲモ欺秘セス又何事ヲモ附加セザルコト  
ヲ誓フ

署名捺印

石  
渡  
莊  
太  
郎

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al )  
vs ) AFFIDAVIT  
ARAKI, Sadao, et al )

DEPONENT: YOKOMIZO, Mitsuteru

I, YOKOMIZO, Mitsuteru, make oath and say as follows:

I am living at the home of TOYAMA, 221 Tsukimidei, Hodagaya-ku, City of Yokohama.

A brief sketch of my personal history is as follows:  
I was a full-time secretary of the Cabinet from May 1927 (the second Year of Showa) to July 1936 (the eleventh Year of Showa), Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet from September 1937 (the Twelfth Year); Governor of Okayama Prefecture from February 1940 (the Fifteenth Year), Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture from June 1942 (the Seventeenth Year), and retired from that office in August 1944 (the Nineteenth Year).

I was acquainted with Mr. ARAKI since he became a member of the MIKAI Cabinet, and especially when he became Chairman of the National Spiritual Mobilization Committee, I worked under him as the Chief Secretary.

The National Spiritual Mobilization Movement was started at the time when the China Incident, during the period of the first KONOYE Cabinet, did not seem to be settled easily and appeared as though it would last for a long period. It was then feared that such situation might induce spiritual slackness or degradation of the people. The Education Ministry, therefore, planned a national movement before Minister of Education ARAKI assumed his post, but since it was related to every ministry by its nature that later the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet assumed the office of liaison and adjustment. Namely, the movement was originated to animate the national spirit, to elevate the consciousness and culture of the people, and thus to materialize its aim in practical life. Accordingly, an organization called the Central League of National Spiritual Mobilization was set up and it became the central agency of various civilian organizations and also served as a liaison and adjustment agency as well as a driving force of the movement. On the other hand, the Intelligence Bureau of the

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Cabinet acted as a liaison agency among the various ministries.

However, viewing from its historical development, the movement was liable to fall into open criticism of being bureaucratic and self-righteous. It was decided, therefore, that its fundamental policy will be decided upon unanimously by both the officials and people of various fields and for that purpose a committee on the National Spiritual Mobilization was organized under the direct supervision of the Cabinet. Hence, it was the democratization of this movement.

Members of the Committee included the people from various fields such as government officials, political, academic and civilian circles, and by giving special attention to the women's standpoint, it was decided to include women among them and a minister of state was to be chosen for its chairman. Therefore, it was thought appropriate to appoint one of the Ministers either of Home Affairs or of Education and Mr. ARAKI, then Minister of Education and an exceeding idealist, was appointed for the post. The Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet was to be in charge of the general affairs of this Committee, and naturally I was made its Chief Secretary. Although members of various committees hitherto included officials and peoples of various fields, their leaders were chosen chiefly from government officials. This Committee, however, appointed many civilians for its leaders in accordance with Mr. ARAKI's opinion, and it should be noted that this has contributed much toward its democratization.

This committee had often met and discussed the fundamental policy of the movement, and policies were always based upon the resolution adopted by the entire members of the committee.

Further, in carrying these policies into effect, its charge was transferred to the Central League of the National Spiritual Mobilization thereby accelerating the realization of such policies which were put into practice through various civilian organizations. Thus it will be seen that the Committee functions as a wedge between the government offices and civilians, and further the importance was placed on the everyday life of the people.

In my dealings with Mr. ARAKI, he was a man of sincerity itself, and one who never was unreasonable. Even after he became the Chairman, he had always allowed all the members to exhaustively discuss problems and he was not lead to a decision easily, so much so that I even became impatient about his method. He never coerced his opinion upon anyone but paid due respect for opinions of the members of the Committee. Moreover, he took notice of the fact that the

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the Committee was often inclined to subject its opinions along the lines of current situations, that he even endeavored to pay attention to the elevation of the cultural level of the people to the utmost and reflect it on the everyday life and frequently advocated cheerful manners of living. However, when there was an argument on deciding July 7th, the day when the China Incident broke out, as the Day of Self-Examination for the people, a few members of the Committee contended strongly for it but the Chairman was of the opinion that it would stress merely the interest of the situation as such and that it would not quite agree with the purpose of fundamentally healthful development of national spirit. He thought, rather of deciding the first day of every month with due respect to the traditional Japanese custom as a day of self-examination and practice and designating it as the Service Day. As the members of the Committee agreed to it and by so deciding, it was avoided in allowing themselves to take advantage of the current situation.

The Chairman paid exceedingly scrupulous attention concerning such point.

Minister of Education ARAKI resigned several months after that and thus the discussion on this subject was not completed while he was its Chairman.

Next I shall relate about the documents discussed at the Cabinet Meetings.

I was the Chief of General Affairs of the Cabinet Secretariat at the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets, to both of which Mr. ARAKI was War Minister, and so I was responsible for keeping in record the documents discussed at the Cabinet Meetings and subsequently passed to the Secretariat for safe keeping. The decision at the Cabinet Meetings was not necessarily done on documents, a considerable part of it was done verbally. Moreover, quite a number of documents on which decision had been made at the meeting was not given to the Secretariat for safe keeping. It was not a customary practice to make record of the Cabinet Meetings.

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YOKOMIZO, Mitsuteru

Subscribed and sworn to before the under-signed officer by the above-named YOKOMIZO, Mitsuteru, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of August 1947.

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Ex 171

Exh No.

9 1

Def Doc No. 2095

ク 自分債我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ類リ宣旨ヲシタル上次ノ如ク供進致シマス

東京國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣旨供進管

供進者 横澤 光 口

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一、私は横濱光輝と申します。只今横濱市保土谷區月見町二二一邊山方に住んで居ます。

略歴を申上ぐれば昭和二年五月より十一年七月迄専任内閣書記官十二年九月より内閣情報部長昭和十五年二月岡山縣知事十七年六月熊本縣知事に任ぜられ十九年八月退官しました。

二、荒木氏と知り合ひになつたのは、犬養内閣の僚となられた時以來であり特に氏が平沼内閣に於て國民精神總動員委員長を委員長となられた時には其下に幹事長として働きました。

三、國民精神總動員運動は第一次近衛内閣時代文部事務が容易に片附かば長期となる形勢があり國民精神の弛緩墮落の招來が心配であつたので荒木文部大臣就任半年位前文部省が國民運動を計畫しましたが其の性質上各省に關係するので後になつて内閣情報部兼連絡調整の役に當ることとして始められたものであります。即ち益忠報團の國民精神を發起し之を日常の業務生活の間に具現させよとして創られたものであります。

従つて民間に国民精神總動員中央聯盟といふ団体組織されて民間各団体の中心となつて連絡調整と運動の推進に當り一方内閣情報部は各省團の連絡調整に當つたわけでありませう然し其後の經過を見れば動もすると官僚精神に陥る嫌があるので平沼内閣の際に根本方針は官民各方面の人の衆議によつて全權すること、し其爲内閣に国民精神總動員委員会を創設することにりましたいは、此の運動の民主化といつてよいと思ひます。委員には官界政界學界民間各界の人々を網羅し殊に婦人の立場を尊重して婦人をも含め委員長には内務大臣を以て之に充つることになりました。

其處で此の運動に最も關係深い内務大臣又は文部大臣たる内務大臣の中から就任されるのが適當であるといふ事になり結局當時文部大臣であり非營を精神家であつた荒木氏の就任を見ないのであります。

此の委員会の庶務は内閣情報部が掌ることになつたので自然内閣情報部長であつた私が幹事長に當ることになりました。

尙從來の委員会は役員に官民各方面の人々に網羅しても幹事は官吏のみで占

めて居たが民意を無視し官僚的になる傾向がありました。此委員会は鈴木氏の意見で幹事に多数の民間人を入れ民主化の實を果ぐるに資した事は注目し値します。此の委員会は何回か台合して運動の根本方針を論議し何時も委員全体の決議で方針が決められたので企圖指導の一元化宮氏一体の實を果げたのであります。

そして此決議は民間に於ては国民精神総動員中央聯盟が中心となつて各団体独自の活動を推進したものであります。

即ち委員会は官廳側と民間側とのくさびでありました。

そして此民間団体の實際運動は国民日常生活に於ける實踐に重點が置かれました。

岡本氏の委員長として執らるる態度は何事にも無理をしないで十分に衆論をつくらしめて自ら降手に決定されるやうなことがなかつた。それで幹事の私としては寧ろ肩がゆい位でありました。而も委員会が時局面に傾き易いのを注意して飽く迄も国民の教養を高め之を日常生活に反映することに意を用ひら

れしきりに「期らかな生活」と云ふ事を唱へられましを例へば「民反省の日」の設置に當りまして七月七日即ち支那軍機動發の日に定めよつとする議案が出た。一部よりは強硬な主張がありましたが委員長はかくては通りに時局の爲めのみのこと、なり根柢より國民精神の昂揚を圖る目的にはぬからとて奉公日即ち反省日行の日を日本昔からの習俗を尊重して月の初日即ち毎月一日に定めたいといふ意見を主張され全委員も委員長の此大方針を了解し其通り決定し従前に時局に便乗することが避けられたのであります。

委員長は斯様な點については極めて周到な注意をされて居ました。荒木氏は其後数月にて文部大臣を退官されたので全部の討論は氏の委員長時代には完了せず

に終りました。

其次に内閣の書類に關して申上ります。

私は荒木氏が陸軍大臣御在任當時即ち、大藏齋藤内閣を預めて内閣官房總務課長の職に在り内閣の書類については内閣官房に下げられたものについて保衛の責任があります。

抑々口證の決定は必ずしも口證によるばかりでなく口證によるものも相當にあり口證によつたものであつても内閣官房に下げられぬものがあります。又口證については内閣官房で記録を作りません



昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月十一日 於

供 造 者

横濱市保土谷區月見坂三二一  
番 山 方  
横 濱 光 輝

右ハ當立合人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立 合 人

蓬 岡 高 明



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al )  
vs ) AFFIDAVIT  
ARAKI, Sadao, et al )

DEFGENT: TOMITA, Kenji

I, TOMITA, Kenji, make oath and say as follows:

I was Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Second and Third KONOYE Cabinets.

In the summer of 1940, some time after the formation of the Second KONOYE Cabinet, I went to General ARAKI by order of Premier KONOYE, to ask him to be a Cabinet Councillor, but he declined the offer.

There were two reasons why General ARAKI declined the post of Cabinet Councillor. First, he opposed the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Secondly, he opposed the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.

General ARAKI's opposition against the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was based on the following ground: The prevailing political partisans' attitude could not always be approved. But the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was said to aim at establishing one party for the whole nation rejecting co-existence of different political parties. Probably it would lead to despotic autocracy, depriving every one of his freedom to express his own opinion. It would be against the spirit of the Constitution and Emperor MEIJI's intentions when he declared that all measures of government should be decided by public opinion. It would be a system contrary to the structure of the state and the august will of the Emperor. That was his reason for opposition. Later it was clarified that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was not a political but a public association. But at that time that was not clear to the public. So was his opinion.

He opposed the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy from his original ideological standpoint that most of the Japanese leaders not only over-estimated the real strength of Germany but it also confounded the idea of our KODO, (The Imperial Way), with that of the German totalitarianism, and therefore that the alliance was misleading in clarification of Japan's real standpoint. Moreover, he absolutely opposed it from his professional military standpoint that it would lead to aggravating the feelings of America and Britain toward Japan with the resultant difficulty of settling the China Incident so much so that it might probably become inevitable for Japan to wage war against America and England.

He stated the Imperial Rule Assistance Association as a domestic problem and the Tripartite Alliance as an international problem were both extremely important for Japan. Conferences for settling these problems ought to have been conducted with utmost prudence. But as they had already been decided, his opinion could affect them no longer. Therefore, he said the post of a Cabinet Councillor was meaningless.

"Premier KONOYE's opinion is in fact the same as yours." I said to him after hearing his opinions mentioned above, "Though there are some who want to found the Imperial Rule Assistance Association on totalitarianism like Nazism, the Premier rejects it because it might be a revival of the Shogunate, contrary to the national structure of Japan. For the purpose of settling the China Incident at the earliest date possible, however, not existent political parties but a nationwide organization is necessary to suppress the Army. Such a national organization the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is aiming at. The Premier is far from considering the Tripartite Alliance as a means to hostilities against America and Britain as some people do. He fundamentally agrees with you, General ARAKI, as he has an ardent desire to settle the China Incident as soon as possible. Therefore we earnestly ask you to accept the post of Cabinet Councillor by all means."

After all my efforts in negotiation, he said he was not self-confident, under the prevailing objective circumstances, and could not be persuaded to accept the post. From that time on public association between Prince KONOYE and General ARAKI was discontinued for the time being, though private intercourse continued, I remember.

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TOMITA, Kenji

Subscribed and sworn to before the under-signed officer by the above-named TOMITA, Kenji, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of August 1947.

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Ref Doc 1914

東京國際貿易裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 宮田 俊 博

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通

リ宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

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Key Doc 19114

- 一、私ハ富田儀治ヲアリマス。
- 二、私ハ第二次及第三次ノ近衛内閣ノ書記官長ヲ致シマス。
- 三、昭和十五年（一九四〇年）ノ夏第二次近衛内閣ノ成立後、ラクシテ私ハ近衛總理大臣ノ命令ヲ荒木大將ニ内閣参謀ニナツテ、儀々儀々ニ参リマスガ、大將ハ新ラレマス。
- 四、荒木大將ガ内閣参謀ニ就任スル際、承諾サレナカツタ理由ハニツアリマス。第一ハ大阪義演會ノ設立ニ反對意見ヲ持ツテ居ラレタリ。第二ハ日獨停三回同盟締結ニ對シ反對意見ヲ持ツテ居ラレタリ。第三ハカハラテアリマス。
- 五、荒木大將ノ大阪義演會設立ニ對スル反對理由ハ當時ノ政黨人ノ態度ハ必スシモ是心出ル。然レモ、世間ハ大政黨執行ハ政黨ヲナクシテ、一黨ニシテ、スルニ言ハレム。ソレハ各人各々ノ意見ヲ自由ニ述ベル機會ヲ奪ヒ結局、該黨ニナラズガマ。
- ソレハ万機公行ニ決スルト仰セラレタリ。明治天皇ノ御言葉ヲ、我々ノ精神ニ背キ、我が國體

Dec 1914.

ヤ陛下ノ大御心ニ反スル制度トナルト云フ  
ニアツタ。後發賣會ハ政治結社ヲナク公算  
結社ナルコトヲ明ニサレタガ當時ハ世間ニ  
マダ防トナツテ居ナカツタ。從ツテ此意見  
ガ出タ。

六、又日清伊三國同盟ニ對スル反對理由ハ當時  
ノ日本ノ有力者タチハ獨逸ノ刀ヲ買ヒ彼リ  
過キテ居ル許リテナク恣意的ニモ獨逸ノ全  
体主義ト我ガ皇道トヲ混同シテ居ル者多ク  
從ツテ三國同盟ノ結果ハ即ツテ吾ノ立場ヲ  
發薄スルニハ誤解ヲ招キヤスクナルトイフ  
大將領等ノ情緒的見カラノ反對ト莫ニ算  
算專家トシテノ立場カラ同盟ニヨリ米英  
トノ感情ハ愈々惡化シ兵爲メ支那事變ノ解  
決ハ益々困難トナリタト、正氣ヲ持テテナ  
クテモ兵ノ爲對米英戰爭ハ不可避ノ状態ニ  
陷ル公算ガ多クナルカラ絶對ニ拒否スベキ  
デアルトノ意見デアツタ。

七、以上ノ次第デ 内問題トシテノ發賣會、國  
際問題トシテノ三國同盟ハ國家ノ重大問題  
デアル。此重大問題ヲ決定スル權限コソ重

Ref Doc 1914

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大デアルノニ今ハ兩方共決定サレタ後デアル  
カラ最早意見ノ入ル様モナイ。珍議トナルモ  
無意義トオカキテアル。

私ハ之等ノ意見ニ對シ一近衛總理ノ考ヘテ居  
ラレルコトモ實ハ大將ト全ク同ジテアル、即  
チ大政興行ヲナチノ如ク一黨ニシタイ  
トイフ考ヘノ人ハアテルケレドモ近衛公ハソレ  
ハ幕府ノ再興チアツテ日本ノ國體ニ反スルモ  
ノダト云フ考ヘテアル。唯一日モ速カニ支那  
專横ヲ解決セソガ爲ニハ既存ノ政黨チハドウ  
シテモ歐日チアツテ軍部ヲ抑ヘルタメニハ一  
大口民組織ニ依ルノ外ハナイ。此ノ口民組織  
ヨリ製貸合ノ目的トスル所チアル。又三口同  
盟ニツイテモ一部ノ人達ノヨクニ之ヲ榮英ト  
ノ戰爭ニモツテ行クナドトイフ考ヘトハ凡ソ  
反對チ支那專横ヲ速カニ解決シタイ熱望ヲ持  
ツテ居ラレルノチアツテ根本ノ考ヘハ荒木大  
將トハ同意見ナノダカラ是非珍議ヲヒキウケ  
テ裁キタイレト色々懇談シタケレドモ容現狀  
勢ヨリ見テ自信ハナイト終ニ大將ノ了解ヲ得  
ルニ至ラズ珍議就任ヲ承諾サレズ其盾近衛公  
ト荒木大將トノ交友モ私的ニハアツタガ公的  
ニハ一時中絶狀態ニナツタト記憶シテ居マス。



Ref Doc 19/14

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月四日於

東京國際貿易裁判所

供述者 富田 俊治 (印)

右ハ當立合人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署明捺印シ

タルコトヲ證明シマス

同日於同所

立合人 延岡 高明 (印)

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Rec'd Dec 1914

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良心ニ従ヒ尊嚴ヲ起ス何事ヲモ欺瞞セズ又何  
事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

宣 誓 書

(註明  
捺印)

齋 田 澄 治



(49)

Def. Doc. No. 2494

Paragraphs 1 & 2 admit  
Rest rejected  
Exh. No. 3173

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: NAKAJIMA, Torakichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am NAKAJIMA, Torakichi. I live in No. 838, 2- Chome, Kamikitazawa-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.
2. I am an ex-lieutenant-general, and served as <sup>intendant</sup> to Prince NASHIMOTO till March, 1946.
3. As regards relation with General ARAKI, I was a major-general attached in the headquarters of the 6th Division at KUMAMOTO when he was Commander of the Division from 1929 to 1931. Thus, we both were in the same place while in KUMAMOTO. Since then we were on intimate terms in Tokyo. Moreover, we were class mates as students in the military Academy, I am therefore, one of those who know what kind of a man he is as a public and private man.
4. While in the 6th Division, I was in charge of the work on reservists, schools and the local affairs I am therefore

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well conversant with his way of thinking and of doing things as well as his educational method as a division commander.

5. The fundamental of his military educational policy can be expressed in this one phrase "to make the army manifest the Emperor's virtue."
6. The general also used to tell officers attached to various universities, high schools, colleges and middle-schools that the education of students and pupils should not be training for war, but should be directed to guiding youngsters to develop their innate traits so as to turn out good citizens useful for the society, that is to say citizens punctually sound in health and bright minded. To say emphatically, one of the characteristics of his addresses to the attached officers was his strong appeal to them to let deans, principals and faculties of colleges and schools, in which they were attached, have a clear understanding of the fact that the Japanese Army was not an army of militarism, of imperialism, particularly of the Russian type but an army which was talking into it the benevolent heart of the Emperor, the real image of the Japanese Army. He said it was the major mission of the attached officers. He also used to tell them that the attached officers should be obedient to the school regulations and show examples of good behaviour. In selecting attached officers I was always ordered by him to pick up men of a harmonious mind rather than strong-willed or bullish man.

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7. He always told me that the young officers of the Japanese Army should not be of the Prussian type but that they must always carry the character of the Imperial Army which embodies in it. -- His Majesty's heart.
9. One of my great reminiscences is what he said on one occasion during my four days stay with the general at KUMAMOTO for the purpose of attending the special great manoeuvres which was held in the neighborhood of KUMAMOTO in November 1931. In that year both the General and I myself were no longer in the 6th Division. At the time of the manoeuvres he was the chief of the Headquarters of the Department of Military Education.  
He said. "The army should be such as, even victorious, will not buy bitter feeling from the enemy and will be loved by the inhabitants in where it stays."  
He was emphatic on it even while he was the Commander of the 6th Division. Now he saw in the course of this maneuver forms being devastated as soliders and wagons trotted on their mercilessly. Pointing at that scene with his finger he sighed, "Despite my great effort in matters of education while in the 6th Division, cannot it bear any fruit yet?"

*Majority favor admission of Japan*

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9. In Dec. of 1931 General ARAMI was appointed War Minister. As I was then living in TOKYO, I often called on him to hear him speak on various questions. He was then very much worrying over the Manchurian Incident. He said that there was a danger of it developing into an all out clash between Japan and China, if we should leave it to take its own course and as the League of Nations failed to grasp the truth of the situation because the of one-sided propoganda of the Chinese, I for myself-should do my best to put an end to the armed fighting now going on, and to prevent the danger of an all out clash between Japan and China. He then said to the effect that after that he would endeavor to see the League of Nations and the other Powers brought together to take the right cognizance of the situation.
10. He was also absolutely against Japan's seceding from the League of Nations. When I met him after Japan's succession, he said that at the Cabinet meeting a provision had been made for a non-withdrawal from the League but as a result of the proceedings of the Conference at Geneva withdrawal became a matter of necessity, politics is a really difficult thing, complained he.
11. In may 1935 I called on the General shortly after the Tangku Treaty was signed. He was very cheerful and treated me with dinner. While dining, and having the meal with me, he

told me joyfully. "I think I have troubled you a good deal about the Manchurian Incident. I am, however, glad to say that it has been settled."

12. In January of 1934 he caught pneumonia. As his condition became quite serious he resigned his post as War Minister and became a patient in the sanatorium at Atami. I went to the sanatorium to inquire of his condition. He said: I am very sorry that I became ill at a very important moment. We are already out of the League. What I wished to do was to hold the opening of a Far Eastern conference in order to restore our cooperation with the Powers, but I became ill and found it impossible to take an active step in the Diet and elsewhere. This was the reason why I resigned, but I have my plans presented before the prime minister SAITO and other ministers by letters, and as for the army since HAYASHI, my successor, pledged to carry it out, I think that it will be realized.

13. He was completely recovered and returned to TOKYO after a few months' rest when I called on him he was in ill humour. He sighed greatly because he could see no trace of any effort that had been paid for the realization of what he had so earnestly requested to the Premier and other ministers.

He said: "they were discussing only minor question. They took no interest in the work of getting a world-wide understanding for the peace of the Orient.

14. After the Feb. 26 affair he retired from the active service. Since then he was leading a quiet life confined in his residence and spending most of his time in reading. Meantime, with much concern he was only looking at the situation of the country which was being led by an extreme movement.

15. When the China Incident broke out.

Premier KONOE, recommended the General as the Education Minister so as to let him serve as the fire-extinguisher just as at the time of the Manchurian Incident. But as the Education Minister, unlike the War Minister, had no power over acts of the Army he could not do anything with the matter, though with all his efforts. I heard him murmuring: "As the Education Minister I can do nothing with the matter" I went to his official residence at NAGATA-CHO for congratulation as he became Minister of Education and learned it.

*Report*  
16. At the time of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy as well as the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association he was opposed strongly to both of these. He told me that he had been approached by Prince KONOE with the post of a State Councillor, but that he had declined it saying that he would not accept in such a situation even to become a State councillor.



1. The general on many occasions warned us against mistaken liberalism, communism and totalitarianism. He firmly told us that we could make contributions toward world peace by perfect realization of the true way of Japan (the basis of which was the Imperial Spirit of benevolence). He was opposed to conquering or amalgamation of any other country or race. For instance, he was opposed to Japan's amalgamation of Korea. At that time he was in Russia and wrote a letter of opposition to Gen. UTSUNOMIYA, one of his intimate seniors, national structure or racial spirit of long standing should be respected and not violated. Especially we have never fought Anglo-Saxon, against which war should be avoided by any means. So he told us.

2. During the Pacific War opinion was prevailing that the monument of Commodore Perry at KURIHAMA should be withdrawn. I went and asked the general if it would be inevitable for unity of public opinion. Suddenly he became serious and said. "I am surprised that even you should say such a thing. The strong point of Japan is to have a sense of gratitude. We cannot deny that we owe much to America since the opening of our country to foreign trade. Though there have been some issues. Unfortunately the present war has broken out. But favors once received cannot be forgotten. Otherwise, where is Japan's strong point?"



The Meeting opened at 10:30, January 30 (Saturday) 1932, in presence of His Majesty the Emperor.

Members present: Chairman KURATOMI

Vice-Chairman HIRANUMA

Ministers: Prime Minister INUKAI (4)

Minister of Finance TAKAHASHI (5)

Minister of Navy OSUMI (6)

Minister of Railways TOKONAMI (7)

Minister of Justice SUZUKI (9)

Minister of War ARAKI (11)

Minister of Education HATAYAMA (12)

Minister of Agriculture and Forestry YAMAMOTO (13)

Minister of Commerce and Industry MAEDA (14)

Minister of Overseas Affairs HATA (15)

Minister of Foreign Affairs YOSHIZAWA (16)

Councillors: KANEKO (19), KUBOTA (20), TOMII (21), ISHIGURO (22),

AIHODA (23), FURUICHI (24), KOI (25), SAKURAI (26),

ARAI (27), KAWAI (28), KAMATA (30), SUZUKI (31),

ISHII (32), MIZUMACHI (33), FUKUDA (35), ARIMA (36),

HARA (37), KUBOTA (38), KURINO (39), MOYODA (40)

Members Absent:

Imperial Family: Prince YASUHITO (1), Prince YOSHIHITO (2),

Prince NORUHITO

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Ministers: Minister of Home Affairs NAKAHASHI (8)

Minister of Communication MITSUCHI (10)

Councillors: ITO (18), ICHIHARA (29), OKADA (34)

Commissioners: President of the Legislation Bureau SHIMADA,

Councillor of the Legislation Bureau KUROSAKI,

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs NAGAI,

Secretary of Foreign Affairs MATSUMIYA,

Vice-Minister of Finance KURODA,

Chief of the Financing Bureau of the Finance Ministry TOMIYA,

Chief of the Accounts Bureau of the Finance Ministry FUJII,

Vice-Minister of War SUGIYAMA,

Intendant-colonel OUCHI,

Paymaster Vice-admiral KATO,

Paymaster-captain ARAKI,

Reporter Chairman of Investigation Committee KANEKO

Chief Secretary: Chief Secretary FUTAGAMI

Secretaries: Secretary HORIE, Secretary MUTO

Chairman (KURATA): The Meeting is opened. I hope you have no objection to the fact that the usual procedure was not adopted to open today's Meeting on account of a request made by the Cabinet. The following two bills are brought up en bloc for deliberation:

- (1) Partial suspension of the transfer of the sinking-fund for the year 1931.

(2) Issuance of bonds to defray the expenses due to the Manchurian Incident.

We shall begin the First Reading, but omitting reading the text. The report of the Chairman of the Investigation Committee is requested. Reporter (KANAKO): I shall respectfully report on our findings. As regards the bills on the partial suspension of the transfer of the sinking-fund in the year 1931 as well as the issuance of bonds to defray the expenses due to the Manchurian Incident, referred to the Privy Council for deliberation, my colleagues and myself, having been appointed members of the Investigations Committee, have held committee meetings on the 27th and the 23th of this month; the committee heard the explanations of the ministers of state and the officials concerned and thoroughly examined the matters on hand. The gist of the bills is as follows:

(1) "Partial suspension of the transfer of the sinking-fund in the year 1931".

The general account budget, being brought to effect during the year 1931, is expected to show a deficit of ¥ 64,000,000, going into what is commonly called the "red" to that amount. The government, having studied the means of replenishing the shortage, proposes to meet it with the following funds: about ¥ 20,000,000, by raising the uncalled part of the bonds, provided for us the Earthquake Damage Bond Law, the Telephone Enterprises Bond Law and the Roads' Bond Law, and (2) ¥ 40,000,000, by stopping the transfer of part of the sinking-fund, which was to be originally transferred from the general to the special

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account for such fund under the Sinking-fund Special Account Law. ..

But in connection with the latter, it was necessary to make a provision especially applying to Article 2 par. 2 of the Sinking-fund Special account Law, which stipulates that the amount to be appropriated for the sinking-fund shall be more than 1.16% of the total amount of Bonds at the beginning of the preceding year but shall not be less than ¥ 30,000,000. A bill was therefore introduced in the last session of the Diet, but on account of the dissolution of the House of Representatives, it failed to come to the vote. In consequence, the Government proposes to issue, in conformity with Art. 3. par 1 of the Imperial Contribution, an Urgent Imperial Ordinance having the same effect as the above-mentioned bill. The said ordinance shall provide that the transfer of the sinking-fund for the year 1931 under Article 2 of the Sinking-fund, Special Account Law may be suspended within the limit of ¥ 44,000,000.

(2) Issuance of bonds to defray the expenses due to the Manchurian Incident.

Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on September 18, last year, the necessary expenses have been met by the revival of the curtailed amount of the working budget and also by appropriations from the second reserve fund. The total sum expended by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War and Navy has already amounted to ¥ 9,650,000. But in order to cope with the progress of events, the Cabinet estimated the further expenses at :

Ministry of Foreign Affairs	¥ 3,030,000
Ministry of War	¥16,020,000
Ministry of Navy	¥ 1,840,000
Total	¥20,900,000

and decided to issue bonds as a source of revenue. The cabinet had recently presented a bill and a budget bill in this connection to the last session of the Imperial Diet but these likewise failed to be voted. However the competent authorities, considering that the appropriation of such expenses is so urgent that it can not be delayed till the convening of a new Imperial Diet following the coming general election of the members of the House of Representatives, the government wishes to promulgate this Imperial Ordinance as a <sup>urgent</sup> financial urgent measure under Article 70 par 1. of the Imperial Constitution. The gist of this ordinance is the same as the stipulations of the above-mentioned bill and budget bill, providing that the government may issue bonds or make loans up to ¥ 20,910,000 to cover the Manchurian Incident expenses; should it become necessary to cover the difference between the price of issue of the bonds, the government will be empowered to issue further bonds or make loans beyond such limitation.

In short the purport of the first of these two ordinances is to provide for a legal exception in the form of an Imperial Ordinance in accordance with 1, Art. 8, par. 1 of the constitution by suspending partially the transfer of the sinking-fund from the general, to the special account as it is necessary to reduce expenditure in order to make up the deficit of revenue in the general account of the current:

year. The second of the ordinances aims at issuing bonds to cover the Manchurian Incident expenses, as an urgent financial measure under article 70, par 1 of the Constitution. Both measures must be recognized as really urgent and inevitable. So far as the latter is concerned, it must be said that it is in strict accordance with the provisions of the constitution, for it is obviously impossible to convene the Imperial Diet immediately, owing to the dissolution of the House of Representatives. The Investigation committee has therefore unanimously approved the unconditional acceptance of both measures. We hereby have the honour of submitting our findings as above, No. 23 (KURODA): I think it is really inevitable to present these measures for consideration on account of the shortage in revenue for the year 1931. Our relations with China will become more and more complicated in future, and further expenditure, above the present ¥ 20,000,000, may be necessary. In view of such a grave financial situation. I cannot but wish that the authorities should face such exigencies with the utmost care. As to whether it is possible to call the Diet or not, although personally I do not think it impossible, considering that the competent authorities have amply studied the question, I shall trust them and for the present second their proposal.

No. 22 (ISHIGURO): For what period are these ¥ 20,910,000 required?

No. 5 (TAKAHASHI): It is the amount required for the budgetary year 1931. However, in view of the changing situation in Manchuria and Mongolia together with the outbreak of another incident in Shanghai, the necessary expenses tend to increase from day to day. Therefore it



must not be understood that this budget is meant to cover the whole amount of expenditure for the year 1931.

No. 22 (ISHIGURO): Is the number of the expeditionary forces calculated as of the present?

No. 6 (OSUMI): The sum of ¥ 3,340,000 requested by the Navy is the amount of expenses required up to the end of March, based on the situation as of January 20. But more ships and men having been dispatched since then, I expect it will be necessary to take other measures.

No. 11 (ARAKI): The amount requested by the Army is, as in the case of the Navy, for the present fiscal year, calculated on the basis of the situation as of January 20. But, the needs that may arise with the development of the Manchurian Incident, will have to be faced in the future.

No. 16 (YOSHIZAWA) : The amount requested by the Foreign Ministry for the year 1931 is a supplementary demand based on conditions at that time and covering the period up to the end of March, in the same manner as stated by the War and Navy Ministers.

No. 32 (ISHII) : Since the Cabinet has asked for deliberation on this important matter, I thought it would explain its general policy toward this affair and also the objectives and the scope of the action undertaken; but as this is not forthcoming I should like to ask some questions necessary to the deliberation of the present proposals.

The scope of the expenditure is not made clear either in the bills or in the report of the Chairman of the Investigation committee. Are the expenses for the Shanghai incident included within the scope of

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this ordinance?

They seem to be so, if we consider the explanation given by the Navy Minister who mentioned the ordering out of warships, etc., but for caution's sake, I should like to question him on this point. Again, a sum of ¥ 30,000,000 is requested by the Foreign Ministry. This Ministry, up to now, has not taken any action, and the people have been exceedingly impatient of its inactivity; however they will certainly feel much reassured when they will learn of this appropriation. They should be further relieved to hear explanations concerning the items of expenditure.

Next, I would like to hear the policy of the new cabinet as to the object, the extent and the scope of our action in Manchuria and China. According to the declarations made by the last cabinet to the council of the League of Nations and others, the objectives of the action of the Imperial army are the protection of our country's rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as of the lives and properties of Japanese nationals there. This objective must be carried out by all means. Our Empire once made Russia and the U. S. A. recognize those rights and interests and obtained written assurances in this connection, but these were abandoned by the Cabinet in power in 1931 in the course of negotiations with the U. S. government. Why did that then cabinet do so? I recall it was a SEIYUKAI Cabinet, and so I would like to hear the policy of the present cabinet in this matter. Has the cabinet resolved to protect our special rights and interests in Manchuria, even if it means making a scrap of paper of the joint statement of Japan and the U. S.? Please give me an explanation on this

point.

Next, the Commander of the Kwantung Army issued a statement last autumn to the effect that the aim of the action of the Imperial army was to establish in Manchuria a land of bounty for both Manchurians and foreigners. This is indeed a thing to be welcomed. But what I wish to know is whether the Empire intends to wait for the birth of an independent local government and then recognize and protect it, or whether we intend to make such plans and establish it directly ourselves? The necessary expenses will vary greatly according to the policy adopted. It might be that Japan's whole possessions would not suffice to meet the expenses. Therefore, I would like to hear the policy of the present government on the establishment of a local government.

Next, I would like to hear explanations on the scope of the action undertaken by the Imperial government. Manchuria has natural geographic boundaries on both the east and the west but none on the south and the north. In the part, there existed a special agreement between Japan and Russia as regards the non-violation of their respective interests in North Manchuria. But according to recent press news, our country has dispatched troops to HARBIN, and if this is true, North Manchuria apparently comes within the sphere of action of our government and army. Will the government include these regions in the "so-called Special Areas", regardless of the agreement with Russia?

According to the explanations given by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on September 18 last year, he had no information concerning situation till September 24

That, in these days when means of communications have so greatly been developed the Foreign office should not know anything for a week, clearly proves that there was a great lack of understanding between the military and diplomatic authorities. Is there any such lack of understanding between the two, even now? Under the former cabinet it was rumoured that the Foreign Office was led by the military authorities who were in turn lead by the military abroad. I am glad to hear that the present Minister of War is capable of fully controlling these front line Military. Will it not again happen that these men, not paying any attention to the orders of the central government, would act on their own initiative? May I trouble the Minister of War to reply to this question?

No. 11 (ARAKI): I will answer your question as regards the actions of the army. In the declaration of the Commander of the Kwantung Army made at the beginning of the Manchurian Incident, there was a portion stating that Japan would turn Manchuria into a Land of Bounty. In view of the circumstances prevailing at the time, this statement was made as a means to calm the population. It would therefore be improper to conclude that it defines the objectives of the army. However, I have sent a warning for the future to the Commander of the Kwantung army. The cause of the Manchurian Incident is primarily due to Chang Hsuen-liang's inability to maintain friendly relations with the Japanese forces. Therefore, the action of the Imperial army must naturally extend to the limits to which Chang formerly exercised his influence. As to the action of the army, there are rumours that the front line forces are

not submitting to any control and are acting at their own discretion.

However, once we have resorted to measures of self-protection, we are obliged to take the initiative in order to attain our objectives and maintain the prestige of the Imperial forces. In the course of such action, there may be acts which give the impression of being excessive, but I beg you will give your most sympathetic consideration to tactical acts related to the operational command. As to relations with the diplomatic authority, these are most amicable and smooth.

No. 16 (YOSHIZAWA): I shall explain the contents of the budget requested by the Foreign Office. Although the total amount of our requests is

¥ 3,050,000, necessary expenses have been met twice, in November and in December of last year, by expenditure from the second reserve fund.

The amounts requested this time include : (1) police expenses in Manchuria, including the wages etc. of the police force, (2) relief expenses to provide for food, ship transportation etc. for Japanese nationals who have taken refuge in our consulates in South China, (3) telegraphic communication expenses needed for the classification of the incident to the League of Nations and governments concerned, and (4) secret funds and miscellaneous expenses; all these expenses are required in connection with the Manchurian Incident.

My conviction is that the first objective of our action in Manchuria is the maintenance of peace and tranquillity, this being our fundamental policy toward Manchuria. Of course it is very difficult to maintain perfect order over such an extensive banditry-ridden land, where even the ordinary people often turn bandits. But, in my opinion,

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the peace of that region is an absolute necessity to our Empire. Our second objective is the protection of our rights and interests. In this connection, it is also necessary to bear in mind the history of Manchuria. The action of our government in the past has been based on this principle, and that will also hold true in future,

As to the views of the Cabinet concerning the action of a new government, this matter originated among the Chinese themselves in Manchuria. It is natural that it is of deep concern to Japan and therefore we are carefully considering our policy regarding in this matter.

Next, to say a few words concerning the scope and extent of Japan's action, I should like to state that in the past there was a secret Russo-Japanese agreement, establishing a boundary line to the exercise of influence of both nations, but the said agreement became void as a result of the Russian revolution. In consequence we consider that it has no binding power today. However, as you are all aware, Russia has great interests in the Far East. As to the dispatch of troops to HARBIN, this, as the Minister of war has stated, was done by the Kwantung army as a temporary measure to protect the lives and properties of the Japanese in North Manchuria, which were endangered by bandits, and I am consider that what further steps should be taken must be decided according to the future situation. In short, Japan's acts are based on the maintenance of order and the protection of our rights and interests in Manchuria. We shall send troops even to the North Manchurian area whenever Japanese lives and properties there are placed

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in pressing peril, but we are giving careful consideration to the relations with Russia.

Chairman (KURATOMI) : As no one seems to desire to speak further, I will omit the second and subsequent Readings, and place the matter to be voted on at once. Those who second the bill please stand up.

(Unanimously approved)

Chairman (KURATOMI) : The meeting is adjourned.

His majesty the Emperor left the room.

(Adjourned at 11:40 a. m.)

Chairman : (signed) Baron KURATOMI, Yuzaburo

Secretary-general : (signed) FUTAGA I, Heiji

Secretaries : (signed) HORIE, Suro

(signed) KUTO, Morio

Report of the Minister of the Navy on the China Incident made in the Imperial Palace, at 11:40 on January 30 (Saturday), 1932

Members present: Chairman KURATOMI

Vice-chairman HIRANUMA

Ministers : Prime Minister INUKAI

Minister of Finance FAKAHASHI

Minister of the Navy OSOMI

Minister of Railways FOKONAMI

Minister of Home Affairs SUZUKI

Minister of War ARAKI

Minister of Education H. TOYAMA

Def. Doc. #2281

Exh. No.  
Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Excerpt from  
Proceedings, Education Council,  
2nd Session

Held on 13, Jan. 1938.  
at the Official Residence  
of the Prime Minister

Session opened at 1,40 p.m.

(The list of the attendants omitted)

Education Minister

(Margins KIKO, Kōichi)

At the conference held on 11th of this month, the Cabinet decided upon a policy to make the young men's school a compulsory course of education for the young men of this country. Concerning this question, the Temporary Education Committee organized in 1917 already adopted a report recommending the Government to take steps as soon as possible to make a part or all of the supplementary technical schools a compulsory course in national education. Recently again in 1935 the Educational Administration Council, which deliberated on the General Plan of Young Men's School, adopted in its report to the Government a side decision for making the young men's school a compulsory course.

Inasmuch as however, the young men's school is an important institution of education, we expect that the Council will fully discuss all problems concerning it, such as its organization, its curriculum, the advisability of young women's school as compulsory institution, etc. The results of such discussions will be respected and followed by the Government.

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Exh. No.

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Secretary of the Education Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 118 pages and entitled "Proceeding the Education Council" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (Former Investigation Division, Education Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo, Investigation Bureau  
Education Ministry.

On this 23rd day of August, 1947

/S/ SAWADA, Tatsuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

On the same date

Witness : /S/ ITŌ, Ryōji (seal)

Secretary, Education Ministry.

Def. Doc. No. 2098

Exhibit # \_\_\_\_\_

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

RAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent :-AIZAWA, Makoto,

Verdict: First duly sworn to as an attached statement  
in accordance with the procedure followed in my country.  
I here depose as follows.

I, AIZAWA, Makoto, of lawful age, being first duly sworn,  
in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, desire  
to make the following statement of my own free will and accord.

From April, 1933, until March, 1936, I was employed as  
a civilian by the Mukden Army and was attached to the Mukden  
Army Special Service Organ. During part of my tenure, speci-  
fically from December, 1933, until March, 1936, when I resigned,  
DOHIMARU, Kenji, was the Chief of the Mukden Special Service  
Organ. During his tenure of office General DOHIMARU had as his  
assistants, in the order named, Majors IMAI, Tokeo; TAJIMA,  
Hikotaro; and TANIHARA, Nakao.

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I have been asked if I knew what the original duties of the organ for which I worked were supposed to be. I cannot answer this question for the reason that the specific duties were set forth in instructions issued to the Chief of the Special Service Organs from the Army Commander and were given to the Chief of our organ by the commander of the Kwantung Army and were, in accordance with the common practice of Armies, considered either confidential or secret and the information contained in such orders was not generally disseminated among the employees, especially civilian employees. Consequently I, being a civilian employee, have no personal knowledge of the orders, but I do know generally what they contained because of the functions we carried out and the duties we were expected to perform.

Generally the duties were similar to those of the press section of the Kwantung Army. They consisted of announcing to the press news from the fronts communicated to the organ by Japanese troops, which were in action in various places. For example, the Jehol operation. There were four clerks, and they were kept busy for the most part decoding telegrams which contained matters for press releases. My specific duties were to translate radio broadcasts received from China and to assist in deciphering coded telegrams. After the end of the Jehol operation; that is, from the time of the arrival of Gener l

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DOHIMARA, our duties were somewhat modified. This came about because the supply of news to the press which constituted the bulk of our work had been curtailed at that time. Our duties consisted of collection of information, issuance of press releases. We were mainly concerned in those days with the collection of information regarding political movements and the state of the public in Fengtien, Jehol Provinces and Inner Mongolia.

The Mukden Special Service Organ had a branch in Dairen, which gathered information from China sources, useful for reference in our relations with Manchukuo and with the progress of Manchukuo. It compiled information concerning movements of the Japanese in Manchukuo and especially in the South Manchuria Railroad circles. The reason for our supervision and guidance of persons of Japanese extract who were in the employ of the Manchukuo Government was to see that they did not act overbearingly or go to extremes in their conduct, which they were some times inclined to do. We compiled and kept a very complete list of the personal conduct of the principal Japanese officials who thus fell under the jurisdiction of the Mukden Special Service Organ. General DOHIMARA was always insistent that such persons conduct themselves properly. While the officials of the South Manchurian Railroad were not employees specifically of the Manchurian Government, it was, nevertheless, very necessary

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to check their actions and to keep them within the strict limits of their official activities with the railroad and not permit any interference with the inner political situation in Manchukuo.

I have been asked if the Special Service Organ, of which I was an employee, as previously stated, had anything to do with matters relating to opium. I have already related the activities of the Organ and I can definitely state that at no time while I was connected with the Organ, or while General DOHIMARA was connected with the Organ, did it ever have anything at any time to do with opium. Of this I am positive.

I have not been asked this question, but I should like to state that the Special Service Organ was not a large organization, as I know many people believe. It consisted only of the head of the organization, his assistant and four clerks, of which I was one. I therefore, know of my own personal knowledge everything that went on within the Organ. This was possibly because of its small size.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this

13 day of August, 1947.

At Tokyo,

Aizawa, Makoto (seal)

On this 13 day of August, 1947

By me: [Signature] (seal)

Def. Doc. No.2098

I, Kinjiro Ohta, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At Tokyo

Witness: /S/ Kinjiro Ohta (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Makoto Aizawa (seal)

Def. Doe 2098

Exhibit #

2176

自分能我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル  
ノ如ク供述致シマス。

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者

愛

澤

誠

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. 2098

私（愛烈誠）ハ我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ宣誓ヲ爲シタル上私ノ自由  
意思カラ自分カラ進ンデ次ノ如ク供述致シマス。一九三三年四月ヨリ一九  
三六年三月迄私ハ奉天軍ニ軍屬トシテ働ハレ奉天特務機關附デアリマシタ  
私ノ任職期間中特ニ一九三三年十二月ヨリ私ガ辭職シタ一九三六年三月迄  
土肥原賢二ハ奉天特務機關長デアリマシタ。本機關在任中土肥原大將ノ部  
下トシテ今井武夫少佐、田島彦太郎少佐谷萩那華雄少佐等ガ居マシタ。  
私ハ私ガ働イテ居タ機關ノ本來ノ職務ハ何デアツタカラ知ツテ居タカ否カ  
ヲ尋ネラレマシタ。ガ然シ私ハ次ノ理由デコノ質問ニハ答ヘラレマヒン。 2  
即チ特別ノ業務ハ關東軍司令官ヨリ特務機關長宛ニ發ヒラレタ指令デ規定  
ヒラレ「機關長ニ與フル軍司令官ノ訓令」中ニ明ラカニサレテ居ルモノデ  
軍ノ普通ノ慣例ニ從ツテ機密或ハ極秘トサレ且ツ新濠ナ命令ニ含マレタ情  
報ハ一般ニ雇傭人特ニ軍屬ニハ傳播ヒラレナカッタト言フ理由ノ爲デアリ  
マス。  
從ツテ私ハ軍屬デアツタノデ其時ノ命令ニ關シテ自分直接ノ知識ヲ持ツテ



キマヒンガ、然シ我々が實行シタ職能及び我々が遂行スルコトニナツテ  
キタ職務等ノ爲ニ夫レヲノ命令ニ含まレテ居タ内容ヲ大体ハ知ツテ居リ  
マス概シテ業務ハ關東軍報道班ノ業務ト同様デアリマシテ各地ニ出動シ  
テキタ日本軍隊カラ機關ニ通報サレテ來ル戦線ヨリノニュースヲ新聞へ  
發表スルコトデアリマシタ。

例へバ熱河作戰等ノ如キデス。四人ノ事務員ガ居リ且ツ彼等ハ大抵新聞  
ニ發表スベキ事項ヲ含ンダ電報翻譯ノ爲メ多忙デシタ私ノ特別ノ職務ハ  
中華民國カラノ「ラジオ」放送ヲ聴取シタモノヲ翻譯スル仕事ト暗號電  
報ノ翻譯ヲ手傳フコトデアリマシタ。熱河作戰ノ終了後即チ土肥原大將  
ガ着任サレタ頃カラ我々ノ職務ハ多少變更サレマシタ。

此ノ事ハ我々ノ仕事ノ大部分ヲナシテ居ツタ新聞社へノ記事ノ提供ガ其  
ノ頃減少シタガ故デアリマシタ。我々ノ職務ハ情報ノ蒐集、新聞報道ノ  
發表デアリマシタ。我々ハ主トシテ奉天省熱河省及び內蒙古ノ政治的運  
動及び治安ノ状態ニ關スル情報ノ蒐集ニ關係シテ居リマシタ。

奉天特務機關ハ大連ニ出張所ヲ持ツテ居リマシタガソコデハ滿洲國及ビ滿洲國ノ發展ト我ガ國トノ關係ニ參考トナル有用ヲ支那筋ヨリノ情報ヲ蒐集致シマシタ。

本機關ハ又在滿邦人特ニ滿鐵關係ノ日本人ノ動キニ關スル情報ヲ蒐集致シマシタ。

滿洲國政府ニ屬ハレタ日系官吏ノ監督並ニ指導ノ理由ハ優越感ヲ持ツテ行動ヲ模或ハ行動ガ行キ過ギニナルヤウナ傾向ガ彼等ニ折々アツタノデソレヲ是正スル爲メデアリマシタ。

我々ハ奉天特務機關ノ管内ノ主要日系官吏ノ極メテ完全ナ考科表ヲ調査作成シテ居リマシタ。

土原大將ハ常ニ斯様ナ人々ガ適切ニ身ヲ處スル事ヲ主張致シマシタ。滿洲國鐵道ノ職員ハ特ニ滿洲國政府ノ雇傭人ト云フ語ケハナカッタノデスガ而シ彼等ノ行動ヲ牽制シ且ツ彼等ノ鐵道ニ關スル彼等ノ職務上ノ行動ノ範圍ナル制限内ニ限キ滿洲國ノ内政的情勢ニ干渉スル事ヲ許サヌ事ガ非常ニ重要ナル事トシテ居リマシタ。

ニ必要デアリマシタ。

私ハ前ニ述ベタ如ク私ガ一職員デアッタ特務機關ガ阿片ニ關スル事項ニ  
何カ關係ヲ有シテ居ツタカ否カヲ尋ネラレマシタ。私ハ既ニ本機關ノ行  
動ヲ述ベテ來マシタ。ソシテ私ガ本機關ニ携ツテ居タ間或ハ土肥原大將  
ガ本機關ニ携ツテ居タ間如何ナル時モ本機關ハ阿片トハ關係ガナカツタ  
事ヲ明白ニ述ベル事ガ出來マス。私ハ此ノ事柄ヲ確信致シテ居リマス。

私ハ別ニ質問ヲ受ケタ譯デアアリマヒンガ次ノ事ヲ申述ベタイト思ヒマ  
ス。ソレハ本特務機關ハ世間ノ人々ガ考ヘテ居タ様ナ大規模ノ機關デア  
ナカツタト言フ事デアリマス。

本特務機關ハ機關長、補佐官及ビ私ガ一員デアッタ四人ノ事務員丈デ成  
立ツテ居リマシタ。

ソレ故ニ私ハ機關内ニ行ハレタ總ベテノ事柄ヲ私自身ノ自ラノ知識トシ  
テ知ツテ居リマス。

此ノ事實ハ恐ラク本機關ガ小規模デアッタ事ニ依ツタノデシタ。

以  
上

Def. Doc 2098

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月十八日於東京

供述者 愛 澤 誠

右ハ營立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日於同所

立會人 太 田 金 次 郎

D e f . D o o 2 0 9 8

宣  
番  
・  
番

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘ヒズ又何事ヲモ附加ヒザルコトヲ誓フ

署名捺印

愛  
澤

誠

EX 3177-A

101

Doc 1763-B

陸軍省	陸軍部	陸軍省	陸軍部	陸軍省	陸軍部

陸軍省

陸軍省	陸軍部	陸軍省	陸軍部
陸軍省	陸軍部	陸軍省	陸軍部
陸軍省	陸軍部	陸軍省	陸軍部
陸軍省	陸軍部	陸軍省	陸軍部

奉特第四号

昭和九年八月廿八日

極秘

(政治)

現下ニ於テ支那政情 (二般)

配布先 軍十九 次長二 次官二

奉大陸軍特務機長

二肥原 貞二

陸軍特務機長

FILE COPY RETURN TO ROOM 21

No 2

Doc. 1763-13

鈴木信雄来翰要旨(八月廿日下午)  
本名六約三週同南方ニ旅行し各地巡訪、後最近夫  
津ニ帰リたまハナリ

一汪、莫雨氏ト、念見、内容梗概

1. 目前ノ問題

・ 現下、華北問題ニ関シテハ般同リ大連ニ於テ園村

少將ト協定セ、結果ニ基キ莫雨氏歸任セ、右協

定案、意思ニ副テ、如ク諸般、処理ヲ爲ス

考慮セリ、唯莫、日、華關係、圓滿ニ努メ

尙民衆ヨリ非常ニ諒解ヲ受テ、今後日本ニ

対シテ希望致シ、尙一當面、面子ヲ立テ、シテ

ニ在リ。

三、社會方面、觀察、一

1. 南支ニ於テハ、三肥原、板垣兩少將、各々南支ハ談話

変色、傾テ

2. 今年南支ハ、非常ニ暑氣ニ耕地ハ殆ト枯シ居

ルニテ、又各地、河川モ殆ト枯涸シ本年、秋收

ハ非常ニ困難ナリ

3. 南支、日本ニ対スル悪感ハ頗ル根深深ク、世支

、如ク容易ニ解消シ難キ様觀察セラル

Staff Section	Combined Signature	Officer in Charge	"Hei" Staff	"OTSU" Staff Signature Initials	"KO" Staff Signature Initials	Chief of the Staff Seal of HAMAMOTO	Division Commander Signature Initials
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HOTOKU No. 44

Aug. 28, 1934

VERY SECRET

V.A. KWANTIUNG ARMY Headquarters	
Aug. 31, 1934	Channel No.

Official seal of the Army's Mukden Special Services Chief

The Chief of MUKDEN Special Services  
KENJI DOIHARA

Tagima

Seal

(Politics)

The Present Political Situation in China.

(General)

Distributions to:

Nineteen to Army, two to Vice Chief of General Staff.

Two to Vice Minister.

/P.2/

The Main Points of the Letter

from NOBUO SUZUKI (Received on Aug. 27)

The said person returned to TIENSIN recently after a three weeks trip to the southern area visiting various places.

I. Brief description of the interview with Mr. WANG and Mr. HUANG.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



A. Immediate problems.

As a result of the agreement made by Yin Tung with Major-General OKAMURA in DAIREN regarding the present North China problem, considerations are being made to carry out various measures based upon spirit of the aforementioned agreement when HUANG-Fu returns to his post. Mr. HUANG has been greatly misunderstood by the people due to his efforts to bring about smooth relations between JAPAN and CHINA. Therefore I hope the Japanese will be more considerate of Mr. HUANG's honor.

\* \* \* \* \*

/p. 6/

III. One or two points of observations of the public.

1. ~~The very mention of the names of Major-Generals, DOHIHARA and ITAGAKI, is enough to make the people turn pale in South China.~~

/p. 7/ In South China to hear the names of Major Generals DOHIHARA and ITAGAKI is something like 'mention a tiger and the people turn pale'.

2. The weather is exceedingly hot in South-CHINA this year, and not only are the crops practically all withered, but the rivers in various places have practically dried up, and the harvest in the autumn will be extremely difficult.

3. The ill-feeling in South-CHINA toward JAPAN is very deep rooted and it seems that it cannot be wiped out so easily as it was in North-CHINA.

## C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kaneo Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Document Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 28 Aug. 1934, and described as follows: "(Political) Current Political Situation in China (General)" FROM: DOIHARA, Kenji, Chief of the Army Special Mission at Mukden. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
2 day of Apr. 1947

/s/ Kaneo Ishibashi /seal/  
Signature of Official

Witness: Shinpei Kobayashi  
/seal/

Non-regular of the Archives and  
Document Section of the 1st  
Demobilization Bureau.  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
2<sup>nd</sup> day of April, 1947

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J.A. Curtis  
2d Lt. Inf.

Investigator. IPS  
Official Capacity

Def. Doc. # 2116

Exh. No. / /

Translated By  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent : - KUWAJIMA, Kazuo

I, KUWAJIMA, Kazuo, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs of my country, depose as follows:

My name is KUWAJIMA, Kazuo, and I was graduated from the Waseda University in 1906. In 1911 I passed the diplomatic service examination, entering the diplomatic service in the same year, and was still in the service in 1931, at which time I was Consul General at Tientsin. I held such posts prior to and at the time of the Manchurian Incident.

As Consul General I collected certain information concerning the accused DOHIMURA, Kenji, ~~SECRET~~ considered to be in connection with his actions with reference to the Manchurian Incident, and wired such information to the then Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, or to the Chief of the Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Some of these wires were introduced in evidence by the prosecution as Exhibits 287, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 300 and 304 etc. In connection with sending these wires, and similar wires, I have been asked concerning the method I employed in securing the information therein contained.

In order to fully understand the situation, it is necessary for me to explain that there was disagreement and friction between the Foreign Office and the Kwantung Army regarding Henry Pu-Yi's coming out of retirement. The ~~Army~~ was acting independently of the Foreign Ministry and we received no official information from the Kwantung Army as to the activities of any of its members, and had no means by which I could do so. It may be possible that the Foreign Ministry was receiving such information, but as to that, I cannot say.

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Def. Doc. # 2116

I, as Consul General, was far too busy to conduct any personal investigation of the actions of DOHIMARA and had to depend upon my subordinates to collect what information they could. They secured information from whatever sources were available, such as newspaper articles, conversations held with various people, both Chinese and Japanese, rumor, in short, any information which might tend to throw any light whatever upon the activities, in this instance, of General DOHIMARA. All this information was reported to me and I then sifted the information, and then drew my own conclusions. The conclusions which I drew comprised the contents of the telegrams which were introduced in evidence by the prosecution as having been sent from me to the Foreign Minister, or the Bureau of Foreign Ministry.

This was the only source of information I had, and with the great mass of information, it was quite impossible to check the authenticity of its source. I had to do the best I could under the circumstances as I had no further personal information.

As for my personal contact with the accused DOHIMARA, I recall that I met him on two occasions, at which time we exchanged merely social conversation. I was most favorably impressed by his personality. General DOHIMARA impressed me as a typical military man.

On this 12 day of May, 1947.

At Tokyo

Deponent /S/ Kazuo Kuwajima (seal)

I, Kinjiro Ohta, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness : /S/ Kinjiro Ohta (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Kazuo Kuwajima (seal)

Def. Doc. No. 2087

Exh. No. 3170

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro, of lawful age, being first duly sworn, in accordance with the customs of my country, depose as follows:

I have been asked if I am acquainted with the accused, DOHIHARA, Kenji, and if I were familiar with his activities during the time immediately preceding and following the Mukden Incident. Also, I have been asked if I am acquainted with one General Ching Teh-Chen, a Chinese general who was a witness for the prosecution, and as to whether I ever had a conversation with him concerning the accused DOHIHARA at Chungshan Park in Peking. I do have knowledge of these facts and desire to make the following statement concerning them.

From December, 1928, until October, 1931, I served under General Chang Hsueh-Liang of Manchuria as a military advisor. For about eight months in the beginning; that is, from December 1928, I was assistant to General DOHIHARA, who was for that period of time military advisor to Gen. Chang Hsueh-Liang. During that period of time I became well and personally acquainted with him, knew his policies and often discussed them with him. On many occasions he emphasized that the secret of friendly relations between Japan and China was for the Japanese to study more deeply the state of affairs in China and to carry on friendly relations between the two peoples in good faith, discarding the Japanese superiority complex, and to refrain absolutely from enforcing our will by unilateral force.

In my association with General DOHIHARA, I came to learn that he was sincere in his efforts and firmly believed in dealing with the utmost sincerity with anything and everything that called for his attention. He is good natured and studious, and I can state as a fact that it is no mere coincidence that he should have held such high educational posts as President of the Military Academy and Inspector General of Military Education. Not only did General DOHIHARA advocate his policies, but in territories under his command he required a strict observance of those policies. I know this to be a positive fact because in January, 1938, I accompanied Lt. Gen. Umezu, Yoshijiro, the then Vice Minister of War, on a tour of inspection of the battle lines of North China. On this tour we visited Tsoushieng, which was the headquarters of General DOHIHARA. I was greatly surprised to learn that tranquility prevailed throughout the city and that it was at the height of prosperity. It was hard for me to realize that this was actually the base of military operations nearest the front line of battle.

In 1937, prior to the tour of inspection which I have just mentioned and at the time of the occurrence of the China Incident, General DOHIHARA was Commander of the 14th Division at Utsunomiya, Japan, and was ordered to go to North China. It is a fact that the masses of the people of North China were deeply impressed by his policy and actually crowded to areas under his control because they knew they would be able to pursue their callings in peace and contentment, without undue interference from the Japanese military. Our inspection tour confirmed everything we had heard concerning the situation in the territories under the command of General DOHIHARA.

On September 9, 1931, immediately prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, by order of General Chang Hseuh-Liang I was sent to Tokyo in connection with the murder of Captain Nakamura, Shintaro, and returned to Peking on September 24th of the same month. While I was in Tokyo, Gen. DOHIHARA was there to make his report as Chief of the special military organ at Mukden on the progress being made in the Captain Nakamura case. I met him and talked with him in Tokyo on September 14th.

During the presentation of the prosecution's case, General Ching Ten-Chin, with whom I am well and personally acquainted, appeared before this Tribunal as a prosecution witness and testified that five days before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident General Ching met a friend of

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his by the name of SHIBAYAMA, who was also a mutual friend of the defendant DOHIHARA, in Chungshan Park in Peking. At this meeting General Ching stated that the Shibayama with whom he conversed said in substance: "DOHIHARA is about to go to Manchuria to embark on some big project." General Ching has always been friendly with me and I have been friendly with him and consider him as my friend, and while he was in Tokyo, and after his testimony, I was contacted by him and he stated that he had used my name before the Tribunal and also told me in what connection. I was surprised at the General's carelessness in using my name in such connection because I know that I am the only Shibayama who is a friend of both General Ching and General DOHIHARA.

As shown by my previous statements concerning my whereabouts on the date referred to by General Ching, it would have been quite impossible for me to have discussed General DOHIHARA at that time and place, and, in fact, I have never at any time told General Ching anything about the foregoing affair, much less mentioned the name of General DOHIHARA in connection therewith. In his conversation with me General Ching told me he had used my family name, Shibayama, but not my given name.

Due to the fact that I was engaged in work in the Captain NAKAMURA case, and I know General DOHIHARA was spending most of his time on the case, and knowing his whereabouts just prior to the outbreak of the Mukden Incident in September, 1931, I was very greatly surprised to learn that anyone could seriously consider he had any connection with it.

On this 15th day of August, 1947  
At Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro (seal)

I, OHTA, Kinjiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ OHTA, Kinjiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro (seal)

263/79

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞興利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述者

供述者 桑島主計

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタ  
ノ如ク供述致シマス

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



私（桑島主計）ハ一九〇六年（明治三十九年）早稻田大學ヲ卒業シ一九一一年（明治四十四年）外交官試験ニ合格シ同年外交官ニ任ジ一九三一年（昭和六年）ニハ天津總領事ヲ致シテ居リマシタ。私ハ滿洲事變當時此ノ地位ニ居リマシタ

總領事トシテ私ハ被告土肥原ニ關シ滿洲事變ニ關スル彼ノ行動ニ關係アルト思ハシタ情報ヲ蒐集シ之ヲ當時ノ外務大臣幣原又ハ谷正谷局長宛ニ打電致シマシタ

此等ノ電報ノ中テ幾ツカハ法廷證二八七號、二八九號、二九〇號、二九一號、二九二號、二九三號、二九五號、二九六號、三〇〇號及ビ三〇四號等トシテ檢察側ノ證據トシテ提出サレマシタ

此等ノ電報及ビ同類ノ電報ヲ打電スル事ニ關シ私ハ其等電報ニ含まレテキル情報ヲ得ルニ私ガ用ヒタ方法ニ關シ尋ネラレマシタ。

尊嚴ヲ充分ニ理解スル爲ニ、薄儀ノ出處ニ關シ外務省ト滿洲關東軍トハ意見ヲ互ニ相對立シテ居ツタ事ヲ説明スル事ガ必要デアリマス。關東軍ハ外務省トハ別個ニ活動ヲシテ居リマシテ、我々ハ其ノ構成員タル者ノ

誰ノ活動ニ關シテモ關東軍カラ公式ノ情報ヲ貰ツタ事ハアリマセンデ  
シタ。

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ク斯様ナ情報ヲ受理シテキダカモ知レマセンガ其レニ關シテハ私ハ言  
フ事ガ出來マセン

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國人ノ色々ノ人々トノ間ニ爲サレタ會話、聞知事項等。總テ此等ノ情  
報ハ私ニ報告サレマシタガ私ハ其レヲ取捨選擇シ夫レニ私自身ノ結論  
ヲ下シマシタ。私ガ下シタ結論ガ私カラ外務省或ハ外務省ノ亞細亞局  
ニ打電サレタモノトシテ檢察側ノ證據トシテ提出サレタ電報ノ内容ヲ  
爲シテ居ルノデアリマス

以上ノ方法ガ私ガ得タ情報ノ一ノ出所デアリマシタ。其シテ非常  
ニ數ノ多イ情報ノ出所ノ信憑性ヲ一々當ツテ確カメル事ハ全ク不可能  
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被告土肥原トノ私ノ個人的接觸ニ就イテ言ヘバ私ハ二回丈ケ彼ニ會ヒ  
マシタガ其ノ時我々ハ單ニ挨拶程度ノ話ヲ交ハシタダケデアリマシタ。  
私ハ彼ノ人柄ニ良イ印象ヲ受ケマシタ。土肥原大將ハ典型的ナル武人  
デアルト言フ印象ヲ受ケマシタ

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）五月十二日 於東京

供 述 者 桑 島 主 計

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立 會 人 太 田 金 次 郎

Def No. 2116

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ  
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Exh. No.

3180

A-10

Japanese Consulate  
Changchun  
May 3, 1932.

RECORD OF INTERVIEW  
with  
MAJOR GENERAL DOIHARA,  
FORMERLY OF SPECIAL SERVICE,  
KWANTUNG ARMY.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

A-10

Japanese Consulate  
Changchun  
May 3, 1932

RECORD OF INTERVIEW

With

MAJOR GENERAL DOIHARA,  
FORMERLY OF SPECIAL SERVICE,  
KWANTUNG ARMY

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Gen. Doihara began by explaining that he left Harbin on the 1st of May, and on hearing that the Commission was at Changchun he was anxious to have an opportunity of meeting it.

Lord Lytton: We should like first of all to congratulate the General on his promotion.

Gen. Doihara: Thank you very much.

Lord Lytton: We are very glad to have the chance of meeting you. We understand that you have just come back from Harbin.

Gen. Doihara: Yes.

Lord Lytton: What are the conditions there?

Gen. Doihara: After the troubles on February 5th, conditions have become quieter and the entire population is now following its business as usual. But near the town and surrounding the city some difficulties are being caused by

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disturbances, scattered bandits, etc. Some of the country districts have been affected by the disturbances. The bandits are mostly in small groups of 100-500, but larger groups of from 2000-3000 are also in evidence and are equipped with arms.

Lord Lytton: Is that all the General wishes to say?

Gen. Doihara: Yes.

Lord Lytton: We understand the General has had a very long experience of China and is a great authority on the subject, and has played a very prominent part in recent events, and we should be glad to hear from him anything which he can tell us regarding present conditions in Manchuria and of the causes which gave rise to the events in which he played such a prominent part.

Gen. Doihara: Any specific points?

Lord Lytton: We would like to follow the story out. We understand the General took over the civil administration at Mukden immediately after the events of September 18th. Would he please describe conditions at that time, state what steps he took, etc?

General Doihara: At the time of the outbreak in Mukden I was assigned to other duties in Tokyo and was on my way to Mukden. I had the first news of the incident near Antung, so I arrived in Mukden the following day. When I arrived in the city the major military conditions which had broken out



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during the night were practically over. Some small parties were in pursuit of the fleeing troops. It was the time just when the Headquarters staff was arriving in the city from Port Arthur, and I was assigned to the duties of the intelligence service in these special conditions. It is a military intelligence service for publicity work, and I was appointed chief of the section.

The conditions following that incident became hopeless because of the disintegration and disorganization of the civil authorities in the city. Then the military authorities took action and induced some of the Japanese local leaders to engage in planning something for Municipal affairs, but it was difficult to coordinate these leaders to function properly, and I was requested by these leaders and by our Headquarters to take charge of organizing the work and devote my services to municipal activities.

For about a month the municipal temporary authorities functioned until the time when the Chinese leaders of the city returned and organized a committee for the preservation of peace and order, and while I was in the office my work was chiefly directed towards the restoration of peace and order and to inducing a feeling of security and getting rid of bad anxieties on the part of the population of the city, and also carrying on relief work necessitated by the incidents.

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After the committee organized began to function, the entire force of our work was turned over to that committee, and Dr. Chao was appointed Mayor of the city.

Lord Lytton: I expect the General is much too modest in regard to his activities, for I understand that at the end of a month everything was brought back to peaceful conditions and he felt that he could then hand matters over to someone else.

Gen. Deihara: Well, perhaps I contributed a very modest part to the restoration of peace and order and gave a feeling of security to the people. During my service there the financial conditions gradually recovered, banks began to function almost normally, and the Mukden-Kirin Railway began to function as before. General conditions were restored to normal and our staff, in cooperation with the committee organized for the preservation of peace and order, worked to standardize conditions in the city, and discovered they were able to take care of the affairs of the municipality. We turned over all the duties to them.

We observed that many leaders in the city had fled, as well as almost 50,000 of the population, after the incident, but by the 20th of October, as conditions became more normal, many of them returned, which was an indication of the return of normal conditions in the city.

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Then the conditions in Northern China gradually began to cause us to take notice, because there were many factions remaining and other agents instigated and utilized by Chang Hsueh-liang's forces causing disturbances in that region. Then, from a strategical point of view, it was necessary that we should establish contact with forces stationed in Tientsin, and so our Kwantung Army was placed on that duty and went to Tientsin.

On the 27th of October I arrived in Tientsin and remained there until the end of November, when I went to the Tokyo office to report on my activities.

I submitted a full report concerning conditions in Manchuria and North China to my headquarters in Tokyo, after which I was sent back to Mukden and arrived there on the 1st of January. On the 12th of January I was sent to Tientsin again, where I remained for a week, and then returned to Mukden.

We have a small office in Harbin. On the 26th of January I was appointed to proceed to Harbin to take charge of that office. I arrived there on the 27th of January. Fighting was occurring between two Kirin forces, one led by Hsi Hsia of Kirin, which moved northward and came in conflict

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with forces under Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu. Fighting continued for about ten days around Harbin.

The fighting between these two opposing forces caused much anxiety to the Japanese residents, particularly in that section which was menaced. At the same time there were many Koreans residing in that district who were terrified, being exposed to the danger of massacre. The citizens of Harbin, also, especially the Chinese merchant element, and other elements in the city, sent many repeated requests for the Japanese army to safeguard their lives and property, and at the same time Japanese residents sent repeated requests for Japanese troops to come for the same purpose. These were the conditions created by the disturbances. The Japanese were in a very difficult position, being surrounded by anti-Kirin forces who were antagonistic to them.

Japanese forces were sent out to protect lives and property of their nationals, and met with opposition from forces of Generals Ting and Li. Finally, after fighting, the Chinese forces were completely disorganized and fled to the north, but fortunately no fighting took place in the city; consequently, the 4000 Japanese residents were safe, and not much difficulty was encountered from Russian residents in the city, or others.

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Lord Lytton: I should like to ask at what moment in the time the General has been telling us about - November to January - did he first become aware of any local desire for a new State?

Gen. Dairhat: In the first part of February in the Kirin province the movement was first noticeable, and proclamations of independence were issued first in Kirin, then in Heilungkiang province.

Towards the end of February manifestos were issued in different provinces, and a new administrative committee was formed by leaders of different provinces and the special district of Harbin. Governors Hsi Hsia and Tsang Shih-yi of Kirin and Fengtien provinces, Chang Ching-hui of Harbin special district, and General Ma of Heilungkiang province, got together and organized an administrative committee of the North-Eastern provinces.

Of course, these are my observations, but there were different autonomous governments declared in different parts of Manchuria. I presume the leaders got together and united with different autonomous provinces into one central form of administrative organization, formulating a plan for establishing a new unified government.

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Lord Lytton: When had the idea first expressed itself of securing the late Emperor as head of the new State?

Gen. Dohara: About the 10th and 11th of November conditions in Tientsin were such that his personal safety was endangered and he secretly left the city for Manchuria. That was my understanding of the situation then. I have had the acquaintance of Mr. Pu Yi for a long time. I remember I paid a visit to his place at the end of October. At that time he was receiving many threatening and blackmailing letters, and he also received a packet containing gifts, which really contained a bomb, and these things showed that his personal safety was in extreme danger, and that, I suppose, was one of the chief reasons for his flight from the city of Tientsin. The bomb was sent in the early part of October, but he intimated to me that he was in a very nervous condition when I met him.

Lord Lytton: Did the General have any subsequent negotiations with him regarding acceptance of this new post?

Gen. Dohara: I had nothing to do with his acceptance or his coming to Manchuria. As I explained I was engaged on other duties elsewhere and the first time I met him since that time was yesterday to say goodbye to him. That was the first time since leaving Tientsin on the 30th of October.

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Lord Lytton: I asked this question because we were told in China that the General had kidnapped Pu Yi, brought him over a prisoner to Manchuria, and kept him till he was ready to go into the new government.

Gen. Deihara: Entirely incorrect. I met him on the 30th of October and I talked with him in a casual way, and to a certain extent I tried to comfort him in the circumstances; and up to yesterday that was all I had seen of him.

Lord Lytton: And was nothing mentioned then about his becoming head of the new State?

Gen. Deihara: We discussed his danger and his personal safety but nothing about his coming to Manchuria.

Lord Lytton: And the General had no discussions with him about the matter when he was living in Manchuria?

Gen. Deihara: No communication whatever. I had no occasion to meet him because I was first stationed in Mukden then in Tientsin, then back in Harbin. It is unfortunate that you should have all this incorrect information; it seems to be propaganda and not in accordance with the true facts.

Since going to Harbin I had a somewhat similar experience myself. Mr. Hanson, the United States Consul-General, held the same opinion that the Chinese did. He seemed to think I was a pirate chief but gradually we became friends and he discovered  
/that I am very far from what he thought I was.

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Lord Lytton: Not a pirate - only an ex-mayor?

Count Aldrovandi: What kind of treatment did the young Emperor receive when he was in Tientsin?

Gen. Dohara: He lived in the Japanese concession in Tientsin and occupied a house previously owned by a former Minister to Japan. He was not very well blessed with this world's goods.

Count Aldrovandi: Yes, but he was threatened in Tientsin. What kind of threats did he receive? Did they indicate what would happen? What did they mean?

Gen. Dohara: General ordinary blackmailing letters such as one finds almost anywhere, threatening his life if he stopped out of the city, etc., and his personal safety was in danger; they indicated, if I remember rightly, that some plain-clothes agents might be sent to assassinate him.

Lord Lytton: But we do not understand why he was threatened, or by whom.

Gen. Dohara: In case he should return to Mukden for instance; these blackmailers were sent to keep him from moving out of the city.

Lord Lytton: The Chinese were trying to prevent him, because he had been Emperor, from trying to regain political power?



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Gen. Doihara: Yes. He was suspected of some political move engineered by him or by his supporters.

Count Aldrevandi: Already in October?

Gen. Doihara: Yes. Those reports were appearing in the newspapers, too, already in October.

Gen. McCoy: Has the General in view of his going about the country and knowing everyone so well and knowing that we come here to investigate conditions any suggestions to give us for collecting the proper facts in places like Harbin, by seeing any particular people, not only Chinese and Japanese but other people in Harbin whom he thinks we might usefully meet so as to get an interpretation of those rumours and stories?

Gen. Doihara: The Mayor of Harbin, Mr. Pao, is a member of the reception committee of your mission who will be one of the able men there who could interpret the conditions there.

Gen. McCoy: The Chinese told us that he was imprisoned in Mukden and that the General took him up there and made him Mayor. What are the real facts?

Gen. Doihara: Such is not the case at all. The year before last Mr. Pao for no reason was arrested by Marshall Chang and imprisoned for almost one year. After the incident he was still in prison and I gave my assistance in releasing

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him because I know there was no reason why he should be in prison. Ever since that time he became a good friend of mine and I discovered his unusual character and ability and I introduced him to the Governor of the Special District, General Chang Ching-hui, who also realized his ability and he was induced to accept the Mayoralty of Harbin. It was not I who made him Mayor.

Lord Lyttons: When was he released?

Gen. Doihara: I think it was in the early part of October.

Gen. McCoy: Why was he put in prison by the Young Marshal? Political offences or what?

Gen. Doihara: I presume it must have been for political reasons. He himself does not know the cause of his imprisonment. How he came to be arrested and imprisoned he does not know, though he had something to do with political intrigues in Mukden at the time.

Then the President of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Mr. Li, might be of some use for information.

General Ting was at first a good friend of mine and I assured him that his life and property would be well protected, but somehow he is still in fear and does not come forth as I urged him to do. Another General, Li, has now disappeared. We have invited him to come to us and reach some understanding.

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Gen. McCoy: Does the General think conditions are getting better now, or worse?

Gen. Doihara: Conditions in the northern part of Manchuria are far from peaceful. There are many elements, especially bandits, who are against the Manchukuo Government. They constitute disturbing factors, but I do not feel that they are an extreme danger.

Gen. McCoy: What has become of the notorious General Ma? I read that he was in prison.

Gen. Doihara: He went towards Heihe to suppress an anti-Ma force, and then he said he would take a rest because of his illness, and since then we have had no news of him. He is, in fact, sickly. I remember him attending a committee meeting when he was quite ill. He has a very poor stomach and suffers from intestinal disorder. At the time when the administrative committee of the North-Eastern Provinces was organized he was one of its most earnest leaders. I remember attending the installation ceremony of General Ma as Governor of the Province in Tsitsihar. It went off very well. He gave an address and also sent out a manifesto stating that he was taking up the office for the benefit of the entire population. He was thus very earnest.

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Then he went to the North near Hoihe in the early part of April, and has not shown up since. We do not know what has become of him.

1 March 1946

## C E R T I F I C A T E

I, J. R. Lovell, Colonel, General, Staff Corps, United States Army, Deputy Director of Intelligence for Research, War Department General Staff, hereby certify:

1. I am the officer in charge of Military Intelligence Service Library of the United States War Department.

2. Set no. 1 of "Military Narrative of the Travel and Work of the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry" consisting of: (a) Narrative, (b) Annex A - Interview, (c) Annex B - Photograph has been in the files of the Military Intelligence Service Library until this date, said being received by the Library from the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Service of the United States Army.

3. Several packages of Documents, letters and reports on the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry were also received from the Far Eastern Section and have been in the Military Intelligence Service Library until this date.

4. On the 1st day of March 1946 the above mentioned set No. 1 of the "Military Narrative of the Travel and Work of the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry", and the packages of documents, letters and reports mentioned in paragraph 3 above were turned over to Captain Edgar G. Boedeker, Judge Advocate General's Department, Army of the United States as the representative of Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel, International Prosecution Section, GHQ-SCAP, APO. 500 Tokyo, % Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

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J. R. Lovell  
Colonel, GSC

辯護側文書第二四三七號

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）三月一日

證 明 書

私、合衆國陸軍參謀團大佐兼陸軍省參謀本部調査情報部部長代理J. R. ラヴェルハ茲ニ證明スルコト左ノ如シ

一、私ハ合衆國陸軍省軍事情報圖書館ノ監督將校デアリマス。

二、(a) 談話 (b) 附録 A - 會見 (c) 附録 B - 爲眞ヨリ成ル「極東諮問委員ノ旅行及ビ業務ニ關スル軍事談話」第一組ハ合衆國陸軍ノ軍事情報部極東課ヨリ軍事情報圖書館ガ受理シタモノデアルト云ハレ現在迄同圖書館ノ書類ニリノ中ニ收メラレテ來マシタ。

三、極東諮問委員ニ關スル文書、書翰及ビ報告書等ノ數個ノ包モ亦該極東課ヨリ受理サレ、現在迄モ軍事情報圖書館ニ收メラレテ來マシタ。

四、一九四六年（昭和二十一年）三月一日、上述ノ「極東諮問委員ノ旅行業務ニ關スル軍事談話」第一組及ビ上記第三項ニ述ベラレタ文書、書翰及ビ報告書ノ數個ノ包ハカリホルニヤ州、サンフランシスコ、郵便局長氣付、陸軍私書函東京五〇〇番、連合軍最高司令部、國際檢察局、首席檢察官ジョセフ。B. キーナンノ代理者トシテノ合衆國陸軍法務部エドガリ。O. ボーテツカー大尉ノ手ニ移管サレマシタ。參謀團大佐 J. R. ラヴェル

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATE OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al,

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent YAZAKI, Kanju

YAZAKI, Kanju, being first duly sworn in accordance with the practice in Japan, deposes and states as follows:

That my name is YAZAKI, Kanju, and that I was a professional Army officer and held the rank of Lieutenant General at the termination of hostilities between the Allied Nations and Japan. That during my life as an Army officer I became well and personally acquainted with one DOHIHARA, Kenji, who is now one of the accused on trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. My acquaintance with the former General DOHIHARA covers a number of years and I have been intimately acquainted with him since the time I was a Captain.

Prior to the China Incident and during the month of March, 1937, the accused DOHIHARA was appointed Commander of the 14th Division of the Japanese Army, which was then stationed in Utsunomiya, on the Island of Honshu, in Japan,

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which was its permanent station. At the outbreak of the China Incident in July, 1937, the accused, DOHIHARA, was still the commander of the 14th Division and I was then a Lieutenant Colonel on his staff. In August we were ordered to North China, where we were engaged in military operations in the region along the Peking-Hankow Railroad, where I continued to serve as his staff officer.

At the time the China Affair broke, General DOHIHARA deeply regretted that it had come about and when we were departing to North China under our mobilization orders he gave us instructions and orders, which were later repeated on the battle field, in which he emphasized that the China Affair was not a war of aggression but was aimed ultimately at cooperation between Japan and China. He especially enjoined us that a rigid enforcement of regulations and orders pertaining to the protection of the Chinese people would be had. During operations and on the battle field Divisional Commander DOHIHARA gave his primary attention to purely strategic matters and, of necessity, left the details to his subordinates. However, he never lost sight of his duty as an officer to his subordinates and never hesitated to assist them personally in the discharge of their duties, whether they were important or trifling, when it came to the protection of the Chinese



people. He used to pay minute attention to duties concerning the Chinese people to avoid injury or oppression on non-combatants.

In order to illustrate my point, I would like to cite some examples which I have personally seen.

Once during operations on the river Yungting-ho, his men had decided to use a Chinese farmer's house to set up a command post for General DOHIHARA. However, when this was called to the attention of General DOHIHARA, he noticed there were Chinese women and children taking refuge in the house, and forbade his subordinates to enter. He had his office located in front of the house where he, his staff officers and subordinates camped in the open air and attended to their business.

Again near Paoting he observed some of his men burning firewood which belonged to Chinese farmers, which they had appropriated in order to warm themselves. General DOHIHARA immediately rode to the spot on horseback, scolded them soundly and made them stop at once.

Again, near Paoting General DOHIHARA saw a Japanese soldier on the march having a Chinese carry his knapsack, and immediately reprimanded the soldier. The soldier stated that he had employed the Chinese and had promised to pay him for the work. In order to be fair General DOHIHARA ordered

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the Japanese soldier to renegotiate with the Chinese in his presence and when it became clear that the soldier could not speak the Chinese language, the General ordered that the soldier immediately relieve the Chinese of the knapsack and cautioned him severely concerning his future conduct in such matters.

Many such instances could be set forth. However, I mention these three only to show that even in matters which might be considered as trifling, General DOHIHARA did not permit the abuse of civilians and non-combatants. I have heard his subordinates on more than one occasion state in substance, "Our Divisional Commander loves the Chinese better than the Japanese soldiers."

General DOHIHARA had a high regard for the Chinese people and for non-combatants, as such. I have never known an occasion when the Chinese general public in any jurisdiction under the command of General DOHIHARA were not settled and peaceful towards the Japanese forces under his command. They continued in their business operations without interruption and their stores and merchandising establishments continued to prosper. It was not uncommon for the Chinese to assist the Japanese soldiers voluntarily in drawing water, preparing meals, cleaning houses, carrying goods and other

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such daily routine matters. In fact, their regard for General DOHARA was such that they would inform him of any bandit attack which they anticipated.

In camp, whenever there was time to spare, it was the custom of General DOHARA to assemble his subordinates and explain to them about the urgent necessity of maintaining friendship between the Japanese and Chinese people. I remember many of his talks extremely well as they left a deep impression upon me. For example, the following are a few samples of what could be expected in these talks:

1. "Sino-Japanese cooperation is of great significance if we are to have peace in East Asia. In order to realize the cooperation which we desire between Japan and China, the Japanese must first study China more profoundly and reach a better understanding of the Chinese people themselves. In order to know the Chinese, we must, with sincerity, associate with them."

2. "The Chinese are peace loving and gentle people, if you approach them with understanding and courtesy. They are willing to understand whatever you speak. You must not assume a violent or oppressive attitude towards them at any time."

3. "If, in our association with the Chinese people, they do not accept our opinion, it is necessary for us to reflect on ourselves instead of blaming them for the lack of

understanding on their part."

Not only did General DOHIHARA often speak in the manner which I have just related, but he endeavored to execute his own views and to place them in practice. It was not a matter of mere words with him, but also a sincere attitude on his part, and he was known throughout the Division for his sincerity to his ideals and teachings.

All I have stated is just by way of illustration of the attitude of General DOHIHARA and his behavior in camp and on the battle fields. He was constantly instructing and advising not only his staff officers, but all of his subordinate officers and men and we found his instructions and admonitions to be of great value in peacefully dealing with the Chinese people.

As I know him well General DOHIHARA often confided in me; both by his behavior and his speech I knew he held an opinion opposed to the China Affair from the very beginning. However, as an Army officer, he had no choice except to obey the orders of his superiors, but even in camp, to his intimates, he always deplored the China Affair.

In the 15th year of Showa, February, 1938, due to illness, I was returned to Japan and served with the basic echelon of the 14th Division at Utsunomiya. After my return I continued to

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have correspondence with General DOHARA and one of the letters which I received was under date of April 22, 1939. This letter was safe handed (carried by messenger) from the North China fronts and I still have it in my possession. In this letter he states:

"Our state has no basic strategic principle established for the affairs and seems to be operating passively decoyed by the opponents and is, as it were, leading a hand to mouth existence. Moreover, without strengthening the scaffold on which she stands, she supports both the North and the Central China new Regimes, which are just like castles on the sand, and unconscious of the urgent need of consolidating the foundation, tries to arrange mere formalities of these Governments. I am greatly disappointed at this attitude of our State, and am very much concerned about it. I have no intention to rejoice in giving a big talk which is of no use. I beg you to explain, whenever you may have a chance, to the authorities with regard to the above-mentioned points and call for their reflection ..."

By way of explanation, the North regime referred to was Wang Ko-min's temporary government, and the Central China Government was Liang Hung-chih's restoration government. Knowing General DOHARA as I had, I knew this letter was but another of his protests against the entire China Affair, I realized that he knew his views were shared by me and that he expected me, wherever possible, to assist him.

General DOHARA, from young manhood onward through his career cherished an ideal for enhancement of friendly relations between Japan and China, and while he was in the Army College he made a special study of the Chinese language and of the

history of China. After graduation he was appointed a member of the General Staff and was sent to China, where he stayed for many years. His name became well known, even to the Chinese civilians. During his years in China and Manchuria he served on two occasions as Chief of the Special Services Organization at Mukden. This organization was primarily for the purpose of gathering military information and intelligence. Whenever trouble arose between Japan and China, I know personally that much was published about the organization and its members which was based on rumor, conjecture and propaganda, which had no foundation whatever in fact. I know that because of the prominence of DOHIHARA's name in matters concerning China that he was connected with many incidents in which he did not and could not have participated.

Knowing General DOHIHARA as I do intimately, over a period of years, I know not only from his many conversation with me, but by his actual behavior that he was opposed to the China Affair from the beginning and that he never changed his attitude. He has often expressed his great regret to me that there could not be peaceful cooperation between Japan and China, which he had cherished as a lifelong ambition. He was particularly regretful moreover that the China Affair was eventually extended to the Greater East Asiatic war.

I desire to further state that I have personal knowledge of everything I have stated in this affidavit.

On this 13th day of June, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: YAZAKI, Kanju (seal)

I, OHTA, Kinjiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) OHTA, Kinjiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YAZAKI, Kanju (seal)

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF

WATASE, Ryosuko

WATASE, Ryosuke, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs observed in his nation, deposes and states as follows:

That at the present time I am employed by the Tokyo Mainichi Press as a member of their staff, as Chief of the Investigation Board of the Editor Bureau. I have been asked if I am acquainted with the accused DOHIHARA, Konji, and if I were familiar with his activities immediately following the Lukouchiao Incident of 7 July 1937 (12th year of Showa).

At that time I held the post of Vice Chief of the Political Department of the Osaka Mainichi Press and shortly after July 7, 1937, to be exact on July 14, 1937, I arrived at Tientsin. The China Incident had not been settled locally and, as I recall, one of the objects then in mind was for the Army to advance towards Pouting. The operation was under the direct command of Lt. Gen. KATSUKI, Kiyoshi, who initiated the actions and was in active command of the offensive operations. As I recall, there were three divisions, one under the command of Gen. TANI, Hisao, who took the central offensive along the Ching-Han line. This was the 6th Division. Lt. Gen. KAWAGISHI, Bunzaburo was on the right of the border between Hepe and Shanhsi Provinces, while Lt. Gen. DOHIHARA moved on the left in the direction of Kuan and Manching, moving almost south toward Pouting.

I was attached to the correspondent work with the Tani unit and consequently on the march to Pouting I was not in a position to observe General DOHIHARA. However, our move was successful and without encountering any major opposition we, that is the Tani unit, entered into the fortress of Pouting on September 24, 1937. The unit under the command of General DOHIHARA entered the following day. As soon as I learned General DOHIHARA had arrived, I went to visit him at his command headquarters, where I held a conversation lasting over a period of approximately two

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hours. We had many interruptions but I would state that I talked with him during that period of time at least one hour. I found him very cooperative, frank and perfectly willing to answer my questions. As nearly as questions, told me that apparently because of the action of Japan, there was little choice except to continue an offensive; that after the initial step had been taken it was foolish to hope that the attack on Peking would conclude Japan's action against China; that the original incident, regrettable as it was, had aroused the Japanese to the point where further action unquestionably would have to be taken. He told me that the National Government would certainly continue to resist and that the only alternative was for the Japanese Army to withdraw of its own accord, and it did not appear that any such action would be taken by those in command. When asked how far he believed Japan would have to advance, he answered in substance, that since such conditions had come to pass as I, as a correspondent, had observed, that Japan has no way but to continue to attack, because the Chinese territory is boundless and it was impossible for him to state how far he believed Japanese forces would be required to go. He said there were many great difficulties before the Japanese and that no hasty judgment could be formed. However, he did state that the Chinese public, as distinguished from the Central Government, could not be considered as enemies of Japan and that to consider them as such would be a great mistake. Believing such to be true, he had placed rigid discipline on his troops with reference to the treatment of Chinese civilians; that he had warned his forces not to harass the Chinese public or non-belligerents, and that especially in time of battle his subordinates were not to injure the general feeling of the Chinese public. He stated that it was his policy to strictly punish, by military discipline, those who conducted themselves in any manner so as to harass the peaceful general public under any situation that was not absolutely necessary, in order to safeguard their own lives and property. He stated that this policy would be put in practice within his jurisdiction because Japan should never cause the general Chinese public to become her enemy. In short, General DOHIHARA was deeply worried about the future of the Sino-Japanese war, was willing to talk about it, and displayed, by his actions, his feelings in the matter. He was genuinely concerned over the enormous damage which would inevitably result to the Chinese public.

I was particularly impressed with the fact that General DOHIHARA did not display a single sign of pleasure as a result of the victorious attack on Peuting. On the contrary, I observed his deep worry about the future as caused by the incident. At the same time, after my interview with General DOHIHARA, I felt that I had come closer in touch with the real nature of the Sino-Japanese war than ever before. I came to seriously consider that Japan had now reached the moment when she must reconsider the then current situation. General DOHIHARA's interview had a profound effect upon my understanding of Sino-Japanese relations.

Subsequently I was not attached to General DOHIHARA's unit but I had many friends who were, and while I did not question his sincerity, I was interested to see whether he would continue the policy towards the Chinese to which he had outlined. I had many friends who were with DOHIHARA's unit from time to time and in my conversations with them they verified that not only did he carry out the policy, but as a matter of fact so strict was he with reference to his subordinates in carrying out the policy which he had outlined that there was often some dissatisfaction among his troops, and that they sometimes openly stated to the correspondents that it appeared as though General DOHIHARA loved the Chinese more than he did his own soldiers, and that he might treat them a little more liberally, especially in war time. It is true there was dissatisfaction with General DOHIHARA's troops and that it was generally attributed to the strict control which he exercised with reference to the treatment of non-combatants. It is also a fact that this strictness on the part of General DOHIHARA became widely known among the Chinese public and it is also a fact that they would remain in their homes when General DOHIHARA made an advance into their territory. As a result of that treatment, it is also true that the Chinese public supplied provisions and labor and otherwise assisted General DOHIHARA's unit.

DEF. DOC. #2107

Exh. No.

On this 19 day of August 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT Ryosuke WATASE (seal)

I, <sup>*Okla*</sup> Kinjiro OHTOO heroby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) <sup>*Okla*</sup> Kinjiro OHTOO (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Ryosuke WATASE (seal)

Def. Doc. # 2232

Wxh,

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)  
Deponent: FUHA Hiroshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, FUHA, Hiroshi, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs in my country, depose and state as follows:

My name is FUHA, Hiroshi. During the recent war I held many positions as Staff Officer of various armies. I was appointed Staff Officer of the 15th Army on January 19, 1943, Staff Officer of the Burma Area Army on March 19, 1943, Staff Officer of the 7th Area Army on July 14, 1944, Staff Officer of the 1st General Army on April 6, 1945, and Staff Officer of the 12th Area Army on June 15, 1945.

I have been asked what I know concerning the organization, command responsibility and command channels, especially of the 7th Area Army, with which army I served as Staff Officer from July, 1944, until April, 1945. The 7th Area Army was organized April 25, 1944, under the Southern General Army and its first Commander-in-Chief was the accused DOHARA, Kenji, who held this post from April, 1944, until April, 1945, when the command was taken over by General Itazaki, who held the post from April, 1945, until August, 1945. The command jurisdiction of the 7th Area Army was Malaya, Sumatra, Java and British Borneo. Borneo was divided into a British area and a Dutch area. In the beginning the army was charged with the preservation of peace in the British area and the Navy was charged with that in the Dutch area. Consequently the army had no jurisdiction whatsoever over the Dutch area.

The Borneo garrison, a component of the 7th Area Army, was the unit directly responsible. However, repeated attacks in New Guinea by allied forces gave cause for increasing alarm and, in fact, they reconquered most parts of New Guinea. The need for general reorganization became of increasing urgency and the Borneo garrison was, in August, 1944, reorganized into the 33rd Army and at the same time was withdrawn

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from the command of the 7th Area Army and placed under the direct command of the Southern Army. Consequently the commander of the 7th Area Army had no further responsibility and no direct command whatsoever over its operations and actions. This move resulted, of course, in the removal of all things relating to British Borneo from the command of the 7th Area Army as of August, 1944.

Moreover, at no time was any prisoner of war camp located within the territorial jurisdiction of the 7th Area Army ever under its control. They were always under the direct control of the Southern Army, which was a superior command to that of the 7th Area Army. The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army, Marshall Terauchi, controlled the administration of these camps and placed the responsibility for each camp directly upon the camp commander. Consequently, in areas such as the territorial jurisdiction covered by the 7th Area Army, the intermediate commanders had no responsibility whatsoever in respect to the administration of prisoners of war, and were not authorized to, and could not issue any order concerning them. Their only responsibility was a functional responsibility and not one of administration. Their duty was limited strictly to security; to guard the camps of prisoners of war, or take measures where necessary to safeguard them from enemy attack. They had no voice whatsoever in the administration of the camps or in the treatment of the prisoners of war. Perhaps I have not made myself clear in referring to intermediate commanders. In this particular instance I am speaking with reference to security channels only and have no reference whatsoever to command channels. In the chain of security command there is first, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army, the Commander of the Area Army, and the Commander of a subordinate army or garrison. The intermediate commander to whom I have reference would be the commander of the army and not the commander of the Area Army. In order to clarify this affidavit, I have prepared a chart showing command channels and security channels only. This chart, which I incorporate as a part of my affidavit, clearly depicts the two channels to which I have made reference. The situation then boils down to this proposition. Full responsibility for the administration and treatment of prisoners of war was under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army. Security of prisoner of war camps was the direct responsibility of the army or garrison commander, as the case might be. The Area Army commander had no responsibility or authority whatsoever. The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army, in addition to reserving to himself the

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direct administration thereof and the treatment of the prisoners of war, also reserved to his command ship transportation and naval units and army aerial units, including air field service. These units and services, in addition to that of the prisoner of war camps, even if located within the territorial jurisdiction covered by an Area Army, were not in any manner subject to any command function of any kind exercised by the Commander of the Area Army.

On this 16 day of April, 1947.

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ KUHA, Hiroshi (seal)

*KATO*  
I, KATO, Takahisa hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo.


*KATO TAKAHISA*  
Witness: /s/ FUHA, Takahira (seal)

#### OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ FUHA, Hiroshi (seal)

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4



See 3/1/41

Def. Doc. No. 2230

Exh. No.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al )  
- vs - )  
ARAKI, Sadao, et al )

AFFIDAVIT OF  
HATTORI, Takushiro

I, HATTORI, Takushiro, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs in my country, depose and state as follows:

My name is HATTORI, Takushiro, and I now reside in the City of Tokyo. I am an ex-Colonel of the Japanese Army and at the time of the Nomonhan Incident I was a Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army. I have been asked if I know whether or not the accused DOHARA, Kenji, was in any manner concerned with the Nomonhan Incident. I do know and can state as a positive fact that he was in no manner concerned with the Incident. He held the post of Attache to the General Staff from June, 1933, and was appointed Commander of the 5th Army on May 19, 1939, which post he held until he was appointed as a Supreme War Counsellor on September 28, 1939. The Nomonhan Incident occurred on the 12th of May, 1938, just a few days before General DOHARA became commander of the 5th Army. The headquarters of the 5th Army was established at Tung-an in Eastern Manchuria and its primary function was the defense of that immediate area.



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As a Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army I knew that the creation of the 5th Army, of which General DOHIMARA was the first commander, had nothing to do with the Nomonhan Incident. The 5th Army had, as subordinate units, the 11th and 24th Divisions, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade and the Futau Border Garrison. None of these units participated in any manner in the Nomonhan Incident, which was going on and continued to go on for a short time after General DOHIMARA's appointment as commander, of the 5th Army. I know that General DOHIMARA was never transferred to an area that had any connection whatsoever with the Nomonhan Incident, but confined his military duties to defense in the Tung-an area.

Confusion may have arisen as to the participation of the 5th Army in the Nomonhan Incident because after it developed, the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army withdrew machine gun units, mortar corps and other such units from each army in Manchuria and added them to the 6th Army, or the 23rd Division, which was then fighting at Nomonhan. Units were taken from the 5th Army as well as from other available sources, but General DOHIMARA was not officially concerned in any manner with the withdrawal of such units from his command and did not, and could not have issued the orders for such withdrawal. Toward the end of the Incident the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which I have mentioned as one of

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the units under the 5th Army, was withdrawn from the command of the 5th Army for the purpose of adding to the Nomonhan military strength, but before this unit could be added, the Incident was concluded and the brigade never participated in the fighting. I know that the withdrawal of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade from the 5th Army was not upon the order of General DOHARA, nor was he in any way responsible for it. The orders were issued by higher authority.

Knowing the situation that then existed, as well as I do, and knowing the command responsibility of the various persons concerned, I can state as a positive fact that General DOHARA was in no manner concerned in the Nomonhan Incident.

On this 25 day of August, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT Kinjiro Ohta (seal)

I, Kinjiro Ohta hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness : (signed) Kinjiro Ohta (seal)

Def. Doc. No. 2230

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Rakushiro Hattori(seal)

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Exh NO 3186

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

直轄供述者

供述者 不 取

自分親我對ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ元ツ別紙ノ通り直轄ヲ爲シタル上次ノ  
如ク供述致シマス

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私不破博ハ我國ニ行ハレル方式ニ從ヒ眞實シタル後次ノ如ク申述ベマス  
 私ノ姓名ハ不破博デアリマス。今次戰爭期間中私ハ各軍ノ參謀トシテ諸  
 種ノ任務ニ就キマシタ。私ハ昭和十八年（一九四三年）一月十九日第十  
 五軍參謀ニ、昭和十八年（一九四三年）三月十八日緬甸方面軍參謀ニ又  
 昭和十九年（一九四四年）七月十四日第七方面軍參謀ニ、昭和二十年（  
 一九四五年）四月六日第一總軍參謀ニ又昭和二十年（一九四五年）六月  
 十五日第十二方面軍參謀ニ夫々任命セラレマシタ  
 私ハ編成、指揮責任、指揮系統ニ關シ特ニ私ガ昭和十九年（一九四四年）  
 七月ヨリ昭和二十年（一九四五年）四月迄勤務シタ第七方面軍ノ夫等ニ  
 關シテ知レル所ヲ尋ネラレマシタ。第七方面軍ハ兩方總軍ノ下ニ昭和十  
 九年（一九四四年）四月十五日ニ編成セラレ初代ノ司令官ハ被告土肥原  
 賢二デアリマシタ。彼ハ昭和十九年（一九四四年）四月ヨリ昭和二十年  
 （一九四五年）四月迄ソノ任ニアリ板垣大將ニソノ指揮ヲ讓ラレタノデ  
 アリマス

板垣大將ハ昭和二十年（一九四五年）四月ヨリ同年八月迄ソノ任ニアツ  
 タノデアリマス

第七方面軍ノ管轄區域ハ馬來、スマトラ、ジャヴァ並ニ英領ボルネオデ  
 アリマシタ。ボルネオハ英領ト國領トニ別レテ居リマシタ。當初ニ於テ  
 ハ該軍ガ英領區域ニ對シテハ何等ノ管轄權ヲモ有シテ居ラナカツタノデ

アリマス

第七方面軍ノ轄下ニアルボルネオ守備隊ガ直接責任アル部隊デアリマシタ。然シ乍ラ聯合軍ニヨル隊次「ニューギニヤ」反攻隊々急調ヲ呈シ實際ニ於テ「ニューギニヤ」ハ大部分奪回サレタノデアリマス。總体的ナ再編成ノ必要ガ急遽ニ生ジ昭和十九年（一九四四年）八月ボルネオ守備隊ハ第三十七軍ニ改編スルト共ニ第七方面軍ノ戦闘序列ヨリ余モ兩方總軍ノ直屬トナツタノデアリマス

従ツテ第七方面軍司令官ニハ最早ソノ作戰行動ニ關シテ責任モナケレバ直接指揮ヲ取ル事モナクナツタノデアリマス。コノ變化ハ當然昭和十九年（一九四四年）八月以降ハ第七方面軍ヨリ英領ボルネオ關係ノ一切ノ事務ヲ除去スル結果トナリマシタ。ソレ許リデナク如何ナル時ニ於テモ第七方面軍ノ管轄地域内ニアル俘虜收容所ガ第七方面軍ノ管理ノ下ニアツタコトハアリマセン。ソレ等收容所ハ常ニ第七方面軍ヨリ上級ノ指揮官ヲ有スル兩方總軍ノ直轄デアリマシタ

兩方總軍司令官寺内元帥ガ之等ノ收容所ヲ統轄シ各收容所ニ直接ニ責任ヲ持タセテ居ラレタノデアリマス。従ツテ第七方面軍ノ管轄地域ノ如キ地域内ニ於テハ中間ノ指揮官ニハ俘虜行政ニ關スル何等ノ責任モナク又俘虜ニ關スル命令ヲ發スル權限モ限セ異ヘラレテ居ラズ且ツ又斯ル命令ヲ發スル事モ出來ナカツタノデアリマス。彼等ノ有シテキタ唯一ツノ責任ト

言へバソレハ職務上ノ責任デアリ行以上ノ責任チハナイノデアリマス。彼等ノ任務ハ嚴格ニ備補ニ限ラレテ居リマシタ。即チ存濟收容所ノ備補收容所ヲ破壊カラ防衛スル爲メノ必要措置ヲ講ズルコトニ限ラレテキタノデアリマス。


彼等ニハ收容所ノ管理又ハ存濟ノ取扱ニ付テハ何等ノ發言權ハナカツタノデアリマス。私ハ中間ノ指揮權ニ關シテ未ダ充分明カニシナカツタト思ヒマス。他ノ場合私ハ軍ニ備補系統ノ事ニ限ツテ申述ベテ居ルノデアリマシテ何等命令系統ノ事ハ述ベテ居リマセン。備補指揮ノ系統ニハ第一ニ兩方總軍司令官、方面軍司令官並ニソレニ屬スル軍又ハ守備隊ノ司令官ガアリマシタ私ガ中間ノ指揮官ト申シテ居リマスノハ軍司令官デアツテ方面軍司令官ノ事デアリマセン。

コノ口述書ヲ明カニスル爲メ私ハ命令系統ト備補系統ダケヲ示ス圖表ヲ準備シマシタ。私ガ口供書ノ一部トシテキルコノ圖表ハ今私ガ申述ベマシタニツノ系統ヲ明カニ描イテ居リマス。當時ノ狀況ハ以下ノ如ク説明サレマス。

存濟ノ管理取扱ニ關スル一切ノ責任ハ兩方總軍司令官ノ直轄デアツタノデアリマス、又存濟收容所ノ備補ハ夫々ノ軍若クハ守備隊ノ司令官ノ直接責任デアツタノデアリマス。從ツテ方面軍司令官ニハ一切責任權限ハ無カツタノデアリマス。兩方總軍司令官ハ存濟ノ直接監理取扱ヲ直轄シ







命令系統  
警備ノミ

Def Doc 2232

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）四月十六日於東京

供述者 不破 慎

右ハ雷立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シ  
マス

同日 於 同 所

立 會 人 加 藤 隆 久

-6-

Def Doc 2232

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

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( 著者 )  
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not used

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al )

- vs -

YAMAGUCHI, Sadao, et al )

} AFFIDAVIT  
}  
}

I, KIMABE, Torashiro, of lawful age, having been duly sworn on oath, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, make the following statement, of my own free will and accord:

I first became acquainted with the accused DOHIMURA, Keiichi, in 1934, at which time he was Chief of the Special Service Organ in Mukden, Manchuria. At that time I held the post of Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army. I held this post from August, 1934, until March, 1936. During this period my work often brought me in contact with General DOHIMURA and I became familiar with the methods he used in the administration of his official affairs and also became intimately acquainted with him from a personal standpoint and learned his viewpoints with reference to the relationship of Japan and China. I observed that he administered his official duties in a sincere manner and did not tend to enlarge or to detract from facts which were dealt with in his official reports. He did not hesitate to speak his mind with regard to his personal feelings as to the conduct of the Japanese toward the Chinese people. On one occasion we asked him to deliver a speech on this subject, which was entitled "How to Act with the Chinese People." This speech was to be delivered to the junior officers and I distinctly recall his words to this very day, when he summed up his lecture with the following words:

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"There is no distinction whatsoever between the Japanese people and the Chinese. The most important and <sup>the</sup> best way to meet people so that you can convey your thoughts fully is to be sincere." He felt, and often expressed such opinion to me, that the best interests of Japan and China lay in a mutual understanding of the people of those nations of each other. He did not believe that war between the two nations could settle any issues. On the contrary, he believed it would drive the peoples of those nations further apart. I personally know that he was opposed to the outbreak of war, or to a show of force by arms against China.

When General DOHIHARA was Inspector General of the Army Air Force, I served under him as Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Army Air Force. He was my immediate superior officer. During this period of time I became very familiar with the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General of the Army Air Force and desire to make the following observation with reference thereto:

The Inspector General of the Army Air Force was under the direct command of the Emperor and was subordinate only to the Minister of War, insofar as his duties were concerned. The Inspector General of the Army Air Force was in charge of the technical education, which was his primary duty, and although the Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters was subordinate to the Minister of War with reference to maintenance, supply, etc., neither of them had authority to participate or to advise in operational matters, and were precluded from participating in the preparation or planning of any operational mission with referenc

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to armed forces in the field or in war. I have mentioned the Inspector General of the Army Air Force and the Chief of the Army Air Force Command Headquarters, which were two distinct posts. In order to clearly show General DOHIMARA's position, I feel it best to explain the command relationship between these two posts, both of which General DOHIMARA held simultaneously.

As Inspector General of the Army Air Force, which was concerned only with technical educational matters and had nothing to do with planning and operational matters, General DOHIMARA was under the direct command of the Emperor. As Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters, the chain of command went from the Emperor through the War Ministry, then to General DOHIMARA as Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters. In this position he did have some duties with reference to Air Corps supply, but did not participate in planning and operational matters.

At the time General DOHIMARA was Inspector General of Military Education, I did not serve under him, but because of the close connection which I formerly had with that office, I am fully acquainted with its operations and responsibilities. The Inspector General of Military Education was responsible for the administration of the various technical schools and Army Service Schools generally, and the educational matter of the Army, with the exception of technical matters pertaining to aviation. However, he had no authority, and as a matter of practice did not take part in any planning or operational matter, and had absolutely no voice in any decision with reference to planning and operation of the Army in the field.

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Because of my many experiences in the Army, I am fully acquainted with the Supreme War Council, of which General DOHIHARA was at one time a member. The Supreme War Council is more of an honorary position than an actual integral part of the Army Command, and was simply a military inquiry organ, whose duty was to respond to the Emperor's questions on important military problems. It had little or no practical authority and was, in fact, an organ which received reports on general affairs and the current military situation from various Army leaders in the central or main commands.

From my observations of General DOHIHARA, I know he cared little for civilian politics and that he considered himself strictly as an Army man, and as such did not feel that he should engage in politics. He has often expressed this thought to me and advised me not to engage in civilian politics. While he was Chief of the Air Command Headquarters, I know of occasions where he was required to deal with various civilian aircraft industry problems, involving political significance. When these matters came up, he merely clarified the position of the Army, its objects and expectations and left all concrete measures entirely in the hands of the industrialists and refused to engage in politics with them. I have never known him to offer them a hand for the sake of political artifice. On the contrary, he remained aloof almost in the extreme.

I have been asked if I knew anything of General DOHIHARA's views on the Pacific war. With respect to this I wish to state that General DOHIHARA assumed his post as Inspector General of the Army Air Forces and Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters six months prior to the

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outbreak of the Pacific war, at which time, as previously stated, I was appointed his assistant as head of the General Affairs Section. General DOHIMARA discussed the problems with me on many occasions and from these discussions I know he had scarcely any knowledge up to the outbreak of the war of the various essential problems of political and military significance in our country. The reason I dare say this is that finally, and just before the outbreak of the war, when I asked General DOHIMARA a few questions concerning what appeared to me to be a strained and gloomy prospect, he did not have the slightest idea whatsoever as to the import of my questioning, and instead asked me what it was all about. After discussing the problems, he ordered me to get information from the War Ministry and the General Staff Headquarters so that he would have the knowledge which we deemed necessary to the discharge of his duties.

I have also been asked about the decoration which General DOHIMARA received from Germany. This was received by General DOHIMARA during the time he was Inspector General of the Army Air Force, and as his subordinate I was present at the time he received it. As I recall, he was decorated with the Grand Cross by the German Government. I know personally that General DOHIMARA had never undertaken any political action, or, for that matter, any action of any kind to strengthen or enlarge the triple alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy, and we were surprised that he received the medal. The only reason that we could attribute at that time for him having received the medal was due to the fact that he was the head of the Department. I distinctly remember that the General himself uttered words of surprise upon receiving the decoration.



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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of  
December, 1947.

KAWABE, Torashiro (seal)

On the same date  
At the same place.

Witness: (signed)

OTA, Kinjiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the  
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KAWABE, Torashiro (seal)

Ex 3188

自分儀我口ニ行ハルル方式ニ従ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル  
夕供述致シマス

極京國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

計

荒 木 貞 夫 其 他

宣誓供述者

供述者 河 邊 虎 四 郎

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## 供 述 書

私（河野虎四郎）ハ一九三四年（昭和九年）ニ被告土肥原ト最初ニ知合ニナリマシタ。其ノ時彼ハ滿洲奉天特務機關長チアリマシタ。當時私ハ關東軍司令部ノ職ニ在リマシタ。コノ職ニ私ハ一九三四年（昭和九年）八月ヨリ一九三六年（昭和十一年）三月迄在リマシタ。此ノ度私ハ職務上屢々土肥原大將ニ接スル機會ガアリマシタ。チ私ハ彼ノ職務執行方法ニ親シクナリ且ツ又彼ノ個人的立脚點ヲ親シク知り而シテ口支關係ニ關スル彼ノ觀點ヲ知ルニ至リマシタ。私ノ觀察スル所チハ彼ガ其ノ職務ヲ遂行スルニ當リ設置チアリ、彼ノ出ス公ノ報告ニ取扱ハレル事實ヲ誇張シタリ。由シタリスル様ナ事ハアリマセンデシタ。彼ハ日本人ノ支那人ニ對スル行動ニ就イテ彼自身ノ感情ヲ表明スルニ躊躇シマセンデシタ。嘗テ我々ガ彼ニ「支那人ニ對スル心掛」ト言フ。口目デ演説ワスル事ヲ依頼致シタコトガアリマス。此ノ演説ハ後進駐校ノ爲ニサレタノデアリマス。其ノ際彼ガ其ノ歸斷ノ結論トシテ述ベタ次ノ言葉即チ「日本人モ支那人モ何ノ區別ハナイ。人ニ接スルニ最も大切ニシテ且ツ己

レノ意旨ヲ先方ニ寫ト諒解セシムル爲最善ノ方法ハ唯ダ一ツ設法之アルノミ  
ト言ハレタコトヲハツキリ今日マデ記憶シテ居リマス。彼ハ日本及び支那ノ兩  
國ニ法モ爲ニナルコトハ兩國々民ガ相互ニ理解シ合フコトデアルト言フ意見  
ヲ持チ且ツ私ニ表明致シマシタ。彼ハ日支兩國間ノ同口ハドレーツトシテ戰  
争ヲ解決出來ルトハ信ジナカッタ。其レドコロカ兩國間ノ戰爭ハ日支兩國ノ  
國民ソ爲々離同サセルダロウト彼ハ信ジテ居リマシタ。又私ハ自ラ彼ガ戰爭  
ノ勃發或ハ支那ニ對シテ武力ヲ示ス事ニ反對シテ居ツタ事ヲ知ツテ居リマス。  
土肥原大將ガ陸軍航空總監時代、私ハ日本航空總監部總務部長トシテ彼ノ下  
デ勤務致シテ居リマシタ。彼ハ私ノ直屬上級士官デアリマシタ。本期間中ニ  
私ハ航空總監ノ職務及び責任ヲ寫ト知ルニ至リマシタノデ之等ノ點ニ關シテ  
次ノ觀察ヲ供進致シタイト思ヒマス。陸軍航空總監ハ天皇ニ直屬シ其ノ職務  
ニ關スル限りニ於テ陸軍大臣ニノミ從屬シテ航空總監ハ其ノ第一ノ職務トシ  
テハ專門的教育ヲ兼ツテ居リマシタ。而シテ陸軍航空本部長ハ資材ノ準備、  
補給等ニ關シテ陸軍大臣ニ隸屬致シテ居リマシタ、ケレドモ、其等ノ何レモ

ガ作戦事項ニ參畫スル權限ハ全ク無ク取守テ武力ニ關スル作戦或ハ計畫ニ關シテ  
 與スルコトハ不可能ニサレテ居リマシタ。私ハ航空總監及ビ航空本部長ニ就テ  
 テ述ベマシタガ其等ノ地位ハ個々別々ノ地位デアリマシタ。土肥原大將ノ  
 土肥原大將ノ地位ヲ同様ニスル爲ニ私ハ此等ノ二ツノ地位ノ間ノ命令關係ヲ  
 説明スル事ヲ最善ノ方法ト考ヘマス。而シテコノ二ツノ地位ニ土肥原大將ハ  
 同時ニ在任シタデアリマス。

陸軍航空總監ハ專門ノ教育事項ニノミ關係シ計畫及ビ作戦事項ニハ關係ガナ  
 カツタノデアリマス。而シテコノ地位ノ土肥原大將ハ天皇ニ直屬シテ居リマ  
 シタ。陸軍航空本部長トシテハ、命令系統ハ陸軍省ヲ通シ天皇カラ航空本部長  
 長ノ土肥原大將ニ傳リマシタ。此ノ地位ヲ彼ハ航空隊ノ補給ニ關スル若干ノ  
 職務ヲ持ツテハ居リマシタガ計畫及ビ作戦事項ニハ參畫致シマセシテシタ。  
 土肥原大將ガ教育總監當時、私ハ彼ノ下ニ働イテ居リマセシテシタガ然シ私  
 ハ前ニ其ノ總監部ト緊密ナル關係ガアツタノデアリマス。私ハ其ノ機能及ビ責任ヲ熟  
 知シテ居リマス。

教育總局ハ航空ノ專門事項ヲ除イテハ全體官ノ種々ナル教育並ニ軍所轄諸學校ノ統轄指導ヲ爲スヲ以テ其ノ職務トナスノデアリマシタ。然シ乍ラ彼ハ如何ナル計畫或ハ作戰事項ニモ參畫スル權限ヲ有セズ且ツ實際同口トシテ參畫セズ又内地ニ於ケル軍ノ計畫及ビ作戰ニ關スル如何ナル決定ニモ絕對的ニ發言權ヲ持ツテ居リマセンデシタ。私ノ軍ニ於ケル多クノ經驗ニ依リ私ハ軍事參議官ナルモノヲ熟知致シテ居リマス其シテ土肥原大將ハ嘗テ其ノ一員デアリマシタ。軍事參議官ハ軍命令ノ實權アル肝要ナ機關デハナク、寧ロ名譽職デアリ其シテ單ナル軍事ノ諮詢機關デアリ其ノ職務ハ臣兵事務ニ付キ天皇ノ諮詢ニ答答スルニアリマシタ

其レハ殆ンド何等實權ナク而シテ實際同口トシテ軍中央ノ主腦部ヨリ一般ノ狀態並ニ軍事的ノ狀態ニ關スル報告ヲ受取ル機關デアリマシタ。

土肥原大將ニツイテ私ノ觀察スル所デハ私ハ彼ガ一般政治ニ關與セズ自ラ嚴格ニ武人ヲ以テ任ジ、政治ニ携ハルベキトハ考ヘナカッタ事ヲ知ツテ居リマス。彼ハ屢々此ノ考ヘヲ私ニ表明シ、私ニ一般政治ニ關與セヌ様息告致シマシタ

彼ガ航空本部長時代ニ於テ政治的意味ヲ有スル民間ノ航空工業ノ諸問題ヲ取扱フ事ヲ餘儀ナクサレタ場合ガアツタ事ヲ私ハ知ツテ居リマスガ此等ノ諸問題ガ發生シタ時、彼ハ唯單ニ軍ノ立場ヲ固カニシ、其ノ終局ノ目的ト希望ヲ明示シマスケレドモ總テノ具體策等ニ付イテハ民間業者ニ一任シ、彼等ト共ニニ政治的同意ニ固スル事ヲ拒ケマシタ。私ハ彼ガ政治的術策ヲ授ケタリシテ彼等ヲ援助シタ事ヲ知リマシテシタ。寧ロ反對ニ彼ハ殆ド極端ナ程超然トシテ居リマシタ。

私ハ太平洋戦争ニ關スル土肥原大將ノ意見ニ就ツテ何カ知ツテ居ルカト質問セラタ事ガアリマシタ。

此ノ事ニ関シテハ次ノ如ク陳述シマス。太平洋戦争開戦六ヶ月前土肥原大將ガ陸軍航空總監兼陸軍航空本部長トシテ在職中、前述セル如ク、私ハ彼ノ副佐官タル陸軍航空總監兼陸軍航空本部長ノ職ニ就イタノデアリマス。土肥原大將ハ屢々私ト共ニ色々ノ問題ニ就キ論議シタノデアリマスガ此等ノ論議ヨリ推察シテ私ハ彼土肥原大將ノ開始ニ到ル迄ノ我國ノ政治的軍事的ノ重要諸問題ニ

就イテ殆ンド何等知ル所ガナカッタ事ヲ知ツテ居リマス

私ガ敢テ斯ク申ス事ハ戦争勃發直前ニ私ガ形勢ノ逼迫シ悲觀的ニ思ハレル事柄ニ關シテ二三ノ質問ヲ土肥原大將ニ尋ネタノデアリマスガ、彼ノ質問ノ意味ニ就イテハ彼ハ何事モ事情ニ預ゼズ却ツテ私ハソレハ如何ナル事カト私ニ質問ヲ爲シマシタ位デアリ此等ノ詰問ニ答ハレタ後彼ハ私ニ陸軍省ヤ參謀本部カラ我々ガ任務遂行上必以ト思ハレル知識ヲ得ル爲ニ情報ヲ得テ來ル様ニ私ニ命ジタノデアリマス。

私ハ又土肥原大將ガ獨逸カラ贈與セラレタ勳章ニツ中尋ネラレマシタ。此レハ彼ガ陸軍航空總監ノ時代ニ贈與セラレタノデアリマスガ、私ハ彼ノ部下トシテ彼ガ其レヲ受ケタ時在勤致シテ居リマシタ。私ノ記憶スル處デハ竹ハ瀧國政府ヨリノ大十字章ヲ贈ラレマシタ。土肥原大將ガ日獨伊三國同盟強化擴大ノ爲如何ナル政治的活動或ハ其ノ事ニ關スル如何ナル種類ノ行動ヲモ爲シタ事ノ無カッタ事ヲ私ハ自ラ知ツテ居リマシタノデアリガ勳章ヲ贈與セラレタ事ニ先キ彼々ハ驚カサレマシタ。當時彼ガ勳章ヲ贈與セラ



レタ現由トシテ我々ニ考ヘラレタ唯一ノ理由ハ彼ガ總監部長デアツタトイ  
フ事實ニ隨着致シマシタ  
私ハ大將自身勳章ヲ受取ツタ時其キノ言ヲ發セラレタ事ヲ明瞭ニ記憶シテ  
居リマス。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）十二月十五日 於 東京

供 送 者 河 邊 虎 四 郎

右ハ管立合人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立 合 人 太 田 金 次 郎

宣  
誓  
符

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ隠秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

一 署名捺印一

河  
邊  
虎  
四  
郎

ナ

Def. Doc. #2489

Exh. No. 3/89

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE F.R. EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et. al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

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Sworn Deposition

Deponent :-TATSUMI, Yeichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, TATSUMI, Yeichi, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the custom in my country, depose as follows:

I have been asked if I know anything about Gen. DOHIHARA's attitude towards prisoners of war during the time he was Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army of Japan, which position he held from May, 1943, until March, 1944. I have also been asked if I know anything concerning the control of prisoners of war in the Tokyo area during that period of time. I served as Chief of Staff to Gen. DOHIHARA for the entire period of time that he was in command of the Eastern Area Army and consequently am familiar with his policies and with the system for the control of prisoners of war in the Tokyo area.

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The main function of the Eastern Area Army was the defense of Tokyo and adjacent territory, which was by far the most important place of defense of Japan proper. As Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army Gen. DOHIMURA had under his direct command several divisions, air defense units, hospitals and other special units. In short, there were literally hundreds of separate units under his command.

With reference to the handling of prisoner of war detachments throughout the main islands of Japan and occupied territories, there was a special arrangement. There had been established for the purpose of dealing with the affairs of prisoners of war two separate bureaus, one known as the prisoner of War Information Bureau, and the other as the Prisoner of War Control Bureau. The Chief of both of these units was the same person, and both organizations were set up directly under the Minister of War. All complaints received from foreign nations, and other outside sources, were routed to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau just mentioned. In addition to these two bureaus, there was set up in the City of Tokyo an area office for the centralized control of prisoner of war detachments within the territorial jurisdiction of the Eastern Area Army. This main office was in the official chain of command under the Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army. Its branches and detachments numbered about twenty with a total of some 4,000 prisoners. The Prisoner of War Control Bureau and the Prisoner of War Information Bureau just referred to were in no manner or wise connected with the handling of prisoners of war.

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connected with the command of the Eastern Area Army, and the Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army had no control whatsoever over these two organizations. However, in accordance with the orders of the Minister of War, or upon his own initiative, the Chief of those two bureaus directed the Chiefs of the prisoner of war camps throughout Japan in regard to the control of the prisoners of war, and he or his subordinate officers often paid visits to the various branches and detachments scattered throughout the various parts of Japan for the purpose of observation and inspection or for the purpose of giving directions to them. As explained, the Commander of the Eastern Area Army, according to the official chain of command, was responsible for the control and administration of prisoners of war within his territorial jurisdiction. However, in actual practice the activities of the prisoner of War Control Bureau and Prisoner of War Information Bureau operated to relieve the administrative responsibility for prisoners of war from him, which permitted him to devote much more time to the manifold duties which he had to perform.

I know personally that during the time Gen. DOHICHI was Commander of the Eastern Area Army he never received a single complaint, either from his superior officers or from his subordinate officers, with reference to the mistreatment of prisoners of war. I do not mean he did not receive any reports on prisoners of war, because he did receive a monthly report on general conditions, but they did not refer to the mistreatment of prisoners of war.

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I know that despite the many duties which Gen. DOHIHARA was compelled to perform he was interested in the welfare of prisoners of war and would take occasion to visit the camps under his control. On one visit to the Naoetsu camp Gen. DOHIHARA learned that the camp was not adequately provided with skilled medical care, and that in an emergency it had to depend upon securing the services of doctors from cities as far away as Shibata. Despite the fact that there were many units and detachments of the Japanese Army, and many civilian communities, as devoid of medical attention as this prisoner of war camp, Gen. DOHIHARA managed to make special arrangements to provide the camp with medical care by Army physicians stationed at the Base Hospital at Takata, only a short distance away.

The policy with reference to the handling of prisoners of war was forwarded to the Commander of the Eastern Area Army over the signature of the Minister of War for his compliance and was not formulated by such commanding officer.

On this 15 day of Jun, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent /S/ Yeichi, Tatsumi

I, Kinjiro Ohta, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,

At Tokyo

Witness: /S/ Kinjiro Ohta (seal)

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OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Yéichi Tatsumi (seal)



極東國際軍事裁判所

暹米利加台衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣審供述者

供述者

島根縣松川郡大社町酒佐

元陸軍中將

辰巳榮

明治廿八年一月

自分淺我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ元ツ別紙ノ通り宣審ヲ爲シ

ク供述致シマス

FILE COPY  
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如

私<sup>私</sup>辰巳榮一ハ土肥原大將ハ一九四三年五月ヨリ一九四四年三月迄東部  
軍司令官ヲアツタ時代ノ成ノ俘虜ニ對スル態度ニツキ何カ知ツテキルカ否  
カヲ尋ネラレマシタ。又東部軍管區内ニ於ケル俘虜ノ管理ニツキ何カ知ツ  
テキルカ否カヲ尋ネラレマシタ。

私ハ土肥原大將部軍司令官ヲアツタ全期間彼ノ下ヲ參謀長ヲ勤メタ事ガア  
リマスノテ彼ノ方針並ニ東部軍管區内ノ俘虜ノ管理ニ關スル組織ヲ知ツテ  
居サマス。

東部軍ノ主要ナル任務ハ日本本土ノ最モ重要ナ防備地帯アル東京並ニ接  
續地帯ノ防衛ヲアリマシタ。東部軍司令トシテノ土肥原大將ハ彼ノ隷下ニ  
數箇ノ師團防空部隊、病院及ビ他ノ特種部隊等ガアリマシタ。要スルニ彼  
ノ隷下ニハ大小數多ノ部隊ガアツタノテアリマス。

日本内地及ビ畿北ヲ越シテ俘虜收容所ノ事務取扱ニ關シテハ特別ノ手配ガ  
アリマシタ。即チ俘虜ニ關スル事務ヲ取扱フ爲ニ俘虜情報局及ビ俘虜管理  
部ガ設置セラレマシタ。此兩者ノ長イ同一人ガ兼任シ、兩者トモ陸軍大臣  
ノ直接管理下ニ置カレテキマシタ。外西及ビ外地カラノ苦情ハ右ニ述べタ  
俘虜情報局長官ハ來ル事ニナツテ居リマシタ。

右ノ二局ノ他ニ東京ニ東部軍管區ノ收容所ヲ統轄スル東京俘虜收容所本所  
ガアリマシタ。コノ本所ハ官制上東部軍司令官ニ隷屬シテ居リマシタ。

而シテ其ノ分所及ビ遊道所ハ約二十個所アリ、總計約四千名ノ收容人員ガアリマシタ。

前述ノ俘虜管理部及ビ俘虜情報局ハ東部軍トハ總門關係ニ無ク、東部軍司令官ハコノ兩者ニ對シ指揮權ハアリマセンナシタ。然シナガラ俘虜情報局長官兼俘虜管理部長ハ陸軍大臣ノ命ヲ受ケ又ハ自己ノ意圖ニ基イテ、俘虜ノ管理ニ關シ直接俘虜收容所長ヲ指揮シ又各地方ニ散在スル分所派遣所ニ對シテモ擬ラ又ハ彼ノ部下ハ疑々出張シテ視察、指導ヲシテ居リマシタ。曩ニ述ベシ如ク東部軍司令官ハ官制上管内ニ在ル俘虜ノ管理ニ就テ責任ヲ有シテ居リマシタガ事實上石ノ如キ俘虜情報局及ビ俘虜管理部ノ活動ハ軍司令官ノ俘虜ニ對スル管理上ノ責任ヲ緩和シテ軍司令官ガ遂行ノ責任ヲ負フテタル極メテ多忙ナ多量多様ノ任務ニ對シヨリ多クノ時間ヲ用ヒ得ルコトトナツタノデアリマス。

土肥原大將ガ東部軍司令官ナアツタ呼彼ハ其上官カラモ又部下カラモ俘虜ノ不當ナ取扱ニ關スル苦情ヲ一回モ受ケタコトハアリマセンナシタ、尤モ俘虜ニ關スル報告ヲ全然受ケナカツタト云フ辭テハナク、毎月一般狀況ニ關スル報告ヲ受ケテ居マシタガ、ソノ報告ガ俘虜ノ不當ナ取扱ニ言及シタコトハアリマセンナシタ。

土肥原大將ハ爲サネバナラヌ數多ノ職務ガアツタニモ不拘俘虜ノ安寧ニ關

心ヲ持タレ機ヲ待テハソノ管下ノ收容所ヲ訪問シマシタ。  
嘗テ直江津收容所ヲ視察セン時同收容所ノ設備施設ガ不充分テ非常ノ時  
ハ新發田ノ機ナ延距離ノ短シニ依頼セネバナラナイモ情ヲ彼ハ知りマシ  
タ。

日本ノ一般市民及び多クノ陸軍部員ヤ分遣隊ガ當時経験アル者ニ不足  
シテキタニモ拘ハラズ土肥大將ハ收容所ニ視察ヲ施ス爲メ特ニ近クノ  
高田ノ陸軍病院ヨリ車醫ヲ派遣スル如ク處置セラレタコトガアリマシタ。  
俘虜ノ取扱ニ關スル方針ハ陸軍大臣ノ名ニ於テ東部軍司令官ニ傳達サレ  
タモノナリアリマセンアシタ。

司令官ハ...

以上

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）六月十五日 於東京

供 送 者 辰 巳 榮 一

右ハ當立書人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日 於 同 所

立書人 太 田 金 次 郎

直 審 書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欲秘セス又何秘ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ  
審フ

(署名捺印)

辰

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2498 A

List of HASHIMOTO, Kinoro's Books

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Exhibit No.	Prosecution Document No.	Name of Book	Date of writing	Qualification	Date of Issue	Qualification
1290	487	Addresses to Young Men	June 1937	Civilian	Jul. 5, 1937	Civilian
264 866	488	The Inevitability of the Renovation	Dec. 25, 1940	Civilian	Dec. 31, 1940	Civilian
177 177-B	490	The Road to the Reconstruction of the World	Dec. 17, 1936	Civilian	Jan. 30, 1941	Civilian
2187 2187-A	1598	The Second Creation	Nov. 19, 1939	Civilian	Jan. 30, 1941	Civilian

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Def. Doc. #2498 B

橋本欣五郎論文一覽表

法廷懸番號	検事官證番號	新聞名	論文題名	發行年月日	資格
2185	130	太陽大日本	議會制度の改革	昭和14 12 (1937)	民間人
2185 675	130	"	青年獅子に告ぐ	14 12 (1936)	"
2185	130	"	軍人の政治顧問團防上當然の任務	14 3 (1937)	"
2185	130	"	列強は軍備増強に必死無敵空軍を 建設せよ	14 7 (1937)	"
2185	130	"	東亞に漲る妖雲を拂へ	14 5 (1939)	"
2185	130	"	英國の勢力を東亞より驅逐せよ	14 5 (1939)	"
2185	130	"	時勢要言	14 6 (1939)	"
2185	130	"	事件の解決は謀英だ	14 6 (1939)	"
2185	130	"	英ソを恐れぬ最高度の戦時内閣を 作れ	14 7 (1939)	"

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JRM TO ROOM 31



Def. Doc. #2498 B

法廷控訴號	機密評議審號	新聞名	論文題名	發行年月日	資格
2185	130	太陽大日本	日本を宗主とする日露支那邦を作れ	昭和 5 (1939)	民間人
2185	130	"	妥協を排す	16 (1941)	"
2185A	130	"	大東亞皇化圖	17 (1942)	"

443190A

DEF. DOC. #2498-B

List of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro's Articles

Exhibit No.	Prosecution Document No.	Name of Newspaper	Title of Article	Date of Issue	Qualification
2185	13-c	TAIYO DAI-NIPPON	"The Reform of parliamentary System"	Jan. 17, 1937	Civilian
2185 675	13-c	"	"A message to Young-Men"	Dec. 17, 1936	"
2185	"	"	"From the Point of View of National Defense. It is the Duty of the Military to mix in Politics."	Mar. 17, 1937	"
2185	"	"	"Powers are Desperately Building Up Air Forces-Build Up an Invincible Air Forces."	Jul. 1, 1937	"
2185	"	"	"Clear the clouds from the East Asia Sky."	May 1, 1939	"
2185	"	"	"Expel the British Influence from the Far East."	May 15, 1939	"

ALL COPY  
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DD# 2498-B

2185	13-c	TAIYO DAI-NIPPON	"Shout Cutting Remarks on the Present Situation."	Jun. 1, 1939	Civilian
2185	"	"	"The Solution of the Incident Depends upon the Expulsion of England."	Jun. 20, 1939	"
2185	"	"	"Organize a class A war-time cabinet that has no Fear of England and the Soviet Union."	Jul. 10, 1939	"
2185	"	"	"Build a State Union of China and Manchuria with Japan as its Leader."	Jul. 20, 1939	"
2185	"	"	"No More Compromise."	Sep. 25, 1941	"
2185 675-A	"	"	"The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence (Dai Toa Koku ken)".	Jan. 5, 1942	"

Exp 3191

DEF. DOC. #2499

Exh. No.

Excerpt from

Exhibit 734

The Special Secret Report From Turkey  
No. 5  
15 Nov. 1929

Sender: Artillery Major HASHIMOTO, Kingoro,  
Military Attache to the Imperial Japanese Embassy  
in Turkey.

To : The assistant-chief of the army general staff OKAMOTO,  
Renichiro.

Title : Situation in the Caucasia and its strategic use for the  
purpose of sabotage activities.

\* \* \* \* \*

/Page 2/

Now in relation to how advantage can be taken of these  
countries strategically, the following points should be borne in  
mind subject to change, of course, with the then existing world  
situation:

We must recognize that England after her expedition into  
the Caucasus following the Russian revolution, is greatly desirous  
of holding on to Baku's oil. And it is necessary to take advantage  
of this fact. However, in the event of Russo-Japanese trouble she  
cannot very well make any movement in the Caucasus against Russia  
without sufficient reason. But it is possible for England and

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FILE COPY

Japan to jointly act and encourage both Turkey and Persia's  
aspirations for territory in the Caucasus and use these two countries  
as tools to work upon the Musuliman state in the Caucasus.

In any event it is most essential to continue to maintain  
good relations with England in case trouble should arise between  
Russia and Japan.

Notice :

Exhibit 3192 to be

Corrected in accordance with language

Board decision, as shown on Court

Record 28,828.

Doc. Div.

Ex 3192

Def. Doc. 1361

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

RAKI, Sadao, et al

WITNESS DEPOSITION

Deponent: OBARA, Minoru

Having first duly sworn as set forth on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. At the time of the termination of the war I was a colonel in the army. Now I am taking charge of ships engaged in repatriation work.

2. I know Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro very well.

3. In August, 1937, when Colonel HASHIMOTO was called up by the army and became the regimental commander of the 13th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, I was then appointed to be a battalion commander under his command. From that time till he returned to Japan in April, 1939, from Keshan (China) I was always with him.

4. When he arrived at the point about 8 miles (3 RI) west of Wuhu on December 11, 1937, Colonel HASHIMOTO received the following order from Commanding General YANAGAWA and thereupon returned to Wuhu immediately:

"Unit Commander HASHIMOTO shall command his regiment together with one field artillery battalion and one infantry battalion and attack at the point near Wuhu ships which are carrying Chinese soldiers and sailing up on the Yangtse."

This order came about 2 A.M.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

5. Colonel HASHIMOTO's order then to me was, "Major CBATA shall command his own unit together with one artillery battalion and occupy a position at the wharf of Wuhu and attack the fleeing Chinese fleet." This order came about 5 A.M.

6. By order of Colonel HASHIMOTO, Lt. NAKAMURA was to advance to a point about 2,000 meters downstream and to wave a handkerchief whenever he saw the fleeing enemy ships by telescope. When I saw the handkerchief waved by Lt. NAKAMURA I was to fire upon these ships.

7. It was still before dawn and not yet light; Lt. NAKAMURA waved the handkerchief. I saw through the telescope a fleet of 5 or 6 ships all gathered and anchored about 50 meters apart. I instantly began firing upon this fleet. The distance was about 4,000 meters.

8. Even after the dawn it was very difficult to see the ships clearly because of deep fog on that day, which was very typical on the Yangtse. I could only discern ships loaded with Chinese soldiers.

9. When we fired twenty or thirty shells, one of the ships put out a black smoke screen. After covering was completed by the smoke screen, one ship sailed toward us.

10. Seeing the ship coming toward us, we thought they were about to surrender, so we stopped the shelling upon them entirely. As the ship neared its hull became clear. When it came within 3,000 meters, we first discovered then it was not a Chinese army ship. At first it was not the distance but the heavy fog which made it difficult for us to tell these were not Chinese army ships.

11. After ceasing fire and while waiting for the ship to reach the wharf, we then found out by its flag that it was a



British ship and it had received two direct hits.

12. A rear admiral wearing staff officer insignia, the captain of the ship, his executive officer, and one other officer came ashore and asked us to meet for negotiations.

13. From our side Colonel HASHIMOTO, Lt. KAKIMURA, and I, together with one interpreter, took part in this negotiation. The first question they asked was why we had fired upon them. To this Colonel HASHIMOTO instantly replied, "we fired upon the ships because they were loaded with Chinese soldiers. Their next question was why we had fired on British ships. Colonel HASHIMOTO again instantly answered, "Due to the heavy fog we were not able to see and tell they were British ships."

14. Since one death had resulted from the shelling, the Captain of the British ship asked us to attend the funeral service. We sent one representative to this funeral service. This was held at the public hall.

15. This British ship was the "Ladybird". Later I learned that the matter of the Ladybird incident was taken up through diplomatic negotiations, but as to its details I know nothing.

16. Colonel HASHIMOTO and the Hashimoto forces had no connection whatsoever with the sinking of the American ship "Panay". We, the Hashimoto force, had never seen the "Panay".

17. The Hashimoto force was stopped at Wuhu, 14 or 15 "RI" (about 37 miles) from Nanking. Shortly after the fall of Nanking this force was ordered to advance to Hangchow and therefore never participated in the attack on Nanking nor did it enter into Nanking, or its vicinity.

18. The Hashimoto force did not attack Hankow nor did it enter Hankow or its vicinity.

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19. The Hashimoto force did not attack Canton (Kuan-Tung) nor did it enter Canton or its vicinity.

At the place of Mr. Itsuro Hayashi, No. 877, 3-Chome, Kami-Kitezawa-Machi, Setagaya-Fu, Tokyo, on this 11th day of January, 1947.

Signed and Sealed: (B&T), Minoru

I hereby certify that the above said person has duly sworn, subscribed and sealed thereto on before me.

On the same date and place.

Witness: signed and sealed: HAYASHI, Itsuro

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TERADA, Masuo (signed and sealed)

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

v.

Shan, Sudo, et al

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Shan, Sudo

\*\*\*\*\*

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent:- Shan, Sudo

having first duly sworn an oath as on attached  
sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my  
country I hereby depose as follows:

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 301

Affidavit by OGAWA, MIICHI

1. At present I am a priest of the Nichiren Sect living in Shizuoka Prefecture and also am engaged in the work of helping children orphaned by the war.
2. I became a member of the DAINIPPON SHINSEI in April, 1938. While NISHIMOTO, Kingoro, president of the society was away on active military duty, I being an advisor to the society, acted for him as president pro temp. Upon his return in April 1939 I relinquished my post of advisor and became a councillor and resigned so till the dissolution of the society in October 1940.
3. The purposes of the DAINIPPON SHINSEI were to abolish the established parties and to accomplish domestic reform since the general public feeling at that time was that these parties and the ZAISEIHO, in collusion had selfishly appropriated to themselves the government to such extent that extreme corruption was rampant everywhere and the only ones whom the public could trust were the military and the judiciary. The DAINIPPON SHINSEI absolutely did not have aggressive war as its objective.
4. The membership in the DAINIPPON SHINSEI fluctuated somewhat but it never reached 20,000. It never included a single military man on the active list or a single influential government official.
5. The expenses of the DAINIPPON SHINSEI were met by the ¥ 1 yearly membership fee and the ¥ 1 entrance fee paid in by each member of the society. The society never received any financial aid from the military or from any other source.
6. The "Taiyo Dai Nihon", which is the official news organ of the society, was not circulated outside of its membership.
7. The DAINIPPON SEIKISAIKAI, a thought organization, was formed upon the dissolution of the DAINIPPON SHINSEI out of a portion of the latter's membership.
8. The DAINIPPON SEIKISAIKAI had as its objectives the guidance of the thought of Japanese youth and the encouragement of increasing the rice production. This increase was to be based on the QINQUE system. Aggressive war was absolutely no part of the society's objectives.
9. The membership of the DAINIPPON SEIKISAIKAI was about 5,000. It never included a single military man on the active list nor a single influential government official.

10. The expenses of the DAINIPPON SEIKENKAI were met by the ¥ 1 yearly membership fee and the ¥ 2 entrance fee paid in by each member. The society never received any financial aid from the military or from any other source.
11. The DAINIPPON SEIKENKAI took over the management of the official news organ of the DAINIPPON SEINLEIHO - the "Taiyo Dai Nippon". After the transfer of management to the SEIKENKAI every effort was made to publish articles concerning increasing rice production. This also was not circulated outside the membership.
12. I have not been connected with the IAY.
13. In September 1944 at the time of the dissolution of the DAINIPPON SEIKENKAI I joined the Imperial Rule Youth Association. Its membership never included a single military man on the active list nor a single influential government official. I was at the time of my joining the association on the general affairs committee and in November 1944, I became Chief of the Guidance Branch.
14. The activity of the IAY was principally the encouragement of an increase in wheat production. The activity of the IAY was absolutely not directed toward aggressive war.
15. The books of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro - "Advice to Youth" "The Second Creation", "The Inevitable Renovation", "How to Rebuild World", "The Declaration of Hashimoto, Kingoro" and his essays in the "Taiyo Dai Nippon" were all written after he gave up his military career and had become an ordinary civilian and are entirely his own opinions. And, further, all these are opinions totally devoid of connection, not only with the military, but with any other persons. They are productions totally devoid of connection not only with the military but with any other persons.
16. The above mentioned books are all reproductions of the essays appearing in the "Taiyo Dai Nippon".
17. All the speeches which HASHIMOTO, Kingoro made at the meetings of the DAINIPPON SEINLEIHO and DAINIPPON SEIKENKAI were entirely expressions of his own opinions as a civilian and had absolutely no connection with not only the military but with any other persons.

At NAGAIKI-MACHI, TAKATA-GUN, SAIZUOKA-KEN on this 5th day of February, 1947.

ARTICLE

/s/ OGURA, MIICHI

we hereby certify that the above said person has duly sworn, subscribed and sealed thereto on before us.

On the same date and place.

witnesses

/s/ IYASHI, Itsuro

/s/ Richard HARRIS

/s/ MINASE, Kunji

\*\*\*\*\*

E-3194

Def. Doc. No. 2130

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

**FILE COPY**

**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: SUZUKI, Takashi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My last rank as an army officer was that of Colonel.
  2. In August 1934 (9th year of Showa) I sponsored a farewell-Party at Akebonoso Restaurant for Major General Hideki TOJO, who was to be transferred to become Commanding General of the Kurume Brigade.
  3. The sponsors of this party were GONDO, Masanori, a section chief of the Military Academy, AMANO, Isamu, an instructor at the Military Academy, and I, then serving in the first section of the Army General Staff.
  4. The ones who gathered at this party were selected only from among those officers who were serving either in the Army General Staff, War Ministry, Department of Military Training or Military Academy and were in the good graces of Major General TOJO. I did not send out an invitation to Mr. HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, who was then attached to Mishima Regiment and who was not serving in any one of the above mentioned four groups.
- Further I was not aware of any particular friendly relationship between him and Major General TOJO that would call for his being specially singled out for invitation. For these reasons he was not present at the party.
5. At no time other than at the above mentioned party did I ever act as sponsor of a party at the Akebonoso

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Restaurant.

On this 14th day of January, 1947.

At No. 45, Umemachi, Nakano-ku, Tokyo

DEPONENT: /S/ SUZUKI, Takashi (seal)

I, IWAMA, Kohei, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date and at the same place.

WITNESS: /S/ IWAMA, Kohei (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SUZUKI, Takashi (Signed and seal)



E. 3193 UN 3193  
5194

Def. Doc. #2231

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

FILE COPY  
ARAKI, Sada, et al


RETURN TO ROOM 361

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: HASHIMOTO, Kingoro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby, depose as follows:

1. I commenced my army service when commissioned an artillery second lieutenant in Dec. 1911. In Aug. 1934 I was appointed artillery colonel and became commander of the second heavy field artillery regiment at MISHIMA. I was transferred to the reserve list in Aug. 1936.
2. I was again called up to the colors in Aug. 1937 and dispatched to the north and to middle China as a heavy artillery regimental commander till in Apr. 1939 I was again restored to the reserve list.
3. Except for the above two periods of active duty I have never been in government service and have been at all other times a simple ordinary civilian.
4. Neither has any official position, which I have occupied been sufficiently important to have entitled me to take part in any planning, preparing or conspiring in relation to the Manchurian Incident, the China Incident or the Pacific War, nor did I as a matter of fact participate in any planning, preparing or conspiring in regard to these incidents or war.
5. I have never been on friendly terms with any of the defendants. As a matter of fact, at the time of the so-called October Incident I was severely reprimanded by Lt. Gen. ARAKI and confined by order of War Minister MINAMI.



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6. My publications "Messages to Young Men", "The Inevitability of Renovation", "The Road to the Reconstruction of the World", "The Second Creation" and essays which appeared in the magazine "Taiyo Dai-Nippon" were all written and published when I was an ordinary civilian. In these publications and essays were described only my personal opinions as an ordinary civilian and they did not represent any plan or conspiracy worked out in cooperation with any other party.

7. While a civilian I made some public speeches, but these conveyed only my personal convictions arrived at independently and not through any plan or conspiracy with any other persons.

8. In Sept. 1927, I was appointed Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Turkey and served there till Jan. 1930. During that period - on 15 Nov. 1929 - I sent to deputy chief of staff OKAMOTO, Renichiro a report bearing the title of "Situation in the Caucasus and its Strategic Utilization". This report was made in the course of the performance of a military attache's routine duty. In this report the phrases "Subject to change, of course, with the <sup>then</sup> existing world situation" and "in case trouble should arise between Russia and Japan" appear. These phrases should be interpreted to mean that "our attitude has to be altered in accordance with changes in international relations" and "i., unfortunately, a war should break out between Japan and Russia".

It is obvious not only from this report, but from an examination of any and all other evidence that I have never plotted, prepared or conspired with others to wage an aggressive war against Russia.

9. In Oct. 1930 I inaugurated with a view to national reform a study and discussion group called "Sakurakai" or the "Cherry-Blossom Society" whose members consisted of officers under the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

"Sakurakai" or the "Cherry Blossom Society" was not a secret society, had no regulations and no fees were charged. The society had no connection with the Kwantung Army or its officers.

Discussions were not held relative to the Manchurian Problem nor did the society have any connection with the Manchurian Incident.

10. I did not form any research group on Manchu-Mongolia issues nor did I join or back incognito any such group. I have never even heard of the existence of such a group.

11. In March 1931, I participated in the so-called March Incident plotted by Doctor OKAWA, Shumei with the aim to organize a cabinet headed by General UGAKI, Kazushige for the cause of national reform, but the plan was not realized because of the General's disapproval.

The Incident was not linked with the Manchurian Incident.

12. I thought up the so-called October Incident in Oct. 1931 to bring about a cabinet headed by Lieut. General ARAKI for the purpose of national reform and urged him to accept. But, on the contrary, he severely reprimanded me and at the order of War Minister MINAMI I was arrested by the Military Police. After 25 days heavy confinement, I was relegated to the position of a regimental officer of the Himeji Regiment. This incident had no connection whatsoever with the Manchurian Incident. It was first thought out in the course of a conversation with Captain CHO, Isamu in the beginning of October of the same year, after he returned to Tokyo from Peking. It never materialized. No civilians joined the October Incident. Mr. KCISO, Kuniaki was not related in any way to this incident.

13. I have never had a chance to talk with Mr. TANAKA, Ryukichi concerning the Manchurian Incident.

In August 1934 I was the commander of the heavy field artillery regiment at Michima City. I knew nothing of the meeting

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sponsored by SUZUKI, Takashi at the Akebonoso restaurant. I have never been there, nor do I know anything of its whereabouts.

14. In April 1931 as chief of the Russian Section of the Second Department of the General Staff at the meeting for "Estimation of Situation" I advanced the following opinion, to wit: That Army Gen. Headquarters should recommend that the government take a firm attitude toward settling the hundreds of pending questions in Manchuria. Other than this, I had nothing to do with the Manchurian Incident or the founding of Manchukuo.

15. At the time of the Marco-Polo Bridge Incident of July 1937, I was living in Tokyo as a reserve officer on inactive duty and had nothing to do with the incident.

16. While I was at the front, pursuant to the order of Commanding General of the Army YANAGAWA, at Wuhu I fired at ships fleeing from Nanking which were carrying retreating Chinese soldiers. Unfortunately, on that occasion the British Gun Boat "Lady Bird" which was among the Chinese ships was struck and an incident was created. But the fact that the shooting was by mistake due to the dense fog which made me take it for a Chinese ship was brought to light and I was set free from any responsibility.

17. I have had nothing to do with the "Panay Incident".

18. Neither I nor the forces under my command have ever been at Nanking, Hankow or Canton. I have neither ill treated POW's, nor committed inhuman acts against any persons. Neither have I permitted others under my authority to do such acts. I have never been in a position wherein I could have performed such acts.

19. After I left active service, I founded in Oct. 1936 with a view to national reform the Great Japan Youth Party of which no soldier on active duty nor any distinguished personages were members.

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The party was supported by 1 yen per capita entrance fee and 1 yen per capita annual membership fee paid in by a little less than 20,000 members. It was never subsidized by the army or from any other quarter. It did not aim at aggressive war.

20. After the dissolution of the said party in October 1940, I established the Great Japan Loyalty Society (DAI-NIPPON SEKISEI-KAI), consisting of some of the members of the former. No soldiers on active duty nor any distinguished personages were among its members. This society was maintained by about 5,000 members' entrance fees at 2 yen per capita and an annual membership fee of 1 yen per capita and was not subsidized by the army or from any other quarter. This society did not aim at aggressive war. It was dissolved in September 1944.

21. "TAIYO DAI-NIPPON" was the official publication of the Great Japan Youth Party and then of the Great Japan Loyalty Society after the former's dissolution. Its circulation was limited to its members.

22. In the fall of 1940, I was appointed a director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), formed by KONOYE, Fumimaro, from which I resigned in February 1941. The said association's object was the practice of the "Way of the Subject". It was not a body which was formed with aggressive war as its aim nor did it work toward such an end.

23. In September 1944, I was appointed headquarters director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Adult Association which was a part of the IRRA, but I resigned in February 1945. After joining this association my only work was the barley crop increase campaign. The association was not a body which was formed with aggressive war as its aim nor did it work toward such an end.

On this 5 day of September, 1947.

At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,  
Ichigaya, Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ HASHIMOTO, Kingoro (Seal)

I, HAYASHI, Itsuro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,  
at the same place.

Witness: /s/ HAYASHI, Itsuro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HASHIMOTO, Kingoro (seal)

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Def, Doc# 2231

Exh, NO

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述者

橋本欣五郎

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲナシタル上  
次ノ如ク供述致シマス

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一、私ハ明治四十四年（一九一一年）十二月陸軍砲兵少尉ニ任ゼラレテ以來軍籍ニアリマシタ、昭和九年（一九三四年）八月陸軍砲兵大佐ニ任ゼラレ三島市ニアル野戰重砲兵第二聯隊長ニ補セラレマシタガ昭和十一年（一九三六年）八月豫備役トナリマシタ。

二、私ハ昭和十二年（一九三七年）八月召集セラレ野戰重砲兵聯隊長トシテ北支並ニ中支ニ出征シマシタガ昭和十四年（一九三九年）四月召集セラ解除セラレテ再び豫備役トナリマシタ。

三、私ハ以上ニ述ベマシタニツノ期間現役軍人デアリマシタ以外ニハ何等ノ官職ニモ就イタ事ハアリマセズ、其他ノ期間ハ凡テ紳然タル市井ノ一民間人ニ過ギマセシマシタ。

四、私ハ滿洲事變、支那事變並ニ太平洋戰争ノ計劃準備謀議ニ參加シ得ル官職ニ就イタ事モナク又斯カル計劃準備謀議ニ參加シタ事モアリマセヌ。

五、私ハ被告ノ誰トモ親交關係ハアリマセヌ  
命ヲ加留  
却テ所謂十月事件當時ニハ荒木中將ニ叱責セラレ南陸軍大臣井澤帥セ

六、私ノ著書「青年に贈る」「革新の必然性」「世界再建の道」「第三の開闢」及ビ太陽大日本ニ掲載シマシタ私ノ論文ハ全部私ガ市井ノ一民間人デアツタ當時ニ書イタモノデアリ且發行シタモノデアリマス。



私ノ著書並ニ論文ハ一民間人トシテノ私個人ノ意見ヲ記述シタモノデアリマシテ他ノ如何ナル人トモ計劃又ハ謀議シタモノデアリマセヌ。七私ハ一民間人デアアル間ニ何處カ演説ヲシタ事ガアリマス、然シ夫レハ凡テ一民間人トシテノ私獨自ノ立場ノ意見ヲ發表シタモノデ他ノ如何ナル人トモ計劃又ハ謀議シタモノデアリマセヌ。

八私ハ昭和二年（一九二七年）九月土耳其國駐在帝國大使館附武官ニ補セラレ昭和五年（一九三〇年）一月マデ其ノ地ニ在勤シマシタ、其ノ間昭和四年（一九二九年）十一月十五日私ハ參謀次長岡本連一郎ニ對シ「高架索事情及之ガ謀略的利用」ト題スル報告ヲ送ツタ事ガアリマス、此ノ事ハ大使館附武官トシテ當然爲サナケレバナラナイ任務ヲ實行シタモノデアリマス。

右報告ノ中ニハ特ニ「其ノ時ノ國際關係ニヨリ變化スベキモ」ト云フ字句並ニ「日蘇有事ノ際」ト云フ字句ガ挿入シテアリマス。

此ノ字句ハ「其ノ時其ノ時ノ國際關係ニ依リ變化シナケレバナラナイガ」若シ不幸ニシテ萬一日蘇國ニ紛争ガ起ツタ場合ニハ「ト云フ意味デアリマス。

此ノ報告ハ索ヨリ其ノ他ノ有ラユル場合ニ於テ私ハ蘇聯邦ニ對シ侵略戦争ヲ計劃シタリ準備シタリ謀議シタリシタ事ハ絕對ニアリマセヌ。

九私ハ昭和五年（一九三〇年）十月中佐以下ノ若イ將校ヲ集メテ國內改

造ニ關シ櫻會ト云フ研究座談會ヲ作りマシタ、櫻會ハ秘密結社デハアリマセヌ、又會則ヤ會費ノ定モアリマセヌ。

櫻會ハ關東軍ヤ關東軍ノ將校トハ何等ノ關係モアリマセヌ、又滿洲問題ニ關シテ討議シタ事モナク且滿洲事變ト何ノ關係モアリマセヌ。

七、私ハ滿洲問題研究ノ結社ヲ組織シタ事ハアリマセヌ、又斯カル結社ニ參加シタコトモ其ノ裏面ニ於テ活動シタコトモアリマセヌ、私ハ斯カル結社ノ存在シタコトサヘモ知りマセヌ。

八、私ハ昭和六年(一九三一年)三月國內改造ノ爲メ宇垣一成大將ヲ首班トスル內閣ヲ組織セシメヤウトシテ大川周明博士ガ企圖シタ所謂三月事件ナルモノニ參加シマシタ、然シ宇垣氏ガ贊成シナイノチ實現スルニ至リマセンデシタ。

三月事件ト滿洲事變トハ關係アリマセヌ。

九、私ハ同年十月國內改造ノ爲メ荒木貞夫中將ヲ首班トスル內閣ヲ組織セシメヤウトシテ所謂十月事件ナルモノヲ考ヘ付キ荒木氏ノ奮起ヲ促シマシタガ反對ニ同氏カラ叱責セラレ南陸軍大臣ノ命令チ憲兵隊ニ捕ヘラレテ重懲候二十五日ノ處分ヲ受ケタ上姫路聯隊附ニ左遷セラレマシタ。

十月事件ト滿洲事變トハ全然關係アリマセヌ。

十月事件ハ同年十月初、長勇大尉ガ北京カラ歸京シタ後同人ト私ト話



テ居タ英國砲艦レデーバード號ヲ射撃シタ爲メ問題トナリマシタ。  
然シ夫レハ濠務ノ爲メ中國船舶ト見誤ツテ致シタ過失デアツタノデ私  
ニハ何ノ責任モナイコトニ定マリマシタ。

十七 私ハバネー號事件トハ關係アリマセヌ。

十八 私並ニ私ノ指揮下ノ軍隊ハ南京、漢口、廣東ニハ絶對ニ行ツタ事ハア  
リマセヌ、私ハ俘虜ノ虐待ヤ其ノ他ノ者ニ對スル殘虐行爲ハシタ事モ  
セシメタ事モ許容シタ事モアリマセヌ、又斯カル事柄ニ關係アル職務  
ニ就イタ事モアリマセヌ。

十九 私ハ現役軍人ヲ去ツタ後昭和十一年（一九三六年）十月國內改造ノ目  
的ヲ以テ大日本青年黨ヲ樹テマシタ、此ノ團體ニハ現役軍人又ハ知名  
ノ士ハ一人モ加ハツテ居リマセヌ。

此ノ團體ノ經費ハ二万名弱ノ會員カラ徵集スル毎年一圓宛ノ會費ト入  
會金一圓トテ支辨シテ居リマシタ。軍部其ノ他如何ナル方面カラモ財  
政上ノ援助ヲ受ケタコトハアリマセヌ。

此ノ團體ハ侵略戰爭ヲ目的トシタモノデハアリマセヌ。

二十 昭和十五年（一九四〇年）十月大日本青年黨ヲ解散シタ後、私ハ其ノ  
會員ノ一部分デ大日本赤誠會ヲ作りマシタ、此ノ團體ニハ現役軍人又  
ハ知名ノ士ハ一名モ加ハツテ居リマセヌ。  
此ノ團體ノ經費ハ五千名位ノ會員カラ徵收スル毎年一圓宛ノ會費ト入

會金二圓トテ支辨シテ居リマシタ。軍部其ノ在如何ナル方面カラモ財政上ノ援助ヲ受ケタ事ハアリマセヌ。

此ノ団体ハ侵略戦争ヲ目的トシタモノデハアリマセヌ。

大日本赤誠會ハ昭和十九年（一九四四年）九月解散シマシタ。

三三、太陽末日本ハ大日本青年黨ノ機關紙デアリマス。同団体ガ解散シマシタ。

後ハ大日本赤誠會ノ機關紙トナリマシタ。

此ノ新聞ハ會員ニ支ケ配布シタモノデアリマス。

三三、私ハ昭和十五年（一九四〇年）秋近衛文麿公ガ創立シタ大政翼贊會ノ

總務ノ一人ニ加ヘラレマシタガ昭和十六年（一九四一年）二月辭任シテ了ヒマシタ。

此ノ団体ノ目的ハ臣道實踐デアリマス。侵略戦争ヲ目的トスル団体デモナク又斯カル目的ノ爲ニ仕事ヲシタコトモアリマセヌ。

三三、私ハ昭和十九年（一九四四年）九月大政翼贊會ノ一部タル翼贊壯年團

ノ本部長ニ擧ゲラレマシタガ昭和二十年（一九四五年）二月辭任シマシタ。此ノ団体ニ加ハツテカラ私ノシタ仕事ハ麥ノ増産獎勵運動タケデアリマス。

此ノ団体ハ侵略戦争ヲ目的トシタモノデアリマセヌ、又侵略戦争ノ

目的ノ爲ニ仕事ヲシタコトモアリマセヌ。

Def, Doo字2231

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）

九月五日

於

東京市ヶ谷極東國際軍事裁判所

供述者 橋本 欣五郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣審シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日於同所

立會人 林 逸 郎

Def, No. 2231

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良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ

宜  
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署名捺印 橋 本 欣五郎

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

UG/KI, S/D/O ET AL

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Affidavit of

UG/KI, Kazushige

I was the War Minister of the Kiyoura, Kato, Wakatsuki, and Hamaguchi Cabinets. When I was the War Minister in the Kato Cabinet (1926 - 1928) I carried out the readjustment of the numerical strength of the Japanese Army. My plan met with the severest opposition in certain army circles but in the face of this great opposition I succeeded in pushing through the plan. At that time, General Hata, then a colonel was Chief of the Second Section (Operational Section) of the General Staff, which Section was responsible for the execution of my program. It was in this Section that the work, the plans, and the operations for my readjustment program had to be carried out. Hata supported me wholeheartedly and earnestly worked for the success of the plan. In the Japanese Army, the Section Chiefs did most of the work and were of the utmost importance in this sense as they were the driving force of all programs which had to pass through their sections. Without the earnest support and the extraordinary endeavors of General Hata, however hard I may have tried to realize the plan, the readjustment plan could not have been accomplished at that time.

When, in 1937, I tried under command of the Emperor to form a Cabinet, I met with the strongest opposition from a part of the army circles. This opposition came as a result of the antipathy which still existed against me because of my execution of the readjustment plan when I had previously been War Minister. The Three Chiefs' Council according to tradition recommended three candidates as War Minister for my Cabinet but each of those candidates submitted to me a note stating that he declined to act in such a capacity under my premiership. So I proposed to recommend one who would desire to work in my Cabinet and one who I knew would support me and my policies as my War Minister. As a matter of fact, there were hundreds of generals in the Japanese Army eligible to become War Minister and the number was not necessarily limited only to three. I tried to offer my own recommendation for the person whom I desired to be my War Minister but the Three Chiefs' Council would not allow me to make any nomination for this post, saying that under the circumstances, there was no suitable candidate to be my War Minister. As a result, I was unable to form a Cabinet. Had I been allowed to name my preference for a War Minister, I would have nominated and asked for General Hata, Shunroku, who was one of the candidates I had in mind.

When the Yonai Cabinet resigned, I heard a rumor that the army had forced Hata to resign from the Cabinet in order to force the Yonai Cabinet out of office. I think that the nature of that action, the way Hata was overthrown and kicked out of the Cabinet was in the same nature as when in a previous year I had tried and failed to form a Cabinet because of being boycotted by the army.

Because he had so earnestly cooperated with my army readjustment program when I was War Minister, he had incurred a strong antipathy in certain army circles and this antipathy followed him throughout his career. In all my years of knowing General Hata, I came to respect him greatly because of the manner in which he became Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor and later War Minister, because he always adhered strictly to military traditions, refrained from engaging in politics at any time, never went to one extreme or the other, but always followed the middle road as a true soldier.



Once in 1944 when I went to China trying to bring about peace between China and Japan, Hata learned of my arrival in China and he sent me a letter encouraging me in my efforts to bring about peace between the two countries. It was ever thus. Hata, while a military man, in all the years I know him always strove earnestly to maintain peace and I think he was most greatly distressed when the war did break out.

Q. TH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

UG/KI, Kazushigo (Seal)

On this 24th day of August, 1947, at Izu, Nagaoka

Deponent: UG/KI, Kazushigo (Seal)

I, KOKUBU, Tomoharu, heroby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Izu, Nagaoka

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (Seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITAR TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

ARAKI, SADA0, ET AL

Affidavit of

General Miyano, Masatoshi

- Q. When the Doolittle fliers were captured, who captured them?
- A. Two aircraft landed in China, one in the area of the 13th Army and one in the area of the 11th Army, and when this was reported the order was given by the Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo to send those fliers to Tokyo immediately.
- Q. Did they all go to Tokyo together, those caught by the 11th Army and the 13th Army?
- A. All together, at the same time.
- Q. Did they all come back to China together?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When they came back to China from Tokyo, where were they sent?
- A. Shanghai.
- Q. When the fliers were brought back to Shanghai, did any orders come with them as to what should be done?
- A. The order was that those fliers were to be tried by the China Expeditionary Force, which did not mean China Expeditionary Force Headquarters.
- Q. What did the order state?
- A. The order was in two parts. One part stated that a new military law for the treatment of fliers who raided Japanese areas had been created and ordered us to post the new law in accordance with a copy that was attached to the order. The second part ordered that the fliers be tried by military court in accordance with the new military law which was contained in the first part of the order.
- Q. When was the order notifying you of the creation of the new military law received?
- A. 28 July 1942.
- Q. Then what happened?
- A. General Hata was opposed to trying the fliers by military law, instead, he wanted to treat them as prisoners of war. He stated to his Chief of Staff, and I heard this because I was sitting there at the time, that it was his intention to give the fliers as generous consideration as possible. He said that in Tokyo insisted that the fliers be tried under the new military law, he Hata, would give them the lightest possible or the most generous possible decision at the trial. He stated that if there were any slightest extenuating circumstances to be taken into

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A. consideration, he would take them into consideration and pass them as light a sentence as possible. He stated it was his intention to treat the fliers generously.

Q. What happened next?

A. Since the China Expeditionary Force Headquarters did not have any military court in its organization and since Tokyo had sent the fliers directly to Shanghai, it was decided that the trial, if it had to be held, would be held by the 13th Army whose headquarters were in Shanghai. Because General Hata opposed the idea of trying the American fliers by a military court, instead of ordering the 13th Army to proceed with the trial, he ordered the 13th Army to investigate whether or not the fliers would be tried by military law or could be treated as prisoners of war.

Q. Then what happened?

A. Later I found out that the 13th Army decided that there was not enough evidence to try the fliers by military court and requested directly of Tokyo, not through our headquarters, more evidence against the fliers. It did this through the Shanghai office of the Kompeitai. This I learned after the trial when during one of my trips between Nanking and Shanghai I saw this document in Shanghai.

Q. Did General Hata ever himself or your headquarters receive any answer from the 13th Army saying that the evidence was not sufficient to hold a trial.

A. No.

Q. What happened next?

A. When General Hata expressed his intention of generous treatment of the fliers to Lt. General Ushirogu, his Chief of Staff, Lt. General Ushirogu on the same day wrote a letter to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo, General Tanabe, stating the intentions of General Hata and also the intentions of the Tokyo Central Authorities. The letter was forwarded to Tokyo by messenger on an airplane the very same day.

Q. Then what happened?

A. As a result of the letter sent by Lt. General Ushirogu to the Tokyo Central Authorities stating the intentions of General Hata, Colonel Arisue came all the way from Tokyo as emissary from the Chief of the General Staff and expressed the desires of the Chief of the General Staff, which were: To carry out the trial in a very strict manner, and that punishment must be very strict. As a matter of fact, the Chief of the General Staff was expecting the death sentence. Further, it was the order of the Chief of the General Staff that the decision of the trial be forwarded to Tokyo immediately for action by Tokyo. The execution of the sentence should be stayed until the decision was forwarded from Tokyo after action was taken in Tokyo on the decision of the trial. Further, after execution of sentence, no announcement was to be made by the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters, but all announcements relative to the trial, sentence and execution of sentence, would be made by Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo. In this connection, General Hata stated to Colonel Arisue that because of the seriousness and the importance of the matter, he wanted the orders from Tokyo in writing. Colonel Arisue retorted that because of the seriousness of the matter the Chief of the General Staff had decided to forward the orders not in writing but by his personal emissary, Colonel Arisue himself, and that there was no more reliable way of conveying those orders than by the use of high ranking officer courier.

Q. After General Hata forwarded the orders of Tokyo that the fliers should be tried, what further action did he take with relation to the trial?

A. No further action.

Q. Did he appoint the members of the tribunal?

A. No.

Q. Did he appoint the prosecutor?

A. No.

Q. Did he appoint the defense counsel?

A. No.

Q. Did he make any appointments for any position with regard to the court or any of its members?

A. No, this was not within his province. The trial was to be held by the 13th Army, which had its headquarters in Shanghai, the place to which the fliers had been delivered from Tokyo. With the arrival of Colonel Arisue with a complete set of orders from Tokyo that they were to be tried by military court, which military court did not exist in the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Force which was located in Nanking, control of all matters in the trial was out of our hands. As the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Force, we were now the channel through which all orders relative to the trial would pass and would be forwarded on to the 13th Army in Shanghai.

Q. Did Hata make known to the 13th Army his intention to treat the fliers generously?

A. No, because he had already been told by the emissary of the Chief of the General Staff what the intentions and desires were of the Chief of the General Staff. Hata as a subordinate could not make any recommendations of his own. If no orders had been received from Tokyo as to the intentions and desires of the General Staff, then General Hata as the highest authority of the Japanese Army in China would have been permitted to express his desires to the 13th Army. But since he had been told directly by the emissary of the High Command, Colonel Arisue, what the Tokyo authorities desired, he had to control his own desires as to their treatment or the demands to be made for sentence. However, General Hata still did not give up his hope of giving the fliers a light sentence because there was still the order to forward to Tokyo immediately the decision of the trial. Then again, the execution of sentence was to be stayed until the decision of Tokyo was made known. On these two points General Hata thought Tokyo would consider the matter carefully and might mitigate the sentence or might do something different after their minute consideration of the entire case, so General Hata put every expectation on the further decision of the Tokyo people.

Q. Why didn't General Hata, when he received the decision from Shanghai and then forwarded it to Tokyo as per instructions, make any recommendation to Tokyo to treat these people generously?

A. Since it had been ordered that the final decision would be made in Tokyo, General Hata could not suggest nor was it permissible for General Hata to suggest again and again to his superiors in Tokyo what they should do or to offer his recommendations. His intentions of treating the fliers in a generous manner had already been communicated to Tokyo through his Chief of Staff and that was the reason why Tokyo had dispatched Colonel Arisue as emissary of the General Staff direct to Hata to notify him of

- A. the contrary intentions of the Tokyo central authorities. General Hata (Contd) had good reason to expect, since he knew that his personal intentions were known to the General Staff and since they had ordered that execution of sentence be stayed until further order should be given by Tokyo they would mitigate the sentences. Indeed, he was correct in this because later the decision came from Tokyo saving the lives of five of the fliers
- Q. How had General Hata's intentions to treat these fliers in a fair manner become known to Tokyo?
- A. When General Hata had disclosed his intentions to his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Ushirogu, Lieutenant General Ushirogu had reported it to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo and had asked the intentions and desires of the General Staff. That is how the intentions of General Hata became known to the General Staff and as a result of this knowledge, Colonel Arisue was dispatched to Nanking to give the orders and the desires of the Chief of the General Staff for the conduct of the trial to General Hata.
- Q. Now at any time did General Hata express if he had his way what his decision would be?
- A. I only know that one day he told the Commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General Sawada that, "I do not know whether you like the sentence of the Tribunal or not, but that is a matter beyond my control. I can do nothing about it", by which he expressed his disapproval of the decision.
- Q. When the fliers were tried by military court under the newly promulgated military law promulgated by Tokyo and ordered posted in China, what decision was open to the court to make?
- A. It could find the fliers guilty or it could acquit them.
- Q. At any time during the entire proceedings was General Hata as Commander of the Japanese Armies in China permitted or authorized to exercise any discretion in the setting up of the Tribunal, its members, recommendation to them of a decision?
- A. No. With the arrival of Colonel Arisue, the entire matter was handled directly in accordance with orders from Tokyo and in the same manner as if the trial had been held in Tokyo. The only difference was that Tokyo had sent the fliers back to Shanghai and had ordered the trial held there. Everything, including decision to hold the trial, the law under which the trial was to be held, the review of the sentence of the tribunal, the time as to the execution of the sentences and even the announcement of the trial and its sentence and the execution of the sentence were all handled by Tokyo. At no time were we permitted or were we in any position to alter or change any of those decisions or to offer our own recommendations. From the very beginning after the fliers were captured by the 11th Army and the 13th Army, Tokyo assumed control of the entire matter. They were ordered to Tokyo for questioning and examination and then when that was finished the fliers were returned to Shanghai and the order arrived that their trial should be held in China.
- Q. At any time from the very beginning until it was all over, was there anything that General Hata could have done to alter the chain of events as they took place?
- A. Neither General Hata, nor anyone else in his position could have made the slightest change in the whole event.

1. I was born on 1st of January 1898 at 3218 Nagotomura, Jinsokigan, Hiroshima Prefecture, and am now living at 912 Oizumirachi Nerimaku, Tokyo.

2. Gist of personal history is as follows:

May 1918	Graduated Military Academy
December 1918	Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant
March 1941	Member of Staff of China Expeditionary Forces. At the time Colonel.
March 1943	Director of Reserve Officer's Training School. At the time Major General
July 1945	Vice-Chief of Staff of Central Area Army, Japan, till termination of war.

3. From March 1941 to March 1943, I was a member of staff of the China Expeditionary Forces and Section Chief of the First Department of Military Staff Office. Referring to the Doolittle Airplane Incident, my Section handled the case because it was an affair concerning the Supreme Command and so I am very conversant with this case.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

MIYANO, Hsatoshi (Seal)

On the 11th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: MIYANO, Hsatoshi (Seal)

I, IMANARI, Taitaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: IMANARI, Taitaro (Seal)

Notice:

Exhibit 3198 to be

Corrected in accordance with Language

Board decision, as shown on Court

Record 29,077.

Doc. Div.

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

ARAKI, SADAQ, ET AL

Affidavit of

ADMIRAL YONAI, Mitsumasa

I was a member of various Japanese Governments over a period of years and since 1937 I held the following positions:

1. Navy Minister for the Cabinets of HAYASHI, KONOE (1st Cabinet), HIRANUMA and SUZUKI.
2. Prime Minister from January 16, 1940, to July 21, 1940.

When the Incident of the Marco Polo Bridge broke out on July 7, 1937, I was the Navy Minister in the 1st Konoé Cabinet. Just at this time General Hata was the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces on the Island of Formosa (Taiwan) and it is needless to say that neither the forces in Formosa, nor General Hata had any connection whatsoever with this Incident either in its beginning or later. It was not until February 1938 that General Hata first went to China, when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Central China.

During the period from January 16, 1940, to July 21, 1940, when I was the Prime Minister, General Hata Shunroku was the War Minister at the time. With respect to the Tri-Partite Pact with the Axis countries, my Cabinet was completely opposed to it and for this reason this question did not even once come up in our Cabinet conferences.

It appeared that there was an atmosphere and a feeling in army circles to make good use of Germany in settling the China Incident, but in my Cabinet, no attention was paid to this at all. The Cabinet was simply disregarding such a possibility.

Coming to this question and to General Hata who was my War Minister, he earnestly cooperated with my Cabinet's policy and, of course, naturally was opposed to the Pact. And so, as my Cabinet opposed and excluded such a pact with Germany and also because it was not pro-German, a desire to overthrow my Cabinet came into being.

Those who opposed my Cabinet were endeavoring to kill two birds with one stone; that is, to have General Hata, who was opposed to the Tri-Partite Pact, resign from the government and simultaneously to overthrow the Cabinet. Eventually, their plan was carried out and their objective was obtained - two birds killed with one stone. When General Hata resigned, I believed and felt that his resignation was not of his own free will but that he was forced to resign by elements he was powerless to fight and today I am more convinced than ever that my beliefs then were correct.

I asked Hata to recommend someone to be the next War Minister. Hata immediately went out saying that the successor would be decided in the Three Chief's Conference. This Conference was composed of the Chief of Staff, the Inspector General of Military Education, and the War Minister. It was their duty to name the new War Minister. He returned in the evening looking very worried and said there was no man who would be the successor to the post. His face looked very pensive because he was conscious that this lack of the successor would become the cause of the fall of the Cabinet - consequently he

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himself would be the cause. I read this feeling in his face, and after the general resignation of the Cabinet, called Hata to my room and said, as nearly as I can remember: "I can understand your situation - you have suffered very much. As for me, however, I do not blame you at all. I understand. Take it easy and do not worry." I shook his hand and Hata smiled a sad smile - a smile of resignation, peculiar to a Japanese. His situation was indeed a pitiful one.

General Hata, as far as I know, never was a member of any clique, association, brotherhood, society or other jingoistic or ultra-militaristic group either in the army or in politics. In fact, Hata at all times solemnly avoided politics. He was first and last a soldier, a conservative soldier, and diligently devoted himself to his duty always in accordance with army regulations, never according to political considerations.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YONAI, Mitsumasa (Seal)

On this 7 day of August, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: YONAI, Mitsumasa (Seal)

I, IMANARI, Taitaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: IMANARI, Taitaro (Seal)

5.2/199A

I.P.S. Document No. 2999-D.  
Exhibit 3199-A

Article published on p. 2 July 17, 1940, TOKYO ASAHI SHIMBUN/  
Liquidation of YONAI-ARITA's Diplomatic Policy.

Peculiarity of the present

Change of Government.

It was January 16 of this year when Admiral YONAI took the office of premiership succeeding the ABE Government, which soon fell in the beginning of this year amid bitter criticisms of the whole nation as the result of successive mal-administrations. Since then, the YONAI Cabinet has successfully weathered the 75th Imperial Diet; on July 16, after full half an year of diligent work, it had to resign. When the Imperial Mandate was issued to Admiral YONAI to form a Cabinet, everybody was surprised, and attention was directed toward Admiral YONAI to see how he would break the difficult situation as a "trump-card of YUASA, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal."

Prediction comes true after half an year.

In the analytical criticism published in this column immediately after the establishment of the YONAI Cabinet, under the title "Characteristics of the YONAI Cabinet", we find the following paragraphs: -

"It is a fact that the people feel something unaccountable in the formation of the new Cabinet; but as it is a feeling, it cannot be helped. Therefore the future of the YONAI Cabinet can be said to be determined by whether it would eliminate this unaccountable feeling through its action, and also how the friction with the reform party would be minimized." And also "As the characteristic of the YONAI Cabinet, we must point out the diplomatic policy. The YONAI-ARITA diplomacy has long been criticised as being pro-BRITISH and pro-AMERICAN by some people. It cannot be denied that the whole YONAI Cabinet appeared as being representative of the status quo."

Thus we indicated, but this prediction has come true half an year later. Criticisms and attacks against the ARITA diplomacy were made by some members of the reform party in the Imperial Diet, but the changes of diplomatic policy to meet the sudden developments of the EUROPEAN war is beyond the scope of mere discussions and must be immediately put into practice. It has finally become a grave political question

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whether the YONAI-ARITA diplomacy, namely, the foreign policy of the present cabinet can actually assume the attitude of meeting these sudden changes.

Premier YONAI and Foreign Minister ARITA have once come to the conclusion of taking diplomatic policy of breaking the status quo in facing the present grave diplomatic turning point, but judging from the past characteristics and records of both YONAI and ARITA, it is concluded that it is impossible to expect an active development in diplomacy. It has been brought to light that the characteristic of the present Cabinet is basically incompatible with the views of the military circle.

#### Demand for a Big Change in Foreign Policy

The surging tendency of the new age which was caused by German-Italian Axis, control of Europe inevitably must exert big influence on Japan's position in Orient. The fiery demands for a big change in Japan's foreign policy which has flared up within the Army circle, has combined with the wide-spread movement of the political circle which is trying to support a new political body with Prince KONOYE as the key man. It thus appeared as the motive power for the downfall of the YONAI Cabinet. The YONAI Cabinet has been forced to retreat after being attacked thoroughly by the strong propelling power representing the Army. Moreover, this tendency spurred the movement of establishing a new political organization, and menaced from the rear the existence of the Cabinet, by making connections with the military circle. However, the resignation of YONAI's Cabinet has already become a question of time due to such confused situations in political circle. One of the problems which stimulated the above-said situation was that of the replacement of the president of the Privy Council in connection with Prince KONOYE's recent resignation as the president of the Privy Council Baron HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, who now belongs to the party campaigning for the establishment of a new political organization, became a candidate for the Presidency of the Privy Council through the recommendation of Prince KONOYE. But Premier YONAI did not accept it and forcefully carried out the promotion Vice-President HARA. This greatly stimulated the bloc of new political organization, and since then their opposition to the YONAI Cabinet has become conspicuously stronger. The direct cause for the collapse of the YONAI Cabinet under such circumstances was War Minister HATA's strong attack.

Therefore, the peculiarity of the present cabinet change is not due to deadlocks in various domestic issues as seen in

the case of the ABE Cabinet. It must be said that through the total resignation of the YONAI Cabinet, they threw off the burden which the YONAI Cabinet which stands for status quo could by no means bear, in facing the epoch-making turning point of domestic and international scale. In other words, it must be said that the radical domestic and foreign policy which is represented by the Army, destroyed with one stroke the present Cabinet which stands for status quo.

#### Cabinet Change Has Big Significance.

From such observations, careful attention must be paid to the fact that the significance and characteristics of this cabinet change are politically and ideologically very important, and that this cabinet change has deep complications never before seen in previous cabinet changes. The fact that the Army has exposed its whole attitude in politics in the present foreign policy should be sufficient to make us fully aware of the present political situation. We will therefore trace the course of events leading up to the present Cabinet change, with emphasis on the Army's movements. In order to meet the tense international situation which accompanied sudden changes in the European War, the Army has previously recognized the urgent necessity of reforming the foreign policy and establishing a domestic political organization, and thus settle completely the China Incident. Studies were being carried out in sections and bureaus concerned, for its realization. The Army's demands suddenly came to the surface when they took advantage of the case of Foreign Minister ARITA's broadcast of June 29th.

In other words, although Foreign Minister ARITA stressed "the establishment of the East Asia 'autonomy sphere'", he did not show any sign of liquidating the principle of depending on Britain and the U.S., and of advancing the policy of breaking the status quo between Japan, Germany and Italy, as actual diplomatic measures. Therefore, the dissatisfaction of the Army only increased. The recent conflict between the War Ministry following matter, and the Foreign Ministry in connection with Foreign Minister ARITA's radio broadcast, was due to these circumstances. The trouble between the Army and the Foreign Ministry arose due to the charge that misinformation was broadcast from the Foreign Ministry to the effect that the broadcast was lukewarm and did not mention the strengthening of relations between Japan Germany and Italy because the Army was not in favor of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis. The problem was finally settled completely during the meeting between the War Minister and the Foreign Minister, and at a single glance, it seemed that the tension surrounding the cabinet change had been alleviated.

#### Prince KONOYE's appearance Expected.

However, the essence of the problem had not been settled. Due to their contention that even if the foreign policy is changed, it would be impossible for the Yonai-rite Axis to carry out the changed diplomacy and that the change would only represent a "Shift" in form, the military circle strongly continued to demand the immediate establishment of the new political organization with the resignation of the Yonai Cabinet, and the promotion of the changed policy by the new organization. Thus the movement for the appearance of Prince KONOYE who is the leader of the new political organization, grew stronger.

In view of the situation within the department, War Minister H.T., after having an interview with both Generals Terauchi and SUGIYAMA, old military senior heads, on the 7th and 8th, decided generally on measures to be taken as the War Minister. And on the 9th he met the Premier in the Cabinet meeting and indirectly expressed his intentions by saying, "How about thinking about cooperating with the new domestic organization?" To this statement by the War Minister, Premier YONAI replied, "with the domestic situation as it is, perhaps I may have to think about it," and thus expressed agreement for the time being.

#### War Minister Presents a Strong Note

Subsequently, on the 11th, MUTO, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, called on ISHIMIZU, Cabinet Secretary General, explained to the latter in detail the intention of the Army, amplifying the intention of the War Minister. Later, War Minister H.T., on the evening of the 14th, presented to Premier YONAI an important advice in writing. The note was very clear, and the content is as follows:

"The present conditions are such that we are now facing the greatest transition phase of world situation, and the strengthening of the domestic organization, and the reformation of the foreign policy have become the most pressing of all our work. However, the government is doing nothing, and it seems that it is idly losing an opportunity which will never come again. In this way it is even blocking the complete settlement of the Incident. Therefore, at this time, in order to give the people's minds a change, and promote the establishment of the new organization, from a broad point of view, how about deciding to have the Cabinet resign?"

The foregoing had an effect of a dagger pointing at the heart of the present Cabinet. On the following day, the 15th, War Minister H.T. had consultations also with Prince KAN-IN, the Chief of the Army General Staff. As a result, War Minister

made a final decision. Premier YONAI, however, had an altogether different view from the army as regards the situation, and with the intention of taking charge of the political situation with the present organization to the last, made the following demand on the 16th at 9:50 a.m. at the Cabinet meeting when he met the War Minister:

"My views are absolutely opposite from those of the War Minister. There is no need for a new organization. As long as you cannot agree with my views, I want you to tender your resignation, and want you to recommend the succeeding War Minister."

Thereupon War Minister HATA tendered the resignation which had already been prepared, and returned to the Official Residence of the War Minister for the time being. He then opened the conference of the Three Army Chiefs (T.N. RIKUGUN SAN CHOKAN) and the Conference of Supreme War Councillors in succession. After deliberations, the War Minister again returned to the Premier's Official Residence at 3:30 p.m., and met the Premier and made a clear cut reply as follows:

"I conferred with the three army chiefs, recommended the succeeding war minister and negotiated for their acceptance. But under the present circumstances, they had no mind to accept it. The entire army is absolutely opposed to your views."

Thus the lifeline of the present cabinet was severed, and the YONAI Cabinet resigned a half year after its formation. When the peculiarity of present cabinet change was made under such circumstances, in such state of affairs, it is not hard to imagine that the political situation after the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet will advance towards the development of a new organization.

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東京新聞縮刷部  
五月十七日  
記事よりの抜萃

米内有田外交の清算

今次政変の特殊性

阿部内閣が相次ぐ失政のため満天下の罵々たる排

難の中に新春早々倒れた後を受け、米内海軍

大将が宰相の印綬を帯びたのが本年一月十六日爾

來米内内閣は第七十五議會を無事乗切り、満半歳

の指揮經營の後七月十六日遂に退陣、羽目に落ち

た當初米内大将に組閣の大命が降下した際は、何人

もこれを意外に感じ、米内大将が「湯淺内府の秘めた切札

として如何にこの難局を打開して進まんとするが頗る注

視的となつた。

豫言半歳後に現る

米内内閣成立直後「米内内閣の性格」と題し本欄に

於て解剖した批判に次の一節の如きことを想起する。

「新内閣成立に際して國民が何か割切れるものを感し

てゐることは事實であり、之は感じてあるから何うも致し

方がない。然らば米内内閣の前途はこの割切れるに感して

その實踐に於て解消せしめるか、又革新派陣營

との摩擦が如何に少く済むかに依つて決定するを見て

よからう。又「米内内閣の性格」として外交政策を挙げねばな

No. 1

獨伊樞軸。歐洲制覇による澎湃たる新時代の風潮は東洋に於る日本の地位に對し、も至大なる影響を與へずには已まぬ。陸軍部内は高き外交方針大轉換の趨勢を要望し、近衛公之新政治体制の中心に、擁立せんとする政界に於ける澎湃たる動きと結び、ついでに米内閣倒壊の原因を動力として、現は米内閣は陸軍を代表とする強烈な推進力のため徹頭徹尾押し捲くられて退却するに至つた。

外交大轉換の要望

米内首相及び有田外相はこの重大な外交轉換期に直面し、應現狀打破外交の結論には到達したものの、所詮米内、有田兩相の過去の經歷及び性格を以て、は外交の飛躍的發展を期待する事は最早不可能に見られるに至り、現内閣の性格は今や軍方面の意向と本質的に相容れない様相を露呈するに至つた。

さして、米内、有田外交は一部に早くも親英米外交と批評されてゐる。……米内内閣全體を通じて多分に現狀維持勢力を代表し、濠洲上陸高は不決定出來ぬ。

と指摘した。半歳後にこの發言は正しく現狀となり現れた。有田外交に對する非難攻撃の征矢は議會中にも一部革新陣營から發せられたが、歐洲戰亂の急激な發展に伴ふ外交政策の轉換は最早論議の域を脱し、急遽な實踐を迫り、あり、現内閣の對外交方針たる米内有田外交を以て、果して此急激な變化に對處する姿勢をとり得るか、どうか、重大な政治問題となつてしまつた。

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加ふるにこの機運は国内新政治体制運動に拍車をかけ、軍方面と連絡を取り、背後から内閣の存立を脅かした。かゝる政界の騷然たる諸情勢は米内内閣の桂冠を既に時期の問題と看取せしめるに至つた。かかる情勢を刺戟した問題の一つは先般の近衛公枢相辞任と被る枢密院議長更迭問題であつた。今では新政治体制確立津管一人となつてゐる平沼騏一郎<sup>（前）</sup>近衛公から推されて枢府議長に候補になつたのに対し、米内首相がこれを容れず原副議長の昇格を強行したことが新政治体制のウツと著ろくと刺戟し、米内内閣に対するこの方面の風高りは著ろくと強くなつて行つた。かかる状態の中に在つて直接内閣崩壊の原因となつたものは畑陸相の強行突進であつた。

従つて今次政變の特殊性は何部内閣の例に見る如く内閣諸級の政策の行状りに縁由するものでなく國內的に國際的にも劃期的な轉換期に直面して現状維持的米内内閣を以つてはさうして、も其背負ひ即ち重荷を總評職代行によつて投出さしめたものと見なければならぬ。換言すれば陸軍が代表する急進的内治外交政策が現状維持的現内閣と一擧にして葬り去つたものとみなければならぬ。

### 政變の意義甚重大

No. 3. 斯く見れば政治的にも思想的にも今後政變の意義特色は極めて重大であつて従来の政變に之を見れば複雑深刻な内容を盛りこむ事と十分注視しなければならぬ。富国の外交政策と對象として軍の積極的に政治の前面に其全姿



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に依る新政治体制。急遽なる確立との新体制による轉換  
引交の推進の強硬に要望され続け、これがために新政治体制  
の中心的存在たる近衛公の出馬を期する運動が日一日熾  
烈となり、末に畑陸相はこの部内情勢に鑑み、去る七八兩日に  
かけて軍長たる寺内、杉山兩大將と會見懇談、後陸相  
として取らざる措置にして大體の壯と極め、九月の閣議前に首相  
と會見して、國家新体制に對する協力に就て互に意見を述べ、  
このかた故由にその意向を傳へ、米内首相の進言に對しては  
「このも國內情勢がどうかは考へねばなるまい」と一應同意  
を表明した

陸相強硬文書手交

次で十三日武蔵軍務局長は石渡書記官長を訪問し陸相  
の意向を転行して更に軍の意向を詳細説明し、そこで  
十四日の夕刻畑陸相は改めて米内首相に對し文書を以て重  
大進言を行った。この文書の内容は

現下の状態は世界情勢の大轉換期に際會し、國內体  
制の強化外交方針の刷新は焦眉の急となつてゐる。然るに  
政府は何せうな事もなく徒らに十載一遇の好機を逸す  
る感がある。かくは事變處理完遂のために支障を来す  
須くこの際決心を一新し新体制の確立を促進するため現内  
閣は大乗的見地よりその進退を慎重とせよと

No. 5

といふハッキリとして正に現内閣の心臓に匕首を擬せんと  
するもあつた。翌十五日には畑陸相は閑院院令謀総長官  
殿下とも申協議申上げた結果陸相の壯は最後的に決案

No. 6

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乃、然るに米内首相は時高に對し、確信とは全然別個。信念を  
把持し、飽くまで現体制の予て改訂を確かなる建前を以て進  
む意向にて、十六日午前九時五十分閣議前の米内首相の會  
見に於て米内首相から

自分、意見は既述の意見は全然反對、新体制の必要はな  
貴方が自らの意見に同意せられぬ以上は辭表を以て破り、  
以後任然に相を推薦して呉れ給へ

と密かに於て相に猶豫を用意の辭表を提出した後、應陸相  
官邸に引取り、三長官會議、軍事會議、議會會議を相次いで  
開催し、協議した結果午後三時半、再び首相官邸に引返り、首  
相會議を完了

三長官、語り、首相の後に三推薦、その文語方と天歩、三  
改訂の情勢、如何に文語、意思が如何に貴方、御意見に  
は全陸軍は全然反對である

とハッキリ叫び、茲に現内閣の命脈は断たれてしまつた、かく米  
内内閣は組閣以来半歳に亘り、退陣した、今次改革の特異性  
が、かう云ふに纏つて見山される、米内閣の退陣後  
の政府が新体制の展開に向つて進んだらう、これは我々に難  
か。

## THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

ARAKI, SADAQ, ET AL

## AFFIDAVIT OF

ARITA, HACHIRO

I have held the portfolio of Foreign Minister in four cabinets: Hirota, April 1936 to February 1937; Ist Konoye, October 1938 to January 1939; Hiranuma, January 1939 to August 1939; and, Yonai, January 1940 to July 1940.

The Yonai Cabinet was opposed to the Tri-Partite Pact because we were opposed to any entanglements with Germany. Such being the case, the Tri-Partite Pact was never, during the life of the Yonai Cabinet, put on the agenda for discussion by the Ministers of the Cabinet.

General Hata was the War Minister in the Yonai Cabinet and throughout his tenure in office he was in full accord with the policy of the Cabinet and cooperated fully with it. In fact, I know General Hata opposed the Tri-Partite Pact from the days when it first was being discussed in Japan. When I was Foreign Minister in the Hiranuma Cabinet, I had occasion to have an audience with the Emperor. While waiting to be received, I met General Hata, who was then Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty. We conversed informally and the subject of the Tri-Partite Pact came up. General Hata stated it appeared the Emperor objected to the proposed pact and that he himself was strongly opposed to it. He made it clear to me that besides his personal opposition to any alliance with the Germans, he also opposed the Pact on the grounds that he could see no benefit to Japan in signing a pact which would work against the interests of our country and which would antagonize the Anglo-Saxon countries.

When Hata resigned as War Minister, in the Yonai Cabinet, I believed there must have been some superior power that forced him to resign his portfolio. The cooperative attitude taken by Hata in the Yonai Cabinet leads me to believe, even today, that his resignation was against his will.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)

On this 11th day of August, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)

I, HORIUCHI, Hyogo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: HORIUCHI, Hyogo (Seal)

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Notice :

Exhibit 3202 to be

Corrected in accordance with Language  
Board ~~decision, as shown on Court~~  
*corrections of*

Record 23 Sept 47

Doc. Div.

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL

vs.

ARAKI, SADA O ET AL

AFFIDAVIT OF

NODA, KENGO

1. I was born on April 22, 1891, at my permanent domicile, No. 2609 Kochi Village, Hotaku District, Kumamoto Prefecture and I am now residing at No. 22 Shiomigaokanachi, Chiba City.

2. The outline of my personal history is as follows:

Graduated from the Military Academy in the year of 1912 and attached to the 55th Infantry Regiment.

Graduated from the Military Staff College in November, 1920.

Appointed Director of the Second Department of Military Education in July, 1938

October, 1939, appointed Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau

April, 1942, appointed Vice-Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces

August, 1942, promoted to Lieutenant-General.

December, 1942, appointed Chief of the Fourteenth Division

October, 1943, appointed Departmental Head of Military Education

April, 1945, appointed Commander of the 51st Army, and remained in that post up to the close of the war.

3. When I was Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, I used the most scrupulous care and attention in recommending the man to succeed General Hata as War Minister. As Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, it was my duty to recommend the man who should be the next War Minister as well as recommending to the War Minister the names of those who should be appointed to the various positions in the War Ministry and in the Army. I took into full consideration the views prevalent in the various bureaus of the War Ministry; I consulted with and took into consideration the wishes of the General Staff, and I consulted fully with the Vice-Minister of War, General Anami. After all these consultations and after a thorough-going study and a careful weighing of all the surrounding circumstances, I decided it best to recommend Lt. General Tojo as the succeeding War Minister. I then notified General Hata of my decision. There were others who were considered for the position of the new war minister, but they were already in other important positions and they could not be easily recommended as the new war minister because it would have been difficult to affect a sudden change from their old positions to the new position of War Minister.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Lt. General Tojo, on the other hand was in Tokyo, holding the position of Inspector General of the Air Force, and he had formerly been Chief of the Military Service Bureau and also of the Consolidation Bureau. Further, he had once been the Vice-Minister of War in the Hiranuma Cabinet. I considered him as the fittest person because of his background to succeed to the position of War Minister. In accordance with my recommendation, General Hata then submitted General Tojo to the Three Chiefs Conference held on 18 July 1940. His nomination was adopted in due course by the Three Chiefs Conference. My recommendation of General Tojo, and General Hata's submitting the name of General Tojo to the Three Chiefs Conference was in accordance with the standing procedure for such matters in the War Ministry. As a matter of fact, neither General Hata nor I had any personal relations with Lt. General Tojo in the past nor any private intercourse with him.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

NODA Kengo (Seal)

On this 8 day of August, 1947, at Tokyo.

Deponent: NODA Kengo (Seal)

I, IIMARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: IIMARI, Yasutaro  
(Seal)



Doc. 1988

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL

vs.

ARAKI, SADAO ET AL

EXHIBIT 200  
AFFIDAVIT OF  
RETURN  
MAYORU INUIA

TO ROOM 361

Personal History

1. I was born on November 25, 1888, in the city of Nagoya, and am living at 2-3 Chome Kasaimachi, Higashi-ku, Nagoya City.

2. The gist of my personal history is as follows:

- a. 1909 - Graduated Military Academy
- b. August 1937 - Promoted Maj. Gen.; Director of Junior Military Academy
- c. November 1938 - Chief of Personnel Affairs, War Ministry
- d. October 1939 - Promoted Lt. Gen.
- e. November 1939 - Appointed Commander of 110th Div. stationed in North China.
- f. August 1942 - Discharged

3. I was Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau in the War Ministry from November 1938 to October 1939. In September 1939, I recommended Major General Muto as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to General Hata who was then the War Minister, as the proper person to be appointed to that position. I made this recommendation in accordance with my duties as Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau. It is the duty of the Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau to make recommendations to the War Minister for the appointment of officers to the various positions in the army.

I made this recommendation after Lt. General Machijiri, the out-going Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau had recommended General Muto as his successor and after I myself had fully considered the opinions of the Military Affairs Bureau and the Personnel Affairs Bureau. In accordance with the regular military procedure in such matters, War Minister Hata then submitted the name of Major General Muto to the Three Chiefs Council. Major General Muto was then designated to the position as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau by the Three Chiefs Council.

General Hata always followed the regular military procedure in all matters affecting the War Ministry and he accepted my recommendation of General Muto without question and did his duty and submitted his name to the Three Chiefs Conference. My recommendation of Major General Muto, General Hata's acceptance of that recommendation, and his presentation of General Muto to the Three Chiefs Conference and the acceptance by the Three Chiefs Conference of the recommendation of General Muto were all in accordance with regular procedure in such matters in the War Ministry.

Def. Doc. 1988

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

INUMI, Mamoru (Seal)

On this 15th day of July, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: INUMI, Mamoru (Seal)

I, INAMARI, Taitaro, hereby certify that the above statement was  
sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the  
presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: INAMARI, Taitaro (Seal)

LANGUAGE CORRECTIONS

23 September 1947

Approved translation of  
Exhibit 3202, Affidavit of  
NODA, KENGO.

1. I was born on April 22, 1891, at my permanent domicile, No. 2609 Kochi Village, Kotaku District, Kumamoto Prefecture and I am now residing at No. 22 Shiomigaoka Machi, Chiba City.

2. The outline of my personal history is as follows:

Graduated from the Military Academy in 1912 and attached to the 55th Infantry Regiment.

Graduated from the Military Staff College in November 1920.

Appointed Chief of the Second Department of the Inspectorate General of Military Training in July, 1938.

October 1939, appointed Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau.

April, 1941, appointed Vice-Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces.

August 1941, promoted to Lieutenant General.

December 1942, appointed Commander of the Fourteenth Division.

October 1943, appointed Chief of the Office of the Inspectorate General of Military Training.

April 1945, appointed Commander of the 51st Army, and remained in that post up to the close of the war.

3. After the resignation of the Yonai Cabinet, as I was Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, I used the most scrupulous care and attention in recommending the man to succeed General Hata as War Minister. (Sentence deleted-LAB) Language Arbitration Board. I took into full consideration the views prevalent in the various bureaus of the War Ministry and the wishes of the General Staff, and I consulted fully with the Vice-Minister of War, General Anami. After all these consultations and after a thoroughgoing study I decided that under the then existing circumstances,

Lieutenant General Tojo was suitable and I, as Chief of the Personnel Bureau, recommended him to War Minister Hata as the succeeding War Minister. There were others who were considered for the position of new War Minister, but they were already in other important positions and it was difficult to affect a speedy transfer.

Lt. General Tojo, on the other hand was in Tokyo, holding the position of Inspector-General of the Air Force, and he had formerly been Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and of the Maintenance Bureau. Further, he had once been the Vice-Minister of War in the Hiranuma Cabinet. I considered him a suitable military administrator and it was the feeling in Army circles that no one except Lt. General Tojo would do, so under these circumstances, I recommended him as the succeeding War Minister. In accordance with this recommendation, General Hata submitted the name of General Tojo to the Three Chiefs Conference held on 18 July 1940. The Three Chiefs after conference were unanimous in recommending Lt. General Tojo as succeeding War Minister. My recommendation of General Tojo, and General Hata's submitting the name of General Tojo to the Three Chiefs Conference was in accordance with the standing procedure for such matters in the War Ministry. As a matter of fact, neither War Minister Hata nor I had any personal relations with Lt. General Tojo in the past nor any intimate relations with him.

LANGUAGE CORRECTIONS

22 September 1947

Exhibit 3198 (Def. Doc. 2044) RP 28,918 line 4  
delete from "but in my" to the end of the page and substitute "but my Cabinet completely disregarded such a thing.

"War Minister Hata fully understood and whole-heartedly cooperated in this policy of my Cabinet.

"However a conspiracy arose to overthrow my Cabinet. A good plan for the conspirators was to have General Hata, who was opposed to the Tripartite Pact, resign, thus overthrow the Cabinet and kill two birds with one stone. Finally this plan was carried out. When I received General Hata's resignation, I believed that he was forced to resign, not of his own will, but through outside forces. I am today still convinced that this was so."

RP 28,919, line 1, before "I asked" insert "On the 13th of July 1940".

Line 12, delete from "consequently" to the end of the next paragraph and substitute "and he felt the responsibility. Knowing General Hata's feelings, after the resignation of the Cabinet en bloc, I called him into my room and shaking his hand said, in general, 'I can understand your feelings. You have suffered much. I do not blame you'. He smiled sadly. His situation was indeed pitiful.

"General Hata, as far as I know, was never connected with any clique, association or organization while in the Army or in politics. He, of course, never belonged to any aggressive or ultra-militaristic organization. In fact he scrupulously avoided politics".

Language Arbitration Board

Def. Doc. No. 2605

Exhibit No. 204

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

IRAKI, SADIO, ET AL

Affidavit of

OIKAWA, Koshiro

I was the Navy Minister for the Second and Third Konoe Cabinets.

In or about September 1941, Lt. General Ushirogu, Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces, called upon me at the Navy Minister's Office as a messenger dispatched from General Hata, Shunroku, the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces, with the following message from General Hata:

Recently, relations between America and Japan have been deteriorating. America is opposed to Japan's stationing her troops in China. I believe that in order to avoid a clash with America, we must withdraw all our troops from China. I heartily request you to do your utmost as Navy Minister to prevent a conflict between America and Japan.

**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

OIKAWA, Koshiro (Seal)

On the 19th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: OIKAWA, Koshiro (Seal)

I, KANZAKI, Masayoshi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: KANZAKI, Masayoshi (Seal)

Def. Doc. No. 2605

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

SUPPLEMENTARY ORDER OF PROOF

H.A., Shunroku - Individual Phase

Dr. Kanzaki, Masayoshi - Aristides G. Lazarus

Document No. 2605 Oikawa

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL

vs.

ARAKI, SUDA ET AL

Affidavit of

Sawada, Shigoro

From October 1939 to November 1940, I was Vice Chief of the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff during this time was H.I.H. Prince Kanin.

In 1940, because of Germany's extraordinary victories in Europe, her fame spread through all of Japan and soon the view became predominant in Army circles that Japan should use Germany's power and influence to bring the China Incident to a favorable solution. The Army was desirous of peace with China and so was War Minister General Hata. He always insisted that it was most urgent to bring an end to the China Incident. The question was, how was the Incident to be settled. It was Hata's contention that the best way to secure peace with China was to reduce the strength of the Japanese troops in China. As his first step in this direction, he sought to decrease, in drawing up the Army budget for the year 1940, the number of Japanese troops in China from 900,000 to 500,000. The General Staff was completely opposed to such an amount of reduction and said it was impossible. The matter was then taken up and discussed between the War Minister and the General Staff and eventually the number of troops was decreased to between 600,000 and 650,000.

Towards the end of June 1940, while I was in China for inspection of the operations, I was called back to Tokyo by an urgent telegram. I returned to find that the Cabinet, contrary to the general desire of the Army, was against entering into any close connections with Germany and that its policy was running contrary to the prevailing opinion of the Army. It was the ardent desire of Prince Kanin, Chief of the General Staff, to attain a solution of the Incident through use of Germany and it was about the beginning of July 1940 that he told me that he intended to accelerate peace with China through the mediations of Germany and that he intended to use the War Minister to break the deadlock between the Army and the Cabinet. So, he ordered me to consult with the officials in the War Ministry, with these ends in view. Accordingly, I called on the Vice Minister of War, Lt. Gen. Anami and we discussed the matter between the two of us. The Vice Minister said finally that as long as the Chief of Staff did not modify his view of using Germany to accelerate peace with China, there was no alternative but to change the present Cabinet; that in view of the character of the present Cabinet, it was impossible to comply with the Chief of Staff's objective even if some changes were made among its members. When I asked the Vice Minister if that was also the opinion of the War Minister, he informed me that that was not the opinion of General Hata, but it was the opinion

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361



of the Vice Minister and the men below him in the War Ministry. I pointed out that the matter was of extreme importance as the opinion of the Army in general and that of the Cabinet were in opposition to each other and that we had better meet again after I had once more consulted with the Chief of the General Staff and then I parted with him.

The Chief of General Staff, having heard my report stated that since his opinion represented that of the majority of the Army and that since according to the Vice Minister there was no other way but a change of Cabinet, we must do our utmost to follow that method and that he was truly sorry for the War Minister that such an extreme measure had to be taken, but one must bear this for the good of the country in such a vital national affair. I again called on the Vice Minister, stated the decision of the Chief of the General Staff and learned that Anami had not changed his views since our previous meeting. Some days later by the orders of Prince Kanin, I wrote a letter which in substance stated as follows:

It is most urgent for Japan to end the China Incident as soon as possible. In order to achieve this it is absolutely necessary to use the influence and power of Germany. From my observation of the attitude of the present Cabinet, I believe it is unable to tide over this present difficult situation. So, at this moment it is necessary to establish a new and stronger Cabinet with the whole nation behind it, which will not waver but will carry out policies with a firm hand. With reference to the above, I demand the War Minister to take action in a manner appropriate to the situation.

The language used in the letter is the polite form of language generally used among highranking officers in the Military and in all government departments. Although the word "resign" itself is not used, the letter actually required the War Minister to resign. The letter was sealed and signed by Prince Kanin and he ordered me to deliver it to War Minister Hata. I did so. In this way, General Hata received the letter and I am not quite sure but it might be the following day or the day after that General Hata submitted his resignation, and then the Yonai Cabinet resigned en bloc.

H.I.H. Prince Kanin, besides being the Chief of the General Staff, was a member of the Emperor's Household and a Father of the Army, in age, rank, experience etc., and it was quite natural that General Hata, although War Minister, nevertheless, as a loyal subject of the Emperor, was compelled to obey his strong demand.

From the beginning, the Yonai Cabinet had been a conservative one and it was opposed to the idea of cooperation and ties with Germany and to the use of Germany in the settlement of the China Incident. Hence a majority of the Army branded the Yonai Cabinet as too weak to settle the China Incident and as lacking in ability to settle the general situation. The intention of overthrowing the Yonai Cabinet and the plan to effect peace by using Germany was predominant in the Army. Besides, War Minister Hata was one of the supporters of the Yonai Cabinet Policy. Hence

the concensus of opinion in military circles was that Hata was not useful in accelerating the attempts at closer ties with Germany and the subsequent use of the power of Germany to effect peace with China and that he lacked the desire to do so and a change in War Ministers was being strongly urged. Indeed, this concensus of opinion of military circles was reflected in the decision of the Chief of the General Staff and this decision was conveyed to Hata by means of the letter which I delivered to him and which forced him to resign his post.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAHADA, Shigero (Seal)

On this 20th day of August, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: SAHADA, Shigero (Seal)

I, KOKUBU, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (Seal)

Def. Doc. 2616

3205A

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

ARUKI, Sadao, ET AL

Certificate of

FIRST DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU

I am the Section Chief of Documents in the First Demobilization Bureau and hereby certify that after searching for the letter which was sent in July 1940 from Chief of General Staff Prince Kanin to War Minister Hata, Shunroku, it could not be found in the files of the First Demobilization Bureau

Date 23 September 1947  
at Tokyo

/s/ MIYAMA, Yoze (Seal)  
Section Chief of Documents  
First Demobilization Bureau

I hereby certify that this was signed and sealed before me.

23 September 1947  
at Tokyo

Witness: IMAMURI, Taitaro (Seal)

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

3205-A

Def. Doc. # 2616

Exhibit # \_\_\_\_\_

證 明 書

自分ハ第一復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、昭和五年七月參謀總長  
園宮俊仁親王ヨリ陸軍大臣畑俊六ニ宛テラレタル手紙ハ調査ノ結果第一復  
員局ノ殘存書類中ニ存在シアラサルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年九月二十三日

於 東京

第一復員局文書課長

美 山

殿

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルコトヲ證明ス

同日 於 同 所

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THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

KANZAKI, Masayoshi, ET AL

EX 3205B

Sworn Statement of

KANZAKI, Masayoshi

Ever since Hata, Shunroku was arraigned, I have been his Chief Counsel.

In order to obtain the letter demanding the resignation which was sent from the Chief of General Staff, Prince Kanin, to War Minister Hata, Shunroku, in July 1940, I, since spring 1946, have requested the First Demobilization Bureau to take all measures possible to search for the letter but it could not be discovered. Further, with the assistance of Mrs. Hata and her son Shunpachi, I have searched Hata, Shunroku's house with the utmost of my power several times, but I could not discover it.

OLTH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KANZAKI, Masayoshi (Seal)

On this 22nd day of September, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: KANZAKI, Masayoshi (Seal)

I, KOKUBU, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (Seal)

## THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

TANI, SAKI, ET AL

Affidavit of

TANAKA, Ryukichi

At the time of the raid on Tokyo by the American fliers in April of 1942, I was Chief of the Military Service Section of the War Ministry. Because during the raid school children had been shot and non-military areas had been bombed, there were different opinions as to the treatment to be given fliers who became prisoners. The General Staff in Tokyo decided that all decisions as to the trial and treatment of the captured fliers should be exclusively within the province of the General Staff itself. Hence, as soon as the fliers were captured in China, the General Staff ordered their immediate delivery to Tokyo. All relative investigations were made in Tokyo and preparations were made to hold the trial of the fliers in Tokyo. However, as to the treatment to be given the fliers, there developed two different opinions. One opinion was supported by the General Staff and the other by the War Ministry. Because of these conflicting opinions the General Staff suddenly gave up its intention to hold the trial in Tokyo and ordered that the trial be held in China and an order to that effect was forwarded to the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters and the fliers themselves were sent to Shanghai.

In those days there wasn't any regulations that fliers could be tried by a military court and so in Tokyo a new military law as to the treatment of fliers who raided the Japanese homeland and the area under its control was promulgated and a copy of the new military law was forwarded to the China Expeditionary Force with orders that the same law would be in effect in the areas controlled by the Japanese armies in China also. In the same order containing the information about the new military law just promulgated, was contained an order to Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China that the fliers would be tried under this law in China. The fliers were then flown to Shanghai which was the Headquarters of the 13th Army. Because there was no military court set up in the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Forces at Nanking, the trial was to be held by the 13th Army at its headquarters in Shanghai.

When the decision was announced that the fliers would be tried by the newly promulgated military law, I protested the decision to General Tanabe, Vice-Chief of the General Staff and stated to him that in my opinion the fliers should be treated as prisoners of war. General Tanabe stated that he agreed with me and not only was that so but that he had just received a letter from General Ushirogu, General Hata's Chief of Staff, stating that General Hata was of that opinion himself, that he, Hata, desired to treat the fliers as prisoners of war. General Tanabe then stated that nothing could be done about the letter because the General Staff had already made the decision that the fliers must be tried by military law.

According to the practice of the Japanese army, the sort of letter that Ushirogu wrote to Tanabe was never written by the commander himself but it was always written by the Chief of Staff and when the Chief of Staff expresses anything in the official letter that is the expression of the intentions of the Commander in Chief himself, not the opinion of the Chief of Staff. That was the practice in the Japanese army and such a letter is never addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, always to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. That, too, was the practice of the Japanese army. Therefore, when I learned that Ushirogu had written a

letter containing the views of Hata and the letter was addressed to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, I knew that it was an official letter in the usual practice of the Japanese army informing the General Staff of the position and the opinion of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Armed in China, General Hata.

As a result of the receipt of this letter from General Ushirogu stating the position of General Hata with reference to the fliers, Colonel Arisue was dispatched from Tokyo by the General Staff to Hata to give Hata the orders and the desires of the General Staff. The General Staff in Tokyo was afraid that Hata would not carry out the instructions of putting the fliers to trial and Colonel Arisue was sent to Hata to notify Hata that he was to do as he was ordered and that no theory or logic on his part with reference to this case would be accepted by Tokyo. Moreover, there was another apprehension among the members of the General Staff that even if the China Expeditionary Force tried these fliers, they might have found a decision of not guilty and that Hata would then have released them after trial and this the General Staff feared.

Thus, as the matter stood, all orders and directives with reference to the trial were issued by the General Staff in Tokyo and the trial was held by the 13th Army in China. Hence, in this trial, General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army merely acted as a channel through which were transmitted the orders of the General Staff in Tokyo to the 13th Army where the trial was being held. There was absolutely no room left whatsoever for the use of any discretion or judgment on the part of the members of the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Force with reference to this trial.

Q. TH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Seal)

On this 10th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: TANAKA, Ryukichi (Seal)

I, IIMMARI, Taitaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo

Witness: IIMMARI, Taitaro (Seal)

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )  
et al )

vs )

ARAKI, Sadao, et al, )  
Defendants )AFFIDAVIT OF  
DR. CHARLES NELSON SPINKS

My name is Charles Nelson Spinks. I am presently employed as a War Department civilian employee in Tokyo. In the autumn of 1945 I was a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Naval Reserve and was in Tokyo as Chief of the Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

I understand and speak Japanese and was present at several of the interviews between Japanese and the Bombing Survey. Our purpose was to find out the effects of warfare on the Japanese economy and industry, particularly the effects of aerial bombing. We found that many of the Japanese whom we interviewed were reluctant to talk to us since they did not know our purpose and thought we might be investigating war criminal responsibility. It was necessary, therefore, to put them at their ease and reassure them that this was not our purpose and that we wanted information for Bombing Survey purposes only.

I cannot say whether or not any of the Japanese interviewed were made positive promises or assurances that the interviews would not be used against them in any war crimes prosecution, although they might well have gotten that impression from the preliminary remarks I witnessed. One of our members usually had a preliminary conversation with the interviewee to put him at ease and explain our aim so that he would speak freely during the interview. Certainly we exerted whatever efforts were necessary in the circumstances to allay suspicion and overcome any reluctance to give us the information we desired.

I was present at the interviews with HOSHINO, Naoki, during November, 1945. HOSHINO was not placed under oath and the interrogations were conducted in a friendly and informal atmosphere. The only interpreter was a missionary, much overworked, whose Japanese was good, although he often needed help from me in translating technical terms. I have been shown by counsel Exhibit No. 454 for identification, which is a transcript of the Bombing Survey interviews with HOSHINO in November, 1945. I would say that this transcript is accurate so far as the questions put to HOSHINO are concerned. It does not, however, contain the preliminary remarks at the beginning of the interviews, nor does it contain an exact or full record of HOSHINO's answers to the questions.



When asked a question, HOSHINO often spoke for several minutes at a time, sometimes as long as five minutes, before his remarks were translated. I could not always follow him or retain the full substance of his longer replies, and the same was true of the interpreter. In such cases the interpreter translated as much as he could remember, or gave the gist of the answer to the stenographer. Sometimes we had to go over the answers after the interview in order to edit them, correct passages, or fill in portions which had been missed, or where the exact words or sentences had been forgotten. I recall that several times during the interview HOSHINO attempted to make corrections, but so far as I know HOSHINO was not shown the final transcripts after editing and corrections were made following the interviews.

There was only one stenographer to record the interviews. Neither the interpreter nor the stenographer was sworn.

At Tokyo, Japan, this 15th day of September, 1947.

/S/ CHARLES NELSON SPINKS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of September, 1947.

/S/ B. A. HARGADON  
1st Lt., Inf.  
Personnel Officer

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCIS R. MILLARD

I, Francis R. Millard, am an American Missionary to Japan, residing at number 171 Amanuma, 1 Chome, Suginami-ku, Tokyo.

I was formerly connected with the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, serving in Japan with that organization as an interpreter after the war. I was the only interpreter during the interviews held with Naoki Hoshino on the 19, 22 and 28 of November, 1945.

Before the first of those interviews I was instructed, as was our practice, to talk with Hoshino and put him at his ease, explaining to him that the only purpose of the Bombing Survey was to get general information on the economic effects of the war on Japan, and to reassure him that the interview had no connection with any war crimes prosecution purposes nor the fixing of individual responsibility. It had been discovered that such assurance was considered necessary in order to get from the Japanese the information we needed. This I did.

Neither I nor the stenographer was sworn. For the purposes of the Bombing Survey, it was sufficient if we took down the gist of the conversation rather than a verbatim record, in order to get the broad, overall picture.

I have been shown Exhibit No. 454 for identification, which is a copy of the interviews we had with Mr. Hoshino. As far as the questions put to him go, it appears to be a verbatim record. As to the answers, however, the words are in many cases my own, or the answers are condensations of what Hoshino said. He often spoke continuously for several minutes in response to a question and I gave no running translation. From time to time I received help on technical terms, particularly from one of the observers at the interviews who spoke Japanese. I had been away from Japan for several years and found such technical assistance necessary.

This document does not show the statements made to Hoshino before the formal interview, and, as I recall, is not a complete record of the conversation in other respects. Hoshino understood some English and suggested corrections from time to time, although I can not say whether or not all corrections were actually made. Neither Hoshino nor I got a chance to read the transcript afterwards and, in fact, I never saw it until it was recently shown to me.

/s/ Francis R. Millard

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of September 1947.

/s/ Bernard J. Hargadon  
1st Lt. Inf.  
Personnel Officer

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: ISHIWATA, Sotaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I, ISHIWATA, Sotaro, have the following career:  
May, 1916, Graduated from the English Law Department of the Imperial University.

May, 1916, Joined the Finance Ministry.

July, 1918, Appointed Chief of a taxation office.

July, 1921, Appointed Secretary of the revenue superintendent bureau, (first in Osaka and later in Tokyo).

December, 1924, Appointed Secretary of the Finance Ministry, (attached to the Revenue Bureau).

May, 1931, Appointed Chief of the National Taxes Section of the Revenue Bureau, Finance Ministry.

June, 1934, Concurrently appointed Chief of the Private Secretariat Section.

December, 1934, Appointed Director of the Revenue Bureau of the Finance Ministry.

March, 1936, Appointed Investigator of the Cabinet.

February, 1937, Appointed Director of the Revenue Bureau of the Finance Ministry.

June, 1937, Appointed Vice Minister of Finance.

January, 1939, Appointed Minister of Finance, (in the HIRANUMA Cabinet).

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August, 1939, Resigned.

January, 1940, Appointed Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, (in the YOKAI Cabinet).

July, 1940, Resigned.

January, 1944, Appointed Minister of Finance (in the TOJO cabinet) and remained in the office (in the KOISO Cabinet).

February, 1945, Appointed State Minister and concurrently Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.

April, 1945, Resigned.

June, 1945, Appointed Minister of the Imperial Household.

January, 1946, Resigned.

Mr. HOSHINO was a junior student at the Tokyo Imperial University one year behind me. After he entered the Finance Ministry, he was my colleague in the Revenue Bureau of the Ministry as well as in the Osaka Revenue Inspection Bureau for many years. I was particularly intimate with him so that even on his personal affairs he asked my advice without reserve.

In June, 1939, the Manchurian government asked the Finance Ministry to send the former a person appropriate to assist its Department of Finance in the execution of its affairs. Finance Minister TAKAHASHI thought it imperative that a man of excellent ability should by all means be sent. So after consulting Mr. KURODA Kageo, Vice-Minister of Finance and Mr. ONO, Ryuta, Chief of the Private Secretariat Section, he selected Mr. HOSHINO. Hence it may be said that the nomination of Mr. HOSHINO was originated from the intention of the Finance Ministry authorities. Mr. HOSHINO, when approached by Mr. ONO in this regard, however, strongly rejected this offer because of the illness of his father (HOSHINO, Kote, a well-known Christian minister in Japan) and of some other family circumstances. In accordance with the request of Chief ONO of the Private Secretariat Section to urge Mr. HOSHINO to accept his new post, I called at Mr. HOSHINO's residence and, having an interview with some members of his family as well as him, I persuaded him to take the government offer. At last Mr. HOSHINO made up his mind to accept the offer. In July he resigned his post in the Finance Ministry, and went over to Manchukuo to enter the civil service of the Manchukuo government.

Through my official negotiations with Mr. HOSHINO, which were carried on in the Finance Ministry and according to my experience during my trip to Manchukuo, I knew that Mr. HOSHINO, after taking his post in the Manchukuo government, had whole heartedly exerted himself to promote the welfare of the people of Manchukuo. As far as I can remember, whenever he regarded any Japanese policy toward Manchukuo as adverse to the interests of the people of Manchukuo, he did everything in his power to prevent it from being carried out. At one time he persistently insisted that, in the interests of the people of Manchukuo, Japan relinquish special rights and interests she had enjoyed so far. In order to realize his projected plan, he frequently visited the Finance Ministry, presenting many a demand to it. In 1935, for example, he

sharply criticized controversial issues, such as the raising of tariffs on agricultural products of Manchukuo and the prohibition of the importation of apples produced in Manchukuo, and urged the Finance Ministry to bring the issues to a conclusion as it saw fit. In addition, he stressed the necessity of relinquishing extra-territorial rights and the executive powers vested in the railway zone authorities. At one time he visited the Finance Ministry and insisted that, in the event of the relinquishment of these, the Japanese installations be transferred to Manchukuo at prices as cheap as possible and especially public facilities be transferred without compensation. Such an attitude as his led some persons to criticize him as laying too much stress on the interests of Manchukuo at the expense of those of Japan.

I do not know well the circumstances under which Mr. HOSHINO took part in the Second KONOYE Cabinet. However, immediately after the general resignation of the YONAI Cabinet took place, Prince KONOYE rang me up, asking for my opinion as to the advisability of appointing Mr. HOSHINO as Director of the Cabinet Planning Board. In reply to it, I said that I considered him to be fit for the post in view of his practical experience in that line of business.

/s/ ISHIWATA, Sotaro

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ ISHIWATA, Sotaro (seal)

Def. Doc. No. 2526

Exh. No. 3210

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

T INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE F.A.R. E.A.S.T  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

MATSUKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition. (Translation)

Deponent : MATSUKI, Tamotsu (

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in our country I hereby depose as follows.

I, MATSUKI, Tamotsu, live at No.1731 4 Chō-me, Fukasawa Chō, Setagaya Ward, Tokyo.

I occupied the following positions in Manchukuo :

1. June, 1932 : the Councillor of the Legislative Council.
1. April, 1935 : the Chief of the Secretariat in the General Affairs Board.
1. June, 1937 : the Chief of the Legislature in the General Affairs Board.
1. March, 1938 : the Chief of the Secretariat in the State Council.
1. May, 1940 : the Vice-chief of the General Affairs Board.
1. June, 1943 : the Chief of the Audit Bureau.
1. October, 1944 : the President of the "Daidō-gakuin (T.N. a kind of school)." College.

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As shown in my public career described above, I, attended the business of the General Affairs Board as, alternately, the Chief of the Secretariat, the Chief of the Legislative and the Vice-Chief of the General Affairs Board, directly under HOSHINO, Naoki, the Chief of the General Affairs Board.

(1) The Chief of the General Affairs Board in Manchukuo is the one who renders assistance to the premier and who exercises general control over the business of the General Affairs Board which ~~occurs under~~ the premier's direct superintendance. He is, therefore, not competent to decide state affairs. Even the decision of routine matters of the General Affairs Board, with the exception of trifling ones entrusted in him only by the law such as the appointment and dismissal, reward and punishment of those below the clerical staff of the Board, was made by the premier himself and not at the discretion of the chief of the General Affairs Board.

(2) At the end of 1936 Chief of the General Affairs Board ODATE resigned his post and Mr. HOSHINO was appointed to the post as his successor. The reasons why he assumed that post were as follows:

Firstly, as about five years had passed since Manchukuo was founded, it was deemed suitable to appoint some one to the post of Chief of the General Affairs Board from those who were in actual service in Manchukuo rather than the usual out-of-date practice of selecting a person from Japanese officials from Japan.



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Secondly, Manchukuo had passed into the period of economic construction from that of 'peace first' and became in need of an able financier and economist who should take the lead of the Board and render assistance to the premier. It was, therefore, in the light of the need mentioned above that Mr. HOSHINO who, of all the government officials in Manchukuo, had been connected with the state finance and economy, was newly appointed Chief of the General Affairs Board on the recommendation of his predecessor and the Premier.

(3) All the preceding chiefs of the General Affairs Board had duly observed the limits of their office, and Chief of the General Affairs Board HOSHINO especially attended to his business, in obedience to Premier Chao's direction and decision, rigidly within the limits<sup>of</sup> his duty. It was a matter of course that, as far as I knew, he had never decided anything on behalf of the premier.

(4) Under Chief HOSHINO, two assistant chiefs, one Japanese and the other Manchurian, jointly took charge of the affairs. For important items of state affairs, however, Mr. HOSHINO used to call up two assistant chiefs, namely myself and Mr. KU Tzu-hsiang, the Manchurian Assistant Chief, and to deliberate on the matter for decision. There were no important matters that were decided without consultation with the Manchurian Assistant Chief.

(5) Chief HOSHINO had due regard for the opinions of Manchurians, especially those of youthful Manchurian officials, and he was ever mindful of the promotion of superior Manchurian officials. Accordingly,

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important posts at the General Affairs Board such as the Private Secretary of the Chief of the Board, the Assistant Chief of the Board, the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, the Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Secretariat, etc. which had hitherto been occupied by the Japanese officials were replaced by the Manchurian officials in rapid succession. He held Manchurians in such regard that the accusation that the Chief HOSHINO over-valued the intentions of Manchurians was voiced in some Japanese quarters.

(6) With regard to the salaries for officials of the Sennin and Inin Ranks (similar to the Japanese Sonin and Hannin Ranks, respectively), there had hitherto been some discrimination between the Japanese and the Manchurians. This was due to an allowance, the sum equivalent to between 40 to 80% of salaries, which had been additionally paid to the Japanese officials. This was because of the high cost of living of Japanese compared with Manchurians, as there was a difference between them in their ways of living. In 1938, Chief HOSHINO removed this discrimination and gave equal treatment to both Japanese and Manchurians.

(7) As a matter of course, there never was a case in which the Kwantung Army dictated to the General Affairs Board, although the wishes of the Army were laid before the Board sometimes. On such occasions Chief HOSHINO took the necessary measures under the direction of the respective authorities after consulting with the government organs concerned as well as the Prime Minister. Even the wishes of the Kwantung Army laid before the Board, if they were considered not to

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be appropriate, were not followed. For instance, when the renovation of the administrative organization was effected in June, 1937, and the Department of Public Peace was formed amalgamating the Department of Military Affairs and the Bureau of Police Affairs in the Department of People's Welfare, a proposal was submitted by the Kwantung Army to have a man from the Military ranks appointed as Vice Minister of the new department. Against this, Chief HOSHINO first consulted us and recommended Mr. SUSUKIDA, Yoshitomo of the civil officials as the candidate, disregarding the desire of the Kwantung Army. Eventually he was appointed as the vice minister.

Notwithstanding the fact that Chief of General Affairs HOSHINO not only was all the time paying attention to the stabilization of the national life of the Manchurian people but also to elevating their economic life, he was always concerned about their afflictions and so assumed a cautious attitude, for commodities gradually became more scarce and consequently economic control stricter, by degrees, as a result of the European war and subsequent to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident, half a year after assuming his office. Such being the case, he was usually making efforts to negotiate with the Japanese government and others, so that Manchukuo might sell the food, as well as other goods that were exported from her, as clearly as possible on the one hand, while on the other she might as profitably and abundantly as possible purchase the necessaries of life and other commodities that were imported into the country. Furthermore, there

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were instance such as in the case of salt, the most necessary food ingredient for the populace, where the government even reduced prices and distributed it to the people, although other prices were going up step by step.

On this 3rd of September, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent : /S/ MATSUKI, Tamotsu (seal)

I, hereby certify that above deposition was duly sworn by the Deponent who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness : /S/ MIGITA, Masao (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ MATSUKI, Tamotsu (seal)

Def, Doo, 2526

Kzh, 4

Ex 210

自分儀我部ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宜習ヲ爲シタル上次ノ  
如ク供述致シマス

逓東國際軍務裁判所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣 審 書 供 述 書

供述者 松

木

俠

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

私、松本侯ハ現在東京都世田谷區深澤町四丁目一、七三一番地ニ住シテ居リマシ

私ハ滿洲國ニ於テ左ノ如キ經歷ヲ有シマス

- 一 昭和七年（一九三二年）六月 滿洲國法制局 参事官
- 一 昭和十年（一九三五年）四月 總務廳秘書處 處長
- 一 昭和十二年（一九三七年）六月 總務廳法制處 處長
- 一 昭和十三年（一九三八年）三月 参議府秘書局長
- 一 昭和十五年（一九四〇年）五月 總務廳次長
- 一 昭和十八年（一九四三年）六月 審計局長官
- 一 昭和十九年（一九四四年）十月 大同學院長

私ハ右經歷ガ示ス通り、總務廳秘書處長、國法制處長、同次長トシテ星野

直樹總務廳長ノ直接ノ部下トシテ總務廳ノ事務ヲ管掌シテ居リマシタ。

(一) 滿洲國ニ於ケル總務廳長ノ地位ハ國務總理大臣ヲ輔佐シ、總理大臣ノ直

接管轄スル總務廳ノ事務ヲ統轄スルニ在ルノチアリマス。從テ總務廳長

ハ國務ニ付キ決定ノ權限ヲ有シマシヤン。唯法令ニ依テ委任セラレタル輕

微ナル事項例ヘバ總務廳所屬ノ委任官（判任官）以下ノ進退賞罰等ヲ除

イテハ總務廳ノ事務ト雖モ其ノ決定ハ總理大臣カ行ヒ總務廳長カ獨斷テ

之ヲ行フコトハ出來マシヤンデシタ。

(二) 昭和十一年（一九三六年）暮、大連總務廳長カ解任シソノ後任トシテ星野

氏カ總務廳長ニ任命サレタ理由ハ第一ニ滿洲國モ建國以來約五年ヲ經過シタノデ何時迄モ總務廳長ヲ日本内地ヨリ輸入シテ來ルト云フ時代ハ既に過ぎ去リ、滿洲ヲ働イテキル者ノ中カラ選ブベキデアルト云フ點ト。第二ニ滿洲國モ治安第一主義ノ時代カラ愈々經濟建設ノ時代ニ入ツテキタノデ、財政經濟ニ關ルイ人カ總務廳ノ中心ニナツテ國務總理大臣ヲ補佐スルコトカ必要デアルト云フニ在ツテ、ソコデ滿洲國政府ノ官吏ノ中デ財政經濟ヲ擔當シテ居ツタ尾野氏ガ前任總務廳長及國務總理大臣ノ推薦ニ依ツテ新ニ總務廳長ニ任命サレタノデアリマス。

三 ソレ迄ノ歴代總務廳長モ良ク其ノ權限ヲ守ツテ來マシタガ特ニ尾野廳長ハ嚴格ニ其ノ職務權限ヲ守リ強國務總理大臣ノ指揮ヲ仰ギ其ノ決裁ヲ待ツテ事務ヲ執ツテ居リマシタ。勿論總理大臣ノ裁決ノ代理ヲ爲スガ如キハ私ノ知ル限り一度モアリマセンデシタ。

四 尾野廳長ノ下ニ日本人及滿人ノ次長ガ各々一人アリ、ソレハ事務ヲ分擔シテ居リマシタガ、重要ナ事項ニ付テハ常ニ兩次長即チ私ト滿系次長ノ谷次亨氏ヲ呼ンデ協議シテ決定シマシタ。滿系次長ニ相談ナシニ重要事項ヲ決定スルコトハアリマセンデシタ。

五 尾野廳長ハ滿人ノ意見特ニ若イ滿系官吏ノ意見ヲ尊重シ、且優秀ナ滿人官吏ノ登用ヲ常ニ心ガケテ居リマシタ。ソレデ總務廳長ノ秘書官ヤ、

本國次長、同統計局長、同官房庶務科長、同總務局長ノ重要ポストガドシ  
日系カラ滿系ニ代ツテ行キマシタ。ソレチ日本人ノ一部ニハ星野局長ハ滿  
人ノ意向ヲ尊重シ過ギルト云フ批難ノ聲サヘ起ツタ位チアリマス。





タ。ソレヲ滿洲國カラ日本其他ニ輸出スル食料其他ノ物齊ハ成ルベク高價ニ引取ツテ賣フヤウニ日本政府其他ニ交渉シテソノ代リ滿洲國ニ輸入スル生活必需品其他ノ物齊ハ成ルベク有利ニ且出聚ルヲ大ニ差クヌルヤウ常ニ努カテ居リマシタ。又他ノ物價ハ追々高騰スルニモ不拘、滿人六衆ニトツテ最モ必要ナ鹽ノ如キハ寧ロ價格ヲ下ゲテ人民ニ配給スル、等ノ事モアリマシタ。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）九月 日於東京

供 迎 者

松

木

俠

一

右ハ當京會入ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ姓名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

証 日 於

立 會 人

右

田

政

夫

宜  
密  
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良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺蔽セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ  
誓フ

署名捺印

松

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決

## THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs.

TAKIKURI, SADAO, et al

## SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: TAKIKURI, Tadashi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

I, TAKIKURI, Tadashi, was born on February 18, the 36th year of Meiji (1903) and at present I am living at No. 57, Otsukanakacho, Koishikawa, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo. In the 3rd year of Showa (1928) I was employed by the Kwantung Provincial Government and was made successively Secretary of the Financial Department, Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Monopoly Bureau and Secretary of the Archives Section. In the 6th year of Showa (1933) I left the Kwantung Provincial Government and joined the Manchoukuoan Government, first as Chief of the Intendance Section of the Civil Administration Department. In November, the 10th year of Showa (1935) I was transferred to the post of Councillor of the Planning Board of the General Affairs Office. I served at the Planning Board until February, the 16th year of Showa (1937) and in the same month I was made Head of the Development Office of the General Development Bureau of the Agricultural Development Department. Next, in October, the 16th year of Showa (1941) I was appointed Chief Official in Charge of the Agricultural Products of the Agricultural Development Department, but in July, the 18th year of Showa (1943) I was appointed Chief of the Planning Board of the Supreme General Affairs Office and in May, the 20th year of Showa (1945), when the Planning Bureau was newly established, I was made Vice Chief of the said Bureau, which post I held until the end of the war.

A. The Manchoukuoan Government, in the 4th year of Kangte, namely on October 12, 1937, decided on the so-called 10 year program of opium prohibition. I, at that time as Councillor of the Planning Board, assumed responsibility for drafting the said program, together with my colleague, Yung Shan-Chi.

The Manchoukuoan Government from the early period after its founding had been earnestly planning for eradication of the evil custom of smoking or eating opium, and, as a means first established a monopoly system for opium and administered the production, delivery and consumption of opium, thus adopting a policy for a decisive curtailment of opium consumption.

Mr. Hoshino, in the 3rd year of Kangte, namely in December 1936, was transferred from his position of Vice Chief of the Financial Department to Chief of the General Affairs Board. At that time the opium monopoly was already gaining impetus and was efficiently enforced. Mr. Hoshino, however, as soon as he was made Chief of the General Affairs Board, called together many representative and serious Manchurian-born, young officials belonging to various departments and had them conduct free discussions relating to the problem of the opium policy. This discussion was continued in earnest for several months and its conclusion was that Manchoukuo had already reached a mature time to enforce a positive prohibition policy. Most of the said young officials agreed that various necessary measures should be courageously taken as rapidly as possible for the drastic eradication of opium addicts. The free discussion by these native-born young officials created a considerably great sensation at that time in Manchuria and attracted the attention of the general public. In fact, among the Japanese-born officials there was a loud voice criticising Mr. Hoshino's attitude

as currying favour with native-born officials. Mr. Hoshino, however, as soon as the report on the conclusion reached by those Manchurian-born officials was received, ordered us to map out, in collaboration with the various related departments, a program on the basis of the said report, to be enforced by the government.

It is, however, not easy to eliminate completely the number of those poisoned by opium, who were estimated at more than 1,000,000 at the beginning of the national establishment of Manchukuo, under very adverse conditions. It was the conclusion of the study of the persons in charge of practical opium work that even if every strong measure was taken, under these adverse conditions it would take as long as 20 years. Meanwhile, most of the prominent people and notables were expressing outwardly their approval of the prohibition policy, but they were secretly expressing their opposition against the drastic method, alleging that it was impossible. Then I informed Mr. Hoshino of these matters and told him that it would take 20 years to achieve complete prohibition. Mr. Hoshino tenaciously insisted upon the 10 year plan, and said that where there is a will, there is a way, and the fruits could not be borne unless we endeavored to achieve the high objective. He admonished me that when the Manchurian youths were about to march on towards the ideal with fervor, the Japanese party should rejoice over the sincere enthusiasm of the Manchurian party and do our utmost in aiding them, rather than to worry ourselves in anticipation whether the goal was possible or not.

Furthermore, Mr. Hoshino said to the persons in the accounting section as follows: "If the opium monopoly profit is appropriated as a source of revenue of the general annual expenditures, prohibition will become difficult from the financial aspect. If it is used for the expenses of the prohibition policy, finances will not be affected even if the prohibition is carried out. At this time, therefore, make them carry out the necessary means for prohibition without stinting the expenses. Don't worry about the decrease in the revenue due to the prohibition. There is no necessity that the opium revenue be used for the general expenses."

Thus, the draft, which I and Yung Shan-Chi wrote, based on the assertion of the Manchurian youth bureaucrats, came to be decided at last by the cabinet meeting, through the conferences and negotiations with each department concerned. This plan was put into effect in and after January, 1938. The central force that propelled this project during these periods was in fact nobody but Mr. Hoshino and a group of Manchurian youth bureaucrats. Although the decision on this prohibition policy, including a drastic article that those governmental and public officials as well as the members of the special companies who did not refrain from opium smoking within a fixed period be dismissed, was a great menace to them, in which most of the high ranks were included, it was realized. The prudent persons among them were willing to take leave and undergo the treatment, one after another. Thus, the improvement at the beginning among the leading class was effected to a remarkable extent.

At the same time, the Government gave special consideration to regional prohibition in towns and cities. In towns and cities they made special efforts at registration, controlled relief, propaganda, etc., and the results in this field were also rapidly improved.

Thus, the number of the registered opium addicts immediately before the end of war was reduced to something over 200,000.

To cite an instance, you could hardly see an addict in Hsinking in 1944, so much so that all the sanitoriums there turned into lodging-houses for laborers.

Mr. Hoshino, at the outset of the foundation of Manchukuo, devoted himself to as well as contributed much towards the unification of the monetary system, the rationalization and establishment of both finance and economy and the abolition of extraterritoriality during the period from 1936 to 1937.

as currying favour with native-born officials. Mr. Hoshino, however, as soon as the report on the conclusion reached by these Manchurian-born officials was received, ordered us to map out, in collaboration with the various related departments, a program on the basis of the said report, to be enforced by the government.

It is, however, not easy to eliminate completely the number of those poisoned by opium, who were estimated at more than 1,000,000 at the beginning of the national establishment of Manchukuo, under very adverse conditions. It was the conclusion of the study of the persons in charge of practical opium work that even if every strong measure was taken, under these adverse conditions it would take as long as 20 years. Meanwhile, most of the prominent people and notables were expressing outwardly their approval of the prohibition policy, but they were secretly expressing their opposition against the drastic method, alleging that it was impossible. Then I informed Mr. Hoshino of these matters and told him that it would take 20 years to achieve complete prohibition. Mr. Hoshino tenaciously insisted upon the 10 year plan, and said that where there is a will, there is a way, and the fruits could not be borne unless we endeavored to achieve the high objective. He admonished me that when the Manchurian youths were about to march on towards the ideal with fervor, the Japanese party should rejoice over the sincere enthusiasm of the Manchurian party and do our utmost in aiding them, rather than to worry ourselves in anticipation whether the goal was possible or not.

Furthermore, Mr. Hoshino said to the persons in the accounting section as follows: "If the opium monopoly profit is appropriated as a source of revenue of the general annual expenditures, prohibition will become difficult from the financial aspect. If it is used for the expenses of the prohibition policy, finances will not be affected even if the prohibition is carried out. At this time, therefore, make them carry out the necessary means for prohibition without stinting the expenses. Don't worry about the decrease in the revenue due to the prohibition. There is no necessity that the opium revenue be used for the general expenses."

Thus, the draft, which I and Yung Shan-Chi wrote, based on the assertion of the Manchurian youth bureaucrats, came to be decided at last by the cabinet meeting, through the conferences and negotiations with each department concerned. This plan was put into effect in and after January, 1938. The central force that propelled this project during these periods was in fact nobody but Mr. Hoshino and a group of Manchurian youth bureaucrats. Although the decision on this prohibition policy, including a drastic article that those governmental and public officials as well as the members of the special companies who did not refrain from opium smoking within a fixed period be dismissed, was a great menace to them, in which most of the high ranks were included, it was realized. The prudent persons among them were willing to take leave and undergo the treatment, one after another. Thus, the improvement at the beginning among the leading class was effected to a remarkable extent.

At the same time, the Government gave special consideration to regional prohibition in towns and cities. In towns and cities they made special efforts at registration, controlled relief, propaganda, etc., and the results in this field were also rapidly improved.

Thus, the number of the registered opium addicts immediately before the end of war was reduced to something over 200,000.

To cite an instance, you could hardly see an addict in Hsinking in 1944, so much so that all the sanitoriums there turned into lodging-houses for laborers.

Mr. Hoshino, at the outset of the foundation of Manchukuo, devoted himself to as well as contributed much towards the unification of the monetary system, the rationalization and establishment of both finance and economy and the abolition of extraterritoriality during the period from 1936 to 1937.

In spite of the fact that prior to and after the establishment of Manchukuo, both the system and organization of her finances were at the extremity of chaos, Mr. Hoshino, who came from Japan in the capacity of Chief of General Affairs of the Finance Department, succeeded in restoring them on short notice by means of his timely guidance and encouragement for his colleagues and men.

Though unification of the monetary system had been regarded as particularly difficult, yet his strenuous efforts and enthusiasm led to success and monetary stability in August, 1935, less than three years after the foundation of the state.

The basis of the general economic development of Manchuria being formed by this, remarkable effects were brought about upon the stabilization and elevation of the living of the Manchurian people at large and the prosperity of the personal economy.

Before that time Manchurian finances were extremely disordered, utterly lacking in fairness, with a most primitive financial system. The people at large were groaning under the burden of extremely heavy taxes. As an effective remedy for it, first the taxation system was reformed, aiming at the reduction of taxes of the people and the fairest taxation. The accounting system and financial organization were made up-to-date as well as fair and just, with the result that Manchukuo took her first step to present the appearance of a modern state and to have the substance as well. This was also generally attributed to Mr. Hoshino's great enthusiasm and continuous efforts.

As to the abolition of extraterritoriality in Manchukuo, Mr. Hoshino harbored a most positive view. On this matter of abrogation of our extraterritoriality in Manchukuo, Japan did not necessarily agree with Manchukuo about the time and method of its execution. Especially, most Japanese residents in Manchukuo who had much concern in the matter expressed the opinion that the time was still immature, which, reflecting upon the Japanese at home, gave rise in some circles of the governmental authorities to a view that they should take a cautious attitude toward it. However, Mr. Hoshino, Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Finance Department at the time (later he became Vice-Chief of the Finance Department) strongly advocated the prompt abrogation of extra-territoriality with a view to the sound development of Manchukuo and the impartial sharing of responsibility by the peoples of both Japan and Manchukuo, and he made efforts in persuading and negotiating with the authorities concerned. As a consequence, "The Treaty concerning the residence of the Japanese nationals in Manchukuo and the taxes in Manchukuo", was first of all concluded in July 1936 (Kotoku 3). This treaty was of such a nature as to greatly increase the imposition of taxes upon the Japanese residents. Moreover, as I have said before, there existed much opposition and the argument for the prematureness of time for this procedure among the Japanese people on the spot. However, it was highly attributable to Mr. Hoshino's sincere and zealous efforts that, despite such circumstances, the extraterritoriality was abolished upon the understanding which was brought about by his persuasion of the discontented Japanese residents.

Then Mr. Hoshino took office as Director of the General Affairs Office. He exerted more strenuous efforts than ever to realize a complete abrogation of extraterritoriality and a complete transfer of the executive powers vested in the South Manchurian Railway Zone Authorities. Even so far as these issues were concerned, he had many difficulties to encounter. Particularly as to the abrogation of judiciary powers, many people in Japan held that it was still premature on the ground that the various systems and the executive and criminal facilities of Manchukuo were not completed as yet. While Mr. Hoshino went to Japan and conferred with and negotiated with high government officials in order to overcome those difficulties, he took every occasion to persuade Japanese authorities on the spot to agree to his projected plan. There were cases where various authorities in charge of general affairs were deadlocked in their negotiations because of their division of opinion. On every such occasion, Mr. Hoshino passed his own judgment on any matter from a broad point of view for the purpose of bringing negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion.

Thus, "The Treaty concerning the Abrogation of Extraterritoriality in Manchukuo and the Transfer of the Executive Powers Vested in the South Manchurian Railway Company Zone Authorities" was put into effect as of December 1 of the same year. At that time, there arose a question as to whether the treaty should be put into effect as of December 1; some officials of the Manchukuo government suggested that it be enforced rather as of January 1 of the following year in view of the necessity of making preparations for the enforcement of the treaty and the like. As far as I can remember, Mr. Hoshino, opining that it had better be enforced as soon as possible, decided on the date of enforcement as of December 1.

The abrogation of extraterritoriality resulted in abolishing the long-standing discriminative treatment between the Japanese and the Manchurians and in contributing greatly to the economic development of Manchukuo, not to mention the favorable psychological effect it had upon the Manchurians.



OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TERAKURA, Tadashi (Seal)

On this 3th day of September, 1947

at Tokyo

Deponent: TERAKURA, Tadashi (Seal)

I, MATSUDA, Masuko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn  
by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of  
this witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo.

Witness: MATSUDA, Masuko (Seal)

INTERROGATION of HOSHINO - EXCERPTS

28 January 1946, page 12

- Q. What was the question about the extraterritorial rights that you referred to back a little while ago?
- A. This extraterritorial right was enjoyed by almost all nations at one time, including the Japanese. Following the influx of Japanese colonists into Manchukuo it was realized that the freedom of taxation enjoyed by them would create inequality and an unfair state of affairs for the Chinese. And it was deemed necessary that this extraterritoriality should be abolished to equalize the situation. In the railway zone both Chinese and Japanese were not subject to taxation and this also was a situation that had to be remedied.
- Q. You conducted the negotiations with the head of the Army, General UEDA, yourself, did you?
- A. I was one of those who conferred with General UEDA.
- Q. And who were the others?
- A. Mr. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, was another who conferred with General UEDA.
- Q. And you and the Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. OHASHI, suggested a plan for working this out, did you? If so, what was the plan?
- A. This was not exactly a plan, but a recommendation to be forwarded to the Japanese Government that steps be taken for the abolition of extraterritoriality in the railway zone.
- Q. What action did they take on that recommendation? That is the Japanese Government.
- A. Late in 1936 or early in 1937 as a result of the Japan-Manchukuo Treaty, the desired result was obtained.

Page 13

- Q. Was it necessary to take up with the head of the Kwantung Army all bond issues which were issued by Manchukuo? I am limiting it to this period of 1932 to 1936.
- A. It was not necessary to refer such matters to the Kwantung Army, but support was usually requested from this source.
- Q. Were there any cases that you remember over the period of 1932 to 1934 in which the Army, or the head of the Kwantung Army refused to give support?
- A. No.

In 1935 bonds to the value of 140,000,000 yen were issued for the purchase of the North Manchuria Railway from the Soviet Government, at which time I came to Japan several times in connection with the flotation of these bonds.

- Q. And did you get the approval of the Kwantung Army in that case, too?
- A. It was not necessary for me to obtain the approval of the Kwantung Army. Rather than approval, it was the moral support as stated previously.

28 January 1946, page 14

- Q. Did the Bureau take any action towards interesting people in making investments in Manchukuo during this period 1932 to 1936? I mean did they take any action towards interesting people in developing industry in Manchukuo?
- A. Great efforts were made to sell shares of newly established companies amongst the population in Manchukuo.
- Q. Was it your department so far as the Manchukuo government was concerned that had charge of that during the period 1932 to 1936?
- A. This department was mainly concerned in a sort of sales campaign to have these shares held by as many people as possible.

31 January 1946, page 17

- Q. [From Pros. Ex. No. 453-A, page 12. What was the reason that the Kwantung Army made any objection to the Zaibatsu making investments in Manchukuo?
- A. The army in general did not oppose the Zaibatsu but there existed such an atmosphere among the Kwantung officers. The Kwantung officers believed that since the Zaibatsu monopolized industry in Japan such should not happen to the industries in Manchukuo. Therefore, the opposition on the part of the army.]
- Q. How did you feel about it, Mr. Hoshino?
- A. Since I did not believe that the Zaibatsu monopolized industry in Japan I felt that anyone could go into Manchukuo and make investments in industry.

Page 19

- Q. Did the Chinese incident come as a surprise to you?
- A. It was a surprise to me.

4 February 1946, page 3

- Q. Was General HONJO in Manchuria when you went there?
- A. Yes.
- Q. State what conversations you had with him about the Manchurian incident in September 1931?
- A. I have never talked with General HONJO concerning the Manchurian incident.
- Q. Did you ever talk with General ITAGAKI?
- A. I have never talked with General ITAGAKI concerning the Manchurian incident.

7 February 1946, page 18

- Q. Did you become a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association?
- A. Well not in any particular sense but as a member of the Cabinet. I was an advisor of the society. All the Cabinet Ministers were.
- Q. You were an officer of that association?
- A. No.
- Q. Were you on the Board of Directors or any permanent committee?
- A. Yes, I was a member of the committee. I was called upon to become a member of a committee to study health matters after my resignation. It was for the study of tuberculosis.

7 February 1946, page 18 (continued)

- Q. So that is all you did with that association?  
A. Yes, that is all.

Page 19

- Q. In the spring of 1940, did MATSUOKA go to Germany and Italy?  
A. Yes.

- Q. And what was the result of his trip to Germany?  
A. I had resigned when MATSUOKA came back so I didn't hear - I don't know the details or the secret details. But the most important result of the trip as a whole was the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Non-Aggression.

- Q. And that was signed about the middle of April?  
A. Yes.

- Q. And was it considered at the Cabinet meeting at which you were present?  
A. No, I didn't attend such a Cabinet meeting. I had already resigned in April and since I was traveling during March I did not attend any of the Cabinet meetings.

26 February 1946, page 5

- Q. Now, Mr. Hoshino, you stated that you were president of the Planning Board until April 1941. What did you do after that?

- A. For half a year thereafter I was doing no special job. I was visiting various parts of the country.

- Q. And what were the visits? Of a business or of a pleasure nature?

- A. It was mostly private trips, except at one time I did make a speech in regard to certain Chuchiku savings. I had been in Manchuria for a number of years and therefore I made this trip to see the condition of the country.

- Q. What was the reason for the collapse of the Third Konoye Cabinet, Mr. Hoshino?

- A. I did not know at that time the reason for I had been out on many trips since between August and October, however, afterward I did hear that the Konoye Cabinet collapsed because there was internal friction.

Page 6

- Q. How did you happen to become Secretary of the Cabinet, Mr. Hoshino?

- A. There was no special reason except that I had been requested to become the Cabinet Secretary on the 17th by Tojo. At that time I had already purchased a ticket in anticipation of going to Korea.

- Q. You and General TOJO were old friends, were you not, Mr. Hoshino?

- A. I would not say exactly old friends, however, Tojo was in Manchuria for about two years at the time I was and that is how I came to know him and also when Tojo was the Minister of War and I was on the Cabinet Planning Board.

26 February 1946, page 6 (continued)

- Q. Who appointed you as president of the Cabinet Planning Board originally?  
A. Prince Konoye.

page 7

- Q. Did you, as Secretary, attend all of the meetings of the Cabinet, Mr. Hoshino?  
A. I did not attend as a Cabinet member, however, I did sit in on the meetings. There also were two other persons that sat in on this conference. The legislative and the intelligence members sat in on these conferences.  
Q. As Secretary of the Cabinet Board, did you have a vote on any of the questions presented there?  
A. No, no rights for a vote.

7 February 1946, page 16

- Q. Did you keep notes of the Cabinet meetings during TOJO's regime?  
A. No.  
Q. Did anybody else in the Cabinet keep any notes, or minutes, or memorandum?  
A. No, the president of the Information Bureau gave whatever information there was to the newspapers.

26 February 1946, page 8

- Q. [From Pros. Ex. No. 2225, page 15. I am advised, I.R. Hoshino, that you were the closest man in the Cabinet to General TOJO. How about that?  
A. As the Chief Secretary, I was the closest to TOJO, however, I can not say that I was the closest advisor.  
Q. I am advised that you also were a strong supporter of TOJO's war policy. Is that not correct?  
A. I have not been asked of any advice by TOJO previous to the war, nor have I given any. I have just carried out instructions as a secretary.

7 February, 1946, page 26

- Q. Did the Prime Minister say anything? [At Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941]  
A. He explained the situation as it was.  
Q. What did he explain? A. I don't remember exactly what was said  
Q. What was it in substance?  
A. Roughly that if the negotiations did not succeed during the beginning of December, there would be war.

11 February 1946, page 14

- Q. Were you present at this Imperial Conference?  
A. Yes, I was but not as a member.

7 February 1946, page 28

- Q. Did you make any suggestions? [At Privy Council meeting of 8 December 1941]
- A. I was not permitted to express anything.

11 February 1946, page 13

- Q. Was the Chief of the Information Board present at the meeting of the Privy Council?
- A. I believe he was present though I cannot say definitely that he was. As the Chief of the Cabinet Information Board and myself as well are not members we would not have to attend the meetings except those that pertained to our duties so that possibly he may have attended this. If they were all ministers it would be compulsory, more or less, to attend these meetings, but as these people are merely in line of duty only and not as a member I would not be able to say definitely that they were.

Ex 213

Def. Doc. 2073 (Revised)

Exh. # \_\_\_\_\_

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: MURAKAMI, Kyoichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet, and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

Personal History

Birth place: Tottori Prefecture.

Latter educational career: Graduated from the Law College of the Tokyo Imperial University in July, 1907.

Summary of official career: July, 1907, appointed clerk of the Ministry of Communications.  
February, 1908, was appointed Secretary of Communications.  
July, 1910, was appointed Senior Secretary of Communications.  
June, 1911, was appointed Councillor of the Ministry of Communications.  
September of the same year was appointed Confidential Secretary of the Minister of Communications.  
November, 1916, was appointed Senior Secretary of the Privy Council.  
April, 1927, was appointed concurrently Judge of the Court of Administrative Litigation.  
June, 1934, was appointed Secretary General of the Privy Council.  
August, 1939, resigned from the post at my own request.

1. Those who held the seats in the Privy Council were the President and Vice-President of the Privy Council, Privy Councilors, Prime Minister and State Ministers who were ministers of the respective ministries. Besides the above, the adult Imperial Princes of the Blood resident in Tokyo were also to attend meetings of the Council by Imperial order. The Princes, however, had never been present until I was relieved of office at the Privy Council, although they attended at the beginning when the institution of the Council was set up.

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RETURN TO ROOM 251

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A State Minister, aside from the Prime Minister or a minister of a department, that is to say, a minister without portfolio, had no seat at the Privy Council.

Assistants of the Prime Minister and ministers of the departments, officials of the Cabinet and the Ministries were allowed to attend the Privy Council in order to assist the ministers in answering questions in the meeting. Ministers without portfolio often attended as "explainers" also. There was no limit to the number of "explainers", so they numbered at times more than ten. The "explainers" were, as occasion demanded, able when called upon and with the approval of the President, to supplement the explanation of the minister in charge. In fact, there were many occasions on which the "explainers" spoke.

2. The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was composed of several members who were nominated by the President of the Privy Council from among the Vice President of the Council and the Councillors. It was their duty to deliberate over the bills entrusted to them and to report the result of their deliberations to the President. The Committee, at its meeting used to make inquiries of the cabinet and the ministers concerned about the matter under discussion and get their replies. And to the inquiries, the minister concerned, as a general rule, had to make his reply. On behalf of the minister, however, his subordinate officials frequently made replies. These assistant officials were all called "explainers".

No shorthand whatever was used at the Privy Council. The record of proceedings was made in accordance with the provisions in the Privy Council Regulations and Regulations for Privy Council Procedure but it was merely the record of minutes of the proceedings written by the senior secretaries and not the exact record of all utterances of all members who spoke.

As for how to take notes of proceedings of the Investigation Committee meeting, there were no legal regulations in connection therewith, so that the gist of proceedings was recorded by the senior secretary for his keeping for reference. This practice was continued for a fairly long time; simply recording the subject, list of members present, summary of the proceedings, etc. In about 1921, however, there was a particularly diligent senior secretary and through his efforts, comparatively detailed notes of proceedings describing the gist of the utterance of each member came to be taken. But these were not the official records legally called for, so the records were sometimes precise and sometimes not, according to the judgment of the secretary in charge or the circumstances relative to the occasion. Sometimes it occurred that only a part of an utterance had been taken down.

In no notes of the proceedings mentioned above, were there any which were shown to state ministers or "explainers" present for confirmation.

On this 28th day of July, 1947.  
At Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.

Deponent /s/ MURAKAMI, Kyoichi (seal)



Def. Doc. 2073 (Revised)

I, URIGITA Masao, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: /s/ Urigita, Masao (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ MURAKAMI Kyoichi (seal)

Ex 2213

Dof. No. 2073  
(Revised)

Exh. no

自分産紙に於ては行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣等ヲ急シ  
ル上次ノ如ク供給致シマス

供 送 者 村 上 恭 一

買 取 供 送 者

荒 木 貞 夫 謹 啟

亞米利加合衆國 宣 傳 所

東 亞 國 際 宣 傳 所

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

一、 経

出身府縣  
鳥取縣

明治四十年七月 齋藤 信賢に任ぜらる

明治四十一年二月 齋藤 信孝に任ぜらる

明治四十三年七月 齋藤 信孝に任ぜらる

明治四十四年六月 齋藤 信孝に任ぜらる

同年九月 齋藤 信孝に任ぜらる

大正五年十一月 齋藤 信孝に任ぜらる

昭和二年四月 行政裁判所評定官兼行政裁判所書記官に任ぜらる

昭和九年六月 行政裁判所書記官長に任ぜらる

昭和十四年八月 齋藤 信孝に任ぜらる

一、本密院の會に出席を有する者は、樞密院議長、同院副議長及樞密院顧問官並びに内閣總理大臣及各省大臣たる國務大臣でありました。此の外は、東京御在任の成年の親王は、同院の會議に出席を有せられることと勅定されて居ましたが、此の親三の御出席は、樞密院設置の當初に於てありましたけれども、その後私が樞密院より退官する迄は遠くおぼろげに過ぎぬ。

樞密大臣であつても内閣總理大臣又は各省大臣でないもの、即ち議院の無任所大臣は、樞密院の會議に出席を待ちませんでした。

樞密院の會議には、内閣總理大臣及各省大臣の會議に於ける答辯を補助する爲め、内閣及各省の官吏が必らずに出席することを認められて居まして、それは一括して説明員と稱せられました。時としては無任所大臣も説明員として出席したことがあります。

説明員の人中には別に出席がなく、時としては十数人の上つたこともありました。説明員は、必らずに出席し、議長の許可を得て、主管大臣の説明を補足する爲めに發言することが出来るのでありまして、實際説明員が發言したことは屢々ありました。

二、本密院の空を空するは、同院議長が同院副議長及空を空する中より指名した委員數人を以て構成せられ、委託された議案に付て空を空する

(Revised)

し、その結果を議長に報告することを目的とするもので、その會議に於て内閣及各省に質問を爲し其の答辯を聞くのであります。その答辯には、關係大臣が答ふるのが本則でありました。之を補助して、其の部下の官吏が屢々之に當りました。此の補助の官吏は、總て書記員と稱せられました。

### 三、樞密院の會議では、一切速記を用ひません。

本會社に付ては樞密院官制及事務規程の規定に依つて速記簿記が作成されますが、之とても、書記官が議事の要旨を記載しただけで、各員の發言を全部そのまゝ録取したものであります。

衆議院委員の議事録記に付ては、何種法規上の規定がありませんのでただ議事上の要旨の爲に、書記官が議事の要旨を録取して、自分の手許に留め置いただけであります。それとも、永い間、單に議事の件名、出席委員の氏名、議事の經過の大要くらゐの事を記載するに止まりましたが、凡そ大正十年頃でありましたらうか、遂に勳勵を書記官が承知して、各員の發言の要旨をも録取した。遂々くわしい議事録記を作成するやうになりました。併し、之は法規上の要求された公式の記録ではありませんから、事務書記官の判例や取捨の事情やに依つて、概観區々でありまして、時には、發言の一部分しか録取してないこともありました。

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Exh. no

右いづれの部を記も、出席した国を大臣や説明員に示して、その確  
明を求めることにはめりません。

Def. Doc. #2073  
(Revised)

Exh. no

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）七月廿八日

於東京都千代田區丸の内

供 証 者 村 上 恭 一

右ハ 立 會 人 ノ 所 前 ニ テ 質 證 シ 且 ツ 署 名 捺 印 シ タ ル コ ト ヲ 證 明  
シ マ ス

同 日 於

立 會 人

Doc. No. 2073  
(Revised)

Exh. no

良心ニ從ヒ何レヲ加ベ何レヲモ決断セズ又何事ヲモト加セザル  
コトヲ言フ

官  
海  
軍

署名  
捺印

村  
上  
恭  
一



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF  
OBATA, Tadayoshi

I, Tadayoshi OBATA, having first been duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet, and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, hereby depose as follows:

I reside at 42 Kitayamacho, Tenno-ji-ku, Osaka. I was graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University in 1917, and secured a position with the Sumitomo Company, later becoming executive director of the Sumitomo Electric Wire and Cable Works at Osaka. In August, 1940, I was appointed Vice President of the Planning Board, but resigned in April, 1941. In April, 1945, I was appointed Governor of Aichi Prefecture. In June, 1945, I was appointed Governor General of the Tokai and Hokuriku District.

During the period from 1932 to 1940 I had occasion to make a number of trips to Manchuria and to spend considerable time there in connection with business. At that time I often saw Mr. HOSHINO, Naoki, who was then in the Government of Manchukuo, first in the Finance Ministry and later as Chief of the General Affairs Board.

In the first years in Manchukuo it was difficult for Japanese or other business men to do business there, but it became much easier after Mr. HOSHINO assumed the position of Chief of General Affairs Board. For one thing, some of the young officers and young officials in Manchukuo did not welcome outside business men, particularly in the early days of the new state. Mr. HOSHINO tried to decrease this feeling, although this was a difficult thing to do. There was no discrimination between Japanese and other foreign business men in Manchuria. The same regulations applied to both.

Mr. HOSHINO welcomed foreign capital which was sincerely interested in building up Manchuria and was not aiming only at speculative purposes. I had a plan to start an automobile industry there with a Japanese company and the General Motors Corporation from the United States. I suggested this and Mr. HOSHINO agreed with the idea. I told him American capital was necessary for Manchuria and he agreed with me. Later on Mr. Aikawa came in to Manchukuo and set up the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation. One of the inducements offered by Mr. Aikawa was his ability to get in foreign capital, particularly American capital and technique. The Manchurian authorities, however, were strict in their requirement that any corporation coming in would have to be incorporated under the laws of Manchukuo, regardless of where the corporation came from. I know about this because I tried to set up a branch of Sumitomo there but could not do so, and had to establish a new company -- a Manchukuo corporation.

It was Mr. HOSHINO's idea to develop all industry in the country, particularly agriculture, in order to lay a solid foundation for the country's economy and the people's welfare. He was interested in developing both light and heavy industry, especially the automotive industry, since Manchukuo was a vast country and had insufficient rail transportation. Trucks were particularly necessary for the agricultural development which he wanted to see take place.

Mr. HOSHINO was anxious for Manchukuo to grow as an independent state generally. The China Incident was a disappointment to him and he wanted it terminated as soon as possible. While he was Chief of the General Affairs Board, he told me there were too many Japanese officials in Manchukuo and that the native Manchurians should play a greater part in government and economic activities. He tried to reduce the number of Japanese officials. He said that if Manchukuo needed technical help, the Japanese should assist, provided they became Manchurian citizens and acted as such, not as Japanese.

Concerning Mr. HOSHINO's relations with the Kwantung Army, it should be said that the reason he was able to get along with them was primarily because he was sincerely interested in building up Manchukuo. He conscientiously discharged his duties in the same way, far more so than most of the other Japanese officials there. The Kwantung Army officers, were for the most part, sincere and in the early days of Manchukuo I had the impression that they were the most capable and most idealistic officers of any part of the Japanese Army. This tradition of capability and sincerity continued, and so Mr. HOSHINO's attitude was respected.

On July 22, 1940, Mr. HOSHINO was appointed President of the Planning Board and Minister Without Portfolio in Prince KONOYE's Second Cabinet, and I was appointed Vice President of the Board in August of that year. The reason I was brought into the Planning Board was to analyze, from a business man's point of view, the various production figures in the impractical plans then being used. Mr. HOSHINO and I soon found out how impractical most of these plans were. It was a difficult position to be in for the China war was constantly expanding, with no termination in sight, and the United States soon began to ban certain exports to Japan. This added greatly to our economic difficulties and so we had to shift plans in order for Japan to meet her needs with what she had. The Planning Board could make plans and recommendations only. The final decision was always made by the Cabinet and executed by the various ministries.

The Planning Board had, as part of its business, formerly made plans and for the allocation of the foreign exchange which Japan obtained by her exports, but our foreign exchange shrunk rapidly. Since Japan could not get new materials, the Board had to devise new means of getting by with what was available and so it turned to the plan for the Expansion of Productive Power, which had been set up in January, 1939. Counsel has shown me Exhibit 842 and this document contains that plan. This was another impractical plan which we had to constantly revise in the face of changing circumstances. The changes were made necessary primarily by the fact that production was decreasing as our supplies of steel scrap, oil, machine tools, aluminum and other items from the United States were diminishing. Accordingly, it was necessary to find new sources of those raw materials and products, and the plan for Expansion of Productive Power was the only way to do it. Japan was weak economically and the Planning Board had to devise some means of meeting the

demands put on it by the Army, Navy and civilian sources.

Japan was still importing some materials from the United States and the Netherlands East Indies, but these were insufficient for her current needs. What it was planned to receive from them, or any other outside source, was the normal amount of peacetime imports and all the planning was based on a continuation of such imports only. The only warfare which was considered in making plans was that going on in China, and neither Mr. HOSHINO nor I knew how much the Army and Navy required for use there. The uses to which they put the materials they demanded were kept entirely secret. If we had had in mind any future war, such as the Pacific War, in making our plans, those plans would have been of a very different nature from the ones we followed. The object of the Plan for Expansion of Productive Power was to turn out producers' goods for those most necessary items cut off from Japan by the export bans of foreign countries, and to attempt to balance the industries. The heavy industry in Japan was far inferior to the light industry and needed a great deal of developing to bring the economy into any kind of a well balanced relationship. By the Plan for Expansion of Productive Power the direct purpose was not to increase the amount of steel and other items, but the ability to produce them. The end of the plan was set for March of 1942 on paper, but we knew no definite accomplishment could be realized by that time. At that time there was no particular division of the Planning Board having sole charge of this Plan so it was to be handled temporarily by the Fifth Division, which had formerly made allocations of foreign exchange and other funds which had dwindled so much.

As I said before, at this time the demands of the Army and Navy were very great. However, Mr. HOSHINO and I tried to cut down the military allocations in favor of civilian goods and the Plan for Expansion of Productive Power. The Army and Navy got first priority but we always succeeded in reducing the allocations which they demanded by a large per cent and they never actually got the full allocation because of material shortages. There was a great deal of difficulty and argument over these allocations and although they were supposed to be decided by April of each year, I remember when I joined the Planning Board that the allocation had already been deferred from April to early in July, and when I resigned in April of the next year, the authorities concerned had been able to reach no agreement on allocations for the 1941 fiscal year.

Next I shall speak about the new economic structure. Counsel has shown me Exhibit 865 which contains the plan. The detailed plan was prepared by some of the young officials of the Planning Board. Mr. HOSHINO took this plan in the autumn of 1940 and presented it to the Economic Ministers of the Cabinet. They expressed considerable opposition to the plan, especially Mr. Kobayashi, the Minister of Commerce and Industry. Mr. HOSHINO agreed that it should be changed. The Economic Ministers of the Cabinet wanted the plan changed so that it would be more in favor of a laissez-faire economy. For instance, the original plan provided that large economic organizations were to take over all industries and run them efficiently, weeding out the small and inefficient business concerns. Mr. Kobayashi wanted the government to help the small business men instead, and Mr. HOSHINO agreed with him. I do not have a copy of the original plan and I do not know where one can be found, since it was not adopted. I shall relate some of the changes made by Mr. HOSHINO and the other Economic Ministers, as I remember them, after many negotiations.

1. There were added to the original plan the words, "to stabilize the welfare and well-being of the people", or words to that effect, to the aims set out in the plan. This was to act as a check on the too great emphasis on a synthetic and planned economy and was a check on any radical change, being more in favor of maintenance of the status quo.

2. In paragraph 3 of Section II, the plan originally read: "enterprise must be separated or combined" instead of "may be separated or combined." I have underlined the work in the original plan which was changed.

3. In paragraph 4 of Section II the original plan read: "medium and small enterprises shall be adjusted and unified."

4. In Section III, entitled, "Economic Organizations", paragraph (a) (2) originally read: "Economic organizations shall be operated under the guidance of the one-leader principle." In short, the final plan on which Mr. Kobayashi and Mr. HOSHINO concurred was a reversal of the original plan in many points.

After these changes had been made by Mr. HOSHINO and the other Economic Ministers of the Cabinet, the plan became substantially as it reads now and was finally approved by the Cabinet. The Planning Board had nothing to do with the execution of the plan which had to be done by the Commerce and Industry Ministry. The new economic plan looked to a partial transfer of control of industry from the government to the businessmen of the control associations so that under the plan there would be less government control than formerly.

The Planning Board's aim under the more and more difficult conditions of the time, was a self-sufficient economy for Japan, pointing to a bloc economy relationship with Manchukuo and China. Japan was to be the center of the highly developed industry because it was more advanced in those lines. Manchukuo and China would emphasize the raw material and basic industries. The industries in North China and Manchukuo were included in the planning because these had been included in the economic plans for the past several years, being already integrated with the Japanese economy. Japan, China and Manchuria under the circumstances then prevailing, from the point of view of natural resources and production techniques, are interdependent and they did not seem to be prosperous without each other's cooperation.

Next I shall speak about the population policy, which is also contained in Exhibit 865. At this time the percentage of population increase in Japan was declining due to the change in social conditions in Japan and the war in China. In its execution the plan presupposed a state of peace and was aimed at the year 1960. Its real effects would not have been seen until that time. Furthermore, one of its immediate effects would be a decrease in the labor supply, since the plan aimed at the encouragement of marriage and restriction of employment of women over twenty years of age, and this meant a decreasing number of women laborers in the factories. It was a paper plan, which was very visionary.

The plan was prepared in the Welfare Ministry and was to be carried out by that Ministry. At that time it was the custom for such plans to be explained by the Planning Board, wherever they might have been proposed. Mr. HOSHINO did not show much interest in the population plan, although I believe he gave some explanation of it, nor did he express any opinion on it.

Def. Doc. 2592

Mr. HOSHINO gave his resignation to Prince KONOYE in early April of 1941. Five days later, in accordance with the usual custom, I tendered my resignation to the new President of the Planning Board and it was accepted.

Dated this 19 day of September, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ Tadayoshi OBATA (seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above mentioned date and place.

Witness: /s/ Masao MIGITA (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Tadayoshi OBATA (seal)

Excerpt from "Reports on Japan  
Manchukuo China Economic Round  
Table Conference" Pages 347-351

Speech of Mr. HOSHINO, Naoki  
(Chief of General Affairs, State Affairs  
Board, Manchukuo)

3rd December, 1938

"Gentlemen, it is indeed a matter for congratulation to us that, as the main result of the present incident, the spirit of harmony and cooperation is overflowing among the countries and peoples in East Asia and the atmosphere of talking together of construction of a new world is first spreading among them.

"This meeting of ours, which is a round table economic conference of Japan, Manchukuo and China, proves to be an excellent example for which I cannot but express my heart-felt gratification.

"However, when we calmly reflect upon the direct cause of the present incident, whatever it may have been, we cannot but reach the conclusion that the most fundamental cause lay in the fact that we Asiatic nations had not thoroughly understood the spirit of good-neighborliness and harmonious cooperation or did not quite satisfactorily grasp the idea of East Asia for East Asiatic peoples.

"I firmly believe that such a state of affairs would never have been brought about had each and every one of us, irrespective of age or sex, or rank, been inspired by the spirit of good-neighborliness and harmonious cooperation and had grasped the unshaken conviction of East Asia for East Asiatic peoples.

"It is, however, useless to talk over the past. The invincible armies of justice have been sent forward and the stubborn and refractory elements have already been swept from most of East Asia.

"What we ought to do today is to establish a world of new ideals in this East Asia which has been restored to our hands. The situation has, of course, not yet reached the state of solution. Although suppressed in local regions, these stubborn and outrageous elements, not awakened from their prejudiced silly dreams, are still keeping on resisting, assisted persistently by those crafty and cunning fellows."

"That is why we are not allowed to have a day of idleness or a moment of ease in our course of constructing new East Asia.

"The incident has now entered upon the so-called stage of long term construction when we should set ourselves up against the protracted war of attrition as planned by them by, on the one hand

pushing same (T.N. construction of New East Asia) ahead without slackening our punitive measures against them and, on the other hand, by diligently concentrating our efforts towards the task of construction and management. /T.N. can also imply "administration" or "exploitation"/.

"And, I think, to establish firmly the first stage of the administration of a new East Asia, by overcoming all difficulties encountered in the course of a long-term construction war, is precisely how many souls can be compensated for their precious sacrifices for the regeneration of East Asia, and is how the present incident's significance as a sacred war will be heightened throughout the entire world.

"Looking back upon East Asia in the past, although it occupies an area equivalent to a little less than one-tenth of the total land area of the world and has a population reaching a little over one-fourth of the world's total population, it seems to have been vainly wandering in the dark.

"However, the trend of the Orient to restore her proper position in world civilization is now at its climax, driving away the evil clouds of many years.

"The bell for the awakening of East Asia was sounded, I think, long ago in the Meiji Restoration of the Japanese Empire. And its first step realized on the continent was the Manchurian Incident, the recent China Incident being a development and expansion thereof.

"In consequence of this, there was first the establishment of Manchukuo, and now the establishment of the governments, each new and strong, in North China, Central China, and on the Mongolian Border.

"Here we see the revelation of God and hear the voice of Heaven.

"Construction of a new East Asia --- this indeed is truly the great duty imposed upon us, the people of East Asia. We must advance towards its fulfilment with the determination to engage ourselves bravely in this duty by staking our eternal lives and honor.

"In other words, the various races, in mutual cooperation and harmony, must awaken themselves to the realization that they are a single organic body of the peoples of East Asia, take full cognizance of the fact that they are the peoples of East Asia, and flatly reject the idea of conflict, blind obedience, exploitation and being exploited which are based on egoistic and utilitarian demands which are, in turn, the most basic evils of the present world. Furthermore, they must put their whole heart and soul in the realization, by themselves, of the ideal world of mutual harmony and pleasure based on the exaltation of the morals of the East.

"Thus, the confusion of the past will be swept away and East Asia would exert a strong pressure upon the evils of the world. In this way, the flower of morality of the East based on the firm unification of the races will flourish gloriously forever.

"This is by no means a futile and self-intoxicated fantasy. It is easily conceivable from the experience undergone by Manchukuo in the course of her development.

"However, here is a point to which we must pay special attention. It seems that the present international situation is critical and its prospect is very difficult to foresee.

"Therefore, in the promotion of this protracted constructive war in which each state must stand on a very firm base, it is necessary that we be prepared and determined so that any changes confronted at any time can be met with a bold attitude.

"In other words, long-term construction must be planned most carefully and minutely in all phases so as most soundly to achieve the desired result.

"Now when this is viewed as an actual problem, it is required at the present first stage of long-term construction that the various attempts at long-term construction be, in addition, measures fully sufficient to cope with the present critical international situation. Accordingly, the most realistic and effective construction policy at the present stage must be to mobilize the economic power existing in the various regions of East Asia, to synthesize and organize this, and thereby endeavor to surmount the present critical situation.

"When considered in this way, the function to be performed by our Manchukuo at the present stage of long-term construction is naturally clear, and we keenly feel that this is extremely important. The fact that our Manchukuo, born at the first stage of East Asia's new life, can at the very start of its /TN: i.e. East Asia's/ regular construction bear one half of that grave responsibility tells us most concisely and frankly of the growth of Manchukuo, for which we all cannot help expressing our hearty joy.

"Regarding the state of affairs before the founding of Manchukuo, I think I need not tell you, but even after its foundation, pessimistic views were apt to be observed here and there concerning the natural resources in Manchukuo. These rumors, however, have completely disappeared before the undeniable fact today. With regard to iron ore, coal, magnesium, aluminum and other staple mineral resources indispensable to development of heavy industry which may be considered as a barometer of national power for modern countries, we have attained to the stage in



which we may well show off to the world the quality and quantity of these important mineral resources. As a matter of fact, we have already contributed a great deal to the intensification of economic power of our friendly nation.

"As for power source which is important for the development of mining industry, it was believed in the past that there was no water power source in Manchukuo. This belief has entirely been contradicted, and today, a large scale water power plan, one of the largest in the world, is steadily being carried out here and there.

"In like manner, we can see a fruitful result for our effort to develop agriculture, livestock raising and forestry as well.

"Such a remarkable progress of industry and economy of Manchukuo --- aspect of so fast and steady development which is even considered one of the wonders of the twentieth century --- is indeed a precious guide-post to the new birth of East Asia. At the same time, I believe, it will contribute a good deal in the future to the development of industry in the whole area of the New East Asia. When I think of the future so promising, my heart is filled with such emotions that cannot be expressed in mere words.

"This is unmistakably an unshakable pyramid of Japan-Manchukuo union as well as racial cooperation and harmony.

"I wonder what kind of aspect another pyramid will present before our eyes when it is built up before long by the hands of awakened peoples in East Asia --- through their inseparable cooperative efforts, at the second stage when the construction of East Asia has entered into its actual course. For the present we can only say that we can do nothing but earnestly look forward to it.

"East Asia is now displaying youthful and lively activities of this everlasting life before our new solemn pledge. Thousands of years ago, our forefathers left for us those glorious cultural inheritances which will never be forgotten in the world history. We who are the most rightful inheritors of these inheritances should exert ourselves for the new birth of a more glorious culture in East Asia. We firmly believe that the construction of the new East Asia and new birth of fresh East Asiatic culture should be established upon our unified strength.

"A big task of round-table economic commerce among Japan, Manchukuo and China has been undertaken lately, and especially today we are having its final meeting here in Hsinking, the capital of Manchukuo.

"I consider that it affords us a precious opportunity in the construction of the new Orient that the men who are responsible for the economic affairs of the newly risen governments in various parts of the Orient have been able to gather together in the same room and have discussions heart to heart for the sake of the economic construction of the

new Orient, and it is my utmost honor and pleasure that I have been able to express my sincere thoughts to you all who are present."

"All those present in this hall representing the various circles are requested to discuss fully so as to carry this round-table conference to perfection, as well as to greatly contribute to the attainment of our common ideals."

昭和十三年十二月三日

RETURN TO BOOM COPY

○目玉野直樹代長(定) 諸君、今次事變の最も大なる成

果と致し、東亞の諸邦諸民族の間に和衷協同の司衝洋として漲り、與に新天地建設のことも謀するの機軸りに動かし、ありますこと、實に御同慶の至りに堪へないところであります。今日の日支經濟懇談會の會合の如き子の顯著なる一例として衷心愉快の念も禁じ得ない次第であります。

蓋し今次事變の直接の事由は如何なるものであつたにもせよ、私共が冷徹なる心境によりて、衆も及ぶ自致し、私共諸民族の甲に善隣協和の精神の徹底によりて、東亞人の東亞なる認識の把握において猶遺憾の點あり、缺くところのありしに、その最も根本的な理由であると論断せざるを得ないのであります。

若し私ども各人各自がその老若男女と同は、その貧富貴賤を論せず、善隣協和の精神に燃へ立ち、東亞人の東亞なる確固不拔

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No 1



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No. 3

然らば、この長遠建設の過程にあきまゝ、西遊致  
 します。凡ゆる困難を克服し、この新東亞經濟の第一階  
 程を堅固に構築致します。ことは、これこそ東亞新生の  
 貴重なる犧牲と致しまして拂はれてまいります。この犠  
 牲に至り始めて酬ゆることを得る所以であり、また本  
 次事變の聖戰たる吾等我々として徳以宇内に昇がらざる所以  
 かと考へるかとあります。

惟ふに過去に於ける我が東亞の姿を顧み見ますと、  
 世界陸地総面積の十分の二弱に相当する二億家を占め、  
 世界総人口の四分の一強に達するところの人口を擁して  
 るにも不肖、たゞ貧乏の中を彷徨するに過ぎなかつたか  
 あります。

然し、ながら多年の炊雲を拂つて東洋が世界文明  
 にあきまゝ、当然、占むべきその正当の地位を恢復せ  
 んとする大勢は、今や澎湃として天を激ふてゐるかとあ  
 ります。

惟ふに東亞覺醒の曉鐘は遠く大日本帝國の明  
 治維新に鳴らされたとあり、その大陸に具  
 現せられたる才一歩は滿洲事變であり、更に拡大進  
 展致したるものが今次の支那事變であつたのであ  
 ります。

これが結果と致しまして先に滿洲國の成立あり、  
 然しこの度は北支、中支蒙疆等の地において清  
 強力なる各政府の成立を見たいかとあります。

私どもは、誠心誠意に神皇正統記を讀み、天の御代を憂へ、  
新王東亞の建設——此に於ては、私どもも東亞諸  
民族の興へらるる一大責任を承り、承り、承り、  
此の悠遠なる五命之深奥を、とて、瞻仰し、敢て、  
此の當るの概を有つて、此が遂行に邁進致すべし、  
らぬ、とあり、す。

即ち各民族互に協心同和、この有機的の全體  
としての東亞人たる意識に自覚め、東亞人なり、と  
明確なる認識を把握し、今日の世界に見る最も根  
本的なる病弊を、あり、す、と、この巧利の自利の至  
張を基本とする闘争、種族、種族、種族、種族、種族、  
を断乎として排撃し、東方道義の宣揚を、根柢  
とする協和共榮の理想を、世界を自らの手に、  
て實現せん、と、ため、に、この全身全霊を、抛た、す、  
ば、なる、と、あり、す。

斯くて過去の昏迷は、掃せられ、新しき東亞  
世界の邪惡に對して、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、吹、  
民族協和の聖典と結合の上に、東方道義の華を、  
燦然として、千載に輝く、と、あり、す。

斯の如きは、決して徒なる自己陶醉的なる空想  
ではない、と、あり、す、と、今日に及ぶ、從、  
過程に、あり、す、と、體驗致し、す、と、に、依り、  
す、と、も、容易に、想到し、得らる、と、ころ、で、あり、す、  
然し、乍ら、に、私どもが、充分の留意致さ、な、す、  
べし、

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








辯護側文書



對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述書

私は午場友彦であります。私は小田原市入字田七拾九番地に住んであります。私は是迄この裁判で、私が私的秘書官を勤めた近衛公の手記に関して二度の機会に於て發言した事があります、

私は「經濟問題に關聯する内閣閣員の更迭」と題する辯護側文書等一九三〇時を見ました。この文書が近衛公の秘書官荒谷茂樹の自筆になるもので公は日々の政務上の出來事を彼に口授するのを常とした事を、私は承認致します。

これは近衛公が荒谷に口授した此の遺の多數の文書と、同様のもの  
あります。

午 場 友 彦

右は一九四七年七月廿四日余の面前に於て宣誓署名せしものなり。

行 政 人 事 府 校

陸軍歩兵中尉

バーナード・エイ・ハーガドン

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

A F F I D A V I T

My name is USHIBA, Tomohiko. I reside at No. 79 Iriuda in the city of Odawara. I have previously testified in this case on two occasions concerning the writings of Prince KONOYE, for whom I acted as Private Secretary.

I have been shown Defense Document No. 1930 entitled, "The Change of Cabinet Ministers Related to Economic Affairs". I recognize this document to be in the handwriting of ARAYA, Shigeki, Prince KONOYE's Secretary to whom he habitually dictated the day's happenings in the Cabinet business. It is similar to numbers of other documents of that nature dictated to ARAYA by Prince Konoye.

/S/ Tomohiko Ushiba  
USHIBA, Tomohiko

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 24th day of July, 1947.

/S/ Bernard A. Hargadon  
Bernard A. Hargadon, 1st  
Lt. Inf. Administrative  
and Personnel Officer

[IPS note on translation copy: Date: 30 Jan. 1946. The following is a translation of Document 59-36; which was obtained from the Tokyo residence of Prince Konoye by Major L.H. Barnard and Lt. Col. B. E. Sackett on 16 Dec. 1946.]

The Change of Cabinet Ministers Related  
to Economic Affairs (Apr. 3, 4)

After the Diet session, the reshuffling of the Cabinet became recognized generally as a matter of common sense. It was said that the Cabinet Ministers related to economic affairs were the weak point. The fact was that even if a conference of Cabinet Ministers related to economic affairs were held, there would have been no one capable of putting the matter into shape. Since Mr. HIRANUMA, Minister of Home Affairs and I were not well-versed in economic affairs, and since there was no alternative but to select a suitable person from the outside, I, after consulting with the Minister of Home Affairs, had to decide on whom to select. Mr. Seihin IKEDA was thought to be the proper choice, but he could not be very well drafted because there were strong objections to him by the reformists. Mr. Masatsune OGURA of Osaka became the next topic of our conversation.

When Mr. OGURA came to Tokyo, Mr. HIRANUMA, Minister of Home Affairs, and I broached the subject to him but he did not readily consent.

Finally Mr. OGURA consented, but upon being consulted in regard to the changes of other Cabinet Ministers related to economic affairs, he wanted the changes made simultaneously with his appointment to the Cabinet post. After all, if he alone entered the Cabinet ahead of the others, he would have had to perform the task of dismissing the gov't. Ministers. This he did not like to do, whereas I wanted to have Mr. OGURA perform this duty.

Pertaining to the change of other Cabinet Ministers related to economic affairs, Mr. IKEDA held the opinion that the Finance Minister too must be replaced. Accordingly, Mr. Yadenji NAKAJIMA was suggested for this post. On the other hand, Mr. OGURA claimed that there was no necessity to change the Finance Minister, adding that NAKAJIMA especially was not acceptable. As candidates for Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. OGURA suggested MATTA and MURATA and if necessary FUJIMURA. The following names were subjected for President of the Planning Board; Teiichi SUZUKI, Tatsuo YAMADA, KAYA, TOKI and INO.

With that Mr. OGURA returned to Osaka. March 30 issue of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Newspaper reported on the conference between OGURA and HIRANUMA and also on OGURA's entrance into the Cabinet. On the following day, the 31st, with the change in the staff of the SUMITOMO Honsha, Mr. OGURA's retirement as general director was announced. Under the circumstances it became urgently necessary to make an announcement. I had the Ministers of War and Navy come to my OGIKUBO residence. I told them about Mr. OGURA's entrance into the Cabinet and received their support. After both Ministers had left, I telephoned Mr. OGURA of Osaka. Upon discussing his independent entrance to the Cabinet, he still maintained that he would be distressed if he were not appointed together with the others. He stated that he would arrive in Tokyo the following morning and discuss the matter then.

FILE 000  
- 1 -  
RETURN TO ROOM 3

However, Kamesaburo YAMASHITA called on this day. Since I knew that he had a voice in regard to OGURA, I told him about the negotiations with OGURA so far. I stated that unless OGURA entered independently it would be distressing, and requested him to persuade Mr. OGURA to do so. He agreed. Since the position of Mr. OGURA would be raised a grade thereby, he would persuade and make OGURA accept. And after negotiating with Mr. OGURA over long-distance telephone that night, I also phoned Mr. YAMASHITA.

Mr. OGURA, who left Osaka on the morning of 1 April, arrived at Tokyo station at 17:20 o'clock and went to his residence in OKUBO. There Mr. YAMASHITA called and conveyed my wishes.

At 20:00 o'clock that night, Mr. OGURA visited me and consented to enter the Cabinet alone. He left at 21:00 that night. He said that he changed his mind, but the persuasion of Mr. YAMASHITA seemed to have had considerable effect. After Mr. OGURA left, I met with newspaper reporters and told them that this reconstruction was an independent thing. The newspaper apparently construed it to mean that the problem of the change of Cabinet Ministers relating to economic affairs had been settled for the time being. Accordingly the subsequent change in the Minister of Commerce and the President of the Planning Board was a complete surprise.

On April 2, I made a confidential report to the Emperor and at 14:30 o'clock of the same day the investiture of OGURA as Minister of State was held by His Majesty. OGURA left that night for Osaka for the purpose of reporting on his recent appointment at the Imperial Mausoleum. When I conferred with OGURA as to the possible choice of Teichi SUZUKI as President of the Planning Board, which position must be filled by a person who knows about the commodity mobilization plan and also the inner workings of the Army and who must be a forceful person, he expressed his approval.

At 20:30 o'clock of the 2nd, the day of Mr. OGURA's investiture, I called Lt. Gen. SUZUKI to my OKUBO residence and proposed his appointment to the presidency of the Planning Board. Lt. Gen. SUZUKI replied it would be all right with him, but the Navy might object. Asserting that the balance of power between the Army and Navy would surely become a problem, he said he could not decide this matter himself and showed some disapproval. His point of view was indeed justified.

On hearing this, a thought suddenly occurred to me. Then I should select the Minister of Commerce from the Navy and appoint Vice Navy Minister TOYODA as Minister of Commerce and Industry.

This was the sudden thought which occurred to me from hearing Lt. Gen. SUZUKI's story. To be sure, I had the following preliminary data showing that Vice Navy Minister TOYODA was qualified for the suggested post:

1. The story that Vice Minister TOYODA, at the conference of Vice Ministers, once argued down the Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry on the problem of iron and coal.

2. According to Baron Bunkichi ITO, Mr. Fuchisaburo KIRI had Vice Minister TOYODA in mind as his successor for the post of the President of the Nippon Iron Manufacturing Company. On top of the fact that Mr. TOYODA was not altogether an amateur in commercial and industrial administration, his appointment as the Minister of Commerce would make the following matters possible:

(1) The character of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry as a Munitions Ministry would become clear. This, together with the Planning Board headed by President SUZUKI would mark an advance toward the perfection of the national defense structure.

(2) The balance of power between the Army and Navy would be maintained.

(3) As for Mr. NOBAYASHI, Minister of Commerce, he would lose face if he were replaced by a businessman or a young bureaucrat. (Actually there were no suitable persons among the businessmen and bureaucrats.) However, if his successor came from the military, looking at it entirely from the demand for transformation of the ministry into a munitions ministry, the matter of prestige for him would be dissolved. These and many other things could be enumerated. When I mentioned this to Lt. Gen. SUZUKI, he said this was a capital idea and said he would also mention it to the War Minister. He left me at 23:00 o'clock that night.

When leaving me Lt. Gen. SUZUKI said that should the topic of the conversation leak out, he would, if questioned by newspapermen on tonight's interview, tell them that we discussed various matters pertaining to the East Asia Bureau of the Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association.)

On April 3, when I met Navy Minister OIKAWA in the waiting room of the Imperial Sanctuary on Emperor JEMMU Day, I discussed this matter with him. The Navy Minister endorsed this as excellent and said that since War Minister TOJO was not there, after conferring with the War Minister, he would again speak about it to me.

After that, upon relating this to KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in the same waiting room of the Imperial Sanctuary, he also endorsed it.

That day about 14:20 o'clock the private secretary of the Navy Minister informed me on the telephone that both the War Minister and Navy Minister would soon call at my OGIKUBO residence. Both Ministers arrived at 14:40 o'clock and gave me their replies of endorsement. On this occasion War Minister TOJO suggested that Lt. Gen. SUZUKI be placed on the reserve list and appointed not only as President of the Planning Board but also hold the additional office of Minister of State without Portfolio. I agreed to this suggestion. OIKAWA also stated that Vice Admiral TOYODA would be placed on the reserve list.

After both the War Minister and the Navy Minister had left at 15:30 o'clock, I telephoned to the Osaka residence of Mr. OGURA, Minister of State without Portfolio, but he was absent, for he had not yet returned from his visit to the Imperial Mausoleum. After a while, at 18:45 of the same day, there was a telephone call from Mr. OGURA and I talked to him about the appointments of Lt. Gen. SUZUKI and Vice Admiral TOYODA. When I asked for his opinion, Mr. OGURA also heartily endorsed this. Then I reported by telephone the progress of the discussions so far, together with the support of Mr. OGURA, to KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Minister of Home Affairs HIRANUMA, Navy Minister OIKAWA, and War Minister TOJO.

That night at 23:10, I called Navy Minister CIKAWA by phone and found out that when the Navy Minister conferred with Vice Minister TOYODA at 20:00 that night, the Vice Minister was much reluctant and requested time to ponder over it.

On the morning of April 4, OKA, chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs of the Naval Ministry, came to make an interim report, informing me that it was still difficult to realize. So I requested that the Navy Minister try once more to persuade Mr. TOYODA.

However, Navy Minister CIKAWA reported to me just prior to the Cabinet conference that, although everything would be all right, he wanted the Premier to speak in person. Accordingly, at 11:30 of the same day, I had Vice Minister TOYODA come to my official residence. Although I spoke to him in person, he did not reply in the affirmative, saying that he had no confidence in his ability to hold the post. He wanted to have another day to think it over. Lest the story might leak if another day were taken, I asked him to give me a reply by 18:00 that night.

When the War and Navy Ministers called on me later, they asked me about Mr. TOYODA's reply. When I related the aforementioned matter, the War Minister wanted an answer by 15:00, saying 18:00 would be too late. Since the Army had already obtained the consent of Lt. Gen SUZUKI, and had begun the necessary procedure, there was a fear of leakage and therefore wanted the Navy to expedite the matter. Of course, it was better for me too to have it settled as soon as possible, so we decided to have the Navy Minister persuade Mr. TOYODA once more. I summoned HIRANUMA, Minister of Home Affairs and requested that he too meet to persuade Vice Minister TOYODA.

As a result, at 15:00 of the same day, Navy Minister CIKAWA and Vice Minister TOYODA came to my official residence together. The reply of consent was finally obtained. At that time the Navy Minister said that he would recommend the promotion of Vice Minister TOYODA to full admiral. I had heard that the Vice Minister was due for promotion to full admiral that autumn. It seems that since Mr. TOYODA desired much to remain in active service, it was arranged to have him put on the reserve list in exchange for his promotion to full admiral.

Since Mr. TOYODA consented, I called and told KOSHINO, President of the Planning Board. He had been already informed beforehand by War Minister TOJO. It was quickly settled. On the part of Minister of Commerce and Industry KOBAYASHI, various rumors were circulated among the people. Since there were rumors that he might refuse to resign, I had Mr. Kikira KAZAMI come to the Japanese room of my residence and told him the state of things so far and had him go to Minister of Commerce and Industry KOBAYASHI.

Upon hearing that his successor was Vice Minister TOYODA of the Navy, Mr. KOBAYASHI gladly entrusted his resignation to Mr. KAZAMI, explaining that the choice suited him, although he would not consent if the choice were Mr. FUJIMURA. The matter was settled in about 20 minutes and Mr. KAZAMI returned.

Accordingly, after inquiring as to the convenience of the Imperial Court, I went to the Imperial Palace at 17:30 and unofficially reported to His Majesty the proposed appointments.



Having received the Imperial sanction, I announced this at once. At 20:00 of the same day, the investiture ceremony for Mr. TOYODA as Minister of Commerce and Industry and Mr. SUZUKI as President of the Planning Board was held.

#### Supplementary News

Since this reorganization was effected in absolute secrecy, the public was completely surprised when the announcement was made.

It was because it had materialized in such a short time. Another reason was, with the appointment of Mr. OGURA as Minister without portfolio, the supposition became stronger that the change of the Minister of Commerce and Industry, President of the Planning Board and others would be executed gradually in accordance with Mr. OGURA's opinion. Due to the fact that April 3 was a press holiday, the attention of the press was not as sharp as it was on other days. This also had some influence.

I understand that when the announcement was made after the Prime Minister met in private with the Emperor, the newspaper reporters said, "We were beaten". It was exactly so.

On the morning of the fourth, Maj. Gen. Tsukimi KINOGA, who was an investigator of the Planning Board and became the section Chief under new President SUZUKI, came to I.M.D., Chief of General Affairs Section of the Cabinet, and indignantly said, "President HOSHINO is willing to resign. Why should persons like KOBAYASHI be allowed to stay in office to dilly dally. Under the circumstances there is no alternative but to dismiss him." I wonder what kind of face Maj. Gen. KINOGA had, when he heard the announcement in the afternoon.

When private secretary TAKEMURA was sick in bed, in the afternoon of the 3rd, there was a phone call from the private secretary of the Navy Minister, indicating that the War and the Navy Ministers would like to call on the Premier. He suggested that inquiry be made direct to my private residence. In the evening of the next day, the fourth, Mr. TAKEMURA heard the sound of bells with shouts of newspaper extras. While he was wondering what it could be about, he received a phone call from USHIDA, another private secretary, informing him about the Cabinet reorganization. Surprised by this report, he recalled the phone call of the previous day.

Struck with admiration by the brilliant achievement of the reorganization, which they characterized as a stroke of genius, all the newspapers expressed approval of this reorganization and are placing great expectations in the future.

Exh. No. 3215

Def. Doc. No. 2522

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Saeko, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: OSHIMA, Hiroo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, OSHIMA, Hiroo, have set forth my career as below:

After graduating from the Law Course of the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1929, since April I served in the Home Ministry, Niigata, Shimane and Fukuoka Prefectural Offices and the Metropolitan Police Board in succession.

From November 1934 I served in the Department of Civil Affairs in Manchukuo, and since November 1936 served in the Bureau of Peace in the Home Ministry and Toyama Prefecture in Japan.

In October 1940 I was appointed a Staff member of the Total War Research Institute.

In July, 1943 I was appointed the Bureau Chief in the Ministry of Welfare, and November 1943 was appointed a secretary of the Cabinet.

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In July 1944 I was appointed the Governor of Aomori Prefecture.

In April 1945 I was appointed the Chief of the Custody Bureau in the Home Ministry, and relieved of the post January 1943.

1. Around the middle of September of 1940 when I was one of the section Chiefs of the Home Ministry, I was asked by the authorities dealing with personnel in the same Ministry if I would go to the Total War Research Institute which was to be opened soon, and I gave them my consent.
2. The aim and the business of the Institute were just as provided for in the Imperial Ordinance concerning the Total War Research Institute; however, as I understood then its chief business was rather for the education of the younger people so as to do away with sectionalism then prevailing among government offices and civilian organizations. The idea for the Institute had originated with the 1st Konoe and Yonai Cabinet, but its realization did not occur until Konoe's 2nd Cabinet.
3. The Institute was to be opened on October 1st, however, since my duty was to do miscellaneous business, I went to its office for preparation beforehand. It had no office of its own yet, and rented a small room in the Houses of Parliament Building without any desks, chairs or other business facilities. I had to arrange with some other offices for the use of furnitures necessary for business.

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4. On the 1st of October, the opening day of the Institute, we for the first time met with Mr. Hoshino, the acting president of the Institution, but he did not say anything other than that he would leave all matters to us. At that time, the staff of the Institution consisted of seven including myself and we were to start the work in this rented office with a clerk, a typist and a telephone operator. However, being without any order or instruction from the Prime Minister, under whose administration the Institute was placed or Mr. Hoshino, the acting president, we, the staff members had to study by ourselves what kind of work should be carried on.

5. At the end of October of 1940 the office was removed from the Houses of Parliament Building to one of the houses belonging to the Cabinet, but we were to share this house with other offices for some time. From April 1941, about 35 students entered the Institution, and in a converted lecture room in this house the lectures were begun. But as the house became too small, a new building was erected.

6. As I recollect, the budget of the Institute for the first year of its opening was yen 160,000, which was to be spent in paying Institute personnel and office expenditures. There was no estimate of expenditures for the work of the Institute.

7. As the Institute did not, for practical purposes, operate until January of 1941 when Lt. G. Iimura became president, we had

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no business on which to report to Mr. Hoshino. During this period he did not visit the Institution at all, gave us no order, instruction or suggestion concerning it, and showed no interest in the work of the Institute. Being embarrassed at such a situation, I had to go to his office twice to ask him for information as to when the president would be selected.

8. About May or June of 1941 Mr. Hoshino was selected by the Institution as one of the councillors which consisted of 15 or 16 persons; however the position of councillor was really nominal and honorary, having no practical work in relation to the Institute, and Mr. Hoshino as such gave us neither instruction nor suggestion.

9. Lt. G. Iimura was formally appointed the president of the Institution in January 1941; however, he had arrived in Tokyo in November with an informal order to be the future president, and, with the request of the staff of the Institute, he advised us and took over practical leadership. With this, the works of the Institute began to be in a little more concrete shape. In other words, he started to draft various plans and to make preparations for education. The adoption of the system of the total maneuver in education was one of the plans thus framed under his guidance at this time.

As I was told, the circumstance under which Lt. G. Iimura was picked as the President was that he was well qualified as an educator of young students and had an even temperament. As the president, he proved to be a good educator as we had expected. He once said to me jokingly of his disappointment in holding such a second-rate position.

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10. As for the students of the Institute, we admitted from one to four from each Department of the Government proportionately to the number of officials therein, and we also took six or seven from business organizations.

There were some taken from the press among the latter.

11. The Institute personnel were reduced on account of the policy of the simplification of administration at the end of 1942 during the Pacific War, and the Institute for practical purposes, ceased to operate at the end of 1943 when the third group of students finished their course.

On this 3 day of Sept. , 1947

at I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT OSHIMA Hiroo (seal)

I, MIGITA, Masao hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depoent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) MIGITA, Masao(seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

OSHIMA Hiroo (seal)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

FILE COPY  
TO ROOM 301  
AFFIDAVIT OF  
MURAKAMI, Hajimu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

In March, 1937 (Showa 12) I graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University. Immediately after that I found work in the Ministry of Finance.

In July, 1940 (Showa 15) when Mr. HOSHINO, Naoki, took office as president of the Planning Board, I was appointed as secretary to the president. From then until April of the following year, when Mr. HOSHINO resigned from the post of president of the Planning Board, I worked closest to him and then I returned to the Ministry of Finance. I am now working at the Accountants' Bureau.

Even after resigning from my post as his secretary, at the request of Mr. HOSHINO, I almost always lived at his private house, and took charge of the transaction of his miscellaneous business, collection of materials for his speeches and his discussions, arrangement of his manuscripts, and whatnot.

Now I will state below what I know directly or from those who were with him about the movements of Mr. HOSHINO during the period between his resignation from the post of president of the Planning Board of the Konoye Cabinet, in April, 1941 (Showa 16) and his inauguration as Chief Secretary of the Tojo Cabinet, in October of the same year.

After his retirement from his office as president of the Planning Board, Mr. HOSHINO spent his days chiefly in reading books, exercises and travels to the provinces.

Those who visited him most frequently at that time were Mr. ISHIWATA, Sotaro, Mr. IRIMANO, Takeo and Mr. OBATA, Tadayoshi, Mr. HOSHINO's intimate friends since his school days. These men visited him as companions in conversations and amusements. Besides these people, Mr. KAWAI, Yoshinari, Mr. TAKEUCHI, Tokuji, and Mr. IDE, Norimichi, a painter, came to his house to play

tennis with him. These were about all who ever visited him during the period and no visit or contact ever made by any of the so-called professional politicians. His life was that of unemployment to the letter.

Mr. HOSHINO visited Mr. TOJO only once. Immediately after his resignation, he dropped in the official residence of the War Minister for a courtesy call regarding the resignation. He has never visited Mr. TOJO since then, nor has he ever seen Mr. TOJO at any place outside their homes, nor has he ever talked with Mr. TOJO on the telephone.

As for his local trips it was as he said when he resigned as the President of the Planning Board that "because of my being away in Manchuria for so long a period there is a necessity hereafter to look about the actual conditions in every field more frequently than ever." Starting with the trip for Kansai area in April 1941, he made such long trips as going to Hokuyiku, Amanohashidate and Fukuchiyama areas, Shikoku and Okayama areas, Hoddaiido area, Tohoku area and Kobe, Nagoya, Kyoto and so on, which were more often interrupted by short trips such as to Oshima, Gamma Prefecture and the like; so much so that he could hardly find time to rest at his home in Tokyo. Except for the initial trip to Kansai area on which I accompanied him, his trips were as a rule with his daughter or his other family members. In October he planned to come back to Tokyo, after going to Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya areas, in order to attend the discussion meeting sponsored by the "Oriental Economist Publishing Co., Ltd," and from the 19th of the same month on, to go to the Northern part of Kyushu and Korea. The previous consultations concerning the date of his start, etc., with Mr. DATE, Muneaki (then serving at the Finance Ministry) who was to go with him, had been already completed. Making use of the few days of his stay in Tokyo, he went on 19 October to the Kabuki Theater together with his family. Just then, around five o'clock PM, at the entrance of the Kabuki Theater, he read an extra reporting "The Imperial Order Name for Mr. TOJO", and Mr. HOSHINO for the first time knew the fact. With only the observation, "Mr. TOJO will have hardships", he continued seeing the Kabuki Play. Then unexpectedly before eight o'clock PM he was called out by loud speaker, and was told to go to General TOJO's residence.

On this account he was obliged to hurriedly cancel his prearranged trips after the 19th.

On this 13 day of September, 1947.

At Tokyo.

/s/ MURAKAMI, Hajimu



OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ MURAKAMI, Hajimu

On this 13th day of September,  
1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: MURAKAMI, Hajimu (seal)

I, Resuke MATSUDA, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) Resuke MATSUDA (seal)

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

Organization on the Offices and  
Officials attached to the Cabinet  
(1st, October, 1941)  
Imperial Ordinance No. 307  
December 20, 1924

We sanction the revision of the cabinet's official  
organization and it is hereby promulgated.

The Organization of the Offices and Officials attached  
to the Cabinet.

Article 1.

The Cabinet Secretariat and the following three bureaux  
shall be established in the Cabinet.

The Pension Bureau

The statistics Bureau

The Printing Bureau

Article 2.

The Cabinet Secretariat shall take charge of the  
following business.

1. Matters concerning the promulgation of Imperial

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edicts and decrees, laws and ordinances.

2. Matters concerning the custody of the originals of the Imperial Japanese Constitution, Imperial Rescripts, Imperial decrees, laws and ordinances.

3. Matters concerning the Examination, drafting, receipt and dispatch of official documents.

4. Matters concerning the appointment, promotion, resignation and status of officials.

5. Matter concerning the Personal history of higher officials of every office.

6. Matters concerning the custody of official seals.

7. Matters concerning the editing and preservation of official documents.

8. Matters pertaining to fiscal accounts of the Cabinet.

9. Matters pertaining to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and general matters concerning the movement to assist the Imperial Rule.

#### Article 3.

The Pension Bureau shall take charge of the following business:

1. Matters pertaining to the adjudication of the rights to receive pensions.

2. Adjudication on pension reports.

3. Granting and taking charge of pensions.
4. Matters pertaining to the pension treasury.

Article 4.

(repealed)

Article 5.

The Statistics Bureau shall take charge of the following business:

1. Consolidation of statistics of every administrative department.
2. Superintendence of international statistical business.
3. Statistics on population, labour and other basic status of the nations, which do not belong to any administrative department.
4. Publication of books on statistics and exchange of Japanese and foreign statistical books.
5. Matters pertaining to the training of statistical officials and the summoning and meetings of the chief statistical officials of every administrative office.

Besides the previously mentioned, the Statistics Bureau may make graph charts of the statistics proposed, in compliance with requests of every administrative office, public bodies, corporation or foundations aimed at public welfare.

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Article 6.

The Printing Bureau shall take charge of the following business:

1. The Editing and sale of the Official Gazette, compendium of laws and ordinances, list of government officials and other books.
2. Matters pertaining to the printing of the Official Gazette and other books.
3. Manufacture of stamps, postage stamps, bills and other printed matters.
4. Matters pertaining to paper manufactures.

Article 7.

The following officials shall be established in the cabinet:

- Chief Secretary -- Chokunin rank
- Chief of the Pension Bureau -- Chokunin rank
- Chief of the Statistics Bureau -- Chokunin rank
- Chief of the Printing Bureau -- Chokunin rank
- Four Secretaries in full service -- Sonin rank
- Two Procurators in full service -- Sonin rank
- Two Secretaries to the Prime Minister in full service --  
Sonin rank
- Two Secretaries to the Pension Bureau in full  
service -- Sonin rank

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Two Secretaries to the Statistics Bureau in full  
service -- Sonin rank

Four Statistical Officials to the Statistics Bureau  
in full service -- Sonin rank

Three Secretaries to the Printing Bureau in full  
service -- Sonin rank,

Six Procurators to the Printing Bureau in full  
service -- Sonin rank

Twenty-three Technicians to the Printing Bureau  
in full service -- Sonin rank

Ten Probational Statistical Officials in the Statistics  
Bureau, in full service -- Hannin rank

One hundred and ninty Subordinate Officials in full  
service -- Hannin rank

One hundred and eighty-eight Assistant Technicians  
in full service -- Hannin rank

#### Article 8.

In addition to the officials mentioned Article 7,  
there shall be in the Pension Bureau medical advisers,  
their member will be designated as three persons' one of  
whom will be a standing medical advisor.

The medical advisers shall be appointed by the cabinet  
upon the request of the Prime Minister.

The medical advisers shall be treated as Imperial

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appointees or Imperially approved officials; however, those who are in regular government service will be treated as such.

Article 9.

The Chief Secretary shall assist the Prime Minister, take charge of confidential documents, manage the general affairs of the cabinet, superintend officials in the Secretariat and himself handle the appointment, promotion and resignation of officials of Hannin and inferior ranks.

Article 10.

Every bureau chief shall take charge of the business of their bureaux under the direction of the Prime Minister.

Article 11.

The secretary and procurator shall take charge of the business of the cabinet secretariat under the direction of the authorities.

Article 12.

The Secretary to the Prime Minister shall take charge of secret business under the directions of the Prime Minister.

Article 13.

The secretaries, administrators, and procurators of every bureau shall take charge of the business matters of

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every bureau under the direction of the authorities.

Article 14.

The medical advisor to the Pension Bureau shall investigate medical matters with regard to pensions in compliance with the inquiry of the Chief of the Pension Bureau.

Article 15.

The statistical officials to the Statistics Bureau shall take charge of statistics under the direction of the authorities.

Article 16.

The technicians of the Printing Bureau shall take charge of technical matters under the direction of the authorities.

Article 17.

The assistant statistical officials to the Statistics Bureau shall be engaged in statistics under the directions of the authorities.

Article 18.

Subordinate officials shall be engaged in general affairs under the direction of the authorities.



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Article 19.

The assistant technicians shall be engaged in technical affairs under the direction of the authorities.

Article 20.

The secretaries to the state minister and subordinate officials, not exceeding three persons and 6 persons in full service respectively may be installed in the cabinet as officials attached to the state minister as prescribed in Article 10 of the Cabinet Ordinance.

The secretary to the state minister shall be an Imperially approved official and shall take charge of secret business matters under the direction of the state minister.

The subordinate officials, prescribed in clause 1, shall be under the direction of the state minister or his secretary in respect to their duties.

Appendix

This ordinance shall take effect from the date of promulgation.

The Colonization Administration Bureau Organization, the Statistics Bureau Organization, Printing Bureau Organization and Imperial Ordinance No. 49 in 1894 are hereby abrogated.

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Appendix

(Imperial Ordinance No. 845, 1940)

This Ordinance shall take effect from the date of promulgation.

In Article 14 of the Ordinance on Pay for higher officials "the secretary to the State Minister" shall be included after "members of the Total War Research Institute."

Def. Doc. # 2144

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, SATO, Asao, who occupy the post of Commissioner to the Cabinet, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Organization on the Offices and Officials to the Cabinet" is an exact and true copy of official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Cabinet).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 21st day of August, 1947

/S/ SATO, Asao (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: /S/ NARUSHIMA, Masanori (seal)

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs.-

ARAKI, Sadao, et

AFFIDAVIT OF  
INADA, Shuichi

I, INADA, Shuichi, having been duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet in accordance with the custom followed in my country, hereby depose and state as follows:

I was Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Cabinet Secretariat from November 1937 until April 1945. Thus I was in this position when Mr. HOSHINO, Naoki, was president of the Planning Board and Minister Without Portfolio in the Second KONOYE Cabinet in 1940, and sometime later, after his appointment as Chief Secretary of the TOJO Cabinet in October 1941, I served under him. One of my duties was to be in charge of the documents filed in the Cabinet Secretariat.

Next, I shall speak about the matter of how "explainers" attend the Privy Council meeting. In my position with the Cabinet Secretariat I used to receive notices from the Secretary of the Privy Council to arrange to send the minimum number of explainers necessary to attend a particular meeting of the Privy Council. I would then notify the various ministers to this effect and they in turn would decide on and issue orders to their subordinates as to who would attend the meeting as explainers to assist them.

About six o'clock in the evening of the day when General TOJO was appointed by the Emperor to form a cabinet in October 1941, as I recall, I was requested to see him quite suddenly. When I visited him at the official residence of the War Minister, Colonel Akamatsu, who later became the secretary to the Premier, was also there waiting for me. General TOJO said to me that, being appointed as Prime Minister, he had to select someone as Chief Secretary to the Cabinet. However, he was not familiar with the affairs of the civil service and he wanted me to state frankly my opinion on what kind of person could be deemed proper for the post of Chief Secretary, and who would be most fitting to discharge the secretarial business from the point of view of those of us in the Cabinet Secretariat who would be under him. I first hesitated to answer but, being rather pressed by Colonel Akamatsu for my unreserved opinion, I stated my general opinion to the following effect: The Chief Secretary should be first, a man of ability without being autocratic and second, should have a good record in the civil service. General TOJO then gave me the names of some persons, one of whom was Mr. HOSHINO. He asked me if we, the

secretariat, could discharge our business smoothly under him. I replied that Mr. HOSHINO had had much experience in official business so that I thought him the proper person for the post and that we of the Secretariat could work well under him. General TOJO then asked me concerning the procedure to be followed in forming a cabinet, after which he thanked me for my opinion and I left. The next day I learned that Mr. HOSHINO had been appointed Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. After his appointment, Mr. HOSHINO told me that all he had been doing after resigning from the KONOYE Cabinet in April 1941 and until just before his recent appointment was to travel around Japan.

It was part of the prescribed duties of the Chief Cabinet Secretary to have Imperial Rescripts prepared in the Secretariat. Accordingly, during the latter part of November 1941, Mr. HOSHINO ordered me to prepare an Imperial Rescript to be issued in the event the negotiations with the United States should be successful, and another Imperial Rescript proclaiming a state of war with the United States and Great Britain. The former was listed on a memorandum which Mr. HOSHINO gave me saying, "This should also be prepared as it may be necessary." The memorandum was written in pencil in Mr. HOSHINO's handwriting, containing five items listing things to be done in the event the negotiations with the United States were successful, and read: "Measures to be taken in case Japan should suffer great hardship -- (1) Request the Emperor to proclaim Imperial Decree -- Settle the People's Minds and Retention of the National Power." This is as much as I remember of what I read. The memorandum was then typed and I returned it to Mr. HOSHINO. The memorandum was placed in the Secretariat files and was later destroyed by fire as I heard during an air raid in 1945.

After receiving this memorandum from Mr. HOSHINO I began drafting the Imperial Rescript. I showed the draft Rescript for peace to Mr. HOSHINO early in December, I believe it was, after he had told me to hurry the preparation of it. After looking it over, he did not approve the draft but returned it to me for reconsideration. It was my intention at the time to revise the draft and resubmit it, but the press of other business was too great and it remained in a pending status until after the outbreak of the Pacific war. If this draft had been needed for actual use, the normal course would have been to revise it several times until the Rescript was satisfactory.

I cannot remember now the exact contents of this draft of the Imperial Rescript for peace. However, its general purport was that Japan would be put in a very difficult position but that the Japanese people should endeavor to maintain the national strength and keep friendly relations with the other nations of the world. This draft was, of course, never used. After the outbreak of hostilities I destroyed the only two copies of the draft which had been made, i.e., the one in my own handwriting and the other which I had shown Mr. HOSHINO but which he had returned to me. This destruction was done since it was recognized that there was no further need for the drafts and also because it was a practice in the Cabinet Secretariat that, inasmuch as Imperial Rescripts are issued from the Throne, all preparatory drafts had to be burned.

On this 16th day of September 1947  
At Tokyo.

DEPCMENT: /s/ INADA, Shuichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ INADA, Shuichi (seal)

I, MIGITA, Masao, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date at Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ MIGITA, Masao (seal)

Def. DOG 2590

2x 3220

Exh NO

257

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述行

供述者 稻田周

自分候我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上  
ノ如ク供述致シマス

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

私ハ一九三七年ヨリ一九四五年迄内閣官房総務課長ノ職ニ在リマシタ。カクテ私ハ星野直樹氏ガ近衛第二次内閣ノ企畫院總裁兼無任所大臣デアツタ。一九四〇年ニモ此地位ニアリ、其後一九四一年十月同氏ガ京條内閣ノ内閣書記官長ニナツテカラハ其下デ勤務シマシタ。私ノ任務ノ一ツハ内閣官房ニ提出サル、書類ノ取扱ヒヲ爲スコトデアリマシタ。

次ニ説明員ガ樞密院會議ニ出席スル経緯ニ付テ申述ベマス。私ハ内閣書記官長トシテ樞密院書記局カラ樞密院會議ガアル毎ニ、ソレニ出席スル必要ナ最少限ノ説明員ヲ派遣スル様打合ハセヲシテ其ヒ度イト云フ報知ヲ受ケルノガ慣例デアリマシタ。ソコデア私ハ各省大臣ニ此旨ヲ知ラセ各省大臣ハ其致ヲ定メ、説明員トシテ誰ヲ派遣スルカト云フコトニ關スル命令ヲ下僚ニ下スノガ例デアリマシタ。

一、一九四一年十月京條首相ニ大命ガ降下シタ當日ノ午後六時頃ト記憶シマスガ、京條首相ヨリ突然ニ命ヒ度イカラト申込マレ、陸軍大臣官舎ニ参リマシタトコロ、其處ニハ後ニ京條首相秘書官ニナツタ赤松大佐モ同席シテ居リマシタ。

京條氏ハ實ハ自分ニ大命ガ降下シタノデ内閣書記官長ヲ選任スルノデアアルガ、自分ハ全ク文官方面ノ情況ニハ暗イノデ、内閣書記官長ニハ如何ナル人ヲ選ブベキデアルカ又ハ其下ニ仕フルベキ君選内閣事務官局ノ立場カラ親デ書記官トシテノ事務ヲ行フノニ誰レガ最も適任者デアルト考ヘルカ、



君ノ忌憚ノナイ意見ヲ聞キ度イト申サレマシタ。私ガ返答ニ躊躇シテオ  
 リマス。ト、側ノ赤松大佐カラモ是非遠慮ナク意見ヲ述ベテクレト申サレ  
 マス。ノデ、私ハ書記官長タルベキ人ハ先ヅ有能デアツテモ專斷的デナク  
 且文官トシテ立派ナ經歷ヲ有ツタ人物デアルベキコト等ノ一般的名所見  
 フ述ベマス。ト東條大將ハ私ニ對シニ、三人ノ名前ヲ示シマシタガ星野直  
 樹氏ハ其ノ一人デアリマシタ。其ノ時東條大將ハ私ニ星野氏ナラバ君選  
 官房事務當局ハ其ノ下ヲ圓滿ニ仕事ガヤツテユケルカトタツネラレマシ  
 タ。  
 ソコデ、私ハ星野氏ナラバ官房事務ノ經驗モアルカラ適任ト思フシ且自  
 分等事務當局トシテ仕ヘルノニモヨカラウト思フト申シマシタ。  
 東條大將ハ更ニ内閣組織ノ事務的手續ニ付テ尊ホテ後御苦勞ダツタト云  
 ハレ私ハ辭去シマシタ。其翌日私ハ星野氏ガ内閣書記官長ニ任命サレタ  
 ノヲ知リマシタ。就任後星野氏ハ私ニ一九四一年四月第二次近衛内閣ヨ  
 リ辭任ノ後書記官長ニ任命ヲ受クル直前迄ハ日本各地ノ旅行ニ終始シテ  
 オツタト云フ話ヲシマシタ。  
 内閣書記官長ノ所定ノ任務ノ一ツハ内閣官房ニ於テ翻譯ノ準備ヲナスコ  
 トデアリマス。コレニ從ツテ一九四一年十一月ノ末頃星野氏ハ私ニ對  
 米交渉ガ成功シタ際ニ發セラルベキ翻譯ト米英ニ對スル開戦ヲ布告スル  
 翻譯ノ準備ヲ命ジマシタ。前者ハ往々中ノ一項デアリ星野氏ハ「コレ  
 モ必要トナルカモワカラナイカラ準備シテ置ク様エ」ト云ツテ私ニ手

シマシタ。其覺悟ハ猶策士ノ皇野氏ノ手記アリ對米交渉成功ノ際ニナサルベキ  
 敬稱項ヲ列記シタモノチ、臥薪嘗膽ノ際ニ對處スベキ措置要項トシテ眞  
 一項ニ詔旨喚發ノ奏請——民心ノ安定ト國力ノ保持——ト誓イテアリマ  
 シタ。願ソチ私ノ記憶ニ殘ツテオトルハコレガケデス。  
 此ノ覺悟ハ以テゾニシ、皇野氏ニ渡シマシタ。ソシテコレハ官房ノ管類  
 綴ニ入レラレマシタガ私ノ関イタトコロニヨレバ一九四五年ノ爆發ニヨ  
 ツテ機カレマスソウデス。  
 皇野氏ヨリ覺悟ヲ渡サレタ後、副督ノ起草ニカ、リマシタ、ソシテ催  
 促セララルハ、三十二月早々和平副督案ヲ皇野氏ニ示シマシタガ、皇野  
 氏ハ一顧ノ欲コレニ稍足セズ再考スル豫私ニ展シマシタ。當時私ハ再修  
 正ノ後更ニ提示スル心算デシタガ、他ノ事務ガ多忙ノ爲太平洋戰爭開始  
 後迄ソノマ、トナツテオリアマシタ。若シ實際此詔旨ガ用ヒラレタトシタ  
 ナラバ此草案ガ完全ナモノトナル迄徹底ニ互リ改訂セラレテオツタノチ  
 アリマセウ。

私ハ現在和平副督案ノ内容ヲ正確ニハ記憶シテオリアセソ。併シ、其  
 具體的題旨ハ、日本ハ極メテ困難ナ地位ニ置カラル、デアラウガ日本ハ凶  
 力ノ維持ニ努カシ、世界ノ他ノ國々ト友好關係ヲ保ツベキデアルト云フ  
 コトヲ示スモノデアリマス。此草案ハ勿論使用セラレマセソデシタ。關  
 後、此ノ詔旨ノ唯ニツノコトイ、即チ私ノ自筆ノモノト皇野氏ニ出シ

テ戻サレタモノヲ破棄シマシタ。  
其理由ハ最早コノ草案ヲ必要トシナイト云フコトガ認めラレタノト、内  
閣官房ノ慣例トシテハ、詔勅喚發後ハ其準備ノ爲メノ草案ハ全部破棄ス  
ルコトニナツテオツタカラデアリマス。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）九月十六日 於東京

供 証 者

稻 田 周 一

右ハ設立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於

立 會 人 右 田 政 夫

Def. Doc. #2590

宜 誓 誓

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ試秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコト  
ヲ誓フ

署名捺印

稻 田 周 一

Ex. 3221

Def. Doc. #2422

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

The Regulations of the Decoration Conference

Imperial Ordinance No. 115

26th Year of Meiji 1893

- Article I. For the purpose of deliberating on the propriety of the grant and deprivation of the ranks, decorations and annuities a Decoration Conference shall be established in the Bureau of Decoration.
- Article II. The Decoration Conference shall be consisted of the chief of the Bureau of Decoration and Gijokan, (the Councillors).
- Article III. The chair of the Decoration Conference shall be taken by the Chief of the Bureau of the Decoration. If the Chief is unable to do so the senior Gijokan (Councillor) shall take his place.
- Article IV. Number of Gijokan (Councillors) shall be less than fifteen. They shall be elected from persons having the decoration of the first order and shall be given Chokumin rank.
- Article V. Besides persons provided for in the preceding articles Gijokan may be selected from among members of the Imperial Household.

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Def. Doc. #2422

Article VI. The advice on the grant and deprival of the ranks decorations and annuities may not be tendered to the Throne unless the matter <sup>is</sup> passed in the conference of more than eight Gijokan (Councillors).

Article VII. The resolution in the Conference of Gijokan (Councillors) shall be passed by majority of votes. In case of equality of votes the chairman's decision shall prevail.

Article VIII. The business of the Decoration Conference shall be handled by the Chief of the Bureau of Decoration.

Annex

Article IX. This ordinance shall come into force from the 10th day of November of the 26th Year of Meiji (1893).

Def. Doc. #2422

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, MURATA, Yachiho, who occupy the post of Chief of General Affairs Section of the Bureau of Decoration, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Regulation of the Decoration Conference" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Bureau of Decoration).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 25 day of August, 1947

/S/ MURATA, Yachiho (seal)  
Chief of General Affairs Section  
of the Bureau of Decoration

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /S/ Saito, Yuzo (seal)

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM GRAY

TOKYO

Dated May 18, 1939

Rec'd 7:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

234, May 18, 5 p.m.

At my conference today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Arita handed me the following message which the Prime Minister requested me to deliver personally to the Secretary of State on my forthcoming visit to Washington in the hope that the message may also be brought to the attention of the President:

At present there is a serious antagonism among the nations of Europe and no one can assure that there will be no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war is to break out, its consequences would be practically beyond our imagination and the indescribable sufferings of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete



3222 ✓

DEF. DOC. #1500 A-7.

destruction of civilization would ensue. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary for us to exert our effort to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe, and, I believe, that is the duty mainly incumbent on the United States and Japan since these two Powers are situated outside the scope of European conflict.

Then what are the causes of this antagonism in Europe? There may be contentions on both sides but on cool scrutiny of the European situations since the World War we come to the conclusion that, although Germany and Italy may be advised to be more patient, Great Britain and France also have a great deal to reconsider.

Undoubtedly the intention of the United States Government is to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe and thus to save Europe from the misery of war. Similarly, it is the ardent wish of Japan that nations should have their own proper places in the world and thus the true world peace might be established and maintained. I, for myself, am doing my utmost to realize this ideal, and on this point, I believe, will be found the possibility of much closer co-operation between Japan and America as well as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations.

GREW

RR:WWC

DEF. DOC. #1500 B-7

2 3223

July 8, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL -- FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 1767

Eugene H. Dooman, Esquire,

American Charge d'Affairs ad interim,

Tokyo.

Sir:

Reference is made to the Embassy's telegram no. 234, May 18, 5 p.m., in which there is given the text of a message from the Prime Minister which was handed to Ambassador Grew by the Minister for Foreign Affairs with the request that Mr. Grew deliver the message personally to me. There is enclosed a reply to this message.

The Department desires to be consulted by telegraph with regard to the question of the time when the reply should be delivered. Therefore, before arranging to call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of handing the reply to him for transmission to the Prime Minister, please telegraph your opinion whether an opportune time for presentation of the reply has arrived, offering also such comments or suggestions as may occur to you with regard to the text of the proposed reply.

When you deliver the reply, the Department desires that you inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it

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is requested that the reply be regarded as strictly confidential and not for publication.

Very truly yours,

Enclosure;  
Reply to Prime  
Minister.

FF:MMH:HPS            FE  
7-7

On his return to Washington Ambassador Grew delivered to me personally the message which Your Excellency was so good as to place in his hands through the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have read with unusual interest the expressions of Your Excellency's concern at the existence among the nations of Europe of antagonism which may lead to open conflict, and of Your Excellency's concern as to what the consequences might be to millions of people and to civilization should such antagonism lead to an outbreak of war. In this situation Your Excellency sees it as the duty of the Governments of our two countries, owing to their situation "outside the scope of European conflict" to exert efforts to prevent the occurrence of the casualty envisaged.

I have carefully noted also the statement pertaining to the causes of strained relations in the

DEF. DOC. #1500 B-7

is requested that the reply be regarded as strictly confidential and not for publication.

Very truly yours,

Enclosure;  
Reply to Prime  
Minister.

FF:MMH:HFS            FE  
7-7

On his return to Washington Ambassador Grew delivered to me personally the message which Your Excellency was so good as to place in his hands through the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have read with unusual interest the expressions of Your Excellency's concern at the existence among the nations of Europe of antagonism which may lead to open conflict, and of Your Excellency's concern as to what the consequences might be to millions of people and to civilization should such antagonism lead to an outbreak of war. In this situation Your Excellency sees it as the duty of the Governments of our two countries, owing to their situation "outside the scope of European conflict" to exert efforts to prevent the occurrence of the casualty envisaged.

I have carefully noted also the statement pertaining to the causes of strained relations in the

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European situation, the interest of my Government in the preservation of peace, and finally the "ardent wish of Japan" that the relations of nations might be so arranged that true world peace would be established and maintained.

Your Excellency will have no doubt, in the light of the published utterances of the President and myself and of the principles we have advocated and supported, that the Government of the United States wholeheartedly desires to see established and maintained upon the basis of fair dealing and fair play between and among nations a condition of true world peace. With especial reference to the situation in Europe, Your Excellency will be apprised of the recent earnest efforts of this Government; the President's identic messages sent on September 26, 1938, to the heads of several European governments which had reached an alarming crisis in their relations; identic messages addressed on April 14, 1939, by the President and myself respectively to the Chancellor of the German Reich and to the Premier of Italy with regard to the possible removal of the pervading treat or fear of a European war.

It would be most gratifying to me, and I may also speak for the President, if there could be found ways for the use of your Government's influence toward discouraging among European governments, especially those

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governments with which your Government may have special relations, the taking of any action, or the pursuance of any policy, that might endanger the general peace. I am confident that any such contribution as this would constitute a high service to those great sections of humanity which live in fear of the devastation of war.

In further reference to Your Excellency's expressed desire to see a true world peace established and maintained, I venture to observe, in a spirit of frankness which I trust will not be misunderstood, that this objective is made the more remote by the existence and the continuance of armed conflict and consequent political disturbances in the Far East today. Just as the unfolding of events in the European sphere have their repercussions in the Far East, so, it appears, the prolongation of abnormal conditions in the Far East contribute to causes of unrest in Europe. American opinion is therefore perturbed by the trend of events in the Far East, especially with regard to the methods of Japan in relations with China.

If, therefore, it should prove impracticable or inexpedient to make effective contribution at once to the settlement of problems arising in the European area, there nevertheless would be urgent need for the exertion of efforts in connection with disturbed conditions in

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other geographical areas, especially by those nations which may unhappily now be engaged in armed conflict. It is my view that each peaceful settlement, in whatever geographical sphere, constitutes a stabilizing element and an important step toward improvement in the general world situation.

Your Excellency may be assured of the genuine desire of the President and myself to do all within our power to convert into practical results those principles and hopes to which we have frequently given expression in connection with the foreign relations of the Government of the United States. While this Government does not perceive any practicable steps which it might usefully take at this time in addition to those already taken, this Government is sincerely interested in the suggestion contained in Your Excellency's message, and in giving further consideration to that suggestion would be pleased to have such further information as Your Excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making more definitive Your Excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe.

FR:IDS/MMH:HFS  
7-7

DPF. DOC. #1500 C-7

Exhibit # 2224

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From Tokyo

Dated August 8, 1939

Received 9:38 A.M.

Secretary of State

Washington

393, August 8, 4 P.M.

Strictly Confidential

Our 389, August 5, 9 P.M.

One. The Prime Minister's personal advisor called on me at nine o'clock this morning. He said that he had just seen the Prime Minister who had expressed desire to receive as soon as possible the Secretary's reply. I told Mr. Fujii that I had been in a position since yesterday to deliver the reply to the Foreign Office but that I had informed the Department that in view of internal Japanese political development I was inclined to withhold action for the present. I added however that as the Prime Minister had expressed desire to have the reply as soon as possible I would deliver it at once to the Foreign Office. I asked Fujii to call again at noon. I thereupon delivered the reply in person to Yashizawa

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DEF. DOC. #1500 C-7

52207

-2- #393 August 8, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

who received the document without comment for delivery to the Foreign Minister. Upon my return from the Foreign Office Fujii called again. I gave him a copy of the reply and said that it included, for the reasons specified in paragraph one of the Department's 242, August 4, 3 p.m., indication of the Secretary's reaction of the Prime Minister's confidential views.

Two. Fujii's comment was that the reply seemed to be addressed to the Prime Minister's written message and looked at in that light, would he thought be well received by his principal. He said that he would see the Prime Minister again this evening after the five minister conference (called to discuss the alliance with Germany and Italy).

Three, I marked the reply strictly confidential and told both Yoshizawa and Fujii that it was not (repeat not) to be published.

DOOMAN

CSB

**FILE COPY**  
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DEF. DOC. #1500 D-7

Exhibit # 7

THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, June 7, 1939.

No. 3936

SUBJECT: JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO THE  
SITUATION IN EUROPE.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL: FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I had the honor in my telegram no. 245, May 26, 8 p.m.,  
to present an analysis of certain trends in Japanese  
thought with regard to foreign policy in relation to the  
situation now developing in Europe. I observed that there

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were elements in Japan - not to be confused with certain congenial, but withal ineffectual, persons educated abroad who have been telling us that reaction to Japan's China policy was "just around the corner" - who realized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the maintenance by Japan of neutrality between the democratic and totalitarian camps would afford Japan little security, and that national security could be assured in the long run only by liquidating the conflict with China. I was not unaware of the need for resting an observation of this nature on a reasonably firm basis, and it is my purpose in this despatch to lay before the Department the circumstances, some of personal knowledge and the others which derive by deduction, on which my view was based. As there is no discussion in the press or in any other public forum of the question whether or not Japan should align itself with Germany and Italy - indeed, any reference by the press to this question is officially interdicted - information with regard to thought trends has come to me largely by word of mouth.

The first conversation which needs to be recorded took place on May 16, at a luncheon which was given in honor of the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew by a Japanese who, while holding no official position, is a close friend and confidant of high officials of the Court and of Prince Konoye, Minister

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without Portfolio, and Marquis Kido, Minister of the Interior. He is in a position to exercise through various contacts considerable influence on the Government. As we left the table, our host drew the Ambassador and me into another room and talked substantially along the following lines:

Although the Japanese Government has decided not to conclude a military alliance with Germany and Italy, there was being exerted on the Government, not only by Germany and Italy but by reactionary groups in Japan, strong pressure toward entering into some arrangement with the latter countries which would reaffirm the solidarity among the nations whose policies were opposed by the democratic nations. The groups to which he belonged had succeeded in defeating the proposal to conclude the alliance and are now doing their best to defeat the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact", or at least to prevent it from becoming a political link with Germany and Italy; but it was difficult to meet the argument of those who had advocated the alliance and are now favoring close association with Germany and Italy, that Japan cannot afford to be isolated. Germany and Italy are urging Japan "to come over to their side", while the democratic nations are turning to Japan a very cold shoulder. If, therefore, the democratic nations,

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especially the United States, could indicate to Japan that restoration of good relations with Japan is desired and that the way is open for Japan to align herself with the democratic nations, but not against the totalitarian states, those Japanese who are working for precisely those objectives would have their hand greatly strengthened.

The Ambassador said that he was very much interested in the views just expressed, but that it must be obvious that the restoration of peace and good relations between Japan and China must be a condition precedent to the restoration of good relations between Japan and the United States and other democratic nations. He could not, therefore, recommend that his Government give any gesture of welcome to Japan unless he were first satisfied that the terms of peace with China which Japan had in view could be reconciled with China's peace terms and would meet with the approval of the American Government.

Our host then talked very vaguely about the readiness of Japan to withdraw from central and South China, but when asked to give specifications he replied that a full statement on Japanese peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He undertook to report the conversation to Mr. Arita, and to suggest to Mr. Arita that he give the Ambassador a precise explanation of

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Japanese objectives in China during the conversation which the Ambassador had arranged to have with Mr. Arita on May 18th.

Mr. and Mrs. Arita were entertaining the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew at luncheon on May 17, and Mr. Grew prearranged with me that I should endeavor during the luncheon party to ascertain from Mr. Arita whether our host of the previous day had consulted him. I accordingly took advantage of a favorable opportunity to engage Mr. Arita in conversation. I found that he was quite familiar with the discussion of the previous day. He said that there had been a suggestion that he give Mr. Grew an assurance that Japan would withhold any action to "strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact" until Mr. Grew returned to Washington and had an opportunity to discuss with his Government the possibility of making to Japan some "gesture of welcome". Mr. Arita said that there was no important opinion in the country unfavorable to the measure which had been proposed to combat communistic activities, and that, if the time became ripe for the conclusion of the agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy, the Japanese Government intended to proceed with it. He could, however, assure Mr. Grew that the agreement would contain no military, political or economic clauses; but with this proviso - if it were found that these activities were being instigated by the Soviet Government, the counter-measures

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proposed would have to be directed against that Government.

Mr. Arita then passed on to the negotiations between the Soviet and British Governments concerning the "common front against aggression". He said that Japan is very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, but that Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that, whether Japan liked it or not, its policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other. The British Ambassador had, he said, given him definite assurances that the arrangement under discussion by the British and Soviet Governments would specifically be made inapplicable, but he (Mr. Arita) replied that any arrangement which formed the basis for the close collaboration contemplated by Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union in respect of their common interests in Europe would be bound to bring about similar collaboration among them in the conduct of their policies in the Far East. He delivered himself at some length and with considerable show of heat over Sir Robert Craigie's insistence that the assurances given Mr. Arita should dissolve any Japanese anxiety with regard to the effective scope of the proposed arrangement. Mr. Arita concluded the conversation with me with the observation that decision over Japan's attitude vis-a-vis the situation developing in Europe would have to

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be withheld until results of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were known.

A full account of the Ambassador's conversation on May 18 will be found in his telegram No. 235, May 18, 7 p.m.

The impressions which the Ambassador and I had formed of Mr. Arita's views as expressed in the conversations of May 17 and 18 agreed in every respect. It seemed to us that Mr. Arita, far from indicating any eagerness to find a way to approach the democratic nations, was preoccupied with the effects on the Far East of the establishment of the "front against aggression" and was not in a conciliatory mood. The Ambassador came, therefore, to the conclusion, as I did, that there was no justification for believing that desire to bring Japan into line with the democratic nations as against the totalitarian nations animated the Japanese Government as such.

Whether by accident or by design, I was approached on the same day, May 18, by a Japanese hitherto unknown to me but who had made the acquaintance of the Ambassador as a fellow passenger during a voyage across the Pacific, with the suggestion that I have a "chat", as he put it, with the Prime Minister. I asked the gentleman to call again, as I wished to consider the matter. I informed the Ambassador of the call and of the suggestion that I have a talk with the Prime Minister. Mr. Grew said that he had



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formed a favorable impression of Mr. Fujii, the person who had called on me, and that he saw no reason why I should not return a favorable reply. When Mr. Fujii called again, I said that I would be glad to have an opportunity to make the acquaintance of the Prime Minister, but that I had heard rumors of the possibility of a change of government and wondered, therefore, whether a call at that time would be opportune. Returning on the following day, Mr. Fujii brought an invitation from Baron Hiranuma to dinner on May 23, when he intended to explain his purpose in sending through Mr. Grew his message to the Secretary, and word to the effect that no change in the government was impending. I accepted the invitation. Mr. Fujii then emphasized the importance of keeping a profound secret the forthcoming talk. He said that Baron Hiranuma's political position was reasonably secure, but that the alignment of factions within the Government over European policy was so delicate as to require that the Prime Minister act very cautiously.

Mr. Fujii called for me on the evening of May 23. As we went in my car, which bears an Embassy license tag, Mr. Fujii proposed that we alight some distance from the Prime Minister's private residence and go the rest of the way on foot; we did. At the gate of the residence there stood a number of policemen, who, although obviously

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surprised by seeing a foreigner, made no attempt to stop me. The servants were prepared for my visit, but I have reason to believe that they, as well as two female relations of the Prime Minister's who served us later at dinner, and no knowledge whatever of my identity. It might be added that the residence, which is situated in the suburbs, is small and quite unpretentious and would barely grace a small tradesman. These details, while inconsequential, may perhaps reflect my impressions at the moment.

Baron Hiranuma received me very courteously. He said that he unfortunately had few opportunities to meet foreigners and thus to receive at first hand the impressions of foreigners with regard to conditions in various parts of the world. The situation in Europe was, in his view, a delicate one, and he felt confident that he could obtain from an American a more objective appraisal of that situation than he would be likely to procure from a European.

I expressed regret that I was not in a position to give him any information other than that which was public knowledge. There then ensued a colloquy on the situation in Europe, during which Baron Hiranuma displayed knowledge not only of a factual nature but of political trends in

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Europe which surprised me. One of the points brought out which, in his view, made for danger in Europe was that Chancellor Hitler - with the objectives which he has in mind for Germany to achieve - provides an issue around which all elements in Great Britain can rally; the imperialists, who do not propose to tolerate a Germany which can pretend to equality with Great Britain; the industrialists, who fear German commercial competition; and, finally, the Jews, radicals and even the Germanophiles, who, vie with each other in their hatred of Hitler.

Baron Hiranuma then said that the possibility of a war arising in Europe was one which he contemplated with horror. It would inevitably result in the total destruction of civilization, as no nation, however remote from the seat of war, would hope to escape the eventual consequences even though it might be fortunate to avoid direct involvement. He had publicly stated on several occasions that Japan could never be a democracy or a totalitarian state, and that Japan could make its greatest contribution by bringing together in harmonious and peaceful relations the two groups of nations. There were, he continued, elements in Japan which considered that Japan could not afford to maintain a condition of isolation and that her security demanded that she enter into "special relations" with Germany and Italy. He was insisting, however, that Japan follow what he termed "moral diplomacy". A nation's

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existence was not to be measured by decades, and it was essential, therefore, that statesmen charged with the destinies of national fix their attention on long term objective rather than on gaining favorable tactical positions, which were after all, ephemeral. The most important of these objectives was a stabilized peace to replace interludes of preparation for the next war. Japan, like the United States, was not directly involved in the troubles of Europe; and it was his thought that these two nations, which were the only Great Powers situated outside of Europe, were in a position to exercise a moderating influence on Europe. To exercise that influence was a duty which they owed their own peoples, for the downfall of Europe would inevitably bring with it the downfall of the rest of the world. In his opinion, the first step which had to be taken was to check the tendency toward the division of Europe into two politically hostile camps. He wondered whether the views of the American Government were responsive to those which he had expressed in his message to the Secretary.

I said that the American Government had taken a lead, in respect of both time and emphasis. In making known discord fact, that nations are today interdependent and that discord between any nations is a matter of concern to all others. His message to the Secretary did not, I said, contain any definitive suggestion as to how the United States and Japan

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might proceed toward averting war in Europe. The principal difficulty, in my opinion, in the way of the collaboration which he had suggested in talking to me was Japan's policies and actions in China. I felt certain that the American Government would, in other more happy circumstances, have welcomed Japanese cooperation toward alleviating the threat to peace in Europe which, the great majority of Americans believed, arises from the policies and actions of Germany and Italy; and I doubted whether the American people would favor collaboration with a nation which it believed to be following in the Far East precisely those policies and actions that are considered to be the root of the trouble in Europe. I also said that the American people have laid before them nearly every day reports of bombings of American property and of other instances of violations of American rights and interests in China. The Foreign Office was trying to exculpate the Japanese military authorities by pleading military necessity or inadvertence, but enough had happened to justify belief that the the Japanese authorities, in China at least, were systematically and deliberately trying to expel American and other foreign interests from China. The views of the American people in these respects were, I said, very definitely formed. I could not but feel, therefore, that the adjustment of the conflict in China on terms satisfactory to all concerned would have to be a condition precedent to that degree of

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collaboration between the United States and Japan which could reasonably be expected to bring about the desired results in Europe.

The Prime Minister observed that he was well aware of the state of feeling which prevailed in the United States against Japan. The American people had assumed that Japan had deliberately provoked the conflict in China with a view to seizing the more populated and productive parts of that country, but he felt confident that the American Government realized that it had not been the original intention or desire of Japan to do anything more than to protect its rights in North China. It was also supposed by Americans that Japan intended to close the Open Door in China; and to his regret the actions of the Japanese authorities in China were not entirely reconcilable with the desire of the Japanese Government to respect foreign rights and interests in China. But he wondered whether the American Government realized that the Japanese people labored under a very real feeling of grievance against the Occidental Powers, especially Great Britain. When the Great War broke out, Japan was an ally of Great Britain. There were no legal obligations on Japan to support her ally, but she conceived that she had a moral obligation to do so. She accordingly declared war against Germany, her navy undertook operations against the German

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fleet in the Pacific, her merchant marine cooperated in various ways, and finally her military forces eliminated Germany from Shantung. "The only thanks we got from Great Britain", continued Baron Hiranuma, "was the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired Japan to support Great Britain." Again, the rights which Japan had acquired in Manchuria as a result of her war with Russia and later by agreement with China were essential to Japan; nevertheless, the efforts of China to prejudice those rights were regarded by Great Britain and the United States with complacency, if not with benevolence; China took courage to persist, with the result that Japan had to resort to force in 1931 to protect those rights. Finally, the Japanese people came to the conclusion that the Nine Power Treaty and the Naval Treaties operated, not to stabilize peace in the Far East, but to bind Japan against safeguarding her interests in China. So long as the Japanese people felt that it had just cause for grievance, it was politically impossible for his government or any government which would succeed him to bring about complete equality of opportunity in China for all nations.

The Japanese people, Baron Hiranuma continued, have considerable sympathy for Germany and Italy, as they conceive these countries to be in many important respects in the same position as Japan. It was not to be expected

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that Germany would have permitted herself to remain under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, nor that Italy would have been content to be dependent on other nations for supplied of raw materials. At the same time, the consequences of efforts on their part to redress their grievances by force, or of the stubborn refusal of the democratic nations to offer to correct these grievances could not possible to confined to the protagonists in the European quarrel but would have to be shared by other nations. He referred to my observation that the settlement of the China conflict would probably have to be a condition precedent to joint American-Japanese efforts to moderate the situation in Europe. If that were to be the view of the American Government, any hope of proceeding along the course which he had in mind would have to be abandoned. The objectives which Japan has had in China are essential for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes, closing of markets to foreign competition, and lack of free access to raw materials, and so long as such conditions exist any moderation or her objectives in China and, therefore, of her peace terms, could not be considered. Nevertheless if conditions could be brought about which would assure to all nations markets for the world's goods on the basis of quality and price and supplies of the materials which they needed, the importance to Japan of



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securing a market and sources of raw materials in China would greatly diminish; and by the same token there would not be the urge that there now is on Germany and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker and smaller nations.

Baron Hiranuma stated that the conditions which brought about the situations in the Far East and Europe are not local but universal in character, and that neither situation could be settled in a manner calculated to bring about a stabilized peace unless the conditions which brought them about were corrected.

Baron Hiranuma said that the belief was widely held abroad that Japan was considering a military alliance with Germany and Italy. He had endeavored to explain frankly the basis of Japanese sympathy for Germany and Italy, and he could say quite definitely that the basis of what appeared to be a concerting of Japanese policy with that of Germany and Italy lay in the fact that all three countries are in the same economic strategic position. He personally was of the opinion that Japan, whose government would for all time to come rest on the sanctity of the Imperial Family, could not tie itself by special relations to any foreign government whose stability depended on the continued existence and political prestige of one individual. There were both in Germany and Italy political currents

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flowing beneath the surface which, in his view, would gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrangement, such as an alliance, which Japan might make with whose countries. Hidden dissident elements would be certain to make themselves felt in time of war and thus are to be reckoned as a threat to the success of German and Italian arms.

At this point we were interrupted by notice that dinner was served. The conversation during dinner was not in any way pertinent to the subject of this despatch, being confined to discussions of points in Chinese philosophy, personal reminiscences, and so on, the Prime Minister discoursing in a most interesting manner.

Returning to his study, the Prime Minister said that he wished to draw together the various threads of our conversations, as follows:

The United States and Japan were the only powers which could help to prevent the crystallization of the trend toward the division of Europe into armed camps. There can, however, be no confident hope that a permanent peace can be established until the world-wide economic and political conditions which bring about unrest in Europe and in the Far East can be corrected: and if an international conference can be called to solve the problems which create unrest, Japan would be prepared to agree to

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the inclusion of the Far Eastern situation among the problems to be discussed. Before any call for such a conference could be issued, Great Britain and France, and Germany and Italy, would have to be sounded out. If the President were prepared to make a confidential approach to the European democracies; he would be glad to approach Germany and Italy; and, if there were returned favorable replies by these nations, he would be glad to have the President call the conference under such conditions as might be agreed upon after discussion through normal diplomatic channels.

I wish to make it clear, before setting forth certain conclusions which I draw from these conversations, that I do not put forward the views of those Japanese - even though they be persons of great importance and influence - who harbor hopes of restoring good relations with the democratic nations, as being necessarily the views of the Japanese Government. These are, however, the views of a powerful element in the Government; they may prevail or they may not, but they cannot be ignored.

Any observer who is in any way sensitive to things not seen would, if he were in Tokyo today, become aware of the groping for security against the gathering storm in Europe. I should perhaps add parenthetically that the

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European situation today has assumed primary proportions, and that it would be visionary to suppose that the present confusion concerning the course which Japan should follow is due to despondence over the apparently ineffectual hostilities in China. The Army and other elements which have thus far controlled China policy have assumed that the Far Eastern conflict could be permanently and completely insulated against repercussions from situations elsewhere, as they did not look to American and other occidental armed intervention in that conflict. Although reference has been made in the Embassy's telegrams to the effects of the President's message to Chancellor Hitler, I do not believe that I could, by further reference to that message, exaggerate the impulse which it had toward persuading the Japanese Government to realize that there may be grave danger of involvement with the United States "not directly across the Pacific but by way of Europe", as one Japanese put it to me. I should, however, place that observation in proper perspective. A threat by the United States to eject Japan from China would, I am confident, be resisted. But if war were to break out in Europe with the United States participating on the side of Great Britain and France, the outcome in the view of those Japanese who think along rational lines would admit of no doubt. With Germany and Italy crushed, the prospect of confronting the

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victors would not be a palatable one to Japan.

There are, therefore, in the situation which seems to be developing but two courses for Japan to follow - either to go over unreservedly to the totalitarian side, or to restore good relations with those nations which, in the opinion of one element of the Japanese Government, would be the victors. True, in rejecting the proposal to join Germany and Italy in an alliance, Japan provisionally chose a third course - neutrality. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether there are many Japanese who confidently believe that neutrality would afford security. The arguments of those who believe in the superior power of Germany and Italy are obvious and simple: Japan has only to associate herself with those countries and wait for the European war to pick China like a ripe plum. But, for those Japanese who have other views concerning the power of Germany and Italy, there is but one way by which Japan's security can be safeguarded, and that is to bring the conflict with China to an end on some reasonable terms. Here again I wish to make it clear that the desire for a settlement of the conflict does not derive from moral regeneration but from realization of stark facts.

In concluding this despatch, which is already unconscionably long, I wish briefly to allude to the

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discrepancy between the attitude of the Prime Minister as indicated in his conversation with me and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose preoccupation over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations has already been mentioned. It is obvious that the desire of the Prime Minister for American collaboration to bring about peace in Europe (and in the Far East) cannot be reconciled with the readiness, which is almost an eagerness, on the part of the Foreign Minister to meet a fancied threat from Great Britain. These two points of view reflect conflicting policies, and which of these policies will prevail may perhaps be decided by events of the next few days.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ Eugene H. Dooman  
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

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

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



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
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
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