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Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials).
Court Exhibits PAG - 3/2.3.3

Court Exhibits consist of a wide variety of published and unpublished documents mainly from United States and Japanese sources. The Japanese items are generally accompanied by English Translations (arranged numerically, with gaps

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IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)

PHOTOGRAPHIC SCIENCES CORPORATION
770 BASKET ROAD
P.O. BOX 338
WEBSTER, NEW YORK 14580
(716) 265-1600
From Togo to Nomura
23 November 1941
No. 816

It seems that the United States does not concur in the fourth clause of Proposal "B" relative to the undertaking not to indulge in measures or actions prejudicial to the endeavor for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China. We have no objection to President Roosevelt's being the introducer concurrently with Proposal "B", and it is our intention to have China, through the good offices of the President, express friendship toward Japan in accordance with the American proposal (B) of the 12th, and thereby commence peace talks directly with China. As it is expected that an agreement for a truce will be concluded between Japan and China at the opening of such negotiations, American assistance to Chiang would in practice become unnecessary in such an event. It should therefore naturally be made clear that the President, by his introduction, should cause Chiang Kai-shek to propose peace to Japan, that the United States in response should support the efforts for Japanese-Chinese peace with a view to establishing friendly relationships between the two countries, and that therefore the United States should refrain from any action which would disturb such efforts.

You are directed to do your best to get the United States to accept the fourth clause of Proposal "B" and, when the negotiations shall have been concluded, to bring about through the President's introduction, by the time set in my telegram No. 812, the peace proposal of Chiang Kai-shek (preferably a simple one).
From Kōmura to Tōgō
25 November 1941
No. 1179

Secretary Hull has twice conferred jointly with the Ambassadors and Ministers of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and China. It seems, however, that with the development of the situation he confers mainly with the British Ambassador only. Since this morning, the 25th, Australian and Dutch representatives are informed through the British Ambassador, and Hull is going to talk with the Chinese Ambassador alone this evening after his conference with the British Ambassador. It is generally noted that the United States no longer treats the four countries on the same level.
From Nomura to Togo
27 November 1941
No. 1190

The development of the Japanese-American negotiations is as you are well acquainted with through successive telegrams. The American proposal of the 26th (telegram No. 1189) shows that there is an extreme divergence between the positions of the two parties, and there is unfortunately no prospect whatsoever of America's accepting our position within the period you indicated.

As the United States made this proposal after having conferred with the countries concerned, in accordance with her long-standing position and because of our urgent need to obtain their concurrence, we must maintain close vigilance regarding their intentions. On the other hand, we have, in accordance with your instructions, pressed them only for speedy conclusion of the negotiations, and have not, therefore, expressed anything in the nature of an ultimatum. Moreover, the situation is such that the President, at the meeting of the 17th, said that there can be "no last word". In such circumstances, if we resort to freedom of action after the time set without in some way terminating the present negotiations, it is very likely that the United States, taking advantage of the fact that she is at present conferring with the countries concerned, will make propaganda that Japan prolonged the negotiations with the aim only of gaining time for preparing for a definite course of action and launched on the planned action upon completion of the preparation even while the negotiations were still being carried on, thereby shifting to us the responsibility for the rupture of the negotiations. It should be recalled in this connection that the United States blamed our advance into French Indo-China for the suspension of the negotiations in the past. Our resorting to free action without taking steps to terminate the negotiations not only would be utilized for counter-propaganda against us, but would prejudice the good faith of Japan as a world power. Such steps, however, involve matters of military secrecy. It is considered advisable that the negotiations be terminated, depending upon the decision of the Government, either by notification to the American Ambassador in Tokyo, by an open declaration, or by any other means. In any case I should like to be informed in advance so that I can give notification here simultaneously.

As I am seeing the President soon, I should like to be instructed immediately if there is anything which I should bear in mind.
From Nomura to Tōgō
28 November 1941
No. 1214

In reference to my telegram No. 1190.

The State Department, which had maintained silence concerning the Japanese-American negotiations, broke its silence and made disclosure of the conversations yesterday, the 26th. The press responded and printed such headlines as "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japan" and "America Rejects Second 'Munich'", and stressed abstract points, such as Hull's four principles, which have general appeal. It has to be noted that the papers argue that it is up to Japan either to accept or to reject the American proposal and that it is Japan's responsibility to make choice between peace and war.
In reference to your telegram No. 1225.

1. It is observed that the United States, taking much of the statement of our government, the trend of public opinion and the troop-movements in the south, and expresses apprehension on account of them over our sincerity in the negotiations. However, the facts about the statement of Premier Tōgō were as contained in my telegram No. 8-5, and we consider that the reported repercussion was caused by an extreme impropriateness or translation (made by the Dōmei news agency). As to the direction of public opinion, I have been taking great pains over it. It is understood that Ambassador Grew has made report to his Government on this point, and even Secretary Hull himself expressed satisfaction with the improvement, as you reported in your telegram No. 11-5. In spite of this, the recent tone of the press in the United States has been very provocative, and the radio broadcasts (especially the short-wave broadcasts from San Francisco in the last several days) are daily giving reports of the delicate subjects of the negotiations. Such broadcasts can never be made unless there is close contact with quarters familiar with the course of the negotiations. It is inappropriate for the United States to blame Japan without considering her own faults.

2. The United States, Britain and other countries have increasingly of late intensified their military preparations against Japan and adopted a provocative attitude toward us. On the 20th of last month, for instance, an American plane made a reconnaissance flight over Garambi in the south of Formosa. (Protest concerning the matter was made to the American Ambassador in Tokyo on the 27th.) This is not an isolated case of such American and British actions. It is our desire in view of the delicate situation that they should themselves refrain from repeating such actions.

3. You are directed to make further explanations to the United States that our proposal of 20 November was made from the standpoint of fairness, and that we believe it the best measure to save the situation at this moment. (It is assumed that the United States refers, when she asserts that our proposal is inconsistent with the general principles, to the provisions of Article 4 relative to non-interference with the peace between Japan and China.) Our assertion is, as repeatedly made clear to the United States, that she should stop assisting Chiang when peace talk is commenced between Japan and China through the introduction of the President. You should bear in mind, therefore, that our position by no means conflicts with what the United States calls fundamental principles.
Ambassador Kurusu and I talked with Secretary Hull for about two hours from 4:15 P.M. on the 26th.

Hull stated that the United States for several days had thoroughly examined the modus vivendi proposed by Japan on the 20th of this month (Proposal "B"), and had fully consulted about it with the countries concerned, but that unfortunately she could not agree to it, and that she was constrained to propose instead a plan (marked "tentative and without commitment") which was a compromise between the American proposal of 21 June and the Japanese proposal of 25 September. The gist of the plan is as follows:

(A) Request of approval of the four principles

(B) 1. Conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Conclusion of an agreement among the United States, the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands and Thailand concerning non-aggression toward French Indo-China and equal economic treatment therein.


4. Assurance that the United States and Japan will not support any régime in China other than the Chiang Kai-shek régime.

5. Abolition of extraterritorial rights and concessions in China.

6. Conclusion of a reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Japan on the basis of the most-favored-nation principle.

7. Reciprocal rescission of the freezing of assets.

8. Stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.

9. Understanding that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the purpose of this agreement and preservation of peace in the Pacific area (a proposal to make the Tripartite Pact a dead letter).

We argued strongly against the proposal, saying that it is in conflict with what has been discussed so far and that we were reluctant to make report of it to Tokyo. However, Hull showed no sign of concession.

It is presumed that the United States proposed such a strong plan as a result of the victory of the strong elements in the country over the supporters of compromise, because of our request to suspend American aid to Chiang, speeches of our leaders against Britain and America and the rumor that Japan requested Thailand to hand over the entire defense of the latter country, as well as under the influence of British, Dutch and Chinese Pressure.
At the Soviet Embassy reception today, to celebrate their national holiday (they are the only diplomatic mission which now holds such receptions), I took occasion to make the strongest representations to every Japanese to whom I talked—regarding the Times and Advertiser editorial, mentioned above, listing seven points as a program for American "restitution" to Japan, and to point out what serious harm the editorial had done, especially at the moment of sending Kurusu to the United States to try to bring the current conversations to a successful conclusion. I spoke of the utter stupidity of creating such a hostile atmosphere here and such an unfortunate impression on the American public at a moment when constructive, not destructive, results were desired. I made it clear that it was not my intention to interfere with the Japanese press but only to point out factually the inevitable effects in my country when such editorials, assumed to represent the views of the Japanese Government since the Times and Advertiser is known to be controlled by the Foreign Office, were reprinted in the United States.

Tōgō, the Foreign Minister, appeared to know nothing about the editorial and was sure that it had not been inspired by the Foreign Office, but he undertook to look into it and a few moments later he called Toshi Go over to him and told him what I had said. I also spoke to Toshi Go, who said that he alone was responsible for the editorial and had written it himself as indicating Japan's maximum demands which would undoubtedly be far beyond what the Government would ask for in the conversations. I told him that he could have no conception of the harm that he had done. Somebody else told me that Go had published the editorial as a protest against the secrecy under which the conversations were being held.

Shigemitsu, with whom I talked, was thoroughly sympathetic and said that he would do his best to stop this sort of thing, while Matsumoto, head of Domei, promised me that there would be an immediate change in the tone and substance of the Japanese press, and he was as good as his word because the tone did immediately change for the better. I think I succeeded in stirring them all up considerably, so the gathering at the Soviet party was distinctly useful.

The next time I called on Tōgō I repeated these representations and he replied that while the Foreign Office had exerted no control over the Times and Advertiser up to the present, it was jolly well going to exert such control from now on. The editorial may or may not have been dictated by the Foreign Office, regardless of what Toshi Go said. One informant said that it had been so dictated, but if so, I think it was probably done by some subordinate official and without the knowledge of the Minister, who, I am convinced, knew nothing about it.
CERTIFICATE

I, Hayashi Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section of the Japanese Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Explanation of the Premier at the Imperial Conference on 1 December 1941" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 7 July 1947.

Hayashi Kaoru

Itenss: Urabe Katsuma

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

H. Nishi

Tokyo
July 1947

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
The Explanation of the Foreign Minister at the Imperial Conference on 1 December 1941

Explanations will be made today chiefly on the development of the Japanese-American negotiations after the Imperial Conference of 5 November. To summarize the circumstances of the negotiations before that Conference, that is to say to about the end of October, the United States had insisted on the following four principles as the basis of international relations; namely:

1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and every nation;

2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries

3) Non-discriminatory treatment in trade;

4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means;

The United States insisted on the application of these principles; expressed doubt as to the peaceful intention of Japan; raised objections to the stationing of Japanese troops in China; insisted that the principle of non-discrimination in international trade be applied unconditionally in China; and demanded that the Tripartite Pact be rendered in effect a dead letter. The negotiations, thus beset with difficulties, at last came to an impasse.

Such divergence of views between the two countries has resulted largely from the fact that the United States Government obstinately adhered to the doctrinaire principles to which it had traditionally submitted, and insisted on their unconditional application to China and other areas, regardless of the actual situation prevailing in East Asia. It was evident that, so long as the United States refused to alter such an attitude, the conclusion of the present negotiations was extremely difficult.

The present Cabinet considered it proper to bring about the adjustment of Japanese-American relations on an equitable basis, and decided to make all possible concessions and to concentrate its energies to avert a rupture between Japan and the United States. From this viewpoint, our previous proposal of 25 September was moderated with respect to the following three questions which had so far been the main points at issue in the Japanese-American negotiations; namely, (1) the interpretation of the right of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Pact, (2) the principle of non-discrimination in international trade, and (3) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China.

1) With respect to the problem of the right of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Pact, we proposed that the United States should declare that she would not make any unwarranted extension of the interpretation of the right of self-defense, and that, at the same time, Japan also should make a similar declaration.

2) With respect to the principle of non-discrimination, Japan should recognize it to be applied to China on the understanding that the principle was to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world.

3) With regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops, it was provided that the Japanese troops dispatched to China in connection with the China Affair would be withdrawn within two years following the restoration of peace between Japan and China in accordance with the agreement to be entered into between Japan and China, except those in specified areas in North China and Manchuria, as well as Hainan Island, which would be stationed for such period as may be necessary. In regard to French Indo-China, it was revised to stipulate that Japan respects the territorial in-
tegrity of French Indo-China, and that the Japanese troops dis-
patched thereto will be withdrawn immediately upon either the
settlement of the China Affair or the establishment of peace in
East Asia on an equitable basis. The Imperial Conference of
5 November decided upon the above.

In accordance with the decision, the Government instructed
Ambassador Nomura to convey to the United States that Japanese-
American relations, which were on the verge of collapse, could
be saved in the pressing circumstances only through the consum-
ation of the negotiations on the basis of the present proposal,
and that it was earnestly desired that the United States should,
in view of the greatest possible concessions which the Japanese
Government had made in spite of every difficulty, sincerely re-
consider the situation and cooperate with Japan for the sake of
the peace of the Pacific. The negotiations were continued in
Washington thereafter, but meanwhile I had frequent conversations
in Tokyo with the American and British Ambassadors with a view to
urging the negotiations. Ambassador Nomura, beginning with the
interview with Secretary of Stat Hull on the 7th, met President
Roosevelt on the 10th, and Secretary Hull on the 12th and the 15th,
earnestly endeavoring to promote the negotiations. Meanwhile, in
consideration of the serious situation, the Japanese Government
on the 5th dispatched Ambassador Kurusu to the United States with
a view to exhausting every possible diplomatic effort. He arrived
at Washington on the 15th, and, assisting Ambassador Nomura, par-

ticipated in the negotiations after the 17th. The negotiations
were then already in full swing. From the 7th onward, the United
States was putting questions about various points as if to sound
the true intention of Japan. The United States, who had insisted
on the overthrow of Hitlerism, demanded that Japan should give up
the policy of force. She seemed to be still apprehensive of the
policy of Japan in connection with the Tripartite Pact, and re-

uested that Japan should reaffirm her peaceful intentions, as
tated in the aforementioned statement of the Japanese Government
on 25 August. Moreover, she repeatedly urged that there would be
a need for Japan to maintain the Tripartite Pact after the con-

ommation of a Japanese-American agreement, and expressed her
wiser that that treaty should cease to exist or become a dead

itter. As regards the principle of non-discrimination in inter-
national trade, the United States desired Japan to drop the condition
which we proposed, that the principle be applied uniformly to the
whole world, urging that she had striven for the restoration of
freedom of trade. At the same time, the United States proposed
eparately "the Joint Declaration on Economic Policy", and sug-

ested that the countries should cooperate in restoring free trade
in the whole world; that the normal commercial relations between
the two countries be restored through conclusion of a Japanese-
American commercial agreement; that, as to China, complete control
over her economic, financial and monetary affairs should be restored to
her; and that a comprehensive program of economic development
would be inaugurated in China under international cooperation.

Ith regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, the
nited States made no special argument, but only showed disapproval
of the permanent or indefinite stationing of them. It proposed,
however, to employ good offices for direct negotiations between
apan and China, provided Japan would adopt a peaceful policy.

The Japanese Government replied that our proposal of 25
ptember comprehended all the points which the United States de-
ired Japan to confirm in connection with its statement of peaceful
intentions of 25 August, and that the present Cabinet naturally
id no objection to confirming them. With respect to the qualifi-
ation of the principle of non-discrimination, an answer was made
at Japan desired its application throughout the world, and that
would recognize the application of the principle to China de-
pending upon the realization of that desire. And with respect to the American proposal for the joint international development of China, the Japanese Government replied that it was unacceptable to Japan as it disregarded the actual state of affairs in China and would open the way for the joint international control of that country. It was also replied that Japan had no objection to the American good offices for peace between Japan and China. It was at this stage that Ambassador Kurusu joined in the negotiations. Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu met President Roosevelt on the 17th, and had interviews with Secretary Hull on the 18th, the 20th, the 21st, the 22nd and the 26th. In the interviews of the 17th and the 18th, however, the President stated that he desired peace between Japan and the United States, and that he had no intention either to intervene or to mediate between Japan and China, but anted only to be an "introducer" between them. On the other hand, the Secretary of State emphasized that the Japanese-American negotiations would prove difficult as long as Japan cooperated with Germany, and dwelt upon the necessity of removing that fundamental difficulty. After exhaustive discussions it became clear that the difficulty lay as before in the questions of the Tripartite Pact, the principle of non-discrimination, and China. Thereupon, the Japanese Government presented on the 20th a new proposal which simplified the previous proposal full of propagandistic tone, on the basis of which the negotiations had so far been conducted; eliminated the question of the principle of non-discrimination, upon which an agreement was not readily to be attained, and also that of the Tripartite Pact, which was left to a future proposal to be made by the United States; and requested the United States simply to refrain from disturbing the peace between Japan and China with a view to leaving the China problem to direct negotiation between Japan and China. The contents of the proposal are as follows:

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

2. The Governments of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in the Netherland East Indies.

3. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes not to indulge in measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

5. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

The Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

Regarding the above proposal, the United States contended that it was impossible to cease aiding the Chiang Kai-shek regime as Japan clarified her relations with the Tripartite Pact and
gave assurance regarding her adoption of a peaceful policy, and
that the President's offer of being an "introducer" presupposed
Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. Thereupon, we requested
reconsideration of the United States, pointing out that it was
self-contradictory that the United States should, after the com­
mence in of the Japano-Chinese direct negotiations through the
introduction of the President as proposed by the United States,
continue aid to the Chiang Kai-shek régime, thereby interfering
with the peace between the two countries, the United States being
an intermediary of peace. Nevertheless, the United States failed
to show any sign of concession, refusing to give up aid to the
Chiang Kai-shek régime and repeating her assertions concerning the
Tripartite Pact, although she stated that she had no objection to
Japan's and the United States' holding leadership in East Asia and
in the Western Hemisphere respectively, and that she desired the
mical conclusion of the Pacific agreement.

Meanwhile, the United States Government consulted with the*
representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chung-
king, and Secretary Hull stated on the 22d that the above Powers,
though they considered it possible to restore the normal relations
of international trade if Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy
was ascertainment, seemed to intend to realize it gradually, and
that the withdrawal of troops from southern French Indo-China alone
would not be enough, according to their opinions, to ease the tense
situation in the Southern Pacific. He further revealed that he
considered it not yet ripe for the President's acting as
"go-between" of peace between Japan and China.

The United States Government continued consultations with the
representatives of the Powers above referred to, and Secretary
Hull told our two Ambassadors on the 26th that, although the United
States had carefully studied the Japanese proposal of the 20th and
had consulted with the countries concerned, she could not unfor­
unately agree to our proposal, and presented the following new
proposals as being a compromise plan between the American June
proposal and our September proposal. The first proposal was a
quest for confirmation of the so-called Four Principles (item.4
hereof was altered to the principle of reliance upon international
operation and conciliation for the prevention of controversies).
It was proposed secondly as the basis for future negotiations that
the two governments should undertake the following:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of
Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-
aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan,
the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United
States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the
American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and
Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the
Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial
integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that
there shall develop a threat to the territorial integrity
of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with
a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary
and advisable to meet the threat in question.

Such agreement would provide also that each of the
Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept
preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations
with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for
each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and
commerce with French Indo-China.
3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any Government or régime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

8. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

9. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

10. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

Regarding the above proposal, our Ambassadors pointed out its unreasonableness, and strongly contended against it, but Secretary Hull did not show any sign of concession, it was reported. On the 27th, the President, in an interview with our two Ambassadors, told them that, although he still hoped for an amicable conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiations, he considered, on the basis of the latest information, that there was danger that cold water would be dashed upon the United States for the second time, just as had been done in last July by the advance of Japanese troops into the southern part of French Indo-China, and that it would be futile to try to surmount the crisis by a modus vivendi if the fundamental policies of the two countries were not in accord.
It is true that the American proposal contained some acceptable items, such as those concerning international trade (Items VI, VII, VIII) and the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China (Item V) but the items concerning China and French Indo-China (Items II, III) the non-recognition of the Nationalist Government of China (Item IV) the disapproval of the Tripartite Pact (Item IX) and the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact (Item I) are all unacceptable for Japan. In fine, this proposal is unreasonable, constituting a marked retrogression from the previous proposals of the United States and entirely disregarding the course of negotiations for over half a year.

In short, the United States Government has persistently adhered to traditional ideas and principles, disregarding the actual situation in East Asia and tried to force Japan to act on those principles which the United States herself would not observe. Throughout the present negotiations, lasting for the past seven months, the United States has made no concessions from her original stand, in spite of the various concessions made frequently by Japan.

It has been a consistent policy of the United States to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of the new order in East Asia, which constitutes our immutable national policy. If we accepted the present proposal of the United States, Japan would be in an international position inferior even to that which it had held before the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, and its very existence would also be endangered.

1. China under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek would become even more disposed to depend upon Britain and the United States, and Japan would have to break its faith with the National Government of China. The friendly relations between Japan and China would be ruined for years to come. Japan would be compelled to retreat completely from the continent; the status of Manchoukuo would accordingly be exposed to all dangers; and we would lose all means to carry through the China Affair.

2. Britain and the United States would reign over these areas as leaders. Japan would entirely lose its authority as well as its position as the stabilizing power of East Asia, and the work of establishing the new order in East Asia would collapse midway.

3. The Tripartite Pact would become a mere scrap of paper, and Japan would have to forfeit its national good faith.

4. The design to restrain Japan by the organization of a collective machinery of Powers, with the Soviet Union as a new member, would increase the menace on our northern frontier.

5. As to such principles as that of non-discrimination in trade, they are not necessarily to be excluded. However, it is only to carry through their selfish policy that Britain and the United States intend to apply those principles exclusively to the Pacific area, and Japan would have to face great difficulties in obtaining essential goods and materials which she requires.

All things considered, the above proposal is utterly unacceptable for Japan, and we cannot help recognizing that, unless the United States wholly withdraws it, it is almost impossible to realize fully our claims by continuing the negotiation further upon the basis of the present proposal.
Def. Doc. No. 1401-C-2

From Tōgō to Nomura
4 November 1941
No. 731

Reference to my telegram No. 725.

As Britain is a de facto contracting party to the present negotiations, and in view of the circumstances that she possesses extensive rights and interests in the Far East, it has to be noted that, when the proposed terms of understanding (this with respect to both Proposals 'A' and 'B') are to be carried into execution, not only Britain, but also the Netherlands, must be in a position to carry them out. Unless there is a definite guarantee on this point, Japan cannot rest assured by the mere fact of having reached an understanding with the United States Government. It is necessary that Britain and the Netherlands should simultaneously concur in the Japanese-American agreement with regard to the matters concerning those two countries. Accordingly, you are directed to approach the United States to have them take necessary steps in order to obtain from the two countries assurances of their concurrence in the agreement, and cable the results.
(1) On the occasion of my interview with the Diplomatic Corps on 30 October, while having a talk with the American Ambassador in Tokyo, I expressed my regret over the recent aggravation of the tense relations between Japan and the United States and pointed out the danger that things might, if left alone, have serious consequences. I called his attention to the fact that the Japanese nation had become impatient with the slow progress of the negotiations which had dragged on for six months and I expressed my desire to bring them to a conclusion promptly, and requested further cooperation on the part of the American Ambassador. I emphasized that, in order to break the deadlock, the American Government also should consider some measures for the settlement of the matter fitting to the actual situation of the Far East, without clinging to theories.

I referred, by way of explaining the complicated circumstances of the Far East, to the problem of the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, pointing out that there were certain countries besides Japan whose forces were actually stationed in China, and also to the situation in Outer Mongolia where the Soviet Union had stationed forces of considerable strength in spite of the fact that China regarded it as a part of her territory, and requested that the American Government should recognize the real state of affairs and fully understand the Japanese viewpoint. The American Ambassador listened to my opinion, promised to cooperate, and replied that it was desirable to proceed with the negotiations simultaneously in Tokyo and in Washington.

(2) When the British Ambassador called on me for some other business on the 29th, I told him that the attitude of the United States tends to be so doctrinaire and unrealistic that there is at present little prospect of success of the negotiations, and the situation is one of deep concern; that should the negotiations end in failure the development of the situation would be unpredictable, and that inasmuch as such development would not be in the interest of Great Britain, who has important rights and interests in the Far East, it would be proper for her to strive at this moment for the improvement of Japanese-British-American relations and the maintenance of world peace. The Ambassador promised that he would immediately transmit the matter to his Government; and left. When I saw the Ambassador on the 30th I repeated to him the same effect and impressed upon him that the situation is very acute and allows of no further procrastination.

Transmit to London.
The United States' time-honored interests in the Far East are well known. They are doing their utmost to find a way of preserving peace in the Pacific. We do not know whether their efforts will be successful, but if they fail, I take this occasion to say—and it is my duty to say—that should the United States become involved in war with Japan the British declaration will follow within the hour.

I hope devoutly that the peace of the Pacific will be preserved in accordance with the known wishes of the wisest statesmen of Japan, but every preparation to defend British interests in the Far East and to defend the common cause now at stake has been, and is being, made.
For this purpose, the question of non-discrimination in trade, on which it should be comparatively easier for both sides to reach an agreement of views, might first be taken up (whereupon Welles asked whether what had been emphasized by Hull at the previous talk had been communicated to the home government, and Wakasugi replied that details thereof had been reported). Secondly, the question of obligations under the Tripartite alliance might be discussed. To this question Welles referred in terms which might be taken as revealing the possibility of an adjustment on the United States side itself. Next, the China question might be talked over. Thus Welles made a new proposal in the negotiations, and showed an attitude indicating a marked desire to promote a compromise.

Wakasugi, in reply, said that today he was not at liberty to add anything to the Japanese proposal of 25 September, because no detailed instructions had yet been received from the home government. It was desirable, however, that, with regard to the new method of approach proposed by Welles, a proposal be formulated by the United States side and presented at the next talk. A study of this new approach would also be made by the Japanese side.

With regard to the question of release of the frozen funds of the two Japanese tankers, referred to at the last talk, and of the two mail ships dispatched at this time, Welles said that steps had forthwith been taken at the time. At the Treasury Department, the necessary steps had already been taken in regard to the three mail ships. As for the tankers, there were strict regulations concerning United States banks. Once funds had been put in an account at the Yokohama Specie Bank, it was difficult to release such frozen funds, no matter whether they were funds which had been in that bank previously or were remittance drafts just received from another country. If, therefore, the funds in question were made into drafts via United States banks, the State Department would do all in its power to meet the request.

The last-mentioned matter is again to be talked over with Financial Attaché Nishiyama.
AFFIDAVIT

KASE TOSHIKAZU

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1925, and was appointed Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of American Affairs of that ministry in November 1941, continuing in that position until April 1943. In the course of my official duties as such section chief I was familiar with the matters herein testified to.

2. Soon after my arrival at the Foreign Ministry at about 30 o'clock in the morning of 7 December 1941 (Tokyo time), I received information from the Domei News Agency that the United Press had carried a report to the effect that the State Department had announced the dispatch of a personal message by President Roosevelt addressed to His Majesty the Emperor. I immediately reported the matter to my superiors, including Messrs. Togo, the Foreign Minister, Nishi, Vice Foreign Minister and Yamamoto, the Director of the American Bureau. I then telephoned to alert Marquis Matsudaira, private secretary to the Lord Privy Seal, and asked him to let us know at once when and if the Imperial Palace received the President's message. For we were under the impression that, being a personal message, it would be sent directly to the Emperor, as in the case of the Panay incident of December 1937. An urgent telegram was dispatched without delay to Admiral Nomura, our Ambassador in Washington, instructing him to make inquiries into, and report back upon the matter (telegram no. 905 from Togo to Nomura, Defense Document No. 1101-F-3). Apparently crossing this telegram on the way, a short dispatch from Admiral Nomura arrived at the Foreign Ministry in the afternoon (telegram no. 1275 from Nomura to Togo, Defense Document no. 1101-2-F-3). This confirming the authenticity of the press news, I instructed all the staff in my office to be alerted for urgent work and waited for the arrival of the message in question. However, as nothing happened, I got in touch with Marquis Matsudaira once again in the evening, shortly after 8 P.M., by telephoning his residence. I was told that the President's message had not arrived yet.

3. At about 10:15 P.M., Mr. Tomoda Jirō, private secretary to the Foreign Minister, received a telephone call from the American Embassy requesting him to make an appointment around midnight for the Ambassador to see the Foreign Minister. I understand that Mr. Tomoda asked if the Ambassador could not wait until the next morning, but was told that an urgent telegram was being decoded and that the Ambassador wanted to see Mr. Togo as soon as it was ready. Shortly after midnight—at about 12:30 A.M., 8 December—Mr. Grew came to the official residence of the Foreign Minister where the interview took place; I was present at this meeting and interpreted the conversation. Saying that he had re-
For this purpose, the question of non-discrimination in trade, on which it should be comparatively easier for both sides to reach an agreement of views, might first be taken up (whereupon Welles asked whether what had been emphasized by Hull at the previous talk had been communicated to the home government, and Wakasugi replied that details thereof had been reported). Secondly, the question of obligations under the Tripartite alliance might be discussed. To this question Welles referred in terms which might be taken as revealing the possibility of an adjustment on the United States side itself. Next, the China question might be talked over. Thus Welles made a new proposal in the negotiations, and showed an attitude indicating a marked desire to promote a compromise.

Wakasugi, in reply, said that today he was not at liberty to add anything to the Japanese proposal of 25 September, because no detailed instructions had yet been received from the home government. It was desirable, however, that, with regard to the new method of approach proposed by Welles, a proposal be formulated by the United States side and presented at the next talk. A study of this new approach would also be made by the Japanese side.

With regard to the question of release of the frozen funds of the two Japanese tankers, referred to at the last talk, and of the two mail ships dispatched at this time, Welles said that steps had forthwith been taken at the time. At the Treasury Department, the necessary steps had already been taken in regard to the three mail ships. As for the tankers, there were strict regulations concerning United States banks. . . .two words indecipherable/ the protection of bank depositors. Once funds had been put in an account at the Yokohama Specio Bank, it was difficult to release such frozen funds, no matter whether they were funds which had been in that bank previously or were remittance drafts just received from another country. If, therefore, the funds in question were made into drafts via United States banks, the State Department would do all in its power to meet the request.

The last-mentioned matter is again to be talked over with Financial Attaché Mishiya.}

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
Def. Doc. No. 1401-Z-1

From Nomura to Tōgō
21 October 1941
No. 995

Reference to your telegram No. 698.

Wakasugi talked with Welles for an hour from 3:30 P.M. on the 24th.

In accordance with your telegram, Wakasugi said that the new Japanese Cabinet had as earnest a desire as the last Cabinet to arrive at a fair and equitable adjustment of Japanese-American relations, that Japan's position had already been made clear, and that, although no detailed instructions had yet been received from the home government, Wakasugi might say that, according to what he himself observed during his recent visit to Japan, the circumstances did not permit of any further indefinite prolongation of the present conversations, it being desirable to arrive at a conclusion as soon as possible and without even a day's unnecessary delay. Wakasugi then asked for the presentation of the United States counter-proposal in response to the Japanese proposal of 25 September.

Welles asked about the intentions of the new Cabinet in regard to the continuance of the present negotiations. Simultaneously, he pointed out that lately persons in responsible positions in Japan had been making bellicose statements; for example, the Navy spokesman had said in a statement that the Japanese Navy was "itching for action"; and that the newspapers, etc., were vehemently attacking the United States. This fact, he pointed out, seriously irritated the Government and people of his country, and was injurious to the continuance of the present negotiations.

Wakasugi countered by saying that there were not a few influential statesmen in the United States, including for example, Senator Pepper, who were making vehement attacks on Japan. Above all, Secretary of the Navy Knox had said in a speech today that not only was a Japanese-American war unavoidable, but the clash was imminent. There were many such bellicose utterances in the United States, and the Government and people of Japan were being no less irritated by them. Welles made repeated explanations to get Wakasugi to understand that the speech of the Secretary of the Navy was not really so vehement, the press reports of it being merely exaggerations of its fragments; and that the Secretary of the Navy, as the highest person responsible for the Navy, the greatest force in the United States, was now and then using strong language in an attempt to encourage the Navy.

Welles proceeded to say, with regard to the counter-proposal of the United States, that, as repeated at the previous talk, the principles and the counter-proposal of the United States were clear in the proposal of 21 June. One idea might be to attempt oral adjustment between the United States and Japanese proposals, but, according to the experience of informal conversations carried on, merely to stick to the formula hitherto followed and discuss it by items would lead only to a repetition of the same arguments as has already been made, and render it difficult to achieve progress in the negotiations. As had been said at the previous talk in the presence of Secretary Hull, it might therefore be a quicker way to make a fresh survey by a new formula consisting of taking up matters of a general character, such as the three important problems, and in endeavoring to reach an agreement of views on them one by one, beginning with those which were comparatively easier of settlement.
For this purpose, the question of non-discrimination in trade, on which it should be comparatively easier for both sides to reach an agreement of views, might first be taken up (whereupon Welles asked whether what had been emphasized by Hull at the previous talk had been communicated to the home government, and Wakasugi replied that details thereof had been reported). Secondly, the question of obligations under the Tripartite alliance might be discussed. To this question Welles referred in terms which might be taken as revealing the possibility of an adjustment on the United States side itself. Next, the China question might be talked over. Thus Welles made a new proposal in the negotiations, and showed an attitude indicating a marked desire to promote a compromise.

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The last-mentioned matter is again to be talked over with Financial Attaché Nishiyama.
Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1925, and was appointed Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of American Affairs of that ministry in November 1941, continuing in that position until April 1943. In the course of my official duties as such section chief I was familiar with the matters herein testified to.

2. Soon after my arrival at the Foreign Ministry at about 10 o'clock in the morning of 7 December 1941 (Tokyo time), I received information from the Dōmei News Agency that the United Press had carried a report to the effect that the State Department had announced the dispatch of a personal message by President Roosevelt addressed to His Majesty the Emperor. I immediately reported the matter to my superiors, including Messrs. Togo, the Foreign Minister, Nishi, Vice Foreign Minister and Yamamoto, the Director of the American Bureau. I then telephoned to alert Marquis Mitsudaira, private secretary to the Lord Privy Seal, and asked him to let us know at once when and if the Imperial Palace received the President’s message. For we were under the impression that, being a personal message, it would be sent directly to the Emperor, as in the case of the Panay incident of December 1937. An urgent telegram was dispatched without delay to Admiral Nomura, our Ambassador in Washington, instructing him to make inquiries into, and report back upon the matter (telegram no. 905 from Togo to Nomura, Defense Document No. 1401-P-3). Apparently crossing this telegram on the way, a short dispatch from Admiral Nomura arrived at the Foreign Ministry in the afternoon (telegram no. 1275 from Nomura to Togo, Defense Document no. 1401-E-3). This confirming the authenticity of the press news, I instructed all the staff in my office to be alerted for urgent work and waited for the arrival of the message in question. However, as nothing happened, I got in touch with Marquis Mitsudaira once again in the evening, shortly after 8 P.M., by telephoning his residence. I was told that the President’s message had not arrived yet.

3. At about 10:15 P.M. Mr. Tomoda Jirō, private secretary to the Foreign Minister, received a telephone call from the American Embassy requesting him to make an appointment around midnight for the Ambassador to see the Foreign Minister. I understand that Mr. Tomoda asked if the Ambassador could not wait until the next morning, but was told that an urgent telegram was being decoded and that the Ambassador wanted to see Mr. Togo as soon as it was ready. Shortly after midnight—at about 12:30 A.M., 8 December—Mr. Grew came to the official residence of the Foreign Minister where the interview took place; I was present at this meeting and interpreted the conversation. Saying that he had re-
coived an urgent message of the President to the Emperor, Mr. Grew requested the Foreign Minister to arrange an audience for him. Mr. Togo replied that it was unusual to take action on a request for audience at midnight, and inquired about the substance of the message. Thereupon, the ambassador left a copy of the message with Mr. Togo for the latter's reference, and took leave of the Foreign Minister after repeating his request for the audience, stressing the extreme gravity of the situation. The interview lasted about 15 minutes. Mr. Togo gave me the copy and asked me to translate it into Japanese as quickly as possible. I did so with the help of my staff. I still vividly remember the very tense atmosphere that prevailed in my office, where everybody worked frantically in order to avoid delay in translating the message. Meanwhile, Mr. Togo got in touch with Marquis Kido, the Lord Privy Seal, by telephone, asking him to arrange for him to report the matter to the Throne. He then, I understand, went to the Premier's residence, consulted with General Tōgō, and left his official residence at about 2 A.M. for the Imperial Palace, there informing the Emperor of the President's message and receiving the answer to be sent through the American ambassador.

1. In accordance with instructions given me on the previous day, I requested Mr. Grew early in the morning of 8 December to call on the Foreign Minister. This was originally for the purpose of handing to the Ambassador a copy of the memorandum of the Japanese Government, terminating the diplomatic conversations, which had been delivered by Admiral Nomura at Washington to the American Government. This meeting would have taken place even if Mr. Grew had not paid the midnight visit to the Foreign Minister in connection with the President's message. Mr. Grew came to the Foreign Minister's official residence at about 7:30 A.M., at which time I was again present at the meeting interpreting the conversation. Mr. Togo gave the Ambassador a copy of the memorandum with the remark that it was a copy of the document already delivered to the American Government by Admiral Nomura. He told the Ambassador also that during the night he had had occasion to learn the wishes of the Emperor in regard to the President's message, and orally transmitted the reply, which was later written out at the Ambassador's request (Exhibit 1247).

Although Mr. Grew seems to be under the impression that the memorandum of the Japanese Government constituted the Emperor's reply, this is a misunderstanding on his part. The memorandum is unrelated to the President's message, it having been delivered to Mr. Hull before Mr. Togo saw the Emperor on the matter.

2. We in the Foreign Ministry, including Mr. Togo, had no slightest suspicion that the Communications Ministry might delay the delivery of telegram addressed to the American Embassy. Moreover, we did not think that the President's message would be addressed to the Embassy. We took it for granted that it was addressed directly to the Emperor. Such an assumption was in fact supported by Admiral Nomura's telegram (no. 1276, Defense Document no. 1431-3-3), which said that the President had sent his message directly to the Emperor without going through the usual diplomatic channels. We, therefore, waited anxiously for word from the Imperial Palace of the arrival of the message. That being the case, the Foreign Ministry had no idea regarding the substance of the message. In fact, Mr. Togo learned the content of the message only when the American Ambassador brought it to his attention at the midnight interview above described.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kase Toshikazu (seal)

On this 13th day of August 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT Kase Toshikazu

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereon in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)
現るに日本報に入れ違に野村大將よりの簡便なる電報が午後外務省に
到着しました（野村報東郷報第一四〇一—一九五三號）

之により新聞報導が確認されましたが私に会議員に対し委託に待つべき
模するよう指示を與ヘメッセージの到着を待ち受るべき。然し何等
の発送がなかったので夕刻八時家を松平侯爵の邸宅に電話して連絡を取
りましたが大統領の親署は未着この旨でありました。

同夜七時十五分頃外務大臣秘書官長友次郎氏は夜半頃米兵大使が外務大
臣に会見し得る様に計されます是以友田氏は大使が到着まで待ち得ないか
を察したこのことである私の承知する所によれば友田氏は大使が到着まで待ち得ないか
は準備出来次第東郷外相に介いたいこの読でありました。十二月八日夜
半少しこ過ぎ夜より午前零時三分頃グレーデ大使は外務大臣官邸に来られ、
同内に於て会見が行られました。私はこの会見に出席し会談を述べました。
した。大内官邸にお伺いの天皇陛下の緊急メッセージを受領したから、拜謁を取計つて頂きたいて申入れました。之に對し外相は何分深夜のことも故内容を聴ませましたときに同大使はメッセージの寫しを参考の為に外相の手許に残し、この進上を重いに重いのことに強調して、拜謁したき旨を反告した後辞去しました。今見は十五分内外で終りました。東郷外相は私にその寫しを渡し出るだけ近に日本語に翻譯するように命ぜられました。東郷外相は私にその写しを渡し出るだけ近くに日本語に翻訳するように命ぜられました。折刻を争ってメッセージの翻訳を急ぎ全員懸命になつて仕事が熱中しましたが、時潮の極度に緊張した空気は今日尚は辞かに私の記憶に残って居る所であるます。一方東郷外相は即時を以て木戸内府を追及び、陸大本官令大将を以て内紛し米国大使を通じて傳達すべき御回答を頂かれた所でありまし。
私は前日、我々が助けられた訓令に基づき、十二月八日早朝グルー大使に鉄し外相を
来訪するよう要請しました。丸もこちらと野村大将がワシントンに於いて
使に手交せんかためでありました。会談はグルー大使が大統領親鸞に
して深夜外相を訪問することがなかったことにしても行われた答でありま
す。グルー大使は午前七時三十分頃外相官邸を来訪しました。私はこの
会談にも出席して通訳に帯りました。東郷外相は既に野村大将が米国政
府に手交した書類の写しである旨を述べて右覚書の写し一通を同大使に
手交しました。
以前右衛門は既にハル氏に手交されておりました。

外相以下我々一人として思いもよらぬしれでした。尚我々は大統領の親信が陸軍省に直接申し出られたものと信じ切って居りました。右の推測は村野村大使からの遠報（雑報側文書第一四〇一一二一三）によつても支持された所であります。即ち同遠報に依れば大統領は親信を通じて外交機密を経由せず直接に大統領に桜を送ったと云ふことであります。故に我々は宮中から親信接到の遠報の来るのを心待ちに待つのであります。

上記の如く深夜の会見に於て米国大使が親信を外相に内示した時初めてその内容を承知した次第であります。
From Tōgō to Nomura  
7 December 1941  
No. 905

The AP and UP news agencies report that the State Department has disclosed the dispatch by the President of a personal telegram to the Emperor. Make report immediately about the facts thereof.
In the evening of the 6th, the Department of State disclosed that the President had dispatched a personal telegram to His Majesty the Emperor. The contents of the message are unknown, but it is generally assumed that it concerns the reinforcement of troops in French Indo-China and the advance into Thailand, in view of the simultaneous disclosure by the Department, based on information received, that in addition to one hundred twenty-five thousand troops already stationed in French Indo-China, two corps were moving this morning into the Gulf of Siam (refer to news dispatch).

The dispatch of the message by the President to the Emperor directly, and not through diplomatic channels, may, it is considered, be the result of taking into consideration our steps in connection with the personal message on the Panay incident some years ago.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

MATSUDAIRA YASUMASA

Having first duly sworn on oath on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was the private secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal from June 1936 to November 1945.

2. I received a telephone call from Mr. Kase, an official of the Foreign Ministry, in the morning of 7 December 1941 at the Imperial Household Ministry. He told me that the Foreign Ministry had received a telegram from Washington reporting that a personal telegram had been dispatched from the American President to the Emperor, and asked me if the telegram had been delivered directly to the Imperial Household Ministry. I told him, however, that the Imperial Household Ministry had not received such a telegram.

On the same day about 8:30 P.M., when I was at my private residence, Mr. Kase telephoned and asked me again about the above-mentioned private telegram from American President. Thereupon, I immediately inquired of the officer of the Chamberlain (Jiushoku) and of the officer on duty in the Ministry about the matter, and informed him (Mr. Kase) that the Ministry had received no such telegram as yet.

Later on, after 12 o'clock of the same night Mr. Kase called me by phone and informed me that the American Ambassador in Tokyo had conveyed the telegram of the President to the Foreign Minister.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Matsudaira Yasumasa

On this 13th day of August 1947
At Tokyo

DEFENDENT Matsudaira Yasumasa (seal)

I, Kato Denjiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same day
At Tokyo

Witness: Kato Denjiro (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
13 August 1947
昭和二年十二月七日午後、私が宮内省に居りました時、外務省の加藤省記官から電話があり、米国大統領から陛下宛宛電が発送され、生まれた旨の報道があるところ。右親電は直接宮内省に直ぐに届いたので、その一事を答へて置きました。その後同日午後八時半頃、自宅に居り、加藤省記官から直接宮内省に直ぐに届いた旨の電を答へて置きましたので、早速侍従官宮内省の宮直の人に伝えました。次に同夜十二時過ぎに加藤省記官から在庁米国大使官長を名乗り、外務大臣に大統領宛のことを伝へたとの電話がありました。
昭和廿二年（一九四七年）八月十三日於東京都

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニサ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シ

供述者 松

立會人

加

質

大

郎

同日於同所

立會人

加

質

大

郎

同
Having first duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Japanese Foreign Ministry in February 1922, and served as Chief of the Cable Section of the Ministry from September 1940 to October 1942. I shall state herein matters which came to my knowledge in the course of my official business in that position.

2. On 7 December 1941 a telegram was sent by Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura in Washington to the effect that the AP and UP news-agencies were reporting that the State Department had made public that the President had sent a personal telegram to the Emperor, and that the matter should be investigated and a report made (Def. Doc. No. 11401-F-3). Simultaneously the Ambassador had sent a telegram dated 6 December to the effect that the President was reported to have sent a telegram to the Emperor (Def. Doc. 11401-E-3). I, as Chief of the Cable Section of the Foreign Ministry, was aware of these two telegrams, but I did not see the contents of the reported telegram of the President at that time. I recall that only on 6 December, as I remember it, was I informed by the American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry that a personal telegram of the President had been transmitted from the American Ambassador to our hands.

3. The Cable Section of the Foreign Ministry used to obtain copies of coded telegrams to and from diplomatic and consular representatives in Japan for the purpose of research in coding technique. As a matter of fact, the Cable Section sent messengers to the competent section of the Communications Ministry to receive such copies, and their receipt by the Foreign Ministry was delayed one or two days after receipt by the Communications Ministry. It was the custom at the time that the code-research group of the Cable Section did not work Saturday afternoons and Sundays. As 7 December 1941 was a Sunday, there was nobody working in the afternoon of the 6th and all day the 7th. It was not possible, consequently, for the Foreign Ministry to have decoded the telegram of the President on 7 December.

Presumably the code-research group of the Foreign Ministry in the usual course received the President's telegram in code from the competent section of the Communications Ministry on 8 or 9 December. (Foreign telegrams in code were not received by me, but went directly to members of the code-research group and were dealt with by them.) The personnel of the group at that time was very small, and only about five were engaged in research on the Anglo-American codes. The situation was therefore that, of the coded telegrams received daily, only a small proportion of the decodable ones was actually decoded. In addition, the Foreign
Ministry received some decoded telegrams, mainly from the high command. There is nothing to show that the President's telegram was decoded by the Foreign Ministry, nor anything to show that it received a decoded copy thereof from the Army high command. For all such telegrams which were either decoded by the code-research group or obtained by the group in decoded text were submitted to me as Chief of Cable Section, and I have no recollection of having seen the decoded telegram of the President's message.

4. It is true, as has been stated, that the code-research group of the Foreign Ministry received in those days from the competent section of the Communications Ministry telegrams sent and received by diplomatic and consular representatives in Japan, but it had nothing to do with the delivery and dispatch of those telegrams by the Communications Ministry. The code-research group of the Foreign Ministry merely obtained copies of those telegrams from the competent section of the Communications Ministry after they had been delivered or dispatched as the case might be. The Foreign Ministry never intervened in the delivery or dispatch of those foreign telegrams. The Foreign Ministry thus had nothing to do with any delay in the delivery to the American Embassy of the telegram of the President.

5. I recall that I received the original copy of the memorandum of the Japanese Government to the United States prior to the start of the war in the afternoon of 6 December 1941 from the section in charge of the matter (the first section of the American Bureau), and had it coded immediately in fourteen parts. The results of an investigation made at the Tokyo Central Telegraph Office and reported to me by my subordinates at my order in December 1941 showed that the first thirteen parts were telegraphed from the cable room of the Foreign Ministry to the Central Telegraph Office between 8:30 P.M. on the 6th and 12:32 A.M. on the 7th, and that the latter cable them to the United States between 10:10 P.M. on the 6th and 1:50 A.M. on the 7th.

The dispatch of the fourteenth part was withheld, at the request of the section in charge of the matter, until notice should be given by them. That section requested at about 4 P.M. of the 7th that it be cabled, and steps were immediately taken to that end. The same text was sent through the MKY and the RCA, two American cable companies, at an hour's interval in order to assure speedy and accurate receipt in Washington. The report of the same investigation disclosed that the fourteenth part was cabled from the Central Telegraph Office at 5 P.M. on the 7th through MKY and at 5 P.M. on the 7th through RCA.

6. Prior to the dispatch of our memorandum, an instruction had been sent from the Foreign Ministry at 8:30 P.M. on 6 December to the effect that as soon as our memorandum to the United States had been received preparation of the document and all the necessary arrangements were to be made so that the memorandum might be handed to the United States at any time upon the receipt of the instruction to deliver it (Exhibit 1216). This telegram was sent, according to the above-aided investigation, from the Central Telegraph Office to the United States at 9:10 P.M. on the 6th.

7. The instruction to hand the memorandum to the United States at 1 P.M., 7 December, Washington time (Exhibit 1216), was cabled through two channels, MKY and RCA, to make sure of speedy and accurate delivery, and investigation showed that it was sent from the Central Telegraph Office to the United States at 6:30 P.M., 7 December, through the MKY, and at 6:28 P.M. through the RCA.
8. One technical error was discovered by an examination conducted immediately after the coding, in one of the first thirteen parts of the coded telegram (I recall that it was something like the dropping of one line), and a telegram of correction was immediately sent (it was, of course, a very similar one). The exact time of dispatch of this telegram of correction was learned; the record kept in the Cable Section having been destroyed by fire; but it cannot have been later than the early hours of the 7th, because several telegraph clerks were on duty throughout the night of the 6th to the 7th.

There was one more telegram of correction, replacing one word in the original text of the memorandum. The original text of the telegram shows that it was cabled from the Foreign Ministry to the Central Telegraph Office at 7:20 P.M., 7 December (Doc. No. 2050-A). In the light of the then prevailing conditions this telegram should have been sent from the Central Telegraph Office to the United States not more than an hour after its dispatch from the Foreign Ministry to the Central Telegraph Office.

8(a) For convenience of reference, the comparative Tokyo and Washington times for the hours mentioned above are as follows (the time-difference being 14 hours):

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<td>6:30 P.M.</td>
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9. Knowing that, the communications conditions between Japan and the United States at that time being generally very good, it did not take more than 30 minutes to an hour for communication. I ordered these various messages sent on the supposition that the times of their arrival in Washington would be (Washington time):

(a) the telegram instructing preparation of the document and other necessary matters, at about 8 A.M., 6 December;

(b) the first thirteen parts of the memorandum, approximately between 9 A.M. and 1 P.M. of the 6th;

(c) the fourteenth part of the memorandum, between 4 and 5 A.M. of the 7th;

(d) the telegram of instructions of the time of delivering the memorandum, at about 5:30 A.M. of the 7th.

All the telegrams concerning the Japanese-American negotiations were handled as "Government" and in view of the tenseness of the situation at that time, the American telegraph companies presumably handled the telegrams concerning the negotiations speedily. Supposing it to have taken as long as two hours for delivery to the Japanese Embassy in Washington after receipt in the United States, it may be assumed that the telegram in (a) of the preceding paragraph was delivered to the Embassy at about 10 A.M., 6 December, that in (b) between 11 A.M. and 3 P.M. on the 6th, that in (c) between 6 and 7 A.M. on the 7th, and that in (d) at about 7:30 A.M. on the 7th. As to the two telegrams of correction, the one correcting the technical error should have been delivered to the Embassy at latest prior to the delivery of the fourteenth part of the memorandum; and the other, correcting one word in the text of the memorandum, should have been delivered by 9:30 A.M. of 7 December at the latest.

10. Those telegrams sent from the Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Embassy in Washington subsequently to the dispatch of the thirteen parts of the memorandum which were received by the Embassy toward the late hours of 6 December and in the morning of the 7th are as follows, according to my memory and as disclosed by the telegrams themselves: (a) correction of technical error; (b) instruction to keep strict secrecy (Exhibit 1217); (c) the fourteenth part of the memorandum (Def. Doc. No. 2045); (d) inquiry about the President's telegram to the Emperor (Def. Doc. No. 1401-P-3); (e) instruction indicating the time of delivering the memorandum (Exhibit 1218); (f) Instruction to destroy the coding machine; (g) the Minister's greeting to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu; (h) greeting of the Director of the American Bureau to Counselor Iguchi and other members of the Embassy; (i) instruction indicating the number of the final telegram; and (j) correction of one word in the text of the memorandum (Def. Doc. No. 2050-A). If my memory serves me correctly, the telegram correcting one word in the text of the memorandum was the last.

All those telegrams except the fourteenth part of the memorandum were simple ones composed of not more than a few lines. The decoding, by one coding machine, of the fourteenth part would have taken twenty or thirty minutes but each of the rest of them would have been decoded in ten or fifteen minutes each. All those telegrams therefore could have been decoded in about two hours.
In those circumstances the Foreign Ministry sent those telegrams to the Japanese Embassy in Washington with the conviction that even if a considerable amount of time should be necessary for typing the memorandum, there would be a sufficient amount of time so that our memorandum be handed to the United States without fail at 1 P.M., 7 December, Washington time.

11. Allowing for the decoding of the first thirteen parts of the memorandum to the United States to take six hours and a half at the longest, I assumed that the decoding would have been completed by 9:30 P.M., 6 December, Washington time, even if the decoding was started after the last of the thirteen had arrived. As a matter of fact, each part should have been decoded as soon as it had arrived, so that the writing of the clean copy of the memorandum could have been started before 9:30 P.M. (the instructions for the preparation of the memorandum having been sent before the memorandum itself was cabled). Moreover, the telegram making the technical correction concerning one of the thirteen parts was sent by the early morning of 7 December, and there was no doubt that it was sent before the fourteenth part of the memorandum (the arrival of the fourteenth part at the Embassy is assumed to have been between 6 and 7 A.M., 7 December). The Japanese Embassy must have received the telegram on the technical correction by 7 A.M., 7 December, Washington time, by the latest, and could have decoded it without delay. The last telegram, correcting one word in the text of the memorandum, should have been received and decoded not later than 10 A.M., 7 December, Washington time. Therefore, even if the officers and clerks of the Embassy concerned had taken a normal rest from 6 to 7 o'clock, the full text of the entire memorandum in fourteen parts could have been written in clean copy by 11 A.M., 7 December, Washington time, by the latest.

12. It having become known in the Foreign Ministry through radio broadcast from America that the delivery of the memorandum to the United States on 7 December had been delayed in Washington, Foreign Minister Togo instructed me upon the return of the Embassy staff from the United States to conduct an investigation of the matter. In the course of the investigation which I accordingly carried out, it was reported to me by one of the telegraph clerks of the Embassy in Washington who returned on the exchange boat in August 1919 that the instruction for preparation of the memorandum so that it could be handed to the United States any time had been received by the Embassy in the forenoon of 6 December, Washington time; that the memorandum had started to arrive at the Embassy from about noon of the same day, and the thirteen parts had been decoded by about 11 P.M. of the same day; that the fourteenth part of the memorandum had arrived at the Embassy by about 7 A.M. of the 7th; and that the telegraph clerks of the Embassy finished decoding the fourteenth part about 12:30 P.M. Kondo, an the other telegraph clerks of the Embassy at that time who returned home in March 1916 on the boat repatriating the Japanese diplomats from Europe, reported in general to the same effect.

13. The Foreign Ministry was often asked by other government agencies to obtain information concerning economic, financial, military and other matters abroad, and instructed its establishments abroad to obtain and report such data. Since the gathering of such information and their communication to the government agencies which had asked for them had no direct relationship to the decision and execution of diplomatic policies, instructions of such nature, when cabled, were generally drafted by officers in the section in charge of the matter and, with the approval of the bureau director and the section chief, or sometimes of the section chief only, were forwarded to the Cable Section for dispatch. In practice, therefore, the Minister and the Vice-Minister had nothing
to do with such telegrams, and they were generally dealt with at
the responsibility of the bureau director, or more often at the
chief of section, in charge of the matter. When a telegram
of information in response to such instructions was received,
the Cable Section forwarded it to the bureau director or the
section chief concerned, and the section in charge sent it to the
government agency which had asked for it. Parallel with such pro-
cedure, the Cable Section sometimes sent copies of such telegram
directly to the government agencies which had made the request,
but that practice was a supplementary measure to meet their
executive requirements.

All telegrams sent from the Foreign Ministry to its embassies abroad were sent in the name of the Foreign Ministry, and all the telegrams from its overseas establishments to the Foreign Ministry were addressed to the Foreign Minister. Of these telegrams, however, the Foreign Minister examined only those telegrams which were deemed important, and there were many which were not brought to his attention. While I was Chief of the Cable Section, for instance, some two hundred telegrams were received and some one hundred dispatched daily, only about one tenth of which were submitted to the Foreign Minister for examination.

I recall that, while I was Chief of the Cable Section, instruc-
tions were sent for gathering information concerning the movement
of warships and merchant vessels in Hawaii, Manila, Java and other
places, and that telegrams in reply thereto were received. These
communications were all dealt with in accordance with the procedure
above described, and I have no recollection that any of them,
either sent from or received by the Foreign Ministry, was submitted
for review to the Foreign Minister or the Vice-Minister.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kimoyama Kazuji (seal)

On this 13th day of August 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT Kazuji (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement
was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal
thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am
conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the
foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct
translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
13 August 1947
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受領して居た實情でありました。

而して右電信課内暗号研究班に於ては土曜日は午後から、日曜日は全日に亘って勤務に就いて居た者はありませんでした。従って七日中は本件大統領機密を外務省に於て解読したと云ふことは在り得ぬことでありさ

十二月八日乃至九日には恐らく普通の例に依り同電信局より右親電の

暗号に見られられた電報の寫を外務省電信課暗号研究班に於て受領して居り、電報案に直接受取ったとは非同様員が受取り適宜に處理して居り、約五名に過ぎませんでしたので、恐より此等毎日受領する暗号電報寫

の内解読し得るものの中より更に極く僅か暗号の研究に従事して居たのは

が要領し他は主として参隷本部より解読を入手して居た次第ですが、
受領して居た賞善でありました。

而して右電信報內暗報研究班に於ては土曜日は午后から、日曜日は全日
直って勤務に就いて居た者はありませんでした。従て七日中に本件大
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暗報に詰まれた電報の写を外務省電信報暗報研究班に於て受領して居り
暗報電に直接受け取ったことはなく同報員が受取り適宜に處理して居り
約五名に過ぎませんにしたので、案より此等暗報の研究に従事して居たのは
の内暗報者得るものの中より更に極く一小部分のみを適當抽出して自
ら解釈し他は主として参謀本部より解釈文を入手して居た次第ですが
四、尚前述の通り、当時暗号電報研究班に於て通信電報の配達手続きの為、電報発送に於て配達不合格の電報を尋不適切に配達したことはなく、従って大統領親電、外務省電報発送に付何等干渉したことはなく、従って大統領親電、在日米国大使館への配達手続きの為、電報発送に於て何等干渉したことはなく、従って大統領親電、在日米国大使館への配達手続きの為、電報発送に於て何等干渉したことはなく。
五・太平洋戦争開始に先立つ日本政府の対米宗教宣伝の電報原文は、主管課長であった自分に於て受領し電信官をして直ちに之を十四本の電信に組むして東京中央電信局に送り制電報告せしめた所に依りますと、最初の十三本は同日午後八時三十分乃至七日午前零時二十分に外務省内電信局より東京中央電信局に押送せられ右中央電信局は之を六日午后十時十分乃至七日午前一时五十分に木刻向け発信した趣であります。

第十四本目は主管課の申人に従ひ同様より発電方要求ある甚大なるのが然りましたので直ちに発信方を手配しました。而して右第四本目の電報は、特に迅速且正確なる様に依って同文を天々御領ししろと。

而して右第四本目の電報は右調査に依れば東京中央電信局より十二月十七日午后五時ごく急に電報を依りますした所に依りますと、午後六時にRCA経由夫々電報を依りますした趣。
八戸対米警報を暗号に組んだ後取扱阿根廷最初の十三本中一本
に技術的誤（一行間隔字したもののに飛ぶ箇所）があったので発
見されなかったので直に訂正警報を発送しました。（右は勿論何て
簡単なものでありました。）

右町正理報の発送せられた正確な時刻は外務省の火災に際し警報係官数名
を終夜直動居しけたもなお居りませんでした故右は七時よりも遅くなつた
こたはなかったものと存じます。

更に私は一週、警報原文中一字訂正の指示警報が発送せられました
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より東京中央警報局に発送せられた居りますから（総務省第二局
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局より直接米口に向け、発送させたるものと思考します。
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十一、対米覚書十三本通分は、解釈完了に最大六時間半を要すると認められたものであれば、まずから右の内最後のものの到着した後に解釈を完了し得たのに対し、里方の時刻は右午後九時半以前に着手し得たのに対して、所定の解釈し得たのをもって大本覚書に於ては遅くも昼間十二月七月午前十時を過ぎてして除到且解釈を完了した場合であります。又最後の一箇所請正の電報は遅くも朝間十二月七月午前十時を過ぎてして除到且解釈を完了した場合であります。
十二。

七日午前十一時頃迄に、之を御書と完了し得た等である。

又、十二月七日対米電信の手交が兼府で談延した者、米国からのラジオ放送
で判明したので兼外務大臣は大使館員が米国から帰朝の上は取調べを
すべき旨に命せられました。かくして行った調査に於て一九四二年
八月間、兼館では荒延した兼府大使面電信記録の一人が私に語つた所に依
れば大使館では照会を伺っても来月に提出しむる様準備し置くべき旨
は七月午後十一時頃迄に到達して居り、同大使館電信課員が第三本目の
外交官引揚へ以て一九四四年三月帰国した啓示の在米大使館電信課員
近隣電信署記坐生等の語つた所も石と大体同様であります。
あなたのもののみで、査閲を経ない電報も選山ありました。例へは自分の電報観察長在任時に行っ
た、ハワイ、マニュ・ジャパ、その他の地
方に行ける電報商船の動静に関
する情報入手のため、電報が受
れられたかどうかの回
信を受
れられたので電報
共外務大臣乃至次官の電報
に供した記憶
はありません。
国立11月11日（11月11日）に四回口発表会

田中 博之

口名 八重山

立命館 本部
良心を問うた時、どんなに無知でさえも黙然とささやくのであれば、何にせよそれを弥补するにあたって、

署名

印

署

148
政府と相携へテ太平洋ノ平和ヲ維持確立セントスル帝國政府ノ希望ハ
遂ニ失ヘタリ。

（二）
海軍大臣
九十四年十二月七日（S－TT）

Page 245

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
No. 902 Part 14 of 14

(Note.--In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve the Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

25943
35-1: 7143

(M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-N.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361
Telegram No. 911 from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura

Drafted on December 7, 1941.

Official in charge: Oda (initialed)

Chief of Cable Section: Kameyama (seal)

46899 (Despatched in duplicate)
46901

By order of the Foreign Minister

Nishi (signed)

Despatched at 7:20 P.M., December 7.

(Urgent, office chief cipher)

Reference to my telegram No. 950,

Please correct "proposal" as "assertions" in the sentence in the first part of the paragraph III of the memorandum to the American Government: "But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal".
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authority

I, ULABE, Katsuma, Acting Chief of the Archives
Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the
attached photostat consisting of 2 pages, in English and
in Japanese of the telegram No. 911 dated 7th December,
1941, despatched by Foreign Minister TOGO to Ambassador
NOMU-A in Washington, is an exact and true copy of the
document in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.
Certified at Tokyo,

on this 11th day of August, 1947.

/s/ ULABE, Katsuma (seal)

Witness: /s/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)
1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in April 1937. In December 1940 I was appointed Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of American Affairs of the Ministry, serving in that position until October 1941. In November I was appointed, in the capacity of a senior secretary, to accompany Ambassador Kurusu on his mission to the United States, and left with him on 5 November. I remained at the Embassy in Washington, engaged in the business of the Japanese-American negotiations, until the outbreak of the Pacific war. I was accordingly concerned, directly or indirectly in the general business of the embassy with regard to the negotiations, though I was not a regular member of the embassy staff. Therefore I have knowledge of the facts concerning the delay in the delivery of the memorandum of the Japanese Government to the United States on 7 December 1941, and state herein the circumstances thereof. (The time I use in this statement is Washington time, 14 hours earlier than Tokyo time.)

2. Telegraphic instructions from the Japanese foreign ministry, deciphered by noon of 6 December (Saturday) had instructed us that they were going to send, by separate telegrams, the memorandum of the Japanese Government in response to the American proposal of 36 November; that it would be the following day before this long message would be completely received (it was actually sent in 14 parts, the last of which was delivered on the morning of 7 December); and that, in consideration of the delicate situation, the receipt of the memorandum should be kept in strict secrecy (in this connection, we were instructed by another telegram—Exhibit 1917—to take every prudent measure to keep it in secret, and especially, not to entrust the preparation of the memorandum to typists). We were further told that we would be instructed later of the time for handing the memorandum to the United States, and that all necessary steps, including the preparation of the documents, should be taken promptly so that the memorandum could be delivered at any time upon receipt of instructions (Exhibit 1715). Subsequently, the 14 parts into which the memorandum was divided began to arrive, and the first 8 or 9 parts had already been deciphered by dinner-time (about 7 p.m.) that evening.

There was a farewell dinner, which I did not attend, for a member of the embassy staff who was being transferred to another post; I had dinner with Ambassador Hamura, then returned to my bedroom. On Sunday morning, 7 December, I went to the so-called Secretaries' Room of the Embassy, which is in the ambassador's residence, at about 9, and there found Secretary Okumura busy typing the memorandum. The typing apparently had not started on the night of the 6th. As the staff of the cable section began arriving soon afterward, I learned from talking with them that after the dinner of the night before the whole staff of the cable section (Telegraph Officer Horiuchi and clerks Kajiwara, Kawai, Kawabata, Konoe and Yoshida) had returned to the office and resumed
the work of deciphering at about 9:30, the deciphering of the first 13 parts being finished before midnight. Having nothing to do but to wait for the 14th part to be delivered, the members of the cable section had then busied themselves, while waiting for it, in cleaning of the remnants of the cipher machine which had been destroyed on the night of 5 December in accordance with the order of the Foreign Minister. The 14th part, I learned, had not arrived during the night, and Counselor Iuchi having reviewed the members of the cable section to retire, they returned to their respective lodgings before dawn, leaving a duty officer.

3. While Secretary Okumura (who was the only senior official of the Embassy staff who could operate a typewriter at all) recently typed the memorandum, I proof-read the typed pages in the adjoining room with Chancellor Nakajima. Before my arrival between 7 and 8 o'clock, I was told several telegrams had been delivered, and the night duty officer had called up all the members of the cable section at their respective lodgings—finding, to his uneasiness, that, having left the office only a short time before, they were not prepared for prompt attendance. At from 9:30 to 10 they had all gathered in the office and from 10 o'clock they set about deciphering the telegrams. Telegrams marked “urgent” were first deciphered. The greetings of the Foreign Minister and the Director of the American Bureau came first, then a few telegrams of congratulations. It was about 11 o'clock that they deciphered the telegram directing that the memorandum be handed to the United States (to the Secretary of State if possible) at 1 P.M., 7 December (Exhibit 1919).

In accordance with Ambassador Nomura’s order, interpreter Enseki promptly called the Secretary of State at his private residence, asking for an appointment for an interview at 1 P.M. The Secretary of State replied that, as he had a previous engagement for lunch, he wished that the Ambassadors would meet Under-Secretary Welles in his stead. Shortly after, we received a telephone message to the effect that the Secretary of State himself would receive the Japanese ambassadors at 1 P.M., at the State Department.

4. Meanwhile, by 11 A.M., Secretary Okumura had finished typing the memorandum as far as the 13th part. However, saying that that copy was meant to be a draft and was not well-typed, and that there was still plenty of time before 1 o'clock, he began to type the draft over again with the assistance of interpreter Enseki. That day, however, they were under such a strain that they were slower and making more mistakes than usual. This became more perceptible as time passed after we had received the instructions to hand the memorandum to the United States at 1 P.M. As the above-mentioned telegram of correction was deciphered, however, they were compelled to retypew a page which they had barely finished typing. Another telegram directing the insertion of a sentence of one or two lines which had been dropped out of the memorandum forced them again to retypew, not only the page in question but also the following page, on account of the striking down of lines. At any rate, in these circumstances it took longer than we had expected, and time flew by rapidly. It was around 12:30 P.M., as I remember, that the deciphering of the 14th part, the last part of the memorandum, was sent to the Secretaries’ Room. The typing of the thirteen parts, however, was not yet completed by that time.

5. In the meantime, Ambassador Nomura came frequently to the Secretaries’ Room to press for the document. Ambassador Furusui also was holding himself in readiness to start, and was waiting impatiently for the correction of the typing.
As it became clear that the typing could not be completed in time for the appointed hour, interpreter Ensaki, by order of Ambassador Nomura, told the secretary to Secretary Hull that the call of the two ambassadors might be delayed because the necessary document was not yet ready, and received a reply that Mr. Hull would expect the Japanese ambassadors as soon as the preparations were completed. It was already about 1:50 when secretary Okumura and interpreter Ensaki finished the typing. The two ambassadors, who had been waiting at the entrance-hall of the Embassy, started for the State Department as soon as they received the typewritten memorandum. I understand that they reached there at about 2 o'clock, were kept waiting for about twenty minutes, and met the Secretary of State about 2:30 and handed him the memorandum.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Yuki Shirōji

On this 9th day of August 1947
at Tokyo

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
13 August 1947
Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vol. 14

Pages 1413-1416

Exhibit no. 41

Information from Documentary Evidence on messages No.
D 901, 902, 907, 910

Note: Information based on documents in Navy files indicated by "(N)", information based on documents in Army files indicated by "(A)".

No. 901 (pilot message; Exhibit 1, p. 238)

Filed by the Japanese 8:56 p.m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (A&N)

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, Washington 1315-1330 GMT 6 Dec (N)

Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army SIS from Navy (A) 12:05 p.m. 6 Dec

Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS (A)

No. 903 (14 part memo; Exhibit 1, pp. 239-45)

Part 1

Filed by the Japanese 10:00 p.m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N)

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, Washington 1303-1310 GMT 6 Dec (N)

Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649 11:49 a.m. 6 Dec

Decoded and typed at Navy (N)

All parts of this message were in English, so that translation was not required.

Part 13

Filed by the Japanese 1:25 a.m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N)

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S, 1635-1653 GMT 6 Dec (N)

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)

Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951 GMT 6 Dec (N)

Decoded and typed by Navy

Part 14

Filed by the Japanese 4:38 p.m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N)

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S, 0805-0810 GMT 7 Dec (N)

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)

Decoded and typed by Navy (N)
Def. Doc. no. 1500-F-6

No. 907 (one o'clock message; p. 248 Exhibit 1)

Filed by the Japanese 6:18 p.m. 7 Dec.
Tokyo time (N)
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) 0937
GMT 7 Dec (N)
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)
Decoded by Navy (A)
Sent by Navy to Army SIS
Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A)

Washington Time
4:18 a.m. 7 Dec

No. 910 (code destruction; p. 249 Exhibit 1)

Filed by the Japanese 6:44 p.m. 7 Dec
Tokyo time (N&A)
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) 1007
GMT 7 Dec (N)
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)
Decoded by Navy (A)
Sent by Navy to Army SIS
Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A)

Washington Time
4:44 a.m. 7 Dec
5:07 a.m. 7 Dec
Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In compliance with the request of Vice Chairman Cooper at page 10783 of the Record of Proceedings, referred to in item 14 of your memorandum of March 1946, Captain Kramer has prepared, and there is forwarded herewith, a smooth copy of the study made by him of the times of delivery to the White House of certain translations of Japanese intercepts.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Orig.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Trans.</th>
<th>Subject &amp; Army Number</th>
<th>Delivered by Navy</th>
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<tr>
<td>7137</td>
<td>B-T #1421</td>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>11215</td>
<td>Geve Germans dope on U.S. negotiations. Think we should tell them re Konye note. First message of block delivered about noon. 6 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7138</td>
<td>B-T #1108</td>
<td>12/3</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>11217</td>
<td>(Re 7152) Re: Person and formal.</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>W-T #1260</td>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>Call-Lumia-Num talk on 5th.</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>T-W #906</td>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>(Re 716) Have Terasaki etc. leave in next few days. My footnotes re Terasaki. Eve 6 December.</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>W-T #1262</td>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>11225</td>
<td>(Re 716) Want to keep Terasaki for present.</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>T-W #907</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>Re code machines, keep one i meant (25835).</td>
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<td>T-W #902 (Parts 1-13)</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>Jap Note parts 1-13 (25843).</td>
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<td>T-W #904</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/6 N</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>Re Typist (25843).</td>
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<td>T-W #907</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>P.M. msg (25850).</td>
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<td>T-W #908</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
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<td>Thanks to 2 hrs. (25853).</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>T-W #910</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
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<td>Destroy all codes and papers (25854).</td>
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<td>T-W #901</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>Pilot msg (25843).</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>T-W #905</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
<td>10745</td>
<td>A-B-U reports re CCR msg to Emperor (25857).</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>T-W #909</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>12/7 A</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>Thanks to Enb Staff (25853).</td>
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**No footnote in original**
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

RUFUS S. BRATTON

RUFUS S. BRATTON, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:

Q What is your name?
A Rufus S. Bratton, Colonel, United States Army.

Q What is your present position?
A Deputy Chief of CIS, G-2, GHQ SCAP.

Q What was your position in the month of December 1941?
A Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

Q What, in general, were your duties at that time?
A I supervised the work of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division, and specifically was the custodian and processor of the Japanese diplomatic messages which were being intercepted and translated by the Army and the Navy. I had charge of that material from the time it reached the Military Intelligence Division.

Q Was it your responsibility to make delivery or dissemination of that intercepted diplomatic correspondence?
A It was my responsibility. I had some officer assistants who helped me in processing the material and occasionally in distributing it.

Q When did you first learn that orders had been issued to Japanese Embassies and consulates to destroy their codes and documents?
A On 5 December we had intercepted cables from Tokyo to the Embassy to that effect, and I had sent one of my officers to the Embassy and he reported that they were burning their papers in the backyard.

Q Whom did you notify of this fact?
A General Sherman Miles, my superior officer and Chief of Military Intelligence, and General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. The intercepted message was sent to the usual recipients of this material, which included the Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff. Distribution to the Secretary of the Navy and the President was at that time the responsibility of the Navy.

Q Did you and Generals Miles and Gerow discuss the meaning of this destruction of codes?
A Yes, we agreed that it meant at the least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war.

Q Do you remember the so-called pilot message, which appears in evidence in this case as Exhibit 1,216 and which I am having handed to you?
A I do.
Q: When did this message first come to your attention?
A: Some time around 2 o'clock of the afternoon of Saturday, 6 December 1941.

Q: Did you discuss the matter with anyone on that Saturday afternoon?
A: Yes; with General Miles and with General Gerow. In addition, that message was distributed to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State.

Q: Are you familiar with the 1st part message which was later received in accordance with this pilot message, in evidence here as Exhibit 1,215-K, which is being handed to you?
A: I am.

Q: When did you first see any parts of this message?
A: That message began to come into my office in the late afternoon or early evening of 6 December, and the first 13 parts had arrived completely between 9 and 10 o'clock that evening.

Q: To whom did you make distribution of those 13 parts?
A: To the Secretary of State, by delivery of the locked pouch containing them to the night duty officer in the State Department some time after 10 o'clock that night. I also advised General Miles by telephone of the contents, and was told by him that he had seen the 13 parts.

Q: When did you first see the 14th part of the message?
A: The 14th part was delivered to me at my office in the War Department 8:15 or 8:30 on the morning of Sunday, 7 December.

Q: What distribution of it was made by you?
A: It was delivered immediately to the State Department by me or my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury.

Q: When did you first see the message ordering 1 o'clock delivery of the memorandum contained in the 14th part message, Exhibit 1,218, which is being shown to you?
A: At just about 9 o'clock of the morning of 7 December.

Q: Whom did you notify of receipt of this message?
A: Generals Miles and Gerow, and General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

Q: Do you know whether General Marshall had read the 14th part message?
A: At 11:25 that morning Generals Miles and Gerow and I met with General Marshall in his office. He then read, in our presence, the complete 14th part message and the 1 o'clock delivery message.

Q: What was the significance of the 1 o'clock delivery discussed?
A: At General Marshall's request each of us gave him his evaluation of it, which was that we concurred in believing that it meant Japanese hostile action against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 o'clock that afternoon.

Q: What did General Marshall do as a result of this conversation?
A: He called Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, on the telephone, and after consultation with him wrote out in his own hand a warning message to be sent to Hawaii, the Philippines, Panama and other American outposts in the Pacific.

Q: I am having handed to you Defence Document no. 1500-E-6. Please examine this document and state whether it is a copy of the message at that time prepared and sent by General Marshall?
A: This is the message which General Marshall wrote and which at his order I took to the War Department Message Center for coding and transmission.
Def. Doc. 209U

Q. Were you advised by the chief of the message center how long it would take for delivery of that message to the addressees?
A. Colonel French, the chief of the message center, told me that it would be in the hands of the addressees within 30 or 40 minutes, which fact I reported to General Marshall.

Q. What time was it then?
A. It was then 11:58 A.M.

FURTHER the affiant saith not.

At Tokyo, this 18 August 1947

/s/ R. S. Bratton

Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authority, on this 18 August 1947, at Tokyo.

/s/ Worth D. White
Capt. Inf.
Summary Court Officer
Mr. Weissell. "Now, just how far, General, did this question of security go in this regard? To take an extreme case, assuming you had intercepted a message in which the Japanese said that they planned to attack Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December at dawn. I take it I am correct in assuming that that message would have been transmitted to Hawaii for their information?

General Miles. It would have been, by the Chief of Staff. I think that case is similar to the one which actually occurred on the morning of December 7. We didn't know where this attack was coming but we very much feared an attack would come coincident with the 1 p.m. delivery of the Japanese reply and my action then was to bring this to the notice of the Chief of Staff so that an additional warning would be sent out.

Mr. Gearhart. But, General Miles, things happened on the 6th of December which suddenly centered your attention upon Hawaii as a possible object of attack, did they not?

General Miles. Things happened on the morning of the 7th of December, sir, which centered my attention on the probable Japanese attack somewhere coincident with the delivery of the Japanese reply at 1 o'clock that day.

Mr. Gearhart. You are familiar with the so-called 14-part Japanese reply to the Hull message of November 26, are you not?

General Miles. I am, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When they speak of it as the 14-part message they are referring to the method the Japanese used in transmitting that message, are they not?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It came in in installments, in other words, rather than in a solid typed coded message; is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Thirteen parts of that message were received in Washington on the 6th day of December, were they not?

General Miles. On the late evening of the 6th they were received.
Mr. Gearhart. "Do you know when the fourteenth part was received on the 7th of December?"

General Miles. I understand that that was received fairly early on the morning of the 7th, at 7 or 8 o'clock. Again, I am not able to testify as to the accurate hour.

Mr. Gearhart. You were impressed with the importance of that fourteenth part of the message, were you not?

General Miles. When I read it, I was very much impressed with the fourteenth part.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you make any out-of-the-ordinary directions in reference to its immediate delivery to the ones that were entitled to receive copies from an emissary from your division?

General Miles. It had been delivered to the recipients about coincidental with its delivery to me, with the exception of General Marshall with whom I was in touch either directly or through Colonel Bratton to get this information to him.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you make any special effort, by telephone or otherwise, or by calling at his office, to inform General Marshall of the receipt of that fourteenth part of the message?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Were you successful in contacting him?

General Miles. I was, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When did you inform him of the fourteenth part of the message?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I have written notes on my activities on the 6th and 7th which, perhaps for clarity and saving time, I might read.

My wife and I dined at the house of Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, then Chief of ONI. We were there from 8 p.m., until about 11 p.m. Shortly before we left, I think about 10:30 p.m., Commander Kramer came to the house, bringing with him a summary, I think, although it may have been the full translation of the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our note of November 26. This was the first knowledge I had that these 13 parts were in.

Early on the morning of the 7th, Colonel Bratton called me at my house, told me that important information was in and that he was trying to get in touch with General Marshall. I asked Colonel Bratton to tell General Marshall that I would come out to Fort Ecyer to see him if he
desired. Either Colonel Bratton or I called General G. These telephone messages were designed to effect a meeting of the Chief of Staff with General Grom, Colonel, and myself, which subsequently took place in General Marshall's office.

I then went to my office. There I saw the full Japanese reply, and the 1 p.m. delivery message, and discussed them with Colonel Bratton. The latter message and the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply struck me immediately.

Soon arrangements had been made for us to be notified when General Marshall arrived. When so notified, I went to General Marshall's office. That took place in his office is best recalled by me in a memorandum I prepared for the Chief of Staff, dated December 15, 1941, subject: "Sunday Morning, December 7, 1941."

This is the memorandum that I refer to, as my recollection of what occurred.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff
Subject: Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

1. My recollection of what occurred in your office on that morning is as follows:

I found you alone in your office at about 11:25 a.m. We were almost immediately joined by Colonel Bratton, who brought in the Japanese reply and the Japanese directive that the reply be given to Secretary Hull at 1 p.m. that day.

You then read aloud the Japanese reply, which was of considerable length. You then asked what Colonel Bratton and I thought should be done about it, or what it signified. We said that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply--1 p.m.--an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. I thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand, but it might be any one or more of a number of other areas.

I urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, and to be on the alert. You then picked up the telephone and got Admiral Stark. You told him you thought we should send out warning as indicated above. After Admiral Stark replied, you put down the telephone and said that the admiral did not think any further warnings necessary, since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Colonel Bratton and I nevertheless urged that warnings be sent.

You then wrote out the warnings message. There was some discussion as to whether the Philippines should be included or not, but I am not quite clear exactly when this discussion occurred. You again got Admiral Stark on the telephone and read the message to him. He apparently concurred, and asked that the naval forces be informed. You added that at the bottom of the message.
At about this time General Gerow and Colonel Bundy arrived. You asked us in succession, beginning with me, what we thought the Japanese reply and timing meant. I said that I thought it probably meant Thailand, but that the timing had some significance and warning messages should be sent. General Gerow and Colonels Bratton and Bundy concurred. The message in your handwriting was then given to Colonel Bratton to take immediately to the Message Center. There was a little discussion here as to whether it should go to General Gerow's office for typing first, but time was then pressing and I gave it to Bratton for immediate delivery. General Gerow said to Bratton as he was leaving, "Tell them to give it first priority to the Philippines if there is a question of priority" or something to that effect.) Bratton returned in a few moments and you directed him to find out how long it would take for the delivery of those messages. Again he went to the Message Center and returned and reported to you that they would have them encoded in three minutes, on the air in eight, and in the hands of the recipients in (I think) twenty.

Colonel Bratton states that he looked at his watch on delivering your message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a.m. He further states that the Message Center gave him no intimation that all four messages would not go over Army radio direct to the four Army Headquarters.

Signed by me.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you remember when you first saw the full message of the 14 parts?

General Miles. I cannot identify the hour exactly, sir. I only know that I got down there to the office fairly early after this telephone conversation with Colonel Bratton, and I think that General Gerow, although of that I am not quite certain, and that I had considerable time to read the message and discuss it with Colonel Bratton before the arrival of the Chief of Staff.

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Mr. Gearhart. But the very use of 1 o'clock by the Japanese Government in directing their Ambassador and Envoy to present that at that hour certainly excited in the minds of every officer who saw that message much comment in respect to its possible meaning, did it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir. It was a very unusual request to make on a Secretary of State of a foreign power, that he receive a message at 1 o'clock on a Sunday afternoon.

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Mr. Gearhart. All right. What did 1 o'clock in Washington mean in Hawaii?

General Miles. I am trying to remember, Mr. Congressman but I do not remember that any of those places specifically were discussed, or that we related the 1 o'clock in Washington to any specific place. We thought the line of action would be Thailand, still thought it that morning, but we wanted our overseas departments and the west coast alerted, and it was an awful urgency about it.
General Miles. One o'clock, as we now know, meant about 7 o'clock, I think, in Hawaii.

Mr. Gearhart. When was the conference completed insofar as the determination to send a message was concerned?

General Miles. I wrote on that same day, December 15, that Colonel Bratton looked at his watch on delivering General Marshall's message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a.m.

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Mr. Mitchell (general counsel). General Gerow, will you state your present rank and station?

General Gerow. Leonard T. Gerow, lieutenant general; station, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Mr. Mitchell. Were you in the War Plans Division in the War Department in 1941?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. When did you receive that assignment?

General Gerow. I reported, sir, in November 1940, and left the War Plans Division in February 1942.

Mr. Mitchell. You were head of the War Plans Division during that period?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans Division.

Mr. Mitchell. You may. Just a part of the regulations relating to the War Plans Division.

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I quote paragraph 12:

War Plans Division, general duties:

a. The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the use in the theatre of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.

b. The War Plans Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

   (1) Location and control of coast and land fortifications;
   (2) Estimation of forces required and times at which they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the national defense;
   (3) The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment
to be the duty of the Operations and Training Division);
(4) Actual operations in the theatre of war;
(5) Consultation with the Operations and Training Divi-
sion and the Supply Division on major items of equipment.

Those are the responsibilities of War Plans Division, 1941,
sir.

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General Gerow. Well, the first time the 14-part message or the
1 o.m. message was in the office of the Chief of Staff
on the morning of December 7th was about 11:30 o'clock.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL;
SPECIAL ENVOY TO CHINA

Friday, December 7, 1945

Mr. Mitchell. Now, when we closed last evening I had just asked
you a question. I will repeat it now:
"Do you remember this diplomatic message from Tokyo to
their Ambassador here, what we call for short the 14 part
message and the 1 P.M. message?"
Your answer was, "Yes, sir."
"Will you state in your own way just when you first knew
about that and under what circumstances?"
And you got as far as saying: "I first was aware of this
message when I reached the"—and then we adjourned.
Will you give us now the answer?

General Marshall. When I reached the office on the morning of
Sunday, December the 7th.

On that particular morning I presumably had my break-
fast at about eight, and following the routine that I had
carried out on previous Sundays, I went riding at some
time thereafter.

I think in one of the previous statements I made in
this investigation of Pearl Harbor incidents that I said
I probably rode at 8:30. Discussions with the orderlies
and also evidence that I had seen of other individuals
leads me purely by induction and not by definite memory
to think that I must have ridden later; just what time
I do not know; but between 9 o'clock and the time I went
to the War Department I ate my breakfast, I probably looked
at the Sunday newspapers and I went for a ride.

My recollection beyond that is that while I was taking
a shower, either as I went into the shower or while I was
actually taking a shower, word came to me that Colonel
Bratton had something important and wished to come out to
Fort Myer. I sent word that I was coming to the War Depart-
ment, so I finished my shower, dressed and left for the War
Department.

My average time of taking a shower and dressing would
be about 10 minutes, possibly less. As to what time I
arrived at the War Department is a matter of conjecture; I
have no recollection.

On my arrival there Colonel Bratton handed me those
Page 1108 (continued)

intercepts which included the 14 sections of the Japanese
message, and I started reading them through. You recall
it is a rather lengthy document and of such a nature that
there were portions of it that I read twice.

When I reached the end of the document the next sheet
was the 1 o'clock message of December 7.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message that directed the Ambassadors to
deliver this thing at 1:00 p.m. Sunday to the American
Government?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, that message. That, of course, was
indisputable to me, and all the others who came into the room,
of some very definite action at 1:00 o'clock, because that
1:00 o'clock was Sunday and was in Washington and involved
the Secretary of State, all of which were rather unusual
put together.

I think that I immediately called Admiral Stark on the
phone, and found he had seen the message, and I proposed
a message to our various commanders in the Pacific region,
the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, that is the Panama
Canal, and the west coast, which included Alaska. Admiral
Stark felt that we might confuse them, because we had given
them an alert and now we were adding something more to it.

I hung up the phone, which was the White House phone,
and in longhand wrote out the message. My recollection was
that he called me back. I am told now that the White House
telephone records show that I called him back. I had no
recollection of reading the message to him. I thought, on
the contrary, he called me just as I finished the message,
saving the last sentence.

However, one way or the other, there was a call or
conversation between Stark and myself, the effect of which
was he wished me to add to the message specifically "Show
this to your Naval officers," which I did in longhand.

I then directed Colonel Bratton to take it immediately
to the message center and start it. There was a proposal
then that we have it typed. The decision was there was no
time for typing, and Colonel Bratton left with the message.

On his return I questioned him as to the length of
time involved and I could not make out whether or not he
was talking about the time of encoding as well as the time
of dispatching and the time of receipt, so I sent him back
accompanied by Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of the
immediate details of all Pacific affairs.

They came back and gave me the estimates of the time
of deliveries in these various parts of the world. My
recollection is that I sent at least Colonel Bundy back
again, and I thought Colonel Bratton with him. I believe
others state that there was no third trip. There were
certainly two—my own recollection is there were three.
However that may be, that was the procedure on the dis­
patching of the message.

Mr. Mitchell. Then at least you did read the message and were in
the act of preparing a warning by 11:30 or 11:40?
General Marshall. Yes, sir; 11:40 would be quite evidently the completion of it, because I had it all written except the last sentence.

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer now, as Exhibit 61, a photostat which reads as follows: "December 7, 1941." It is typed.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary, General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army;

And the message is this:

Japanese are presenting at one p.m., Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.


It has the signature of General Gerow on it. Has the committee a copy?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. And the committee will note that underneath it is a record:

"Radios as follows dispatched 11:53 AM, 12-7-41 by Code Room, WDMC."


Mr. Mitchell. And another was dispatched 12:05 to Manila, another one to Hawaii at 12:17; the one to the Caribbean Command is blurred. It looks like 12:00 o'clock, and the one to the Fourth Army at San Francisco at 12:11.

Tuesday, December 11, 1945

General Marshall. Senator, as I recall my testimony and as I recall the events a message came to my quarters as I was taking a shower or getting into a shower after riding that Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house to see me with an important message and I—

Senator Ferguson. Well, then—

Mr. Gesell: Let him finish, please.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Please go ahead and finish your answer.

General Marshall. That Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house, wished to come out to the house with an important message and I sent word that I would come out to the Department and I completed my shower and dressed and I believe I said that would probably take me about 10 minutes and then got in the car and drove down to the Department.
Senator Ferguson. Which, as I understand it, was 7 or 10 more minutes?

General Marshall. I imagine about 7 minutes; yes.

Senator Ferguson. So that would be 17 minutes—


Senator Ferguson. (Continuing.) After you knew that Bratton wanted to get in touch with you—


Senator Ferguson. You received this message?

General Marshall. No, sir. I will say that is all, I think, that—well, you say "this message" meaning what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the 14 parts.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the 1 o'clock.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the destruction of the codes.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So that 17 minutes after you received notice from Bratton as far as you were concerned you received these messages?


Senator Ferguson. And that was on the Sunday morning?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; Sunday morning.
All my shore duty has been spent in my specialty as a cipher expert and radio intelligence expert. I came ashore to assume this duty in charge of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit in May 1936, and remained on that duty until February 15, 1942, at which time I was removed by the orders of Admiral Horne.

I would like to make one statement which may or may not be important, that the Navy completed its distribution of that message, all 14 parts, plus the pilot message, about 3 hours before the Japanese Embassy in Washington called up the State Department and asked for a delay in their appointment with Secretary Hull because they were not ready.
Mr. Richardson. Will you state your full name, please?

Commander Schulz. Lester Robert Schulz.

Mr. Richardson. What was your assignment for duty in Washington during the first week of December?

Commander Schulz. I was under instruction in the Office of Naval Communications for communication intelligence. That was my permanent assignment. However, I was on temporary duty under verbal orders at the White House as a communications assistant to the Naval Aide, then Captain Beardall.

Mr. Richardson. Were you on duty at the White House in Admiral Beardall's office there on the night of December 6, 1941?

Commander Schulz. I was on duty in the White House.

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall Captain Kramer coming to the White House on the evening of December 6 to deliver any papers?

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. Richardson. About what time did he come?

Commander Schulz. Between 9 and 10; I should say about 9:30.

Mr. Richardson. Are you able to state now whether among the papers which were delivered to the President there were this 15 parts or what was eventually the 14-part message?

Commander Schulz. No, sir; I cannot. I did not read the message. I have only learned of its substance through information that has been divulged during this inquiry, from newspapers and so on.

Mr. Richardson. All right. Now, what happened when you delivered these papers to the President? You remained there?

Commander Schulz. Yes, sir; I remained in the room.

Mr. Richardson. What happened?

Commander Schulz. The President read the papers, which took perhaps 10 minutes. Then he handed them to Mr. Hopkins.

Commander Schulz. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance—"I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance—"This means war."
Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear from any source that the Japanese Ambassadors in various places, for instance, here in Washington and in London, were destroying codes, or did you ever hear of it?

Mr. Welles. I recollect that shortly before December 7th an intercept gave an indication that the Japanese Embassy here was instructed to destroy its papers.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall when that was?

Mr. Welles. Well, without referring to a record I could not give you the precise day or time.

Senator Ferguson. Was it prior to the 7th?

Mr. Welles. Prior to the 7th.

Senator Ferguson. What did that signify to you as a diplomat and Under Secretary of State?

Mr. Welles. That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator Ferguson. Did you catch that?

Mr. Welles. That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator Ferguson. Could you say it indicated war?

Mr. Welles. A rupture of diplomatic relations at the very least and under the circumstances then elevating the probability of war.

Mr. Gesell (Chief assistant Counsel). General, will you state for the record your full name and your present rank, and duty, please, sir?

General Miles. Sherman Miles, major general, army of the United States; stationed in Boston, Mass.

Mr. Gesell. You were head of G-2, were you, General, on December 7, 1941?

General Miles. I was, sir.

Mr. Gesell. How long have you had that duty?

General Miles. I reported on May 1, 1940.
Mr. Gesell. "What, in a general way, would you say are the duties and the functions of G-2?"

General Miles. The Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff is charged with the collection, analysis, estimation, dissemination of information primarily for the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.

G-2 is a staff officer of the Chief of Staff, an assistant chief of staff for intelligence.

Mr. Gesell. G-2 is another name for Military Intelligence Division, is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. "May I ask you, General, what significance could properly be attached at this time to the number of messages which we had intercepted from the Japanese in the period from December 1 to December 5 and later indicating that the Japanese were destroying their most secret and confidential codes in Washington and in fact throughout the world?"

General Miles. The inference would be that the Japanese had either planned for the outbreak of war, in other words, planned to initiate a war as they did or feared war coming suddenly though what was described in that message you recently read, a class of arms.

Mr. Gesell. Therefore, the information concerning code burning and destruction was of specific and vital military nature, was it not?

General Miles. It was, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL H. L. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY

Mr. Richardson (General Counsel). Admiral, will you state your name to the reporter, please.


Mr. Richardson. What was your assignment during November and December 1941?

Admiral Ingersoll. I was at that time Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Richardson. Your immediate superior was Admiral Stark?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. "What were your duties generally speaking in that assignment, Admiral?"

Admiral Ingersoll. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations had no duties assigned by law or by Navy regulations. By Executive
order he was a member of the joint board which was the
forerunner of the joint chiefs of staff. As office
regulations prescribed by the chief of naval operations
he had in general supervision of all officers of the Office
of Chief of Naval Operations. I had no original cognizance
of any manner. As a matter of fact I had no office other
then myself. And all heads of sections took up their
questions with me usually before presenting them to the
Chief of Naval Operations.

Once the Chief of Naval Operations had established a
policy, I endeavored then to relieve him of all the load
that I could of the details in carrying out that policy,
in signing papers and releasing dispatched, I kept him
informed of correspondence where I thought there was
something of which he should be informed.

Admiral Ingersoll. - considered that the information which we
received regarding the destruction of the codes and which
was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important
messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations
during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one
being the dispatch stating that, "This is a war warning" in
effect and that all hope of negotiations had broken off.

"Now, the wording in that winds message did not say
that we are going to be in a state of war or that hostilities
now exist. It referred to a rupture of diplomatic negoti­
tiations or that the situation between the countries was
becoming critical.

The importance of the messages regarding the destruction
of the codes is this: If you rupture diplomatic negotiations
you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplo­
mats go home and they can pack up their codes with their
dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic
negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The
consuls stay on.

"Now, in this particular set of dispatched they not only
told their diplomats in Washington and London to burn their
codes but they told their consuls in Manila, in Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Batavia to burn their codes and that did not
mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations, it meant war,
and that information was sent out to the fleets as soon as
we got it and it made no difference whether we ever got an
execute from the winds after that or not, and that is why
I think officers in high positions are vague about it. It
did not make any difference.

J. Gearhart (Representative from California). . . .No the
reason why you knew that the destruction of the codes meant
war and not merely breaking off of negotiations was the
fact that if they were merely breaking off diplomatic
negotiations with us they would not have to destroy their
codes"
Admiral Ingersoll. Correct.

Mr. Gearhart. So that it was a dead tip-off, a foregone conclusion in the estimations of the higher ranking military officers that the order for the destruction of their codes within our areas meant nothing but was?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; and the fact that the consulates were included clinched it in my opinion that it was war and not a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic relations.

Senator Ferguson. But would you say that all Navy men would come to the conclusion that the moment that codes were going to be destroyed that that meant war between the countries?

Admiral Ingersoll. That was what we construed it and I think everybody construed it, that it would mean that.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now you know of no one in the high command in the Navy that construed the destruction of the codes in any other way than you construed them?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think everybody in the Navy department construed the destruction of the codes as the fact that Japan expected to be at war very shortly with the three countries that were involved in that series of messages.

Senator Ferguson. Then we come to this conclusion, that at least on the 4th--I think that is the date they sent the messages out, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. Third or fourth.

Senator Ferguson. Third or fourth, that everyone in the Navy, as far as the high command was concerned, were alerted that war was going to occur between America and Japan?

Admiral Ingersoll. Those instructions were sent to certain commanders, to the commanders of the fleet, to the naval attaches in Peiping and to the Naval detachments and others and the purpose of sending it to them was to inform them that we expected to be at war--or that Japan expected to be at war with those countries in a very short time.

Senator Ferguson. And our country was one of them?

Admiral Ingersoll. And our country was one of them.

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TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALVIN D. KRAHNER, UNITED STATES NAVY

Vol IX
"Extremely urgent." The other one was listed, 907, "Urgent, very important," but this is "Extremely urgent" and I will read it:

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also # 907, 908 and 909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine—

You will notice it says:
the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes.
Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

Now, I will ask you when that message was received and decoded.

Capt. Kramer. I cannot state, sir, from first-hand knowledge when it was received and when it was decoded. I do know that it was not received, or at least seen by me, until about the middle of Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what hour would that be?

Captain Kramer. I believe that this particular one, 91D, which you read, was seen by me first when I returned from my appointment at the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that it was seen at the same time as the 1 o'clock message?

Captain Kramer. That is my recollection, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now I have information here that a 910 and 907—there are two short messages I have just read—was filed in Tokyo on 4:18 a.m. on the 7th of December. This is Exhibit 41. It is page 248 of Exhibit 1. And it was intercepted in Japanese code by the Navy Station at Pearlridge Island, Washington, at 4:35 a.m.

Captain Kramer. It says 4:37.

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Senator Ferguson. You don't know; all right.

Now, let us get to 910, this message about:

Please destroy at once—After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, #908 and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes—

and so forth.
Translator's Notes to "State Secret Outline of Future Diplomatic Measures vis a vis the United States" /

Pencil additions in the Japanese language to original Japanese typescript are shown by underlining.

/1/ Original sentence (partially crossed out) read as follows prior to alterations:

"But for the time being have the two ambassadors as though it were their own opinion continue the negotiations with the United States with the same opinion as has been expressed hitherto in regard to the basic plan."
Pencil additions in the Japanese language to original Japanese typescript are shown by underlining.

/1/ Original sentence (partially crossed out) read as follows prior to alterations:

"But for the time being have the two ambassadors as though it were their own opinion continue the negotiations with the United States, with the same opinion as has been expressed hitherto in regard to the basic plan."
From Nomura to Tōjō
30 November 1941
No. 1222

The newspapers of the 30th reported an address of Premier Tōjō under big headlines, and special importance was attached to the expression therein that the "exploitation" of the Asiatic peoples by the British and Americans "must be purged with a vengeance." Meanwhile, the White House secretary announced, according to the press, that Secretary Hull promptly reported the speech by telephone to the President, who was taking a rest at Warm Springs, and that the President suddenly changed his program and left there in the afternoon of the 30th for Washington, which he was to reach on the morning of the 1st.

As it is feared that the American Government may use the address as material for their propaganda, please take appropriate steps in connection with it and send its text (in Japanese and English) to me promptly.
From Togo to Nomura
1 December 1941
No. 866

Premier Togo's address in question was delivered on the occasion of the meeting, held on 30 November under the auspices of the Koa D5mei, celebrating the anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and China. It was drafted by the administrative office of that organization. The draft was handed to the press at their request in the evening of the 29th, without due inspection by the Premier and other Government authorities, as the 30th was Sunday and there were to be no evening editions.

The Premier in fact delivered no address on the 30th. As regards the draft, the Premier as well as the Government authorities had no knowledge of it. Necessary measures were taken concerning the Koa D5mei.

It is added that the expression in the English translation, "For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance," was in the original Japanese, "For the honor of mankind, and for the pride of mankind, this must be thoroughly rejected." This is for your information.
Statement Handed by the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on December 2, 1931

The so-called speech of Premier Hideki Tojo was originally drafted by members of the office staff of the East Asia Restoration League, a non-governmental organization of which Mr. Tojo happens to be President, as a congratulatory address to be delivered on November 30, on the occasion commemorating the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China, under the auspices of the said League.

However, November 30 happened to be Sunday; the League staff gave out the manuscript to the newspaper reporters upon their request on the night of November 29 (Saturday), before the said draft was examined by either the Premier himself or other Government officials, and this unapproved manuscript was printed in the metropolitan newspapers.

As a matter of fact, the Premier himself made no speech of any kind on the 30th. Moreover, neither the Premier nor other government authorities had any knowledge as to the content of the said speech.

It should further be noted that the reported statement "For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance" is a mistranslation of the original text. There is, in the original text, no such expression as "purge" or "with a vengeance." The correct translation of the statement should be "For the honor and pride of mankind, this sort of practice must be removed."
SENATOR FERGUSON: Now I ask you about a telegram sent by Mr. Winant, our Ambassador to London, dated December 2, 1941, received 10:10 A.M. This was sent to the Secretary of State, personal and secret to the Secretary and the President.

British Admiralty reports that at 3 A.M. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra Li hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.

Do you know why the British Admiralty would be notifying our State Department and the President about these ships if we did not have some agreement in relation to their movement?

MR. WELLES: Because the information given in this telegram, which I remember very well, was a clear indication that the Japanese were already moving further, proceeding further on their course of domination of the Southwest Pacific region.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Would you read the one of the 28th, please?

MR. WELLES (reading):

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning.

The Ambassador began the conversation by saying that he had expected to spend the week end in Philadelphia, but, since he had heard from his Embassy here that his government was "greatly excited," he had returned to Washington. He read to me a telegram from his government which indicated that our naval officials in London had been informed by the Navy Department that the negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken off and that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated, and that consequently precautionary measures must at once be undertaken. The Ambassador inquired whether this was in fact the case. I replied that the situation so far as I knew was exactly as it was last night, namely, that the Japanese Ambassadors had submitted a statement of the position of this Government, handed to them by the Secretary of State, to their government and that no reply from the Government of Japan had as yet been submitted to this Government through them. I said that consequently I could not say technically that the negotiations had been broken off, although it was, of course, the assumption on the part of the Government of the United States that the Japanese Government would not accept the basis proposed by the Government of the United States. I told the Ambassador of the various reports which had reached the Department of State regarding the situation in the Far East today.
上院議員フェルデソシン
さて陸英大使ウィナント氏が送付した昭和十
六年十二月二日の日附で午前十時四十分に受領した電報
に於て之を
"Ex. 2979-Y"
付せられたものです。

九九三頁
（アメリカ合衆国政府印刷局 ワシントン 昭和二十一年）

今朝ロンドン時間で午后三時にカナルベヤ。ポイント合合で二船群が時
間にして十四時間前後にあるタブ万方向に向って除行してゐるのも見ら
れたと英国領事府は報告してゐる。第一船群は、第二船群は、巡洋艦
大隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦大隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦
大隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦
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大隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦
大隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻、巡洋艦十隻
吾々はそれらの艦隊の動向に触れまして報告する為政を決めた際に何らの問題を知つたものか。

ウェルズ氏、本電報に記載されてる情報によれば、私にそれを見ることなく
報告してあるのですか？日本が既に囲幕太平洋方面を支配する方針を
乗り出して、既に進展してあることが明らかだからです。

2
大変は話の出だしに次のように申しました。即ち大使はフィラデルフィアで、

派遣国との間に関連して来た交流は決裂し日本がすすむ行動を開始するのを

と対策されつつすぐに友を始める日本、政連に知らせたと述べた。大使はそれらを文書で

合衆国政府の前に出すように告げた傍らに彼等が到着する範囲内では報にいうことに

の返答は大使を通じてアメリカ合衆国政府に提出されておらないと私は答

した。
従って交渉は決裂したが私は技術的に申すことに出られないと言った。初

続いて両国間の応答を示し、私は合意の表面に出ていたが

となるアメリカ合衆国政府が災害した結果を日本政府が承認しなかったり

というのはアメリカ合衆国政府側の推定であったが、今日の極東情勢に

最後の節である左記の節の内容は次の通りである。昨々の日本大使と大統領及

使は報告しなかったので本内政府は大使には困難であったが

大統領にと大臣は言った。本件に関する報告を私が大使に與えることが出

どうか大使は私に絶対。そこで私は白黒館で行われた会談に関する

長官の意見の内容を大使に教えたのである。
1. My name is Yorio SAWAMOTO. I served in the Navy from November 1908 (Meiji 41) when I graduated from the Naval Academy until September 1945 (Showa 20) when I was relegated to the reserves as a full admiral.

During that period I participated in work connected with naval organization in the capacity of First Section Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry (at the time as a captain) from August 1929 (Showa 4) until November 1932 (Showa 7). Furthermore, I held the following posts in Tokyo during my years of service.

From August 1921 (Taisho 10) until June 1923 (Taisho 12) - Staff of First Section Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry (Lieutenant Commander).

From December 1926 (Taisho 15) until December 1928 (Showa 3) - Staff of First Section, Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry (Commander).

From February 1936 (Showa 11) until November 1937 (Showa 12) - Chief of General Affairs, Bureau of Naval Fleet Activities Headquarters (Rear Admiral).

From April 1941 (Showa 16) until July 1944 (Showa 19) - Navy Vice Minister (Vice Admiral - Full Admiral)

Besides having held the above posts, I served as Commander of the Second China Fleet from October 1940 (Showa 5) until April 1941 (Showa 16).

2. In the Japanese Navy, naval administration fell under the authority of the Navy Minister, while the Chief of the Naval General Staff disposed of matters concerning naval operations. Naval administration and supreme command were classified according to organization. Both the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff were directly subordinate to the Emperor, so that there was no question of the one being superior or subordinate to the other.
The Navy Minister controlled naval administration and supervised all matters concerning naval officers and naval civilians. The office of Navy Minister was that of a civilian official and his appointment and dismissal were decided by a report to the Prime Minister in similar fashion with those of the other ministers. It was customary however for the outgoing Navy Minister to nominate a successor and recommend him to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, acting on his recommendation, then took the usual procedure of appointment.

The appointment of the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau followed the same procedure as those of the other Bureau Chiefs of the Navy Ministry and the Navy Minister had complete control of same.

The Navy Ministry was composed of the Navy Minister, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Vice Minister, Councillors, the Ministerial Secretariat, the Naval Affairs Bureau, the Mobilization Bureau, the Personnel Bureau, the Educational Bureau, the Bureau of Stores, the Medical Bureau, the Bureau of Accounts and Supplies and the Judicial Affairs Bureau. The Naval Parliamentary Vice-Administrator, Vice Minister and Councillors and the Ministerial Secretariat were similar to the corresponding offices of the other ministries.

The Naval Affairs Bureau handled affairs touching naval administration in general, naval armaments, national defense policy, international regulations, general public relation issues, dissemination of naval knowledge, etc.

The Mobilization Bureau supervised affairs concerning general despatch preparations, national mobilization, supplementing of arms and munitions, sea and land installations and equipment, mobilization of munitions industries, affairs concerning material and resources, shipping port facilities, port service and transportation and protection of trade and labor.

The Personnel Bureau supervised affairs relative to general personnel appointment, dismissal and replacement of officers and special service officers, conferment of rank and honors, pensions,
relief (support), calling out and war time mobilization of naval officers, men and civilians and the drafting of enlisted men, etc.

The Educational Bureau controlled general education and training of the Navy, acceptance into service of naval students, education of naval reserves, education of extra-naval personnel engaged in maritime pursuits, etc.

The Bureau of Stores supervised preparation, preservation and supply of requisites for warship management (equipment, consumption goods) fuel, lubrication oil, clothing, food, etc., as also the regulations and technical knowledge concerning these various items.

The Medical Affairs Bureau controlled medical affairs and sanitation of the Navy and all education concerning same.

The Bureau of Accounts and Supplies handled accounts and finance, budget and settlement of accounts and affairs concerning national property, wage contracts, and original cost calculations.

The Judicial Affairs Bureau controlled the various regulations concerning naval judicial affairs, the judicial police and military prosecution.

The various bureau chiefs were appointed by the Navy Minister and their duties were to have their respective bureaus completely in hand and to direct and supervise the work of the divisions and sections of their bureaus.

5. The Naval General Staff disposed of affairs relative to national defense logistics. The Chief of the Naval General Staff was under the direct command of the Emperor and participated in the secrets of the Imperial War Council and controlled the Naval General Staff.

6. As above shown, the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff were organs of different character, though they possessed various common aspects as well.

For example, naval strength was planned by the Naval General Staff as it constituted the basis of operational planning, but the Navy Ministry demanded the budget and the equipment of military strength was conducted by the Ministry. Hence in planning naval
The actual procedure was for the Chief of the Naval General Staff to plan affairs concerning naval strength and to discuss the same with the Navy Minister. The Chief of the Naval General Staff consulted the Navy Minister on the important items of supplementing of naval strength, despatch preparations and national defense logistics while the Navy Ministry discussed expenditure necessary for the execution of these measures with the Naval General Staff. Further, planning and execution of operations were under exclusive charge of the Naval General Staff, so that the Navy Ministry could have no part therein. Consequently, it was impossible for the Navy Ministry to discuss the pros and cons of operation plans. But depending on the circumstances relative to preparations for operations for which the Navy Ministry was responsible, the Naval General Staff might be forced to change its plans of its own accord.

In the event of war or of hostilities (incidents), if necessity demanded, the Imperial General Headquarters was established. In face of the China Incident, the Imperial General Headquarters was established in November 1937 and was continued throughout the Pacific War. The Imperial General Headquarters was composed of the Supreme Command organs of the Army and Navy, and its internal organization was clearly divided into the two departments of the Army and Navy. The Chiefs of the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff were both Chiefs of Staff and of equal rank and were the highest responsible persons for the operations of their respective forces. Consequently the responsibilities of their work were clearly divided. Those organizations related to the Army and Navy were respectively called the Imperial General Headquarters Army Division and the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Division.

In other words, the Imperial General Headquarters was composed of an Army Division and a Navy Division. However, the Army and Navy Staff Division which formed the nucleus of the Imperial General
Headquarters were actually the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff respectively, and the two were completely independent of each other. Consequently, in the execution of duties, on operations which concerned both the Army and the Navy, joint discussions and exchanges of information were effected; but on matters which did not concern both branches, there were no consultations, and orders were issued and executed independently. There were two types of Imperial General Headquarters orders - the "Imperial General Headquarters Army Order" and the "Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order" - those related to the Army belonging to the former category, and those related to the Navy forming the latter.

Even when the Imperial General Headquarters was established, as there were no special buildings or offices for it, the Naval General Staff became the Imperial General Headquarters, Naval Division, and a board reading Imperial General Headquarters Naval Division was placed alongside the Naval General Staff sign. When the Imperial General Headquarters were established, the Navy Minister had an office in the Headquarters but he did not thereby become an officer on its staff. Neither did the Navy Ministry thereby become an organ of the Imperial General Headquarters. It goes without saying that the Navy Minister was subordinate to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, who was the Chief of Staff of Imperial General Headquarters for the Navy because of this set-up.

The presence of the Navy Minister in the Imperial General Headquarters was for the purpose of controlling the various naval affairs connected with operations. Consequently, though the Navy Minister was able to attend the Imperial General Headquarters conferences, he had no voice in the proceedings as a general rule.

Important naval operations were planned and put into execution at the Imperial General Headquarters according to the following procedure. The senior officer of the First Division of the Staff of the Naval Division of the Imperial General Headquarters drafted the plan. After passing in order from the First Section Chief, the First Division Chief and the Vice Chief of the Headquarters, the
Chief submitted it to the Emperor for approval. After the sanction had been granted, orders were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet or to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Fleets and dependent on the nature of the issue, to the commanders of naval and minor naval stations. Consequently, the Navy Minister did not participate in operations plans.

Commanders-in-Chief were allocated to fleets, naval and minor naval stations.

Commanders-in-Chief of fleets were under the direct orders of the Emperor and assumed command of the Fleet and supervised fleet duties.

Commanders-in-Chief of naval and minor naval stations were under direct orders of the Emperor and controlled defense of their allotted defense sectors and despatch preparations within their sphere of jurisdiction.

The several Commanders-in-Chief received orders from the Navy Minister in matters pertaining to naval administration and instructions from the Chief of the Naval General Staff on matters concerning operational plans.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet directed the fleets under his command but in matters of naval administration, in items other than those immediately related to the command of the Combined Fleet, the Commanders-in-Chiefs of the several fleets received instructions direct from the Navy Minister.

The same applied to the case of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleets.

It was ruled that administration in occupied areas was to be controlled by the several commanders-in-chief under the orders of the Navy Minister. The Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief did not participate in the above administration.
On this 4th day of August, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: SAWAMOTO, Yorio  (seal)

I, SAWAMOTO, Yorio hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro  (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAWAMOTO, Yorio  (seal)
昭和十六年（一九四一年）四月より同十九年（一九四四年）七月まで

四月までの第二遣支艦隊司令長官は、昭和十五年に上陸をしたことにあたる

日本海軍では軍政は海軍大臣の権利に隠し制限は軍令部総長の権理

する所であって軍政及び制限は制度上区分されている。

海上大臣及び軍令部総長は各々天皇に直属していえ大臣と総長との間に上下の関

係はない。

海上大臣は海軍軍政を管理し、海軍軍人軍属を統制し所管の諸部を監

督する。

海軍大臣の地位（ポスト）は文官であり他の各省大臣と同様内閣総

理大臣が奏上して任官するものであるが、実際上の慣例として前

任の海軍大臣が後任の海軍大臣を選任し院議大臣はその
軍務局長の補佐は他の海軍省の同長の補職とその手数は同様である。

軍務局長の補佐は他の海軍省の同長の補職とその手数は同様である。

海軍省は大臣、政務次官、次官、参議官及び大臣官房、軍務局、兵備
幌の人事局、教育局、軍需局、口務局、財務局、法務局よりなる

海軍政務次官、次官、参議官及び大臣官房は他の各省と同様である

軍務局に於ては海軍軍需、財務政令、国際規約、一級海軍軍政、一
級書外事項、海軍軍務官及び等に関する事務を掌る

軍務局に於ては海軍軍務官及び等に関する事務を掌る

人事局に於ては人事一括、士官、特務士官等の任免補職、彼位、敘
勤、恩給、海軍軍人軍属の拔任召役、現時充職、兵の徴募等に関す
る事務を掌る
教育局には、海軍の教育訓練及び、海軍生徒の採用、海軍授勲員の教育等の事務等に関する事務を掌る経理局、法務局に於ては会計経理、財政決算、財産等に関する事務を掌る内務局、海軍部外海軍関係員の教育等の事務を掌る職務に於ては教養品（備品・消耗品等）燃料、潤滑油、被服、量食等の準備保管供給に関する事及び等に関する規程、技術等に関する事務を掌る技術等に関する事務を掌る警備監督局に於ては海軍法務関係諸規則、軍事司法制度及び軍事検察及び海軍検察に関する事務を掌る。
いつは軍令部は自発的に計量を受けてきざるを得ないこととなる。戦時下は事前に要して必要に応じ大本営を設置されることがある。大本営は陸軍及び海軍の統帥機関から洋戦争中にもこれが編練された。大本営は陸軍及び海軍の統帥機関から

参謀本部に一九三七年十一月支部前後において大本営が設置される大本

成っていてその内部の組織は陸軍、海軍に確然と二分されている。参

謀本部に一九三七年十一月支部前後において大本営が設置される太平

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洋戦争中にもこれが編練された。大本営は陸軍及び海軍の統帅
海軍に関するものは後者である。又大本営が設置されている場合、海軍大臣は大本営海軍部長となリ軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板にあつた職ではなく軍令部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板にあつた職ではなく軍令部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本営海軍部がそのまま大本営海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がそのまま大本善海軍部となり軍令部の看板と並んで大本善海軍部がまま
海軍大臣は関与はしない

艦隊司令長官及び横須賀府には司令長官を置いている。

艦隊司令長官は海軍に直属し艦隊を統率し防備を統督している。

海軍大臣の指揮を受ける。

各司令長官の所属事項は部隊長の指示を受けている。

連合艦隊司令長官は下艦隊を統率するが軍政に関しては海軍大臣の指揮を受ける。

占領地の行政に関しては司令長官が海軍大臣の命を受けずを除る。
昭和三十二年（一九四七年）八月四日

右

同日

於

立會人

小野 清一郎

供述者

澤本 頭雄

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(署名)

（捺印）

本 頼雄
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Second Demobilization Office of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese and English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Chart of the Ordnance of the Imperial Japanese Navy" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Govern. ent (Second Demobilization Office of the Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 1st day of August 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness,

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: ONO, Seitaro (seal)
INTERI.EL ORDINANCES CONCERNING THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE FLEET (SHIPS)

(Gunrei-Kai No. 10, Nov. 30, 1941)

Art. 2. A fleet shall be divided into squadrons as the occasion may
demands.

A squadron shall be composed of the following: two or more battle-
ships; a battleship and a destroyer division, submarine division,
transport division, two or more destroyers, two or more submarines,
two or more gunboats, two or more escorts, two or more transports
or air groups; a portion of these without a battleship; or two or
more air groups; when it is composed of aircraft carriers,
seaplane carriers, flying cor., destroyer divisions, submarine
division, gunboat divisions, escort divisions, transport divisions,
destroyers, submarines, transports etc., it shall be customarily
known as the air squadron, destroyer squadron, submarine squadron,
transport squadron etc.

When the occasion demands, a squadron may include destroyer
division, minesweeper division, sub-chaser division, patrol
ships, etc., or have independent floating unit attached to it.

Depending upon the manner of its organization, a squadron
shall be known as the First Squadron, Second Air Squadron, Third
Destroyer Flotilla, Fourth Submarine Flotilla, Fifth Transport
Squadron etc.

Art. 4. The Combined Fleet shall have a commander-in-chief.
Each fleet may have either a commander-in-chief or a commandant.
A squadron shall have a commandant. But in the case of Article 30 below, this post may be omitted.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, commander-in-chief of the fleets and the commandant of an independent fleet shall be direct imperial appointees.

Art. 10. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, directly subordinate to the Emperor, shall command the Combined Fleet and superintend affairs relating to the fleet. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall receive orders from the Minister of the Navy as regards administrative affairs and directions from the Chief of the Navy General Staff as regards the planning of war operations.

Art. 11. The commander-in-chief of a fleet, directly subordinate to the Emperor, shall command the fleet under him and direct affairs of his fleet. The commander-in-chief of a fleet shall receive orders from the Minister of the Navy as regards administrative affairs and directions from the Chief of the Navy General Staff as regards the planning of war operations.

Art. 31. The Commanders-in-Chief of the fleets or the commandant of an independent fleet under the Combined Fleet shall be commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.
Art. 32. Of these duties relating to the commanders-in-chief of
the fleets, those pertaining to military command shall be appli-
cable to the Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

Art. 33. The commandant of an independent fleet shall be directly
subordinate to the Emperor, and those provisions pertaining to
fleet commanders-in-chief shall be applicable to him, regarding
his official powers.

Art. 34. The commandant of a squadron shall be subordinate to a
fleet commander-in-chief. He shall hold and command the squadron
or a portion of it under him and shall perform his duties in
accordance with the provisions as set forth in articles 12, 16,
17, 18, 19, 26 and 27.

The commandant of a squadron directly commanded by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet or the com-
mander-in-
chief of a fleet shall perform his duties as ordered by the
said commander-in-chief.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHI, Tokyo, who occupy the post of Chief of Archives, Section, Second Demobilization Office, Demobilization Department, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Imperial Ordinance Concerning the Organization" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Second Demobilization Office, Demobilization Department).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 19 day of May, 1947

/3/ YOSHI, Tokyo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /3/ IWABEI, Shinju (seal)
ARTICLES REGARDING BUSINESS CONTACT BETWEEN NAVAL MINISTRY AND NAVAL GENERAL STAFF (1933 No. 264 Oct. 1, 1933)

Art. 1. The rules below provided govern the manner in which affairs will be dealt with that are interrelated between the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff.

Art. 2. When the Imperial Supreme Headquarters is not established though the nation is at war, interrelated affairs will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Wartime Imperial Supreme Headquarters Service Regulations besides the Rules Herein provided.

Art. 3. As regards the scale of military strength the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft and seek the decision or approval of the throne after negotiation with the Minister of the Navy.

Art. 4. As for the following matters, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy, seek the Imperial sanction, and then transmit them to related Imperial armed forces as well as notifying the Minister of the Navy. In case the Minister of the Navy sees some necessity regarding the despatch of naval forces, he will propose negotiations with the Chief of the Naval General Staff in that connection.

1. The strategical despatch of armed forces, and the duties and movements thereof.
b. The tactical and strategical duties and movements of fleets.

c. The despatch of armed forces for protective purposes overseas, and the strategical and tactical duties and movements thereof.

Art. 5. As for the following matters, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy, seek the Imperial sanction, and then transmit them to appropriate quarters as well as notifying the Minister of the Navy:

a. Order of battle in time of war.
b. Military manoeuvres and exercises, both major and minor.
c. The basic models and principles on tactics and logistics for the use of naval forces at war.

Art. 6. Concerning the following matters, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy, seek the Imperial sanction, and then transfer them to the Minister of the Navy, who will in turn put them into execution:

a. Peacetime organization of fleets and flying units.
b. Organizations of destroyer flotillas, submarine flotillas, torpedo-boat units, minesweeper divisions, flying units, landing parties, etc.
c. Regulations governing the Fleet Manoeuvres; and the 
Regulations governing the Naval Manoeuvres.
d. The Rules governing the Succession of Military Command 
and like matters.

Art. 7. As for the following matters, the "Minister of the 
Navy will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Chief 
of the Naval General Staff, and put them into execution; 
In the case of matters which require the Imperial sanction, 
the Chief of the Naval General Staff shall seek it or them 
and transfer them to the "Minister of the Navy for execu-
tion. In spite of the above the Chief of the Naval General 
Staff shall propose the negotiation to the "Minister of the 
Navy when he sees the necessity:

a. Despatch of naval forces, and the duties and movements 
thereof, excepting those provided for in Article 4 
above.
b. The commissioning of naval combat vessels, and the 
change of service status thereof.
c. The administrative allocation of naval combat vessels 
among various naval stations regarding the maintenance 
and manning thereof.

Art. 8. As for the following matters, the "Minister of the 
Navy will make a draft, conduct negotiations with the Chief 
of the Naval General Staff, seek the Imperial sanction when
necessary, and put them into execution; but the Chief of
the Naval General Staff will propose the negotiation to
the minister of the navy when he sees the necessity:
   a. The establishment of the permanent organization of
      naval forces and schools, and the fixing of the
      standard personnel thereof.
   b. The appointment of staff officers.
   c. Standard instructions and rules concerning the exercise
      of naval arts, and the handling of weapons.

Art. 9. Concerning specially ordered inspections the Chief
of the Naval General Staff will conduct negotiations
with the Minister of the Navy, and the Minister of
the Navy will seek the Imperial sanction concerning
them.

Art. 10. As for the various important establishment relating
   to the strengthening of naval armament, to the preparation
   for war, and to the rational defense and to the use of
   armed forces, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will
   conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy.

Art. 11. As for the following matters, the Chief of the
   Naval General Staff will make a draft and transfer it to
   the Minister of the Navy:
   a. The Various Regulations concerning "wartime Communi-
      cations and the "Wartime Communication Regulations."
necessary, and put them into execution; but the Chief of the Naval General Staff will propose the negotiation to the minister of the navy when he sees the necessity:

a. The establishment of the permanent organization of naval forces and schools, and the fixing of the standard personnel thereof.
b. The appointment of staff officers.
c. Standard instructions and rules concerning the exercise of naval arts, and the handling of weapons.

Art. 9. Concerning specially ordered inspections the Chief of the Naval General Staff will conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy, and the Minister of the Navy will seek the Imperial sanction concerning them.

Art. 10. As for the various important establishments relating to the strengthening of naval armament, to the preparation for war, and to the rational defense and to the use of armed forces, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will conduct negotiations with the Minister of the Navy.

Art. 11. As for the following matters, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will make a draft and transfer it to the Minister of the Navy:

a. The Various Regulations concerning "wartime Communications and the "wreck Communication Regulations."

Art. 12. As for the necessary expenditures for the various important establishments relating to the strengthening of naval armament, to the preparations for war, to the national defense and to the use of armed forces, consultation will be made by the Ministry of the Navy with the Naval General Staff.

Art. 13. As for matters affecting the strength of armed forces such as the installation of ships' armament and selections of types thereof and important establishments on land and sea, and as for matters concerning important research and experiment on the above, consultation will be made between the Ministry of the Navy and the Naval General Staff.

Art. 14. As for the reports and the like materials related to education and training, to research and experiment, and to important missions, investigations will be made jointly by the Ministry of the Navy and the Naval General Staff.

Art. 15. After consultation with the Chief of the Naval General Staff, the Minister of the Navy will give instructions on administrative matters to the naval attaches and assistant naval attaches detailed to the Japanese embassies and legations abroad.
Def. Doc. № 1647

Art. 16. As for matters involving monetary expenditure such as the intelligence service, fleet manoeuvres, operations of naval vessels, or the compilation of books, the Chief of the Naval General Staff will draw up a plan and institute negotiations with the Minister of the Navy.

Art. 17. As for the matters concerning discipline and morals, education and training, and other important military affairs and various regulations related to the national defense and the use of armed forces, in addition to those provided in the various articles stated above, the Minister of the Navy will keep close contact with the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Yosuii, michinori, who occupy the post of The Chief of the Archives of the 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Rules Governing Business Contact between Naval Ministry and Naval General Staff" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The 2nd Demobilization Section).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 19th day of May, 1947

Yosuii, michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: shii, shinji (seal)
第八〜九

海軍大臣及

陸海軍大臣

第十〜十一

電信電話関係

第五〜六

陸海軍大臣

第七〜八

陸海軍大臣

第十二〜十三

陸海軍大臣

第十三〜十四

陸海軍大臣

第十四〜十五

陸海軍大臣

第十五〜十六

陸海軍大臣

第十六〜十七

陸海軍大臣

第十七〜十八

陸海軍大臣

第十八〜十九

陸海軍大臣

第十九〜二十

陸海軍大臣

第二十〜二十ー

陸海軍大臣

第二十一〜二十二

陸海軍大臣

第二十二〜二十三

陸海軍大臣

第二十三〜二十四

陸海軍大臣
ORDINANCE CONCERNING COMBINED NAVAL FLYING CORPS. (EXCEPT)

(Naval General Staff order no. 17,)
Dec. 10, 1938.

Art. 1. Combined Naval Flying Corps shall be composed of two or more air groups each, shall be known as the First Combined Naval Flying Corps, Second Combined Naval Flying Corps, etc.

Other naval units, afloat or ashore, may be attached to a Combined Naval Flying Corps when such necessity arises.

Art. 2. A Combined Naval Air Command shall be composed of two or more Combined Naval Flying Corps.

Art. 4. The Combined Naval Air Command shall have a Commdant. The Commdant directly subordinate to the throne, shall command the Combined naval air command under him. He shall also be in charge of naval administration subject to orders from the Minister of the Navy.

"With regard to the planning of operations, the commdant shall receive directions from the Chief of the Naval General Staff."
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michiaki, who occupy the post of Chief of Document Section, the Second Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, hereby certify that the document hereunto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of one part, and entitled "Ordinance Concerning Combined Naval Flying Corps," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 12th day of May, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michiaki (signature)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereunto in the presence of the witness:

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /s/ HAYASHI, Shin'ichi (signature)
第二条

海軍聯合航空隊八海軍航空隊二隊以上ヲ以テヲ構成スル。
右署名略印ハ自名ノ前ニ於テ為セラタリ

昭和二十二年五月十九日
於東京

会人
宗
宮
信
次

次

自分ノ描畫ヲ替ヲ為シテ

令拔萃ト題スル著述ハ日本語ノ依ツテハ

ヨリ成ル海軍職合航空除

文書ノ抜萃ノ正確ニシテ原案ナルヲナルコトナシ

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Laws and Ordinances Concerning the Organization of Naval Stations. (Excerpt)
(Naval General Staff Order Aug. 23, 1912)

Art. 1. There shall be established a naval station in every naval port. Each naval station shall be called by the name of the respective naval port where the naval station is located.

Art. 2. The naval stations shall deal with defense and security measures of the respective naval districts under their jurisdictions, as well as the various naval preparations for war delegated to them, and shall supervise various offices and departments attached to them.

Art. 3. Naval Stations shall be commanded by their respective Commanders-in-Chief. The Commanders-in-Chief shall be appointed by His Majesty the Emperor.

Art. 4. The Commanders-in-Chief shall be directly subordinate to the throne and shall be in command of their respective subordinate armed units, both afloat and ashore. They shall also deal with administrative matters as directed by the minister of the navy. In matters concerning the planning of war operations, they shall be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Art. 5. The Commanders-in-Chief shall direct all the affairs of their respective naval stations, and shall supervise and superintend the discipline and morals as well as education and training of their respective subordinate...

Art. 11. The Commanders-in-Chief are empowered to direct the military police stationed in their respective naval districts as regards the enforcement of the Fortified Zone Law and the Regulations Concerning both Regular and auxiliary Naval Ports.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Yoshii, Ichinori, who occupy the post of Chief of the Second

Section, the Second De-mobilization Bureau, De-mobilization Board, hereby

certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting

of 2 pages and entitled "Order for Ordinances Concerning the Organization of

Naval Stations," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document

in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd. De-mobilization Bureau, De-mobili-

zation Board).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 12th day of May, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Ichinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed

herein in the presence of the witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /s/ MINAGIYA, Shinji. (seal)
ART. 1. Auxiliary naval stations shall be established at all auxiliary naval ports (excluding the Tojuyama and beko auxiliary naval ports). Each auxiliary naval station shall be known by the name of the locality in which it is situated.

ART. 2. An auxiliary naval station shall deal with matters relating to defense and police measures of the patrol area under its jurisdiction as well as the preparations for war delegated to it, and shall, supervise various offices and departments attached to it.

ART. 3. Each auxiliary naval station shall have a commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief shall be appointed by His Majesty the Emperor.

ART. 5. The commander-in-chief shall be directly subordinate to the Emperor and shall be in command of all naval forces, afloat or ashore, under him. He shall also be in charge of naval administration subject to orders from the Minister of the Navy.

With regard to the planning of war operations, the commander-in-chief shall be directed by the Chief of the Navy General Staff.

ART. 10. The commander-in-chief shall direct affairs pertaining to his naval station and superintend the discipline, morals, education and training of his subordinates.

ART. 15. The commander-in-chief is empowered to direct the military police stationed in his district as regards the enforcement of the Fortified Zone Law and the Regulations concerning Police, Regular and Auxiliary Naval Forces.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOJI MICHINORI, who occupy the post of Chief of the Document Section, the 2nd, Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, hereby certify that document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 25 pages and entitled "Laws and Ordinances Concerning the Organization of Military Naval Station. (Excerpt)," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board.)

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 19th day of May, 1947

/YOJI MICHINORI (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ HIROMIYAMA SHINJI (seal)
各要項（関山要項及び関公要項・除外）に準じて実施スル。
文部省<br>出関勧告<br>成立ニ関スル件<br><br>自分＝文部省ハ従来ノ第二勧告局ノ文書ヲ撰次ヲ依ケルカルカル＝ヘテ＝ヨリカレ＝ノ文書ヲ備＝ナルノヲ於<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認<br>＜添付＝テラレタル日本政府＝向＝前＝第二勧告局＝於＝テ＝カレ＝ノ頁ヨリ成ル＝ノ文書＝備＝ナルノヲ認
Def. Doc. No. 1928

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Opponent: SHIMIZU, Mitsumi

Having first duly sworn and as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose as follows.

1. My Name is SHIMIZU, Mitsumi. I am a former Vice-Admiral of the Japanese Navy. I occupied the following posts in connection with personnel affairs during the 36 years of my naval service.

   From December 1923 till December 1924
   (Lieutenant Commander)
   Staff officer of the Education Bureau, Navy Ministry. Naval Cadets Selection Committee member.

   From December 1931 till April 1934 (Captain)
   1st Section Chief of the Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry.

   From December 1936 till December 1938 (Rear-Admiral)
   Chief of Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry.

2. All Naval personnel affairs were handled by the Navy Minister.
3. Although a naval officer was appointed to the post of Navy
Minister, he was considered a civilian official from the stand-
point of the Government system. Hence his appointment and dismis-
sal were determined by a Report to the Throne made by the Prime
Minister as in the case of other cabinet ministers. In the event
of change of the Navy Minister, it was customary for the Premier
to request the outgoing Minister of the Navy to recommend his
successor and the latter to name an appropriate candidate from
among the officers of the Navy.

4. The appointment of staff officers, officers who were very clo-
sely connected with the Chief of Naval General Staff and the Naval
General Staff, was decided by the Minister of the Navy after Con-
sultation with the Chief of Naval General Staff. In cases where
Imperial sanction was required, the Minister of the Navy directly
reported to the Throne for same without approaching the Cabinet.

5. The appointment of the Vice-Minister of the Navy and of the
various Bureau Chiefs of the Navy Ministry was conducted as follows.
The Personnel Bureau Chief after considering various qualification
such as personality and ability would select three most promising
candidates, numbering them in order of merit and would submit the
list to the Minister of the Navy. Whereupon, the latter would
decide on the one which he believed was most suited to the office.

In the selection of the several Bureau Chiefs the opinion of
the Vice-Minister was taken into consideration besides the plan
of the Chief of the Personnel Bureau.
6. It was customary to appoint Commander-in-Chief of Fleets and of Minor Naval Stations simultaneously with the regular annual personnel shifts in December. The regular personnel appointments were decided by the Minister of the Navy through selection of an Appointment Plan tentatively drafted by the Chief of Personnel Bureau.

Special consideration was given in the selection of Naval school instructions and others in educational posts, people with abundant common-sense and sublime personalities being chosen for these posts.

7. According to the Service Table regulations, the commanders of each unit were responsible for the preparation of a service table of his subordinate officers and the submission of same to the Minister of the Navy through their superior officers of the direct line of command, every August. The Chief of the Personnel Bureau kept in custody and adjusted these service tables, and being kept fully informed on details of the personalities and abilities of all the officers of the Navy, drafted and submitted to the Minister of the Navy the Personnel Change Plan of all Naval officers on the principle of just and non-partisan choice of the right man for the right post. The Minister of the Navy passing his decision on the basis of this plan would result in the issuing of the appointment orders.

9. Selection for promotion of officers was handled with special care; a promotion conference being held each year in autumn to decide promotions. This Promotion conference was attended by all
the commanders-in-Chief of Fleets, Minor Naval stations and important ports and by the admirals designated by the Minister of the Navy (Fleet admirals, Members of the War Council, Vice-Admiral of the Navy, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff, Chief of Naval Technical Department, Chief of the Department of Naval Aeronautics, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, Chief of Personnel Bureau, Chief of Educational Bureau, etc.) The Minister of the Navy presided the conference, and after serious deliberation and on the principle of fairness selection for promotion of all Naval officers was conducted. The results were published in the early part of December.


Utilising only the above mentioned carefully prepared service tables and based on the aim of choosing the right man for the right job, fairly and without bias, all appointments were the result of careful selection and there was no opportunity given for the formation of factions or cliques.

10. It was perceived that from about the time of the Manchurian Incident a very small group of young naval officers, dissatisfied with the times were beginning to harbor revolutionary ideas and were seen to move in a direction contrary to the soldiers' code.

The Navy never for a moment relaxed vigilance of this trend. Most unfortunately however, the disgraceful incident known as the May 15th Incident occurred in the May of 1932. At the time, the Navy fearing that to leave officers who harbored such thoughts on the
active list would not only undermine the discipline of the Force, but would in the long run jeopardize the very existence of the sa. and endanger the State, decided to act with a firm hand. Hence it relogated some 30 off officers to the reserves who were found to be sympathizers of the young officers involved in the incident. Simultaneously the Minister of the Navy issued instructions to all officers of the Navy to abide respectfully by the Imperial Edict to the Armed Forces and not to participate in politics. With the approval of the Minister of the Naval and in place of the personnel Bureau Chief who was absent due to illness, I issued instructions to the Navy as a whole at the Chief of Staff's conference immediately after the incident, the gist of which is as follows: "If there is any officer who now wishes to take part in politics, let him lay down his sword, leave active service and follow his inclination. However versatile a genius he may be, let him leave the active lists at once."

As the result of further investigations, it has however been confirmed that there exist neither written evidence of the above Navy Minister's instruction nor of my Oral statement made in my capacity as 1st Section Chief of the Personnel Bureau in the absence of the Personnel Bureau Chief.

On this 24 day of July, 1947
At Tokyo

DEPOMAK SHIIZU, Mitsumi (seal)
Def. Doc. No. 1926

I, TAKIGAWA, Masajiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) TAKIGAWA, Mitsumi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SHIMIZU, Mitsumi (seal)
Chapter 2. Promotion of Officers and Special Service Officers.

Article 10. The promotion to higher ranks of the officers of any branch on or above the rank of captain shall be made according to the consideration of the Throne.

Article 11. As for the promotion of the officers of any branch on or below the rank of commander, the candidates and their priorities shall be decided in the promotion council, subject to the final review of confirmation by the Throne. However, in time of war, in time of quasi-war, or in time of other urgency, the decision of the promotion council may be dispensed with. In promotion council the Navy Minister shall sit in the chair; its members shall be composed of the Chief of Naval General Staff, various Commanders-in-Chief, Commander of a Fleet which is not headed by Commander-in-Chief, and other ex-officio admirals as designated by the Navy Minister. The admirals designated by the Navy Minister shall attend only such Promotion councils as the Navy Minister approves. The Navy Minister may exempt...
Commanders-in-Chief or Fleet Commanders stationed at far-flung localities from attending the meeting. In case the Navy Minister is prevented from sitting in the chair owing to an accident, the admiral topmost in seniority shall act in his behalf.

In the case of Special Service Officers, the candidates for Promotion and their priority shall be decided by the Navy Minister.

Article 12. (Deleted together with the rest).
I, **YOSHI, Michinori**, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Excerpt from Imperial Ordinance Concerning Naval Officer Promotion" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau),
certified at Tokyo,
on this 2 day of June, 1947

/S/ YOSHI, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ **TAKABE, Masajiro** (seal)
Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Shikazo YANO. I was formerly a Vice Admiral in the Japanese Navy with thirty years of naval service. After graduating from the Naval Academy in December 1915 I held various positions including that of Staff Member of the Personnel Bureau of the Navy Ministry, instructor at the Naval Staff College, First Section Chief, Educational Bureau, Navy Ministry and from November 1942 until 1944 I held the office of Educational Bureau Chief of the Navy Ministry supervising naval education.

2. I have been informed that the Indictment in this case charges that the educational system of the Navy, as well as other branches of the Government, were used to inculcate a spirit of totalitarianism, aggression, desire for war, cruelty and hatred of potential enemies. Because this is so completely erroneous, I wish to state as best I can without going into details, the general type of educational matters presented officers and potential officers at the Naval Schools.

3. Besides elaborate and well designed courses on international law, taught both in the schools and even in the midst of fleet duties, there were other subjects which were calculated to mold the character and personality of the potential officer. In the first place, great care was taken in the selection of instructors. These men were thoroughly investigated and were required to possess well rounded personalities and moderate and mature judgment.
Subjects designed to promote the individuality of the student were given with the consequent result that any subject which would result in a belief in totalitarianism and the like would be diametrically opposed to the educational tradition of the Navy.

4. Since the aim of naval education was the cultivation of the man before the soldier, lectures on morals, psychology and philosophy were delivered toward the end of training the individual to be a model citizen on the basis of reasoning that a good soldier made a good citizen. There was no suggestion of advocacy of teachings of cruelty and hatred of potential enemies or the desire for war. The basic educational policy of the Navy was respectful abidance by the Imperial Edict issued to the Army and Navy with the accompanying interpretation based on the spirit of "Bushido" which was the code of morals hitherto prevailing among the Samurai Class.

Freedom of religion was taught and of course permitted. Therefore, it was possible to be a member of any religious faith and at the same time to be a naval officer. There were no special religious phrases or slogans, for this reason, adopted as educational slogans by the Navy. There was no restraint therefore upon the right of a student to individual thinking.

5. While the academic subjects of the naval schools followed closely the teachings of those of other countries relative to practical subjects, the Academy laid special stress on four cardinal principles which were loyalty, courtesy, valor and fidelity as indicated in the Imperial Edict. Instructions on each of these were constantly given. Among officers of the Japanese Navy and following historically the practice adopted and patterned after the British Navy, it was the standing tradition that the Japanese Navy and its personnel must at all times observe gentlemanly behavior.

In short, the educational policy of the Japanese Navy was reverend abidance by the Imperial Rescript and the embodiment of "Bushido." It laid special stress on the observance of justice and humanity and non-transgression of international law. It would be difficult to imagine that either a cursory or thorough study of the subjects
taught or the method used in teaching at the naval schools were susceptible of an interpretation of totalitarianism, aggression, desire for war, cruelty and hatred of potential enemies.
DEPONENT: YANO, Shikazo

I, YANO, Shikazo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) TAKIGAWA, Sei'iro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YANO, Shikazo (seal)
Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Kondo, Shunsuke. I live in Tokyo. I served as Chief of the Nanyo-Cho or the South Seas Bureau from April 1940 to November 1943. My headquarters during that period were on the Island of Palau. Some years before I took over the above position a so-called 10-year plan for the development of the Mandated Islands was commenced. It envisioned the construction of harbors, aviation facilities, light houses, wireless stations, meteorological stations, roads and fisheries facilities. These facilities were not in contemplation of war nor were they considered as either fortifications or military installations by the Bureau. They were actually necessities and of great cultural and commercial value to Japan in furthering the development of the Islands.

2. The harbor work at Palau, Saipan, and Truk consisted of opening up the coral reefs, construction of wharves, erection of light houses and installing navigation aids, all with the object of assisting the merchant
These works were commenced under my predecessors in office and were continued during my tenure. The aviation facilities which had been constructed consisted of an air field for land planes on Saipan and ramps for sea planes on Saipan, Truk, Palau and Jaluit, the principal ones being at Saipan and Palau. All of these facilities were constructed by the Nanyo-Cho or the South Sea Bureau with the object of establishing an airline between Japan proper and the Islands together with an inter-island service between Saipan and Palau, Truk, Ponape and Jaluit. These airline services were undertaken by the Nippon Air Line Company.

Although neither the planning or execution of the above mentioned project had been made at the request or under the direction of the Navy, some assistance was received from the Navy in the way of technical advice and in the procurement of materials and labor, and in the transportation. We would have been seriously handicapped or the task made completely impossible were it not for this assistance rendered us by the Navy.

At the time I assumed my position there were about 100 foreigners living on the Islands, mostly Spanish missionaries and Chinese. I recall one American family on Rusa Island which had settled there from the preceding generation and were engaged in soap manufacturing. Travel between Japan proper and the Islands had actually been restricted from before my time. That restriction applied to foreigners and Japanese. There was a decided inadequacy of shipping accommodations, especially since so many merchantmen had been requisitioned after the outbreak of the China trouble. Besides there was a decided lack of lodging facilities.
proper food supply and other accommodations which were necessary for existence on the Islands. Because of these circumstances, it is true that travels for the Islands were restricted to the minimum. Prior to December of 1941 I did not see any guns or other military installations. Actually many of the Japanese on the Islands were extremely uneasy as to what would happen to them in the event of hostilities and thought that there should be some measures taken to afford them security.

On this 23rd day of May, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: KONDO, Shunsuke (seal)

I, ONO, Seiichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of his Witness.

On the same date
At same place

Witness: (signed) ONO, Seiichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) KONDO, Shunsuke (seal)
Deponent: HAYASHI, Hisao

I hereby depose as follows.

1. My name is HAYASHI, Hisao. From August of 1933 to September of 1936 I was Chief of the South Sea Board, which was the administrative organ of the South Sea Mandated Islands, with its main office in FALAO.

2. I state positively that there were no military installations in the South Sea Islands while I held my post there. It is true that there were some harbor constructions and some aeronautic installations. However, they had no military purpose, their only objective being the economic and cultural development of the South Sea Islands.

3. As soon as I assumed my post, it occurred to me that
Aeromantic installations were necessary for transportation between Japan proper and the Islands, for discovering schools of fish and for the rescue of the wrecked ships. Just before I went to PALAO to take up my post, I talked with Admiral OSUMI, Mireo, then Minister of Navy, about the construction of airfields. We told me that the construction of airfields would better be given up for the present, because it could cause difficulties in the League of Nations. However, since I believed that it was absolutely necessary for the development of the South Seas Area, and as it was for no military purpose, I made up my mind that it should by all means be carried out.

The South Sea Board first constructed a seaplane ramp in PALAO, and then one in SAIPAN. The Board also planned to construct seaplane ramps in other islands. At first we had only two seaplanes which we borrowed from the Navy and operated on a test basis. The construction work or the airfield for land planes was commenced in SAIPAN in 1934. However it was not completed during my tour of duty.

4. My idea of the development of the South Seas Area could not easily be fully carried out owing to the small budget of the South Sea Board. So I tried to attain my object by setting up a ten-year plan for the development of the South Sea Islands. This plan was carried out by a
Cabinet decision which adopted the report of the Investigation Committee for the Development of the South Sea Islands. This plan had in view a wide range of projects concerning the development of the South Sea Islands and included the following items:

(1) The development of agriculture, forestry, mining and aquatic products industries is to be encouraged and promoted.

(2) The transportation facilities are to be organized well. Especially, navigation routes between Japan proper and the South Sea Islands, and those from the South Sea Islands to Australia through outer South Seas Area are to be established. Harbors in SAIPA*, PALAN, PONPE, TIMIN, ROTA, YAP and other islands are to be constructed or repaired.

Air-routes are to be established between the Islands themselves, and between Japan proper and the Islands.

(3) The education system is to be improved. Education of the natives adjusted to the real conditions of life should be carried out thoroughly.

During my time at this work, I ever took measures to prohibit or to restrict foreign travellers from visiting the South Sea Islands. It is true that I had been told by the
NIPPO YUSER Knisha that as far as possible the same company was trying not to accept foreign passengers. I heard that it was or account of the difficulties in supply of food and other accommodations, and of the lack of hotel facilities. However, the South Sea Board never ordered the same company to refuse to accept foreign passengers, and it was never requested to make such order by the Foreign Ministry or by the Navy Ministry.

I recall many instances of foreign visitor's calling or me at PALAO during my stay there.

On this 28 day of May, 1947;
At Tokyo.

Deorcotent /s/ HAYASHI, Hisao (seal)

I, ONO, Seiichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deorcotent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

"Witness: /s/ ONO, Seiichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HAYASHI, Hisao, (seal)
Table 15

Classified Table of Export Trade
(unit: a thousand yen).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Plants &amp; animals (living)</td>
<td>1,914,391</td>
<td>4,226,297</td>
<td>6,231,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Grains, Flours, Starches &amp; Seeds</td>
<td>52,754,469</td>
<td>45,962,607</td>
<td>79,999,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Beverages, Comestibles &amp; Tobaccos</td>
<td>95,603,915</td>
<td>243,159,342</td>
<td>360,983,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Skins, Hairs, Horns, Tusks &amp; Manufactures thereof</td>
<td>6,920,367</td>
<td>21,979,240</td>
<td>13,166,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Drugs, Chemicals, Medicines &amp; explosives</td>
<td>73,147,387</td>
<td>70,146,703</td>
<td>107,502,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Dyes, Pigments, Coatings &amp; Filling matters</td>
<td>9,278,175</td>
<td>20,530,957</td>
<td>37,960,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Yarns, Threads, Twines, Cordages &amp; materials thereof</td>
<td>738,372,920</td>
<td>598,845,620</td>
<td>694,866,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Tissues &amp; Manufactures thereof</td>
<td>502,723,337</td>
<td>1,000,019,119</td>
<td>903,150,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Clothing &amp; Accessories thereof</td>
<td>101,947,777</td>
<td>229,911,530</td>
<td>168,466,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Papers &amp; Paper Manufactures</td>
<td>36,513,156</td>
<td>60,398,391</td>
<td>120,104,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Potteries &amp; Glass</td>
<td>42,310,509</td>
<td>87,543,505</td>
<td>75,673,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Ores &amp; Metals</td>
<td>59,079,521</td>
<td>125,422,214</td>
<td>139,091,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Metal Manufactures</td>
<td>43,291,101</td>
<td>98,812,703</td>
<td>147,326,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Miscellaneous Articles</td>
<td>111,755,299</td>
<td>203,675,957</td>
<td>264,050,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Re-exports</td>
<td>32,966,551</td>
<td>43,876,712</td>
<td>12,096,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,093,972,617</td>
<td>3,175,419,224</td>
<td>3,578,370,409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

デフ・ドック #1513

明治期に支那人でありました。大正時代からクリ下乡に住み石が築造に

するため、余暇はアリカ人の一家族が立った場を思い出し、「日本で何

をしていたか」という疑問に答えるため、旅人は日本に

旅の機会に応じて、私を不思議なものとして思われていた。特に支那人の事

について、親類の別名を名乗ることの多い日本人に対する態度に

設けては、昭和初期に至るまで、支那に不十分であったと。

に於ける生活の為に必要な食物の

距離が無用であると認識していた。訴る情況でありましたので、当

の旅行は、昭和初期に至るまで、私と他の食事施設として呼ばれ

されて、既に白人の食事と同様、しつこく呼ばれることに

3
自然に読むことができるテキストは見つかりません。
近藤俊介『供書』

『頁第一行目』

「一九四〇年」の次に
「四月」を挿入いたします。
私の姓名は近藤信介です。私は東京に住んでおります。私は一九四〇年
から一九四三年十一月仮南洋路長官の府にありました。私は上海の居住を
引き続き数年前より居るのではあります。ハリーの居住は香港、ハーキン、
無理等が発展、進歩をまき、開発に加わったもののでありません。

このため、文化発展に大なる役割を有するものでありました。

荒木 貞夫
其信

近藤信介 宣教庁

昭和二十二年

東京聖書事工

亞米利加合衆国

長崎
第一页第一行目
「一九四〇年」の次に「四月」を挿入願います。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. ) A P P I D A ' I T
AGAINST
v. KAI, Sadao, et al ) MIKASA, Misaburo

1. My name is MIKASA, Misaburo. I reside in Tokyo. I have been connected with the South Seas Islands for many years, having gone to Truk Island in 1916 as an employee of the South Seas Trading Company. In 1926 I was transferred to Falau Island where I stayed until 1937. As vice-chief of the branch office I again returned to Truk where I remained until Spring of 1939 when I returned to Tokyo.

In September, 1941, I again went to Falau as chief of the branch office. In August, 1942, I became chief of the business office at Ambo where I remained until January, 1944, at which time I returned to Japan.

2. Then I went to Truk in 1916, I found the headquarters of the South Sea Island Defense with a certain number of armed personnel. Around 1919 or 1920 all of the forces were withdrawn and from that time up to 1926, when I left, and also from 1937 to 1959, during which time I resided again on the same island, there were no armed personnel, military installations or fortifications.

3. During my days on Falau from 1926 to 1933, a resident
naval officer. With this exception there were no military personnel or military installations of any kind.
In 1941, when I returned to Palau, there were still no military installations. Air travel was limited to sea planes operated by the NIPPON Air Navigation Company. Even at the outbreak of war, the island appeared wholly defenseless, causing us great anxiety that disaster might lie in wake of this unpreparedness. After commencement of war some naval aircraft and naval personnel came to the island but no fixed military installations were constructed until August of 1942.

4. Counsel has shown me affidavits or statements taken from various natives on the South Sea Islands, which, I was told, were used in this Court to prove the construction of military installations. Because of my long association with these peoples I can truthfully say they, on the whole, were possessed of poor mental faculties. Most of them are unable to tell their age and even those educated in public schools under the South Sea board could count only such simple numbers as were necessary for daily life. Further, I did not find them trustworthy, they would lie on the slightest provocation or from mere expedience.

On this 20 day of May 1947

at I M T F B

DEPONENT HUKAWA, Misuburo (seal)
I, ___________________ hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal before in the presence of this Witness.

Witness: (signed) ONO Saichiro (seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YUKAWA Hisaburo (seal)
DEF. DOC. #1516

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs.

ARAKI, Badao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

of

SUZUKI, Suguru

1. My name is SUZUKI, Suguru. I hold the rank of Commander in the Japanese Navy and between the years 1937 and 1939 I served as Flying Section Officer of the Yokohama Naval Air Force. I was required to assist in the training of personnel for the Nippon Airline Company, a privately owned concern which was planning to open a regular air route to the South Seas Area. It was planned to use heavy flying boats which demanded that new personnel be taught maintenance, air navigation and piloting of such heavy craft. Since even the Navy itself possessed few men with definite knowledge in this field I was assigned to serve as instructor.

2. In pursuit of my assignment, in August of 1938, I made an inspection tour of the Inner South Seas Island area visiting many of the Mandated Islands. Later, also in the course of my
duties, it was necessary to fly directly down to the islands for the purpose of making a survey for potential landing facilities on the islands. I received no instructions from the Navy to assist in this work for the purpose of establishing potential military airfields and I emphatically emphasize the fact that they were considered only for civilian commercial purposes for the use of the Nippon Airlines Company.

3. In December of 1939 I was appointed Staff Officer of the newly organized 4th Squadron of the Japanese Navy. My duties pertained to matters dealing with aviation and communications. Again I toured the Inner South Seas area, this time aboard ship visiting many of the Mandated Islands. I made over-all studies of the Mandated Islands to the end of drafting plans for military defense that might be employed in the event of possible hostilities. This did not mean that the intention was present to fortify the Mandated Islands but only that the necessary plans and preparations to properly defend said islands would be on hand and available in the event their use was necessary. Military men will understand this to be a necessary procedure. At no time during my many visits to the Mandated Islands which included Saipan, Kwajalein, Motije, Jaluit, Tarac, Truk and Palau did I observe any military fortifications or constructions that might be classified as military installations. To the contrary, it appeared to me that Japan was being extremely lax in taking necessary precautionary measures which they rightfully could have done
J. D. Doc. #16

Even under treaty specifications,

4. In April of 1940 I was relieved of my assignment and enrolled at the Naval Staff College as a student officer. Therefore, after this date I truthfully cannot testify from personal observations as to the conditions on the Mandated Islands. I can say that when I returned to Japan at this time I submitted a plan, in documentary form, to the Naval General Staff setting forth my ideas on potential defense preparations that should be made regarding the South Seas Islands area. It may well be that the blueprint map of potential installations on Wetjo Island, dated August 10, 1940, and introduced as Prosecution evidence in this case was the result of some of the suggestions made in my report. I wish to stress that they were merely plans of potential action to be taken and were not in any way concrete schedules to be actually executed.

In regard to the establishing of air fields on several of the Mandated Islands, I wish to state that the Nippon Airline Company desired to begin trial flights on its new commercial run in September of 1938. In order to make this possible it was necessary to construct simple and plane ramps to accommodate the 4-engine heavy flying craft. As I stated previously, the supply of pilots for this type of aircraft was extremely limited and that the only source of instruction for potential
pilots had to come from the Navy. Even in the Navy itself there were very few men who could handle such large ships. The first group to receive training consisted of four pilots, two wireless operators, two mechanics and a number of ground mechanics. The number was gradually increased and by the end of 1939 eight pilots had completed the training course. They were all civilians, two of which were reserve naval officers. Landing facilities for the planes were established at Arakabeson Island in the Palau Group and nearly completed in late 1938. At Saipan Island a temporary slip had been built and it was not until late 1938 that a concrete slip and a small sized hangar were installed. If my memory serves me correctly there was an improvised airfield on Saipan which was little more than a leveled off bit of firm land. At Yap Island there were no facilities to lift or lower planes and only dumses were used.

The Nippon Airline Company was a privately owned concern receiving subsidies from the government. The reason for this was during this time it was difficult for the company to sustain itself in such an early period of development with income dependent solely on passenger traffic and freight charges. Since it was deemed advisable, from purely a commercial point of view, to promote a rapid development of this type of air travel the government, but naturally, lent
While I have no knowledge of restrictions placed against foreigners visiting the Mandated Islands I do specifically recall that in 1939 I was refused the privilege of visiting Guam which was of course an American possession. It was proposed to visit Guam for the purpose of discussing and airline junction between the Nippon Airline Company and the Pan Pacific Airlines. The refusal came from the American Embassy in Tokyo. I recall during the early part of 1940 our planes directly encountered U.S. patrol Catalina Flying Boats in areas over the Mandated Islands and while our aircraft were in the atolls of the Marshall Group during training flights we encountered many wireless obstructions. These obstructions appeared to be a systematic procedure convincing us — rightfully or wrongfully — that they came from U.S. Naval sources. Similar wireless obstructions were experienced in communications between our warships. Again, such incidents as occurred in February, 1940 when a United States naval cruiser wandered outside the port of Saipan at very close range for a period of 50 to 60 minutes caused great mental unrest among Japanese naval circles and indignant reports from Japanese residents on that island were received.

Such incidents as these combined with other activities on behalf of the United States Navy during times when great suspicion and anxiety existed between the two countries resulted in a situation which might be described as a psychological war of nerves.
adding fuel to the argument of exponents of criticism of the Japanese Navy for failure to take precautionary measures in regard to protection of the Mandated Islands.

On this 26th day of May, 1947
At I.M.T.F.E

DEponent SUZUKI, SUJURU (seal)

I, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereon in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At I.M.T.F.E.

Witness: (signed) OKO Soichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SUZUKI, SUJURU (seal)
一、私の名は後藤新、横須賀市に住んでいます。
私は先輩教官であり

二、バラオに於ては、私はパリリウノ島の飛行場建設に従事いたしました

三、サイパンに於て私は主として連年の多かなる役を果たしました。
その油船は、破壊五ケ月で一海嶺砲のもの三千、一千領破のもの二千であったが、飛びを求める私が九五一年三月日本に到着するまで未完成である。そして、水上飛行機にしても飛行機として使用出来てならなかったが、マニュエル・ブランコのそれに較べると劣るだけである。

パラオにおいても水上飛行機の起着場はパラオの自然と同様に日本海軍省に使用されており、パラオに於てもサイパンにおける私の現在の所要条件を満たすもので、起着場及び水上飛行機はパラオのそれと同様に日本海軍省に使用されている。

四、マニュエル・ブランコ（MANUEL BLANCO）の給油器（注: 現在未使用。）
センでした。又一九三八年防空線や仮装甲橋の存在したことを述べた。
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: GOTO, Yuzuru

In accordance with the procedure in my country having first sworn on oath as on attached sheet I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is GOTO, Yuzuru. I live in YOKOSUKA-city. I was formerly a naval engineer. I was at PALAU Islands from October, 1937 to April, 1938 and at SIFAJI from October, 1939 to March, 1941.

2. In PALAU Islands I was engaged in the construction of the aerodrome at FELIJIU.
It was called "the F.M." at that time. It was actually impossible to use it as an aerodrome, since nothing was done but ground-levelling by clearing the jungle and laying down coral. The construction of this aerodrome was undertaken by the South Seas Board, but the Navy gave assistance to that work. I was informed that the Navy's intention was to use it as a field for forced landings in time of manoeuvres.

In P.I.K.O Islands there was already a seaplane ramp with some attached establishments, but it was merely utilised for the air-route of the NIPPON Air Navigation Company, a private company, and was not for military purposes.

3. In S.IP.H, mainly I supervised the work of oil-tank construction. The oil-tanks were five in all, three of them having a capacity of about 10,000 tons while the other two had a capacity of about 1,000 tons. None of them was however completed by the time I left there for Japan in March, 1941.

There were an aerodrome and a seaplane ramp in S.IP.H, but the aerodrome was not sufficiently surfaced, had no hanger, works and no radio station. It was not completed to be utilized as an aerodrome. The seaplane ramp was used only by the NIPPON Air Navigation Company as in P.I.K.O.

During my stay in P.I.K.O and S.IP.H, there were no military installations. The aerodromes and oil-tanks above referred to were the only things I saw that could in any way be the subject of controversy in this regard.
So a natives were used as labourers in the construction of aerodromes or oil-tanks, but they were not compelled by corporal discipline, nor were they treated cruelly. Reasonable wages were paid to them.

4. EBBEJEL BILLMOE, in his Deposition (L.F.S. 76022, Court Exhibit 7863), says that anti-aircraft guns and coast guns were installed at SLETO (T.F. Phonetic) in 1940. However, there were no gun installations at that time. He also states that there were air-raid shelter trenches and camouflaged hangars in 1939. There were nothing like these at that time.

5. In the Deposition of IGNAZIO BELLWITT (L.F.S. 76019, Court Exhibit 7885) it is stated that he heard that a dump of ammunition and large tanks were under construction near the S.J.P.K Harbour in 1935. This is a mistake. The construction of large tanks was commenced after I arrived at S.J.P.K in 1939 and not completed when I left in March of 1941 as I stated before.

6. According to the Deposition of ELIAS F. S.M.L.N (L.F.S. 76020, Court Exhibit 7886) the Japanese brought guns of about 10 inch caliber to S.J.P.K around 1937, and not the up in 1939 and 1940. However, there was no such fact. It must be that he referred to the fact that guns for manoeuvres were landed temporarily.

In the same Deposition, he states that enforced labour of natives began in 1939. It is true that natives were engaged in the construction work, but they were never used severely. Two Yen a day was no small pay at that time.

7. ANTONIO UMAKEME, in his Deposition (L.F.S. 76025, Court Exhibit 7888), states that Japanese gun-emplacements were laid in 1940.
But there was no such fact as this by the time I left SAWAI in March, 1941.

8. CONCEPCION ALCAZAR, in his Deposition (I.P.S. 2021, Court Exhibit 502), states that five barracks having a capacity of about 3,000 military and naval men were constructed in 1938. However there were only two or three barracks having a capacity of about 100 persons, and there were no military or naval men.

9. VINCENTE L. LORMACORTADO, in his Deposition (I.P.S. 2017, Court Exhibit 391), states that in 1938 there were six underground oil-tanks in 1939. However the construction of oil-tanks in SAWAI was for the first time undertaken after I arrived there in 1939. He states also that gunemplacements were laid in 1939. This is not true.

10. JOSE F. MARCELINO, in his Deposition (I.P.S. 2018, Court Exhibit 293), states that in SAWAI there were 2 hangars containing big and small airplanes, 1 big concrete shelter containing all kinds of explosives, bullets and bombs, 2 or 3 aircraft repair-shops, and 6 or 10 big barracks in 1940. He must refer to facts after the outbreak of the war. In 1940, there were no such constructions except two small hangars containing one plane and two or three small buildings. There was no big barracks, furthermore there was not a military or naval troop. There were no repair works and no shelter trenches.

On this 17th day of May, 1947,

Deponent /3/ GOTO, Yuzuru

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I hereby certify that the above was signed and sealed in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at the same place.

Witness: /S/ OHO, Shinichiro (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth witholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ GOTO, Yuzuru (seal)
1. My name is IWASAKI, Asashichi. I reside in Tokyo. From September 1st, 1938 until October 15th, 1945 I was employed as an assistant engineer in the Naval Construction Division of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station. My duties encompassed the supervision and planning of various blueprint maps for potential naval construction.

2. Some time around August 1940, my office received a routine order from the Naval General Staff to prepare a blueprint draft of some building constructions on Wotje Island. I supervised the making of this blueprint which was done by my assistants. It was completed in approximately three days. My reference to the making of this blueprint as a routine order was because it was quite customary for my office to receive various assignments for blueprint construction in order to give the Navy definite and accurate information on which to base their requests for the Naval Budget around April 1st of each year. We had yearly work assignment sheets which were put on the shelf after completion and never used.

3. The particular blueprint prepared by my assistants and myself pertaining to Wotje Island is the same one which is in evidence before this Court as Prosecution
Exhibit 1256C. This blueprint is not the kind to be used in actual construction of buildings. The Execution Plan or the plan from which actual constructions would be made consists of a different kind of paper. If this blueprint had actually been the one that had been used in constructing the buildings on Wotje Island, the identification box in the lower right hand corner would show the name of the engineer actually in charge of executing the plan. I have with me the type of form that is used in making actual blueprints from which construction would be made and point out that in the lower right hand corner the form is entirely different, as I stated before. I did not undertake the plans for construction that were actually to be utilized as direct building plans. That type of work was done by special personnel handling final execution plans.

In either August or September of 1941, I recall that a staff officer came to my office and asked for this particular map which I have to him personally. It is quite possible that this planning map would be used as the basis for the construction of an execution plan. It would take approximately three to five months of concentrated effort to construct the various buildings and projects set forth in this blueprint. It will be noted that the blueprint shows only the location of the
objectives to be achieved and not the dimensions that are actually necessary for construction. The ordinary practice involved would be to take this blueprint map to the Island of Wotje, make a spot investigation, and then return and commence the drafting of the actual execution plan.

5. From viewing the blueprint map which I prepared and the aerial photographs of Wotje Island, Prosecution Exhibit 1253A and 1253P, I note a discrepancy in the outlines of the air field itself. It is also impossible for me to tell from looking at the aerial photograph what the various constructions consist of. While I am not an expert in the matter of reading aerial photographs, I must say that I cannot identify the items mentioned on the blueprint map as being those in the photograph.

On this 26th day of May, 1947
At Toku

DEFFONENT IWASAKI Asashichi (seal)

I, ONO, Seichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Toku

Witness: (signed) ONO, Seichiro (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

IWASAKI Asashichi(seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs.

AMAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: WAKATSU, Nakoto

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

My name is WAKATSU, Nakoto, and I reside at No. 774, Karuizawa, Karuizawa-machi, Nagano Prefecture. I wish to make the following statement:

1. I was an employee of the NANYO KOGATSU KABUSHIKI-KAI (South Seas Development Co., Ltd.). As an employee of the said company, I was on Tinian Island under Japanese mandated rule from January to October 1935, on Rota Island from October of the same year to January, 1937, and on Saipan Island from January 1937 to April, 1946. On June 14, 1944, the United States forces landed on Saipan and I was in custody of the forces from
July 13, 1944 to April, 1946 when I was repatriated to Japan.

2. During my internment, on or about March 16, 1946, I was summoned to the United States Military Government in Saipan and examined by a young American Lieutenant (jg) of about twenty years. He knew Japanese and interrogated me in that language. His Japanese was not fluent, but good enough to make himself understood. He wrote down my statement in English and had me sign it but he did not translate it and read it to me.

I have looked at the original document numbered Prosecution Exhibit 334 which was shown to me by Defense counsel at the time I was interviewed here in this building. I do not understand spoken English. I can only understand written English if I have an English-Japanese dictionary before me and considerable time to ponder over the written material. On the original document is a statement by Ensign Charles D. Sheldon which reads as follows:

"I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Japanese language and that before the above statement was signed I read some in the Japanese language to the person who signed same."

This statement is in error. A translation of this English document was not given to me either orally or in written form. The manner in which I was questioned is as follows: The American Lieutenant asked me questions in Japanese to which I responded. Then, writing with a fountain pen on a piece of paper, he appeared to be making out a statement. The interview lasted about 20 minutes, at the end of which time..."
the lieutenant gave the handwritten piece of paper to a Navy enlisted
man who typed out the piece of paper which I ultimately signed in the
same room. I knew Ensign Sheldon by sight since he was in charge of
the Japanese internees at my camp and I saw him almost every day.
However, I had never spoken to him nor he to me. Therefore, the
inaccuracies and mistakes appearing in the affidavit, Court Exhibit
884 in regard to which I shall make my statement, must have occurred
because the English was never translated into Japanese and read back
to me for confirmation.

3. I want to point out inaccuracies and mistakes in the affidavit
(Court Exhibit 884) which is purported to be the record of my oral
statement, as follows:

(a) In the above-mentioned affidavit it is written: "I observed
the various military installations in the vicinity of SLITO
Field on which construction was commenced in 1933."
However, I merely stated: "I think that SLITO Air Field
had been there about two years before I reached J.A.A.N.
I did not state "I observed various military installations."

(b) In the same affidavit it is written: "Two years before
the outbreak of the war, the Japanese military built a
series of concrete trenches and shelters around the SLITO
Air Field which were designed to serve as means of protec-
tion in case of air raids. However, this is an error.
I stated: "One or two years before the U.S. forces occupied

- 3 -
Saw concreto air-raid shelters along the road near the Air Field.

In the same affidavit it is written: "In 1940, I happened to see some Japanese navy men storing a huge amount of ammunition in some warehouses in Aslito Air Field. These warehouses were situated in a forest section and were camouflaged to look like trees." This also is a mistake. I merely stated, "about one year before the occupation by the U.S. forces I saw camouflaged warehouses on the hillside of Aslito." And when I was questioned in regard to what was contained in those warehouses, I answered, "I don't know."

In the same affidavit it is written: "There were coastal guns located on Asinan Point and Nafutan Point." However, actually I answered, "about one year before the occupation of the U.S. forces, I heard that there were coastal guns on Asinan Point and Nafutan Point."

In the same affidavit it is written: "I heard after from Navy officials that there was an anti-submarine net in that harbor placed there just before December, 1941." However, the fact is that when I was asked "You know that there was an anti-submarine net in that harbor, don't you?" I answered, "I don't know about it."

Since, as above mentioned, I stayed on S.Iratt, Tinian, and Rota Islands for about ten years from 1935 to 1946, I am very familiar with conditions...
in these islands. The cultivation of sugar-cane, the manufacture of sugar and alcohol, and the improvement of fishing and fisheries, etc., in these islands were promoted by the Japanese. Beside the Japanese, the CHICHIRROS, KANeK 3 and other natives were also employed, and they were engaged in the above productive industries, thereby elevating their economic standard of living to a remarkable extent.

In each island, besides schools for the Japanese, public schools for the natives were established. Primary education was widely carried on. Secondary education was given to both the Japanese and the natives together in the Japanese school. Some of the natives who graduated from intermediate school went to Japan to be educated in colleges. The Japanese made almost no discrimination in their treatment of the natives. It is true that the standard of living of the natives was lower than that of the Japanese, but generally the Japanese were kind to them, and never worked the native laborers excessively. Therefore, the natives always felt well disposed toward the Japanese.

On this 22nd day of May, 1947,

I, ONO, Seiichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date at

Witness: /S/ ONO, Seiichiro (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ W.J.K. MITSU, Hikoto (seal)
My name is Paul W. Wenneker. I reached the rank of Full Admiral in the German Navy. From 1934 until 1937, and later from 1940 until the surrender I was the chief German Naval Attache to Japan, residing in Tokyo. After returning to Germany in 1937 I was given general naval duty including command of the German pocket battleship Deutschland.

My duties as German Naval Attache were quite similar to the duties of attaches of other countries at that time. During my first stay in Japan from 1934 to 1937 I had absolutely no instructions of any kind with reference to military collaboration with Japan. In fact my association with the naval men of other countries, namely Great Britain, the United States and Russia was much closer than with the Japanese. We were all treated with like suspicion and distrust by Japanese naval officers.

Even when I returned the second time in 1940, after the outbreak of the European war, the situation relative to cooperation between my country and the Japanese naval officials was not greatly improved. I seldom was able to inspect their ships. My request to visit the Mandated Islands had been repeatedly refused. I was never afforded the courtesy of discussing matters with Japanese naval officers of my own rank but was forced to deal with captains and younger officers. Even after the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, cooperation was sadly lacking between German and Japanese naval officials.

I was not informed by the Japanese that they were to attack Pearl Harbor. I did not know that hostilities would commence on December 8, 1941. Such information had not been conveyed to my country through my office or through the Embassy, even though both Germany and Japan were then faced with a common
enemy. As to the real strength of the Japanese Navy, the number and size of ships under construction, the construction projects under consideration, the oil supply in stock and operational plans under contemplation, I must state that I possessed not even an approximate knowledge concerning them, even though I was the logical person to receive such information. I had inquired concerning these matters frequently both officially and privately but received either no replies or such vague answers as to be of no value whatsoever.

During the Pacific War, further evidence of lack of cooperation was the fact that the Japanese failed to reveal vital information concerning their losses incurred during important naval battles. I distinctly remember that it was around a year after the battle of Midway that I first learned that Japan had lost four carriers. We had requested information concerning this particular matter on many occasions since we had heard American broadcasts to this effect but the Japanese consistently refused to inform us.

Relative to cooperation between Germany and Japan in regard to submarine warfare, I wish to say that the utter lack of cooperation would be the better topic for discussion. Germany did attempt to school Japanese naval officers in the thought that submarines should be used to attack enemy merchant shipping and thereby to cut off the supply lines. The Japanese Navy contended that they could better use their submarines for direct attack against fighting vessels of the enemy. Hence our proposal was completely rejected. We wished to assist the Japanese toward the construction of modern and efficient submarines. To this end we presented them with two new submarines. The first was delivered by German crew at Kure. The second was lost in the North Atlantic and never reached the Japanese Islands. The first submarine was minutely inspected by the Japanese but I was later informed that they did not feel they could duplicate it and did not intend to do so. Therefore, insofar as German
activity is concerned, the Japanese submarine warfare was not effected in any way.

5. In April of 1942, I was finally allowed to visit some of the Mandated Islands. I went to Palau and Saipan, also stopping at Guam. I have been asked if there were any fortifications on Saipan or Palau. I, like the Italian Attache who was with me, was greatly surprised to note there were absolutely none. We saw air strips, some good billets, houses and store houses, but no guns and no fortifications. I saw a large field on Saipan which was supposed to be an airfield but which was grown over by weeds. The harbors were very poor and they were only commencing the building of oil tanks. As I said before, we were greatly surprised at the lack of precautionary measures taken by Japan on these islands and I felt that the reason for the prior refusals to visit the islands was more to conceal the lack of fortifications than to reveal fortifications.

6. Germany lost two auxiliary cruisers, three submarines and six steamers in Japanese waters during the war. Most of these were lost out of lack of cooperation, that is, insufficient escort or the relaying of vital information concerning the enemy's position by the Japanese.

7. During my stay in Japan and from my many social and business contacts with various military men, I noticed a decided lack of cooperation even between the Japanese Army and Navy. They were constantly suspicious and jealous of each other and I personally tried to smooth matters over as best I could. The Army escorted its own convoys and except for those military movements which necessitated the use of the Navy in transporting Army troops the disunity was quite amazing to me.
AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul W. Wenneker, being duly sworn upon my oath do hereby state that the foregoing writing consisting of three typewritten pages is true and accurate according to my best knowledge and belief.

[Signature]

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of August, 1947.

[Signature]

DAVID W. PARSONS, C244429
Captain, Infantry
Investigating Officer
Certificate of Non-Existence of Documents

1. I, Yoshii Michinori, as archives Section Chief of the Demobilization Bureau II of the Demobilization Office, and a document custodian of the Demobilization Bureau II.

2. The originals, duplicates and copies of the following telegrams do none of them exist in the Demobilization Bureau II, the organization disposing of the remaining business of the former Japanese Navy Department.

   (1) The telegrams exchanged in 1941 between Vice-Admiral Nomura at Berlin and the Japanese Navy concerning American-Japanese negotiations.

   (2) The joint telegraphic instructions dispatched in January 1942 by the Navy Minister and the Naval General Staff Chief to Vice-Admiral Nomura at Berlin concerning the conclusion of the Military Agreement.

   (3) The telegrams exchanged between Vice-Admiral Nomura at Berlin, and the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff since the March-April period in 1942 concerning the intensifying of operations by the Japanese Navy in the Indian Ocean area.

3. Of the foregoing telegrams, the duplicates of the outgoing telegrams and the originals of the incoming telegrams in section (1) were in the custody of the General Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, or in the Navy Minister's Secretariat; the duplicates of the telegrams in section (2) and the duplicates of the outgoing telegrams and the originals of the incoming telegrams in section (3) were in the custody either of the General Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, the Navy Minister's Secretariat or of the 1st Department of the Naval General Staff; and where there were no originals or duplicates, there were found copies kept in custody. The rule was that copies of telegrams should all be kept for one year in the custody of the Telegraph Section of the Navy Ministry.

4. In the United States air-raids of May 1945, continuing from midnight of the 25th to dawn of the 26th, the bulk of the Navy Ministry building was destroyed by fire. The Minister's Secretariat, the General Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, and the 1st Department of the Naval General Staff and the office rooms of the Telegraph Section were all reduced to ashes, and almost all the documents kept in these places were lost. The originals, duplicates and copies now missing are believed to have all been destroyed by fire on this occasion.

5. As for the originals and duplicates of the above-mentioned telegrams kept in custody at the Japanese Embassy at Berlin, we inquired of all the returnees including former Admiral Nomura, but none of them possessed the copies, obviously having destroyed them as fittingly to the above explanation.

I vouch for the truth of the above statement in every respect.

Certificate at Tokyo on this 19th day of August 1947

Yoshii Michinori
Archives Section Chief of the Demobilization Bureau II
I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
On the same date

Witness: Okuyama Hachiro

Certificate

I, who occupy the post of the Archives Section Chief of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, hereby certify that the telegram dispatched about March 1943 by Ambassador Oshima at Berlin concerning the transfer to Japan of German submarines and the reply telegram thereto are not among the documents in the custody of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Certified at Tokyo
on this 19th day of August 1947

Hayashi Kaoru

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place
On the same date

Witness: Sato Takegoro

Certificate

1. I, Taniguchi Yasumaro, occupied from May 1940 till May 1945 the post of Assistant Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy at Berlin, and was in charge of the telegrams dispatched and received by those concerned with the Navy and the custody of these documents.

2. With air raids on Berlin intensified from about November 1943, we consigned to the fire some of the important documents and telegrams on several occasions, and in April 1945 when Berlin fell in a crisis, we destroyed the rest of them by fire for the last time.

3. The originals, duplicates and copies of the telegrams mentioned below do not of them exist as they were completely destroyed by fire on the above-mentioned occasions.

(a) The telegram exchanged in 1941 between Vice-Admiral Nomura at Berlin and the Naval Department concerning the America-Japan negotiations.

(b) The telegraphic instructions dispatched in January 1942 by the Naval General Staff Chief and the Navy Minister to Vice-Admiral Nomura concerning the conclusion of the Military Agreement.

(c) The telegrams exchanged between Vice-Admiral Nomura
at Berlin, and the Japanese Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry since the March-April period in 1942 concerning the intensifying of operations by the Japanese Navy in the Indian Ocean area.

I vouch for the truth of the above statement in every respect.

Certified at Yokosuka on this 16th day of August 1947

Taniguchi Yasumaro
General Affairs Section Chief of the Yokosuka Local Demobilization Bureau

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place on the same date

Witness: Shikami Yoshisuke
Director of the Yokosuka Local Demobilization Bureau
Def. Doc. No. 1606

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
- vs -

JAPAN, et al

AFFIDAVIT

by KOKUTA NAOKUNI,
No. 1 Yochome, Kitazawa,
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.
(born on 15 May, 1935)

I, the above named, after having duly sworn as shown in
the separate paper in accordance with the form observed in
Japan, do depose as follows:

1. German-Japanese military cooperation before the outbreak
   of the Pacific War.

When the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Alliance Pact
was concluded I was appointed military committee member of the
Mixed Technical Commission which had been set up in accordance
with article 4 of the Pact, and in this capacity I left Tokyo
for Germany in December, 1940. On my departure the Navy Mini-
sterr's instructions were handed to me by Toyoda, Seijiro the
Vice-Minister of the navy. They read: "The Tripartite Alliance
Pact aims at precluding a war with the United States, and, by im-
proving our diplomatic relation with that country, it is to give
an impetus to an early settlement of the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

- 1 -
Such being the case, the primary duty of the Military Commissioner is to pass correct judgement from the military viewpoint on the question of 'whether or not an act of offense has been launched upon one of the parties of the alliance' as provided in Article 3 of the Pact. In view of the fact that this pact is for an alliance for defensive purposes care must be taken to avoid immaturity reaching the decision that 'an act of offense has been committed' and thereby drawing this country into the abyss of a war. Since the final decision will be made in Tokyo, the problem must be handled with utmost caution and wisdom and all efforts must be exerted to investigate and report the real circumstances involved."

I arrived at Berlin on January 5, 1941, but the Mixed Commission was not inaugurated for a long time. In the meanwhile, the German government did not accord us due treatment as Commissioner, and all opportunities were denied us for opening official discussion. Consequently there was no occasion for us to deal with the question of 'whether or not an act of offense has been launched' or to submit a report to Tokyo on the question.

Although the Mixed Commission was hastily inaugurated after the outbreak of the Pacific War, it was not more than a perfunctory meeting and was held only two or three times in the earlier stage of its introduction, to be followed by no meeting at all later on. Under these circumstances the existence of the Commission was only nominal, though I continued to stay in Berlin in the capacity
of Military Commissioner until March, 1945, when I was relieved of the office and left Germany for home. During my stay in Berlin I acted exclusively as military adviser to the Japanese ambassador there. Moreover, with regard to problems concerning purely military operation, I consulted directly with the Military authorities concerned, thus making them clearly distinct from political matters. And even in the disposition of these military matters, our military commissioners acted merely as a liaison office between Tokyo and Berlin.

The only work in which the military commissioner had acted under explicit directions from Tokyo concerned the conclusion of the Military Agreement which was originated by the instruction of the Japanese Government given to him in January, 1942, i.e. immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War. No other direction was given from Tokyo at all.

During the period of the American-Japanese diplomatic talks, not even information relative to the above negotiation could be received by us from our Central Office. (T.N. Japanese Government in Tokyo). Aroused by loud talks in the air as reverberated through papers of neutral states I referred the matter to Tokyo more than once by telegraph, because of my great anxiety. As a response to my repeated inquiry, if I remember rightly, just a single answer was received some time in July or August of 1941, to the effect that the Japanese Government was conducting negotiations with the United States in strict conformity with the spirit
of the Tripartite Alliance Pact which aimed solely at the prevention of American participation in war and at the settlement of the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

2. Concerning the Military Agreement.

On January 19, 1942, Shova 17, shortly after the commencement of the Pacific War, the Military Agreement was concluded by Germany, Italy, and Japan. Because this was purely a military accord among the Supreme Command of the three powers, the Japanese ambassador took no part in the agreement. According to the provisions of the agreement, Japan was to destroy the enemy in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean east of Longitude 70 degrees east, and Germany and Italy were to destroy the enemy in the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean west of Longitude 70 degrees East. The basic idea of this accord was that the best coordinated operational result might be expected through independent activities of each navy in its respective designated areas. Therefore each navy conducted its operations entirely under its own plans and abilities, apart from those of the colleague powers; and no special mutual talks were held for the coordination of the operational activities of the three. Though, of course, as will be mentioned later, there were several occasions when one party or another made proposals regarding a partner's methods of operation, as is naturally the case with a wartime alliance, these proposals were nothing but the expression of the desire of the party so proposing, all deciding authority over the actual conduct of the operations being always
reverted by the party responsible for the operations.

3. Military Cooperation, including Submarine Warfare, after the Outbreak of the Pacific War.

Based on the information that around March or April, 1942 the United States had commenced transportation activities on a large scale to the North African theatre via the Cape of Good Hope, the navies of Germany and Italy made repeated proposals to the effect that they were desirous of seeing the Japanese navy intensify its activities in the Indian Ocean including offensive action against the American transportation activities and re-enforce its forces strongly in this theatre. In this proposal, their desire was for a powerful reinforcement of the Japanese fleet in this theatre with strong surface vessels as the main strength rather than a mere encouragement of the submarine campaign as heretofore conducted by the Japanese navy.

Whenever these proposals were made I tried to persuade the German authorities on the basis of directions from Tokyo that the Japanese fleet were too fully occupied with the operations in other theatres to divert much of its strength to the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless the same proposal was repeated again and again with the increase of difficulties in maintaining the German military position in North Africa. In some cases they expressed their desire to have Japan at least strengthen the submarine forces in the Indian Ocean to a great extent. As a reply
Def. Dec. 26, 1946

to this sort of proposals I always explained to the assiduously that the Japanese submarines were being employed for the most part in operations of main fleet and that in view of the smallness of their number the dispersion of more submarines to the Indian theater on the part of Japan was very difficult.

Although I do not know what the German naval authorities expected of Japan in connection with Hitler's offer to Ambassador Oshima of the donation of two German submarines to Japan, but from what had been explained to us, it originated entirely in Hitler's own mind and was utterly unconditional. In return for this offer no request was made for more intensified submarine warfare on the part of Japan. The following are the Führer's words as told me by ambassador Oshima: "Lately the German submarines have been strikingly improved in their maneuverability and especially, underwater capacity. Hoping the Japanese navy will be benefited in her submarine construction, I wish to donate two of the new German submarines to Japan at this time." These words by the Führer were carried in the ambassador's telegram addressed to Japan at that time; and a message from Tokyo in response to this telegram explicitly stated that Japan would accept with gratitude this Hitler's offer. Further, in the telegram I received from Tokyo in those days in connection with the bringing of these submarines to Japan, no allusion was made to such a subject as the encourage out of the submarine warfare; the naval authorities in Tokyo simply instructed me by telegram
that, as the primary objective of bringing the German submarines to Japan lay in the contributory effect of those new submarines upon Japanese submarine-building technique those German submarine technicians should be brought to Japan with submarines. In short, as far as the Japanese navy and I myself were concerned, it was understood that the submarine offer was made solely along the line of the above-mentioned words of Hitler and that no intensified activities of submarine warfare, on our part, was entailed condition in this offer, not to mention our acceptance of such request.

One of those two submarines was lost on the way to Japan, and only one safely reached her destination. However such a difficult problem as the improvement of our submarine construction technique could not be solved in a short period. During the course of time, on the other hand, an opinion became prevalent, pressed by the need from the forces on the front, that this type of submarine with its inferior underwater speed would not meet our purpose and that an entirely new idea was instead needed in our submarine construction. Such being the case, those submarines brought about after all no practical benefit to Japanese submarine operations.

About such a policy as annihilating the crew-members of enemy vessels sunk by submarines, nothing was ever suggested to us by the Germans. I never heard of such a suggestion either from Ambassador Oshima from anyone else. On the occasion of the London Disarmament Conference which I attended as a member of
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 26, 1947
文書不存在に関する説明書

私は吉井進教で現在復員が第二復員局文書課長の職にあり第二復員局
左の各電報の本紙、控及窓は何れも元日本海軍省の調書整理係関である

二月に交渉に関し一九四一年在野軍海軍中将と日本海軍省との間に手

一九四二年三月、四月以降日本海軍の印度洋方面作戦強化に関する在野

官房に保管してあり（の）控及窓の在電の控、来電の本紙は海軍省軍務局又は海軍大臣

前項の電報中（の）往電の控、来電の本紙は海軍省軍務局又は海軍大臣

電報の無い所には窓が有った。又各電報共その窓は一年間海軍省電信課に

保全することになつて居て
右署名捺印は當立管人の面前に於てなされた
昭和二十二年八月十六日，於横須賀

横須賀地方復員局
總務部長

 noss

横須賀地方復員局長

鹿

目

善

難
The information concerning vessels constructed or under construction by the United States Navy Department, as of 7 December 1947, and other information dated 23 January 1947 and bearing the symbols (NAVSHIPS 1051) consisting of 11 pages hereby attached and giving a part thereof and prepared by ALBERT B. RAY who being duly sworn did depose and say that he is the Production Analyst in charge of the Ships Statistics Section of the Bureau of Ships of the Navy Department, and, as such Production Analyst, has access to the official records of the Navy Department with respect to the matters herein considered; that the information contained herein was taken by him from such official records as a part of his normal and regular duties; that the information contained herein and taken from such official records was accurately and correctly transcribed.

/s/ Albert B. Ray

District of Columbia SS

Sworn to and subscribed before me, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, by ALBERT B. RAY to me known to be the above described person and known to me to be the Production Analyst in charge of the Ships Statistics Section of the Bureau of Ships of the United States Navy Department, having the duties stated above.

/s/ Herbert A. Engler
Notary Public
My commission expires Jan 1, 1951.
I. Vessels Under Construction as of 7 December 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>BB</td>
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<td>410,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>442,300</td>
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<td>CB</td>
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<td>81,000</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>107,200</td>
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<td>CL</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>393,080</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE &amp; DE</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>146,496</td>
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<td>TOTAL COMBATANT</td>
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<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>249,508</td>
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<td>Mine Craft.</td>
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<td>121,233</td>
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<td>Patrol Craft</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>42,028</td>
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<td>Large Landing Craft</td>
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<tr>
<td>District Craft (SP)</td>
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<td>19,215</td>
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<td>District Craft (NSP)</td>
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<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>1321</td>
<td>2,432,137</td>
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</table>
Defense Doc. No. 1596

II. Vessels On Hand as of 7 December 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
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<td>GVL</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
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<td>CL</td>
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<td>157,775</td>
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<td>DD</td>
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<td>SS</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>1,382,026</td>
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</table>
III. (a) Carriers On Hand 12-7-41 and Completed up to 8-13-45.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type, No. &amp; Name</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Keel</th>
<th>Launch</th>
<th>Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CV 2 LEXINGTON</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>1-8-21</td>
<td>10-3-25</td>
<td>12-14-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV 3 SARATOGA</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>9-25-20</td>
<td>4-7-25</td>
<td>11-16-27</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV 4 RANGER</td>
<td>14,700</td>
<td>9-26-31</td>
<td>2-25-33</td>
<td>6-4-34</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV 5 YORKTOWN</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>5-21-34</td>
<td>4-4-36</td>
<td>9-30-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV 6 ENTERPRISE</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>7-16-34</td>
<td>10-3-36</td>
<td>5-12-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV 7 WASP</td>
<td>14,700</td>
<td>7-1-36</td>
<td>4-4-39</td>
<td>4-25-40</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV 8 HORNET</td>
<td>19,800</td>
<td>9-25-39</td>
<td>12-14-40</td>
<td>10-20-41</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV 9 ESSEX</td>
<td>27,100</td>
<td>4-28-41</td>
<td>7-31-42</td>
<td>12-31-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV 10 YORKTOWN</td>
<td>27,100</td>
<td>12-1-41</td>
<td>1-21-43</td>
<td>4-15-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV 11 INTREPID</td>
<td>27,100</td>
<td>12-1-41</td>
<td>4-26-43</td>
<td>8-16-43</td>
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<td>CV 12 HORNET</td>
<td>27,100</td>
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<td>8-30-43</td>
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<td>CV 13 FRANKLIN</td>
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<td>1-31-44</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV 14 TICONDEROGA</td>
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<td>2-7-44</td>
<td>5-8-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV 15 RANDOLPH</td>
<td>27,100</td>
<td>5-10-43</td>
<td>6-28-44</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV 16 LEXINGTON</td>
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<td>9-26-42</td>
<td>2-17-43</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV 17 BUNKER HILL</td>
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<td>8-17-43</td>
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<td>CV 19 HANCOCK</td>
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<td>CV 20 BENNINGTON</td>
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<td>CV 21 BOXER</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV 31 BON HOMME RICHARD</td>
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<td>CV 36 ANTIETAM</td>
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<td>CV 38 SHANGRI LA</td>
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<td>CV 39 LAKE CHAMPLAIN</td>
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<td>3-15-43</td>
<td>11-2-44</td>
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</table>
### III. (b) Carriers On hand 12-7-41 and Completed up to 8-13-45.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type, No. &amp; Name</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Loca</th>
<th>Launch</th>
<th>Commission</th>
</tr>
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<td>8-22-42</td>
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<td>CVL 23 Princeton</td>
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<td>10-18-41</td>
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<td>CVL 24 Belleau Wood</td>
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<td>12-7-41</td>
<td>3-31-43</td>
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<td>CVL 25 Copps</td>
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<td>CVL 26 Huffman</td>
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<td>CVL 30 San Jacinto</td>
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<td>Type</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ATTACKER</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>HUNTER</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>5/22/42</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>BOGUE</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>5/ 1/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>CHASER</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>2/16/42</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
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<td>CARD</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
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CVE built by Navy - other CVE's were acquired.

Launch date for CVE's built - Start of Conversion for Acquisition.

BAVG 1 Lend leased to United Kingdom as of 12-7-41 but listed for information.

Note: The above CVE and BAVG vessels were converted from Maritime C3 (Cargo) type vessels except the following:

CVE 26 - 29 (converted from tankers)
CVE 55 - 104 (special military type/S4-S2-BB3)
CVE 105 - 115 (special military type)
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1. The Vinson Trammel Act of 27 March 1934 (Public Law Number 135 - 73d Congress) which authorized:

(a) That the composition of the United States Navy with respect to the categories of vessels limited by the treaties signed at Washington, 6 February 1922, and at London, 22 April 1930, is hereby established at the limit prescribed by those treaties.

(b) That subject to the above treaties to construct (in addition to those vessels previously authorized by act of 13 February 1929 and Executive Order 6174 of 16 June 1933):

1. Aircraft carrier of approximately 15,000 tons Standard Displacement,
2. 99,200 tons of Destroyers,
3. 35,530 tons of Submarines.

(c) Replace overage vessels by vessels of modern design and construction as limited by the above treaties.

Note: The total tonnage established by the above treaties (as amended) for the United States Navy (Combatant Vessels) was 1,262,068 tons.

2. The 20% Expansion Act of 17 May 1938 (Public Law 528 - 75th Congress) which authorized: (as amended)

(a) 135,000 tons Capital Ships
(b) 70,000 tons Aircraft Carriers
(c) 66,75% tons Cruisers
(d) 38,000 tons Destroyers
(e) 13,658 tons Submarines

(f) In addition approximately 133,650 tons of auxiliaries were authorized and 15,000,000 dollars for use in construction of experimental vessels.

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant Vessels) for the United States Navy was 1,557,480 tons.

3. The 11% Expansion Act of 14 June 1940 (Public Law 629 - 76th Congress) which authorized:

(a) 79,500 tons Aircraft Carriers
(b) 66,500 tons Cruisers
(c) 21,000 tons Submarines
(d) The above tonnages may be varied upward or downward 33,400 tons so long as the total tonnages (167,000 tons) is not exceeded. (This transfer later amended to 50,100 tons)
(e) Acquire or construct 75,000 tons Auxiliaries.
(f) Established the life of combatant ships as follows:

- Battleships: 26 Years
- Aircraft Carriers: 20 "
- Cruisers: 20 "
- Other Combatant: 16 "
- Submarines: 13 "

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant Vessels) for the United States Navy was 1,724,880 tons.

4. It is assured that the so called Stark Plan (1940) is the 70% Expansion Act of 19 July 1940 (Public Law 757 - 76th Congress) which authorized:

(a) 385,000 tons of Capital Ships
(b) 200,000 tons of Aircraft Carriers
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(c) Replace overage vessels by vessels of modern design and construction as limited by the above treaties.

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2. The 20% Expansion Act of 17 May 1938 (Public Law 528 - 75th Congress) which authorized: (as amended)

(a) 135,000 tons Capital Ships
(b) 36,000 tons Aircraft Carriers
(c) 68,75% tons Cruisers
(d) 38,000 tons Destroyers
(e) 13,670 tons Submarines

(f) In addition approximately 133,650 tons of auxiliaries were authorized and $15,000,000 dollars for use in construction of experimental vessels.

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant Vessels) for the United States Navy was 1,557,480 tons.

3. The 11% Expansion Act of 14 June 1940 (Public Law 629 - 76th Congress) which authorized:

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(e) Acquire or construct 75,000 tons Auxiliaries.
(f) Established the life of combatant ships as follows: Battleships 26 Years Aircraft Carriers 20 " Cruisers 20 " Other Combatant 16 " Submarines 13 "

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant Vessels) for the United States Navy was 1,724,480 tons.

4. It is assumed that the so called Stark Plan (1940) is the 70% Expansion Act of 19 July 1940 (Public Law 757 - 76th Congress) which authorized:

(a) 385,000 tons of Capital Ships
(b) 200,000 tons of Aircraft Carriers
Defense Doc. No. 1596

(c) 420,000 tons of Cruisers
(d) 250,000 tons Destroyers
(e) 70,000 tons of Submarines.
(f) 1,325,000 tons, Total

(f) 397,500 tons transfer authorized between types of
vessels above.
(g) 72 Patrol Craft
(h) 100,000 tons auxiliaries.

Note: The total tonnage established by the above act (Combatant
Vessels) for the United States Navy was 3,049,480 tons.
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说明：
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- B：产品B，每件20元。
- C：产品C，每包15元。
- D：产品D，每盒25元。
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建築のために使用することができ承認された。

（昭和十五年）一九四〇年七月一日の第一分類揚法（公法三一九号）第一七〇号大会）は次の如く

（航空部艦）

（巡洋部艦）

（潜水部艦）

（商船部艦）

（水路部艦）

（鉄道部艦）

（航空部艦）

（巡洋部艦）

（潜水部艦）

（商船部艦）

（水路部艦）

（鉄道部艦）

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德文: Do. Dec. 1806
To: Judge Advocate General  
Navy Division, War Crimes Office

Subj: Ship Information Requested by Defense Counsel in Main Tokyo War Crimes Trial.

(b) JAG, Navy Div., War Crimes Office ltr, Encl.-1, of 19 Mar. 1947 to BuShips.

Encl: (HW)  
(A) Subject Information.  
(B) Copies of refs. (a) and (b) returned as requested.

1. Enclosure (A) contains a tabulation of the combatant and miscellaneous vessels under construction as of 7 December 1941, and the combatant and miscellaneous vessels on hand as of that same date.

2. It should be noted that reference (a) requested "in addition to information sent...the total number and total tonnage of miscellaneous vessels." This Bureau has assumed that the Defense Counsel for the Major War Criminals of the Far East was seeking the total number and total tonnage of miscellaneous vessels (a) under construction as of 7 December 1941 and (b) on hand as of 7 December 1941.

3. Enclosure (A) is complete and accurate, and has been authenticated and notarized.

/s/ Stirling P. Smith  
S.P. Smith  
By direction of  
Chief of Bureau

FROM BUREAU OF SHIPS
### I. Vessels Under Construction as of 7 December 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
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<td><strong>Combatant</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Total Combatant</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Miscellaneous</strong></td>
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<td>Auxiliary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Large Landing Craft</td>
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<td><strong>Total Miscellaneous</strong></td>
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<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
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**In NAVSHIPS (1851) 23 January 1947, this total was incorrectly stated as 1,915,776 tons.**

***In NAVSHIPS (1851) 23 January 1947, this total was incorrectly stated as 2,432,137 tons.***
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I, Hidemi YOSHIDA, having first been duly sworn, do depose and say.

1. I served as a member of the staff of the Research Division of the Second Demobilization Bureau, the Demobilization Board, from June 1946 to May 1947. On the latter date I became Chief of the said Division, and am still serving in that capacity today. My work has been concerned principally with preparation and correlation of information and data to be submitted in compliance with demand from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Since spring of last year I have prepared many reports of various kinds pertaining to the armaments of the former Japanese Navy upon demand of GHQ and the International Prosecution Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. And I understand that a few of them - tables showing the vessels of the former Japanese Navy - have been exhibited in this Court.

2. In April of this year, the Defense Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East handed me a copy of an official document of the United States Navy Department pertaining to the vessels of the United States Navy, with the request that I prepare a comparative table of the vessels that the United States and Japanese Navies had already completed and had under construction as of 7 December 1941.

Since our data on the United States Navy had hitherto been largely a matter of inference and deduction I experienced no small pleasure in thus receiving for the first time such data of an
Defense Document 2085

In addition to the fact of the work of making accurate comparative tables of the navies of the two countries being a matter of personal interest to me, I could see no good reason for refusing to comply with the request of the Defense Section. I therefore accepted the assignment gladly and addressed myself with the utmost care to the preparation of the comparative tables in sheets and handed them to the Defense Section upon completion. These are Defense Documents Number 1572 and 1573.

One difficulty encountered in this work was the fact that the two navies employed different systems in the classification of their ships. Adjustments to overcome this difficulty were made in the following manner:

(a) Vessels of the United States Navy listed as CV (aircraft carrier), CVL (carrier converted from cruiser) and CVE (escort carrier), as well as vessels of the former Japanese Navy listed as aircraft carrier and converted aircraft carrier (converted from merchant ship) have all been grouped together under the single category of aircraft carriers. I adopted this method of adjustment because of my belief that it would only serve to confuse understanding if these various classes of vessels were to be treated separately, whether from the standpoint of their capacity or the purposes for which they were intended; and also because the definition of aircraft carrier laid down by the London Naval Conference of 1930 being - "The expression 'aircraft carrier' includes any vessel of war, whatever its displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon" - it seemed the safest method to be guided by that definition.

(b) The United States Navy's CL (large cruiser) was included under heavy cruisers, while Japan's training cruisers were included under light cruisers.

(c) The United States Navy's DD (destroyer), DE (escort destroyer) and BDE (definition unknown to me) are all treated as
(d) Construction of Japan's capital ship SHINANO, along with another ship of the same type, was commenced in April, 1940. But work on both was suspended very shortly after their keels were laid, the unnamed ship being dismantled, but the SHINANO being left untouched on the dock with no plan for proceeding with its construction until June 1942, when work was commenced to build it into an aircraft carrier in order to replace the carriers lost in the battle of Midway.

For the above reason, the SHINANO is not included in the table of ships under construction, either as a capital ship or an aircraft carrier. Instead, I have merely made an annotation at the bottom of the table to the effect that there was one capital ship on which work was suspended shortly after the keel was laid.

In carrying out this request made to me by the Defense Section, I made one significant discovery. That was the fact that the estimate which our Naval General Staff had made of the United States Navy's strength by the process of inference and deduction was a strikingly close approximation of the actual strength as shown by the official document handed to me by the Defense Section; and that, if anything, our estimate was somewhat lower than the actual figures. All of which leads to the patent conclusion that not only the Naval General Staff's estimate of the United States naval strength, but the demand for shipbuilding programs which it submitted to the Navy Ministry on the basis of its estimate, were well grounded.
On this 15th day of August, 1967
At IMTFE, Tokyo.

DEPONENT: YOSHIDA, Hidemi

I, YOSHIDA, Hidemi hereby certify that the above statement
was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal
thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) ONO, Selichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YOSHIDA, Hidemi (seal)
私の姓名は吉田英三です。

私は昭和二十一年（一九四六年）一月から一九四七年五月、陸軍省第二部戦案課長を兼ねて二課長を務めました。

その後、陸軍省戦略局に配属され、戦略局の戦略課長を務めました。帰国後は、軍事参謀庁に配属され、軍事情報課長を務めました。

私は、陸軍省戦略局の戦略課長、軍事情報課長の一任を務め、戦略の立案及び実施にあたっては、戦略局の戦略課長及び軍事情報課長の一任を務めました。

私は、戦略の立案及び実施にあたっては、陸軍省戦略局の戦略課長、軍事情報課長の一任を務め、戦略の立案及び実施にあたっては、陸軍省戦略局の戦略課長、軍事情報課長の一任を務めました。

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航空母艦のCVL(Aircraft Carrier), CVL(Carrier) converted from cruiser, CVE(escort...
四面日本海軍の軍艦建造は、一九四〇年四月に他の同型艦一隻と共に戦艦として起工されました。鬼面も無い艦隊指揮上に放棄され、一九四二年六月に至りイップドウ為に戦艦の航空母艦の旗を補ふ為急に航空母艦として再生せしむべく工事を見興したのでありまます。

従つて同艦は建造中の艦隊表に於て、戦艦としても、航空母艦として。

一隻ある旨を記載したに過ぎません。
す。往時日本海軍中部令部が米国海軍兵力を関し推測判断して、
りました等量と今回米国海軍省から図示された公文書によって示され
た現実量とは極めて接近して居るという事実、並に我々の推定が実際
の数値よりも幾分下過ぎたと言ふ事実、並に我々の推定が実際
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的数値よりも幾分下過ぎたと言ふ事実、並に我々の推定が実際
的数値日凌晨}}
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月十五日
於東京裁判員取引所
供述者
吉田 茨三
立會人
小野 豊一郎
### Comparative Table of Naval Vessels under Construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BATTLE SHIPS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 ves. 128,000 Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS</strong></td>
<td>4 ves. 77,860 Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEAVY CRUISERS</strong></td>
<td>11 ves. 188,200 Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIGHT CRUISERS</strong></td>
<td>4 ves. 42,700 Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DESTROYERS</strong></td>
<td>12 ves. 27,120 Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMARINES</strong></td>
<td>29 ves. 42,554 Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MISCELLANEOUS</strong></td>
<td>37 ves. 57,225 Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>88 vessels</td>
<td>1,321 vessels</td>
<td>1,409 vessels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle Ships</td>
<td>2 ves. 128,000 Tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>4 ves. 77,860 Tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Cruisers</td>
<td>11 ves. 188,200 Tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>37 ves. 57,225 Tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88 vessels</td>
<td>1,321 vessels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Research Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, and that such official copies of official records of the Japanese Government. The data of the U.S. Navy certified records of the U.S. Navy Department in Washington, D.C. I further certify that the records are correct and accurate. Signed this on the 1st of May 1947, at Tokyo.

[Official seal and signature]
Comparison between the U.S.A. and Japan, as of Dec. 7, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TONS</th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides this there was 1 battle ship (62,000 tons), the building of which was suspended just after keel laid.

Government as member of APACITy have prepared this chart. Tonnages were taken from files and the chart is true.

Hidemi Yoshida.

[Signature]
Comparative Table of Naval Vessels on Hand Between Japan and the U.S.A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle Ships</td>
<td>10 ves. 301,400 tons.</td>
<td>8 ves. 162,600 tons.</td>
<td>18 ves. 464,000 tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>10 ves. 152,970 tons.</td>
<td>8 ves. 162,600 tons.</td>
<td>18 ves. 315,570 tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Cruisers</td>
<td>18 ves. 158,800 tons.</td>
<td>18 ves. 171,200 tons.</td>
<td>36 ves. 329,970 tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Cruisers</td>
<td>20 ves. 98,855 tons.</td>
<td>19 ves. 157,775 tons.</td>
<td>39 ves. 256,610 tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>112 ves. 165,868 tons.</td>
<td>172 ves. 239,530 tons.</td>
<td>284 ves. 405,398 tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>65 ves. 97,900 tons.</td>
<td>111 ves. 116,621 tons.</td>
<td>176 ves. 214,521 tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>151 ves.</td>
<td></td>
<td>151 ves.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Japan - 391 vessels. = 1,466,120 tons. U.S.A. 1,537 vessels. = 2,655,450 tons.

I hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government, Second Demobilization Bureau, and in such official capacity from official records of the Japanese Government, the data of the I taken from certified records of the U.S. Navy Department in Washington, D.C. on the 1st of May, 1947, at Tokyo. Hereby certifying that the above chart is true and accurate.
### Between the U.S.A. and Japan, as of Dec. 7, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>534.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>600 Tons</th>
<th>490,384 Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

77 Tons.

95 Tons.

---

*I further certify*

---

志田英三

---

Government as member of Reseas.

---

The vessels and tonnage are accurately stated.

---

政府員として、航路と重量が正確に記載されていることをご認証申し上げます。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>日期</th>
<th>金额</th>
<th>日期</th>
<th>金额</th>
<th>日期</th>
<th>金额</th>
<th>日期</th>
<th>金额</th>
<th>日期</th>
<th>金额</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**备注：**

根据上述表格数据，可以看出...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>机线</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>电压</td>
<td>6877</td>
<td>7890</td>
<td>4567</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>9876</td>
<td>6543</td>
<td>3456</td>
<td>7890</td>
<td>4567</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>9876</td>
<td>6543</td>
<td>3456</td>
<td>7890</td>
<td>4567</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>9876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>电流</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>9876</td>
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注：表中数据仅供参考，实际使用时请根据具体情况进行调整。
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SOURCE: Bureau of Naval Personnel, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard.
Excerpt from ANNUAL REPORT Fiscal Year 1945 - THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY - BY TYPE

NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND COAST GUARD
1 July 1940 through 30 June 1945

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- 1 -
Sworn Deposition

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Nobutake KONDO. For approximately 40 years, from November 1907 (Meiji 40) when I graduated from the Naval Academy, until I was relegated into the reserves as a full admiral in September 1945 (Showa 20) I served in the Japanese Navy. During my term of service I held the following posts at the Naval General Staff at three different times:
   
   From June 1930 (Showa 5) until December 1932 (Showa 7) - Naval General Staff First Section Chief (Captain)
   
   From December 1935 (Showa 10) until December 1938 (Showa 13) - Naval General Staff First Division Chief (Rear Admiral - Vice Admiral)
   
   From October 1939 (Showa 14) until September 1941 (Showa 15) - Vice Chief of Naval General Staff (Vice Admiral)

2. As a rule, the following procedure was followed by the Japanese Navy in its planning and effectuation of its armament program:
   
   (1) The annual national defense plan was formulated by the First Section of the First Division of the Naval General Staff. This was a decision on policy on how to complete national defense, envisioning the eventuality of war, and formed the basis for armament plans and the training programs of all units, etc.
   
   (2) The Third Division of the Naval General Staff collected and pieced together information on the international situation, the war preparedness conditions, and war potential of the major powers and distributed it to the divisions of the Naval General
Staff to serve as criterions for the various planning it did for the Navy in general.

(3) The Third Section of the Second Division of the Naval General Staff, on the basis of the above-mentioned National Defense plan, formed the draft of a plan for minimum possible armament required by the Navy for fulfilling its national defense responsibilities, after consideration of the national strength and of the armament situation of the major powers. The draft, after being approved by the superiors, was deliberated at a preliminary conference with competent officers of the Navy Ministry. At this preliminary conference, national strength, the difficulties of execution of the plan etc. were most minutely examined by the representatives of the Navy Ministry and of the Naval General Staff and it was customary for considerable alterations to be made in the draft.

(4) After an understanding had been reached at the above-mentioned preliminary conference, an official report of the conference was sent by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the Navy Minister, to which the latter set forth his opinions on the prospects of the execution of the plan in his reply.

(5) The Navy Ministry, besides, contacted the various government organs in connection with distribution of budget and material

(6) After the budget had been decided, the execution order was issued by the Navy Minister and the various organs began their allotted work in the execution of the order.

The organization being as above delineated, I - holding the positions before mentioned - had considerably detailed information on armaments.

It was immediately after the conclusion of the 1930 London Disarmament Conference that I was appointed First Section Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff. It was consequentially at a time when the National Defense plan had to be revised to a yet more defensive order to conform to the new situation.

By the Washington Treaty, the number of capital ships and aircraft carriers permitted Japan for retention was limited to 60%
of those of the United States and Great Britain. However, information collected after the Treaty revealed that the United States Navy was steadily preparing for trans-ocean operations and it was thought that if the necessity arose the United States Fleet could at any time reach Japanese home waters. To oppose this threat, efforts were made to complete our national defenses by equipping the Navy with fleet-footed cruisers and other craft of lesser type which would depend principally upon their torpedoes to carry out interceptive operations in home waters.

Moreover, with the limitation placed on the strength in auxiliary vessels permitted for retention by the London Disarmament Treaty of 1930, the characteristic armament of our Navy was made subject to restriction. Further, we were forced to look on with folded arms whilst the United States Navy constructed new types of warships.

For this reason the ratification of the Treaty became a serious problem in the Privy Council, while Stimson's "Hats Off" speech in the Senate contributed not a little to aggravating the feelings of the Japanese people. The Naval General Staff arrived at the conclusion that there was no way of coping with this situation except through intensive training for the raising of technical strength and through construction of such small warships as were not limited by the restrictions of the Treaty and airplanes to cover up the resulting defects in armaments.

It was around this time that many precious lives were sacrificed in fierce training; and deplorable accidents involving warcraft which were not covered by treaty limitations occurred, such as capsizing in heavy weather of torpedo boats under 600 tons which were too heavily armed.

4. I was appointed Chief of Division One of the Naval General Staff at the time when the 1935-1936 London Disarmament Conference was in session. A month after my appointment Japan seceded from that conference.

What we advocated at this conference was a step forward from
our earlier demand for armaments that were non-aggressive and non-menacing - namely, armament which would remove all danger of war ever breaking out. Unfortunately our thesis was not accepted by the other powers. The Japanese Navy directed its attention to various experiments with the aim of fulfilling its responsibility in national defense within the scope of the minimum possible budget, in consideration of the meagre resources of the nation. The result was the discovery that there was no other way than to give our armament program the characteristics hereafter to be shown. As a result, the Third Supplementary Program was drafted.

The Third Supplementary Program called for the construction of two battleships, two aircraft carriers, eighteen destroyers and fourteen submarines - a total of thirty-six ships with a total tonnage of 233,000 tons, plus thirty-four auxiliary vessels displacing 44,500 tons by the end of 1941.

Considering that, even were the Washington and London Treaties to continue in effect, the time had arrived for replacement and construction of capital ships with the tendency present in all major powers to launch into large scale warship construction, the plan was indeed on a very minor scale.

The principal characteristic of this plan was the construction of two capital ships each carrying nine 18 inch guns and displacing 64,000 tons. As before mentioned, as there was finally no quantitative limitation adopted at the London Disarmament Conference because of the trend for replacement and construction of capital ships, the major powers simultaneously launched into construction of capital ships. In this situation our country, unable to realize armament in any way comparable to that of the other nations by any ordinary methods, adopted the construction of super-battleships as a last resort and attempted to fulfill its national defense obligations within the scope of a small budget.

In May 1938 (Showa 13) the second "Vinson" Plan passed the United States Congress and information steadily filtered in to th
effect that construction of capital ships and other craft was being promoted. Various measures to counter this situation were studied but expenditure running high owing to the China Incident, no concrete plan had been formulated up to the time of my leaving the post of Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff in December of the same year (1938).

It was immediately after the outbreak of World War II in Europe that I was appointed Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff. In our country it was the time when we were worrying over means of preventing the war from spreading outside Europe. We had already received notification of the abrogation of the Japan-United States Trade Treaty at the time. Our intelligence section knew that American reconnaissance troops had already moved into Hawaii and that the Hawaiian Army Air Force had been greatly strengthened. This United States pressure on Japan was felt acutely by us who were charged with the plans for national defense, and our uneasiness over the question as to how we should meet our responsibilities of national defense in the face of the rapidly mounting American naval preparations was hourly increasing.

At that time the Japanese Navy was in the midst of the abovementioned Third Supplementary Program, but with the exception of the completion of a portion of the smaller craft, this Program was still unfinished. Meanwhile, from the beginning of the same year namely of the year 1939 (Showa 14), it had started on the Fourth Supplementary Program. According to the judgment of the Naval General Staff at that time, the United States, in accordance with the Second Vinson Plan, had started or was about to start construction in the near future on three 45,000 ton capital ships, aircraft carriers to the tonnage of 40,000 tons, cruisers to the approximate tonnage of 70,000 tons, plus destroyers and submarines totaling an approximate 40,000 tons, and other auxiliary craft, in addition to the six capital ships, two aircraft carriers and numerous cruisers and smaller craft it had under construction. It was because of this enormous United States armament program and the aforementioned...
political and military pressure that the Third Supplementary Pro-
gram was considered insufficient to warrant confidence from the
national defense viewpoint, and the Fourth Supplementary Program
was begun.

The Fourth Supplementary Program was a program for the construc-
tion of a total of fifty nine vessels including two battleships, one
aircraft carrier, six cruisers, twenty four destroyers, twenty six
submarines, displacing an approximate 296,000 tons, besides twenty
four auxiliary ships totaling approximately 29,000 tons, by the end
of 1944 (Showa 19); but at the time of my appointment in October
1939 (Showa 14), with the exception of part of the small warship
program, the plan was not yet under way. Further, the two batt-
leships of this plan were similar to those of the Third Supplemen-
tary Program. Their construction was commenced in the beginning of 194
(Showa 15); but as will be shown later, the building had to be dis-
continued within the same year. One of them had to be scrapped be-
fore the outbreak of the Pacific War, while the other was abandoned
with its keel on the docks until the war began.

Immediately after my appointment to office, information was
received that the Third Vinson Armament Expansion Plan had passed
the United States Congress and we felt grave misgiving touching
national defense. And in January 1940 (Showa 15) the incident in
which the "Asama Maru" was boarded by a British warship in waters
so close to Tokyo made the Japanese people in general very sensit
regarding our security by sea. In July 1940 (Showa 15) the United
States published its so-called "Stark Plan" for construction of
two-ocean fleet. Up to that time we had managed somehow to form
national defense plans against the naval expansion of the United
States; but we could discover no means of discharging our national
defense duties within the scope of our limited national resources
if this enormous plan were to materialize.

Moreover, as the United States - Japanese trade restrictions
were steadily being stiffened and negotiations for increase of
trade with the Netherland East Indies and French Indo China were
not progressing at all, it seemed as though the very foundation of our nation was being threatened. Further it was our belief that the fact of the United States Fleet moving into Hawaii, together with the strengthening of concerted United States - British support to the Chungking Government, made the latter confident of victory and thereby rendered more difficult the settlement of the China Incident, which was Japan's greatest concern at that time.

Such being the situation, and there being ever present the danger of war clouds spreading to the Far East by some untoward error at any time, the execution of the Third and Fourth Supplementary Programs had to be hurried.

As construction of the two battleships of the Fourth Supplementary Program was not progressing, and in order to concentrate all effort on speeding up construction of small-type craft especially required for defense purposes, construction on the former was discontinued in November 1940 (Showa 15). Again, around autumn of the same year, plans were submitted also for the emergency conversion of merchantmen into auxiliary aircraft carriers.

Toward the end of 1940 (Showa 15) the international situation took a sudden turn for the worse. Information was received of the mobilization of the Philippines Reserve Army, of the United States Secretary of War's instructions to declare martial law in Pearl Harbor, of the withdrawal of United States troops stationed in North China, of announcement of mines being laid in the eastern entrance to the Singapore Straits, of reinforcement of Australian troops in Malay, of military conferences and operations agreement between the United States, Great Britain and Australia and the arrival of United States troops to reinforce the Philippine Army in Manila, etc.

As for the Naval General Staff, it considered various plans realizing that it had to do something about naval armaments in view of the great naval expansion of the United States. While it was being hampered in forming any workable plan because of lack of national resources, the international situation took a turn for
the worse, as already mentioned, and in view of the steadily pro-
gressing United States naval armament expansion the Emergency
Supplementary Program was put into effect in May 1941 (Show: 16)
which called for the construction of nine medium and nine small
submarines respectively, besides war-ships for defense purposes.
Further, in August of the same year, an Emergency Armament Program,
of which one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, twenty six destroyers,
three small submarines and other defensive forces comprised the
main points, was put into execution. However, with even this, we
could not possibly keep pace with the enormous expansion plan of
the United States Navy, and we always suffered from misgiving and
apprehension. Our armament plans were stimulated by this over-
whelming expansion plan of the United States Navy and what we con-
sidered the military encirclement of Japan. Thus our plans were
formulated on the spur of the moment, as is indicated by the use
of the names Extraordinary Supplementary Program and Emergency
Supplementary Program. In substance, they were mainly based on
small defensive warships.

6. The armament situation of the Japanese Navy during my various
terms of office at the Naval General Staff was as given above.
Those responsible applied themselves perseveringly to the task of
fulfilling their duties of national defense and consolidating arma-
ments within the scope of the meagre national resources to oppose
the increasing naval armaments of the major powers.

In other words, our Navy's single thought was how to defend
against the potential threat of a foreign fleet invading our home
waters, and our plans were formed and armament policy decided on
the basis of this consideration. Not even once was a plan drafted
for an aggressive attack on another nation at this time.

I swear to the Tribunal that in my capacity as a high ranking
officer in the Japanese Navy that during my tenure of office at
the Naval General Staff there were absolutely no plans made by the
Japanese Navy which were intended or planned for offensive war.
Prior to my assumption of office there existed no such plans be-
cause I closely surveyed all of the information and papers that existed in the files of my predecessors. From personal observation of the plans for naval training which I received and those that I drafted myself while serving with the Fleet, as well as of the education given at the various naval educational institutions, I emphatically testify that the naval plans for the protection of Japan were wholly defensive in nature.

During the time I held office at the Naval General Staff and was participating in the decisions on national defense plans and armament policy, the poverty of national resources constituted a large source of worry. Difficulties were encountered especially on the following points:

1. In the event of war, it was considered quite possible that Japan's shipbuilding speed might slow down but that it would be most difficult, if not impossible, for it to be increased, while the United States and Great Britain, on the contrary, were expected to accelerate their construction rate at a rapid pace as had been done at the time of World War I.

2. While Japan possessed very few first rate merchant ships which could be converted into auxiliary warships in case of emergency, Great Britain and the United States had many such vessels capable of speedy conversion.

3. Japan did not possess civilian aircraft which could be converted into a reserve air force as could the numerous civilian aircraft possessed by the United States and Great Britain.

4. Japan possessed only a small number of civilian factories capable of being converted into munition factories during war time while, on the other hand, the United States and Great Britain were capable of large scale conversion of civilian industrial plants into military use during war time.

5. Japan faced a shortage of materials vital for war time needs whereas, by comparison, both the United States and Great Britain had an abundance of such materials.

In the face of these facts, it was necessary for us to ma:
tain a comparatively large peace time force even though this meant a heavy strain on our meagre national resources. The ability of the United States and Great Britain to rapidly mobilize and draw upon their vast resources dictated this necessity. And to have failed to consider these factors would have left a serious defect in national defense.

8. In the affidavit of Admiral Richardson, presented to this Tribunal on November 25th of last year, it was stated that the Japanese Navy in its preparation for a war of aggression had been exerting itself toward the construction of aircraft carriers. The statement varies from the facts indicated by the very construction of the carriers themselves, which show that they were built for use in home waters.

It is a fact that aircraft carriers may very easily be utilized for offensive purposes, but it was also generally recognized that aircraft carriers were necessary for defense against attacks by fleets which included aircraft carriers.

The Japanese naval authorities believed that aircraft carriers were absolutely required for defense purposes as long as other powers possessed aircraft carriers.

For Japan there was great danger of attack by carrier-borne planes, in which event damage would be extremely great, for the following reasons:

1. Japan, being narrow and surrounded on all sides by sea, there was no area of the island which lay outside the attacking radius of carrier-borne planes.

2. Nearly all the major cities, large industrial areas, and the trunk lines of communications of Japan lie close to the coast.

3. Most Japanese houses, being constructed of inflammable material, damage through bombing would prove extremely great; and if incendiary bombs were used there was great danger of large fires resulting.

To defend itself against attack by carrier-borne planes, Japan required numerous airfields and aircraft. As means of defense against attack by aircraft there are airplanes, anti-aircraft...
Defense Document 1978

weapons and barrage balloons, but aircraft was the most effective of the three. When the objectives to be defended lie along the coast, as was mostly the case in Japan, anti-aircraft weapons and balloon barrages usually could not be expected to prove sufficiently effective in warding off attack.

Japanese territory, being small and surrounded by sea, necessitated the existence of numerous airfields and airplanes for the defense against attack from air. Further, weather conditions, being often very bad, would prove an obstacle to movement and concentration of aircraft, and hence an even greater necessity for large numbers of airfields and aircraft.

It was impossible to maintain large numbers of aircraft owing to the meagreness of national resources. Further, construction of airfields was difficult because of the narrowness of the territory and especially because of scarcity of flat land.

On the one hand, for the Fleet not to include aircraft carriers while other nations possessed this type of ship would have meant a marked difference in capacity for reconnaissance, long distance attacking potential and strength in anti-aircraft defense. With the development of aircraft, a fleet without aircraft carriers lost its raison d'être. It was therefore advantageous, especially in the case of Japan, to maintain this carrier strength of the Fleet at a point where it could fully hold its own against those of opponent nations, and thereby to serve the purpose of national defense.

Aircraft carriers could be utilized to advantage in the aerial defense of the home land since it is surrounded on all sides by water. Especially is this true since there was the danger of attack by enemy carrier-borne planes. In such an event our carriers could be used to attack the enemy carriers before they entered the radius for bombing of the Japanese mainland, thus providing us with adequate defense against air attack. In view of the comparative facility of movement and concentration, even in the event of bad weather, there were many favorable arguments in favor of maintaining aircraft carriers as a way to improve national defense.
of aircraft carriers in the naval defense of the narrow territory of Japan.

It was for this very reason that Vice Admiral Kanji KATO, the Senior Japanese Technical Committee member to the 1922 Washington Disarmament Conference, advocated the necessity of Japan having the same number of aircraft carriers as the United States and Britain, for defensive purposes.

Further, it may be clearly seen from the nature and capacity of the Japanese carriers that they were constructed for defensive purposes and not for offensive. Moreover, to utilize carriers for offensive warfare it is necessary to have various types of attending warships; but the Japanese Navy did not have them.

The number of Japanese aircraft carriers on December 7, 1941, including temporarily converted merchantmen, was ten with displacement of some 152,970 tons. Included in this number were the slow moving converted merchant ship "Kasuga Maru", the out-dated, over-aged small carrier the "Hosho", which was used only for training purposes, the small carriers, "Ryujo" and "Zuiho", which could carry only a limited number of small aircraft. Consequently, the number of aircraft carriers which could be utilized for fleet action was six. Moreover, the cruising radii of these first line carriers were far shorter than those of United States naval ships. Evidence of this fact may be seen in the extraordinary refueling problems that later confronted the Navy in its preparations for the Pearl Harbor Attack.
On this 11th day of August, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEFONENT: KONDO, Nobutake

I, KONDO, Nobutake hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) SUZU, Isamu (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KONDO, Nobutake (seal)
D. D. 1500-B-2

Exhibit No. 12 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

14 November 1945

Hon. Frank B. Keefe,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Keefe:

I am enclosing a revised statement on naval estimates and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941 inclusive to be substituted for the statement with the Secretary of Navy's letter sent you on yesterday.

This revised statement was prepared after collaboration between this office and the Bureau of the Budget in studying the records of the Navy in question, and the figures appearing thereon will agree with those furnished you by the Bureau of the Budget. While the record concerning the regular Naval Appropriation bills for each year were complete, information concerning supplemental estimates requested by the Navy Department was lacking in many cases and required extended search through the files for the years in question.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. G. Allen
E. G. ALLEN,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Director of Budget and Reports.

(Enclosure)
### Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Appropriations requested by the Navy Department</th>
<th>Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress</th>
<th>Amounts made available by the Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>Budget estimate</td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>requested by the Navy Department</td>
<td>of appropriations submitted to the Congress</td>
<td>Contract authority</td>
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<td>1932</td>
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<td>$358,262,123</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>347,794,248</td>
<td>358,262,123</td>
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<td>10,000,000</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>1935</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>335,410,916</td>
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### Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1936 to 1941, inclusive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Appropriations requested by the Navy Department</th>
<th>Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress</th>
<th>Amounts made available by the Congress</th>
<th>Appropriations</th>
<th>Contract authority</th>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1,921,300</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1938</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
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<td>562,425,709</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>567,191,709</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
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</table>
## Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Appropriations requested by the Navy Department</th>
<th>Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress</th>
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<tr>
<td>Supplementation and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
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<td>2,225,094,342</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>3,562,405,920</td>
<td>3,549,383,345</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total asked</td>
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<td>7,426,240,190</td>
<td>7,256,236,276</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,337,311,577</td>
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<td>Supplementation and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>3,368,187,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,226,629,902</td>
<td>3,562,405,920</td>
<td>3,549,383,345</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total asked</td>
<td>4,434,271,533</td>
<td>7,426,240,190</td>
<td>7,256,236,276</td>
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1934-1941 inclusive:

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<th>Congress executed budget by</th>
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Total: 8,265,934,388
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<th>Appropriated by the Congress</th>
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<td>Contract authorizations</td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
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<td>283,960,155</td>
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# Appropriations, War Department military establishment, fiscal years 1932 through 1941

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Requested by War Department</th>
<th>Requested by the Bureau of the Budget</th>
<th>Appropriated by the Congress</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>Contract authorizations</td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
</tr>
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<td>1936</td>
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<td>Contract authorizations</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>12,807,789,142</td>
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<td>11,830,355,139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
一、私の姓名は近藤信竹と言います。

二、私は明治四十年（一九〇七年）十一月海軍兵学校卒業以来昭和二十年（一九四五年）九月海軍大将で予備役に編入せられる迄約四十年間

（一）軍令部第一部第一課で毎年度国防計画を立て之を実施するのに次の様々な手続

に依るのを例として居りました。

昭和一〇年（一九三五年）十二月まで

軍令部次長（海軍中将）

昭和十四年（一九四〇年）十月から同十六年（一九四二年）十二月まで

軍令部第一部第一課長（海軍少将）

（二）此の間、私は左の通り三度に亘り軍令部に勤務致しました。
経計画及び部隊の訓練計画等の基準となるものであります。

（二）司令部、第三部では海軍全ての計画計画立案上の参考資料とする為、国際情勢に列国軍備の状況及び現勢に備する情報を集め、これを総合し各部に配布して居りました。

（三）陸海軍においては司令部、第三部において、前記国防計画に基づき、必要な情報に基づき、国際情勢に列国軍備の状態を考慮し、日本の防衛上の責任を遂行するに必要と考えられる最少限度の軍備計画の原案を作り、上司の同意を経て、海外省の主務者に下協議します。この下協議に於ては国、実行の難易等に就き、省部間に極めて詳細な討議を盡して相当な修正を加へられること常であります。

（六）予算が決定された所で、海軍大臣から実施に備する命令が下され夫々、
二年が六年条約の御批准に即し号院で非常を書くとになったのでありますのが、
一方米国の上院には、スザンヌ氏の防衛案が行はるも口民の感情
に少からし奈に罰を呑ました。従ってとして許し許しする方策として、服
訓練に依る能力の向上に余る外五条約の範囲以外の小広範及び飛行爆を降倹
し新たにした手段の増を捧げ外れずとの結果であったのであります。

この頃、条約に依る軍部の資質なる人命を犠牲にした外観は条約自
外の見地では大々の我を下しの水際には無縁に多くの兵器を期設した為荒
四

任後一ヶ月程で内々日方の同案よりの助進となったのではり
一歩然に依り軍部の資質は従来の不満成不備の点を訴え上主張を更
るの際、同内主張の虎の舞い様な仮備にすると言々主張に許るもので
ありました。何幸は著しい問題に依り成るのに少し予算の範囲内で如何にして口防
分は問題は差し却つ問題に依り成るのに少し予算の範囲内で如何にして口防

5
昭和十三年（一九三八年）五月には第二次大戦作戦の為、米国を訪問したが国防省の業務を務め、当時海軍では高等職務を務めた。第二次大戦作戦の為、米国を訪問したが国防省の業務を務め、当時海軍では高等職務を務めた。
私の着任直後第三次ソビエト連邦軍機関飛行機爆撃機の問題の経緯がある私々としては非常な大なる不安を感じました。昭和十五年七月米国は南洋艦隊建設の問題として「スター・レース」案を発表しましたがこれに伴い我方は米国の海軍拡張に対し何とか対策を講じて来ました。この問題は米国がそれにに対応して来させた場合限りあり我軍力の範囲内で如何にして我防の策をな計画が実を結び来た場合限りあり我軍力の範囲内で如何にして我防の策を

私ここ述べるに至っては我々は殆ど方策を見出し得ませんでした。

しかし米国の対日貿易は頑強にその側限を蠻化して來るし、関東、満洲との

貿易問題増員の交渉は一向難持らず、我方中立の政策が何とかされる有機的である

化は重複政府をして戦勝国にありと思はしめて終に暫時、我國の最大関心事

たりし支那戦局解決は未々困難の態を加へるものと信ぜられました。
昭和十五年（一九四〇年）末頃より国際情勢は急激に悪化し、北支要衝の情勢が事態の一端を占めていた。この影響を受けて、海軍は次第に機密を厳守しつつ、海軍の航空母艦を作る密を決してしまった。又同年秋頃に至り、急迫的に改装し
て航空母艦は昭和十四年（一九四〇年）十一月に竣工したものである。

昭和十六年（一九四一年）五月に中小型水雷を各艦に作られた、その他の防禦用
艦艇の臨時追加補充計画を実施に移しに同年八月には航空母艦一艘、巡洋艦二隻、巡洋艦三隻、潜水艦三隻、その他の防寒兵力を主とした艦艇の臨時追加補充計画を実施に移したのであります。なお、この三隻の巡洋艦の防寒兵力は米海軍の巡洋艦に相当するものであります。
たことは全く無理と言うことも裁判所に対し明言致します。又私の従任前
も斯の如く計画は存りませんでした。このことは私が前任者の蔵本に有
た論の情報及言説を詳細に咨料したので明らかである。私が蔵本に勤
務中受けた訓諭及び蔵本の預教の計画を蔵本から見ても、又蔵本の各教官
の教育から見ても日本海軍の国防計画は防部以外の何物でもなかったこ
とを強く信じ致します。

第七条

私が蔵本部に勤務し国防計画及び軍方針の決定に関与した際、我口力
が貧弱であると言ふことは大きな懸念の部であります。特に左の論点15
はその対策を講ずるものに困りました。

米国には戦時艦艇の補助として使用し得る抗飛魚雷は極めて少ないのに迎
し英米は多数の優秀船を有することを著しく促進させるものと考えられるが

米国は陸海軍軍とならず而も民間航空は速めて貧弱なのでに反し英米は極め
多くの民間企業力を持っておられること。

模もくような民間企業力を持っておられることを、軍用に活用した歴史を有すること。

戦時兵器を造り、軍用に活用した歴史を有すること。

戦時兵器を造り、軍用に活用した歴史を有すること。

この必要が生じたので、これを無くし、防上に大切な欠陥となること、これによります。
日本は航空母艦搭載機に依り攻撃させられる危険多く且その場合の被害
に限って大きいのであります。その理由は次の通りであります。
その理由は次の通りであります。

日本は四面海で且つ国土狭長でありますから航空母艦搭載機の攻撃
日本に航空母艦等は数に依る攻撃も防護されるが、爆弾や弾丸は防護されません。空襲は依る攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないが、未だに依る攻撃も依らない部分には依らないのであります。日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないが、日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないのであります。日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないが、日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないのであります。日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないが、日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないのであります。日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないが、日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないのであります。日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないが、日本に依る攻撃も依らない攻撃も防護されうる部分には依らないのであります。
一方は敵に実機が発見対能を有するより航空母艦を含んで居ない偵察力及び遠距離に於ける発見力に於て防空防犯力としての整を生じ飛行設の発達はそのままに於て本艦防空を兼ねさせることが日本の航空母艦を充分紡手国を匹敵し得る様にしてこれで本土防空を兼ねさせるとは日本の航空母艦を日本本土防空に於て防空母艦を用用するに便であります。特に敵航空母艦等を本土防空に於て防空母艦等を用用するに便であります。本土防空を兼ねさせるものであります。本土の防空母艤が進攻的意図の下に為されたもので無く防禦的意図に

尚日本の航空母艦が進攻的意図の下に為されたもので無く防禦的意図に
悲いて建造された事はその航空母艦の性能から見れば明かであります。

日本は一九四一年十二月七日に保有していた航空母艦に急激に増備を

この中には艦橋から改築した速力の遅い駆逐艦、練習用にしか使用して

なければならない造式小型艦、風呂及小型で数少なかった小型艦の

この先端は艦が急激に使用出来る航空母艦に六隻というふることになりま

為には後には日本海軍が実験及び攻撃の準備に努って、総計補給の非常

に空襲を防ぐことを目的に東京及び他に進出せられた。
昭和二十三年（一九四八年）八月十一日於東京

右八百立倉人ノ面前ニテ直筆シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ聡明シ

供読者近

信

竹

於

立倉人

鈴木

勇
良品

実

信

竹

20
Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Tatsukichi MIYO and I was formerly a captain in the Japanese Navy. I served in Section One (Operations Section) of the Naval General Staff from 1 November 1939 until 27 December 1942. At that time I held the rank of Commander. During this period of service I was placed in charge of air operations and took part in the planning of the Pearl Harbor Operation as well as other operations in the Pacific War. My assignment involved coordinating work between the General Staff and the Combined Fleet.

1. The Pearl Harbor Attack was decided upon a short time before the outbreak of war. A study of the circumstances related to the planning and preparation thereof will reveal when it was originated.

2. Around May 1941, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet submitted to the General Staff a plan of operations to cope with the possibility of our being drawn into a war with the United States. This plan was based upon the assumption that the United States Pacific Fleet would be anchored at Hawaii and that our fleet could deal an initial blow against it through the medium of an air raid by carrier borne planes. This whole idea was a radical departure from the plans of naval defense hitherto designed by the Naval General Staff. Since it was a venturesome plan, the Naval General Staff viewed it with great scepticism and little interest.
Among some of the grounds that made the project appear definitely impractical was the fact that our air strength was not adequate; the degree of secrecy for such an operation would be difficult to maintain; the fact that the United States Fleet might not be in Pearl Harbor at the time designated for the attack, and the difficulty in securing proper intelligence for the execution of such operation. In addition to these, at that time both the Army and Navy Supreme Headquarters were in complete accord on the opinion that the Sino-Japanese conflict must be brought to a speedy conclusion and that all other matters pertaining to national policies in the Southern Regions and elsewhere should be left to the diplomatic representatives of our government for solution.

Moreover, the Navy at that time felt strongly that war with the United States could be averted. Such being the case, as said before, the Naval General Staff considered the Pearl Harbor Attack Plan a fanciful thing and did not take it seriously. In view of this opinion of the Naval General Staff, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet, in turn, did not press the subject further.

However, in July of 1941, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands took severe economic steps toward Japan with the result that the oil supply of the country was shut off. Parallel ing these measures, we had had knowledge of United States, British and Netherlands war preparations designated against Japan. And the conception of matters at that time in the Navy was that Japan was steadily being encircled.

The Navy, charged with the primary duty of national defense in the Pacific, faced a situation which could not be complacent ignored. Some time in September, and in view of the then existing conditions, my colleagues and I in the General Staff received orders from our superiors to begin making preparations for formulating potential plans of operation against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. Approximately in the early part of September, Headquarters of the Combined Fleet resubmitted
an opinion to the General Staff that an air attack against the United States Fleet at Hawaii was a requisite operation in the event of war. They also notified us that this plan was scheduled to be studied at one of the regular chart maneuvers of the Navy to be held some time in the middle of September with key personnel of the Fleet as the participants. Whereupon the Naval General Staff agreed that if the result of the chart maneuvers were found successful the Hawaii Operation would be taken into consideration and studied.

After the maneuver, opinions were exchanged between the Naval General Staff, Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and Headquarters of the First Air Force Fleet as to whether or not the plan was plausible. Recognition of serious difficulties in the execution of the plan, from a technical viewpoint, resulted from this discussion. The First Air Force Fleet, which would have to take the most active role in the attack, opposed the plan. The Naval General Staff also was opposed to it. It was then decided to make further studies of the matter. Therefore, at this time, there was no plan acceptable by the High Command directed at attacking the United States Fleet if the Navy was called upon in the event of war.

The Headquarters of the First Air Fleet later reversed their former opinion and around the latter part of September, 1941, Captain KUROSHIMA, Staff Officer of the Combined Fleet, came to the Naval General Staff and there stated the strong opinion of Commander in Chief Admiral YAMAMOTO in favor of the plan. The effect of this opinion was that the attack against Pearl Harbor was the only hope of successfully conducting naval operations against the United States. It was there pointed out by the General Staff that in the event of war it would be necessary for Japan to secure the main areas of the southern regions such as the Philippines, Netherlands Indies, Malaya, etc. at an early date from the standpoint of self existence and self protection. It was recognized that in face of the steadily increasing militar;
and naval preparedness of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, a Japanese attempt to secure the southern regions would be difficult of attainment, even if virtually all of our air strength was used in such operation.

If it was taken into consideration that our air power would have to be divided if the Hawaii Operation was to take place, a very difficult situation would arise. Furthermore, since a large portion of the Fleet would be involved in the attack on Hawaii, it was evident that a blunder at the very outset of the war would be disastrous. It was suggested that the unprotected Mandated Islands should be defended with what available force there was, based upon a plan that in the event the United States Fleet attacked us in the midst of our southern operations, the Southern Region Operation Forces could be diverted to meet it. In other words, the more advantageous use of our forces would be to concentrate the main strength in the southern region operations at the outset and smash the bulk of the enemy strength in that area as quickly possible. Thereafter, to shift the greater part of our naval air strength to preparation for counter attack operations against the United States Fleet.

Against this line of thought, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet maintained that since the Mandated Islands were unprotected, even if the Southern Region Operation Forces were diverted to meet the United States Forces in the event of an invasion, it might be unavailing and the Islands would easily be occupied by American forces. If this occurred the Mandated Areas would be occupied one after another and the line of communication between Japan proper and the Southern region areas would be severed. Therefore it was deemed vital to stop the United States Fleet before it commenced offensive operations against Japan.

The execution of the Hawaii Operation Plan was so strongly advanced by Commander in Chief YAMASHOTO that he threatened to resign if it was not accepted. Therefore, in view of this set of facts as well as other arguments, the Naval General Staff was
7. The aircraft carrier forces taking part in the Pearl Harbor Attack were formulated as follows:

On September 25th the aircraft carrier ZUIKAKU was completed and commissioned and together with the aircraft carrier SHOKAKU, completed in early August, made up the Fifth Air Force Squadron. This squadron was assigned to the First Air Force Fleet. The aircraft carrier strength of the First Fleet was then as follows:

First Air Force Squadron - composed of the AKAGI and KAGA.
Second Air Force Squadron - composed of the SORYU and HIRYU.
Fourth Air Force Squadron - composed of the RYUJO and a merchant ship which had been converted from the KASUGA MARU.
Fifth Air Force Squadron - composed of the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU.

The aircraft carriers of the Fourth Air Force Squadron were small ships of low speed and short radius of action. Furthermore, they were capable of carrying only a small number of old type planes and were unfit for the Hawaii Operation which more than taxed the cruising capacity of the new carriers.

Again, the air crew personnel and air forces on each of the above mentioned carriers was far less than the prescribed number fixed for war time operations.

The Headquarters of the Combined Fleet requested that the air crew personnel of the Fourth Air Squadron be diverted to fill vacancies existing in the First and Second Air Force Squadrons. They also requested that trained aviators with aircraft carrier experience be supplied from the Flying Corps ashore for the Fifth Air Force Squadron, together with the request that an increase in the number of carrier borne planes to estimated war time standards be made.

In order to provide trained personnel from shore flying unit, it was necessary to use instructor personnel of Naval Air Corps training units. This created an additional problem since the then existing conditions were that, even with the number of flying
instructors on hand at that time, we were lacking sufficient instructors to meet the demand of training badly needed new pilots. However, because of the insistence of the Commander in Chief this request could not be denied although the central authorities exhibited great reluctance in complying with it since it greatly affected the plan to increase the number of air crew personnel.

The air crew members mobilized through the above mentioned measures were assembled in the middle of October. Only one month was allowed for their warming up before the date of departure from the home ports for Hawaii in the middle of November. This hurried training inevitably restricted the personnel to daylight attack tactics as well as daylight landing and takeoff practice from the carriers and is responsible for the fact that the air force units conducting the attack against Pearl Harbor had to avoid night operations and takeoff after daybreak.

9. The question of extending the radius of action of the aircraft carriers is important. Due to the established Japanese naval policy, our warships were so constructed that their cruising ranges were limited to our own waters and were far shorter than the cruising range of warships of the United States. For that reason, three carriers — namely, the AKAGI, SORYU and HIRYU — out of the six aircraft carriers taking part in the Hawaii Operation did not have sufficient radius of action.

As is well known to all navigators, during the winter a strong northeasterly monsoon ranges over the Northern Pacific Ocean with accompanying rough seas. The serious problem of how to refuel our vessels under those conditions presented itself. After considerable study it was decided to carry fuel even in the double bottom of each vessel and to also load fuel drums in every available space aboard ship. By these extra loadings we felt that the Fleet could operate so as to return near the area of the 160° East Longitude line, even if refueling on the way became impossible.
There was another problem involved in the use of aerial torpedoes. Previously, in order to secure dead accuracy in attacking warships with aircraft borne torpedoes, it was necessary not only to open fire at sufficiently close range but also to make certain that the torpedoes did not pass under the target.

To answer these technical requirements, research studies had been started around 1939 relative to the use of aerial torpedoes against ships at sea. However, satisfactory results were not obtained until the Yokosuka Naval Air Corps and the Aeronautical Technical Department discovered that the torpedo could be kept from submerging too deeply in the water by attaching a special balancing instrument. This was in September 1941.

These studies had not been made with the purpose in mind of attacking Pearl Harbor. The shallow waters of that area introduced a new problem which involved the use of an aerial torpedo with even a more shallow water approach than had been studied in past experiments. Thereafter, hurried research and experiments for this purpose were commenced early in October. The work of remodelling the torpedoes and equipping them with new balancing instruments was not completed before the aircraft carriers left port to rendezvous at Hitokappu Bay.

Other witnesses will testify more specifically as to these matters and will deal with the further hurried preparations that took place.

11. The Imperial Navy, with the hope of restoring peace to the Orient as soon as possible, was exerting her efforts for the speedy settlement of the China Incident. With this object in view, the 11th Air Force Fleet, consisting of base air force units, had been diverted for operations in China.

However, when war clouds hung low over the Pacific Ocean in early September, the 11th Air Force Fleet was recalled to Japan to practice preparation trainings to cope with new problems.

The operation in China conducted by the above mentioned fleet had been mainly of bombing land targets as well as aerial combat
Therefore, in order to prepare for operations inherent to the naval air force, the personnel of the Fleet had to be trained anew in such vital tactics as the bombing of mobile vessels, torpedo attacks, scoutings and reconnaissances; aerial navigation, night flying etc. Such trainings were not only important but required considerable time. To acquire necessary standards, even highly experienced fliers were required to endure long hours of renewed rigid training.

It took practically a whole month for the ground crew together with air base equipments to withdraw from China to home bases. On top of that, it required almost another whole month for them to complete various preparations for proceeding to new bases where they were to await orders for next operations. Such being the case the period for the shore based flying units to go through a stream preparation training was limited to one month or so. Due to this lack of training various problems arose. The following is a striking example of it:

According to the original plan of the Naval General Staff, the fighter planes assigned to the Philippines operation were to take off from aircraft carriers due to their short cruising radius of action. As a matter of fact, however, there was not sufficient time to be spared for practicing take off from and landing on aircraft carriers. Therefore, in the field forces a special study and training was introduced in order to lessen the rate of fuel consumption of these fighter planes. At the same time the Fleet Headquarters modified the central authorities plan so that fighter planes would load as much fuel as possible and operate directly from land bases in Formosa. In case some planes would be forced to land on the way due to lack of fuel, rescue means were to be made by the Fleet.

As the above fighter planes had to leave Formosa before dawn they had to practice night flying. To meet this requirement the Air Fleet forces were forced to suspend the training of less experienced fliers and concentrate all available time and material
upon the training of experienced fliers. As a result, the inexperienced aircrew members could not fly until the southern area operations reached a definite stage, while on the other hand, the experienced fliers, whose number were naturally limited, became almost exhausted in taking part in continuous operations day after day.

2. The Navy was further unprepared for war as evidenced by the fact that the Air Base Construction Corps was not organized until the probability of war became imminent in November. The Navy Ministry did not consent to the request of the Naval General Staff regarding the draft and organization of the Construction Corps until too late to properly train them. Consequently, conditions were such that this construction corps boarded ship with practically no training just before the outbreak of war. They lacked necessary machinery and other equipment required for hurried construction of air bases and met with innumerable difficulties.

13. The Chief of Naval General Staff issued an Imperial Headquarters Naval Directive Number 5 on 21 November 1941. This directive has been destroyed by fire but has been reconstructed from memory and it read as follows:

"The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet shall immediately recall all operating forces under its command and return home if the United States - Japanese negotiations reach an agreement."

Again, when Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO visited Tokyo on 2 December 1941 to say words of farewell, Admiral ITO, now dead but then Deputy Chief of Naval General Staff, told me that Admiral NAGANO verbally instructed YAMAMOTO as follows:

"If the United States - Japanese negotiations become certain of reaching an amicable settlement before the opening of hostilities, all forces under the Combined Fleet will be recalled from deployment to be returned home."

It was also stated in Combined Fleet Order Number 1 that in the event a great change is observed in the situation, Preparedness Status Number 2 may be retracted to Preparedness Status Number 1. "A great change in the situation", though needless to
explain, refers to United States - Japanese negotiations. That
"Preparedness Status Number 2 may be retracted to Preparedness
Status Number 1" meant the retirement of the Fleet Forces to wait-
ing positions from the operational theaters of opening hostilities
to waiting positions as was shown in Fleet Order Number One. Con-
sequently, our naval forces were so arranged that in the event
of a great change in the situation, such as an amicable settlement
of problems between the United States and Japan, they would be
able to return to Preparedness Status Number 1. That is, the
Task Force would retire to the waiting position of the evening
of December 3rd which was 42° North Latitude, 170° West longitude.
Preparedness Status Number 2 took effect when the Task Force moved
into Hawaiian waters after December 3rd, 1941.

Further, the Combined Fleet Order dated 22 November stipulate
that the "Task Force Group shall operate so that immediate recall
from deployment be possible if negotiations with the United States
reach a settlement."

Paragraph 4 of the Task Force Group Order Number 1, dated
23 November said: "Depending upon circumstances, operations may
be suspended in the midst of the trip and this group may be made
return to Hitokappu Bay, Hokkaido or Mutsu Bay area."

After the Task Force left Japan, weather forecasts and vario-
information was sent to them from the General Staff. I was chief
assigned to the drafting of such information. As I recall, it was
on the evening of December 6th when Operations Section Chief
Captain TOMIOKA spoke to me and said:

"The Task Force Group proceeding toward Hawaii may
be under great strain because of its belief that it may
be ordered to return at any moment. As the situation
stands at present it can be said there is no prospect
of negotiations between the United States and Japan
reaching an amicable settlement so we had better advise
them of this fact."

Therefore, I added this sentence to the telegram I was draft-
ing at this time: "No hope is in sight of United States - Japan
negotiations reaching peaceful settlement."

I later learned from Rear Admiral KUSAKA, then Chief of Staf
of the Task Force Group, that they were considerably worried about receiving such a message too late to be effective, and because of the distance involved were alarmed that they may not receive it at all.

15. The submarines participating in the Hawaiian Operation were ordered to refrain from attack until they knew the aerial offensive had been launched. The sole reason for the above order was the possibility of the submerged submarines missing reception of the telegram ordering cessation of operations because of success in the negotiations at the last minute.

16. We did not expect that our operation against Pearl Harbor would be entirely undetected by the United States Forces. Rather, we anticipated that there was great possibility of being detected at least 30 or 40 minutes before attack. Our submarines were to reach the waters near Hawaii one day before the scheduled attack in order to observe. We thought it to be entirely possible that they might be discovered or detected prior to the air attack. And in fact I later learned that one midget submarine was discovered and sunk one hour before the operation started. We judged that probabilities were roughly 90% that radar equipment had been installed at Hawaii and that, if so, our air force units would surely be detected at least 30 or 40 minutes before arriving over their target. Scouting sea planes were also scheduled to operate in the vicinity of Hawaii approximately 30 minutes ahead of the attacking air units. If the two sea planes should be caught by radar we thought it possible the detection of our planes would be made more than an hour before the opening of our attack. And, if detected by visual means, the attacking attempt would be discovered at least 30 minutes before the attack.

It was always our firm conviction that all necessary diplomatic steps preceding hostilities would be taken by the proper authorities. We fully expected that before hostilities commenced the United States would know a state of war existed with Japan.
Defense Document 1976

On this 30th day of June, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: MIYO, Tatsukichi

I, MIYO, Tatsukichi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

MIYO, Tatsukichi (seal)
Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Mitsuo FUCHIDA. I formerly was a captain in the Imperial Japanese Navy. I commanded the First Air Attack Unit participating in the raid on Pearl Harbor, December 8 1941.

On the 25th of August 1941 an order was received for my transfer from the post of Staff Officer of the Third Air Squadron to that of Chief Flight Officer of the Aircraft Carrier AKAGI. A few days later I reported for duty aboard the AKAGI at Yokosuka.

At that time the AKAGI was the Flagship of the First Air Fleet and the Commander in Chief was Vice Admiral NAGUMO. The First Air Fleet was then composed of the carriers AKAGI and KAGA (First Air Squadron) and the SORYU and HIRYU (Second Air Squadron.)

2. After taking over the post of Chief Flight Officer of the AKAGI, I was named Senior Chief Flight Officer of the First Air Fleet and ordered to take charge of the combined training of all the air corps aboard the above mentioned four aircraft carriers, as well as to assume unified command of the air force when it should be organized.

Up to that time, there had been a tendency to carry out air training of the fleets in respect to individual carriers, with the result that the over-all strength of the group had not been adequately brought out. It was decided at this point to place special emphasis upon the group training and unified command of all the air corps attached to the First Air Fleet; hence, the above order issued to me in my position as Senior Chief Flight
Defense Document 1982

Officer of the Fleet.

Most of the air corps then attached to the First Air Fleet were distributed for training purposes among several bases located in southern Kyushu.

I carried on my training duties at the Kagoshima Base and at that time neither I nor any of the other members of the flying corps even knew that the idea of the attack on Pearl Harbor had been conceived. We carried on the above-mentioned group training throughout September in the belief that it was our so-called "annual training".

3. Toward the end of September - I do not remember the exact date - Lieutenant Commander Genda, then Tactical Staff Officer of the First Air Fleet, came to me under orders from above with the instruction that as the negotiations with America were becoming more and more critical, the idea had been conceived that in the event of war breaking out between Japan and America, an aerial attack should be made at the outset of the war against the main force of the American Fleet located in Hawaiian waters. And hence, that studies and training such as would enable our aircraft to meet the tactical needs of such an attack should be secretly carried out.

It was further explained to us that the object of this operation was to make an aerial attack against the main force of the American Fleet presumably located around Pearl Harbor so as to make it difficult for a time for the American Fleet to come across the ocean, and thereby enable us to complete our operations in the South during that time; and hence that the general plan was to make aircraft carriers and capital ships the primary target with the local airfields and the air force based there the secondary targets in order to preclude their being used in counter-attack.

This instruction was given only to myself and Lieutenant MURATA, who was also a Chief Flight Officer on the AKAGI, and none of the others in the air corps knew anything about it.
Lieutenant MURATA, being an expert on torpedo attack, was especially instructed to take part in this study. It was originally intended to use torpedoes as the principal weapon in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Beginning early in October, we therefore incorporated the study of the idea of the Pearl Harbor Attack into our training to determine whether or not such an attack was plausible or could be successfully executed.

Many problems came up in connection with the study and training concerning the execution of the plan of attack on Pearl Harbor. The waters of Pearl Harbor, being very narrow and only about 12 meters deep, it was felt that the ordinary torpedo attack method, hitherto used in training which caused torpedoes to penetrate the water to a depth of approximately 60 meters, would result in the torpedoes striking bottom and hence nullifying their effect. In our study and training therefore, we worked very hard to effect a torpedo firing method which could be adapted for use in shallow waters.

Near the very end of our training period, around the middle of November, we came to the conclusion, as a result of our studies, that the most effective firing method was to have the planes fire from a height of 20 meters and at an air-speed of 160 knots with the plane flying parallel to the water. As we were then supplied with torpedoes equipped with stabilizing gears, we selected a spot in the narrow waters of Kagoshima Bay where the depth was 12 meters and practiced firing until we gained confidence in shallow water torpedo operation.

This final training was carried out two days prior to the departure of the Fleet from Saeki Bay and barely in time. A study of torpedoes with stabilizing gears, together with research in shallow water torpedo firing, were carried out on the basis of our demands, and it was proved that the above torpedo was most effective when fired in shallow waters. However, the total number of required torpedoes had not been prepared and could not be supplied before the departure of the Fleet. Hence the aircraft carrier KAGA
remained behind for approximately three days in Java, and after receiving the remaining torpedoes followed the Fleet.

5. The attack on Pearl Harbor demanded the use of as many high accuracy torpedoes as possible. It was decided, however, to use horizontal bombing also for the following reasons:

1. Although the problem of shallow firing suitable for the waters of Pearl Harbor was thus solved, such firing method required special skill and we felt some uneasiness in the case of flyers who had not been highly trained.

2. Should the American Fleet at anchor be protected by torpedo nets, the torpedoes we intended to use against them would prove ineffective.

3. It was reckoned that American warships would be lying two abreast while at anchor. In such case the only possible means of attack against the one lying on the landward side would be by bombs.

Since the accuracy of our Navy's horizontal bombing at the time was not very high, we decided on the formation "Probable" bombing method. And in order to increase the number of attacking units we reduced the number of planes per formation from nine to five. In order to maintain the hitting percentage, it was decided to reduce the bombing altitude to 3,000 meters which was the minimum height calculated to enable the bombs which we then intended to use (converted 16 inch shells) to pierce the armor of the American capital ships. Under those conditions it was calculated that such skill of the bombing leaders as we could count upon at the time would make it possible for the tactical demands of the operations against the anchored battle ships to be satisfactorily met.

However, the 800 kilogram armor-piercing bombs which were to be used for this operation were 16 inch shells urgently converted for the purpose. Consequently in the event of their being carried by planes, it necessitated the reconstruction of the
bombing apparatus of the plane structure.

supply of bombs was made in time for the departure of
the Fleet from Saeki Bay. However, the reconstruction of the
bombing apparatus of the newly received planes fell behind schedule
Hence the aircraft carriers took position on board and en route
from the port of departure to the rendezvous point at Hitokappu Bay
and completed reconstruction.

The aircraft carrier ZUIKAKU was completed on 25 September
1941, and the carrier SHOKAKU a short time earlier. Out of these
two, the Fifth Air Squadron was organized and incorporated into
the First Air Fleet. But as their crews had to be hurriedly
trained, with the training of less than a month, their training
and proficiency was not adequate. It was therefore decided to use
the flyers belonging to the First and Second Air Squadrons in the
attacks against warships since that required special skill, and
the flyers belonging to the Fifth Air Squadron were to be used in
the attack against the airfields.

It was first intended, at the beginning of the training, to
have the planes take off from the carriers at night so as to make
the attack on Pearl Harbor at dawn. But the training and profi-
ciency of the flyers, especially when those of the newly organized
Fifth Air Squadron was considered, was not believed sufficient to
enable them to take off at night on group flight. Hence, when
the training ended, I reported this opinion in effect to my
superiors and the original dawn attack plan was changed so as to
have the planes take off from the carriers at dawn and to make
the attack by daylight.
On this 27th day of June, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (seal)

I, FUCHIDA, Mitsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

At the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
- VS -
ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition
Deponent: Minoru GENDA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Minoru GENDA and I formerly was a captain in the Japanese Navy. I was appointed Staff Officer of the First Air Squadron on 1 November 1940. On 15 November 1940 I was promoted to the rank of commander. On 1 April 1941 I became Staff Officer of the First Air Fleet and remained at that position until the latter part of June 1942.

2. Early in February 1941 when the Flagship KAGA was anchored in Ariake Bay (Kyushu), I received a letter from the Chief of Staff of the 11th Air Fleet, Rear Admiral ONISHI, with whom I was personally well acquainted. In this letter he asked me to come to Kanoya at once as he wanted to see me on important business. So I proceeded to Kanoya on the following day and called on him at the Fleet Headquarters.

He then showed me a private letter which he had received from Vice Admiral YAMAMOTO, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. I do not know where this letter is at the present time but in substance it was as follows:

"In the event of outbreak of war with the United States, there would be little prospect of our operations succeeding unless, at the very outset, we can deal a crushing blow to the main force of the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters by using the full strength of the First and Second Air Squadrons and thus to preclude the possibility of the American Fleet advancing in offensive operations in the Western Pacific for some time. And it is my desire that I be given command of this air attack force so that I may carry out this operation. Please make a study of this operation."
Rear Admiral ONISHI then said to me: "Please make this study in utmost secrecy, with special attention to the feasibility of the operation, method of execution and the forces to be used."

I commenced this study upon returning to my ship and after a week or ten days I again called on Rear Admiral ONISHI and handed him my answer. I criticized the plan from several aspects and concluded that the attack, while extremely difficult, was not impossible. With some slight reference to my answer, Rear Admiral ONISHI prepared his views on the matter and sent them to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet.

3. At the time of the organization of the First Air Fleet in April of 1941, the only officers in the Headquarters of the said fleet who were aware of YAMAMOTO's idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor were Commander in Chief Vice Admiral NAGUMO, Chief of Staff Rear Admiral KUSAKA, Senior Staff Officer Captain OISHI and myself. From that time until the early part of September we did not undertake to draw up any concrete plan with reference to this operation.

Early in September Rear Admiral KUSAKA, Chief of Staff, summoned the Staff and ordered us to study and draft a plan for this attack and I was named Secretary for this purpose. After working for about a week aboard the AKAGI I completed a preliminary plan. While this preliminary plan was in the main similar to the Operation Plan that was actually executed, it differed from the latter in the following respects:

A. The point of rendezvous prior to departure for the attack was fixed at Atsugishi Bay or Mutsukai Bay.
B. There was no connection with the advance force (submarines).
C. There was nothing concrete as to time.
D. The air-raid plan was not worked out in detail.

4. Around the 12th or 13th of September the chart maneuvers of the Combined Fleet were held at the Naval Staff College. The maneuvers relating to the Hawaiian Operations which were carried
out separately from the general maneuvers were, for the most part, based on the above preliminary plan, the one difference being that it made use of Hitokappu Bay as the rendezvous point.

I believe it was on the 1st of October 1941 that Vice Admiral NAGUMO summoned the Headquarters personnel of the various air squadrons and commanders, chief flying officers and squadron leaders of all the carriers to his flag ship and issued the instruction that since this fleet would receive the assignment to attack Hawaii, in the event of war, the training and study of the Fleet thenceforth should be carried out with emphasis on that point.

The last chart maneuver of the Combined Fleet was held aboard the NAGATO in the western part of the Inland Sea early in October and was carried out on the basis of the three-carrier plan.

5. At the Task Force Headquarters, the Senior Staff Officer drafted the Hawaii Operation Plan (Secret Task Force Order No. 1) toward the end of October and then took it to the Combined Fleet Headquarters for approval. On the second of November the whole of the Task Force (with the exception of the fighter plane force and the Second Submarine Squadron) rendezvoused in Ariake Bay. All unit commanders and above, together with flying officers, were summoned aboard the Flag Ship AKAGI where they were told of the duties that would be assigned to our Task Force in the event of war and that, by way of preliminary training, maneuvers would be carried out with Saeki and Sukumo as targets, and the plan for these maneuvers was explained.

6. I do not have a clear recollection as to when we received the Combined Fleet General Order Number 1 but I believe it was just after we had completed the above maneuvers. The Task Force Order Number 1 was immediately printed and a part was distributed on 17 November prior to departure from Saeki Bay to the advance force (submarines) and other necessary quarters with the date of issue of the order left in blank. The balance were distributed with the date of issue filled in and distributed upon arrival at Hitokappu Bay.
Defense Doc. 1974

I believe that the part of the Combined Fleet General Order No. 1 pertaining to the Task Force (whether that part had been cut out from the General Order or printed as a separate pamphlet I do not recall) was as follows:

"The Task Force, keeping its movements in utmost secrecy and in accordance with a special order, shall advance into the Hawaii area; and immediately upon commencement of war it shall attack the main force of the American Fleet in the Hawaii area and deal it a mortal blow.

"Air attack is scheduled for dawn of X day (exact date to be given by a later order.)

"Upon completion of the air attack, the Task Force is to return to Japan.

"Should the negotiations with America prove successful, the Task Force is to return at once."

Although the Task Force Order No. 1 was probably the same, in the main, as the exhibit submitted in evidence by the Prosecution I recall that communication and supply plans were attached to it.

The ships of the Task Force, upon completion of preparations, came to Saeki Bay one by one; and by the 16th all had rendezvoused there with the exception of the KAGA.

On the 17th, the ships left Saeki at intervals in scattered groups and rendezvoused at Hitokappu Bay on the 22nd. The KAGA arrived there somewhat later. The Task Force Order No. 3, which was the plan of air attack, was completed at this time and distributed to all the ships together with Order No. 1 on 24th November. This Order Number 3, I believe, was much the same as that submitted by the Prosecution.

In addition to the above orders, there was issued to the various units an order in the form of verbal instructions from the Chief of Staff pertaining to the measures to be taken under various conditions. Most of this order I drafted myself. Its principal points were the following:

A. If, while proceeding eastward from Hitokappu Bay, the Task Force should encounter American warships, merchantmen or airplanes or neutral merchantmen, it should change direction sharply as soon as discovery is made by the patrol vessel; but advance toward the objective should
Defense Doc. 1974

be continued while maintaining greatest secrecy as to position. If the whole of the Task Force is discovered, turn back as though nothing had happened; but if such discovery is made on X-1 day or later, resolutely carry out the attack.

B. If all the attendant conditions dictate an assault, despatch the combat planes of the second attack corps at the same time as those of the first attack corps.

Torpedo and bomb attacks are to be carried out while the 81 combat planes maintain control of the air.

All unit commanders and flying officers of the Task Force were summoned aboard the AKAGI on 24th November for final explanation of the operation plans and consultations, and the start for the attack was made from Hitokappu Bay on the 26th.
Defense Document 1974

On this 1st day of July, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: GENDA, Minoru (seal)

I, GENDA, Minoru hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

GENDA, Minoru
Sworn Deposition

Depositor: Ryunosuke KUSAKA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Ryunosuke KUSAKA. I was formerly a Vice Admiral in the Japanese Navy and participated in the Pearl Harbor Attack of December 1941, as Chief of Staff of the First Air Force Fleet.

2. As has been stated, the plan of attack was originated by Admiral Isoroku YAMAMOTO, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, around January of 1941. I remember it was April or May of that year and after I had been assigned to the post of Chief of Staff of the First Air Force Fleet that I learned of the plan. Generally speaking, the Pearl Harbor Attack was a hazardous and speculative operation penetrating deep into enemy lines. Since it was considered too venturesome, as a first step in military operations which decided the fate of the State, various studies were repeatedly made. However, since I could not agree with Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO's idea as I did not consider the plan to be practical, I expressed a lengthy opposition opinion directly to the Commander in Chief himself.

Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO listened carefully to my opinion and then said as follows:

"I fully understand your opinion; however if war should break out with the United States, taking into view the condition of military strength as it stands today, I have no confidence in fulfilling the responsibility of our national defense other than by attacking the United States Fleet immediately after the outbreak of war. Therefore, as long as the United States Fleet is stationed at Hawaii, it is my conviction as Supreme Commander, that we must commence operations by an attack there. I ask you, then, to stop opposing me from now on."
on and concentrate your efforts toward securing the success of this attack."

3. The Naval General Staff in early October 1941, in spite of its previous opposition to the plan, gave way before the firm opinion of Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO and finally consented to study the Hawaii Operation so that preparations could be made for any emergency situation that might arise. Subsequently, joint studies were made between the Naval General Staff Operations Section, staff officers of the Combined Fleet and the First Air Force Fleet. As studies of the operation advanced, the atmosphere gradually changed to the point of view of adopting the Hawaii Attack Plan as the first priority plan. This was largely due to the fact that the Combined Fleet Headquarters was so strongly convinced of its possibilities as compared with the disadvantage of having to plan a counter attack strategy against the enemy for the purpose of protecting the undefended South Sea Islands.

4. At that time there was only one carrier based air force fleet which was the First Air Force Fleet consisting of the following three air force squadrons:

First Air Force Squadron with aircraft carriers AYAGI and KAG.

Second Air Force Squadron with aircraft carriers SORYU and FIRYU.

Fourth Air Force Squadron with aircraft carriers RYUJO and the converted carrier "Kasuga Laru", named the "Taiyo."

At that time there were also the light aircraft carriers "Hosho" and "Zuiko" which formed the Third Air Force Squadron of the First Fleet.

On September 25th, 1941, the aircraft carrier "Zuikaku" was commissioned and, together with the aircraft carrier "Shokaku", which had been completed one month before, composed the Fifth Air Force Squadron. These were assigned for service under the First Air Force Fleet.

5. Of the four air force squadrons attached to the First Air Force Fleet, both carriers of the Fourth Air Force Squadron were capable only of carrying a small number of planes and those planes were outmoded craft. They were slow with a short cruising range and entirely unfit for the Hawaii Operation. Therefore, the
Combined Fleet Headquarters submitted the following demands to the central authorities.

(a) Select highly trained air crew members from both carriers of the Fourth Air Force Squadron to fill vacancies in the First and Second Air Force Squadrons, thereby increasing the number of carrier planes on both air force squadrons and particularly the number of fighter planes.

(b) Fill the vacancies in the Fifth Air Force Squadron with trained personnel, experienced in service on carriers, from land air force units.

Concerning the two above items, there was no other way to supply men for item (b) other than to pull out training officers and enlisted men instructors from the training corps. The Personnel Bureau Naval Aviation Board showed great reluctance to do this because it would inconvenience the training and supplying of future air crew personnel. The demands of the Combined Fleet, however, were strong enough to enforce its wishes and it was finally done.

6. The Pearl Harbor Attack was thus conducted by a temporarily organized task force consisting of the First Air Force Fleet as its main body. It was mid October 1941 when the shifting of necessary personnel and the formation of the First Air Force Fleet was completed. Because the Pearl Harbor Attack was not thought possible unless rigid training be enforced, it was necessary to carry out practice schedules until late November. But as the embarkation date was around the middle of November, it left port without even a month's training.

As a result of studies made on the Pearl Harbor Attack Operation, daylight, or if possible, before daybreak, as the time of attack was desirable. But due to such circumstances as the insufficient training of air crew personnel, the accompanying lack of confidence in taking off from the carriers and flying in formation, together with navigating before daybreak, were problems which caused a change in the schedule of the attack so that it...
was finally arranged for the planes to leave the carriers thirty minutes before daybreak and to fix the hour of attack at one hour and a half after daybreak.

The Pearl Harbor Attack was an extremely difficult operation and its major difficulties were the following two points:

(a) The problem of a shallow submersion torpedo.

Previous studies had been made to lessen the submersion degree of torpedoes after firing and to shorten the distance required to stabilize itself at an adjusted depth. These studies were made before the Pearl Harbor Operation was conceived and were designed for the purpose of aerial torpedo attacks on shipping. The results were far from satisfactory. When studies on the Pearl Harbor Attack began, research work in this field became more important for it was an unanswered question as to whether aerial torpedo attacks were possible in the restricted and shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. The First Air Force Fleet, with the cooperation of the Yokosuka Naval Air Corps and Naval Air Technical Department made repeated experiments and finally, in late October, reached the conclusion that it was possible.

The remodeling of torpedoes necessary for such operation was delayed and they could not be delivered to the ships before embarking for their rendezvous point at Tankan Bay. So the aircraft carrier stayed behind until the last to receive the remodeled torpedoes and then to distribute them to each ship at Tankan Bay.

There was also the question of torpedo net cutters which were thought to be necessary for the operation but, although the research work was hurried, the studies and experiments did not produce satisfactory results and it was decided not to equip the torpedoes with cutters.

(b) The second difficulty was the problem of extending the cruising range of the ships participating in the attack. The attack force took a northerly course where navigating ships were scarce in order to avoid early discovery and planned to approach Hawaii from the north where we thought air patrols would be
It was the northeastern monsoon period and we knew that the aircraft carriers AKAGI, SORYU and HIRYU, as well as the destroyers, would not have sufficient cruising range if refueling en route was impossible due to the strong winds and high waves. As for refueling destroyers on the high seas, we had had considerable training and experience and in the event refueling was impossible, these ships could turn back and the operation be carried on by cruisers and heavier type ships.

The problem was different in regard to aircraft carriers. If three out of six participating were omitted, the operation could not be performed. Consequently, after many studies were made, it was decided to carry fuel even in the double bottomed sections and stacking fuel drums outside the storage rooms. Then, in case refueling was impossible, these ships would be able to return to a point at 160° east longitude.

However, loading fuel into the double bottomed sections of the aircraft carrier AKAGI and also the reserve fuel tanks was prohibited by naval regulations considering the strength of the ship's structure. I therefore entered into negotiations with proper officials, attempting to neutralize this naval regulation, but achieved no success. Whereupon the Commander in Chief of the Fleet was forced to take full responsibility regarding the possibility of an accident occurring and the decision was made to load fuel in the reserve fuel tanks and double bottom sections, although not in compliance with regulations.

The Task Force which was temporarily organized for the Pearl Harbor Attack was to embark from their port either alone or in small groups around 15 November 1941 in accordance with Combined Fleet Headquarters orders, and rendezvous at Tanken Bay by 22 November. After refueling, the Task Force left the bay at 0600 hours 26 November to the next stand-by point at 42° north latitude, 170° west longitude.

During this operation, there were two important problems which
caused me great concern in my capacity of Chief of Staff of the Task Force.

One was whether or not the main body of the United States Fleet would be stationed in the Hawaiian area at the time the attack was to be made. The other was the fear of enforcing the attack when orders to return might have been transmitted (if United States - Japanese negotiations reached an amicable settlement) but which might not be received owing to the remote distance of communications or other causes. It would indeed have been a grave problem had orders been dispatched to return and were not received by the Task Force.

Behind the reason for my concern on the latter point was the fact that on 2 December, Imperial Headquarters Naval Section orders stated that diplomatic negotiations would be continued even after a decision was passed designating 8 December as the day to open hostilities, and a ray of hope that hostilities could be avoided was still seen. If United States - Japanese negotiations reached an amicable settlement, or a possibility of reaching a peaceful solution became a certainty, all forces were to stop all operational actions and, after hurriedly rounding up all units, were to return home. This was so indicated in Imperial Headquarters Naval Department Instruction Number 5 and concurrently in Combined Fleet Headquarters Instruction Number 1. (In the instruction the words "In the event of important change in situation meant the amicable settlement of United States - Japanese negotiations.) Moreover, we had heard of this matter from Commander in Chief Admiral YAMAMOTO at every opportunity. Therefore, I was greatly concerned until on the 5th or 6th of December I received a telegram from Chief of Division One, Naval General Staff, stating that there was no hope of United States - Japanese negotiations coming to a peaceful conclusion.

10. As for the ultimatum to be delivered prior to the attack, I thought it was naturally being taken care of by the central authorities. Therefore, I was convinced that a notification
had been communicated before the attack began.

From a strategical viewpoint, an attack without notice might be idealistic, but such treacherous action was unthinkable from the point of view of training and common sense of the Japanese naval officer, and also because of the traditional 'Bushido' (the creed of the Samurai).

As a matter of fact, I expected the possible discovery of our operation before the attack by United States patrol planes in Hawaii. Our observation sea planes were scheduled to arrive at Pearl Harbor at least thirty minutes ahead of the attacking forces, and moreover, we were expecting our attacking forces to be caught by radar, thus revealing to the United States our potential attack. We actually were prepared to suffer considerable damage and casualties in this risky undertaking and were greatly surprised when such did not occur.
On this _____ day of August, 194
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: KUSAKA, Ryunosuke (seal)

I, KUSAKA, Ryunosuke hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KUSAKA, Ryunosuke (seal)
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(Cont.D, I57)
5th Dec. 1904

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(4) その後、日本では各地で反日運動が行われ、国民の反日感情が高まる

(5) さらに、政府は反日運動を支援し、国民の反日感情をさらに高めることで、

(6) その結果、日本は国際적으로孤立し、経済的にも打撃を受けることが

(7) 今後も、日本は反日運動の影響を受けて、国際社会との関係を修復し、

(8) また、経済的問題を解決するために、政府は政策を改訂し、

(9) その結果、日本は国際社会との関係を修復し、経済的問題を解決することが

(10) 今後も、日本は反日運動の影響を受けて、国際社会との関係を修復し、

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(12) その結果、日本は国際社会との関係を修復し、経済的問題を解決することが

(13) 今後も、日本は反日運動の影響を受けて、国際社会との関係を修復し、

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(15) その結果、日本は国際社会との関係を修復し、経済的問題を解決することが

(16) 今後も、日本は反日運動の影響を受けて、国際社会との関係を修復し、

(17) また、経済的問題を解決するために、政府は政策を改訂し、

(18) その結果、日本は国際社会との関係を修復し、経済的問題を解決することが

(19) 今後も、日本は反日運動の影響を受けて、国際社会との関係を修復し、

(20) また、経済的問題を解決するために、政府は政策を改訂し、


(手写内容未译出)
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アリマス

パリ

ハスノモノハルノ間デアルノデハルノク希見
ハノニハ务メルペク観度ニ付イテ別ニハノ関
如ノニハ無ナ前進令ヲ仰イタノテアリムスノ
ハルス

ハノニハ無ナ前進令ヲ仰イタノテアリムスノ
ハルス

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デアルトノ差別反指。而シテ伊口
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Instructions Sent To Imperial Government Delegates
At The Preliminary Negotiations Of The Naval Disarmament
Conference Of 1935.

1. The reason for our Government giving consent to the
opening of preliminary negotiations for the Naval disarmament
conference which was proposed by Britain in May this year was
because the present Naval Disarmament Conference is an impor­
tant affair and as difficulties were foreseen. Therefore,
it is to avoid unnecessary agitation of public opinions, of
nations concerned, as well as to exchange opinions fully between
nations represented and thereby clarifying the standpoints and
assertions of all participant nations and accomplishing our
objectives to enable the smooth attainment of the conference
aims and also security of our national defense.

2. In view of the present preliminary negotiations inevi-
tably facing a difficult situation the Imperial Government
places great expectations to your efforts. In negotiations,
follow the basic policy as indicated herein, as well as the
import of this instruction and as for naval technical affair
consult the senior naval-expert delegate.

As negotiations are expected to be delicate, anything
which require fast and appropriate measures are entrusted to
your decision within the scope of authority specified in this
3. As to the problem of formalities, exchange of opinions with the main participant nations have already been made but endeavour to accomplish our assertions on items still unsolved at the preliminary negotiations scheduled to open around October this year.

4. The British Government has repeatedly made proposals on debating on the problem of the so-called substantial problem of naval disarmament but it was not necessarily the same with the U.S.

As there seems to be considerable difference between what has been explained to our Embassy at Washington from competent U. S. authorities and what the U. S. delegates spoke to our delegates at London and therefore it is requested that you make it clear at the very beginning of preliminary negotiations if the U. S. is prepared to make sufficient arguments on the problem of substantial disarmament. Even in case the U. S. is not prepared to discuss on the substantial disarmament problem the Imperial Government has no objections in negotiating with Britain but attention must be paid to see that Britain does not lead in negotiations and make our standpoint disadvantageous.

5. In the present Naval disarmament preliminary negotiation, the Government, based on the basic policy as defined
under No. 6. herein, shall prepare a disposition to form a new agreement which will secure an impartial and adequate naval strength and establish a stable national defense. Thereby reducing the people's burdens in the future and promoting peaceful intercourse between all nations. And after the expiration of already existing naval armament limitation agreements, it must be borne in mind that the Imperial Government will not tolerate the conclusion of any agreement which will continue to force upon us disadvantageous conditions and make our national defense insecure.

6. The following basic policy of the Imperial Government in connection with naval disarmament is viewed with greatest importance and therefore, our basic principles shall be here indicated. It is requested that every effort be exerted to get the recognition by the nations concerned, especially the U. S. and Britain. The basic policy of the Imperial Government is as follows.

The Imperial Government seeks to establish a principle of non-intimidation and non-aggression without impairing the sense of security in national defense for all nations because every nation is entitled to the right of possessing armaments required for the safety of the state. Among major naval powers it is a fundamental problem to agree upon a criterion for common maximum limitation of arms for each nation to
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possess, as a measure for reducing arms. In reaching an agreement on this point, in order to demonstrate the true spirit of disarmament minimize the above limitation and drastically curtail offensive arms while adjusting defensive arms. Thereby basing upon the principle of "difficult to agress and secure in defending". To attain this objective, highly-armed nations will be compelled to make greater sacrifices than the others.

7. In reference to the grounds for the above basic policy, if necessary, you are to begin negotiations on definite problems bearing in mind the following factors.
   a. You may assert the complete abolition of capital ships if the condition of the conference permits.
   b. Assert the complete abolition of aircraft carriers.
   c. In the case capital ships and aircraft carriers are to be maintained, place restriction on total tonnage of such ships including A and B class cruisers, destroyers and submarines as well. In this case, emphasis should be put on the reduction of capital ships, aircraft carriers, and heavy cruisers. Designate tonnage allotment for each type of ship to each nation and the allotment to the U.S. and Japan shall be equal. In the case capital ships and aircraft carriers are abolished this will be applicable.
   d. The Imperial Government at an early possible
date shall demand attaining the standard of the newly agreed military strength, but if necessary, in conformity to the above contents of agreed naval strength we shall consider concluding an agreement in which we will gradually have to attain a standard in a limited time.

8. Depending on the progress of preliminary negotiations, it may confront a situation where negotiations may be closed abruptly or adjourned or even not opened. But the manner in which the present negotiation proceeds will greatly influence the international situation to follow and therefore in such a case utmost care must be taken not to incur any undesirable conditions to our overall plans for the conference.

9. The question of equality in naval strength between France and Italy has been unsettled to this day. In connection with our present assertion, the standpoint of our Government against these two nations shall be extremely delicate. Therefore put the center of negotiation on the two nations of Britain and the U. S. first and thoroughly explain on the point that our assertion is the result of earnest desire cherished by our people. Endeavor to have the U. S. and British understand this point. Again, as for the two countries of France and Italy, according to situation, explain to them that the main objective of our assertion is Britain and the U. S.
As for the relations between France and Italy, make it known to them that we have no objections whatsoever on any adequate compromise reached direct between the nations concerned.

10. The Washington Treaty on naval armament limitation in view of the assertion to be made at the present naval disarmament preliminary negotiation is to be abolished as of 1936 according to our Government policy. Even if we announce its abolition, it does not mean that we do not favor a new naval disarmament agreement but seek to contribute to the establishment of a world peace by forming an impartial and fair new agreement between the nations concerned. Therefore, in the present preliminary negotiations, first indicate our basic policy and impress upon the delegates of the respective participant nations that in view of the above policy the Washington Treaty inevitably must be abolished. Moreover, as our present assertion is based on the earnest hopes of our people the Government has already decided upon its abolition notification, but on the other hand our Government desires to carry out the preliminary negotiations in a friendly and effective manner to the extent it is possible. Therefore, the Government is withholding the notification so it is desirable that efforts be made to guide the negotiations so that this opportunity is taken to take formal steps in
abolishing it with the mutual understanding of all nations concerned and following which all nations will cooperate in the formation of a new treaty. Thereby it will contribute to the alleviation of public opinion. This point should be explained to the respective delegates.

Of the above nations concerned, the U. S. will show considerable opposition. It appears that some part of the British side are opposed to the continuation of the Washington Disarmament Treaty. On the other hand, two years after the notification of its abolition, all signatories will witness its abolition, so it is wiser to put emphasis on future negotiations and develop it amidst a friendly atmosphere. Persuade the participant powers to consent upon abolishing this agreement by the end of 1936.

However, if case our proposal is not accepted or it the decision hung on a balance, the Imperial Government will announce its abolition by the end of the year according to its independent decision.

11. Any item besides what has been referred to in this instruction, or any matter considered irrelevant to the import of this instruction, it is requested that you cable us.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHI, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the Demobilization Section of the Demobilization, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Instructions sent to Imperial Government Delegates at the Preliminary Negotiations of the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947

/S/ YOSHI, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)
ERRATA SHEET

Place: "Excerpt from Collection of official Statement concerning China Incident" above the title.
A fundamental understanding concerning French Indochina
in view of promoting the establishment of a new order in East
Asia and the settlement of the China Incident was reached during
August at TOKYO between Foreign Minister MATSUKA and French
Ambassador HATT at TOKYO in a friendly manner.

The Japanese Government gave assurance to the French Govern-
ment that she intends to respect the rights and interests of
France in East Asia, especially the territorial integrity of
Indo-China and the sovereignty of France to all of the Federation,
and the French Government consented to afford the Japanese Govern-
ment special facilities in Indo-China for the Japanese Army and
Navy necessary in the execution of their operations.

Furthermore, a conference between the Japanese and French
military authorities was held at MUN with the view of attain-
ing a concrete agreement on the offer of military facilities
mentioned above and by September 27, this had reached a satis-
factory and smooth conclusion.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of The Chief Archives of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese and English consisting of 806 pages (No.1 to No.5) and entitled "Collection of Official Statement concerning China Incident" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (The Information Bureau of Foreign Office.)

Certified at Tokyo, on this 18 day of Feb., 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on the same date

Witness: /S/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)
SIGNED DEPOSITION

Deponent: Shigoru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Circumstances of the Occupation of North French Indo-China by Japanese Forces.

1. From October 1939 to November 1940 I served as Vice Chief of the General Staff under Imperial Prince KAN-IN, then the Chief of the General Staff.

2. Early settlement of the China Incident was the policy Japan adhered to consistently. After the operations in China began to show a tendency for protraction, I went, with the permission of the Chief and the approval of the War Minister, to Hongkong, where I held a secret liaison conference for peace among the military representatives of Japan and China. This conference however ended in vain, and in...
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The consequence it became urgently necessary for us to cut off Chungking from North French Indo-China and the Burma Road, both of which were the most important supply routes for Chungking. For this purpose the Japanese Government opened negotiations with the Vichy Regime and the British Government. As a result of these negotiations it was decided that the above road should be closed voluntarily, and in June 1940 a special committee headed by Maj. Gen. NISHIIHARA was dispatched to French Indo-China in order to inspect the conditions at the border.

3. After the closing of the French Indo-China Route, the Chungking Government steadily gathered its forces along the border of French Indo-China, and it was feared they might enter the French territory. These circumstances led Japan to dispatch forces to North French Indo-China for the defense of that area. As a result of negotiations between Tokyo and Vichy, an agreement was reached in August 1940 between Foreign Minister MATSUZAKA and Ambassador HENRI for the dispatch of Japanese forces to North French Indo-China. The details of the matter were left to agreements to be reached at Hanoi between the military representatives of Japan and French Indo-China.

4. The negotiation in Hanoi encountered no little difficulties. By some means, however, on 4 Sept. we succeeded in bringing it to a point when the agreement was about to be signed. However, an unfortunate event broke out on 5 Sept. The MORIMOTO battalion, on approaching the borders for reconnaissance purposes, was informed by the commander in charge of the French Indo-Chinese border forces, that they were entering Indo-Chinese territory, whereupon the battalion immediately
withdraw. However not a shot was exchanged between them. According to further investigation, it was reportedly not certain, whether the YORIMITO battalion had or had not, actually wandered into their territory.

5. Making an excuse of this occurrence, the French-Indo-Chinese authorities stiffened their attitude to claim the ovor-all denunciation of the agreement which was about to be signed. The Japanese, still desirous of peaceful settlement, resumed further negotiations, but the French Indo-Chinese authorities, remained uncompromising and we could hardly reach a conclusion.

6. At that time the government of French Indo-China had pledged their loyalty to the Vichy Government. Nevertheless we received information to the effect that such was, more or less, dubious. Especially, the attitude on their part to delay, on some pretext or other, the carrying out of our occupation of Northern French Indo-China, which had already been agreed to by the Vichy Government, raised some suspicion. Thus an Imperial Headquarters finding it necessary to demonstrate a peremptory attitude with regard to the agreement in Hanoi, issued instructions to Maj-Gen NISHIDERA to demand a final answer on the part of the French Indo-Chinese authorities by noon 22 Sept. However, the Imperial Headquarters adhered to bringing the agreement to a satisfactory close, and was quite desirous of making a peaceful advance. Should they refuse, we would have to resort to the alternative of occupation by force, and hencupon, orders were given to the South China
Army to prepare, in advance, for any measures of war or peace. The foregoing orders issued by the Imperial Headquarters were to the effect that if an agreement was to be reached, we would make a peaceful advance from Haiphong in accordance with the said agreement; in case no consent could be obtained by noon 22 Sep., we should commence action at midnight on the 22nd, and make our way by force should their forces offer us resistance. It is reported that this written order has been burnt and no longer exists.

The Chief of the General Staff Headquarters had sent the Chief of Military Operations to direct this action to be taken by the South China Army and was one which required utmost delicacy and prudence in handling.

7. Noon of September 22 was the very moment to decide on war or peace. French Indo-China maintained an unbending attitude. Japan, being eager to keep peace at all costs, gave way at last. Thus the agreement for occupation was finally completed in peace. Therefore the agreement, which was scheduled to be concluded at noon, was actually concluded a few hours past noon.

8. The news of the conclusion of the agreement was immediately dispatched to our South China Army, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army ordered his units to set about peaceful occupation. Unfortunately, however, by that time the forward units of our forces had commenced actions for free occupation on a report that the agreement had not yet been reached at noon, and was advancing through a mountainous region in dispersed order. Those forward units did not know that the agreement was
afterwards reached. Therefore at noon, 23 September, they began to enter French Indo-China, a fact which resulted in the deplorable border hostilities.

9. Thanks to an order from Tokyo and to the adequate remedial measures taken by General ANDO, Commander-in-Chief of the South China Army, before the arrival of that order, the hostilities at the border ceased before entering a serious stage. The Japanese forces returned to French Indo-China all that they had obtained the hostilities. Thus the matter was completely settled.

10. According to the agreement, Japanese transports might have entered the Port of Haiphong under the guidance of the French Navy, but as a fighting had taken place on land to the north, an entry into the port of Haiphong was considered dangerous, and, for this reason, a landing was made in safety on the southern coast without provoking any battle. At the time of this landing, a unit of Japanese patrol-planes dropped some bombs in the suburbs of the city of Haiphong due to a misunderstanding of signals between the commander and his subordinates. As to this, reparations were made for damage and the commander was punished.

11. The military strength of Japanese troops in Indo-China consisted of about 1,000 soldiers in all, if I remember rightly. The Japanese Military Authorities considered it very dangerous to dispatch such a feeble unit alone to a remote foreign land, but, nevertheless, the Chief of the General Staff, in consideration of a principle of peaceful
occupation, decided the least possible military strength that circumstances would allow.

12. The crossing of the frontier by the MORIMOTO Battalion and the occurrence of fighting on the border, were much regretted by the central authorities of Japan, but were nothing but incidental happenings, but from the viewpoint of military discipline, the commander of the battalion, MORIMOTO, and (his regimental commander were committed for military trial and punished, and the two Commanders, namely ANDO and KUNO were dismissed, and degraded to divisional commanders. Moreover, even among the central military authorities, the Chief of the Strategic Section who was in charge of directing the South China Army was transferred.

13. As above, the entry into the northern part of French Indo-China was motivated by the necessity of hastening the settlement of the China Incident and that was the reason why the process of entry had been all the time accompanied by peaceful intentions. That is the commission's inspection was first conducted and the entry itself was put into practice as a result of concessions made on the part of Japan after reiterated negotiations had been made for more than two months with French Indo-China a country not very strong at that time. It was quite natural therefore that there was employed only the least possible military strength the agreement allowed, and, this, to manifest simply our peaceful intentions. In such a manner, the Japanese side tried wholeheartedly to express their sincere desire for peaceful friendship.

On this 14th day of August, 1947.

At Tokyo.

DEFENDENT /s/ SAWADA, Shigoru (seal)
I, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the
Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of
this witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ KIYOSU, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SAWADA, Shigoro (seal)

- 7 -
Sworn Deposition

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly an admiral.

   I was appointed Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff on December 2, 1935 (Shôwa 10) and Commander-in-chief of the Fifth Fleet on December 15, 1938 (Shôwa 13), in which position I served until the following year, 1939 (Shôwa 14).

2. The operation of occupying Hainan Island was planned while I was, as above-mentioned, in the position of the Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff (around November 1938 (Shôwa 13)). I then, as chief of the First Department, that is, the chief of the Operation Department, had charge of
drafting the operation plan. Besides, occupying Hainan Island was carried out by the units under command of myself as the Commander-in-chief of the Fifth Fleet. Such being the case, I am very well informed concerning the military situation of those days, the subject of this operation and the state of affairs of the occupation movement.

3. Since the outbreak of the China Affair, Japan keenly realized that, with a view to the early settlement of the Affair, it was strategically necessary, aside from her continuous military efforts, for her to prevent arms and other munitions which had become the source of the Chinese resitant power against Japan from being imported from outside.

4. As a result of the Japanese occupation of Kwangtung which was carried out in October 1936 (shōwa 13), it was possible to keep in check the transport and supply of munitions island from there. Japan, however, found another inland supply route in the south-west of China. Thus the coastal of Kwangchow Bay and Annan Bay areas increased in importance to such an extent that Japan began to feel the necessity of blockading this area in her attempt to check the inland supply from the sea. For doing this thoroughly, the occupation of Hainan Island which it was intended to make one of our advanced
bases, was considered indispensable.

5. Japan, with the progress of her military operations against China, occupied important zones one by one and got into a position to deliver long air attacks upon other important zones. The result of our blockade operation of ingoing supplies to the Chinese Army however, turned out to be far from thorough-going because the spear-head of the Japanese Army did not reach the western part of Kwangtung Province, Kwangsi Province or the Kweichow and Yunan area and especially because it could not attack the South route at several inner important points. Thus Japan desiring to accomplish the aim of blockading her enemy's supply route, found it necessary to establish an air base on Hainan Island and to make it an advanced base of hers.

6. The Hainan Island Operation was based upon an order, "Occupy Hainan Island," which was issued by the Imperial Headquarter in January 1939 (Showa 14), and was carried out in the form of a joint operation by the Army and Navy. On February 10, 1939 (Showa 14) an Army force (one mixed brigade) on a little more than ten transports which had been escorted by the Fifth Fleet under my command, landed on the island at Chengmai-Wan Bay on its northern end and occupied Haikow and its vicinity. This started a series of occupations which was made at
various strategic points by our Army and Naval forces. This Japanese-held Island became of not a little help in our subsequent operations against the continental inland regions and the coastal areas of South China. Above all, the successive air attacks upon the South Supply Route were delivered by the air group of this Hainan Air Base.

7. As I mentioned above, the occupation of Hainan Island was made exclusively on the basis of purely strategic requirements. With the development of the conflict to the stage when Japanese troops advanced into French Indo-China and when the Pacific War broke out, this Island came to play a strategic role from considerations of its topography. In no way, however, was this planned from the outset nor did we operate with the intention of occupying the Island permanently.

On this 15th day of May, 1947
At Tokyo

DEponent /s/ KONDO, Nobutake (seal)

I, YASUDA, Shigeo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) YASUDA, Shigeo (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KONDO, Nobuteke (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

S'ORN DEPOSITION
Deponent: ABE, Iatsu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and
in accordance with the procedure following in my country I
hereby depose as follows.

1. I am a former naval Vice Admiral I occupied the post of
chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry from
October, 1939 until October, 1940, when I was ordered to Europe,
and was chiefly in charge of affairs concerning general naval
administration and armaments as well as national defense policy,
assisting the Navy Minister and the Navy Vice-Minister.

2. It was while I was in the aforesaid post of chief of the
Naval Affairs Bureau that the Japanese Forces marched into the
northern part of French Indo-China. Prior to the diplomatic
negotiations, it was agreed by the Naval General Staff that, in
the capacity of Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, represent
the Navy and together with the representative of the Army held

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conference with the authorities of the Foreign Office (mostly the Chief of the Bureau of European and Asiatic Affairs and the Treaty Bureau) on the basic problems which might he discussed in the diplomatic negotiations.

3. At the time Japan was taking pains in the disposing of the China Incident, and Imperial Headquarters recognized, that to hasten the settlement of the China Incident it was most necessary to block off the so-called French Indo-China route, the only supply route for Chiang via French Indo-China, and ordered the Expeditionary Forces of the Army to take Nanning temporarily with an eye to bombarding from the Nanning airfield the Yunnan Railway, which led to French Indo-China. Nanning, however, was a very small and unhealthy place and, what was worse, the airfield, being unusable during the rainy season, proved to be of little use for blocking the supply route, and the situation was where materials to aid Chiang went into China as before. Thereupon, under the positive necessity of securing the blocking of the route, the Imperial Headquarters consulted the Navy and Army Ministries about the plan of diplomatic negotiations in which the Foreign Office and the French Government were to talk with each other mutually expressing their sincerest views in realizing the blocking of the route practically and peacefully by the French Indo-Chinese themselves.

4. In compliance with the above intentions, the Foreign Office after much consultation with us, the authorities of the
Navy and army, determined to enter into diplomatic negotiations, which were conducted very prudently and patiently, and at length obtained an understanding from the authorities of French Indo-China. And it was decided that observers be posted along the frontier as well as at sea ports and some other places so as to keep an eye on the transportation of aid to Chiang supplies which were sent by way of French Indo-China. And in June, 1940, an observation party, which consisted of navy and army men together with officials of the foreign office with major-general NISHIHARA chief of section, was sent to French Indo-China. The aim, however, was not attained, and the complete blocking off of the aid to Chiang supply route not readily realized.

To secure the blocking off of the route, the foreign office had had talks with Henri, the French ambassador to Japan, at Tokyo since Aug. 1 of the same year, and on Aug. 30 an understanding as to basic problems such as occupation by Japanese forces of the Tonkin area for the purpose of securing the blocking off of the aid to Chiang supply route and offering of facilities for our military operations in China, was reached at the talk between foreign minister MITSUKI and ambassador Henri, concerto details being left to be worked out by the Japanese and French military authorities on the spot.

5. Agreement between the authorities on the spot, however, did not take shape speedily and it was not until Sept. 23, when an agreement was reached at last. But it took much time to notify
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the dispatched troops of the Japanese and French armies of the said agreement, which caused some clashes between the troops near the frontier through misunderstandings. Except for these clash clashes, the agreement was materialized according to peaceful and reciprocal understanding and the occupation was also carried out in peace, which I learned from reports from the spot.

6. In short, the sole aim of the occupation of the Japanese forces of the northern part of French Indo-China, as stated above, was none other than for the acquisition of facilities for military operations for the purpose of blocking off the aid to Chiang supply route. Accordingly, the occupation, being of a temporary nature, would have come to an end with the settlement of the China Incident and it was firmly promised at the above restitution, and that the occupation area provided in the agreement was limited to the regions of French Indo-China adjacent to the borders of China and French Indo-China, and that the Japanese Government would respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China as well as French sovereignty over French Indo-China. Japan never had any designs of territorial aggression.

On this 15th day of May, 1947
at Tokyo.

Defendant, Katsuo (seal)

I, T. H. M., Shigoe hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness (seal) T. H. M., Shigoe (seal)
OATH

In accordance with the conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

[Signature: "[handwritten] seal"]
Def. Doc. 1689

ERRATA SHEET

Page 1 - second line from bottom add "I" before "represent"

Page 2 - 1st line "Mostly" to "especially"
            3rd line "he" to "be"
            10th line from bottom "where" to "that"
4. The Excerpt from the Arrangement, concerning the Construction and Exploitation of the Yunnan Railway.
(Signed at Feking, Oct. 29, 1903)

The official documents dated 19th and 20th days of March of the 24th year of Kwang-Hsi, corresponding to the 9th and the 10th days of April 1898 were exchanged between Mr. Dubail, charge d'affair of the French Republic, at Feking, and Tsong-Ci-Yamen.

(omitted)

Article 24

The railway having for its purpose uniquely to give facililties to the Commerce, when the construction would be completed and the circulation of the trains commenced, it would not be permitted to use the railway for the purpose of transporting the Anamese salt, and the European troops, or the arms of war or munitions which may be served to the aforesaid European troops. The railway can not transport the objects prohibited by Chinese laws.

If China should engage in a war with a foreign country, this railway could not observe the regulations of the neutrality. If shall be put to the entire disposition of China.

(Abriged)
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Acting Chief of the Archives Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of one page and entitled "The Excerpt from the Arrangement, concerning the Construction and the Exploitation of the Railway of Unnan (Oct. 29, 1903)" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (the Department of Foreign Affairs).

certified at Tokyo, on this 14th day of Aug., 1947

/S/ URABE, Katsurou (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place, on the same date

Witness: /S/ SATÔ, Takogoro (seal)
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Sworn Deposition (Translation)
Deponent: TERAI, Kunizo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly a naval captain. From 20 November 1938 to 15 December of the same year I was air-group commander on board the Shinsen Maru, following which, till 1 November 1939 I was commander of an air unit of the 16th Air Group stationed at Tongking Bay and I took part in the South China operations.

2. The bombing incident of "Takkei" (Ph.) in French Indo China on 26 August 1939 was believed to have been caused by an airplane under my command when I was commander of the air-unit of the above mentioned 16th Air Group. And for that reason I know the circumstances in detail. However, a considerable length of time has elapsed since that time and as I have no records of that time in hand, I do not recall exact figures.

3. Around 28 August 1939 a telegram from the Navy Ministry, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, was sent to Headquarters 5th Air Corps and also to the 16th Air Group demanding a detailed investigation and a report on existing circumstances, because there was an incident of a seaplane dropping a bomb on "Takkei" in French Indo-China on 26 August 1939 with the possibility of involving an airplane of the 16th Air Group. The reason for ordering an investigation to the 16th Air Group was because it was the only seaplane unit operating in that area at that time. As I was commander of the air-unit of the 16th Air Group I took charge of the investigation.

4. At the time, summing up air-reconnaissance reports and informations from other units it was concluded that
transportation of war-supplies into China through French Indo China was being carried out in a brisk manner. The 16th Air Group received orders to check it and continued daily patrol activities in the French Indo-China and China border areas.

On the day of the incident, 26th August, three airplanes type-15 patrol seaplanes, conducted a reconnaissance mission in the border area. Each plane carried two bombs, 60 kilogram bombs for land purposes, with instructions to attack targets effective in disrupting supply communication lines and in case such targets were not observed, to bomb air-fields, bridges or military installations in the Tungchow vicinity.

From the reports submitted by the air crew members of the above three planes, after returning from the mission, I learned that one plane got astray due to poor weather conditions over the border area and took the following course.

The same plane continued to encounter unfavorable weather and was compelled to keep flying at low altitude. Finally it lost the position of the plane and wasted time in attempting to confirm its own position.

Getting worried about returning to the base and when it decided to jettison the bombs in order to extend its cruising range, it spotted a town below which appeared to be Fungchow, the designated target area. However, due to the fact that it was not sufficiently confident and as it was after the Panay Incident etc., was under strict orders to respect foreign interests paying special attention in this respect, it avoided bombing the city limits and dropped its bombs in the suburbs.

5. In compliance with the enquiry telegram mentioned above, a detailed investigation of that day's occurrence was made but as there were absolutely no other plane than the one already mentioned, I presumed the above mentioned airplane had crossed the border without knowing it and penetrated into French Indo China due to bad weather and the point which the airplane thought to be the Fungchow area was actually the "Takkei" (Ph.) vicinity and I made out a report to that effect. However, compared with the bombs which were carried, it was hard to understand why "casualties were extremely high" as reported by newspaper telegrams and radio broadcasts.
Judging from the fact that aircrew members avoided bombing city limits, it is still doubtful to me to this day.

Furthermore, at the time of the incident I did not even dream that French Indo China territory was bombed and so I did not make a confirmation of the bombed locality.

6. The Japanese Government, based on the above mentioned report took up the case and through diplomatic channels expressed its regret to the French Indo China authorities and I learned from competent sources that reparations were made.

On this 25th day of May, 1947 at Tokyo.

Deponent: /S/ TERAI, Kunizo (seal)

I, YASUDA, Shigeo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at the same place

Witness: /S/ YASUDA, Shigeo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TERAI, Kunizo (seal)
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST


RETURN TO ROOM 361

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: Chikao, Yamamoto
86 Ko, Niiyamachi, Niiyamura,
Kitagun, Ehime-ken,
Born: Oct. 13, 1896

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly a rear admiral. On Nov. 15, 1939 I was made a Captain and on the same day was assigned to the 15th Air Unit Command. I was in this position until Nov. 15, 1940.

2. This 15th Air Unit was organized at HAINAN in November, 1939. The Air Unit participated primarily in the operations in the South-China sector and it engaged in the bombing of the TIEN-YUEH Railway which was at that time an important supply route of war needs for the enemy.

3. The mistaken bombing of train on the TIEN-YUEH railway
on Feb. 2, 1940 was done by planes of the 15th Air Unit, the circumstances of which are as follows: (Incidentally, the 15th Air Unit was the sole unit that had participated in the raid and no other unit was involved.)

a) The bombing target had been confined to railway bridges and railways, and the bombing of trains had strictly been prohibited. On that day the bombing was carried out with the 7th bridge as main target.

b) According to the report of the crews on the planes, the air currents were bad at the time of bombing the enemy fighters, were intercepting, and the fire from the enemy anti-aircraft guns was heavy. The bombing was carried out under these adverse circumstances and the bombing altitude was 3,800 meters. Consequently, no one had realized the fact that there was a train on the 7th bridge at the time of bombing.

c) Later, as a result of my close examination of the aerial photographs taken at the time of bombing I discovered what seemed like a train on the bridge, entering half-way into the tunnel just north of the bridge. Therefore, I asked the bombing crews whether or not they had seen a train there at that time, or whether or not they had noticed any damage done to the train. But no one had noticed the existence of the train.
4. Such being the case, the mistake bombing of the train was an accidental incident occurred while the bridge was being bombed to cut off the enemy supply route.

On this 21 day of May, 1947 at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ Chikao, Yamamoto (seal)

I, Shigeo, Yasuda, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

Witness: /S/ Shigeo, Yasuda (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/\:/: Chikao, Yamamoto (seal)
Sworn Depositon

Deponent - S. T. O, Takegoro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, S. T. O, Takegoro, now reside at No. 346, SHIMURA-HASUNE-CHO, ITABASHI, TOKYO. At present, I am a secretary of the Archives Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On October 2, 1946, a certificate was issued by me, on behalf of the Chief of the Archives Section, concerning the source and authenticity of the document entitled the "Outline of Foreign Policies of the Japanese Empire (dated September 28, 1940) which was No. 837-4 of International Prosecution Section.

The aforesaid "Outline of Foreign Policies of the Japanese Empire" (dated September 28, 1940) is in file together with three other documents under the cover bearing the title of "Foreign Policies of the
Japanese Empire, a certificate referred to above, however, does not cover any of these three documents.

One of the three documents entitled the "Draft of Japan's Policies toward the Southern Regions" (dated October 4, 1940) and typed on Japanese paper, 9 pages in all, bears no name of the compiler, nor are there any seal or signatures affixed thereto of the persons concerned with the matter or those who examined the document. Consequently, it is not clear whether or not the original of this document was prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On this 14th day of August, 1947.
at Tokyo.

Deponent /S/ SATO, Takogoro (seal)

I, SUZUKI, Hitoshi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereon in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at Tokyo.

Witness /S/ SUZUKI, Hitoshi (seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ SATO, Takogoro (seal)

- 2 -
Deponent: MIYO, Tatsukichi  
Residence: No. 36, Taira-machi,  
Meguro-ku, Tokyo-to  
Born: January 12, 1902

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I was formerly a navy captain.

During the period from November 1939 to December 1942, I served as a commander in the Operations Section of the Navy General Staff in the capacity of a staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters, taking charge of affairs relative to aerial operations.

The following is what I was enabled to learn, at that time by virtue of my official position, concerning the advance of Japanese forces to South French Indo-China, which took plan while I was on duty in the Navy General Staff.

1. At the time of my assumption of office in the Navy General Staff, it was a consistent policy pursued not only by the Navy, but by the entire nation, to try and effect speediest possible settlement of the China affair.

Now, Japan's deadlocked land operations in China had created such a situation as requiring the enforcement of economic blockade against China as an all-important factor in the solution of the Incident.

Our advance to South French Indo-China was prompted by various economic and political necessities, but what we, as parties directly concerned in military operations,
felt most imperative of all reasons for this action was the necessity to avert a collapse of our national defense for one thing, and, for another, to bring the China affair to an early conclusion by means of an over-all economic blockade of our hostile neighbor.

It was about the beginning of July, 1941, if I remember right, that the First Department Chief of the Navy General Staff, while ordering us operation officers to make preparations for the proposed move to French Indo-China, initiated us into the reason briefly in the following terms why such a step was inevitable.

Much to the obstruction to our intended conclusion of the China affair, the Anglo-American aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime through the southwestern part of China is growing increasingly vigorous. Worse still, the United States, Britain, China and the Netherlands are acting in concert, forming against our country the so-called "A B C D Line". They are pushing on with their steady war-preparations and at the same time hardening their economic pressure upon us. Here, in illustration of this fact, we may take the failure of the Japan-Dutch-India negotiations as one of the most outstanding cases.

What is more, their evil influence is now reaching for French Indo-China and Thailand; and in fact, there are indications that the de Gaulist Partisans and other anti-Japanese elements in French Indo-China are, in collusion with the Britishers, inducing all French Indo-China to go over to the Anglo-American camp. There is indeed an unmistakable possibility of its becoming another Syria. If so, it is ten to one that Thailand will allow herself to be won over to the Anglo-American group in view of her prevailing domestic and foreign relations.
Should such a situation be created, the ABCD front would be invincibly fortified, forcing Japan to be completely isolated and shattering our project of blockading China whereby early to settle the Incident. Suppose we had our economic relations with Thailand and French Indo-China broken off, what would be the result? Excluded from Anglo-American trade as we actually are and with the economic negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies ending in failure, Japan would now suffer an economic collapse and be forced to fall on her knees before the joint ABCD pressure, to speak nothing of a successful settlement of the China affair.

Suppose that British and some other allied forces made a move into French Indo-China, it would be very probable that the de Gaullet elements and other anti-Japanese groups, would work together with these occupation troops, and provoke our forces stationed in North French Indo-China to a clash with them, which would ultimately lead to serious consequences.

"If we wish to prevent such an unhappy event to occur, the only possible way for us, though not a desirable one, is to get ahead of other powers by ourselves dispatching troops to South French Indo-China. There is no alternative.

"Speaking from the French standpoint, she will surely welcome the idea of defending her possession in East Asia conjointly with Japan, with a view to preventing it from becoming a second Syria."

2. Relative to the advance of Japanese troops to South French Indo-China, I will mention two facts.
(1) When I took office in the Navy General Staff, I found that the Navy had already been on its guard against Japan being involved in World War II.

The Navy had been consistently opposed to our country entering into an alliance with Germany and Italy, for fear that such a move on our part would cause increasing friction with the United States and Britain, and, moreover, would imply a danger for our country being embroiled in war.

Our Navy, after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, took special caution so that the Pact might not unnecessarily impose fighting obligations on Japan. It absolutely refrained from referring to any idea of concerted military operations with Germany and Italy or similar courses of action; for we were in dread that if we should unwittingly talk about such an agreement among the three nations for joint military operations, Germany and Italy would at once take the Japanese Navy to be disposed to join in the war, and would even try to compel us under the terms of the Pact to fight their battles.

Such was the precaution that was adopted by the Japanese Navy at the time of Japan's occupation of South French Indo-China, and this precaution attitude on the part of our Navy was kept up to the time
immediately before the outbreak of the Pacific War. It is obvious from this fact that before the opening of the Pacific War there had been no joint operation agreement existing among Japan, Germany, and Italy.

(2) When the Japanese military move to South French Indo-China was launched, staff officers who were responsible for the formulation of war plans had no mention whatsoever for war in the Pacific area, nor had we any plans or preparations under such intention. It may clearly be seen from this that the Japanese advance to South French Indo-China was no preliminary step that had been taken in readiness for the Pacific War.

When I first came to make arrangements for the advance to South French Indo-China of our troops, I was much annoyed to find that there was no adequate military information available concerning the place. For instance, when I wanted to know about its soil, I found there was no data to work upon other than those materials collected by civilian interests, and it was from these meager materials that I managed somehow to get general ideas. The fact-finding survey that was conducted on the spot after our entry into the region revealed numerous errors in our previous calculation.
Immediately before the advance of our troops to South French Indo-China the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands almost simultaneously cut off economic relations with us and placed a ban on their oil exports to Japan. Japan, thus taken by surprise, endeavored to get the strained situation eased in any way, but there was no prospect of her efforts meeting with success; on the contrary, things continued to go from bad to worse, with dark clouds hovering overhead. The outcome of all this was the September 6 decision of our National policy.

Immediately following the above decision, orders from our Section Chief in which he said that the Government had decided to make preparations for war that might break out any moment at the A B C D front, and that we operations officers should begin without delay to study and formulate plans of campaign in line with the government policy. To me, as one of the officers in charge of military operations, it appeared a sheer absurdity to try to fight against the four Powers when we were finding the single China affair too much for us. So I said to the Section Chief, "With our air force so poorly equipped, we can't expect to wage war on the four Powers with confidence of success." Thereupon the chief said admonishingly: "It is not the question of our going into war because we are sure of success, or staying out of it because we are not sure of it. We are simply forced to be ready for any eventuality of war for the sake of self-defense. It is not for a war of our choice that we now stage preparations!"

Faithfully following this admonition of our Section Chief's, we now set to work on the preparation of military operational plans for a self-defensive war in assumption that such might occur and it was with this intention that we pushed on with our undertakings. It was about the beginning of September — that is more than a month after the Japanese military occupation of South French Indo-China — that we started to formulate plans with a view to the possibility of a conflict with the four powers which ultimately developed into the Pacific War.

On this 15th day of August, 1947.

At Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ KIY OE TSUKICHI

I, YASU U.SHIKEO, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: /S/ YASU U.SHIKEO.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ MIYO, TATSUKICHI
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs.

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: HIGASA, Ken

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I. I am HIGASA, Ken.
   I am now dwelling at No. 124, 2 Chome, Kitazawa, Setagaya-District, Tokyo Prefecture.
   In the summer of 1941, I was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Japanese Army and occupied the post of staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters.
   At the conclusion of the co-defense pact between Japan and French Indo-China, I was despatched by the General Headquarters to aid the spot negotiation which were carried out by Major General Sumita stationed at Hanoi at that time.

II. Major General Sumita was informed by the General Headquarters that the diplomatic negotiation regarding the co-defense of Japan and French Indo-China in July, 1941, was concluded in France on 21 July, between Mr. Darlan, the then Foreign Minister of the Vichy Government and
III. The contents of this agreement were none other than that of enforcing
details in compliance with the official statement mentioned above.
It is composed of concrete measures in detail, such as the movement of
Japanese forces, their landing point and landing date, the course of
the troops, occupation regions, the facilities for billeting and
supplying of the Japanese forces. The removal of breach mechanism from
the guns of French Indo-China forces, particularly to avoid the
accidental occurrences of collision between Japanese and French Indo-
China forces as is set forth in Article II of the official statement,
the gist and region of withdrawal of the French Indo-China forces
stationed in the vicinity of the beach where Japanese forces plan to
land and the establishment of land marks visible from the air at the
stationed areas of French Indo-China forces.
Neither the telegram sent from the General Headquarters, nor the
agreement documents of that time can be found today.

(refer to the certificate attached)

IV. I flew by air to San-a in the Hainan Island on the day after the
conclusion of this agreement, and informed the Supreme Commanders of
the Japanese Army and Navy, who were there as occupation forces, the
course up to the conclusion and also of the contents of the agreement.
We talked especially about the minute arrangements for the prevention
of accidental collision.
Then, on or about the following day, the 25th of July, I remember, going
to Saigon by air with Major General Sumita and others. Detailed
Def. Doc. # 1909

I. KYOSEKI, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was
sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in
the presence of this witness.
on the same date, at the same place.

Witness, /s/ KYOSEKI, Ichiro (seal)

OATH:

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth with­
holding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HIGASA, Ken (seal)
I. I am HIGASA, Ken.

I am now dwelling at No. 124, 2 Chome, Kitazawa, Setagaya-District, Tokyo Prefecture.

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At the conclusion of the co-defense pact between Japan and French Indo-China, I was dispatched by the General Headquarters to aid the spot negotiation which were carried out by Major General Sumita stationed at Hanoi at that time.

II. Major General Sumita was informed by the General Headquarters that the diplomatic negotiation regarding the co-defense of Japan and French Indo-China in July, 1941, was concluded in France on 21, July, between Mr. Darlan, the then Foreign Minister of the Vichy Government and
Mr. L370, Sotomatsu, the Japanese Ambassador to France, and that the exchange of official statements were made on 22 July, 1941. At the same time he was informed of the arrangement of military cooperation, the contents of which are identical with that of Exhibit No. 651, although Exhibit No. 651 is dated 29 July, 1941, the contents were reported before this date.

Based upon these informations Major General Sumita immediately opened negotiations with French Indo-China.

At that time the relation between Japanese party and the party from the French Indo-China Government Office was very friendly, and always closely connected. As a result, the spot agreement based on the exchanged official statements, of which Major General Sumita was directly in charge, proceeded smoothly and speedily without any trouble. Together with the Navy and Foreign Office representatives I witnessed the signing between Major General SUMITA Raishiro and Governor-General Decoux. As the representatives of French Indo-China, there were present the Governor-General, the Chief-Secretary, Juan, and several other persons, and the signing was carried out in a very friendly manner.

At the signing, Major General SUMITA asked the French party whether the notification from France containing the same contents as that of Exhibit No. 651 stated above reached French Indo-China party, and the French party affirmed it.

I recall that the date of this agreement was 23, July, 1941.
III. The contents of this agreement were none other than that of enforcing details in compliance with the official statement mentioned above. It is composed of concrete measures in detail, such as the movement of Japanese forces, their landing point and landing date, the course of the troops, occupation regions, the facilities for billeting and supplying of the Japanese forces, the removal of breech mechanism from the guns of French Indo-China forces, particularly to avoid the accidental occurrences of collision between Japanese and French Indo-China forces as is set forth in Article II of the official statement, the gist and region of withdrawal of the French Indo-China forces stationed in the vicinity of the beach where Japanese forces plan to land and the establishment of marks visible from the air at the stationed areas of French Indo-China forces.

Neither the telegram sent from the General Headquarters, nor the agreement documents of that time can be found today.

(refer to the certificate attached)

IV. I flew by air to "San-a" in the Hainan Island on the day after the conclusion of this agreement, and informed the Supreme Commanders of the Japanese Army and Navy, who were there as occupation forces, the course up to the conclusion and also of the contents of the agreement. We talked especially about the minute arrangements for the prevention of accidental collision.

Then, on or about the following day, the 25th of July, I remember, going to Saigon by air with Major General Sumita and others. Detailed
arrangements were made there between French Indo-China forces stationed there and us. Needless to say, the preliminary agreements etc., between Japan and French Indo-China at Saigon were carried out in a friendly atmosphere throughout these meetings. Scrupulous care and preparations were made lest any accidental collision should occur in the several days prior to the landing of Japanese forces.

It was especially planned in advance that the SUKITA Mission shall certify the withdrawal of the French Indo-China forces from the beach, who in turn shall report it to the Japanese forces, and then the landing shall begin. This was executed exactly as. Accordingly a part of the Japanese forces landed on the 29th, and the greater part on the 29th, and no accident occurred.

V. I later found in a document (Court Exhibit No. 651) that the date of the formal signing of the protocol regarding the co-defense of French Indo-China was 29, July, 1941.

However, as mentioned above, the contents of the official statement exchanged by the representatives of both countries on 22 July, were reported to each respective despatched agency, by the governments of Japan and France. Based on this, the pact was concluded harmoniously and the occupation was begun.

On this 29 day of May, 1947.

At the Compound of the International Military Tribunal For East Asia.

DEFENDENT /s/ HIGASHI Ken (seal)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I, YOSHIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of the chief of Document Section, the First Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Office, hereby certify that the following documents are at present not in the custody of this Bureau.

1. The telegram in which the General Headquarters informed the SUMITRA Mission in French Indo-China on 22 or 23 July, 1941, that an agreement as to the co-defence of French Indo-China was concluded between Japan and France.

2. The pact concluded between SUMITRA, Raishiro and Governor-General, Decoux, based upon the said telegram, in March, 1941.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13 day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness; /s/ KIYOSER, Ichiro (seal)
I. Kiyose, ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

on the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ Kiyose, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Higasa, Ken (seal)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I. YOSHIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of the chief of Document Section, the First Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Office, hereby certify that the following documents are at present not in the custody of this Bureau.

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2. The pact concluded between SAKITA, Raishiro and Governor-General, Decoux, based upon the said telegram, in March, 1941.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13 day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness; /s/ KIYOSHI, Ichiro (seal)
I. I am HIGASA, Ken.

I am now dwelling at No. 124, 2 Chome, Kitazawa, Setagaya-Distict, Tokyo Prefecture.

In the summer of 1941, I was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Japanese Army and occupied the post of staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters.

At the conclusion of the co-defence pact between Japan and French Indo-China, I was despatched by the General Headquarters to aid the spot negotiation which were carried out by Major General Sumita stationed at Hanoi at that time.

II. Major General Sumita was informed by the General Headquarters that the diplomatic negotiation regarding the co-defence of Japan and French Indo-China in July, 1941, was concluded in France on 21, July, between Mr. Darlan, the then Foreign Minister of the Vichy Government and
Def. Doc. # 1909

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arrangements were made there between French Indo-China forces stationed there and us. Needless to say, the preliminary agreements etc. between Japan and French Indo-China at Saigon were carried out in a friendly atmosphere throughout these meetings. Scrupulous care and preparations were made lest any accidental collision should occur in the several days prior to the landing of Japanese forces. It was especially planned in advance that the Sumita Mission shall certify the withdrawal of the French Indo-China forces from the beach, who in turn shall report it to the Japanese forces, and then the landing shall begin. This was executed exactly so. Accordingly a part of the Japanese forces landed on the 29th, and the greater part on the 29th, and no accident occurred.

V. I later found in a document (Court Exhibit No. 651) that the date of the formal signing of the protocol regarding the co-defense of French Indo-China was 29 July, 1941. However, as mentioned above, the contents of the official statement exchanged by the representatives of both countries on 22 July, were reported to each respective despatched agency, by the governments of Japan and France. Based on this, the pact was concluded harmoniously and the occupation was begun.

On this 29 day of May, 1947.

At the Compound of the International Military Tribunal For East Asia.
I, KIYOSHI, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

on the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ KIYOSHI, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HIGASHIKAN (seal)
CERTIFICATES OF SOURCE

I. YOSHIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of the chief of Document
Section, the First Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization office, hereby
certify that the following documents are at present not in the custody
of this Bureau.

1. The telegram in which the General Headquarters informed the
SUMITA Mission in French Indo-China on 22 or 23, July, 1941, that an
agreement as to the co-defence of French Indo-China was concluded between
Japan and France.

2. The pact concluded between SUMITA, Raishiro and Governor-General,
DECOUR, based upon the said telegram, in March, 1941.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13 day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed
hereunto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness, /s/ KIYOSHII, Ichiro (seal)
EXHIBIT I!

EXCERPTS FROM THE INTERROGATION OF TOJO HIDEKI

13 February 1946

Q. What measures were to be taken in connection with advancing southward?

A. I think perhaps they were the dispatch of troops into southern Indo-China.

Q. What other measures were taken in connection with advancing southward?

A. I think that was all.

Q. Was anything to be done in connection with Thailand?

A. I rather think so - in connection with increasing close relations with that country. Previous to this time, on 9 May 1941, Japan had arbitrated the border dispute between Thai and French Indo-China.

Q. Was it not planned to occupy French Indo-China?

A. Not at all. Japan concluded a joint defence treaty for the stabilization of French Indo-China on 29 July 1941.

Q. Prior to that time, had any Japanese troops entered French Indo-China?

A. No they had not. They were dispatched in accordance with the treaty. The treaty was signed on 29 July 1941 and the troops were dispatched to southern Indo-China on the same day. They entered the country on a basis of the agreement.

Q. Prior to the treaty in question, had it not been decided in July 1941 to send troops to that country whether French Indo-China agreed or not?

A. Not at all. A military agreement [gunji kyotei] had been concluded on September 22, 1940, under which the Japanese troops were stationed in northern French Indo-China. The situation was that military pressure from Singapore, the Philippines, and so forth, had continued and, on 29 July 1941, the American freezing of assets had gone into effect and it had become very difficult to carry on peaceful commerce with the Dutch Indies. The China Incident was continuing and the stabilization of French Indo-China was a very important matter. Therefore, on 29 July, troops were sent to the southern part of Indo-China in accordance with the agreement. The Imperial...
Conference had foreseen changes in the situation and had decided to carry on negotiations with France in reference to Indo-China.

***************

Q. Was not the real reason why Japan decided in July 1941 to advance southward that she needed raw materials?

A. This was certainly not the main reason. The main reason was the necessity for maintaining stability in French Indo-China while the fighting with China was going on, but Japan did need peaceful trade in order to support production at home as well as to maintain the struggle in China. America had stopped trade with Japan and Japan needed oil, iron ore, bauxite, tin, and food from the south to be gained by peaceful trade.

***************

Q. What was there about the stability of Indo-China that necessitated calling an Imperial Conference in July 1941?

A. The China Incident was in progress and Japan was exerting every effort to successfully conclude it. Any disturbed area to the south would have an unfavorable effect on the solution of the incident. Moreover, it had been a Japanese idea for a very long time before this to maintain the stability of East Asia. A third reason is that foodstuffs, principally rice, which were imported from French Indo-China, would be unavailable if conditions were unsettled in French Indo-China. These foodstuffs were very necessary for Japan.

Q. Was it considered by you, as War Minister, that French Indo-China would be militarily useful in connection with the China Incident?

A. Of course, I thought of it. Of course, from the military point of view, there was a practical relation as far as northern French Indo-China was concerned. The supply route north from French Indo-China was of assistance to the Chinese and, furthermore, we wanted, from the military point of view, to establish air bases in northern French Indo-China so as to be able to cut off the route from Burma. However, the fact that French power had declined, as a result of conditions in Europe, necessitated the stationing of troops not only in northern Indo-China but also in the central and southern parts for the maintenance of stability.

***************
Q. You have mentioned that the presence of Japanese troops in French Indo-China was of assistance in the fighting against the Chinese. Would not the presence of troops in French Indo-China also be of assistance to Japan in case war should break out between Japan and England, America, or Holland?

A. Economic and military pressure from England, America, and Holland was increasing. The stationing of troops in Indo-China was chiefly to maintain the stability of that country. However, it did assist operations against China and help make peaceful commerce possible. The stationing of troops there was for defensive military protection and was an appropriate measure of national defense, I believe.

***************
Sworn-Deposition (Translation)

Defendant: HISHIURA, Susumu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was serving in the business concerning the military preparations in the Military Affairs Section, the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry from October 1931 to August 1941, except the period from April 1934 to February 1937 during which I was residing abroad.

From August 10, 1941 I was ill and in hospital over a month, and could not work in the office during the period of illness. I was transferred to the post of the Private Secretary to the War Minister in October of the same year, returned to the Military Service Bureau again in April 1942 as the Chief of the Military Affairs Section. Since then until December 1944, I was serving in the business of the same section.

2. First of all, I will speak about the fact that most of the armaments used in the Pacific war was spared or supplied from the military provisions either which had been originally prepared to be used in Manchuria for guarding Manchuria against USSR or which had been prepared as an emergency in the process of the Sino-Japanese Incident, and it had not been originally prepared to be used in a Pacific war. In the Mobilization Plan of 1941 which had been planned by March of 1941, the organization of the units in operations was as follows:

(a) Having a large Baggage Transport Section in the rear providing against the fighting in severely cold or barren regions.

(b) The whole organization of the brigade was equipped so as to be the Mobile Units in operations in Manchuria but under no consideration to be used in the Southern Islands.

(c) All the horses needed in the Supply and Baggage Departments were to be Manchurian horses except the horses for the Headquarters (which was one third of the whole horses).
Those points are worth notice. Consequently, immediately before using those units in the Southern Regions, we had to change the organization completely to make it suitable for the purpose. And even though the organization had been changed, yet it could not be, but a very inadequate and incomplete one, when the unit was mobilized to the South. You can surmise the Operation Plan by the distribution of the Supplies for Operation. Noting, for example the distribution of Ammunition and aviation gasolines in the supplies for operations under the direct control of General Headquarters about the spring of 1941.

**Ammunitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Republic</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Proper</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa and</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French India</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Aviation Gasolines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Formosa and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, by the so-called "Seki Special Maneuvers" which aimed at the strengthening of the guarding of the USSR Manchuria Boundaries, they began to send forth a considerable portion of the Supplies necessary for the operation which had been preserved within Japan to Manchuria from July or August 1941. 27% of the whole ammunition and 14% of the whole amount of aviation gasolines were removed to Manchuria.

3. With the decision on National Policy early in September 1941, it was scheduled to make preparation for war by the end of October or thereabouts although we were working for a compromise with America through diplomatic negotiation and were decided not to resort to war with America and England. But at least in the field of supplies Japan was already blocked entirely by America and England, and there was no room for an increase in output, and what was referred to as a completion of military preparation for the war against America and England was in reality a more changing of the distribution of the supplies which were already possessed by Japan, or preparation of personnel and materials for developing resources in the Southern Region in case of an outbreak of operations in the South, and Japan was obliged to be content with this.

As for the supplies for operation mentioned above, for the first time, in the period from September 1941 to December, 10% of the ammunition and 12% of the aviation gasoline were transferred to Formosa and French India.

4. As a supplementary explanation, I will give the details of the completion of military preparation for about ten years preceding the Pacific war.
In September 1931, the Manchurian Affair broke out. The Japanese Army at that time basically consisted of over 17 Divisions and 26 Air Squadrons. However, although the numerical strength of the Front seems to have been arranged, material to equip them was badly wanting, and even the ammunition allotted to each Brigade on its mobilization was hardly sufficient. Though it had been decided to produce these munitions by mobilizing all the industrial power of Japan evidently it was only a paper plan and there were many parts that could not be taken seriously. But as we had no concrete remedy for them, we did nothing about that. As for the productive power of aeroplanes and the storage of aviation gasolines they were almost none, and the real substance of the Imperial Army, which was commonly acknowledged to be the strongest army in the East Asia, was a mere superficial armament that had no content. The amount of consumption of steel in one year by the army at that time was only 20 thousand tons, and the total budget was only about ¥ 200,000,000. Thus being under the restriction of state economy, in spite of the anxiety of the authorities concerned with the military preparations, not only were the preparations of the Japanese Army inferior when compared with those of the other powers, which after participating in the First World War showed a marked advance in their armaments, but they were also substantially getting poorer and poorer. Munitions and other materials produced were merely sufficient to supply the peace time consumption. In such a condition of the military preparation, the Manchurian Affair broke out. However, Japan had promised a cooperative defense with Manchuko, while on the other hand had to consider the defense of the part of Manchuria which bordered with the great military power of USSR. In addition, she had to face the continued advancement of industries of the USSR, and her increase of the numerical strength in the Eastern Part of "Siberia". All of these necessitated Japan to increase her military power in Manchuria in order to feel secure in the northern region of Manchuria. But in reality, the economical restriction was as strict as ever and the military power in Manchuria was increased only slightly year by year. For instance, aviation which needed the most urgent progress, the annual amount of production was only about 100 million yen in reality, and the entire Army air unit, which consisted of 26 companies in 1931, was barely increased to 50 some odd companies in 1936. Moreover the make up of these companies was so poor that no one thought it possible to carry out offensive operations. In the General Staff Office they considered that if something should arise between Japan and the USSR, the defense of Japan and Manchuria would be impossible unless Japan had at least as many as two thirds of the military strength anticipated to be used in East Asia by the USSR. However, in actuality such strength could never be provided.
So, it was a matter of course that no one had ever thought of preparing for an all-out war with China, if such did ensue. Up to the happening of the Lukouchiao Incident in 1937, there had never been any request from the General Staff Office concerning the filling up of the armaments with a view to such an incident. The idea behind the desire to complete the armaments in those days was mainly to be prepared to take counter-measure if and when attacked by the USSR. It was planned with the idea that remaining and other necessary armaments, which were lacking in Japan and Manchuria could be obtained from the United States and Britain and even from China. Fighting against China, Britain and the United States was never contemplated.

5. In the spring of 1937 when I came back to Japan from European duty to serve in the Military Affairs Office, they were just beginning to realize the above plan to complete the armaments - the plan which was being made intensively since 1936 in the way of defense against the USSR. On the other hand they were having much discussion about the plan to expand the productive power of Japanese and Manchurian with the object of developing industrial economy of the two nations. When we checked the military demand with this plan, the self-sufficiency of fuels in the event of war with USSR, for instance, would be impossible in Japan and Manchuria even if the plan was carried out accordingly. Furthermore we had never in peace time considered stockpiling the quantity necessary for war time. So the plan was being carried out with the idea of keeping friendly relations with America, England and China etc., even if a war should break out against the USSR.

6. In such a situation as explained above, suddenly the Lukouchiao Affair broke out in July 1937. The affair spread more and more in spite of the Japanese policy and effort to minimize it. The development of the hostile situation gradually made it necessary to mobilize and send to China a Group, which had not been expected necessary. Even the budget for the expedition was barely appropriated in piecemeal amounts during the summer and fall of 1937.

And a considerable quantity of the materials which had been accumulated with a great deal of trouble in preparation to defend against the USSR was consumed against China. Moreover, the divisions which were expected to be used in Manchuria had been used in China, and in many cases their organizations and equipment were not suitable for the local situation and we suffered greatly. For instance, though the use of field guns was inconvenient and mountain guns were more expedient in China, most of the Japanese divisions were Field Artillery divisions. Therefore we had to reorganize them with old-fashioned mountain guns. Moreover the consumption on the battlefield far exceeded the amount that could be produced. The mobilization of war industries was not as effective as desired since it had just then begun. The unexpected large-scale operation in China consumed a large amount of war materials on the one hand, and increased the danger in the northern region of Manchuria.
7. Especially the occurrences of the Changku-feng affair in the summer of 1938 and of the Nan-muhan affair in 1939 gave us a lesson and a chance to reconsider our military preparations. The lack of our munitions in the Changku-feng affair made us realize the fact that we were capable of supplying only seven and a half divisions in the event the affair spread. In the Nan-muhan Affair our capacity of supplying air and mechanized units was inferior when compared with the efficiency of supply of the mighty air and mechanized units of the USSR. These facts made us feel that unless we put our entire efforts in military preparation against the USSR, it was not possible even to carry out the China Affair with confidence.

On the other hand, as it became evident that the Sino-Japanese Affair was going to be prolonged in spite of Japan's desire to settle the affair early, to supply the China theater of war and to increase the security against the North, the drafting of a plan was undertaken in 1939 and the idea conceived was to strengthen the army and supply mobilization for 3 years beginning in 1941. The total budget for the plan was about 100 billion yen, and 40% of it was to be appropriated for supplies in China and the rest was for military preparation in Manchuria. Also the transfer of a munitions industry to Manchuria was tried as much as possible in consideration of war against the Soviet, and it was decided to establish the South Manchuria Plant, etc., in North and other places. The immediate completion of military preparations being so urgently demanded at that time that the ordnance manufacturing was considerably advanced but the cultivation of the resources which was the basis of the manufacturing industries was much neglected. Especially, liquid fuel, "rubber", bauxite, and alloys of special steel among the war materials of Japan had to be obtained more than ever from abroad, that is America and England due to the expansion of necessary wartime strength and the consequent need of these materials. That is, the material support by America and England, which had been considered to be absolutely necessary in case of war with the Soviet in future, became much more vital. The army of that time, bearing even this serious burden, went ahead to draft the Three Year Plan.

3. As the Sino-Japanese Affair progressed, it gradually brought about the anti-Japanese economical oppression of America, England and other countries. The situation became critically worse after the summer of 1940. However, if the relations with America and England should be broken, the Japanese army would be frustrated in carrying out the Sino-Japanese Affair as explained above, and besides, it would also mean the upsetting of the foundation of completing military preparations for the defense of Manchuria in view of the frequent armed conflicts actually occurring along the Soviet-Manchuria borders. Also as we had never thought of warring against America and England, we believed we would somehow be able to come through this crisis. So we just unable to change our point of view and engage in military preparations for war against America and England. In fact, the public opinion was anti-American and anti-English and it
would have been natural for the military authorities to prepare for an emergency because such is their duty. But they had a set traditional idea of defense against the USSR and anybody who knew anything about the material situation in the event of war with America and England were fully aware of the difficulties that would confront Japan in the course of such war. These facts prevented them from making wholehearted preparations. For the Japanese Army at that time the solution of the China Affair and the military preparation for the defense against the USSR were more than they could handle. Even if full military preparation for war with America and England was ordered by their superiors they would not have been able to do so concretely due to the lack of materials and the budget.

Since the middle of 1941, the situation grew worse day by day. In the Japanese Army, the consensus of opinion was to accelerate to reach an agreement through diplomatic negotiations and avoid the dangerous situation. And thus, the summer of 1941 came as mentioned above.

On this 23th day of May, 1947

Deponent /S/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)

I, KIYOSKE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness /S/ KIYOSKE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)
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第五十一页

第五十二页
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am YOSHINAGA, Yoshitaka. My residence is No. 226, Unogi-cho, Chofu, Ōta-ku, Tokyo. I was commissioned as Army Artillery 2nd Lieutenant in 1926, and was engaged in the ordnance research work of various nations at the Army Technical Headquarters from 1932 to 1934. From 1936 to the end of war, I was engaged in the planning of research and in the ordnance research of various nations at the Army Technical Headquarters (later the Technical Department, Army Ordnance Administrative Headquarters.)

2. The study of ordnance technique in the Army was made exclusively with consideration for cold-region operations in line with the Anti-Soviet operations. I was after the occupation of the Southern French Indo-China that the Southern operation, that is, the tropical-zone operation were taken into consideration.

3. The fundamental policy of the ordnance research work was directed by the War Minister in 1937 or so, and this policy remained unchanged until 1943. Nothing was indicated in this policy to give consideration to operations in the Southern area.

Consequently, the importance has been attached to the adaptability of weapons in the cold zone. The principal weapons were tried in the cold-zones in North Manchuria every year since 1932 or so, and those weapons which did not
pass the tests were not adopted as regular weapons. However, the adaptability in the tropical zone was never taken into consideration.

4. After the occupation of the Southern French Indo-China, it was emphasized that the adaptability of weapons in the tropical zone be also considered in the research work, and the ordnance technicians were sent to Formosa in August, 1941, to test various weapons.

A tropical zone test room for weapons was completed for the first time towards the end of October, 1941.

Thus, the war broke out when the research work regarding the adaptability of weapons in the tropical zone was in its early stage and incomplete.

As a result, the defects of the various kinds of weapons became apparent in the Southern theater of war.

For example, there was a tremendous amount of unusable ammunitions due to the insufficient damp-proof device, and the local units preferred to use captured weapons.

The tanks also had no cooling system, and the research in this line was made only after the war broke out. With regard to railroad, the research had been made as to the various gauges in the Continent, but as to those in the southern regions nothing was done. For the first time in May, 1942 the study of railroads in the South was initiated.

5. Since no training was given to the units in handling weapons in the tropics, a part of the units were given a very short unit-to-unit training since around November 1941.

On this 19th day of August, 1947
At the Compound of I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT /S/ YOSHINAGA, Yoshitaka (seal)

I, KIYOSHI, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: /S/ KIYOSHI, Ichiro (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ YOSHINA. Yoshitaka (seal)
Def. Doc. No. 1710

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

ARAKI Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: YOSHIDA, Tosuke

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby deposite as follows.

Affidavit

1). I, Yoshida, Tosuke graduated from the Law Department, Tokyo Imperial University in 1926, and immediately entered the Finance Ministry. I was Chief, Treasury Section, Finance Bureau, Finance Ministry, from January, 1941 through October, 1942. Therefore, I have full knowledge of the procedure concerning military notes. At present, I am the Director of the Kobe Custom House.

2). Military notes were for the use of the armed forces while in military operations, and in no way belong to the ordinary currency, but, in view of their bearing upon the obligations of the national Treasury, their hand-
ling had been placed under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Section of the Finance Bureau of the Finance Ministry, so far as the matters concerned were internal, and except when handled by the military itself.

3). In January, 1941 (the 16th year of Showa), the Army requested the Finance Ministry to take steps for printing and manufacturing military notes with denominations in foreign currencies of the Southern Regions. Whereupon, in the same month, a Finance Ministry decision on the preparation for the issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations was made, and a printing and manufacturing order was placed with the Printing Office, a Government organ under the direct supervision of the Cabinet. Around May of the same year, a certain of the said military notes had been printed and manufactured. Printing and production of same was also continued thereafter.

4). About the middle of October of the same year, the Army requested the Finance Ministry to take necessary measures for dealing with said military notes. We, the staff the Finance Ministry were working on the draft measures relating thereto. In the meantime a Cabinet change took place on 13 October, 1941, with Mr. Kinenro Haga as the new Finance Minister.

On 22 October, we completed the drafting of a document entitled "the issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations", which was to be submitted for approval to the Ministers concerned. The draft was passed upon by the respective bureaus concerned in the Finance Ministry and went to
Mr. Kay-, the new Minister.

Mr. Kay- showed deep concern about the passage in the summarized particulars relative to the issuance of the military notes with foreign currency denominations in the said draft that reads: "military notes with foreign currency denominations shall be issued, preparing for the eventuality of our taking military operations in South Seas Regions, when they shall be used by the armed forces concerned, in their payment of military expenditures."

He warned "maybe, this passage is not erroneous, but it is inadequate to fully express what the drafting authorities are intending. The army requests that the military notes prepared beforehand, probably because it fears that exigencies can not be met by setting about the business in a hurry, just when the hostilities have begun. But our country has by no means decided to wage any war. The meaning of drafting this document, therefore, shall be that we want to be provided with measures relating to military notes, in advance, just as a sort of general preparedness to cope with an unexpected eventuality. The document shall make clear the above-said purport and record what is truly meant by the drafters.

Upon this, the Ministry, on 29 October made out and decided upon a document recording the import of Minister Kaya's remark, and annexed it as a reference to the end of
the above mentioned document for approval, entitled, "the issuance of military notes with foreign currency denomination." This was sent round to and approved by the respective minister concerned. After being thus approved, the document including the said reference was kept in the Treasury Section, where I worked.

5) The "issuance" of military notes, as mentioned in the abovesaid document, means the crediting by the Bank of Japan to the "other Government deposit" at the Bank, of the amount of military notes manufactured by the Cabinet Printing Office and received by the Bank from the said office.

On this 13th day of Feb., 1947
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT YOSHIDA Tosuke (seal)

I, TANAKA Yasumichi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo.

Witness (signed) TANAKA Yasumichi (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

[Signature]

[Date]
The issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations for
the use in the Southern Area military operations.

In view of the present international situations and if in case when war
plans in the Southern Area are made for an unexpected eventualty in the
future, and considering a necessity which may arise in that contingency, the
issuance of military notes in foreign denomination shall be made as preparatory
measures in order to provide for payment of military expenditures of the unit
concerned according to the following general outlines.

Note: The issuance of military notes in the past were decided upon by
the Cabinet conference, due to the fact that they were issued
just at the time of their actual use. The present issuance,
however, being a more preparatory measure conceived for an
unexpected eventualty in the future, is decided upon by the
Ministers concerned only, pending report to the Cabinet conference:
if by any chance an emergency truly happens to necessitate their
actual use.

1. Military notes with foreign currency denominations shall be
   issued, preparing for an eventualty of our military operations
   in the South Seas Regions, when they shall be used by the
   armed forces concerned, in their payment of military
   expenditures.

- 1 -
2. Then necessary, the military notes shall be converted into Japanese currency.

3. The handling procedures relative to the above two paragraphs shall be established by the Minister of Finance, upon consultation with the Ministers of War and of the Navy.
Def. Doc. #1711

Authentication of a certain document

I, the Chief of the Bureau of Finance, the Ministry of Finance, the Japanese Government, hereby certify that the accompanying document, written in Japanese, consisting of one page, and entitled "The issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations for the use in the Southern Area military operations," is a true and correct copy of a document annexed as a reference to the end of a document submitted for approval and duly approved, which is entitled "The issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations," drafted on 22 October, 1941, and approved on 31, same month, same year, and which is in a file kept by the National Fund Sub-Section, the Treasury section, the Bureau of Finance, the Ministry of Finance, the Japanese Government, and entitled "The military notes, the 16th year of Showa (1941)"; and further that the said document submitted for approval and duly approved was delivered to the counsel for the Prosecution at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, at the request of them, in 1946, of which the reference document entitled "The issuance of military notes with foreign currency denominations for the use in the Southern Area military operations" was returned to us by the said counsel in 1947.

/S/ JUTSUO KUSUI (seal)
Chief, the Bureau of Finance, the Ministry of Finance.

At Tokyo
--- April, the 22nd year of Showa (1947)
I herewith certify that the above signature was added and the seal affixed in my presence.

Witness: /S/ Yoshi ISHIDA (seal)

Chief, 1st Temporary
Section, the Bureau of Finance, the
Ministry of Finance.

At same place as above.

On same day as above.
## ERRATA SHEET

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change "attached" to "attacked"
DEPONENT: Tanaka, Shinichi

1. Having first spoken an oath as set forth on the attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby deposite as follows:

My name is Tanaka, Shinichi. I am an ex-Lieutenant-General and now live at 2012 Yoshioka, Mizusawa-ura, Miyo-gun, in Iliya Prefecture.

I was on duty as chief of the first section (operations planning) in the General Staff Office from 12 October 1940 to 7 December 1941. Now I shall deposite here about the operational plan and preparations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in which I took part in the past.

2. First I shall explain the operational plan and preparations for the year 1941. In the conference for the 1941's peace-time operations plan held in the winter of 1940, the Chief of the General Staff adopted a draft for the Southern operations, which was almost the same in contents with that of the previous year. In other words, the draft was a purely technical provision for defensive operations, a war from which the Supreme Command used to make annually as a part of general peace-time national defence plan. This draft has been burned and is not available for the present. However, I am sure I can tell the following facts according to my recollections.

a. A major part of the peace-time operations plan for the Japanese army consisted of defensive preparations against the Soviet Union, in point of quantity as well as quality.
Therefore in deciding upon an annual peacetime operational plan, the thing to be done first of all was usually to define an outline of the anti-Soviet defensive plan (its rough projects, forces and materials needed for it, etc.), laying aside all other considerations for the time being. It was only after this was finished that the operational plan for the South came up for consideration.

It was as it were secondary and supplementary in importance. No stress was laid upon it, sometimes it was nothing more than a paper plan in rough and abstract form. It was not too much to say that nothing concrete was found in the operational preparations for the South. The plan projected for the year 1941 was also of the same nature.

b. According to the design in the above program, if a war should break out between Japan and the United States, measures to be taken were limited to the occupation of the Philippines and Guam and in consequence the capture of American military bases in the Far East. It never contained in any sense detailed plans or preparations against possible attack from the mainland of the United States which might have been expected to follow as a necessary consequence in such an event.

An Anti-American operational plan would have been projected as against a possible over-all attack by the main forces of the United States. If it were so, the extent and scope of the plan would have been wider and more complicated in anticipation of a protracted war. In this case the question when and where would be the end of the war would have been a key point to decide beforehand.

The Japanese operations plan, however, never referred to this essential point and touched only upon operations against the American military bases in the Far East. Even offensive actions against Hawaii, not to speak of the mainland, were not taken into account in the plan. The reason was that priority was given to the defensive plan and moreover that our national power could not stand such operations. Another important reason was that Japan's sole aim was to drive away the imminent threat. It was entirely unnecessary further to wage war with the United States. This was the fundamental attitude of the Japanese army in making up the year 1941's plan and had been so in the annual programs that preceded it. As to Britain the following was the measure to be worked out by 1941's plan, in case a war should break out with her: It is true that we had the idea, in case of war to capture first her military bases in the Far East, such as Singapore or Hongkong, but no concrete plans were prepared for that. India, Australia and other British territories were never contemplated in the plan. It was the same also with the Netherlands East Indies. The actual conditions did not
allow Japan to plan simultaneous operations against more than two countries including the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, as she has not sufficient military forces and national resources to venture such a war. On the other hand, inasmuch as it was very difficult to foresee the development of such a many-sided war it was admitted that in such a case we should have somehow to combine the separate plans originally designed as against individual nations into an over-all plan of operation. The Supreme Command, however, had of course an idea to take some political measures as far as possible not to launch such simultaneous operations.

The above mentioned strategy meant that we should, at the outset of war, check their attack in a passive way for a while and afterwar's take an offensive and thus maintain defensive attitude. Of course, we expected that, according to the progress of operations, in some cases it might be necessary to cope with the offensive of the enemy, to give up fruitless passiveness and to turn to an effective counter attack as soon as possible.

However, in view of the insufficiency of operational preparations that could be expected within 1941, it was quite clear at the beginning of that year that not only in the earlier months but also as late as at the end of the year we would be still unable even to carry out the passive formulae of operation, not to speak of checking at once an offensive attack from some country. In this connection, detailed accounts shall be given in a later paragraph.

It was generally admitted that the preparations had to be completed only through steady and continual efforts over a long period, because of Japan's poor condition in strategic resources war funds and munitions production. It was because we had no capacity to meet the need of a crisis, if once it happened, with drastic measures on a grand scale. So the incompleteness of preparations meant complete impossibility to make operations. These facts clearly show that the plan for the year together with its preparatory programs could not meet even the requirements of the defense plan for 1941. (This sentence is not clear)

d. The peacetime operations program for 1941 was drafted and decided upon by the General Staff Office as stated in the foregoing explanations, but a further study was never attempted for framing a concrete policy. No permanent army headquarters had yet come into being standing on a permanent foothold to be in charge of execution of Southern operations in case of a crisis. Even divisions necessary for the operation not yet been designated.
3. Here I am going to explain some facts in relation to the drafting of peacetime operational plan for 1941.

a. The care of the peacetime operational plan for 1941 lay in the basic policy of Japan to: avoid, in view of the current state of things both within and without, any over-all war with other countries so that Japan might devote all her efforts to the solution of the China Incident; to try to bring the South Problems then pending between Japan and other countries to a prompt settlement by some means short of war; and above all to block the so-called Aid-Chiang routes of the Third Powers. These were the points which General Sugiyama Gen., Chief of the General Staff, who was in charge of command over the General Staff Office as whole and of national defense and tactics pointed out as essential to the drafting of operational plans, when he gave an instruction to me, chief of the first section (in charge of operations) as well as to Lt.-General Tsukada, Osamu, vice-chief of the General Staff Office (who was in charge of controlling general affairs end of adjusting policy and strategy).

b. Why war should be averted from strategical points of view was clear from the following circumstances: In the winter of 1941 at the drafting conference of the plan for the following year, the number of forces needed for war-time emergency was estimated by the War Ministry at forty-eight divisions in total. If they were divided into a few groups which would be dispatched each for one quarter, namely about thirty divisions for anti-Soviet defense, about ten divisions for the China operations, five divisions for guarding against the United States and Britain and a few divisions in reserve for the Imperial Headquarters, there would have been no doubt big shortage of forces in every quarter. It was true especially with regard to the amount of tanks, motor-cars, communication facilities and liquid fuels. Further, in anticipation of a crisis with the United States and Britain in the future, considerable increase was required above all in the number of army corps for defensive purposes in this direction, amounting to at least a little more than ten divisions in the early period of emergency. Therefore, there should have been prepared about ten divisions for the China operations, a little more than twenty divisions for the anti-Soviet defense and a few in reserve for the Imperial Headquarters. The Chief of the General Staff recognized that, in such a case, shortage of armed forces and war materials would be much more acute and such a war would compel us to leave the China Incident completely fruitless. The chief further concluded that Japan should keep up a policy to avert a wholesale war from the viewpoints of both politics and strategy. In this respect, I understood, the War Minister also had agreed in opinion with the chief.
Besides, in framing the plan, the following matters underwent special examination in an interview I had with the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in my capacity as Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff. The question was in what the strategy of the Japanese Army would be affected by the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. The discussion was held in November of 1940, and the result was as given below:

The general view held by the Vice-Chief was mainly that Japan should by every means avert any resort to arms in so far as the justice and fame of our nation be maintained, however imminent the compulsion of the Tripartite Pact. I agreed with him on this point. The conclusion, of course, was a result of consideration from a purely strategical point of view. The final decision whether to resort to arms or not was a matter left to our state policy. The question whether or not any of the contracting parties to the Tripartite Pact was really attacked by the United States, was a matter for future judgement which was to be decided in relation with the circumstances at that time and from a fair and independent viewpoint. We ought to keep up this attitude with a firm belief and make a due judgement in view of the whole destiny of our nation. In case Japan should be attacked from the United States, Germany would, of course, give us a military aid of some sort. However, considering the fact that Germany was then absorbed in the European wars and that her military power was nover limitless and besides in view of the circumstance that Germany was not a big naval power and situated remote from East Asia and the Western Pacific, (an expected battlefield in case of a war between Japan and the United States), the Japanese Army could not expect a strategical aid from Germany. On the other hand, in case Germany should be attacked by the United States, Japan would be obliged to give aid to Germany by arms. Japan, however, could not afford to engage in military operations against the United States exclusively for the purpose of aiding Germany. On the contrary, she had to devote herself to her own independent operations in order to complete a general national defense. In case a war should break out between the United States and Germany, we should find out some measures or other to meet the circumstance. It was especially the case at that time when the Japanese Army had no surplus in armed forces.

These were the gist of the conclusion.

The Chief of the General Staff approved the above conclusion and made clear his views in agreement with the Vice-Chief that the 1941 peacetime operations plan should be designed and established from an independent viewpoint; that it should not be restricted or given any support from outside; and that it should not be influenced in strategy by the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance Pact. The 1941 peacetime operations plan was founded upon this principle.

C. As to preparations accompanying the 1941 peacetime operations plan, I recognized that they were lacking in thoroughness, for the Southern operations (for defense) were left out of consideration in the plan and therefore those areas remained untouched or without defense.

(a) For the South, even the study prerequisite for the defense of that area was left incomplete or untouched as to organization, equipment, materiel and training of forces to be employed for landing and tropical operations.

For although the most urgent and immediate need of the time was to reform the organization and equipment of a part of army forces and give them special training so that they might be used for the Southern operations against the United States and Britain as provided in the peacetime national defense plan, it could hardly be expected that
those proportions would be finished even in their crude form by the
summer of 1941, if it be set about at once.

In the 1941 mobilization plan, emphasis was laid on the completion
of defense in Manchuria against the Soviet by reorganizing each division
so as to adapt it to operations in continental climate, especially in
the cold wilderness of North Manchuria. The organization and equip-
ment thus prepared for the troops were entirely opposite in nature to
those for the South. Particularly, transport goods to be accommodated
for each division was of a great amount, and a majority of horses for
transport and communication was expected to be Manchurian ponies.
From this it was clear that the Japanese Army laid greater stress upon the
defensive operations against the Soviet Union than upon those against
the United States and Britain, even at the beginning of the period
covered by the 1941 operations and mobilization plan, that is, in April
1941. As for the equipment of army airplanes, only sixty or seventy
percent out of the original mobilization plan were expected to be
reached before August, 1941. Among them, especially, heavy bombers
which had been originally designed for defensive purposes for the
Manchurian-Soviet frontier, had but a small flying range and were not
well fitted for Southern operations. As stated in the above paragraph,
aviation facilities on the whole were not available for Southern
operations.

(b) As regards the stock of ammunitions for operational purposes, only
a small amount was piled up for the Southern operations during the
period between the spring and the summer of 1941. At the end of
September and later in October, there was accumulated an additional
amount and afterwards, until December, it reached in total barely to the
amount available for some ten divisions at the most. The accumulation,
however, had not been calculated in the aforesaid preparations which had
been based upon 1941's peace-time operations plan, but it was carried
out chiefly after the determination of national policy.

(c) As mentioned before, the preparations in the 1941 plan meant
chiefly, reorganization and training of several divisions so as to fit
them for the guard and defense in the South; study of tactics in the
tropics; study of landing tactics; collection of information and
strategical materials. They were essential matters of study for framing
a peace-time national defense and were not the prerequisites for the
execution of wars against the United States, Britain and Holland.
Moreover, it was too late in commencement and was not rapid in progress.
In addition to this, information concerning the South, particularly
military conditions, weather, topography, land and marine meteorology
were found incomplete and no bases were prepared for aviation, sea-
transport and communication activities.

(d) In view of the actual condition as above stated as well as the
expected progress of preparations within the designated year, even
passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect. Much
more difficult was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive
actions or an instant counter-attack against the enemy's offensive.

We tried, however, to meet at least the minimum requirements of
defensive preparations in an effort to make up for such shortages in the
preparations.

There were many difficulties found in the way of execution due to
the want of military funds and materials in the Army Ministry and the
insufficiency of investigation by the Supreme Command. It was not
before September of the year that preparations in organizing armed
forces and war materials were first launched. They were to a greater
extent
applications from those originally prepared for the defense against the Soviets, or some such modifications for meeting an emergency.

III. I shall state here about the plan and preparations which were adopted after the decision on a national policy was arrived at as a result of the Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941, (Exhibit 588).

A. On 2 July, immediately after the decision of a national policy, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the General Staff gave the following explanations to the chiefs of all sections in his staff in connection with the problem of the United States and Britain, which had been fully discussed at the Conference. Above all, he stressed the need of propelling the once-fixed policy and accordingly the study and preparations for moving into South French Indo-China.

(a) The fixed principles should not be changed fundamentally as to the solution of the China Incident. We should however, strengthen pressure upon Chungking from the South and check up the routes for helping Chiang Kai-shek. While, on the other hand, if circumstances admit, we should exercise belligerent rights against Chungking and take over hostile foreign settlements into our hands. We must pay utmost vigilance to every circumstance, especially to the United States and Britain, in taking up such measures. The pressure upon Chungking from the South had to be effected also by the practical application of policies already established toward French Indo-China. It was an urgent need to dispose of the hostile foreign settlements in China, as they were presenting a great obstacle in the way of settling the China Incident. It was more desirable to solve it through diplomatic means, but, if circumstances do not admit, we should have to take them over by force through the New Central Government of China. In that case, there would be some danger of strained relations with the Anglo-Americans. Something more serious than the occupation of South French Indo-China might happen in diplomatic relations with those countries. Therefore, we must never be in haste in the solution. This was the reason why foreign settlements in China were decided to be taken over, if the case required it. Anyhow we must be ready, if the worst comes, not to evade a defensive war against the Anglo-Americans.

(b) The Southern policy was made up generally on the basis of the once-fixed national policy and aimed at the advancement of troops into South French Indo-China. The policy especially confirmed the need of maintaining readiness for a war against the United States and Britain. Nevertheless, it did not mean Japan was determined to make a war. It only admitted that, if Japan should suffer a military interference from the United States and Great Britain in the way of executing her policy toward Siam and French Indo-China through peaceful and diplomatic means, she would never shun operations for self-defense in those areas. In that case, every effort was to be paid to avoid armed forces entering Siam. As to the real purport of the expression of "not to evade war towards Britain and America" in the above decision, it has been understood from the atmosphere of the Imperial Conference itself and the real intention of the Navy, that by them it was expected that Japan would successfully carry out her policy in peace toward French Indo-China and Siam, without causing any trouble with the Anglo-Americans, if she paid possible efforts for the cause. The expression that Japan was not afraid of war with the United States and
Britain meant only that we would not be in danger of stimulating a war by taking a policy toward French Indo-China; however, any interference or challenge from Anglo-Americans, if they were turned toward us, might cause an unexpected situation; thus, we should make a careful preparation for carrying out a policy toward French Indo-China and should have a firm determination to get ready for the worst. We also foresaw a future time when the activities of the Army, whose offensive activities would be greatly enlarged to permit us a more careful consideration of Southern problems, as our preparations were not ready as compared with those against the Soviet Union and China. Anyhow, in view of the situation where Japan's sphere of defense was enlarged up to French Indo-China, the first step to be taken was a practical study of operations plan against the United States and Britain from various points of view.
The outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union was making extremely pointed the relations between Japan and the Union. In addition American aid to the Soviet Union and the construction of military bases by the United States in the Soviet territory in the Far East were making the Japanese-Soviet relations more intricate and serious. In this respect, special consideration must be given in connection with the Anglo-American problem.

In the conference held on 2 July, every member in attendance expressed the same desire to carry out a peaceful advancement following the international treaties as far as possible. The War Minister also discussed his intention to do his best in order not to cause any trouble at the time of advancement, as had happened formerly in North French Indo-China last autumn. The Supreme Command, calculating on this intended to dispatch the Imperial Guard Division then stationed in South China to French Indo-China in order to complete the advancement. For this cause, we decided to make good use of the results of investigation made last June and to establish and intimate connection and communication between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff, especially in adjusting the relations between politics and military operations.

The Chief of the General Staff, who had agreed in view with the Government and the Army General Staff late in June 1941, pointed out that the aim of advancement of South French Indo-China, was both to cut the Chiang Kai-Shek route formerly established there and to contribute to the establishment of economic autonomy of Japan. He further stressed that with this in view, we should first of all secure friendship and reliance from French Indo-China. Moreover, he stated to the following effect:

Both the Central authorities of the Army and the troops on the spot should pay full respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity and other rights of France with and understanding that the Japanese Embassy in French Indo-China and the troops on the spot must not fail to make control and communication between themselves, and in connection with this a decisive measure for control must be taken among the stationed troops. Even common soldiers must be fully aware that every misunderstanding or disagreement should be avoided by both peoples due to the difference in manners, customs and languages of the two nations. This he emphasized at the conference for the mapping out of the advancement program.

B. I give the following as a supplement to the above statement in relations to the stationing of troops in South French Indo-China.

As to the possibility of peaceful advancement into South French Indo-China, General Sugiyama, the Chief of the General Staff, clarified his view early in July that Japan did not take French Indo-China for an enemy and the advancement was not of a military occupation. He concluded that there as a favorable prospect on the side of France to admit a peaceful advance, on condition that we could convince them of the purpose of our stationing of troops, though it would not be an easy task. Early in July, it was informed that Britain might march into French Indo-China beforehand, as she was aware of our intention to make advancement there. Anxiety would prevail among us if this would cause any untoward accident at the time of our occupation. The Chief believed that our attitude, if maintained just, fair and firm, would not give rise to any trouble by the conduct of British Armies.
(b) The invasion of Chinese Armies into North French Indo-China was at this time a matter of great concern for the Central authorities of the Army and for the dispatched forces stationed in South China and French Indo-China. Early in July, information reached us that three divisions of Chungking's Army, hitherto stationed near the border...
between China and French Indo-China, received an order to enter into French Indo-China. In order to meet this situation, the first section of the General Staff made a secret study of a plan of reinforcing one regiment of infantry, if needed temporarily, and moreover even to despatch one division then stationed in Canton. On the other hand, early in 1941 the General Staff gave out information to the effect that Chinese forces amounting to four armies or about 16 divisions were stationed in face of French Indo-China, in the districts of Lungchow, Tsinghsi and Mangtzo, Chinese territories adjacent to the districts of Langcon and Lookay, situated at the northeast border of French Indo-China.

C. As already mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff asked on 2 July 1941, shortly after the Imperial Conference, to make a thorough investigation upon the strategy toward the United States and Britain. Following this, at the end of July, when the occupation of South French Indo-China was put into operation, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the first section were urged by the Chief of the General Staff for the promotion of the study. The results of the investigation at that time were like below:

(a) The preparations generally required at the time, were put into practice within the limits of the already-fixed plan established early in the year. They were: -- studies in various fields of operations, studies of defensive plans to meet a critical situation on the basis of the proceeding annual plan; and now investigations and preparations for the defense of French Indo-China on the principle of Franco-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreement.

Detailed accounts of preparations were also within the scope of the established policy including the promotion of training, equipment, supplies, and sanitation. It was an urgent need to make up for the loss suffered in the operations in China.

(b) The decision of national policy reached on 2 July and its consequent result, the Franco-Japanese military cooperation for the mutual defense of French Indo-China, had its aim in the protection of that area from the United States and Britain. The matter had never been imagined in the past annual operations plans. It was a new theme claiming a totally different study and preparations on the part of the General Staff. Our armed forces stationed in French Indo-China after the occupation of the Southern part of that area amounted to one brigade and one flying corps (two companies) for North French Indo-China and one division (in order not to interfere with the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations, no forces except the airforce engineers corps were stationed there in addition to the above one division) were assigned for the defense of French Indo-China from the threat of invasion by the United States, Britain and De Gaulle regime or the invasion or other aggressions by the Chinese forces. The General Staff, not going farther beyond the limit of an informal study on the reinforcement of units which had been reserved for crisis in China and Formosa, left further measures to the Army on the spot. While, construction of air bases and installation of communication facilities were going on according to the provisions of official agreement reached between Japan and France, other measures were also taken into consideration as shown in the above statement.

(c) It was likely that Japanese operational measures for self-defense against the United States and Britain which might follow the mutual defense agreement with French Indo-China or other similar circumstances, would naturally cover the main areas (such as Malay, the Philippines), and would develop into military operations necessary for defending the Japanese homeland. Therefore, it became a pressing need to propel a further study in the operational plan in anticipation of a future situation. The Chief of the General Staff then requested the Vice-Chief and the Chief of the First Section to promote the study on the plan.
including the study of operations in the tropics, on the sea, in the air and of landing in areas such as the Philippines, Malay, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Bismark Islands, Guam, etc. Likewise, the Chief of the Second Section was asked to collect information and materials on military affairs in the South and the Chief of the Third Section was given an instruction to speed up a study on the war materials for ocean and landing operations.
IV. I shall now explain matters in connection with the operations plan and preparations after the decision or national policy made as a result of the Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941.

A. In early September 1941 the Chief of the Army General Staff at a meeting attended by the Vice Chief of Staff and chiefs of departments explained the items in the above-mentioned national policy which related to the United States and Great Britain, the gist being as follows:

In short, it was a request for reconsideration of the operations plan and the furtherance of or the making of a new start in the operational preparations in order to cope with the situation.

1. The national policy decided on 6 September reflects a strong consciousness of the critical importance of rational defense. In other words, the question of how to cope with the present critical situation, especially the offensive actions of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands toward Japan and of how to cope with the reality of the daily diminishing resilience of our national strength in the face of the Anglo-American freezing of our assets, especially the embargo on oil, the complete loss of which is now but a matter of time -- how to cope with this critically grave situation and how to save the fate of the nation -- these are questions
which our country must answer. In order to solve these questions and in crying need as our country is of measures to surmount the difficulties, ever in the event of our falling into the worst possible situation, it has been decided to pursue our diplomacy in all seriousness or the two-fold policy of diplomacy and war preparations with an attitude of making efforts for peace, but ready to fight if peace fails. This is what the national policy decision provides for. For this purpose it was decided that, while seeking the attainment of the objectives of the negotiations with a time limit on the one hand, completion of war preparations with a time limit shall be made with a resolve to meet possible eventualities when war against the United States (Great Britain and the Netherlands) is unavoidable from the standpoint of self-preservation and self-defense. The nation's position on peace or war is to be decided in the early part of October (1941). These are the matters the aforementioned national policy decision provides for. In short, the decision or national policy both in name and in fact is not a decision resolving on war, but a decision whose object is to bring about a new turn in the situation through diplomacy. The hastening of defensive war preparations is directed against the offensive actions of the Powers against Japan with a will and resolve to fight in case war cannot be averted.
It should be emphasized that the primary principal of the decision is to attain our objective through diplomacy.

2. In comparing the decision of 2 July and that of 6 September there are differences in the fundamental points. (a) With respect to what might be the cause for conflict between Japan and the United States and Great Britain, the earlier decision was limited to the problem of Siam and French Indo-China, especially the latter, whereas the later decision reflects the fact that the area and actuality of friction between Japan and the United States and Great Britain have become greatly enlarged and far more serious as a result of the American-British-Dutch offensive against Japan, the embargo and the situation with regard to the resilience of Japanese national strength. In other words, Japan was to demand by sheer force of circumstances that the United States and Great Britain refrain from interfering in and obstructing the solution of China Incident, and from threatening Japan's national defense, and offer their cooperation in acquiring raw materials. She further was to demand of the United States and Great Britain recognition of the special relations between Japan and French Indo-China, the non-establishment of military interests in the territories of Siam, the Netherlands East Indies, China and the Soviet Far East, and confirmation that there will be no military reinforcements in the Far East. Moreover, the later decision also provided that Japan naturally would agree to concessions to a considerable degree in return for the foregoing demands.
(b) Should by any chance military operations be undertaken under the earlier decision, the objective was to carry out measures concerning French Indo-China, while in the later case, the nation's self-preservation and self-defense would be the motive.

(c) Whereas the former decision considered French Indo-China as essentially the center of the area of operations, the area of operations under the latter would expand widely.

(d) Accordingly, it is only natural that there should be differences in the strategical concept.

(e) The situation regarding the strategic material oil is great change completely different from what it was at the time of the July decision. Now the much feared danger signal that our national defense would be rendered powerless can be seen in this single item. (Lee IV. refer to IV, E).

3. As this decision on national policy is a demand for acceleration of operational preparations directed toward the South, the General Staff is required urgently to complete the actual plan on an overall basis. In connection with operational preparations the fixed annual peacetime plan and the supplementation made after 2 July, shall be further accelerated and perfected. In addition necessary operational preparations shall be begun anew. The Supreme Command feels especially the need for a deep reconsideration of the fact
that the annual plan for the year 1941 is insufficient, incomplete and impractical and the accompanying preparations for defense betrays weakness and lack of thoroughness.

In view of the situation, the chief of the General Staff have given directions to the Vice-Chief and the chief of the First Division on the following matter as an operational formula to be newly adopted. It is, in substance, that the national policy decision of 6 September is an order for the completion of operational preparations on a general scale regardless of whether or not they are offensive or defensive in nature. As the first operational formula to be adopted, Japan shall in the early stage counter passively the attacks of the American, British and Dutch forces singly or severally and then after completing operational preparations turn to the offensive to secure the defense of our land. In such a case we must recognize that we cannot avoid carrying out continuously operations necessary for our self-preservation and defense, and preparations toward this end shall be completed. As to the second operational formula, although we shall counter the attacks of the opposing party, we shall without falling into a defensive position undertake repulsive actions by counter-attacking from the very outset and then carry out the strategy indicated in the first formula, as to which of the above two we should rely on or whether other plans
(such as special defense in some particular spot) should be adopted, the choice would naturally be determined by the situation within and without our country at the time of the commencement of hostilities and the degree of completion of our national policy in meeting that situation as well as the state of our military and naval preparations. At such a time the various conditions surrounding the navy would have a decisive importance. As for the army Supreme Command, it was directed that whatever may be the circumstances, the army's objective was to carry out operations which, if possible would immediately repulse the opposition's initial attack and that various studies and preparations be carried forward with this in view.

4. Although the formula of operations to be adopted and the aim of preparations to be advance are, as stated above, there is no alternative at present than to undertake defensive operations at first. In other words, while on the one hand we must undertake to perfect all emergency measures in planning and preparing our strategy of defense, we must, on the other as operational preparations are gradually pushed to completion make it our principle to plan and prepare urgent matters in an orderly manner so that there will be no miscarriage in the execution of our defensive or offensive strategy which ever it may be. This, from this day on ward, has become the important subject of study especially of the
Supreme Command. At the same time, the possibility of initial
an initial attack by the opposition before the completion
of Japanese preparations by the latter part of October, is
a matter worthy of deep caution and prudent consideration
on the part of the operation authorities.
B. About the middle of September, the General Staff decided upon a plan of defensive strategy to be adopted for the time being in the South, based upon the September national policy decision and prepared according to the following mental attitude:

1. The defensive strategy for the South to be taken by the Japanese army shall vary according to the stage of progress of operational preparations, but on the whole, it shall be on a very small scale. In the final analysis its primary object will be the defense of French Indo-China itself from the attack of the opposition. From the actual state of our present operational preparations we cannot engage in operations in other areas in the southern region. Hence, in such an event grave difficulties would arise in the defense of Japanese territory and protection of our marine transportation.

2. As such operations as the foregoing amounts to a great failure from the standpoint of national defense, we should quickly abandon such a passive and harmful operational formula and turn from a purely defensive position to a passive offensive. This requires speedy progress in our operational preparations such as would permit a change over to emergency operational command for our self-preservation and defense.

3. In case such operations are unavoidably given rise to, much
against our wishes, the principle of operational command and other methods as are deemed proper shall be established in accordance with the actual state of progress of operational preparations. In this connection, no directions in advance are deemed necessary to be given to the forces on the spot (forces stationed in French Indo-China). This is regarded as disadvantageous to us.

C. Since about this time, the General Staff, was constantly apprehensive lest there be a possible attack initiated by the United States and Great Britain, considered it highly necessary to prepare fully against it. Hence there was great concern in our defensive operational command in this period when preparations for operations in the South were incomplete. On November 6, 1941, the Imperial Headquarters sent to the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army an order to prepare for the capture of strategic points in the Southern Region.

This order permitted him, in the event of an initial attack by the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands or one of them, to meet the attack with the forces under his command for purposes of self-defense. In an order issued on December 1, 1941 the Imperial Headquarters directed that in the event of a serious initial Anglo-American attack the Supreme Commander shall, in cooperation with the navy, commence
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offensive (occupational) operations at a proper time. As can thus be seen, these orders were issued out of a deep concern over a possible initial attack by the United States and Great Britain. There were also grave apprehensions over a possible British invasion of Siam.
D. The state of operational preparations about the middle of September was generally as follows: In connection with the preparations both under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry and the joint jurisdiction of the Ministry and its Sub-divisions all matters were vigorously advanced through cooperation between them, but delay could not be avoided. This was principally due to lack of materials and shipping.

1. Although it was the plan of the General Staff gradually to release units of the 5th and 18th divisions from the China operations for employment in the French Indo-China area, their education, training and equipment having recovered to some extent about this time to enable them to engage in operations, yet their recovery and perfection; especially preparations which would accord with the requirements of operations in the South were far from sufficient. (These divisions were at first being concentrated for return to Japan and demobilization, but in view of the situation in the South, their return home was called off and they were made to stand by in China.)

These divisions had been on duty maintaining public peace and safety in China (near Shanghai and Canton). In addition, they were primarily engaged in military training. Even in case an incident with the United States and Great Britain should suddenly occur and these divisions are dispatched to cope with it, they would require nearly two months before they could actually engage in defensive actions, the time being necessary to complete concentration, transportation and other various preparations.
In addition, to the above, several more divisions engaged in the China operations were scheduled to be transferred to the Southern operations in accordance with future requirements, as well as three additional divisions in Japan proper and Formosa.

2. Ammunition for the Southern operations for approximately 10 divisions to engage in battle was scheduled to be stocked up in Formosa and French Indo-China and it was planned that as a part of the scheme the first stock pile be created in Formosa about the end of September, but its executions was extremely doubtful because of the shortage of shipping. Conditions were such that even if all difficulties were overcome in transporting and accumulating the entire stock, the accumulation could not be completed until the end of December. The ammunition to be stocked up was for general operations and not as equipment for the forces. My subordinates were able to learn of the above from their contacts with the various bureaus of the War Ministry which were concerned with these matters. Moreover, about this time the Standard amount of ammunition to be used for the Southern operations was considered to be one and one-half times the general standard and it was on this standard that the basis for the stock-piling of ammunition was set up.

3. After the middle of September, 1941, a part of our forces was despatched to the South from Manchuria and the Japanese Homeland. The newly despatched forces were: One division a tank regiment an independent anti-tank unit, air force ground crews, signal corps, and
supply forces for South China, a tank corps headquarters, a tank regiment, an independent anti-tank unit, an air corps, artillery corps, signal corps, and supply forces for Formosa; and an independent mixed regiment, air force group, corps, and supply forces for French Indo-China.
4. Since about this time, aviation and shipping installations were being reinforced or newly created in French Indo-China and South China; supply bases were being established in South China, Formosa and French Indo-China; the requisitioning of shipping and the camouflaging and arming of ships were begun or their effectuation being facilitated; and necessary training of army corps and air forces intended for use in the operations was being accelerated.

E. In the meantime, I learned from the Replenishment Bureau of the War Ministry about the actual situation relative to preparations pertaining to liquid fuels, the gist being as follows:

Assuming that Japan would continue the China Incident through 1941 and 1942 generally under the international situation now prevailing, her holdings of aviation gasoline and heavy oil in 1943 after dedicating the amount expected to be consumed in these two years would be extremely small and sufficient to meet the requirements of no more than one year of military operations. The reserve of heavy oil especially is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Navy to conduct decisive operations for no more than half a year. The foregoing estimates are based on the total reserves within Japan. Furthermore domestically produced crude oil, synthetic crude oil, naphtha etc., are far from sufficient to have any effect on the general situation, while with respect to synthetic oil there was no prospect of obtaining them in great volume. In other words if the present conditions remained unchanged during the two years, it was clear that our defensive strength would
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diminish as a matter of course to a state of complete powerlessness.

F. In the Army department of the Imperial Headquarters an overall operation plan against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands was being formulated on the basis of past studies, experience and collected data, but the chief of the General Staff conceived of the plan of operations to capture strategic points in the Southern Region in order to establish Japan's position of self-preservation and defense by breaking through and severing the ABCD encirclement immediately in the event Japan is provoked and challenged after the early part of October 1941 and on this basis issued directions for the formulation and study of initial operations against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. This draft plan obtained the approval of the General Staff late in October, and in the middle of November, was definitely established as a plan both in name and in fact. The foregoing does not mean, however, that the Japanese army, had after the early part of October, the intention to capture key points in the Southern Region or that there was such a possibility. It merely indicated the course of development of the study of plans of operation. At the same time, it was but a natural expression to cope with the situation caused by extreme difficulty of adjusting Japanese-American relations and the strengthening of the encirclement of Japan in East Asia. Moreover, it was but a result of a study of means by which to meet a situation in which Japan might be compelled unavoidably
to act for her self defense even at the risk of throwing herself into the very jaws of death.

6. The preparations started on the basis of decision of 6 September, 1941, were to be suspended, in the event peace was decided as the national policy on the occasion for the decision for peace or war which was scheduled to be made in early October. If, on the contrary, a decision for war was adopted at that time, formal preparations were to be vigorously pushed forward and completed by the end of the same month. However, the preparations actually did not progress as rapidly as had been expected. This was because the decision for peace or war as a national policy had not been made on early October as scheduled and a period of indecision continued until the advent of the TOJO Cabinet in the middle of October. Then from shortly after the formation of the TOJO Cabinet until early in November, Japan's policy vis a vis the United States and Great Britain had been returned to a clean slate. Meanwhile operational preparations in this period were unavoidably slowed down or their effectuation held in abeyance. In this period the mobilization of troops, the requisitioning of shipping, and the establishment of military bases were greatly retarded. However, as I will state later, operational preparations proceeded on a full scale after the Liaison Conference in early November indicated the outline of national policy.
H. Japanese foreign policy and operational preparations based upon the decision made as a result of the Imperial Conference on 6 September, 1941, were coordinated according to the following considerations:

1. On the day before the Imperial Conference on 6 September, a complete mutual agreement was reached between the Prime Minister and the Army and Navy chiefs of the Supreme Command on the point that the first principle of the National policy decision was to obtain Japan's objectives through diplomatic negotiations and therefore from the theoretical standpoint Clause Two of the decision should come before Clause One and that war was not desired but was to be resorted to only if absolutely unavoidable, that the essence of the decision lied in diplomatic negotiations.

2. Full consideration should be paid in the carrying out of preparations so as not to hinder the diplomatic negotiation. With this in view the armed forces to be sent into South French Indo-China in addition to those already stationed there should be limited only to ground crews of the air force.

3. Necessary mobilization to follow the decision on national policy of 6 September was, even after it was put into effect, to be suspended, if the diplomatic negotiations made a turn for the better. The foregoing items, 1 and 2, were to be decided by the consultation between the chief of the General Staff and the War Minister.

4. All operational preparations were to be carried out on the principle that it will not to impede or obstruct the diplomatic negotiations.
V. I shall now speak of matters relating to the operational plan and preparations after the adoption of Proposals A and B, vis a vis, the United States reached after the Imperial Conference of 5 November, 1941.

A. The explanations made by the Chief and Vice Chief of the Army General Staff on the same day, 5 November 1941, to the chiefs of various divisions of the General Staff Office, were in substance as follows:

At the Liaison Conferences held daily from the latter part of October to the early part of November, prior to the decision of 5 November, it was recognized that the relations between Japan and the United States were at last approaching the final stage where a choice had to be made between peace or war, but it was agreed that efforts will be continued to effect a diplomatic settlement while maintaining, as heretofore, the two-fold policy of diplomacy and war preparations as a means of tiding over the critical situation. However, there was a time limit on both the diplomatic steps and war preparations. Operational preparations were to be carried forward with the resolve that if a settlement could not be reached through diplomatic negotiations, then an appeal to arms would be made as a last resort and preparations hereafter were to be on a full scale. The decision was explained as being the same as that of 6 September in that a resolution for war was not made. "With regard to when operational preparations should be completed, the Chief of Staff on this same occasion, expressed the view that that goal should be set for the end of November or beginning of December.

B. With the intensification of a crisis in the relations between the two countries, full scale preparations were launched after 5 November on the two-fold principle of diplomacy and preparations with the intention to leave no stone unturned in the consideration of measures with which to cope with the worst eventuality. I am familiar with these matters as they were in my line of duty and their gist is as follows:

(1) In addition to the vigorous advancement of the preparations, which were hitherto being made, mobilization and deployment of troops, requisitioning of ships and the establishment of military bases were carried out with the utmost effort. The Army's operational preparations for the initial phase of operations were being completed with the end of November as the goal.

(2) The overall plan of operations of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were under study and discussion parallel with the government's diplomatic efforts. It was late in October that it became a final plan and it was formally adopted both in name and in fact in the middle of November (about the 15th). (See C below). The establishment of the plan of operations for the General Army for the Southern Region and other armies under it in the field took place later.

(3) The organization of operational armies, namely, the order of battle of the Southern Army and the order pertaining to important personnel including the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army and others under him were issued on 6 November, and on the same day an Imperial Headquarters order concerning the operational preparations of the Southern Army was transmitted. The gist was that the Supreme Commander shall prepare for the capture of key areas in the South from bases in French Indo-China,
South China, Formosa and the Southwest Pacific Islands, employing his main forces and in cooperation with the Navy. In case he is attached by American, British and Dutch forces, he is empowered to meet the attack with the forces under his command.

(4) On 8 November, in Tokyo, an agreement for joint operations was made between the Headquarters of the Southern General Army and the combined fleet.

(5) On 15 November the Imperial Headquarters notified the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army of the outline to be followed in the operations to capture and occupy key areas in the South. The areas to be captured and occupied were the Philippine Islands, British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and a part of southern Burma. It was further directed that the stability of Siam and French Indo-China be maintained with all possible effort.

(6) It was after 5 November that operational army corps to serve under the Southern General Army left for their areas of service from Japan, China, and Formosa. These army corps were to be returned home at any time, when the negotiations between Japan and the United States reached a settlement. In this connection, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave direct instructions to Gen. TERAUCHI, the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army, and the latter readily acknowledged it.

(7) As to the supply, the necessary preparations were generally nearing completion after the middle of November.

(8) All the full scale war preparations stated above were not the result of a decision for war. Hence, if the Japanese-American negotiations were successfully consummated, all the preparations were to be halted and returned to a clean slate. In this respect there was a complete agreement between the General Staff and the War Ministry as well as the Naval Supreme Command. The suspension of preparations was a matter of considerable difficulty and required coolness and boldness of will and speed in handling of business relating thereto. At that time the Chief of the General Staff was full of confidence in this respect.

C. Although both the original and current of the operational plan for the Southern Region which was established in the middle of November, 1941, were destroyed by fire, the general outline thereof which I retain in my memory is as follows:

(1) The outline of the plan is given in paragraph 1 and onward, but it is to be borne in mind that it was to be abandoned if the diplomatic negotiations reached a settlement before the outbreak of war.

(2) The areas of operations in the South were to be the Philippine Islands, Guam, Hong-kong, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Bismark Islands and Dutch Timor.

(3) Operations were to be commenced simultaneously against the Philippines and British Malaya through close cooperation between the Army and Navy and completed in the shortest possible time.

(4) Armed forces to be employed in the operations were to consist of 11 divisions, 9 tank regiments, 2 aviation corps and other units under the army's direct command. The division of these forces into army corps and their areas of assignment were scheduled as follows:

The 14th Army of the Southern Army, consisting of two divisions as its mainstay and assigned to the Philippines area; the 15th Army,
consisting of two divisions was assigned to maintain stability in Siam and operations in Burma; the 16th Army, consisting of three divisions (of which two divisions were to be transferred after the end of other operations) were assigned to the Netherlands Indies area; the 25th Army, consisting of four divisions, was assigned to engage in operations against Malaya and Singapore; the air force was to consist of two air corps as its mainstay; the 23rd Army under the command of the China Expeditionary Forces, was assigned to operations in the Hong-Kong area, with one division as its mainstay; detachments in the Southern sea area under the directed command of the Imperial Headquarters were to consist of three infantry battalions as their mainstay and assigned to operations against Guam, the Bismark Islands, etc., and another division was to be assigned to maintain stability in French Indo-China.

(5) The date for the commencement of operations was to be fixed after the decision for war was made. As set forth above, the operational plan and preparations of the Japanese Army varied in the scale of their objective, the degree of precision and their strength in accordance with the relaxation or intensification of the international situation and the demands of defense during the period between spring and early winter in 1941. In every case it was a stipulation of operational technique and naturally not a war plan. Moreover the Japanese Supreme Command had nothing which can be called a war program in time of peace. The same was the case with the Japanese Government. This concludes my testimony.

On this 16th day of May, 1947, at IMTFE.

DEFONENT TAKAKA, Shinichi (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date - At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)
CERTIFICATE

I, MIYAM, Yozo, who occupy the post of The Chief of Archives Section, 1st Demobilization Office, Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the following 4 documents were burnt at the termination of war and that they are in the custody of 1st Demobilization Office. Documents are as follows:

The plan of Imperial Military Operation of 16th year of Showa.

The command concerning, "Preparation for attack on Important Southern Regions" which was issued by the Imperial Headquarters Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army, on the 6th of November 16th year of Showa (1941)

Operational order concerning "Attack on Important Southern Regions with holding plan of Attack" which was issued by the Imperial Headquarters to the Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army, on the 15th of November 16th year of Showa (1941).

Imperial Headquarter order concerning opening of hostility, on the 1st of December, 16th year of Showa (1941).

Certified at Tokyo
on the 25 day of July, 1947.

MIYAM, Yozo
Chief of the Archives Section,
the 1st Demobilization Bureau.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: KIYOSL, Ichiro
FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
日本スケジュールに沿って、対話型プログラムを開発し、その成果を評価するためのミートアップを行います。このミートアップでは、参加者全員が参加し、情報共有と意見の交換を行う予定です。

参加者は、技術者だけでなく、ビジネスマンも含まれており、異なる視点からの意見を交换することが期待されています。このミートアップは、業界全体の発展に寄与する一助となることを願っています。
軍の動静を観察出来ず、略地にされると予想される戦局は、敵の陣地に細密な戦術が行動される。戦局が悪化し、敵の戦力が強さを示すことを示す。また、敵の動揺を確認せずに、我々の戦力を損失することになる。}


c噩略地に細密な戦術が行動される。戦局が悪化し、敵の戦力が強さを示すことを示す。また、敵の動揺を確認せずに、我々の戦力を損失することになる。
南部佛印、対スル兵力進駐ニ就テ、会議ニ於テ各員奥

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サヲ平和進駐ニ為スルヲ断スセリ、同会議席上、

ハ南支ニ於ル戦閣ヲ進駐ヲ備ステハシテ、南支進駐ヲ計画スルニ為メ

六月末ノ研究ヲ前シ、成果ヲ活用シ且、陸軍省及軍令部トノ連絡ヲ共

ハ軍部ニ於テ、著ヲ進展シキタキ期スル

尚此際参謀総長ハ昭和十六年六月下旬ニ於テ、政府及軍令部ト共ニ意

見一致シアル如ク、後、今般進駐ヲ目的ハ、南部仏印方面ヨリスルノ後、

分断ヲスルコトヲ指摘シ且、此目的達成ノ為、ハ、先ノ仏印ノ好ハ信賴ト

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態度ラヲ真剣ナル外交ニ臨ムコトヲ規定シモノガ本国ヲ察アルニ
ルコトシ且戦ヲ醉サルカノ決意ラ以テ戦争ヲ準備ラ限期付キテ完整
ヲ melakukanルヲ以テ戦争ヲ開始ヲナルノ為ニテハ昭和十六年十月上
旬ニ於テ決定スルコトヲ規定シモノヲテアルヲ以テハ本国ヲ大阪ハ
戦争ヲ競ハレルヲ決定スルモノヲアラスヲ外交ニ依ルドハルヲ本時上スルヲ
国ハ対日攻勢ヲに対スルヲ為シ戦争ヲ準備ヲヲ戦争ヲ醉サルヲ求ム
下ニ於テ迅速ヲ促進サレコトヲ主眼トスルモノヲアルハシ外交ヲ依ルヲ
为すヲ第一義トスルコトヲ許可ラザルリ
(1) 七月ニ二日ヲ来てノモノヲ対シハ即ち九月ニ六日ヲ決定ノ内容ヲ对照
スルニ其根本ナル事項ヲ於テ異ナルモノヲカラルヲ即ち先ツ
(2) 日米英仏
増速ヲ後タリ得ヘギ事項ヲ前者ハ速ヲ即チ付印ヲ期シ付印ヲ問題ヲ
三主トシテ規定
日中間ニ於テ前既ニ於テ観察決定ニ基シテ、当面単独ヲ於テ作戦ヲ進ムンノヲ決定シタリノ。日本陸中ノ採用スルコトアルヘキ防衛ヲ指定タリノ。事ハ次ノ如キノハ、次ノ如キ職務ヲ担当スルテハ、

二依リハ、本部ノ観察ヲ決定シタリノ。日本陸中ノ採用スルコトアルヘキ防衛ヲ指定タリノ。事ハ次ノ如キノハ、次ノ如キ職務ヲ担当スルテハ、

相手方ノ攻撃ニテ、防衛ヲ指定タリノ。事ハ次ノ如キノハ、次ノ如キ職務ヲ担当スルテハ、

迎撃シテ、防衛ヲ指定タリノ。事ハ次ノ如キノハ、次ノ如キ職務ヲ担当スルテハ、

以上ノ如キ作戦ハ、国土ヲ指定ハ、防御ヲ担当スルテハ、次ノ如キ職務ヲ担当スルテハ、

テハ速からニスノ如キ作戦ハ、国土ヲ指定ハ、防御ヲ担当スルテハ、次ノ如キ職務ヲ担当スルテハ、

攻撃ヲ結局スルテハ、国土ヲ指定ハ、防御ヲ担当スルテハ、次ノ如キ職務ヲ担当スルテハ、
備ノ急速ナル進撃ヲ要スル

戦準備進涉ノ状況ニ應シ空白ヲ於テ作戦ヲ指示スルヲ必要ニ於テ

必要ハ認メナリ罷ノラトヨリ不利トスル

此處以降参謀本部ハ関係ノ向ヲ先制攻撃ヲ挙ニ出スヘキヲコトヲ常ニ顧慮

シハニ対シ十分ナル進撃ヲ要スルモノト考ヘタ

作戦準備未完時期ニ於テ関係ヲ防衛ヲ作戦ノ指導ニハ大ナル進撃ヲ考慮シ

昭和十六年十一月六日大本営ハ南方軍総司令官ニ於ヘタ南方要域攻

所在ノ部隊ヲ以テヲ進撃スルコトヲ許ヲ示シ又昭和十六年十二月

一月ノ命令ニ於テ大本営ハ米英ノ戦面目ナル先制攻撃ヲ慶タル場合ハ
海軍部庁指示に基づき、適時進攻を進めていく。特に海上においては、偵察や機動部隊の活動が重要となる。各部隊は、敵の動向を常に注意深く監視し、攻撃の機会を逃さないよう配慮する。

海軍部庁指示に基づき、適時進攻を進めていく。特に海上においては、偵察や機動部隊の活動が重要となる。各部隊は、敵の動向を常に注意深く監視し、攻撃の機会を逃さないよう配慮する。
情勢二鑑に従って戦計を定め、支那事態に待機するスルコトとハラリモニテアツ

而シテ右各師団八支節は、在ツテハ現地（上海及び闌東附近）ニ於

テ治安警備ニ任スル外主トシテ訓練シ、進塲シテアツカハ万一対宋英

等ノ事件覚悟＝シテシテ飛行機テ防衛行動ニ就キ特ハゲルタメニハ約二

了輸送共ノ他のノ諸準備ノタメ実際ノ防衛行動ニ就キ特ハゲルタメニハ約二

筒月弱ノ日子ヲ必要トシテ尚以上ノ外対支作戦ノ数ヶ師団ヲ將来ハ

必要ニ應シテ南方作戦ヲ考慮ヨリ予定ヲ胸筹シ

南方作戦ヲยืน

定シ其ノ内ノ一部ヲ第一次トシテ九月末、時ノ台湾ノ集積ヲラシルニ計

画ヲナツタカノノミ行ハ船運不足ノ関係上頓ル疑ハシミテアツ

尚右所麥ノ輸送及集積ハ疎難ヲ排シテ実行ニ當ルモ十二月ニ至ラ

ナ
昭和十六年九月中旬以降満洲及び内地ヨリノ兵力カ南方ニ派遣セルレタ

航空地上部隊通信部隊兵站部隊

獨丸隊航空地上部隊兵站部隊通信部隊機関及び練習施設ノ増強新設、南支台湾

(1) 船舶機関及び機関

(2) 台湾
昭和十六年九月中旬以降満洲及内地ヨリ部ノ兵力カ南方ニ派遣セルレタ

レタ

師団戦車連隊

（二）

軽戦車

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（四）

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戦車

（十一）

戦車

（十二）

戦車
1991年 \n現状

(6) 長崎港を経由して九州各地への輸送を検討している。一部の港には、定期便も設定されている。

D.D. NO 1661
ナリ且東亜ニ於ケル列國ノ対日包圍ノ強化ノ情勢ニ反接スル自然ノ現ハレテアリ又将来万々ノ場合自衛ノタメニハ自ら死中二投シテ兹ニ活ヲ獲ルノ方策ニ出ヲタルノ己ムナキ情勢ニ應セントスル矧且ノ結果テアリタ。

昭和十六年九月六日ノ決定ニ基イテ発足シテ作戦準備ハ十月上旬ニ於ケル和戦決定ノ機関ニ於テテジテ作戦ニ於テハ剣後最強力ニ本格的作戦ヲ

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昭和十六年九月六日御前会議ヲ経テ決定シタル國策ニ基ク日本ノ外交

ト作戦準備トハ次ノ要領ニ依テ調和スル如ク措置セラレタ

(8) 九月六日御前会議、前日総理及後統帥部長ノ間ニ於テ右國策ノ決定

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見レハ右決定ノ第三項ト第一項トカ其位置ヲテルヘキモノテアル旨

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右ノ及ヒ参謀総長ヲ陸軍大臣トノ秘議決定ニタルノモノヲテアル

一切ノ作戦準備ハ外交々務ニ支障ヲ妨害ヲアタヘサル範囲ニ於テヲす

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（2）一日に国交緊迫下展大・経済外交及作戦準備ニ本ニ原則＝下ニ付

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併行ミテ研究審議シテ＝シッパララタシテナッサ＝十月ニ＝日預テアソ

シテハ）足＝現＝名実＝確定セラレタハ十一月中旬＝（十五日頃）
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(1) 南方軍名方面ノ作戦

(2) 何時ハ前進ヲ進ム

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昭和三十三年（昭和七年）五月十六日
於戦東国際軍事裁判所

供述
脇
田中新一

同日
於

文書
清
一郎
説明

昭和十六年十一月二十四日

昭和十六年十一月十四日

三種類

終戦

現在我が国

保密

同日、於同所

九官人、清瀬一郎

同日、於同所
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石黒祐洋
同日於同所

清瀬
一郎
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al.

THE UNITED STATES vs.

ARAKI, Sadao,

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: MIYAMA, Yuzo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am MIYAMA, Yuzo. At present I am Chief of the Documents Section of the First Demobilization Bureau. My present address is No. 8, 1-ohome, NAGATA-cho, CHIYODA-ku Tokyo Prefecture. I was adjutant of the War Ministry from March 6, 1945 (20th year of Showa) until it was abolished.

2. I was the responsible person for the handling and custody of secret documents of the War Ministry except those kept by respective bureaus and sections.

Handling of secret documents of the Army was prescribed by the Army Regulations, for handling such documents.

Part 2 of article 46 stipulates that official impedimenta will be used as containers for secret documents to be taken to the front or to the spot of trouble, and that in case of emergency, measures will be taken to burn the important documents, if necessary. Furthermore Article 52 of the Army Criminal Code provides for imprisonment of the custodians of military secret documents and articles for a period of not more than five years if in case of emergency he does not endeavor to safeguard them from the enemy. (Ref. Appendix No. 1 and No. 2)

3. At the time of termination of hostilities as surrender was considered a special circumstance the War Minister specially issued an order to burn the secret documents on the basis of his responsibility and authority. That order, by command of the Minister, was drafted by his adjutant, and procedure for sanction was executed by myself.

I remember, the main points of the order were as follows:
"Secret documents and similar documents as mentioned in the army Regulations for handling secret documents should be burned immediately. This telegram by order should be burned upon receipt."

This order was issued on August 14, 1945, as a notification from the adjutant-general of the War Ministry. The original of this order was burned, and as all units burned theirs in compliance with the order.

There exists no original now.

The main points of this order have already been reported to SCAP.

A copy of this report was submitted to the Allied Forces and none is in our possession now.

This order was despatched to all schools, government offices, and army forces larger than independent units having custody of secret documents. At the War Ministry on the afternoon of August 14, the recipients of the order were assembled and I had my subordinate adjutant verbally instruct them as to the order and commence the burning that evening.

The burning was carried out by the respective bureaus and sections.

The reason for this was that the chiefs of the bureaus and sections were held responsible for the handling and custody of the secret documents kept in each respective bureau and section.

The burning took place in the inner yard of the present Court of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East and several other places.

Owing to the extraordinary excitement and confusion due to the surrender, the above order to burn only secret documents was not strictly obeyed, and as each bureau and section burned them instinctively in the shortest possible time as was customary in ordinary times, not only secret documents but also ordinary books were burned, without being chocked with the record.

On the night of the 14th, the flames rose so high into the sky that the local fire-brigade stations mistook them for an ordinary fire. The burning lasted until the 18th. Only toward the evening of the 17th, each bureau and section found out that even ordinary books were burned.

The Great Diary, the Proclamation of Councillors, various laws promulgated since the establishment of the army, documents relating to the war of (1877)(10th year of Meiji), Diary of the Sino-Japanese War, Diary of the Russo-Japanese War, Documents relating to the Siberian Expedition, Documents in connection with the prisoners of war in the Russo-Japanese
War and World War I, the League of Nations, Reduction of Armament and the Peace Treaty, and the annals and the original records of the advance and retreat of the deactivated divisions, brigades and regiments, all being valuable historical materials which had been transferred to the army warehouse at HACHIOJI, YUKI, YUKI-MURA, MINAMITAMA-GUN, TOKYO Prefecture, during the period from December, 1944 (19th year of Showa) to March, 1945 (20th year of Showa), to avoid possible damages from air raids. Some of them were burned but the remainder were kept in custody under a strict surveillance of guards in accordance with Directive No. 2 of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers on September 3, 1945 (20th year of Showa).

After that at the request of Major Duncan Macferren, Chief of the Documents Section of the Allied Forces Washington the documents were transferred directly by eight trucks of the First Demobilization Bureau to the First Army Arsenal at OJI on January 8th and 9th, 1946 (21st year of Showa), and delivered to the Washington Document Section (W.D.C.) there.

The Explanation of the classification of documents issued and the Great Diary in the War Ministry is as in the attached supplement. (Ref. Appendix No. 3)

The burning was commenced in the evening of the 14th by each respective unit, government office and school and I suppose it was completed in a short time.

Appendix No. 1

Extract from the Army Regulations for Handling Secret Documents:

- 1933 (9th year of Showa) Army normal No. 950;
- 1939 (13th year of Showa) Army normal 979 revised;

Article 46; paragraph 2

Official impedimenta shall be used as containers to be taken to the front or the spot of an incident by the mobilized forces and measures shall be taken for the destruction of the important documents in case of emergency, if the necessity arises.

Appendix No. 2

Extract from the Army Criminal Code:

- Law No. 46: April 10, 1903 (41st year of Meiji).
- Law No. 35 revised: February, 1942 (17th year of Showa)

Article 52:

When the custodian of military secret documents and articles does not endeavour to safeguard them from falling into enemy hands, in case of emergency, he shall be liable for imprisonment for a period of not more than five years.
Explanation of Classification of Published Documents and the Great Diary in the War Ministry.

I. Classification of published documents in the War Ministry.

All documents issued in the War Ministry have issue numbers according to the following classifications.

1. Military Command, number ---
   Joint Army and Navy Military Command, for the public.

2. Military Command A number ---
   Military Command relating to secret matters common to both the Army and Navy and not for the public.

3. Military Command B number ---
   Military Command relating to secret matters common to both the Army and Navy and not for the public.

4. Military Command, Army A, number ---
   Military Command relating to top secret matters in the Army and not for the public.

5. Military Command, Army, B number ---
   Military Command relating to secret matters in the Army, and not for the public.

6. Army Top Secret number ---
   Commands, notifications etc., other than military command, Army A relating to top secret matters.

7. Army Secret, number ---
   Commands, notifications etc., other than Military Command B relating to secret matters.

8. Army Ordinary, number ---
   Commands and notifications other than those of the previous numbers relating to ordinary matters.

9. Army, Top Secret, Manchuria number ---
   Documents falling under Army Top Secret relative to the Manchurian Incident.

10. Army Secrets, Manchuria, number ---
    Documents falling under Army Secret relative to the Manchurian Incident.

11. Army Ordinary, Manchuria, number ---
    Documents coming under Army Ordinary relative to the Manchurian Incident.

12. Army Top Secret, China, number ---
    Documents coming under Army Top Secret relative to the China Incident.

13. Army Secret, China, number ---
    Documents coming under Army Secret relative to the China Incident.

14. Army Ordinary, China, number ---
    Documents coming under Army Ordinary relative to the China Incident.

15. Army Top Secrets, Asia numbers ---
    Documents falling under Army Top Secrets relative to the Pacific War.

- 4 -
16. Army Secrets, Asia number ---
   Documents falling under Army Secrets relative to the
   Pacific War.
17. Army Ordinary, Asia number ---
   Documents falling under Army Ordinary relative to the
   Pacific War.

In addition to the above, during the First World War and
the Siberian Expedition, classifications of issued documents
such as "Europe" and "Siberia" were included.

The materials compiled into the Great Diary consist of
the items listed above from item 6, and the Military Commands
were filed separately but were burned at the termination of
the war.

II. The kinds and names of the Great Diaries:
   The documents issued in the War Ministry were classified
   as permanent-storage documents and five-years-storage
documents. These were preserved as Great Diaries.
   (1) Names of the permanent-storage Great Diaries.
      Certain year Great Diary, A compilation from the
      first class to the sixth.
      Certain year Great Diary, B compilation from the
      first class to the fourth.
      Certain year Army Top Secret Great Diary (certain
      year Military Top Secret Great Diary).
      Certain year Army Ordinary, Manchuria Great Diary.
      Certain year Army Secret, Manchuria Great Diary.
      Certain year Army Top Secret, Manchuria Great Diary.
      Certain year Army Ordinary, China Great Diary.
      Certain year Army Secret, China Great Diary.
      Certain year Army Top Secret, China Great Diary.
      Certain year Army Ordinary, Asia Great Diary.
      Certain year Army Secret, Asia Great Diary.
      Certain year Army Top Secret, Asia Great Diary.

      Besides the above there were the European Great
      Diary (relative to the First World War) and the
      Siberian Great Diary (relative to the Siberian
      Expedition).

   (2) Names of the five-year-storage Great Diaries.
      Certain year Great Diary 1
      Certain year Great Diary 2
      Certain year Great Diary 3
      Certain year Great Diary 4
      Certain year Great Diary 5

III. The Contents and Classifications of the Great Diaries.
   The contents of the Great Diaries were compiled and clas­
   sified as follows:
(1) Compilation A (classified from class 1 to class 6: Ordinary documents relative various regulations, the issue numbers indicated as army ordinary number --, and also exchange documents relative to this and classified as follows:--
Class 1 -- Organization, discipline ceremonies, marriages, dress regulations, and decorations.
Class 2 -- Military service, recruiting, enlistment, ranks, appointments, service, vacation, roll, documentary reports.
Class 3. -- Pension, relief, reward.
Class 4 -- Education, maneuvers, security, requisition, punishment.
Class 5 -- Ordnance, transportation, communications, sanitation, horse administration, miscellaneous.
Class 6 -- Relating to the Diet.

(2) Compilation B(divided in to four classes: Ordinary documents with concrete contents other than compilation A, the issue number indicated as army ordinary number ---; also intercommunication relating thereto).
Class 1 -- Imperial visits, ceremonies funerals, Imperial inspection, acceptance of official calls, reward, punishment, and personnel.
Class 2 -- Land, buildings, ordnance, clothing, horses, veterinary supplies transportation and communication materials, books, articles, expenditure, and contributions
Class 3 -- Inspection, special examination, education, correspondence.
Class 4 -- Disaster, miscellaneous.

(3) Secret Great Diary
Instruction, addresses, administration, regulations, reward, grant of money, organization, military service, operation, mobilization, dispatch, transfer, security, travel on official mission, dispatch, acceptance of official calls, personnel, thought, training and maneuver, emergency, inspection, censorship, investigation, survey, requisition of munitions, air permit fortification, ordnance, horse administration, land, buildings, accounting, clothing, food, sanitation supplies, veterinary supplies, transportation, communications, shipping, books, opinion, diplomacy, foreign information (China) information (European and American countries) and miscellaneous, all identified as Army Secret number --, and the
documents falling thereunder.

(4) Army top secret Great Diary:
Mobilization, operation, fortification, ordnance, material and supplies, clothing, ships, communications, all identified as Army Top Secret number — , and intercommunication documents relating therewith.

(5) Army Manchuria ordinary Great Diary:
Ordinary documents relative to the Manchurian Incident, and the contents under (1) and (2), these identified as Army Manchuria ordinary number — , and intercommunication documents relating thereto.

(6) Army Manchuria secret Great Diary:
Secret documents relative to the Manchurian Incident, and the contents under (3) and these identified as Army Manchuria secret number — , and intercommunication documents relating thereto.

(7) Army Manchuria Top Secret Great Diary:
Top secret documents relative to Manchurian Incident, and the contents under (4), these identified as Army Manchuria Top Secret number — , and intercommunication documents therewith.

(8) Army China ordinary Great Diary:
Ordinary documents relative to the China Incident and the contents chiefly under (1) and (2), these identified as Army China ordinary number — , and intercommunication documents therewith.

(9) Army China secret Great Diary:
Secret documents relative to the China Incident, and the contents chiefly under (3), these identified as Army China secret number — , and intercommunication documents therewith.

(10) Army China Top Secret Great Diary:
Top secret documents relative to the China Incident and the contents chiefly under (4), these identified as Army China Top Secret number — , and intercommunication documents therewith.

(11) Army Asia Ordinary Great Diary:
Ordinary documents relative to the Pacific War and the contents under (1) and (2), identified as Army Asia ordinary number and intercommunications therewith.

(12) Army Asia Secret Great Diary:
Secret documents relative to the Pacific War, and the contents under (3), these and identified as Army Asia Secret number — , and intercommunications therewith.

(13) Army Asia Top Secret Great Diary:
Top secret documents relative to the Pacific War, and
the contents under (4), these identified, as Army Asia Top Secret number --, and intercommunications therewith.

(14) Five-year-storage documents:
Ordinary documents to be on file for several years, the identification being Army ordinary number --, and intercommunications therewith; classified according to the issuing offices.
Great Diary 1: Correspondence of the Cabinet, departments, boards, prefectures, various organizations, and companies.
Great Diary 2: Correspondence of the War Ministry, Army General Staff Headquarters, Army Inspectorate-General of Military Training, Headquarters of the Tokyo Garrisons, Headquarters of the Formosan Army, and Headquarters of Military Police.
Great Diary 3: Correspondence of the Korean Army, China Garrison Army, Technical Headquarters, Transportation Section, Headquarters of the Air Forces, and contents related to the budget, land, buildings, personnel, ordnance materials, and clothing.
Great Diary 4: Correspondence of each division (contents the same as the above).
Great Diary 5: Correspondence of the Ordnance Central Depot, Army arsenals, and Main Clothing Depot, Wooled Factory, Veterinary schools.

June 5, 22nd year of Showa (1947)
Tokyo.

Deponent: /s/ MIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi hereby certify that the above deponent swore and affixed his signature and seal in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date and at same place.

Witness: /s/ BANNO, Junkichi (seal)
INTERROGATION OF TOJO, Hideki
11 March 1946

Q. What war preparations were pushed?
A. We were surrounded by Britain, America, and the Dutch. Preparations for an attack at any time by them were pushed.

Q. What preparations were made of an offensive nature during that period?
A. The nature of the preparations was defensive.

Q. When were the first steps taken to prepare for any of the four offensive operations which later were executed, as you have stated?
A. Preparations of a defensive nature were begun from the time of the 6 September conference.

Q. Regardless of the question of whether they were offensive or defensive, is it not true that preparations for the four attacks, that you have previously referred to, were begun immediately after the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941?
A. No, not at all. From the time of the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, we did not know when we would be attacked by England, America, and Holland, therefore preparations to resist attack were planned. It was not until after the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941 that the various surprise attacks were planned. Strategically, Japan was on the defense; tactically, she was on the offense. Japan was surrounded by much greater forces than she herself possessed. The big picture was that of defense. In actual fighting, she attacked. /Read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness. /

***************

Q. In connection with the four operations, which you have mentioned, who gave the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff orders in connection therewith?
A. The orders were issued by the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy on the advice of the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff. These have the responsibility of assisting the Throne and, by virtue of this responsibility, go to the Emperor with orders prepared and ask for his assent. When this is given, the orders are given to the Army commanders or, in the case of the Navy, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. The responsibility is that of the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff from first to last.
Or, whose advice do the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff write and present such orders to the Emperor?

A. The Chiefs of Staff have section chiefs under them. The section chiefs draw up the plans and, if approved by the Chief of Staff, they are presented to the Emperor. This is an important matter. The Imperial Conferences come in here. For example, when the Imperial Conference of 1 December decided upon war, the Chiefs of Staff then prepared the orders and took them to the Emperor for approval and the cabinet also made various preparations.

Do you mean to say that no action had been taken nor orders issued relative to the four operations, which you have mentioned, until after the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941? Do you understand the question fully?

A. I understand the question all right. The national will for war was decided for the first time on 1 December 1941. I do not believe, as Premier, that any orders were issued for war previous to that time.

The question does not refer to orders in connection with war, but to orders or action taken in connection with the four attacks. Were such orders given or actions taken before the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941?

A. I believe, as Premier and as War Minister, that it is unlikely that any orders were issued in connection with those four attacks previous to the decision for war that I have mentioned. I believe that it is improbable that orders were issued to carry out these attacks prior to the national decision for war. Kokka no senso ishi no kettei zen ni kogaki jissi no moirei wo desu hazu nashi to shinzu./

Do you mean to say that everything in connection with those four attacks, including planning, deployment, and execution, took place within the one week following the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941?

A. With regard to their execution /jissi/, I do. As for plans, that is something else. Every national state has a plan of defense. This plan is revised from time to time in accordance with the situation. There was a great deal of tenseness just before the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941. The situation was changing all the time and the plans were changed accordingly, but the orders for
execution of those plans, I believe, were not
issued until after the decision for war.

Q. What about deployment?

A. You must remember that there were other objectives
too. The China Incident was in progress and there
were troop movements in connection with the
joint defense of French Indo-China. For those
purposes, a variety of dispositions were required.
However, the carrying out of attacks against
England or America would not, I believe, have
preceded the decision for war. Defense against
possible British-American-Dutch attacks also
had to be thought of in connection with the national
plan of defense. I think that the attacks against
England, America and Holland would probably have
to have followed the decision of 1 December 1941,
which expressed the national will.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
- vs -
ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPENDENT: IIMURA, Minoru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:
I was Director of the Total Warfare Institute from January 1941 to October of the same year.

There were institutes in other countries similar or kindred to the Total Warfare Institute. Following their example, the Total Warfare Institute of our country was founded in the autumn of 1940 (the 16th year of Shwa).

In the government organization regarding the Total Warfare Institute, it was prescribed that, under the Premier's control, it shall take charge of the fundamental investigation and research into total warfare, and the education and training of officials and others concerning the nation's total warfare. However, its actual operational management was as given in the following articles.

All the Ministries, the army and navy, not to speak of Premier Konoike who was responsible for administering this Institute and was my direct superior, were scarcely interested in this Institute; therefore, during my incumbency, I received no instruction, advice, or suggestion concerning the business of this institute from any of the above-mentioned quarters or persons. Consequently, its business, in accordance with the stipulations of the above-mentioned government organization, was carried out from an independent standpoint.

As the first step, education and training were undertaken. In instructing its students, the conventional memorizing cramming system was ignored; developmental and practical education was sought after.

The main subjects of education and training comprised lectures on fundamental knowledge concerning various fields such as politics, economics, thought and military science, physical education; theoretical (hypothetical) exercises, inspections and tours were utilized simultaneously.
Even when I first joined the Institute, there existed the training program in theoretical exercises which was one of the annual functions of this Institute. In carrying out this plan, no person, except staff members of this Institute, gave instruction or guidance. The apportioned term was about one month.

The reason why current conditions were adopted in our hypotheses given at the beginning of the theoretical exercises was that if the circumstances of a period other than the current had been adopted, it would have been difficult for the students to imagine themselves operating under assigned circumstances and to imagine the hypothetic operations, particularly the intricate numerical basis.

The various conditions arising from the hypotheses were no more than suppositional situations adopted for the sake of exercises. The object of the exercises was, not the suppositional situations themselves, but training in co-ordinated actions based on those situations.

The hypotheses and the consequent suppositional situations have no connection with the actual policies of the authorities concerned. It was because actual matters of this sort were known to no one except the authorities concerned who would never have divulged them.

As these exercises were partly open to the public, it was impossible and not permissible to utilize the actual policies of the government.

The reason why the accounts of the exercises were marked "strictly confidential" was because they contained some secret national statistics.

In accordance with the administrative procedure of the institute, the result of this research was probably reported to the Cabinet which was directly in charge of this Institute, but
never reported it to other quarters to say nothing of the other ministries or the military; we were never instructed by them.

As anybody will see from a glance at the documents, the utilization of the results of this study in actual policies was out of the question because of the lack of time necessary for scrutiny and because of the above stated aims.

Students of this Institute, who were first selected by all Ministers and certain civil organizations at the request of this Institute, then examined by the Institute and submitted to the Cabinet, were selected and formally appointed by the Cabinet as students of this Institute.

They were all young men whose average age was about 32, and none held a responsible position in any Ministry. There was one judge among them but he was also a young man like the others and was in a low grade.

The budget of this Institute was ¥160,000 a year and a half of it was for personnel expenses and the other half for office expenses. The budget was too small for making any activity possible.

In short, this Institute would seem to be considerably important so far as its name and stipulations in the organization were concerned, but it was, in fact, nothing but an institute for educating junior officials. And from various standpoints it was not possible to educate them successfully. Not a single result of their study was utilized in drawing up practical policies or war plans.

With a view to obtaining assistance from various quarters, a councillor system was adopted by this Institute in May or June, 1941; but these councillors were entirely nominal personnel registered only as members.

We received no direction or suggestion from the accused KIMURA, SUZUKI, or HOSHINO in connection with business of this Institute.
On this 1st day of December, 1946

At No. 501 2-Chome, Kashiwagaya, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo

DEPONENT: IMURA, Minoru (seal)

I, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At same place

Witness: (signed) SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

IMURA, Minoru (seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 4 March 1947
产品名称：

生产日期：

保质期：

规格：

数量：

价格：

共计：

以上内容请仔细核对。
研究結果に基づき、本研究所から上級官庁にアッタ内閣等務務の担当者に、現実政策及び利用目的の決定を提案するため、国際化の推進とその成果を示す目的が上述通り。通例に従い、各種機関の関係者と連携し、政府の方針と関係者の意見を反映した政策を立てるため、研究・調査の結果を内閣に報告する。
No. 4

Page 164
No. 3

© J.D. 1544
Yes. The former did influence the latter. You must remember that the military setup in Japan is very different from that in America. The Chief of Staff is independent of the War Department in matters of command, and also from the point of view of organization. He is not subordinate to the War Minister but is equal to him. Hence, this atmosphere which permeated the Army was undoubtedly communicated to the War Minister by the Chief of Staff and communicated to Cabinet deliberations by the War Minister. However, I repeat again that this was not a clique or a faction. I might explain to you the Japanese system as regards the position of the Emperor, the Chief of Staff, the War Minister, and the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Army. All matters of command passed from the Emperor to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. All matters of military administration passed from the Emperor via the War Minister to the Commander in Chief. The Emperor could also issue Imperial ordinances (choku rei). At this time, the China Incident was in progress and therefore a great many decisions passed from the Emperor through the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff was an exceedingly important individual. The relevance of this explanation to the question which was asked is as follows: The Chief of Staff was naturally cognizant of the pro-Axis feeling in the Army and necessarily informed the War Minister of the fact. The latter then introduced the subject of the Army's feelings into the Cabinet discussions where they had some influence upon the decisions taken. In Japan, the position of the Chief of Staff is not at all the same as the position of the Chief of Staff in America. The Chief of Staff in Japan, it is true, does not attend Cabinet meetings. However, his view on a multitude of matters relating to strategy are conveyed to the Cabinet via the War Minister and, generally speaking, he is of equal status with the War Minister and not subordinate to him.
CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hidoki TOJO

Date and Time: 13 March 1946, 0935-1215 hours.
Place: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.
Present: General Hidoki TOJO
Mr. John "Fihelly, Interrogator
Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer
Questions by: Mr. Fihelly

**********

Q. This is all very helpful to us as we are attempting to fully understand the Japanese political and military systems, and we thank you for your assistance.

A. This matter of the relation of the cabinet authority to that of the Supreme Command is very basic. If it is not understood, nothing will be understood.

Q. As Premier and War Minister, were you a member of the Supreme Command, the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and of the Supreme War Council?

A. As War Minister, I was not a member of the Supreme Command, but I was a participant (senkaku sha). I was concerned with military administration but not with the conduct of operations or tactics. I was not a member of the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. However, I was, along with the Chiefs of Staff, a member of the Supreme War Council.
I am saying what follows here, not by way of excuse or to avoid responsibility because I hate the idea of trying to avoid responsibility. I wish to take full responsibility, but this is only a factual explanation of a real situation in order to assist you in your investigation. When Prince KONOE was Premier, it was very, very difficult for him because of the fact that his sphere of authority included only the civil sphere. When I became Premier, since I was concurrently War Minister, I had, in addition, a voice in purely military matters, to wit: in military administration. When I became Chief of Staff on 22 February 1944, soon after the fall of the Marianas, I had an additional segment of authority in regard to purely military affairs. In fact after that, only the purely Naval matters were outside of my authority. As Premier, I had full responsibility for civil affairs; as War Minister, I had the additional military function of military administration; as Chief of Staff, I had the further High Command functions of operations and tactics /asukon yohai/.

This whole matter of the actual system in Japan is basic to the understanding of such things as the China Incident and the matters in southern Indo-China that we have talked about. At the first, the government policy in regard to the China Incident was that of localization. However, due to the fact of the independence of the High Command, the fighting kept spreading as they strove for victory. Premier KONOE had a terrible time.

One other thing I think is important: Under the Japanese system, the Emperor was assisted by the following officials: Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal /Naidaijin/; the Lord Chamberlain /jiuji Ch/; and the Imperial Household Minister /kunai Daijin/. He also had a Chief Aide-de-Camp /jiuji Bukan Ch/. The Lord Privy Seal was the Emperor's advisor on matters relating to civil affairs. The Grand Chamberlain and the
Imperial Household Minister had no direct connection with either the civil government or the Supreme Command. The Grand Chamberlain was adjutant to His Majesty; as such, he had a variety of duties. However, neither he nor the Imperial Household Minister had any direct connection with either the civil government or the High Command. This was particularly true in the case of the former, since he was a civil official and not a military man. The Emperor's Aide-de-Camp, being a full general, had access to the Supreme Command, but, under the government system itself, he had actually no authority for direct liaison.

The Emperor did confer directly with the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. However, this body was not very active since most of the members were of advanced years. Therefore, in practice, the Emperor was in a difficult position. He had no one on his staff to help him on High Command matters. When the Premier and the various cabinet members reported to the Emperor on civil matters, he could consult the Lord Privy Seal. When the Chiefs of Staff reported to him in regard to command problems, he had no body to consult except the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals.

The responsibility of the Premier and the Foreign, War, and Navy Ministers, and the President of the Planning Board, together with the Chiefs of Staff, for advice to the Emperor, through the instrumentality of the Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences, was of tremendous importance. To return to the China incident, for example - the Government policy was a policy of non-enlargement of the Incident; nevertheless, because of the fact that the civil government had no authority over the Supreme Command, the fighting was in fact, enlarged and the civil government was powerless to prevent it.
Def Poc No. 1501

terms. Which class of the German and Japanese decorations (second class, third class, cross, grand cross) due to be recommended depended in pursuance of the statutes of the orders, first and foremost upon the rank of the officer to be honored and not on his more or less important personal merits. This fact created a paradox in that it was impossible to decorate German or Japanese lieutenant-colonels because the German and Japanese Foreign Office had not been able to agree how to classify them, whether as colonels or majors.

In regard to the German Navy's telegram of May 17, 1942, the wording of the telegram was not seen by me. I had handed Ambassador Ott my proposals for orders to be conferred upon Generals, Maj. Gen. Altenburg, Maj. Gen. Lutjens, Maj. Gen. Tojo, and other officers not entered into this telegram.

I had proposed these officers were on account of their position in the Japanese navy then because of their special accomplishment in favor of the German navy. Other officers in corresponding positions, for instance Maj. Gen. Janse, a then Chief of Staff in charge of G-2 department of the General Staff, had not been recommended by me as they had already received the German decoration.

That I asked for a decoration for Maj. Gen. Altenburg, I do not remember. I do not reiterate the wording of my proposals for the aforementioned four officers which I handed to the Amb. Ott but I must have been close to the wording chosen by him in paragraph 2-6 of the telegram. In order to overcome the German Foreign Office's reluctance, I regarded the superlative to be necessary where the positive would have been more correct and more correspondent to the simple reality. Maj. Gen. Lutjens added superlatives in his additional explanations.

... F. Krutscher

Oath

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth without holding anything back or omitting anything.

... F. Krutscher (signed)

Subscribed and sworn to before this 24th day of April, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

Bernard A. Harmon (signed)
1st. Lt. Inf.
Administrative Officer
Bureau Division, Legal Sect.

-2-

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
Concerning German decorations for Japanese Army officers.

I was German military attaché in Tokyo from December 4, 1940 until July 2, 1941.

The German Foreign Office was competent to grant any request made through the German Ambassador for the bestowal of German decorations upon Japanese Army officers. The German Foreign Office was very reserved in granting such orders. Its reluctance was caused by the reasons:

1. It wished to limit as much as possible the number of German decorations bestowed upon foreigners in order to increase the value of the Order of the German Eagle, the only decoration obtained to be granted to foreigners in diplomatic courtesy routine.

2. The German Foreign Office desired to null reciprocity from the Japanese side. The German request was refused by the Japanese Foreign Office which always pointed to the fact that the different classes of the German Eagles were bestowed upon foreigners only while on the other hand the Japanese decorations, since Sun and Sacred Treasure, were never by Japanese as well as by foreigners.

Neither the German Ambassador nor I desired the maintenance of reciprocity in number between German and Japanese decorations which was so strictly required by the German Foreign Office as essential. I was much more interested in the granting and maintenance of a favorable atmosphere surrounding the Japanese officers who were expected to work with us. The desired atmosphere was enhanced by the bestowal of occasional decorations. Sometimes the Japanese War Ministry or General Staff mentioned to us which officers they wished to be distinguished by a German decoration. Most times such hints coincided with my own intentions. Usually the Japanese officers thus mentioned to me for a German decoration did not know anything about it themselves and were often surprised when they received the order. I regarded these mutual German and Japanese decorations neither as a reward nor as a courtesy but as an act of diplomatic courtesy without such significance.

To overcome the aforementioned resistance of the German Foreign Office, I regarded it necessary to make the candidates for German decorations upon Japanese officers as in somewhat exaggerated
The undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, agree as follows:

1. In order to cope with the urgent situation in the East Asia, Thailand shall give to Japan the permission of passage by the Japanese Forces through the Thai territory and giving of all necessary facilities for the said passage as well as immediate execution of measures to avoid every possible conflict which may arise between the Japanese and the Thai forces.

2. The particulars for the execution of the precedent paragraph shall be agreed upon between the military authorities of the two countries.

3. Japan shall guarantee that the independence, sovereignty and honour of Thailand be respected.

Done, in duplicate, at Bangkok on the 8th December 1941

/S/ The Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs.

/S/ T.T.
The Japanese Ambassador
At Bangkok, 
Dec. 8, 1941

Your Excellency TSUBOKAWA, Teiji, The Japanese ambassador:

I have duly received Your Excellency's note dated this day notifying me to the following effect.

I hereby inform you for caution's sake that I have affixed my signature to the agreement which has been signed this day between the Governments of Japan and Thailand.

And I suggest that the Government of Japan will take adequate measures necessary for confirming the above agreement as soon as possible.

Again submitting my highest esteem of courtesy to Your Excellency,

Thailand Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the documents hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 8th December, 1941, and described as follows: Military Alliance between Thailand and Japan permitting the passage of Japanese troops through Thailand, letter dated 8th December, 1941 from the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador and confirmation of Military Alliance signed by the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Ambassador dated 11th December, 1941.

I further certify that the attached records and documents are an official document of the Japanese Government, and that they are part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 18th day of November, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

/seal/
Chief of Archives Section.
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ K. Emura

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d. Lt. Eric W. Fleisher 0039200, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 18th day of Nov. 1946.

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher. 2d. Lt.

NAME


Investigation I.P.S.
Official Capacity
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: KANE, Kusuo.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly a Captain in the Navy.

From September, 1941, to August, 1943, I was staff-officer of the Shanghai District Naval Base Force and concurrently staff-officer of the Shanghai Special Landing Force, both of which units were under the command of the China Area Squadron. I participated in the planning of operations in general, in the Shanghai area.

2. The opening of operational movements involving the above forces on 18 December 1941 was as follows.

a. In compliance with orders issued by the Commander of the China Area Squadron, internal preparations had been made a few days before the outbreak of war to provide against emergencies. All forces were standing by for immediate action. However, absolutely no information was provided as to date and hour on commencing operations, until such time as orders were received from Commander of the China Area Squadron.
The hour to commence operations was to be indicated separately.

b. The occupation of the International Settlement in Shanghai was conducted chiefly by units attached to the Shanghai Special Landing Force from around 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. 8 December (Tokyo Time; the same hereinafter merchantmen in waters around Shanghai was carried out by units attached to the Shanghai District Naval Base Force from around 5:00 a.m. the same day.

I was senior staff-officer of both the Fudong Force and Naval Base Force, and the commencement of operations was affected after orders to commence action had been received (by phone) from China Area Squadron Headquarters.

3. From memory, I can explain on a sketch map as hereto attached the condition of the waterfront area of Shanghai, before and after the day when operations began.

On this 23rd day of May, 1947
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT /S/ KANG, Kazuo (seal)

I, TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo

Witness /S/ TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ AKANE, Kazuo (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 21, 1947
SKETCH MAP.

CUSTOM-HOUSE

Approx. 1500 Meters

 Telephone Wire

GARDEN BRIDGE

Soochow River

Shinko Maru (GUN-B ot T)

Consul's House

Dock

Peterel (British)

Emissary (Nishimura)

Emissary (Oka)

Hotel Brg. Ma.N.

Changed mooring point upon receiving orders to commence action.
Def Doc No 1885

自分答証書

供述

藤木 貞夫

平成三十七年九月十九日

昭和四十七年九月十八日
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

**SWORN DEPOSITION**

Deponent: MIYAMA, Yozo

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose as follows:

1. The following documents are shown to me for identification:

   The first is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. I. I mark it as "Document A".

   The second is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. VI. I mark it as "Document B".

   The third is the File of Permanent Records of the War Ministry, 1931, Oct., Section 3. I mark it as "Document C".

   The fourth is Item No. 379 (1 bundle), according to the number given by the Washington Document Center. It is entitled as the Army-Asia-Secret-Great-Diary, 1942, Vol. V. I mark it as "Document D".

   The fifth and sixth are the Manchuria-Incoming-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, parts I and II. I mark them as "Documents E and F".

   The seventh is the Manchuria-Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. I. I mark it as "Document G".

   The eighth is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. II. I mark it as "Document H".

   The ninth is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. III. I mark it as "Document I".

   The tenth is the Secret-Great-Diary of the War Ministry, 1931, Vol. V. I mark it as "Document J".

2. I certify hereby that all the above documents were formerly kept at the War Ministry and later delivered to the Washington Document Center.

O.A.T.H

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to state the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

DOCUMENT MIYAMA, Yozo (signed & sealed)

August 28th, 1947 at Tokyo

The above is sworn by the deponent who signed and sealed in my presence on the same day at the same place as above written.

IMPRINT: OKAMOTO, Toshio
Def. "(S 1660

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARA'I, Sadao, et al

SOM DEPOSITION

Deponent: YA A'OTO, Yoshio

Having first duly sworn an oath as or attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby deposes as follows.

1. I was formerly a Rear-Admiral, on 8 December 1941, when war broke out I was Staff Officer of the Chinese Area Squadron and stationed in Shanghai.

2. At the outbreak of war, or instruction received from Imperial Headquarters addressed to the Chinese Area Squadron was to the following effect:

"Military operations by the Chinese Area Squadron will commence subsequent to confirmation of report on the initial attack by the Combined Squadron."

3. In conformity with this order, the Chinese Area Squadron passed instructions to forces under its command, to commence operations only after direct report of the Pearl Harbor attack by the Combined Squadron had been received.
4. Prior to issuing this instruction, preparations were made to cope with any emergency which may arise. However, the date and hour to commence military operations was kept in absolute secrecy to all forces under our command. Therefore, all forces under the command of the Squadron, made preparations and stood by in readiness until orders to commence operations were received.

5. As I have already stated, we had received orders strictly prohibiting the beginning of operations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. Therefore, we acted in obedience to that order.

It was after report had been received by radio at Squadron Headquarters, to the effect that, "we were successful in the attack against Hawaii", when orders to commence operations were communicated to forces under our command.

6. I shall next make a statement on the attack against the British warship Petrel.

Around 0520 hours 8 December 1941 (Tokyo Time; following hours will be the same.) the Commander of the Chinese Area Squadron dispatched emissaries to the U.S. warship Wake and the British warship Petrel. The emissaries explained to the effect that Japan had entered a state of war with the U.S. and Britain. They advised the commanding officers of these warships to surrender their ships and crew. Moreover, if our
terms were not accepted they warned them of an inevitable attack.

As the Petrel did not accept our terms it was attacked and sunk. VIZ: Around two hours prior to the attack, Japan and Britain had entered a state of belligerence. Despite the fact sufficient measures were dealt out to avoid any unnecessary bloodshed, due to the reason the commanding officer of the Petrel refused to accept our terms, the attack was unavoidably effected.

The U.S. warships _Take_, which faced exactly the same predicament escaped the attack because it accepted our lawful disposal.

As a result of this attack, three naval service men on board the Petrel were killed. If it is true, it should be considered as "casualties suffered as a result of legitimate acts of warfare". It was not murder or man-slaughter inflicted by measures other than legitimate acts of warfare.

7. To explain details concerning the attack, it is as follows.

A few minutes after 0330 hours on 8 December 1941, the Chinese Area Squadron Headquarters received confirmed reports on the Pearl Harbor attack and the landing operations on the Malayan Peninsula. Immediately, two emissary boats were prepared at the wharf in front of our headquarters. Commander Inaho Otani and Lt. Commander Sakuji Matsumoto, who...
were both Staff Officers attached to Squadron Headquarters, boarded the emissary boats. Hoisting a flag of truce the emissaries departed at 0515 hours for the British warship Petrel, and the U.S. warship "Wake." Commander Otani who headed for the Petrel reached the ship a few minutes before the other emissary. He presented to the commanding officer of the Petrel, a letter written in English to the following effect.

"Today, just now, Japan has entered a state of war with the U.S. and Britain. "We advise you and your ship and crew to surrender to the Japanese Navy. If you refuse to accept our terms we shall immediately commence hostile actions."

That was the contents of the letter of advice addressed to the Commanding Officer of the Petrel from the Commander of the Chinese Area Squadron, Admiral Koga. The report made by the emissary was as follows.

"The Captain of the Petrel was absent when we arrived. An officer who apparently was (but not certain) the second-in-command was on duty as senior officer or board. His reply was, "The Captain of this ship is away at present and we cannot answer." Whereupon our emissary said, "In the absence of the Captain, the senior-officer who is present should naturally take charge of the ship. Is it not the same with the British Navy?" Our emissary requested an answer. The senior-officer present replied, "No, we will not surrender" and refused.\footnote{Line number: 4}
Def. Doc. 66

accord our surrender terms. Therefore, the emissary said, "They shall attack." He left the ship and immediately fired a red very-shot according to previous arrangements.

The members of the Squadron Headquarters saw this signal, it was contrary to general expectations and some even thought the signal was a mistake.

But upon confirming it was not a mistake, order to open attack was communicated to all nearby forces. At the order to open fire, the gunboat Toba, destroyer Yes, etc. went into action and within two or three minutes the Petrel burst into flames.

The officer commanding the attack was Vice-Admiral Makita, Commander of the Shanghai Base Corps. After first firing a few shots, the Commander (Vice-Admiral Makita) ordered a temporary cease-firing. The attack was soon resumed. In approximately 10 minutes, the Petrel sank. According to the report from Vice-Admiral Makita later on, I learned the reason why he ordered a temporary suspension of firing. It was to ascertain whether or not the Petrel could then surrender, and thereby refrain from unnecessary shelling.

However, the guns mounted on the Petrel were being trained against our ships and her crew was observed taking a defiant attitude and so the attack was resumed.

8. Emissary Lt.-Comdr. Utsunomo reached the U.S. warship
"ake only a few minutes after Commander Otani reached the Petrel. It was witnessed by the members of Squadron Headquarters. The report of the emissary to the U.S. warship "ake is summarized as follows.

"In almost the same manner as in the case of the Petrel, the letter advising surrender was delivered to the Captain of the "ake. (I remember the Captain of the "ake being present.) The Captain of the "ake hesitated at first to make a reply, but after a while answered "Yes", and accepted our terms. Therefore, our emissary left the ship and fired a white-signal very-pistol. Members of the Area Squadron Headquarters breathed a sign of relief when they saw the signal.

9. Later on, according to the story of one crew member of the Petrel, when the attack began, the crew members jumped into the river and swam ashore to seek shelter on nearby "Paoton". The greater majority of the crew was saved but it was said that three were either killed or wounded. (Memory of deaths and injuries is uncertain.)

10. Summarizing the whole situation, the operation of hostile actions against the British warship Petrel at Shanghai was carried out fair and square, faithfully abiding by international law. Moreover, utmost effort had been exerted with a view to minimize the inflicting of unnecessary casualties.

11. Now I shall state about the advance upon the international settlement south of the Soochow River.
Around 0700 hours on Dec. 8, 1941, in order to make a previous arrangement with the authorities of the Shanghai Municipal Council concerning the advance on the international settlement, Consul-General Moriyoshi, as delegate of Japan visited the Municipal Council, accompanying Colonel Sakata, staff-officer of the 13th corps and Rear-Admiral Hara, sub-chief of staff of the China Sea Fleet, in the capacity of representatives of the army and navy respectively.

About one hour later, together with the Commander-in-Chief, I heard the report of Rear-Admiral Hara. According to his report the authorities of the Municipal Council agreed to our intention to advance the troop, peacefully and further expressed the intention to the effect that the Municipal Council itself would endeavor to preserve public order and also would cooperate with us in advancing. The arrangement fixed 1100 hours as the time of starting of advance.

In conformity to this prearrangement, at 1100 just the military and naval troops crossed over the Soochow River, entered the international Settlement and seized the buildings necessitated. Even if the troops were in arms, they advanced as in usual-marching formation.
Thanks to the cooperation of the Municipal Council, the public order was observed so perfectly that the advance was carried out quite peacefully without causing any trouble between the troops and citizens.

Or this 23rd day of May, 1947.

At Tokyo.

DEFENDANT /s/ YAMAOTO, Yoshio (seal)

I, TAKASHI, Yoshitsugu hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ TAKASHI, Yoshitsugu (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ YAMAOTO, Yoshio (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al, Defendants

Having first duly sworn on oath as on the detached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in the year 1921, and was in the office of the Director of the Bureau of Treaties from September, 1940, to October, 1942.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, matters concerning prisoners of war as well as civilians held in the theater of operations were under the charge and control of the Army or the Navy, while civilians of the enemy countries interned in Japan Proper were under that of the Home Ministry and those in the overseas territories, such as Formosa, Korea and Sakhalin, under that of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs. In this connection, the liaison business with foreign countries, so far as it was transacted through the Foreign Ministry, was carried out chiefly by the Bureau of Treaties until 1 November, 1942.

2. When the war broke out, Foreign Minister TOGO frequently expressed to the officials of the Foreign Ministry concerned his hope that civilian internees and prisoners of war might be treated with humanity and leniency. Pointing out that the fate of Japanese residents, amounting to several hundred thousands, in the enemy countries would be affected by the treatment by Japan of those prisoners of war and civilian internees, he urged us to take whatever steps might be possible for the realization of his hopes. We transacted business in conformity with the Foreign Minister's wishes in our daily contact with the competent officials of the other Government offices concerned.

3. On 27 December 1941 the United States Government addressed an inquiry through the Minister of Switzerland to the Japanese Government concerning the Treaty of 1929 for treatment of prisoners of war (The Geneva Convention). The United States being a signatory of the Convention, it inquired whether the Japanese Government intended to abide by the Convention during the present war despite Japan's not having ratified it (Exhibit 1468)1 With respect to the treatment of prisoners of war, Japan had been a signatory to the Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, concluded in 1907. That Convention has in its appendix seventeen stipulations regarding prisoners of war, and the principles of humanity are, moreover, stressed in its preamble. In accordance with Foreign Minister TOGO's opinion that our country should, out of humanitarianism, abide by the Geneva Convention (which expressed in full detail the stipulations of the Hague Convention) to the maximum extent that circumstances permitted, I discussed the matter with Uemura, Director of the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau, and other Army and Navy officers concerned. As a result, the reply
was made to the United States Government on 29 January 1942 (Exhibit 1469), in accordance with the answer of the War Ministry, which was in charge of the matter (Exhibit 1958), to the effect that although Japan had not ratified the Geneva Convention, and therefore was not bound by it, Japan would apply the Convention mutatis mutandis with respect to American prisoners of war under Japanese control. In response to the same inquiry made by Great Britain through Argentine Charge d'Affaires on 3 January of the same year (Exhibit 1494) a similar reply was made on 29 January (Exhibit 1496). As Great Britain proposed on 5 January 1942 through the Argentine Charge d'affaires that national and racial customs be taken into consideration, on a reciprocal basis, with respect to the supplying of food and clothing to prisoners of war (Exhibit 1495), the Japanese Government expressed agreement to that proposal also, in the same reply dated 29 January (Exhibit 1496). As the United States Government subsequently made inquiry on this matter point (Exhibit 1492), a reply similar to that to Great Britain was sent (Exhibit 1493).

Japan had not ratified the Geneva Convention, by reason primarily of the relations between the provisions of domestic law with those of the Convention; and the problems growing from this inter-relation would still have given rise to much difficulty in the event of an undertaking to apply the Convention completely and unconditionally. Moreover, it was anticipated that great difficulties in practice would result, as large-scale warfare spread over East Asia, if we were to apply strictly all the stipulations of the Geneva Convention, which Japan had not ratified. It was for these reasons that it was replied that the stipulations of the Convention were to be applied mutatis mutandis. It was the intention of Japan with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war that the stipulations of the Geneva Convention be applied so far as circumstances permitted; in other words, unless there were hindrances or obstacles which made its application impracticable.

It has to be noted that Japan did not at that time formally ratify or join the Convention in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 or Articles 94 and 95 thereof. What the Japanese Government did was only to communicate its intention in response to the inquiries made by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, through the countries representing their interests in Japan respectively; it did not take any of the domestic steps necessary for ratifying or entering the Convention, nor did it submit to the Government of Switzerland its ratification or notification of entrance, in accordance with the aforesaid provisions. For this reason the Swiss Government never notified the member-nations of the Convention of Japan’s ratification of or entrance into the Convention.

The Japanese Government, moreover, had never taken the view that the Geneva Convention become part or evidence of the laws and customs of war by reason of its signature by 47 nations, including Japan, and its ratification by more than 40 nations, but adopted the view that the fact that the Soviet Union, who is not a party to the Geneva Convention, refused to apply it during the present war showed that the Convention did not automatically bind nations as an established international custom.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Matsumoto Shun-Ichi (seal)

On this 17th day of February 1947 At Tokyo.

DEPONENT Matsumoto Shun-Ichi (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
17 February 1947.
Having first duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in June 1941, and was the Chief of the Third Section of the Bureau of Treaties from 8 January to 31 October 1942. The said Section was in charge chiefly of the business concerning international cooperation including international conferences, international treaties, etc. When I was the Chief of the said Section, the contact of the Foreign Ministry with foreign countries in connection with prisoners of war and civilian internees was transacted chiefly in my Section.

2. It was the desire of my superiors that prisoners of war and internees be treated as leniently as possible in order to lessen their difficulties from the standpoint of justice and humanity, to say nothing of the observance of the stipulations of the treaties to which Japan was a party. We officials of the Foreign Ministry, although we had no authority actually to deal with the matters, exerted our utmost efforts to see the realization of the desire entertained by the Foreign Minister and other superiors.

3. The Foreign Ministry received inquiries and protests from the diplomatic representatives of Switzerland or Argentina acting on behalf of the United States of America or Great Britain respectively in connection with the treatment of prisoners and internees, and we transmitted these representations to the authorities concerned without delay, and on the receipt of the opinions or information from them never failed in transmitting them without delay to the countries concerned.

Generally speaking, when I was in charge of these matters, the treatment being fairly good, if not ideal, we received few complaints or protests from any country in connection with the treatment of prisoners or internees in Japan Proper. Probably it was partly due to the fact that the war was still in its earlier stages and food and clothing were not so scanty as in the latter stages. As to the treatment of prisoners and internees in the occupied territories we received some protests, but receiving replies from the authorities concerned to the effect that they were receiving fair and equitable treatment, and having no means of directly investigating them ourselves, we could only believe what was reported in these replies.

At any rate, we endeavored earnestly and sincerely to alleviate the difficulties of the prisoners and internees as far as possible. Here are some instances which were dealt with by the Foreign Ministry when I was in the Bureau of Treaties.
A) Visits to the internment camps.

The International Red Cross Committee at Geneva requested in the middle of February 1942, that the delegates of the Committee be allowed to visit the internment camps. The Bureau of Treaties conveyed the request to the competent officials of the War Ministry, as well as other ministries concerned, and strove for its realization. As the result of this effort, the visits of the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee were realized as mentioned hereunder:

(a) Camps for prisoners of war.
- ZENTSUJI on 12 March 1942
- TOKYO on 21 August 1942
- HONG KONG towards end of May 1942
- SHANGHAI on 18 August 1942

(b) Camps for civilian internees.
- SUMIRE GAKUIN, TOKYO on 16 May 1942
- YOKOHAMA on 30 May 1942
- SHIROYAMA, Nagasaki on 11 June 1942
- MIYOSHI, Hiroshima on 13 June 1942
- KOBE on 15 June 1942
- SENDAI on 19 June 1942
- HONG KONG towards end of May 1942

I recall also that the members of the Swiss Legation and Consulate visited various camps on several occasions, although I do not remember the details at present. The above list is a list of the Red Cross visits in my time, but I understand that visits by the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee as well as of the countries protecting the interests of the belligerent countries were made from time to time thereafter.

In connection with these activities of the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee, the Railway Ministry issued free tickets and rendered various other facilities in accordance with our request.

Visits to the internment camps in the occupied territories, however, were not permitted by the military authorities concerned when I was in that office, for the reasons that these regions constituted the theater of operations.

B) Treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan.

We requested the authorities concerned to accord as lenient treatment as possible to the prisoners and internees, and we were always told by them that the treatment was good and equitable. In fact, the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee, after visiting various camps as mentioned above, reported that the conditions there were "good", "favorable", or "excellent", as shown by the Defense Document No. 2009.
C) Treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the occupied territories.

The Foreign Ministry had little knowledge concerning the condition of the prisoners of war and civilians outside of Japan. When we received an inquiry or protest about this matter, we transmitted it immediately to the authorities concerned, requesting them to supply us necessary information, and on receipt of the reply from them, we transmitted it immediately to the countries concerned. I recall that communications of this nature were made on the conditions of prisoners in war and internees in Guam, West Iwona, and the Philippines. The information we received at that time on these questions was promptly transmitted to the countries concerned. The Foreign Ministry, having no means of investigation, had to rely upon the information supplied by whom and could not do anything further than drawing the attention of the authorities concerned to the necessity of accord fair and equitable treatment to the prisoners and internees of enemy countries, especially taking into consideration the residence of Japanese in enemy countries.

Such being the circumstances, nothing was known to us with respect to the ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees in the occupied areas unless we were informed by the military or naval authorities concerned or by the adversary belligerent countries. As to the prisoners and internees on Wake Island, we received some inquiries from the Swiss Minister in Tokyo in the beginning of 1942, but they were inquiries about conditions and not protests nor complaints, and we did not fail in transmitting them to the authorities concerned, and upon receipt of reply from them, we immediately sent the information obtained at that time to the Swiss Minister, as shown in Exhibit 2034, and a further communication was made to him on 10 August. (Exhibit 2040). It was not known to us at all that ill-treatment was carried out there as testified by Mr. Stewart on 10 January 1947. The so-called "Death March of Bataan" was also a matter unknown to us in those days. As for the Thai-Burma Railway, the matter being exclusively the Army's concern, we did not hear of any plan for its construction, much less, of the employment of prisoners in its construction, when I was in the Bureau of Treaties.

D) Relief of prisoners and internees.

Early in 1942, the British Government made a proposal to send a Red Cross ship from Australia to bring relief goods to the prisoners and internees at Hong Kong and Singapore. The United States Red Cross also made a similar proposal for the benefit of the American prisoners and civilian internees at various places in East Asia. The Foreign Ministry approached the Navy on this matter, but they maintained that the safety of navigation of the ship could not be guaranteed in the light of the war situation in the southwestern Pacific. Thereupon, we exerted ourselves, with success, to receive food, medicine and other relief goods, taking advantage of the voyages for the exchange of diplomats and some civilians, which were then being arranged between Japan and the United States of America and Great Britain. The Akaka-maru, the Tatsuta-maru, and the Amakura-maru transported the relief goods of about 1,500 tons in total, and these relief goods were distributed to the prisoners and internees through the delegates of the International Red Cross committee in Japan, at Shanghai and at Hong Kong, and through the competent official at Singapore and Manila where no such delegates were stationed.
E) Exchange of information concerning prisoners of war and civil internees.

On 9 December 1941, the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva notified the Japanese Government that the Central Bureau for the Information of Prisoners of War of the Committee would act as an intermediary for information concerning prisoners of war and civilians under detention of both belligerent powers, and requested cooperation on the part of the Japanese Government. The Foreign Minister notified the Committee of our compliance. From that time onward, we exerted our efforts, always in concert with the competent authorities of the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau, the Home Ministry, the Communications Ministry, etc., to offer all information obtainable to the Central Bureau at Geneva as quickly as possible.

In this connection, we further rendered our services so that similar information might be supplied to the representatives of Switzerland and Argentina, then acting as protecting powers on behalf of the United States of America and Great Britain respectively. In some cases delay in supplying information took place, but it was said to us by the authorities concerned that it was owing to the difficult conditions prevailing in the area of military operations and to the difficulties of communication with the remote regions, and not to their bad faith.

I wish also to add that the Foreign Ministry informed the Swiss Minister that "Regarding the American civilian internees, we are ready to reply to every individual inquiry after the fullest possible investigations," and requested him to supply us the names of persons of whom information was required (Exhibit 2010). This suggestion was made in order to conform more fully with the desires of those concerned in expediting the investigation by the authorities concerned.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kudō Tadao

On this 26th day of August 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT Kudō Tadao (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko
Tokyo
26 August 1947
数学模型与数据处理

在数学模型与数据处理中，我们面临的主要挑战包括优化算法的开发、数据的选择与预处理、模型的构建与验证等。本节将重点介绍这些问题的解决方法。

1. 优化算法的开发
   - 首先，我们需要对问题进行建模，明确目标函数和约束条件。
   - 其次，选择合适的优化算法，如梯度下降法、牛顿法等。
   - 最后，通过编程实现算法，进行测试与优化。

2. 数据的选择与预处理
   - 首先，根据问题需求，选择合适的数据集。
   - 其次，对数据进行清洗，处理缺失值和异常值。
   - 最后，进行特征选择与数据标准化，提升模型效果。

3. 模型的构建与验证
   - 首先，通过特征选择与参数调整，构建初步模型。
   - 其次，使用交叉验证等方法，评估模型性能。
   - 最后，对模型进行优化，提高预测准确性。

通过以上步骤，我们可以有效地解决数学模型与数据处理中的问题。
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说明：

- 上布指用于制作上衣的布料。
- 面布指用于制作面饰的布料。

另三指另一种布料，用于特定用途。
(5) 内地に於ける俘虜の待遇

恵国の便宜供与方略従って特別の事情の有する場合においては俘虜としての待遇に於ては特別の措置を講ずる理由を発表する事に努めます。
に信頼し関係常局に対しては特に敵国在留日本人の事に考慮に入れて
敵国の俘虜及び抑留者に対し公正な待遇を與える事の必要に於いて
常に留意すべき事に於ては

【ウエークーパ】

俘虜及び抑留者

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照会で抑留者を受けた

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照会を瑞西公使に送付しました。（文）

トマス・ユーバート氏が一九四七年一月十日送信

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考慮に入れて
一九四二年始め英国民政府から香港、シンガポールに駐在する僱用者、教養に実地を送付する爲、歐洲から赤十字団派遣の船団あり、又米国赤十字に於ける交涉状況に鑑み、右船舶利用する機会に於て、僱用者、教養者、其の他の教養生を受領する機会は厚く、要望を表明せると、シンガポール及び香港に於て赤十字団派遣の委員会代表の手で、又教養生の居ない黒港及び香港は総領事が、援助の申し入れを受けた京も、日本政府の協力する委員会を設け、その役割を果たすことを知らせ、各種の事項を周知した。
この点に関して同様の情報や、その当時の米国及び英仏各団のために利益を提供される様に我々は努力したのであり、他 Сов国及びアルゼンチンの代表に対しても提供される様に我々は努力したのでありますが乏は、作戦地域における淵源であるのに対して、通信用通報に関しては、石油の危険を伴う地域に関する情報、及び vuelの地域の通信の困難に原因するもので、局の不近意に依ります。
The delegation in Japan.

On the occasion of his visit paid to the camp of Sumico Jegakuin in Tokyo on May 16, Dr. Paravicini found 16 citizens of the United States, 10 Britishers, 11 Canadians, 6 Dutchmen, 2 Belgians and 1 from Honduras. The two thirds of them are missionaries, all of local origin, who arrived, in succession, at the camp established on December 8. In his telegraphic message addressed to the International Committee, Dr. Paravicini describes the very salubrious situation of this camp, and the excellent conditions of lodging and nourishment. He points out that all these interned are made to undergo a medical examination once a month, and that, in case of need, they are sent to better hospitals. Dr. Paravicini adds the following informations: the Catholic and Protestant religious services are celebrated in this camp; the interned have a library with some newspapers and amusements at their disposal; there is none that is indigent among them; the commandor, inspector of the service of the foreigners of the Metropolitan Police gives a good treatment to these interned, who, represented by four trustworthy men, have an
excellent discipline and morale. The delegate writes, in conclusion, that this camp is an exemplary camp. The sole desire expressed by the interned is about the calls to the outside world, which they wish to be allowed to pay more frequently.

The delegation in Shanghai.

According to an information sent to the International Committee by its delegate Mr. Eglo, the 67 nurses from Corregidor, all sound and safe, are interned in the University of Manila, where they are treated well. Mr. Eglo informed also that about 13,000 civilians were interned in St. Thomas's, and that the letters received from 200 among them show that the treatment and the conditions of life there are excellent.

July, 1942, pp. 465-466

The delegation in Japan.

Dr. Paravicini visited the camp No. 2 of Yokohama Koncho, on May 30. Established on the seashore, on an artificial ground constructed of stone and argillaceous soil taken from the neighbouring hills, well-drained, sunny and well-ventilated, the camp comprised 18 Englishmen, 7 citizens of the United States and 2 Greeks of local origin. It was opened on December 18, 1941 like the camp No. 1. The building is two-storied. The treatment, the discipline and the morale there are good, and the delegate
of the International Committee received only few complaints from some of those interned suffering from depression.

On that same day, the delegate of the International Committee visited the camp No.1, situated in the southern part of Yokohama, at a half kilometre from the sea, which sheltered 19 Englishmen, 16 citizens of the United States, 11 Greeks, 3 Dutchmen, 1 Irishman, 1 Canadian and 1 Norwegian. The treatment, the discipline and the morale here are good.

On June 11, Dr. Paravicini visited the camp of Shircyama, Nagasaki, where were found 1 American and 1 American woman, 6 Englishmen, 1 Englishwoman, 10 Canadians, 4 Dutchmen and 2 Belgians. Established on the summit of a well-drained clayey hill, in a climate which has an excellent reputation, the camp enjoys the fertility of the country. The treatment, the morale and the discipline here are good, and the delegate of the International Committee heard no complaint on the part of the interned. Dr. Paravicini points out, however, that they desired to have some books, cards and playthings, and that the Japanese Red Cross was applying itself to getting them for the interned. In conclusion, the delegate declares that the camp is excellent.

On June 13, he visited the camp of Miyoshi, Hiroshima Prefecture, which was opened on December 13, 1941. There were 13 citizens of the United States, 4 Britishers, 3 Belgians and 1 of the Irish nationality, of whom 18 were women and 3 men. Two hours by train to the north of the seat of the prefectural government of Hiroshima, the camp is situated in the neighbourhood
of two towns. In 1935, an American mission established a sanatorium here, three hundred metres above the sea-level, surrounded by cultivated fields, by parks and by hillocks covered with forests. The climate here is salubrious. The buildings are solid, sunny and well-ventilated. A good morale reigns in the camp, and no complaint was made to the delegate of the International Committee. The commander, a sympathetic man, is satisfied with the discipline of the interned as well as their spirit of comradeship.

On June 19, Dr. Paravicini visited the Sendai camp, which was opened on December 9, 1941. Twenty-two citizens of the United States had vacated the camp, two days before the call of the deligate, on their own demand. The interned are lodged in a neighbouring house, while there remain in the camp 2 Americans, 1 Englishman, 1 Englishwoman, 1 Dutchman and 23 Canadians. The camp stands isolated in a wood in the midst of the university town of Sendai. The vegetables and fruits, as well as the marine products, are abundant. The conditions under which the interned are lodged and fed are very favourable.

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---4---
The delegation in Japan.

A telegram received from Tokyo provides us with information on the war prisoners' camp at Zentsuji.

Established in 1914 to lodge war prisoners and accommodated again to the purpose after it was abandoned in 1919, this camp is formed of wooden barracks. One notices that it is not surrounded, unlike some camps in other countries, by a high circle of barbed wire. It has, as hosts, some American, British and Australian war prisoners for the present.

Those who are interned there have named it "University of Zentsuji", on account of the deepened lessons founded here: courses of commerce, of engineering, of stenography, of navigation of Japanese language, all given by the prisoners themselves. The theatrical performances take place on Sunday evening, and a conference on Thursday evening.

On Sunday morning, the religious services are celebrated by Anglican and Protestant chaplains, of whom two are Americans and the other one is an Australian.

The health service is secured by American, British and Japanese physicians.
国際赤十字委員会

一九四二年六月
三八二三八三頁

現地ノ日本訪問ノ五月十六日パラヴィッチェイ博士は東京ノ亀井学

国收容所を訪問した。同所には米国人十六名、英国人十名、カナダ人十

名、オランダ人五名、ベルギー人两名、ボンドワス人一名を収容し

てゐるが、其中三分の二は布教師で、またいづれも該地方居住者であ

り、十二月八日同收容所開設以来遂次收容されたものである。

パラヴィッチェイ博士は国際赤十字委員会宛電報中左の通り述べてい

る。受容二所在地は非常に健康地で宿舍及び食料の状況も極めてよい。収

容人はいずれも一ヶ月一間医師の診断を受け、要するに一流の病院に連

られている。尚カトリック及び新教の参弔も行われ且つ図書館があって、日刊

新聞及び雑誌等も備へつつある。因つ此ノ所長は警視警外人係の監督で

可り大したものである。
香港岛南区旧区工程

1970年代末期

该区域位于香港岛南区，包括兰桂坊、兰桂坊西、兰桂坊南等地区，属于城市重建项目。该区域在1970年代末期进行大规模的旧区重建，改善了当地的居住环境和基础设施。重建项目包括拆除旧建筑物，建设新的住宅和商业设施。该区域在重建后，成为了香港著名的时尚娱乐和夜生活中心。
同時に関かれ、待遇、規律、精神もよく国際赤十字代表は優秀性が問われた後、所へ。一各 

同日日東赤十字代表は模範の南部、から Bailo 米館で居る第一收容所を訪問した。同所には英人十九名、米人十人名、カナダ人一名、オランダ人三名、アイルランド人一名、英人六名、英人七名、カナダ人十名、オランダ人四名、ベルギー人三名が居た。收容所は粘土質の丘の上にあって排

水もよく、また氣候は有名なない慶で地方の害虫物に害を受けて居る。待

水を入手すべく盛力中の皆を指導して居る。
東京からの電報によれば、難通寺の仏像を収容所の様子が述べられる。即ち
本収容所はもともと一九四四年仏像を収容する為に造営したものであるが、
一九四九年一旦廃棄されたのを再び造営したものです。収蔵の木造仏像
ラックより成り立って居るが注意すべきは、よく外観にある様には見え
模様で居らされている様である。

下記英米及び英兵が収容されているが、看護者は之を普通の大学と称して
あるが在年の理由は此数に散らかされた学問をさせられるからで商業部
役記載
日本語で何れも捕虜自身が動かしている。

又日曜の日は英教会及プロテスタンの教師によって宗教上の儀式が行われ
保教に於いては英米日教師が共に参っている。
Extension of the Conflict to the Pacific Area

The conflict being extended to the Pacific area, the International Committee has—as it had already done for the other countries which had entered the war—telegraphically placed the services of the Central Bureau of Prisoners of War at the disposal of the belligerent states, asking them if they were disposed to exchange by the intermediary of the Central Bureau of Geneva lists of information on prisoners of war, and insofar as possible on civil internees whom they should detain.

That communication was addressed to the Governments of the United States, Japan, the Netherlands in London, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador.

The Committee furthermore had brought the above steps to the knowledge of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and the Union of South Africa.

The International Committee received, by 12 January, answers by which the United States, Japan, Guatemala, Haiti and Nicaragua declared themselves ready to proceed to the transmission of informations and to the exchange of news.

April, 1942: p. 217

The Delegation in Japan

Dr. Paravicini telegraphed on 14 February that the Guam and Wake prisoners had expressed their gratitudes to the Japanese authorities for the good treatment which had been accorded to them.

Accompanied by a colleague of the Information Bureau of the Japanese Red Cross, Dr. Paravicini on 12 March visited a prisoners-of-war camp which is situated in a fertile plain between hills covered with pine trees; the climate is healthy there, and the delegate indicates that there are no endemic diseases. The space of the camp is three hectares; it contains two solid Army barracks built of wood, capable of receiving several hundreds of prisoners.

Translation Certificate

I, Saito Chu, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the French and English languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Saito Chu
Tokyo
27 August 1947
Secretariat Secret No. 1934-C. November 15th, 1934

To Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Esq.
From Vice-Minister of Navy.

Our reply to your Note with regards Recommending to the Throne the Ratification of "the Treaty signed on the 27th of July, 1929" pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

"With reference to the above subject, enquired in your note of 10-T-KIJOSSU-GO No. 3091 dated August 9th, we replied by our letter of Secretariat No. 1934-C at that time. But as the result the study which we made later, we, the Navy Ministry, reached the conclusion that it is advisable to refrain from recommending to the Throne the ratification of the said treaty. (Our opinions are attached herewith in the annexed papers.)

Our opinions on this treaty

1. The Japanese soldiers do not expect any possibility of becoming "war prisoners. On the contrary the soldiers of the foreign countries do not necessarily consider in the same way as the Japanese. Therefore, although this treaty appears reciprocal in its form, it is unilateral in its substance causing obligations on our side only.

2. This treaty is to guarantee the lenient treatment to prisoners, hence, e.g. in case enemy forces attempt to make air raids taking into consideration that they would become prisoners after achieving their aims, the range of action of enemy planes might be doubled. Thus, it is feared, the extent of the danger of being air raided would naturally be enlarged and so forth, bringing about consequent disadvantages upon our naval operations.

3. That, under the provisions of the Article 86, representatives of third powers be allowed to have interviews with war prisoners without observers is harmful from the military point of view.

4. The provisions of this treaty concerning the punishment of war prisoners give war prisoners more advantages than the those which Japanese soldiers will receive under Japanese laws. This fact will necessitate, the amendment of such codes and laws as the Navy Disciplinary Law, the Navy Penal Code, the Navy Court-Partial Law, and the Navy Ordinance concerning imprisonment.
Def. Doc. # 2125

Such revision is not advisable in the light of the principles of the said laws, the purpose of which is to maintain the military discipline. On the ground above said, we are of opinion that we had better not to recommend to the Throne the ratification of the said treaty.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, ITABE, Katsuma who occupy the post of the assistant Chief of the Archives and Documents Section of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "The Reply to the Subject of Petitioning the Emperor for his Ratification concerning the Treaty Concluded on the 27th of July in 1929 pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 15th day of August, 1947.

/s/ ITABE, Katsuma (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /s/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)
Army Secrecy No. 521

September 6th, 1934

To: Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru, Esq.

From: Vice-Minister of War, HASHIMOTO, Toranosuke

The following is our reply on the subject of petitioning the Emperor for his ratification of the Geneva Treaty concluded on 27th of July, 1929, for the improvement of the conditions of wounded and sick members of armed forces at the front, and a treaty of the same date relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.

Concerning your letter of inquiry, (JO-I-KIMITSU-GO No. 3091) dated 9th of August, we have no objection to petitioning the Emperor for his ratification of the Geneva Treaty concluded on 27th of July, 1929, for the improvement of the conditions of wounded and sick members of armed forces at the front, but in regard to the treaty on the same date relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, in the opinion of War-Ministry, we would like to refrain from petitioning the Emperor for his ratification thereof. Therefore we wish you act in our favour at your discretion.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, URABE, Katsuma, who occupy the post of the Acting Chief of the Archives Section of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Reply on the subject of petitioning the Emperor for his sanction concerning Geneva Treaty concluded on 27th of July in 1929 for the improvement of the conditions of wounded and sick members of armed forces at the front, and a treaty, on the same date relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. (Official letter of the 6th of September, 1934 despatched from Vice-Minister of Foreign Ministry SHIGEMITSU to Vice-Minister of War, HASHIMOTO)" is an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 15th day of August, 1947

/S/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)
Def. Doc. 1589

April 9th, 1942

War Ministry, Asiatic Affairs, Confidential. No. 1108.

Public Document Concerning Treatment of POW's

Article 2 of the regulations concerning the treatment of POW's (cf. the preceding number) provides that the POW Control Bureau should transact business concerning the treatment of POW's and the internees at the front. The scope of this "business concerning the treatment of POW's and those interned by the Army" is determined as follows:

1. Matters concerning general plans for treatment, such as accommodation, discipline, exchange, release, employment (for labor propaganda, etc), punishment and general allowances of POW's and those interned by the Army at the front.

2. Matters concerning labor of POW's.

3. Matters concerning correspondence of POW's.

4. Matters concerning punishment of POW's.

5. Matters corresponding to the preceding items No. 2 and 3 in the case of those interned by the Army at the front.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, OYAZU, Ayro, who occupy the post of The Chief Judicial Investigator of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Administrative Matters concerning POW Treatment" as an excerpt and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the 1st Demobilization Section of the Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 3rd day of May, 1947

(signed) OYAZU, Ayro (scrl)

I hereby certify that the above signature and scrl were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: (signed) KHI, Akira (scrl)
Notification to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Control Bureau from the Adjutant.

Dated November 22, 1942

This is to inform you that it has been decided to entrust the decision regarding the following matters to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Control Bureau.

(a) Matters of minor importance concerning the accommodation, handling, allowances, transfer, labour and punishment of prisoners of war and internees at the front.

(b) Matters concerning correspondence of the prisoners of war and internees at the front.

(c) Matters concerning the relief of prisoners of war and internees at the front.

(d) Matters of minor importance concerning granting to foreigners entrance of prisoners of war camps and the military detention houses.
Def. Doc. No. 1590

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clark (seal)

Tokyo, Japan
Date 21 May 1947

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I hereby certify that the document hereto attached is concerning the matters which were entrusted to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Control Bureau.

I may add that no matters were entrusted for decision to the Vice-Minister of War concerning prisoners of war.

/s/ YOYA, Yozo (seal)
Chief of the Archives and Document Section,
First Demobilization Bureau

May, 1947
CERTIFICATE OF(Source and Authenticity)

I, (Name), who occupy the post of (Title), hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Note from the Adjutant to the Director of POW" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the 1st Demobilisation Section of the Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this [Date]
of [Month], 1947

(signed) (Name)
Having first duly sworn an oath on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, SUZUKI Kunji, was born in Hyogo Prefecture on 6 January 1893.

After graduating from the Military Academy in 1913, I served in various military offices, and I was the Chief of the Tokyo War Prisoners' Camp from September 12, 1942 to April, 1944.

I am now confined in Sugamo Prison.

I will state as follows about "Instruction of the War Minister to the new Chiefs of the War Prisoners' Camp". (Exhibit 1962),

1. September 29, 1942, when joint education of the newly appointed Chiefs of the War Prisoners' Camp and its staff was given at the War Ministry, which I attended as the Chief of the War Prisoners' Camp.

Lt. General K. HIDUHA, Mikio, the Chief of the Prisoners' of War Control Bureau read the War Minister's instruction for the Minister.
Neither War Minister TOJO nor Vice-Minister KIMURA was present at the lecture.

2. Lt. General KIMURA, after reading the instructions, explained it as follows:

a. "In regard to the treatment of the war prisoners, it is natural that you should be faithful to its righteous execution according to the rules, so that you should manifest the impartial attitude of the Empire as it really is, to the world; nevertheless, you must supervise them rigidly insofar as you do not become inhuman..." expressed in the instruction, means as follows:

The treatment of war prisoners ought to be carried out according to the War Prisoner Treatment Rule and its by-law. Especially, "War prisoners must be treated with the spirit of benevolence and should never be insulted or ill-treated" provided in Article 11 of the War Prisoner Treatment Rule, should be observed. But great care must be taken so that no untoward incident should happen. In short moderation and refraining from both warm treatment and ill treatment is essential in the treatment of war prisoners.

b. "War prisoners should not pass..." a day eating the bread of idleness, but their labor and skill must be used for the purpose of increasing production..." expressed in the instruction, means as follows:
Today we, the whole nation of Japan, regardless of sex and age, are exerting ourselves according to our abilities to the utmost to increase production in the country, trying to overcome pressing shortages of labor. Therefore, the war prisoners also should render service to the increase of production, filling the shortage of labor, in proportion to their health, ability and special skills, respectively.

Viewing from existing pressing shortage of labor, it is good that the war prisoners do not pass even a day eating the bread of idleness. But it is not good that they be forced to work without consideration for their health, ability or special skills. Technical experts and skilled hands should be considered so as to be given the opportunity to display their special skill or ability and kept away from fatigue duties.

The present war will not easily come to an end. It will perhaps be a long war. Therefore, we should make it our motto that we make a reasonable and efficient use of war prisoners, refraining from force and impatience. For that purpose we must take their health and ability into consideration and allow them reasonable holidays.

If we mistreat them, and cause sickness or death, it will be most unfavorable to Japan.

c. At the closing, Lt. General KAMIMURA emphasized that in brief the cardinal principle of the treatment of war prisoners depended upon impartiality in treating them based on the principle laid down in the above-mentioned Article 11 of the War Prisoner Treatment Rule. KAMIMURA said that the instruction of the War Minister is therefore nothing but enlargement of this principle.
3. When I met Lt. General KAMIMURA, he told me as follows:

"The Chiefs of the war prisoners' camp such as you, well know that war prisoners should be fairly treated, according to the War Prisoner Treatment Rule and War Minister's instructions. But needless to say that you must be always be cautious of things which attract the Japanese public's attention. You must beware of causing feelings unfavorable to the war prisoners, among the people who are having great difficulties in getting daily commodities, by making it appear that prisoners are enjoying too good treatment. But you should never fail in treating them justly.

For instance, recently a number of the municipal assembly men visited the Paymasters' Department of the Imperial Guard Division and asked, 'Why is it that we, the citizens of Tokyo, cannot eat a bit of meat while meat is given to the war prisoners?' Before this time the citizens of Tokyo had seen pork being transported in a truck for prisoners' food. The Chief of the Paymasters' Department barely succeeded in mollifying them by earnestly explaining the circumstances. I UEMURA have also experienced cases of this kind. I hope you will all see through these delicate mental conditions of the citizens and beware of exciting the Japanese people without reason.

4. Upon the other part of the Minister's instruction, I, SUZUKI, put my interpretation as follows and put it into practice:

a. "As to the treatment of war prisoners there is a difference between the way of our country and those of European and American countries due to inconsistent ideas as to the war prisoner." —expressed in the instruction, means that though in the countries in Europe and America the war prisoners
are regarded and treated as "honorable war prisoners" in this country they are treated throughout with sympathy and pity as "pitiful war prisoners".

In our country it is considered from old time the greatest disgrace that we, the Japanese, be taken prisoners. But as to enemies who surrendered giving up their arms, it is thought to accord with the spirit of the "Bushido" that we treat them throughout with benevolence and pity.

b. "You must endeavor to make the people in the occupied areas know the superiority of the Japanese race and believe that they consider it the highest honor to be Japanese subjects sharing in the boundless benevolence of the Emperor." --- expressed in the instruction, is in brief that the Japanese are required to display their excellent character, not to insult the war prisoners or to be puffed up with pride.

Among foreigners and even Japanese there are some who think that the Japanese nation is inferior to the European and American nations in a moral sense. So we must make them know that the Japanese people are not inferior insofar as morality and sense of justice is concerned and further, it is necessary to explain to them the world-wide beneficence of the Japanese Emperor through the fair treatment of prisoners of war.

I, as the Chief of the Tokyo War Prisoner Camp, have been discharging my duty in the treatment of the war prisoners for a year and a half. While in office I did always my best, observing Lt. General KIMURA's explanation on the War Minister's instruction and my own views, to say nothing of conforming to the War Prisoner Treatment Rule and other provisions. I will show you some examples.
1. In order to drive home the foregoing instruction of the War Minister, I often summoned the Chiefs of the Branch War Prisoners' Camps to call their attention to it and never failed to seize the opportunity to inspect the places where the war prisoners were working, so that they might not be subjected to unreasonable imposing of labor. On account of this measure, I never found in any camp any prisoner who was forced to labor in disregard of his rank, health or ability.

2. As to food rationing, we gave more than the fixed quantity by rules, which was 420 grams for officers and 570 for other ranks. Those figures actually given varied to the following figures as the supplies varied:

- 786 gram -- 650 gram -- 690 gram --
- 786 gram -- 660 gram -- 740 gram --

All prisoners, officers and other ranks got the same rations. Compared with the ration of the Japanese at that time, A-Class -- 330 gram, B-Class -- 390 gram, and C-Class (heavy workers) -- 540 gram, even the minimum quantity to the prisoners was 110 gram more than what was allotted to the Japanese heavy workers. In addition, the prisoners were each given a rice ball a day which was about 70 gram on the average at his post, so the quantity which was given substantially, was never less than 720 gram.

3. It was the food for the sick persons that we most worried about. We gave them bread of the best quality which was made by the Meiji Cake Producing Company; those in serious condition were given particularly milk and eggs though the quantity was small, which were supplied for neither the old nor sick persons among the Japanese except that women in pregnancy or...
childbirth were apportioned a small amount.

4. As to the laboring of officers and non-commissioned sublieutenants in main camp, I permitted them to engage in arranging the mail for the prisoners, according to their wishes. Major Francor who was a senior officer as the head of the group, distributed the business among the other officers and they all were glad to work every day. At some branch camps, poultry farming, raising of rabbits and fish or gardening was allowed according to the officers' wishes. I think such kind of labor that was permitted the officers as above-mentioned was rather a consolation or an amusement than a labour.

There was not a camp where the officers and non-commissioned sublieutenants were engaged in the same kind of work done by the other ranks.

5. As the sporting goods of baseball and volleyball, checkers, cards and some musical instruments were sent as comfort goods from the Red Cross Society, they were distributed among the branch camps and were used freely by the officers and others for amusement.

When I permitted those who wanted to buy musical instruments, they were very glad and organized a brass band. On Christmas, 1943, a band concert was held to which I was invited.

6. It was about the end of the year 1943, I think, when War Minister TOJO visited the Tokyo War-Prisoners' Camp one day about 4 P.M. without notice. He inspected the entire camp and kitchens for about half an hour and gave prize money to the staff of the camp expressing his satisfaction over our arrangement.
childbirth were apportioned a small amount.

4. As to the laboring of officers and non-commissioned sublieutenants in main camp, I permitted them to engage in arranging the mail for the prisoners, according to their wishes. Major Francor who was a senior officer as the head of the group, distributed the business among the other officers and they all were glad to work every day. At some branch camps, poultry farming, raising of rabbits and fish or gardening was allowed according to the officers' wishes. I think such kind of labor that was permitted the officers as above-mentioned was rather a consolation or an amusement than a labour.

There was not a camp where the officers and non-commissioned sublieutenants were engaged in the same kind of work done by the other ranks.

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When I permitted those who wanted to buy musical instruments, they were very glad and organized a brass band. On Christmas, 1943, a band concert was held to which I was invited.

6. It was about the end of the year 1943, I think, when War Minister TOJO visited the Tokyo War-Prisoners' Camp one day about 4 P.M. without notice. He inspected the entire camp and kitchens for about half an hour and gave prize money to the staff of the camp expressing his satisfaction over our arrangement.
On this first day of July, 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT SUZUKI, Kuniji (seal)

I, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo and ABE, Akira hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depo- nent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo
Witness: (signed) ABE, Akira (seal)

O.T.H

In accordance with my conscience I swore to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/By/ SUZUKI, Kuniji (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

AGAINST

ISHII, SUSUMU, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF ISHII SUSUMU

Deponent, ISHII, SUSUMU

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I
hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is SUSUMU ISHII

2. I live at YOCHIKAYA, USHIKOMI-WARD, TOKYO CITY.

3. I was born on DEC. 1, 1895

4. My brief career is as follows:

   On Sept. 19, 1941, I was appointed an attached officer of
   the ARMY DEPARTMENT OF THE IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, and leaving
   CANTON, the place of my former post, arrived at TOKYO on Sept.
   23, 1941.

   On Nov. 6, 1941, I was appointed a staff officer of the SOUTHERN
   ARMY.

   On Nov. 27, 1941, I left JAPAN to depart for the front.

   On March 18, 1943, I was appointed a professor of strategy
   in the ARMY STAFF COLLEGE. On March 22 in the same year, I left
   SHONAN (T.N. SINGAPORE) and returned to TOKYO.

5. The instruction attached hereunto was drafted by myself according.
to the directives given by General Teruuchi, the Commander-in-chief of the Southern Army, and Lt.-general Tsukadu, the chief of staff of this Army, and was approved by them. On Nov. 20, Commander Teruuchi called a meeting in Tokyo of all the commanders under his command, including Major-General Kawaguchi, Commander of the Kawaguchi Detached Corps and transmitted the above-mentioned instruction. The commander himself read the instruction to them, and afterwards made it printed and handed it to them. I was in attendance on the occasion.

Instruction

At this critical moment of our national advancement, I, Teruuchi, was unexpectedly appointed to the responsible post of the Commander-in-chief of the Southern Army. Nothing is more honourable and grateful for me. I am anxious to discharge the heavy responsibility now placed on me, chiefly depending on the loyalty and bravery on the part of all our commanders and their men.

All the officers and men should grasp the true meaning of the present sacred war, impress your heavy responsibilities on your minds and do your best with an indomitable will.

Both the Army and the Navy always on good terms and in close collaboration with each other should prove their true strength and accomplish the aim of the present campaign in the shortest length of time never faltering in the belief that the Japanese nation can never lose in the war.

Try to appease and enlighten the innocent local peoples by showing
the true virtue and dignity of the Japanese Army through your own behavior and always refrain from resorting to violence.

I especially wish you to exercise self-restraint and fight bravely in view of the hot climate and prevailing pestilence at the front.

Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army

On this 19th day of January, 1947
At Tokyo

I, BANNO Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) BANNO Junkichi (seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ISHII, Hisami (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES AMERICA, et al.
v.
RAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWEARING DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: YAMAZAKI, Shigeru.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I here­by deposes as follows.

1. I, YAMAZAKI, Shigeru, was born in NAGANO Prefecture on January 16 of the 24th year of MEIJI (1901), and am present­ly living in UWARORI, K.MIHAKU-MURA, CHIISAGATA-GUN, NAGANO Prefecture. After I was graduated from the Military Academy in the 2nd year of TaISHO (1913) I filled various posts successively and, then, was appointed Secretary of the War Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau in January, 1942 (the 17th year of SHOWA) and was commissioned to hold concurrently the additional post of a member in the War Prisoners Control Department in April of the same year, continuing in the above posts until February, 1943 (the 19th year of SHOWA).
2. I will make a statement as follows on instructions, dated June 3 of the 19th year of SHOWA (1944), concerning labor-duty for officer and warrant officer prisoners of war.

(Exhibit No. 1961):

A. These instructions were made with the desire of having the prisoners work voluntarily and were well-meaning taking the war prisoners' health into consideration, they absolutely did not have any meaning of compulsory labor.

B. Those instructions were issued from the Director of the War Prisoners Control Department to the units concerned, namely, the army commanders or garrison commanders who controlled the war prisoners' camps in accordance with article III of the War Prisoners' Camp Regulation, but was not directed to the heads of the war prisoners' camps themselves. Accordingly, the phrase, "it is desired that proper guidance be rendered," at the end of the text refers to the camp heads as leaders and does not directly point to the prisoners.

C. These instructions were issued personally by the Director of the War Prisoners Control Department as an authorized matter.

3. I will make a statement on the War Minister's instructions to the newly-appointed heads of the war prisoners' camps on June 25 of the 19th year of SHOWA (1942) (Exhibit No. 1962)
and on the War Minister's instructions to the newly-appointed heads of the war prisoners' camps on July 7 of the same year (Exhibit No. 1963):

1. Those two instructions were made out personally by Lieutenant General K. KIMURA, the then Director of the War Prisoners' Control Department, on his own initiative;

2. Those two instructions were read by the above Lieutenant General K. KIMURA as proxy at the conference of the heads of the war prisoners' camps at which both Minister TOJO and Vice-Minister KIMURA were not present.

On this 23th day of June (TN: probably May), 1947
at UFABORI, KAMIKA-WA-KURU, CHISAGO-TA-GUN, NAGANO Prefecture.

DEFENDANT Shigeru Yamazaki (seal)

I, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at the same place.

Witness: (Signed) Tokisaburo Shiobara (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Shigeru Yamazaki (seal)
War Prisoner Labor Regulation

(September 10, 1904, Army Instruction No. 139)
(Revised 1905, by Army Instruction No. 40, 1914, by No. 34)

Article 1. War prisoners may be employed as workers with discrimination according to their status, ranks and abilities, but those ranking above non-commissioned officers shall be exempted from this provision.

Article 2. In addition to the preceding Article, war prisoners may be permitted to work in behalf of public offices, private persons, or for their own sake.

Article 3. The labor to be imposed upon war prisoners shall not be too heavy, nor shall it be such a work as disgraces the positions, military or civil, which they hold in their country or relates directly to the plan of operations against their country.

Article 4. Whenever war prisoners are to be set to work outside the war prisoner camp, it is necessary besides complying with the procedure prescribed in Article 6 of the Specific Regulations concerning the Treatment of War Prisoners, to prepare a set of rules necessary for control, and to get the approval of the War Minister.

Article 5. Whenever a public office or a private person...
Desires to employ war prisoners for labor, the garrison commander shall make necessary arrangements concerning the kind of labor, place, hours and wages and set the approval of the War Minister. When war prisoners are employed by Government offices, their wages shall be seven sen a day in the case of sub-officers or those ranking with a non-commissioned officer and four sen a day in the case of privates. But those who work with special technique for instance, in baking, sewing, or shoe-industry, may have their wages increased up to sixteen sen according to their abilities, diligence and working hours.

Article 6. The garrison commander shall order the intendant officer of the war prisoners camp to keep the wages of war prisoners and earnings they have got through their labor as provided under Article 2. But what is given by the Government offices to the war prisoners besides their wages shall be delivered in advance to the national treasury in part as a compensation for the expense of feeding and clothing them.

The sum to be delivered to the national treasury will be indicated according to the demand.

Article 7. The money kept in accordance with the provision of the preceding Article shall be entered in the book separately for every prisoner and kept accounts of by the order of the garrison commander.
Article 8. The money in the custody of the intendant officer in accordance with the provision of Article 6, belongs to the war prisoners and shall be appropriated for the expense of refreshments to be given to them or to improve this condition in the camp. If there remains surplus, it shall be allowed at the discretion of the garrison commander to them for free use or shall be given them when they are sent back to their country.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of The Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "War Prisoner Labor Regulation" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (the First Demobilization Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of August, 1947

/S/ MIYAKO, Yōzō (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place, on the same date

Witness: /S/ ABE, Akira (seal)
V.3 Excerpt from the War Prisoners' Information Bureau's Monthly Report.

Improvement of PW Administration

I hereby certify that the above document is an exact excerpt from an official document in the custody of the War Prisoners' Information Bureau.

On this 20th day of May, 1947

/\ JYAKUSHI, Sadayoshi
Acting-Chief of the War Prisoners' Information Bureau.

THE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 3831
Re Improvement of PW Administration

(March 3, 1944 Add.Y._ADM._SEC._ET No. 696)

Notice from the Vice-Minister of War

to the Units concerned.

In the PW administration the use of PWs for labor has been stressed heretofore. Although this has directly helped to increase our fighting strength and has produced other good results, the average PWs' health condition is hardly satisfactory due to the inevitable shortage of materials, etc. Their high rate of death must be brought to our attention. In the light of the recent intensified enemy propaganda warfare, if the present condition continues to exist, it will needlessly stimulate the hostile feeling of the enemy and it will also be impossible for us to expect the world opinion to be what we wish it to be. Such will cause an obstacle to our prosecution of moral warfare. Not only that, it is absolutely necessary to improve the health condition of PWs from the standpoint of using them satisfactorily to increase our fighting strength. In view of these facts, you are requested at this time to deal, in accordance with the following, in regard to prompt improvement of the health conditions of PWs. I hereby give instructions.

It should be added that, although efforts must be exerted to utilize spaces on ships in transporting war prisoners, it is necessary that, the purport of the despatch ARM.Y._ADM._SEC._ET No. 1704 of 1942, (Its copy hereto attached) be thoroughly understood in handling war prisoners at this juncture.

1. Foods and clothings to be supplied to PWs should be given according to the degree of their labor as provided in various regulations.

2. dispensaries for the PW camps (branch camps or detached camps should be equipped with proper facilities for medical treatment and the main camps should be equipped with attached medical wards of reasonable standard) should be immediately established to give satisfactory treatment for the patients among PWs. For this purpose, the necessary funds, materials and sanitary supplies should be procured and delivered upon each request.
3. Not only efforts should be made to fully facilitate the sanitary work by using the medical personnel among the enemy, but also, if particularly needed, such measures as requesting the War Minister to have Army hospital medical officers or medical officers attached to units serve concurrently at the FW camps should be taken. Thus the medical care for the FWs can be more solidly administered.

4. In order to increase the rate of labouring FWs statistically, to use sick FWs in need of rest or to assign heavy labor tasks to patient workers or to physically weak must be avoided. Thus, attention should be paid to the sanitary care of FWs. Moreover, consideration must be given to the physical condition of each individual FW in the light of local climate and if necessary individuals should be confined in different places alternately or transferred so as to increase substantially their efficiency in labor.

5. As to the domestic matters of FWs, their health, especially their relaxation, must be considered so long as the security and control permit from the standpoint of the administration of FWs. This will increase their efficiency in labour.

6. If the health condition of FW’s gets worse due to inadequate care on the part of their employer, an order of suspension or restriction of the employment of FWs will be issued, so it is requested that the situation be reported.
Def. Doc. 5877

Transcribed by

International Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE Far East

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

- vs -

Japanese et al.

STATEMENT

Defendant: Yasuji Chikao

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached. agent aid to conscience
with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose for the questions
of witnesses Hie gawa Hisao as follows:

Question: State your name, address and occupation.

Answer: Milt. 35 Chikao; Niiya-mura, Eie-gun, Kiito-ken.

No occupation.

Q.: State your post and rank at the time of demobilization.

A.: Rear-Admiral: Commandant of the 11th Air Squadron.

Q.: State main posts you occupied since around the outbreak of war till

its termination.

A.: Chief of First Section, Administrative Division, Department of Naval

Aeronautics from September 1941 to December 1942;

Chief of First Section, Naval Department of Imperial Supreme Headquarter,

from January 1943 to December 1944; and Chief of Staff, 10th Air Fleet

and Commandant, 11th Air Squadron from January 1945 to the end of the
Q. What sort of a job was assigned to you from January 1943 to December 1944?

A. I was in charge of the affairs concerning overall operational conduct of the Japanese Navy under the control of the Chief of the First Division, Naval Department of the Imperial Supreme Headquarters. To fulfill this duty I was to direct the members of the First Section in drawing up plans as well as drafting orders and directives for the overall operational conduct of the Navy.

Q. Have you ever taken part in drawing up the plans for submarine warfare or in drafting orders or directives for the same?

A. I took part in those affairs, both exclusively for submarine operations and for the problem of overall operations inclusive of submarine warfare.

Q. What sort of plans and orders of submarine operation were they that you took part in?

A. What I participated in was the overall naval operations of the period since the latter part of March, 1943, that is, the period for the so-called Third Phase of the Campaign. As regards submarine warfare, this period could in turn be broken down into three minor periods. The First minor period covered from the latter part of March, 1943 to October of the same year. The highlights of the operational policy for this minor period were:
(1) Destruction of maritime traffic constituted the key point of the operation. In this respect this minor period made no difference from the preceding stage of campaign which extended from June 1942 to March 1943.

(2) To cooperate with the German submarines in operations in the Indian Ocean area.

(3) Supply to outlying bases shall be carried out by means of a portion of the submarines.

Results of operations up to that time led us to believe that submarines could be more effectively employed against enemy sea traffic than against enemy naval forces. Increasing activities of enemy aircraft in the Solomon Islands and Rabaul areas, however, made the supply by ordinary surface transports to these outlying bases more and more difficult, a situation which compelled us to employ submarines for the transportation of supplies.

The method of forwarding supplies by means of submarines was subsequently extended to New Guinea, the Mandated Islands and the Aleutian Archipelago areas. This necessitated numerous submarines to be diverted from the field of maritime traffic destruction, leaving in the latter field only a scantily force of submarines, a situation which made the prospect of achieving the results at first visualized very remote.

The operational plan for this minor period is what was indicated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.
Jsoroku by the Chief of Naval General Staff MAdNO Osani on 25 March 1943 as Naval General Staff Directive No. 209, in the drafting of which I myself took part as the Chief of the Section in charge of the planning.

The second minor period began in October, 1943 with the principle in operation unaltered. But the advent of German submarines in the Indian Ocean necessitated the drawing of the demarcation between the fields of operations of Japanese and German submarines. This line of demarcation was indicated by the Chief of Naval General Staff MAdNO Osani to Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral KILL with Naval General Staff Directive No. 232 dated 4 October 1943.

The operational agreement concluded with Germany regarding to the field of operations in the Indian Ocean setting 70°3 longitude as the line of demarcation was indicated to the units concerned by Naval General Staff Directive No. 232 of 4 October 1943 for the first time. Prior to that date nothing was shown to them concerning this matter.

This was because, I suppose, it had not been deemed necessary to issue such directive until the activities of the German submarines became actually seen in the Indian Ocean, though the agreement with Germany on the matter had been already concluded.

This Naval General Headquarters Directive was drawn up by MV-
half in the capacity of the Chief of the First Section. 

The third minor period started in August 1943. For this period no alteration was made in the principle of operations in so far as a directive of the Naval General Staff was concerned. In reality, however, our navy became too tightly occupied with the operations in the Philippine area to divert submarines to continue the traffic destruction and the submarines which had so far engaged in the traffic destruction in the Indian Ocean as well as in the Pacific Ocean had been withdrawn.

Q: When was it that the cooperation of the submarines among Japan, Germany and Italy was contemplated in the Japanese Imperial Supreme Headquarters?

A: When on 7 March 1943 Naval General Staff Directive No. 249 was about to be delivered for the Third Phase of the War to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAGUCHI from the Chief of the Naval General Staff, an item dealing with the cooperation first found its insertion into this directive because it was expected that some of the German and Italian submarines would start operations shortly in the Indian Oceans in accordance with the military agreement among the three powers. It was not until 4 October 1943, however, that the operational units concerned were first instructed concretely about the matter, because the necessity to do so had not been felt before.

Q: During your tenure of office as the Chief of the First Section, Naval Department of the Imperial Supreme Headquarters, had any of Japanese
Naval officers residing in Germany or any German official ever notified to Tokyo the German request or something like that about the cooperations of the Japanese and German submarines?

A: No, Nothing of the sort.

Q: German U-boats successfully pursued the policy of killing all of the persons on board the Allied vessels except only few of them useful for getting information then they sank these vessels. Do you know the fact that the Germans requested to Japan for the adoption of such policy around 1943?

A: No, I have never heard of any such thing.

Q: Has the principle of the annihilation of the crew members of a sunken vessel ever been adopted in the plan of operations drawn up in the Imperial Supreme Headquarters?

A: The Japanese Navy have never adopted such a principle; absolutely never. On the contrary, though it is a matter of course, the strict observance of international laws and the high regard to human lives have been hold among the traditional spirits which have guided the Central Authorities of the Japanese Navy. For instance, in Naval General Staff Directive No. 15 of 30 November 1941 and in Naval General Staff Directive No. 60 of 1 March 1942 it is counseled as a matter of warning that in carrying out submarine warfare ample time for safe retirement should be given to the crew members and passengers of Allied vessels, unless circumstances might otherwise dictate.
This humanitarian spirit of the Navy had been maintained unchanged throughout the war.

Q: What fleet was in command of the submarines which operated in the Indian Ocean from around October 1942 to around October 1944?

A: A division of submarines was placed under the command of the South-Western Area Fleet since 10 July 1942, and operated in the Indian Ocean till October 1943. In October, 1943 the Eighth Submarine Squadron joined forces with the aforesaid division. Both of these submarine forces were placed under the direct control of the Commandant of the Eighth submarine Squadron, who in turn was under the command of the South-Western Area Fleet.

Since August, 1944, every submarine of the above Squadron diverted to other area from the Indian Ocean.

Q: What fleet was in command of the submarines that operated in the Pacific Ocean -- in Samoa-Fiji area in particular -- from 1942 to around 1944?

A: They were commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the sixth Fleet.

Q: By whom was the First Submarine Force commanded as of 20 March 1943?

A: Belonging to the Sixth Fleet, it was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

Q: In the relation between the 1st Submarine Squadron and the submarine forces operating in the Indian Ocean, was the one in command of the other regarding the operational matters?
A: No, they had no direct connection at all between them. Although both
the Sixth Fleet and the South-Western Area Fleet were under the command
of the Combined Fleet, the Submarine forces operating in the Indian
Ocean, which belonged to the South-Western Area Fleet, and the First Sub-
marine Force originating to the Sixth Fleet had nothing in common between
them regarding the matters pertaining to command.

Q: Where were the bases and how extensive were the theaters operations?
Tell me the bases and the theaters of operations of the submarine
forces belonging to the South-Western Area Fleet and of the submarine
forces attached to the Sixth Fleet.

A: The submarine forces of the South-Western Area Fleet had their base at
Penang and the theater of their operations was the Indian Ocean (since
October 1942, the theater was limited to the Indian Ocean only east of
70°E longitude); while the submarine forces of the Sixth Fleet had
their base at Truk with the Pacific Ocean as the field of action.

Q: When was MITO Hisashi transferred to the Navy Ministry from the office
of the Commandant of the First Submarine Squadron?

A: It was on 29 March 1943.

Q: Do you know who succeeded him and what sort of orders were given to the
successor?

A: He was succeeded by Rear-Admiral KOUDA Takeo. The First Submarine
Squadron was ordered to turn to the Northern Pacific and was assigned
another duty in Kiska-Attu area in the middle of April.
Q: To what extent and scope did the directive prescribe which was issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet?

A: The directive specified in minute detail such matters as were deemed necessary for the fleet to conduct operations in accordance with the Imperial Supreme Headquarters Naval Order, which was in fact an order issued by the Chief of Naval General Staff as ordered by the Throne.

The directive covered in the main:

1. Master Principle to be observed in the direction of operations.
   For instance: In waging submarine warfare, the utmost importance should be attached to the destruction of maritime traffic, and the key area should be the Indian Ocean; and the like.

2. The Strength of the forces to be used might be indicated in case where circumstances might so dictate. But such matters were preferably left to the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

3. Matters agreed upon over the conference table between the Army and Navy Supreme Commands of the Imperial Headquarters concerning cooperation of the fleet with army field forces (These were usually called as "Central Agreement.")

In other words the directive covered: (1) basic principle deemed necessary for the Chief of Naval General Staff to instruct the Commander-in-Chief regarding the latter's execution of the duty given by the
Def. Ex. No. 189:

Imperial Supreme Headquarters Naval Order; and (2) what the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet had not been empowered to do by himself (i. e., "Central Agreement for the main").

Further, in drafting these directives care was exercised to mention only the main principles to be followed, or some such things and to abstain as far as possible from going into detail. This was to allow the Commander-in-Chief in this attitude of discretion in his planning and practice, encouraging him to stage operations in close conformity with actual situation of the theater.

Q.: Have you ever witnessed what is called Top-secret First Submarine Squadron Order No. 2 issued by the Commander of the First Submarine Squadron on 20 March 1942?

A.: No. I have never.

On this 22nd day of July, 1947

At TOKYO

[Signature]

I. Imazawa Tatsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date At TOKYO

Witness: (Signed) Imazawa Tatsuo (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Yurimato Yatsuho (seal)
相談に関する命令指示の趣旨等を実行することであります

水路作業実施の経過と水路作業を含む全路作業期間に限局した

資料調査したのは一九四三年三月下旬以降の全路作業で此の期間は

所謂第三段作業期間を呼称されておるもparamsの水路作業に限局しました

(8) 印院洋面では独特な水路との協同作業を実施すること

方針の基盤は次の通りでありました

第一期は一九四三年三月下旬より同年十月迄の間で此の期間の作業

第二期は一九四三年六月以降一九四三年三月迄の期間と変化はなく
(5) 一部の水路で前進基地に対する補給を実施すること

水路は普通の作戦施設に縫み前進作戦に使用するよりも交通施設

実際に使用する方が一番有効であると考えられた。但しソロモン

トックル方面の修復状態が良好でないことが多く来ました。故に

交通施設に依る補給は非常に困難であった。したがって

方面に余裕を残すためには前進基地に到る

の聖水路による補給は仮想と比較の多い水路の多數が

方面に使用することができる。特に交通施設に未使用

のものを出来たからです。なお、水路は

に作戦方針

第二期は一九四三年十月以降の作戦であります。但し此期间の作戦方針

に対
答

問

貴方は一九四三年頃独造レポートが連合軍英語を震しかした場合、
発案者等を誘導するに足る少数者を誘導後者は適切に震発す
る方針を採用して成功したので之の方針を日本に於ても採用する
方針を採用されて震発した場合、

大本営の作戦計画に震発させる許格発見機の震発の震減と、改善
の震発より震発がなかったと云ふ震を発表してありますか

日本海軍に震発な方針が採用されることは震発ありませ

の震発は日本海軍中央の震発的震発でありまして一九四四年三月一日～大震潮

には何れも生運の震発として震発潮の作戦計画に震発されて一九四一年十一月三

日～大震潮第一五月一日～大震潮第六〇號一

では如何れも震発的震発として震発潮の作戦計画に震発されて一九四一年十一月三

に震発すべきことを発表して震発此の震の震発は震発震発震発されて

は居りません
一九四三年十月頃より一九四四年十月頃迄の印度洋作戦に従事し
た潜水艦は何處の進歴の指導下に在りましたか

一九四二年七月十日より潜水艦一隻が南西方面進歴の指導下に入

一九四三年十月より潜水艦一隻が南西方面進歴の指導下に入

一九四三年十月進歴印度洋作戦に従事しました

一九四三年十月に第八潜水艦艦隊司令長官の指揮の下に作戦しました

令官の直接指揮の下に作戦しました

一九四四年八月以降は前記所属の潜水艦も印度洋に作戦せず他の7

一九四四年より一九四四年頃迄の間に太平洋作戦にサモア、フィ

一九四三年三月二十日以前時第一潜水艦隊は何處の指揮を受けて

一九四三年三月二十日以降時第一潜水艦隊は何處の指揮を受けて

令官の直接指揮の下に作戦しました

関 答

関 答

関 答
同

答

製作命令に伴って発せられる大命令所調「大海令」に依り作戦実施上

の関係に関する箇所を指示するのです

■ 作戦指揮上の方針

例へば現地の方針は交通状況を基に指示するとか

の内容を保ち可とされ係状況に係らず可

目的の影響は現地交通命令長官の要旨順守に依って要求

に相当するか否か

答

被告承認それに対する命令を承知してありますか

被告承認は古文田等部隊が多少でありますたが第一線水部隊は北方

に到達の命を受け是月中旬スがアツ方面の別に仮に

まではimusか

被告承認部隊より連合艦隊司令長官に対する報告はこんな風の事
（署名捺印）
山 本
雄
西敏.png

大英帝国国教会第三议会于 нужный日期开放并以

第一委员会

第一委员会

1. 2021

2. 2021

3. 2021

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Naval General Staff Directive No. 209

Date: March 25, 1943.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral NaGANO, Osami.

To: Commander-in-Chief, Admiral YAMAMOTO

1. The Imperial Naval Operational Policy for the Third Phase of the Pacific War is decided as set forth in Annex I.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall conduct operations in accordance with the Policy of Operations as defined in Annex II.
ANNEX I.

IMPERIAL NAVAL OPERATIONAL POLICY FOR THIRD PHASE OF PACIFIC WAR.

Chapter I

The Campaigns against the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Chinese Republic.

The aim of the Imperial naval operations for the 3rd phase of the war is to demolish hostile naval and air forces encroaching upon the east Asiatic waters, to destroy enemy sea traffic lines, and to establish speedily the strategical structure of the Empire so firmly as to insure her self-consolidation and ultimate victory, and thereby to frustrate the fighting volition of the enemy. In order to realize these:

1. First of all the foundation of never-failing victory shall be obtained in aerial warfare.

2. Enemy fleets shall be destroyed by surprise in their advanced bases or elsewhere as may be feasible, enemy positions of strategical importance shall be taken or destroyed by surprise as required, thus the offensive designs of the enemy shall be forestalled; at the same time attempts shall be made to draw out enemy fleets to meet them and destroy.

3. The defense of our strategic positions shall be speedily consolidated, and when enemy forces are seen approaching to our
Def. Doc. No. 1943

areas they shall be destroyed by the closely concerted actions of our sea and air forces which shall initiate attack in ahead of the enemy.

4. By means of intensifying sea traffic destruction warfare the lines of enemy reinforcement and supplies shall be disrupted thus to contribute to a speedy frustration of enemy's fighting morale.

5. Efforts shall be made to protect our lines of sea communications as fully as possible.

6. Stern vigil shall be maintained against enemy's air raid upon the homeland of the Empire.

II Defense

The defense shall be executed in accordance with the below stated division. And the special emphasis of the defense shall be put upon anti-submarine and anti-air measures in the case of the interior lines of the defense, and upon the measures to checkmate invading enemies in close cooperation particularly with local army forces as well as the measures of anti-submarine and anti-airraid protections in the case of the exterior defense lines.

(The forces of the major and minor naval stations
(The forces of the Hainan Minor Naval Station is excepted) .... the patrol areas under their respective charge;
The 4th Fleet ... the Mandated South Sea Naval District, and the areas including the Gilbert Islands, Nauru Island, Ocean Island, Wake Island, Guam, Douglas Reef; the 5th Fleet ... the occupied area in the Aleutian Islands; The Southeastern Area Fleet ... the occupied areas to the east of and including of British New Guinea; The Southeastern Area Fleet ... the occupied areas to the west of and including Dutch New Guinea; and The China Seas Fleet .... the occupied territories along the China Coast.

III. The Sea Communication Protection

1. The all Major Naval Station Forces, the all Minor Naval Station Forces, the China Seas Fleet, and the Southeastern Area Fleet, the Southwestern Area Fleet, the 4th Fleet, and the 5th Fleet shall Protect the lines of sea communications in the waters around Japan, along the China coast and in the vicinity of the occupied territories respectively in accordance with the division of their assignment.

The sea lanes stretching between two or more jurisdictional waters shall be protected by a special force to be designated as situation may demands.

2. Besides the above, units belonging to front line forces shall
be made to cooperate with the local forces originally assigned to each specific area in the anti-submarine hunt while operating in such area, if their original mission permits as well as if situation so demands.

VI. Transportation and Supply

1. In transporting supplies to the outlying bases for front line field forces, the ships to be employed, the routes of the sailing, and the time of supply shall be adequately selected, and necessary guarding measures shall be taken against the attacks by hostile naval or air forces, in order to insure safety of the supply activities to those front line field forces.

2. Bases situated at the very head of front lines shall be supplied by means of submarines or the like combatant vessels if occasion demands.

3. Every possible assistance shall be made in transporting supplies to army units disposed on outflung positions.

Chapter II

In case War Breaks Out With U.S.S.R. During War With U.S.A., British Commonwealth, And China (Campaign B)

1. Basic Principle of Operational Policy

The strategical aims to be attained by the Imperial Japanese navy in case war breaks out with the Union of Soviet Socialist
Def. Doc. No. 1943

While we are at war with the United States, the British Empire, and the Chinese Republic, there shall be in the demolition of the hostile naval and air forces in the eastern part of the U.S.S.R., and in the capture and secure possession of strategically important positions in the Kamchatka and northern Sakhalin area asides from the fulfillment of the strategic ends original to the campaign against the U.S.A., the British Commonwealth, and the Chinese Republic.

For this purpose:

1. It shall be striven to attain the operational aims in a short time by means of instituting attack ahead of the enemy at the very beginning of the war using as large forces as possible in close cooperation with the army.

2. In aerial warfare a speedy and complete demolition of enemy air power shall be accomplished, especially through initiating attack ahead of the enemy, in order to pave the way for a speedy favorable development of our operations, both on land and sea, and in order to securely protect the supply routes and important establishments behind the front lines.

3. Special precautions shall be vigilantly maintained against various obstructive measures by the enemy, and efforts shall be made to forestall them.

4. The connections between the United States and the U.S.S.R. shall be disrupted as fully as possible.

5. The campaigns against the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Chinese Republic shall be continued almost in accordance with the operational policy now in operation.
II. Defense, Sea Traffic Protection
Transportation and Supply, Etc.

1. The important positions of our Empire shall be defended tight
and firm, especially against air attack; and the Tsushima Straits,
the Tsugaru Straits, and the La Perous Straits shall be blocked
against the passage of the enemy vessels.

2. The lines of communications in the waters along the Pacific
coast of the Japanese mainland, and along the China coast and in
the interim sea area between the above mentioned waters and the
occupied southern territories shall be secured laying special
emphasis upon the routes from our mainland and China to Korea and
Kwantung Peninsula.

3. The following is the schedule for the division of the use of
operational bases:

   The forces with the 5th Fleet as the main strength

   ......... in the early stage of the campaign: --
   the major naval port at Yokosuka and the
   minor naval port at Ominato; and later than
   the middle stage of the campaign: the major
   naval port at Saizuru and the minor naval port
   at Ominato.

   The other forces ... same as those now observed.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHI, Kazuo, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Historical Section of the Material Readjustment Branch of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 13 pages and entitled "Naval General Staff Directive No. 209" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 10 day of July, 1947

/S/ DOHI, Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witnes: SONJIYA, Shinji (seal)
Chapter I.

The Campaigns against the United States of America, the British Commonwealth, and China.

I. Air Operations

1. Speedily catching and destroying enemy air powers, the Combined Fleet shall strive to establish our control of air.

2. Disposing the main body of our shore-based air forces in the Southern Pacific Area and a portion of them in the Southwestern Pacific and Indian Ocean Area, the Combined Fleet shall catch and destroy enemy air units and other approaching forces of the enemy on the one hand and shall attack and disrupt the enemy route of supply to their advanced bases to the full extent on the other hand. A part of these air forces shall be disposed in the northern section of the Empire to maintain vigilant watch to the east and to the north.

3. Maintaining the major portion of carrier-borne aerial forces in the Pacific Front while disposing a part of them in...
the Southwestern Pacific and Indian Ocean Area as may be required, and thereby carrying out maneuvering operations at any opportune moment as well as securing their concentration and dispersal to the best advantage of each stage, the Combined Fleet shall have nothing left for the thorough destruction of enemy naval strength by means of receiving campaign.

II. Submarine Campaign.

1. The stress of the submarine campaign shall be placed upon the destruction of the sea traffic of the enemy so as to forestall the enemy's design of invasion as well as to reduce his fighting strength with a view to hasten the surrender.

2. As may be thought fit a portion of the submarine forces shall be used for surprise attacks upon enemy fleet or positions of strategic importance.

3. Some of the submarines shall be employed to transport supplies to outlying bases.

4. In case the main forces of the enemy fleet are approaching toward us the submarine forces shall keep contact with the enemy fleet and strive to reduce the strength on the way.

III. Sea Traffic Destruction Warfare.

1. The Combined Fleet shall intensify the warfare to destroy enemy's sea traffic to the utmost extent employing various available forces such as submarines, aircraft, surface vessels, etc.
2. The main emphasis of the sea traffic destruction campaign shall be directed against the American and Australian communication route in the Southern Pacific Ocean and the traffic routes to India and Australia in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean, shifting the emphasis from one to another as may be thought wise in accordance with the conditions of the enemy as well as the strength of our forces available.

When the development of war so demands, a portion of submarine forces shall be employed in the destruction of the enemy sea traffic in the waters along the west coast of the United States or in the vicinity of Hawaii.

3. A close connection shall be maintained with the submarines of Germany and Italy so that the operational cooperation will be effected.

IV. Operations by Areas.

1. The South Pacific area.

a. The Combined Fleet shall keep close cooperation with the army forces and whenever possible take the initiative of operations over the enemy so that our strategical foothold will be consolidated and further extended.

b. In the Solomon Islands area, firmly holding the strategical positions to the west of and including Isabella Island, and employing sea and air forces, the combined
fleet shall forestall the activities of the enemy force in the area to the east of the island and at the same time shall initiate attack ahead of the enemy to destroy his air and sea forces moving about in the area. If situation permits, attempt shall be made to recover Guadalcanal Island together with the islands to the east of it in opportune moment in accordance with a directive as instructed separately.

c. In the eastern part of New Guinea, the strategic positions to the west of and including Lae and Salamau shall be firmly secured so as to consolidate our operational bases, and efforts shall be made to forestall the activities of the enemy in the area. In opportune moment an attempt shall be made to take Moresby in accordance with a directive as instructed separately.

d. When considered appropriate strategic positions of the enemy shall be destroyed by surprise or captured. Surprise shall also be made to demolish enemy fleet harbored in a advance base.

e. Enemy’s supply route shall be attacked and disrupted in a thorough-going manner.

2. The Mid Pacific Area.

The Mandated Islands, Gilbert Islands, and Wake Island shall be strongly defended, and the sea areas to the east of the Mandated Islands shall be vigilantly watched and patrolled. And
thereby eneny's counter offensive shall be forestalled through initiating destructive attack in advance of the enemy.

3. The North Pacific Area and the Sea Area to the East of Japan.
   a. Firmly securing the western part of the Alouitian Islands and cooperating with the army forces, the Combined Fleet shall strive to arrest the advancing of the enemy.
   b. Employing chiefly air forces and submarines, the Combined Fleet shall search out and destroy the enemy's sea and air forces. At the same time every available effort shall be exerted to destroy the supply lines of the enemy.
   c. Stringent watch and patrol shall be maintained in the sea area to the east of Japan to safeguard the mainland of the Empire against the surprise, attack by the enemy.

4. The South Pacific Area.
   a. Closely cooperating with the army, the Combined Fleet shall defend firm and tight the southern occupied territories forestalling the recapture by the enemy as well as destroying the enemy's air raid forces.
   b. Aerial offensive shall be conducted against the Northwestern part of Australia in any opportune moment so as to forestall and destroy the enemy's attempt of counter offensive.
   c. The control of the sea and air shall be secured in the
erstern section of the bay of Bengal with a view to safeguard our line of supply to Burma. Efforts shall also be made to forestall and destroy the counter offensive of the enemy to that area.

d. As separately instructed strategic economy positions in the southern part of New Guinea shall be captured in opportune time.

e. The Indian Ocean area.

1. Submarines and sometimes surface vessels shall be employed to destroy the enemy's sea traffic in the Indian coast and the west coast of Australia.

b. Cooperating with the army, the Combined Fleet shall take Cocos Island, as considered advisable. The Combined Fleet shall also launch a surprise attack upon enemy fleets and his strategic positions to destroy them.

V. The Defense

1. In close cooperation with the army the Combined Fleet shall defend its jurisdictional areas and occupied territories tight and firm.

2. In outlying positions of strategic importance several separate zones of defense shall be established by areas with adequately disposed forces and appropriately installed
ments of various sorts so as to build up a tough and undeniable defense system.

Chapter II.

In Case War Breaks Out with USSR During War with U.S., British Commonwealth and China (Campaign 3).

1. First Phase of the Campaign.

1. Deploying a portion of the shore-based air forces and a greater part or a portion of the carrier-borne aerial units, the Combined Fleet shall crush the enemy air strength based in the area in Kamchatka and the southern part of Sikhote-Alin at the very beginning of the war. Then this operational objective has been almost attained, enemy surface strength in the eastern part of the USSR shall be searched out and destroyed.

The aerial offensive against Kamchatka shall be conducted in cooperation with the army depending upon circumstances.

2. A force with the 5th Fleet as its main strength shall be so employed as to capture by surprise Okha and Petropavlovsk at the very beginning of the war in cooperation with the army, depending upon circumstances. Doyavadi shall also be included in the above-mentioned scheme of surprise capture though the details will be decided separately. This force shall also be used...
to search out and destroy enemy's surface fleet moving out in the Jokotsk Sea and in the Aleutian area.

3. Employing a portion of the submarines forces the Combined Fleet shall destroy the enemy's sea traffic with a view to block the Russo-American sea communication.

4. The forces other than mentioned above shall be always kept ready to meet the forces of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and China in a manner of offensive defense and be made to strive to check their invasion as well as to weaken the strength of their forces.

II. The Second Phase of the Campaign.

1. Employing a force with the 5th Fleet as the nucleus and a portion of the shore-based air forces, the Combined Fleet shall maintain the command of the sea and air of the area to the west of and including the western part of the Aleutian Islands, and at the same time strengthen the defense system of occupied areas; in opportunite moment the force shall be employed to take Vladivostok in cooperation with the army.

2. The other forces shall be employed to continue the operations prescribed for the first phase of the campaign and to launch vigorous offensive operations against the forces of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and China, so long as situation permits.
Def, Doc. #1944
Naval General Staff Directive No.50
Date: March 1, 1942.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral NoGaming Osami.
To: Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto.

The sea communication destruction warfare shall be conducted in accordance with the following:

1. Operational policy.

With the ultimate view to restrain the destruction and disturbance of the hostile sea lanes as thoroughly as possible in the entire area of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the operations shall be executed in the following manner:

a. With an added duty of destroying the enemy's sea communication in the Pacific area. Submarines of the Advanced body shall be made always active in the Hawaiian waters; while on the other hand a portion of the submarine forces shall be despatched from time to time to the waters of such areas as the eastern coast of Australia, the coast of New Zealand, the west coast of the United States, the southern Pacific islands of strategic importance, and the Panama Canal area, in order to disrupt the enemy lines of communications between Hawaii and the mainland of the United States as well as between the west coast of the American continent and the east coast of Australia, and at the same time in order to destroy and disturb the enemy lines of communications in the waters along the
west coast of the America continents and near Australia, with a view to confuse the enemy naval forces through arousing the public sentiment of the peoples of the enemy.

b. With an added duty of destroying the enemy's sea communications in the Indian Ocean area, the submarines attached to the Southern Body shall be made active chiefly in the northern part of the Indian Ocean and the Australian west coast area, while a portion of the said submarine forces shall be despatched from time to time to the waters of the east coast area of South Africa in order to disrupt the line of communications between the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

c. Some converted cruisers shall be used mainly for this traffic destruction warfare and be made active from time to time in the waters of those areas such as Panama, South Africa, South American west coast, etc., in cooperation with submarine forces in order to destroy and disturb the enemy's lines of communications.

d. In case cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc. are to be used for various maneuvering operations, they shall endeavor concurrently after the destruction and disturbance of enemy sea communications.

2. Standard Guides to the Treatment of Shipping.

a. In dealing with shipping the following countries shall be deemed as purely neutral:

   The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Chile, Turkey, Sweden, France (the domains under the De Gaul regime excepted), Switzerland.
b. The shipping belonging to those countries other than above mentioned shall be dealt with similarly to that of the enemy countries.

c. In the conduct of operations with submarines or aircraft, vessels regardless of their nationality may be sunk without warning unless they are easily recognizable as the vessels of the neutral countries as stated in Paragraph 1 above, provided that such attack shall be made after confirming the nationality of the vessels as far as possible in the case of the waters near Japan, near the Russian territorial coast, near the west coast of South America to the south of and including Peru, etc.

d. In the operations by surface craft it shall be made a rule as far as possible that such attack be preceded by duly processed visit and search, and every possible endeavor shall be made to rescue human lives if circumstances warrant the sinking of the vessels.

e. As a rule hostile vessels shall be captured and be brought to a port of Japan Proper whenever possible. When such is not feasible captured vessels shall be either made to sail to the nearest friendly port or be destroyed after having taken proper measures for the personnel and cargoes on board.

f. As a rule persons of armed forces, both armed men and civilians, higher graded mariners, technicians, important government officials, and the like who are belonging to enemy countries and the Chiang Kai Shek regime shall be taken prisoners of war.

(attached directive)

The Naval General Staff Directives Nos. 13, 28, and 31 are hereby abolished.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHL, Kazeo, who occupy the post of the Chief, the Historical Section of the Historical Records Branch of 2nd Disposition Section of Disposition Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Naval General Staff, Narrative, K3a No. 62" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an original document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Disposition of the Disposition Bureau) certified at Tokyo,

on this 10th day of July, 1947.

\(\text{/S/} \) DOHL, Kazeo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness, at the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ SOMIYA, Shunti (seal)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHI, Kazuo, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Historical Section of the Material Readjustment Branch, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Naval General Staff Directive No. 107" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 10 day of July, 1947

/S/ DOHI, Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ SOMIYA Shinji (seal)
Def. Doc. # 1941

of Japan, off the coast of the Russian territory, off the coast
of South America to the south of and including Peru.
(Attached directive)

The Naval General Staff Directive No. 60 is hereby abolished.
to operate in those areas as the Indian Ocean, and the southeastern part of the Pacific Ocean.

d. A force with surface combat vessels as its nucleus shall be employed to operate in such areas as the southwestern coast of Australia, the Bay of Bengal, and the seas area to the east of Australia, as considered appropriate, to destroy and disturb the enemy sea traffic.

e. When surface vessels are employed for this purpose, vessels of hostile nature shall as far as possible be captured and made to sail to friendly ports.


a. The countries that are to be deemed as neutral in the matter of dealing with shipping shall be as follows:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Chile, Turkey, Sweden, France (the domains under De Gaul regime excepted), and Swiss.

b. The shippings of the neutral countries other than listed above shall be treated similarly to those of the enemy countries.

c. In the case of operations by submarines and aircraft vessels may be sunk regardless of their nationality without warning unless easily recognizable as the vessels belong to those neutral countries as listed in Paragraph a. above, provided that "effort shall be made" to verify the nationality of the vessels before launching an attack in those waters such as in the vicin
Naval General Staff Directive No. 107.

Date: June 22, 1942.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGANO Osami.

To: Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet, Admiral YAMAMOTO.

The sea communication destruction warfare shall hereafter be conducted in accordance with the following:

1. Operational Policy.

a. Utilizing every available forces and opportunities to such an extent as not constituting hindrance to other operational activities every possible effort shall be exerted to destruct and disturb hostile sea communications with the ultimate objective to enhance the subjugation of the enemy.

b. A greater part of the submarine forces shall be chiefly employed for this purpose with the concurrent duty to attack enemy combat vessels whenever good opportunities are offered. The emphasis of the offensive shall be directed to the sea areas where enemy's sea traffic is crowded in the order of the follow for the time being:

(1) The southeastern coast of Africa, the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean, and the Bengal Bay area.

(2) The eastern and southern coasts of Australia and the Cook Straits area.

c. Either cooperating with submarines or independently as the case may be, some of the converted cruisers shall be employed
Naval General Staff Directive No. 61

Date: March 1, 1942.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral ISORI OZAMI.

To: Commander-in-Chief of China Seas Fleet, Admiral K.;
Commander-in-Chief of Ijuru Naval Station, Admiral TOYODA;
Commander-in-Chief of Yokosuka Naval Station, Vice Admiral HIRATA;
Commander-in-Chief of Naizuru Naval Station, Vice Admiral IOBAISHI;
Commander-in-Chief of Sasebo Naval Station, Vice Admiral T. NAMOTO;
Commander-in-Chief of Chinkai Minor Naval Station, Vice Admiral SAMUZO;
Commander-in-Chief of Hakodate Minor Naval Station, Vice Admiral YAMAGUTI;
Commander-in-Chief of Urini Minor Naval Station, Vice Admiral GUNMA;
Commander-in-Chief of Osaka Minor Naval Station, Vice Admiral ISORI YOSHII.

In dealing with the shipping of enemy countries and general neutral countries the following shall be the guide hereafter:

1. The sea area under your respective charge shall be patrolled, and the ships of any country and those of the neutral countries that are to be treated similarly to the ships of enemy countries shall be captured or detained.

2. The following countries shall be treated as purely neutral in the dealing of shipping:

Union of Soviet socialist Republics; Spain; Portugal;
Argentina; Chile; Turkey; Sweden; France (the domains under the De Gaul regime excepted); Swiss.
3. The shippings of the neutral countries other than the countries above listed shall be tentatively treated similarly to those of the enemy countries.

4. In dealing with foreign shipping in general due process shall as a rule be taken in accordance with the provisions of laws. If a sinking is made "without enabled to go through prescribed process" because of some forced circumstances, every possible means shall be taken to rescue human lives after the sinking.

5. As a rule persons of armed services, either armed men or civilians, higher graded mariners, technicians, government officials, etc., who are belonging to the enemy countries or to the Chiang Kai-shek regime shall be taken as prisoners of war.

(Attached Directive)

The Naval General Staff Directives Nos. 14, 15, and 28 are hereby abolished.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Doi Kazuo, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Historical Section of the Material Readjustment Branch of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Naval General Staff Directive No. 61" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 10 day of July, 1947.

/s/ Doi Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ Sosuke Shinji (seal)
正規ノ手順ヲ終了シタルモ退クハ、現ニテハノ処置ヲ講ずるモノに

（展望）

大正十年四月

（二十八月）

八月

（令）

大正十年四月

（二十八月）

八月

（令）
第十五条

特例

これに定められた行為の対象者に対し、その他の規律・素行、その他の必要事項を判断するための手続を設ける。

第十八条

陸海軍振興令第十七条並びに第四十四条第二十二条及び第二十条に規定の二條レ之行フ

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陸海軍振興令第十七条並びに第四十四条第二十二条及び第二十条に規定の二條レ之行フ
官庁関係員

第十八条　官庁長官及び官庁関係員に於て

第十八条　官庁長官及び官庁関係員に於て
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6
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

(NAVAL MINISTERIAL NOTIFICATION, No. 33, 17 FEBRUARY 1904
AMENDED BY NOTIFICATION No. 407, 1941)

ARTICLE 1.

The personal belongings of enemy combatants or of the persons who are to be accorded the treatment of prisoners-of-war by virtue of international treaties and customs shall be inspected forthwith upon their captivity.

ARTICLE 2.

Arms, ammunitions, and other articles of military use in the possession of a prisoner-of-war shall be confiscated. All other articles shall be either left in the possession of the prisoners for convenience or received for deposit.

The commanding officer of a naval unit is empowered to allow only those (prisoners-of-war) who are officers in rank and who are deemed especially necessary to keep their dignity to wear their own swords in such cases. Their names and reasons for such special treatment shall be reported to the Navy Minister.

The swords permitted to be worn as mentioned above shall be retained at the prisoner-of-war Camp.

ARTICLE 3.

A prisoner-of-war, upon completion of the procedures prescribed in the preceding two articles shall be interrogated as to his name, age, status, rank, permanent domicile and affiliated vessel or office, and time and place of injury if any. Moreover, a prisoner-of-war journal shall be kept daily and an inventory of the articles of prisoners-of-war confiscated or received for custody, shall be prepared.

ARTICLE 4.

Prisoners of war shall be classified into officers (including those of corresponding ranking) and enlisted men (non-military personnel shall be classified according to their status and work in which engaged). However, this shall not apply to any person who will not answer truthfully to interrogations regarding his name and rank, or to any person who is guilty of other offences.

ARTICLE 5.

In case a prisoner-of-war is guilty of an act of disobedience he
may be subjected to confinement, binding, or any other measures deemed necessary.

In case a prisoner-of-war attempts desertion, the force of arms may be used for its prevention, if necessary.

Article 5-2.

A prisoner-of-war who attempts desertion or performs undisciplined acts shall be subjected to disciplinary punishment.

The preceding punishment shall be affected according to the regulations stipulated in Naval Disciplinary Punishment Ordinance, Art. 10-14, Art. 22-24, and Art. 31-36.

The disciplinary punishment of a prisoner-of-war shall be enforced by the chief of the naval officials who is then in charge of the internment of the said prisoner-of-war.

Article 5-3.

When a prisoner-of-war has committed a crime, the Naval authorities who are then in charge of his internment shall examine the case in the capacity of proxy of a naval judicial police and after the examination, shall forward the case to the prosecutor of the nearest court-martial.

Article 6.

The naval commandant shall deliver prisoners-of-war with their roster, the prisoner-of-war journal, their articles kept under custody and the inventory of these articles to a naval station, minor naval station, or to the nearest naval authorities.

Should the prisoner of war die during the delivery, their roster, personal belongings, and all other documents and articles shall be delivered.

Article 7.

The commanding officer of a naval unit of the chief of other naval offices in the operational areas, when he considers it convenient, may deliver prisoners-of-war under his custody together with the the prisoners-of-war roster, prisoners-of-war journal, prisoners-of-war articles and the inventories of the articles under his custody to such army units as combatant forces, quartermaster departments, or transportation and communication departments after due negotiation with those units.

In this case the number of prisoners-of-war, classified separately into officers (including those of corresponding rank) and enlisted men, shall be reported immediately to the Minister for the Navy.
Article 6.

The Commander-in-Chief of naval stations, naval minor stations or the chief of other naval authorities, on receiving the delivery of prisoners-of-war shall promptly report the number of the POWs delivered, divided into officers (including those of the corresponding rank) and men to the Minister for the Navy. The Minister on receiving the above report shall designate the place and date to deliver prisoners-of-war to the army authorities who are to receive those prisoners-of-war.

Article 9.

Naval stations, minor stations or other naval authorities, on receiving the delivery of prisoners-of-war shall detain them in any temporary camp available which has adequate facilities to prevent them from desertion until such time as when transportation or redelivery is possible.

Article 10.

The place where prisoners-of-war are being interned shall be controlled and guarded by guards under the supervision of a naval officer.

Article 11.

When a prisoner-of-war requests the purchasing of his favorite edibles or daily necessities at his own expense, the supervisor shall afford him necessary convenience if the request is deemed unobjectionable.

Article 11-2.

When a prisoner-of-war is allowed to be interviewed by a visitor, some restrictions necessary from the standpoint of supervision, shall be imposed in the way of place, time, etc. and a guard shall be placed to be present at the interview.

Article 12.

Telegrams or mail sent or received by a prisoner-of-war, shall be examined beforehand by the supervising officer. Those found unobjectionable shall be permitted but the use of code messages and other suspicious correspondence shall be prohibited or seized.

Article 13.

In view of the fact that mails sent or received by a prisoner-of-war are exempted from postage dues by international treaty, naval authorities shall be responsible for the care of prisoners-of-war, shall negotiate with the post office in the locality on the required procedure so as to put this into effect.

- 3 -
Article 13 - 2.
When prisoners-of-war are accommodated at a naval hospital or clinic, a list of the prisoners-of-war patients shall be made according to form.

Article 13 - 3.
The funeral for a prisoner-of-war shall be held with appropriate ceremony befitting his rank and position.

Article 14.
The will of a prisoner-of-war shall be handled in a manner not different from that of a member of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Article 14 - 2.
Articles or will lost by a prisoner-of-war shall be forwarded by the official in charge to the prisoner-of-war Information Bureau in accordance with provisions set forth in Article 6. However, if there are articles impossible of preservation, these shall be sold and the money forwarded instead.

When the forwarding is done as in the above paragraph, the fact shall be reported to the Minister of the Navy.

Article 15.
Commanders-in-chief of naval stations, Commanders-in-chief of minor naval stations, or other naval authorities shall hand over at the place designated prisoners-of-war under their care together with the prisoners-of-war roster, prisoners-of-war journal, prisoner-of-war articles under custody, inventory of these articles and all other documents to the army authorities who are to receive the prisoners-of-war.
Def. Doc. #1455

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, KIYIURA Ryosuke, who occupy the post of the Chief of Document Section of the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "The Treatment of Prisoners of War", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Ministers Secretariat.)

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of March, 1947

/s/ KIYIURA Ryosuke (seal)


I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /s/ SOMYA Shinji (seal)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Muramura, Ryunosuke, who occupy the post of the Chief of Document Section of the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 5 pages and entitled "The Treatment of Prisoners of War", is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Former Ministers Secretariat.)

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5 day of March, 1947

/S/ Muramura, Ryunosuke (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ SOMiya, Shinji (seal)
Translated by Dfco
Defense Language Branch

TO: GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.
(Attn: Legal Section)

FROM: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT: POW Camp Administration.

C.L.O. No. 414(1.2) 27 January 1946

With reference to the check sheet No. 558 LWO of the Legal Section
dated 10 January 1946 on the above subject, the Central Liaison Office
wishes to submit herewith the required report as per separate papers.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

(T. Katsuoka)
Chief of Liaison Section
Central Liaison Office.

Encl. 1. On POW's Camp Administration in Army.
2. On POW's Camp Administration in Navy.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
I. Establishment of POW's Camp.

1. The War minister will establish or close POW's Camp under the
Imperial Ordinance No. 1152 (Ordinance establishing POW's Camp)
issued on December 23, 1941.

Organization of POW's Camp is to be designated by the Army Orders.

2. In some instances, however, Army Commander or Garrison Commandant
had established temporary camps in order to hold POW's before
being sent to POW's regular camps to be established under the
said Ordinance.

II. Administration of POW's Camp.

1. Administrator of POW's Camp.

An Army Commander or Garrison Commandant, as to be appointed by the
War Minister will take charge of POW's Camp under the POW's Camp
Ordinance.


Each head of POW's Camps may establish Branch Camp, Labor Detach-
ments, and Dispatch Camps in consideration of prisoners' manage-
ment, housing, and Labor etc.

To the offices of heads of the said Branch Camps, Labor Detach-
ments, and Dispatch Camps, officers, who will be given as much
authority as company commanders, may be assigned.
3. In temporary camps installed by Army Commanders or Garrison Commandants the same rules and regulations as above will be applicable for.

4. Appended hereto is the list No. 1, indicating an outline of channel of control of POW's.

5. All departments and bureaus are assistant organs to the War Minister as the Commander of POW's management, to which specific duties are allotted, but none of them has any authority or a direct administrative power over POW's.

   Especially, POW's Administration Division, which was established on March 31, 1942, is one of the said staff organs.

   Appended No. 2 is the list of duties allotted to POW's Administrative Division.

6. The War Minister has no Jurisdiction over any POW's held by the Navy.

III. Ordinances and regulations providing for the authority and duties concerning POW's administration.

   All of the following important ordinances and regulations are extracted from a "Collection of Ordinances and Regulations concerning Treatment of POW's were already submitted to JLG of your General Headquarters.

   -3-
Def. Doc. # 1456

A. The Army Orders.
B. Ordinances for POW's Camp.
C. Regulations concerning treatment of POW's.
D. Detailed regulations concerning treatment of POW's.
E. Regulations concerning allowance for POW's.
F. Regulations concerning services of POW's.
G. Regulations concerning dispatch of POW's.
H. Regulations concerning treatment of dispatched POW's.
I. Regulations concerning punishment of POW's.
OUTLINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
OF POW'S CAMP.

Army District
HQ's in
Homeland
Korea and
Formosa

Commander of:
South East
Army
China Expeditionary Force
Kuantung Army
Philippine Army

Employer of
P.O.O.W.

Branch Camp
"Riku-Tatsu" No. 29, Apr. 2, 1943,
Detailed Regulations, Art. 11,
concerning the treatment of
POW.

Labor Detachment

Dispatch Camp

War Department Regulations 58, Oct. 2, 1942
Regulations concerning dispatchment of POW.

War Department Regulation, 22, May 2, 1943.
POW Labor Regulations.

--- Commanding system.
--- System of Liaison, Information and
   Enquiry.

--- (Established by the Regulations
   Concerning POW's Camp)
Encl. 2

ON PO'S CAMP ADMINISTRATION IN NAVY

In principle, all prisoners of war captured by the Navy were to be handed over to the Army; but until such time, there were cases when they were placed under temporary naval supervision in improvised camps. At these camps, the prisoners of war were placed under regulations of war based on international agreements, to be treated the same as regular prisoners of war.

Control of those temporary camps was affected along the following lines:

1. (a) The name of each organization, which had policy making or administrative authority or responsibility with reference to such prisoners:

That party designated by the Commander-in-Chief of a Major or Minor Naval Station or the Commander of an operational force and which, for convenience, we shall here call A. (It was customary in such cases to designate the commander of the Dofon® area in question)

in his turn designated another party (usually a Junior Officer whom we shall here call B, who commands a group of petty officers including hygienist seamen and other necessary personnel) as well as interpreters and other civilian employees whom we shall, as a group call C.

(b) The exact limits of the authority or responsibility of each such organization:

A performs direct supervision over the camp under orders from the...
Def. # 1456

Commander-in-Chief of a Major or Minor Naval Station or the Commander of an operational force.

B carries out actual management of the camp under orders from A concerning the supervisions of POW.

C, work under orders from B.

(a) Re orders, status, regulations or other sources of such authority or responsibility:

A issues necessary instructions for the direct supervision of the camp.

B, on the basis of orders from A and with his approval established necessary regulations for the supervisions of prisoners of war in Temporary Camp.

2. Outline of the administrative organization of POW camps.

Minister of the Navy

(Controls the administration of Temporary POW Camps).

Commander of Operational Forces

Commander-in-Chief of Minor Naval Station

(Supervises temporary POW Camps)

Party Designated by above

(Carries out Direct Supervisions of temporary camp.)

Commander of POW Camp

(Carries out actual management of temporary camp)
N. B. For particulars concerning the supervision of prisoners of war captured overseas, the Naval Section of the Imperial Headquarters consults the Ministry of the Navy when there is any connection with operations.
31 March 1942.

Notice from the Minister to the units concerned.

Regulations concerning the treatment of war-prisoners are as follows:

Regulations concerning the treatment of war-prisoners.

1. All business concerning the treatment of war-prisoners in the Ministry of War will be conducted under these regulations.

2. In order to conduct the business concerning the treatment of war-prisoners and internes in the war zones, the War-Prisoners Administration Bureau is established in the Ministry of War.

The War-Prisoners Administration Bureau shall have a director, officer-personnel, NCO's, and civilian officials of "hannin" rank.

3. The posts of director, officer-personnel, NCO's and civilian officials of "hannin" rank, will be held concurrently by those who hold their principal official posts. The full number of the staff is specified as in the attached list.

4. The Director will be Subjected to the direct command of the Minister of War in taking charge of all business in the Bureau. The all officer-personnel will be Subjected to the Command of director in conducting the business.
5. The NCO's and the civilian officials of "hannin" rank are to engage themselves in the business, under command of the superiors.
**Attached List**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer-personnel</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NCO's and</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;hannin&quot; officials</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**N. B.**

1. Some field-and company-officers who hold their principal official posts in other bureaus may be added to the above list.
2. The positions of the NCO's and the "hannin" officials may be filled with employees.


The duties concerning the treatment of POW's, contained in Article II of the regulations concerning the treatment of POW are provided as follows:-
1. Matters of general plans for the treatment of POW and internment by the army at the front, such as internment, imporintendance, exchange, discharge, employment (labour, propaganda etc.), punishment, payment etc.

2. Matters of labour of POW.

3. Matters of communication of POW.

4. Matters of punishment of POW.

5. Matters in connection with the above 2 and 3 items, concerning the internees by the army at the front.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, SHIBA, Katsuo, who occupy the post of Liaison Officer, Liaison Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English consisting of 9 pages and entitled "POW Camp Administration", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Liaison Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30 day of January, 1947

SHIBA, Katsuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness:

INAKAMA, Tatsuo (seal)
Def. Doc. #1945

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: ARAKI, Sadatoshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Question: What is your name, address and occupation?
Answer: ARAKI, Sadatoshi
No. 1792 Hiyoshi-Honcho, Kohoku-Ku, Yokohama C'ty.
Formerly Rear Admiral, at present studying history.

Question: What post did you hold at the time you were demobilized?
Answer: Chief of the First Division, Naval General Staff.

Question: Give us a general outline of posts you occupied after around December 1941?
Answer: From October 1940 to January 1943 Chief of the 1st Section, Naval General Staff. From January 1943 to 5 November 1944 service on the seas and at the front lines. After December 1944 Chief of the First Division, Naval General Staff. Until the termination of war. During which period I was promoted to rear admiral in November 1943.
Quest: What duties were you in charge of as Chief of the 1st Section, Naval General Staff?

Ans: The 1st Section comes under the command of the Chief of the First Division, Naval General Staff. It takes charge of general military operations of the Japanese Navy and my duties were to command the members of the 1st Section and conduct the planning of general military operations as well as drafting the orders and instructions concerning the operations.

Quest: In early October 1942, did you dispatch Lt.-Comdr. Sadatomo OKA, Staff-Officer of Naval General Staff, to Kwajelin Island?

Ans: Not only to Kwajelin Island but few other places.

Quest: Please state the purpose of the mission, areas dispatched to, etc.

Ans: In early October 1942, it was decided at Imperial Headquarters to organize a combined inspection party from both the army and navy with the purpose of inspecting the front lines, mainly to re-examine the defense projects in the Pacific Ocean area. They were to be sent to Marshalls Group, the Marshals Group, the Carolinas Group, the Solomons Group, New Britain Island etc. From the Naval General Staff, I gave orders to Sadatomo OKA, who at the time was Lt.-Comdr. and staff-officers, to be dispatched to the above mentioned areas as member of the inspection party.
He was my subordinate as staff-member of the 1st Section and was mainly in charge of defense preparations. From the Navy Ministry, Kumotaro NAKAO, Comdr. and member of the Education Bureau was dispatched to go alone with Staff-Officer OKADA as specialist because he was experienced in actual defense preparations.

**Ques:** Who gave orders to Sadatomo OKADA?
**Ans:** I gave the orders.

**Ques:** Did you give the purpose and duties of the mission to OKADA?
**Ans:** I, as Chief of the 1st Section, Naval General Staff, personally and directly gave purpose and duties at all times whenever a member of the Section was sent out. In the case of OKADA, it was no exception, and I gave him purpose and duties of the mission.

**Ques:** Did you give orders for Vice-Admiral JBE, Commander of Kweajelin Island, concerning prisoners-of-war?
**Ans:** The 1st Section of the Naval General Staff does not handle matters dealing with prisoners of war. It was outside my competence, and I have not given any orders or instructions.

**Ques:** At the time, did you know that Vice-Admiral JBE, Commander of Kweajelin Island held prisoners of war in custody?
**Ans:** I did not know.

**Ques:** Were there prisoners of war in the areas where you dispatched OKADA at the time?
I knew by reports that there were prisoners of war at the Fourth Fleet in Truk Island and at the 6th Naval Base Corps in Rabaul.

Vice Admiral AHE has stated that he was informed by Staff-Officer CTJL that the disposition of central authorities was to execute prisoners where they were captured and not send them to Japan. Can you recall anything related to his statement?

Nothing. It is something we never knew about. Vice Admiral ABE's statement differs greatly with the Japanese Navy's Official forms for forwarding orders. In our navy, orders are issued in the forms of telegrams or documents other than giving oral orders directly to the receiver. There is positively no form such as forwarding an order orally through a third person. I also do not know any case when an order or instruction was forwarded directly to an unit under the command of a naval fleet from the naval General Staff without first going through the fleet headquarters.

What was the name of the unit stationed on Kwajelin Island and what were its direct and immediate system of command?

The 6th Naval Base Corps was stationed on Kwajelin Island and at the time Rear Admiral Koso ABE was commander. The unit was under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Shigemi INOUE, commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet.

Give the procedure on how orders and instructions were forwarded
from the Naval General Staff to the Commander of Kwajelin Island. Positively in no case would an order or instruction be sent directly to the Commander of Kwajelin Island from the Naval General Staff.

Orders and instructions issued by the Naval General Staff are sent to headquarters of the Combined Fleet. Normally they are forwarded to units under the command of the Combined Fleet in the form of orders from fleet headquarters itself. Exceptions are when orders and instructions from the Naval General Staff are concurrently sent to headquarters of the Combined Fleet and to headquarters of the Fourth Fleet. There are positively no precedents in the Japanese Navy when an order was sent directly from the Naval General Staff to the Commander of the 6th Naval Base Corps or when headquarters of the Fourth Fleet merely acted as intermediary in communicating an order to the Commander of the 6th Naval Base Corps.

Ques: Does the Navy Ministry ever give orders directly to a member of the Naval General Staff?
Ans: No.

Ques: When did Staff-officer OKADA return?
Ans: Approximately one month later after completing the objects of the mission.

Ques: Did you receive OKADA's report?
Ans: I did.

Ques: Was there anything concerning the prisoners of war on Kweijelin?

Ans: Nothing whatsoever.

Ques: Whore is OKLDD now?

Ans: He was killed in action in the Philippines on 26 December 1944. Kumotoro KIKKO, who accompanied OKLDD and a naval commander in rank at the time, was also killed in action on 16 May 1945 on board the warship Haguro in the Malacca Straits.

Ques: During the war have you ever participated in planning operations for submarines and also drafting orders etc?

Ans: I have.

Ques: What was the length of period?

Ans: From November 1941 to January 1943, and from early December 1944 till the termination of war.

Ques: During the war what course did the Japanese Navy take in submarine warfare?

Ans: Classifying the course into roughly three stages. They were:

(1) The period when they worked havoc on communication lines coordinating with fleet operations doing a side-job.

(2) The period when major force was devoted to destruct lines of communication.

(3) The period when they engaged in menacing communication lines as well as supplying the advanced bases.
I did.

Was there anything concerning the prisoners of war on Kwajelin?

Nothing whatsoever.

Where is OKL-da now?

He was killed in action in the Philippines on 26 December 1944.

Kumetoro NIHIO who accompanied OKL-da and a naval commander in rank at the time was also killed in action on 16 May 1945 on board the warship Haguro in the Malacca Straits.

During the war have you ever participated in planning operations for submarines and also drafting orders etc?

I have.

What was the length of period?

From November 1941 to January 1943, and from early December 1944 till the termination of war.

During the war what course did the Japanese Navy take in submarine warfare?

Classifying the course into roughly three stages.

They were:

(1) The period when they worked havoc on communication lines coordinating with fleet operations doing a side-job.

(2) The period when major force was devoted to destruct lines of communication.

(3) The period when they engaged in menacing communication lines as well as supplying the advanced bases.
State the change in each stage in operational policies for submarine warfare.

From the outbreak of war to June 1942 was called the first stage of operation.

The policy of operation for this period was indicated to Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Y.M.'UTO by the Chief of Naval General Staff in "Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 15". It pointed out the course of submarine operations in relation with general sea warfare in the primary stages at the outbreak of war, and items to be observed in dealing with shippings. This was drafted on 30 November 1941 by order of the Chief of the First Division, Naval General Staff in preparation should war break out with the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands in the future.

The plans of operation for this period attached importance on offensive operations in the southern regions and therefore in the Pacific Ocean area, the primary object of submarine warfare was to watch and pursue the movements of the U.S. fleets and the destruction of communication lines was of secondary importance.

Operations for submarines attached to forces operating in the south placed primary importance on duties involving offensive operations in the southern region and the destruction of communication lines was of secondary importance.

Especially, the submarine destruction warfare in the
Indian Ocean area had been instructed to strengthen activities after operations in the southern region has reached a certain stage.

Furthermore, in performing the destruction of communication lines the sentiment of the Japanese Navy respecting human lives and abiding by warfare laws and regulation is clarified in Imperial Headquarters Naval Department Instructions of 30 November 1941 and 1 March 1942. This policy has not been altered throughout the whole period of war. The next period was called the second stage of operations. It lasted from June 1942 to March 1943. The characteristics of this period was putting primary importance on destruction of maritime communication lines.

During the First Stage of Operations the offensive strategy in southern areas reached a definite stage and so importance was attached to communication line destruction warfare. Cruisers and other surface crafts were employed along with the submarines to work havoc and confuse the enemy. The bulk of the submarine force were allocated for this purpose. Main water-areas for submarine attacks were in the following order.

(a) Southeastern coast of Africa and northwestern part of the Indian Ocean.

(b) Eastern coast of Australia and Cook's Strait area.

In the Pacific Ocean area the emphasis of constructing communication lines was laid on severing the supply route to the U.S.
forces in the southern areas by blockading the communication sea lanes between the U.S. and Australia.

The operations for this period was indicated to Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO from the Chief of Naval General Staff on 22 June 1942 as Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 107. It was drafted during my term of office.

The third stage of submarine warfare was based on a policy issued on 25 March 1943. It was planned and drafted by my successor Chikuo YAMAMOTO in the form of Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 201. Characteristics of this order are:

(1) Emphasis of the operation was put on destruction of maritime communication lines, which is the same as in the second stage of operations.

(2) Supplying advanced basis by using a part of the submarine force.

(3) Performing co-ordinated operations with German submarines in the Indian Ocean area.

What I have stated so far was the general policy and changes of submarine operations adopted by the Japanese Navy during the recent war.

Notes: During the recent war, was an operation policy either planned or indicated by the Imperial Headquarters to annihilate the crew members, except for a few necessary to obtain information when sinking enemy shippings by submarines.
Def. Doc. #1945

Ans: Such a thing was never planned nor indicated by Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instructions. If it were indicated, it should be recorded in the file of Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instructions. Not only is there no such record but is very far from the spirit of the Japanese Navy.

Quest: Did the German authorities ever make any such request?
Ans: Not when I was at the Naval General Staff.

Quest: Have you ever read or heard about the First Submarine Force Order issued by the Commander of the First Submarine Flotilla on 20 March 1943?
Ans: No, I haven't.

Quest: What instructions did the Japanese Navy give as regards respecting human life and abiding by international laws and regulations in submarine operations?
Ans: It was indicated in Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 15 issued 30 November 1941 to the effect that, "it is lawful to attack unarmed enemy merchant-ships only in waters 300 nautical miles from the enemy coastline and in the areas between Hawaii and the west coast of the U.S. mainland. In other cases otherwise than above, unless circumstances are unavoidable, time must be given for crew and passengers to seek safety." As for dealing with equipments of neutral countries, instructions were given to take measures as provided in international laws and regulations with the exception of...
the four nations of France, Norway, Denmark and Greece.

Further in Imperial Headquarters Naval Command Instruction No. 60 issued 1 March 1942 it gave instructions on the following points.

(1) In performing operations on surface shippings take formal procedures to the extent possible, and always inspect the ship. However, due to unavoidable circumstances if the ship was sunk, endeavor to rescue human lives.

(2) Capture hostile shippings whenever possible and escort them to our port or harbor. However if circumstances do not permit the above, take expedient measure and escort ship to nearest port or harbor, or also, dispose of the ship after crew and cargo are removed.

(3) Service-men, civilians attached to the armed-services, merchant-ship officers, technicians and Government high-ranking personnels of the Chiang Kai Shek regime shall be arrested as prisoners of war together with nationals of Collignerant nations.

In this war, considerable attention was devoted in respecting human lives and to abide by international law and regulations.

On this 10 day of July, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (seal)
I, INAGAWA, Tatsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by
the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of
this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: /S/ INAGAWA, Tatsuo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (seal)
Naval General Staff Directive No. 15 (1st)

Date: November 30, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGAO Osami.

To: Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet, Admiral YAMOTO.

In case when war breaks out with the United States, the British Empire, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the policy stated in the annex shall be the guide to the conduct of the sea communication destruction warfare for the time being.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHI, Kazuo, who occupy the post of Chief of the Historical Section, Material Readjustment Branch, 2nd Demobilization Office, Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Naval General Staff Directive No. 15 (Gist)" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document, which is an answer made through the Nakamura-kiken to questions put forth to the Former Japanese Navy by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces through Col. Mansön (Phonetic) of the Supreme Headquarter Allied Forces on November 1945.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 21 day of June, 1947

Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: MUNYA, Shijii (seal)
1. I, YOSHI, Michinori, now hold the post of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section, Second Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Office and am in charge of the documents of the said Bureau.

2. The original of "Instructions, Navy Department, Imperial Headquarters", which were issued during the Pacific War, were in the custody of the Adjutants' Office, Navy Department, Imperial Headquarters, but was lost by fire during an air-raid by American planes which lasted from the mid-night of May 25, 1945 until the dawn of the following day.

3. Since then a set of copies of the said Instructions which were kept at the First Department of the Naval General of Staff have been used in place of the original, and are at present being kept and used by the Historical Section of the Material Preparation Department. But among these copies, those issued in 1941, i.e., the Instructions No. 1 to No. 35 were destroyed during the above-mentioned air-raid and are not in existence.

4. In November, 1945 there were inquiries from SCAP as to the said Instructions No. 1 - No. 35, and we investigated all the offices to which they were distributed. However, as none was available, we made a summary of these instructions by combining what were remembered by the people concerned and replied to the inquiries of SCAP.

I hereby confirm that the above statement is true.

On August 27, 1947
At Tokyo

/S/ YOSHI, Michinori (seal)

The above signature and seal were affixed in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place

Witness: /S/ SOMIYA, Shintar (seal)
Directive No. 282, Naval Department,
Imperial General Headquarters.

From: KAGANO Osami, Chief of the Naval General Staff.
To: KOGA, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

It is directed that the following items should be adhered to in executing submarine operations in the Indian Ocean:

1. The boundary between the operation area of the submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy and that of the German submarines is set on the longitudinal line of seventy (70) degrees east as a general rule, the east side of it being allocated to Japan and the west of it to Germany. In case of necessity, however, they can operate anywhere irrespective of this boundary.

2. The submarines operating in the Indian Ocean are forbidden to make any anti-submarine attack.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, DOHI, Kazuo, who occupy the post of the chief of the Historical Subsection in the Data Arrangement Section, 2nd Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization Department, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "DAI.KAI.SHI No. 283" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the 2nd demobilization Office of the Demobilization Department).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 23rd day of August, 1947

/Sp/ DOHI, Kazuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /Sp/ SOMYA, Shinji (seal)
Sworn Deposition
Deponent TATSUO OOHASHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

Q.- Your place of residence, name and date of birth please.
A.- 57, 4-Chome Den en chofu, Oota Ward, Tokyo City.

Tatsuo Oohashi

Date of birth: 31st August 1891 (24 Meiji)

Q.- What was your rank at the time of the Surrender?
A.- Rear-Admiral in the Reserves.

Q.- Please give a short history of your service in the Navy.
A.- I served as submarine captain, commander of a submarine squadron, as a staff member of the submarine section of the KURE arsenal, 1st and 2nd Section Chief of the KURE Military Supplies Section, Captain of the submarine tender Noshima. In August 1941 (Showa 16) I was appointed
Commander of the 14th Gunboat Squadron and in April 1942 (Showa 17) was relegated to the reserves. On the very same day of my relegation however, I was recalled into service. During the Pacific War I held the following posts.

From May 1942 (Showa 17) till September 1943 (Showa 18) Captain of the Rio de Janeiro Maru.

From September 1943 (Showa 18) till December 1943 (Showa 18) Commander of the Rio de Janeiro Maru. (The same boat having been converted into a transport.)

From March 1944 (Showa 19) till January 1945 (Showa 20) Transport Commander of 1st Escort Fleet.

From January 1945 (Showa 20) till the Surrender.

Naval Attache at Moji.

Q.- What type of ship was the Rio de Janeiro Maru?

A.- She was a diesel-engined passenger-transport ship displacing 10,000 tons and capable of a maximum 16 knots, owned by the Osaka Shosen (O.S.K.) which had assigned her to its South American Service. The Navy had conscripted this ship and had converted her into an auxiliary submarine tender.

Q.- What was the outward aspect of the ship?

A.- She was a two-masted, single-funneled ship of the passenger type.
The upper parts of the masts and of the funnel were painted green, the rest of the ship being painted grey.

Q. Why were such colors adopted?
A. It was to avoid long-range detection by enemy submarines.

Q. Please give an account of the activities of the Rio de Janeiro "aru after you assumed her command.
A. In April 1942 she sailed to Kwajelin there to stand by for the Midway operation, but in June of the same year she returned to Sasebo. After leaving Sasebo for Penang in July of the same year, she was attacked by an enemy submarine en route off the coast of French Indo-China and damaged. She entered Singapore harbor for repairs. On completion of repairs in December 1942 she sailed for Surabaja.

From January till October 1943 she was occasionally engaged in transport duty, using Surabaya as base for her activities.

Q. Why was she used for transport duty?
A. As Surabaya was a submarine base, unless submarines required use of advanced bases, there was no need for tenders. On the other hand, there was a shortage of ships.

Q. What did she transport?
A. Personnel and military supplies.

Q. Would weapons and ammunition be included in the above?
D.F. DOC. # 1954

A.- Of course they would be included.

Q.- In what areas did she operate?
A.- In Java, Borneo, Celebes, New Guinea, Anbon, the Philippines, the Small Sunda Archipelago, Timor etc.

Q.- Did you ever transport patients?
A.- No, never.

Q.- When did you touch Anbon?
A.- The 1st time was in the middle of January 1943. If I remember rightly, we touched at that port about twice between that time and March of the same year.

Q.- What was the object in stopping at Anbon?
A.- It was for purposes of local transportation of personnel and military supplies.

Q.- For approximately how many days did you anchor at Anbon when you stopped there?
A.- Always for a day or two.

Q.- Were PW's used by the local troops in the loading and unloading of freight?
A.- I do not remember.

Q.- Did you ever take patients aboard at Anbon?
A.- Never.

Q.- What approximately was the crew of the Rio de Janeiro Maru?
A.- Approximately 300.
Q.- Was the crew armed?
A.- The necessary personnel were armed.

Q.- Under what command was the Rio de Janeiro Maru subordinate?
A.- In April 1942 she was under the direct command of the Combined Fleet, and belonged to the 5th Submarine Squadron. But from June 1942 onwards she was attached to the Submarine Unit of the South Western Fleet.

Q.- What happened to the Rio de Janeiro Maru after September 1943?
A.- As in September 1943 she was turned over to the auxiliary transport category, she was sent back to the Japanese mainland for refitting.

After that for a time she was in the HARIKA Dockyards being refitted. I hear that she was sunk in Truk in February 1944 after completion of the refitting. I left her in December of the same year.

Q.- Did the Rio de Janeiro Maru ever assume the Red Cross insignia during the time you were aboard her?
A.- No, she never did.

When I read in the papers that an Australian POW or it may have been a POW of another nation, stood as a witness in the International Tribunal to testify that the Rio de Janeiro Maru had used the Red Cross sign at Anbon, I
could not help but wonder how such a mistake had been possible.

Q.: Was there a naval hospital ship by the name of Rio de Janeiro Maru?

A.: I never heard mention of such a ship.

On this 10 day of July, 1947

at Tokyo

DEPONENT /S/ Ohashi Tatsuo (seal)

I, SOWIYA, Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

witness: /S/ SOWIYA, Shinji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Ohashi Tatsuo (seal)
昭和十九年（一九四四年）三月より昭和二十年（一九四五五年）一月まで
第一艦隊礁潜信報
段
門司 海軍 受 官
リオデジャトロ丸という船は如何なる船ですか
大阪鎮潜所有で破壊一〇〇〇〇〇〇最大速度約十六節 ディール・エンデンの賃船籍で南米沉偷に使用されてるたのを海軍に数
用される等級水深浸に改造された船であります
その船は如何なる外装をしてありますか
二等一等級の客船型で上等と等級の上等を灰白色に取り他者近
い
変方が出来てからリオデジャトロ丸の行動を述べて下さ
一九四二年四月より戦後作戦のためジェリシン島に同船し、待機

同年七月佐世保を発し、ペビンに向け航行中、船内で戦時水産の攻

容細を受ける運搬されたプリンガーを同船しました。

同年六月佐世保に着港後、即座に

理完了スラバに同船しました。

一九四三年一月以降十數日はスラバを着地として時々出送任務

に従事しましたが、何故出送任務に従事したか、

スラバに対して尾級、環境、海象、資源供給の必要がない役者態度の不足の為で、

常に含みます。
アンボンへ入管したのは何時ですか。第一団は一九四三年一月中旬であり以後同年三月迄の間に二回程
入管しました。アンボン入管の目的は何ですか。アンボンには何日立入管してありますか。
何時も一日か二日位です。入学中荷物の借取は荷物に現地部隊が書籍を出用してありますか。
私は同様裁判の庭で証言したが或は他の何者かの同声であった人が出席して来ました。頭髪を切って白髪をしたことが不思議に思いました。同様裁判の開廷に出席した赤十字軍を使用した人が聞いた話でありますか。

答

左治郎船長は聞いた話であらりません。
昭和三十二年（一九五七年）七月十日於
東京

同 日
於 東京

供 述 者
大 霍

本 人
宗 宮
信 次

8
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-VS-

ARUMI, Sadao, et al

STORAGE DEPOSITION

Depositori: OKOCHI, Doryshichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am a former Vice-Admiral.

2. On 2 November 1944, I arrived in Kerela and assumed my duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Area Fleet and concurrently of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet.

However, by the latter part of December, 1944, we had lost the greater part of our naval force and our air power too had diminished considerably.

Consequently, after that, I took command of the remnants of the naval units in the Philippines Area; these units were soon placed under the command of the Army as far as naval operations were concerned. Therefore, I merely directed and supervised personnel affairs and accounts.
3. In January, 1945, when U.S. forces commenced larding operations at Liri, I left "arila on the 5th and moved to Barfo. This was due to circumstances which arose from the necessity of taking command of over-all military operations. The naval forces left behind in "arila at that time were placed under the Command of General Yamashita as far as land operations were concerned, from zero hours, 6 January. After that I was only able to give moral encouragements indirectly, I for no longer possessed authority to take command over naval larding forces in land warfare.

4. From then on, all communication between us and the forces in "arila was made by wireless. As time elapses the efficiency of the wireless communication greatly decreased, but still it was continued for a considerable time. The progress of the battles in "arila was therefore reported to me as well as to General Yamashita. With the information I then received, I was able to picture the desperate situation of the Japanese units in "arila when the U.S. forces besieged the city. From that I can recall today, I shall mention a few examples.

(1) Enemy shelling and bombing were extremely intense and the whole area was completely devastated.

(2) Guerrilla activities were intensified and even women and children harassed our forces, greatly hindering our operations.

- () -
(3) Ammunition ran short.

Thus, externally, our forces faced the furious gunfire of the U.S. forces, while internally they were harassed by guerrillas. It was evident that our units were fighting under great difficulty and disadvantage. Around 20 February, communication with Manila was completely cut, and I judged that the entire garrison in Manila had been killed.

Besides the progress of the battle in general as I have stated above, details as to the internal condition of our units were entirely unknown and the so-called "Manila atrocities" were something I did not ever dream of.

About 13 April a message from Tokyo in the name of the Vice-Minister for the Navy was received, which said, "Spain has recently severed diplomatic relations with Japan on the ground that Japanese troops massacred Spanish nationals in the Battle of Manila. Report on the matter is requested."

It was the first time that I felt some incident must have occurred.

However, since all personnel involved in the alleged incident had been killed, there was no way for us to conduct an investigation. I also inquired of the Army Headquarters under General Yamashita, but they too did not know anything about the incident and therefore I cabled a reply to Tokyo to that effect.
As I have stated, the 'arila Incident without either General Yamashita's or my knowledge.

I learned about the particulars of the incident for the first time after the surrender, from the indictment against General Yamashita.

On this 15th day of March, 1947

at Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ OKOCHI, Denshichi (seal)

I, SO'IT', Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

"witness: /s/ SO'IT', Shinji (seal)

O:TH

O:TH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ OKOCHI, Denshichi (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 27, 1947.
かの事故ありたりを処知させる次第でありました。
然れども保係員全員に死させる法は多く、又廻収
下司令部に漏ひ合せて見せたる同議に何し知つて居りまです
の旨東京に返へしたる故であります。以上の通りでありまし
てマニラ事件は山下大将も私も然し知らぬ同
に起したるものであり私故は即成に山下大将の起訴状
内容を知つたものであります。
ど行して私の方にも通報して来ました。それによりますと米が

ニラを包囲するや非常に苦悩に陥った状況が察知されたのでありま

して今私が記憶して居ります内に次の状態があるんです。

（一）敵の砲火猛烈を変め附近一帯焦土と化して一草一本もなし

（二）ゲリラの敷設爆弾ばかり婦女子に至る迄我を苦しめる暴行

頼らしさなり

極めて困難なり

（三）ニラは時も短かくあり

国外来人の一者烈なる絶火の猛攻と受け内ゲリラの戦に苦しむ。

（四）ニラは全部は既死したものと判りました。

以上の全体の状況の外其の内部の詳細は元より全然不明であるため

言らざるを得ずは日本軍がニラ専攻と元に於て（此度ニラは）マ

然る尾三四日頃東京より海軍政官の名に於て（此度ニラは）マ

軍の腹に於いて日本軍がニラ専攻を報せりと報じて何等

ニラ専攻を報せり。又の事情報せりと報せりとの特定あり前々

前々報せりと報せりと報せりと報せりと報せりと報せりと報せり
私は昭和十九年十一月二日午後四時、東京に着旗司令長官総員第三一三部隊及び第三南進遠征司令

昭和二十年一月米軍のリグガ――上陸作戦を開始するに及び私は全

作戦指揮の都合上同五日マニラに渡還してパガに帰還したが当

して山下大将の指揮下に入れる際私は精神的側面の攻撃を

しておりました。従ってマニラの近況は山下大将に報告させると同時に之
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: -- ARIMA, Gen

born: August 13, 1900

SUIKOKU No. 11-Chome
NAKAMEGURO MEGUROKU,
Tokyo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I. I am at present Chief of the Medical Section of the Second Demobilization Bureau.

II. The outline of my official career is as follows:
September 15th, 1938 member of the Medical Bureau of the Navy Ministry

June 1st, 1942 Chief of the Quarantine Section of the Sanitation Bureau of the Civil Government under the South-west area fleet.

- 1 -
To begin with, the authority of handling prisoners of war was in the hands of the army, and the navy was not supposed to keep and manage prisoners of war; therefore, we had no special stock of medical goods for prisoners of war. Accordingly, when the navy interned prisoners as a temporary step during the period between their capture and their transfer to the army, the unit which was in charge of managing them was supplied with medical stores for the total number of soldiers in the unit and prisoners, and all medical treatment for them was carried out without discrimination; treatment for prisoners was on the same standard as the sick and wounded of the unit; seriously ill prisoners were allowed to enter a navy hospital exactly as Japanese officers and soldiers.

Thus, the navy neither treated them particularly warmly because they were prisoners nor treated them especially coldly. Medical treatment for them was carried out strictly and fairly, in accordance with "Navy Regulations for Handling Prisoners of War".

- 2 -
IV As to the stock of medical stores, it was a fundamental principle of the Navy to keep materials which would last for a year for peacetime national defense, out of necessity caused simply by the fact that it has forces under it. However, it was a basic standard regardless of the sort of enemy country or the term of the probable war. In the case of the last war, therefore, the outbreak of the war found us provided with this quantity.

In other words, concerning medical stores, we had no particular instruction to take steps to enable us to wage war for four years against America, Britain, Holland, and others. For we learned about the outbreak of the last war and its scale only from ordinary news, reports and, as far as medical materials were concerned, we faced the war unprepared.

V. As to the disposition and numerical increase of surgeons and medical men following the increase of prisoners, the navy had no plan to manage prisoners of war as previously mentioned; therefore, the number of men in a unit which was in temporary charge of prisoners was increased. In view of this, a step to increased surgeons and medical men to cope with the increase of its number was adopted. However, on account of the rapid increase in the army's strength and the unexpected organization of various troops after the outbreak of the war,
the increase in number of surgeons and medical men, who must have special education, could not meet the necessity.

VI A plan for distribution of medical materials, providing for the supply of the basic quantity for the total number of the unit plus the estimated quantity made necessary by the particular duties and sanitary conditions of its station, was adopted in accordance with the account and Supply Regulations of Medical Stores (Refer to Notice no. 237 issued in July 1941).

The person responsible for distributing these materials was the chief of the medical stores section of the medicine bureaus of the respective navy hospital. Otherwise the apothecary officer of a navy hospital ship supplied them at the request of a medical officer or a surgeon in charge of handling the military materials of a unit.

Even though a request be made, it was impossible to supply it when there was no stock in the navy stores or Japan proper. At distant places sometimes supplies did not arrive because of riding. When communications and traffic between many points on the battle-front were stopped or were strained as in the latter half of the war, it was impossible to supply demands.

VII The chain of command concerning medical business in the navy included the chief of the Medical Bureau of the Navy Ministry, who was an assistant to the Minister and commanded or ordered his subordinates not directly but only
in the name of the minister. Regarding military administration, commanders-in-chief of naval districts, guard districts or fleet headquarters were under the control of the Minister. Each of the staffs of these commanders included a chief medical officer, who was an assistant to the commander-in-chief.

Under a commander-in-chief, there were war-ships, units, schools, naval hospitals, etc. Temporarily keeping and managing prisoners of war, till the time of handing them over to the army, was done by the above mentioned war-ships and units. Prisoners who needed medical treatment were received into the infirmary of the unit. In that case, the person directly responsible for their treatment was the surgeon in charge of that infirmary, who was under the control of the chief medical officer. The chief medical officer was directly subordinate to the unit commander; accordingly, he received orders from the unit commander. Sometimes he received suggestions and advice on medical affairs from a superior medical officer who was the staff-officer of the commander-in-chief, but they were not commands or orders.

Those who are seriously ill among the prisoner patients belonging to the infirmary of a unit were transferred to a navy hospital, just as Japanese officers and men were.

This may be shown in Diagram No. 1 on the separate sheet hereto attached.
VIII Regarding general health problem, especially those concerning dwellings, clothes, and labor, the Medical Bureau of the Navy Ministry paid particular attention in the earlier days of the war mainly to problems in the tropics; and in the latter days of the war, mainly to maintenance of the physical strength of soldiers in the homeland following food and fuel shortages; searching for a scientific method as the subject of special war-time study made by the Research Section of the Navy Medical School and unofficial scientists, we exerted ourselves to the utmost to put our conclusions into practice on troops but under the situation, it was most difficult to carry out.

Our national strength at that time was quite insufficient to meet the general demand. For example, we were in such a condition that even when the "penicillin cure" was needed, we could by no means use it for the general clinic as we had such a small quantity that it could be used only for clinical study. And when we wanted D. D. T., we had only a test tube of it as study material and even though we thought of using it universally as the Occupation Forces are doing, we could not realize this goal.

IX Concerning medical treatment, now the death of prisoners from diseases in Japan proper is the subject of grave discussion but a large number of Japanese soldiers died from diseases in the various stages of the war.
Under conditions existing in our country after 1944, the ration for soldiers deteriorated in quantity and quality until, if computed in calories per day, it dropped below 1,700 calories, and even below 1,500 calories.

On the other hand, owing to fuel shortage, there was no heating in winter season, warm baths became impossible, clothes and bedclothes which were necessary for warmth were wanting and, in general, maintaining body warmth was impossible; consequently, a disproportion arose between calories absorbed and calories consumed per day, and the number of calories consumed was always larger this fact resulted in loss of physical strength and nourishment. Such condition of illness seldom broke out among older soldiers who were accustomed to military life but often broke out among younger ones who were not accustomed to military life. This kind of general physical weakness caused many persons to suffer from such complications as pneumonia and diarrhea. This retarded their convalescence.

The navy called it "Prostration resulting from inability to adjust oneself" and decided to distinguish it statistically from malnutrition in the overseas war front.

The number of cases of this disease reported to the central authorities at that time was more than 6,000 in the navy alone throughout the country. Of this number more than 500 patients died; however, it is inferred that the actual number was more than 10,000, of which more than 1,000 patients died. Erroneous diagnoses of these cases called pneumonia or
diarrhea, which were actually only complication of the disease, the major disease and prostration only a result was observed.

X. As to the death of prisoners from disease, we must keep in mind the difference in resistance to bacteria in the case of foreigners.

Concerning the comparative ability of war prisoner and Japanese to resist disease, we have made no experiment or study and I am consequently in no position to draw a scientific conclusion. However I am of the opinion that from study and experiment on animals and epidemiological observation, it is possible to state as follows:

(a) Animals brought up in a favourable environment have less resistance to bacteria infection than animals grown in a natural environment.

(b) Men exposed to bacteria from their childhood in an unfavorable environment have greater resistance to bacteria than men who have grown in a favorable environment from their childhood, it may be inferred that prisoners were more susceptible to bacterial infection than the Japanese. In addition, such handicaps may be supposed among the prisoners as the following: (1) spiritual restlessness, (2) inability to acclimatize, (3) unfamiliarity with Japanese food, (4) difference in customs, (5) lack of communication with the Japanese due to the language barrier. As the result of these difficulties, it is possible to infer that patients had trouble and took a longer period in recovering from a disease.
The result of experiment on animals and the epidemiological fact which formed the foundation of this conclusion are as follows:

1. Examples of experiments on animals:
   (a) When a domesticated mouse and a wood-mouse living in natural surroundings were compared, the former died with less bacteria for its weight than the latter.
   (b) When a canary and a wild Japanese white-eye were compared as to resistance to "bird malarial protozan", the canary was more strongly infected with it than the white-eye; that is, the former showed less resistance to bacteria than the latter.

2. Epidemiological observation on human beings:
   (a) It often happens that when persons who have grown in a rural district where there are few tuberculous bacteria come to a city later, come in contact with many people with active tuberculosis and fall ill suddenly, they die in a short period. On the contrary, when persons who have grown in a city from their childhood and often resisted tuberculosis infection, fall ill, they pass into a chronic state and in many cases their convalescence is better compared with that of the former.
   (b) In case of malaria, the same result as the above
was observed.

When a tribe grown in a place where malaria prevails becomes immune racially from malaria for a long period, they seldom die of acute malignant malaria. But when inhabitants of the temperate zone who have never been infected with malarial protozoa enter the place where malaria prevails they are immediately attacked by acute malaria and their condition grows serious.

(c) In the case of dysentery, the same tendency may be observed.

XI. The sanitary environment of Japan must be regarded as a reason for weakening the prisoners' resistance. As to Japan's climate, it may be said that the summer is that of subtropical climate and the winter is severely cold. Even if a person grew up in Japan from his childhood, he would have much trouble until he became acclimatized. On account of this, many weak persons are attacked in their childhood, by various kinds of diseases and die. Besides, during the wartime, even the Japanese accustomed to Japanese food were not satisfied, due to the shortage of food materials, especially of albumin and fat. Furthermore, owing to the lack of chemical fertilizers, human manure was used by private homes for cultivation of vegetables; consequently the

-10-

- 5 -
Density inside the body of parasites such as intestinal worms and hookworms was raised. Thus even the resistance of the Japanese to diseases was generally lowered; and cases of dysentery, typhoid fever, eruptive tuberculosis, pneumonia, and tuberculosis increased. Thus as an environment, Japan was in a considerably unfavorable condition. I am afraid that large number of health troubles arose among prisoners coming to such an environment.

XII. I think the difficulty in understanding medical English in Japan was a considerable handicap in medical treatment of prisoners of war.

As to difficult medical terms, especially difficult phrases in the Japanese language that even the Japanese exact physicians, do not understand are frequently used. In interpreting them into English, even a professional interpreter will find himself unequal to the task. On the other hand, education for physicians was carried on by medical scientists of the German school, so that surgeons in the army and navy are quite ignorant of medical English. This being the case, it is inferred that if prisoners complained about their illness, the Japanese did not understand the details of their complaint and even of Japanese surgeons or medical men gave medical advice to them, the prisoners often failed to understand what they meant.

On this 10th day of December 1947
at Tokyo.

 Diplomat. (Seal)
Def. Doc. No. 1256

I, Inukai, Tatsu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo

Witness: (signed) Inukai, Tatsu (seal)

On the

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

...... Gen (seal)
Naval Chain of Administrative Command (Medical Affairs line)

- Medical Officer--surgeon
- Vessel Commander
- Medical Officer--surgeon--Sick House
- Commander-in-chief of
- Naval District
- Unit Commander
- Medical Officer
- Medical Office--surgeon--Sick House
- Medical Office--surgeon--Sick House
- Head of School
- Chief of Section--member
- Staff Member
- Chief of the Staff
- Head of Hospital
- Chief of Medical Section--member
- Staff Member
- Chief of Personnel Affairs
- Chief of Judicial Affairs
- Medical Officer
- Supply Officer
- Medical Officer
- Medical Officer
- Supply Officer
- Commander-in-chief of
- Guard District
- Commander-in-chief of Fleet

Note:
Shows the Chain of Command
昭和十三年九月二十五日
軍務局局長

南西方面艦隊民政府衛生局防疫課長

十八年十一月一日
第一南進艦隊軍需長

二十年五月九日
海軍省軍務局第一課長

元来俘虜の管理は陸軍にありまして、海軍としては俘虜を保有管理する事の準備をされて居ります。従って海軍では俘虜なるが故に特に対応しないない代りに特に対応した次第です。
海軍としての医療品の準備について軍隊を保有してある以上平素国防
に関し大体一ヶ年分を保有するのが常原則であるまず前年間
の準備に関しては米英開戦期に相手に四年間戦争出来るだけの手段を
備え置かねばならぬ。したがっては平素の準備を固めるのが唯一の
方法である。所期の目的を達し得るには戦争発足前にいかに
充分な準備を万全に固めておることかは常時懸念せねばならない。
衛生薬材の分配は治療品薬理規制（昭和十六年七月三日第二三七号参照）

の定める所により部隊の絶対数に対する基準量を各部隊の任務及び駐屯地の衛生状況を加味したものを提供する方針を採って居りました。

此の見合前にも海軍又は陸軍及び在外在外の無い時は供給不能であり

まして又遠隔の地では長々海派等の為め不適であり又戦後半の戦

線各地間の通信交通の利用し取は不自然なる場合は供給出来ません

でした

まして又遠隔の地では長々海派等の為め不適であり又戦後半の戦

線各地間の通信交通の利用し取は不自然なる場合は供給出来ません

でした

防及陸海司令長官は軍政事項に付いては大隊の指揮を承います

府及び陸海部隊長官は軍政事項に付いては大隊の指揮を承います

舞場中には軍政中には大隊の指揮を承います

司及陸海部隊長官は軍政事項に付いては大隊の指揮を承います

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司及陸海部隊長官は軍政事項に付いては大隊の指揮を承います

舞場中には軍政中には大隊の指揮を承います

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舞場中には軍政中には大隊の指揮を承います
渡辺的一時の處置としての僕の保有、管理は右衛門部隊において

此の部隊の士官に属する僕の担当中衛生中級生は日本海軍病院

し、海軍兵務局として一時的専門的に於ける一般衛生問題を

するために主として病院及び病院に於ける此等諸問題を

に留意し海軍兵務局学校研究部及部外学者による戦時特別研究

に適用する労力

又当時の吾輩の耐力をしては大勢如何とも為し難く例へはべニシリ

に至りましたか四国の状況上其实現は至難であります

防衛部長の直接の衛生責任者は其病舍担当の軍医である上級の軍医長から衛生的な

付け裕望的指示乃至忠言を受ける事はありませんが之れは指揮命令では

ありませぬ
京都にまでせる歴史生活に思わぬ新兵に薬入を替えました。又此
発生しませんで高発生生活に偽れない新兵に薬入を替えました。又此
その全身変調が因とつって肺炎下痢を併発する者も多数に昇り疾病の

【発表文献の引用】

 исследование, "Инфекционные заболевания...".
環境の良い所で育った動物は自然環境に育った動物に比べ細菌感
染に対する抵抗力が弱い。

細菌の微少な所で幼時から細菌に曝されての人間は幼時より良い
健康を保つために日本兵に比較して幼時より環境の良い所で育った文化人
と
加ふるに体感じは
・精神的不安
・気候に慣れられない
（ハ）日本人に慣

（一）動物を用いた実験

カナリアーと野生の白鳥を用い一鳥マラリア原虫に対する

人に対われた二十代の日鼠と自然に生活する野鼠を比較すると二十

抵抗力建築を比較した事（カナリアーの方が高圧力が顧かっ）

カナリアーの方が抵抗力が顧かった

これが判った

多数の

結核菌の全く存在しない田園に育った人が後日都會に出て多数の

之れと反対に剣少から都合に著しく結核菌の感染に堪えた人は後日

結核を発病しても慢性に頂き激し激後は前者に比較して良好な場合

流行地に入ると速かに急性のマリアリ発病し症状も重かった

マリアリ原虫に一同に感染した事のない温帯住民がマリアリに対する種族

偽馬リーやも同様な事が認められた

赤道より右の傾向が認められる
医薬手段（medical手段）は全く知らなかったのでありましたが、右の様な状況でありましたので従来が無視に付いて訴えても細い處ま
で日本人に判らなかったのでありましたが又日本の軍医や衛生兵が療
養上の注意を與べても恩赦に如何の意味か判断出来なかった事が多
かったとはないかと思います。
昭和二十一年（一九四六年）
十二月十日於東京

同日
於東京

立會人
稻川　龍雄

供述者
有馬　玄
6 December 1945

From: Minister of the I. J. 2nd Demobilization
Ministry.

To: General Headquarters of The Supreme Commander
For the Allied Powers.

Subject: Reply regarding the sinking of merchant ships
in Indian Ocean.

With reference to your letter dated 19 November 1945,
our statement is herewith presented.
Reply regarding the sinkings of merchant ships in Indian Ocean.

With regard to the cases on the above subject requested by your Memorandum dated 19 November 1945, protests were filed during the war by the respective governments except for the Norwegian S.S. Scotia; and whereas at each time of the protest we investigated the matters through various reports and telegrams as well as the returned persons from the operated areas, in none of these cases positive results was obtained, and accordingly the governments interested were notified to that effect.

Because of the loss of almost all Japanese submarines then operating in the Indian Oceans, remaining very few survivors, and because of the destruction by fire of all relevant records, reports and telegrams, the renewal of the survey has now become very difficult, and accurate results cannot be expected at present. But we have conducted our investigation as far as possible based upon the inquiry of the majority of the surviving crews and of those persons who occupied key posts in submarine warfare; and the result of the investigation so far obtained is as follows:

1. Names of submarines in question together with the outline of the movements thereof.
The submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy that operated in the Indian Ocean during the period relative to the sinkings of merchant ships described on the protests filed against the Imperial Japanese Government, i.e., from the end of 1943 through August 1944, were:

I-8, I-26, I-27, I-37, I-162, I-165, I-166,

Ro-110, Ro-111 ................. Total 9 submarines.

While their duties lay in destruction of communications, reconnaissance of strategic places, as well as supplying to German submarines, etc., priority was given to the reconnoitring the key points in such areas as Maldives, Chagos' Islands, Diego Suarez, Mombasa, Aden Bay, and the north-western part of Australia. The carrying out of these reconnaissance duties caused these submarines to operate dispersing all over the length and width of the Indian Ocean. Except the I-162, the remaining eight submarines have all reported as missing in the Indian Ocean or during subsequent operations, in other theatres, and as for this survived I-162, its commanding officer during the operations in question was killed in action in July 1944 in southern Pacific. Under these circumstances, though the accuracy cannot be guaranteed, the movements of each of these submarines have been described, based upon the memories of the surviving crews, on the annexed Table No. 1 and on the attached chart. It should be added in this connection
during that period considerable number of German submarines were engaging in commerce destruction in all spheres of the Indian Ocean paralleled to our submarine activities there. And since the summer of 1943 the dividing line between the German operational area and ours as well as the limitation of periods of operations was rescinded owing to the earnest desire of the German Navy.

2. Judgement concerning the submarines responsible for the sinkings of the steamers.

Since there is no one who can recall to his mind the names in question among those of sunken vessels, the only way for us to do is to make a comparison between the movements of each of our submarines as explained in the preceding paragraph on one side and the date and place of the sinking of each victim steamer stated in the protests from the respective Governments on the other; and this overall comparison is shown or the Annex Table No. 2. But as is clarified in this table we can identify no submarines which may be suspected of the inquired sinkings with the reservation regarding Nos. I-27, I-166, and Ro-110. These last named three submarines, with all of their crew, have failed to return to their base from their operations in the Indian Ocean, and therefore if ever they might be responsible for any of the sinkings, there is no means for us to continue the investigation any further.
Such being the situation it is a matter of regret that we cannot herewith specify the names of the responsible submarines. As for the Scotia, it is desired, the information concerning the date and place of the sinking of this Norwegian vessel will be revealed to us as soon as possible, because without these data we cannot get any clue to the probing of this case.
## Chart of Submarines Manoeuvres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Ship</th>
<th>Operational Duration (Leaving and Returning Date)</th>
<th>Field of Operation</th>
<th>War Results</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-3</td>
<td>From Mar. 20, 1944 To May 5, 1944</td>
<td>Central &amp; South Indian Ocean</td>
<td>March 30, 1944</td>
<td>1 Sunk (12°-0'E) 80°-0'E) Proceeding to (Penang) first decade of March 1944 from Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From July 10, 1944 To Aug. 20, 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-26</td>
<td>From Dec. 10, 1943 To Feb. 20, 1944</td>
<td>Northwest Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Dec. 29, 1943</td>
<td>2 Sunk 59°-0'E Total 190°-0'E 3 Sunk (59°-0'E) 210°-0'E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From Mar. 20, 1944 To Apr. 25, 1944</td>
<td>Central Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Jan. 2, 1944</td>
<td>5 Sunk in Aden Bay and Arabian Sea (War results undisclosed since Feb. 1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From 1st decade of Feb. 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-37</td>
<td>From Sept. 27, 1943 To Dec. 5, 1944</td>
<td>Southwest Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Oct. 23, 1943</td>
<td>(16°-0'E) 1 Sunk Returning back home Apr. 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From Mar. 10, 1944 To Apr. 27, 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-162</td>
<td>From Oct. 5, 1943 To Nov. 10, 1943</td>
<td>Central Indian Ocean</td>
<td>About Oct. 16, 1943</td>
<td>2 Sunk 74°-0'E Total 3 Sunk 10°-0'E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From Feb. 20, 1944 To Jan. 20, 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From Feb. 20, 1944 To Mar. 25, 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Oct. 24, 1943</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>Because of the ship age, much time required for putting into shape. Since July 24, 1944, operating in New Guinea area:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Nov. 27, 1943</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Jan. 2, 1944</td>
<td>Central Indian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Jan. 22, 1944</td>
<td>Ocean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Mar. 31, 1944</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>Jan. 16, 1944</td>
<td>10° 0' N</td>
<td>1 Sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To May 4, 1944</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From May 31, 1944</td>
<td>To July 5, 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Oct. 10, 1943</td>
<td>Central Indian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Nov. 10, 1943</td>
<td>Ocean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Dec. 10, 1943</td>
<td>To Jan. 10, 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 3rd decade of Jan. 1944</td>
<td>To 3rd decade of Feb. 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 2nd decade of Mar. 1944 (War results undisclosed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To 2nd decade of Apr. 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1st decade of May 1944</td>
<td>To 1st decade of June 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 3rd decade of June 1944</td>
<td>To 1st decade of Aug. 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd decade of Aug. 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[83°-0'E]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From 1st decade</th>
<th>To 3rd decade</th>
<th>Dec. 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of Dec.1943</td>
<td>of Dec.1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay of Bengal</td>
<td>Dec. 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reported missing while in action; then confirmed as sunk in March, 1944.

Sunk in Bay of Bengal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From 1st decade</th>
<th>To 3rd decade</th>
<th>Dec. 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of Jan.1944</td>
<td>of Jan.1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(War results unknown since Feb. 1944)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sunk in Bay of Bengal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From 1st decade</th>
<th>To End of Dec. 1943</th>
<th>Dec. 24, 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of Dec.1943</td>
<td>Bay of Bengal</td>
<td>Southeast Ceylon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proceeding to Penang from Japan Proper in mid-Nov. 1943.

Returning back home at the end of March 1944.

1 Sunk in Bay of Bengal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From 1st decade</th>
<th>To 3rd decade</th>
<th>March 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of Mar.1944</td>
<td>of Mar.1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Sunk in Bay of Bengal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Comparison between the Dates and Locations of the Sinkings of the Steamers and the Movements of the Japanese Submarines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunkon Ships</th>
<th>Daisy Sbller</th>
<th>British Chivalry</th>
<th>Sutley</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>1943.12.13</td>
<td>1944.2.22</td>
<td>1944.2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat., Long.</td>
<td>17°13'11&quot;N, 103°52'31&quot;E</td>
<td>05°55'8&quot;S, 132°0'8&quot;E</td>
<td>05°28'2&quot;S, 130°32'34&quot;E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### J-8
- **Japanese Proper**: Japan Proper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>(Penang)</th>
<th>(Penang)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time from berthed first part</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.11.14</td>
<td>Maneuvering in Arabian Sea, but Central &amp; West</td>
<td>Maneuvering in Arabian Sea, but Central &amp; West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-27</td>
<td>Maneuvering in Arabian Sea, but extremely far-away from the sunken spot</td>
<td>Maneuvering in Arabian Sea, but extremely far-away from the sunken spot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutley</td>
<td>(Details unknown)</td>
<td>(Details unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.20.20</td>
<td>Maneuvering in Penang Manor, 20.1.15, heading to west of Ceylon,</td>
<td>Maneuvering in Penang Manor, 20.1.15, heading to west of Ceylon,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.166</td>
<td>(Penang)</td>
<td>(Penang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuvering in Bay of Bengal, sunk</td>
<td>Maneuvering in Bay of Bengal, sunk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ship Dec. 1943</td>
<td>1 ship Dec. 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely far-away from the sunken spot</td>
<td>Extremely far-away from the sunken spot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.110</td>
<td>1 ship Dec. 1943 but very heavily loaded</td>
<td>1 ship Dec. 1943 but very heavily loaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.111</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### J-65
- **Japanese Proper**: Singapore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>(Singapore)</th>
<th>(Singapore)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time from berthed first part</td>
<td>Returning to Penang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11.20</td>
<td>Maneuvering Central Ocean</td>
<td>Maneuvering Central Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11.20</td>
<td>Maneuvering Central Ocean</td>
<td>Maneuvering Central Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.166</td>
<td>Maneuvering Central Ocean</td>
<td>Maneuvering Central Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.110</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.111</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### J-66
- **Japanese Proper**: Penang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>(Penang)</th>
<th>(Penang)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time from berthed first part</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.110</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.111</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
<td>Similar to left</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No other subs suspected of said incident. Due to the deaths of all crew.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtitle</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annex 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Gunkyn Ships</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td><strong>Place</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944.2.29</td>
<td>Long. 2°10'S Lat. 6°20'W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944.3.29</td>
<td>Long. 2°14'E Lat. 6°24'W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944.4.28</td>
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<td>Richard Harvey</td>
<td>1944, 3-29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean Nicolet</td>
<td>1944, 7-2</td>
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**I - 8**

Richard Harvey, (Penang)

**I - 26**

Maneuvering around Japan Proper area of Maldive Is., (Returning to home-land first part of May 1944)

**I - 27**

Maneuvering in Central & West Indian Ocean (Details unknown)

**I - 37**

Maneuvering west of Chagos, but greatly isolated from the sunken spot of (Penang)

**I - 162**

Under repairs owing to the damage caused by mines April 27, 1944 (Details unknown)

**I - 166**

Maneuvering Central Indian Ocean (Details unknown)

**Bo - 110**

Returning to homeland first part of April 1944

**Bo - 111**

(Returning to homeland end of Mar. 1944)

**Remarks:**

1. Date and place of the sinking of vessels are based on the protests raised by the Governments concerned during War.
2. Memories of crew survivors are used as basis in compiling the column for findings.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, OISHI, Munet to, who occupy the post of Liaison Officer of the Second Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 10 pages and entitled "Reply regarding the I.J. submarines which sank merchant ships in Indian Ocean" is an exact and authorized copy from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Liaison Section. 2nd Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization Ministry),

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 26 day of May, 1947.

/S/ OISHI, Munet to (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /S/ IJAGAWA, Tatsuo (seal)
For the purpose of refuelling the Ro 501 which was bought home and after being transferred to Reunion from GM, we waited for it here, but did not wait.
As all of the crew were killed, the details are not clear.

The operational movements covered the areas—south of Ceylon south-west of India and east of Bengal Bay. The details of the fighting results during the period remain unknown. Because it did not come back after it sailed out for assaults leaving Penang in Aug. and the crew were all killed.
Ro I 1 I

From Dec 1943 to Jan 1944
- 1st movement
  Started Puing early part of Dec 1943
  Returned from last part of Dec 1943
  Feb 7 laid down mines

From Feb 1944 to March 1944
- 2nd movement
  Started Puing early part of Feb 1944 and returned
  March about 20 Feb 1944
  Return from last part of March
TABLE OF RESULT

Oct 1943 to Sep 1944

5 Ships (127)
in Gulf of Aden and
Arabian Sea between
Nov 10 and Dec 1 1943

x (126) Jan 2 1944
x (126) Dec 29 1943
x (126) Dec 31 1943

x (116) Jan 16 1944
x (116) Oct 7 1943
x (116) Dec 2 1943
x (116) Mar 21 1944

x (109) Sept 30 1944
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**备注：**

1. 内容一的具体描述。
2. 内容二的详细说明。
3. 内容三的注意事项。
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| | | 植田

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| | | 田村
| | | 植田

備考
文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ関スル證明書

自分大石宗次ノ従員ノ第二従員局連絡部員ノ職ニ居ル省ナル處、次ニ
添附セラレタルノ一頁ヲ成ル印虞ヲ於テ気ヲ留メスル様シテ
保管ヲ係ル公文書ノ正確ニシテ質ナル質シナルコトヲ證明ス、

昭和二十二年五月ニ十六日、於東京

大

石

宗

次

立會人

稲

川

龍

雄
We were waiting for the Ro501 in order to report it, but as it happened that it did not appear after pre-arranged time, made toward the base at about 12 Aug. after searching for it in at right angles to the scheduled course.
Engaged Operation in
Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea

Said 5 merchant ships about
in a month, and received
a certificate of merit
(1st Movement)
1st movement
Shocked Penang early part of Oct 1943
Returned Penang late part of Dec

2nd movement
Shocked Penang early part of Feb 1944
Did not returned to its base. So that the vessels in this movement remain unknown.
Oct to Dec 1943

Reached Penang Dec 18 1943

Arrived Singapore Nov 27
and
Started thru Dec 16

Coast Penang
Oct 24 1943

MALAY

SUMATRA

JAVA

Australasia

Engaged Opposition 25th Jan thru 6th Feb 1944

Hindu Tan

CELM
As all of the crew were killed, the details are not clear.

The operational movements cover the areas: South of Ceylon, South-west of India, and east of Bengal Bay. The details of the fighting vessel during the period remain unknown. Because it did not come back after it sailed out for action, leaving Penang in Aug., and the crew were all killed.
Ro II

Dec 1943 to Jan 1944

1st movement
 peers early part of Dec 1943

2nd movement
 Sank a merchant ship

3rd movement
 Started Parang Aug 1943 and returned there Jan 20

4th movement
 Started Parang early part of Dec 1943, and returned there last part of Dec 1943

From Feb 1944 to March 1944

3rd movement
 Started Parang early part of Feb 1944 and returned there about 28 Feb 1944

4th movement
 Started Parang early part of March 1944, and returned there last part of March 1944.
20 110

As all of the crew were killed
the details are not clear

The operational movements were initiated
in Bengal Bay. About 10 Dec, it engaged
in mine-laying on the approaches to the
Salute Reef. In Dec, caused a
change in sink. Information about its
new base left uncertain since it left
Singapore at the beginning of Feb (3rd
movement).
TABLE OF RESULT

Oct 1943 to Sep 1944

ARABIA

- 5 Ships (127) in Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea between Nov 10 and Dec 15, 1943

HINDUSTAN

- 1 Ship (Roll) Feb 1944 in Bengal Bay

BIRMA

- 1 Ship (Roll) Dec 1943

AFRICA

- X (126) Jan 2, 1944
- X (126) Dec 29, 1943
- X (126) Dec 31, 1943

MALDIVES

- X (115) Oct

CHAGOS

- X (18) 30 March 1944

SIAM

- 185 Jan 16, 1944

SINGAPORE

- Roll I Dec 24, 1943

BURMA

- Roll II Mar 1944

MADAGASCAR

- (137) 10 Jan 1943
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs.

ARAKI, Sado, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: TAKATA, Toshitane

Having first duly sworn on oath as an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. Q. Briefly state the posts held by you.

A. From July 1, 1935, to November 15, 1937, I was on the staff of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, and had charge of matters connected with naval organization and personnel.

Thereafter I was staff officer of the fleet in the China waters, commander of the aircraft carrier "Soryu" and staff officer of the Second Fleet. After that from November 15, 1940, to July 14, 1942, I assumed the post of Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, and had charge of matters relating to naval armament and naval administration.

After that I served as staff officer of the Combined Fleet, staff officer of the Combined Fleet; commander on transition to the Combined Fleet and assistant of chief staff of the Combined Forces. February 15, 1945, up to the termination of the war I was Deputy Director, Naval Affairs Bureau, central Navy Ministry, and had charge of matters relating to the navy's preparation for war. I was a rear admiral when the war ended.

2. Q. What sort of office routine was handled in Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry?
A. 1) Naval preparations and matters relating to general naval administration.
2) Matters relating to warships, vessels, units, offices, and organization of schools and duties.
3) Matters relating to organization of warships, ships and units and service duties.
4) Matters relating to naval discipline and public morals.
5) Matters relating to maneuvers.
6) Matters relating to censorship.
7) Matters relating to ceremonies, etiquette, regulations on uniforms and garniture.
8) Matters relating to warships, vessels and ordnance and other war supplies in general.
9) Matters relating to martial law and defense.

The foregoing are items provided for in the Regulations Pertaining to the Organization of the Navy Ministry, but the nature of the duties are set out in detail in the Regulations Pertaining to the Functions of the Navy Ministry. Also the contents thereof were also classified in detail in the Table of the Division of Duties Navy Ministry Personnel.

3. Q. Since December 8, 1941, what section in the Navy Ministry handled matters pertaining to prisoners of war?
A. Section one of the Naval Affairs Bureau handled them.

4. Q. Were there any provision stating that matters relating to prisoners of war come within the jurisdiction of the Naval Affairs Bureau?
A. The words "prisoners of war" were not particularly used in the Ordinance on Organization of Ministry of Navy and Regulations Pertaining to the Functions of the Navy Ministry. But since matters relating to prisoners of war were embraced within the general matters concerning naval administration, (a) the task of preparing a draft for the establishment or revision of the various regulations concerning the handling of P.O.W. (b) Liaison work within Japan in connection with P.O.W. was undertaken by Section One Naval Affairs Bureau, and for that purpose regular personnel was assigned.

Furthermore, with respect to the handling of the prisoners of war as a matter of international routine affair, Section Two of the Naval Affairs Bureau acted as a reception organ.
5. Q. What were the standard of rules and customs in the Navy upon which the prisoners of war were handled?

A. It was based on international law, which was the standard upon which the Navy handled prisoners of war.

Regulations Pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. These were the procedures provided for until the prisoners of war captured by the Navy were turned over to the army.

It had been the practice since the Meiji Era and there were various regulations pertaining to it for the Navy to turn over the prisoners of war captured by it to the Army, and they were interned in the prisoners of war camp under the control of the War Minister.

6. Q. What sort of concrete measures were taken by the Navy so that it could work on the basis of international law?

A. On October 7, 1914, the Rules of Naval Warfare were promulgated. Article One provides:

"During wartime the Imperial warships may, according to this order, or other rules, regulations and provisions of treaties, capture at sea, and take all necessary measures against other acts of hostility in order to attain the object of the war. With respect to matters which are not provided for herein, the principles of international law shall be applied."

These were the basic rules and regulations.

The Japanese Navy had been giving suitable lectures in connection with international law at various schools conforming with the educational standard of such schools. Moreover, specialists in international law were dispatched to the fleet and gave lectures there on.

There were two civil officials in the Navy who were conversant with international law, and they were attached to the secretariat of the Navy Minister. They handled matters relating to international relations, and the opinions of these civil officials were not only respected, but if it became necessary either one of them, or a specialist like Dr. Jumpei Shinobu was dispatched to the fleet and he gave the necessary advice in the
disposition of questions involving international relations. After the outbreak of the China Incident the Navy Ministry frequently issued reference books advisory memorandum, telegrams of warning, etc. to the various naval units in connection with international law. The following were some of the principal books which were published and distributed to the various warships and naval units:

Outline of Wartime International Law
Tables appended to above
Supplement to above
Commentary on Naval Ministerial Order Guiding Men-of-War's Conduct in High-Sea and Foreign Territorial
Various Problems Pertaining to Rules of Naval Warfare
Laws & Regulations Relating to Naval Warfare of Various Nations in the War of 1939-1940 (12 volumes)

Among the various laws or reference books referred to above there was contained various treaties, advisory matters relating to prisoners of war.

7. Q. What authority had the Navy Minister in connection with the administration of P.O.W.?

A. The Navy Minister had authority to the rules for the administration of the prisoners of war. He drafted the Rules and Regulations Pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and provisions Relating to Supplies & Allowances of Prisoners of War. The Director of Naval Affairs Bureau, Director of Accounts and Supplies Bureau and Director of Legal Bureau were aides to the Navy Minister in connection with the adoption, revision or abolition of these rules and regulations.

The commander-in-chief of the naval station, commander-in-chief of guardianship and commander-in-chief of the fleet were in a position to enforce the administration of the prisoners of war on the basis of the regulations drafted by the Navy Minister. When prisoners of war were captured by any unit under the command of the foregoing commanders, the necessary regulations concerning their administration were fixed.

8. Q. I wish to ask you about the relations between the Navy Minister and the operation force. Was the Navy Ministry consulted by the Naval General Staff in connection with the operation orders issued to the operation force?
A. He was not consulted at all with regard to pure operations.

9. Q. Was the Navy Ministry ever consulted with regard to the submarine operations in the Pacific War?
   A. Never.

10. Q. With regard to matters concerning the prisoners of war at the zone of operation, were they disposed of as naval administration matters?
    A. In case of an actual engagement with the enemy, or in the case of an emergency corresponding thereto existing the matters were disposed of as operational matters.

11. Q. Under which of the foregoing matters did the administration of the prisoners of war in the various islands take form when Japanese troops were actually subjected to enemy attacks or constantly exposed to the dangers of enemy assault?
    A. It was disposed of as operational matter.

12. Q. What was the date when the Japanese force occupied Wake island in the early stage of the war?
    A. As I remember, it was on December 23, 1941.

13. Q. Were there any prisoners of war on the said island when it was occupied, and how many were there?
    A. I remember that the number of war prisoners was unexpectedly large, which surprised me. However, I do not remember the number.

14. Q. When and by whom was that report made?
    A. I recall that soon after the occupation, the commandor of Wake island operation force telegraphed to the commander-in-chief of the 4th fleet, and the commander-in-chief of the combined fleet. At the same time, the information was sent to the Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry.
15 Q. Who was the garrison commander on Wake island, and how many men were under his command?

The garrison commander on Wake island during my tenure as chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, was Navy Capt. Susumu Kawasaki, who was under the command of Vice Admiral Narumi Inouye, commander-in-chief of the 4th Fleet.

16 Q. What steps were taken to handle the prisoners of war on Wake island?

It was decided to transport them to Japan and deliver them to the army. In early part of January 1942 the Nitta Maru was dispatched to Wake island, and the prisoners of war placed on board.

17 Q. Has this regarded as a naval administration matter or an operational matter?

That it was inconvenient from the point of view of supply to leave a large number of prisoners of war on the islands in mid ocean so it was better to transport them quickly to Japan, was a naval administration matter. Whether or not it would hinder the general operations to send such a large type ship as the Nitta Maru to Wake island immediately after the opening of hostilities, or whether defense against enemy attack on the Nitta Maru could be prevented was an operational matter. That is to say, whether the Nitta Maru should be dispatched to Wake island or not was a matter which must be considered from both the naval administration and operation.

18 Q. Who ordered the movement of the Nitta Maru?

As I recall the Mobilization Bureau, an aide organ to the Navy Minister, drew up the plan of the movement after having obtained the approval of the sections and bureaus concerned in the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff, and the Navy Minister issued the command for its movement.

19 Q. What were the movements of the prisoners of war after they had been taken aboard the Nitta Maru?
15. Q. Who was the garrison commander on Take Island, and how many men were under his command?

A. The garrison commander on Take Island during my tenure as chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, was Navy Cpt. Suzumu Kawasaki, who was under the command of Vice Admiral Narumi Inouye, commander-in-chief of the 4th Fleet.

16. Q. What steps were taken to handle the prisoners of war on Take Island?

A. It was decided to transport them to Japan and deliver them to the army. In early part of January 1942 the Nitta Maru was dispatched to Take Island, and the prisoners of war placed on board.

17. Q. Was this regarded as a naval administration matter or an operational matter?

A. That it was inconvenient from the point of view of supply to leave a large number of prisoners of war on the islands in mid-ocean so it was better to transport them quickly to Japan, was a naval administration matter. Whether or not it could hinder the general operations to send such a large type ship as the Nitta Maru to Take Island immediately after the opening of hostilities, or whether defense against enemy attack on the Nitta Maru could be prevented was an operational matter. That is to say, whether the Nitta Maru should be dispatched to Take Island or not was a matter which must be considered from both the naval administration and operation.

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19. Q. What were the movements of the prisoners of war after they had been taken aboard the Nitta Maru?
as I remember, the Nitta Maru arrived in Japan about the middle of January, but pursuant to the request of the army the prisoners from Wake island were placed in a temporary prison camp in Shanghai, and they were transported to Rokusung direct from the Nitta Maru.

20. Q. Were the prisoners of war transported on the Nitta Maru all from Wake Island? How many were there?
A. They were not all. As I recall those transported on the Nitta Maru ran up to considerable number, but I do not know how many.

21. Q. What was the reason for the entire prisoners not being transported on the Nitta Maru?
A. At the time the Nitta Maru reached Wake Island (I do not remember the exact time) we received a telegram from the commanding officer on the spot saying that there were many prisoners of war whose transfer was difficult on account of their being ill, while there were quite a number who voluntarily wished to remain there. Subsequently the Navy Minister studied the problem of supply and international law questions. According to the opinion of a specialist in international law attached to the Navy Minister's Secretariat, the prisoners of war could remain after they have voluntarily signed a contract agreeing to engage in work which was not connected directly with combat. Therefore, we answered by cable to such effect and have each prisoner sign such an agreement which should be dispatched to the Navy Ministry. Furthermore, I recall that we received instructions which were issued, that as for those who were ill and could later be removed, and others who have completed their work and desired to be transported to Japan, could be so transported as soon as transportation was available.

22. Q. Did those contracts reach the Navy Ministry, and what became of the prisoners of war who had remained thereafter?
A. Up to the time of my resignation as Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, that is July 1st, 1942, those contracts did not reach us. Except for an episode, which I
Q. What was that episode?

23. A. The occupation force on Wake Island discovered huge amounts of construction materials and engineering machinery and construction engineers on the island. They were surprised to find an enormous quantity of these together with precision construction machinery. They immediately tried to use them and started to operate the bulldozers, but could not do so. While they were at a loss what to do, one of the American engineers, who was watching, by sign language waved aside the Japanese soldiers and ordered direct operation of the bulldozer. The story was that this was the motive which prompted some of the prisoners to re-encounter there.

24. Q. Do you know anything about the fact that several prisoners of war who had been placed on board the "Itta Maru" were executed enroute from Yokosuka to Foochow between the middle and the end of January 1942?

A. I do not know anything about it. At that time not only was there no reply, but I do not recall hearing of any subsequently.

25. Q. What was the situation with respect to meting out of punishments to the prisoners of war?

A. There was a law called the P.O.W. punishment law, and the Naval Regulations Pertaining to the Treatment of War Prisoners which clarified following point, namely:

If it was a disciplinary measure the commander of the naval authorities who actually had the prisoners interned applied the provisions of the Naval Disciplinary Regulations. In case of a penal measure, the naval authorities investigated as executive naval judicial prosecuting officer (kaigun shiho keisatsu kan) turned over the case to the prosecutor of the nearest court-martial who would try the case.

26. Q. Did you see the detailed Regulations for the Punishment of Prisoners of War established by the transport commander of the "Itta Maru", or did you receive a report thereof?

A. I knew nothing about it at that time, nor did we become aware of it until recently.
heard, concerning the prisoners of war remaining on Wake Island, I do not recall receiving any report.

Q. What was that episode?

23. A. The occupation force on Wake Island discovered huge amounts of construction materials and engineering machinery and construction engineers on the island. They were amazed to find an enormous quantity of these together with precision construction machinery. They immediately tried to use them and started to operate the bulldozers, but could not do so. While they were at a loss what to do, one of the American engineers, who was watching, by sign language waved aside the Japanese soldiers and ordinarily operated the bulldozers. The story was that this was the motive which prompted some of the prisoners to return there.

24. Q. Do you know anything about the fact that several prisoners of war who had been placed on board the Nitta Maru were executed enroute from Yokohama to Foochow between the middle of January and the end of January 1942?

A. I do not know anything about it. At that time not only was there no reply, but I do not recall hearing of any subsequently.

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26. Q. Did you see the detailed Regulations for the Punishment of Prisoners of War established by the transport command of the Nitta Maru, or did you receive a report thereof?

A. We knew nothing about it at that time, nor did we become aware of it until recently.
27. Q. Who set up the temporary prison camps and selected their sites?

A. The commanders-in-chief of the fleet, naval station and minor naval station, who received the prisoners of war, set up the prison camps pursuant to the Regulations for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

28. Q. Who set up the Ofuna temporary prison camp? Do you know what was the occasion when you became aware of its establishment?

A. The Ofuna temporary prison camp was established by the Yokosuka Naval Station. I learned of it for the first time when the Yokosuka Naval Station submitted the papers to the Navy Ministry requesting appropriation in connection with the construction of the Ofuna temporary prison camp. I remember that it was a short time before I resigned as Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau.

29. Q. Did you, during your tenure in the Naval Affairs Bureau, receive reports or protests that the prisoners of war at Ofuna temporary prison camp were mistreated or driven to hard labor, or that patients were not given adequate medical treatment?

A. There were absolutely no reports on such matters, nor have I heard it from other sources.

On this 27th day of August, 1947
at Tokyo

Deponent /s/ TAKATA, Toshitane (seal)

I, Somiya Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto, in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo

Witness: /s/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing, adding nothing.

/s/ TAK:TAH, TOSHI:NA (seal)
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: YAMAMOTO Yoshio

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby deposite as follows.

YAMAMOTO, Yoshio
443, 2-chome Koonji, Suginami-ku, Tokyo.

1. Q. What posts did you occupy since December 8, 1941?

A. I was staff officer of the Fleet in the China Waters on December 8, 1941. On February 5, 1942 I was in the Naval General Staff and concurrently the Navy Ministry. From February 12, 1942, I was ordered for duty in the Naval Affairs Bureau and was engaged in studying the reorganization of the naval system. On July 14, 1942, I succeeded my predecessor TAKADA, Shitano, and assumed the post of Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, and held the said post until July 9, 1945. At the time of the war’s end I was Rear Admiral of the Navy.

2. Q. During the wartime did the Navy Ministry issue any instructions concerning the handling of the prisoners of war?

A. Instructions were issued by telegrams and correspondence with respect to the handling of the prisoners of war.
3. Q. Where were these directed to by the Navy Ministry?

A. Headquarters of the Naval Base, Headquarters of Minor Naval Station and Headquarters of the Fleet.

4. Q. Do you know where these original telegrams were filed and if they are now available?

A. The originals were in the custody of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry, but they were all lost in the fire in the air raid on May 25, 1945.

5. Q. Can you recall the substance of their contents?

A. I can recall the following facts from memory:

Orders were
a) issued on December 1941. The supervision of the prisoners of war was to be in the hands of the Army, and the Navy was to administer them until they were turned over to the Army. This was set forth in Regulations Pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, but the orders were made to call attention to the existence thereof.

b) As prisoners were captured in the southern combat zone from January 1942 to February, instructions were issued to transport them to Japan.

c) As there were quite a number of deaths among the prisoners of war due to influenza at the Sasebo temporary prison camp from December 1942 to the spring of 1943, orders were issued to the Sasebo Naval Station two or three times to make an investigation of the state of affairs. Moreover attention was called respecting the food situation, which was reported as low.

d) October 1943, Instruction issued to transfer to the Army a considerable number of prisoners from Sasebo.

e) December 1944. Instructions issued to make a survey and report on the condition of the prisoners of war held outside of Japan. The condition of the prisoners outside of Japan was to have been reported in accordance with the Regulations Pertaining to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, but due to the difficulties encountered in traffic and communications many of the reports did not reach Tokyo.
and caused the office routine in handling them to bog down. Therefore in order to straighten out the materials now instructions were sent out to make a survey. Despite the foregoing instructions reports did not arrive. 

Still

1) March 1945. If prisoners were interned by the troops stationed abroad they were instructed to turn them over to the nearest army units as quickly as possible.

6. Q. Do you know where the prisoners captured by the Navy were placed during the war?

A. I understand that the prisoners captured by the Navy were stationed at Wake island, Rabaul, Ambon, Makassar and Haiphong. However, most of the prisoners on Wake island were first sent to Woosung, Shanghai, in early 1942, and later one portion was transported to Japan and delivered to the Army, and a small portion remained to engage in engineering works. I also understand that the prisoners in Rabaul were sent to Japan and turned over to the army.

7. Q. Do you know whether there were prisoners held in other areas?

A. I do not know as there were no reports received from any other place.

8. Q. Had you heard that the prisoners in Wake island had been mistreated?

A. No.

9. Q. Do you know that under date of August 21, 1943, the American Government dispatched a list of 40 names of prisoners on Wake island whose whereabouts were unknown.

A. No. It do not.

10. Q. Do you know that the American Government has made inquiries about the tidings of the prisoners of war on Wake island as follows:

-3-
I receive no information concerning such inquiries.

11. Did you ever see any other inquiries with regard to the tidings of the prisoners on Wake Island?

I do not recall any inquiries from any place other than the reply to the inquiry from the Japanese Office that there were a few prisoners remaining on Wake Island, which was made by my predecessor in office in 1942.

12. Was there a report from Rear Admiral Sakibara, Commander of the Wake Garrison, about October 1943, with regard to the prisoners who remained on that island?

Report came directly to the Fourth Fleet, but at the same time telegraphic report came to the Navy Ministry, Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet.

13. What was their nature of the request?

At that time there was a bombardment of Wake Island by the American task force. The situation was such that with the continuance of the bombardment the landing of American troops was expected. In consequence the American prisoners of war thereupon started a mass riot, therefore they were shot. That was the substance of the telegram.

14. With respect to this, what sort of action was taken by the Navy Ministry?
4. As for the Navy Ministry it was not in a position to take any direct measure as no action was taken. However, it was watching what action would be taken by the superior officers, the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Fleet.

15. Q. Where was the headquarters of the 4th Fleet at that time?
A. True.

16. Q. What was the condition of traffic and communications between Wake, Truk and Tokyo at that time?
A. There were contacts by wireless, but sea-borne traffic could not be conducted unless at considerable risk of danger.

17. Q. Was there any report from the 4th Fleet with respect to the conduct of the commanding officer on Wake Island later?
A. There were no reports, whatever. From the end of 1943 the South Sea Islands were being attacked by the American air force and navy, therefore the 4th Fleet was exposed to severe desperate battles. In view of these state of affairs it was impossible to press for reports and cause investigations to be made.

18. Q. Was a court-martial set up in the 4th Fleet at that time?
A. Yes.

19. Q. Did the 4th Fleet take any step in putting this case before the court-martial?
A. As for the Navy Ministry its position remained indefinite because there was no report. With the capture of the various South Sea Islands one after another, the occupation of Wake Island became imminent and despite the fact that the entire garrison was prepared for a mass self-destruction, there was no way in which the combined fleet or the 4th fleet could rescue this garrison unit. In view of these circumstances, we could not summon the commanding officer to the headquarters of the 4th fleet for the purpose of investigation, or to shift the commander and place him before a court-martial for trial.
20. Q. Do you know Commander OKI, staff officer of the Naval General Staff?
A. Yes, I do.

21. Q. In the early part of October 1942, did you or any one orally in the naval affair Bureau instruct or send word to Vice Admiral Abe, commander on Kwajalein island, through staff officer Okada or some other member of the Naval General Staff to execute the prisoners in Kwajalein on the spot?
A. Absolutely not. The Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry was not concerned with staff officer Okada's trip to the south seas. Also the Naval Affairs Bureau was not aware that there were prisoners of war on Kwajalein island at that time.

As for the Navy it always issues orders or instructions by telegrams or in writing, and has absolutely never entrusted anybody with verbal orders. Also according to the setup in the Navy the Navy Ministry could not give orders or instructions direct to Rear Admiral Abe as the commanding officer on the spot.

22. Q. Were protests received in connection with the sinking of allied powers' merchant ships by Japanese submarines in the India Ocean during the war and the perpetration of atrocities on the survivors?
A. I do not remember the date and the number of times the protests were received, but we did receive some.

23. Q. What steps were taken at the time of the receipt of these protests?
A. The parties in charge of the submarines were asked to an investigation of those connected with it. Inasmuch as the matter involved operations the investigation was required to the Naval General Staff and the fact was thoroughly investigated. But as they reached the conclusion that since the Japanese submarines were not involved in the protests we replied to such effect to the Foreign Office.

24. Q. Was any investigation made after the war with respect to the foregoing facts?
A. There was an inquiry from GHQ so the principal parties of the surviving submarine crew and those connected with the matter at the time were investigated but such fact could not be established and we replied to that effect. The text of the documents and appended table dated Dec 5, 1945, signed on behalf of Bureau Chief Nakamura, en
Def Doc No. 2142

"Reply to the Matter of the Merchant Ship sunk in the Indian Ocean by the Imperial Japanese Submarines" addressed to Col. Allen of GHQ was our reply.

25. Who administered the temporary prison camp in Ofuna?
   A. Yokosuka Naval Station.

26. Who appointed the superintendent of the prison camp?
   A. I do not know the details, but I think commanding officer of the Minor Naval Station in Yokosuka under the jurisdiction of the Yokosuka Naval Station appointed some suitable subordinate.

27. Was the appointment of the prison camp superintendent reported to the Navy ministry?
   A. Such a matter was within the province of the Yokosuka Naval Station and no report was made to the Navy ministry.

28. What sort of a report was made by the Yokosuka Naval Station?
   A. There was a report on the personnel in the prison camp, their names, ranks, and other matters designated in the Regulations Pertaining to the Handling of the Prisoners of War.

29. Did you ever receive any report that the prisoners in the Ofuna temporary prison camp were mistreated, or that the prisoner patients did not receive adequate medical attention?
   A. No. such report ever came in during my tenure in office.

On this 15 day of August 1947
At Tokyo.

I, SOMIYA, Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.
/S/ YAMAMOTO, Yoshio (seal)
の主管は陸軍で海军は陸海に引き渡す措置を定的に管理するものである。その手続き及び取扱は新しく指示したもののがある。

一九三五年一月から一九三六年に亘り陸海軍作戦地で俘虜を得たので

内地方面へ輸送するよう指示されたものであります。
一九四二年春にかけた佐世保の相当と言う所の俘虜収容所で俘虜が流行性感冒で死亡するものが多かった

食糧等につき注意を要起しました。佐世保相当の俘虜を陸海軍に移管すべき指示が為され

外地方に於ける俘虜状況を要査報告すべきことの指示が為され

まして外地方に於ける俘虜の状況は俘虜取扱い規則に基づって報告

する事とされているましたのが交通通信困難の為の報告の到着

しないものが多く事務処理上大変不都合が多かったので新に資料
「ウ」キー島「ラパールー」「アンボン」「マカッサル」及び海南

（へ）一九四五年三月

かわらず依然として報告は編りませんでした。

かに最寄陸上部隊に移管すべきことを指示されました等でありません。

七、間隔方は戦時中海軍の拿捕した俘虜は何処で何屋にあったか承知して

其の後一部を連送して居りました。又「ラパールー」及び海南に

木工事に従事して居りました。而して陸上に引渡されたことを知って居りましたか

何処かは知つておもたか

八、間隔方の知ってゐた地区の俘虜が虐殺を受けたことを隠さずにたか

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十二、元一九四三年十月頃ウエリー島守備隊指揮官酒井原少将より残留し

十三、間其内容は

十四、間之に対し海軍省はどういふ措置を採りましたか

十五、間当時トラックです

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二十一、答知つてきます

二十、同に司令部参謀海軍少佐岡田貞外茂を知っておりますか

エゼリリン島のふれは、アレル島の他に海軍に対し一

答左述の事はありませぬ。岡田参謀が海部に出張したのは海軍省

布局には関係ありませんが、命令を発した上にただ到達した海軍

の島长を現地海軍布局のアレル島の命令を受けて居りません

と申す事は制度上出来ないものであります。
二十七、間収容所長の任命は海軍省へ報告がありましたか

二十八、間収容所の受政は適当な事が報告されませんでしたか

三十九、間収容所の役職が適当な役職を受けたかどうかを記憶して居りませんか

答　私の在任中左様なことを聞いたことはありません

以上
 unidentified
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Depositor: I. KONDO, Jotaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, KONDO, Jotaro, am presently living in Tokiwa-Machi, Urawa-City, Saitama Prefecture.

I was born in Nagano Prefecture on the 13th November, 1894, and graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University in July, 1920. From January, 1942 to July, 1945, I was the Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture.

I wish to make the following statements concerning Exhibit No. 1969, "the Report concerning Labour Conditions of the Prisoners of War."

(1) This is a copy of the report which I had sent to the Eastern Army Commander for his reference. This report was made originally in my name to the Home and Eastern Ministers whose jurisdiction I was under as the Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture.

I was under no obligation to report to the Eastern Army Commander.

I presume that the headquarters of the Eastern Army transmitted to the War Ministry, the report which I had sent there for reference.

(2) The report gave the fact that the employment of the P.W.'s for labor brought about a favorable impression upon the Japanese people especially labourers.
Def. Doc. # 24/25

(3) Written in the last paragraph of this report is the following:

"Of course, we did not make any public announcement the employment of the PW's for labor, but the people found out that the PW's were at work by unintentional observation of their trips between the work shop and the camp ....... As such, it was the personal opinion expressed casually by some passer-by who happened to witness the PW's on their way to and from work. It was never intended to use the PW's for public display.

I had never received any instruction or suggestion from my superiors and others to expose the PW's for public view. I gave no such instruction or suggestion to the local parties concerned.

(4) In short, this report was made to the Home and Welfare Ministers, the higher authorities, by the prefectural government, compiling informations received customarily from various local organs. A copy of this report was sent to the Eastern Army Commander just for his reference. No special significance was attached to this report.

On this 15th day of August, 1947.
At 10-28, Tokiwa-Machi, Umeda-City.

Deponent /S/ KONDO, Jotaro (seal)

I, /S/ ABE, Akira, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ ABE, Akira (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KONDO, Jotaro (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

versus

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Docket: SUGITA, Kasuji.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
Affidavit of SUGITA, Kazuji

1. I am SUGITA, Kazuji, by name, born on 31 March 1904, living at present at No. 174 Kitazawa 2 Chôme, Setagayakm, Tokyo. I entered the preparatory course of the Military Academy and besides studying in the U.S. and Britain, I served various posts before the outbreak of the Pacific War, when I became a staff officer of the 25th Army under the command of General YAMASHITA and kept the post till I got a new appointment as a staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters on 23 April 1942.

During that period, I held the post of the Chief of the Intelligence Staff till 16 March 1942 and then the officer with the British Army for about a month after the fall of Singapore.

Since the middle of March 1942, till my transference to Tokyo I was the Chief of the Operation Staff.

2. The instructions issued by the Commanding General of the Army YAMASHITA at the start of the Malayan Campaign emphasized the foremost principle of making friends with the native people. On the fall of Singapore we were made to see to it that an exemplary occupation work should be carried out with no hitch in taking over the city in consideration of the great repercussion of the fall of the city...
not only over the southern native people but to every nation in the world. (His instructions were burned up). While we were acting upon the instruction, the General urged General Percival to surrender early instead of going on with their resistance that involved so much bloodshed of townsfolk. In his written summons to surrender, which, I think is in the hands of the British Army. A promise was also made on the occasion of the interview between General YAMASHITA and General Percival that the British noncombatants and womenfolk would be protected.

3. During the attack on Singapore, the Japanese Army also sustained much loss (60% of that throughout the whole Malayan Campaign) and tension between Britain and Japan was so intense after the fall of Singapore, general sentiment of our soldiers against Chinese merchants grow worse as the Chinese obstructed our operations a great deal as the operation proceeded.

The following are examples of Chinese merchants' obstruction:

a. Toward the end of December 1941, a hundred or more of armed Chinese merchants took stand in a northern forest with the aim of disturbing commissary lines and burning our munitions as well.
B. In the end of December 1941, during the battle near Cambar, frequent signal shells were seen shooting in the night from around our troops. And upon investigation it was learned that this was done by Chinese merchants.

c. In the middle of January 1942, in the battle near Guemasa (TN7) and Soganot (TN7) as well as at the time of the enemy air raids on Kuala Rumpur, signal shells were again shot up to show the way for enemy fire and planes, which were later made clear also to have been the tricks of Chinese merchants.

Also in the middle of January 1942, when the Japanese Imperial Guards Division was crossing river, they helped to guide enemy planes on night raids.

d. In the middle of January 1942, when the aforementioned Division was fighting near Maraooa and Batbahat (TN7), Chinese merchants aided enemy submarines lying off the coast. They sheltered, guided and defended the secret agents who came from the submarines, making the enemy fire from the Maraooa Sea easy and advantageous.

e. At many places military communication wires were cut up. All through the while the commanding General of the Army did not make any change in the instruction given at the start of war, but only put more stress on the strict punishment
of those whose obstructions of our operations were beyond doubt.

And his attitude was stern toward ill behavior of Japanese officers and men. An investigation made after the termination of war disclosed that the army commander issued an order on 17 February 1942. This order was purely an operational one with the aim of mopping up the Chinese merchants of enemy character lurking in and around the city, and intending to deal them a decisive blow.

As for me, I witnessed neither the actual mopping up nor even a single corpse. I have heard that there was some evidence that 5,000 Chinese were killed but Japanese officers told me that 5,000 was a much too large an estimate. I heard later that the General Headquarters of the Japanese Forces in the Southern Regions thought that the mopping up tactics should not have been used and was not ordered by them.

Lt. General MUTO, who came to the Southern Area in the latter part of March 1942, expressed his view that the mopping up tactics should not have been used, also.

I don't remember anything of my interview with Major General Newbegin (TN) and Colonel Wilde on 22 February 1942 about which Colonel Wilde testified.

Immediately after the fall of Singapore conferences and arrangements were so frequent in order to prevent mishaps,
divergences, and misunderstandings between Japan and Britain (in view of lack of experience of occupation works on our side and language difficulty) that it was the latter part of February before the occupation operated smoothly.

In the island of Singapore, the British Forces were allocated for internment to Changi and Indian soldiers to Nieson (TN) and other areas and there existed considerable confusion.

It was highly difficult task to concentrate the British soldiers stationed on separate islands, but efforts were made to prevent accidents in conformity with the order of the Commanding General of the Army. The British Forces, if my memory serves me right, carried foodstuffs in good quantity for themselves, using their own automobiles (some 10), trucks (some 50) and hydro-automobiles (some 10).

They were driving about 20 trucks a day to carry foodstuffs by themselves from the wharf of Singapore, but those trucks (except a few) were, I heard, confiscated about the middle of March.

The ordinary townsfolk as well as womenfolk detained in private houses in the northern part of Singapore at the beginning were taken toward the end of February to the Changi Prison. At that time Japanese Forces were so pressed in the preparations for the next operation while British POW's were quite at leisure that some of the Japanese soldiers asked, "Which is the winner?"

I remember, too, of General YAMASHITA's inspection.
in the camps about the beginning or middle of March 1942, when he shook hands with Lt. General Percival who expressed thanks to General YAMASHITA. Till the first part of February or March 1942, the great majority of the prisoners were engaged in improving the prison and in preparing for cultivation of crops to support themselves, bathing at intervals in the sea. Since the beginning of March hundreds of prisoners were coming back and forth by autos from Changi all the time for the purpose of cleaning the city of Singapore, which proved so inconvenient that the plan was changed so as to transfer part of them to the city from Changi and preparations for it were under way. What became of it, however, I cannot tell, for then I shifted to different post and in addition I travelled to Sumatra on official business.

5. Of the Hospital Alexander incident, I got no information at that time. About 12 or 13 March, the date on which Colonel Wilde testified that this occurred, the front line was not advanced as far as the said hospital.

6. I acknowledge the Exhibit 476, namely the document consisting of "Outline of the investigation on inhumanities during the Malayan Campaign" and other four parts, except the part made of two leaves of Japanese paper copied from excerpts of Diary of 18 February. These documents were availed of by the 4th squad of Prisoners Investigation.
Committee. Among them, "the State of Punishment of Chinese merchants at Singapore (23 October 1942)" was written mainly by myself at first. But as it proved insufficient further study was made and it was revised as "Outline of the investigation on inhumanities during the Malayan Campaign of 23 November written chiefly by myself, assisted by Major HASHIZUME.

But a number of insertions and cancellations on the documents were made by other hands. I drafted them and presented them, as noted on the first page, to the Central Prisoners Investigation Committee and to the Prisoners Investigation Board. Whether these organs adopted them or not I cannot ascertain from the documents. I am not sure of whose hands are these notes such as "deleted" or "see attached papers" entered with pencil on the documents.

On this 24th day of July, 1947
At Defense, I.M.T.F.E., ICHIGAYA, Tokyo.

DEPONENTS: SUGITA, Kazui (seal)

No. 174 KITAZAWA NI-CHOME, SETAGAYA Ward, Tokyo-City.

I, SUGITA, Kazui, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereeto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Defense, I.M.T.F.E., ICHIGAYA, Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KORETSUNE, Tasumi (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUGITA, Kazuji (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUGITA, Kazuji (seal)
ル...附近...近衛師団...沿河...隊...隠借...八段橋...夜囲撃...防衛...

昭和十七年一月中旬を以て下句近衛師団...マッカー...バトバト...附近ノ...

防衛...保全...任...マッカー...海面...ス...面...隠借...

防衛...保全...マッカー...海面...ス...面...隠借...

防衛...保全...マッカー...海面...ス...面...隠借...

防衛...保全...マッカー...海面...ス...面...隠借...

防衛...保全...マッカー...海面...ス...面...隠借...

防衛...保全...マッカー...海面...ス...面...隠借...
Translated by
Defence Languages Branch

(Cover)

Instructions to Japanese Soldiers
at the Front

Censored by the War Ministry
(TN: 1943)
January 20, 16th year of Showa

(Army Order, No. 1)
Let this book be used as a guide in raising moral at the front.

War Minister, TOJO, Hidoki
January 8, 16th year of Showa (TN: 1941)
Instructions to Japanese Soldiers at the Front

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Instructions to the Japanese Soldiers

at the Front

Introduction

The battle-field is the place where the Imperial Army, in obedience to the Imperial command, should convey impress the enemy, with the august virtue of His Majesty by displaying its true spirit, capturing whatever it attacks, gaining victory whenever it fights, and propagating widely KODO (THE way of the Imperial grace) wherever it goes.

All soldiers at the front, therefore, are expected of to firmly comply with the mission of our country, strictly observe moral principles of the Imperial Army, and exalt the prestige of our Empire throughout the world.

The essence of the soldiers spirit is clearly shown in the Imperial Instructions to the soldiers and a basic outline on fighting and training are given in the General Principles of the manual. However, the actual condition's at the front are such that the soldiers, often become too absorbed in matters of the present and are apt to forget the essentials and fall short of their duties and dignity as military men. We must be well guarded against this pitfall. From our past experiences, therefore, it is now desired to show the standard of actual behavior expected of all the men, in hopes that perfect observance of the Imperial Instructions at the front shall be observed thereby enhancing the morals of our Imperial Army.
Such is the true aim of the following instructions.

Essentials Part I

I KOKOKU (TN: Imperial Land)

TAI HIPPON is the KOKOKU (TN: -- an Empire reigned over by His Majesty the Emperor), a country ruled over by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal, and reigning forever in accordance with the Imperial policy which was established at the time of the foundation of the Empire. The Imperial grace and majesty reaches over entire humanity and enwraps like the sun the whole universe. We the subjects, on our part, have adhered from generation to generation to the virtues of loyalty, filial piety and bravery, and have rendered service in the fulfillment of the Imperial mission and the vindication of the moral way of our Empire. United in one body with the Emperor, we have worked out our national growth and prosperity.

All officers and men at the front, realize the intrinsic spirit of our national policy, and maintain an indomitable belief in it, so that you may devote yourselves to the fulfillment of your great duty to protect and maintain this glorious Empire.
II The Imperial Army

The Army is under the supreme command of His Majesty the Emperor, and by embodying the spirit of "SHIJBUN" (TN: martial spirit of God) in its action, charges itself with the duty of enhancing the majesty and virtue of our Empire and maintaining the prosperity of our Imperial Throne.

The spirit which is righteous, brave and benevolent, and which, in compliance with His Majesty's mind, strives for the realization of world harmony, is the very spirit of "SHIJBUN". Martial spirit should be resolute, and benevolence impartial. Should an enemy resist our Imperial Army, yield the sword bravely to their utter submission. Even though your military might overcomes the enemy, your martial virtue will not be perfect if you are devoid of the virtue of benevolence to forgive those who submit and to love those who obey. Martial spirit should not be haughty and benevolence not ostentatious. The virtues of bravery and benevolence are noble only when they flow naturally and spontaneously from one's self. The true province of the Imperial Army lies in the execution of justice tempered with mercy so that the universal virtues of His Majesty shall be looked up to by all.

III Military Discipline

The pith of the Imperial military discipline exists in the sublime spirit of absolute obedience to His Majesty the Commander-in-Chief.
Every person, high or low, should realize from the Exaltation of supreme command. The higher should be strict in the execution of the entrusted Imperial Command, and the lower sincere and loyal in the obedience thereunto. The vital requisite to victory and for securing public peace is the firm unity of the Army obtained through its single-hearted loyalty to the Emperor and perfect consolidation and coordination under a single, supreme command.

The front is especially the place for military men to put utmost practice to their sublime spirit of absolute obedience, that enables our military men to conduct themselves duly in the face of a life-and-death struggle and, at a command, to march forward joyously to death, to the silent consummation of their supreme obedience and self-sacrifice, in the quintessence of our Imperial martial spirit.

IV Unity

The Imperial Army looks up to His Majesty the Commander-in-Chief as its head. All military men should comply with His Majesty's gracious mind, and by attaining harmony among themselves through their unanimous loyalty to the Throne, should realize complete unity of the whole Army.

Each unit in the Army should, in conformity with the basic principle of supreme command, establish a strong unity in it, permeated, however, with a peaceful harmony, with its commander as its center. Military men of all ranks, high or low, should be strict in discharging their several duties and obedient to their commander's will, and while trusting in others and...
standing aloof from cares of earthly life and interests, should be ready to sacrifice their individual selves for the sake of the whole.

V Co-operation

All soldiers should be united in discharging their several duties and at the same time should be ready to sacrifice themselves joyfully for the sake of the victory of the whole Army.

Each unit should reciprocally respect the duty and honor of other units. Put trust in and give assistance to one another. Take up difficult tasks voluntarily, and through co-operation and harmony, make every effort for the accomplishment of the common aim.

VI Fighting Spirit

Fighting should be done resolutely and dauntlessly always consistent with fighting spirit.

In attacking, be positive and decisive, always take the initiative, and fight it out with a hardy and indomitable spirit until you completely overcome your enemy. Even when on the defensive, you should keep alive the edge of offensive spirit and never fail to secure the initiative in action. Do not yield your position to the enemy even if it means death. Pursue the enemy resolutely and thoroughly to the very end.

Be daring and courageous, and fear nothing. Meet hardship with boldness and composure, overcome difficulties with an indomitable spirit and surmounting every obstacle, devote yourselves to reach your final goal of victory.
VII Faith of Victory

Faith is might. One who fights dauntlessly with firm faith always wins.

Faith in certain victory arises from a constant and indefatigable self-training of determination to the death. In your time by all means devote yourselves to the utmost to the cultivation of unfailing power for winning victory.

The issue of the present war will decide the future of our Empire. Bear in mind your duty and responsibility to the tradition of a "Hundred battles, a hundred victories, reflect the gloryfilled history of your army and never cease fighting until victory is won."
Essentials Part II

I Piety

Divine spirits witness our deeds from above. Ever be just, honest and pious and be loyal to the Emperor and dutiful to parents, so that you may be deserving of divine protection from Heaven.

II Filial Piety

The essence of loyalty to the ruler and filial devotion to the parents is the essence of our national morality, and this explains the fact that those who are loyal to the Emperor invariably are dutiful to their parents.

Then you are to be front, bow your parent's wishes deeply in mind and devote your lives to the cause of loyalty to the Emperor, thereby rendering illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

III The Salute and Departure

The salute manifests the genuine spirit of obedience and is the indication of the unity of superiors and subordinates. Especially, punctilious salutes are required at the front.

Punctiliousness and uprightness of deportment which issues from a courteous personality is the proof of one's trustworthiness as military men.

IV Comradeship

Comradeship is the way of all military men to unite in one in life and death--building trust in each another, cultivating
moral strength through mutual and constant contact, and giving
assistance in cases of need, and warning against wrong and
misconduct—all for the fulfillment, in concordant co-operation,
of their duties as military men.

V Exemplification by the Leaders

Those of higher ranks should, in all circumstances,
set themselves as examples for their subordinates. If the
superiors are not proper, disorder would necessarily follow
among the subordinates.

Action is valued at the front. Lead the men personally
with firm determination.

VI Responsibility

Duty is sacred. Responsibility is grave. Do not slight
a single task, a single duty. Devote your soul, exert your over
effort and use all the means in your power for the best possible
accomplishment of your duty.

The one with the strongest sense of responsibility is truly
the most courageous man in the battle-field.

VII View on Life and Death

That which annihilates the bounds between life and death
is the sublime spirit of self-sacrifice and service.

Transcend life and death, and devote yourselves to the
fulfilment of your duty. Rejoice in the life of everlasting
loyalty and patriotism which is to be attained through the
serenity of the soul reached after the supreme exertion of
all bodily and mental efforts.
VIII Honor

A man of honor is strong. Keep always in mind the honor of your families and native communities, and strive hard to fulfill their expectations.

Prefer death to a shameful life of captivity. Never leave a disgraceful name behind you at death.

IX Simplicity and Fortitude

Regulate your life at the front with stern simplicity, and promote thereby the spirit of fortitude and military morale.

Life at the front must necessarily be plain in mode. Practice economy and self-denial in everything, remembering that privation and inconveniences are common in the battle-field. Luxury slackens a valiant spirit.

X Integrity and Purity

Integrity and purity is the basis of our chivalrous ideal. How can a man unable to restrain himself from worldly desires, offer himself to the cause of our Emirate?

Control yourself with coldness and severity. Be fair and just in dealing with matters. Act with a clean conscience in the sight of gods and men.
I. Admonitions at the Front

1) Calamity falls even in unguarded moments. Be always prepared against unexpected contingencies.

Do not despise the enemies and natives. Neither be content with a small measure of success or neglect your further duties. Mind that misfortune comes also from negligence.

2) Be careful in guarding military secrets. Spies are always about you.

3) The duty of a sentry is grave. He is charged with the fate of an army, and represents the military discipline of a unit to which he belongs. He should thoroughly understand the gravity of his duty and fulfill it with a stern sense of responsibility. Against a sentry's status should be deeply respected.

4) Ideological warfare plays an important role in modern war. Have an unshakable conviction in the Japanese Empire and exert yourselves not only to confound the enemy's deceitful propaganda but to take an active part in the vindication of our KODO (The Imperial Way).

5) False rumors have their origin in lack of conviction. Do not waver but always be firm. Have confidence in the real power of the Imperial Army, and trust your superior officers.

6) Pay regard in the custody of enemy assets and properties. Requisition, confiscation and destruction of supplies should be carried out always only on orders of the commanding.
officer according to regulations.

7) Following the basic principle of the Imperial Army, love and protect innocent native people with benevolence.

8) While at the front, never become addicted to sexual pleasures or forget yourselves being carried away by selfish desires, so that you will not mar the prestige of the Imperial Army or soil your honor offered in service of the Emperor. Be strictly prudent and make every effort not to stain the integrity and purity of our military men.

9) Control your anger and discontentment. "Think of anger as an onion." says an old teaching. A momentary fit of passion often results in lingering resentment.

The severity of Military Law aims especially at the maintenance of the honor of military men and upholding the prestige of the Imperial Army. Always remember the determination and devotion you have embarked for the front; think of the sincere affection of your parents, wife and children; and even as a joke do not expose yourself to crime.

II Etiquette and Good Behavior at the Front.

1) According to the tradition of our military spirit, devote yourselves constantly to cultivating martial virtues and skill.

"Never get tired of whatever you are engaged in," said a certain general of the old days.

2) Free yourselves from family cares for the sake of concentrated devotion to the Imperial cause, and always keep your person and personal possessions clean and orderly so that...
you may, on your death, leave good impressions behind. All military men should be ready to die in the battle-field, and your families should be given previous warnings not to be disturbed even if your remains fail to be sent home.

3) It is to be most regretted for military men to die of diseases at the front. Be strictly careful about your health so that you may not fail through intemperance in the performance of your public service.

4) Be as prudent as the ancient warriors who valued their swords as their own souls and horses as their own treasures. At the front, always treat your arms and other supplies with respect, and take good care of horses.

5) Morality at the front is the source of fighting power. Be considerate always of the convenience of others—write also an never monopolize on lodgings and supplies.

It is said that, "A fowl that takes off from water never leaves it muddy." Do desire to leave honorable and everlasting fame of the valiant and admirable Imperial Army even in the remotest regions of foreign countries.

6) It is a lofty character desired in military men not to boast of their own meritorious deeds but to credit others with honor.

Never be jealous of the advancement of others. Do not begrudge if your merits are not appreciated but think of the deficiency of your own sincerity.

7) Be sincere and honest in every matter and be ashamed of telling lies and exaggerations.
8) Always maintain manliness befitting a citizen of a great nation, and by taking up the cause of justice, exalt the prestige of our Empire throughout the world.

International etiquette should also be fully observed.

9) In case you are allowed to return home by Imperial order after living through many fatal battles, think first of those who sacrificed themselves for the sake of the Empire. Set good examples to the public by your prudent conduct and redouble your resolution to render further service to the Imperial Throne.

Conclusion

All of the fervent are based on the spirit of the Imperial Instructions to Military Men and aim at serving the supreme end of the same. Therefore, these should be held as the standard of practical morals at the front thereby attaining full observance of the Imperial Instructions.

All officers and men at the front should firmly comply with the purpose of this book and, excelling in devotion to public service, should fulfill their duties as military men so that they may respond to the profound and gracious favor of His Majesty the Emperor.
Certificate of the Distribution of Document

I, chief of the Document Section, the First Demobilization Bureau, the Demobilization Office, certify that the "Instructions to Japanese Soldiers at the Front" appended herewith, consisting of thirty-two pages, and printed in the Japanese language, is a document distributed to officers and men of the entire army as Army Order No. 1, on July 8, 16th year of Showa (TN: 1941).

The sixth day of the first month, the twenty-second year of Showa (TN: 1947).

Tokyo: MIYAMA, Yozo
Chief of the Document Section, the First Demobilization Bureau.

I certify that the above seal and signature were affixed in my presence.

On the same day and at the same place:

Witness: TAFARA, Keiji
Certificate of the Formation of Document

I, chief of the Documents Section, the First Demobilization Bureau, the Demobilization Office, certify that the publication entitled "Instructions to Japanese Soldiers at the Front" appended herewith, consisting of thirty-two pages and printed in the Japanese language, is one of many documents compiled and published by the War Ministry of the Japanese Government.

The twenty-first day of the first month, the twenty-second year of Showa (22, 1947)

Tokyo: MIYAMA, Yeco

Chief of the Documents Section,
the First Demobilization Bureau.

I certify that the above seal and signature were affixed in my presence.

On the same day, at the same place:

Witness: TANADA, Koji

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 7 Feb. 1947
"Instructions to Japanese Soldiers at the Front"
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

v.

ARUJI, Shiko, et al.

SHORT DEPOSITION

Dependent: ICHINOME, Kiriya.

He, first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is ICHINOME, Kiriya.
2. My present residence is c/o TANIISHI, No. 436, HAITSUBOSO-4-CHOME, KENAGY, 1/1, TOKYO Metropolis.
3. I was born on the 3rd day of July, the 30th Year of Meiji (1907).
4. The outline of my career is as follows:
   On the 26th day of January of the 16th Year of Showa (1941), finished a special course at the Military College.
   On the same day, commissioned a staff officer of the Imperial Guard Division.
   On the 14th day of February of the same year, arrived at IWO JIMA, OKINAWA Island.
   On the 13th day of September of the 16th Year of Showa (1943), commissioned a staff officer to the Fourth Division.
   On the 22nd day of September of the same year, mobilization was ordered to the Fourth Division and I prepared, in SUWAT.
Island, for the arrival of the Division as an advance staff-officer.

On the 10th day of November the 18th Year of Shôwa (1943), arrived at PADAMB, SUMATRA Island.

On the 10th day of June, of the 19th Year of Shôwa (1944), commissioned a military staff-officer of the Imperial Headquarters.

On the 27th day of June of the same year, arrived at Tokyo.

At the time when I was on duty in the SUMATRA Island, copies of the Imperial Rescript given to the soldiers and the instruction in the war field had been distributed to every corps station there. At the headquarters of the Imperial Guard Division, all members of its respective department not on one spot every morning and held morning parade. All members of the headquarters of the Fourth Division did also likewise. At the morning parade a senior officer or his deputy officer read in turn, the Imperial Rescript or "The Instructions to Army Officers and Men on Conduct and Behavior In Battle Fields", and gave instructions or directions based on these, so that the Rescript and instructions may well be put into practice.

On the festival and memorial days, the same thing was performed previously to its ceremony.

In every corps assigned to the both division too, the same effort was made in the same way to diffuse and put into practice the Imperial Rescript and the spirit of "The Instructions To Army Officers and Men Conduct and Behavior In Battle Field".
I knew it by the report from the corpse and also by my personal attendance on the spot on the festival and memorial days.

On the 23rd day of January, the 22nd year of Showa (1947),

IN TOKYO.

Deponent: ICHINOSE, Kuniya (seal)

I, RAIMO, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of the witness,
on the same day,
at the same place.

Witness: RAIMO, Junkichi (seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and saying nothing.

/s/ ICHINOSE, Kuniya

- 3 -
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EXHIBIT

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

VS.

SHIYO, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

Name: Alfred F. Kretschmer
Address: Marco Hotel

Attorney

Concerning the treatment given to POWs of war
who had fallen into Japanese hands

I was German "Military Attaché in Tokyo" from December 4, 1940 until May 8, 1945.

Between January 1941 and March 1944, I paid official visits to the various Japanese fronts: Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, North China, Central China, Formosa, French Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, Singapore, Dutch East Indies, Philippine Islands. I have not seen the New Guinea front.

In March 1942, when all the Axis Military and Air Attachés visited part of the southern regions conquered by the Japanese army, in Singapore only we were invited to look over one of the local POW camps. We declined as we had already protested in "private" than we were led through a civilian internment camp there. Perhaps because of this, our strict refusal, no one...
of us were ever again invited to visit a Japanese POW camp.

In Singapore one happened to see Australian POW driving in trucks. They made a healthy impression, more healthy than depressed, and seemed scarcely guarded. In December 1942 or January 1943, in reprisal for the chaining of German soldiers captured during an English commando raid on one of the Channel Isles, the German government, as is known, had ordered a special number of British POWs to be temporarily put in chains. The German Foreign Office had commissioned Ambassador Ott to ask the Japanese Foreign Office to join in or these reprisals as Italy had promised to do. Ambassador Ott, as well as we, Naval, Air and Military Attaches, detested the extension of such reprisals and besides this we were of the opinion that the Japanese government would reject this request as not corresponding to the Bushido spirit. Ambassador Ott, therefore, remonstrated to the German Foreign Office. The remonstrations was disregarded and Ambassador Ott asked me to approach the Japanese army with the proposal. He himself would address the Japanese Foreign Office. I talked the matter over with Major YAMAZAKI of the War Ministry. The next day I received the War Ministry's answer that the Japanese army would not join in such German reprisals, they being contrary to the Bushido spirit. Ambassador Ott received a corresponding answer from the Japanese Foreign Office. In my conversation with the leading army circles, I learned that the desire existed among the Japanese to treat POWs decently and
Def. Doc. A 1520

according to international law as was done in the First World War with the German Tarnstor Garrison.

As to the civil internment camp in Berlin which was shown us by Axis Military and Air Attaches in March 1947, I state that the quarters were somewhat crowded but the internees made a healthy impression. They were temporarily allowed to govern and feed themselves.

"wherever I saw Japanese soldiers during my excursions mentioned above, they were in fair or good discipline.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ A. F. Kretschmer

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24 day of April, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ Bernard A. Hergesell, lst. Lt.
Inf.
Administrative Officer
Defense Division, Legal Section
Sworn Deposition

Deponent: INADA, Kasazumi

I, having first duly sworn am oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, hereby depose as follows.

My full name is INADA, Kasazumi. I am 52 years of age, and I am at present living in SUGAMO Prison.

At the time of the outbreak of the war, I was Vice-Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army in Manchuria and held the rank of major general. In the spring of the following year I became Chief of Staff of the same Army.

In March of 1943 I became Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the Southern Army in Singapore. In December of the same year I became commander of the Second Aircraft Base Force in New Guinea and Kanokoco. In April 1944 I became the 6th Air Division Commander, and in October of the same year, the 3rd Shipping Transport Commander at Manila. In April 1945 I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, in May of the same year I became Chief of Staff of the 16th Area Army in KYUSHU and, concurrently, of the Western Army. The close of the war came at that time.
About July, 1943, in Singapore I had an interview with Lieutenant General HAYAFA, Chief of the War Ministry’s Prisoner Control Department, who was then on a tour of inspection of the conditions of war prisoners. Then he stated his wish to improve the treatment of war prisoners; I answered to the following effect:

Supreme Commander TERAUCHI was irreconcilably opposed to cruel treatment of war prisoners and was wont to call for more care in handling them. The members of his staff were always seeing that the concerned officers and men act according to his desires. They instructed, however, that war prisoners should be treated in the same manner as ordinary armed units, since special treatment better than that given the ordinary armed units could not possibly be given to them. For example, the work on the railway to connect Thailand with Burma, then in progress, employed ordinary armed units, civilian laborers, and war prisoners. This work was not by any means an easy task for them for various reasons. They were hard pressed for provisions and medicine. However, the war prisoners were never cruelly treated. All that could be afforded was done for them all alike so as to maintain their working power.

Then, on the same occasion, Lieutenant General HAYAFA told me that he had inspected principal war prisoner internment camps in various parts of the Southern Countries, such as Thailand and Burma, and had given instructions to improve the treatment of war prisoners.
On this 28th day of May, 1947

At LLTFE.

DEPONENT /S/ INADA, Masazumi (seal)

ke, KAZU., Isaburo, and OKIOTO, Hisashi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at LLTFE.

Witness /S/ KAZU., Isaburo. (seal) OKIOTO, Hisashi.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ INADA, Masazumi. (seal)
従来以後、繊維物加工工場には労働者が常続して働いていた。従業員の健康を守るために、労働状況改善のための対策を行った。従業員の健康を守るために、労働状況改善のための対策を行った。
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）五月二十八日
於極東國際軍事裁判所内

右ハ當立陶人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且共署名捺印シタルコトヲ証明シマス。
良心に従い、誠実に述べたが、証拠を欠き、又証拠も附加せずに申したことを允当せんと存じます。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sedco, et al

Sworn Deposition

Doponont: Sa, Wada, Shigoru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in our country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was born at No. 4, Komobo, Kamoda-Mura, Tosa-Gun, Kochi Prefecture on 29 March 1887 (the 20th year of Meiji). My permanent domicile is No. 47, 5-Chome, Asagaya, Suginami Ward, Tokyo City, where I am still living.

2. The outline of my life history is as follows:

June 1906: Appointed Sub-lieutenant
March 1935: Appointed Major General
March 1936: Appointed Lieutenant General
July, the same year: Appointed Commander of the 4th Division
October 1939: Appointed Vice Chief of the Army General Staff
December 1940: Appointed Commander of the 13th Army (stationed at Shanghai)
October 1942: Relieved of duties as the Commander of the 13th Army
15 November 1942: Placed on the reserve list.

In the period of my active service, I served mainly in the Army General Staff, the War College, and as an officer attached to the Japanese Embassies abroad.

3. From December 1940 till October 1942, I was at Shanghai as Commander of the 13th Army. The military occupation by the Japanese troops of the International Settlement at Shanghai, following the outbreak of the Pacific War on 8 December 1941, was effected in an orderly manner and under perfect discipline, amidst the admiration and praise of the whole citizens. There were no unfortunate happenings, nor was there a single shot fired.

Every prosecution was taken to prevent any unfortunate happenings that often accompany the military occupation of a city. The following are the major stops taken:

a. The strength of the occupation force was reduced to a minimum, and it is true that the number of soldiers did not exceed 500 at the most.

b. The occupation took place in the daytime. In other words, since we thought that the general office hour of workers following various professions and belonging to various classes in the International Settlement began at about 9 a.m., we commenced the occupation hour later, that is, at 10 a.m.

c. Prior to the advance of troops, our mixed military convoy composed of army, navy and foreign office personnel, visited the Shanghai Municipal Office and notified in advance of our military occupation in order that the authorities of the settlement might take all possible measures to prevent disturbances and unrest among the citizens.
d. The police units of the settlement were promptly stationed at various security positions, and in their presence the advance of the Japanese troops was started.

g. The troops, marching in orderly formation without being subdivided, reached the turf and the barracks formerly used by the U. S. Marine Corps, and there quickly closed up. Soldiers were strictly prohibited from dispersing.

f. Whenever there was any special duty to be performed, either a corps commanded by an officer or a group of specially chosen non-commissioned officers were appointed for the task.

h. Everywhere in the city notices were posted telling the citizens to set their minds at rest.

i. I summoned up all the commanders and gave them instructions that every possible precaution be taken against wrongs and misdoings, and that military discipline be enforced with great strictness and severity. I also instructed them to discharge their duty without resort to arms.

j. Banks were not closed and were under special orders to carry on their business as usual.

k. Japanese nationals were prohibited from entering the city, except those with certificates issued by the Japanese Consul.

Because of such precautionary measures, not a single incident occurred. I started for a round of inspection through the city at about 3 p.m. and found nothing unusual. There was much traffic. Shops were carrying on their business as usual, not a single shop being closed.

The newspapers in Shanghai unanimously extolled the behaviour of the Japanese troops and went so far as to call them exemplary beholders.

4. In Shanghai there were some 1,500 or 1,600 American and British prisoners of war who were in charge of the 13th Army under my command. I used to instruct the Chief of the POW Camp to be above all, compassionate, fair and just in his treatment of prisoners of war. Major General YUSE, Camp Commander, meticulously chanced by my instructions. When prisoners were assigned to some labour inside the camp, he used to share the work with them, whereby setting an example.

Major General YUSE, on his own initiative, used to come to my quarters once a week to report on the conditions in the camp. He was so devoted to his work that he at length succumbed to a disease and died while he was still in the same position.

The POW Camp was properly equipped and properly managed. Mr. Eglof (TN: ?), a Swiss, dologated by the International Red Cross to inspect the camp, was highly delighted after he had inspected the camp, and immediately after his visit to the camp, took the trouble of writing me a letter of thanks.

Although it is regrettable that one of the interpreters at the camp has been indicted as a war criminal on the charge of some illegal act, yet the general conditions in the camp may be gathered from the fact that with the exception of this interpreter, neither the Camp Commander nor any one of his subordinates has been put to trial.
We tried to be fair and just also in our treatment of hostile nationals. It was my intention to place no restraint upon peaceful citizens, who offered us no resistance, and to let them lead a normal life. Upon this line, we decided on the methods of treating these citizens. Consequently, during my tenure of office hostile nationals such as Americans, Britishers and so on were under no restraint whatsoever and were at liberty to reside and make a living in the city. They were allowed to follow their respective occupations. Even in the case of the officials in the Shanghai Municipal Office, those occupying leading positions were not removed but were allowed, in the interests of the settlement, to carry on their work until they themselves tendered their resignations on their own initiative (as I remember, towards March 1942).

Furthermore, bank deposits were not frozen, and for each individual person’s living expenses a certain amount per month could be drawn from the bank. With regard to the treatment of hostile nationals and their properties, there was a committee consisting of delegates from the War Ministry, the Navy Ministry, the Foreign Office and the Asiatic Development Bureau, which after deliberation decided on various measures so that no one could take arbitrary and high-handed steps.

The authorities of the Foreign Office, I believe, know better than anyone else that in the Shanghai district a fair and just treatment was accorded to hostile nationals.

On this 16th day of January 1947
At the Sugamo Prison
Deponent: /s/ SAWADA, Shigoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place
Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SAWADA, Shigoru (seal)
I, MARY JEVIN MARTIN, residing at 21, Kensington Gate, W.8. in the County of London, England, make oath and say that the attached photostatic copy of the statement entitled Japanese in Hongkong, January to July 1945, given by me for use in evidence in the trial of major war criminals for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East now sitting in Tokyo, and that such statement is in all respects true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signed) MARY JEVIN MARTIN

Gloucester Road, South Kensington, in the County of London this 29th day of April, 1947.

Before me,

(Signed) ERVIN V. JENKINS
Commissioner for Oaths.
Japanese in Hongkong, January to July, 1942.

Mrs A.J. Martin

The Japanese I met in Hongkong during these months my husband and I were prisoners there were all foreign Office or Consular men and it was thanks to their care and protection that we received the very special treatment we did, and never at any time in the hands of the Army or the Gendarmerie. They took very good care... did not.

My husband, Arthur J. Martin, was British Consul General in Chungking and we had gone to Hongkong on sick leave in November, 1941, where he had an operation early in December, at the Queen Mary Hospital. He was getting on excellently well, but the attack of the Japanese of Hongkong was followed by a complete breakdown of most services; no food, no medicines, a practical breakdown in so many directions including morale, that chances for survival for any except the most fit and hardy were slight and my husband died on the 7th of April, 1942.

During those months, from January until the end of June, when I was allowed to leave Hongkong on the repatriation ship, the Gripsholm, with the repatriated Americans, my husband and I, and later I alone, owed every bit of consideration and help which we received to certain Japanese officials, to whom I feel the deepest gratitude. The kindness they showed us made that my husband's last days were at least peaceful, and that I am alive today. I was not prepared, after my husband's death, to face concentration camp life, and told the Japanese in charge of Foreign Affairs so. I was lucky that he realized I meant what I said. The kindness my husband and I received was also shown to various other people and I feel that the Japanese concerned should receive credit...
for what they did.

The first we came in contact with is or rather was Consul in Hongkong, a Mr Kimura. Colonel Yama was in Tokyo and Mr. Kimura was in charge during the first three months after the Japanese occupation of Hongkong, of the Consulate General with its staff. Kimura had no authority as the Army were entirely in control and treated him with the most open discourtesy. He was transferred to Peking in Nov.

When it became apparent that severe measures were being taken to control the foreigner in Hongkong, and that passes were required for any one moving about I wrote a letter for my husband, to the Japanese Consul General, asking for a pass, and for his assistance in obtaining diplomatic protection for us. We were then at the Queen Mary Hospital.

Mr. Kimura sent a vice-consul out next day, gave me his own card, and asked that I call on him the following day at his office in Hongkong. After a long and very intimate conversation with two Japanese officers Mr. Kimura was able to get for me a military pass, on his own personal guarantee and my promise to report to him every ten days. I had a number of interviews with him, often chatting for nearly an hour. We discussed the war pretty thoroughly and I was of the impression that he was horrified at what had happened, although he was far too astute to say much. I do know, from eye-witnesses, that when the famous march down the Peak took place, all the residents walking down with their luggage, young, old, sick or well, Mr. Kimura rounded up every motor car he could get hold of and sent them up the Peak to bring people down. He did so much to alleviate the awful conditions that Hongkong residents found themselves in
that the Army authorities had him on the mat and threatened him with severe punishment if he did not cease his efforts, and forbade him seeing Dr. Selwyn-Clark, and various other British still at large.

When he was about to be transferred I had an interview with him and he told me that Mr. Tokio Oda was coming, as Chief of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, that he would have all the authority and power and freedom that he lacked, and that he would look after my husband and me and be in apposition to do much more for us. Mr. Kimura was a quiet very pleasant mannered man, most unaggressive, and felt very must the position he was put in by the Army, and his own inability to help us.

Mr. Oda, Tokio Oda, was a much more aggressive personality. He was a most agreeable, good looking man, about 35 years of age, and was said to have studied at Amherst College, while stationed at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. To insure his own authority as Chief of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs in Hongkong, he had had himself made a Colonel in the Army, although his suave good looks make an amusing contrast to the truculent appoishment of a good many of the Japanese Army officers. He was also a member of the Black Dragon Society. He took over complete charge of affairs on his arrival, and immediately instituted the sending of parcels to Stanley Jail, where about 3,500 prisoners were interned. Conditions there, due to underfeeding and overcrowding were very bad and the parcels went a long way to alleviate conditions for the lucky few who were recipients. I understand about 500 parcels a week were the average. Those who had no friends in Hongkong were unlucky. Red Cross parcels were undelivered, and special grants of money were so whittled down and prices
wore so fantastic that they got very little.

Visits every week to the French hospital by the prisoners from Stanley, for medical treatment were also instituted by Mr. Oda, on the appeal of Dr. Selwyn-Clarke. This kept a link going between Stanley and the outer world.

The kindnesses shown by Mr. Oda to my husband and me were innumerable. He came out to see my husband personally, lent us money out of his own pocket, and later a considerable sum from Japanese Government funds. He saw to it that I had a pass sealed by the highest army authorities. I had it translated by a Chinese friend who told me, "Well, you certainly are under very high protection." It meant I had courteous treatment from all sentries, who guarded all the roads everywhere in Hongkong. He spared no effort to protect us in every way, and on my husband's death sent a representative to the funeral, with a huge wreath from the members of the Foreign Affairs Bureau, and came personally to call the following day to express his sympathy. He never lost an opportunity to show me kindness, although he was extremely bad tempered at times, particularly at the time when the political bombing of Japan took place and his own family were undergoing. He did far more than could have been expected, with so much understanding, it is hard to believe it all, looking back now. He said to me one day, "Why do you worry when I am looking after you." I couldn't ask for more than that I suppose. And I was fortunate to get away on the Gripsholm, again with his help, before he was transferred from Hongkong.
He hated the work, after two months there. He lamented his own inability to relieve the suffering there. He told Father Joy, the head of the Jesuit Procurato, who was a great friend of ours and told me. Father Joy would be an invaluable witness for the defence for all "good Japanese" in Hongkong. He got about everywhere and knows them all.

I understand that Mr. Oda was keenly interested in getting the Red Cross established in Hongkong. But Mr. Zindel, the representative, a Swiss came to Hongkong after I left on the Gripsholm, or rather on the Anna Maru, which later transferred us to the Gripsholm, so I can not say anything about his activities there. I do know that when I was leaving Hongkong, and went to say good bye to Mr. Oda, I asked him if he had any message to give Lord Halifax, or Sir Alexander Cadogan, both of whom I hoped to see and he replied, "Yes, tell them to get the British out of Hongkong, get them out as quickly as they can, to India, anywhere out of here." And I replied, "You will help, you have done so much already." "I will do everything I can," he replied. I do not believe anyone could have done more than he did, in the face of the attitude of the Army authorities, and the British owe a great debt of gratitude to him for what he did.

Mr. Fugita was one of the Vice-consuls in the Consulate General and was one of the first Japanese I met after the occupation. I can see him now, in the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, dousing out passes to 3rd Nationals, handling them all, and in particular the Norwegian Consul who made a scene because apparently he was not to have a pass, with
such courtesy and tact it was hardly believable he was one of the hated Japanese. I met him several times, knew him slightly over a period of several months until I was relieved of his post and went away to Japan. He was always most kind, and finally left because he couldn't understand the friction with the Japs and his own inability to help people who so often desperately needed help. That is the story I was told; he couldn't stand seeing so much suffering, and being unable to help. Rather Joy can tell you all about him; he did everything possible to help my husband and me, even giving us eggs one day, which he had received as a present from the New Territory, for my husband.

Colonel Yano was Consul General in Hongkong, and was away in Tokyo most of the time. He gave me his own personal calling card, to use in case of necessity with the recollection that if I found myself in any difficulties at any time, sentries were often making things difficult for people, I was to telephone him at once. He personally took Miss Tiortoff, the mother of Mrs D.C.Davis, whose husband was in the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, up to their house on the Peak, in an effort to get some clothes and personal belongings from their house. They at the Sunhua Hotel with the other bankers. Colonel Yano helped her load up a big load of things in his own motor car and brought her down the Peak again. Somehow I cannot imagine a Consul General of any other nationality doing such a thing, queer people, the Japanese.

I met Mr. Kinura the day I got my military pass from Mr. Kimura, at lunch at a very bad restaurant on the Queen's Road, where I had gone to get something to eat other than hospital fare, which was bad, to put it
mildly. The food at the restaurant was bad too, and I looked up from the table I was sitting at, to see a pleasant faced middle aged Japanese sit down opposite me. He so politely inquired if I minded that when he ordered Beef Steak I remarked that it was really shoe leather and found myself in a conversation with him. He was curious to know who I was and how I happened to be out of Stanley Jail. He knew of my husband, and we found so many congenial topics to talk about that an hour and a half passed before the lunch was over, he insisting on paying for it, although I assured him that I was still solvent. He replied that I had better keep it, I would need it. My impression was that although he was advisor to the Japanese Army in Hongkong, he did not approve of the war. He had been agent for the Mitsui Bussan Kisha. He inquired if he could do anything for us, and said to call on him if he could. I later found that he had spoken to Mr. Oda about us in an effort to help.

The repatriation ship, the Asama Maru, left Hongkong on the 29th of June, if I remember rightly. Things went very smoothly from the Japanese crew including cabin stewards and stewardesses. Accommodations were extremely crowded, the ship was simply packed and to avoid complication the Japanese had requested the American Embassy officials to undertake the billeting of the passengers. This had been done most efficiently and everyone went to his appointed berth at once without delay. All one had was a berth and in our cabin four people were packed in a cabin intended only for three. We managed well enough however and there was a very good atmosphere in that tiny room.
Some bigheaded person, in the Embassy I heard, had the idea that
the men on board should disregard seigniority and give up their A and
B deck cabins so that people of lesser importance, particularly the
missionaries, with their large families of children should have the
comfort of better accommodations. So all members of the American
Embassy and Consular Services, with the exception of Mr. Southard, the
Consul General from Hong Kong, and the South American Diplomats vacated
their cabins and went below to the steerage. There may have been others who
held on to their good cabins, but I did not hear of it if they did.
Although there was a certain amount of grumbling by wives separated
from their husbands who slept down below it was all done with considerable
good spirit. Those who might possibly have ejected vigorously under
more normal conditions were held to discrete silence by popular opinion.
I have since heard that Mr. Drew kept his cabin. This seems quite likely.

Arrangements on the Azuma Maru were most efficiently planned and
carried out as proved by the smooth running of everything during the
month's journey from Hong Kong to Samoa Marques. There was ample food
such as it was, it was well cooked and served and on the 4th of July
the Chief distinguished himself by serving amusingly oriental cake,
large layer cake, decorated with red, white and blue decorations to
celebrate the day. I seem to remember some inscription on the cake
on our table but cannot remember just what. I noted it at the time
however and thought how typical and how rather nice. This in particular
because those people on the Azuma Maru, with few exceptions, hated the
Japanese with a deadly hate, very often with the greatest justification.
and the Japanese were well aware of it. They did not dare say much, people spoke quietly when they spoke at all, because they could not be sure that they might be detained on the Asama Maru, and returned to Japan as prisoners. That fear did not lift until Lorenzo Marquis was reached and we were off the Asama Maru.

Particular mention should be made, and credit given to the very charming Chief Deck Stewart who was the one and only Japanese on board who did not avoid the passengers. He did everything possible to make the journey comfortable and pleasant and say to it that the deck games were always available and the decks as comfortable as possible under the crowded conditions. To my mind, his efforts were made with so much tact and kindness that I spoke to him a day or two before reaching Lorenzo Marquis, saying that I for one wished him to know that it had been noticed and appreciated. He did not have much to say, but told me that he had been Chief Deck Stewart on one of the big Japanese liners on the U.S. Japan run for many years. Oscar of the Waldorf in New York couldn't have been more charming or efficient.

The month's journey on the Gripsholm was an entirely different affair. We arrived on board, 1,500 passengers, and were asked to sit around on the deck till cabins were cleaned and ready. That seemed reasonable enough, and an excellent lunch, buffet, was served which cheered people up considerably as the long tables literally groaned under the loads of food such as we had not seen for months during our captivity.

We were told that the billeting officers were working on allotting the
cabin and everything would be ready by late afternoon. Arrangement for food, dining room arrangements and the food itself were at all times excellent. The allotting of cabins however was a fiasco, from the start to the finish. It was said later that two billeting officers had been flown out from Washington to take care of matters, and that they were too drunk to do the work. Whether this was true or not I am not in a position to say. I do know how or that I sat around that ship the evening of the first day with friends and then queued up till four in the morning, and finally was given a cabin number to find it occupied by Mr. Southward and two South American Consul Generals. As I am rather inclined to forgo for myself I took my small suitcase, all we were allowed to have with us, and camped out in the first unoccupied cabin I could find. People slept on the floors, in the saloons, anywhere they liked.

The next day was a repetition of the first, queues of people, and still no cabin. I descended the decks and picked out a small two birth cabin and settled down there for two days, it was 3rd class accommodation, but better than nothing, and all good cabins were occupied by Embassy, Consular and other officials and their wives, and by the South American Diplomats. After five days I was informed that I could not have the small cabin, or even a berth there and could go to Dock in an inside cabin, where I could have a top berth in an eight berth cabin with some missionaries. I objected to this as my husband was Consul General in the British Consular Service, and I was travelling at the expense of the British Government. Mr. Forrest Drummond, a Secretary from the Embassy in Chungking was on board, had a most comfortable cabin on 2nd deck, and on c

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leading to the rescue, settled with an extremely autocratic person who seemed to be doing billoting just as well too, as I had developed a severe cold and inflammation in one ear which the doctor said threatened trouble, as a result of strain. The doctor filled me full of sulfanilic acid, which made me even more ill, but eventually cured the ear, and I finally was given a berth in an inside cabin on B Deck, with a school girl from Tsingtao and two missionaries. As billeting seemed to be done by seniority, or so they said it was done, and my husband had been a very senior official, I did feel that I rated a bit higher than that, I certainly had with the Japanese, but I had been so often brushed off by the Americans doing the billeting, with a tough aggressiveness that I had almost forgotten existed, being the wife of a senior official in China had perhaps accustomed me to more consideration, more courtesy, and perhaps spoiled me a bit, I decided to make the best of an extremely uncomfortable situation. Although I must confess, there were times when I really wished I were back in Hongkong, with Mr. Oda to look after me.

We were on our way home, we were leaving all the agony of those months in Hongkong behind us, that was something to rejoice over and I have since tried to forget that last month on the Gripsholm a thing has hurt you once, and it hurts you again, every time you think of it. So I try to forget it. As I look back it was the mental atmosphere as much as the physical discomforts that made the trip on the Gripsholm so bad. People had a pretty bad time, they were unhappy, they had worries and anxieties but I still cannot see what excuse some of them
had for believing as they did. Mr. Southard's "stable companions" left him a "Rio de Janeiro," he had a de luxe cabin to himself after that. with a private en suite. He kept it to himself, although the ship was crowded. Rice for rice was salt water baths, and fresh water was not available, so, up the back of the back of the cabin with his luggage, and boasted of it. That was the evening in July, coming up through the West Indies. It makes me laugh now but it did not seem so funny then.

On the "commerce" by South American diplomat at Rio were immediately filled up by the clerical staff, ladies, who had made alliances for the voyage with various people in key positions. The whole ship laughed over that. I left it; I was on, and is best forgotten, human nature in the raw just as the experience at the foreign hospital was human nature in the raw, and Stanley Jail, the latter so raw that I would have committed suicide rather than go there.

I never was as glad of anything in my life really than the sight of New York as we sailed in that harbor. It seemed hardly possible then. I really was there. That helped to take the taste of the journey out of my mouth. He was perhaps the very courteous treatment I had from the P.B.I., who had a long interview with me and asked a great many questions.

This is a very brief outline of my experiences. The five Japanese I contracted in Hongkong stand out most clearly. As I look back on it all, the utter aloneness, the feeling of being utterly abandoned, the help they gave us, practical efficient help, to the utmost of their ability, given with so much sympathy and kindness,
Def. Doc. #1849

makes me feel that all Japanese are not war criminals. Many are, many have caused unspeakable suffering to our people and must be punished. But among all the horrors there were some that stand out. They helped, they kept my morale up at a time when it would have been much easier to have quietly closed the book and said, "I've had enough, I'm having no more" and slipped away to a pleasant word. I am grateful for what they did, also for what the Japanese did on the Lassa Market to ease the journey as far as they could, they were efficient about it too, and if at any time a good word from me can be of any use to them I shall be only too glad of the opportunity to say it.

(Signed) Mary Ervin Martin
Mrs. A. J. Martin
Widow of Arthur John Martin
GBE, British Consular Service China.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE Far East

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition
Deponent: KOYODA, Koichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on October 30, 1888 at No. 17, Chugurcho,
Kumamoto City.

My permanent residence is No. 160, Jonai Soejicho,
Numazu City, Shizuoka Prefecture.

My present address is No. 687, 3-chome, Koboitocho,
Chiba City.

Brief personal history:
1909. Graduated from the Military Academy.
1918. Graduated from the Military Staff College.

I was residing in the Kvargturg district as the commander
of the 104th division from December, 1940 to July, 1942, and
after that I served as commander of the division area at Seoul, Korea until the surrender of Japan.

I served as commander of the 104th division stationed in the suburbs to the north-west of Kuangtung from December, 1940 to July, 1942.

In December 1941, the Japanese army carried out almost no military operations. It exerted all its efforts toward maintaining public peace and order in the Kuangtung district. Therefore, it is hardly possible to conclude that the Japanese army occupied the walled city on December 21, 1941.

When the Great East Asia "war broke out on December 8, 1941, no more than one and a half divisions were garrisoned in the Kuangtung district. At that time Yu Han-mou, who took command of a force numbering 220,000, took the offensive against my division, and my division did everything in its power to defend itself against the attacks.

Though I resided in the Kuangtung district for no less than twenty months, I have never heard of such place names as Shihuohan, Uyarchiao, Shahsia, Shairucharg, Hopierfucheng, Shuehkung-hsiencherr, Chaohsian, Feimervai, Hsimerkou, Faisfa. I am firmly confident that strict military discipline was maintained in my division. For instance, I went so far as to dispatch judiciaries twice a week to various units under my command in order to give training, aimed at the
prevention of crimes on the part of my subordinates. Thus, we did our utmost to prevent such crimes, however slight they may be.

The strict military discipline of my division won the respect of the Chinese masses. I can say definitely that there was not a single case in which a Chinese person, male or female, young or old, was murdered by the subordinates in my division.

On the 18th day of June, 1947, at Tokyo.

DEFENDANT /s/ KOMODA, Koichi (seal)

I, IMAI, Yasutarō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ IMAI, Yasutarō (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KOMODA, Koichi (seal)

- 3 -
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs.

ARAFU, Sachio, et al

Sworn Deposition
Dependent: OKADA, Yoshimasa

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on 27 June in the 36th year of Meiji (1903)
at my permanent domicile, 46 Honcho, Marugamo-City, Kagawa-
Prefecture, and my present address is 190, 2-Chome, Mabashi,
Suginami-Fu, Tokyo.

2. My personal history is outlined as follows:
   Graduated from the Military Academy in the 15th year of
   Taisho (1924).
   Appointed Staff-officer (Major) of the Japanese Expeditionary
   Forces in China in the 14th year of Showa (Oct. 1939).
Def. Doc. #1781

Appointed Staff-officer (Lieutenant-Colonel) of the 23rd Army in the 18th year of Shōwa (June, 1943).

Appointed Staff-officer (Colonel) of the 6th Area Army, Hankow and I remained to be so up to the end of the war.

In January in the 19th year of Shōwa (1944), the Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China ordered the 23rd Army to capture Liuchow, advancing from the Canton-Area.

The original document of the order is not existing now, because it was burnt when the War ended. But as I was one of the senior Staff-officers of the 23rd Army at that time, I know quite well all the movements of the Army.

The 23rd Army was stationed in the Canton and the neighbouring Area. When the army got the order to capture Liuchow, instead of advancing directly towards Liuchow, the main force marched to the north, and the KOYASASKO force advanced to the south or to the opposite direction from Liuchow, concealing the operations plan.

The KOYASASKO force was a battalion under the command of the YONSYAMA Brigade, which advanced from Kowkeng to Taishan. The force started its movements from Kowkeng late in June and entered Taishan.
loading the van of the whole Brigade. By that time all the inhabitants of Taishan had already evacuated and not a soul was to be seen, and some soldiers of the Pacification Corps despatched by our Army burst into laughter saying, "How can we pacificate people when there is not a soul to talk to?"

The KOYAS\(\text{\textregistered}\)Ko force tried to march towards Liuchow from the point 30 miles south of Taishan toward north and along the Si-kiang (River), but there was a very strong position of the enemy at this point and the force had a fierce battle with the enemy which lasted from the early part of July till the latter part of the same month, and casualties of the force amounted even to several scores and the force had to waste much of its arms and ammunition. The aim of the KOYAS\(\text{\textregistered}\)Ko Battalion's action was not to fight, but to advance secretly to Wuchow as soon as possible and to sweep the mines laid by the enemy in the Si-kiang in order to help the main force which was coming up north.

For this purpose one of the mine-sweeping groups of our Navy accompanied us. Such being the case, therefore, we were quite at a loss when we were confronted with this unexpected battle. We wanted to get to Wuchow as soon as possible, but we got
there five days later than we had expected due to the stubborn resistance of the enemy. After a hard battle, however, we drove back the enemy and advanced towards Wu-chow, and all the inhabitants in the area had already taken refuge and none of them could be seen.

The force had an urgent duty of getting to Wu-chow without losing a moment. And therefore it could not be possible that the force had time enough to murder inhabitants or set fire to their houses on its way to Wu-chow. It had simply to continue its heavy march day and night.

Moreover, the Commander of the Army had strictly ordered all the soldiers to observe the "three don'ts" that is "don't burn", "don't kill" and "don't plunder".

Force Commander KOYASAKO had been the superintendent of the Military Preparatory School in Osaka until he was appointed Commander of the force.

It was the un-written rule of the Japanese Army that a superintendent of the Military Preparatory School was to be selected and appointed from among officers of noble character, considering the education of young boys. And therefore I
cannot believe that there should have been any atrocities committed by the men of Commander KOYASEKO, who was an idealist and man of noble character of the Japanese officers. If there had been such misconducts, I should have been informed of it, but I firmly believe that there were no such facts.

I have attached a rough sketch of the map which shows the course that the KOYASEKO force followed from Canton towards Wuchow.

On this 6th day of April, 1947

at Tokyo

DEponent /S/ OKADA Yoshimasa (seal)

I, OKADA Yoshimasa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depenent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ IMANARI Yutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ OKADA Yoshimasa (seal)
明治二十二年（一九八年）四月五日於東京

立今人

今

盖

太郎
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: KOYASUKO, Kanzo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

(1) I was born on May 21, 1897, at No. 1468, PUTACEMOTO, KASHIWA-KU, AOS-CUN, KUMAMOTO Prefecture, which is my permanent domicile and where at present I am still living.

(2) The gist of my career follows:

In 1928, I graduated from the my Cadet School.

About 3 years beginning 1941 on, I was attached to Osaka Military Preparatory School.

From 1944 to the termination of hostilities, I held (as a major) the post of the commander of the 126th Independent Infantry Battalion and participated in the operations in South China.

(3) In June, 1944, my battalion, acting in coordination with the 23rd Army's attack on Luchow, advanced from the Canton...
district to the TAISHAN area and then turning north northward operated in the Wuchow area, a strategic point on the River Sikiang. In this operation, which began in the early part of July, we made a forced march continuously for about a month. Owing to the unexpectedly stubborn resistance of the enemy, however, we were delayed despite our strenuous efforts for a rapid advance, and spent about five days longer than the directed schedule.

In this fighting, scores of our officers and men were killed wounded and a large amount of munitions were consumed.

(4) My unit had always been under strict orders of our army commander and other superior officers concerned to maintain military discipline with strictness and severity. Our slogan being the three don'ts of don't burn, don't kill, and don't plunder, I am absolutely sure that no one in the unit violated the order. So thoroughly did my men adhere to the orders of superior officers that I hereby state positively that absolutely no one under my command ever killed any Chinese, or ever shot fire on any Chinese houses.

(5) Although this has no direct bearing upon the action of the Japanese army, I may add in this connection that, we were then told that, in a valley some 3 mi. (TN about 12km) north of TAISHAN, there were a group of villagers forming an armed body, called the SANSHAHSIANG self-defense corps and led by members of the communist traitors-slaying Party.
that all the members of this body, amounting some 600, were armed either with rifles or with revolvers and that they constantly oppressed the neighbouring villagers.

(b) Late in June of the same year, my unit advanced towards the TAISHAN area and then was ordered to march farther.

At that time, the coolies we had employed in the Canton district expressing their desire to return home, we gave them sufficient wages, allowances, and even clothes and let them go. The coolies then released consisted of about a half of those who had followed us from Canton. I hear that when these coolies on their way home passed by the said communist village, they were assaulted by the villagers and were looted, massacred or captured, then they retreated to the TAISHAN district and obtaining the help of the neighbouring villagers, who had been oppressed by the communists they revenged themselves on their communist enemy and this caused some blisters. With regard to this affair, I know nothing beyond what I have said above because the Chinese alone were involved in the affair, since we were busily engaged in operations to fulfill our duty to reach WUCHOW as soon as possible, we were hurriedly marching on. If any atrocity is reported to have been committed around TAISHAN, I am inclined to think that the report, by mistake, has mixed this occurrence up with the Japanese action. I definitely state that not a single act of atrocity was ever committed by my unit.
(7) By the above statement, I believe that the actions of my battalion were of purely military nature and included no illegal actions.

(8) I hereto attach a sketch-map, which I believe will make clear the situation around TAISHAN.

On this 15th day of June, 1947,
at Tokyo

Dponent: /S/ KOYASEKO, Kaname (seal)

I, IMINARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the dponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at Tokyo.

Witness: /S/ IMINARI, Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear, to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KOYASEKO, Kaname (seal)
Dear Sir,

I am very pleased to hear from you.

The change of certain provisions to the

Letter from Shang-San Shing:

Role of the Communication Bridge

Advance on the

Contact of my battalion

To Canton

Tanshiu, Kow

Sanfow

Tanshiu-Kow

Chung-Hee, Mau-Hu
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Dependent: KOYA33KO, Kano

Sworn first to swear an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1) I was born on May 13, 1897, at No. 1466, PUTASEMOTO,
WASHKUSA, HIRAN, HOKKAIDO Prefecture, which is my permanent domicile and where at present I am still living.

2) A brief of my career follows:

I graduated from the Army Cadet School in 1928.

For about 3 years beginning 1941 on, I was attached to
Osaka Military Preparatory School.

From 1944 to the termination of hostilities, I held (as a major) the post of the commander of the 126th Independent Infantry Battalion and participated in the operations in South China.

3) In June, 1944, my battalion, acting in coordination with the 23rd Army's attack on Luchow, advanced from the Canton
district to the TAISHAN area and thenco turning north operated in the Wuchow area, a strategic point on the Sikiang. In this operation, which began in the early part of July, we made a forced march continuously for about a month. Owing to the unexpectedly stubborn resistance of the enemy, however, we were delayed despite our strenuous efforts for a rapid advance, and spent about five days longer than the directed schedule.

In this fighting, scores of our officers and men were killed, wounded, and a large amount of munitions were consumed.

(4) My unit had always been under strict orders of our commanding officers to maintain military discipline with strictness and severity.

Our slogan being the three don'ts of "don't burn, kill, and don't plunder," I am absolutely sure that the unit violated the orders. So thoroughly did my unit adhere to the orders of superior officers that I hereby state positively that absolutely no one under my command ever violated any Chinese, or ever set fire on any Chinese houses.

(5) Although this has no direct bearing upon the action of the Japanese army, I may add in this connection that, we were then told that, in a valley some 31° (about 12 km) north of TAISHAN, there were a group of villagers forming an armed body, called the SANSHAHSIANG self-defense corps and led by members of the communist traitors' slaying Party.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)
Deponent: TOSHIMA, Fusataro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on January 5, 1889 (the 22nd year of MEIJI) at my permanent domicile, No. 832-1, MUKOJIMA, OAZA, NAKAZEKI-cho, BOFU-shi, YAMAGUCHI Prefecture. My present residence is at No. 625, 1-chome, DAITA, SETAGAYA-ku, TOKYO-to.

2. The general outline of my personal-history is as follows:
   1910 Graduated from the Military Academy.
   1934 Was promoted to Colonel in March and appointed of MIYAKONOJO Regimental Commander.
   1937 Was promoted to Major General in December.
   1940 Was promoted to Lieutenant-General in August.
   1940 In October, was appointed Commander of the 3rd Division
in China and went there.

1942 In the middle of January, was appointed Commander of the Imperial Guards Division.

1943 In October, was appointed Commander of the 2nd Army in New Guinea and while I was stationed in the Celebes the war ended.

3. By the summer of 1941, the Chinese Forces in the Changsha area had become very powerful and were beginning to take the offensive against the Japanese Forces who were beginning to sense a grave threat.

With the aim of delivering a hard blow upon these Chinese Forces in the vicinity of Changsha, it was decided the troops advance towards this area. The objective of the operations was not to occupy the area but just to crush the enemy forces. For this reason, it had been arranged that our forces return to their garrison station as soon as they attained their objective.

4. The 3rd Division under my command started operations in concert with the 4th, 6th and 40th Divisions and in early October of that same year, the 4th Division of the divisions mentioned above entered the town of Changsha and after staying there three days or so, immediately pulled out for their stationed area. As for my 3rd Division, we did advance as far as Chuchow, a short distance from Changsha, but did not
enter Changsha itself. From there we returned to our former camp near Hankow.

5. During the time of the operations, military discipline of the Japanese Forces had been exceedingly strict and I can rightly state that the actions of the Japanese Forces had been very fine and exemplary. The authorities of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China applied their utmost effort in the maintenance of strict military discipline. There is the case where around March, 1941, the Army Commander summoned together all the Divisional Commanders within the Army to Hankow where a meeting was held to talk over the maintenance of strict military discipline. On that occasion, the Army Commander delivered instructions which were both grave and firm. The gist of his speech was as follows: "The essence of the Japanese Army is not in just being strong. Every soldier must treat the inhabitants in the field of operations with sincerity and kindness, aid righteousness and punish the bad basing your actions on the true spirit of BUSHIDO. Even in time of operations, he who inflicts unnecessary injuries upon inhabitants or damages their property is acting very much contrary to the spirit of the BUSHIDO. Each Divisional Commander must make certain that there is absolutely no soldier under his command that would act contrary to spirit of BUSHIDO."
All the Divisional Commanders got the men of their respective Divisions to faithfully obey the purport of the above instructions.

Prior to that time, there had been three taboos with the China Expeditionary Force: Do not burn! Do not kill! and Do not loot! The Japanese troops in China, in obedience to these orders of their superiors absolutely did not commit any deeds that would be a disgrace to a soldier.

While my 3rd Division was in the midst of operations a view was presented that we had better destroy enemy barracks by fire. However, I issued strict orders and prohibited soldiers from destroying even barracks of the enemy. This was because there private homes used by the enemy as and since distinguishing private homes from those used as barracks would be difficult not to mention the fact that there was doubt in the wisdom of allowing the soldiers to get into the habit of burning even barracks I prohibited rigidly this practise.

Another attack operations on Changsha was carried out from the end of 1941 to the beginning of 1942. The objective of this operation was the same as that of the previous one. This time the 3rd Division under my command in cooperation with the 6th Division made the attacks on the Chinese Forces in the area of Changsha. We returned, however, without
Def. Doc. # 1783

...going into Changsha, although we had advanced to a point near the city.

7. During my stay in China, in accordance with the intention of the Army Commander, I paid my utmost attention to the maintenance of strict military discipline. So far as my Division is concerned, I firmly believe that on this point, there is not a thing in which we are not unimpeachable.

On this 15 day of June, 1947 at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ TOSHIMA, Fusataro (seal)

I, IMANARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: /S/ IMANARI, Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TOSHIMA, Fusataro (seal)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
- vs -
SHINDO, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: SUZUKI, Teiji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1) I was born on May 7th, 1887, at my permanent address, No. 179, SHILO-
HOKO, TOTSUKA-MURA, IWATA-GUN, SHIZUOKA Prefecture. At present I am living at No. 71, HITSUKO-KACHI, SHIZUOKA city.

2) The outline of my career is as follows: Graduated from the Military Academy 1910; Promoted to major-general in 1929; promoted to lieutenant general in 1942; Appointed Commander of the 104th Division under the 23rd Army August, 1942; Appointed Commander of the 143rd Division in 1945, and was back in Japan proper, when the war ended.

3) I was Commander of the 104th Division from August, 1942 to March, 1945.

Towards the end of June, 1944, the 104th Division was ordered to occupy the LIUCHOW airfield. To conceal the movement of the division, at first I had the troops advance towards the banks of the LIENCHIAN in the northern districts of KUANTAO, and then had them turn around and advance towards WUCHOW.

Then we continued to march towards LIUCHOW.

We started action against the LIUCHOW airfield from its eastern and southern districts. Just at this time the 6th and 68th Regiments, both a part of the Central China army, were marching from the northern and eastern
Def. Doc. #1756

On this—day of——, 1947

At ———

Deponent /S/ SUZUKI, Taiji (seal)

I, SUZUKI, Taiji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At ———

Witness /S/ HORIUCHI,Hyogo (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ SUZUKI, Taiji (seal)
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: SUZUKI, Teiji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1) I was born on May 7th, 1887, at my permanent address, No. 179, SHIBA, HONDO, TOKAI-MURA, IWATA-GUN, SHIZUOKA Prefecture. At present I am living at No. 71, HOKAI-KOCHI, SHIZUOKA city.

2) The outline of my career is as follows: Graduated from the Military Academy 1910; Promoted to major-general in 1939; promoted to lieutenant general in 1942; Appointed Commander of the 104th Division under the 23rd Army August, 1942; Appointed Commander of the 143rd Division in 1945, and was back in Japan proper when the war ended.

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Then we continued to march towards LIUCHOW.

We started action against the LIUCHOW airfield from its eastern and southern districts. Just at this time the 6th and 68th Regiments, both a part of the Central China army, were marching from the northern and eastern
districts of the LIUCHOW airfield, and in cooperation with them, we succeeded in occupying the airfield in the beginning of November, 1944. After staying there for about five days, we advanced as far as CHECUNING, and then changed directions to return to KHANTong. My Division entered the LIUCHOW airfield only, and we did not allow a single man to enter the city of LIUCHOW which was across the river.

In occupying the LIUCHOW airfield, only a single advance battalion from my Division fought against the remaining enemy, and we were able to enter the airfield easily, almost without battle worth speaking of.

During this battle, my Division strictly observed the three-point instructions of "Do not burn. Do not kill. Do not plunder," which had been ordered by the Army Commander; we faithfully carried out the policy of extending love to the people, and behaved with our chief objective on pacification and securing peace in the rear areas.

As the enemy, had given orders to the residents in general and had strictly carried out the military policy of evacuation for the battle-field, the residents in general had indeed all escaped and there were none who remained. When it became gradually known to them that Japanese army discipline was strictly maintained and that the Japanese army not only did not injure the residents but loved them, they returned one by one to follow their occupations.

I declare absolutely that the discipline of my Division was strictly maintained, and there was not a single instance of my men having killed any resident or having burned any of their residences.
On this ___ day of ______, 1947

At

Deponent /S/ SUZUKI, Taiji (seal)

I, SUZUKI, Taiji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereunto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At

Witness: /S/ Horiuchi, Hyogo (seal)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ SUZUKI, Taiji (seal)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: YONEYAMA, Yonoshiko

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born on July 30, 1898 at 4-chome AOYAMA, Tokyo. My home is 627, 3-chome MINAMISUGI, SUGINAMI-ku, Tokyo, and my present address is 24 JUMONJI, YODA-Mura, CHIBA-Gun, CHIBA Pref.

2. An outline of my career is as follows:

1910 Graduated from the military academy.
1941 Appointed major-general and Commander of the 52nd Infantry Brigade.
December, 1942 Appointed Commander of the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade, in which post I served until the termination of the war.
Def. Doc. #1757

3. I, as commander of the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade, took part in attacking LIUCHOW from the KUANTUNG area.

My unit did not advance directly toward LIUCHOW, but began to advance south, toward LEIHLOW Peninsula, in the opposite direction of LIUCHOW, in order to conceal the operation plan.

The KOYASEKO Battalion under my command conducted action at HSINGHUI in the neighborhood of KUANTUNG and marched to the vicinity of CHAOANGLU, north of TAIHSHUN, at the end of June. All the inhabitants, beginning with those of TAIHSHUN, had fled; as a result, we saw none of them.

I did not permit the Japanese forces to enter the town of TAIHSHUN, except a small number of military policemen whom I sent to guard the evacuated houses. There were no incidents on the streets of TAIHSHUN.

4. Strictly abiding by the Army Commander's three strict commands "Don't burn, don't kill, and don't plunder", the Japanese forces maintained exceedingly strict military discipline. In the neighborhood of TAIHSHUN, they never killed inhabitants or set fire to their dwellings. I can affirm that there was no such action among forces under my command.

5. We received fierce fire from numerous enemy watch-towers constructed at a place approximately 30 miles south of TAIHSHUN, the name of which I have forgotten, and met with stubborn resistance; consequently we suffered considerable loss and the artillery commander was killed.
6. When our unit started from KUANTUNG, we took with us several hundred Chinese coolies employed in the neighboring area of HSINHUI. As we came to the environs of TAISHAN, they wished to go back to their native place; after giving them ample wages, allowances, and clothes, we permitted them to do so. (Though a half of the coolies we had taken won’t come home, the unit did not recruit new ones.)

However, I have been informed that when those coolies came by a communist village on their way home, they were arrested by members of a society by the name of CHU CHIEN TUN (Taiwan Organization for punishing traitors), who robbed them of their money and other articles and finally killed them. However, this happened among the Chinese and had nothing to do with the Japanese troops.

7. I never heard that the Japanese troops plundered, killed or set fire. I assert here that none of my subordinates was guilty of such action.

8. Battalion Commander KOYASEKO is a man of noble character; particularly he loved the Chinese people and stressed “respect for old people and love for children” as a motto. He won unusual confidence among the Chinese people.

10th
On this day of June, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEFENDENT /S/ YONEYAMA, Yosokika (seal)

I, HanNaI Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the opponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence
of this Witness.

On the above date at the same place.

Witness: /s/ YAMAKU Yosutaro (soul)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ YONEMI. Yonoshika (soul)
昭和十八年。八月尾、関東地方に近在に於て、新近発達した新興都市を建設することを決定した。新興都市は、既存の都市を基盤として、新しい機能を伴ったものである。新興都市の建設は、都市の発展を促進すると共に、地域の経済発展をもたらすことが期待されている。

昭和十四年、関東地方に於て、新興都市の建設を決定した。新興都市の建設は、既存の都市を基盤として、新しい機能を伴ったものである。新興都市の建設は、都市の発展を促進すると共に、地域の経済発展をもたらすことが期待されている。

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昭和二十二年（一九四七年）六月十日
於東京

同日於同所

供辯者

米 山

証

立會人

今 成

幸

太

郎

-5-
I hereby depose as follows.

I was born on 26th October, 1897, in the city of
OMATA, FUKUOKA Prefecture, which is also my permanent
domicile. I am now in SHIGANO Prison.

III: My past career is roughly as follows:

Oct., 1937. - Commander of Infantry of the 26th Division. (Lt. General)

Nov., 1938. Commander of the 4th Independent Garrison
at HABAN KING, Manchuria.

Aug., 1931. Commander of the 26th Division (Lt. General)

Aug., 1941. Chief of Staff of the Department of Military
Education.

Since then up to November 1944, I served first as the
Chief of Staff of the Singapore Army and then as the Commander
of the Manila Army. In December, 1944, I was placed on the reserve list.

III. Late in January, 1940, in my capacity as the Commander of the 26th Division, under the Central Mongolian Army commanded by Lt. Gen. OKABE Takoaburo, I was engaged, with the cooperation of our cavalry corps, in operations in the "WUW" district to suppress Tien Tso-yi's forces there. Our troops advanced from PACTON by motor vehicles and defeated the enemy. The battle ended in about ten days. The forces under my command evacuated the town of "WUW" immediately after occupation and after that the town was guarded by forces commanded by Lt. Gen. OKABE Takoaburo.

IV. I used to warn my troops never to treat the nationals cruelly and this intention of mine was fully understood by all, from the regimental commanders down.

I instructed my troops to be kind towards the Chinese people. This instruction was obeyed faithfully by all. My 26th Division was noted for its discipline, and was known as the model division in North China.

V. For the following reasons, I definitely deny the account of the 2nd and 3rd of February, 1940, some of the soldiers of the 13th Regiment of the 26th Division, committed outrage and slaughter: --
The battle of "WWWUN" was fought on the open plain of "WWWUN", and no attack was attempted on the town. Moreover, all the inhabitants had taken refuge in the interior and there was not one left. Therefore, no such violence could take place. Besides, any such unlawful acts could not and in fact were not committed by my troops, nor by the troops of Maj. Gen. AD'CHI, the Commander of the Infantry Corps and Col. ISHIGURO, the Commander of the regiment, both of whom were particularly scrupulous about discipline. If there had been any of such unlawful acts, they would have been reported to me for, thanks to the satisfactory communication with various localities at that time, I could receive and carefully examine all the reports coming from everywhere. However, no such cases of violence came to my notice. Moreover, if such an act had been committed, it would have been brought before a court martial for strict punishment, but no case of this nature was tried by a court martial.

I insist that there were absolutely no such incidents.

On the contrary, the fact was that Japanese troops were massacred in the said "WWWUN" district. Late in March, 1940, as the snow began to melt, a number of Japanese soldiers and officials of the OK/RE group, who were guarding the town of "WWWUN" after the "WWWUN" operations, were massacred by T'IEN Tso-yi's forces who invaded the town.
Def. Doc. # 1705

As that was the situation the allegation that the Japanese army or troops under my command committed outrage and slaughter etc. is absolutely untrue.

On this 15th day of July, 1947,
at I.M.T.P.

DEFENDANTS/"KURODA, Shigeru (seal)

I., IMAMARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,
at SAME PLACE.

Witness: /s/ IMAMARI, Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KURODA, Shigeru (seal)
I, ABE, Yoshinitau, having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in this country done as follows:

1. I was born on April 10th, 1907, at Kinokuku, Terada-Mura, Ochi-gun, Ehime. At present I live at Koyaura, Saka-Mura, Aki-gun, Hiroshima Prefecture.

2. An outline of my career is as follows:

   (1) Graduated from the Military Academy in 1920, Second Lieutenant, Infantry.

   (2) Staff-officer, North China Area Army, Major, Infantry.

   (3) Attached to the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry.

   (4) Chief of Staff of the 33th Division, Colonel, Infantry.

   (5) Commander of the Army Railway Transport of the Hiroshima District, Major-General until the close of the war.

3. I took part in the battle of Hongkong in the capacity of Chief of Staff of the 33th Division. The said battle was started on command of the 23rd Army on the morning of December 8, 1941.

The outline of

4. I shall explain this battle of Hongkong in two stages — the first is the attack on the Kowloon Peninsula and the second on the Island of Hongkong.

1st Stage:

Our Division advanced into the Tamaoshin line after we first rushed through the western and southwestern sides of Teru for the purpose of seizing the enemy on the plain of Chunsin and we began to break through border positions from the eastern district of Hagen-Tsuen. Then we prepared ourselves for attacks on the enemy's principal position, and started our main attack on Chunsin from the southwestern part of the mountain near the battle-positions and advanced quickly into the northern tip of the tip of the Kowloon Peninsula after breaking through the said position. One part of our troops further advanced to the southern tip of the Peninsula.

2nd Stage:

Attack on the Island of Hongkong.

In regard to the landing operations against the Island of Hongkong we chose the beach-head point between the northern corner of the Island at "Li-Wu" near the northern corner as the landing point for our main force. Our right flank made preparations for an attack near Tseng-Yang, whereas our left flank prepared for the attack near Tseng-Fang Shu. After the Artillery Corps of the 23rd Army and those of our Division had fired devastatingly on the enemy positions, we landed on the Island. Upon completion of the landing, we immediately
advanced further to the lines of Mt. Chacogens (T.M. phonetic).

5. No air units were attached for the purpose of the battle of Hong-Kong. But there were planes attached to the 23rd Army and they joined in the operation under the command of that Army. At first they bombed enemy aerodromes and warships and later cooperated with us in our ground operations.

6. Exceeding one battalion out of our divisional artillery which was assigned to the left flank, we united all the other artillery in the landing operations against the Island of Hong-Kong and bombarded enemy artillery positions of automatic weapons, pillboxes and various obstacles laid along the water front between the north corner and Sui-Miu Tang which was to our front and after the first landing was effected we ordered them to fire at the enemy behind these defenses. Consequently, we issued no orders to fire at water level objects. Particularly, we ordered our artillery forces strictly forbidden to bombard the town in spite of great tactical disadvantage.

7. We did not receive any information that there were Soviet merchant ships at anchor in the harbor neither before nor during the landing operations. We did see three or four sunken ships in the harbor before our attack, however, but could not tell whether it was due to bombing by a chance shell fired either by the enemy or us or from scuttling. Our bombardment was concentrated on the enemy ground positions, obstacles and artillery positions in the vicinity of our landing point. It felt no need to fire at the ships in the harbor. And indeed there is no fact behind any accusation that we fired on the ships lying at anchor in the harbor. On the contrary, it is possible that an enemy shell might have hit the anchored ships as they were directing their fire at our landing craft in the course of the landing operation. The Japanese troops did not open fire within their landing barges until they landed. The thing they did was to put up a smoke-screen while the enemy fired at our landing barges.

The landing operation was commenced at about 2100 o'clock under cover of darkness so although the enemy used searchlights, their firing was so much hit and miss it is quite probable that some of those merchant ships which were within the zone of maneuver of our landing barges might have been hit by enemy shells.

We are positive that our army absolutely never committed such acts as to lock up the ships' crew, confiscate them of their belongings or their provisions, etc.

It cannot, however, be denied that the Chinese residents who were in the occupied area of the Japanese forces, after we succeeded in the landing operations of Hong-Kong, plundered evacuated houses and warehouses at night and sometimes even in the daytime and us a small junk to loot ships in the harbor. Since our Division was still occupied with all its strength in attacking interior positions on the island at the time it was very difficult for us to be tending to the suppression of such incidents.

8. There were many ships large and small lying at anchor in the southern part of the harbor of Hong-Kong, particularly, in the east near to the Island of Hong-Kong, Taiyen, and the western part. The harbor area was filled numerous and probably numbered less than twenty. Some or our ships were in a sunken state but their crews were in a safe place somewhere as we saw nobody on the ships.

Our landing barges, therefore, were compelled to thread their way among these ships lying at anchor in the harbor.

It could not recognize the nationality of the ships in harbor because they had no flags or any clear marks of identification.

9. We will do our best further endeavor extermination of human lives, the 23rd Army twice comptuing the front of Dona, and as a bearer of .6 of trees, to advise the British Army to enter the. Particulars; on the second occasion we suggested to them to consider the extermination of at least the women and children from the Island, which, however, was not accepted by the British Army.

-2-
10. With reference to prisoners of war, our Division took charge of only disarming and keeping watch of them. I do not remember exactly how many British war prisoners there were, but I think there were about fifteen in Kowloon and about six thousand in Hong Kong.

The British Army troops voluntarily disarmed themselves and gathered in their barracks, so it wasn't as troublesome as it had anticipated nor did any incident occur. Thereafter the handling of the war prisoners was completely under the supervision of the 23rd Army.

11. Regarding the non-combatants in Hong Kong, the 23rd Army took charge of them, but they were small in number as the majority of the families of the British had evacuated Hong Kong before the battle began. The remaining number continued to live in hotels or in their own homes just as they had been doing.

12. We were closely moved by the Imperial Command which gave us the honor of capturing Hong Kong and very conscious of the heavy responsibility and duties involved.

The Divisional Commander gave us instructions on several occasions, the gist of which was as follows:

"The attack on Hong Kong differs from garrisoning in China. It is an attack on a fortress which has seen years of laborious preparation by the British, and it will be against an army which is one of the strongest forces in Europe. It is therefore, certain that the history of this battle will be closely examined and commented upon by future historians for a long time. We must pledge ourselves to stake all our lives upon victory in this battle. Particularly, no act of illegal conduct should be committed throughout the battle, such as murder, atrocities, plunder and destruction, etc. Our attitude must be gentlemanly so that we may not suffer even the slightest criticism from the enemy as well as the third Powers."

Throughout the battle, we strictly obeyed, without the slightest variation, as purport of the above instructions.

After our Division broke through the border and captured the enemy's principal position, tactical principles demanded that the whole army should immediately storm into the town of Kowloon so that the enemy garrison for the district of Kowloon might be prevented from retreating to the Island of Hong Kong. However, as it was plain that the entry of a large number of soldiers into Kowloon would necessarily throw the city into confusion, the entire army was ordered to halt at the foot of a hill to the north of the city, and only two infantry battalions with the best training records in the Division were ordered to enter the town. As a consequence the whole town was completely saved from confusion.

During our landing operations on Hong Kong, enemy artillery from their positions inside the town fired fiercely at us. But despite the intense firing by the enemy our troops were strictly forbidden to bombard the town, and were ordered to aim only at such pill-box positions as were located higher on the hill than the residential sections. Individuals to say this proved a great tactical disadvantage in our operations but in spite of it we did our utmost to protect Hong Kong from war disaster. Because our troops were not permitted to attack inside of the city, Hong Kong still remains today as it used to be and there were no casualties among its residents. After the enemy on the Island of Hong Kong surrendered at least three battalions were needed ordinarily to maintain peace and order of the city as well as to disarm the enemy. But we selected only one of the best infantry battalions in the Division for this difficult task, cut the number of men to the least possible, placed them on their honor and they performed wonderfully.

Even after the capture of all of Hong Kong, we stationed only three select infantry battalions in the town, because unforeseen incidents might possibly allow the entry of a mass of troops into the city and its vicinity. Our main forces, therefore, were concentrated in the suburbs to the north of the town of Hong Kong.
Kowloon and restrictions were placed on the soldiers in entering the town. Thanks to these measures, no incidents took place although some complaints were heard among the soldiers.

13. Looting by Chinese refugees was perpetrated taking advantage of unguarded moments even during the course of battle; therefore, we strictly prohibited the public in general from going out at night. However, as these refugees broke into evacuated houses even during broad daylight to say nothing of at night, we had extreme difficulty in preventing such looting.

After the occupation, Chinese refugees opened markets in Kowloon and Hong Kong but the majority of their transactions consisted of stolen goods.

I am firmly convinced that there was absolutely no case of murder, atrocity and looting committed by the officers or men of our Division.

I do not remember exactly the number of British soldiers killed and wounded, but the wounded for the most part were taken care of by the British Army themselves.

Some of them were searched for and found by our front line troops in conjunction with the British Army. When the dead were discovered, they were buried respectfully at the spot where they were found; and the wounded were taken into hospitals.

On this seventh day of December 1946, at the First Demobilization Bureau in Tokyo.

DEPARTMENT: ABE, Yashimitsu

(Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness at the same place at the same date.

WITNESS: I'AMARI, Yasutaro

(Seal)
I swear according to my conscience to state the truth withholding nothing nor adding anything.

Yoshinatsu
如果您对这张图片中的内容有任何疑问，或者需要进一步的帮助，请随时告诉我。我会尽力提供支持。
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）
二月十五日於
極東日臨軍事
裁判所

当日

立會人
今鹿
繁太郎

右
當立會人ノ面前ニ写直写シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ誓明

5
敵は、東海岸部を守備するために、一部の部隊を同地に配置した。これにより、東海岸部の防御が強化された。したがって、この結果、日本側の進攻を難しくした。
ソレデスカラ我師防問阻導案突破次デ破ノ主陣地攻略後ハ九龍地域

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ソレデスカラ我師防問阻導案突破次デ破ノ主陣地攻略後ハ九龍地域
十四
私ハ英軍死傷者ノ数ハ記憶シテ居リマセンガ死傷者ハ主トシテ英軍
然シ其ノ一部ハ英軍ト共ニ我が第一線部隊ガ搜索発見ニ勧メマシタ
死者ヲ助ケルソレハ現場ニ於テ扣撃ニ繼続シ略者ハ病院ニ收容シマシタ

Def, Doc 1257
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: SHIMODA, Chiyoshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I. I was born on June 7, 1902 (Meiji 35) at No. 29, Kami-machi, Narayama Motoshin-machi, Akita Prefecture. My permanent residence is No. 1741, Ekota 4-chome, Nakano Ward, Tokyo and my present residence is No. 643, Shimo-azabu, Kawasaki, Kanagawa Prefecture.

II. The following is an outline of my career.

1924 (Vaisho 13) graduated from the Military Academy
1936 (Showa 11) attached to the General Staff Office
April 1940 (Showa 15) staff-officer of the 104th Division
October 1941 (Showa 16) staff-officer of the 23rd Army
March 1943 (Showa 18) staff-officer of the Kanto Defense Army
April 1943 (Showa 18) staff-officer of the 3rd Imperial

Guard Division and chief of the staff of the 152nd Division (Colonel)
Def. Doc. No. 1877

Termination of War.

III. From April 1940 (Showa 15) to October 1941 (Showa 16) I was a staff-officer of the 104th Division and served as the chief of operations and intelligence. In October 1941 (Showa 16) I was appointed a staff-officer of the 23rd Army (stationed in Canton) and served as the chief of intelligence till March '943 (Showa 18). I am, therefore, well aware of the movements of the 23rd Army which was stationed in Canton district about 1941 (Showa 16).

In about lunar December of 1941 (Showa 16), the Army stopped all operations and devoted all its energies to the maintenance of public order. It is, therefore, needless to say that it successfully entered the city without fighting. Since occupation of Hongkong the Chinese Army restored quite a calm attitude and the peace was maintained very well.

In Canton and vicinity, I have never heard of such places as Sanhuang, Wuyenchao, Shasia, Shaipuchang, Hopien, Kuchen, Hsuehkung, Hsiencheng, Chaohsian, Peimenwai, Haimenkou, Paisha etc. If anything special had taken place in connection with the Japanese Army, I must have heard of it as I was the chief of intelligence. Even the matter which concerned the life of a Chinese was to be reported to the Army without exception, but I have no remembrance of receiving any such report at that time.
I positively deny the fact that about 2,000 citizens were massacred by the Japanese Army at that time. Not only the commander but the leading staff of the Army were extremely strict on military discipline and repeatedly warned their subordinates to treat kindly the Chinese people, to respect the customs of the Chinese and not to interfere with the Chinese authorities. To the general soldiers, they showed such a brief motto as, "Do not burn, do not kill and do not plunder", and tried utmost to make it pervade the whole army that scarcely anyone disobeyed it.

Therefore, if the Japanese Army had ever massacred a Chinese, it would have been taken up as the serious problem of the Army.

The rumor that 2,000 Chinese people were massacred was merely a fiction and I definitely assert that such a thing did not take place while I served in the 23rd Army.

On this 27th day of June, 1947,
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT: SHIMODA, Chiyoshi (seal)

I, IMARU, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,
at the same place.

Witness: IMARU, Yasutaro (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/3/ HILODA, Chiyoshi (seal)
According to the usual custom of our country, I first swear as in the attached paper and then state as follows:

I was selected as managing director of the Manchurian Aircraft Manufacturing Co. Ltd. in December 1944. This company was the only airplane manufacturing company in Manchuria, and its head office and main factory were in Mukden.

Next to the main factory there was the factory of the Manchurian Machine-Tool Manufacturing Company where machine-tools were manufactured, and several American or British prisoners of war were working there. I was told that there were some who had high technical ability among them.

While no prisoners of war were working in my factory, I asked the reason of the man who was in charge of the workers. He answered, "We inquired about the employment of prisoners of war, unofficially of a staff officer of the Shantung Army before you came here. The staff officer replied that we cannot let the prisoners of war work in airplane manufacturing work according to international law. This is the reason why we don't employ them."

At this answer, I first learned of the limitation of international law and the Shantung Army's attitude toward the treatment of prisoners of war which carefully observed the limitations of international law.

WRITTEN OATH
18 February 1947

I, hereby swear that I shall state nothing but the truth according to my conscience, neither concealing nor adding anything.

/s/ OKABE, Eiichi

I hereby certify that the above was duly sworn in my presence and signed at Kobe, Japan, this 18th day of February, 1947.

/s/ Sumihisa

RETURN TO ROOM 361
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
The United States of America, et al.

Against
ARAKI Sadao, et al.

Affidavit (transcript)

By
IKEJIRI Satoshi

I, being duly sworn according to the customary formality in this country depose and state:
I) I was a major in the army. I arrived at my post as adjutant of the Army in the Burra Area on May 5th in the 19th year of Showa (1944). Since then until Aug. 15th in the 20th year of Showa (1945), I remained at the same post. Demobilized on July 21st of the 21st year of Showa (1946), I have since that time been working as a non-regular member of the Administration Business Transaction Dept., of the southern Army.

II) In the middle of September in the 18th year of Showa (1944) General KIMURA Heitaro arrived at his post as Commander of the Army in the Burma Area and ever since then until the termination of the war, I took office as adjutant to him.

III) My main duties as adjutant in the Army of the Burma Area were: The handling of correspondence, books and confidential documents, affairs concerning awards, the handling of documents concerning prisoners of war and internment etc.

IV) Concerning the treatment of P.O.W.'s during the construction of the Siam-Burma railway, the Headquarters of the Burma Area Army had no connection at all, and moreover it was a year after the railway construction had been completed that General KIMURA arrived at his post as Commander of the Army in the Burma Area.

V) The Rangoon P.W. Camp was one of the branches of the Malay P.W. Camp, and so came under the control of the Commander of the Combined Southern Army.

   The chief of the Rangoon P.W. Camp was appointed and removable by the Chief of the Malay P.W. Camp. That is to say, although the chief of the Rangoon P.W. Camp and two non-commissioned
officer formed the staff of that camp, they were dispatched from the Malay P.W. Camp. The army surgeon and the requisite number of guards were dispatched from the 73rd Headquarters of Line of Communications of the Burma Area Army and were under the Command of the camp commander.

VI) In the Army internment Camp in Tavoy, civilians of hostile nations (except P.O.W.'s) were held, and they were under the control of the Commander of the 24th Mixed Brigade, which was under the Burma Area Army.

VII) General KIMURA Heitaro, Commander of the Burma Area Army always directed his subordinates to treat the P.O.W.'s and internees with benevolence and never to insult nor mistreat them but to treat them fairly, observing the articles.

VIII) The condition and the treatment of the P.O.W.'s in the Rangoon(P.O.W) Camp, while General KIMURA occupied the post of Commander of the Army in Burma, were approximately as follows:

a) The camp, former Rangoon prison, was a permanent building, fully equipped for living and sanitation with dispensary, sick rooms, showers, kitchen, exercise yard etc. The equipment of the internment camp was also in good condition.

b) Of the P.O.W.'s the healthy men of the rank of non-Commissioned officers and below were sometimes ordered to work when necessary, but the patients were allowed to rest within. The type of labour they performed was mainly work at the wharf and odd jobs in the supply departments and at their camp.

c) P.O.W's were allowed to rest not only on Sundays but also on the public holidays of their countries. Additional supplies were provided to them from time to time.
d) PCW's of the rank of warrant officer and above sometimes, of their own volition, in order to take exercise, came to the working places and gave directions and supervised the PCW's engaged in their work.

e) The PCW's were made to run a farm by utilizing the vacant land within the camp and they were also made to raise livestock by issuing to them cows, pigs, goats, ducks, etc, from official depots for the purpose of obtaining fats. The surplus crops of their farm were sold on the Rangoon market and the receipts became their income, and were allowed to be appropriated for the purchase of luxuries at the market.

f) We occasionally sent the military band belonging to the Burma Area Army to that camp for the entertainment of the PCW's.

g) As for amusements, we equipped the camp with a piano, books etc, making our utmost efforts to give what comfort we could within the limitations of the locality.

h) The prisoners were also allowed to obtain goods at the camp canteen to a reasonable extent and they bought a considerable amount of cigarettes, milk etc.

i) I never heard of any case of mistreatment of the PCW's (prisoners) during General KIMURA's stay at that post. I only remember that we reprimanded some of them on several occasions at the request of, Brig.-Gen. HOBSON, their senior officer for their lack of obedience to his commands.

j) Both Brig-Gen. HOBSON and Maj. LORING, British officers representing the ICW's on one or two occasions presented letters of
thanks to the camp commander for the fair treatment of the POW's and twice to the Chief of the camp, regarding the fair treatment of the POW's. At the end of April in the 20th year of Showa (1945), on the occasion of the withdrawal of the Japanese Army from Rangoon, we told them that they would be released, whereupon these two officers delivered a letter of thanks to the Chief of the camp. I have not heard of the two officers since then.

k) The treatment of the internment in the Army camp in Tavoy was also generally fair in accordance with the provisions and I got no report any particular case of mistreatment. Letters of thanks were presented to the chief of the camp as many as seven or eight times.

1) In brief, while General Kimura was in office, we had but very scanty supplies from the rear and the materials were running short, nevertheless we made as much effort as possible for the good treatment of the POW's internment. I believe the treatment was generally with fairness.

The facts above mentioned are based upon the reports from the Headquarters of the 73rd Line of communications and the Headquarters of 24th Mixed Brigade, and upon my recollections of information from Captain Shirakawa, the former adjutant of the 73rd Line of communications Headquarters.
This 27 day of November, 21st year of Showa (1946)

At the office of Japanese Counsel
in the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East

by IKEJIRI Satoshi (seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned date.

Bernard A. Hargadon, 1st Lt. Inf.
Administrative Officer

OATH

I swear according to my conscience to tell the truth
with-holding and adding nothing

IKEJIRI Satoshi (seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 20 Jan 1947
以上のハラー第一師団及び独立旅及び二十四旅及び師団及びヨリノ

以上ハラー第一師団及び独立旅及び二十四旅及び师団及びヨリノ
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEFENDANT: SAKURAT, Tokutaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I, SAKURAT, Tokutaro, ex-major general, was born June 21, 1897. My present address is Tsuno-machi Koyu-gun, Miyazaki Prefecture. I was in charge of defense of the Akyab area on the India and Burma border as commander of the Infantry of the 55th Division from September, 1943 to February, 1945. Then I served as chief advisor to the Burmese National Defense Army. Immediately after the Burmese National Defense Army rose in revolt, I was ordered to be attached to the Infantry School on 5 April 1945. Later, I became divisional commander and remained so until the end of hostilities.

2. It was after the military operation of Imphal which ended in failure, in mid-September 1944 that General KIMURA came into office. As the commander of the SAKURAT Detachment, I took command of a force numbering about 3,700 consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and one cavalry regiment as its nucleus and was in charge of the frontal defense of Akyab, while the main force of the 55th Division moved to the Bassein area.

3. General KIMURA, after he assumed office, especially stressed and advised that we should strive to win the confidence of the people, to enforce strict military discipline and to raise the morale of the men. Later he delivered instructions several times to the same effect. In compliance with his instructions, we brought it home to our subordinates that very strict military discipline was the best way to win the confidence of the people. We did our utmost to behave as prudently as possible, so military discipline was very strictly maintained.

4. General KIMURA was so earnest about the promotion of friendship and harmony between the Japanese army and the Burmese and the stabilization of the latter's livelihood that he had his subordinates compile a pamphlet entitled "The Attitude to Take Towards the Burmese", and distributed them to the members of units under his command.
Defense Doc. 1871

We guided our subordinates on the basis of this pamphlet. Because of this, all the men in my garrison area behaved themselves well, adhering rigidly to "The Attitude to Take Towards the Burmese", and there was not a single case in which the Burmese were persecuted or maltreated. In addition, in order to raise the standard of the people's living, we made and gave agricultural implements, hoes and boats to them, so that they were extremely grateful to us. Friendly relations between the Japanese and Burmese was very strong. Therefore, they were willing to help us with transportation in the rear areas and in the transportation of provisions and the sick even at the front voluntarily.

The Japanese Army particularly respected and protected the religion of the Burmese, so that they were very much in harmony with the inhabitants. The Burmese said that so far as the seashore was concerned they themselves would defend it and they did guard duty along the beach. When the enemy landed, they reported it to us by means of signals and the like. Once the village headmen in the neighborhood of Intan (TN; phonetic) was killed in action while obstructing the landing of the enemy.

5. In February 1945, I left Akyab for Rangoon to become the chief advisor to the Burmese National Defense Army. Circumstances in the Rangoon area were different and public peace was not as good as in the Akyab area. Atthat time, the main forces of the Burmese National Defense Army were located in Hmada, while powerful units were stationed in the vicinity of Toungoo, Pegu and Thaton.

On 15 March 1945, our army and the Burmese National Defense Army concluded an operational agreement and our army celebrated, holding a ceremony for their going out into the field. However, Burmese National Defense Army suddenly rose in revolt against us, at the end of March 1945, as the conditions of our Army became worse and worse day by day, not to mention the propaganda of the Anglo-Indian Army. With the sudden change of situation, I called on the Commander in Chief of the Burma Area Army, KIMURA, immediately, and talked it over with him regarding how to handle it. General KIMURA, after considering the former friendly cooperation between the Japanese Army and the Burmese and their standpoint, ordered me that our Army absolutely must not take any revengeful action against them. Furthermore, he ordered that we must protect all those who would pledge allegiance without regard to their past and carry out only the minimum punitive action necessary from the standpoint of operations.
On this 14th day of June 1947
At Tsunazaki, Woyu-gun
Miyazaki Prefecture

DEFENDANT: SAKURAI, Tokutaro, (Seal)

I, KORETSUNE, Tatsuo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness: (signed) KORETSUNE, Tatsuo (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAKURAI, Tokutaro (Seal)
My name is TAZUMI, Genzo. I was a captain attached to the Burma Area Japanese Army.

1. Q. Were you the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon in Burma at the time when General KIMURA, Keitaro was the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army?
   A. Yes.

2. Q. Was the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon receiving orders and directions from the POW Camp of Malaya? (If not, from whom the POW Camp of Rangoon was receiving orders and directions?)
   A. Although the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon was subject to the Commander of the POW Camp of Malaya, the former was being ordered and directed by the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army in connection with the execution of business.

3. Q. Did the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army give orders and directions to you while you were holding office as the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon?
   A. The Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon, no sooner than taking over the former Field POW Camp of Rangoon as the 6th Detachment of the POW Camp of Malaya, was placed under the command of the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army on 15 March 1944, and the latter in turn put me under the control of the Commander of the 73rd Line of Communications Sector of the Rangoon Line of Communication Department. Accordingly, it was that the Commander of the POW Camp of Rangoon received the immediate command, orders and directions from the Commander of the 73rd Line of Communications Sector.

4. Q. Had the General Headquarters of the South Area Japanese Army ever given any orders or directions to the Camp of Rangoon?
   If so, when and how far was it, explain in detail.
Interrogation of Captain TAZUMI, Genzo 27 February 1947

Answer for Question 4 should be read

"A. No, they had not."
5. Q. Were there any POW's who were sent from the Rangoon Camp to the other camps? Explain it.
   A. There was none, so far as European POW's are concerned. I remember, it was toward the end of 1944 when I was once ordered to send 1st Lieutenant Peacock of the British Navy to Japan proper, but as he was taken ill on the way he was sent back to the Camp. As for the Indian POW's, we transferred about 100 of them about January, 1945, to the HIKARI organ as required personnel for the Indian National Army.

6. Q. Explain in detail about the health and sanitary conditions of the POW's and their clothing, food and housing conditions.
   A. (a) State of health and sanitary conditions --
       As for the POW's state of health, there was a big difference in the degree of health among the POW's themselves. In other words, those who had excellent health always kept up the same conditions, and those who were of poor build were constantly weak and fell ill and no sooner than they left the hospital they would again enter the hospital. Judging from the number of patients it could not be said to be good. However, after around July 1944 the number of patients gradually decreased and the health of POW's took an upward trend.
       Jungle sores which were very frequent at the time of the taking over, was almost completely cured by around August 1944. The advance of health was more remarkable for the Indians than for the Europeans.
       On the other hand, in spite of various efforts made, it was impossible for us to see that the number patients of beriberi was notably reduced. As for the communicative diseases, two slight cases of smallpox had broken out around April 1944 but was completely cured immediately. I think it was in the middle of April when cholera suddenly broke out and there were about 10 genuine cholera cases. As a result of our utmost efforts to prevent the spreading it was put an end before becoming serious. A for the hygienic conditions in general in the camp, it was impossible for us to keep them in a satisfactory condition on account of the shortage of
of medicine and inadequate equipment, but I consider that generally speaking the general hygienic situation in the camp was in good condition owing to sensible attentions and efforts of both camp staffs and POW's.

(b) Food, clothing and housing.

Though clothing was not so good as compared with that of Chang'e and other places, of which I had previously been in charge, I was able to maintain the ordinary condition by getting Japanese goods for replenishment from time to time. As for eating, to which I as well as the staff had made the utmost efforts, I firmly believe that we did furnish a good supply to POW's. It is supposed that boiled rice was not liked by the European POW's as a regular diet, but that could not be helped. Instead, we made every possible effort to obtain fresh meats and eggs for them.

Housing was bare-looking itself because we appropriated a bare prison for the camp. The furniture and fixtures also were poorly equipped. However, with the small number of persons received and sufficient space for living, POW's were able to house at ease.

7. Q. How many hours a day had the POW's been demanded to work?
A. Seven hours

8. Q. Explain in detail the manner of the executive staffs of the camp handling the sick and wounded POW's.
A. As to the sick and wounded, we treated them very kindly. A few examples of them are as follows:

a. In case a POW was wounded at the time when he was working within camp, we presented a gift in the name of the camp.

b. Army surgeons as well as hygienic staffs who were in charge of treating the sick and wounded, engaged, kindly and earnestly on the duty day and night. As a remarkable example, there was a case of Lt. Peacock of the British Navy who was already mentioned in Answer 5. As he was scheduled to be sent out to Japan proper after leaving the camp accompanied by the personnel of the Japanese Ministry Police, he suddenly took ill and it became impossible to make his way. Although treated in the Japanese Naval Hospital for some time, the progress of his illness was no good. At the time when he was sent back to
this camp, he was in such a condition as had serious difficulties in walking and could not take ordinary meals, that he came back lying on a stretcher. At that time Surgeon ONISHI devoted himself entirely to his treatment, he also gave articles of luxury at his own expense and he administered medicines of his own.

So, all the staff of the sanitation section headed by him took care of him in all kindness, carrying him out into open air in the shade of trees or helping him to walk.

When he returned, he was so haggard he could hardly be recognized and it was feared that he would not recover. But his health gradually improved to such a degree that he was able to participate in the four successive days and nights' march in company with the prisoners who were living in the common mass camps, on the occasion of the evacuation of the camps in April 1945.

9. Q. Where the wounded and sick prisoners properly treated?

A. Generally speaking, I think they were under proper treatment. Owing to the lack of medicines and equipment as well, I am not positive to say it was perfect but nothing more could be done under the circumstances of that time.

10. Q. Were they demanded to labor?

A. No, they were not.

11. Q. What was made of the incomes obtained from the vegetables and other products of the farms cultivated by the prisoners and the live stock of their raising.

A. Vegetables and other products were supplied them for their ration. Hogs were not raised enough to meet the demand. But the fresh vegetables ran into a considerable surplus which were shipped to the military market with the understanding of the Superintendent Department of the Area army in exchange for the special ration of pork, eggs and cooking oil. Those articles were added to the supply of the prisoners. (At the time the military market was suffering from the want of fresh vegetables to be doled out for the general units).
12. Q. Were you answerable to General KIMURA for the management of the prison? Or did you manage and supervise the said camp on your own responsibility and authority?
   A. I was responsible to the commander of the 73rd Commissary Sector Commander for executing the Burma Area Army's regulations for handling the prisoners and for supplying them as well as the service regulations of the 6th Branch of the Malay Prisoners Camps (namely, the Rangoon Camp) which were set forth by the 73rd Commissary Sector Commander.

13. Q. Has General KIMURA ever visited or inspected the Rangoon Prison? And, if he has, how was he impressed then?
   A. No, he has not while I was serving there.

14. Q. If you received letters of thanks from prisoners, what did you do with them? Who got the letters at Singapore?
   A. I received the letters of thanks from prisoners. But towards the end of 1945 when withdrawing from the camps our trucks encountered enemy and were burned down with all the official and private things. The last letters I got on the occasion of their liberation were snatched off by an unknown soldier along with a black leather purse containing them, when Australian soldiers plundered us at Singapore.

I have truly and faithfully interpreted the foregoing statement to the best of my belief and conscience.

Subscribed and sworn to before me on the 27th day of Feb., 1947.

/S/ David W. Parsons
Captain, INF.
Investigating Officer
Def. Loc. N 1006

ENL. T. SALT

Interrogation of Captain TAZUMI, Genzo 27 February 1947

Answer for question 4 should be read

"A. No, they had not."

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
三、

答出方程式は以下の通り。被動長方形を決定し、時速192.155を指揮命令。被動長方形を決定し、時速192.155を指揮命令。

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Excerpts from Interrogation of Tazumi 27 May, 1947

Q. Had you any facilities for recreation and comfort for the prisoners in the Rangoon Camps?

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Q. What was the canteen like in the said camps?

A. Eats, drinks and daily necessities were bought for all of the prisoners from the canteen fund which was their Collective fund. Order and distribution of articles was in charge of officers among the prisoners. And the paymaster of the camp acted as the agency for finding ordered articles and kept connection with merchants. I forgot the volume of monthly sales.

Q. Did you allow them to rest on such days as Sunday and other holidays in accordance with the regulations?

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Q. Was there unlawful acts inflicted by Japanese soldiers on the prisoners since the middle of September 1944? Or have they ever subjected prisoners to discipline?

A. I don't remember any of the unlawful acts toward the prisoners by Japanese soldiers. But the prisoners were punished.

Examples:
1. When some British soldiers refused to go out for labor. (It was reported by the British Chief of the building).
2. When an Indian officer would not act upon the administrative regulations for the prisoners.

Q. Was there any case in which the prisoners in the said camps were mentally and physically well treated?

A. Yes, there were. The examples are as follows:
1. Upon the revision of the prisoners' payroll maximum wage rate was allowed them.
2. They had, near the camps, their own vegetable farms where the products were not only enough for them but were often bartered for rare foods in the military market.
3. They received a lot of cows and pigs which were slaughtered in the camps thereby increasing the supply of raw fresh meat.
4. During Christmas and New Year a lot of luxuries were given them.

Q. Were you a member of the staff of the 73rd Commissary Sector or an M.P?
A. No. I was not in the staff of the 73rd Commissary Sector, but was in the staff of the Malay Prisoners Camp. My branch of arms was artillery.
問三
ラングラー
伴房収容所内に於ける住人
営業・応接所等を於ける
・

問四
伴房収容所内に於ける営業
借・事務所等に於ける

問五
伴房の出資により電報資金を作り地方より飲食物日用品を共同顧人

問六
伴房内内の伴房に於しだ日曜・祝祭日等には規定通り休養をせめり

一九四四年九月中旬以降伴房収容所に於て日本兵に於る伴房に於する

＜3088＞

田 住
元 三
（１）
不法行為ありしや、又その他の理由により俘虜を懲罰に附せしことありしや。

俘虜を懲罰に附せしるための不法行為は記じなし。

例へば、英人兵・相模に於て出向を拒む（英人被将の甲出により）

同収容所内に於ける俘虜に対して機知亀を備え、俘虜を懲罰に附せしすることありしや。

俘虜収容所附近にて營撃場を（鉄架一箇み充分の野菜を入手せしの

みならず零く軍市場と交渉して市場の珍らしき食物と物々交換せり。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: ICHIDA Jiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

ICHIDA, Jiro is my name.

I was born on December 29, 1894. My present address is Showa-dori, Nakama-machi, Onga-gun, Fukuoka-ken.

I entered the Military Academy in 1914.

In April 1944, after having been employed in various departments, I was appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the Burma Area Army, which office I held till the termination of the war. I was then a Major-General. My chief duty during this period was to assist the Chief of Staff.
2. It was mid September 1944 that General KIMURA, Heitaro, arrived at his post as Commander of the Burma Area Army. Our Army there had suffered a crushing defeat in the Imphal campaign with its fighting strength weakened considerably, and since about August 1943, supplies had almost ceased to come from Japan.

3. General KIMURA, who arrived when things were in such an unfavorable state, issued a set of instructions to all the troops under his command on joining them strongly to maintain military discipline and to try to win the confidence of the natives. When we had meetings in late October and in the middle of December 1944, and in late January 1945, the General summoned to the Army Headquarters the staff officers and unit commanders under his command and reminded them most carefully of the instructions he had previously given, (the draft of the instructions and other documents related to the same are not extant, having been either lost or burnt while retiring). While in office, General KIMURA constantly endeavored hard to see his instructions obeyed thoroughly by his troops, so that the Burmese people came to place a good deal of confidence in him.

The General met the Burmese State Ministers at least once or twice a month for the purpose of exchanging free and outspoken opinions. He welcomed the complaints against the Japanese and in the cases that he thought proper had the requested improvements made. Meanwhile the war situation had been developing unfavorably from day to day for us, entailing
increasing hardships and suffering on the part of the natives. The General felt sorry for their plight. When he had occasion to meet the Burmese high-ranking officials he always expressed his gratitude for their good will and at the same time showed sympathy for their delicate circumstances. General KIMURA instructed his men to contribute to the stabilization of living conditions of the Burmese at the expense of the strategical requirements.

General KIMURA always took pains to promote good feeling and harmony between Japanese and Burmese. In order to prevent misunderstandings likely to arise because of the difference in the manners and customs and language, he had a two-volume booklet compiled, entitled "The Attitude to take toward the Burmese" and distributed copies not only among our men, but also among the greater part of the Japanese residents for their guidance and observance. (I tried to get a copy but so far haven't been able to lay hands on one.) At the same time he asked the Burmese Government to tell their people plainly of our readiness and desire to act in concert with them. The government on their part distributed the summarized translation of the general's request among the prefectural governors for their information. The result of the general's efforts was reflected in the fact that the friendly and harmonious relations between the army and the populace were notably improved and
our men, appreciating their commander's spirit and intention, did their best to realize his wishes.

I used to attend the Japanese-Burmese Cooperation Conference as a representative of the Burma Area Army, and so I had ample opportunities to come in contact with the high governmental officials. Mindful of the general's care and the Burmese official thoughts and opinions, I took care to cooperate with the government in their undertakings in all ways, and to ensure the stabilization of the livelihood of the populace.

4. The general war situation during General KIMURA's tenure of office was:

His arrival at his post coincided with the concentration of the main force toward the River Irrawaddy following the crushing defeat we had suffered at Imphal. He had hardly assumed his new duty before he advanced to Maymyo, 18 September, 1944 and he devoted himself there to the conduct of military operations until around the 20th of October. The Japanese Army in Burma could barely manage to make preparations for the Irrawaddy battle by moving forward all the available troops to replenish the remaining strength of the 15th Corps that had taken part in the Imphal battle, though we were so circumstances that it was next to impossible to leave behind any part of the general fighting troops requisite for the preservation of peace and safeguarding of the rear area. On the 3rd of February 1945,
General KIMURA and his army advanced as far as Kalow where the General conducted the operations himself. He remained there 16th of February. Owing to our inferiority in fighting power, especially in equipment such as planes, tanks and fire-projectors, the Japanese lines were pierced all along, and again we were forced to retreat with heavy losses. The 16th and 33rd Corps managed somehow to set about the concentration operation to the Tanassorim area mid-May 1945, and completed the movement by their main bodies in June. The fighting strength of these armies was sadly diminished, with the best part of the arms being lost, and the soldiers physically were most seriously deteriorated; in fact, more than ten thousand of them had to be invalided to Thailand. The 28 Corps had its retreat cut off and was obliged to stay in the Pegu district for about three months isolated from the others. In late July 1945, when the rainy season was at its worst, this disjoined army desperately charged into the enemy force, losing thereby the better part of its strength and the whole of its major arms. When the war came to an end the troops were still retreating without having met the main body.

The withdrawal of the Burma Area Army Headquarters from Rangoon to Moulmoin commenced at the end of April 1945, the complete concentration being effected at the beginning of July. The headquarters, however, could not function as it should; its hasty retreat to Moulmoin, the loss of communication and
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transportation equipment and the important documents, the
transference of many skilled staff-officers, the unsatisfactory
replacements among the administrative personnel, frequent air
raids by British-Indian planes and the fact that it was at
the peak of the rainy season -- all these factors interfered
with the satisfactory functioning of the Army headquarters.
Above all, the air raids by the British-Indian planes which
were conducted in the daytime and on moonlight nights as well,
frequently compelled the headquarters to seek shelter in the
outlying villages of Moulmein and attend to its duties there.
And most of the soldiers, too, not to speak of the invalids,
had to seek shelter in the jungles both day and night.

At the end of March 1946, with the state of things prevail-
ing so unfavorably, the national defense army of Burma,
numbering 6,000-8,000 rose against the Japanese and the guer-
rillas started a campaign of harassing our rear lines and
were greatly menaced.

The Burma National Defense Army had seemed favorable to
the Japanese, as an agreement was arranged at Rangoon with the
Japanese army for united operations. The revolt was an
unexpected one for the Japanese. Afterwards, it became clear
that a secret declaration of war against Japan had been made
and signed by Major General Onsan on 14 March 1945. For this
purpose they had previously stationed numbers of men in the
rear of the Japanese army, at the key strategic points, such as
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purpose they had previously stationed numbers of men in the
rear of the Japanese army, at the key strategic points, such as
Toungoo, Pago, and Thaton. The main body in Hanzada, with the outbreak of the uprising, destroyed the means of communication and transportation at several places, assaulted the sentry-guard, squads of soldiers and gendarmerie squads at various places, murdering most of these officers and seizing the money and stores kept in their custody. Espionage was engaged in by the guerrillas so that the Headquarters of the Burma Area Army and the 28th and the 33rd Corps headquarters were subjected to serious bombings with heavy losses to us, and the Japanese officers in charge of the national defense militia were for the most part killed. Of the 200 odd Japanese nationals, including the interpreters and the commercial clerks who were in the Delta region, only a few were found safe at the end of the war and the rest are still missing.

However, General KIMURA sought no revenge. On the contrary, he stressed the importance of the friendship hitherto kept up between Japan and Burma and met the situation from a strategical point of view only. There were left no forces to meet the emergency. A small amount of troops and part of the 55th division which had been dispatched for aid in the quarter of Bassoin and Meiktila were used for the purpose of making a false show of strength.

From January 1945 there began to be formed one after another guerrilla parties of Karen and Kachin tribes in the
mountain regions south of Komapow and Kaukaroik area and in the
regions south of Papun. What with the entry of the Indian
educated Burmese, the arrival of Indians and British officers
by means of parachutes and the replenishment by air of arms and
munitions, the guerrillas grow rapidly in strength till the
groups were scattered far and wide, working most actively in
collusion with the rebels. The 31st and the 33rd Divisions
were offered resistance at several places on their retreat
from Komapow and sustained heavy losses.

In the strategical areas in general and Tenasserim Province
in particular, we were constantly harassed till the end of the
war by the activities of the rebels and the guerrilla groups.
They sprang surprise attacks upon the Japanese armies inflicting
heavy losses to the latter. And this was especially the case
in the rainy season when small Japanese parties of troops,
wearied and exhausted, were in retreat. Then these troops
were assaulted and deprived of their arms or of their lives.
In late July 1945, as the 28th Corps, while trying to cross
the Sittaung River, met with a stout resistance from the
guerrillas and their associates on both banks of the river.
In a nameless village on the western bank of the river, 40 or
50 kilometers to the northwest of Swo-gyin, ten Japanese Red
Cross were assaulted and not one of them came back alive.
(this, according to the report of the soldier who was with the
victims at the time of the incident. For all of these cases of resistance on the part of the Burmese, General KIMURA always warned his troops against taking retaliatory measures.

Such being the case while General KIMURA was commanding, there was no chance whatever for us to take British-Indian troops as prisoners. Thus the situation of the Burma Area Army for the few months before the end of the war was a succession of defeats. In consequence of the defeats and the subsequent decline in the army's fighting strength, our men were demoralized; they were both physically and morally in a state of exhaustion. The Japanese troops who were scattered in small groups all over the operations areas were overpowered by a sense of defeat, and had their minds occupied only with the question of how to defend themselves against the Burmese rebel army and the guerrillas.

The harassing activities that these hostile groups were carrying on in the rear of our army, the loss and destruction of the means of communication, the lack of fresh supplies of dry cell batteries, traffic disturbances caused by British planes, the interruption of communications during the highest rainy season -- all these factors combined to all but paralyze the entire working system of the Burma Area Army, thus rendering it very difficult for the officers to lead and supervise their men properly. As the Burma Area
Army Headquarters had been scheduled to break up before the end of August 1945, the retrenchment, reorganization, and transference of the Army was planned, part of which was actually being executed. Meanwhile most of the Army Staff officers had been transferred, therefore we were obliged to make-shift with non-career staff officers for the time being. Naturally, the Army Headquarters which was busily engaged in making preparations to meet the intended attacks by the Allied armies by land and sea in the near future experienced much difficulty and inconvenience in attending to their business. It was while we were laboring under these difficulties that the war was ended. Unfavorably circumstanced as he was, Commander KIMURA had been endeavoring all this while to maintain and improve the discipline of his troops and also to win and keep up the trust of the populace.

5. Not one single instance of unlawful conduct allegedly committed by his men was ever reported to the Army Headquarters. I am certain that no orders were ever issued by KIMURA for the perpetration of the atrocious acts, evidence of which has been brought before the court. Such acts would not have been tolerated. As for the Kalagen village affair, the British Army Headquarters, several months after the close of the war, questioned General KIMURA about it; the general and I and the other staff officers as well had not known
anything about it. It was in March 1946, if I remember right, that I heard about the affair for the first time and it was from Lt. General TANAKA, Nabun, ex-Commander of the 33rd Division (He had been transferred to Thailand before this time) who happened to come to the Insein Camp in order to attend the Joint Anglo-Japanese War History Research Institute held at Rangoon.

6. As far as I know, the conditions of the prisoners of war and internment camps while General KIMURA was in office in Burma are as follows:

(1). The Burma-Siam Railway was under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of all Imperial Armies in the Southern Area, and it had been completed about one year before the arrival of General KIMURA. And so the Burma Area Army had no part in the construction, maintenance and operation of the railway in question.

(2). The prisoners of war camp in Rangoon, which was the 6th Detachment of the Malayan P.O.W. camp, was under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Malayan P.O.W. camp, who was under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Expeditionary Forces. And the Commander in Chief of the Southern Expeditionary Forces ordered the Chief of Malayan P.O.W. camp to set up one Detachment of Malayan P.O.W. camp in Rangoon and put it under the direction of the Commander of Burma Area Army.
Def. Doc. #284

The Commander of Burma Area Army put that detachment of the 73rd Supply corps who was also the Commander of the Rangoon Rear Communication Headquarters.

(3) For about three months and a half after General KIMURA’s arrival at his post, the Tavoy army internment camp was in charge of the Commander of the Independent 26th Mixed Brigade. In December 1944, the Tavoy and Mergui army districts were, by orders from the Commander-in-Chief, of the Southern Expeditionary Forces transferred to the jurisdiction of the Thailand Area Army, and were placed under the direct control of the Tavoy unit under command of the Thailand Area Army commander.

(4) The Rangoon prisoner of war camp was originally the Rangoon Central Prison, where, if I remember right, about 600 persons were interned. The camp was a permanent building, fairly well fit to live in, being equipped with medical rooms, sick rooms, recreation hall, bath and wash rooms, kitchen, water supply, playground and so forth.

(5) For comfort and recreation the camp was provided with pianos, phonographs and books, and exercise was encouraged with many sorts of sport equipment being utilized. The military band was occasionally invited to afford the inmates entertainment.

(6) The depot supplied lots of cows, pigs, goats and ducks in several installations for the prisoners to tend to help supply nourishment.

- 12 -
(7) The prisoners were permitted to lay out farms, both inside and outside the compounds, so that they might be interested in making themselves self-supporting. The result was that after a time they were able to produce more than enough and sell in the Rangoon market what was left over. The proceeds of the sales was used for themselves. The prisoners did not have their rations of staple food reduced; they were in fact better supplied than the Japanese in general, and therefore they were very grateful for this.

(8) Milk, tobacco and other daily necessities could be had at the canteen in the camp, for which convenience the inmates expressed themselves highly "ratified."

(9) Sundays and prisoner's national holidays were set aside to be observed by the prisoners as days of rest on which occasions they were sometimes allowed additional rations.

(10) Working hours were gradually shortened, the average being six hours. The kind of work that they were required to do was, I was told, unloading ships, convoyance, and other general jobs.

(11) No news was ever brought to my ears that atrocities of any kind were ever practiced by the Japanese soldiers on the prisoners during General KIKURA's tenure of office, though I was told that punishment was meted out several times at the request of Brigadier Popson to those British-Indian soldiers who had shown themselves disobedient to him.
(12). In June 1944, before General KIMURA's arrival, cholera broke out in the camp, which however was soon stamped out.

Since August 1943 medical supplies from home had almost ceased to arrive and even the Japanese troops themselves had to do without their rations. Medical treatments, therefore, left much to be desired, I was told. Despite these shortages, they did their best.

Captain TAZUMI, the then chief of the prisoner of war camp at Rangoon, who everyone agreed was the most excellent of the chiefs of the institution, received from Brigadier Popson and Major Melius letters of thanks on several occasions. This is what the captain told me himself.

When the Army Headquarters evacuated Rangoon, it was at first decided that the prisoners whose health would be impaired by removal and some whose services would be needed would be left at Rangoon, preparatory to their release, and that only those who were well and strong would be removed; but owing to the war situation the whole of the prisoners were released on the spot toward the end of April 1945.

About one hundred persons were accommodated in the military internment camp at Tavvy where the management in general was directed fairly and properly, so that the institution was favored several times with letters of thanks. These letters
Dof. Doc. #284

were attached to the reports and other documents submitted to the British Army after the surrender.

It was the practice for the Japanese Air Force in Burma to take charge of all allied airmen who were captured for the purpose of interrogations. The Burma Area Army had no command over the Air Force.

On this 13th day of January, 1947
At Defenso Counsel, International Military Tribunal for the Far East

Defendant: ICHIDA Jiro

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 13th day of January, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

Witness /S/ TATSU, K.otsumo

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ ICHIDA Jiro
問六

一九四四年九月中旬以後同産所における日本兵に対する

番号を要求される日曜日一斉休校は不可能となり毎日交番に若干名づつ

番号

問五

一九四四年九月内に於て日本兵に対する休校

番号を要求される日曜日一斉休校は不可能となり毎日交番に若干名づつ

番号
Excerpts from Interrogation of Tazumi 27 May, 1947

Q. Had you any facilities for recreation and comfort for the prisoners in the Rangoon Camps?
A. Yes, athletic meetings for the white people only were held three times and concerts were held often and some 60 books were given them in two installments.

Q. What was the canteen like in the said camps?
A. Eats, drinks and daily necessities were bought for all of the prisoners from the canteen fund which was their Collective fund. Order and distribution of articles was in charge of officers among the prisoners. And the paymaster of the camp acted as the agency for finding ordered articles and kept connection with merchants. I forgot the volume of monthly sales.

Q. Did you allow them to rest on such days as Sunday and other holidays in accordance with the regulations?
A. Yes, we did, but since January 1945 the outdoor labor required so many men that all could not rest at once on Sundays and they took rest every day in turns.

Q. Was there unlawful acts inflicted by Japanese soldiers on the prisoners since the middle of September 1944? Or have they ever subjected prisoners to discipline?
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3. They received a lot of cows and pige which were slaughtered in the camps thereby increasing the supply of raw fresh meat.
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Q. Were you a member of the staff of the 73rd Commissary Sector or an M.P?

A. No. I was not in the staff of the 73rd Commissary Sector, but was in the staff of the Malay Prisoners Camp. My branch of arms was artillery.
同後二、三件
同収容所内に於ける俘虜に対しての相應的物質的、軍需を着せさせる事例あり。
例 俘虜労務、支給規定の改適に際し救大人有利なる支給をさせり。
例 印人就役一俘虜或は規定を守らず。印人兵に依る俘虜に対する不法行為は記述なし。
例 英人兵一俘虜並に附着せしめることありしや。又その他の理由により俘虜を厳罰に附着せしめること
不法行為ありしや。
The Burma Campaign continued with intensity during the monsoon season of 1944. Chinese, American, and British troops were then disposed along the Chindwin River north of Kalewa and from the upper Irrawaddy to Lungling. It was planned to drive southward through Central Burma to Mandalay, and Admiral Mountbatten prepared for Operation DRACULA to seize Rangoon amphibiously from the south. At the close of the monsoon, Chinese, American, and British troops under the immediate command of General Sultan advanced southward astride the Irrawaddy, captured Shwegu in early November and by December had cleared the projected trace of the supply road to Bhamo.

The Japanese in Burma had never recovered from General Stilwell’s thrusts and from the losses inflicted by British and Indian forces on their 15th, 31st, and 33rd Divisions in their abortive effort to sever the Bengal-Assam Railroad. As fast as the combat forces moved ahead, United States Engineers, commanded by Brigadier General Lewis A. Fick, shoved the road forward behind them, operating their bulldozers so far forward that they were frequently under fire. On January 28, 1945, a convoy of American
trucks and materiel from India crossed the Burma-China frontier. The Stilwell Road was open.

In Western Burma the British broke south through Tidin across the Chindwin against Japanese delaying actions. Southward in the Arakan, British operations cleared the Kaladan River delta on the Arakan Coast and provided air strips at Akyab and on Ramree Island.

The Japanese retreat in Burma was in full swing by the end of January 1945. General MacArthur's successive landings in the Philippines and United States fleet operations in the China Sea had cut the Japanese supply line to Burma. In mid-February, a British column crossed the Irrawaddy near Pagan and drove to Myitkila. The seizure of this road and rail center with its airfields undermined the whole Japanese position in Central Burma. In the meantime, other British-Indian forces were closing on Mandalay from the north and west. Japanese trapped in Mandalay held out against the British until March 21. Forty days later British airborne troops descended along the western shore of the Rangoon River south of the port and assault troops came ashore the following day. The Japanese had already fled Rangoon and the British forces entered on May 3. The port facilities were captured in good condition.

The Burma campaign had all but ended. A few Japanese units were able to withdraw eastward into Thailand and into the Moulmein area of Southern Burma, but thousands of the enemy were cut off in
isolated pockets with little hope of escape. Admiral Mountbatten reported the fighting had already cost Japan 300,000 casualties of which 97,000 were counted dead.
私、松村大郎

昭和二十七年十二月二十九日生い、現在住所は

福岡県、遠賀郡、中間町、昭和通り、大正三町、家主官学校、入學、後来各職。

任務＝服シタル後、一九四四年四月、ビルマー方面軍参謀副長＝補セラレ、終戦＝至ル迄、同職＝留マリマシタ。

参謀長＝補佐＝ビルマー＝アリマシタ。

一　ハ一九四四年九月中旬＝ビルマー方面軍司令官トシテ署任＝ビルマー＝アリマシタ。

三　ハ一九四四年八月＝ヨリ内地＝ビルマー＝アリマシタ。

四　ハ一九四四年七月＝ビルマー＝アリマシタ。

五　ハ一九四四年七月＝ビルマー＝アリマシタ。

三　ハ一九四四年七月＝ビルマー＝アリマシタ。

二　木村兵太郎大将＝ビルマー＝アリマシタ。

一　山本参谋長補佐＝ビルマー＝アリマシタ。

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一九四五年七月末第二十八軍ゲリラ部隊河底河、解体セリハ被殲ハ
又一九四五年七月末第二十八軍ゲリラ部隊河底河、解体セリハ被殲

通信機関並び乱戦部隊第二十八軍ゲリラ部隊河底河、解体セリハ被殲

上記ノ如クテナル次等部隊第二十八軍ゲリラ部隊河底河、解体セリハ被殲

以上ノ如クも本村大將ハ石厳ニ告ゲルニ察ヒ有報復ノ行動ヲ執ッヘハナラスト常
飛行機ニヨル交通防害、並ニ最近雨期ニ於ケル交通社等トニヨルハ

ルマー方面ノ船線系統ハ殆ンド毎トハ戦時ノ規定ヲアリマシテテ、箇ノ

指揮ヲ掌ヲモノスタンク困難ニ昭リマンガ。加之一九四五年八月下旬、

ルマー方面司令部ハヨリ改ヒノ決定ヲ下スルニ、箇ノ

一時的参戦ヲ勿論ヲ営ヨニ合テハ関係ヲ有スケルニ、方面軍司令部ノ

命令ヲ努力ヲ拂ハレマシテ、

五、而シテ木村大将麾下ノ将兵ニヨル不法行為ヲ第ニ次シハハ、ハル

方ハ司令部ハ報をメタルコトナク、又現在當方ハニ於ケルサレタ

ノカラゴレ村事件ノ如キモノ、終戦後数ヶ月経テ、英軍司令部ヨリ木

村大将ニ封賞ヲガリマシテガ司令官大將並ニ私及其他方面ヲ参戦モ全

キ
実施組織の図を示す。これにより、広範囲な訓練や訓練施設を管理する機能が発揮される。
(八) 同收容所内ノ～於テ～牛乳・茶草・日用品等ヲ販売シ～感釈
(九) 日曜日及休息ノ祝祭ノハ休発ヲシ～祝祭ノハ加給品ヲ與ヘタコト
}

13
十一

木村大将在任期間中、同俘虜収容所ニ於テ日本兵ノ不法行為ヲ行ヒ

英印仏兵ニ對シ厳格ヲ施フガ行ハレタコトヲ聞イタコトヲアリマス。

ラメシテ

木村大将ニ著任前一九四四年六月頃同収容所内ニコレラガ死亡

十一

ラメシテ

其後間モノヲ記述シマシタ。

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ラメシテハ私ヲ支前大尉ヨリ聞イタコトデアルスマス。

ラメシテハ私ヲ司令部ヲコールガ村入ヲ撤退スルニ除シテハ俘虜ノ前除

ラメシテハ俘虜ノ健康ヲ監視ヲスルヲ與ヘルソメラレル患者俘虜及び所

ラメシテハ俘虜ハコレガノノ民衆ヲ解放ノ処置ヲ施シ、健康俘虜ノ為

ラメシテハ俘虜ハコレガノノ民衆ヲ解放ノ処置ヲ施シ、健康俘虜ノ為

ラメシテハ俘虜ハコレガノノ民衆ヲ解放ノ処置ヲ施シ、健康俘虜ノ為
昭和二十七年（一九四七年）一月十三日於東京辨理邦藏裁判所

右

立合人

田

次

郎

同日於所

供述者
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: YOSHIDA, Gompachi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on et...ed sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depono as follows.

My name is YOSHIDA, Gompachi. I was formerly in service
as Major General. I was born on January 18, 1924, and now
live at No. 55, 5 chome, Noborito, Chiba-shi. Chiba Pref.
In December 1915, I entered the Military Academy. After
graduating from the Academy, I occupied various posts. I
was appointed Commander of the Rangoon Air Defense forces in
August 1943, and late in September 1945 Chief of Staff of the
15th Army where I remained until the end of the war.
2. General KIMURA, Heitaro, came to the City of Rangoon to
assume his office on September 12, 1944. The next day in the
compounds of the Headquarters of the Burma Area Army, General
KIMURA delivered an address to men and officers of the whole
Army I being present. In his address he told us emphatically to encourage military discipline and morale, to apply due and prompt punishment and rewards, to promote friendship and good understanding between the two peoples, and to win the public favor. In obedience to the General's address and for the purpose of having my men well informed of his instructions, first of all I held an inspection of troops under my command. I also organized such various units specializing in specific tasks as follows: units to treat and rescue the Burmese people killed or injured in air raids; fire service units; and units for delivery of necessary medical articles.

At the time when I was appointed Chief of Staff of the 15th Army, the Army was in retreat toward the banks of the Irrawaddy following the failure of our Imphal operations. In his interview with me on my departure for my new post, General KIMURA instructed me in detail to the same effect as was stated in the General's first address following his arrival. Besides, he gave me strict orders to avoid taking to scorched-earth tactics on our way of retreat and thus to keep the native populace out of the horrors of war; and especially to afford every possible facility to those government officials and civilians who wished to evacuate with the Japanese forces. On my arrival at the Headquarters of the 15th Area Army, I found telegraphic orders from General KIMURA to the above
effect. Upon my assumption of post, I thought it was of
initial urgency to make it thoroughly known to the whole Army
of the intention of General KIMURA. The review of military
discipline in our Army was carried out by the Commander of
the 15th Army KATAMURA and myself, with a view to thoroughly
informing the soldiers of the intention of the Area Army
Commander. At that time, Commander KATAMURA took charge of
the review of the major units directly attached to him, and
I, in his place, took charge of the minor. The commanders
of army corps under the 15th Army likewise executed review on
their sub-units. In those days the 31st and the 33rd Divisions
were retreating with extreme difficulty, but despite the
situation, Commanders of both Divisions took pains to carry
out the inspection of troops with regards to military dis-
cipline on the battlefield, and applied due and prompt punish-
ment to unit commanders for neglect of taking good care of
arms. As regards our relations with the Burmese people, the
scorched earth tactics was, of course, prohibited and appropri-
ate facilities for retreat were afforded to official and
civilian evacuees. It was also ordered to avoid setting bil-
lets and any army camps in residential districts. In this
way the forces at the front put up with all inconveniences to
keep the people from suffering from the ill effects of war.
Also after that, at the time of evacuation from Maymyo (about
Def. Doc. No. 1928

30 kilometers north-east of Mandalay) a special order was issued to ban the scorched earth tactics.

3. General KIMURA, who was very eager to promote good understanding and cooperation between the Japanese and Burmese, distributed among his forces a pamphlet in two volumes entitled "The Attitude to Take Toward the Burmese" and ordered it to be observed. We also made efforts to see to it that the order was carried out. The pamphlet contained articles on the differences in manners and customs between the two peoples to clear away any misunderstanding so it might contribute to the friendship between them. It is the regret of this deponent that the pamphlet and the Area Army Commander KIMURA's telegram to the 15th Army Headquarters, mentioned above, cannot be submitted to the Tribunal because they had been lost or burned at the time of our retreat through enemy lines after the failure of the battle of Irrawaddy.

Besides at the end of war all documents other than those concerning personnel affairs, accounts and supplies, and military sanitation, and particularly any document having any connection with strategy and policy were burned by order of superior authorities.

4. By the time of the opening of the battle of Irrawaddy, General KIMURA had held meetings at the Area Army Headquarters in Rangoon for the purpose of consulting with respective army
staff officers and unit commanders about problems of strategy, education and self-government. At each meeting General KIMURA gave necessary instructions. At the meeting on strategy when I presented myself, he delivered repeated addresses in reference to the maintenance of military discipline and to winning public favor. It was also emphasized to the same effect at other meetings. We, as his subordinates, concentrated our efforts to carry them out in obedience to his intentions.

Because of racial similarities, from the very beginning, the Japanese Army and the Burmese people were well disposed toward each other. Generally the Japanese Army was cautious and prudent in action and enforced strict military discipline and thereby had won the confidence of the Burmese people at large. With the increasingly heavier pressure of troubles by war, an anti-war feeling was gradually stealing into the hearts of the Burmese people. Particularly since the latter period of the battle of Irrawaddy, in view of Japan's obvious defeat, an anti-Japanese tendency seemed to have been brought about among a certain portion of the people, from the time of the revolt of the Burmese National Defense Army.

6. After the failure of the operations in the Imphal zone, the 15th Army suffered heavy losses both in number of troops and arms. Remarkable decline was seen of morale and physical strength. More than that, a great number of soldiers were
suffering from diseases. Thus it was quite difficult for the 15th Army to regain its combat power. Little supply was sent from the rear and we prepared with much difficulty for the coming battle of Irrawaddy. But about the middle of February 1945, a frontal attack by predominant British-Indian Forces was attempted. In parallel with this action, a flank attack was made by British-Indian Mechanized Corps which had broken into Burma by way of Meiktila early in March. As a result, our lines were cut off on all sides, and each corps was forced into an isolated position. Every means of communication by land was cut off and, owing to the want of electric batteries, wireless communication was barely available resulting in insufficiency of command and communication. Under such situation, it was decided to rearrange our lines on the Shan Heights ranging east of Meiktila, and orders were issued to respective corps to break through the enemy siege and to assemble troops near Kalow. However, during this time we again suffered losses of a great many men and arms. Since then we often encountered the enemy. Forced marches, covering long distances, were ventured; food was scarce and there were lots of patients to go with us; communication was entirely cut off for a long time. Under such conditions the 31st and 33rd Divisions moved to the Tenasserim zone for a short stay, and the Army Headquarters and the 15th Division continued on
their way to Siam. The mountains which they had to go over
were so rugged and steep that every soldier, taking with
him nothing other than his portable weapon, retreated literally
with bare life. Many of the soldiers died of disease on the
way. It was difficult for a minor unit to pass the zone
west of Roykow (TN?) and that south of Kamipew (TN?) for
attacks by guerrillas obstructed the march so often that the
troops were compelled to take up a challenge while retreating.
Since May 7, 1945, the 15th Army gradually assembled its
forces in the Tenasserim district. Owing to the forced march
over a long distance and the attacks by the guerrillas and
British-Indian Forces, our soldiers were entirely fatigued
both mentally and physically and 70-80% of them were ill.
A large part of arms was lost. There were almost no materials
and apparatus for the use of communication, so that it was
extremely difficult for every commander to keep his men under
his command. The Headquarters was situated at the Mouchi
(TN?) mines 14 miles east of Toungoo. Every night there we
suffered from attacks by guerrillas. The guerrillas also
waylaid those smaller units which passed the Toungoo and
Kamipow (TN?) roads, to attack them from top of cliffs or by
bridges and almost never failed to kill or would some of our
soldiers.

Beginning early in June 1945, the communication by land
was scarcely possible, as this was the heaviest rainy season.
Such being the situation, the communication either between a commander and his subordinates or between one unit and another was also hardly carried out.

In addition, the activities of British-Indian planes and the disturbing attacks in the rear by guerrilla units of the Burmese National Defense Army made a vital menace to our forces. Soldiers in minor units and stragglers were in constant danger of life as a result of the pressure of defeat.

On this 30 day of June, 1947.

At Chiba.

DEPONENT /s/ YOSHIDA, Gompachi (seal)

I, KORETSUNE, Tatsumi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,

at Chiba.

Witness: /s/ KORETSUNE, Tatsumi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ YOSHIDA, Gompachi (seal)
合衆国陸軍参謀本部

1943年7月20日

（木村個人聴訳）

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進まず進む。陸上、航空、海軍各部隊、…
ビルマ攻略。日本軍のハリカップの作戦。日本軍はビルマ攻略、隆冬攻略、南進攻略、西進攻略、東進攻略、北進攻略の作戦を計画した。ビルマ攻略は、日本軍の戦略によるものである。ビルマ攻略は、日本軍の戦略によるものである。ビルマ攻略は、日本軍の戦略によるものである。ビルマ攻略は、日本軍の戦略によるものである。ビルマ攻略は、日本軍の戦略によるものである。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ANAKI Sadao et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: HIRAOKA, Junzo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is HIRAOKA, Junzo. I was born in the Hiroshima Prefecture on January 1, 1890, the 23rd year of Keiji, and appointed second lieutenant in the Army on Dec. 25, 1912, the 1st year of Taisho. After having passed, since then, through ordinary courses in the Army, I was appointed an attache to the Commander of the Burma Area Army in March, 1943, and remained in the same post to the end of the war. I was Colonel at the time of surrender. I am now detained in Sugamo Prison.

2. In the last part of February, 1944, I was appointed to hold the additional post of the adviser to the Burmese Government and had, thereafter, comparatively many opportunities to contact
in Burma became worse day by day and the living conditions of the Burmese people became worse also. So Gen. KIMURA often forewarned his staff officers that though they were preoccupied by pressure of severe operational demands, they must not forget the feelings of the Burmese people, and that they should not lose their popularity with the Burmese, even at the sacrifice of some part of the military operations, and had directed the release of some textile goods from the Japanese Army to the Burmese civilians, and the limitation of the quantity of grain purchased by the Japanese Army. Furthermore, I often witnessed the scenes in the Departmental Chief Conference or other occasions, in which he was urging the Chief of the Medical Department of the Army under his assignment to promote medical relief for the sick and wounded caused by bombardment, etc., among the Burmese people.

6. Listening personally to the people's voice through the Burmese leaders, Gen. KIMURA had, notwithstanding the scarcity of paper, a leaflet entitled "The Attitude to Take Toward the Burmese People" compiled, printed and distributed among soldiers and the Japanese residents. Furthermore, he had the Vice Chief of his Staff, etc., give lectures on the kindly treatment of the Burmese peoples to the important Japanese civilians in Burma.

7. Such sympathy and sincerity of Gen. KIMURA as above mentioned toward the Burmese people helped regain the Conference of the
Burmese in the Japanese Army which has been lessening through her disadvantageous war situation in the whole Pacific battle area, especially in Burma, so that the anti-Japanese underground movements by some groups of Burmese who were arising since the rainy season of 1944 was temporarily stopped.

It was about November, 1944, that many Burmese leaders, comprising Dr. Bahmo, Mr. Takin Miya (Vice Premier), Mr. U Ton Aun (Minister of Cooperation), Mr. Takin Tanton (Minister of Demand and Supply) and Mr. Uba Win (Home Minister) told me that they were happy to have a benevolent Commander with good understanding, good will and deep sympathy toward Burma, and that they expected that the anti-Japanese atmosphere which was appearing in some groups of the Burmese would probably be swept away.

8. In February, 1945, when the war situation in many districts was at a most adverse stage to Japan, the handcraft exhibition was held at Rangoon under the sponsorship of the Japanese and attracted the Burmese numbering from 50,000 to 100,000 every day. Furthermore, movie theatres in Rangoon City, numbering seven or eight in all, were almost packed every day and night even after the rebellion of the National Defense Army in the latter part of March of the same year.

9. At the time of evacuation of the Japanese Army from Rangoon, General KHIURA, having deliberately decided not to
incur the war disaster upon the Burmese people, prohibited, by order, the burning of the property of the Burmese people. At the evacuation, furthermore, he left the Burmese leaders to do as they liked and so a half of the ministers remained in Rangoon.

10. As the adviser to the Burmese Government, I sometimes heard the Burmese Government complain of the junior grade Japanese military men and civilians, but I never heard, during the tenure of my office, of the cruelty committed by the soldiers of the Burma area Army spoken of by either Governmental authorities or the people.

On this 8 day of July 1947
At I. M. T. F. E.

DEPONENT /S/ HIRAO, Junzo (seal)

I, KORETSUNE, Tetsumi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: (signed) /S/ KORETSUNE, Tetsumi (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ HIRAIOKA Junzo (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: -- YAMAGUCHI, Biji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

Certified at No. 132, Nicho-machi, Nanjo-machi, Takat-ahi, Niigata-ken on this 25th day of March, 1947 (the 22nd year of Showa)

Deponent: YAMAGUCHI, Biji

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here to in the presence of the Witness:

At the same place

On the same date

Witness: KUNITOMI, Tatsumi

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YAMAGUCHI, Biji

- 1 -
1. I, YAWAGUCHI, Miji, an ex-Lieutenant Colonel, was born on August 11, 1907. My present address is No. 134 Sanchome, Nanjo-machi, Takata City, Niigata Prefecture.

After I graduated at the Military Academy in 1929 and the Military Staff College in 1938, I occupied several posts till July 8, 1944 when I was appointed staff officer attached to the Burma Army. I served as Chief Operations Officer until July 20, 1945, though I was ordered to be transferred to a certain other post on July 18 of the same year.

I shall relate the conditions before and after the withdrawal from Rangoon of the Burma Army Headquarters.

2. Contrary to our expectation, the British-Indian armies launched a drive, about mid-April 1945, against the outlying districts of Tongoo (Tung-ngu) north of Rangoon, which compelled our Headquarters to decide to retreat to Moulmein in Tenasserim. The attempt involved proceeding northward and then crossing the Sittang (Sitaung) river via Pegu. We were therefore confronted with the necessity to make a hasty retreat. However, it so happened that the Chief Staff Officer and the Operation and Information and Administration Officers were all absent, having gone to the Tung-ngu area, taking charge of the operations there. We waited for their return before we commenced the retreat. This meant the loss of the right moment to some extent and it was not before the end of April 1945 that we finally started. The
rainy season had just set in, and the Kwao-Sittang road that ran along the western bank of the Sittang was then a veritable quagmire. This unexpected incident hampered our activity a good deal. Added to this, the lack of adequate ferrying facilities obstructed our crossing the river. The western bank was crowded with our troops, which British planes attacked fiercely and put them into utter confusion. We suffered tremendous losses and the great amount of automobiles and voluminous documents.

Exposed to the raids of the British-Indian air forces, the ferrying of troops and other activities in the daytime was much interfered with; it took us quite a long time to complete the withdrawal of our Army forces across the river toward its eastern area. This experience we had to go through again in crossing the Tatou and the Salween rivers. Altogether, it was the work of over a month to effect the collection of the whole Army Headquarters.

3. Our withdrawal from Rangoon was so hasty that there had been no preparations made beforehand for the removal of the Headquarters to Moulmein, and consequently after our arrival in Moulmein we had to arrange as the occasion demanded for necessary facilities and equipment. Naturally it resulted that the working efficiency of the Army Headquarters declined to a considerable degree for some time.
1. Toward the end of April 1945, the Commander of the Army arrived at Moulmein with some members of the staff, while the rest of the staff remained behind to see that the forces were ferried safely across the Sittang river or to attend to the withdrawal of troops on the road between the Sittang and Moulmein. Unexpected delay was seen everywhere in the arrival of many of the clerks who were in charge of the practical business of the Headquarters, the concentration of the most of the troops, the arrival of various sections of the Headquarters such as the Intendence, Ordnance, Veterinary and Judicial Sections, all the members of which had to retreat on foot. With all this delay it was impossible for the Headquarters not to be further delayed in functioning. As for the conveyance of baggage by the troops and officers on their retreat to Moulmein, all that they could do was to take with them what little baggage they could carry for they had had the greater amount of motor cars they possessed destroyed by fire at Sittang and they had hardly any means of transportation available to them after they had crossed the river. Before the evacuation of Rangoon, Commander KINU14 had issued orders strictly forbidding his men to resort to "burning up tactics" policy in the city, so that the innocent citizens might not be molested. Orders to the same effect were also issued by
him before this when the 15th Army was evacuating Imphal. As for the withdrawal of the Burmese leaders, it was left to their own choice. Those of the prisoners of war whose health it was feared would be affected by removal, were allowed to remain behind preparatory to subsequent release, while the others were ordered to be moved. However, the war situation caused us to release all the prisoners of war on the spot.

2. Commander KIMURA, some of the staff officers and a few assistants who were the first to arrive at Moulmein, took up their abode in several houses in the suburbs of Moulmein, about three kilometers south of the city and began to work in these buildings. However, the lagging behind of the majority of the assistants, the lack of camp furniture and business articles, and above all, our dependence upon scanty and worn-out communication apparatus, for which there was no fresh supply of batteries -- all these deficiencies combined caused a marked decrease in our communication capacity.

As for the means of transportation, the 24th Combined Brigade Headquarters at Moulmein had a few battered motor trucks and they were the only serviceable vehicles available to us. Before the war came to an end, the Army Headquarters had managed to secure about a hundred trucks in the Tenasserim area, which however were hardly enough to supply the first
line with necessary provisions. Such being the means of communications and transportation, we had the greatest difficulty in maintaining commanding connection between the units.

By and by there arrived the rest of the Army Staff officers and members of the various sections of the Army Headquarters. They took up their abode in private houses, one or two kilometers apart from one another and began to conduct their regular business. They had to sit on the earthen floor of the house with wooden boards as desks to work at, with no telephones to communicate with one another.

3. Subsequent to the withdrawal of the Army Headquarters to Moulmein, aerial attacks by the British-Indian forces on Moulmein area became more and more frequent so that the Headquarters personnel were obliged to run to the improvised air raid shelters near by several times a day and stay there for an hour or two each time. These circumstances made it necessary for us to build shacks with all haste in the inconveniently located jungles in order to accommodate the staff officers. It often happened too that we had to go out for shelter into the small villages about half an hour's drive from Moulmein and there they stayed all day long attending to the business.

4. In July 1945, the regular rainy season and set in. The Tenasserim area is the rainiest region of all Burma and
the country around Moulmein abounding in rivers and streams form a large paddy field zone. Throughout the three months before and after July, the rainiest month of the year, the surrounding flat country turns into a vast expanse of muddy water, so that even main road traffic often gets interrupted and the minor roads are rendered all but impassable. As it usually is at this time of year, so was it this year. The communication was naturally so much interfered with that it was by no means easy to keep up connections with one another and so each of us had great difficulty in effecting the proper command of his men. The Thai-Burman Railway was often interrupted. We could get supplies sent from the rear, but they were not sufficient to meet our needs; a meager amount of clothing was about the most that we could expect and in the matter of communication and transportation apparatus not a piece was supplied to us.

About this time, General KIMURA invited the following people to the Headquarters of Area Army one by one. Lt General TANAKA, Commander in Chief of the 33rd Division; Lt General KAWABE, Commander in Chief of the 31st Division; Lt General TAKEMURA, Commander in Chief of the 49th Division; Lt General AIDA, formerly Commander in Chief of the 24th Mixed Brigade; Major General SAKUWA, a later commander in chief of the 24th Mixed Brigade; KIMURA, Commander in Chief
of Gendarmerie, all of whom had retreated to the Tenasserium area one by one after March 1945. He demanded strongly that they stress the importance of enforcing military discipline and that the proper treatment of the Burmese people should be kept in the minds of the Japanese officers and men. He had the same instructions conveyed to the other Commander in Chief of the area army by staff officers. And in the conference of the headquarters of the area army, he directed earnestly and repeatedly that the personnel of the headquarters observe military discipline and be careful that they properly treat the Burmese people. Furthermore he sent officers, especially judicial officers, in various places in his command for the purpose of making inspections of his command with regard to military discipline which included the proper treatment of Burmese.

5. About the time that we are speaking of, the guerrilla force in the Tenasserim area, enforced by the British-Indian paratroops, was steadily growing in power and strength. These paratroops nightly supplied the guerrillas with arms and ammunition. In addition to this, the guerrilla troops in concert with the Burman Rebel Army operating in the same area, launched brisk activities. Small contingents of Japanese troops, stragglers and soldiers retreating, were exposed to their frequent assaults, the means of communication and transportation were subjected to their destruction and secret
agents were active. The rear of our force was most seriously menaced. In fact, soldiers in small groups or those that fell out of line were in constant dread of these guerrillas. To cite a few instances, a party of Japanese guards were on the Woulmein-Measord road assaulted and sustained a heavy loss; near Thambizayet Japanese soldiers in small groups were several times raided; one Japanese staff officer was shot by a sniper on the Woulmein-Taton road and wounded; occasionally on the Woulmein Thambizayet road solitary line of communication soldiers were shot, quite a number of stragglers and soldiers retreating were killed. About this time bands of Burmese savages began to run riot so that the inhabitants of the locality were glad to seek shelter in the Japanese-garrisoned regions.

6. The task of the Army Headquarters at that time was one of extreme complication and therefore very subtle to execute, and we were so circumstanced that it was next to impossible to resort to any positive military operations. In anticipation of the possible frontal attack both from land and sea that the British-Indian army might make immediately upon the termination of the rainy season, we had to make arrangements quickly preparatory to launching operations. For this purpose, our staff officers, beset though they were with traffic difficulties caused by the rain,
had to undertake extensive topographical reconnaissance and look after the fortification works. Besides, it was incumbent upon us staff officers to see that the retreating soldiers who were arriving exhausted were well cared for. We bent our best efforts to this direction. Earlier we had been ordered by the South Army General Headquarters to remove the 15th Corps and the 37th, 33rd, 55th and 56th Divisions to Thailand; we were just then engaged in carrying out the orders. We were also occupied with the work of forming one corps, 3 divisions and 2 combined brigades from the rest of the forces, and of dissolving the Army forces headquarters and the 28th Corps Headquarters. We had therefore our hands quite full with the reformation of the Burma Army forces. But the 28th Corps which was to constitute the most important part of the intended reformed army was halted in the Pegu mountains in isolation and nothing was known about its fate. We had to make ready for the accommodation of these troops, which kept us very busy.

7. Since it had been decided that the Burma Army forces be dissolved before the end of August 1945, the Staff Chief, three senior Operations, Information and Administration Officers, two Operations Officers and two Administration Officers, all of whom were experienced members of the Staff had been transferred since June. One Operations Officer who had previously been dispatched to Thailand, stayed on there
from May till the close of the war, while I, who was head Operations Officer, was transferred on July 20. Hence there was not one Operations Officer left with the Headquarters and the only staff officers that remained were the assistant Chief Officer, one head Information Officer and one Administration Officer. Even that one Administration Officer just mentioned had to remain at the front line till right before the war end, some staff officers were laid up with malaria, and even those who had been appointed temporarily failed to arrive from the front line as early as one could wish, and so it often happened that there were not more than two or three staff officers working in the Headquarters. At the height of the rainy season traffic was stopped and the facilitating communication were well-nigh destroyed, and this made it hard to keep in touch with the front line. During this time Commander KUMURA was frequently confined to bed with attacks of his chronic disease -- neuralgia.

3. The troops which had retreated to the Tenasserim from the front line suffered defeat in every battle fought since the Battle of Irrawaddy. In fighting and while retreating they had sustained heavy losses and lost a good part of their arms. When they arrived at last after a long and hard retreat back across the mountains and marshes, they were both physically and spiritually worn out and most of them were invalids. The troops, arriving with only the clothes
on their backs and no more arms than those which each carried
had almost no means of communications. We were therefore
very much inconvenienced in the matter of commanding the
troops, the maintenance of connections between us and otherwise.

4. As for the alleged illegal actions of which a charge
is laid before the Court, the Army Headquarters never ordered
such illegalities to be perpetrated, nor did it receive any
reports on the same; in fact, we knew nothing whatever about
the cases. Accordingly, General KIMURA, Commander of the
Area Army forces, had of course no knowledge whatsoever of
those wrongs. The General circumstance as he was thus
painfully, made it a point of major importance to maintain
the discipline of his forces and to win the goodwill of the
natives and was bending his utmost efforts to this purpose.
He took every possible measure to make his wishes known to
his officers and so that discipline of his troops was on the
whole well kept up.

5. The Air Division in Burma; The HIKARI Organ (which
was in charge of liaison with the Indian Militia); the
Shipping Transport Corps; the Southern Field Railway Corps
and the Naval Base force were joint forces whose duty it was
to work in cooperation with the Burma Area Army forces, and
were not under the command of General KIMURA.
Excerpt taken from
Volume XXV of the
Trial Record in the case of
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-vs-

TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA

Testimony of KIKUO ISHIIWA
I. IKUO ISHIKAWA

called as a witness on behalf of the Defense, being first
duly sworn through Commander Bartlett, was examined and
testified as follows through Commander Bartlett, with the
assistance of Major Pratt and Lieutenant Asano:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q. (By Captain Reel) What is your name?
A. (Through Commander Bartlett) Ishikawa, Kikuo.

That should be Kikuo Ishikawa.

Q. And your rank in the Japanese Army?
A. Lieutenant Colonel.

Q. When did you come to the Philippine Islands?
A. 27th of September of last year.

Q. And what was your assignment here?
A. Supply and Transportation.

Q. And are you a member of the staff of general headquarters
14th Army group?
A. Yes

Q. Did you keep that assignment right on through to the
time of surrender?
A. Yes.

- 1 -
Q: You were in Kapangan at the time of your surrender?
A: At the time of the surrender I was at No. 3 R.H., or Rest House.

Q: Now, at For. Mobile and at Torio and at Kapangan, were you in General Yamashita's headquarters?
A: Yes.

Q: Now, as staff officer in charge of supply and transportation, tell us briefly just what your duties were.
A: With respect to supply, briefly, it was divided into food, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. With respect to transportation, just motor transport.

Q: What was your connection, if any, with General Kira, the Intendance Officer?
A: To explain by an example, General Kira would have charge of daily issue of rations at all times, whereas I would make plans concerning rations only during operations. The actual rations themselves were always under the control of General Kira.

Q: And why would these matters of supply be routed to you?
A: As examples, if a shipment in rice should arrive from Saigon, or, on the other hand, the extreme scarcity of rice made it necessary to cut the ration, or something of that sort, then it would come to my attention.

Q: And in your capacity as transportation officer, were you concerned with the food supply?
A: Very close connection.
What was that, and why?
A For instance, if a ship should arrive in Manila, it was necessary to get it unloaded before anything happened to it, and as a result it was necessary to route all available transportation for discharging the ship and hauling the supplies to places of safety.

* * * *

C Now, from what you saw and what you know, what was the condition of food and supplies in so far as prisoner of war camps, internee camps, and the Japanese Army, were concerned?
A (Through Commander Bartlett) In my knowledge, it was no difference whatever between the prisoner of war camps, internee camps, and the Japanese Army; they were the same.
C (By Captain Reel) Now, what was the condition of the food supply between October and December, 1944?
A I will tell you the conditions in October first.
C All right.
A When I arrived in October, although the standard ration for troops was 450 grams, they were actually receiving not more than 400 grams.

According to my memory, in November, on the 9th day, 10,000 tons of rice arrived from Saigon. Of this, approximately half was sent to Leyte. On the assumption that the remaining half must be stretched out over two months, the daily ration was again cut to 400 grams. As a matter fact, the actual ration received by the men was less than 350 grams.
I will now speak of December. No food arrived by boat in December. All the ships were sunk by enemy action. As a result, the food situation deteriorated further and many organizations were actually receiving not more than 250 or 260 grams. Therefore, it appeared necessary to take steps to secure part of the new crop of rice being harvested at the end of December and early in January, and I brought this matter to the attention of the commander -- to General Kira's attention.

* * * * *

Q. (By Captain Reel) Now, you just stated that a ship arrived approximately the 9th of November, 1944, containing 10,000 tons of rice. Are you sure of that figure?
A. Yes.
Q. General Kira was on the stand and said that sometime in November 16,000 tons of rice arrived. Was he correct?
A. I think what he said is a mistake.
Q. Now, that 10,000 tons of rice, what was done -- strike that. What was done with the 10,000 tons of rice?
A. Of the 10,000 tons, 5,000 tons were sent or lent to the navy.

CAPTAIN REEL: Was that 500 or 5,000?
INTERPRETER OISHI: Yes, 500.
THE WITNESS: The actual amount used in Manila was 4,000 tons. There was some spoilage.
Q. Now, how many meals a day did the Japanese army soldiers get?
A. Three times a day, but on occasions two times a day.
Q. Now, was that general rule of three times a day cut to two times a day sometime in January of 1945?
A Yes.
C That included yourself?
A Yes.
* * * *
* * *
Q Now, did you go on any inspection trips of prison or internnee camps?
A Yes.
Q And on whose order did you make these inspection trips?
A The Chief of Staff.
C That is General Muto?
A Yes.
Q Now, where did you go on these trips, which camps?
A To Santo Tomas Internment Camp, the Bilibid Internment Camp and McKinley Internment Camp; the three places in all. Did you go to any others?
A No.
Q And what did General Muto tell you to do?
A The matter's dealing with supply, particularly food.
C And what did you find on your inspections to these three camps relative to food?
A The food supply was the same as those of the Japanese army but they were gradually diminishing. Ships had not come in. There were no fuels for transportation purposes so we had to borrow those items from the air force.
* * * *
Q (By Captain Reel) Did you find that the Japanese army had to make local purchases in the vicinity of those three camps?
A They purchased vegetables but I doubt if they purchased rice.
Q Now, what were the dates upon which you visited those three camps, as near as you can recollect?
A I believe it was about November 20th, 1944.
Q As a result of those visits, did you make a report to General Muto?
A Yes.
Q What was the nature of that report?
A The food was the same as those of the Japanese army but it was meager.
Q Did you make any recommendations?
A Since ships didn't come in and we couldn't very well requisition any supplies from the locality something must be done to requisition them from Luzon.
* * * *
* * * *
C (By Captain Reel) How would this requisition, as it has been interpreted, be done?
A I didn't mean "requisition"; "buy" is the word.
CAPTAIN REEL: Could I have the last answer?
(Answer read)
C (By Captain Reel) Now, what was the recommendation that you make to General Muto relative to buying rice?
A First of all, even if we didn't buy rice we didn't have the fuel for automobiles. We should have arrangements made to obtain fuels from the air force.

C In other words, you recommended getting fuel from the 4th Air Army?

A Yes.

C And what did General Muto do when you reported that to him?

A He immediately dispatched myself and Deputy Chief of Staff Nishimura to this 4th Air Force.

C For what purpose?

A In order to obtain gasoline.

C And how much gasoline were you to obtain?

A A minimum of 10,000 drums.

C Did you get it?

A No.

C Did you make further trips and attempts to get gasoline from the 4th Air Army?

A I made about seven trips.

C And did you finally get any gasoline from the 4th Air Army?

A On December 15th of last year I received 1500 drums.

C Did you actually get 1500 drums in your possession?

A I actually received 600 drums.

* * * *

* * * *

C (By Captain Reel) Where were the 600 drums that you did receive?

A We used that to transport munitions and food supplies from Manila.

* * * *

* * * *
GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission interrupts. Let us drop this subject of gasoline. We grant that the transportation difficulties and gasoline shortage difficulties were present and that they were acute and that they affected their operations. We see no occasion for pursuing this any further. We will now take up some other subject.

CAPTAIN REEL: All right, Sir. The only purpose of going into the fuel question was because the lack of fuel was the bottleneck that prevented the shipment of food. That is its relationship to the food question, if the Commission please.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: We grant that.

CAPTAIN REEL: Yes, sir.

(By Captain Reel) Now, do you recall an order relative to the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees?

A Yes.

Q And tell us what that order was and who it came from.

A It came from Tokyo, from the Army Commander through Yamashita and it was issued to the various internment camps.

Q In other words, the order came from Tokyo but was passed on by General Yamashita, is that right?

A Yes.

Q When did the order first come to your attention?

A I believe it was about December 20th.

Q And what was the substance of the order from Tokyo?

A It first was to treat prisoners in a friendly manner and in case the Americans should approach to leave as much food and medicine as possible for the internees and prisoners.

The third item was not to treat the prisoners or internees in any atrocious manner whatsoever before retreating.

* * * *
Now, was that a written order?
A Yes.
Q And do you have that order with you?
A No.
Q What happened to it?
A I had to throw all the papers I had away at the Luzon P.C. Camp No. 1.
Q Did you have it until you got to the Luzon Camp No. 1?
A Yes.
Q And why did you throw it away?
A There was instructions to that effect.
Q From whom?
A From one who is in charge there.
Q Somebody in charge of the prison?
A Yes.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission interrupts for clarification of words. I believe he said "throw away". Is that correct?

INTERPRETER OISHI: Yes.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Could it also have meant "surrender" or "give up"? because it seems inconceivable that American officers would ask prisoners of war to throw away official documents when their mission was to capture or gain possession of them.

MAJOR PRATT: Sir, the word which the prisoner used was "suturu", which means to "discard" or "throw away".

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Very well.

* * * * *

(By Captain Joel) Did you at any time either during your trips to Santo Tomas, Libid, Fort Holinley or at any other time hear any reports of cruelty and ill treatment of prisoners of war and internees?
A No.
CAPTAIN CALYER: All right, sir.

Q: (By Captain Calyer) On your visits to Santo Tomas, Bilibid and Fort McKinley did you go into the dining rooms when the prisoners were being fed?

A: At McKinley I happened to go there when they were just preparing the food, that is, when the food was ready to be served.

Q: What was being prepared?

A: They had rice together with fried potatoes, with some beans.

Q: That was in December?

A: Yes.

Q: What was the diet of the Japanese soldier at that time?

A: Something very similar.

Q: Did you inspect the storehouses at Fort McKinley?

A: No.

Q: Did you inspect the dining rooms at Santo Tomas?

A: I went to Santo Tomas after they had already eaten supper.

Q: Do you know what had been served?

LIEUTENANT ASANO: Hold it! He hasn't finished the answer.

CAPTAIN CALYER: Oh, I am sorry. Withdraw the question.

A: (continuing) And I visited the warehouse.

Q: (By Captain Calyer) What did you find at the warehouse with regard to supplies?

A: They had food stored there similar to our standards.

Q: What kind of food?

A: Mostly rice.
Do you know what had been served with the meal before you got there?
A  I do not know.
Q  Did you examine or inspect the dining room at Bilibid?
A  I arrived at Bilibid after meal also. I inspected the warehouse and the kitchen.
Q  What did you find?
A  I found that the rations were the same as those of the Japanese soldier.
Q  On your trips to these three places did you talk with any of the internees about food?
A  No.
Q  Were any reports or complaints submitted to you by the camp committee at any of these places?
A  No.
Q  Did you talk with the Japanese officials in charge of the camp?
A  Yes.
Q  Were they satisfied with food conditions in their respective camps?
A  They were not satisfied.
Q  What was done about it?
A  They requested more rice and more canned goods.
Q  What did you do about it?
A  I wanted to increase their rice and canned goods but, as far as the rice went, as I mentioned before, they were getting the same amount as the Japanese soldier and I do not remember now, but, as far as the canned goods are concerned, I believe I did something about those.
O: What did you do?
A: I gave instructions to increase the amount of canned goods they were to get, but at that time there weren't many canned goods available and what the results of my instructions were I do not know.

O: Were those increases intended for the internees or for the Japanese garrison?
A: What I have stated concerns the internees and the prisoners.

* * * * *

O: (By Captain Calyer) How many prisoners were at Bilibid at the time you made your inspection?
A: About 2100.

* * * * *

O: (By Captain Calyer) How many prisoners were at McKinley at that time?
A: About 300.

O: How much rice was being prepared for that meal?
A: Since there are three kettles cooking, I assumed that it must have been about from half a sack to one sack.

* * * * *

O: Do I understand you to mean, then, that about 25 pounds of rice was being prepared for 300 people?
A: I was referring to amount of rice from 50 to 100 pounds.
During any of these inspections, did you observe the internees?
A At McKinley I observed some, but other than that I wasn't able to observe them.
Q: How did those whom you observed at McKinley compare in physical appearance with the Japanese guards at McKinley?
A I thought it was similar.
Q: How did you happen to make these inspections?
A As I stated before, in the early part of November I was ordered to make an inspection tour concerning the shortage of rice and other food supplies.
Q: Weren't you the staff officer in charge of prisoner of war affairs?
A I was in charge of provisions and medical supplies, as far as the prisoners were concerned.
Q: Is that all that you had to do with prisoner of war camps?
A That is correct.
Q: Did you have the same duties with respect to internee camps?
A Same.
Q: Was that with regard to all prisoner of war and internee camps in the Philippines?
A Yes
(To Captain Reel)

The more question: On your inspection trip to Fort McKinley, when you saw a meal being prepared, how many pounds of rice did you see being prepared for that meal?
A approximately anywhere from 50 pounds to 100 pounds.

* * *

EXAMINATION OF BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION

(by General Reynolds) While the witness was acting on General Yamashita's staff on prisoner of war matters, we wish to know whether any of the complaints filed by American prisoners of war and civilian internees were brought to his attention.
A No, I haven't.

Did General Yamashita's orders require that such complaints be forwarded to his headquarters?
A Yes.

As staff officer did you consider the overall responsibility for prisoner of war camp and civilian internees squarely on General Yamashita?
A I believe that the most responsible person is the commanding officer of the prison camp of war camp.

* * *

* * *
FURTHER RECONCILIATION

Q. (By Captain Calyer) Who prepared the regulations regarding the conduct of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the camps?
A. The regulations pertaining to the conduct in prisoner of war camps was made by a discussion between the camp commander and the committee, and that is my understanding.

Q. Were they approved by any higher authority?
A. I don't remember, but probably it was so. At the time of my arrival things were put into practice already, and those things were decided long before my arrival.

Q. As staff officer in charge of prisoner of war affairs did you ever inquire what regulations were in effect?
A. Matters pertaining to the conduct within the P.W. camps were the responsibility of the camp commander, and I didn't have much to do with what was going on within the camp.

Q. Did you ever inquire what those regulations were?
A. Since those regulations were made by the inmates themselves I didn't think I should say or do anything about it.

Q. Will you answer the question, please, whether you inquired what the regulations were?
A. No.

Q. Do you know who prescribed regulations with regard to the punishment of civilian internees and prisoners of war?
A. I do not know.
def. doc. # 2035

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FURTHER EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION.

(by General Reynolds) "Do you mean to tell me that the Japanese High Command in Tokyo held that General Yamashita did not have complete responsibility for prisoners of war under his control?

No, I did not.

What did you mean?

Direct responsibility with the prisoner of war camp commander.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Read the original question and ask the witness to be very careful in answering it frankly and fully. If the Interpreter wishes to do so he might write the question out.

(question read)

WITNESS: I believe there are some responsibilities.

(by General Reynolds) "What is that responsibility?

As for carrying out the orders, that was the responsibility of the prisoner of war camp commander. However, the overall responsibility lies in the Army commander.

Who was responsible for the camp commander carrying out the orders?
First, there was Lieutenant General Ko, and afterwards it was Lieutenant Colonel Hayashi.

And after that who was it?
A That is all.

And above Lieutenant Colonel Hayashi and Lieutenant General Ko, who was then responsible to see that the orders of Tokyo were carried out?
A The next responsible person is the commanding officer of the line of communications unit.

Who is the next one?
A After that the responsible person was myself, who was a member of the staff in charge of the I.W. affairs.

And who was next?
A The next person, the next responsible person, is the chief-of-staff.

And who was next?
A And the next responsible person is the commanding officer of the 14th Area Army.

What was his name?
A General Yamashita.

Of all the people he has named who had responsibility for the prisoners of war and civilian internees which of them was responsible to Tokyo for their administration?
A I believe it is the 14th Army commander.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Why should he believe it; doesn't he know it?
THE WITNESS: Since the prisoner of war camps are within the command of the army commander, and since most of the administrative matters go through the army commander, I believe it is his responsibility.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Any further questions?

CAPTAIN REEL: Yes, I have a question.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION

(by Captain Reel) And who was next in command above General Yamashita?

A Marshal Terauchi.

Q And did all your communications to Tokyo go through the Supreme Southern Commander, Marshal Terauchi?

A Reports pertaining to prisoners were sent directly to Tokyo, to the office of information for prisoners.

Q And reports from Tokyo, did they go through Marshal Terauchi, the Supreme Southern Commander?

A I believe they came direct.

Q Did reports other than routine reports have to go through the Supreme Southern Commander?

A Yes.

Q And did reports other than more routine reports coming from Tokyo go through the Supreme Southern Commander?

A Yes.

CAPTAIN REEL: That is all.
CERTIFICATE

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, JOHN R. PRITCHARD, Captain, Infantry, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, in English, is a document excerpt from the Public Trial Record in the case of United States of America vs. Tomoyuki YAMASHITA, and is an exact and true copy of the official document which is in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 1st day of July 1947.

/s/ John R. Pritchard

/\/, JOHN R. PRITCHARD

I hereby certify that the above signature was affixed hereto in my presence.

at the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ WILLIAM R. BRENN

/\/, WILLIAM R. BRENN

Major, Ordnance
珠寶冠文書
第ニ三五號
名古屋事件の裁判記録書二十五巻よりの抜萃

石川 舟雄

繋解側翻人として呼応されると石川舟雄は先ずパリトレット海軍中佐を通じて
「パリトレット海軍中佐を通じて」と言ひ

日本陸軍における貴方の階級は

貴方は何時比営に来ましたか

昨年の七月十七日です

常陸に於ける貴方の服役は

貴方は第十四軍団司令部防務の一員ですか

第十四軍司令部防務部長の一部です
詰答

貴方は降伏の時私に三体筋所にいいましたね。将の司令部におられましたか

補給及党政機関の変更をした簡単な図面を下さったのですね。戦時においては、確実な自動車路を立てて、立例を示すことが必要です。吉良大将が全期間を通して毎日の配給を担当しましたね。現状の糧食自給は常に大将の管理

答問

詰答

貴方はその役目を降伏まですっかり務めましたね。
答問

問

提案官庁の承認において、証言は食糧補給に関係がありました。

答問

問

内容及び理由は、例えば、マニラに船が着くと事故が起こらない中線船から荷を作下す必要があ

答問

問

全な場所に移さればなりませんでした。

答問

問

１９四四年（昭和十九年）十月～十二月の間に

答問

問

先ず十月の状態から申し上げます。

十月改が到着した時、沿岸に配置する標準食糧は四百五十瓦でしたか、
自分は従来トへ申し上げガナルタ皆リデス。隠入トイフノガ正シノ

内容ハ

何リソ先づ吾々ハ米ト買ハナルテタトシテモ自動車用燃料持タナ

サウデス。降下ガノコトヲ報告サレタトハ元軍司令ヲ武藤大将ハドウサレマシタカ

ソレヲ手ヲ入レマシタ

最低費一ヲ万物ヲ合ガソリシリニハ既得ル管ヲアツタカ

レデドケノガソリシリテマラ
答

（リール大尉）

答

（リール大尉）

換言スレバ此ノ命令ハ東京カラ来タガ山下大将ヲ命令ヲ授出し

答

（リール大尉）
中国語翻訳

図（上記の説明）

今、地域が増えると、地域間の連携も強まることが期待される。ところが、地域間の連携が弱まることもある。

図（地域の関係）

地域の関係は、地域間の経済活動に影響を及ぼす。地域間の経済活動が活発な地域では、地域との連携が強まる傾向がある。

図（経済活動）

地域間の経済活動は、地域内の経済活動と連携を必要とすることが多い。地域内の経済活動が強まる地域では、地域間の連携が活発になる傾向がある。

図（地域内の経済活動）
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby deposes as follows.

I, KOSEI, Saburo, am living at No. 110, Nishiuwahashi, Matsumoto City, Nagano Prefecture. I am thirty-six years of age. During the Pacific War I, as the assistant Resident of Asohan of the East Coast Residency, Sumatra, Netherlandish East India, was in charge of the general military government in this district for three years ranging from August 6, 1942 (Showa 17) to August 15, 1945 (Showa 20). And then from the termination of the war to the end of April in 1946 (Showa 21) when I was repatriated, I engaged myself in the arrangement of business at Tanjoh Valley of Asohan Sub-Residency. Accordingly, I am one of those who have the best knowledge of the condition of the military government and the real state of the general detention camp, not only in Asohan Sub-Residency, but also in the East Coast Residency.

I, General treatment for war-prisoners and internees in Sumatra.

A. War-prisoners

At the time when I arrived at my post there (August 6, 1942 [Showa 17]), the European War-prisoners camp was in the vicinity of Medan. All the native soldiers had been released by that time except the soldiers who came from Amboe. They were kept under detention at Kota Chano because their religion and custom were different from others' and they had no occupation. I do not know about the internal affairs of the camp, for the administration of war-prisoners was under the direction of the commandant of the detention camp at Singapore.
and had nothing to do with the military government.

B. General internes

The policy concerning the treatment of the interned was always in accordance with humanity and the international law.

Provisions were supplied with food according to the rule, compulsory labour and mistreatment were prohibited, and punishments were all dealt in the light of the law. Besides, private things of the interned were permitted to be brought in to the greatest possible extent, and their remaining things and the property of legal persons were respectively kept and administered by the Administration Bureau of Enemy's Assets in accordance with the proscribed procedure.

For the sake of convenience for making statements, I should like to divide into three terms the period ranging from the time of my arriving at the post to the war-end.

The first term: From August, 1942 (Shown 17) to March, 1944 (Shown 19)

(a) During this term the detention camps were under the control of the Military Government Department. They were located in the cities of Medan, Blajagy Shantal, Binjay, Tanjon Valley.

(1) Hospitals, hotels, churches and private houses (residences of European people) were used for camp buildings.

(2) The ration of provisions, especially of staple-food, for the interned was much larger in quantity than that for general inhabitants. Even in the prewar time Sumatra could not supply herself with sufficient food-stuff and was dependent upon the import from abroad. During the war-time, the lack of vessels and the damages sustained by the attack of submarine boats caused great difficulty in its importation of food. From a viewpoint of self-sufficiency, we were conducting a movement for a great increase in food-production, but we could not get any noticeable result. Due to the shortage of transportation capacity we encountered many difficulties in gathering crops. Accordingly we could not distribute food to inhabitants so well. But as for the ration of food for the interned, we did our best to maintain the proscribed quantity. When there was shortage of rice, we always made up for it with some other kinds of grain. Vegetables were raised .
only by a few natives and some Chinese residents and that very little. So we encouraged vegetable-growing but the result was not so good.

(3) General internees were at first allowed to carry some money in cash and other valuables. But this was restricted around May 1943 (Showa 18) due to various evils which took place in connection with them.

(4) The internees were allowed to go shopping on a duty system and the authorized merchants to enter the compound. Therefore the internees at first much enjoyed their lives. But as evils came to take place one after another, the authorities became more strict with them and at last those intercourses with outside were prohibited. So was the employment of maidservants.

(5) Sanitation

One European doctor was attached to every detention camp. Mild cases were looked after at the dispensary in the camp and those with serious disease were admitted to a hospital with the permission of the responsible persons. At that time medical articles were kept in large quantities.

(6) Within the compound of the camp everything was transacted by the internees on an autonomous system. They could take recreation and other necessary measures for securing health at their own device. If there was anything that they found impossible for them to do, they used to send us their representatives and had them make proposals to us. They were allowed to buy sporting goods.

(7) The buildings of the detention camp were of European style and very good for health. Their life within the detention camp was totally autonomous and they carried on the education of their boys and girls themselves.

(8) Considering distance and other matters we provided the greatest possible convenience for their interview and communication. On every national holiday they were permitted to see their families.

(9) Japanese personnel could not enter the camp without the permission of the responsible person.

(b) Collaborators in military government.

It was the policy of military government at that time to have those who were concerned in farms and doctors voluntarily collaborate in the administration of farms and in sanitary business respectively. So several hundreds of European people worked outside the camp...
and still onj.-ld., almost the same life and status as before. Such persons were completely protected from being looted by the natives or from the dangers of life, and were vested with the authoritative power concerning the performance of their duties and this power was guaranteed. Some of them were made to stop collaboration and held in the detention camp through the prescribed formalities for such special reasons that they went into personal conflict with some Japanese, made friction with native people, did or might go against the aim of military government, or often took an action liable to be regarded as being against the aim. All others continued their life until the military situation became acute afterwards. All, except special persons, willingly collaborated in our task of military government. The heads of the military government office all recognized, admired and appreciated the good results of their collaborations.

The Second Term: From around April, 1944 (Showa 19) to October of the same year.

During this term the 25th Army was in direct charge of the detention camps. This was because the military situation in the Indian Ocean grew gradually strained and one or two of the detention camps were removed to the inner land. The treatment of the interned was, in principle, the same as in the First Term. However, it appeared that Lieutenant-Colonel SATA who newly entered upon the duty and some few soldiers and civilians in military service were in some points inattentive, because they were not accustomed to the land and could not make themselves understood and the surrounding situation became tense, and yet the military government department ordered them to give perfect assistance to the interned. It was around this time when the general economic difficulty began to be shown and the business of the detention camp began to grow gradually difficult to be managed. The officials concerned made their best to gather food-stuff and other materials as well as to make connection with the military government department. Their efforts were very impressive.

Owing to the shortage of staff, part of the guard was filled by the native supplementary soldier.

Since then European people as collaborators were gradually being replaced by Japanese people or the natives because the war situation grew acute.

The Third Term: From around October 1944 (Showa 19) to the end of the war.
During this term the administering system was the same as in the Second Term. With the pressing of the war situation and the military requirement, the authorities hastily established at Shilingolingo and Airupaminko near Lamppurat which was under my charge new detention camps in which all interness amounting to some 7,000 in North Sumatra Zone were to be held. The detention camp of Shilingolingo was for the male, while that of Airupaminko was for the female and children. The former was newly built for that purpose, and the latter were buildings which had been used by a certain farm.

It is true that in the both camps living, housing and sanitation were not in a satisfactory condition. The detention camp for the female and children was in a little better condition than that for the male.

I sympathized for the interned who were living a hard life as food and other materials became scarce. However, that was caused by the military situation, and we could not help it.

II. When JANAEB, Commander of the 25th Army, made an inspection (around June, 1945) (Showa 20), I happened to hear him and Division Commander KUNOMURA talking to each other. The improvement of the detention camp was the main subject of their talk. And soon after that time (about the middle of July, 1945 (Showa 20)) Chief Staff of the 25th Army, YAHAGI, on the occasion of his first inspection, delivered an address to the officials of the detention camp. I stood by him. In that address he made remarks generally and minutely on the treatment of the interned. Indeed, its contents were based upon humanity and the international law. He, pointing out the officials' inattentions one by one, rebuked them and showed clearly the rules of treatment to be followed. I listened to this address which deeply touched me. So far as I know, the order from above relative to the treatment of the interned was thoroughly based upon the international law and humanity. But I admit that, owing to the inattention of quite a few persons at the inferior offices or to special situations of these days, there were cases where the orders were not perfectly observed.

I believe, however, that the detention camp was, as a whole, in a satisfactory condition prior to the Third Term.

III. When I was in office, I was called a gentleman by European people, a Klamat by the native and a Tajon (a gentleman) by Chinese people. At the time when I left for Japan, I was specially given a farewell address by an English prosecutor to the following effect: "on behalf of each European people, I should like to express to you our deepest gratitude for your treatment of us European peoples during the war." I hear that witness Linharo acknowledged at this court the goodness of my treatment of the interned. In this connexion, I must say that I owe all my honour to the guidance and instruction given by
Division Commander MUTO. Next, I will refer to my relations with Division Commander MUTO.

IV. Relations between E and Division Commander MUTO.

As military government in Sumatra was being performed by the military government department of the 25th Army, a division commander at the place had nothing to do with military government, nor had he a right to order the governor of each residency concerning military government. Accordingly, Division Commander MUTO had nothing to do with military government and the detention camp, nor had he any relations with me in the matter of order and direction.

I heard that Division Commander MUTO arrived at his new post on Sumatra in the middle of May, 1942 (Showa 17). He left Sumatra for his next duty early in October, 1944 (Showa 19). Accordingly, Division Commander MUTO stayed on Sumatra all through the period of the above-mentioned 1st and 2nd Terms. During this period North Sumatra was generally in a quiet condition except the food situation (above all rice). The policy of the treatment of the Third States' people and the interned was to have them collaborate in military government. The internment life was still in good condition. It was not long after I arrived at the post that I saw Division Commander MUTO the first time. It so happened that I saw him when he took a rest at the official residence of Asahan Assistant Resident which was located in the city of Tanjung Valley. Now I should like to state what I remember of those matters instructed by Division Commander MUTO every time when I met and talked with him.

(a) August 16, 1942 (Showa 17)
(At the Assistant Resident's official residence in the city of Tanjung Valley)

It was right after my arrival, and I was just taking over the official duties from the predecessor, Army Lieutenant YAMADA. I told the Commander what I had known for myself since my arrival and the condition of the Sub-Residency which I had learned from the predecessor. Then I requested him to give me a word of instruction which I, as Assistant Resident, should bear in mind in order to carry on military government. In compliance with my request he told me as follows:

(1) "During a short period of time following the occupation of Sumatra, a military officer was in charge of military government. But I hope that you, as a civil official, will do daringly what you believe the best regardless of precedents set by soldiers."
(2) "You cannot secure public peace without winning the natives' heart, nor can you realize any ideal without securing public peace. It is a matter of importance that you should pay full consideration and attention to this respect."

(6) "As the internees of the enemy nation are to be sympathized for, you must look after them with full compassion. The location of the detention camp must be made prudently for fear lest any of the natives or any disgraceful one of the soldiers should commit unlawful acts upon the interned and thus you must secure its safety."

(b) January 25, 1948 (Showa 18)

(At the Division Commander's official residence in Medan)

Calling on Division Commander MUTO at his official residence, I set forth the following plans which I had made in accordance with his suggestion given to me on the occasion of his first inspection:

To get together at one place several detention camps then scattered over the city of Tanjong Valley.
To take measures concerning their life, sanitation and entertainments.
To have a Dutch doctor reside outside the camp with his family and have his work for the health of the interned and the native.

He looked much pleased with these plans and urged me to carry them out promptly. I added that it was uneconomical for us to let them idle away at the time when the food situation grow worse. Then he said to me, "Since compulsory labour is prohibited according to the international law, always encourage them to work voluntarily and do your best supply the proscribed quantity of food."

He also told me as follows:

"In any country a child is a treasure. So let not children in the detention camp merely play all day, but have them study for themselves. You may for them collect text books which they possibly possess in their respective homes."

He further told me as follows:

"The Imperial Army must maintain its strict military discipline. But since various kinds of army corps have come here to Sumatra these days, I can not tell what kind of person is included in them. Whenevver you find anyone act indiscreetly, let me know right away."

He also pointed out that we ought to treat as gentlemen all internees working in the plantation or in other places.
(a) Around August 1943 (Showa 18)
(When Division Commander MUTO inspected Wilhelmina
Fall. At the Assistant Resident's lodging at Kisaran)

I was looking forward to the inspection tour of Lieutenant-
General MUTO. The Division Commander at his interview with me
told the following matters:

(1) "In order to carry out military government
successfully, you must push Sultan forward. You
must be always prudent when you make any revision
of the old way of administration."

(2) "Foodstuff (rice) is the most important to the
people. So you ought to make great efforts for
the increase of food-production. However, when
control goes too far, the circulation of food-
stuff will be hindered and people's productive
desire will be oppressed."

(3) "You should make full use of the economic activity
of Chinese merchants. To this end you must have
Chinese merchants feel easy."

(4) You should expel bad Japanese people from your
jurisdiction.

On Japan's politics which I referred to, Division Commander
MUTO said, "I do not like the rightest wing. Japan's idea ought
to have more universality. The Japanese must work more and
observe the world.

(b) Around September, 1944 (Showa 19)
(At the time when Division Commander MUTO made in-
spotions right before his start for his next post.
At Kisaran Assistant Resident's lodging.)

At the time when I saw him at Kisaran Assistant Residen:
's lodging, he expressed various opinions. Among them, I recall
there were the following words:

"Japan's government has recently promised Indonesians'
independence. But I feel extremely discouraged to see Sultans
clinging yet to the feudalistic Sultan government. It is
necessary for the military government officials concerned to load
them well."

Division Commander MUTO, as I mentioned just before, had
nothing to do with me concerning the command system and the
business system. Nevertheless, I personally and voluntarily
requested Division Commander MUTO at every chance to express his
opinions on the performance of military government. Based on
those opinions I transacted the business of military government
for more than three years and gained good results. Therefore,
I am still very grateful to him for his guidance.

On this 12 day of June, 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT /S/ KOSHI Saburo (seal)
I, HARA Seiji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereon in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ HARA Seiji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KOSHI Saburo (seal)
Translation of the Telegraphic Report to Geneva of his Inspection of the Prisoner of War Camp, Mukden, by Pestalocchi, Representative in Japan of the International Red Cross Society.

Telegram No. 824.

Re: Prisoner of War Camp, Mukden, Manchuria.

Mail address: Prisoner of War Camp, Mukden, Manchuria.

Capacity of camp, 1500. Chief, Col, MATSUDA.

No. of prisoners,

<table>
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<th>Officers</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Australian</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>American</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.C.O.'s</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Privates</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1274</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these 84 British & 16 Australians were transferred from Seoul and originally from Singapore.
1174 Americans were transferred from the Phillipines, mostly from Bataan and Corregidor.

Eldest: aged 57
Youngest: aged 21

Representatives:

British Maj. PEATY
American Maj. HUNKINS

Representatives of N.C.O. British 1
American 1

Besides which Representatives of Privates British 1
American 1

Date of inspection: 11 November 1942

Situated on a fertile plain outside the city of Mukden, opened on 20 October last year, quartering began on 11 November of the same year. Transfer from the temporary camp to the present one complete by 1 November this year.

Total area of the camp 49330 sq. mtrs.

Surrounded by a brick wall 2.6 mtrs. in height, high-tension wire contraption on the walls.

Area of the building for the use of prisoners 11550 sq. mtrs. two-storied brick building similar to a military
Def. Doc. # 2245

barrack, tiled roof, connecting wash-room and lavatories, double paned windows, wooden floor.

Ho.
Hospital, canteen, store-room, bath-room, boiler-room, odd-job room in separate building.

Furnished with electric lights, heating by Russian style pechika (brass pipes covered bricks) similar to that of military barracks. Period of use from 10 November to 20 March ventilation excellent, equipped with fire-extinguisher.

Living quarters of the prisoners comprised of 3 buildings, each divided into ten compartments with upper and lower bunks. Capacity of each compartment 50, at present 42 to 46 men and 16 officers quartered.

Sleeping kit consists of 1 straw mattress, 6 army blankets, 2 sheets, 1 pillow, 1 pillow-case, and in the summer-time a mosquito net. Orders are issued in English translated from Japanese. Hygienic equipment, wash-room, latrine, 120 water taps, 72 Japanese-style lavatories pailed out every week, 3 concrete bath-tubs 3 mtrs. long 5 mtrs. wide & 3 m deep, showers, connected to the main building. Men allowed to bathe every other day, officers every day. Change room for those assigned labor with coat-hangers, 48 water-taps, excellent drainage, flush toilet, disinfection by lime, mats disinfected by dipping them in disinfectant, water provided from well within the camp, drinking water boiled before use. (water-distributing tower under construction)

Meals morning, noon, and evening. Each person rationed in grams, wheat flour 400, kao-liang 80, maize 190, special ration for those assigned labor, meat and or fish meat 52 to 100, fat 25, vegetables including potatoes 600, soy beans 200, some apples and oranges, sugar 60, flavorings such as curry, pepper, soy sauce, salt a little, kao-liang tea 20, average calories 3800. For the invalid and those assigned labour 4120 calories, Japanese army 3457 calories.

At lunch-time Ichi-anchi spiced vegetable soup, sweet-potato pie, potato-onion and bean pie, corn bread, ordinary bread and kao-liang tea. All of excellent quality. Prisoners are satisfied with the food but in the long run they feel the monotony.

Personal weight in Dec. 1942 64.7 kilos
Today 69.1 kilos

Prisoner's cooks 48, including baker, head cook with 24 years experience. 24 large pans, 3 ovens in the bakery, area of
vegetable garden 5300 sq. mtrs., at present spinach is planted over 3500 sq. mtrs. Two rooms for storing vegetables, carrots, cabbage, and turnips storable till May 1944 stored.

Health conditions, when first quartered between 700 to 800 severely ill. By the efforts of the Headquarters Kwantung Army, General Army Hospital, and the Red Cross Hospital, health improving and the present conditions can be said excellent.

A well-equipped sick-room within the compound supplied with medical apparatus and other necessities that are supplied to places recognized as army hospitals. Calls to patients are made by doctors among the prisoners and surgeons. Dentistry at the General Army Hospital Mukden.

As an extraordinary measure, the entire prisoners were injected against typhoid, paratyphoid A and B, dysentery, and smallpox. Roentgen rays, blood examination.

As doctors, 1 Japanese surgeon, 3 N.C.O. medical orderlies, 3 privates, 5 civilian nurses. Prisoner doctors, 4 surgeons, medical orderlies N.C.O.s and privates totaling 29. Number of patients, infections dysentery 6 isolated, malaria 5, beri-beri 13, influenza 2, acute enteritis 17 and 26 others total 69. Out of which 43 in the camp hospital over an extended period, 3 short and 23 exempted from duty. Since opening of the camp, number of death, at Mukden 154, on the way to and at Fusan 62, at Takaо 6. The worst month being December 1942, death rates gradually receding after that month. Death caused by acute enteritis, beri-beri, dysentery, acute pneumonia and malaria.

Clothing provided every summer, winter and in extreme winter. Extreme winter clothing consisting of wool-lined overcoat, boots, wool cap, woolen gloves, socks and underwear. Besides which working clothes, cap, coat, and boots. Prisoners brought their own raincoats and summer clothing, officers only bringing clothing for all seasons. For laundry a special washing equipment, soap provided. Financial conditions, officers' private savings ¥7,318.00, the rest ¥734.00 Officers were paid the equivalent pay the Japanese officers received.

Roll-call at 7 o'clock, lights out at 21 o'clock. Work voluntary and unconstrained, no work on Sundays and holidays. Work consisting of maintenance and control of the camp and workshops. Men paid up to 25 sen a day. A tool repair shop, 4 sewing machines in the sewing room. Metal and lumber workshops.
At the canteen, cigarettes, candles, everyday necessities, toilet goods and stationary sold. Open on Sundays and holidays. 4 barbers. Profits are used according to the prisoner's wishes. Men allowed 10 cigarettes a day and officers more. Recreation-room annexed to the canteen.

English church service held every Sunday, service by Japanese clergyman.

In the large playing-ground outside baseball and football could be played, while on the other ground volleyball and basketball could be played. Inside the house playing cards and chess possible. 186 books, novels, technical books, Bible, daily Nippon Times 120 copies, weekly Nippon Times 18 copies.

2 gramophones, a reasonable number of American records and a few Japanese records. No motion pictures nor radios. Accordingly to the representative, materials for mental enjoyment were entirely necessary. Regardless of kind, increase of books were looked forward to, especially texts for the study of language, machinery, agriculture and medicine.

Permissible communication per year, for an officer 3 letters, 3 cards, warrant officer 1 letter, 3 cards, N.C.O. 4 cards, private 3 cards. Beside which 20 radiograms allowed per month. Outgoing letters and cards via the P.O. Intelligence Bureau 1620 up to October 1943. Incoming letters and cards 431, and 11 radiograms up to October same year. According to Maj. Peaty, the British representative, received his wife's letter dated 8 September 1942 on 8 September 1943. According to Maj. Hunkins, the American representative, American prisoners received no mail after May 1942, but 5 answers to radiograms despatched were received. Have not been allotted any relief goods of the Red Cross Society yet. Received ¥1,500 contribution from the Vatican Mission with which money such things as musical instruments and clothing were procured.

From the words of the representatives and others, general condition of the camp satisfactory. Col. MAMA showed kindness, and on some points conditions are better than expected. No complaints. According to the Chief of the camp, discipline lacking on account of the fact that the prisoners were brought from different units. 160 penalty cases, for as obedience, petty theft, breach of camp regulations especially the fire regulations. 3 deserters were
condemned to death after being court-martialed for murder and violence.

Inspected the prisoners cemetery outside city of Mukden, on each grave is erected a plain wooden cross with name, rank, nationality, and identification number written. By next spring expects to be able to decorate with flowers, a part of the seeds of which have been sown already.

General impression excellent, Col. Matsuda and his officers are doing their best. Utmost cooperation, favor and kindness from the Manchurian Red Cross Society and untold favor from the Headquarters Kwantung Army.

Pestallocchi

Note: The spelling of names in this translation, Pestallocchi, Peaty and Hunkins, are the translator's version.
Certificate

I hereby certify that this document is a correct copy of the document in the custody of the Prison of War Intelligence Bureau.

28th of March, 1947.

Secretary of the P.O.W.
Intelligence Bureau.

/s/ KAMISAKA, Shinichi (seal)
It is clear that our forces engaged in sacred warfare should
should be to the last the forces to protect the cause of righteous
righteousness and not to move without that cause, in view of
our the spirit of the foundation of the Stako-Additive-mission.
This is the principle on which the use of force is based.

In view of the real meaning of the sacred war, it is
natural that our forces should be ready to succour and enlighten
those prisoners, sick and wounded, who abandon resistance or
are incapable of resisting against them, and to favor them with
the influence of our Imperial rule. This is the case with
hostile residents and their properties, etc., and much more
the case with the officials and people of a third power and
their properties. The righteousness of our forces will be concretely understood by the hostile forces and people, and
besides, by any third nationals until our forces are enthusiastically welcomed everywhere. Our forces, therefore, should
not only in accordance with international laws and conventions
but also display spirit positively on their own initiative.

The principal articles of the international laws and co-
covenants applicable to wartime are shown in Appendix I.

Military discipline in war-time

It is for the purpose of meeting war-time demands and
producing good results that we are making every effort to
maintain military discipline in both exercises and home duties
in our peacetime training. But, once we meet with war or in-
cident, we are apt to be less enthusiastic for the maintenance
of military discipline. For example, we are apt to hesitate
to discharge our duties on the pretext of damage, allow our men
to make an excuse for taking an easy way, and neglect the strict
observance of compliments regulations and proper dress, thereby
committing an unconscious breach of military discipline.

It goes without saying that the environment in war-time is
so different from that in peacetime that we cannot be physically
so regular and orderly as in peacetime, but nevertheless we should
expand our immaterial demands, all the more so because our forces,
receiving a great number of reservists not accustomed to
military discipline, are lacking in solid unity, and there
are many other disadvantages in regard to the maintenance of
military discipline.
Military discipline in the battlefield

Roughness of mind and demoralizing act and speech are apt to be found in the battlefield — for example, such offences against military discipline as an act of violence against a superior or disobedience to orders, and other vicious offences such as looting and rape. This trend will be promoted especially by the dangerous and miserable conditions of the battlefield, imperfect housing facilities and poor supplies. So, in order to prevent this trend, it is necessary for the commander to take every opportunity to bring home the real meaning of the sacred war, and to stress education and training, to control and direct his men with fairness, to punish and discipline them properly, and to improve housing and maintenance facilities.

Fairness in deciding reward and punishment

In war-time, one is apt to feel so much sympathy with the men under his command as to subordinate justice to personal feelings and lose his desire to superintend and direct them strictly. While, on the other hand, such an idea is apt to spread among his men that, in the battlefield, a minor offence may be overlooked by their superior officer, and that an offence committed can be concealed with ease. These two factors will help correlative to create an unfavorable environment for the maintenance of military discipline.

One must have the spirit to make a costly sacrifice in the cause of justice, realizing that it is not to love his men that one should be so much influenced by personal feelings as to bring about the idea that military discipline may be violated with impunity, and thereby making them commit graver offences.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 162 pages and entitled "Manual of War-time Services" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (Department of Military Training), certified at Tokyo, on this 14th day of August, 1947.

/S/ MIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness, at the same place, on the same date.

Witness: /S/ KA ZUMA, Isaburo (seal)
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: NISHIURA, Susumu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I, NISHIURA, Susumu, after having been first duly sworn according to the custom of my country make the following statement:

1. I was formerly in service as Colonel and occupied the post of Chief of Army Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, from 20 April 1942 to December 1944. In the Ministry I was in charge of the establishment and institution of the army, I have a thorough knowledge of how the business of treating Prisoners of War was allotted in the army both in principle and in practice. I hereby state as follows:

2. Prepared for the purpose of making my statement understandable are attached to this document.

3. The system of business in the army concerning the treatment of Prisoners of War was regulated and practised as shown in the attached papers.

After the capture of POW's by the Japanese Army, the following two steps were followed as to the treatment of POW's.
(1) Treatment within the troops in operations.

(a) When a front force captured FOW, after having made necessary investigation and having prepared a POW roll and POW diary, the prisoners were delivered to the nearest office of transportation and communication.

(b) The commander of an army in operation who wanted to send prisoners to the rear reported to Imperial Headquarters as to the number of the prisoners to be sent and further the War Ministry was informed by the Imperial Headquarters.

(c) When the War Ministry received a report about sending POW's to the rear, the Ministry advised the Imperial Headquarters as to the ports or other places where POW's should be sent, and the Imperial Headquarters informed the War Ministry of the date of arrival of POW's at the place assigned.

(d) In accordance with the orders of the Imperial Headquarters, the office of transportation and communication would escort POW's to the designated place and deliver them to the receiver who had been designated by the War Ministry.

(c) The commander of a force in operation would establish a provisional POW camp to house and supervise POW's until the time of delivery, (Exh.No. 1965, Regulations Concerning the Treatment of POW., Chapt II, Art XII, XIII, XV, XVI, XVII).

After this delivery to the receiver designated by the War Ministry, POW's come under the jurisdiction of the War Minister. Before that time, the treatment of POW's was in the hands of the troops in operations, so that any trouble occurring prior to the time of delivery to the receiver of the War Ministry was out of the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

(2) Treatment within the Army Administrative system after coming under the jurisdiction of War Minister.

After the receiver designated by the War Ministry received POW's, they came under the jurisdiction of the War Minister and were put in a POW camp established by the War Minister. (Ordinance concerning POW camps, Art II, Exhibit No. 1965). The POW camp was supervised by the army commander or defense commander designated by the War Minister. (Ibid Art III).

During the Pacific War there were established a lot of POW camps at the front. In that case the field commander in operation and
The like, supervised the POW camps in his area and his supervision was put under the jurisdiction of the War Minister. As to the provisional camps mentioned above, the supervision thereof was beyond the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

The chief supervisor (i.e., army commander or defense commander) in conformity with the relevant regulations, etc., commanded and supervised the POW camp and laid down the POW camp service regulations, thus taking charge of all the supervising business concerning the POW camp. (Ordinance concerning the POW camp, Art V, Regulations concerning the Treatment of POW, Art XXI)

The business under the jurisdiction of the War Minister was divided into several parts and assigned to the POW Administration Department and each Bureau in the War Ministry as shown in the attached Table.

As regards each allotted business also shown in the table, that of the POW Department was provided by the Regulations concerning the Treatment of POW and by the Adjutant's Notification (Defence Exhibit No. 1598), and that of each Bureau in the War Ministry indicates the chief business which had connection with the treatment of POW and allotted to the Bureau according to the regulated official system of the War Ministry.

The POW Administration Department as a chief office in charge of the business under the supervision of the War Minister concerning the treatment of POW managed the following business:

1. Matters concerning the general plans of treatment of POW and military internees at the front; detention, supervision, exchange, release, employment (labor, propaganda, etc.), punishment, treatment, etc.

2. Matters concerning the labor to be imposed upon POW.

3. Matters concerning the communication of POW.

4. Matters concerning the punishment of POW.

5. Matters concerning the labor and communication of military internees at the front.

The following are necessary explanations as to several important matters:

The POW Administration Department was established at the end of March, 1942, in accordance with the Regulations Concerning the Treatment of POW, mentioned above. I have
learned that in the past were the business concerning the treatment of POW was allotted to the bureaus in the War Ministry. It was generally thought at the beginning of the last war that the above allotment of the business was practicable as in the past wars. The greatness in number of POW and the complicated and extensive business of treating POW made it necessary to have an office exclusively managing the business of the War Ministry concerning the treatment of POW. The POW Administration Department was arranged to be established in the Ministry to meet such demand, but was actually established as late as at the end of March, 1942, under such circumstances. As was already stated above, the business under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry concerning the treatment of POW was conducted by the POW Administration Department as the responsible office. The POW Administration Department was on the same level with other bureaus of the War Ministry and was not in a position to be controlled or supervised by the Military Affairs Bureau or any other bureau in the War Ministry. In fact, during my tenure of office as Chief of the Military Affairs Section, I, at no time, gave orders to the said Department, for in my belief the business concerning POW should have been managed by the POW Administration Department.

B. The main business of which the Bureau of Military Affairs took charge concerning the POW, were as shown in the attached tables:

The main business conducted in accordances with the above were as follows:

(1) To draw up the Ordinance for POW camps and the organization of POW camps.

(2) To draw up the regulations concerning the establishment and organization of POW Administration Department.

(3) To draft the reply of vice-minister concerning the application of the Geneva Convention.

C. Besides there was the so-called POW Information Bureau which was arranged by War Minister. This was an organization specially established in accordance with the Hague Convention and was entirely separate from the War Ministry. This was altogether different from POW Administration Department established as one of the sections of War Ministry. Furthermore, Chief of the POW Information Bureau was not subject to the control or supervision of Chiefs of the
According to the regulation governing the POW Information Bureau, the same bureau, the same bureau, had a right to ask for various information from the operating forces.

(4) MISTREATMENT OF POWS:

The so-called mistreatment of POW's in Malay and Bataan Peninsulas were acts which took place during or immediately after the fighting and the POW's were not yet brought under the jurisdiction of the War Minister—namely, they were still under the supreme command system. Those prisoners engaged in the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway were, for the most part, under the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

The construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was carried out by the Commander-General of the Southern Army by order of the Chief of the General Staff. The War Ministry was consulted by the Chief of the General Staff about this construction order. The various bureaus were consulted according to the division of business stipulated in the Official System of Organization. The Military Affairs Bureau took charge of the budget for construction, the Maintenance Bureau, communications, materials and labor; and the POW Administration Department, labor, etc. Each Bureau and Department was consulted according to the business in its charge, and the Minister and Vice-Minister were jointly responsible for the consequences.

The Southern Army undertook to carry out the construction work, and the General Staff took the lead in shortening or lengthening the term of construction, alleviating transportation facilities and increasing the forces, etc. The Director of Transportation and Communication Bureau undertook to direct the construction work, as previously testified by Lieutenant-General WAKIMATSU, the then director of that bureau. (Court Record in Japanese, PP 16-15)

As the prisoners engaged in the construction work were under the jurisdiction of the War Minister, he dispatched NISHIURA, Director of the POW Information Bureau and Chief of the POW,

On this 10 day of Aug., 1947
At Tokyo

[Signature]

DEponent /s/ NISHIURA, Susumu (scnl)
I, KAZUMI, Isaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ KAZUMI, Isaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)
In addition, the personnel of P.O.W. Supervision Bureau and Dispensary Bureau were dispatched to inspect the actual circumstances, thereby taking all possible reform measures.

War Minister --- Vice-Minister of War

Secretariat --- Affairs concerning the handling of documents and other general business.

Personnel Affairs Bureau --- Affairs concerning appointments and dismissals and other personnel affairs.

Military Affairs Bureau --- Affairs concerning organization, control of budget, arrangement of units, various wartime regulations, and international covenants.

Military Service Bureau --- Affairs concerning gendarmerie, military discipline and morals, punishment, air defense, prevention of espionage, and military police.

Bureau of Equipments --- Affairs concerning munitions production, military labor, communication and transportation.

Bureau of Accountants --- Affairs concerning budgets, money, clothing, food, building, and various wartime regulations for the accountants' Department.

Bureau of Medical Affairs --- Affairs concerning sanitation, prevention of epidemics, hospitals, medical supplies, and various wartime regulations for the Medical Department.

Judicial Affairs Bureau --- Affairs concerning military administration of justice, amnesty, execution, and various wartime regulations for the Judicial Affairs Department.
P.O.W. Administration Department — Affairs concerning general plans of handling of P.O.W.s and military internes at the front such as accommodation supervision, exchange, release, utilization, punishment, and treatment; communication and punishment for P.O.W.s and military internes at the front; and P.O.W.s labor.

Note:

1. The War Minister supervises the P.O.W.'s Camp and controls the P.O.W. Information Bureau.

2. The vice-Minister of War assists the War Minister and arranges departmental affairs and makes charge of affairs of Secretariate, each Bureau and the P.O.W. Administration Department.

3. The chief of each Bureau and the P.O.W. Administration Department supervises the business in his own bureau or department according to the order of the War Minister.

4. With regard to the affairs of each Bureau, we quote here only important items which have connection with the treatment of P.O.W.s.

5. The above are based on the Official Organization of the Cabinet (Exhibit #70), the Official Organization of the War Ministry (Exhibit #74), regulations for P.O.W.s and Hiku-A-Mitou (Army Asia Secret) No. 1108, the adjutant of War Minister's note in the War Ministry.
二

軍ノ行動

戦ノ際ミ政府、軍ヲ管ヲ主ニハル、資本ヲ用イテ、 Plain Text
戦時における部下に対する文化が必要となることが知られています。不適当な行動は、部下の意気込みを低下させ、組織の全体的な成功を阻害します。したがって、毎日の作業環境においても、相手の感情や需要を理解し、尊重することが重要です。
Hearing first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am a former Army Medical Colonel. I stayed in Singapore as a member of the Medical Department of the Southern Army General Headquarters during the period from October 19, 1942 to July 5, 1944, and was in charge of medical and sanitary affairs assisting Medical Lieutenant-General OKI, Kuichiro, Chief of the Medical Department.

2. On the occasion of the proposed construction of a railway linking up Thailand and Burma, I stressed that the sanitation measures were very important in this enterprise and the success of the construction work depended directly on sanitary conditions in view of the bad sanitary conditions prevailing there, the speedy accomplishment of the work being held in contemplation.

Commander in Chief of the Southern Army TERUCHI paid special
Attention to this point and I made every effort to investigate sanitation matters and made every preparations for that, before and after the start of the work.

3. Focusing chiefly at malaria, cholera, dysentery and black plague in the investigation, I despatched Medical Captain MCAL, member of the Medical Department, to the area with the Surveying Corps at the end of 1942 and had him study general sanitary conditions over there, collecting material for the purpose of establishing definite sanitary measures. And in January, 1943 I also despatched Dr. CHORI Nanzaburo, member of the Research Institute of Formosa on Tropical Medical Science and an authority in research work of the malaria-mosquito, as a non-regular civilian official attached to the army in company of eleven persons to Thailand first and then to Burma later, and had them investigate malaria in the areas of construction. I made more effective the execution of prevention and extermination of malaria based on their reports.

After that I carried on investigations further, with water Supply and Purification corps at the area as the centre of activities, and at the same time took charge of the prevention of malaria and other communicable disease and the water supply.
4. In order to enforce strongly the sanitation measures to cover this construction work, the main body of the Southern Army's Water Supply and Purification Department, which was most powerful in the said army's operation area, and the overwhelming majority of the medical services directly attached to the said army as well as other medical services of the army Corps at the front were attached to the Railway Construction Commander, forming the Medical Unit of the Railway Corps. Medical Colonel KITAGAWA, Commander of the Water Supply and Purification was appointed commander of the said medical unit and he strived to give it full swing.

5. Despite such careful investigations and preparations with which the construction was embarked upon, the rainy season set in about the middle of April, 1943, nearly a month earlier than expected, before foodstuffs, drugs and medical supplies were sufficiently accumulated in the hinterland, turned the construction ways into a quagmire and traffic came almost to a standstill cholera which broke out among the Burmese natives spasmodically found ways into the construction district in Thailand and became more and more prevalent. It reached its peak in June, defying all the medical services' devoted efforts which were greatly handicapped by the blocked traffic in penetrating into the hinterland. The Medical Department Chief himself went to th
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area and took over supplying as much medical supplies (sanitary water filters and other supplies) as he could from the Southern Army's reserve stocks. Then again he had Medical Department personnel dispatched time and again to the area and did all he could to check the diseases.

Further the situation was reported to Commander in Chief and the all construction work was suspended for a time and all efforts were concentrated on stamping out the epidemics.

6. The fact that malnutrition, dysentery, malaria and tropical ulcer increased in proportion to the progress of the construction work may also be thought to have been result of the bad sanitary conditions by the rainy season as well as by the dearth of foodstuffs caused by the blocked roads. Against these epidemics, it goes without saying that the activities of the medical services and supplying of drugs were stimulated, while the all important supply of essential foodstuffs and increase of supply of mosquito nets and blankets were appealed to concerned officers, but these could not easily be improved on account of transport difficulties over the area.

On this 2nd day of Sept. 1947

At Tokyo.

DEPARTMENT YASUDA, Tsunao (scl)
Def. Doc. No. 2470

I, KAZUMA, Isaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness: (signed) KAZUMA, Isaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ YASUDA, Tsuneo (seal)
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached abeet and in accordance
with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I. KOBAYASHI, Shujiro, live at KITAIDE, SHIMMEI-MURA, IMADACHI-GUN,
FUKUI Prefecture and am 48 years old.

In July of the 19th year of SHOwa (1944), I arrived at Manila as the
Staff-Officer of the 14th Area Army in the Philippine Islands. When the
SHIMBU Group under the command of the said Army was formed at the close
of that year, I was ordered to be attached to the Group and, until the
termination of war, engaged in the campaign in the region east of Manila.
As the Senior Staff-Officer, my main duty was to control the operations and
the rear-service. When I arrived at my post, the Commander of the Army
was Lieutenant General KURUODA. He was succeeded by General YAMASHITA
early in October of the 19th year of SHOwa (1944). The U.S. Army started
landing in LEITE on October 18 of the 19th year of SHOwa (1944). Two days
later, on October 20, Chief of the Staff MUTO arrived at his post.
I will make a statement as follows on the real state of a time.
1. I will explain the plan of operations in the vicinity of Manila and
   the intention of the Commander of the Area Army toward Manila City.

   A. As regards the operations in LUZON Island, the policy before October
      of the 19th year of SHOwa (1944), was to fight decisive battles in the
      LINGAEN and BATANGAS fronts, especially in their seaside regions. However,
      not only did the LEITE campaign deplete our force but also the experience
      taught us that decisive battles were disadvantageous. The policy was
      therefore changed to that of delaying tactics, taking up a position in
      mountain region. The new plan in the middle and southern parts of LUZON
      Island was that the army in this district would occupy the mountainous
      region east of Manila with its main force, a part of which were disposed in
      the BATANGAS Province and that, in Manila, the troops (some 2,500 strong
      of the army forces) should be stationed for the sake of mere guard and of
      covering munitions. It was early in December of the 19th (122 of the
      original is surely a mistake -- T.N.) year of SHOwa.
It was a serious subject of study whether or not Manila should be defended to the last. But General YAMASHITA decided on a plan of its abandonment. Concerning this problem, Lieutenant General MUTO, the Chief of the Staff, insisted on a plan of abandonment from the outset and gave this opinion to General YAMASHITA. The reasons for him insisting it were as follows:

1. The difficulty in supplying food-stuffs for the million citizens of Manila and preventing them from becoming victims of battle;
2. Possible danger of reducing the centre of civilisation in the Philippine Islands to ashes by the spread of the flames due to a great number of wooden houses in the City;
3. The impossibility of establishing solid air defences owing to subterranean water running near the surface of the land;
4. The impossibility for the existing Japanese forces of defending the City lying on the seaside plain and requiring a large number of divisions for its defense.

Since, however, it was impossible to remove in a short time the pile of war supplies for the whole of the Southern Army and numerous military establishments from in and around Manila City, it was at first decided to station there a part of the forces to have them transport, carry out and escort the munitions as well as maintain public peace. Some 30,000 tons of munitions remained in Manila early in January of the 20th year of SHOwa (1945).

In order to carry out the above policy, the Area Army Commander took the following steps, besides the disposition of the forces:

1. He had the Philippine Government remove to BAGUIO on December 22;
2. He manifested the idea of abandoning Manila by means of removing the Army Headquarters from the MCKINLEY Barracks to IPO, about 30 kilometers north-east of Manila on December 26, and expedited transportation of the forces and munitions which had been delayed by indecisive movement from around Manila to the mountainous region;
3. Since about the middle of December, he especially ordered me to visit the headquarters of the forces stationed on the west side of the Manila – MONTALBAN Road (the entrance to the mountainous region), approximately 20 kilometers north-east of Manila and to urge them on the spot to hurry into the eastern mountainous region;
4. He ordered the Manila Defense Headquarters in charge of guarding the City until then, promptly to MONTALBAN north-east of Manila and named the forces the KORAYASH Group, after the name of the commander so as to make soldiers change their way of thinking;
5. He sent an staff-officer early in January of the 20th year of SHOwa (1945) to the Commander of the Air Forces, who still remained in the City of Manila on account of illness, to hurry him away to the Northern LUZON;
6. He gave strict instructions to the forces in Manila, forbidding any notion of inflicting harms to the citizens as well as prohibiting them from putting any building to warfare use, except that simple works for air defense and self-defense were permitted on the MCKINLEY Barracks.
In this respect, I endeavoured, as the staff-officer left behind at the place east of Manila, to have our forces thoroughly understand the above effect. For instance, at the meeting of staff-officers and adjutants of every group and unit under the command, held at MONTALBAN about the middle of January, I communicated it exactly to them and explained, adding that, even if its result should handicap them in fighting, they should act so as to realise the intention of the Area Army Commander. They all appreciated it and left. Lieutenant YOKOYAMA, the Commander of the SHIBU Group, as well attached importance to the intention of the Area Army Commander in this connection. He, accordingly, gave instructions early in January to all the officers and men under his command, emphasizing that, as the world was watching every act of our forces fighting in this vicinity of the international city, they were required to maintain in particular strict discipline and to take such good and just actions that they might not be laughed at by posterity.

2. In regard to the progress of battles in the vicinity of Manila, I will explain the actual condition of the Japanese army.

A. On the morning of February 4, I was informed of the following condition at MONTALBAN 20 kilometres north-east of Manila.

On the evening of the 3rd, the last day, Manila was totally surprised by the U.S. forces advancing from the north which immediately occupied the north of the River KARIKINA. The enemy consist of automobile units with numerous tanks, though their power is uncertain.

B. Toward the evening of that day, one marines battalion, in charge of guard of the vicinity of SAN JUAN DELMONTE north-east of Manila, was surprised, defeated and ran toward the east. At that time, the both banks of the River KARIKINA were in a state of confusion.

C. Putting together informations from various sources, we found:

1) That the U.S. forces, led by guerrilla units, threaded their way through gaps of disposition of our forces without taking the main road along the seashore and advanced from the west side of the city toward the north-east of Manila;

2) That, in front of our sentries, a guerrilla unit on an automobile passed hoisting our general's flag, and following it there appeared unexpectedly U.S. tanks accompanying auto-tracks, on which were many guerrillas;

3) That the enemy strength remained uncertain and could not be estimated;

4) That a number of barely armed officers, men and civilians in the military service who had been billeted in Manila city and engaged in commissary service including transportation were attacked and butchered by guerrilla and by "inhabitants" hostile to the Japanese.
In short, at the outset of the Battle of Manila, the sudden attacks of the enemy threw our soldiers and residents in Manila into complete confusion and disorder, and made accurate information impossible.

During the meantime, as our main forces stationed in the mountainous region east of Manila, piles of munitions having been burnt by the enemy's air-raids, traffic suspended, they dragged into their positions the provisions and other materials which had some time ago been carried to the front of their positions and built roads and positions. Thus they were awfully dismayed.

Towards the 7th, we were informed that the U.S. forces penetrating into Manila were not so mighty as the main force of which was at QUEzon and SANJULIÁN DELMONTE (the north-eastern suburbs of Manila) and that the traffic and communication between the units in the vicinity of Manila and those in the east quarters became difficult owing to the irregular hostilities opened between both sides at the PAKO station (located near the centre of Manila City and many storehouses for our war supplies) and to the advanced enemy forces on the north bank of the River PASSIK on the north of MCKINLEY. So we intended, before everything, to get out of this difficulties, to transport the munitions which had been being carried forward in the vicinity of the River MARIKINA to the eastern mountainous region and to restore the communication with Manila. For these purposes, it was decided to make a part of the forces sally out from the eastern mountainous region and the order was given to that effect. However, it was too late to equip them for the sally, especially, it was hard work to make the troops, prepossessed with the idea of taking the defensive in the mountains, sally out to the plain. Finally, the operations was postponed until the morning of the 24th.

But, since they had no fire-arms under the domination of the enemy air force, not only did they lose vigour and become slow in their sallying movement but also provisions ran short, and thus they were idling away their time. Meanwhile, the troops in the City of Manila were urged by the Area Army Commander to immediately withdraw from the City to the eastern direction, but while the communication with Manila City ended in failure, the sallying unit withdrew to the former position on the 21st. Such being the case, our forces (mainly the navy) in the City of Manila found it difficult to escape from the City besieged by the enemy. Thereafter, repeated telegraphic orders for the boats for crossing the River of MARIKINA and the troops dispatched to cover their picking up into the boats proved effective, but a report was received saying, 'The enemy's complete siege and incessant illumination around us enable none of us to escape here.'

In the meantime, however, there was a certain section of our army forces in the City of Manila which escaped there under cover of darkness led by a company commander. And there was a naval force stationed in the vicinity of MCKINLEY retreated to the east since about the 15th.

After all, it can be concluded that our forces in Manila, suffering from surprised attacks, were in chaos from start to finish, owing to the activities of a large number of guerilla, panic-stricken refugees, confused commissary units and hospitals, etc. still remaining
unarmed in the City, irregular struggles by the naval forces unacustomed
to land fighting etc. Meanwhile, the SHIMBU Group Headquarters remaining
in the mountain of MONTA LEAN endeavoured to obtain every available
information, though they could not ascertain the actual condition due
to still deficient networks of communication and observation in the
mountain. It was on February 18 that they came to confirm the general
progress of battles. Yet the details of the state in the City remained
uncertain for them. Some liaison men we had sent there did not return in the
end.

3. I will refer to the state of affairs in the BATANGAS Province and
thereabout.

The former 8th Division which had been stationed in this district
removed, led by the Divisional Commander, to the east of Manila at the
close of December. And the remaining troops were left under the command
of a colonel. As it was difficult to communicate with them due to their
separation by the Lake RAGNA from the main force, we were informed of
the condition in this district only through wireless reports.

Up to that time, the guerilla had been considerably active in this
district. Non that out forces decreased, their activity seemed to have
grown in violence. It was inferred from the wireless reports that they
were in great difficulties fighting with "the American-Philippine army" and
"the superior enemy and Guerilla" forces, nevertheless the details
were of course uncertain. As their area of operations was thus separated,
they took actions as an independent detachment to which the SHIMBU head-
quarters could hardly give orders while they fought. The troops in this
district were ordered, as their duty, "to hold in check the enemy's landing
and advance, taking up the established positions in the vicinity of
BATANGAS, and then to occupy the height on the south bank of the Lake
RAGNA in order to cover the left flank of the main force of the Group."

4. I will dwell upon the actions taken by the Area Army Commander
toward the Philippine inhabitants.

A. General YAMASHITA was rigid particularly in the military dis-
cipline. In respect to avoiding troubles to the inhabitants, he ordered
the troops, even in case those stationed in the towns until then as well
as those reinforced from Japan were removed for the purpose of operations,
to restrain (almost prohibit) themselves to the utmost from using any
private building and to make it a fundamental rule to be in camp. Besides,
he always confirmed this point when he sent us to the place concerned
and also he, since his arrival at his post in Manila, used barracks or
those similar to them for his residence in order to set an example in
person.

B. They were also required in general to pay the inhabitants for
their food-stuffs, utensiles, etc. which they had used and, in an un-
avoidable case, to give an I.O.U. in place of them and, besides, to
obtain their consent. Even when the Group ran out of provisions in May
of the 20th year of SHOYA (1945) in the operations among the mountains
east of Manila, I saw that the Commander ordered the troops under his
command, by a bulletin, to carry our the instructions from the Area Army Commander and that commanders under him also ordered their men to that
effect.
C. In case of purging and suppressing the guerilla, he instructed the whole army to carefully discriminate through precise information between guerilla and peaceful people in order to avoid any such action as mistaking peaceable one for the enemy. For this purpose, "Armed guerilla" was definitely indicated suppressive operations.

D. "How to Escape from War Disasters' for the inhabitants," especially, "How to Escape' for the citizens of Manila" were put in writing and also arrangements were made for their course of escape in order to prevent them from being mixed with our troops on their taking refuge. Not only that, in the City of Manila, staff-officers of the Manila Defense Headquarters who had good experience in taking care of the citizens in the past would be left behind, in consideration of preventing them from causing misunderstanding with our army.

5. I will explain how we directed the treatment of war prisoners and of internees of the hostile Powers.

A. About the middle of December of the 15th year of Showa (1940) when the indications of the U.S. army's attack against Luzon became clear, the divisions concerned were instructed to deliver war prisoners and internees peaceably to the U.S. army when they arrived there, to have them carry provisions for one month at least with them, and to escort them against bandits. The SHIBU Group, in accordance with the above instructions, delivered some 4,000 in Panay and SAINT THOMAS and 3,000 in LOS BANCOS to them.

B. Delivery at Manila.

On the evening of February 3 when Manila City was surprised by the American-Philippine forces and the Camp was besieged by the U.S. tank corps, Lieutenant Colonel Hayashi, the Head of the Camp, with the intention of avoiding eventual spread of disaster to the internment buildings, mustered his staff (I remember they numbered 30 or so.) in the main office and negotiated with the U.S. army. The U.S. army, on the other hand, proposed to him that, though they would comply with the delivery of all the internees, the Japanese forces should wholly be disarmed. The head of the Camp expressed himself that, although his main duty would conclude with peaceable delivery of the internees, yet they could not stand immediate surrender as the Japanese soldiers and that either they would remove to the Japanese positions individually in arms or, if there was no alternative, they all preferred to fight to death. After negotiations were repeated and as the representatives of the internees gave the U.S. army an advice, saying, "These Japanese looked after us very well," the U.S. army replied that they would comply with the Japanese proposal and that they would instead lead the way to a safety zone. Accordingly, the Head of the camp ordered 150 of his men to be in full arms, had them put the Camp buildings in order and took a roll-call of his men, and they departed there, leading forward to the internees. For fear of a possible surprise attack by the U.S. army after going out of the gate, they went forward, making preparations ready to fight. While on the contrary, a colonel of the U.S. army, who guided us was so gentlemanly (a man of BUSHIDO after a Japanese expression) that he wanted the Japanese
troops against misunderstanding by the ordinary U.S. troops and told
them to walk along either side of road. He, at the head of them in person,
led them safely to outside the disposition of the U.S. army and then
shook hands with the Head of the Camp. The Head expressed his gratitude
to the colonial for his kindness. They bade farewell, wishing each other
good health. The above was the personal report of the Head of the Camp
after his return.

C. Delivery at LOSBAGNIOC.

It seemed that, as this district was located at a long distance
from the SHIBU Group Headquarters, there was misunderstanding for while
due to the difficulty of communication. As a result, about the middle
of January, the Head of the Camp tried without leave, to set the internees
free and to retreat to a safety zone. So the Commander ordered him, in
accordance with the intention of the Area Army Headquarters, to protect
them in safety and to supply them with food until the arrival of the
U.S. army. The Head of the Camp again took them in the former place and
later, when the U.S. army arrived there, sent a messenger to KALABA to
propose their delivery to the U.S. army. In the end, the purpose was
accomplished by setting them free at LOSBAGNIOC.

D. Transportation of the U.S. war prisoners to Japan.

War prisoners were to be transported to Japan by order of the Army
Minister and on the ships assigned by the Imperial Headquarters. Early
in October of the 19th year of SHIDA (1944), war prisoners were ordered
to be transported to Japan. So healthy prisoners of the KABANATSAN Camp
were gathered at Manila where they awaited the order, but there was no
assignment of ships. They were left there as they were. After the
LEYTE operations, however, successive access of the U.S. army to LUZON
Inland made us worry ourselves, when those war prisoners were ordered about
December 10 to sail on board the ORYOKU-MARU by which the Japanese women
and children were to be sent home and they departed from Manila on board
the ship. This transportation was carried out by the order given by
the predecessor to General YAMASHITA as at early as the beginning of
The staff of the headquarters including General YAMASHITA were ignorant
of these circumstances until the ORYOKU-MARU was air-raided by the U.S.
air forces.

6. I will make a statement on the condition of our knowledge of the
real state of the forces in various districts and on the real condition of
communication.

Lack of preparations for the operations, especially, inferiority in
wireless equipment; the complete command of the air in the daytime by the
U.S. army; the difficulty of traffic within our province cut to pieces by
the enemy and guerrilla; and, in addition, the disorder of our forces,
which fought in the vicinity of Manila, being hastily formed including
those troops in rear-service, patients discharged from hospitals; and,
moreover, abrupt joining by the air and naval standing forces which had
no former connection with us. Those circumstances prevented us to get
from them available reports as desired. Consequently, the Headquarters
took great pains. As a striking instance, it was when we read a magazine
of the U.S. army in the camp after the termination of the war that we for
the first time learned the fact that, as early as on February 6 or 7,
the powerful U.S. forces had advanced from the south to the southern sides of Manila City. As it was beyond all our imagination that an accident had occurred in Manila and BATANGAS districts. Accordingly, we neither received any report on such a matter nor made any report to the superiors.

On this 26 day of Aug. 1947
At I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT KOBAYASHI, Shujiro (Seal)

I, OKAYOTO, Shoichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: /S/ OKAYOTO, Shoichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KOBAYASHI, Shujiro (seal)
I. I. KODAMA, Kyûzô, served in the War Ministry as Chief of the Military Service Section, Military Affairs Bureau, during the period between March, 1940, and June, 1944. The duties of the Military Service Section covered matters concerning military discipline, punishment, regulations of various sorts relative to military service, and the proper duties of individual soldiers, etc.

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached article and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

Moreover, sectional staff officers were called to a special meeting for the exclusive purpose of enforcing discipline.

II. KODAMA, Kyûzô, served in the War Ministry as Chief of the Military Service Section, Military Affairs Bureau, during the period between March, 1940, and June, 1944. The duties of the Military Service Section covered matters concerning military discipline, punishment, regulations of various sorts relative to military service, and the proper duties of individual soldiers, etc.

Moreover, sectional staff officers were called to a special meeting for the exclusive purpose of enforcing discipline.
Appendix I, 1--9, are specimens of such instructions.

I. I. In Japan, primary importance was attached above all to the strengthening of command power as the basis of military discipline. By emphasizing this point, it was held, it was possible to keep the members of the army away from possible misbehavior and to change for the better the characters of those who had committed any such misbehavior. In time of war, however, more immediate and concrete measures were taken in addition to this in order to prevent such mis-conduct as might result from the abnormal circumstances at the front as well as the lowered moral standard of the troops owing to the increase in army personnel.

In the following paragraphs I shall describe measures taken by the central authorities in relation to those types of mis-conduct which are now being tried by military tribunals at various places.

IV. Education and guidance given by the military at the time were as follows:

1) Manuals —

Enforcement of military discipline and raising of morale are emphasized in every manual. Especially, the training manual clearly points out the way therto. It requires soldiers, right from their start for the front, to be careful about the maintenance of military discipline, and the necessary example to be shown to the natives in fighting areas for the heightening of the prestige of the Japanese forces.

2) As for international law and regulations, both officers and men were given necessary training in a sensible way. For instance, teaching concerning the Red Cross Treaty was given in Military Training Manual.
No. 60, and the law text-book for the Military Academy Preparatory School (Appendix No. 7) dealt with Land Warfare Regulations. In order that the said international laws and regulations be strictly observed, concrete instructions were given concerning operational movements — such as the action of a country, instructions concerning billeting, and requisition of materials — and also about the treatment of prisoners of war.

The central authorities did not receive any formal information whatever concerning such cases as appeared before the military tribunals. Consequently, the measures taken by the central authorities were not in most cases adequate for the actual cases to which they were applied. However, in view of the prolonged warfare and the declining tendency of the character and intelligence of troops, necessary principles regarding the education, control, and guid of forces were given, attention was called to them, and other necessary military measures were taken.

1. Wartime Service Manual was compiled and distributed to the officers at large to be used as their reference material and guide-book during their service at the front. Its compilation being owned necessary, was carried out in 1938 (Showa 13) by the Inspectorate-General of Military Training in view of experiences gained up to that time through service abroad.

2. Military discipline and Morale Investigation Corps were sent out for investigation and guidance. Staff members of the central authorities were specially ordered in 1939 (Showa 14) to make an inspection tour to various spots in China for a period of some two months. After their return, the central authorities gave all units a guide to rigid enforcement of military discipline and morale, and adopted military administrative measures for
the sake of the enhancement of recreation facilities and adequate methods of replacement.

3. Articles brought back from abroad by the military men and civilians in the military service on their return to their homeland, were strictly inspected and controlled by every unit, at every port of embarkation, landing spot in the homeland, as well as by the home unit, thereby to discover and prevent breaches of discipline and, above all, plundering in the battlefield.

(4) The copies of the "Instructions to the Men at the Front" were distributed in the 16th year of Showa (1941) for the heightening of morality at the front. As the war was prolonged, a fear of the decline of morality and especially of possible plundering and violations came to be felt.

To meet the situation, the said "Instructions" was compiled by the central authorities and distributed in the name of the Minister of War. Every military man at the time always carried a copy of it with him, and by respectfully reading it day and night, exerted himself to comply with the teachings given in it.

(5) In the 17th year of Showa (1942), a part of the Army Criminal Code was revised by Law No.35. By this change, necessary provisions were newly added or amended in relation to military offences, for the sake of the strengthening and rigid enforcement of military discipline.

It is especially notable in these changes, that the crime of rape at the front was prescribed as a crime for which prosecution may be instituted without any complaint by the injured party.

(6) The central authorities gave several times strict warning against
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private punishments. It was applied to the treatment of prisoners of war and the native population as well as to Japanese military men.

(7) Great care was taken by the central authorities as to the prevention of offences and crimes against the natives. A special term "offences against the natives" was invented, and a statistic study of crimes and misdeeds was made, to which the authorities called the attention of every unit.

(8) The Military Administrative Order was revised in August, 18th year of Showa (1943). An item was added to it that the order was to be applied also to the forces at the front (The Order No.1), and regiment commanders, it was stated, should give lessons and guidance to their subordinates about the rules for treating the natives (The Order No.24).

(9) In order to pull back to the right course the mind of soldiers who unaware had become dissipated through prolonged service in the field and especially through disasters and dangers caused by fighting, adequate considerations were taken for affording every possible convenience for forwarding of letters and dispatches from their homes, forwarding comforts, sending out entertainment groups, as well as for the promotion of recreation facilities at the front, for instance, organization of military men's clubs to make visits and establishment of military men's clubs, etc.
Def. Doc. # 2140

On this 20th day of August, 1947

At I.T.F.E.

DEPONENT KODA-A, Kyuzo (seal)

I, INOUE, asutarō hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At I.T.F.E.

Witness: /S/ INOUE, asutarō (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KODA-A, Kyuzo (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: -- MURATA, Shôzô.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. The outline of my political career is generally as follows:

The Minister of Communications in the Second KONCYF Cabinet (1940) (For a while I was concurrently the Railway Minister but later exclusively Minister of Communications)

Concurrently Minister of Communications and Minister of Railways in the Third KONCYF Cabinet. (1941) I resigned along with the resignation of the KONCYF Cabinet on October 14, 1941.

I arrived at my post as Advisor to the Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands on February 11, 1942.

After the independence of the Philippines on October 14, 1943, I was the Japanese Ambassador Plenipotentiary.
to the Philippine Islands until August, 1944.

2. I will now make a statement on the political affairs of the Philippine Islands before and after her independence.

The Philippine Islands were under the military administration of the Japanese army when I arrived at my post there. At that time, the Army Commander was out in the field at the Corregidor and Bataan fronts and, as to political affairs, there was a military governor in Manila who was in charge of the military administration mainly bearing the responsibility of government. However, in so far as the domestic administration was concerned we entrusted it to the important persons of the Philippines who organized the Administrative Committee and were allowed to take charge of administration in accordance with the intention of the Japanese Army. The chairman of the Committee was Mr. Vargas. I recollect that the Administrative Committee was organized on January 23, 1942. The members of this Committee at first took an attitude of assisting the Japanese Army merely for the sake of maintaining peace in the Philippine Islands. But, Premier Tōjō's speech in the Japanese Diet on January 21, 1942, to the effect that Japan was willing to honor them with independence if the Philippines would henceforth understand the Japanese intention and act in concert with Japan, made a very favorable impression on the Filipinos and as they gradually grew to recognize the Japanese Army better, they
came to appreciate the true motives of Japan. And the members of the Committee gradually came to view a co-operative attitude towards the Japanese Army. Of course, since it was a period of military administration, things did not go as Filipinos desired completely. Moreover, not only were the Japanese troops fighting in Corregidor and Bataan but also former Filipino troops and troops of the U.S. army remained in various quarters. It was, accordingly, only natural that good government could not be expected, since the military administration was conducted on the field of battle. A little later, Bataan and Corregidor fell and the majority of the U.S. and Filipino troops there, both officers and men, were made prisoners of war. But some of them escaped and filtered into various quarters who, together with the various people who had heretofore been there, all changed to wage guerilla warfare. Things, therefore, came to such a pass as to compel us to make an effort in mopping up the guerillas in their various quarters. The administration in Manila on the part of the Filipinos, however, greatly improved, as Manila was the centre and was the pivot of everything. In January of the following year, the 18th year of SHōWA(1943), Premier Tōjō issued a concrete statement in the Diet to the effect that Japan would grant independence to the Philippines in the near future and as a result of which the Philippines
became independent on October 14 of the same year. The Philippines thus became independent, and they first began with the revision of the Constitution essential to independence. In revising the Constitution, the Army appointed as Chairman of the Constitution Revision Committee Mr. Laurel, who had the established reputation of trustworthiness as well as being conversant with the Constitution and an authority on the legal affairs of the Philippine Islands. The Revision Committee was created according to Mr. Laurel's opinion. The Constitution Revision Committee was hereupon formed with all of the members of the aforementioned Administrative Committee (Chairman Mr. Vargas) together with other civilians of excellent character. The Constitution was revised by these members and, on October 14 of the 18th year of SHÔWA (1943), the Philippines became independent and an independent government, was established. At this time, the National Assembly was called in accordance with the new Constitution. Owing to the pressing of time, however, the new Constitution provided for provisional regulations for electing the Assembly members, according to which the members assembled and, in that session, conducted the Presidential election and elected Mr. Laurel President. Then President Laurel personally selected the Cabinet members and put the administrative machinery into operation according to the constitution. Towards the revision of the
Constitutionally, Japan assumed a non-interference policy. That is, the republican form of government was adopted as before as the form of government for the Philippine Islands and both the national flag and territory were left just as before. Some of the Japanese people were said to be of the opinion regarding territory, "We hope Mindanao Island will be reserved for Japan in view of future military and other purposes." Premier Tōjō strongly maintained this must absolutely not be done. "We should not lay our hands on it in the slightest." As a result, the entire territory became that of the Republic of the Philippines.

As for the national language of the Philippines, the Tagalog language became the official language after the independence, whereas it was English and Spanish prior to independence. For instance, President Laurel made speeches in the Tagalog language. And the Foreign Office which did not exist prior to independence was created thereafter, and a most influential man was appointed Foreign Minister. Moreover, American procedure was followed in the Philippine Assembly as to either the form of bills introduced by members or their method of introduction. And in these bills, it seemed to me that Japan did not interfere hardly at all. Afterwards, even when some of the bills were not particularly desirable, they did not seem to have
been interfered with so much. Not only that, the Japanese advisors to the Philippine Government numbered three, each of whom was respectively in charge of finance, police, and scientific matters, respecting the wishes of President Laurel. In short, I think this course of action was not contrary to the central policy of Japan of having Filipinos have their own way in government and having them independently administer the affairs of state from their own will. With such ideas as mentioned above, we did various things for the benefit of the Philippines towards their independence. Let me mention a few within my knowledge:

A. The birth-place of RIZAL, who had advocated the independence of Philippines since the time of Spain's reign and whose statue was situated at the place of his execution, had been forgotten by the Filipino people. A house was built at his birth-place just as it was when he was born, to encourage the spirit of independence in the Filipino people;

B. Aiming at cultivating men of ability necessary for an independent state, outstanding youths were selected twice a year and were sent to Japan to study, entering the schools of their own choice;

C. At the first anniversary of Philippine Independence, the Japanese Government donated 500,000 pesos as the Ambassador's gift in honor of the occasion, suggesting that...
it be spent for the purpose of educating the young people of the Philippines and that everything would be left to the Philippines as to its use. Both the President and the Minister of Education were overjoyed.

D. Agricultural improvement in the Philippine Islands was of the first consideration for an agricultural nation like the Philippines and great effort was put forth in this field ever since the time of the military administration. We had the Director of the Agricultural Affairs Bureau of the Philippine Government inspect Formosa accompanied by 5 or 6 accomplished scientists of agriculture. The Government-General of Formosa gave them free reign and allowed them to inspect wherever they wished. And we had them compare the condition of the Philippines developed under U.S. control for 40 years, with the results of Japan's efforts in the administration of Formosa for 40 years since she got possession of it. On inspecting Formosa, they were greatly surprised at and lost in admiration with the results, uttering in the end even such words as, "I don't care even if someone thinks we received a bribe from Formosa;"

As Advisor to the Army, I also set up an inquiry committee on industry, economy, culture, education and the various matters for the sake of contributing to the independence of the Philippines. There were extensive findings made by the U.S.A. of course but they
were naturally made from an American point of view, and I maintained that we must draw up ones based upon an Oriental viewpoint. But Army Headquarters would not agree with me stating that it was not the proper time. So I went to Tokyo to consult with Premier Tōjō and he approved it. On the one hand a search was made for outstanding scholars from the general public and on the other, aid was solicited from the presidents of various universities. In the end, the scholars, ROYAMA, TOHATA, SUGINURA, OSHIMA, SUMIYAMA and ITO, all came over to the Philippines with their able assistants and took up the survey.

As originally Philippine Islands was entirely dependent on U.S.A. as her possession; it was indeed impossible speaking only from the industrial point of view for her to be independent without relations with America. For instance, the Filipinos are very fond of smoking cigarettes but they produce only a lot of cigar leaves and no tobacco-leaf and import cigarettes from America. Rice was also insufficient and about 10 percent had to be imported annually. The Philippines was in such a condition and she hardly had qualifications for an independent state, until she was able to produce herself for anything, daily necessaries as food first of all, clothing, and others necessities. Therefore, the
technical experts in various fields were sent there from Japan by the military administration to encourage the growing of cotton, yellow tobacco, Formosan rice, etc., looking beyond into the future since as early as the time of the military administration. As for cotton, though it had been grown to some extent since former times, there was some dispute about whether it would grow or not. So we engaged university professors who were experts in cotton to have them study the matter. As they reported that cotton-growing would be possible in some areas, we had them carry it out. Of course it had to be carried out with the understanding of being prepared to take losses for 3 or 5 years at least. We, accordingly, tried to have influential cotton spinning companies or colonization companies, having the capacity to bear the burden, grow excellent cotton after designating these areas for it. As a consequence, these various companies paid heavily but for which they were prepared from the outset. As for tobacco, some districts got very good yields of the yellow leaf variety used in cigarettes. That it can be thought up to now, although it was possible to have been grown, they didn't allow them to and had them depend rather upon import. The Formosan rice crop turned out well in the first year but not as well in the second year.
It was because Japan agreed to protect the Philippines in accordance with the treaty of alliance that an army was not organized at the time of the independence. The constabulary in charge of maintaining internal peace was already established and was reorganized by the Japanese Army. The war situation in the South-Western Pacific area was unfavorable to Japan after the independence of the Philippines. The situation was where there was no knowing when the Philippines might be attacked. Consequently, we are not able to say that the affairs of state were conducted entirely according to the intention of the independent Philippine Government. Moreover, there was the agreement between the Philippines and Japan as mentioned above, to the effect that Japan would assume the defense of the Philippine Islands. At that time, since the Japanese Army was in the position where it had to discharge its own primary military duty on the one hand and to protect the Philippine Islands on the other, the independence of Philippines could not be considered a complete one immediately. The President was well aware of this fact. That the Army would be withdrawn when the war was over was declared by the Commander of the Army and the fact that Premier TOJC was of the same opinion was not only known very well by the President but also by myself.
0. Premier Tōjō's statement on the independence of the Philippines created such a sensation in the Philippine Islands that the Filipino people were greatly concerned at the time of the resignation of the Tōjō Cabinet. Therefore, invited the reporters of the Filipino and Japanese newspapers and told them, "Even with resignation of the Tōjō Cabinet Japan's policy will not change. Philippine independence shall be recognized as in the past. The declaration at the Greater East Asia Conference is a permanent and immutable one." They were greatly relieved. They thought that well of Tōjō in connection with her independence.

Let me give an example which indicates how Premier Tōjō was adored by the Filipino people. It happened when he visited the Philippine Islands. Premier Tōjō, on alighting from the airplane, directly went to the Ministers, assembled to meet him, and shook hands with them all. As this was completely different from the attitude of the Army Commanders etc., they were very pleased. On the next day, after he spoke to a large audience numbering hundreds of thousands, he returned on foot without taking a waiting automobile to the hotel near by through a crowd of people greeting them as he went along. This was an expression of his attitude to show he was for the Filipino people, without a thought
of personal danger, and they were delighted. Premier Tōjō's speech on this occasion gained great popularity. His speech was made at LUNETA Park in the city of Manila. When the Mayor of Manila expressed his desire, on one occasion, to name it Tōjō Park in token of the Philippine people's gratitude, Mr. Tōjō refused, saying, "Please don't."

As the Commander of the Japanese Army, HOKMA, TANAKA, KURCMD, and finally YAMASHITA were appointed successively due to various reasons, but Chief of Staff WACHI arrived at his post one or two weeks after my arrival and was in office until YAMASHITA's arrival. He won great popularity as Chief of Staff and as military administrator of the time. He was so zealous in making the Philippines worthy of an independent state by all means that such songs as 'WACHI March' appeared among the people.

3. Now I will make a statement on the "Death March."

I don't think it is clear whether "Death March" is a term to apply to the Filipino war prisoners or to the American war prisoners. I witnessed the American war prisoners on the "March", landing from Corregidor and marching toward the internment camp from the street but there didn't seem to be any deaths in the procession. It was, however, true that there were some deaths among the Filipino war prisoners who marched separately.
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I will now relate the state of affairs when I visited the headquarters of the Japanese Army on Bataan soon after the surrender of the U.S. army there. I witnessed then war prisoners lying on the wayside who, after surrendering at Bataan, had fallen out of the march on their way to camp. When I had a talk with the Commander of the Army, I asked him about this. He answered, saying, "Little did I expect that there were so many. Contrary to my expectations that those who offered to surrender would number 30 or 40 thousand, there were as many as 70 or 80 thousand and I had great difficulty in transporting them. First of all, we had no trucks which, accordingly, compelled us to have them walk. Neither had we so much in the way of rations. Moreover, they were suffering from malaria or other diseases, so we had a very hard time escorting them to the camp." This was the actual state of things. Although it may appear to have been done deliberately to be called the "Death March," I think its results were unavoidable.

This is something I heard from a Filipino of some war prisoners who were deeply moved by the fact that Japanese soldiers on duty in prisoner of war camp, for instance, lived under the same roof and ate the same meals with the war prisoners.

Various kinds of leaflets were said to have been distributed from airplanes during the Philippine offensive.
of Commander HCM. Among these leaflets, was printed, "The Filipino people who will swear allegiance to us shall not be looked upon as our enemy." I think General HCM entertained this idea to the last, because he released war prisoners one after another in spite of the continuation of the war. This greatly pleased the Filipino people. There are other cases as having helped in getting employment for them, assisting them in their education, etc., but as they would come under hearsay I shall refrain.

On this 6th day of June, 1947
At IJ.T.F.T.

DFPONENT Wurata Shozo (seal)

I, KIYOSU, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At same place

Witness: (signed) Ichiro Kiyose (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth witholding nothing and adding nothing.

-14- Wurata Shozo (seal)
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On this 6th day of June, 1947
At I.M.T.F.P.

Defendant: Kurata Shozo (seal)

I, Kiyose, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At same place

Witness: (signed) Ichiro Kiyose (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

- 14 - Kurata Shozo (seal)
面々共に皆「グリン」を囲う rondement。従って、各地ガノ「グリン」を囲う rondement。
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第二次近衛内閣（一九三四年）

前次近衛内閣（一九四○年）

法華宗本山寺

東京都

(1940年)
Def poo No. 1741
此憲法の改正方法についてはマニラ条約に規定されている。日本は同意を Intrinserて大統領を指名した。これにより、日本軍はフィリピンの政府を支配し、フィリピン人の権利を侵害する事となった。
文部大臣を非常喜んで戦後アリメス。

何ぞ大箱問題でアリ政時代ボリナルビオマリス

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何ぞ大箱問題でアリ政時代ボリナルビオマリス
先ず第一目分作ラクレバ、誠立書トシテ末合格ヲ殆ンド具備シテ
次状態デリマシタ。従ツテ植化、黄良米 crawled 進米等ノ栽培ノ努力ヲ
厩政時代カラ將來ヲ見通シテ数政ノ下ニ各方面ノ役ヲハ日本ヨリ進レテ
ルモナラシテノデ、此ノ植化栽培ヲ行ハセルコトニシマシテ勿論単
年予五五年ノ間ハ略摂承知ノ上デシナクレバナラスノデ其栽培ノ努力ヲ
力ヲナラシテニ CCP へ可能デアルト云フ故ル

(Def noé No. 1741)
此點八大成領軍司管官兼知事居裡マサショ、取等が減メバ軍を引上ケル
トフコト八大成領軍司管官兼知事居裡マサショ、果条補塩が同様ノ言ヘデ
アツタコト八大成領ノミナラズ私モ減シクモノイテ居リマス。
Def Leo No. 1741
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Yasuji WATANABE

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown or attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Yasuji WATANABE. I was formerly a captain in the Japanese Navy. From June 1943 until April 1945 I was assigned to the Navy Bureau, Naval Affairs Bureau, and from May 1945 until the termination of the war I was assigned to the Maritime Supervision Board. My duties chiefly encompassed matters concerning the schedule of merchant ships.

1. At the outbreak of war Japan possessed approximately 6,300,000 tons of merchant ships. This calculation is based on vessels of 100 tons or more in capacity. Largely because of the action of United States submarines against Japanese shipping, in August 1945 this tonnage was reduced to approximately 1,500,000 tons. Since this figure included grounded ships, those requiring repairs and others not capable of immediate sea duty, only 500,000 tons could actually be operated in homeland waters.

2. Ships sunk or damaged by United States submarine activity, aircraft and minor amounted to approximately 1,100,000 tons in 1942, 2,100,000 tons in 1943, 4,100,000 in 1944 and 1,500,000 in 1945 until the end of hostilities. This was a total of approximately 8,800,000 tons.

In spite of a 4,000,000 ton increase in merchant vessel construction, captured ships, etc., there was a great decrease in over-all total tonnage as shown in Annexed Document Number One. The ships newly constructed were inferior in structure and slow in speed thereby hampering the efficiency of the transportation.
3. The commodities carried by these merchant ships varied from time to time, but consisted largely in foodstuffs and those products needed for the war effort. There were service vessels, which consisted of those requisitioned by the military, and civilian vessels, operated without the direct supervision of the military. The service vessels largely confined their activities to the South Seas Area, Malaya and Netherlands Indies, while the civilian vessels ran between China, Manchuria and Japan together with some in the Korean, French Indo-China and Philippine Areas. The merchant traffic consisted of coal, petroleum, grain, iron ore, bauxite, rubber, cotton, salt, etc.

4. In order to remedy the situation caused by heavy shipping losses, General Headquarters set up a revised and strengthened convoy escort. But due to lack of necessary escort warships the plan was not effective and a priority was given to the escorting of those convoys carrying petroleum and bauxite. The importation of iron ore from Italian Island had to be ceased together with the importation of food stuffs from French Indo-China. Then in June 1944 after United States troops landed on Saipan the maintenance of the southern sea routes became most difficult. A Maritime Commission composed of military and civilian representatives was set up to seek a solution to the dangerous problem then facing us. The losses had resulted in a miserable condition reflecting heavily on the people's livelihood. Shortages of fertilizer caused a decrease in the harvest of grain and an accompanying 10% cut down in distribution of staple foodstuffs.

Hence the food supply of Japan decreased and the supply of our armed forces overseas likewise became a serious problem. I am able to give the percentage of decrease of supplies to our forces overseas if the Tribunal desires it and have not done so here in order to save time.

5. In 1945 the transportation districts were limited to Manchuria, Korea and Northern China. In addition to enemy submarine activity our loss of merchant shipping became even more acute due to mine laying operations by B-29's. Sea routes were practically restricted
to Japanese home waters and resort had to railway transportation. In view of the prevailing conditions in May 1945 the Maritime Service Supervision Board was set up as an over-all organ to supervise military and civilian water transport but it was too late to do much with the situation since the transportation capacity had been reduced 75% since the outbreak of war. Circumstances of that time are explained in Annexed Document Number Two which shows the amount and kind of cargo carried among the Japanese Islands and to and from Japan proper.

To sum up the whole situation, sea transportation in the latter half of the war was devoted to raw materials for munition industries with a heavy effect upon the people's livelihood. In the final stage of the war, in order to secure a minimum of food commodities to sustain the people, the import of raw materials for war manufactures was almost eliminated. The transportation capacity was then only 21% of the pre-war strength.
On this 29th day of August, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: Yasuji WATANABE

I, Yasuji WATANABE, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) AKATANI, Ken (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Yasuji WATANABE (seal)
AMOUNT OF MATERIAL TRANSPORTED BY SHIP
(AVERAGE AMOUNT MONTHLY)

LIST II

FERTILIZER

Ton

10,000

20,000

50,000

80,000
私は渡邊安次と申します。私は元海軍大佐で一九四五年六月より一九四五年四月に遊海軍省以務局に一九四五年五月より終戦時原海軍総監部に勤務しました。

一九四五年の終戦時並に約五十万吨船の攻撃により終戦時には約五十万吨船が約百三十万トンありました。が右整備を進せ主として米国の淡水船の攻撃により終戦時には約百五十万トンありました。百万吨以上の商船船体は約六百三十万ルートありました。新造船及び補修などによる増加は約四百万噸ありました。新造船及び補修船を含むで居りました。のので戦時実際内地方面に在って動き得るもののは僅かに約五十万ルートに過ぎます。
木材、ウッド、ドートン等であった。石油、ガス、鉄鋼、镕石、ポータサイト、溶氷の不足による産業を阻害、機械の損失を強化することができなかった。石油及

焼却の火損害による産業を阻害、機械の損失を強化することになり、木材及び

九四三年五月のソビエト及びイラン島に上陸以来、東方航路の維持が非常に困難に

一九四四年七月をガシパボン島に上陸以来、東方航路の維持が非常に困難に

打開に努めました。故に、焼却の損失は国軍には重大なる影響を與へ

として焼却の外に九二九による焼却攻砲が加わり、焼却の損失は益々深刻になり

の焼却の外に九二九による焼却攻砲が加わり、焼却の損失は益々深刻になり
極力鉄道輸送に転換させられる様になりました。この様に状況を打破する為、
一九四五年五月に民船輸送統一する機関として海軍輸送部が設けられ
ましたのが時既に遅く当時の輸送量は仮設より十五％もは々して居ました
此の状況は附録第二に示してあります。之は日本内陸及び日本海外間に輸
送された貨物の種類及び数の推移を示したものであります。之を要しまするに
戦争終了時海及び陸上輸送の状況は製品の製造及び原料の供給の略行を
して兵器生産、内外用ならびに民需に輸送を為すことを試みたもので
は昭和時二十一％でなかった戦争は終ったのであります。
# Amount of Material Transported by Ship

(Average Amount Monthly)

**List I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>2,000,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sand</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 5,000,000 |
AMOUNT OF MATERIAL TRANSPORTED BY SHIP
(AVERAGE AMOUNT MONTHLY)

LIST II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>100,000</th>
<th>90,000</th>
<th>80,000</th>
<th>70,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Regulations concerning the Dispatch of FOVs

(21 October 1942 War Ministry ordinance No. 58)

Parts amended, added and deleted by War Ministry Ordinance No. 25, 1943.

Dispatch of FOVs is, hereby, stipulated as follows:

Art. 1 'Dispatch of FOVs,' as used in this ordinance, means dispatch of and giving quarters to FOVs outside the FOV camp in order to assign them to labor tasks. 'Dispatched FOVs' means those prisoners who are thus dispatched.

Art. II Any person other than the Army personnel who desires to have FOVs dispatched within the Empire (areas other than Japan Proper, Korea, Formosa not included) shall submit an application for the dispatch of FOVs, as shown in the attached form, to the War Minister in order to obtain his approval. The same procedure shall be followed if the applicant desires to change particulars in the application for the dispatch of FOVs or in the application already approved by the War Minister.

The procedure of submitting the above application for the dispatch of FOVs shall be given separately.

Art. II-2 When the War Minister approves the foregoing application, the Minister shall decide the number of prisoners to be dispatched, and their housing, supervision, labor tasks (location, type of work, working hours, period of labor, etc.), supplies (including wages and canteen facilities), medical treatment, etc. and shall inform the Army Commander or the Garrison Commander who is in charge of the FOV camp (such person shall be referred to as FOV Camp Administrative Chief in the following paragraphs).

Art. II-3 The FOV Camp Administrative Chief shall, on receiving the above mentioned notification, make necessary regulations thereof and shall dispatch the prisoners.
Art. II-4. Any person other than the Army personnel who is not in the limits of the Empire and desires to have POW's, dispatched shall submit an application for the dispatch of POW's, as shown in the attached form, to the POW Camp Administrative Chief in order to obtain his approval. The same procedure shall be followed if the applicant desires to change particulars in the application for the dispatch of POW's or in the application already approved by the POW Camp Administrative Chief.

Art. II-5. The POW Camp Administrative Chief shall, on approving the above mentioned application make necessary regulations thereof and shall dispatch the prisoners.

Art. II-6. When the POW Camp Administrative Chief dispatches prisoners in accordance with the preceding article, he shall promptly report to the War Minister the number of dispatched prisoners, their housing, supervision, labor tasks (location, type of work, working hours, period, of labor, etc.), supplies (including wages and mess facilities), medical treatment, etc.

Art. III. In case of a public organization or a juridical person submitting an application for the dispatch of POW's a representative thereof shall submit the application.

Art. IV. Any person who is authorized to have prisoners dispatched (such person shall be referred to as employer of dispatched prisoners in the following paragraphs) shall receive instructions from the chief of the POW Camp who dispatches the prisoners (such person shall be referred to as chief of the POW Camp in the following paragraphs without any modifying clause) with regard to the following: the enforcement of the regulations which were made by the POW Camp Administrative Chief in accordance with Article II-3 or Article II-5; and the particulars in the application for the dispatch of POW's which were approved by the War Minister or by the POW Camp Administrative Chief in accordance with the provisions of Art. II or Art. II-4.

Regarding the enforcement of the above, the employer of dispatched prisoners shall be visited at any time by the chief of the POW camp for inspections.

Art. V. The employer of dispatched prisoners shall make rules and obtain approval of the POW Camp Administrative Chief with regard to the enforcement of the regulations which were made by the POW Camp Administrative Chief in accordance with Article II-3 or Article II-5 and the particulars in the application for the
dispatched of POW's which were approved by the War Minis- 
ties or by the POW Camp Administrative Chief in 
accordance with the provisions of Art II or Art. II-b. 
The same approval is also required for the employer in 
changing the rules.

Art. VI The employer of dispatched prisoners shall provide 
and maintain the facilities necessary for the prisoners, 

hotting and supervision.
The above mentioned facilities shall generally be in 
proportion to that of the POW camp.

Art. VII The employer of dispatched prisoners shall 
provide a necessary number of guards to supervise the 
dispatched prisoners and place them under the command 
of the personnel from the POW camp which sent the 
prisoners. (Such camp shall be referred to as POW 
camp in the following paragraphs without any modifying 
clause)
The number of the above mentioned guards shall be 
one for about every 30 prisoners.

Art. VIII The employer of dispatched prisoners shall 
supervise the prisoners' labor tasks. 
The above supervision of labor tasks may be 
assumed by the guards mentioned in the preceding 
article.

Art. IX The employer of dispatched prisoners shall 
be responsible for providing the entire or part of 
the provisions, beddings, heating fuel, daily necessities, 
traveling expenses (including expenses required in 
sending and returning prisoners) and other supplies 
for the dispatched prisoners. Such supplies shall 
generally be in proportion to those given within the 
POW camp, with the following exceptions:
Salaries for the officer prisoners and the enemy 
medical personnel dispatched; clothing to be supplied 
to the prisoners when their worn-out clothing can no 
longer be used.

Art. X The employer of dispatched prisoners shall 
pay the required wages to the Chief of the POW camp each 
month by the date fixed by the chief of the POW camp.

Art. X-2 The employer of dispatched prisoners shall 
provide a canteen in accordance with the relevant regulations 
made by the chief of the POW camp.

Art. XI As regards the medical treatment of dispatched 
prisoners, the employer of dispatched prisoners shall 
be in charge of the matter.
with regard to the medical treatment of dispatched prisoners who need to be hospitalized, the matter will be ruled by the chief of the POW camp.

XI-2 The employer of dispatched prisoners may offer to the chief of the POW camp money or commodities in order to encourage the dispatched prisoners in their labor tasks or to help to lighten their hardship.

When the chief of the POW camp considers such contribution to be harmless from the standpoint of the control of prisoners, he shall approve the above contributions and shall offer this to the dispatched prisoners as the case may require.

XII In case a dispatched prisoner dies, it shall be so reported that the date of the deceased's return to the POW camp be the date of his death.

XIII The employer of dispatched prisoners shall keep a diary in accordance with the relevant regulations made by the chief of the POW camp and shall record all necessary matters concerning the dispatched prisoners.

XIV The employer of dispatched prisoners shall report to the chief of the POW camp in accordance with the relevant regulations made by the chief on 10th, 20th and at the end of each month as to the condition of dispatched prisoners (results of labor tasks, health condition, and any other important matters).

XV In case the employer of dispatched prisoners violates the regulations which were made by the POW camp Administrative Chief in accordance Article II-3 or Article II-5, or the particulars in the application for the dispatch of POW's which were approved by the War Minister or by the POW Camp Administrative chief, in accordance with the provisions of Art. II or Art. II-4, the War Minister (if outside the Empire, the POW Camp Administrative Chief; same applies in the following paragraphs) may retract his approval of the dispatch of POW's.

Apart from the cases stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the War Minister may retract his approval of the dispatch of POW's whenever it is deemed necessary.

The entire expense required for the return of prisoners due to the retraction as stipulated in the first paragraph shall be paid by the employer of dispatched prisoners.

Under no circumstances the employer of dispatched prisoners can claim compensation for damage incurred from the retraction of approval mentioned in the first paragraph.

-8-
Art. XVI. The employer of dispatched prisoners shall not impose upon the dispatched prisoners' tasks beyond the regulations of this ordinance, except in special cases authorized by the War Minister.

Art. XVII. Omitted.

Art. XVIII. The above regulations shall apply when dispatching PO's to any army units other than POW camps.

Additional regulation (The War Ministry Ordinance No. 23, 1943):

Any person who has PO's dispatched in accordance with the earlier regulations shall submit to the War Minister an application for the dispatch of PO's in accordance with Art. II or Art. III-IV within 30 days (or 60 days if outside the Empire) after the date of enforcement of this present ordinance.

Annexed sheets (omitted)
第二条 三者一者何仏所管之役有りて、仏所管之役専用ノヲヲ記セントルトキハハ役ヲ取ノ許可ヲ与ニリテハ人ノ代表ヲヨリノ報告ヲス

第三条 禁用ノヲヲ記セントルトキハハ役ヲ取ノ役ヲ行ワツルノヲ許可ヲ与ニリテハ人ノ代表ヲヨリノ報告ヲス

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第二条 対象となる者は、派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者の派遣者に使用者的
十八條
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備考
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附則
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備考
本令ヲ公布スルヲ以テ
The Regulations for the handling of Dispatched Prisoners of War provide as follows:

Art. 1. Dispatched prisoners of war shall be handled in accordance with the Regulations Governing the Handling of Prisoners of War, the Detailed Regulations for the Handling of Prisoners of War, and other related regulations in addition to the Regulations for the Handling of Dispatched Prisoners of War and this Notice.

The provisions of articles 1, 19 and 20 of the Regulations for Prisoner of War Labour shall be applicable to dispatched prisoners of war.

Art. 2. Rescinded.

Art. 3. Except when specifically stipulated in the Regulations for the Handling of Dispatched Prisoners of War and this Notice, the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp, who sends out prisoner of war, shall handle matters concerning dispatched prisoners of war.

Art. 4. When the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp dispatches prisoners, he shall be required to make minute investigations into, and observations of not only their abilities but also of their characters, ideas as well as corps etc., to undertake to prevent desertion or possible unforeseen mishaps among prisoners of war. Prior to the prisoners of war's departure make them swear a solemn oath on the essential matters.

Art. 5. When the Superintendent of the Prisoners' Camp dispatches prisoners of war, he shall have them accompany by a necessary number of his staffs, and assign them the duties of supervising and watching the dispatched prisoners of war.
Regulations for the Handling of Dispatched Prisoners of War (The War Ministry Notice No. 74, Oct. 21, 1942), revised, added and deleted by the War Ministry Notice No. 41, 1943.

The Regulations for the handling of Dispatched War Prisoners provide as follows:

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Art. 5. When the Superintendent of the Prisoners' Camp dispatches prisoners of war, he shall have them accompany by a necessary number of his staffs, and assign the duties of supervising and watching the dispatched prisoners of war.
Art. 6. The following items shall be observed in the control of the dispatched prisoners of war:

1. Especially by strict measures for the supervision and surveillance of prisoners of war, efforts shall be made against espionage. At the same time, the desertion and unforeseen mishaps on the part of dispatched prisoners of war shall strictly be prevented.

2. Unless there is a special reason dispatched prisoners of war shall not be permitted to go outside. In case they do, guards shall be assigned to them.

3. All telegrams and mail sent to or received by dispatched prisoners of war shall pass through the hands of and censored by the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp.

4. Interview with dispatched prisoners of war and the visits to places to which they are dispatched, etc. shall not be permitted to any except to those having by permission of the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp.

5. When dispatched prisoners of war express a desire to purchase luxury items or articles of daily use with their own money at places other than the canteen provided for them by their employer they may be permitted to do so in accordance with the rules determined by the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp.

Art. 6. Then any one desires to give money and (or) articles to dispatched prisoners of war, he may do so in accordance with rules determined by the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp.

"When dispatched prisoners of war desire to send out money and (or) articles, they shall do so through the Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp who shall make an inspection of the same.

Art. 7. The Superintendent of the Prisoners of War Camp shall make occasional rounds or carry out inspections of dispatched prisoners of war from time to time.

Art. 8. The Superintendent General of prisoners of war camps may order from time to time shifts of dispatched prisoners of war.
第八條
俘虜収容所管理長官、随時派遣俘虜ノ交替ヲ命スルコトヲ
Subject: Frugal Consumption of Provisions, etc.  
[Army-Asia-Secret No. 3827 May 6, 1944 (Showa 19)]

From the Vice-Minister of War.

The following notification is sent by order:

In order to carry out operations and supply satisfactorily and also to cooperate with the spirit of the Principles of Emergency Measures for Decisive Battles under the prevailing situation of demand and supply of provisions, etc., it has been decided that the supply of provisions to the army forces and the sale of food and drink at post exchanges shall be executed for the time being after June 1st of this year as follows:

1. The basic ration of rice and wheat of the Army forces (including Defense Units) in Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Manchuria (including the Kwantung Leased Territory) shall be, regardless of the seventh diagram contained in the Detailed Regulation of the Greater West Asia War Army Supply Ordinance, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICIF</th>
<th>RATION PER DAY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RICE</td>
<td></td>
<td>In case the basic articles are provided, the differences due to the revision of the ration shall not be given, but the supplementary price of 3 sen per day shall be given instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHEAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -
Ten per cent of the above-mentioned rations of unpolished rice and cleaned wheat shall, as a rule, be substituted by other cereals or potatoes. In this case, the rate of the quantity of substitutes and the method of readjustment etc. shall follow the notification Army-Asia-Ordinary No. 807 of June, 1943 (Showa 18) (Matters Concerning Use of Unpolished Rice and Enforcement of Mixing Other Cereals, etc.)

The Army Commander, according to the actual circumstances of each unit under his command, may further curtail the ration and have the food thus reduced allotted and supplied to other units.

2. Each unit shall make efforts to intensify self-support on the spot by making most of vacant or unutilized land, etc., as well as supply nutrition by utilizing substitute foods, especially edible oils and fats. The supplementary price stated in the preceding item 1, the price for rice and wheat of the quantity reduced according to the second paragraph of the preceding item 1, as well as the fixed amount of charge for board shall be appropriated for the expenses involved in the foregoing.

3. The following restriction shall be put on the sale of food and drink at post exchanges in the Army units (including Defense Units) in Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Manchuria (including the Kwantung Leased Territory):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sweets</th>
<th>per capita per month</th>
<th>¥1.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liquors</td>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>250 g (about 1 pint (American))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>- do -</td>
<td>7 pieces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sale of such things to those who reside outside the barracks shall be suspended for the time being.

4. Even units and work depots within the zone of operations shall endeavor to reduce the consumption, as stated herein, in accordance with the spirit of the Principles of Emergency Measures for Decisive Battles.

5. With the revision of the basic rice and wheat rations the price of rice which competent chiefs of the intendance departments determine shall be based upon that of unpolished rice; provided, however, in case the price for the first half of 1944 (Showa 19) has already been officially announced it shall be effective during the same period.
Subject: Proper Adjustment of Supplies of Daily Necessities to P.O.'s

Notification from the Chief of P.O.'s Superintendence Bureau to all units concerned.

Recently, there has been a deterioration in the physical strength of prisoners of war, not to speak of the many cases of under nourishment which prevents them from demonstrating their capacity as laborers. Even though this is due to the general domestic food situation which has rendered difficult the furnishing of supplies, the problem of providing prisoners of war supplies as would be sufficient to maintain proper standards of health cannot be neglected in order to maintain labor power.

The turn of the war situation is such that an increasingly pressing food situation must be expected. Such being the case it is directed that prompt measures be taken to improve supply conditions, especially to effect a proper adjustment of supplies of daily necessities by strengthening hereafter the position of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and that proper guidance be given as would be in full accord with the principles of the army's plan in transferring prisoners of war to our homeland for labor purposes.

In order to strengthen the position of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, you are directed not only to reclaim waste lands or to encourage the employers of prisoners of war voluntarily to offer cultivated land, but also to take positive planned measures to divert a part of the prisoners of war engaged in production to work directly related to their livelihood. You are advised to abandon supplementary small-scale methods and directed to produce results.

With regard to the principles for effectuation of food self-sufficiency you are to comply with Riku Mitsu (Army Secret No. 0).
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, YOKOI, Takaharu, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section, Prisoners of War Information Office, hereby certify that the following seven documents hereunto attached entitled "Laws and Regulations Concerning Prisoners of War", written in Japanese, each consisting of respective number of pages indicated in brackets, are exact and true excerpts from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Prisoners of War Information Office):

A. Regulation concerning the Dispatch of POW's (4 pages)
B. 2. Regulations concerning the Treatment of Dispatched POW's (2 pages)
C. 3. Economy of Provisions, etc. (2 pages)
D. 4. Appropriate Supplies for F.O.W. (1 page)
E. 5. Labor tasks to be Assigned to Officer and Warrant officer Prisoners (1 page)
F. 6. Relief to be Given by the F.O.W. Employer when a Prisoner Dies. (1 page)
G. 7. Facilities for F.O.W. camps (2 pages)

Certified at Tokyo
On this 13th day of August, 1947.

(signed) YOKOI, Takaharu, (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place
On the same date

Witness: (signed) KIZAKA, Kozaburo (seal)
On Relief for the Dead and Injured Prisoners of War by their Employers.
(June 4, 1943, Regulations for Prisoners of War. Article 7. Clause 32)

Notification from the Chief of the Prisoners of War Administrative Section to the respective Armies in Japan Proper and the Korean, Formosan and Kwantung Armies.

You will instruct the employers of prisoners of war (including employers of despatched prisoners), that prisoners (including despatched prisoners; the same hereafter) who die or become injured through accident for which he is not responsible (excluding those of unavoidable nature etc.) during his duties at the factory or plant, etc., to contribute relief-money to them, in conformity to the Prisoners of War Labor Regulations Article 15 or Regulations for Despatch of Prisoners Article 11 Clause 2 Generally by the following standards:

1. When injured requiring sick leave from work. To contribute the same sum of money as wages (excepting the amount for national taxes) corresponding to the number of days of leave.

2. When injured resulting in permanent disability or death. To contribute the equivalent amount of money as the accident or family compensation amount based on the Factory Law and the Mining Law.

The basic wage, in this case, will be one yen.

In addition it is instructed that the fund donated to the dead prisoners shall be handled as part of their personal effects left behind.
On Internment Facilities for Prisoners of War.  
(February 3, 1944 Prisoners Facilities No. 1)

Notification from the Chief of the Prisoners of War Administrative Section to the units concerned.

The internment facilities for Prisoners of War (does not include dispatched areas) on work outside of the army are prescribed in Note No. 2 in the attached document to the Prisoners Labor Regulations, Army, Secret, Asia, 1942, No. 5353 "The maintenance of Quarters for Prisoners of War". But, as there seems to be some doubt on the details, the following note is issued for the sake of precaution:

In addition it is instructed that the following notes No. 1 to No. 4 be applied while the employers of despatched prisoners are in charge of all arrangements and maintenance of quarters and facilities for Prisoners of War (Regulations on Despatch Prisoners of War Article 6) where Regulations on Despatch Prisoners of War are applicable.

1. The initial establishment of the internment facilities for prisoners of war (henceforth will be designated only as facilities) will be in the charge of the employers only when there are special orders from the War Minister.

However, when the employers of prisoners of war feel a shortage of material just at the time, it is desirable that reasonable measures as mediately for them to the local authorities be taken concerning the acquisition of materials.

2. It is prescribed (Note No. 2 in the attached reference sheet to the Labor Regulations) that the establishment of facilities will be commenced after the War Minister's approval. But this approval can not be issued in view of the inadequacy of shipping space for prisoners of war so long as the shipping transport situation remains unsettled.

Accordingly this section, in consideration of the fact that there is little time in the establishment of facilities, will inform Army Headquarters long before the schedule to receive prisoners for service, so that preparations may be advanced and getting on with the construction of facilities started roughly from the said
period on.

3. Although the responsibility of establishing facilities is with the employers of prisoners at the time of actual establishment the army and camp authorities will give the proper directions and instructions (for instance instructions to revise the design from the administrative point of view as guard control and sanitation or directions to alter the site in view of defense, etc.) and take care to prevent the occurrence of such incidents as the leakage of military secrets or the destruction of houses.

4. As soon as permission has been obtained for prisoner of war services and as soon as facilities are completed the employer of prisoners should present the army with the facilities.

This presentation means its loan without charge and the army and the employers shall conclude a definite contract concerning this.

5. Although thereafter it is prescribed that the army will be in charge of maintenance and preservation of the facilities (Army, Secret, Asia, 1942, No. 5353), as an added precaution the employer of prisoners will take charge where there were defects in the initial facilities and again naturally for having constructed the initial facilities.
Errata Sheet

Affidavit of Otsuka, Kaoru
Page 11, Article 18. In the paragraph, line 5 should read "110,000 cases were reported, totaling 320,000."
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadec, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: ODAJMA, Tada

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I have occupied the posts of senior official in the Prisoners of War Information office and senior member of the Prisoners of War Supervision Department in the War Ministry since March, 1943, and held the rank of Colonel. The Prisoners of War Supervision Department was abolished in November, 1945.

During that period, I visited different POW's camps in the home island, Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, etc. I not only know the fact about the supervision of P.O.W. but also many reports forwarded to the POW information Bureau by chiefs of POW's camps and POW's

employers therefore: I want to tell the facts relating to those matters.

2. At the beginning of 1944, due to the fact that the health conditions of POW's were not approvable, a notification concerning the improvement of administration of P.O.W., was issued to each Commanding General of the Army who was in charge of administration of P.O.W. in the name of the Vice-Minister of War. (D. 276)

Due to the fact that the sanitary conditions of P.O.W.'s aboard transport ships was not approvable, a notification was issued to the units concerned in December, 1942, in the name of the Vice-Minister of War and the Gen-Chief of the General Staff, as to call forth their attention concerning transportation of P.O.W.'s. The Attached is a copy of this notification, of which meaning was repeated in the said notification issued in March, 1944. (Exh. 1965)

3. On Dec. 26, 1943, Maj.-Gen. Hasama, Chief of the POW's Administration Division, War Ministry, expressed the intention of the War Minister Tojo to the meeting of the commandants of P.O.W. camps as to the inadmissibility of inflicting (mistreatment) upon P.O.W.'s by explaining to the
following effect:  
The purport of the address.  
While admitting that the treatment of POW's must conform to the 
circumstances of respective localities, I believe that we ought to 
be very careful not to exceed the proper limit at all, prompted 
by a sense of hatred. As such is nothing short of the expression 
of antagonism in a petty manner, a thing which is contrary to our 
"Bushido" as well as to the first principle of the present Greater 
Asiatic War, which itself is a moral war.  
Especially we must consider the unlimited evils of (mistreatment) 
as they, arising as they do from trivial personal feelings, will not 
only aggravate individual feelings on the part of the POW's but will 
also constitute a measure for the degree of culture of our country 
at large, and may help the POW concerned in promulgating anti-Japanese 
propagandas after his repatriation. Moreover, the most part of the 
motives of mistreatment can be attributed to the language difficulties 
and the improper understanding of rules and regulations on the part of 
those in charge of POW administration, and it sometimes occurred that 
some of them were knocked down by the enraged POW concerned in revenge. 
In such an extreme case our disgrace will not be redeemed by the 
penalty that the POW concerned will receive for his violence.  
In this connection, I expect that you will especially be careful 
in directing those under your command, and improve every possible 
opportunity to make the purport of this address known to every unit 
concerned, and also to every unit or person employing POW's with a view 
to attain propriety in our treatment of POW's.  
Note. I committed this purport of address to writing in accordance 
with my memory; as, after, original manuscript had been destroyed by bombing. 

5. The Army Medical College is expected to perfect the measures for 
the prevention of epidemics among POW's, and to provide for their 
medical treatment. They also considered it proper to carry out the 
bacteriological as well as the scientific research of the malnutrition 
patients who were many among POW's, and so from February, 1943, they 
carried out various thorough researches, by a specially detailed : 
research party, with the POW's detained in Tokyo POW Camp. They had 
their results published and thus contributed to the promotion of the 
general state of health of the POW's. 
The circumstance of this investigation and study may be known 
from two documents, one is the document in the custody of the Japanese 
Government POW Information Bureau (Evidence No. 3-1), and the other 
is my Evidence No. 3-2, attached herewith. 
Moreover, in accordance with the results of the above-mentioned 
investigation and study, the Tokyo POW Camp took immediate steps as 
described in my Evidence No. 3-3. (D.D. 2006) 

6. General Tozawa, commander of the Kwantung Army, taking seriously 
to heart the POW's state of health and especially the number of 
epidemic cases among them, issued special instruction in February 
1943, to the Chief Supply Officer of the Kwantung Army and the officer
in charge of the Kwangtung Army’s Anti-infection and Water Supply Main
Depot to the effect that the medical service at the wukden POW Camp be
strengthened by allotting or despatching many medical personnel to this
Camp, in order to take steps for the immediate restoration of the POW’s
physical strength, and to help and direct the medical service at this
Camp. (D.L. 2503)

The annexed (Evidence No. 4-1.2) is the copy of the instructions
and the account of the state in which the health service was carried
out.

7. From a letter found among the effects left by the late Maj.-Gen.
M.P. Beckwith Smith, a POW, which was in the custodty of the Japanese
Government POW Information Bureau, the following fact was revealed:

In 1942, General Yamashita, the Commander of the 25th Army at
Singapore at that time presented such articles of comfort as beer,
butter and cheese along with a cordial letter of comfort to the general
officer POW’s who were detained at Singapore.

The attached is a copy of the letter. (Evidence No. 6) (D.L. 241)

8. In accordance with Art. 5 of the Regulations for the Treatment of
POW’s Ex-), POW’s enjoyed freedom of faith and were allowed to attend the
religious services of their respective sects. Moreover, at some POW Camps,
ministers were especially asked to officiate the religious
services at the camps.

And again at Christmas the greatest possible facilities were
specially allotted to the POW’s.

As to the funeral ceremonies for a deceased POW it is laid down in
Art. 37 of the Detailed Regulations for the Treatment of POW’s (Ex-)
that proper ceremonies be observed according to the rank and status of the deceased, and so at each POW camp such ceremonies were
 carried out most solemnly and wreaths were invariably offered on such occasions.

The ashes of deceased POW’s were also carefully placed under
proper custody. The attached news account and photograph are the record
showing how Colonel Murata, Commandant of the Osaka POW Camp kept the
ashes of some deceased POW’s most properly and reverentially, from a
true human spirit that surpassed such minor sense as friend or foe.
(Evidence No. 7) (D.L. 2301)

The feelings of the nation toward POW’s cannot be declared to
have been cordial. As air-raids became more intensified, and as the
number of those who had lost their kins in the war became more numerous,
it was considered that these feelings were more aggravated.

In consequence the proper treatment of the POW’s by the Army was
consured everywhere that the Army was according too good treatment
to the POW’s. And again POW Camp staffs, who were directly concerned in
the treatment of POW’s were looked upon by the nation at large with
apathy, and were criticised by them as if they were unpatriotic to the
state. There were instances that such staffs were disturbed by some of
such unthinking people in the execution of their duties in connection
with the POW administration.

The attached shows some examples of such censures and disturbances.
(Evidence No. 8) (D.L. 2119)
10. With a view to rectifying the nation's feelings towards POW's, the Army, before quartering POW's at respective camps, used to send some members of the staffs concerned to the localities where such camps were situated to explain to the officials and people of the localities, especially to those who had been granted by the Army to employ the POW's, how to treat the POW's until they understood so thoroughly that there were no fear that undesirable troubles might occur in this connection. Even after POW's were quartered, the staff concerned improved every opportunity to rectify the people's ill feelings towards POW's.

And again at some POW camps, liaison conference between the POW camp authorities and the organizations employing POW labour were held once or more a month, in order to prevent the occurrence of any unpleasant troubles in the treatment of POW's. (The reports of various POW camp commandants have been consulted in drawing up this article).

The attached is a copy of record written by some member of the Fort of Osaka Coast Stevedores Union according to his memory about the remarks made by Colonel Murata, the Commandant of the Osaka POW Camp at the time. (Evidence No.9) (D.D. 2114)

11. The rule laid down in the International Treaty (General conference of 1907) that the ration for POW's is to be the same as issued to the members of the captor's army, was observed in the Japanese Army. The annexed table (Evidence No.10) shows the comparison of the amount of staple food supplied respectively to POW's, the Japanese Army and the Japanese nation.

The ration for POW's at every POW camp was almost all supplied by the army, and so there was no case of supply of such ration having ever failed to be carried out.

The subsidiary foodstuff for POW's, different from the case of the staple food, was issued to POW's from the Army, not in kind, but in fixed allowance amount. The POW camp authorities supplied necessary foodstuff to POW's by purchasing it from dealers or markets with this fixed allowance. But as the nation's feelings towards POW's gradually aggravated, some people, seeing that there were considerable difference between the rations issued to the nation on one part and the POW's on the other, and that the POW's were daily supplied with fish etc., things not to be obtained by the general public, became envious, and they either blamed the POW camp staffs, who were doing their best in feeding the POW's or, as in the case of some of them, went so far as to interfere with their purchase of foodstuff.

But the POW camp staffs continued their efforts single-mindedly in securing the amount of foodstuff required for maintaining the POW's under their charge in a healthy condition, in the face of such undeserved blames and interference. At every POW camp, the staffs, in their effort to obtain the required foodstuff smoothly, maintained a close contact with the distributory organizations, and the city, town or village authorities, police stations or agricultural societies, and when they found that some one concerned were unreasonable, they did their best in leading them to the right path.

The staffs, when they succeeded in obtaining the required stuff, paid attention to such details in carrying such foodstuff into the camp.
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camps as to cover it over, or to do the carrying in at night, in the sole hope of not exciting the general public's antipathy.

As the food situation at home became so acute, that it was difficult to secure enough foodstuff through legitimate distributory organization, the POW camp authorities had to increase their efforts in this connection.

At every POW camp hitherto unutilized land was quickly turned into kitchen gardens in the hope of growing corn or vegetables to help the self-supply of at least a portion of the foodstuff required. Sometimes the staffs had to go out far, with trucks or, in the extreme case, with wagons manned by the staffs themselves, to purchase foodstuff. At other times the staffs went to a fishing port before dawn and there waited long for the arrival of fishing boats to buy fish from them at black market prices. Thus they left no effort untried for obtaining foodstuff even in violation of the food distributory system.

Some troubles occurred between a POW camp Commandant and the organizations employing POW labour, when he approached the responsible persons of the companies or factories with requests to supply some reasonable amount of supplementary food to the POW's.

But most employers of POW labour supplied, out of their foodstuff in stock, such supplementary food as macaroni, rice-balls, soups or bread to the POW's in their employ. And some such employer even supplied to the POW’s a part of such food which was originally intended to be issued to the Japanese workmen. The attached (Evidence No.11) shows the result of the investigation made at the main localities in Japan proper about the condition of the supplementary food issue. (D.L. 1990)

But the strenuous efforts of the POW camp staffs and the cooperation of the POW labour employers, the feeding of POW's was carried out smoothly, and the ration issued to an individual POW amounted to 3,000 calories or more in nutrition value, and this was considered to be approximately sufficient for maintaining a POW's health.

Of course, as with the special local circumstances or the effect of the current season, a part of POW camps felt it extremely difficult to obtain subsidiary foodstuff, with consequent decrease in the amount of food issued to POW's. But this was only a temporary phenomenon and could by no means be properly attributed to any negligence in duty on the part of the POW camp staff concerned.

According to a document in the custody of the Japanese Government POW Information Bureau, the calculation of the amount of nutritive value of staple and subsidiary food as issued to POW's is shown in the attached copy. (Evidence No. 12) (D.L. 1997)

The attached table (Evidence No.13) shows the comparison of nutrition value of food issued respectively to POW's, the Japanese Army, and the civil population. (D.L. 1995)

As to “taking POW's national and racial customs into consideration”, every POW camp was very careful, and especially they paid attention to the issue of bread ration, animal albumen and fat as well as to the manners of cooking. At many POW camps, baking ovens were provided with, and they had their yeast prepared by their own cooking detail. At some other POW camps POW's were allowed to do their own cooking and they were also consulted in preparing their menus. This Evidence No. 14 is a copy of menu of a certain day at the Hiroshima POW Camp.

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12. As to the medical treatment of POWs, every POW camp staff made enormous efforts. Especially when, with the progress of the War, medicaments gradually became so scarce that the supply from the Army proved insufficient, they were compelled to make special efforts for the maintenance of POWs' health, as for instance, to obtain medicaments from druggists or to go to mountains or fields for collecting herbs.

The employers of POW labour also co-operated with us in the utmost degree. Some of the examples of such co-operation are shown in the attached. (Evidence No. 15-1.2) (D.D. 1994)

1) Colonel Murata, Commandant of the Osaka POW Camp, seeing that many of POWs under his charge were suffering from under-nourishment, instructed Surgeon Lieutenants Nosu and Casht to carry out a thorough study and investigation of the situation. The two surgeons obtained useful materials for information and published them, and they also established a measure of care for this kind of disease. The attached is the essay born from their investigation. (Evidence No. 15) (D.D. 1995)

2) At the Tokyo POW Camp, "penicillin", which was then very difficult to obtain even by the Japanese Army, not to speak of the civil population, was once applied to a POW in that camp for his treatment.

(From the report by Col. Sakaha, Commandant of the Tokyo POW Camp).

3) In spring of 1945, Captain Numajiri, commander of Ashio Branch Camp, believing it to be most adequate measures judged from the condition of the patients, that those serious patients of baliboli, namely Miso, Porter, Carvill, Gutzmon, Marshby and three others, totaling eight persons, should be transferred to an infirmary attached to the Tokyo Main Camp as soon as possible, and relying on the excellent skill of Surgeon Captain Tokuda, Chief of the infirmary, succeeded, after enduring difficult negotiations with various parties concerned due to many objections and blames were raised against the measure, in preparing a special automobile for the transport of these patients. At last, those patients were transferred all the way from Ashio to Tokyo by the automobile, and were confined in Shinagawa Infirmary where they recovered.

It is some 90 miles far from Ashio to Tokyo, and if it had been done of the Japanese patients, such warm treatment as stated above could not have been expected to receive from him judging from the traffic situation prevalent at that time.

I was told the above information directly from Captain Numajiri.

4) In last of 1944, an army sergeant AIZAWA and an ambulance man KUBOTA of Niigata P.O.W. Camp who had in critical condition
owing to an acute pneumonic case and they sat up with the sick P.O.W. throughout three days and nights and at last they made the P.O.W. an escape from the jaws of death, in this connection, P.O.W. senior officer Fulmar Richard B. expressed an appreciation representing all of the P.O.W.s to the camp authorities.

(5) On 11 October, 1945, the Osaka P.O.W. Camp received unexpectedly an order for the internment of P.O.W. who had been transferred to Japan Proper around "Riison" Island, having been fatigued due to shipwreck. Due to many cases of dysentery, acute colitis and diphtheria among them, these P.O.W.s could not be transferred from Kobe, the landing place, to Tokyo as scheduled. Therefore, following the instruction of the senior officer, these prisoners of war were also taken into Osaka POW Camp. Thereupon, staff personnel of Osaka POW Camp assumed the charge of internment and disposition of these patient POWs, furnishing them with gauze, newspapers and toilet-paper, etc. which were gathered from the homes of the staff personnel, regardless of dangers for infection with these diseases upon themselves.

(Report of Col. Mirata, Commander of Osaka POW Camp)

(6) Many factories which employed Prisoners of war, such as, Nihon Soitotsu Kamishi Seitetsusho, Hirohata Seitetsusho, Kamishi Kogyocho, Kamioka Kogyocho, etc. Sent a great quantity of medicines to P.O.W.'s Camp, as gifts, and tried to help them.

13. Cases where Prisoners of War administrator and civilians concerned received letters of thanks, addresses of thanks or letters of gratitude wherein prisoners of war expressed gratitude for their fair treatment of Prisoners of War and for their efforts made for the sake of POW's happiness, are too numerous to be mentioned. One of the representative cases is shown in the documental evidence No. 16, 1-3. (D.D. 1991 - 1993)

14. The text of statement made by the Apostolic Delegation in Japan in its report to the Rgo concerning the treatment of Prisoners of War by the Japanese, is shown as follows:

This is a copy of document in the custody of POW Information Bureau. (Documental Evidence No. 17)

15. Officer Prisoners of War have never been ordered or enforced to be employed on work. "Officer Prisoners of War may be allowed to be employed on work of their own choosing". This is a provision provided for in Article 1 of the Regulations on the Work of Prisoners of War.(Ex---)

In each camp, they encouraged officer Prisoners of War to be
owing to an acute pneumonia case and they sat up with the sick P.O.W. throughout three days and nights and at last they made the P.O.W. an escape from the jaws of death, in this connection, P.O.W. senior officer Fulmer Richard B. expressed an appreciation representing all of the P.O.W.s to the camp authorities.

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15. Officer Prisoners of War have never been ordered or enforced to be employed on work. "Officer Prisoners of War may be allowed to be employed on work of their own choosing." This is a provision provided for in Article 1 of the Regulations on the Work of Prisoners of War. (Ex---) In each camp, they encouraged officer Prisoners of War to be
employed on work of their own choosing with various reasons. With respect to the work of officer Prisoners of War notification dated June 3, 1942, was made from Director of POW Administration Division of War Ministry to the units concerned, requesting that officer Prisoners of War should be employed on work of their own choosing. In the said notification, it was added that the following types of work were appropriate for the officer Prisoners of War to be employed, also it was requested that their ranks and positions were taken into consideration, and imposition of hard work or the like was avoided. 
1. Various works wherein techniques and sciences being utilized.
2. Agriculture.
3. Raising of live stocks and domestic fowls.
4. Supervision for the general labor Prisoners of War.
5. Description of data for the history of War.
6. Affairs of propaganda.
7. Other works which are deemed appropriate to employ them.
How the officer Prisoners of War were encouraged to be employed on work is shown as follows:
(1) Officer Prisoners of War were encouraged to be employed on work for the purpose of health.
It is more harmful than good for health to lead an idle life, and suffering from ennui would cause them to be spiritually weak, therefore, encouragement was given to them to engage in slight farm work or raising of live stocks.
(2) Also for the purpose of rectifying the Japanese people's feeling toward Prisoners of War, they were encouraged to be employed on work.
It was afraid that the fact that those officer POWs who were not employed on work were allowed to receive much more ration than that of Japanese nationals and Japanese Military officers, would be the cause of aggravating national ill-feelings toward POWs; which would, in consequence, be the cause of occurrence of bad influence upon administration of whole POWs. Therupon, explaining that, under the state of war, every country in the world had deep anxieties respectively regarding the food distribution, and that, even though they were in captivity, it was their human duty so be employed more or less in the work of self-supporting, they were encouraged to be employed on work.
(3) From a parent's heart whose desire was that an increased ration be given to officer Prisoners of War, considering the food situation in Japan, officer Prisoners of War were so encouraged to be employed on work.
With the development of the war, the food situation in Japan
became more and more difficult, and the staple food for both military personnel and nationals were inevitably decreased. Besides, it became difficult all the more to obtain subsidiary foodstuff.

This state of affairs inevitably affected Prisoners of War. Whereas, up to June 1944, officer Prisoners of War had received 420 grams of staple food ration and non-commissioned officer and private Prisoners of War had received 570 grams (however, additional amount of ration up to 220 over 570 grams was increased in accordance with the type of work and condition of individual health), on and after June 1944, the amount of staple food for officer Prisoners of War was decreased to 390 grams, and for those non-commissioned-officers and privates who were employed on hard work was decreased to 705 grams, and for those who were not employed on hard work, was decreased to 570 grams. Decreased staple food, however, would be no harm to health provided that the subsidiary foodstuff was supplied sufficiently.

It became gradually difficult, as stated above, to obtain those subsidiary foodstuff; above all, the nutritive value which officer Prisoners of War who were not employed on hard work could take, showed gradually a declining trend. Nevertheless, the nutritive value taken by these Prisoners of War was much higher than that of the Japanese people. In view of the health condition of officer Prisoners of War in Zentsuji POW Camp in which many officer Prisoners of War were interned, a plan was made to increase especially the staple food of officer Prisoners of War up to 500 grams for which investigation had been made carefully under the central military authorities concerned. The plan, however, ended to a mere attempt proving that to distribute one and a half times more staple food for Prisoners of War than that for the general Japanese people, was not deemed to be adequate in view of food situation in Japan and from the point of view of proper guidance of the Japanese nationals. Therefore, with the intention to supply the same quantity of staple food for the officer Prisoners of War as that for the non-commissioned-officers and privates, treating the officer POWs as if being employed on hard work by assigning a slight self-supporting work for maintaining their health, also with another intention to grant them an additional allowance of grains grown by farm work, they were encouraged to be employed on work.

It was neither with any intention to exploit the labor facility of Officer Prisoners of War in order to relieve the shortage of labor facilities in Japan, nor with any intention to offer an insult to them without making much of their positions as officer, but with the parent’s heart of the Prisoners of War administrators concerned who encouraged the officer POWs, for their own happiness,

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Officer Prisoners of War were employed on work.

In actual case where Officer Prisoners of War were employed on work of their own choosing, is described in a document in the custody of POW Information Bureau as shown in the separate sheet.

(Documental evidence No. 18)


The Japanese are generally short-tempered and are in the habit of getting excited at trifles. Also, it was especially the case with military units that, despite the strict supervision and instruction of the senior officer, habit of inflicting the so-called private punishment, by assaulting the subordinates, from a slight cause was not extinct. Therefore, in a case where misconduct was committed by a Prisoner of War, for instance, failure in acting up to regulations or assuming a disobedient or haughty attitude, illegitimate punishment was liable to be inflicted on the Prisoner of War without discrimination.

These were the factual cases for which I must express my sincere regret.

It is presumed that in most cases this violent behavior would not have been conducted if our officers had been acquainted with their manners and customs and had understood their languages.

For instance, when a certain non-commissioned officer scolded a Prisoner of War at a POW camp, the Prisoner of War replied "I think so and so." Eys-witnessing the tongue put out naturally when he said "think", the non-commissioned officer inflicted a blow on him with rage in a moment presuming that he was insulted by the behavior of the Prisoner of War; when some Prisoners of War were scolded by others, the former would gaze at the latter's face folding their arms, unlike a Japanese custom, which was liable to be regarded by the Japanese, as a very haughty attitude.

Of course, in Prisoner of War Administration Division they prepared notifications on manners and customs of Prisoners of War and transmitted them to Prisoner of War Camps as an aid to put out troubles to be caused from misunderstanding.

The trials presently conducted at the Yokohama Military Tribunal testify to the fact that cases of some of POW Camp Staff members having inflicted violence upon PWs.

But on the other hand, it was always with a sense of respect that I witnessed, while my visits of observation to POW camps, the staffs of such camps concentrating all their efforts, in the face of various abuses and interference of the nation who had no cordial feelings toward the PWs, in obtaining foodstuff, medicines, or in completing their arrangements for the protection against cold or damp, being inspired by a sense of genuine friendship toward the PWs.
A certain N.C.O., now being detained at the Sugamo Prison was alleged to have assaulted the responsible person of an organization, which then was employing POW labour, out of his indignation for the employer's lack of enthusiasm towards the POWs under his employ. The injured person lodged a protest to me personally against the N.C.O. on the occasion of my visit to that organization. At other time the fact came to my knowledge that a certain interpreter attached to a POW camp, though he had the habit of striking a POW from a slight cause, would, when a POW happened to fall sick, attend on him whole-heartedly almost without taking any rest or food, with the natural result that he was always popular with the POWs in spite of his bad habit. From these facts I can assure you that the POW camp staffs were real guardians for the Prisoners of War under their charge.

On this 22th day of August, 1947

At JIMTE

Deponent /S/ ODJIM, Tadashi (seal)

I, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At __________

Witness /S/ ________________ (seal)

Q/TH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ ________________ (seal)
その宗門の延べ年数の変更を行うことを許してありました。そして在住者の收容所
に於ては特に教師を收容所内に招き宗教儀式を司礼させました。
又特にクリスマスには出来得る最大限の便宜が為され
たりの死亡した時の儀式を行う様に規定せられた居るが、各收容所共花輪等にその階級身分
に原じ相当の儀式を行ふ様に為せられた居るが、各收容所共花輪等にその階級身分
に原じ相当の儀式を行ふ様に為せられた居るが、各收容所共花輪等にその階級身分
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に原じ相当の儀式を行ふ様に為せられた居るが、各收容所共花輪等にその階級身分
国際協力の感情を是正する為には、彼等の生活を理解し、尊重する事が大切です。関係職員を派遣してその地域の実情を観察し、その場で必要とされる行動をとることが重要です。

収容所に対する糧食等の補給は創設者の指示に基づき調整を行いました。特に大阪府府庁tract所長村中大佐の注意を踏まえた上で、収容所の日常的な生活を支えました。各収容所の報告に基づき、補給を行いました。
支給されました。収容所側では、それに応じて民間から必要な物資を購入して、

収容所補助の給食を充実させて届けたものであります。

従って、収容者の健康保と、収容所職員の食糧の自給が確保されるには、十分な食糧を入手することが重要となって来ましたので、各収容所共用

調理は余す所なく農園化して食糧の自給を図つたり、又トラックを以

たに、収容者の就労を推進することを目的として、収容所職員に於ては、

食糧の設備整備を図っております。
て、それらは収容所職員から荷車を経て遠方へ輸出しに送られ、
搬送が滞りやすい箇所を観察して食物を活用することに努めました。収
宿施設は住居と食堂、入所に努力しました。
再収容所長は住居を使用して居る関係者、工場等の責任者に対し相談の
配布、の案内を加味したりして使用者側との間にいささかの起きたこともあ
ります。
然し大度の使用者はストックの食糧を以て利用にウドン・餃子・スープ、
パンなどの食事を活立てました。も使用者は日本人工の技に支えする分例を
提供に問うたのが之であります。
（昭和第十一号）
俘虜収容所所員の努力と俘虜使用者側の協力によって俘虜収容所の収容数が増加し、健康状態が向上した。俘虜収容所の収容数は一部で減少したが、これは戦況の影響である。

俘虜収容所の収容数は、情報局に保管された記録によれば、俘虜に対する主食・副食の数が減少している。カロリー不足が顕著である。

俘虜収容所の指示によると、俘虜は朝から晩まで忙しい。朝は朝食、昼は昼食、晩は晩食の3食をとることになる。朝食はパンの割り、動物性蛋白、脂防の多いもの、昼食は雑炊、晩食は雑炊の一部である。一日のカロリー摂取量は必要以上に少ない。

俘虜収容所の報告によると、俘虜の健康状態は悪化している。特に日本軍の労働力が減少している影響で、俘虜収容所の収容数が減少している。
だけでは不足であったので民間に薬物を配ったが、山野に出向いて薬の効果を採用したりして健康保持に努力しました。

1. 大阪府役所長村田佐は府内中の感染状況を熟知して居たので、発案した政策を採用しました。

2. 東京府役所長八間正は府内中の感染状況を熟知して居たので、発案した政策を採用しました。

3. 昭和二十年春、足立分所長前原大尉は感染状況を熟知しており、発案した政策を採用しました。

大阪府役所長村田佐は府内中の感染状況を熟知して居たので、発案した政策を採用しました。

東京府役所長八間正は府内中の感染状況を熟知して居たので、発案した政策を採用しました。

東京府役所長前原大尉は府内中の感染状況を熟知しており、発案した政策を採用しました。
昭和十九年の末日、新潟分所の監潭県書及、久田衛生兵は急性肺炎の発症で数日に死亡した。彼は、我々の仕事内容が、いかに困難であるかを我々が感じていた。
一五、俘虜労務規則第一條には将校たる俘虜は其役に資すべき労務に服せしむることを詰と規定してあります。各収容所では種々の理由によって被虜が自発的に労務に従事することもあり、これについては俘虜将校の労務に対しては昭和十七年六月三日陸軍省管理部長より於て技術命令を利用して諸労務を監督し且労務を避けさせ得ります。
1. 保健将校の労務を労働した結果の役でありました。

2. 労務に従事しない者の様子を観察して、劣悪した保健将校が日本国民、日本兵将校ぞえに近いものでした。食糧を配給された人口を、数々の労務に従事して、日本兵将校の給与を増加してやりたいという。

3. 国内の食糧事情は、宮本将校の裁量で、見事に改善され、新潮国国民と共に、朝食をすることができました。
此事件は必然的に倍率をもたらし、昭和十九年六月の俘虜の主食配給量は将校に対しは四○瓦、官兵に対しは五七○瓦（但し労務、健康の状況により、二〇瓦以内を増減）で、官兵中力務に従事する者は七〇瓦、力務に従事する者は五七〇瓦であり、ことが此副食の入手は前者の通りで、後者は十分である。特に労務に従事しない俘虜は日本国民に比較すると特別上位にあって、特に主食を五七〇瓦に増加するが、この處でも発動されない。このように俘虜将校における労務上、特に主食の配給に関しては特別の配慮がある。従って、主食の配給に関しては前記の通りであり、将校の健康状態に従ふ俘虜将校には特に主食を増加する。
に微弱を與えようなどの者の中になされたのでもなく、幕末後年将校の幸
を厚く帰されるには、帰された浮世絵絵図の者、親近であつたのであります。

（即ち、第十八號）
日本人は一般に気が緩くて鈍い心理にも影響するものあり、又係に...

この暴行の成因であって鈍い風俗習慣を知つて居り又言葉が通りて居れば起こりたる場合が多かったと思ひます。例へば某領収所で或下士官が俘虜に対して小言を嘘にしたがその俘虜が出たのを見つて自分を侮辱したとしてカッとして遂に手が出たと、即ち彼等が他人から叱られたとしてカッと逆上して遂に手が出たとね。従でジツと慌手の額をつめるとけると、即日本人の習慣と居て遂に組んと

俘虜収容所の職員及び俘虜に暴行を加へたことは目下執行されて居る。
横証者の供述裁判所に依ってそのの事件があったことを認めます。私が各裁判所を訪問して各検束所職員が伴房に劣って知るためを知ります。目下裁判所刑務所に拘束されられて居りましたあることを使用者側の責任者から設計して居るためを知り、伴房から親しかれて居るというふれもの

18
この通牒は、只今送信中。通回路を復旧されている場合に、即ち空襲に対する通信が比較的順調であることを報告した。このため、現地の満洲に於て仮住民に関する通知を実施した。次に、通信は、再び計画され、空襲に対する通信が比較的順調であることを報告した。
俘虜情報局に於ては戦死者の通報をも行いましました昭和二十二年八月迄に通報した数は約一千件であった。

月迄通報した数は約一万一千件であります。
An Excerpt From The Monthly Report Of The Prisoner Of War Intelligence Bureau May, 1943 (Showing)

I hereby certify that the document entitled as above is an exact excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Prisoner of War Intelligence Bureau.

On this 11th day of June, 1947

/s/ NAKANISHI, Sadayoshi

Acting Chief of the Prisoner of War Intelligence Bureau.
An Excerpt From The Monthly Report Of The
Prisoner Of War Intelligence Bureau Issued
In May, 1943

Since last February the Army Medical College,
having organised an investigation squad, has conducted
the physical examination of the prisoners of war interned
at the Tokyo POW camp with views of preventing epidemics
thoroughly and rationalizing medical treatment, and at the
same time making a bacteriological and scientific examination
of the quasi-malnutrition case which has frequently broken
out among the internees to observe it in comparison with
the so-called war malnutrition case and to make a study
on the difference due to the racial difference between
both cases from a pathological point of view and
to obtain referential knowledge about the prevention and
medical treatment of the said disease and to get some idea
medical topographical data in the field of operations.

The items of study and investigation were as follows:

1. Stool Test
   (a microscopic test and an examination of
   protozoan and parasite eggs)

2. Blood Test
   (an investigation of malarial protozoan-
Evidencc J3-1

carriers)

3. Blood Test
   a. Widal Reaction
   b. Weil Felix's Reaction
   c. Syphilis Reaction

4. Examination of diphtheria bacilli

5. The measurement of precipitation of red blood-corpuscle

6. Blood-Type Test

7. Blood-image Test

8. Tuberculin Reaction

9. Examination of excoyoration and tuberculosis bacilli

10. General Test

It is of great significance that the various pathogenic examinations mentioned above have enabled us to discover various diseases of the prisoners in their earlier stage, especially to find out the greatly contagious conditions of amoebic dysentery and a high percentage of carrying intestinal canal protozoan and to take proper steps immediately to prevent those contagious, and thus to contribute to the thorough prevention.
of epidemics and the rationalization of medical treatment. Furthermore, it is also a highly noticeable result that these examinations made the hostile nationals realize to the fullest extent the superiority of the Japanese military medical science. In addition, it is understood that they gave an important suggestion for the consideration of sanitary condition in the South Sea areas.
Suggestions Regarding Improvement of Health Conditions of Prisoners of War Camps
(Investigation Squad of Army Medical College)

Despite the fact that in the treatment of prisoners of war we follow international law and other pertinent stipulations, sometimes regrettable events do take place and give enemies material for propaganda, because the persons concerned are not well acquainted with the customs of the enemy countries and often allow misunderstandings to arise, especially about daily matters such as food, clothing and habitation, disputes rise the more frequently.

When our people are going through hardship and deprivations there is no need to satisfy to the full the desires of the prisoners of war whose countries have been satiated with natural wealth. It would be enough to guarantee for them the lowest standard of living allowable from the human standpoint. On the other hand, however, when we face the question from the point of view of the utilization of their labour it proves necessary to preserve their health and ensure their working ability by creating good living conditions which will improve their labour efficiency.

We also fear that those prisoners of war who have lived under unhealthy conditions in the fighting zone and have contracted various diseases might carry epidemics to our people on their being transported to our homeland and put to work in all areas as labour material. It is not only for their health but also for the good of our country that we should give utmost considerations to maintaining their good health.

From the above point of view, we studied the conditions of the P.O.W. Camps in Tokyo and now make the following suggestions for the improvement of their health conditions:

(1) Generally speaking, the prisoners of war are pale and under-nourished. Especially not a few of the patients in hospitals have lost 20 to 30 per cent of their pre-war weights. There may be many causes for this poor under-nourished condition, but the most decisive of them seems to be the lack of proper and sufficient supply of nutriment. These nutrition troubles seem to have originated mostly during the fighting and the subsequent P.O.W. camp life in...
the occupied areas. Though we recognize a general tendency for gradual recovery after their landing in Japan, there are not a few cases of malnutrition growing worse and causing death.

When we study the causes of the prisoners' lack of proper and sufficient nutriment, we find that, despite its sufficient caloric value, Japanese diet causes, because of a fundamental difference of food customs, a comparative lack of albumen and fat and over-supply of carbohydrate, and as a result, the prisoners suffer from want of main nutrition and vitamins, and begin to show symptoms of unbalanced nutrition.

Accordingly, what we must do seems to be to obtain for them such food as suits their food customs and have them cook it to their taste. It seems also necessary to prepare for sick people in the P.O.W. camps and hospitals special food suiting their taste. (They seem not to like rice-gruel.)

As vitamine B deficiency diseases are most noted in polished rice and barley should be given for their main food; and for those who show marked cases of neuritis or beriberi, an additional ration of rice-bran should be effective.

(2) Prisoners of war are generally in dirty, ragged clothes and many carry lice. It must also be noted that a considerable number of them have died of pneumonia very likely because of their weak resistance to the cold Japanese winter, and of their light clothing meant for the warm climate of the tropics, where most of them were originally stationed. This necessary to have them mend and wash their clothes often enough and to provide them in necessary seasons with more clothes even though they may be of rough material. Especially for those who work in the cold regions it could be better somewhat to modify their mode of clothing so that their labour efficiency might be increased. As for their habitation, care must be taken to prevent draughts from coming in and thereby to have as few cases of influenza as possible develop among them.

(3) Their skins are generally dry and atrophied and many suffer from eczema and the itch. According to an English doctor who is a P.O.W., they severely suffer from a skin disease called the "rice itch," caused by their living on rice. This, however, seems merely a logical result of their losing skin vitality through malnutrition and having no chance
Evidence # 3-2

for bathing and resorbing to scratching until they develop eczema all over the body this being aggravated by lice and mites. Those who have serious mite itches are extremely "\'lthy, abscesses covering the entire body.

For preventing the above, it is recommended to have them take a cold baths frequently, or hot bath if possible, as often as we can afford to have them take, keep their clothes clean and dry, and have their hair cut short. Effort should be made to segregate those who have the itch, have them take medicated baths or apply ointment over the entire body so that they may quickly recover.

(4) On examining faeces of P.O.W.s at a few camps, we got the results of 21.7% at Yokohama, 11.2% at Kawasaki, and 6.8% at Tsurumi, of carriers of dysentery amoeba. Out of 2039 prisoners, 76 people, 3.7% had malarial infection in their blood. In the Hongkong Camp, many diphtheria cases have occurred since last June. There have also been some cases of diphtheria among the P.O.W.s held in the homeland, and the Investigation squad has discovered 2.6% diphtheria carriers among them. From the above facts, we greatly fear that if we let these carriers work outside the camps and allow them to come in contact with the Japanese people, there will be a great danger of spreading an epidemic in the country. As preventive measures against the above, we should not only inspect them both before and after their landing in Japan and give them necessary treatment and isolation in order to prevent importation of germs but also give them frequent physical examinations in the camps so that the infected may be quickly discovered, isolated and properly treated and the disease prevented from spreading throughout the camps. Against the coming summer when these epidemics, if left alone will surely rage, we must take preventive measures at the earliest possible time. When we are obliged to send germ-carrying P.O.W.s among Japanese people, it is necessary to have measures taken for their isolation, treatment and prevention of mosquitoes and flies.

(5) Examinations of cases of serious nutrition troubles among P.O.W.s show various complicated conditions, which, however, may be summarized roughly in the following categories:

(A) Wasting after chronic dysentery or chronic enteritis. (extremely many)

(B) Anaemic wasting after malaria. (fairly many)
(6) Beriberi (comparatively few)

(8) Polyneuritis accompanying nutrition troubles.
(This closely resembles beriberi of the wasting type, but, probably because of the racial difference, there are no such symptoms seen in the patients of this illness as shown by Japanese beriberi patients. Symptoms of neuritis such as pain and thinning of the legs (sometimes arms) are notable. Symptoms of papillitis accompany comparatively many cases. (This illness has not been noted so far independently in the list of illnesses caused by unbalanced nutrition.)

(6) Wasting after chronic dysentery or chronic enteritis has a high mortality rate and requires adequate and timely hospital treatment. Polyneuritis gives severe pain in the legs and especially in the soles. We have had a case in which we were obliged to amputate one leg because of the necrotic trouble that developed through the exposure of the pained leg to coldness which seemed to ease the pain. Though vitamin B-1 has some effect, it is completely powerless in serious cases. Early treatment is therefore absolutely necessary.

The present Tαst II and SAGAMI HARA army hospitals are not adequate to accommodate all the sick or infected prisoners for adequate early treatment so that it is recommended to provide small-scale hospitals or enlarge dispensary in the camps and utilize prisoner doctors for medical care of the patients, the last resource being in accord with the economizing of the P.O.W.'s labor requirements.

Polyneuritis is often accompanied by heart trouble or breakdown of the motor centre so that overwork for such a patient sometimes results in sudden death. This fact must be taken into consideration in assigning different kinds of labour and deciding the necessity of rest for prisoners.

(7) The attached table shows the cases of death, classified by the diseases:
Table of deaths classified by diseases. Feb. 23

The medical office, Tokyo P.O.W. Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chief Camp</th>
<th>1st Branch Camp</th>
<th>2nd Branch Camp</th>
<th>3rd Branch Camp</th>
<th>5th Branch Camp</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dysentery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enteritis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nouritis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbalanced nutrition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pneumonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septicemia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himembolie</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaundice and hepatitis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baribori</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encephalitis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental diseases</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lymphthoria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1. C represents deaths at camps and H represents deaths at hospitals.

2. The fourth branch camp has no patients as it has just been opened.
Certificate

"Suggestions Regarding Improvement of Health Conditions in P.O.W. Camps (Army Medical College Investigation Squad)"

It is hereby certified that the above is a true and exact copy of a document in the custody of this section.

7, June 1947.

Medical Section Chief,
Works Department
No. 1 Demobilization Bureau

/s/ INOUE, Yoshihiro (seal)
In foundation Office, and entitled "Extract from 1943 Camp monthly report, May issue, 1943" is an exact excerpt from a document in the custody of this office.

On this 11th day of June, 1947

[Signature]

Extract from Tokyo C.O.W. Camp monthly report
May issue, 1943

Through general examinations for bacterial infections given since January this year at the army medical college for the prisoners of war confined at this camp, and at the first, second, and fifth branch camps it was found that 103 prisoners had dysentery cæsæas, (7.9 per cent), two prisoners had dysentery cæsæas (0.09 per cent), one prisoner had paratyphoid-B cæsæas (0.04 per cent), 57 prisoners had diphtheria cæsæas (2.4 per cent) and 77 prisoners had malaria cæsæas (5.3 per cent).

In consequence, the prisoners with such disease cæsæas were immediately isolated in each branch camp, and strict preventive measures were taken. At the same time, every effort is being exerted in treating the prisoners and checking the spread of diseases. However, the isolation of the prisoners with disease cæsæas in every separate branch camp cannot sufficiently be carried out due to the fact that it will add extra duties to the medical officers and that the building and repairing facilities within the camps and the disease preventive equipment are inadequate.

Consequently, in order to successfully carry out the preventive measures, it was decided best to assemble and isolate all the prisoners who have disease cæsæas in one place.

A report to this effect has been made to the authority and the preparation to establish attached hospitals is to be begun.
Kwantung General Operation Order No. C 90

Kwantung Army Order

February 1, 1300 hrs, Hsinking.

This is to certify that the following is a copy of a document in the custody of this section.

/\ /\ IncdE, Yoshihiro (seal)

Chief, Medical Section
Affairs Department

Mobilization Board

May 22, 22nd Year of Showa (1947)

Kwantung General Operation Order No. C 90.

Kwantung Army Order.

February 1, 1300 hrs, Hsinking.

1. The Chief supply officer of the Kwantung Army shall despatch as soon as possible the following number of persons from the battalion under his command to the MUKDEN prisoner of war camp and they shall be under the command of the said camp:

- Medical Officer 1
- Medical Petty Officers 2
- Medical orderlies 10

2. The Chief of the MUKDEN prisoner of war camp shall henceforth strengthen the hygiene service and exert yourself to restore physical condition of the prisoners of war immediately making use of the above personnel.

3. The Chief of the Kwantung Army HQ shall dispatch as soon as possible about the following number of persons to the MUKDEN POW CAMP and they shall assist and direct the sanitary service of the said camp.

FILE - 1
COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
Lef Doc No. 2003

Officers  5  
Petty Officers  5  
Men  about 10

4. As to the details, in addition to obtaining the direction of the Chief of the Army Medical Services, the commanders concerned shall make arrangement.

General, UMIFUZU
Commander in Chief
Kwangtung Army

Method of Communication:

Delivery of printed matter (Deputy-Inspector, HQ, Sanitation and Water Supply, KUKDEN POW CAMP).

Distribution:

Written Departments of Vice-Chief, Vice-Officials (Medical Officer, Directive of Chief of Army Medical Services based on Kwantung General Operations Order No. C 99).

1. In order to prevent epidemics in the KUKDEN POW CAMP, this should be laid upon the importance of examination of the POW for infection.

Firstly search for intestinal origin, dysentery bacillus, amoebic dysentery of the chronic diarrhea cases which are at present so prevalent. Secondly search for the original germs of malaria and make other necessary examinations.

2. The materials necessary for search for infection will be obtained from the HQ, Sanitation and Water Supply Branch of the Kwantung Army.

3. Any of the above-mentioned research requiring heavy expenditure should be requisitioned for in advance.

February 1, 19th Year of Showa (1943)

Lt. General KAJITSUKA
Chief, Medical Services,
Kwangtung Army.
The Second of No. 4th, Certification.

W. 24. From November, SHOWA 17, 1942 to December, SHOWA 18, 1943.

Excerpt from the Mukden-Report.

Preventive Measures against epidemics adopted in the Mukden P.O.W. Camp.

I here by certify that this document is the correct excerpt from the documents under the custody of our government.

June, 27th, Showa 22.

/S/ NAKANISHI Sadaki
The secretary of the Chief of P.O.W. Investigation Bureau.
MONTHLY REPORT OF THE MUKDEN P.O.W. CAMP.

Excerpt from number 2 of the Monthly report.


Feb. 21st, SHOI 18 (1943)

I. Situation of the works:

The temporary Prevention Epidemic Squad of the Kuan-Tung Army Water Supply and Purification Department, organized according to "No. 93, 25 of Kuan-Tung Army General Work order" arrived in Mukden on Feb. 14th, and immediately established its work-place in the Mukden P.O.W. Camp, and the practical work was opened on 15th. The work was promoted smoothly by the effort of the Chief and members of the squad and by the positive aid of the Mukden Military Hospital, and on 19th the investigation of pathogen of the intestinal system of isolated-patients was finished, accordingly attaching importance to diarrhoea-patients, the pathogen of all prisoners was investigated.

II. Conditions of the patients:

Diarrhoea-patients are 247 among 1965, total number of prisoners. (This number is those who had passages more than three times a day, 19th) Those who were put in isolated-ward as diarrhoea-patients through the diagnosis of the Surgeon of the P.O.W. Camp are 124, (In the present time, 19th, there are 90 diarrhoea-patients) Other 123 patients who had diarrhoea are living together with men of healthy condition, for they are only slightly conscious of the symptom of their own illness. The number of the dead from February 13th to 21st was five.

III. Situation of the pathogen-investigation:

1. The result of investigation of pathogen of intestinal system for 124 patients who were in isolated ward is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathogen</th>
<th>Number of positive</th>
<th>% for persons who were examined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dysentery-Bacteria</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysentery-Protozoa</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trichomonas</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xylophagia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- 2 -
The dysentery-Bacteria is mainly of different typo-Bacilli.
But it seems that there are some regular Bacilli, now under further investigation.

2. Cases of mixed infection of intestinal system pathogens is as follows:
   Dysentery-Bacteria, dysentery ameba and Trichomonas, ....1.
   Dysentery-Bacteria and dysentery ameba ........................4.
   Dysentery-Bacteria and trichomonas .............................1.
   Dysentery-ameba and trichomonas ...............................3.

3. The result of investigation of pathogens of all prisoners shall be reported later.

4. At the examination of 117 prisoners who have had Malaria-anamnoses fever protozoa was proved among 18 persons and Tropical fever-protozoa was proved among two persons on 3rd.

5. In another case, "L. type-para-typhus bacillus" was found in his blood and excrement.

IV. Some opinions on autopsy:
   Nine cases of autopsy were visually judged that they were bacterial dysentery or ameba-dysentery. Among three cases of investigation of protozoa about contents and etc. in colon; one case of dysentery-ameba, the case of L. type para-typhus-bacillus and one case of dysentery-ameba were found.

V. Clinical condition of illness:
   It is as another document.

VI. Situation of prevention epidemics.
   According to the plan of preventive measures against epidemics, as attached elsewhere, we are in exclusion of the third term of preventive method.
About the Blinde situation of so called malnutrition-patients in the Mukden P.O.W. Camp Feb. 17th, Shown 18 in Mukden.

Mr. Nagayama, the Chief of the Medical Section.

Anglo-American officers and men surrendered and taken Captive by the formidable onslaught of Japanese army at Corregidor and Bataan were in a condition of being extremely worn out by desporative fight, lacking in food-materials and suffering from pestilence. For a certain purpose, it was decided that 1485 prisoners of them be put in the Mukden P.O.W. Camp. (Colonel Nagamatsuda) Since December of last year, they were in transportation and during the difficult voyage, being constantly menaced by enemy’s submarines, the food-supply turned out inevitably very bad, consequently the general health-situation of prisoners became much worse, and on the way, at Fushian and other places, 57 persons died. At present, those who are under treatment in the squad are 160 persons, epidemic-patients (mainly A type para-typus) in the Mukden military hospital are 8 persons and those who are healthy and engaged in daily work are no more than about 300 persons. Being guided by the head of P.O.W. Camp and his subordinates, I examined the general clinic situation of patients in the squad with Mr. Tomura, the chief of the squad, and also being guided by Lieutenant surgeon Kumahima and sublieutenant-surgeon OKI of the squad and in company of Surgeon Major Kobayashi and others who had come for a study and prisoner-surgeons of America and Britain as assistants examined in detail about 20 cases of typical diseases among in-patients. Now the outline of the clinic views are described as follows—

The main, clinic condition of this disease is the headstrong dysentery causing gauntnees in high degree, anemic Marasmus, general prostration and tendencies of abdominal dropsy.

External features—

Nutrition becomes extremely bad; gauntnees is so strong as if the bone is covered nothing but skin, especially gauntnees is seen distinctly in the limbs. Complexion is pale; eye-sockets fall down, eye-light grows dim; nose-top becomes sharp; languid in passive way and thus latent chronic marasmus disease can be traced from some time past.

Temperature—

Close examination of temperature shows; no high fever, the pulse, of most patients are normal, no distinct slow pulse; in some serious cases the number of pulse increases but
regular; generally speaking, feeble; in some serious cases, often intangible.

Consciousness:

It is seen that even in serious cases there are no distinct obstacles in Consciousness; no brain-disease and etc.; responses to questions are generally distinct; but serious patients pass urine unconsciously; according to the report of surgeons, many of them were clear in their consciousness until the last moment when they suddenly succumb. The conjunctivis and the mucous membrane manifest anemia more than the middle degree in accordance with the progress of the disease. Pupil shows tenderness of the middle sized dilatation or contraction; reflection of light seems to be same what slow; obstacles of the sight is not apparent; but there are some cases where after cornea-disease (cornea-softening disease), white spots appeared in cornea; an right-blind, hearing is not obstructed.

Visible mucous membrane inside of mouth:

This mucous membrane is pale caused by anemia; in the pharynx no congestion; in pale palate is seen the enlarged blood-Vessel; no bleeding, injury and etc.; tongue is rather flat; papilla drooped and the surface of tongue is flat, smooth and moist; the degree of drooping is in parallel with epidemic condition; sometimes there is injury, the kind of "NEF", around of tongue. No sore generally felt in lymphatic gland of the cervical region by several touching.

The Chest:

In chest, the lung and slender collar bone and the ribs are arisen and can be counted; by tapping generally low feeble sounds is heard resounding.

Lung and Liver: regions are between the fifth and sixth ribs along the right mammary gland; no traces of dilatation of the heart. Respiratory Sound: no distinct change except rough in a few cases; in one or two cases exist symptom of bronchial pneumonia; but cordial sound, common to accidental combined illness is generally low especially in the case of serious patient; sometimes it is heard monotonously; at the apex of heart it rises to the first sound in impurity or into soft noises; the second sound in vibrating nature; accordingly the second Sound is heard distinctly. At the bottom of the heart, it rises into the second lung-artery-sound or sometimes the second-artery-sound.

The abdominal region:

No distinct corpulent by visual-examinations, but in some cases bowel-pulse in somewhat strong; among serious patients, bowel sinks
Def Loc No. 2302

sometimes clearly in the shape of a boat; abdominal wall-vein is enlarged clearly, and sometimes by touching examination, undulation proved suggesting the existence of ascites.

Spleen--

Sometimes spleen is felt in a degree that its dull-sound region is enlarged, but no tangible example. The edge of Liver can but be slightly felt but not felt entirely in many cases. The liver rim is slightly felt but not felt in most cases; There are some patients who feel oppressive sorrow in the part of the Liver. The dull-region of the Liver suggests a little rise of Lung and Liver regions but the lower region is not clearly felt in many cases; at the time of touching-examination, the strain of abdominal wall was found in many cases, accordingly no feeling such as touching-soft air-cushion or cotton. The main condition of disease is that varying rope-like thing often felt in the bone-hollow of left bowels. The rope-like-thing can be touched distinctly through thin abdominal wall; it does not move, but is nervous against pressure; there are some other cases that the above mentioned rope-like-thing can not be touched, but there are some cases when the bone-hollow of left bowels grow nervous by "Deperasense pressure"; sometimes partial pulse of bowels is felt in the bone-hollow of the left bowels; in right side neither sorrow nor swelling was found. No distinct sudden pain before evacuation nor gripping pain after passage, but at the beginning of excreta-feeling, some .... feel a slight colic.

Tendon-refulsion (the Knee-jer) rises distinctly in almost half the cases; in almost half it decreased. The clonus of foot is not found. Koling-condition of disease is positive in some cases. Oppressive-pain in the head-region of spleen-intestinal muscle exists 100%. Abnormal Peripheral sense of limbs is more or less in some cases. The sound of artery; in the elbow-hollow and in thigh is of degree of audible only when stethoscope is pressed strongly in the case of almost the; but in one example it was easily and distinctly heard.

Fleeting and its tendency in one case; (serious case) -- a slight extravasation-region in skin was found in almost palm-sized space spreading over the upper part and lower part with heart-hollow part as its centre; Rumpelrose-phenomenon is atonic in one example; blood-pressure in one case dropped to be 95-70; showing descension of highest blood-pressure; in the case of serious patients, this tendency is found.

Besides, skin is generally dry and is of epidemic feature and have many wrinkles, (face is seen old in comparison with their age) In the latter period of the disease anasarca appears at the end of limbs back back of hand and foot, (there is a tendency of producing anasarca together with ascites).

No blister in testicles; no jaundice; prisoner-surgeon diagnosed
illness of the Brown moos-like skin (Scale-itch-like-moss) in lower thigh as Peragra, but it needs more investigation for its decision. In another case, there were two examples which seemed to be Ray-disease (in rather limbs) or specially caused gangrene; there were some patients who complained nervous irritation at the end of their lower limbs. The main complaint was diarrhea and incessant thirst (the middle condition of disease, they drank water three litres in a day) and powerless feeling; in many cases, they had rather good appetite comparatively.

Urine is from several times to about 20 odd times in a day; water-like-excreta (sometimes mix mucus); blood-excreta rather rare; mixus sometime form; the quantity of urine is not recognized, but seems to be of considerable quantity; especially some patients said that the quantity of their urine was increased in the night. On the point of their constitution, (primary cause) according to the chief of the squad these prisoners were inferior in their physical power, for the reason that they were technical experts especially chosen for the job. By our examination, it seems that ordinary paralysis-type and consuming-energy-type may occupy large part of them at least.

The above is the condition of disease mostly in the case of regular type condition and serious cases. By increasing examples, more or less addition may be needed. To conclude the above, the patients may come under so called "Loosing-flesh-type-was-malnutrition-disease".

(1) Fundamental symptom of this disease is mainly chronic colitis type-diarrhoea, and stress must be put on the investigation of infections disease of intestinal system, especially bacterial dysentery and Ambs and other proteges. It is of course necessary to pay special attention to the mixed infection.

(2) They that have malaria-anamnesis are not few. No spleen-hypertrophy, but latent malaria shall be regarded carefully.

(3) Some have neuritis, the symptom of beribiri. But the present condition is not of the main cause of a mere malnutrition or avitaminose as prisoners themselves are inclined to think.

(4) Haemorrhages and its tendency and anasarca (abdominal dropsy) are the type soon in serious chronic dysentery.

(5) Some patients are in serious condition, and their prospects are sad, but others can be assured recovery from illness by careful medical treatment.

(6) The clinic treatment shall be as belows—
(1) It is necessary to take off obiyalbunia. (It is necessary to give albuminous nourishment of the quality of good absorptiveness. Milk is the best. Among all, incessant transfusion of blood is necessary.)

(2) Livor-Protection-Treatment: (Injection of Insulin, Vitamine G and B or giving them through mouth and giving Lemon-Livor Preparation)

(3) The Cause-Treatment:—Yatres-drug for Malaria, Amoba-dysentery and etc. That is to say, Mefina, Quinine, Runkan etc.

(4) Binding-drug: (Atropin and Morphin-opium drug).

(5) General Nutrition Treatment: (Drug for stimulating digestion; drug for promoting the secretion of digestive fluids and Lactic ferments-drug).

(6) Water-Supply: (Especially Cranis bill-drug).


(8) Convalescence period-Treatment: (Arsenic ferrous Medicament; each kind of vitamin and etc.)
Major-General Beckwith-Smith.

Dear General Beckwith-Smith,

As a small token of my personal interest in your welfare, and a practical contribution to your own comfort, I send you thirty tins of butter, thirty tins of cheese, 150 bottles of beer and a bottle of sherry.

With compliments and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) Lieut-General Yamashita.
I hereby certify that the attached photo-copies (4 sheets in all) are the true photo-copies of the pictures which were found among personal effects left by the deceased POW, Major-General M.B. Bechwith Smith, of the British Army. (Re: The original pictures were already forwarded to family of the deceased, on Feb. 25, 1946.)

March 24, 1947.

/S/ S. Nakanishi
Sadaoichi Nakanishi,
Acting Director,
Japanese Government,
POW Information Bureau.
Case of reproof and of rudo act

(The Report of Colonel HOSOI, the Head of 11.KO1.NE Prisoners' Camp)

(a) On 11th of March, 1945, 11.KO1.NE Gendarmerie Detachment received the following letter:

"Which do the military authorities take more care of -- prisoners of war? or the people? Japan can not win the war so long as she neglects her people and cherishes the prisoners of war, can she? We are engaged in labor more than 12 hours a day, with the rationed rice not more than 3 'go'. If such state of things lasts any longer, we should be very anxious about the future of Japan."

(Report of Colonel H.M.I.T., the Head of 15.A.A. Prisoners' Camp)

(b) It occurred once that a number of Japanese who happened to cast furtive glances at the supplementary food to be supplied to prisoners at each place of working in Umeda Branch, Osaka, of the Japan Transportation Company, assaulted a guard-head, one of the Japanese leaders on the spot, saying, "Despite the fact that we, Japanese people, are rationed daily less than the additional food allotted to the prisoners for a time, the prisoners are provided with such plentiful addition besides their daily meals. They are too well treated."
Evidence No. 8

Cases of Reproof and of Rude Act

Excerpts from the materials presented at the conference of H.P.O.D. TE-CE. KL Prisoners' Camps' Heads

I, Teiki, who occupy the post of the acting director of "Prisoner Information Bureau", hereby certify that the document hereto attached is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the said Bureau certified on 11th of June, 1947

/S/ NAKAMISHI, Teiki (seal)
Having first duly sworn as set out on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country,
I hereby depose as follows:

1. My permanent domicile is No. 2, 2-Chome, Oimatsu-Cho,
   Kita-Ku, Osaka City, and my present address is No. 15,
   Shinkawa-Dori, Nishinomiya City, Hyogo Prefecture.
   I am now 52 years of age.

2. I have been in the service of the Osaka Longshoremen's
   Control Guild since April of the 16th year of Showa (1941).

3. I hereby vouch for the fact that, MURATA, Sotaro, ex-
   colonel and commander of the Osaka POW Camp called
   up to a meeting those concerned in POW's labor-supervision
   in about September in the 16th year of Showa (1941),
   to the Head Office of the Osaka POW Camp in Minato-Ku,
   Osaka City, where he gave them instructions as per
   appended papers.

Instructions

A. The prisoners of war are of course enemy nationals,
   but they are fine soldiers. Now taken prisoner, with
   freedom lost and without arms, they are like infants.
   Therefore, private punishment will not be applied to
   them either by use of force or by other means. If
   there is any offender, he will be given just punishment
   at this POW Camp according to international law. So
   you must treat them as good people.
It is my desire that, lest they should suffer from ill-health as a result of labor, that those to whom they are allotted labor, for work take every possible care about their food, drink and sanitation and supply them with abundant calories.

On this 13th day of May, 1947

At No. 36, Kawaguchi-Cho, Nishi-Ku, Osaka City.

Deponent: /S/ TAKAGI, Noboru (seal)

I, NISHIMURA, Ryoichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: /S/ NISHIMURA, Ryoichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TAKAGI, Noboru (seal)
Syonan.
July 7th 1942

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FILE COPY

RETURN TO COM 361
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Deponent: /S/ TAKAGI, Noboru (seal)

I, NISHIMURA, Ryoichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: /S/ NISHIMURA, Ryoichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TAKAGI, Noboru (seal)
Def. Doc. # 1997

Exh. No.

Translated by

Defense Language Branch

Excerpts from Vols. 7, 12, 57, 58, 76

the P.O.W.'s Rations Investigation List

the Prisoners of War Camps of Tokyo, Oeke, Zentsuji and Fukuoka

I hereby certify that the present document is an exact excerpt from the document in the custody of our office.

NAKAMISHI, SADAI

Acting-Director of the P.O.W. Information Bureau

May 26, 1947
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Staple and Subsidiary Foods</th>
<th>Calorific value</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
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*Calculation Table of Food Value*

*April, 1944*
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**Note:** Sub-Br. - Sub-branch  
Toch.R.I. Technical Research Institute  
Subs. - Subsidiary
Table of Standard Rations and Food Values

Osaki P.O. Camp
(Ok-ku P.O. camp Monthly Report for May, 1944, Appendix No. 8.)

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<td>Rice</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>501.400</td>
<td>polished rice; Unpolished rice; Foreign rice etc. (TN-last word, unintelligible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polished</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>497.400</td>
<td>polished wheat; barley meal; pressed barley; etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya-beans</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>319.100</td>
<td>Soya-beans; Pressed Soya-beans; polished beans etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kweiling</td>
<td>bread</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>272.700</td>
<td>Kweiling; Maize etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>240</td>
<td>2670.300</td>
<td>bread (280 gr. of bread is calculated as 240 gr. of rice of wheat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staple Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2260.900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staple</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh</td>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52.300</td>
<td>beef; pork; rabbit-meat; chicken; whale-meat; eggs; Canned beef;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>86.300</td>
<td>Sea-fish; river-fish; shell-fish; slabs of pounded fish;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Foods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greens</td>
<td></td>
<td>31,900</td>
<td>radish, stone-look, egg-plant, melons, greens, cabbage-onion, spinach, turnip, peas, konnyaku.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>roots</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>105,200</td>
<td>burdock, carrot, lotus-root, taro, yama-imr, yatsugashira.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flours</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32,800</td>
<td>wheat flour; rice flour; dogtooth violet starch; dried macaroni; wheat vermicelli; dried buckwheat etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peas and beans</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>79,700</td>
<td>soya-beans; red beans; mottled kidney-beans; white kidney-beans; legumes; peas, roku-mame etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seaweeds and others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>undaria pinnatifida tangle; mushroom; dried gourd shaving; fried strips of radishes; dried vegetables etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fried bean-curd</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51,500</td>
<td>kim fried bean-curd; thick fried bean-cured; naboage; bean-curd fried with condiments etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bean-curd from beans</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>bean-curd (tofu); broiled bean-curd; frozen bean-curd etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsidery Foods</th>
<th>Condiments</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pickles</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.800 Pickled redish; redish pickled in born-paste; redish preserved in sake-locas; pickled greens; pickled melon; pickled egg-apple; pickled garlic; pickled seasoned in sake-locas; vegetables in thin slices and preserved with soy-sauce; vegetables preserved in mustard etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonn-paste (miso)</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75.700 bonn-paste (miso); kinsenji-miso toko-miso; powdered-miso etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scyp (born-sauce)</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.400 scyp vinegar-sauce; powdered-sauce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugars</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39.000 white sugar; black sugar; yellow sugar; wheat gluten.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fats &amp; oils</td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>279.000 beef-tallow; pork-tallow; butter; rapeseed oil; other edible oils &amp; fats (animal and vegetable) etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salt</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teas; confectionery;</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.700 teas; confectionery; fruit; spices; curry etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fruits &amp; others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>728</td>
<td>864.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>3,125.400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Table shows the Standard Ration for Class A (those who do outdoor labor).
Zonkoji P. 0. W. Camp

Table of Rations
(Staple foods and Subsidiary foods)
Zonkoji P. O. W. Camp Monthly Report for Dec. 1944, appendix
Table No. 7, and
Zonkoji P. O. W. Camp Monthly Report for March, 1945, appendix
Table No. 7
P. O. W.'s Food Value Calculation Table Dec. 1944 (Va. 59) and
March 1945 (Va. 58)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Diet for laboring soldiers</th>
<th>Ordinary Diet (A)</th>
<th>Officers' Diet</th>
<th>Special Diet for Patients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staple</td>
<td>Side</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Staple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>2.443</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>2.718</td>
<td>7.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Br.</td>
<td>2.365</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>2.652</td>
<td>7.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Br.</td>
<td>2.379</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>2.806</td>
<td>7.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.397</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>2.794</td>
<td>1.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Br.</td>
<td>2.397</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>2.806</td>
<td>1.938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The food value shown on the present Table is calculated according to the Table of Military Food Value Calculation prepared on Jan. 28, 1941.

Sub-Br. = Sub-Branch.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Sta[les</th>
<th>Subsidiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Average Daily Pation Quote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pation</td>
<td>rice; wheat;</td>
<td>substitutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Branch</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>459.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Branch</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>689.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Branch</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>619.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Branch</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>468.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Branch</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>662.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Branch</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>489.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Branch</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>457.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch</td>
<td>1st Sub-Br.</td>
<td>2nd Sub-Br.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>782,0</td>
<td>24,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Sub-Br.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sub-Br.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Sub-Br.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Sub-Br.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Sub-Br.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Sub-Br.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Sub-Br.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Sub-Br.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Br.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>472,0</td>
<td>162,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>644,0</td>
<td>60,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>548,0</td>
<td>166,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>720,3</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub. Br. = Sub-Branch
|------------|---------|-------------|-----|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|         |         |
|            |         |             |     |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |

**TABLE OF MENU SCHEDULE A CARRIED OUT**
From 1, April, 1945, Hiroshima P.O.W. Camp
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meal Type</th>
<th>Soybean</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Salt</th>
<th>Fish Powder</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Apr</td>
<td>5:30</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Apr</td>
<td>7:30</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Apr</td>
<td>9:30</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Apr</td>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Apr</td>
<td>13:30</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Apr</td>
<td>15:30</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remark:**
1. In the columns of albumen and caloric are to be written upon calculation the total amounts for the seven days of the first 10 days.
2. In the same column, field cooking is to be marked O, season cooking O, and treat foods 9.

I hereby certify that this Table is an exact excerpt from the Document SB 2 which is in the custody of our Bureau. 12 June, 1947.

NAKANISHI Sadako,

Acting Chair of the P.O.W. Information Bureau.
CAUSES OF AND COUNTER-MEASURES FOR THE
CHRONIC CASES OF DIARRHOEA AMONG THE
PRISONERS OF WAR.

RETURN TO ROOM 361

BY

Surgeon Lieutenant NOSU, Shoichi
Surgeon Lieutenant OHASHI, Hyojiro

OSAKA CONCENTRATION Camp and
the Attached Infirmary.
I. Introduction

II. On the Causes

Paragraph One: INFECTIOUS DIARRHOEA

1. Amoebic Dysentery and Bacterial Dysentery.
2. Cholera
3. Typhoid and Para-typhoid
4. Intestinal Tuberculosis
5. Intestinal Parasites

Paragraph Two: DIARRHOEA DUE TO TOXIN

Paragraph Three: FOOD DEFICIENTIOUS or MALNUTRITIOUS DIARRHOEA

1. Malnutrition
2. Beriberi
3. Pellagra
4. Peripheral Nervous Inflammation
5. Scorbatus

Paragraph Four: NON-TYPICAL DIARRHOEA

1. Sudden Transition from Foreign to Japanese diet.
2. Side-dishes of Fibrons Food.
3. Laxative Food (especially Soya-beans as Staple Food)
4. Diathesis of the POWs against (2) and (3)
5. Mental Influence of Captivity on the POWs
6. Climatic Influence of Japan Proper

III. On the Counter-measures.

IV. Summary.

V. Conclusion
I. Introduction

The present thesis deals with the statistical observations on the causes and the counter-measures of the chronic diarrhoea very peculiar to the POW patients, based upon the latest clinical experiences of the physicians in the Osaka POW Camp and its Attached Infirmary have had.

The diseases the POWs are apt to suffer do not differ, roughly to say, much from those found in the Japanese Military Hospitals when classified according to the kind of diseases. Summing them up, however, by setting an item under the designation of chronic diarrhoea, the large majority of the POW patients come under the case in which the patients complain of the diarrhoea as their main complaint. The patients under this designation show very high percentage especially at the beginning of their captivity on the field, amounting, for instance, 80% of all POWs at a certain camp in the Philippines. Fortunately, it is seldom to see such a high percentage among those transferred to Japan Proper.

The Osaka POW Camp, nevertheless, has experienced a considerable number of the cases of chronic diarrhoea since its opening to date. As the latest case, in the early summer of the 19th Year of Showa, the number of sufferers from diarrhoea in several detached camps amounted to about 50% of all patients.

Though the Attached Infirmary to the Osaka POW Camp has not yet been sufficiently equipped, as not so much time elapsed since its opening, the medical officers noticed that, out of their daily experiences in treating the POW patients, the frequency of the chronic diarrhoea ranked first. Having deeply felt that it will be of help in promoting the working efficiency and beat of the POW to investigate the causes and to devise the counter-measures thereof, we beg herewith to summarize our observations in a small volume for the reference of our comrades in the Army Sanitary Department.

II. On the Cause.

By the term diarrhoea we mean an abnormal frequency of the intestinal excrements. It is unnecessary here to repeat pathologic-anatomical discussion of its causes. The diarrhoea peculiar to the POWs engaging works can roughly be summarized into the following categories:

- 3 -
Paragraph One: Infectious Diarrhoea

1. Amoebic and Bacterial Dysenteries
2. Cholera
3. Typhoid and Para-typhoid
4. Intestinal Tuberculosis
5. Intestinal Parasites

It is generally known that the infectious diseases of the digestive organs, especially of the intestines are the most common causes of diarrhoea.

Of the diarrhoeas, one most peculiar to the POW patients is dysentery diarrhoea (1941).

In the 17th Year of Showa, 30% of 3,600 inmates at a certain POW Camp in the Philippines were found to be suffering from the amoebic diarrhoea. It is obvious that still higher percentage of sufferers would have been detected if the bacteriological examinations were made, by the staining method.

During a period of from April to September, the 19th Year of Showa (1944), there occurred many cases of diarrhoea in several detached camps within the jurisdiction of the Osaka Correction Camp. The examination of feces showed that about 2% of all the POW and 13% of all diarrhoea cases were found to be suffering from amoebic dysentery.

Though we made the examination assuming that the germ-carrier of the amoebic dysentery to be the important factor in causing the chronic diarrhoea, the facts showed, as above mentioned, to the contrary to our supposition that only about 2% of the POWs transferred to Japan Proper were, luckily to say, found to be germ-carriers.

Since the opening of this infirmary, we had, luckily, no case of bacterial dysentery, cholera, typhoid and para-typhoid. As to the intestinal tuberculosis, we have, at present, several cases in some detached camps and their attached infirmaries; but they can not be recognized as the cause of chronic diarrhoea peculiar to the POWs. On the other hand, intestinal parasites, especially Ascaris (roundworm) is causing here a chronic diarrhoea, and we detected that 6% of all diarrhoea cases in our attached infirmary, as of September, the 19th Year of Showa, were caused by ascaris, making the patients thoroughly recover from the condition of diarrhoea by vermicide treatments.
Paragraph Two: DIARRHOEA due to Toxic Poisoning.

Food and medicinal poisoning are also well-known causes of frequent typical symptoms of acute diarrhoea. In the instances of the POWs, especially, mass food poisoning often occurred abruptly as the result of almost unavoidable greedy taking of deteriorated food owing to the food shortage overwhelming to meet and the excessive labour, common state to almost all POW Camps nowadays. Rotten protein, especially rotten fish, is its most common cause and drinking of infected water in summer is also one of the important factors.

We have experienced several cases of this kind of diarrhoea in some detached camps since the opening of the Osaka POW Camp. In a certain camp, for instance, in September, the 19th Year of Showa, we found that about 50% of all internee suffered from it.

Paragraph Three: FOOD DEFICIENTIOUS or MALNUTRITIVE DIARRHOEA

1. Malnutrition
2. Beriberi
3. Pellagra
4. Peripheral Nervous Inflammation
5. Scorbutus

These are main causes of diarrhoea among the POW. According to a survey made in September, the 19th Year of Showa, about 25 to 30% of all diarrhoea cases were found to be due to food deficiency. One thing here to mention specially, however, is that, since this May the food allotment for the POWs has been considerably improved and the index number for the nutritive value of the POWs food in the detached camps is now gradually going upward and does not sink below 3,000 calories in general. So we can now reasonably expect a gradual decrease in number of Malnutritious diarrhoea cases in the future, and the eradication of this sort of causes may be attained very soon.

If it is presumed that a POW takes food of about 2,000 calories a day and consumes, at least, over 3,000 calories a day, then the digestive and absorptive power of his intestinal mucous membrane will considerably be deteriorated as the result of the conspicuous consumption of the physical composition, and the decline of the general
resisting power and obstinate chronic diarrhoea will be incurred. It brings about the deficiency in protein and oedema too, causing thus often chronic diarrhoea.

Generally speaking, the food deficiency is accompanied by the partial deficiency of certain nutritious elements, especially that of vitamins.

We could often detect, in the cases of the POW food deficiency, the combined symptoms of beriberi, pellagra, peripheral nervous inflammation and scorbutus etc. In the case of the POW at least, the above mentioned symptoms of vitamin deficiency can not be considered apart from food deficiency in general. Thus, we must always keep in mind that the vitamin deficiency case of the POW always accompanies the chronic diarrhoea as the main complaint.

Paragraph Four: NON-TYPICAL DIARRHOEA

1. Sudden transition from Foreign Diets to Japanese Ones.
2. Side-dishes of Fibrous Food
3. Laxative Food (especially Soya-beans as Staple Food)
4. Diathesis of the POW against (2) and (3)
5. Mental Influence of the Captivity.
6. Climatic Influence of Japan Proper

Those three kinds of causes above mentioned are the most typical of, and not confined merely to the POW. The similar cases can often be found in Japanese Military Hospitals. We must especially mention, however, that the chronic diarrhoea peculiar to the POW are incurred by miscellaneous causes to be summarized under the designation of non-typical diarrhoea beside the above mentioned three items. These non-typical diarrhoea reveal no particular clinical symptom in daily life. The patients are in comparatively good nutritious condition and so vigorous that they are not necessarily to be kept in door at their early stage of disease, though they complain several times or over ten times of fluid-like stool. They will be able to bear certain degree of labour so far as careful countermeasures be taken. A survey in September, the 19th Year of Showa detected about 20 to 25% of all diarrhoea cases to be of this kind of non-typical diarrhoea.
III. On the Countermeasures.

We have so far described in brief the causes of the chronic diarrhoea prevailing among the POWs. Recently, we have studied the countermeasures against them at the Osaka P.O.W. Camps and since July, the 19th Year of Showa (1944), the number of diarrhoea patients showed the tendency of gradual decrease.

1. Infectious Diarrhoea

Concerning this item, the health officers' attention was directed, following generally the instances at the Military Hospitals in Japan prior to the readjustment of the sanitary services and equipments, cultivation of ideas on sanitation and preventive induction at the time of their reception. Further to say about the personal hygiene, body and clothes-cleaning, hand-washing and gargling are strictly enforced in any camps and we have experienced no epidemic outbreak of infectious diarrhoea since the opening of the Osaka POW Camp, whose record we wish to keep unaltered with the trust regulation.

One thing to be noticed, however, is that germ-carriers, especially of amoebic dysentery, are often detected among the POW patients; the fact suggesting the necessity of incessant feces-examination and quick isolation in every camp in the future.

We beg herewith to offer, to the reference of the concerned, a brief description of the sanitary equipments and countermeasures against the chronic diarrhoea devised with the joint research of the army surgeons on duty at the attached infirmary of the Osaka Concentration Camp as follows.

(Handwritten insertion by a MIZUTANI which reads as follows:—
As the summer draws near, I will transmit this to every detached camp by means of monthly bulletin etc., and expect not to fail in every respect.)

A. General equipments for personal sanitation.

1. The following methods of table-ware disinfection as applied in the field operation shall easily be applied in any camp, namely, to put three drums of 50 gallon content on small fire range and fill the first drum with hot soap-water and the other two with clean-hot-water and let every team take the process of disinfection and rinsing after every meal.

2. Further effort shall be made regarding the cleaning of body and clothes, especially to enforce washing hands with soap before every meal and after soiling the lavatory.
(c) Considering the fact that there are many diarrhoea patients, we advocate to abolish the present bathing equipments in every camp and, instead thereof, to conduct hot-water by iron pipe from the main tank so that everyone can use it by first receiving it into a bucket.

(d) Overcrowded meeting shall be prohibited and diarrhoea patients shall be isolated.

(e) Clothes and shoes shall be changed timely and custodian's attention shall be directed to the maintenance of suitable temperature in the camp and infirmary in winter.

B. Sanitary Equipments

(a) So long as the water-flushing lavatory and the drainage purifying tank are not equipped, the following arrangement shall be taken for flycatching, namely (1) to drain up the lavatory tank incessantly, (2) to furnish sufficient fly-traps and savors and (3) to fit the cover to each seat of lavatory.

(b) As to the kitchen, the following points shall be observed, namely (1) to expel germ-carrying cooks from the kitchen by way of the pathological examination, (2) to take effective measure of fly-prevention, (3) to fit the cover to all table-wares and (4) to have army surgeon supervise cooks strictly.

C. Water Supply Equipments

Wherever service water is not available, boiled water or potassium chlorate treated water shall be supplied.

D. Disposition of Drainage and Garbages.

(a) All drain ditches should be straightly laid out and drained at a competent distance from the living quarters and fitted with the cover.

(b) Garbage boxes should be fitted with the covers and the garbages should be promptly disposed.
(2) Toxic Diarrhoea

Selection of foodstuffs and way of cooking are the most important factors in preventing toxic diarrhoea and the degenerated protein, especially decaying fish, is often the main cause of intoxication. Cases of Toxic diarrhoea hitherto experienced at the Osaka POW Camp were all slight, and even in the case of September the 19th Year of Shōwa, in which about 30% of all internees of a certain detached camp suffered, all patients recovered in three or five days. Toxic death has never been experienced in this Camp.

Toxic diarrhoea, however, always breaks out abruptly and prevalently and has much influence upon the health and labour-supply. Therefore, selection of foodstuffs, devices on the way of cooking and tasting on menu heavily fall on the shoulders of the surgeons as their responsibilities. Whenever a toxic diarrhoea case is found to be slight, then the drug treatment is unnecessary, and the most recommendable treatment is to take care of keeping him warm, to let the patient lie in bed fasting for 24 hours and then to feed him beginning with liquid food. In case when the intoxication is serious with high fever and heart-disease, it is, of course, necessary to take such suitable measures in time as stomach-washing, higher intestines-washing, dosing of purgatives and heart-medicine, injection of Ringer's solution or blood-transfusion. We have, luckily, never experienced such a serious case of toxic diarrhoea since the opening of this Camp.

(3) Food deficientious malnutrition diarrhoea

It is necessary to feed POW workers with food of over full 3,000 calories a day, namely, 550 gram of carbohydrate, 57 gram of fat and 70 gram of protein, not to mention suitable quantity of various elements of nutrition. It is especially to be mentioned that this degree of nourishment is not only necessary to the POW workers but absolutely indispensable to the POW patients resting in the attached infirmary. It is almost needless to emphasize on the necessity of allimntothrapy or dietary cure in the treatment of disease in general. Most of the POW patients have in especial been suffering already from the food deficiency and there is no other way of cure than the allimntothrapy.

It must be said to be a great advancement in the dietary treatment of POW's that considerable improvements in dietary accommodation were made in all detached camps since May, 1944, especially
after the introduction of special preparations of soya-beans, bones and viscera of cows and fish-meal for protein supply; as a result gradual decrease of the food deficiency diarrhoea. The food deficiency diarrhoea can be cured with dietary treatment as its best countermeasure lies in the improvement of the nutritive value, sufficient supply of protein, in especial.

It is noteworthy, however, that the food deficiency prevalent among the POWs often accompanies the symptoms of partial deficiency of various nutritive elements, especially of vitamin. We very often clinically detected the cases of malnutrition accompanying beriberi or pellagra. In such cases, if we pay too much attention to the concurrent symptoms and treat by giving vitamins, neglecting to take care of the principal disease then it would eventually lead to an undesirable prognosis.

Our recent experience showed that, in not a few cases, stressful dietary treatment for considerably serious patients of malnutrition with beriberi lead to the cure of serious beriberi alongside with the recovered nutrition.

When we found many cases of malnutrition with beriberi or peripheral nervous inflammation among the POWs newly transferred from abroad to the MACUSA Detached Camp this August, we applied not vitamin pills, but merely a countermeasure of devices on recovery of nutrition, dosing of rice-bran and moderate sun-bathing with the result that they could be cured in a very short time. This is obviously a noteworthy instance.

(4) Non-typical Diarrhoea

The causes of diarrhoea peculiar to the POWs, as mentioned here under the designation of non-typical diarrhoea, are various and multilateral, the influence of climate and weather, the coexisting and combination of food and individual physical constitution, taste and customs are the important factors. Our special attention must be paid to the fact that the mental influence of the POW life often constitute a cause of diarrhoea as cases of hypochondria and high degree hysteria are frequently found among them. Consequently, it is rather necessary, as the countermeasure, to amuse and treat them with a certain degree of gencrness, for their mental worry and physical sufferings are very great in this strange land. Especially, in the case caused by mental influence, the suggestion treatment had often remarkable
Def. Doc. No. 1994

Recently in the attached infirmary we had army surgeons exclusively engaged in the study of the treatment of this sort of chronic diarrhoea without the help of pharmacotherapy with considerable success.

As the characteristic symptoms of non-typical diarrhoea any subjective or objective symptoms are hardly discerned except the fluid-like stool for several or even ten times a day as main complaint. When the diarrhoea be protracted, it sometimes incurs general frustration, but at the beginning, the patients are generally in very high spirit and have no trouble to work. We shall be able to cure them while they are working by a suitable mental guidance.

IV. Summary.

We have herewith devised the countermeasures against the chronic diarrhoea aiming at the fact that special attention is requested to be paid for their alimentation, considering that they are mainly employed in the productive area in the domestic front with the gradual increase of the number of the 20's nowadays. The causes of this disease should be in the ordinary days, attributed to the infectious intestinal disease. In the cases of 20's, however, infectious diarrhoea occupies only 10 percent of all patients of diarrhoea and their majority are of food deficiencies and non-typical diarrhoea which occupy about 90% of all cases. So the first counter-measure against the diarrhoea is to enforce strict feces-examination and quickly to isolate the germ-carriers.

The next step is to classify all non-germ-carrying diarrhoea patients roughly into two kinds of food deficient diarrhoea and non-typical diarrhoea. In the case of the former, the deliberate attention shall be paid for their diet alongside with the pharmacotherapy, picking up the serious ones in the infirmary to give treatment for rather longer time. In the case of the latter, however, the sufferers are not necessarily to be treated as patients. Some times we can employ them in works with no fear, paying special attention for their mental consolation with due consideration for their adaptability to the foreign climate and weather, and their individual physical constitution, custom and taste. It is needless, however, to mention that the long POW life often incurs the hypochondria and hysteria necessitating to send them to the infirmary.
V. Conclusion.

(1) The POWs are apt to suffer from the chronic diarrhoea and we sometimes found that about 90% of all inmates at the beginning of the captivity on the field, and about 50% of them in Japan or similar afflicted with the disease.

(2) Most of the POW patients suffer from the chronic diarrhoea concurrently and the examination in September, the 19th Year of Showa showed that the percentage of the diarrhoea to all patients was about 90%. Since May, the 19th Year of Showa, however, an attempt to improve the diet has been made in the Saka Interna-tion Camp and as the result the percentage of the chronic diarrhoea showed a tendency to consider decrease considerably...

(3) Only 10% of the chronic diarrhoea cases among the POWs are found to be attributable to the infectious intestinal diseases.

(4) It would be premature to attribute all cases of the chronic diarrhoea among the POWs to the food deficiency, though they are largely caused by food deficiency (nutrition deficiency)

(5) We could often clinically detect the non-typical case of chronic diarrhoea among the POW patients. These were peculiar to them and amounted to 20% all diarrhoea cases.

(6) The countermasures taken by sanitary officers in treating the chronic diarrhoea among the POWs may be summarized as follows:

(a) Strictly examination of faeces and the speedy isolation of the germ-carrier.

(b) The classification of all diarrhoea patients other than the germ-carriers into two classes of those due to food deficiency and those who suffer from non-typical diarrhoea, and then establish the respective means of treatment for each.

(c) In the case of food-deficiency diarrhoea, the taking care of the diet and employment of the chemotherapy concurrently and even when complication was detected attention was always paid
(4). In the case of non-typical diarrhoea, sensible treatment was taken and for the slighter ones mental induction was requested to be applied in order to let the patient willingly set to work.
Certificate of Authenticity

I hereby certify that the printed matter hereto attached is the thesis compiled and published by me.

Certified at the National Hospital,
WADA Village, HIDAKA County,
WAKAYAMA Prefecture.


/S/ OHASHI, Hyojiro (seal)
An Excerpt from the Monthly Report on the Prisoner of War (Doc. No. 12) issued on 31 Dec. 1944:

Gratitude Expressed by the Prisoners of War At the Tokyo POW Camp.

Commander Mayer, a senior officer to this internment camp tendered the following letter of appreciation in behalf of the internes to express gratitude for the various entertainments given on Christmas day, 26 December.

Letter of Appreciation Dec. 26, 1944

TO: Col. SAKABA

Chief of the Tokyo POW Camp

In behalf of all the prisoners of war in the Tokyo POW Camp, I wish to express our warm appreciation for being allowed to enjoy a wonderful Christmas day. For us prisoners here this day means so much and the fact that we are able to celebrate this day according to the customs of our country is indeed a privilege.

The majority of prisoners here, who are separated so far from their homes and families, have already observed Christmas twice in this camp but I am certain that this was the merriest of all. Had it not been for the Japanese military authorities we would not have been able to enjoy this day.

I wish to express again our heartfelt appreciation to Colonel SAKABA and his subordinates for their efforts in making our Christmas so enjoyable.

Mayer, Commander, U.S.N.
Evidence No. 16-3

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached, entitled "Gratitude of the Prisoners of War in the Tokyo POW Camp" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (The Prisoner-of-War Information Bureau).

On this 16 day of June, 1947

/s/ HAKANISHI, Kodenshi
Acting Chief of the Prisoner-of-War Information Bureau.
I, Paul M. Lynch, Clerk of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, do hereby certify that the annexed and foregoing 2 pages of writing are a true, correct and compared transcript of Exhibit No. 3121, including language corrections, if any, as the same appears on file in this office.

I further certify that this exhibit was admitted into evidence on the 8th day of September, 1947, as shown by the daily record at pages 27843 of the proceedings entitled:

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of this Tribunal on this 20th day of July, 1948.

/s/ Paul M. Lynch
Paul M. Lynch, Court Clerk
International Military Tribunal for the Far East

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

H.C. Bishop
International Military Tribunal For the Far East, General Secretary
United States of America
China, Great Britain
Russia, Australia, Canada
France, Netherlands,
New Zealand, India
Philippines
東京俘虜収容所俘虜処遇問題

昭和三十二年六月十六日
俘虜収容所長

中 西 貞

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 801
没有可用的自然语言文本。
OSAKA P.O.W. CAMP
Hirohata Sub-Camp
Hirohata, Japan

20. 8. 22.

To: The Medical Director and Staff, Seitetsu Hospital, Hirohata, Japan.

From: Sidney E. Sold, Captain, Medical Corps, U.S. Army.

For almost two years I have been the Prison Camp surgeon at the Prisoner of War Camp at Hirohata. During this time you have helped care for the prisoner of War Camp at Hirohata. During this time you have helped care for the prisoners. You have equipped our dispensary with medical and surgical instruments. You supplied us with medicines and surgical supplies, and were relatively generous with them, even when those items were very scarce and difficult to obtain. Your staff physicians gave medical and surgical consultations. You loaned me medical reference books. You also x-rayed our patients when it was required.

I know how busy your staff has been, and I know how scarce medical supplies have been in Japan. Therefore, I can and do appreciate what you have done for us.

I am writing you this letter as I leave Japan, so that you and whoever else reads this letter may know that I acknowledge the fine spirit in which you acted toward us. You and your staff have treated us so much more fairly and honorably than others, that you deserve commendation for it.

May the scars of war soon heal. May you and your staff have success and happiness in the years to come.

/s/ SIDNEY E. SELL
Capt. U.S. Army
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HIROTA, Teruki, who occupy the post of the medical director of HIROHATA SETTETSU, SHO HOSPITAL, NIPPON SETTETSU Co., Ltd. since August 1939 (13th year of Showa) hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in English consisting of 1 page is an exact and authorized letter of appreciation given to me personally from P.O.W.'S who were interned at HIROHATA Branch, O.S.K. F.O.W. Camp.

Certified at No. Ko-1625 Eike, Shikamoku, Himejishi, Hyogo-Prefecture

/S/ HIROTA, Teruki

The director of hospital, HIROHATA SETTETSU, SHO, Nippon Settetsu Co., Ltd.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place

At the same time

/S/ 

Witness
Excerpts from VA 1. 2. 13

"Examples of Officer POWs' Voluntary Work"

1. The four men voluntarily engaged in knitting fishing-nets for use in the north-northeast fishing area have proven to be very efficient.
   (an excerpt from "Laboring Officers", the monthly report of Hakodate POW Camp, April issue 1944)

2. In the Second Detachment, Captain ZEKURAI and Second Lieutenant KAY among other officers at labor, have worked voluntarily with eagerness and seriousness. Their results were far better than those of the average Japanese workers. Their great contribution was recognized by the firm and after many conferences it was decided that a sum of money for encouragement was to be given to the two officers as a reward.
   (an excerpt from the monthly report of Hakodate POW Camp, June issue, 1943)

3. The Officer POWs who were transferred and assembled at the detachments of Inuno and Oeyama, are actively engaged in farming. Particularly in the Oeyama Detachment they raise wheat, potatoes, sweet potatoes, and vegetables for themselves and before long they are expecting to harvest as much as 8 sacks (T.N. about 16 bushels) of wheat.
   (an excerpt from the monthly report of Osaka POW Camp, May issue, 1945)

4. The officer POWs who were transferred from Hiroshima POW Camp to Hokureishii Military Training ground, have volunteered to do farming, and have been working diligently since the end of last month.
   (an excerpt from the monthly report of Osaka POW Camp, June issue, 1945)
I hereby certify that this document is composed of exact excerpts from the document in the custody of this office.

July 1, 1947

/S/ NAKAMISHI, Sadayoshi
Acting Chief of F.M. Information Bureau
Excerpt from the "Tokyo Prisoners of War Internment Camp Monthly Report" (March, 1943)

1. Ordinary diet.

The staple food for the captives of non-commissioned officers and under were rationed 570 grammes at first, but it was gradually increased, in proportion to the amount of their labour, to 690 grammes by January 1st of this year. As the hours of their labor were extended in March, the last reserved quantity of 76 grammes were added, making it 786 grammes, which were the largest regulated amount and the equal quantity of ration allowed Japanese soldiers.

Moreover, from the viewpoint of preventing beri-beri, more cleaned wheat was used so that their staple food was composed of at the rate of 410 grs. of polished rice and 376 grs. of cleaned wheat.

Moreover, efforts were made to supply them with subsidiary articles of diet containing much albumen and fat so that they might be free from deficiency diseases and raise power of resistance to diseases.

2. Diet for patients.

To those sufferers from diarrhoea, bread and eggs, etc. have hitherto been given, and to the sufferers from beri-beri, vitamin and rice-bran were supplied and thus an early recovery of the patients was taken care of from the point of view of nutrition.

3. Efforts are being made to increase the sales of daily necessities in the canteen to the extent that no undue pressure may be brought upon the demand of the general public, in order to have prisoners find comfort and hope in this direction so that they may display the maximum ability in their labor.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, YOKOI, Kōji, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section in the Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau, hereby certify that the printed matter hereto attached, printed in Japanese, consisting of two pages and entitled the "Tokyo Prisoners of War Internment Camp Monthly Report" (March, 1943) is an exact and true copy of an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (The Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau).

At Tokyo,
on this 18th day of August, 1947.

/S/ YOKOI, Kōji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburo (seal)
昭和十九年四月一日 駐在三八二二日奉命

（昭和十九年六月）

- 勞役に没する存

- 力業に服せざる進士官以下

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- 賞品資及元一等官等の米資給與計数に関する件に於き新たに改定存

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文書
出所：成立ニ戟スル聡明書

(三箇)

自分ハ廣井考治ハ俳句倶楽部

会頭ニ任せるノ故ニ爾ト書き

日本語ヲ訳スルヲ以テ

聡明書ヲ作セラレタ

April 21, 1921

於東京

謹啓

立川人

野伊之郎
An excerpt from "the Deboker war Prisoners
Camp Waco (June, 1944)

a. With reference to the notice upon the frugal use of
provisions regulated by the Army Sub-secretary Order No. 2827,
1944 and the notice upon rations allowed to war prisoners
in rice and wheat regulated by the Army Sub-secretary Order
No. 5511, 1944 the revised plan of rationing war prisoners
was newly established and in conformity therewith rations
were allowed on and after June 1st as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Ration Allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual war prisoners under labour</td>
<td>705 gs/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual war prisoners below the non-commissioned officer free from labour</td>
<td>570 gs/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual commissioned officer and similar ranking officer</td>
<td>360 gs/day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a general rule, delivery of rice and wheat to all
war prisoners is based on at the rate of 705 gs. per head
but is to be adjusted by actually allowing the foregoing
rations to each one in accordance with the nature of labour
and physical conditions and by supplying the remaining
amount, if any, to the war prisoners either under hard labour
or in bad health. The result is generally satisfactory.

b. At the sub-branch where war prisoners are employed
in labour of coal mining, each one is given by the local
organ of distribution 710 gs. of rice and wheat which are
the same amount as Japanese miners are allowed under the
identical work. The ration, with mixtures of cereals and
pulse, is allowed generally after the method of the branch.

c. Taking demand and supply of rice and wheat into
consideration, all branches (sub-branches) are rationing
their war prisoners at a mixture rate of 30% of substitute
food for rice and wheat, acting up to the plan mentioned above.

d. There having been no distribution of wheat flour
through the month of June which was to be done by the
Mururo Division, all the branches faced difficulties in rationing
bread, and so they are now in course of negotiations with
the Division thereof. Fresh supply is expected from next
month.
2. Subsidiary Food.

a. As the matter of nutrition has become much indebted to the volume of subsidiary food in consequence of less supply of staple food and paying 3 sen to each war prisoner for making up thereof, we are making every effort to keep war prisoners in good health enough to let them work, as well as to prepare and arrange subsidiary food, sticking to the principle of self-support at each locality.

b. Generally speaking the subsidiary food are secured with smoothness and regularity, especially so with green vegetables. Fresh fish generally come to hand with regularity. Meat, however, was not easy to be gotten by the 2, 3, 14, 17, sub-branches during this month.

c. In view of war prisoners' taste, the diet is prepared with much use of curry powder, pepper and edible oil, and cooking is to be done by war prisoners themselves with their daily required amount of materials.

d. At each branch and sub-branch of the War Prisoners Camp during this month, the daily average calories taken by a war prisoner is 3,022,84 calories, his average weight being 60,153 kilogrammes, the particulars of which are given in the following list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>names of branches and sub-branches</th>
<th>calories taken per day</th>
<th>calories on an average</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the 1st Branch</td>
<td>3,166 cals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>the 2nd Branch</td>
<td>3,150 cals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>the 3rd Branch</td>
<td>3,576 cals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>the 4th Branch</td>
<td>2,842 cals.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 1st Sub-branch</td>
<td>3,023 cals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>the 2nd Sub-branch</td>
<td>3,032 cals.</td>
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<td>Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Branch</td>
<td>2,637</td>
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<tr>
<td>17th Branch</td>
<td>3,110</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st Branch</td>
<td>3,120</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Sub-branch</td>
<td>3,219</td>
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<td>4th Sub-branch</td>
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<td>5th Sub-branch</td>
<td>2,810</td>
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<td>6th Sub-branch</td>
<td>2,984</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Sub-branch</td>
<td>3,124</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Sub-branch</td>
<td>2,806</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th Sub-branch</td>
<td>3,013</td>
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<td>11th Sub-branch</td>
<td>3,257</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Sub-branch</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Certificate of Source and Authenticity:

I, YOKOI, Kôji, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section in the Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of three pages and entitled "An Excerpt from the Fukuoka Detention Camp Monthly Report" (issued in June, 1944) is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 18th day of August, 1947

/S/ YOKOI, Kôji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereeto in the presence of the Witness at the same place on this same date.

Witness: /S/ KAZUKA, Isaburô (seal)

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
An Excerpt from "the Rokko War Prisoners Camp Monthly (June, 1944)"

a. With reference to the notice upon the frugal use of provisions regulated by the Army Sub-secretary Order No. 3827, 1944 and the notice upon rations allowed to war prisoners in rice and wheat regulated by the Army Sub-secretary Order No. 5511, 1944 the revised plan of rationing war prisoners was newly established, and in conformity therewith rations were allowed on and after June 1st as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ration</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>705 gs. per head per day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>705 gs. per head per day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>570 gs. per head per day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned officer</td>
<td>360 gs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a general rule, delivery of rice and wheat to all war prisoners is based on at the rate of 705 gs. per head but is to be adjusted by actually allowing the foregoing rations to each one in accordance with the nature of labour and physical conditions and by supplying the remaining amount, if any, to the war prisoners either under hard labour or in bad health. The result is generally satisfactory.

b. At the sub-branch where war prisoners are employed in labour of coal-mining, each one is given by the local organ of distribution 710 gs. of rice and wheat which are the same amount as Japanese miners are allowed under the identical work. The ration, with mixtures of cereals and pulse, is allowed generally after the method of the branch.

c. Taking demand and supply of rice and wheat into consideration, all branches (sub-branches) are rationing their war prisoners at a mixture rate of 30% of substitute food for rice and wheat, acting up to the plan mentioned above.

d. There having been no distribution of wheat flour through the month of June which was to be done by the Mururo Division, all the branches faced difficulties in rationing bread, and so they are now in course of negotiations with the Division thereof. Fresh supply is expected from next month.
2. Subsidiary Food.

a. As the matter of nutrition has become much indebted to the volume of subsidiary food in consequence of less supply of staple food and paying 3 sen to each war prisoner for making up thereof we are making every effort to keep war prisoners in good health enough to let them work, as well as to prepare and arrange subsidiary food, sticking to the principle of self-support at each locality.

b. Generally speaking the subsidiary foods are secured with smoothness and regularity, especially so with green vegetables. Fresh fish generally come to hand with regularity. Meat, however, was not easy to be gotten by the 2, 3, 14, 17 sub-branches during this month.

c. In view of war prisoners taste, the diet is prepared with much use of curry powder, pepper and edible oil, and cooking is to be done by war prisoners themselves with their daily required amount of materials.

d. At each branch and sub-branch of the War Prisoners Camp during this month, the daily average calories taken by a war prisoner is 3,032,84 calories, his average weight being 60,153 kilogrammes, the particulars of which are given in the following list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>names of branches and sub-branches</th>
<th>calories taken per day</th>
<th>calories on an average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the 1st Branch</td>
<td>3,166 cals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 2nd Branch</td>
<td>3,150 cals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 3rd Branch</td>
<td>3,576 cals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 4th Branch</td>
<td>2,842 cals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 1st Sub-branch</td>
<td>3,023 cals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 2nd Sub-branch</td>
<td>3,032 cals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch</td>
<td>Calories</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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I, YOKOI, Kôji, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section in the Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of three pages and entitled "An Excerpt from the Fukuoka Detention Camp Monthly Report" (issued in June, 1944) is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau).

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 18th day of August, 1947

/S/ YOKOI, Kôji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place

on this same date

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburo (seal)
1. 善通寺仏像所収容所月報抜粋（昭和十九年十一月）

2. 仏像の出巡に際しての準備は依然配給状況を考慮したものを確保し、月報に記載したものに従って配布すること

3. 十字架等の食料品の寄贈を受けたもの等、副食物に限られていた場合を除く

4. 仏像の出巡に際しての準備は依然配給状況を考慮したものを確保し、月報に記載したものに従って配布すること

5. 仏像の出巡に際しての準備は依然配給状況を考慮したものを確保し、月報に記載したものに従って配布すること

6. 仏像の出巡に際しての準備は依然配給状況を考慮したものを確保し、月報に記載したものに従って配布すること

7. 仏像の出巡に際しての準備は依然配給状況を考慮したものを確保し、月報に記載したものに従って配布すること

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9. 仏像の出巡に際しての準備は依然配給状況を考慮したものを確保し、月報に記載したものに従って配布すること

10. 仏像の出巡に際しての準備は依然配給状況を考慮したものを確保し、月報に記載したものに従って配布すること
Excerpt from the Monthly Report by the 資治 場 War Prisoners' Camp (November, 1944)

1. Though the supply of meat and fish is not enough as before, vegetables seem to have been placed on the regular channel since the middle of this month. We are getting them by lawful means without sacrificing any civilian demand; we are now supplying more than 600 grams of vegetables per capita a day in every camp. In addition, thanks to the relief food from the Red Cross, through the good offices of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau, condition has become satisfactory for the present as far as meat and vegetables are concerned.

2. Soy-bean which has been supplied as a substitute for staple-food was stopped since the No. 2271 financial notice of the ZENTSUJI Division, "Instruction pertaining to the Stoppage of Supply of Soy-bean etc. As Substitutes for Staple-food" dated August 22, 1944 was issued; we have been making up for the deficit with our stock. But since the beginning of this month the stock has all gone. So at present we are securing necessary quantity from millet, kaoliang, green-peas, red bean and sweet-potato, which is now in season, as substitutes for rice or wheat. We have installed hand-mills, providing for the necessity of supplying pulverized food.

3. Regarding the food supply to officer prisoners forming a greater part of the war prisoners in our camp, we are trying to improve the labor for the self-supporting of officer prisoners, making accountant officer prisoners cooperate with the War Prisoner Cooking Section in planning meals. Besides encouraging the originality of officer prisoners for their own cooking as above mentioned, we newly provided for a "Special Meal for Recuperation (570 gram of staple-food)" which will be supplied to those who are especially in weakened condition (at present about 10 persons).
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOKOI, Koji, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Investigation Section of the War Prisoner Information Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Excerpt from the Monthly Report by ZENTSUIJI War Prisoners' Camp" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the War Prisoner Information Bureau)

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 16th day of August, 1947

/S/ YOKOI, Koji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

or. this same date

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburo (seal)
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: KUBOTA, Tokujirou

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am KUBOTA, Tokujirou. I am presently living in KUWA-Mura, SHIMOTSUGU-Gun, TOCHIGI-Prefecture. I was born in Osaka on the 14th day, July, the 24th year of Meiji (1891). I was the President of the Manchurian Engineering Machinery Company Ltd. (MANSHU KOBUKU KIKAI KIBUSHIKI KAISHA) from June, the 17th year of Showa (1942) to February, the 19th year of Showa (1944).

2. The matter of using prisoners of war concerning court exhibit No. 1970-A took place when I was the President of the Manchurian Engineering Machinery Company Ltd., so, I shall depose as follows...
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: KUBOTZ, Tokuiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am KUBOTZ, Tokuiro. I am presently living in KUMAGAYA, SHIMOTSU, Gun, TOCHIGI Prefecture. I was born in Osaka on the 14th day, July, the 24th year of Meiji (1891). I was the President of the Manchurian Engineering Machinery Company Ltd. (MANSHU KOGAKU KIKAI KABUSHIKI KAISHA) from June, the 17th year of Showa (1942) to February, the 19th year of Showa (1944).

2. The matter of using prisoners of war concerning court exhibit No. 1970-A took place when I was the President of the Manchurian Engineering Machinery Company Ltd., so, I shall depose as follows.
concerning the real circumstances of the use of the prisoners in connection with this case as the said president at that time.

(1) Although, there arrived at Mukden approximately 1,300 prisoners of war towards November, the 17th year of Showa (1942), it was about February, the 18th year of Showa (1943) that the said company commenced to employ the POWs, and their number was about 50. Thereafter, the number of POWs were gradually increased, and their peak reached about 600. According to the first plan, we were going to use about 1,000 POWs, however, the percentage of actual workers was 60% at the highest rate. This was due to the fact that as a consequence of an investigation of the POWs abilities, we found out a number of them were farmers and that there were fewer experienced mechanics than we had expected. Also because of the fact that we did not work them improperly taking into consideration such things as the POWs health, ability, rank etc.

By the way, the employees of our company numbered approximately 300 Japanese and about 700 Manchurians --- totalling about 1,000, when we first began to use the POWs; at the peak we had approximately 800 Japanese and about 1,200 Manchurians --- totalling about 2,000.

(2) Our company manufactured machinery belonging to the category
of enlarging productive power, and as far as I know there were no plans established either by the Army, or by Manchukuo or by our company also, to make the company a military factory, and not a single order was received by our company from any arms manufacturing factories in Manchuria, Japan proper and other places, to produce arms or parts thereof. Consequently, our company never used the P.O.W.s to engage in work related with the manufacture of arms or with work directly concerned with the operations of war.

3. As mentioned above, there were so few technically experienced workers among the prisoners of war, contrary to our first expectations, that at first, although they attended the factory every day they did not do any work worth mentioning. In the meantime, in compliance with the desire of the majority of the P.OWs we decided to teach them the techniques of machinery manufacture. We purchased about five tons of pig-iron and steel materials from the 918th Army unit in Manchuria at that time, to be used as material for the educational program and we classified the P.O.W.s into mechanics, finishers, fitters, tool makers, blacksmiths, carpenters, draftsmen, designers, warehouse-keepers, automobile repairmen etc. and taught them the techniques of machinery manufacture under the leadership of the company's engineers and skilled workers. As a result of this, after my
resignation as president of the company, an automatic lathe was made.

4. Colonel MATSUDA, Chief of the internment camp in Mukden, inspected our company frequently and instructed all the Japanese and Manchurian employees to treat the P.O.W.s with charity and tolerance.

Consequently there was no discriminatory treatment between the Japanese, Manchurian and the P.O.W.s, and they were able to work with pleasure in perfect harmony as one.

5. The poisoners of war were idle and felt awkward doing no work whatsoever during the interval and before reporting to the factory after their arrival at Mukden but, they used to visit the factory now and then as they desired; A party for the P.O.W.s was held in the main dining hall of the factory on Christmas Eve, 1942 in accordance with the P.O.W.s desires. Though various materials were not easily available at that time, we bought tobacco, Candy, apples, oranges etc. by all possible means and distributed them to the P.O.W.s; and the P.O.W.s themselves contributed to the party by putting on skits and other entertainment.

On this 5th day of August, 1947

At Nippon Industrial Bank, 7-5-1 kayō, Chiyoda-Ward, Tokyo.

Def. Doc. #2093

Defendant: Kubota, Tokuiro (seal)
I, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: /S/ SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo (seal)

Q.TH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KUJIRO, Tokujiro (seal)
REPORTS ON TREATMENT OF P.O.W. IN PRISONER'S CAMPS IN JAPAN PROPER

I.

PURPORT

This report has been prepared for the purpose of clarifying how the Japanese personnel in charge of the prisoners' camps in Japan Proper committed illegal acts in the treatment of the prisoners of war of the Allied Forces and how the Japanese authorities dealt with these culpable personnel, and explaining the actual circumstances at the time which led to these events.

As this report has been and is being drawn up according to the returns which have been or are being made by chiefs of camps, additional reports on these cases will be made later on.

II.

THE FACTS WHICH WERE REVEALED ON THE ABOVE CASES AND MEASURES TAKEN.

Upon inquiries among the prisoners' camps in Japan Proper, it was revealed that, with few exceptions, atrociously and inhuman acts of violence were never done deliberately upon the prisoners of war.

However, there were certain cases where improper measures were taken in the dealing or treatment of the P.O.W., such as some unauthorized punishments which was inflicted upon the P.O.W. by some Japanese personnel who were carried away by their emotions and misunderstanding of custom. Such cases were caused through the difference of languages and the lack of efforts on our part, or sometimes some unavoidable circumstances, which resulted in a lot of illness and deaths among the P.O.W., and the carelessness on the part of the employers of prisoners caused accidents while the prisoners were being employed on P.O.W. labor.

Although most of these cases took place under unavoidable circumstances, we keenly regret that we were to blame for it. And in case the treatment of the P.O.W. was unfair, we did justice to our faults and every time gave strict warnings to those concerned, and the offenders were all dealt with by their superiors as mentioned in the affixed list.

And instructions were given to the military district commanders that they should make a close examination of each case and deal fairly with the offenders, clarifying where the responsibility rested, so more reports will be made on our fair dealings as they have been disclosed.

III.

EXPOSITIONS: "STATEMENT"

Our basic policy of the treatment of the prisoners of war aimed at giving a just and fair treatment to them according to various regulations relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.
Our superintendents of the prisoners of war strictly observing this basic policy made every effort to treat them fairly. However, it was really a matter of regret that some supervisors directly in charge of the prisoners dealt out illegal punishment which the Japanese are apt to practise by habit and sometimes treated them unfairly under various circumstances at home or owing to some unavoidable accidents. The circumstances at the time under which the above cases took place will be explained below.

1. Illegal punishment inflicted upon Prisoners of War.

1) Illegal punishment is not only one of the chronic evil practice in our army, but also one of the national defects. Generally the people of this country make light of the evil of this practice. They never regard it so gross an insult as Europeans and Americans do. They have such erroneous views that a kind man would rather chastise an offender with a blow of his fist and let him go than punish him formally according to the law putting him to shame before the public or bringing disgrace upon his family, and that discipline will be maintained by illegal punishment. We deeply regret that such an evil practice brought troubles upon the prisoners of war.

The authorities of the Army had already been cognizant of the serious evils of such private punishment which trampled upon human rights, or disturbed military discipline, or became an obstacle to education in various lines, and made every effort to remove such an evil practice, repeatedly giving strong warning, but with all their efforts conditions failed to improve as much as expected.

Besides, the Japanese are generally quick-tempered. They easily get excited over trifles. Especially when a trouble takes place on account of the difference of languages or customs. They are too impatient to inquire into the rights and wrongs of the case or chastise offenders by lawful means which are possible, and, carried away by their excited feelings, deal out private punishment at once on the spot. But later when they become calm they repent of their violent acts.

11) Motives for private punishments.

The examination of the real facts of such private punishments inflicted upon the prisoners of war shows that in almost all cases, the punishers did such private dealings not for venting their own rancor but simply for the purpose of correcting the misconduct of the prisoners of war, or in self-defense, or on account of their misunderstandings, which were produced by the difference of languages, that the prisoners were insulting or resisting them.

On the other hand, some prisoners of war were really irreclaimable, lacking in moral sense, and some of them were shunned by the rest of the prisoners, who sometimes asked us to chastise them by our hands.
Def. Doc. 1433

111) Supervision and guidance in preventing private punishments.

Most of these unjust acts were done by men lower than non-commissioned officers and very few officers committed such offenses.

Careful consideration was paid in selecting lower officials such as watchmen, leaders, and guards who were usually in touch with the prisoners, and much care was taken for the supervision and guidance over these lower officials. But almost all the watchmen were disabled ex-servicemen because at the time the recruitment of the army was more urgent. And a comparatively large number of these disabled ex-servicemen were prejudiced and mentally defective because of their physical defects, and they were liable to treat the prisoners unfairly. So we always had a close supervision over those guards. Those who were extremely wrong were fired at a moment notice. As leaders and guards were selected and recommended by the employers of prisoners of war, and all these personnel were not so good in character, much care was taken in selecting them, and the closest supervision and careful guidance were exercised over them.

On the occasion of the Council of the Chiefs of the P.O.W. Control Bureau of the War Ministry, which was held on December 26, 1943, Major General HAMADA, Chief of the P.O.W. Control Bureau (Concurrently Chief of the P.O.W. Information Bureau), delivered an address calling the attention of those concerned.

Gist of Major General HAMADA's Address

Although the prisoners of war should be treated in accordance with the actual condition of the places where they were, we must be very careful not to treat them too badly in our excess of hatred. Unfair treatment of prisoners of war is nothing but an exhibition of narrow animosities and contrary to the spirit of Bushido or the cause of justice for which we are now waging this Greater East Asia War. Especially a private punishment, although it is originally a matter of trifle personal feeling, will not only hurt the personal feeling of the prisoners of war, but also furnish misleading data for surmising the general state of the treatment of P.O.W. in this country. If they should carry out pernicious propaganda about the ill-treatment of the P.O.W. in this country after their return home, the evil effects will be really beyond measure. I understand that in nine cases out of ten the difference in languages and the lack of understanding of the rules and regulations on the part of our officials concerned were the motives of such private punishments. I hear some prisoners were incensed at it so much as to knock down the punishers in reprisal. At this we cannot remove shame with mere punishment of the prisoners.

You will please pay special attention to guiding your men in regard to the treatment of the P.O.W. and at every possible opportunity make every effort to make this point perfectly understood by all the units concerned, the units which employ the P.O.W., and other employers of the P.O.W. so as to give due and fair treatment to the P.O.W.
Def. Doc. 1433

iv) Feelings of officials of P.O.W. Camps toward the P.O.W.

Generally the Japanese are very simple and honest by nature, and easily taken in by propaganda. They are liable to be instilled with bitter hostility against the enemy through propaganda especially by foreign newspapers and magazines. During the Greater East Asia War, they harbored serious hostility against the enemy, but they treated those who had surrendered rather warmly, displaying hostility no longer. However, it cannot be denied that some of our officials failed to treat the prisoners of war fairly through a sense of superiority at heart. But, as mentioned above, it was not through such hostile feeling that the officials of the P.O.W. camps acted unfairly in treating the prisoners, but officials who were comparatively ill-educated and lacking in moral sense practised such unjust acts under wild excitement when troubles happened.
Def Loc No. 1433

(1) Number of Deaths and Invalids; Classification of Disease.

The total of the POW who were transported to Japan Proper was 35,000. Thirty five hundred out of these prisoners of war, 10% of the total number, died. The number of invalids was from 2,000 to 3,000 per month on average. We are really sorry that we cannot justify ourselves for this, although this was due to various unavoidable circumstances.

The monthly total of deaths is shown in the Affixed List No. II.

The diseases which caused these numerous deaths and invalids were chiefly chronic enteritis, beriberi, pneumonia, and distrophy, almost all of which are mainly due to the unaccustomed food or climate. Few of the prisoners suffered from infectious diseases.

(2) Efforts made of Improvement of Health Conditions.

(a) As mentioned above, those who were in charge of the POT were all very much concerned at the health condition of the prisoners. At every opportunity they tried to improve it, urging officials in direct charge. Every possible scientific measure were taken for the improvement of the sanitary conditions of the POT, especially for the proper assignment of labor according to health condition, the adjustment of supply, labor, and rest, the establishment of POT hospitals, the utilization of provincial hospitals or army hospitals, the improvement of equipment and the procurement of medical supplies. And for the last tremendous expenses were paid.

(b) However, in spite of such unremitting efforts of the officials concerned, medical supplies came to run short as an inevitable consequence of the development of the war. Consequently, to our keenest regret, there were brought a materially ill effect upon the management of the affairs of the POT's health.

A close examination of the causes of such miserable health conditions of the POT showed that the more or less improper treatment of the POT during the transportation to Japan Proper, and the sudden change of the climate caused by their move from the tropical zone to the cooler zone were among the main factors of the poor health condition of the POT.

During the voyage, the commanding officers of troops in transit together with other officials made their best effort for the sanitation of the POT.

But these transport ships were very often wrecked, being attacked by the airplanes and submarines of Allied Forces or sometimes obliged to be at sea much more days than scheduled to avoid such attacks, consequently supplies running short, the POT were gradually exhausted and many of them died or suffered from distrophy, and those who had been in very good health were found in poor health condition when they landed on Japan Proper. And this brought a very bad effect on their health condition afterward.

In December 1941, the War Vice-Minister and the Vice Chief of the General Staff issued a note for the purpose of exercising proper supervision over the POT in transit for Japan Proper, urging officials in charge to pay much attention to the treatment of the POT. The note is shown below:

Subject: Transportation of POT.

It is reported that there are found a number of invalids (and deaths) among the POT who have arrived in Japan Proper of late on account of the improper treatment in transit. In the light of this fact, it is brought to your notice by order that closer attention should be paid to the treatment of the POT who are to be transported to Japan Proper, that is, the selection of the POT, quarantine, allotment of the medical staff, preparation of necessary medical and food supplies in transit, proper supervision during the transportation, arrangement to meet the convenience of the POT transport ships at each port of call, and adequate supply of clothing.
The transportation of these POW being from the tropics to the cooler districts, special care was taken in deciding the time for their journey. However, owing to some circumstances such as irregular shipping traffic or others, some of the POW got to Japan Proper in winter which sometimes brought ill effects upon the health of the prisoners (T.N. original not clear - underlined portion).

(c) On March 3, 1944, a note regarding the establishment of hospitals for prisoners of war was issued in the name of the War Vice-Minister to call the attention of the officials concerned to the following points:
1) Prisoners of war shall be supplied with food and clothes according to the nature of work. The quantity of these supplies shall be in accordance with the various regulations relative to the treatment of POW.

11) Each prisoners' camp shall have sick wards attached to it as soon as possible. (Branch camps and labor detachments shall be equipped with necessary medical supplies and instruments, and each main camp shall have an infirmary with sufficient equipment), so that sick prisoners may receive sufficient medical treatment. Expenditures, materials and medical supplies necessary for these institutions shall be delivered on demand.

111) Enemy medical personnel shall be employed most effectively to improve sanitary work in each camp. And medical personnel of the army units attached to prisoner camps shall be in charge of the sanitation, prevention of epidemics and medical treatment. And necessary medical personnel were sent to these dispensaries from Army units stationing near camps so as to give satisfactory medical treatments. And what is to be mentioned here with hearty thanks is that POW medical personnel rendered a remarkably great service to the sanitation of the camps, willingly assisting Japanese medical personnel.

1111) Medical Supplies:

Medical supplies were delivered to POW infirmaries, like other Army units, from the headquarters of the Army to which camps belonged the demand of the Chief of each POW camp. Besides, the medical supplies donated by the International Red Cross Society were also used. In addition, to give sufficient medical treatment, penicillin, the famous wonder drug, the study of which had been initiated and completed in this country, was also given to sick prisoners, although the general Japanese armies had had no supply of it.


a) Beriberi.

It seemed that generally the prisoners had very weak resisting powers to beriberi which has been prevalent in the East. Many a case was found among prisoners. Generally speaking, more serious cases of this disease were found among the prisoners than among the Japanese soldiers.
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As this was partly due to the change of food, firstly the improvement of food supplies was planned. To have a better absorption of nourishment, bread was recommended in every camp. Although the food problem was really acute at home, every effort was made for the adequate supply of meat and fats. Besides vitamin preparations (both internal medicines and injections) were supplied in very large quantity. Wakamoto and Yeast were given at meals.

Consequently in Japan Proper there is seen a remarkable decrease of beriberi cases of late, and those who are now suffering from beriberi are mostly old cases.
b) Dysentery.

This disease is, as a rule, very prevalent in the Southern Regions. And it was noticed that more amoeba dysentery cases were found among prisoners than among the Japanese troops. As these prisoners were undernourished, their condition was comparatively serious.

The following table shows the result of the microscopic examination of the most serious dysentery cases which was made at the Mukden Prisoners Camp immediately after their removal from the Southern Regions at the end of February, 1943 (Including bacilli-carriers).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of cases Examined</th>
<th>Positive Reaction</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dysentery Bacilli</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysentery Amoebae</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Para-typhus Bacilli</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the protozoan carriers had a considerable number of trichomonis mixed with protozoa. As to dysentery amoebae, we mostly used "cetren" (T.N. spelling not sure) as the supply of "emcbin" was not sufficient on account of its short production.
When the prisoners arrived in Japan Proper, there were found a considerable number of capsule-carriers among them, but gradually the number of these capsule-carriers decreased.

(c) Diphtheria
The prisoners were idiosyncratic to this disease, especially to dermatitis diphtheria which was very prevalent. At first the cases were found in large numbers at Hongkong, and also in Manjus. A considerable number of these cases came into this country later. As counter-measures, we conducted bacteriological examinations, disinfection of clothing, enforcement of gargling, and the use of flu masks. Most of the cases received diphtheria serum treatment, as we got an ample supply of the serum.

(d) Pneumonia
In Hokuriku district a considerable number of prisoners suffered from pneumonia on account of the cold there.

As precautionary measures, we took such steps as stated below, and as to the cases, we removed them to warmer districts for the best possible treatment.

5. Measures for Protection against Cold in Cold District.

As the prisoners had very poor resisting powers, especially against the cold, the following steps were adopted.

(a) Increased Supply of Blankets.
In each camp every prisoner was supplied with five or six blankets (ordinal supply 4), no blanket being left boarded. In some places where it was severely cold employers of prisoners gave a donation of "futons" (T.N. Bed covers and mattress wadded with cotton) to prisoners at the suggestion of the camp authorities.

(b) Prisoners' rooms were sealed up to protect them from draught. To keep warmth, entrances of their barracks were fitted up with double doors of blankets or matings, and floors of their rooms were covered with straw, straw bags, "tatamis" (T.N. thick straw mattings), "usuberis" (T.N. thin straw mattings).

(c) Heating Arrangements.
All the rooms or sick wards of prisoners camps were furnished with stoves. These stoves were used in camps from September, a little earlier than in our barracks. In some camps rooms were warmed from midnight or early in the morning (3 a.m.).

(d) Other Arrangements.
The best possible protections against cold were provided, for example, windbreaks in front of the entrances of the barracks, double windows on the north side of buildings, recreation rooms, with glass windows on the south side, serving as sun-rooms, warmed rest rooms near working places, partition of large rooms, ceiling of rooms, and regular supply of warm food.

In some camps, all the prisoners were supplied with hot-water bottles.
6. Food Supply

Both for the maintenance of health and enjoyment of life, the most careful attention together with the most serious efforts were made toward the adequate supply of food for prisoners, and concerning their meals, we always respected their national customs, and gave much thought to their taste, physique and constitution. The calorie of their ration, which was fixed according to that of our army, was usually not under 3,000, special care being taken for the supply of albuminous food and fats. Consequently, the prisoners' rations were much more than those of the Japanese at large, and even more than those of our special heavy workers.

The rations of the prisoners, the Japanese Army and the average Japanese are shown in the food list No. 3.

Serious endeavors were made to secure this rate of their rations under the most unfavorable condition of food supply at home. And among our people there were some who felt envy at such rations of the prisoners.

With the development of the war, the acquisition of materials, especially articles of food, became more and more difficult. As to rations prisoners were never treated with discrimination because of their being prisoners. The fact is that the people at large found themselves in such a sad plight that they could not maintain health with the regular ration only. Some of them attempted black-marketing and some went far away into the country for purchasing food articles.

It was not only the people at large but also the end of 1944 there were found many cases of beriberi case among the soldiers, and these cases increased one after another. Therefore, at the beginning of 1945, the self-supplying system of food articles was encouraged among the army units for the purpose of procuring the adequate supply of nourishment for the personnel of the army. Such being the case, it was not only the prisoners that were suffering from malnourishment.

Under such circumstances, the personnel of prisoners' camps endeavored to obtain adequate supplies of food for prisoners, overcoming various difficulties. Sometimes they went out at night after daytime work to get food articles, and sometimes went to market drawing carts themselves, sometimes to some distant places, say more than ten miles away from their camps; sometimes they went around mountain sides for getting vegetables. Sometimes they had to persuade the prejudiced personnel of district organs. But it was really a matter of regret that these unremitting efforts of the personnel of camps produced no good result. The situation became worse and worse, with the result that the health of prisoners was affected so much.
7. Equipment in Camps.

Every possible means was taken, as far as circum-
stances permitted, to obtain materials for the equipment
of camps, which had directly or indirectly more or less
effect upon the health of prisoners. But such circumstances
as shown below, brought upon a condition which was not so
desirable.

Building business was confronted with serious
difficulties at home as early as before the outbreak of
the Greater East Asia War. In 1929 ordinary building works
became almost impossible. With the lapse of time, the
situation became more and more aggravated. Since the
outbreak of the war all the new construction works except
those having direct connection with the operations of war,
were not permitted to set about. And even those which were
indispensable were mere makeshift buildings just like
triangular barracks or trench barracks which were seen in
the first line.

As the prisoners' camps were built and equipped
under such circumstances they could not be said to be
satisfactory. The short supply of building materials such
as timbers, nails, cement, panes, metal fittings, sheet-zinc,
bricks, slates, as well as the shortage of laborers such as
carpenters and plasterers, made it difficult not only to
start a construction of new camps but also to convert old
buildings into prisoners' camps.

8. Accidents Which Happened While Working at POW Labor,
etc.

(a) Thirty-six cases of such accidents have become
clear so far. The details are shown in the affixed list
No. 4.

(b) Although these accidents took place under un-
avoidable circumstances, most of them were partly due to
the carelessness on the part of the employers of the pri-
soners. So that strong warnings were given repeatedly,
and sometimes special trainings were given to the prisoners
(T.N. not clear) so as to avoid such accidents.

(c) He suggested the employers of prisoners to make
adequate counter-measures against such unhappy accidents,
and take some steps to console the injured prisoners.

As to the means of consolation and condolence,
rules were provided as follows:

Measures for Relief on the Part of Employers
of Prisoners in Case of Accidents.
In case prisoners (Including prisoners despatched from outside. The same with the "prisoners" in the following.) should be killed or injured in any accident for which they are not responsible (excluding those which are inevitable) while they are at work in factories or other working places, you will suggest the employers of prisoners (including employers of despatched prisoners) to make donations according to the following standard in accordance with Article 15 of the Regulations governing the P.O.W. labor and Clause 2, Article 11 of the Regulations governing the Despatch of Prisoners.

(1) Prisoners who lay off on account of their wounds.

Employers shall donate the sum correspondent to injured prisoners wages according to the number of their off-days.

(2) Prisoners crippled or killed as the result of their wounds.

Employers shall donate the sum correspondent to the accident allowance or the allowance to the surviving family in accordance with the Factory Law and the Mining Law. In this case the base wage shall be 1 Yen.

P.S. The money offered to dead prisoners shall be disposed as articles left by the deceased.
APPENDIX NO. 1

(A) Hakodate Camp

Outline of the Affair

On 4 April, 1943, the Japanese beat a prisoner of war with bamboo stick because of the prisoner evaded work.

Assailant and the Punishment imposed Upon him by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman, TAKESHIYA, Toshio. 2 day's domiciliary confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

In January, 1945, while the Japanese was standing sentry as a guard, the prisoners used violent languages. In addition, when the Japanese patrolled, the prisoners were using prohibited stove. Then the Japanese beat prisoners.

Assailant and the Punishment imposed Upon him by the Superior

Civilian Service Man, SAITO, Terukichi, Four days heavy domiciliary confinement.

Outline of the Affair

In April, 1943, as the prisoners forced themselves into the dispensary and stole some medicines, the Japanese beat them and admonished them. Later, the Japanese beat them for several times.

Assailant and the Punishment imposed Upon him by the Superior

Ambulance Pvt, 1st Class, KANAMARU, Matsuzo. Five days confinement for serious case.

OUTLINE OF THE AFFAIR

On 20 July, 1943, the Japanese beat a prisoner because the prisoner stole a cucumber at the munitions dump.

Assailant and the Punishment imposed Upon him by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman, TANAKA, Junichiro. One day confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair and Others

same as above.

Assailant and the Punishment imposed Upon him by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman. NAGAMINE, Masayoshi. Four day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 3 September, 1943, the Japanese slightly beat a prisoner because the prisoner forced himself into the warehouse of canteen and stole something.
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Assailant and the punishment imposed upon Him by the Superior

Corporal ITOH, Kunio. Five days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 12 September, 1943, the Japanese got angry and beat prisoners because the prisoners were late several times to their work.

Assailant and the punishment imposed upon them by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman WATANABE, Sadao. Two days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 20 September, 1943, as a prisoner hummed loudly at the clinic, the Japanese warned him, who, however, did not take any obedient attitude. And then the Japanese slapped and admonished him. The Japanese also beat the prisoner after that.

Assailant and the Punishment by the Superior

Ambulance Pvt. 1st Class. IMAI, Kiyoshi. Five days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 4 February, 1944 while patrolling, the Japanese found the prisoner smoking out of the fixed place and beat him slightly.

Assailant and the Punishment by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman NAGAMINE, Masayoshi. Seven days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

In December, 1943; the Japanese found the prisoner, who was to keep vigil, sleeping on bed, and beat him slightly. The same Japanese beat the prisoners three times, as the prisoner smoked out of the fixed place or did not obey orders or instructions.

Assailant and the Punishment imposed by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman SUDA, Kiyomatsu. Seven days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the Affair

On 10 January, 1944, while the Japanese was on patrol-sentry, the prisoner not only neglected to salute, but
laughed scornfully, so the Japanese slightly beat the prisoner. In addition, the Japanese slightly beat the prisoners who had a smoke after the "light out".

**Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior**

Civilian Serviceman MIYAGAWA, Nobuhiro. Five days confinement for serious case.

**Outline of the Affair**

On 19 June, 1944, the Japanese beat the prisoners on the head who deliberately neglected work. Moreover, the Japanese warned prisoners of war of their unfairness in the distribution of mess, and beat with leather belt those who refuted.

**Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior**

Civilian Serviceman TAKESHITA, Toshio. Ten days confinement for serious case.

**Outline of the Affair**

On 23 July, 1944, the prisoner night watchman whom the Japanese appointed was not on duty and other POW was on duty. Its reason was not clear and their attitudes were very impolite, and so the Japanese beat them.

**Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior**

Surgeon Lt. SITBA, Tsutomu. Seven days confinement for serious case.

**Outline of the Affair**

On the morning of 14 August, 1944, at the roll call, the prisoner of war who was not sick wore overcoat. So he was beaten by the Japanese.

**Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior**

Sgt. ASATOSHI, Eiji. One day confinement for serious case.

**Outline of the Affair**

On 10 December, 1944, as a prisoner exchanged official issued boots with tobacco possessed by a Japanese worker, he was beaten.

**Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior**

Civilian Serviceman KARIYA, Yoshiaki. Five days attention.
Outline of the Affair

In January, 1945, the Japanese was insulted by a prisoner who also violated the rules of night-watch duty. So the Japanese beat the prisoner.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Civilian serviceman, SAITO, Terukichi. 4 days attention.

Outline of the Affair

On 6 February, 1945, a prisoner cut an officially issued bed sheet and, with it, made gloves and pants. So he was beaten by the Japanese.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Sgt. ASATOSHI, Eiji. Five days attention.

Outline of the Affair

On 8 February, 1945, the Japanese slightly beat the prisoners who disobeyed the order, for the sake of caution for other POW's.

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Ambulance Sgt. ARAKI, Kuniichi. Three days attention.

Outline of the Affair

Same as above

Assailant and the Punishment Imposed by the Superior

Civilian serviceman, WATANABE, Sadao. Admonition.
Outline of the affair
In May, 1944, resenting against the prisoner's violation of rules and impolite attitudes, the Japanese beat him.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Civilian Serviceman, YAMADA, Junichiro. Five day's heavy attention.

Outline of the Affair
On 20 April 1945, a prisoner entered the warehouse violating the rules of warehouse and took meal at the section of the warehouse, so he was beaten by the Japanese.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Civilian Serviceman KOSHOIZU, Iwao. Two day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair
Same as stated above.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Civilian Serviceman, YAMAKA, Katsumi. Two day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair
In July, 1945, a prisoner entered kitchen without permission and neglected salutation, so he was beaten by the Japanese.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Civilian Serviceman IKEUCHI, Kenichi. Two day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair
On 1 August 1945, the Japanese beat the prisoners who were always slow in action and, in addition, did not obey instructions.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Civilian Serviceman HATANAKE, Sadao. Seven day's heavy attention.

Outline of the affair
On 8 July 1945, the Japanese was indignant at the insolent attitudes of prisoners of war, when he interrogated them on the charge of something wrong, and beat the prisoners.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Chief Pte. KIMURA, Nobumasa. Two days confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair
On 10 August 1945, when the Japanese interrogated the prisoners who committed thefts at vegetable garden, the prisoners did not confess the truth on one pretext or another, taking bad attitudes. So the Japanese beat the prisoners.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Chief Pte. KUDO Ich. Five days heavy attention.

Outline of the affair
On 27 July 1945, while the Japanese was on duty as the chief of sentry, he warned and beat the prisoners who neglected salute.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Chief Pte. KIMURA, Keigo. One day's heavy attention.
Outline of the affair
On 2 February 1943, the Japanese beat a prisoner of war who smokod ignoring rule and was lazy.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Guard ENDO, Hidoo. Suspension of attendance for five days.

Outline of the affair
In July, 1941, the prisoners took defiant attitudes against the Japanese leadership of work, and so the Japanese beat them.

Offenders and the punishment by the superior
Clerks of Akasawa Line: SUZUSHIMA Sadami, NAKAZUMI Chiyosaburo (the above two were discharged) and OKO Shiuichi (Admonition and five day’s suspension of attendance).

Outline of the affair
On 17 September, 1942, during the work, the Japanese and prisoners beat each other owing to the unskillfulness in the work and the lack of understanding due to language difficulty. At that time, the Japanese slightly injured the prisoners right leg.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Coacher MITSUHASHI Yonokichi. Admonition and discharge.

Outline of the affair
In April 1945, at roll calls, the prisoners assumed very insolent attitudes despite repeated warnings. In addition, the prisoners stole things from civilians’ houses for several times.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Guard KIMISHIMA Kenzo. Discharge.

Outline of the affair
In June, 1945, the Japanese ordered the prisoner of war to repair a cart, which the prisoners refused under the pretext that he did not break it. Then the Japanese beat the prisoner.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Outline of the affair
The manner of service was bad. There were rumours that this Japanese embezzled things for prisoners of war. Moreover, he beat prisoners.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Interpreter of the Company SHIROMA Kin. Discharge.

Outline of the affair
A P.O.W. stole herrings while working in the warehouse and was beaten by the Japanese.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Guard ZIINO Mitsuichi.
Outine of the affair
At the turn, the Japanese beat prisoner on his head with some instrument.

Offenders and the punishment imposed by the superior
Civilian Serviceman TSUDA Koju. Three day's heavy attention.

Outine of the affair
The Japanese beat prisoner of war as a man in charge of provisions and fodder.

Offenders and the punishment imposed by the superior
Civilian Serviceman TSUDA Saburo and SASAKI Toraji. Three day's heavy attention.
Outline of the affair

The Japanese punished prisoners of war privately.
Offenders and the punishment imposed by the superior
Sgt. MIURA Soichiro and Civilian Serviceman OSANAI Shigeru.
Strict Admonition.

Outline of the affair

The Japanese punished prisoners of war privately because of prisoner's neglects of their duties.
Offenders and the punishment imposed by the superior
Guard of the company: TAKASARI Suteo and SATO Shin-nosuke.
50 percent reduction of salaries for twenty days.

Outline of the affair

There was something unfair in the Japanese's distribution of articles.
Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Sgt. OHTA Kaichi. Three days heavy attention.

Outline of the affair

The Japanese beat prisoners on their head.
Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
Civilian Servicemen YONEMURA Pichigi (discharge) and TAKASAGO Ikutada (5 day's heavy attention).

(C) TOKYO CAMP.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1943, this Japanese was very earnest and especially careful in the management of the prisoners of war. On the contrary, however, he was too strict to administrative duties of the prisoners of war and his treatment of them was also extremely severe. Above all, when he ordered prisoners of officer's rank some work, they did not obey, so he beat and kicked them.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior
The camp commander of the fifth branch, Lieutenant KATOH Tetsutaro. Three day's heavy attention.
Outline of the affair

This Japanese forced work on sick prisoners who were suffering slightly.
This Japanese's disposals of seized goods and stocked articles were not certain.
This Japanese carried out inoculation without any knowledge of medicine (allegations by the prisoners of war).

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Lieutenant NISHIZAWA Masao. As he had been transferred to other unit, his whereabouts is now under investigation to interrogate the actual state.

Outline of the affair

In June, 1945, this Japanese was positive and earnest on the path of his duty, but he was also of quick-tempered and very often restrained prisoners privately, and took violent action. So he was strictly admonished and was transferred to other branch. Still, however, his repentance was not satisfactory.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. WATANABE Mutsuhiro. Four day's heavy attention and sent back to his original unit.

Outline of the affair

While this Japanese was in charge of clothings, there everyday was shortage of articles issued to prisoners. So, this Japanese, setting too much importance on the officially issued articles, inflicted private restraints on the prisoners.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman KOBAYASHI Seigo. Five day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1945, this Japanese was in charge of labours and had been earnestly and diligently engaging in his duty. However, while he was assuming leadership of labour, there very often were the acts on his part that should be considered as "severe". Above all, this Japanese was indignant about the indifferent attitude of a prisoner and violently beat him on his face.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman KIMURA Iwao. Three day's confinement for serious case.
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Outline of the affair

In December, 1942, this Japanese had always been a supporter of the prisoners and he treated the prisoners with kindness. However, if there had been someone whose fulfillment of duty was unsatisfactory or whose attitude lacked rigidity, he was so relentless that he inflicted private restraint repeatedly. Above all, when he acknowledged that a prisoner's movements in his daily life were very rough and inconsiderate, he beat him on his face on the pretext of admonition.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Interpreter, Chief Private KURIYAMA Michio. Three day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

While this Japanese was with the cooking section of the first branch, there were signs that he stole prisoners belongings and rations, but no positive proof was produced about it. According to what was stated by the representative of prisoners, he mistreated prisoners in order to conceal his crime. This Japanese, actually, again and again mistreated prisoners severely.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman MIYAZAKI Hiroshi. Three day's heavy attention.

(D) NAGOYA CAMP

Outline of the affair

Between April and July, 1945, there were prisoners of war who broke the key of the provisions warehouse and stole rations, who, in their own section, were cooking the soyabean paste which they stole, who concealed flours, rice, etc. that they stole under the floor at the time of the inspection of administrative duty and who did not request the repair of clothing. This Japanese beat those prisoners for four times, poured water over them and beat them even with leather belt.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman SHINODE Ryoichi. Three day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

Between April and July, 1945, this Japanese several times beat prisoners who stole soyabean paste while they were carrying it, who broke the key of warehouse and stole rations and "sake" wine which should be distributed to the Japanese staff, who stole fishes, etc.
stole rations and "sake" wine which should be distributed to the Japanese staff, who stole fishes, etc.

*Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior*

Civilian Serviceman NAKASAI Matajiro. Three day's confinement for serious case.

*Outline of the affair*

Between August, 1944, and June, 1945, this Japanese repeatedly beat prisoners whose attitudes at the time of muster, lining up, etc., were very bad, the prisoners of officer's rank who, anticipating Japanese defeat, adopted insolent attitudes, prisoners who stole beer at the place where they were working.

*Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior*

Civilian Serviceman HOSHI Setsuemon. Three day's confinement for serious case.

*Outline of the affair*

Since approximately May, 1945, this Japanese beat the prisoners who stole Japanese "sake" wine, who were under suspicion of stealing the comfort and relief articles, etc., and furthermore beat other prisoners for several times.

*Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior*

Civilian Serviceman TAKENOUCHI Kazuhiro. Five day's confinement for serious case.

*Outline of the affair*

In July and August, 1945, this Japanese beat the prisoners who sneered at the Japanese members of the camp, declaring that the Japanese defeat would be decisive and also beat officers on the pretext that the officers supervision over the prisoner was unsatisfactory. Moreover, this Japanese beat them for several times.

*Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior*

Civilian Serviceman KAWAMURA Kamoshi. Five day's confinement for serious case.

*Outline of the affair*

Between April and July, 1945, under the pretext of insufficient supervision over the prisoners, this Japanese beat respectively the American prisoners of officer's rank who ordered prohibit on from smoking, who chattered during the work, etc.

*Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior*

Civilian Serviceman TOYAMA Fusao. Two day's confinement for serious case.
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Outline of the affair

In May and June, 1945, this Japanose beat prisoners who neglected their labours and who stole edible oil from the factory, respectively.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman KATOCH Genzo. Two day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1945, having been informed that there were some prisoners who stole provisions from the factory of the company, he called the American officers who were controlling prisoners account and beat them.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman TANAKA Tokuichi. Three day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

In July, 1945, this Japanese beat prisoners who stole rice from the spot of their work and a prisoner, who having been under confinement on the charge of a theft, stole rations again while he was on duty of miscellaneous jobs.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

C.S. NAKAGAWA Tatsunaru. Two day's confinement for slight case.

Outline of the affair

In June and July, 1945, this Japanese beat the prisoners who went out to glean soy beans after lunch, ignoring rules, who were impolite in their salutes and attitudes, who pocketed materials while measuring them,etc.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

In approximately July and August, 1945, this Japanese beat prisoners, for several times, who, ashamed weight while measuring, who sung or whistled in the midst of their work, who cooked soy-beans that they stole from the spot where they were working.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

C.S. YASHIKI Seiji. Two day's confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

In August, 1945, this Japanese beat the section-chief of prisoners who were lazy in his work, and roused prisoners antipathy by making a strong statement that the
POW officer's steps were improper concerning the works of prisoners. This Japanese
also reused POW officer's antipathy by exchanging tobacco with shoe cream, safety
razor, etc. possessed by POW, in answer to the prisoner's request.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Clerk of the Company in charge of liaison, ITOH Akira. After informing to the
company, he was discharged by the company.

Outline of the affair

In June and July, 1945, this Japanese beat POWs, on their logs, who neglected
to do their duty. This Japanese also beat prisoners or leave them standing for about 30
minutes beside the electric furnace when these prisoners did not appear at the work-
shop after their recess expired.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

A worker of the company, MAKINO Umetaro. Admonition and reduction of salary
for August.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese beat prisoners whom he took the leadership of their works.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Workers of the company, TOKAI Kosaku and WASEJI Katsugi. Admonition and the
reduction of salary for one month.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese was punished because of insufficient control of Ito Akira, who
exceeded his authority against the prisoners of war while he was engaged as a con-
tact war.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Chief of the Iwao branch of the Nippon Tsuum Company H. SHIZUKE Takeshiro. The
Company voluntarily admonished him. How to admonish was still pending.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese's control over his subordinative staffs concerning treatments of the
prisoners of war was so insufficient that civilian servicemen, etc. under his con-
trol repeatedly beat or mistreated.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

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POW officer’s steps were improper concerning the works of prisoners. This Japanese also roused POW officer’s antipathy by exchanging tobacco with shoe oares, safety razor, etc. possessed by POW, in answer to the prisoner’s request.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Clerk of the Company in charge of liaison, ITOH Akira. After informing to the company, he was discharged by the company.

Outline of the affair

In June and July, 1945, this Japanese boat POWs, on their logs, who neglected their duty. This Japanese also boat prisoners or leave them standing for about 30 minutes beside the electric furnace when these prisoners did not appear at the workshop after their recess expired.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

A worker of the company, MAKINO Umetaro. Admonition and reduction of salary for August.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese boat prisoners when he took the leaderships of their works.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Workers of the company, TOKI Kosaku and WASEDA Katsumi. Admonition and the reduction of salary for one month.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese was punished because of insufficient control of ITO Akira, who exceeded his authority against the prisoners of war while he was engaged as a contract war.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Chief of the Iwase branch of the Nippon Tsuun Company H. SHIZUNI Takejiro. The Company voluntarily admonished him. How to admonish was still pending.

Outline of the affair

This Japanese’s control over his subordinative staffs concerning treatments of the prisoners of war was so insufficient that civilian servicemen, etc. under his control repeatedly beat or mistreated.
Commander of the Branch Camp, Lieutenant KOJIMA Chotaro, Seven day’s heavy attention.

Outline of the affair, offenders and the punishment

Charged by the same offence as stated above, the following officers were also punished as stated below:

2nd Lt. OKADA Michiroku (five day’s attention).
Lt. HAYAKAWA Yuji (two day’s attention).
Captain NAJIKAWA Koji (Three day’s attention).

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

The Commander of the Nagoya POW Camp, Colonel OHTAKE Michiji. Ten day’s heavy attention.

(E) OSAKA CAMP.

Outline of the affair

Between about November, 1944 and February, 1945, this Japanese, for the purpose of reforming misbehaviours, misused, against several American prisoners, moxibustion which should be made good for medical treatment.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. MAZUMI Kichinosuke. Ten day’s attention.

Outline of the affair

In approximately September, 1944, this Japanese stole a part of the comfort and relief articles for the prisoners (towel, soap, grape, cube sugar, etc. etc.).

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman SHIGEI Takeichi. Six months imprisonment and was discharged at the same time.

(F) HIROSHIMA CAMP

Outline of the affair

On approximately 20 December, 1944, the sugar for cooking was stolen. In the
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Commander of the Branch Camp, Lieutenant KOJIMA Chotaro. Seven day’s heavy attention.

Outline of the affair, offenders and the punishment

Charged by the same offence as stated above, the following officers were also punished as stated below:

2nd Lt. OKADA Michiroku (five day’s attention).
Lt. HIRAKAWA Yuji (two day’s attention).
Captain HIRAKAWA Keiji (Three day’s attention).

Outline of the affair

This Japanese’s grip of subordinate concerning the treatment of prisoners of war was insufficient, so that his subordinates frequently mistreated prisoners by beating, etc.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

The Commander of the Nagoya POW Camp, Colonel OHTAKE Michiji. Ten day’s heavy attention.

(E) OSAKA CAMP.

Outline of the affair

Between about November, 1944 and February, 1945, this Japanese, for the purpose of reforming misbehaviours, mistreated, against several American prisoners, moxibustion which should be made good use for medical treatment.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. MASUMOTO Kichinosuke. Ten day’s attention.

Outline of the affair

In approximately September, 1944, this Japanese stole a part of the comfort and relief articles for the prisoners (towel, soap, grape, cube sugar, etc. etc.).

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian Serviceman SHIGEI Takeichi. Six months imprisonment and was discharged at the same time.

(F) HIROSHIMA CAMP

Outline of the affair

On approximately 20 December, 1944, the sugar for cooking was stolen. In the
course of investigation into the offender, this Japanese compelled prisoners to confess by piercing the prisoner's thigh with gimlet or by hoisting the prisoner's buttocks with electric small kitchen-range, or by beating them.

**Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior**

Sgt. HIYAMAKI Yoshikatsu. This man became missing since about 10 September, is whereabouts are now under search.

**Outline of the affair**

The manner of treating prisoners of war by this Japanese was generally severe. Once, in winter time, he left a prisoner who was under detention in the guard room for a serious offence nearly bare.

**Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior**

Captain MURAKAMI Takuji. Reproof.

**Outline of the affair**

In February, 1944, while this Japanese was serving at the main prisoner's camp in Zentsuji, he greatly insulted officer-prisoners and roused their antipathy. But it seems that he did not mistreated any prisoner.

**Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior**

Interpreter KOBAYASHI Yasuo, was transfered to other place after being acknowledged not to be suitable for camp duty.

**Outline of the affair**

Between June, 1943 and December of the same year, while he was with the camp detachment at Mukojima, he mistreated POWs frequently.

**Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior**

Civilian Serviceman ARIMA Shigeru. Though being admonished and asked to give a written explanation, there still was no sign of his reform. So he was discharged.

(3) FUKUOKA CAMP

**Outline of the affair**

In February, 1945, the Japanese summoned a British officer, Jinkens, to his own room, mistreated by himself the prisoner by reason of neglecting in the work at the self-support garden and roused antipathy.
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Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Interpreter SUMIOKA Harutaro. He was admonished strictly and was transferred in the sense of relegation.

Outline of the affair

In April, 1945, at a plant where POWs were working, a prisoner stole a lunch of a Japanese worker. That prisoner had committed the same for several times in the past. Sgt. Maj. YASUHISA, who was the NCO of the week, in an attempt to control this prisoner on his own authority, imprisoned him and gave him nothing but water for the next day. In the meanwhile, he let a Dutch doctor-prisoner examine the imprisoned, and no unsoundness was acknowledged. However, on the third day, the prisoner suddenly took a serious turn and, though every possible measures had been taken, he died of heart-failure. This prisoner of war was suffering from a chronic disease of heart and his usual behaviour were very bad, getting the worst reputations among the prisoners of war themselves. The prisoners chief of his room frequently requested the punishment upon this prisoner.

In passing, Sgt. Maj. YASUHISA was an honest soldier with fine spirit, and when the prisoners were liberated, they thanked him very much saying that he had done greatly for the good of them. (The copy of the death certificate for this prisoner was submitted in accordance with the request by the Chairman of the Receiving POW Committee, Colonel Kurushima.)

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. Maj. YASUHISA Hideo. Twenty Day's heavy destitute confinement.
Captain NOZAKI Gentaemon, the commander of the branch, was sentenced to ten day's heavy domiciliary confinement on the charge of insufficient control of subordinate and delay of report.

Outline of the affair

Since the spring in 1940, as this Japanese had supplied the prisoners of war with more food than the fixed quantity, rations ran short. In an attempt to make up the deficit and to adjust it, the Japanese supplied the prisoners with rations below the fixed quantity for a long period between November, 1940 and about March, 1944. This fact reduced the physical strength of the POWs, endangering their health and lives.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Lt. Colonel KAMATA Torajiro. As the result of the investigation of the actual state, the Japanese was accused to the prosecution of the court martial as a criminal case, and the nominal crimes for his were:

1) Abuse of authority. 2) Injury.

Outline of the affair

About the middle of July, 1945, when the Japanese interrogated prisoners who were in the very act of stealing vegetables from the prisoner's self-support garden, this Japanese beat the prisoners on their heads with bamboo sword. A prisoner was nudged in his breast which resulted the fracture of his ribs.
Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Civilian serviceman OTO Toshio.
1) Presented a curse of Yen 100 for the fracture of ribs.
2) Accused to the prosecution of the Court-Martial.
Nominal Crimes: 1) Violence. 2) Injury.

Outline of the affair

On 15 August, 1945, when the Imperial rescript for the termination of hostilities was issued, the attitudes of the prisoners of war had changed completely with the overflow of the victorious mood. Then this Japanese could not control his excitement so that he summoned all the officer-prisoners and beat some of them.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Sgt. Nakahara Toshinari. Five day's domiciliary confinement for serious case. Additional punishment by the camp commander was fifteen day's domiciliary confinement for serious case. Additional punishment by the camp commander was ten day's domiciliary confinement for serious case.

Outline of the affair

Between January and May, 1945, this Japanese reduced the ration of the prisoners of war under the confinement. As the result of it, there were two cases of complication of diseases. There was another case that a prisoner under confinement had to be
Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior

Captain FUKUMOTO Tsutomu. He was accused to the prosecution of the Court-Martial. Nominal Crimes: 1) abuse of authority.
2) Death resulting from injury.

Outline of the affair

After the liberation of the prisoners of war, some of the prisoner's articles which had been in the safekeeping of the Japanese authority were missing. Lt. YAMADA, for former commanding officer of the Branch, and Sgt. Irie, the responsible person for the safekeeping, had had each one of the missing articles. But all the other missing articles were not found.

Offenders and the punishment imposed by the superior

Remarks:

1) As many punishments described in the above chart seem to be unfair, now the relative superiors are investigating their contents.

2) There had been some punishment inflicted in addition to the abovementioned punishments.

3) The results of the above two columns will be added to this chart.
ADDITIONAL CHART NO. 4

THE SURVEY OF THE INJURIES SUFFERED DURING THEIR WORK OR OTHER CASES.

(A) HAKODATE CAMP

Sufferer

British Pte. MORRISON. Suffered a burn for the lower-half of the body.

Outline of the accident

In May, 1944, at the powdered-coal division of the Kamisso Works of the Asano Cement Company, a great explosion suddenly occurred owing to the ignition to the powdered coal during the operations. As the result of it, three Japanese workmen were killed immediately and a prisoner of war who was near that place got burnt.

Action taken by the authorities

This prisoner was immediately carried to the hospital attached to the company, and underwent emergency medical treatment by the doctor of the hospital who cooperated with the prisoner-doctor. The he was admitted to the hospital of the camp and had undergone medical treatment by both Japanese Military doctor and the prisoner-doctor. At first, the prisoner was in very critical condition, but as the result of the medical treatment with all the doctor's might, he had gradually improved. And now it could be diagnosed as improving on the whole though the functional disorder would be unavoidable.
Sufferer

British Warrant Officer ADWARD DARRENT. Instant death.
British Corporal Alexander ENDIS. Instant death.

Outline of the accident

In Juno, 1945, there was a removal of POW's camp and, while the prisoners were carrying cargoes on their shoulder, these two prisoners were run over to death by the train moving forward at that time. We had a strong wind mingled with drizzle on that day. In addition, as the prisoners were wearing rain coat with hood and carrying goods on their right shoulders, they were in a position from where it was difficult to look through the rapidly oncoming train from the right hand.

Action taken by the authorities

As soon as the accident took place, the Japanese military doctor rushed at the urgent report, and as it was decided to be "instant death" as the result of an inquest, the bodies were immediately carried to the Branch and lay in state courteously. On 4 July, a pastor was called and an impressive farewell service was held for the honours of their memories with the attendance of all the Japanese soldiers and the prisoners of war.

Sufferer

British Pte. HALLOWELL. Bruise.
Outline of the accident

In July, 1945, while prisoners were working at the Mitsui Muta Mineral Factory, there was a sudden cave-in and a part of the falling rocks hit the waist of the prisoner and injured him.

Action taken by the authorities

The prisoner was rescued immediately and carried to the dispensary to make assurance doubly sure of the medical treatment. And on August, he was admitted to the hospital of the mineral factory for undergoing further treatment and is progressing favourably. Thereafter, the company has been warned so that further efforts would be made about the investigation of the cave-ceiling.

(B) SUNDAI CAMP

Sufferers

Four prisoners burned.

Outline of the accident

Owing to the breakage of the bottom of the smelting furnace of the company, the melted pig-iron exploded and four men were burned.

Action taken by the authorities

As the result of thorough medical treatment at the dispensary, they made complete recovery without remaining any mark.
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Sufferer

BRKARL JOHN * Died.

Outline of the accident

In July, 1944, while American prisoners of war were working in the Kotaki pit of the Ashio Copper Mine, a prisoner was killed after being severely hit on his head by a mineral ore which was thrown by another prisoner who was working on the upper step.

Action taken by the authorities

According to the Factory Law, the ¥850.- was given as solatium.

Sufferer

A prisoner of war.

The amputation of right leg from under the knee.

Outline of the accident

In August, 1945, at the Ashio Mineral Refinery, a prisoner was on the platform for driving machineries. Because of his own carelessness, he squeezed his right leg between winlasses, causing complicated fracture. He then had his right leg amputated from two inches below the knee.

Action taken by the authorities

He was immediately admitted to the hospital, where a prisoner ambulance man was attached to him to look after him. And, according to the Factory Law, ¥400.- was given as pension.
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Sufferer
One died. British FOURLOUGH FIELD, and ALFRED EDWARD.

Outline of the accident
A cave-in killed a man. On 27 April, 1945, while the prisoners of war engaged in the work were taking a rest, rocks fell from the ceiling so suddenly that they could not take shelter and got wounded.

Action taken by the Authorities.
There is no report about the disposal of this case.

(C) TOKYO CAMP

Sufferer
JASPER W.
The loss of eyesight of left eye.

Outline of the accident
In May, 1944, while engaging in the boring work at the copper mine in Asio, as a Dutch prisoner thrusted the drill into the hole where old explosives were still remaining, an explosion occurred and the prisoner lost the eyesight of his left eye.

Action taken by the authorities
The employing authorities let him enter the hospital and undergo medical treatment, according to the factory law, ¥160.– was delivered to the prisoner as solatium.

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Outline of the accident

In July 1944, while American prisoners of war were working in the Kotaki pit of the Ashio Copper Mine, a prisoner was killed after being severely hit on his head by a mineral ore which was thrown by another prisoner who was working on the upper step.

Action taken by the authorities

According to the Factory Law, the ¥850,- was given as solatium.

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Action taken by the authorities

He was immediately admitted to the hospital, where a prisoner ambulance man was attached to him to look after him. And, according to the Factory Law, ¥400,- was given as pension.
Sufferer
A prisoner of war.
Amputation of right leg, leaving one third of thigh.

Outline of the accident
In December, 1943, while working at the Ome Factory of the Hokuriku Electrification Company, a prisoner of war was dashed from behind by a car loaded with ores and was bruised and lacerated about right knee. Later the wound took a change for the worse. Then an amputation on was performed with one third of thigh left.

Action taken by the authorities.
The authority made an artificial leg at ¥350.- and gave him it. In addition to this, the prisoner was given ¥956.- as the injury pension.

Sufferer
Sgt. Edward A. Cohen died.

Outline of the accident
In October, 1944, while working at the ore mountain, an American prisoner of war was hit on the back of the head with an ore of about ten kilograms fell from a slope about ten metres high and killed.

Action taken by the authorities
¥100.- was paid as an allowance to the bereaved family. To prevent the damage thereafter, the numbers of the fall-rock watchers were increased.
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Sufferer
Amputation of right leg.

Outline of the accident
In November, 1944, while working at the ore mountain, a prisoner of war got wounded and caused complicated fracture on the right leg and had the leg amputated later.

Action taken by the authorities:
¥956.- was paid as pension. Thereafter, the authorities stopped to use prisoners at the work of the ore mountain and replaced them with Korean labourers.

Sufferer
Complicated fracture of the left knee.

Outline of the accident
In November, 1944, while working at the ore mountain, a prisoners of war had complicated fracture on his right leg and had it amputated.

Action taken by the authorities:
¥750.- was paid as pension.

Sufferer
Cross G. Joseph. Amputation from the knee.
Outline of the accident,

In March, 1944, while working at the Yamanoshita Steel Works in Niigata, an American prisoner of war was wounded on his right leg, and after undergoing medical treatment, it was improved properly. However, later the tetanus was developed and he was amputated from the knee.

Action taken by the authorities.

He was immediately admitted to hospital and was amputated by Doctor Shirai. At one time, he was in a dying condition, but, thanks to the endeavours by the doctor and other staffs in charge, he made a good recovery. As a man on duty, he was given a solatium of ¥300. Moreover, an artificial leg was given to him and later he was paid wages equally with people at work.

Sufferer

Three men died.

John Foster, Olisa Glantor.

Outline of the accident

In March, 1944, while the prisoners were working at the electric-furnace in the course of manufacturing carbide, they were carrying a pot filled with carbide, when the bottom of the pot dropped. And as the streaming carbide was close to the puddle, an explosion broke out and ignitich to the clothes of three working prisoners followed. As the result of
Vit, three of them were seriously burned while one another was slightly burned. The three serious wounded died afterwards.

Action taken by the authorities

The three seriously wounded prisoners were immediately admitted to the hospital attached to the company, and, though having undergone medical treatment under careful nursing by a doctor, nurses and prisoner-ambulance man, they died. Then a grand funeral was held and ¥400 each was given to each dead as solatium.

Sufferer

Warrant Officer Dott. Instant death.

Outline of the accident

In July, 1945, while a Canadian prisoner of war was on his way to a camouflaged ship, his working place, together with his coacher, he was passing the quay where the very ship was at anchor. By chance, when he reached just under the clain in the lifting operation, a hatch-boat dropped because of the breaks of hemp rope binding the boat. The prisoner got under the boat and died instantly.

Action taken by the authorities

As soon as the accident took place, the commanding officer of the detachment immediately went to the spot. Asking the Kompeitai and the
police station to investigate the cause of the case, and after listening the situation from the responsible person, the commanding officer requested the employer the dealing of the person who was directly responsible for the accident, the consolation for the victim and the prevention of future accident, as the result of his request, the employer carried out the reprimand, transfer and the salary-reduction of the directly responsible person. In addition to those actions, Eight Hundred Yen* was presented to the bereaved family of the dead.

Sufferer

A prisoner of war sustained laceration on his forehead.

Outline of the accident.

In October, 1944, at the Moyoyama mining ground of the Hidaohi Mine, a prisoner of war sustained laceration on his forehead on account of a falling of a rock. He was sent to the hospital attached to the Mine and made a complete recovery after a month. Thereafter, he was engaging in some light works.

Action taken by the Authorities

The wounded was immediately admitted to the hospital, when a expert surgeon sewed up the wound. Thereafter, the Japanese expert surgeon, a prisoner-doctor and prisoner ambulance-soldier cooperated in looking after the wounded.
Suferor

The U.S. Army Corporal Casper Harvert. Death.

Outline of the accident

On 14, April, 1945, while driving an electric tractor for carrying the power operated coal from the workshop, a sand-slide broke out and the prisoner was pinioned between the tractor and the rocks on the embankment. As the result of it, the prisoner sustained the contusion of abdomen, internal haemorrhage, the fracture of the lower part of right thigh, and a laceration of right thigh just below penis. Then he died.

The action taken by the authorities

The wounded was immediately carried to the dispensary and was treated by medical staffs and prison- doctors to the best of their abilities, while on the spot, investigation was made regarding the cause and the state of the accident. Furthermore, careful inspection and control was requested to the responsible person of the company.

Suferor


Outline of the accident
On 2 July, 1945, when the prisoner left his bed for going to latrine and was on the way to ladder, as it was just under the air-raid alarm and black-out, he lost his footing from the bed and fell. As the result of it, he sustained the fracture of skull, internal haemorrhage and concussion of the brain. Then he died.

**Action taken by the authorities**

There was no report about the action as to this case.

**Sufferer**


**Outline of the accident**

When the prisoner was about to receive a gunny containing 50 kilograms of soya beans which had been being unloosed by derrick from a ship, the prisoner lost his foot and was knocked down by the cargo. As the result of it, sustaining the fracture of sternum internal haemorrhage and the fracture of left ribs, he died.

**Action taken by the authorities**

He was immediately carried to the dispensary and undergone infallible treatment by the medical staffs. Later, the cause and the state were investigated and the responsible person of the company was requested the inspection of the workshop and the good control of it.
(E) OSAKA CAMP

Sufferer
C. Chroide Macmurry. Death.

Outline of the accident
On 24 February, 1944, at Kanzaki station, the prisoner touched with an electric car on account of his own fault and died.

Action taken by the authorities
Because of the politeness of the treatment after the death of this prisoner, the chief-secretary of the prisoners sent a letter of thanks to the Japanese Authorities.

(F) HIROSHIMA CAMP

Sufferer

Outline of the accident
On 30 September, 1944, while working at the shaft of the Bessi Copper mine, which was his workshop, the prisoner was killed instantly owing to the falling of rocks.

Action taken by the authorities
He was immediately dug out and his instantaneous death was confirmed. Then the authorities made the company that had been employing the prisoners
pay relief fund according to the Law of Mine and left the fund as his lost articles.

**Sufferor**

**Outline of the accident**
On 28 April, 1945, when this prisoner was engaged in chimney-sweeping at the Suritoro Chemical works, his workshop, the ash-furnace which was left at the yard broke down and the prisoner was buried and wounded. And, afterwards, the prisoner died.

**Action taken by the authorities.**
He was immediately dug out after undergoing the first medical treatment at the medical relief station of the company, received treatment at the dispensary attached to the branch. However, he died about four hours after getting injured. The Japanese authorities made the company pay relief fund according to the Factory Law and left it as his lost article.

**Sufferor**

**Outline of the accident**
On 23 June, 1945, while engaging in the mining coal at the gallery in the Kotoyama mine, the prisoner got injured on account of the falling
of rocks and died.

**Action taken by the authorities.**

He was immediately treated at the hospital of the company and
furthermore undergone medical treatment at the dispensary of
the camp, but he died. The company paid the relief fund according
to the Mine Law and made it the prisoner's lost article.

(G) **YUNICVA CAMP**

**Sufferers**

Twelve soldiers as stated below:

A. Vine, D. Ban, Deen Van, B. Foot, E. W. Bravest,
Clumel Hashus, Edward Rongard, George Sméton, J.W. Philips,
T.H. Genois, V.G. Williams, and A.O. Williams.

**Outline of the accident**

Of shipbuilding work, there were many men who erroneously fell
during the work and died instantly or died after being
seriously wounded.

**Action taken by the authorities**

Immediately the sufferers were carried to the Kawakami Hospital
and were treated to the best of authorities' ability. On the
other hand, in close cooperation with the management of the
company and coaches of the workshop, the authorities endeavoured
to provide proper safety.
do the [illegible] in order to meet with the conditions of the work shop which would charge at all times.

Sufferer

France Hickoo. Death.

Outline of the accident

while engaging in unloading work, atten dropped and injured the prisoner on the head.

Action taken by the authorities.

Two Hundreds Yen of condolence money and an obituary gift were presented to the dead.

Sufferer

Terry Andrews. Death.

Outline of the accident

Without permission the prisoner evacuated between two goods-waggons, when the wagons moved and he was run over and killed.

Action taken by the authorities.

After the inquest, the dead body was carried to the camp by an ambulance car. The employing authorities called the responsible persons and addressed so that such an accident would never break out in the future, while the prisoners were also warned against violation of various rules so that
Never again such incident would happen.

Sufferer
D. Francis Zentins. Death.

Outline of the accident
This prisoner fell from the upper floor at night and died.

Action taken by the authorities
In addition to the installation of hand-rails all along the upper floor, all the prisoners were warned against the recurrence of such accident.

Sufferers
Six men as stated below:
Zabid Peter Dypansky, Stuart James Morris, Fred Moore,
George Sabenton, Howard Bent and Clement Saia.

Outline of the accident
On 7 September, six prisoners died because of Methyl-coholism.

Action taken by the authorities
In cooperation with prisoner M.P., the Japanese Authorities and public body made efforts to investigate the affair and to expose the seller. Doctors and hospital on the side of the employer sorted themselves in the medical treatment and relief and received thanks from the prisoners of war.
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Sufferer

A. Lawrence Davico. Death.

Outline of the accident

There were many dying owing to the accident in the shaft such as cave-in, affairs in regard to coal-car.

Action taken by the authorities

"Honorable such accident happened owing to employer's fault, the Chief of the Branch made the authorities punish the responsible person and, by explaining the situation to all the prisoners, gained their understandings.

Sufferer

A prisoner. "Wounded.

Outline of the accident

The prisoner mistook the driving of the elevator of the shaft and fell from a higher point of about three meters high and sustained fractures of the heels of his both legs.

Action taken by the authorities

According to the Factory Law, a solatium was presented.
Outline of the accident:

While the prisoner was driving horse-wagon, his horse ran amuck, and he fell, was run over and wounded, sustaining fractures of his waist and thigh.

Sufferer:

Wounded: A POW.

Action taken by the authorities:

Same as stated in the corresponding line of the above case.

Outline of the accident:

In the shaft, owing to the breakdown of the headlight, the prisoner's leg was pinched between the coal-wagon. Then he got wounded and had his left leg cut.

Sufferer:

Wounded. Amputation of left leg.

Action taken by the authorities:

A solatium of ¥ 1,400 - was presented to the sufferer.

Outline of the accident:

While engaging in the electric furnace operation, an explosion suddenly broke out. Though being warned immediately, owing to the language difficulty, a prisoner was burned very much on his face and limbs.

Sufferer:

A POW sustained burn.

Action taken by the authorities:

Emergency treatment was given to the wounded at the dispensary of the employer, then he was carried to the dispensary of the branch and underwent medical treatment.

Outline of the accident:

Owing to the small cave-in, a few prisoners of war were slightly wounded in the back. Though Japanese coachee warned the prisoner of the danger, owing to the language difficulty, the prisoners were wounded.

Sufferer:

Wounded.
Action taken by the authorities:

The Commander of the Branch decided to let coaches have papers in which a few necessary vocabularies of English were stated.

Remarks:

The cases which are entirely due to the fault of the person in question are all omitted from this list.

SURVEY OF THE PRIVATE PUNISHMENT
(A) HAKODATE CAMP

Outline of the case:

Recounting that the prisoners did not obey the order, on 5 March 1943, this Japanese beat the prisoners.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman, KARIYA, Yoshitaka. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 20 April 1943, this Japanese beat the prisoners who forced their way into the provisions warehouse and stole rice and barley.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman HIGUCHI, Shigeru. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 1 May 1943, this Japanese beat a POW as the prisoner smoked beyond range of stipulated time and position.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior:

Corporal ASATOSHI, Eiji. Reproof.

Outline of the case:

Because a prisoner gave women workers tobacco, he was beaten for caution by the Japanese.

Offender and the punishment imposed by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman, SANKAI, Matsuzo. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 14 September 1945, while being on duty of cookery, a POW stole
breads and ate them, and then he was beaten.

**Offender and the punishment by the superior:**

Sgt YAMASHIJI, Goji.  
Admonition.

**Outline of the case:**

This Japanese beat a POW because the prisoner neglected work during working hours and did not obey the order of the chief guard.

**Offender and the punishment by the superior:**

Civilian Serviceman SAKAI, Matsumu.  
Admonition.

**Outline of the case:**

On 24 August 1944, a POW was beaten by this Japanese because he stole tobacco during working hours.

**Offender and the punishment by the superior:**

Civilian Serviceman MIYAGAWA, Nobuhiro.  
Admonition.

**Outline of the case:**

This Japanese beat POWs who, pretending illness, laid off and did not obey the order for work.

**Offender and the punishment by the superior:**

Civilian Serviceman SAKAI, Matsumu.  
Admonition.

**Outline of the case:**

On 20 April 1945, this Japanese beat a POW who did not obey order during sweeping.

**Offender and the punishment by the superior:**

Ambulance Pte 1st Class TERABAYASHI, Tomoki.  
Admonition.

**Outline of the case:**

On 20 May 1945, this Japanese beat a POW for four times because the prisoner not only did not obey the order for sweeping, but also showed a defiant attitude.

**Offender and the punishment by the superior:**

Chief Pte IKI, Kashin.  
Admonition.
Def Poc No. 1433

Outline of the case:

On 29 May 1945, while patrolling the camp yard, the Japanese struck a P07 who neglected salute, with the butt of the rifle.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Pte 1st Class ISHIBASHI, Masanori. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 25 June 1945, a P07 was slightly beaten by this Japanese because he rejected work showing insolent attitude.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman KADOTANI, Mezo. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 1 July 1945, though having been warned very often, the prisoner did not obey so he was striken with the butt of the rifle.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Corporal OH-HASHI Kenichi. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

In July 1945, a prisoner was beaten because he entered kitchen without permission and, moreover, omitted to pay his compliments.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Civilian Serviceman KIKUCHI Kenichi. Ten days' heavy good behavior.

Outline of the case:

On 7 August 1945, this Japanese struck with the butt of the rifle a prisoner who was late for the working lining up.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Corporal OHSAKA Masaheuru. Admonition.

Outline of the case:

On 20 February 1944, a prisoner was beaten because he did not obey the order and evaded work.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Chief of guard KANAOKA Kishiro. Good behavior after admonition.
Outline of the case:

In May 1945, this Japanese beat a prisoner because of smoking while working.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Guard TAKAHASHI Koinojo, Two day's suspension of attendance.

Outline of the case:

In March 1945, this Japanese beat a prisoner because the prisoner interrupted the work during work.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

OBIKAWA Ushimatsu, Admonition and the reduction of a holiday.

Outline of the case:

On 29 October 1944, at a factory while manufacturing rice, the prisoner was not obedient despite warnings for many times, and so he was beaten by the Japanese.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Guard SHIBATA Kenen. Admonition and one day's reduction of holiday.

Outline of the case:

On 11 August 1944, this Japanese beat a prisoner who was going to steal rice and barley.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Guard MIFUKI, Takuji. Two day's suspension of attendance.

Outline of the case:

On 14 July 1944, while leading prisoners' ranks to the workshop, a prisoner very often broke the rules and did not obey in spite of repeated warnings. So the Japanese beat that prisoner.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:

Guard-leader NOZAKI, Tadamori. Reduction of one-third of salary for one month.

Outline of the case:

This Japanese beat a prisoner, with stick, who was working.

Offender and the punishment by the superior:
Outline of the Case
In June 1943, while POW's were engaging in loading of salt, this Japanese beat some of them who stole salt.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior
The Chief Guard KAMASAWA Masao. Reproof.

Outline of the Case
In October 1944, while loading coal, some prisoners were found stealing eggs and were beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior
Guard SASAKI Kohichi. Admonition.

Outline of the Case
In September 1944, while carrying frozen fishes into the warehouse, a prisoner was found stealing a salmon and was beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior
Guard TANI Yutaka. Admonition and reproof.

Outline of the Case
In May 1945, while loading coal a prisoner of war was found stealing beans from a steam-and-sail-driven boat and was beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior
The same man as stated above. Reduction of 15 percent of his salary.

Outline of the Case
In May 1945, while loading coal this Japanese beat POW's who either stole raw herring or were lazy at duty.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior
Guard TAKASHIMA Sadashichi. Reproof.

Outline of the Case
In August 1943, while engaging in loading job, a prisoner forced himself into the kitchen and stole cooked rice, so this Japanese beat the prisoner at that time and at several other times.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior
Guard ISHIGURO Koichi. Admonition for four times.
Outline of the Case

In April 1945, while carrying cement to the warehouse, a prisoner stole herrings at the same warehouse and was beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Guard TANIGUCHI Tetsuo. Reduction of 25 percent of salary.

Outline of the Case

In July 1945, while POW’s were producing salt, this Japanese beat few prisoners who stole rice or who were lazy in their work.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Guard MORIYA Sakae. Reduction of 20 percent of salary.

Outline of the Case

In May 1945, while working at the Komori Warehouse, a POW was found stealing eggs and was beaten.

Offender and the Punishment inflicted by Superior

Guard NAYA Takeshi. Reproof.

Outline of the Case

In April 1945, while carrying goods to the warehouse, few prisoners were found stealing and eating herrings and were beaten.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Guard AZUMA Shozaburo. Good behavior.

Outline of the Case

In December 1944, when POW’s were lining up for the allotment of job, few of them were beaten because of haughty attitudes.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Coacher IKEDA Kyuzo. Admonition.

Outline of the Case

In May 1944, few POW’s were beaten because they did not obey the advices about work and order and because of language difficult.

Offender and the punishment by Superior

Coacher KIHISAKA Tetsuo. Admonition.
Outline of the Case

On 11 August 1945, this Japanese beat prisoners who returned home without completing their duties.

Offender and Punishment by Superior

Clerk in charge of mine at Akahara KONUMA Toshio. Good behavior for two weeks.

(b) Nagoya Camp

Outline of the Case

Between April 1945 and July of the same year there were prisoners of war who stole "miso" while carrying provisions, who stole foodstuffs after breaking lock of the provisions warehouse, who stole Japanese wine that was to be distributed to the Japanese staff of the camp, who stole fish while carrying provisions, etc. Together with other civilian servicemen, this Japanese beat these prisoners of war. This Japanese also beat the prisoners individually with belt, or let the prisoners sit straight for one hour.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman NAKASAI Matsujirō. Three days heavy imprisonment.

Outline of the Case

There were officer-prisoners who took insolent attitude before foreshowing Japanese defeat. There were prisoners of war whose attitudes were considerably bad at their salute, muster, or at line up. There also were prisoners of war who stole Japanese or Korean's lunch. This Japanese beat these prisoners every time such misbehavior happened.

Offender and Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman TANAKA Tokuichi. Three days heavy imprisonment.

Outline of the Case

On 10 July 1945 seven or eight American prisoners of war stole foodstuffs from the warehouse both of company and camp. Civilian Serviceman TANAKA, who was on day-duty, after receiving report about this case, called the supervisor of the American POWs, Captain Lyle, to account and beat him.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman TANAKA Tokuichi. Three days heavy imprisonment.
Outline of the Case

Between June and July 1945, there were prisoners of war who, setting the rules at naught at their workshops, went out to the railway tracks to pick up soya beans which lay scattered there. There also were prisoners of war whose salutes, attitudes, etc. were bad at the rest-room of guards, and who cheated the coacher while measuring materials. The under-mentioned Japanese beat these prisoners with bamboo sticks or slapped them.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman KOBASHI Yonemitsu. Two days heavy imprisonment.

Outline of the Case

In July and August 1945 there were prisoners of war who were in an uproar by singing or by whistling on their way to and from the workshops, who stole soya beans at workshops, who cheated weight while measuring with the balance. The under-mentioned Japanese beat these prisoners with bamboo sticks. He also slapped two prisoners.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman YASHIKI Seiji. Two days heavy imprisonment.

(C) Osaka Camp

Outline of the Case

The under-mentioned Japanese stole some of comforts, wine and soap for POW's.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman SHIGEI Takeichi. He was condemned to six months imprisonment.

Outline of the Case

When the camp commander inspected the camp, the commander witnessed this Japanese mistreating a prisoner resting that the prisoner did not obey his order.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman TANAKA Ichiro. Admonition and discharge.

Outline of the Case

It was learned that the under-mentioned Japanese stole few of comforts for POW's.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Civilian Serviceman HASHIMOTO Takeshi. Five days heavy good behavior.
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Outline of the Case

Saying that he would buy Japanese-English dictionaries for POW's, this Japanese received some money from the prisoners and did not buy. This fact was heard by the superior, so he was interrogated and was punished.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Interpret, a certain Japanese, admonition and discharge.

Outline of the Case

In June 1945, while the under-mentioned Japanese had been with the camp he frequently beat POW's who seemed to be lazy in work. He therefore raised prisoners' antipathies.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman UCANAI Shuichi. Discharge.

Outline of the Case

Between December 1942 and January 1945 the under-mentioned Japanese promised an American prisoner of war to buy the Japanese bond for the prisoner and seized money without buying bond. It was found by superior.

Offender and the Punishment by the Superior

Civilian Serviceman WATANABE Gisaburo. Discharge. The case of seizure was transferred to a police station.

Outline of the Case

Between November 1944 and February 1945 the under-mentioned Japanese made a wrong use of moxacautery for improving prisoners' misbehaviors.

Offender and the Punishment by Superior

Sgt. MANTANI Unosuke. Heavy good behavior for ten days.

Outline of the Case

In connection with the above-mentioned moxacautery case, this Japanese was punished on the charge of lack of supervision.
Offender and the punishment by superior.

The Commander of the Branch, Lieutenant KOJIRO, Chotaro. Heavy good behaviour for five days.

Outline of the case.

In January, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese tortured a POW by making him stand beside a furnace.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Warrant Officer KIMARI, Ichiji. Seven days heavy good behaviour.

Outline of the case.

Having random and positive nature, the undermentioned Japanese frequently insulted the prisoners-officers. At that time, staffs of the camp reported this matter to the POW control department. As the result of it, this Japanese received a warning letter from Lt. Colonel YASUDA. Immediately after that, this Japanese was transferred by the order of War Ministry.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Interpreter KOBAYASHI, Yasuo. Transferred.

Outline of the case.

The undermentioned Japanese was of loose character and it seemed that his treatment of prisoners of war was generally very unfair. He is now undergoing interrogation.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Guard HARA, Joichichi. Under interrogation.

Outline of the case.

The undermentioned Japanese was of too serious cast, so that he did not overlook prisoners' small faults and very frequently clashed with prisoners officers.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman Ii. I. 010, SHIGEYOSHI. He was admonished very often by other camp staffs.
Def No. 1433

Outline of the case.

The treatment of the prisoners of war by the undermentioned Japanese especially his punishment of POW's, was severe. For instance, in case of the detention in the guardroom of a prisoner in a rigorous winter, he did not give the offender any clothing and bedding. So it seemed that prisoners were far more fearful of the detention than the court martial.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Commander of the Branch, Captain MURAKAMI. Admonition.

Outline of the case.

In addition to the suspicion of torturing prisoners of war at the Yamane Detachment, this undermentioned treatment of prisoners were generally severe and he was very often admonished by the superior.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Sgt. MIYAKI. Strict admonition.

Outline of the case.

In addition to the fact that the treatment of the prisoners of war by the undermentioned Japanese was generally severe, it seemed that there was something dishonest in his dealings of the comforts for the prisoners and the provisions. He is now under interrogation.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Interpreter, concurrently Intendance Chief Private OKADA. Under investigation.

Outline of the case.

While the undermentioned Japanese treated POW's, he very often mistreated prisoners. Though he was admonished and was called to account, there was no indication that he would express sorrow.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman MIYAGI, Genichi. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

The undermentioned Japanese frequently lynched the prisoners of war.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman SOYA, Genichi. Discharge.
Outline of the case.

At the latter part of February, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese called an American officer JINKI to his private room, and, saying that the officer was lazy in the clearing work, mistreated him. In addition, he called some soldiers and let the soldiers beat the British officer, too, and roused a big antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Interpreter YAMAOKA, Harutaro. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

On 29 March, 1945, an American prisoner of war stole Japanese worker's lunch at the factory. This prisoner committed this crime several times in the past. ABd, who was the week-NCO at that time, confined the prisoner in the guard-room to supervise the prisoner on his own authority. On the following day, he gave the prisoner only water. During this time, the Japanese let a Dutch prisoner-doctor examine the prisoner and the prisoner was entirely sound. However, on the day after the following day, the prisoner suddenly fell into a critical condition, and though every possible endeavours, died from the heart-failure. Having the lifelong prisoners usual conduct, very bad reputation (prisoner) very often requested the punishment of him.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Sgt. YASUZUJI, Kibei. Twenty day's heavy good behavior.

Outline of the case.

In May, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese was found by the branch camp commander lynching prisoners of war and was punished.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman YUYAMA. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

In February, 1945, while being on guard duty, the undermentioned Japanese lynched a prisoner of war for supervision and was admonished by superior.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman TOYAMA, Sakari. Discharge.
Outline of the case.

On 22 August, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese frequently mistreated prisoners of war while he was on cooking duty.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman TANUSI, Yuxio. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

On 22 August, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese frequently lynched prisoners of war.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman ONO, Taro. Discharge.

Outline of the case.

On 30 January, 1945, the undermentioned Japanese beat a prisoner of war who went out of the row-cull line without permission. By this reason, he roused a little antipathy of the prisoners, so he got angry and thrust the left shoulder of the prisoner with bayonet and hurt him slightly.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

Civilian Serviceman MUSUI, Tomo. Five days heavy good behaviour.

Outline of the case.

In August, 1945, while on week-duty, the undermentioned Japanese beat prisoner-officers and roused antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

NCO YAMADAURA, Sanji. Strict admonition.

Outline of the case.

In August, 1945, while changing clothings and while being week-duty, the undermentioned Japanese beat prisoners whose fulfilment of his instruction and regulation were uncertain.

Offender and the punishment by superior.

NCO NAGAI, Tadashi. Strict admonition.

Outline of the case.

With the obscurities of comforts for the prisoners of war that
were dealt by the undementioned Japanese and his lynchings, he roused proper antipathies of the prisoners.

**Offender and the punishment by superior.**

*Army doctor YAMABAI, Akitaro. Strict admonition.*

**Outline of the case.**

The undementioned Japanese had a nature of drunken madness. And whenever he was drunk, he lynched prisoners. So many prisoners had very bad feelings against him.

**Offender and the punishment by superior.**

*NCO. HAYAYAMA, Bin. Strict admonition.*

**Outline of the case.**

The undementioned Japanese was punished in December, 1943. He was very short tempered and his treatment of the prisoners of war was very harsh. He punished prisoners with trifles. When he found a prisoner-doctor passed water into a bottle at a camp room, he made the doctor stand carrying the bottle in front of the guard room and instigated him. In addition to it, he called one prisoner to his own room by the reason of insulting himself and punished the prisoner.

**Offender and the punishment by superior.**

*NCO. TANUMA, Mitsuo. Strict admonition.*

**Outline of the case.**

There had been many theft cases of tobacco, etc. while the undementioned Japanese was on guard duty. The way of investigation by this Japanese was so eccentric that he awoke all the sleeping prisoners, took off blankets of all prisoners, or, in one case, beat prisoners with wooden pieces.

**Offender and the punishment by superior.**

*Civilian Serviceman NAKAMU, Chu. Discharge.*

**Outline of the case.**

Extremely excited by the Imperial Rescript of the Suspension of War, the undementioned Japanese was eccentric enough to gather up all the prisoners of war and beat them. It was on 17 August, 1945.
Offender and the punishment by superior
Sgt. Kuribara Yoshinori. Five day's heavy good behaviour.
Fifteen day's heavy good behaviour was plused by the camp com­-
mander. Further more, the army Commander added more ten days.

Outline of the case
Insufficient control of the abovementioned case and delay of
report.

Offender and the punishment by superior
Captain NOZAKI Gentoku. Ten day's heavy good behaviour.

Outline of the case
In June, 1945, at the time of the period of increased produc­-
tion of coal', this Japanese extended by his own authority the
working time of the prisoners to from twelve hours to fourteen
hours (including hours necessary for the return trip to the
workshop). Furthermore, with the motto of "those who do not
work must not eat", this Japanese reduced the rations of
patients and roused prisoner's antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior
Officer T?K-WAK SHIRO. Strict Admonition.

Outline of the case
At the time of the liberation of the prisoners of war, pri-
soners submitted a report of damage stating that the under-
mentioned Japanese seized some articles of the prisoners
while the Japanese was with the camp. Apart from this, this
Japanese was said to treat POW's very harshly - he tortured and lynched prisoners very frequently by making prisoner sit on square wooden bar.

Offender and the punishment by superior:
NCO EGUCHI Hirokichi. Transfer.

Outline of the case
On 15 July, 1945, because of the lack of understanding due to language difficulty, the undermentioned Japanese punished a prisoner-doctor-major by force and roused prisoner's antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior
Ambulando Pte 2nd Class KODAISHI Shigeki. Three days heavy good behaviour.

Outline of the case
By reason of that prisoner's salute and their fulfilment of the rules of billet administration were bad, the undermentioned Japanese beat prisoners and roused proper antipathy.

Offender and the punishment by superior

Outline of the case
As the undermentioned Japanese frequently lynched prisoners of war by reason of trifle matters, he was strictly admonished. So it was thought that he was made reform. However, according to the prisoner-senior-officer after the liberation, this
Japanese received Yen Hundred and Forty Five from the prisoners of war under a promise of not mistreating prisoners. As the very Japanese is now missing after being mobilized, whereabout is now under investigation by the competent police station.

Offender and the punishment by superior
Civilian Serviceman SATOH Kunikichi.
Strict admonition. About the bribery, it is now under investigation.

Outline of the case
Owing to the misunderstanding due to the language difficulty, the undermentioned Japanese threw instrument upon a prisoner and injured his slightly.

Offender and the punishment by superior
Employee, worker. FUKUDA Taro.
Strict admonition and was called for account.

Remarks: 1) As the punishment stated in the above list are not always proper, the relative superior officers are now making further investigations of the contents.

2) Apart from the punishment of the Japanese stated on the above list, there were also some cases that those Japanese were punished.

3) The results of the above two articles will be added to this list further.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached consisting of 36 leaves, was prepared by the Central Research Committee of P.O.W. Affairs by order of the First Repatriation Bureau.

Certified at Tokyo
On this 25th day of April, 1947

/s/ YOSHIYAMA, Yozo
The C'Jof of the Archives Section of the First Repatriation Bureau (Seal)
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月五日於東京都千代田區丸ノ内
日本興業銀行ビル内

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**備考**

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注: 上記は例示であり、実際に使用される内容や数字は異なる場合があります。
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注：表格内容为日历表，具体日期和月份请根据实际情况填写。
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(内容解释：此表可能涉及日本的公历与农历的对应关系，具体含义需结合历史和文化背景进行解读。)
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注：日期和内容仅供参考，实际内容请以原文件为准。
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[Note: The content of the table is not translatable due to its complexity and the nature of the language.]
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<td>食品の製造や販売に係る各種の記録をきちんと保存し、必要な文書を提出する。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>これらの文書の管理方針を定め、従業員に理解させること。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>食品の安全性を確保するための対策を講じること。</td>
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*注：具体数据请参照实际文档内容。*
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说明：各回内容为假设性描述，具体情节请以实际情况为准。
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補助参照：

- 聖=聖
- 外=外

備考：

- 以上の項目は、詳細な説明が必要です。
- 以外の項目は、追加の情報が必要です。
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注：
1. 番号は、それぞれの道に所属する員名の順に並べたものです。
2. 年月日は、役職を担う月日を示しています。
3. 管理人は、それぞれの道を管理する責任者を示しています。
4. 住所は、各道の役所の所在地を示しています。
Military Police Report No. 322 (Third Higher)


FR: Military Police Commander MAKIMURA, Akita.

TO: Chief of General Staff SUBHYIA, G.o.

26 May 1942.

Attached is the report of the investigation of the eight officers and men of the American planes who took part in the raid on JAPAN proper on 18 April and were forced down at NUCHANG and NING PO in CENTRAL CHINA.

FORWARDED TO: Minister of War, Vice-Minister of War, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Chief of Home Defense. (3).

Chief of General Staff, Vice-Chief of General Staff, Chief of 1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section, Chief of General Affairs Bureau. (3).
Since the bombing was done without making various preliminary surveys of the objective, I was resigned to the fate that a certain amount of damage to residential areas and injuries to civilians would be inevitable. On the other hand, I also thought that this was a good opportunity to carry our so-called guerilla type of air raids. However, at the time of the actual bombing, I was seized with fear and I had no thought other than to unload the bombs indiscriminately and escape to safety as quickly as possible. I believe it would be unreasonable to expect any degree of accuracy in the bombing carried out at that time.

Ques. No. 6. Did you do any strafing while getting away from NAGoya?

Ans. Before, I haven't revealed any information on this point, but the truth is that about five to six minutes after leaving the city we saw in the distance what looked like an elementary school with many children at play. The pilot steadily dropped altitude and ordered the gunners to their stations. On the plane was at an oblique angle, the skipper gave firing orders, and bursts of machine gun fire sprayed the ground. Of course since all this took place in a moment's time, I have no idea as to the extent of the damage inflicted.

22 May 1942.

TOKYO Military Police Headquarters.

Prisoner : War: FARROW, William G. (Age 23)

Ques. No. 3. State your duties on this bombing raid.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPPLY CENTER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY POLICE STATION, GENERAL STAFF
ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by Legal Section.

Military Police Report No. 322 (Third Higher)


FR: Military Police Commander FUKUSHIMA, Akita.

TO: Chief of General Staff SUZUKI, Gen.

26 May 1942.

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- 1 -
Chief of Naval General Staff, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff,
Chief of 1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section, Chief of 5th Bureau.

Navy Minister, Vice-Minister of Navy, Chief of Bureau of Naval Affairs (3) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Defense.

INTERROGATION REPORT

(Only the important points are recorded)

Ques No. 3. State your duties in this bombing raid.

Ans. Pursuant to orders received from Colonel DOOLITTLE to bomb OSAKA, (I was co-pilot on plane No. 16, a North American B-25 medium bomber, piloted by FARROW), we penetrated into the Japanese homeland, but enroute, we changed our course to NAGOYA because of the difficulty in bombing OSAKA. We reached NAGOYA about 1400 hours, and after dropping four incendiary bombs on the various military installations we made an attempt to escape to safety, but were forced to make an emergency landing near NANCHANG, CHINA.

Ques No. 4. What were the conditions during the bombing raid over NAGOYA?

Ans. Because we had to make an unexpected change in our course, it was like blind flying and therefore I felt that as long as we dropped our bombs on the center of the factories and tanks, it was all right.
Since the bombing was done without making various preliminary surveys of the objective, I was resigned to the fact that a certain amount of damage to residential areas and injuries to civilians would be inevitable. On the other hand, I also thought that this was a good opportunity to carry out our so-called guerilla type of air raids. However, at the time of the actual bombing, I was seized with fear and I had no thought other than to unload the bombs indiscriminately and escape to safety as quickly as possible. I believe it would be unreasonable to expect any degree of accuracy in the bombing carried out at that time.

Ques. No. 6. Did you do any strafing while getting away from NAGoya?

An. Previously, I haven't recalled any information on this point, but the truth is that about five to six minutes after leaving the city, we saw in the distance what looked like an elementary school with many children at play. The pilot steadily dropped altitude and ordered the gunner to their stations. When the plane was at an oblique angle, the skipper gave firing orders, and bursts of machine gun fire sprayed the ground. Of course, since all this took place in a moment's time, I have no idea as to the extent of the damage inflicted.

22 May 1942.
TOKYO Military Police Headquarters.

Prisoner: "War: FLARROW, William G. (Ago 23)

Ques. No. 3. State your duties on this bombing raid.

-3-
Ans. Pursuant to orders received from Colonel DOOLITTLE to bomb OSAKA, as pilot of plane No. 16, a North American B-25 Medium bomber, in command of a crew consisting of HITE, co-pilot, BARR*; navigator SIATZ*, machine gunner, and DESHLAGER*, bombardier, I proceeded to carry out my mission. We approached the Japanese homeland, but because bombing of OSAKA was extremely difficult, while enroute, we changed our course and headed for NAGOYA. We reached NAGOYA at about 1400 hours, and after dropping four incendiary bombs on the various military installations of that city, we made our escape but were forced to make an emergency landing near NANCHANG, CHINA.

Ques. No. 4. Your claim that the military installations were your objectives, but didn't you actually bomb innocent civilians?

Ans. I don't know what excuse to make for that other than to state the fact that, we were a temporary crew with inadequate training. I cannot make any assertion that we bombed our targets and nothing else. Moreover, at that time the Japanese anti-aircraft guns were actively active, and since our only thought was to drop our bombs quickly and make a hurried dash for safety, I believe it is natural that some damage was inflicted on residences, and some civilians may have been killed. On this score, as commander of the plane, I am fully cognizant of my responsibilities.

Ques. No. 5. Wasn't that point made clear in Colonel DOOLITTLE's order?

Ans. No. We saw the decisions regarding the selection of the target.
objective of the air raid was really to demoralize the Japanese people, it was natural as far as we were concerned, that the bombings of innocent civilians would be one of the methods. Furthermore, since our pre-designated objective, OBAK, was unexpectedly changed to NAGOA, I could only guess at the location of our target.

Ques. No. 6. While heading out to sea from NAGOYA, didn't you strafe children of an elementary school?

Ans. There is truly no excuse for this. I have made no mention of this incident before, but after leaving NAGOYA, I do not quite remember the place - there was a place which looked like a school, with many people there. As a pilot shot, with a feeling of "Lu in these Japs", I made a power dive and carried out some strafing. There was absolutely no defensive fire from below.

22 May 1942

TOKYO Military Police Headquarters.

Prisoner of War: HILLMARK, Dave Edward* (age 27).

Ques No. 3. State your duties in the bombing attack.

Ans. After receiving orders for the bombing of TOKYO from Colonel DOOLITTLE, I, as pilot of plane No. 6 a North American B-25 Medium bomber, took off from the aircraft carrier HORNET about 0900 hours, 18 April 1942, and headed toward TOKYO, with two steel mills as my specific bombing objective.

Ques. No. 4. State in further detail, the contents of the order.
Anh. The order designated my plane as plane No. 6 in the TOKYO bombing group. Insofar as the targets were concerned, Colonel DOOLITTLE made the final decisions after consultation with each pilot as to the appropriate targets selected from a map drawn to a scale of 1:100,000 and after an orientation session, as can be seen from the foregoing, the decision was made after I selected my target from some 300 odd plotted targets.

Ques No. 5. What were the precautions taken for the bombing?

Ans. The Imperial Palace was not to be bombed. This did not signify any special respect but its significance was in the adverse effect that would have followed from doing it.

Ques. No. 6. Then did you presume that you only had to avoid the Imperial Palace and that it was permissible to bomb the homes of the general public?

Ans. They did not especially specify the bombing at random, but in this method of hit-and-run air attack it is inevitable that homes would be damaged to some extent. Therefore, I believe that Colonel DOOLITTLE did not give us precautions against this because he was aware of such an eventuality.

Ques. No. 7. How did you confirm the results of the bombing?

Ans. As I just said, I'm not stating that we especially attempted to destroy the steel mills. On the whole, we thought it would be
all right to drop bombs in the heart of the location of the steel
mills and individual plants, but we did not confirm anything. Moreso,
since anti-aircraft fire was rather active, and we were quite appre-
hensive about the arrival of Japanese fighter planes, our solo concern was
to unload our bombs and make a hasty escape.

Ques No. 8. From your technical experience, what did you honestly think
of the bombing methods used on that day?

Ans. In all probability there was a considerable amount of indis­
crinate bombing.

Ques No. 9. What are you thinking of after killing and wounding so
many innocent people?

Ans. Since it was our intention to bomb TOKYO and escape to CHINA
quickly, we also dropped bombs over objectives other than those
ores specified, and made a hasty escape. Therefore, we also bombed
residential homes, killing and wounding many people.

22 May 1942.


Ques No. 3. Relate your duties in connection with this air raid.

Ans. Upon receiving orders from Colonel DOOLITTLE, to participate
in a raid on the city of OSAKA, I was assigned to plane No. 16, a
North American B-25 Medium bomber, as a mechanic and machine gunner.
At 1400 hours, I presumed that we were over the city of OSAKA and in
accordance with the original orders, we dropped four incendiary bombs on the city with military installations as the objective. After the bombing we fled toward the sea and made a forced landing in the vicinity of NANCHANG, CHINA.

Ques. No. 4: What do you think of the fact that your plane bombed innocent civilians?

Ans. Since I am a gunner and am not actually concerned with the bombing I have no idea as to the method of bombing or its results. However, if the objective was to demoralize the general populace, even if the bombing was directed at residential areas, etc., then personally I do not give a hoot as to how we did it.

Ques. No. 5: After the bombing of NAGoya, did you not actually carry out strafing?

Ans. It was an extremely inexcusable deed. Shortly after leaving NAGoya, while flying southward along the coast, the pilot immediately upon perceiving a school, steadily reduced altitude and ordered us to our stations. I aimed at the children in the school yard and fired only one burst before we headed out to sea. My feelings at that time were "damn these Japs" and I wanted to give them a burst of fire. Now I clearly see that this was truly unpardonable and in all decency should not have been committed.

22 May 1942.
T. CYO Military Police Headquarters.

 prisoner of War: DEFNEGLI, Jacob D., (Age 29).

 Ques. No. 3. State your duties in connection with this bombing.

 Ans. Pursuant to orders received from Colonel DOOLITTLE to bomb OSAKA, five of us, including the pilot, boarded the plane with the specific mission of bombing the petroleum tanks at OSAKA.

 Ques. No. 4. How did you participate in the bombing?

 Ans. I am the bombardier, but I carried out the bombing in cooperation with three men and the pilot. We dropped four incendiary bombs on the oil tanks and on residential areas.

 Ques. No. 5. State the conditions at the time of the bombing.

 Ans. Since I saw two or three large petroleum tanks, I presumed it was the city of OSAKA; later I learned that it was NAGOYA. Since we dropped incendiary bombs while flying at an altitude of 500 feet above the city, direct hits were scored on the petroleum tanks and residential areas.

 Ques. No. 6. Why did you bomb residential areas in addition to the specified objectives?

 Ans. Since in this type of bombing it is inevitable that the bombs will scatter to the residential areas from the beginning, I expected
such an eventuality and acted accordingly. As far as we were concerned, the quicker we discharged our bombs and caused a lot of casualties and escaped, the better it was for us. Colonel D. LITTLE AND THE OTHER ranking officers, as well as our pilot did not especially call our attention to these things. Of course, since the primary objective was the petroleum tanks, the surrounding residences were clearly discernible.

Ques. No. 7. Even if you were instructed by the pilot to drop the bombs properly, didn't you, as the bombardier, think that in the name of humanity you shouldn't have bombed innocent civilians?

Ans. With our technique and methods used in that air attack such things, even if we thought about them, would have been impossible.

22 May 1942.

TOKYO Military Police Headquarters.

Prisoner of War NIELSEN, C. J. (Age 25).

Ques. No. 3. State your duration in connection with the bombing.

Ans. Pursuant to orders received from Colonel DOOLITTLE to bomb TOKYO, I was assigned to plane No. 6, a North-American B-25 Medium Bomber, as a navigator.

Ques. No. 4. 2d Lieutenant NIELSEN, in what capacity did you participate in the bombing?

Ans. Since I was responsible for the navigation of plane No. 6, I made plans for our escape to CHINA after raiding Japan. When we approached Tok...
the bombardier and I worked together in dropping our bombs.

Ques. No. 3. What was the situation at the time of the bombing.

Ans. At that time I was mainly observing the situation outside from the windows. At an altitude of about 1,500 meters, as soon as we crossed the NuA River in the northeast part of Tokyo, the pilot immediately ordered the bombing. In general the main objective was the factories, but with such a bombing method I believe we missed it completely.

Frederic K. NUNNA, Robert J. (Age 24).

Ques No. 4. Show your duties in the bombing raid.

Ans. I received the order to bomb Tokyo from Colonel DOUGLAS, who lead the bombing raid on Japan. I was co-pilot of plane No. 6, a North American B-25 medium bomber. As far as the bombing was concerned, we received orders to bomb two steel plants which were indicated on the map.

Ques No. 4. To Lieutenant WALTER, what was your part in this bombing raid?

Ans. Since the pilot was operating the plane, I was chiefly concerned with locating the objective. Presently we passed BOCO Peninsula. As soon as we crossed the NuA River, I spotted the particular factory in question, and called the pilot's attention to it. The pilot immediately ordered dropping of the bombs, one after the other. However, because of the heavy anti-aircraft fire from below our sole interest was in trying to make a safe escape, so we never did confirm the results of our bombing.
ICRC NO. 1027

Quest. No. 5. You not only bombed the factories, but you also bombed homes of innocent civilians and killed many people. What are your reactions in that respect?

Ans. It is natural that dropping bombs on a crowded place like TOKYO will cause damage in the vicinity of the target. All the more so with our technique, of dropping our bombs while making hit and run attack, so I believe it was strictly unavoidable. Moreover, Colonel DOOLITTLE never did order us to avoid such bombing and neither were we particularly worried about the possible damage.

Quest. No. 7. Don't you feel sorry for even the innocent wives and children who were injured?

Ans. Personally, I am extremely sorry, but in modern warfare such things cannot be helped. I sincerely hope that the spirit of the people is one of the objectives, there is no alternative other than to ignore our feelings.

22 May 1942.

Prisoner of War: BAPR, George*, (Age 25).

Quest. No. 3. What was your part in this bombing raid?

Ans. I received Colonel DOOLITTLE's orders to bomb OSAKA. I was the navigator on plane No. 16, a North-American B-25 Medium Bomber.

Quest. No. 6. Did you not strafe an elementary school while headed out to the sea after the NAGOYA raid?
Ans. I am quite sure that was done. Only then the pulses steadily dropped off, and the ending was executed and I knew of it.
Copy of Excerpts from the Text of a Telegram.

FROM: Chief of General Staff.
TO: Commanding General of the CHINA Expeditionary Force.
10 October 1942.

The verdict issued by the military tribunal concerning the punishment of the American airmen who raided the Japanese homeland is considered to be fair and just.

However, upon review we believe that with the exception of both pilots and the gunner, SFAATZ, the death sentence should be commuted.

It is recommended that the death sentences of these men be commuted to life imprisonment.

On the 13th of this month, Lieutenant-Colonel TAKAYAMA will depart from FUKUOKA in connection with the case, and we shall appreciate it if you will keep him informed as to the execution of the sentence, etc.
DEF. DOC. # 109 - H

DISPATCHED: 22 October, 1250 hours.
RECEIVED: 22 October, 1354 hours.

TO: Chief of Staff
FROM: Chief of General Staff
General Staff, Wire No. 432

Enemy airmen who commit acts of atrocities shall be committed to a military tribunal. In the future, all announcements as to the verdict will be made by Grand Imperial Headquarters. Moreover, absolute secrecy as to the place of disposition must be maintained.

Distribution of telegram:
To
Nami
To
Sho

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 261
Measures for the disposition of the American Airmen who raided the homeland.

Your approval on this matter is respectfully requested.

FROM: Chief of General Staff SUGIYAMA, Gen.

TO: HATA, Shunroku, Commanding General, CHINA Expeditionary Force.

10 October 1942.

1. Sentenced to death.
   MALDARK, Dave Edward, pilot
   FARRAR, William D., pilot
   SPAATZ, Harold A., machine gunner

2. Death sentence commuted.
   WELDER, Robert J., Co-pilot
   NIELSEN, C. J., Navigator
   HITE, Robert J., Co-pilot
   BARK, George E., Navigator
   DESHAGER, J. J., Bombardier

3. Time of execution.
   About 15 October. (The staff officer of the China Expeditionary Army will keep us posted as to the details).

4. Matters concerning the disposition of the airmen whose death penalties were commuted.

   The five whose death sentences were commuted shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. As war criminals, their treatment shall not be that accorded ordinary prisoners of war.

   Even in the event of an exchange of war prisoners they may not be repatriated to the United States forces.
Concerning Punishment of F.O.W.

(Feb. 28, 1905 Law No. 38)

Article I. If a prisoner of war offers resistance or violence to supervisors, guards, or escorts of prisoners of war he shall be punished with imprisonment with hard labor. The offender whose offense is light shall be punished with imprisonment without hard labor for not less than 6 month and not more than 5 years.

Article II. If a number of prisoners of war conspire to commit the offenses specified in the preceding article, the ringleader shall be punished with death, and the remainder of the offenders shall be punished with exilé for a term. He whose offense is slight shall be punished with imprisonment with hard labor.

Article III. If prisoners of war conspire and make a mass escape, the ringleader shall be punished with exile for a term. The offender whose offense is serious shall be punished with death. The rest of the offenders shall be punished with imprisonment with heavy labor. The offender whose offense is slight shall be punished with imprisonment without heavy labor for not less than 6 month and not more than 5 years.

Article IV. If a prisoner of war on parole breaks his parole, he shall be punished with imprisonment with hard labor. If a prisoner of war, breaking his parole, makes resistance with a weapon, he shall be punished with death.

Article V. If a prisoner of war, after giving his parole not to try to escape, breaks the parole, he shall be punished with imprisonment with heavy labor.

Article VI. The provisions specified in article I--III shall not apply to offenses committed while they were previously prisoners of war by those who have been taken prisoner of war again.

Article VII. When a prisoner of war is placed on trial by court martial, provisions applicable to soldiers and sailors of the Imperial Army shall be applied to him according to his rank.

- 1 -
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, MIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Concerning Punishment of P.O.W.s (Feb. 29, 1905 Law No. 38)" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the First Demobilization Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 22nd day of August, 1947

/S/ MIYAMA, Yozo
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ AEY, Akira
(seal)
昭和二十二年八月三日 / 未 / 未

立会人
安 部 明

公文書ノ用ノ為メテハノ為サレタリ

昭和二十二年八月二十二日 / 未 / 未

民法要論ハ第一裁判所裁判長ノ為レタル判決ヲ成スル如ク判決ハ判決ノ為ノ為ハ

民法要論ハ第一裁判所裁判長ノ為レタル判決ヲ成スル如ク判決ハ判決ノ為ノ為ハ
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)
Depor. OYAMA, Ayao

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I was examined as a witness at the court of the I.M.T.F.E. on May 7, this year. On that occasion, I was asked by Prosecutor Comyns Carr about the original formal record of the statistics list entitled "the List of the POW's punished by Army Court-Martial from December 8, 1941 to August 15, 1945" (Exhibit No. 1998) which I had produced on July 17, 1946, at the request of Prosecutor Monaghan.

In replyng to the question, I said that the list was compiled according to a list of statistics which was in custody of my Division, that is, the Legal Investigation Division of the First Demobilization Bureau. But a subsequent investigation showed that this was utterly a misunderstanding on my part.
This statistics list was compiled by my subordinate officials by consulting the copies of written findings Army Court-Martials which were submitted by various Army commanders to the War Ministry. I wish to correct my answer regarding this point.

In the above questioning, I replied to the prosecutor that I supposed the copies of written findings of Army Court-Martials which had been submitted by the Army Commanders to the War Ministry and which had furnished the basis for the statistics list then in our custody had been destroyed by fire. This was also an error due to my misunderstanding. Later I found that these copies of the written findings for POW's had been preserved. I wish, consequently, to correct this point, too.

I found later also the copy of the written verdict for the Wells case about which I was specifically questioned by the prosecutor. That was a report of the NADA 9801 Unit or Headquarters of the 37th Army to the War Ministry.

At that time I had no remembrance about the details of the findings in the Wells case, and could therefore not answer Prosecutor Comyns Carr's question: "Do you think it was just that Mr. Wells was sentenced to 12 year's imprisonment and hard labor merely for spreading rumors?"

When I discovered and read the copy of the written findings in the Wells case I found that the crime of the same Wells was not merely an act of spreading rumors. Actually, Wells was
Def. Doc. of 1817

sentenced to 12 years of renal servitude for having committed a set of concurrent offenses prescribed in Art. V-I, and the latter paragraph of Art. XI, of the PO Penal Code, and Art. XCVIII of the Army Criminal Law or Art. C of the Navy Criminal Law.

Art. V-I of the PO Penal Code provides, "Whoever resists or disobeys the order of persons who are responsible for supervising, watching, or guarding prisoners of war shall be punished with death or renal servitude or imprisonment for life or for not less than 1 year."

In Art. XI of the same Code.

"Whoever forms a group with the purpose of committing disobedient acts shall be punished with renal servitude or imprisonment for not less than 6 months and not more than 5 years; the ring leaders shall be punished with renal servitude or imprisonment for not less than 1 year and not more than 10 years."

Both in Art. XCVIII of the Army Criminal Law and in Art. C of the Navy Criminal Law.

"Whoever spreads rumors about military affairs in time of war or of an incident shall be punished with renal servitude or imprisonment for not more than 7 years."
I wish to make it clear that I believe that the verdicts sentencing Wells to 12 years of penal servitude on the basis of these provisions are just.

On this 17 day of June, 1947, at Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ OYAMA, Ayao (seal)

I, OYAMA, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ OYAMA, Junkichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ OYAMA, Ayao (seal)
Decision

War prisoner Captain Lionel Collins Matteuce. Thirty one years old. Born at Stepney, Suburb of Adelaide, South Australia, Australia. Formerly attached to the Communication Corps of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

War prisoner Lieutenant Roderick Graham Wells. Twenty four years old. Born at Techiyuro Victoria, Australia. Formerly attached to the Communication Corps of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

War Prisoner Sergeant Alfred Stevens. Thirty years old. Born at the City of Perth, West Australia, Australia. Formerly attached to the A Company of the 19th Machine Gun Corps of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

War prisoner Corporal John Allen McMillen. Thirty eight years old. Born at Curn South Wales, Australia. Formerly attached to the headquarters of the 22nd Infantry Regiment of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

War prisoner Corporal Walter Joffey Poffic. Thirty years old. Born at Jones Backsley New South Wales, Australia. Formerly attached to the 84th Automobile Repairing Corps of the 8th Division of the Australian Army.

Due to the charges of spy, pernicious designs on the country, violation of the war prisoner punishing low and fallacious rumour concoction brought upon the said Matteuce, those of fallacious rumour
Def. Doc. F1817

conviction and violation of the war prisoner punishing law of the said Wells and Stevens and that of violation of the war prisoner punishing law of the said MacMillan and Roffio, this court martial after the trials duly processed under Judge Captain of Legal Affairs 末尾武男, Haruo pronounced its sentences as follows:

Text

Defendant Hattuco shall be put to death.
Defendant Wells shall be imprisoned with hard labour for twelve years.
Defendant Stevens shall be imprisoned with hard labour for five years.
Defendants MacMillan and Roffio shall respectively be imprisoned for one and half a year.

One six shot revolver seized (Evidence No. 1) shall be confiscated.

Reasons

The aforesaid five defendants were respectively attached to the above-mentioned corps and joined the Greater East Asia War and on February 15th, 1942, they were made prisoners by the Imperial Navy at Singapore and since then they had been kept in the First Branch of the Borneo Prisoner Camp at Sandakan East Coast State of North Borneo from July 18th of the same year.
1. The defendant Muttuce was very strong in his fighting spirit, even after his surrender. He was very reluctant to remain as a prisoner and was always on the very alert to escape from the camp.

(1) Since he arrived there and during his engagement in his farming work in the nearby fields, taking advantage of the lenient surveillance, from about August of 1941, he began to make access to Mr. Atin, a Dosun and the head of the Branch Police Office, situated at the 8 mile point of the Rebook road, Sandakan and his under officials, Mr. Matsop, a Dosun and keeper of the pasture belonged to the Agricultural Experimentation Station of the East Coast State, situated at the eight mile point of the said road, Mr. Alexanderfan, a Chinese farmer, residing at the 7 mile point of the above road and some others and at last he made acquaintance with them all.

In about October of the same year, in the full knowledge and against the order given by Lieutenant HOSHIJIMI, Susumu, Chief of the camp, prohibiting any of their communication or contact with the outsiders of the camp, he still continued his access with outsiders and even hinted at future possibility that once the afflicted area would be regained by the hands of Great Britain, any assistance given to him would warmly be reworded and instigated the said Atin and others. Thus during the months from the middle of March to July of the same year, his offences were continued and
the above-noted fields and their neighbourhood were made their places of meeting. Almost once every week, he secretly met the said Abin and made the latter the intermediary to communicate with the outside. Besides, he often met the rest of the people referred to for similar designs and purposes.

(2) Probably for the purpose of providing for the escape some other day, in about August of 1942, he asked the above-mentioned Alexanderfan to draw up one map each of the former British territories, North Borneo and Sandakan and its neighbourhood and actually received them and on that occasion, as soon as he had heard from Alexanderfan a rumour that a large number of U.S. Philippine Army staying at the Sulu Islands were going to attack Sandakan, he expected sure its realization and planned to assemble all the prisoners interned to destruct the camp in order to join the said U.S. Army upon the above supposition. Nearly at that time, he entreated Alexanderfan to let him have a revolver and six shots in the latter's possession and he further made the latter promise to come near to the fence of the camp and to blow the whistle, as soon as he learned the arrival of the U.S. Army and he further delivered the latter a letter, asking for their deliverance by the hands of the U.S. Army, attaching thereto a sketch, describing the topographical features of the camp and its vicinity and entrusted the delivery of the letter to him and...
talked his plan then being hatched to him and requested him to comply with him so that when the prisoners stood up in defiance, five rifles and 150 shots provided in the police office should be delivered to them. Thus every preparation possible was secretly being carried on, while in order to benefit the expected arrival of the U.S. Army and since the information to them, he endeavoured to learn and collect all possible news in general about the movement of the Imperial forces. Again, at about the end of August of the same year, he asked Alexanderfan to draw up and deliver him a drawing or local map, minutely describing the arrangements of the Imperial forces staying at Sandakan and in about December of the same year, he asked a Dosun named Magination in the clerical service of the said Agricultural Experimentation Station to draw up and deliver him a drawing or local map of the said station and prisoner camp and their neighbourhood. Furthermore, at about the end of September of the same year, through the afore-mentioned Matsop, he made a health official named Roi Kifuku of the Sandakan Citizens' Hospital draw up a map, describing the billeting condition and the number of the Imperial troops and Japanese at Sandakan and he actually received it. Besides, on several occasions, when he met Abin, he listened to the changes of the condition of the Imperial army and the internee Britishers and Americans, the condition of the incoming and
damages by the air-raid offered by the combined forces of Great Britain and the U.S. and also that the Japanese had unfavourable results in other directions.

(b) Then from December, 1942 to July, 1943, on a score occasions, he forwarded the news in writing to a British doctor called Tailor in the service of the Sendakan Citizens' Hospital who was then confined to home to the effect that the U.S. forces attacked the Japanese transports in the sea near the Bismark islands and sunk twenty-two ships, shotting down at the same time a large number of the Japanese planes and that the Japanese forces had many damages in other fields of battles.

(c) Again, from May, 1943 to the middle of July of the same year, on several occasions, he forwarded the news in writing to a Britisher named Philips who was then confined to home situated at five mile point of the Rabock road, outside of the City of Sendakan regarding the above Solomon and New Guinia news and also the other unfavourable news toward the Japanese forces.

(d) From May, 1943, imitating the manner of the said Weinton, he himself attempted to assemble parts and make up a radio receiving set in order to listen into the news broadcast by the British and American sides and he disclosed his intention to Weinton and Wells and in collusion with them, through the said Abin, the required parts were being gradually collected and
outgoing ships at the port of Sandakan and also the condition of
demand and supply of daily necessities of the inhabitants.

(3) In about November, 1942, when the prisoners of the same camp, named
Weinton and Ricors, secretly began to listen in to the war news
broadcast by the British and States sides, by making up a radio
receiving set and to circulate the said news in turn to the rest
of prisoners in the camp, he became gladdened, as the news contained
some unfavourable things toward the Japanese forces and he secretly
forwarded it on to Britihers and Americans, either detained or
confined in home.in the same district in order to accelerate the
defying spirit. Besides, in full expectation that the similar
news might easily be spread among the inhabitants at large, he
asked Weinton to get one copy each of the news each time. Thus he
continued his sinister practice, each time when he met Abin, through
the intermediary of Weinton and Ricors.

(a) From the middle of November, 1942 to the end of February, 1943,
he dozen times, he forwarded the war news in writing to the
former governor Smith of North Borneo who was then detained in
Bahara island in the throct of the Bay of Sandakan and the
other detained Britihers to the effect that as the result of
the fierce battle between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Navy
at the Solomon islands, the Japanese had severe losses and
damages and in New Guinea also, the Japanese suffered great
evading the surveillance of the warden, in the same camp and
under the direction of Wointon, up to July of the same year,
he was engaged in assembling parts with the assistance of
Wells, but it could not be perfected and the scheme was
discovered.

2. The other defendant Wells was also very strong in his antagonistic
spirit and was very much abhorring the situation of his prisoner.
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(1) As above stated, being well informed by the orders of the officer in charge of P.O.V. Camp about October 1942 that all the prisoners were strictly prohibited from having any correspondence or contact with the inhabitants outside, he, notwithstanding, communicated when he heard from the defendant Stevens in about May 1943 that the Englishman named Haver who had been detained there was now an electric engineer in Sandakan Electric Power Station. To this Haver the news of the present situation of the war broadcast by English and American authorities. With continual criminal intent he kept contact with Haver approximately once a week towards the middle of July in order to stimulate his spirit of resistance, using as medium the aforesaid Stevens. Chen Ping, a workman and others of the electric power station attached to the camp. They had decided previously a cryptograph using numerals and Roman letters by which they exchanged messages. He communicated approximately ten times the news, which he had heard from the said Waiton and others, of the American air force that attacked a large Japanese transport fleet near the Dismark Islands, that it sank the majority of the fleet and shot down a large number of airplanes, together with a number of pieces of "news" altogether quite to the disadvantage of the Japanese army.

(2) About May 1943, on being invited by the accused Mathius to collaborate with him to make a radio receiving set, he consented, and with mutual connection and eluding the vigilance of warders, he engaged in making the receiving set with Mathius.
(3) In the beginning of June 1945, when Waiton was punished and put into the Camp prison, he used on his behalf the radio receiving set, caught the American and British broadcast for several days, and with continual criminal intent communicated orally or by letters to officer prisoners and other prisoners in the Camp the news to the disadvantage of Japanese army; for instance, he communicated the news that the Japanese army in Rangoon had sustained a great loss by the bombing of English and American Army and that the Japanese army in China was fighting a hard battle everywhere owing to the resistance of Chungking side.

III. The accused Alfred Stevens had been ordered, since towards the end of November, to operate the machine in the electric power station attached to the Camp situated outside the premises. While he was engaged in his business, knowing well the instructions of the officer in charge that they were strictly prohibited from holding communication with the people outside as above stated, committed the following offences with continual criminal intent.

(1) From about January to July 1945 he communicated to Wu Ha Kuang, Chen Ping and other workmen in the station several times many pieces of information altogether to the disadvantage of
the Japanese army, among which was news of British and American broadcast received by the accused Wells and others, namely, the American air force attacked a large group of Japanese transport ships near the Bismark Islands.

(2) From about May to July 1943, using Macmillan, Roffic, Chen Ping and others as medium he helped exchange of about twenty letters between the defendant Wells and the aforesaid Naver and handed to Wells several parcels sent by Naver containing Radio requisites and other articles. Toward the end of June he helped three times the communication between the prisoner Lathius and Nabin the guard.

IV. The accused Macmillan from about September 1942 and Loffe from about February 1943 were engaged in collecting firewood outside the premises of the Camp. Knowing well by the orders of the officer in charge that they were strictly prohibited from holding any contact with the people outside, they committed the following offences with continual criminal intent by taking advantage of the rather lenient surveillance:

(1) From toward the end of May to the middle of June 1943 Macmillan twice received from Stevens and Chen Ping the letters and parcels sent by Naver and delivered them secretary to Wells. He also handed the letters of Wells to Stevens and Chen Ping and made them deliver the letters to Naver.

(2) From the middle of June to the middle of July in the same
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year post received from Wells three letters for Mavor. He handed them to Stevens and Chen Ping and made them deliver the letters to Mavor. He received from Stevens Mavor's letters and parcels for Wells and delivered them to Wells.

The court accept the above-stated fact (leaving out the point that they were committed with continual criminal intent) by putting together the following records and evidence:--

- The deposition in this court of these five defendants.
- The affidavit of *attius to the questions of Military Police.
- The deposition of Minton to the questions of the prosecutor contained in the record of the case of Alexander Gordon Wenton and other four defendants concerning violation of War Prisoners Punishing law and fallacious rumour concoction. (The document number 16 of the record 1943)
- The deposition to the question of the Prosecutor of the defendants Abin Angon, *atsoc* bin Gungao, Alexander Fun, De-Mingal-Lai-Kuei-fu, Wa Lokwang, and Chen Ping contained in the record of *mestragon and 33 others' case of the breach of military discipline brought here from the record of Nade No. 9901 unit tribunal of military discipline.
- The deposition to the question of Military Police of the defendant Mavor, James Taylor, *fred* Phillips in the record
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Gerald "ever and three others' case (Dec. No. 22 1943) of the same source.

Evidence No. 1 -- 4.
One six-shot revolver impounded.
One receiving set of radio with 19 requisites, also impounded.
One diary, impounded.

The continuation of the criminal intent can be perceived by the fact that similar crimes were committed successively within comparatively short duration of time. According to law, the act of the defendant Mathius stated in I(1) falls within the purview of Art. 5, Clause 1 of the War Prisoners Punishing Law. The act of spy in (2) comes within the purview of Art. 85, Clause 1 and Art. 86, of the Criminal Code. The act of preparation with pernicious designs on the country fall within the purview of Art. 89, and Art. 86, of the Criminal Code.
The act stated in (3) falls within the purview of Art. 99, of the Military Criminal Code and Art. 100, of Navy Criminal Code.
The act stated in (4) falls within the purview of the latter part of Art. 11, of the War Prisoners Punishing Law. The offences of (1) (2) and (3) being committed by one act which falls within the purview of several articles of crime, and the offences (1) and (3) being committed with one continual
criminal intent, we apply Art. 54, clause 1, 1st part, Art. 55 and Art. 10, of the Criminal Code and decide the punishment to be that of spy, which being the gravest among the said offences, and sentence the capital punishment. The offence of (4) which is violation of War Prisoners Punishing Law, and the above stated offences are the concurrent offences that come within purview of Art. 45, 1st part, of the Criminal Code. But since the capital punishment is chosen for the said act of spy, it is not necessary, according to Art. 46, Clause 1 of the Criminal Code, to condemn to the other punishments.

The act of II (1) of Wells comes within purview of Art. 5, Clause 1, Art. 99, of the Military Criminal Code and Art. 100 of the Naval Criminal Code, and the offence (1) and (5) have been committed by one act which comes within purview of several articles and altogether committed with one continual criminal intent. So, by applying Art. 54, first part of Clause 1, Art. 55, and Art. 10 of the Criminal Code the court sentence penal servitude for a term owing to violation of War Prisoners Punishing Law, it being the gravest among his offences. For his offence stated in (2) penal servitude is chosen. The above stated offences are concurrent offences in Art. 45, part 1, so the court apply Art. 47, Art. 10, Art. 14 of the Criminal Code, and sentence Wells to penal servitude of twelve years owing to violation of War Prisoners Punishing Law with increase of punishment according to the Criminal Code. The act of Stevens in III (1) and (2) comes within purview of
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Art. 5 Clause 1st of the War Prisoners Punishing Law. His fallacious rumour concoction falls within purview of Art. 99, of the Military Criminal Code and Art. 100 of the Naval Criminal Code. The above stated offences were committed by one continual criminal intent and by one act which falls within purview of several articles. So, by applying Art. 54, Clause 1, Art. 55, and Art. 10, of the Criminal Code, penal servitude for a term is sentenced owing to violation of War Prisoners Punishing Law which is the gravest offence that has been committed by these people; and according to the law, the court sentence Stephens to five years penal servitude, Macmillan and Loffe to one year and a half penal servitude, as their act stated in IV comes respectively within purview of Art. 5, Clause 1, of the War Prisoners Punishing Law according to which penal servitude for a term should be sentenced. One six shot revolver (Evidence No. 1) that has been seized should be confiscated according to art. 19, of the Criminal Code because the accused Mathius gained it through the said preparation of pernicious act on the country, and because it does not belong to anybody but the defendant. So the court decides as stated in the text.

2nd March 1944

Mado 9301 unit Special Military Tribunal.

The presiding judge, Lieutenant Colonel

The Judge, Major

The judge, Captain

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JUDGMENT

P.W. Captain Lionel Collin MATTHEWS, 31 years old.
Place of birth: Stepney, in the suburbs of the City of Adelaide,
Southern Australia, Australia.
Formerly attached to: Signal Corps of 8th Division, Australian Army.

P.W. 1st Lieutenant Roderick Graham WELLS, 24 years old.
Place of birth: Town of Tatura, Victoria, Australia.
Formerly attached to: same as above.

P.W. Sergeant Alfred STEVENS, 30 years old.
Place of birth: City of Perth, Western Australia (otherwise unknown).
Formerly attached to: 4th Machine-gun Corps, same Division as above.

P.W. Corporal John Alan MCMILLAN, 38 years old.
Place of birth: Town of Cooma, New South Wales, Australia.
Formerly attached to: Headquarters of 22nd Infantry Regiment, Division as above.

P.W. Corporal Walter Geoffrey LOFFY (PHONETIC), 30 years old.
Place of birth: John Street, Town of Bexley, New South Wales.
Formerly attached to: 84th Automobile Repair Corps, same division as above.
With regard to the criminal case of Matthews, accused on the charge of espionage, preparations for the enemy's invasion, violation of the War Prisoners Penal Law and spreading false reports and wild rumors; Wells and Stevens, accused on the charge of spreading false reports and wild rumors, and violation of War Prisoners Penal Law; of MacMillan and Lofty (EMERIGIC) accused on the charge of violation of War Prisoners Penal Law, this court-martial has, with the participation of the Prosecutor, Judiciary Captain MATSUMOTO Haruo completed trials and hereby gives judgment as follows:

Text of the Judgment.

The accused, Matthews shall be punished, with death...

The accused Wells, shall be punished, with 12 years' imprisonment with hard labor...

The accused Stevens, shall be punished with 5 years' imprisonment with hard labor...

The accused MacMillan, and accused Lofty, shall respectively be punished with 1 year and six months imprisonment with hard labor...

One six-chambered revolver (Exhibit No. 1) which was seized shall be confiscated...

Remark.

The five defendants, who participated in the Greater East Asian war, respectively attached to the above-mentioned units or corps, were taken prisoners by the Japanese forces at Singapore on the 15th of February in the 17th year of SHOWA (1942). Since July 18th same year
they have been detained in the 1st Branch of the Borneo War Prisoners Internment Camp, located at Sandakan, Eastern Province, Northern Borneo, 1st Lieutenant Lionel Collin MATTHEWS, whose hostile feeling was so strong even after surrender that he could not reconcile himself to the life of war prisoner was secretly looking for a chance of escaping from the camp.

(1) After his arrival at the camp he was every day engaged in cultivating the camp farm situated outside the camp. About August 1942, availing himself of the comparatively slack surveillance, he approached, and formed friendship with ABIN (PHONETIC) a Doumese (PHONETIC) and Chief of the Lubbock Road 8th Mile Branch of the Sandakan Police Station, and a few policemen under the Chief MATSUP (PHONETIC) a Doumese and keepers of the Ranch attached to the 8th Mile Experimental Farm of Eastern Province, Alexander FAN (PHONETIC); a Chinese farmer, residing at 7th Mile on the said Lubbock Road, and several other inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Notwithstanding he was well aware of the fact that about October the same year communication and contact with inhabitants outside the camp had been strictly forbidden by the order of Chief of the camp, 1st Lieutenant BOSHIJIMA Susumu, MATTHEWS kept in touch with them, and seduced ABIN, and others, saying that those who would give every assistance to himself and other prisoners, would be favorably treated in the future, when the British administration was re-established. Continually holding criminal intent from about the middle of March, 1943 to about July the same year, he chose the neighborhood of the said farm as a rendezvous, where he secretly met ABIN and made the latter relay communications with
the outside, as stated below. W.THEES also had frequent meetings there and kept in contact with other inhabitants.

(2) About August in the 17th year of Shōwa (1942) he asked the said Alexander PAN to draw a map each of British Northern Borneo and the vicinity of Sandakan with a view to using them at the time of escape when receiving the maps he heard from the said PAN about the rumour that U. S. and Philippine forces of considerable strength were stationed in Sulu Archipelago and there were signs of their shortly making an attack on Sandakan.

Believing in the possibility of its realization, W.THEES entertained a design, in the event of the attack, to pull together all the prisoners and destroy the camp in response.

He asked the said ALEXANDER and obtained a revolver together with six cartridges, which were owned by the Chinese.

Besides, he made ALEXANDER promise to come to the outside of the camp and blow a whistle immediately when the U. S. and Philippine forces should arrive. He also handed the same person a letter addressed to the commanding officer of the U. S. and Philippine forces, in which he drew a topographical map of the camp's vicinity and stated...
a request that the prisoners be saved from the camp. He also
confided his design to the policeman ABIN, and asked him and ob-
tained his consent to put 5 guns and 150 cartridges, with which the
branch station was provided at the prisoners’disposal on the ocasion of their uprising. Thus he was secretly making preparations.

In addition, with a view to reporting to U. S. and Philippine
forces, when they might invade, he made strenuous efforts to collect
general information regarding the Japanese forces. Towards the
end of August in the same year, he asked ALEXANDER to draw a map
of the Sandakan area showing the details of disposition and strength
of the Japanese forces stationed in Sandakan; and about December the
same year, he asked M. JINN (HIONETIC) a Dozone (HIONETIC) employed
as clerk of the Experimental Farm, to draw a map of the vicinities
of the said Farm and the Internment Camp and received the map and,
at about the end of September the same year, he got the said M. TSUP
to persuade L.I. Kuoifu, a nurse of the Sandakan Citizens Hospital,
to draw a map showing quarters and numbers of Japanese occupation
forces and residents at Sandakan. Besides receiving these maps,
M. TSUP, during his several meetings with ABIN, heard, from the

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latter whether there were any movements of Japanese forces as well as the British and American internees, concerning the vessels coming in and out Sandakan harbour, and regarding the demand and supply of daily necessaries for the inhabitants.

(Phonetic)

(3) About November 1942, when JAINTON and RICARD, prisoners of the said camp, secretly manufactured a radio receiving set and listening to British and American news, circulated it among the prisoners, and as it contained much that was unfavorable to the Japanese, MATTHEWS contemplated transmitting it secretly to the British and American internees and residents under surveillance. In anticipation that such news might be propagated among the general inhabitants of the same region through such British and Americans, he asked JAINTON and got a copy each of news. Thus he kept with his treacherous designs and through the policemen, endeavored the dissemination of news as follows:

(a) From the middle of November 1942 to the latter part of February the following year, he sent news in writing more than ten times to Smith, ex-Governor of British Northern Borneo, interned in Behala Island at the entrance of Sandakan Bay and other
British internees, stating, that the Japanese Navy had suffered a heavy loss as a result of a severe Japano-American naval battle in the Solomons, and that the Japanese forces in New Guinea had sustained immense losses from the British and American air raids, and also giving many other reports of the war situation which were unfavorable to the Japanese.

(b) Over twenty times from about December 1942 to about July 1943, he furnished TAILOR, an English doctor, who was then ordered to work at the Sandakan Citizens' Hospital under surveillance, with various reports about the war unfavorable to Japan, including the news that the U. S. Air forces had attacked Japanese transports in the adjacent seas of the Bismarck Archipelago, sinking 22 transport ships and shooting down a large number of Japanese airplanes.

(c) Several times from around May 1943 to the middle of July the same year he also gave HILLIP, an Englishman who then was confined under surveillance in his own house at 5th Mido, Lubbock Road, in the outskirts of the City of Sandakan, some news unfavorable to the Japanese, concerning the war situation the Solomons and New Guinea.

(d) From about May 1943 MATTHEWS attempted, following the example of W. LINTON to manufacture a radio-receiver for himself, and listen to the British and American broadcasts. He disclosed his intention to W. LINTON and JELLS; and in collusion with then gradually procured necessary parts through the policeman LABIN and with JELLS was secretly engaged in assembling them under W. LINTON'S guidance until about July, when they were detected by the watchman and failed to accomplish this purpose.
II. The accused, RODERICK GRAHAM WELLS had also a strong hostile feeling and felt a great repugnance for his lot of being a prisoner.

(1) Notwithstanding he knew very well that the prisoners, as stated above, had been strictly prohibited about October, 1942 by order of the Camp chief to correspond or to keep in contact with any inhabitants residing outside the camp, WELLS, about May 1943 secretly sent war news to the Englishman MAYVER, who, he heard from the accused, STEVENS, was then resident under surveillance and employed as electrical engineer at the Sandakan Power Plant. Till about July the same year, with the view of stirring up MAYVER'S hostile feeling, WELLS continued to exchange correspondence with MAYVER once a week through the intermediary of STEVENS and CHEN Ping, a worker of the power plant attached to the internment camp, with a code consisting of the Roman alphabet and Arabic figures. By this means WELLS sent to MAYVER about ten communications concerning the above mentioned reports, conveyed by WAINTON, that the U.S. Air forces had attacked the Japanese transports and convey off the Bismarck Archipelago and the greater part of the Japanese warships and transport vessels had been sunk and many Japanese airplanes shot down, and other news unfavorable to the Japanese.

(2) About May 1943 WELLS acceded to the persuasion of WATTHES to work together on the manufacture of a radio-receiver as stated above. And, till about July the same year, he was engaged in constructing the radio-receiver in collusion with WATTHES under WAINTON's guidance, eluding the watch of the guards.
(3) At the beginning of June 1943, while ALBERT was confined in the guard-room as punishment for violating the disciplinary regulations, the WELLS used the radio-receiver and listened to British and American broadcasts for him for a few days.

Thus he continued his treacherous intent and spread among the war prisoners below the rank of officer, either in writing or verbally, the news that the Japanese forces in Rangoon area had sustained serious losses by the bombing of the British and American air forces, and that the Japanese forces in China had also been fighting hard battles against the Chungking troops who put up stiff resistance at different places, and some other news regarding the war situation, which was adverse to the Japanese Army.

III. About the end of October 1942, the defendant ALFRED STEVENS was ordered to operate the machinery of the camp power plant outside the camp premises. Notwithstanding he at that time knew well that contact and correspondence with any inhabitants residing outside the camp had been strictly prohibited by order of the camp chief as already stated, he performed the following acts.

(1) Several times from about January 1943 to July the same year, he told WU HOKUANG (HONEST) and CHEN PING, electrical workers in the power plant, as told by WELLS, that the U.S. air forces had attacked the Japanese transports and convoy in the adjacent seas of the Bismarck Archipelago and had sent Japanese to the bottom and gave other news of the war unfavourable to the Japanese Army.
(2) From about May 1943 to about July the same year, he acted as intermediary some twenty times between the accused, WELLS and MÜLLER, delivering the correspondence exchanged between the two and forwarding the parcels of radio-set parts sent from MÜLLER to WELLS, through the defendants MCMILLAN, defendant LOFFY, and said CHEN Ping. Further, towards the end of June the same year, he thrice conveyed messages between MATHews, the prisoner, and ABIN, the policeman.

IV. The defendant MCMILLAN, from about September 1942 and, the defendant LOFFY from about February 1943, were respectively engaged in gathering firewood in the outskirts of the Internment Camp, and in spite of the camp chief's order forbidding all communication and contact with inhabitants outside the camp, they continued their treacherous intent and, slaking, availing themselves of the surveillance committed the following offences.

(1) From about the end of May 1943 to about the middle of June the same year, they twice received the letters and parcels of MÜLLER, referred to above, from STEVENS and CHEN Ping and handed them to the addressee WELLS, and also they handed WELLS's letters to the said STEVENS and CHEN Ping to be delivered to the addressee, MÜLLER.

(2) From about the middle of June 1943 to about the middle of July the same year, LOFFY thrice received from WELLS letters addressed to MÜLLER and handed them to STEVENS and CHEN Ping to be delivered to MÜLLER. Also, receiving from STEVENS the letters and parcels of MÜLLER addressed to WELLS, he delivered them to WELLS. The above-mentioned facts, excepting that of the continuation of criminal intent, are deemed conclusive judging collectively from the statements which were made respectively by the five defendants at this court; the military judicial
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(3) At the beginning of June 1943, while WINTON was confined in the guard-room as punishment for violating the disciplinary regulations, the WELLS used the radio-receiver and listened to British and American broadcasts for him for a few days.

Thus he continued his treacherous intent and spread among the war prisoners below the rank of officer, either in writing or verbally, the news that the Japanese forces in Rangoon area had sustained serious losses by the bombing of the British and American air forces, and that the Japanese forces in China had also been fighting hard battles against the Chungking troops who put up stiff resistance at different places, and some other news regarding the war situation, which was adverse to the Japanese Army.

III. About the end of October 1942, the defendant ALFRED STEVENS was ordered to operate the machinery of the camp power plant outside the camp premises. Notwithstanding he at that time knew well that contact and correspondence with any inhabitants residing outside the camp had been strictly prohibited by order of the camp chief as already stated, he performed the following acts.

(1) Several times from about January 1943 to July the same year, he told WU Hokung (HONEST) and Chen Ping, electrical workers in the power plant, as told by WINTON, that the U.S. air forces had attacked the Japanese transports and convoy in the adjacent seas of the Bismarck Archipelago and had sent Japanese to the bottom and gave other news of the war unfavourable to the Japanese army.
police hearings on the defendant MATTHEWS, the prosecutor's hearings on the ALEXANDER GORDON WAINTON in records (Records No. 16, 1943) of the criminal case of WAINTON and four others on the charge of violation of the War Prisoners Penal Laws and of spreading false reports and wild rumors, the prosecutor's hearings on the defendants, ABIN BINJANTON (PHONETIC) MITSUF BILINGUAO (PHONETIC), ALEXANDER JUH DAI MAGINAL (PHONETIC) LIU KUEIFU, WU HOKUNG, and CHEN PING, in the records (Records No. 21, 1943) of the criminal case of ERNEST GADAN (PHONETIC) and thirty-eight others on the charge of violation of military regulations, obtained from the Military Discipline Council of NAPA No. 9801 Unit; the military judicial police hearings on the defendants MAYVER, JAMES TAILOR, and ALFRED PHILLIPS in the records (Record No. 22 1943) of the criminal case of GERARD MAYVER and three others on the charge of violation of military regulations; one six-chambered revolver, one radio receiving-set, 18 radio accessories and one diary (Exhibits No. 1-4) which were seized. And, as regards the continuation of criminal intent, it is hereby judged to be conclusively from the fact that similar offenses were repeatedly committed by the defendants in short periods of time.

Of the defendant MATTHEWS' acts mentioned above those referred to in I (1) come under Article 5 paragraph 1 of the War Prisoners Penal Law; acts of espionage in I (2), under Article 85, paragraph 1, and Article 88 of the Criminal Code; the preparations for the enemy's invasion mentioned in I (3), under Articles 88 and 86 of the same code; the acts in I (3) under Article 99 of the Military Article 100 of  

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the Naval Criminal Code; those in II (4) under the latter part of Article 11 of the War Prisoners Penal Law.

The two crimes referred to in (1), (2), (3) are a single kind of act but are against several laws; and in addition, they were committed with the continuation of criminal intent. Therefore, the provisions of the first half of Article 54, paragraph 1, and Articles 55 and 10 of the Criminal Code are applicable to the two crimes of (1) and (3), and out of the prescribed penalties death penalty, the severest punishment for the crime of espionage shall be selected and imposed on the accused. And, although this crime and that of the violation of the War Prisoners Penal Law are concurrent offences according to the first half of Article 45 of the Criminal Code, yet, no other penalties shall be inflicted upon the accused according to Article 46, paragraph 1 of the same code, because a death penalty shall be imposed on the accused for the said crime of espionage.

As regards the accused in the acts mentioned above, those in II (1) fall under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the War Prisoners Penal Law, Article 99 of the MILITARY CRIMINAL CODE, and Article 100 of the Naval Criminal Code; those in II (2) under the latter part of Article 11 of the War Prisoners Penal Law, and those in II (3) under Article 99 of the MILITARY CRIMINAL CODE and Article 100 of the Naval Criminal Code.

However, as the offences in II (1) and (3) are the same act forming several offences, and there was continuation of criminal intent in these two crimes, penal servitude for a term, i.e., the severest penalty
the severest penalty provided for in the War Prisoners Penal Law shall be imposed in accordance with the first part of paragraph 1, Article 54, Article 55, and Article 10 of the Criminal Code; as regards the offence in II (2) penal servitude shall be chosen; and as the above offences form concurrent crimes as provided for in the first part of Article 45 of the Criminal Code, the accused ELLS shall be sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with hard labour within the limit of the term legally aggregated on the severer penalty, by applying Articles 47, 10, 14 of the Criminal Code.

The acts committed by the accused STEVENS, as mentioned in III (1) and (2), come under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the War Prisoners Penal Law; and the act of spreading false reports and wild rumors under Article 99 of the Military Criminal Code and Article 100 of the Naval Criminal Code. However, because the above offences are one and same kind of act and form different crimes, and there was the continuation of Criminal intent, the War Penal Law, in accordance with the first part of paragraph 1, Article 54, Article 55, and Article 10 of the Criminal Code; shall be applied, and selecting penal servitude for a term according to the provision for violation of the War Prisoners Penal Law the accused STEVENS shall be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment with hard labour within the limits of the term prescribed in the Law.

The offences committed by the defendant M. CHILLI and LOFTY, as referred to in IV above, come under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the War Prisoners Penal Law and Article 55 of the Criminal Code, and selecting...
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penal servitude for a term according to penal provisions of the law, MACMILLAN and LOTTI shall be sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment with hard labour within the limits of the term provided for.

One six-chambered revolver (Exhibit No. 1) shall be confiscated in accordance with Article 19 of the Criminal Code on the ground that the said revolver was obtained by the accused MATTHEWS in committing crime of preparations for the enemy's invasion and belongs to no other people than the convict concerned. In accordance with the reasons stated above, we give decision as in the text.

On this 2nd day of March in the 19th year of Showa (1944)

A Provisional Court-Martial

of

NLI. No. 961 Unit.

Chief Judge: (President) Lant. Colonel MIYAZA, Sobei.
Judge: (member) Military Judiciary Major KISHIBARA, Shuji.
Judge: (member) Captain TSUJII, Yoshii.
Translated by
Defense Language Branch

I hereby certify that the copy of Judgement hereto attached,
is one that was submitted to the War Ministry by the H.D. No. 9801 Unit; that it, by the Headquarters of the 37th Army, as a copy of the original judgement which had been given at a provisional court-martial by the H.D. No. 9801 Unit, and was actually in the custody of the 1st Demobilization Bureau.

On this 17th day of June, the 22nd, year of Showa (1947)

[Signature]
Chief of the Judicial Investigation Section, 1st Demobilization Bureau.
本添付の判決書は厳命を一にして廃絶九十八〇一郡除臨時軍法会議に於て裁判したる
判決原本の寄与して廃絶九十八〇一郡除即ち第三十七軍司令部よ
り陸軍省に報告したものをにして現に第一復員局に保存しありたる
ものなる事を駁明す

昭和二十二年六月十七日

第一復員局法務調査部長

大山文雄

1
【日文】

 должность

 "オーストラリア"州 "パース"市
 "メキシコ"州 "タラベラ"町
 俘虜

 前同師団第四連隊  中隊
 陸軍軍曹

 前同師団 歩兵第二十一聯隊  本部
 陸軍伍長  ジョン・アラン
 三十八年
出生地
姿州「ノウサウス・ウェールズ」州「ベクスリィ」町「ジョーン」街

元所属
前同師範第八四自動車修理館

俘虜
陸軍伍長 ウォルター・ジョフレー

三十年

右「マチュウス」及「ステイゴンス」及スル各造言飛語及俘虜成罰法違反造言飛語及俘虜成罰法違反

法曹会審検察官陸軍法務大尉渡邉春雄幹並審理及遂ケ判決スル

左ノ如シ

同司同
マスウェルスレナリ及び同ノ役五十一年=

マスウェルスレナリ及び同ノ役五年=

マスウェルスレナリ及び同ノ役二年= シ

執レモ役一年六月
開始事実
試験場で俘虜収容所附近に地図一覧を掲出し、同時に試験場前

同

作成交付セシメ、同年九月末頃前示マトソップル。各者所

シテ同地駐屯ノ帝国軍隊及び在留邦人ノ役目、人員数等ヲ記入

ノ移動ノ有無サンドカンニ港出ノ船始ノ状況等同地住民ノ生

活ヲ発見ヲ給ノ状況等ヲ聴取レ

リカーズ零等カ密カッコレラデオニ皇帝よりノ上之ヲ同所ノ俘虜等ノ

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数ヲ包含シナルか否と同時にニ抑留ノ又ハ放還中ノ英米人等ノ
昭和十九年三月二日

テ主文ノ如ク判決

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於テ
Excerpt from the International Inspection of the Red-Cross. No. 301, January 1944 pp. 10, 11

Delegation to Japan -- On November 13, Mr. Max Pestalozzi has visited the camp of prisoners of war at Mukden, Manchukuo, which confined Britishers, Australians, Americans, in total, more than a thousand prisoners of war.

The dwellings are satisfactory; they are the brick -- buildings, well-constructed and well-equipped, the prisoners there are provided with straw mattress and a complete bedding. As for clothing, the prisoners possess two suits of clothing; one for summer and one for winter. The prisoners of war are satisfied with the nourishment, however they find it a little monotonous in the long run.

The sanitary arrangements are sufficient. The camp has an infirmary attached to it, full-equipped, which, considered as military hospital, is given all necessary things. The dental cares are also much appreciative. All the prisoners have been inoculated against typhoid, paratyphoid and dysentery, and vaccinated.

A large sport ground and many indoor games are available to

*November 13, 1943*
prisoners, but prisoners who desire are given books, as much instructive as recreative.

In regard to correspondence, the prisoners can send a plenty of messages.

The discipline is somewhat relaxed, because the prisoners came from several units of Army and Navy.

The delegate of the International Committee express much satisfaction of his visit and the kindness of the Red Cross of Manchukuo and signalize at the same time that the officers attached to the camp are making the utmost effort in order to ameliorate the treatment of the prisoners of war.
On December 6 again, Mr. Anst has made the second call at the camp of prisoners of war at Mukden, which assembled more than a thousand Americans, approximately a hundred Britishers, several Australians and a Frenchman.

The measures to protect against aerial attacks have been taken; the hygienic institutions are satisfactory and the camp is disinfected whenever it seems to be necessary.

The rations correspond in quantity to those which are distributed to the camp-guards, but the quality of them looked better; the energy values attained about 3500 calories.

The supplemental foods are prepared for the prisoners who do heavy labours and for the patients, as well as in the special occasions as, for example, certain fete-days.

The hospital of the camp is a brick-building, which can receive one hundred and fifty patients; it is composed of a separate ward, a tuberculosis patients' room, a room of test, operation, X rays, pharmacy and a recreation room. The medical and surgical equipment is complete, and only the patients suffered from special diseases are transferred to the Mukden Military Hospital, which gives equally dental care. The medical inspections take place three times a week and the patients receive the doctors' visits every day. All the prisoners have been vaccinated for
smallpox and inoculated against typhoid, paratyphoid, dysentary and cholera.

The money which they use is given them out of their own savings.

It is above all expended at the canteen, where they are informed that these pocket moneys serve to buy musical instruments, sporting goods, seeds and toilet articles: the prisoners also can send the funds to their families, if they wish.

Most of the people are able to work. The duty hours are eight hours a day, with recesses of morning, noon and afternoon; Sunday is holiday; some men work in factory and the rest are occupied in conversations in the camp.

There is no chaplain in the camp; the religious services are celebrated in English by a Japanese clergyman.

The prisoners can play sport, music and cards; visitors from outside are not admitted, no more than the visits to outside are not authorized, but they can go out of the camp to visit the graves.

The camp commander has reported to the delegate that their morale and spirits have been, on the whole, ameliorated, and that the relations between the camp authorities and the prisoners have been satisfactory, and with the camp-guards they
have talked in a like manner; the state of health have been equally ameliorated and they have seemed also to be satisfied with the fact that they can have those special considerations given them at that time.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, ATSUMI Totsuko, who commissioned by Japanese Red Cross, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in French, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Extrait de la Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge No. 301 Janvier 1944" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of (Japanese Red Cross).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 18th day of August, 1947

/S/ ATSUMI Totsuko (seal)
Japanese Red Cross No.5
Shiba Park Tokyo

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereon in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ ABE Akira (seal)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, ATSUMI Totsuzo, who commissioned by Japanese Rod Cross, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in French, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Extrait de la Revue International de la Croix-Rouge No.301 Janvier 1944" is an exact and authorised excerpt from an official document in the custody of (Japanese Rod Cross).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 18th day of August, 1947

/S/ ATSUMI Totsuzo (seal)
Japanese Rod Cross No.6
Shiba Park Tokyo

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here at the presence of the Witness.
at the same place, on this same date

Witness /S/ ABE Akira (seal)
Having been duly sworn, does hereby depose and state as follows:

My name is Charles Ream Jackson, and I am a commissioned warrant officer of the United States Marine Corps. I have been in the military and naval service more or less continuously since 14 June, 1917. Prior to entering the Marine Corps on 3 September, 1927, I had some eight years service in the Infantry and Coast Artillery of the Army, rising to the rank of First Lieutenant. I resigned, with an honorable record on 27 July, 1925; was commissioned a First Lieutenant in the Officers Reserve Corps, Infantry, with a certificate of capacity for Captain. I resigned this commission to enter the Marine Corps.

In the Marine Corps I rose to the rank of Sergeant Major, the highest an enlisted man could go, and at the outbreak of war was serving as the Battalion Sergeant Major of the Second Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment. I served through Bataan and Corregidor, was twice wounded and twice awarded the Purple Heart, and was awarded the Silver Star decoration for gallantry in action against the enemy.

As a prisoner, I was confined mainly in Cabanatuan Prison Camp, leaving there about the middle of August of 1944, and arrived in Hanowa Camp, Akita Prefecture, Honshu Island, Japan, shortly after the 1st day of September, 1944.

I had suffered from bacillary dysentery, anaerobic chronic dysentery, edema and neuritis beri beri, ambliopia - a sort of dimness of vision.
caused by starvation - ulcers, malaria, pellagra, and general malnutrition, among other ailments. At the time I arrived in Hansen my main sicknesses were chronic amoebic dysentery, recurrent malaria, pellagra, and both types of bori bori. I weighed about one hundred twenty-five pounds, some fifty pounds underweight. I had about recovered from my wounds.

I consider my mental condition perfectly normal, considering the conditions of my captivity.

At the time of our arrival, a young Second Lieutenant of the Imperial Army was in command of the camp - I recall not his name - and he was replaced some six weeks later by one First Lieutenant Seaka of the Japanese Infantry.

There were five hundred enlisted prisoners, Captain Elmer E. Fleming, Field Artillery Reserve, First Lieutenant Richard T. Bullen, Coast Artillery Reserve, Major Jackson of the Army Medical Corps, and First Lieutenant John E. Lany, likewise of the Medical Corps. There were some eight Army Medical Corporals, all enlisted, included in the five hundred.

For the first ten days we loafed and rested, with extra rice, but never enough food for our starved bodies. Camp details were set by Captain Fleming, and rosters prepared. We were organized into one group to work on the top side of the copper mine, working muck, another group to work in the machine shop, about four groups to work beneath the ground, mining ore, a group in the smelter, and the aforesaid camp detail group. This last was the prized and desirable detail, and was set by Captain Fleming.

The Mitsubishi Mine People had gone to considerable expense and trouble to receive us, and had built a new barracks to house us. It was better made than the ordinary construction in the village, as I could see. It was obvious, since we had all been processed at Bilibid Prison in the Philippines, and marked "fit" by American doctors - the sick were taken off the detail - that the Mine folk expected five hundred able-bodied men. However, as I said, I was by American standards a sick man, and so were most of the others.

A Japanese Doctor whom we called the "Black Prince" came in after we had been there for a month or less. Major Jackson was a too kind hearted man, and had placed about three hundred and fifty of these prisoners on quarters, meaning they were too sick to work. He was no diplomat, hated the Japanese, and refused to back down from his position that if those men went to work, they would soon die. The "Black Prince"
shook most of them off the list, all but forty, whom he considered very sick. The rest were sent to the Mine. It was obvious that the army authorities and Mine folk wanted to know why these men were not working, and pressure was put on Lieutenant Asaka to get them back to work.

The Doctors were relieved from all duties, and a medical sergeant, whom we called "Cyclops", ran the sick call. He gradually let the quarters list increase to nearly eighty men. Lieutenant Fullen, who knew a little Japanese, was sick call interpreter. "Cyclops" was totally ignorant of his duties, and was putting smooth malingerers of long practice in such on the quarters list, and sending sick men to work. Around November 20 he sent a Private of the Army named Miller up to the Mine to work, and Miller died on the way back of pneumonia, aggravated by malnutrition. At the same time a Japanese Inspection Party was in the camp. As a result, Doctor Jackson was sent to some Tokyo Hospital or other; Doctor Lamy partly resumed medical duties, supervised by "Cyclops" - a shy subdued and embarrassed man - and some two weeks later, we got Doctor Dan Golenternek, Captain of the Army Medical Corps, in as Camp Surgeon. This man was a splendid physician, and a master diplomat in working with the Japanese. He took full charge, and in a short time, as the bitter cold came upon us, around three hundred or more were on the quarters list.

Lieutenant Asaka even had in civilians for heavy work, such as clearing snow off the roofs, and emptying the latrines, assisted in this latter, partially, by the prisoners.

"Cyclops" got up a sort of forty bed hospital, and things began to get better. From what I personally observed of the adjacent Chinese and Korean prisoners, and the free Japanese Mine workers, by Oriental standards we were treated very well. By our American standards, we were badly treated. But then there was a war on, and our captors were Oriental.

Punishments were handed out, as far as possible, by Captain Fleming, who, as far as I know, never reported a man to the Japanese. These were of a minor nature, mainly forfeiture of the small tobacco ration for theft from each other and from the common food supply. The Japanese punished on the spot with a slapping that hurt mostly our dignity for petty offense, such as not saluting properly, being out of uniform in freezing weather, and petty thefts, when detected.

It was several months before Asaka put any one in the Brig, and practically every man who went in there richly deserved it. They stole from fellow prisoners, or from the common food supply. The
Brig was a tough place, with no heat, and Asaka let most of them out in the cold weather on recommendation of Doctor Golenterook before their sentences had expired.

I considered Asaka very lenient in punishment. Men sold in the Mine Japanese Army blankets, shoes, and other articles issued them by the Army and Mine people. In most cases, they were reissued new clothes, and nothing much was done about it.

However, he required a rigid military etiquette—these prisoners refused, almost to a man to cooperate—and his guards slapped people around plenty, but with no brutal beatings. However, some of the civilian "Guides" were very brutal at the Mine, out of sight of Asaka, who always stepped in to stop such practices in my opinion, as far as I could see. Sergeant Ralph Pope, Engineers, Army, had his arm broken by a "Guide" known as "The Rat", whether an official report was ever made to Asaka I do not know.

After Lieutenant Colonel Walker, Aviation, took over as Senior Officer Prisoner, he threatened to report men to Asaka, and did so for theft. One Technical Sergeant Lebeau went into the Brig, with the hearty approval of all of us, for confirmed and repeated thievery, around the end of March, and stayed there, except for occasional hospital treatment, until nearly July, 1945. Colonel Walker recommended him to Asaka for such punishment, and told us he had done so, for Lebeau rated it.

The only beatings I ever saw the "Cyclops" hand out were at the beginning of cold weather, when he ordered men to be fully clothed outside barracks, as a health measure. They blithely ignored his orders; one afternoon he laid for them, and slapped those he caught out of uniform. On one other occasion, catching us around for "Bongo" dismissal as Senior Noncommissioned Present, we refused, in our hatred and stubbornness, to do it with snap and precision, and several men were lightly slapped.

On the whole, "Cyclops" was our friend. He gave the sick meager gifts, for his pay was very little, and got that hospital going. They relieved him around late March, and his going was regretted. His successor was a nondescript "buck passer", who did little for or against the prisoners. "Cyclops" even thought enough of his former patients to come back and pay them a visit at his own expense later on in the summer, and this should be credited him as a good mark.

First Sergeant Jack Boyd, Army Infantry, having been informed by Captain Fleming, who got it from Asaka, that all prisoners were
to be executed in the event of a major landing on any one of theﬁve home islands, and several other prisoners, stole dynamite,
caps, and fuses from the Mine in order to make a last ditch defense
when the shooting started. There must have been forty pounds secreted
under the floors of the barracks, round the end of April, as we
came in from the Mine, we heard it had been discovered, and there
would be an investigation. In the Philippines we would have been
shot first, and investigated later. At evening "Bango", 4enaka, who
spoke English, but never condescended to use it to the prisoners,
addressed us through the Camp Interpreter. To our relief, he said
no one would be punished, but the next time there would be a court
martial, and probable death penalty.

The prisoner rations were entirely separate from those of the
Guards, though cooked in the same galley. Captain Fleming, and
later, Colonel Walker, supervised the distribution. Those officers
tried their best to make a fair distribution, but the men stole
from the food supply, to eat themselves, and sell the rest for
tobacco.

From what I personally observed, the Guards had about half as
much more to eat as we did, and the Mine civilians had about the
same amount, or possibly a little more, than us. 4anaka,
Takunishi (First Sergeant and Second in Command), Sanhai (Police,
Quartermaster, and Mess Sergeant), and "Cyclops", had to eat I
cannot say, but I saw this much - they lost weight, day by day,
and I make a guess that the loss averaged twenty pounds per man.
It would have been very easy for them to have eaten all they wanted,
and I credit them for their honesty in this matter.

Christmas came, with Red Cross packages, four twelve pound
boxes per man. To us these were the retrofit of delicacies. We
counted those precious packages as they were unloaded at the railroad station, we knew exactly how many there were. I am positive
that outside of some thefts by the prisoners, no Japanese ever
stole any of them. 4e bitterly hated 4enaka because he tantalized us
by issuing them in incriments - maybe Doctor Golenturak was back
of that - but this was the best thing for all of us, starved as we were.

The Japanese Guards would have given anything for those packages,
and it was a source of great trouble and worry to 4enaka to keep those
packages properly guarded.

4enaka began to short us on the rations to build up a storeroom.
The impression we got from the Japanese was the war was to be a
ten year one, of attrition, and we had better save food for next
year. The army, suffering from the blockade, might not have enough for us. He prudently built up quite a lot. After surrender, before the planes dropped us "K-rations", he gave us all we could eat, and more besides.

Once, with Captain Fleming, Takahashi was talking about the general treatment of prisoners, and I heard him say, "Oh, you cannot kill these prisoners. The Commandant (Asaka) is responsible for their lives and well being."

All in all, from personal observation, I considered Asaka hard and strict, a true professional soldier, who took care to safeguard lives and health. He had little food and medicines to do it with, and condoned repeated thievery from the mine of fuel, trading with the civilians, and violations of Army orders.

There were periodic inspections by the high command from Tokyo of the prisoners. Soldier-like, Asaka had the camp cleaned up, and prisoners dressed their best, just like inspections in our own army. However, as far as I know, no prisoner was permitted to interview the inspecting officers and state grievances.

In this particular camp, only eight men died. One was the result of a mine cave-in, Private Warner, U.S. Marine Corps, one was tuberculosis, First Sergeant McCarthy, of the Army and I think the rest were plain pneumonia, aggravated by general malnutrition and dispondent heartbreak. Out of five hundred and sixty men, for we had received an increase of British prisoners, this seems to be pretty good, from what I have heard of other camps. There was positively no sadistic tortures or aggravated brutality, such as I saw in the Philippines. Outside of the Brig, and the slappings from the guards, there was not much to complain of in the way of punishments.

At San Diego, California.

This 11th day of August, 1943.

I hereby certify that the foregoing was duly sworn to, signed and sealed in the presence of this witness.

At the same place, on the same day.

Witness: /S/ Samuel Roberts
Defense Counsel
Aug. 1945

PRESS INTERROGATE USAGI CINELV
CAMCAMP AND USAF Y MAJOR PE FILLO AS BRIGADT OFFICER USYOKO
AM/39 UNBRIGADT SPUKOFFICER PO Representative for Last
Two Years Quote Situation as Good as They Can Explain
Comfortably Well housed fed and clothed medicines sufficient
Current needs but anxious knowing whether further Red Cross
Supplies available. Got through last winter very nicely
Only one death were kept warm all IRC Relief turned
Over to HIM for distribution. Health conditions considerably
Improved since last year no serious illness nobody on
downgrade men becoming acclimatized weights improved overall.
Weighing average halfkilo however five to sixkilos for
First arrivals new shoes problem as almost impossible
Getting large enough sizes remaining clothing issued
Replacements adequate. Food good good fresh vegetables supply
Basic rations kept up to specification Recreation limited by
two factors firstly available time after work secondly
Space which insufficient for games such as baseball have
good orchestra but could stand another Gramophone library
Received only one shipment during last fourteen months
Of less than fifty volumes should like seeing more books
Great timeliness in communicating with families transit time
Approximately only on either way wrote middle October.
RECEIVED ONLY ONE SHIPMENT DURING LAST FOURTEEN MONTHS
OF LESS THAN FIFTY VOLUMES SHOULD LIKE SEEING MORE BOOKS
GREAT TIMELAG IN COMMUNICATING WITH FAMILIES TRANSITING
APPROXIMATELY ONCE A WEEK WAY WROTE MIDDLE OCTOBER
FOURTH OF JULY AND MAY FOURTH WHAT WAS Already
HAD APPLY TO BAINES ON DESCRIPTION STATEMENT FOURTH
IF MAIL COULD BE SENT CE OR WOULD MAKE BIG LOAD OFF
MUNS MIND RECEIVED AMCROSS BULLETS IN PICTURES MONTH AGO
WHICH GREATLY APPRECIATED AS I'M LIKE HEARING THINGS OF
LOCAL INTEREST NONE SINCE BRACKET COPIES OF AMCROSS NEWS
NUMBER THREE FOUR SEVEN READY FOR DISPELISH AT TOKYOMAINCAMP
UNBRACKET RECEIVED COMMUNICATION FROM US GOVERNMENT CONCERNING
FAMILY MAINTENANCE AND INSURANCE NOTHING SIMILAR FROM
CANADIAN BRITISH NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENTS ALTHOUGH "LATIVE"
POW KNEW INTERESTED SPECIALLY "POCADING ALLOWANCES PAID"
FAMILIES SHOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUCH INFORMATION I'M MAY
HAVE OF "POCING FOR PUBLICATION TO MHN AS CANT GET HAND
WOULD HAND IT OVER TO HIM PROMPTLY NOTHING BEING KEPT
BACK STOP CONTINUED

INTERCROSS

RCA/HM
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCES AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOKOI, Koji, who occupy the post of The Chief Investigator of the Information Bureau of P.O.W., hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 8 pages and entitled "Despatch from Suez on Aug. 1943. The Information of International Red Cross. Gen.], is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document entitled "Reports file concerning P.A.S. call] in the custody of Japanese Government" (The Information Bureau of P.O.W.)

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13 day of Aug., 1947.

/s/ YOKOI, Koji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signatures and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /S/ SUTSUMA, Isaburo (seal)
Saturday the 25th August 1945

To: 1st Lieut. Hiraishi, Hiroki
Camp Commander
No. 21 Prisoner of War Camp Fukuoka.

Sir,

It is my privilege as Commandor of the British and Australian troops, at present here under your protection convey the appreciation of all ranks for the concern which you have shown for, and the efforts which you have made to relieve the monotony of our short stay here.

Since our arrival here on the 1st June 1945 we have realized something of the increasing difficulties under which you have performed your duties; but the tolerance of your Command in the past, and your immediate consent to my request for organized excursions out of the Camp, has earned for you the profound respect of all ranks.

We hope for your continued co-operation, and look forward to the progressive improvement of our relation during the rest of our stay here.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 36
Camp Commandant
No. 1 Prisoner of War Camp, Fukuoka.

Sir,

It is the desire of the undersigned British Warrant Officers to express our gratitude for the gentlemanly manner in which you have conducted the affairs of this Camp since taking over the role of Commandant.

The policy which you adopted has, in our opinion, saved many lives and eased so much of the misery we all experienced in the past.

We extend, on behalf of the British soldiers in this camp, our heartfelt thanks and pray good health and happiness to you and yours in the days to come.

Signed R. While

W.O.11(BSM) R.A.

Signed F. Smith

W.O.11(BSM) R.A.

No. 1 Prisoner of War Camp
Fukuoka,
31st August, 1945
To whom it may concern;

This will certify that Mr. Tsukasa, Furusho, commander of Fukuoka Prison Camp No. 23, is deserving of any consideration possible due to his fair and considerate treatment of the American War prisoners under his control.

We consider him a loyal Japanese subject and a true officer of the Imperial Army. He has always conducted himself as we would like to conduct ourselves under the same circumstances.

Frank M. Turner
Captain, U.S. Army

Thomas R. Taggart
Captain, U.S. Army
Please convey our best wishes to Mr. Eriwitchi and other members of the staff with whom we have come in contact and trust that only the better times shall remain in our memories, and that henceforth peace shall always be maintained between your country and ours.

Would you please convey a message of heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Nagasawa from Pte. Ross (No. 299) for the timely and utmost assistance when he received the injury to his leg as work recently.

Wishing you all peace and happiness for the future, on behalf of the members of No. 2 furnace squad, and in particular.

Yours Sincerely

SGT. H.H. HALLAM
W.O.II.F.D. WILLIAMS
Mr. Miazaki,

Now that hostilities have ceased between our countries, it is only a short time before we will be going home to our own country, back to our dear people at home.

We would like to take this opportunity, through the courtesy of the Japanese staff at our barracks, to thank you sincerely for all you have done to assist us whilst we have been employed in your department of stainless factory.

During the 2½ years we have been working in No. 2 furnace shed, your attention and assistance to all our needs and difficulties has been given with heartiness and promptitude which has been greatly appreciated by all, and has helped us considerably to carry on this period of our internment which was quite strange and unfamiliar to our normal occupations.
From: Sgt. S. Falcus, 8396966
9th Loyal Northumberland Fusiliers c/o G.P.O.

To: The Manager,
Pro Dressing Mill,
Irak...

Dear Sir,

I am writing to thank you on behalf of the men who worked in your mill as prisoners of war, for your thoughtfulness and kindness toward us. Your personal interest in our welfare, and the care you took in instructing us in our individual jobs, employing each man in the capacity in which he was most interested and happy, did much to dispel any gloom from our minds, and made us feel like ordinary working men. I must also mention your kindness and sympathetic attitude toward anyone who was sick during working hours. All members have expressed the desire to possess a copy of your permanent address, so that they may communicate with you. If you can let me have a copy I will ensure that everyone becomes acquainted with it.

I must also mention the workmen who were our instructors, they deserve our thanks, especially, and I hope you will convey
this to them, Minami of the 4th Floor, Takino of the vacuum, and Tunada of the 6th Floor stores.

Goodbye and good luck to you Sir,

Sincerely Yours

S. Falcus.

Iruka

25th August, 1945
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Corporal Jiro Ikoda, Imperial Nipponese Army, has been on duty as Sergeant Major at this Prisoner of War Camp No. seven (7) from June 2, 1945 to date during which time I have been Prisoner Commander.

Corporal Jiro Ikoda has performed his duties efficiently and fairly with exceptional courtesy to all Prisoners of War at a time when this was not the normal attitude of our guards.

I feel personally indebted to Corporal Jiro Ikoda for his courtesy to myself and my men. I speak for all one-hundred ninety-five Americans here in requesting such courtesy and consideration as you can grant him.

GUY H. STUBBS
Lt. Col. CAC
U. S. ARMY
Excerpt from SB-5

A letter of appreciation from POW.

I certify that the above document is a correct and true copy of the documents in the custody of this bureau.


/S/ IIDA, Yukio (seal)

The acting-chief of POW Information Bureau.
Letter of Thanks
To the Chief of the POW Camp, Mukden

1. On behalf of all the American prisoners of war here in this camp, I wish to express my gratitude for the efforts made by all the personnel who are engaged in health inspections for the purpose of investigating the causes and the present conditions of our bad health, and thereby, deciding measures for its improvement and cure.

2. All of us are much impressed by the most painstaking and thorough-going method and attitude taken by these experts. We believe that in spite of the difficulty of their task they will surely achieve satisfactory results.

3. We have received very kind treatment since we came to this camp. It was beyond our expectation to have such concern shown for our welfare. I firmly believe that all of us concerned are so grateful that they will never throughout their lives forget this experience.

S. H. Hankins (TN Phonetic) Major, USA
Chief of American Liaison Section
POW Camp, Mukden

17 February 1947

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Excerpt from the March Mukden POW Camp Monthly Report

IX Health

4. Sanitary Measures

Concerning sanitary measures, we are aiming at their perfection by carrying out, continuing from the previous month, the third-term preventive measures, according to the regulations pertaining thereto.

We entrusted the Mukden Army Hospital with the examination for enteritis infection of the 191 hospitalized patients. This was conducted on the four days from March 16th to 19th. The results were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Material Inspected</th>
<th>Object of Search</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>No. of persons examined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bacteria</td>
<td>One case of</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16</td>
<td>Faeces</td>
<td>causing</td>
<td>positive re-</td>
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<td>To</td>
<td></td>
<td>inflammation of</td>
<td>action to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19</td>
<td></td>
<td>action to intestines</td>
<td>dysentery germ test</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We are planning to have, in April, a second examination for infection by the Sanitation and Water Supply Squad (the Water Supply and Purification Squad).
Excerpt from the April Number of the Mukden POW Camp Monthly Report

XII Health

5. Sanitary Measures

For the prevention of epidemics, the third-term preventive measures were carried out continuing from the previous month. The Sanitation and Water Supply Squad of the Kwantung Army organized its Second Special Inspection Corps for our camp. The corps carried out its examination of faeces and serum and skin reactions, starting their work from April 16. The results show an overwhelming number of cases of negative reaction, as is shown in the following table. We therefore closed the third-term preventive measures.

Results of Inspection for Infection
(Only In-patients were examined twice)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of persons examined</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 16</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>Faeces</td>
<td>Positive 2 (F Y)</td>
<td>In-patients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Healthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 19</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In-patients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive 2</td>
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## List of POW Camps Inspected in 1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Number</th>
<th>Permission Number &amp; Date</th>
<th>Date of Inspection</th>
<th>POW Camp Inspected</th>
<th>Visitor</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(23) 18</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 127 March 6</td>
<td>March 12</td>
<td>Zentsuji</td>
<td>Dr. F. Paraavicini Rep. to Japan Int. Com R.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 276 April 27</td>
<td>Sometimes after May 20</td>
<td>Hongkong</td>
<td>Edward Egere Rep. to Shanghai R.C. Int. Com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(230) 73</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1430 Dec. 4</td>
<td>Dec. 7</td>
<td>Tokyo (including Kawasaki and Yokohama) Korea (including Chemulpo)</td>
<td>Dr. F. Paraavicini Rep. to Japan R.C. Int. Com.</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. Tel. No. 1424 Dec. 4</td>
<td>Dec. 15</td>
<td>Tokyo (Main Camp and Yokohama)</td>
<td>Angst Swiss Rep.</td>
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<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. Tel. No. 1424 Dec. 4</td>
<td>Dec. 16</td>
<td>Korea (Main Camp and Chemulpo)</td>
<td>Angst Swiss Rep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File Number</td>
<td>Permission Number &amp; Date</td>
<td>Date of Inspection</td>
<td>POW Camp Inspected</td>
<td>Visitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 1520 Dec. 17</td>
<td>Jan. 10</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>William Schilling Swiss Vice-Consul, Shanghai</td>
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<tr>
<td>(51) 15</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 280 Feb. 27</td>
<td>March 8, March 9, March 10</td>
<td>Osaka (Main Comp) 8th, 9th; 1st, 5th; 1st, 6th</td>
<td>Peravioini Rep. to Japan R. C. Int. Com.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(139) 15</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 280 Feb. 27</td>
<td>March 14, March 17</td>
<td>Fukuoka (7th, 10th; 6th, 9th, 11th, 12th)</td>
<td>Max Pestalozzi Asst. Rep. to Japan R. C. Int. Com.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(46) 39</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 411 Apr. 1</td>
<td>Apr. 9, Apr. 10, Apr. 11</td>
<td>Osaka (M.C., 8th, 9th, 1st, 5th, 6th)</td>
<td>Swiss Leg. Off. Kangarbach</td>
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<td>(46) 39</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 411 Apr. 1</td>
<td>Apr. 14, Apr. 21</td>
<td>Fukuoka (7th, 10th, 8th, 9th, 6th, 11th)</td>
<td>Swiss Leg. Off. Kangarbach</td>
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<tr>
<td>(60) 55</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 559 May 5</td>
<td>May 8, May 9</td>
<td>Tokyo (M.C., 1st, and 2nd)</td>
<td>Paul Marela Pope's Env.</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Person</td>
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<tr>
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<td>55</td>
<td>May 17</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>Paul Marcola</td>
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<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>June 1</td>
<td>Formosa</td>
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<td>E. B. Gouar</td>
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<td>June 19</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Edward Egro</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>June 30</td>
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<td>Max Pestalozzi</td>
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<td>Aug. 11</td>
<td>Hakodate</td>
<td>Maurice Champaut</td>
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<td>Aug. 21</td>
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<td>Sept. 22</td>
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<td>124</td>
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<td>124</td>
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<td>Nov. 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Masa Ord. No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Person</td>
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<td>133</td>
<td>1763, Nov. 16</td>
<td>Dec. 3</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
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<td>File Number</td>
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<td>Date of Inspection</td>
<td>POW Camp Inspected</td>
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<td>142</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 2026 Dec. 30</td>
<td>Jan. 6</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Alphonso Piospero, Rossi, Carol Bohem, Fascist Party Branch Reps.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 230 Feb. 27</td>
<td>Mar. 4</td>
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<td>Apr. 14</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
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<td>Apr. 27, Apr. 21</td>
<td>Zentsuji</td>
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<td>May 9</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Mil. Asia Ord. No. 652 May 9</td>
<td>June 2, 3, 4, 5</td>
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<td>Heinrich Angst, R. C. Rep. to Japan</td>
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<td>June 7, June 9</td>
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<td>July 6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td>Bernhard Swiss Leg. Off.</td>
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<td>Mukden Angst R. C. Rep. to Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>Dec. 9, 1945</td>
<td>Hongkong Bishop of Hongkong</td>
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</table>

*Note: The table outlines various events, including dates, locations, and titles of individuals involved.*
List of POW Camps Inspected in 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Number</th>
<th>Permission Number &amp; Date</th>
<th>Date of Inspection</th>
<th>PCW Camp Inspected</th>
<th>Visitor</th>
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<td>Nicholas Cotty Pastor</td>
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<td>July 27</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(TN: Personal names being transliterated from KATAKANA are largely phonetic.)
(Excerpts from PAIO)

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached is an exact excerpt from a document in the custody of our office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 25th day of August, 1947.

YAMAMOTO, YOSHIRO
Specially Commissioned Official
(Full-time Non-Regular Member) of
the POW Information Bureau

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: SUZUKI, MASAHIRO
Specially Commissioned Official
(Full-time Non-Regular Member) of
the POW Information Bureau
Def. Doc. #2141

Dolegatio Apostolica
in Japonia

FILE COPY

MEMORANDUM

RETURN TO ROOM 201

Under the instructions of the Holy See, this delegation occupied itself during the war in assuaging the lot of prisoners of war and civil internees in Japan as well as of Japanese civil internees abroad.

To this end an information service was organized; the list sent by the Japanese General Staff to the International Red Cross served as a card index. As requests for information arrived by mail or by special broadcasts over the Vatican radio those indexes served to identify the person more accurately and to find his internment camp as well. Requests or family correspondence were then routed through the Foreign Ministry and the Japanese military mail service. Thence went cut sums of money destined for prisoner of war camps outside Japan, in accordance with the instructions of the Holy See.

Overtures were made to obtain for the Apostolic Delegato authorization to visit prisoner of war camps and to bring to all, irrespective of their religion, the consolation within his power. International agreements did not recognize this right except on the part of the International Red Cross and representatives of the protecting powers, but permission was nevertheless given. This was a simple favor which did not give me as a matter of course either the right or the duty to see to the observance of international conventions or to protest in the event of their contravention. The object was purely humanitarian to console the prisoners.

During the years 1943 and 1944 I visited in this manner some thirty camps in the interior of Japan between Fukuoka and Sendai, accompanied each time by a functionary of the Foreign Ministry to help me on the trip and in my relations with the police and the military authorities. Almost everywhere I was cordially received by the camp authorities who regulated the programme of visits to the best of their instructions. Usually this commenced with the reading of a report on the general situation of the camp, the number of inhabitants, and health, sanitation, food and clothing conditions. There then followed a quick inspection of the surroundings and an interval in the presence of the officers and an interpreter, of someone or other representing the camps. The other prisoners were then usually at work.

Naturally the prisoners could hardly speak openly under these conditions. Nevertheless, there were cases when prisoners praised the efforts made by their overseers to render their
life less hard.

In addition to these visits it would have been nice to distribute provisions and clothing as is done in other countries by the representatives of the Holy See, but everything was severely rationed and it was impossible to obtain anything of this sort. As the most frequently expressed desire of the prisoners was to obtain something to read, a certain number of works, particularly in English were purchased on the Tokyo market, but only a small number reached the prisoners as far as I can make out. This was not because of the authorities desire to cause suffering but the consequence of an exaggerated sense of responsibility. No book could be sent to the prisoners without being examined line by line by censors who knew little English, and who were few in number and very busy and who above all could not arrive at an opinion as to whether to pass a book or not.

Another desire of the prisoners was to get news of their families. They were permitted to write three or four times a year but many letters were lost and replies came rarely. I strongly demanded that they be as generous as possible in the matter of correspondence.

I lived a long time in Japan before the war and more or less shared the fate of the Japanese people in the course of the hostilities. By making use of this experience I should like, without seeking to excuse or justify anything, to explain the mentality of the country insofar as it concerns prisoners of war. Apart from every atrocity and abuse, the condition of the prisoners in respect of quarters and clothing was entirely that of the common people. The discipline was that of the Japanese army which in certain respects is extremely hard.

In Japan the standard of living was always much lower than usual, but during the war it dropped extremely still and the people had almost nothing to eat and could buy clothing only with the few clothing coupons allotted to them for one year. They were housed one on top of another and the government provided space of only two yards square for Japanese workers in war factories. Such conditions naturally became insupportable and cruel for members of the allied armies without affecting the Japanese to the same extent.

In order to arrive at an impartial judgment it is necessary to add that the Japanese do not have the idea of a prisoner that a long Christian culture has given us. They naturally despised this class of person and no Japanese soldier was permitted under any circumstances to allow himself to be captured. Officers, by the way, used to state that what they were doing in favor of allied prisoners was absolutely one-sided, for they themselves would never have any prisoners.
The fact of being entirely assimilated by the Japanese and submitted to their customs, often contrary to our own, led to the belief in deliberate humiliations when such was not at all the idea; communal Japanese bath, the practice of working almost naked etc.

The wide difference in religion, furthermore, led to the fact that through simple ignorance the special spiritual needs of the prisoner were not taken into account and this was one of the points upon which this Delegation had to insist most in order to persuade the camp authorities that such needs were real and supreme. Certain results were obtained but circumstances often prevented much from being done. As far as Catholic priests were concerned, for example, they were not permitted access to the camps except in the case of those who were Japanese alone and they were very few, overloaded with work and few among them knew English sufficiently well. Nevertheless, they did their best to answer the calls of the camp commanders, but in accordance with the Japanese mentality they were called more often to preside at funerals than to assist the dying.

To sum up: The general impression is that apart from the atrocities and abuses of certain individuals, the great and real suffering of the prisoners was largely the result of a fate which allowed them to fall into the hands of a people so different in manners and mentality rather than being due to a premeditated plan of humiliation and torture.

At Tokyo this 7th day of August 1947,

Archbishop

SEAL
I, Archbishop Paolo Marella, being duly sworn, hereby depose and say:

That I am the duly accredited apostolic delegate in Japan and reside at Tokyo.

I hereby declare that the attached document entitled "Memorandum", written in French and dated at Tokyo 7 August 1947, consisting of five pages, was written by me and is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/S/ Paolo Marella

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 21st day of August 1947, at Tokyo.

/S/ David W. Parsons,
Capt. Inf., Investigating Officer
Sentenced on July 30, 1943
Put into effect on the same day

Judgment

The Mukden P.O.W. Camp

P.O.W. Joe Bill Choatin (24)
American
Marine Sergeant
Formerly a member of
K Company, 3rd Battalion,
4th Marine Regiment.

The Mukden P.O.W. Camp

P.O.W. Ferdinand F. Mehringgolow (21)
American
3rd Warrant Officer
Formerly a member of
the crew of the Canovoa,
aircraft carrier.

The Mukden P.O.W. Camp

P.O.W. Victor Palioty (23)
American
Marine Corporal
Formerly a member of
B Company, 1st Battalion,
4th Marine Regiment.
After trial at this Court Martial with Judiciary Captain NAKAFUJI, Kotaro, a prosecutor, as an advisor, a decision has been given to the cases against the above mentioned defendants: the defendant Chestin on charges of being a ringleader of collective escape, theft, murder, and attempted murder; the defendant Mohringgolow on charges of collective escape, theft, murder, and attempted murder; the defendant Pelioty on charges of collective escape, murder, and attempted murder.

The decision is as follows:

**Text of Judgment**

The Court sentences the defendants Chestin, Mohringgolow, and Pelioty to death.

The seized articles --- a map of Manchoukuo, a compass, and a knife (Exhibit 1 - 3) shall be confiscated.

**Reasons**

The defendants Chestine, Mohringgolow, Pelioty were all taken prisoners by the Japanese Army in the battle of Corregidor, the Philippines on May 6, 1942, in consequence of the surrender of the American Army Commander. They were at first interned in the P.O.W. camp on the spot, and later on Nov. 11, 1942 removed to the Mukden P.O.W. Corp. The defendant Chestin was strongly built, dauntless, and intrepid. After his internment as a prisoner, very soon he became a latent power among his mates, always taking their leadership. While he was a marine, he was instructed by his superiors that in case he should be taken prisoner he should seize every opportunity to escape from the enemy's hand and come home to America, and that he should not do anything in the interest of the enemy. So he always watched for a chance to escape from the camp, intending to go northward and come home by way of Russia. The defendant Mohringgolow, a boxer of the American Fleet, was also strongly built, but being loose and reckless by nature, he detested the camp life. On May 1, 1941, he attempted to escape from the camp, but was arrested then. He was sentenced to 30 days' close confinement. But he had no mind to change his way and watched a chance for escape. The defendant Pelioty also detested the interned life in the camp and secretly desired to get himself free as soon as possible.

(No. 1) About June 10, 1943, the defendant Chestine revealed his intention to Pelioty and Mohringgolow and suggested them to escape from the camp with him. The two willingly agreed with him.
After that they met together secretly at every opportunity and talked about the plan for escaping, and all the time Chestin took their load. He ordered the defendants Mehringgolow and Felioty to arrange necessaries for escaping and travelling. After they had finished the preparations, about noon on the 21st of the same month Chestin called the two into the bathing room in the camp and told them to carry out the plan after the roll-call that evening, taking advantage of darkness as it was moonless that night and appointed the time and place to meet. About 10 o'clock that evening the three met at a hollow place near a storehouse behind the dispensary in the camp. They crept toward the barbed wire entanglements about 50 metres east of the Hollow place. About 10:30 they succeeded to pass under the entanglement then they went on foot north-west ward toward Russian territory, helping each other with a compass (which belonged to the defendant Chestin — exhibit 2) and a map of Manchuria (which belonged to the defendant Mehringgolow — exhibit 3) as their guides.

But about 6:30 p.m. on July 2, 1943, they were arrested about 3 kilometres south-west of a mongolian village of Liangchiatzu, Putonhargommátok, Korchin Tsawaii-hoichi, West Haingan Province by members of the vigilantes of the above-mentioned village.

(No. 2) With the intention of getting necessary tools for the plan,
(1) in March (the day not clear) of the same year, the defendant Chestin stole 2 knives at two times, with the same criminal intention each time, from the kitchen of the **Machine Tool Manufacturing Company**, 2nd Block, Chine Tai, Tatung Ward, Fukden, where he was working on duty as cook at that time. The knives belonged to the above company.
(2) about June 1, 1943 the defendant Mehringgolow stole a knife (the owner was unknown) placed on the shelf in a room of the camp-affairs section in the camp.
(3) While escaping they were pinched for food and went together to a house in which lived Tuncampu (31), an assistant police inspector and Chief of the branch police station at Liangchiatzu. The three asked him for some food without knowing that he was a policeman. Tuncampu, harboring suspicion in his mind, put them a few questions the three tried to put him off with false explanations in a dumb-show that they were German fliers and that their plane had crashed on their way home from Japan, three of their comrades being killed on the spot, and that they were going to the station of the Japanese Army, the assistant police inspector demanded them to accompany him to the
crash scene, and the three defendants were compelled to go
thoro with him. About 4 that afternoon the three left the
village with the assistant police inspector followed by
Fatuton (56) and Kao Fengshan (56), both Mongolians and
vigilance men of the village. On their way the defendant
Chestin suggested the other two, Mehringgolow and Falioty,
to kill the assistant police inspector and the two Mongolians.
Mehringgolow and Falioty agreed with him at once. At this
they decided by mutual consent the defendant Chestin would
kill the assistant police inspector, the defendant
Mehringgolow Patuten, the defendant Falioty Kao Fong shan.
About 5 that evening when they came to a sandy place
2
kilometres south-east of the village, the defendant Chestin
suddenly attacked Tuwesampu, stabbing his abdomen with the
craving knife which he carried with him. Tuwesampu made
resistance. Chestin repeatedly stabbed his abdomen the
wounds were fatal. At the same time the defendant
Mehringgolow also attacked Patuten with his knife (Exhibit-

3) stabbing Mehringgolow’s back and breast and Patuten fell
on the spot. Tuwesampu died from the wounds in the abdomen
at 7:30 p.m. at Yongchiatzu Putonharyantutok on the day.
They failed to kill Patuten, although he had to receive a
three weeks treatment for his wounds on the breast and
back. Kao Fengshan, seeing the scrimmage, immediately
took to flight.

We have recognized the foregoing to be true judging by:
(1) the defendants’ depositions made at this court,
(2) the . . .my Judicial policeman’s statement concerning the reasons
of the arrest of the defendants, which was stated by
Hsiechieosuhoi.
(3) the inspection statement prepared by the above Judicial
column.
(4) Kao Fengshan’s interrogatory prepared by the judicial policeman.
(5) the written explanation submitted by Hara, the
Chief of the P. O. W. Labor Division of the Manchurian Machine
Tool Manufacturing Company.
(6) the attestation of Tuwesampu’s corpse and Patuten’s diagnosis
prepared by Surgeon Lt. Y. Hara, Shiro.
(7) the seized articles, a map of Manchoukuo, a compass, and a
knife (Exhibit 1 - 3)
(8) the defendant Chestin’s offenses of the same nature repeated
during a short time.
According to the laws, as to the defendant Cheatin as the crime of being a ringleader of the collective escape of F.O.I., shown above (in No. 1) comes under the first clause, Article VII of the Penal Law of F.O.I., we decided to condemn him to death — one of the penalties provided in the law the crime of theft shown above (in No. 2-(1)) comes under Articles CCXXXV, and LV of the Criminal Law, the crimes of murder and attempted murder shown above (in No. 3) come under Articles LX, CCXIX, and CCIII of the Criminal Law. But in the present case as one act has constituted two crimes of murder and attempted murder, penalty should be laid on the more serious crime, murder, according to the first clause of the first paragraph of Article LIV and Article X of the Criminal Law. And his crimes shown above are considered to be concurrent crimes, which were provided in the first clause of Article XLIV, but as we have decided to condemn him to death on a charge of his being a ringleader of the collective escape, no more penalties are not imposed upon him on charges of the other crimes.

As to the defendant Mohringgolow, as the crime of collective escape shown above (in No. 1) comes under the latter clause of Article VII of the Penal Law of F.O.I., the crime of theft shown above (in No. 2-(2)) comes under Article CCXXXV, and the crimes of murder and attempted murder shown above (in No. 3) come under Articles LX, CCXIX, and CCIII. But in the present case as one act has constituted two crimes of murder and attempted murder, penalty should be laid upon the more serious crime, murder, according to the first clause of the first paragraph of Article LIV and Article X of the Criminal Law. Accordingly we have decided to condemn him to death — one of the penalties provided in the law. But we condemn him to death on a charge of murder, no more penalties are not imposed upon him on charges of the other crimes.

As to the defendant Pelioty, the crime of the collective escape as shown above (in No. 1) comes under the latter clause of Article VII of the Penal Law of F.O.I.; the crimes of murder and attempted murder shown above (in No. 3) comes under Articles LX, CCXIX, and CCIII of the Criminal Law. But in the present case as one act has constituted two crimes of murder and attempted murder, penalty should be laid upon the more serious crime, murder, according to the first clause of the first paragraph of Article LIV and Article X of the Criminal Law, accordingly we have decided to condemn him to death, no more penalties are not imposed upon him on charges of the other crimes.

The seized articles, a map of Munchoukuo, a compass (Exhibit 1-2) were used when they committed the crime shown in No. 1, and the other seized article a knife was used when they committed the crimes shown in No. 3. All these articles do not belong to any person other than the defendants, these shall be confiscated according to Article XIX of the Criminal Law.
Hereby we decided to give judgment as shown in the text.

On this 30th day of July, 1943

Special Court Martial of Kwantung Army

Presiding Judge:
Major ICHIKAWA, Einoshin

Judge:
Judiciary Captain IMAMURA, Ichiro

Judge:
Captain SHIGOKU, Kotaro

The above is a copy of the judgment.

On this 30th day of July, 1943

Special Court Martial of Kwantung Army

Clerk: NAKAZIMA, Takeshi
Def. Doc. #:2244

I certify that this document is an correct copy of the document in the custody of the Prisoner of War Intelligence Bureau.


P.O.W. Intelligence Bureau

/S/ YOKO1, Koii (seal)
Sworn Deposition (Translation)
Dependent: -- Saito, Yoshie

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and
in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby
depose as follows.

I, Yoshie Saito, under oath testify the following facts:

I was born in 1880, and live in Shoto, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo-to.
After graduating from the Tokyo Imperial University, I entered
the Foreign Office, was stationed as diplomatic and consular
attache in Peking and Tientsin, China, became Secretary of Embassy
in Washington under Ambassador Shidehara, became Director of the
Bureau of Commercial Affairs of the Foreign Office; after resigning
in 1926, I became a Director of the South Manchurian Railway Co.,
Ltd., in July 1940, upon formation of the Komei cabinet, at the
request of Foreign Minister Matsuoka I became adviser to the
Foreign Office and held that position until I resigned in July 1941.

I was on intimate terms with Mr. Matsuoka for 30 years; at
the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy, as advisor to the Foreign Office I stayed day and night at the private residence of Foreign Minister Matsuoka where the negotiations were taking place, and throughout the entire period I was responsible for the technical side of the negotiations concerning this pact. Due to this, I am comparatively accurately informed regarding the ideals, aims, motives on the Japanese side which led to the conclusion of the pact, and the circumstances concerning the conclusion of the pact.

2. Before entering into details I would like to testify as to Mr. Matsuoka's general idea concerning the method to bring about peace throughout the entire world. Mr. Matsuoka was of the opinion that it was impossible to establish world peace through the power of the League of Nations, and he considered a separate formula was necessary; this he often spoke of before he became Foreign Minister. When Mr. Matsuoka was President of the South Manchurian Railway Co., and when I was advisor to the S.M.R., I once called on him at his villa at Gotemba concerning company business, he spoke as follows after finishing the company business:

"The world is too large. Races, national sentiments and policies are different, and the past ideas of establishing world peace through a centralized and unique organ is a mistake when dealing with such a world. For this, I can think of no better method than that friendly neighbouring countries with mutual interests should form a union, then a larger union should be formed among these unions, and among these larger unions peaceful relations..."
should be established, and finally this should be spread through the world. Should I become Foreign Minister, I intend to realize this idea. However, this will not be easy, and sufficient study must be made of the problems. I would like you to think about it."

When I met him again at Gotenba, in the spring of 1937, as I recall Mr. Matsuoka said:

"Well, have you studied my idea? A union including Japan, Manchuria and China and their neighbouring countries must be formed. However, unfortunately, this cannot be hoped for considering the present situation of long-standing disputes between Japan and China. So, I, as President of the SMR and as a man with many Chinese friends, am in a good position to take steps to further Sino-Japanese peace as a private individual, and I should like to go to China some day soon and see what can be done. Therefore, I wish to request you to go to China, and make thorough observations on the situation."

I had been studying Chinese affairs for many years, and since I considered this my life-work, I went to China in accordance with Mr. Matsuoka's suggestion with great pleasure.

The reason why Mr. Matsuoka said that Japan should form a union with the East Asiatic countries was according to what he often told me, because he thought that these countries are neighbours with similar races, and both from a historic and realistic view-point, are as closely related as cogs in a machine;
therefore these countries could comparatively easily construct a new order on the basis of mutual interests. Then the reason for his urgent desire to solve Sino-Japanese conflicts was not only in order to realize Sino-Japanese economic collaboration, but also because he considered it was absolutely necessary for the construction of an East Asiatic new order as one stage toward world peace.

3. After Mr. Matsuoka resigned his post as President of the S M R, in March 1939, for a time he lived a leisure life, and during this period he spoke to me from time to time of his opinion concerning inter-states unions as a method of establishing world peace. In July 1940 when he became Foreign Minister he made me an advisor to the Foreign Office, and he gave much thought to the method to be taken to establish world peace. Mr. Matsuoka decided to conclude the Tripartite Pact in August 1940 when he received a telegram from Ambassador Kurusu saying that Mr. Stahmer had left Germany for Japan. His motives were:

1) to realize his above-mentioned concerning the establishment of world peace,

2) to solve the China Incident.

3) current Japanese-American relations were in such a bad condition that they could not be improved by ordinary diplomatic methods due to the extremely strong American attitude, and no other method could be found.

These were the 3 circumstances behind his decision, and this I
was told by Mr. Matsuoka two or three days after the negotiations were begun concerning the conclusion of the pact.

4. First, on the content of Mr. Matsuoka's idea for establishing world peace, I have already given a rough idea. Mr. Matsuoka considered, according to what he told me, that it was necessary first of all to construct an inter-states union in the past based on the mutual interests of the various countries. The area to be covered by this inter-state union was to be decided in accordance with the attitude taken by the countries concerned, and Mr. Matsuoka's ideal was that Japan, Manchuria and China should form the core, and that it should include the whole of East Asia. Moreover, if interests identical to the mutual interests of East Asia, forming the basis of this inter-state union, should exist in other parts, these countries should of course join the union—this was Mr. Matsuoka's opinion. The meanings of mutual interests are too broad to be defined in one word; but, for example, one of the ideas was economic co-existence and co-prosperity. Mr. Matsuoka thought that all the treasure lands of the East Asiatic countries were either the colonies of the European and American Powers or else were of a semi-colonial nature, and in cases where the territorial or colonial policies of the European and American Powers did not necessarily coincide with the interests of the East Asiatic countries themselves, then it was to the mutual interest of East Asiatic countries that these policies should be appropriately modified. In other words, Mr. Matsuoka thought
that amendment of the policies of these European and American countries to a certain extent had to be asked if the new order in East Asia should really be established. However, Mr. Watsuoka never told me that it was inevitable that the European and American Powers would have to be excluded in order to construct the East Asiatic new order. Surely, the European and American Powers with territory in Asia would not utterly oppose some changes in their policies if this was to the benefit of the inhabitants of the territory and also to the benefit of world peace. Mr. Watsuoka's thought was that, even if these changes could not take place rapidly, it was not impossible to make gradual changes after due discussions. At the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Watsuoka did not have the intention of using force in order to improve this situation. He was not so vain as to suppose that Japan had so much actual strength.

The first time this idea of an East Asiatic new order was announced to the public was in the preamble to the Tripartite Pact. In it it reads:

"The Government of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and to co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe wherever it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to
promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the people concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three
Government to extend co-operation to such nations in other
spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth
endeavours along lines similar to their own in order that
their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized.

This English text was written and proposed personally by Mr.
Watsuoka, and German side did only accept it.

As such was what happened, leaving aside the question of
how Germany and Italy regarded the Tripartite Pact. Japan was
firmly convinced that it was one way to establish world peace.
The so-called "new order in East Asia" referred to in this
pact indicated the situation which would be brought about once
the peaceful region in East Asia was established.

5. The second Japanese motive for concluding the Tripartite
Pact was the Chinese question. To say the truth, Japan was
greatly troubled by the Chinese question. At that time, Japan
was worried over her extraordinary increase in population, and
there was no solution except the encouragement of industry.
Therefore, Japan thought that on Sino-Japanese economic
collaboration depended the very existence of the nation.
However, due to the irresponsible anti-Japanese movement in China
many difficulties were created to prevent its realization, in
addition to the Japanese vested interests were violated, and the
lives and properties of Japanese residents in China were

- 6 -
Even after the China Incident broke out in July 1937, Japan intended to withdraw her forces as soon as possible. For example, an order was issued to the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces (which later became the China Expeditionary Forces) not to advance beyond the Soo-chow River, which flows through Shanghai, and also that permanent measures should not be taken in the Shanghai area. (This order was issued in or about August 1937). The reason why this order was not strictly obeyed was because Chinese resistance was so strong that Japanese forces could not halt at this line.

In this way, after the Japanese Army occupied Nan-king, and after further advances were made, the situation continued to deteriorate. Therefore Japan was in a hurry to end the China Incident, and turned to various measures. The statement that no dealings would be made with Chiang Kai-shek, the pronouncement of the three Konoye principles, the emergence of Wang Chingwei, all these measures were taken for this purpose. On the other hand, Japan earnestly desired to open direct discussions with General Chiang Kai-shek on the entire peace question, and military personnel, diplomats and private experts on Chinese affairs who were thought to have formerly been on familiar terms with the Chiang Kai-shek clique took every available step, unfortunately all of them ended in failure. Although there may have been many reasons for the failure, Japan considered that at the time America, Britain and other countries wholly sympathized with China, and did not hesitate to
offer concrete and abstract assistance. By obtaining Anglo-American assistance, General Chiang Kai-shek maintained his position and did not shift one iota his thorough anti-Japanese policy; this was thought to be the main reason on the Japanese side. To be frank, Mr. Matsuoka and others on the Japanese side thought that it was the intention of America and Britain to have General Chiang Kai-shek bitterly oppose Japan, and then taking advantage of the weakening of Japanese strength, to overpower Japan by force. Therefore, on one hand, facing Japan, they argued that peace was profitable, and repeated strong protests based on the stipulations of treaties were made. On the other hand, toward General Chiang Kai-shek, material and moral support was given, and efforts were made to prolong, as long as possible, the Sino-Japanese armed conflict—this was considered to be the Anglo-American policy vis-a-vis Japan. Setting aside the question of whether this opinion was false or not, Mr. Matsuoka believed in view of this situation that Japan's power would necessarily have to be strengthened by allying herself with other Powers in order to settle the Chinese question. By doing so, America and Britain could be checked and their policy toward Japan would be changed, thus leading to the early solution of Sino-Japanese questions. This was one of the motives leading to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

6. The third reason why Mr. Matsuoka was forced to conclude the Tripartite Pact was the so-called A B C encirclement problem. Among these, Mr. Matsuoka was most concerned over
the American attitude. At that time, America, Britain and China combined and formed the so-called A D C encirclement front, and planned to crush Japan—this was the problem which caused the least concern to the Government and the people of Japan. Setting aside the question of whether America and Britain actually had this aim in mind, the pressure put by these 3 Powers on Japan actually increased daily, and unless some means were found to break through the encirclement, Japan would be faced with the danger of extinction—this was the opinion held by Mr. Matsuoka and many other informed Japanese at that time. Mr. Matsuoka was constantly bothered by this problem, and continuously worried about how it could be possible to dissolve this encirclement. Especially, the fact that America concentrated the larger part of her navy—the largest in the world—in the Pacific greatly stimulated Japanese feeling as it was considered to be a threat by force. Again, the rumour that America possessed bases in Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma, etc., and the American naval vessels would in the near future enter Singapore, was becoming stronger from day to day. Therefore, Mr. Matsuoka and many other informed Japanese becoming increasingly worried over the danger that Japan would soon be attacked by the combined Anglo-American forces. On the other hand, America abrogated the Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911, and trade with Japan was in reality extremely curtailed, thus causing Japan to suffer under military and commercial pressure. Mr. Matsuoka was constantly concerned...
over this, and one day said to me:

"If Japan and America should ever go to war, it would be most unfortunate for Japan, and it would inevitably have the most disastrous results for Japan. Not only that, but the culture of the human race would be completely destroyed, and the world would become darkened. To prevent this is something that I, as Foreign Minister, cannot forget even in my dreams."

Mr. Matsuoka, day and right, studied measures concerning this problem. In fact, Mr. Matsuoka often told me:

"If it were possible to dissolve America's high-pressure policy, the problems of Japan, America, and Britain, and the Sino-Japanese problem would be naturally easy to solve. Moreover, if this were realized, it might even be possible for Japan to take a step forward, and could alone, or together with the Soviet Union, act as arbitrator in the Anglo-German war. However, since American policy is so high-handed, Japan cannot oppose America single-handed with her own power, so Japan must shake hands with some other strong Powers."

To express what Mr. Matsuoka told me then in a simple way, the countries he had in mind by saying to shake hands with some Powers were the Soviet Union and Germany. However, to combine with the Soviet Union would probably irritate America, and it was certain that the Soviet Union would immediately refuse Japan's proposal to shake hands with her. So, Mr. Matsuoka...
reached the conclusion that there was no other measure for the time being but to associate with Germany.

7. Another motive besides the above-mentioned three which Mr. Matsuoka had in concluding the Tripartite Pact was to attempt to adjust Russo-Japanese relations through the good offices of Germany. At the time, although there did exist a small dark cloud over Soviet-German relations, at any rate they were on friendly terms. So Mr. Matsuoka thought to shake hands with the Soviet Union by utilizing, if possible, Germany after associating with her. Mr. Matsuoka thought of shaking hands with the Soviet Union for a considerably long time. When Mr. Matsuoka was President of the S M R he said to me:

"I was a great favorite of Count Shimpei Goto who was a well-known Russophile and made all sorts of efforts to realize a Japanese-Soviet rapprochement. Recently, he has gone himself to Russia and carried on negotiations. I believe that I myself am responsible for making Count Goto a Russophile. In this way, my pro-Sovietism is considerably old, and now that I have become President of the S M R, I am even more impressed by the necessity."

In this manner, he based his opinion on the actual conditions of Japan; and went on to discuss world-currents, speaking in a logical way of Soviet-Japanese friendship.

Long after that, when he returned from his trip to Europe in 1941, he spoke to me of the events which occurred on his departure from Moscow where he had stayed and said:
"Mr. Stalin came to the station to see me off. Both Soviet officials and Ambassador Tatekawa assured me that this was without precedent. He appeared to be sincerely reluctant to say goodbye to me, and when I was about to leave he hugged me and kissed me very hard. And he said to me, "The Finnish race is not a European race. They are real Asiatics. Since they are both Asiatics, shouldn't Japan and the Soviet Union be good friends?" So, I thought utilizing this opportunity to delay my departure, and carry on further negotiations concerning Soviet-Japanese friendly relations beyond the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. However, since arrangements had been made on affairs to follow my return to Japan, I thought that to postpone my return would have a delicate effect on the international situation. So, I reconsidered, and thought that I could again come at some appropriate time."

At the time, since it was urgent for Japan to settle the Chinese question, as mentioned above, and the Soviet Union had a important influence on this question, if friendly relations could be established with the Soviet Union, it would naturally minister to the solution of the question. From this viewpoint also, it was necessary to establish Soviet-Japanese friendly relations. Mr. Matsuoka once said to me:

"The China Incident is less a problem having to do with China, than it is a problem concerning America and the Soviet Union."

From this viewpoint, Mr. Matsuoka attempted to realize his cherished plan to establish Soviet-Japanese friendship by
shaking hands with Germany, and utilizing her good offices. This was also one of the motives behind the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. In addition, Mr. Stahrer told Mr. Matsuoka at the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact that Germany was prepared to act as intermediary.

8. As stated above, the Tripartite Pact was not concluded in preparation for war. However, since an association was formed with Germany and Italy then actually at war with England, Mr. Matsuoka was aware of the danger of Japan being forced against her will into the war by Germany and Italy notwithstanding Japan's desire not to enter the war. So, he thought of making reservations at the very beginning of the negotiations concerning the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, and made two reservations in connection with the negotiations. One was that Japan would remain outside of the war waged by Germany and Italy against Britain, and the second was that the European War would be prevented from spreading to America and East Asia. Mr. Matsuoka told both Mr. Ott and Mr. Stahmer at the beginning of the negotiations that Japan considered that the most important mission of the Tripartite Pact was to establish peace throughout East Asia, therefore, Japan should not be forced into the Anglo-German war because of the Pact, and a German guarantee on this point was desirable.

He demanded that the following two points be promised:

1. Germany would not interfere in the political questions of East Asia, and Japan would not interfere in the political
questions of Europe;

(2) The European war should be carried on by Germany and Italy alone and Japan's aid should not be sought, on the other hand, the military operations against China would be carried out by Japan alone and Germany's aid would not be sought.

The German side immediately agreed to this. Concerning the policy of improving the relations with the United States and of preventing America from entering the war, agreement was reached almost in the same procedure. Shortly thereafter Mr. Ott brought Ribbentrop's personal message to Mr. Matsuoka, which I also saw and read at that time. This was a fairly short note; one sheet typed in German, but its contents were very important. Its point was that Japan should speedily attack the Soviet Union from the rear. Its wording was impolite, and to the point, moreover its contents were in violation of the promises given at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. When Mr. Matsuoka saw it, he was very angry, and utterly declined to give any consideration to the proposal as it was in contravention to the mutual understandings exchanged at the time of the Tripartite Pact. Another thing, after Mr. Matsuoka had returned from his trip to Germany and the Soviet Union, I asked Mr. Matsuoka about the information I had received that he had been advised by Hitler and Ribbentrop to attack Singapore. To this Mr. Matsuoka replied:
"There was such talk. I was Foreign Minister, and not one of the Service Ministers. So no matter how earnestly this was recommended to me, I was not in a position to assent to the proposal. Moreover, concerning the use of armed force by Japan to further the development of the European war, reservations were made at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Whether Japan should attack Singapore or not was a matter concerning which Germany had not right to say anything. I am absolutely opposed to conquest. As you know, my motto is non-conquest, non-aggression, non-exploitation. I did modify my words. For example, I said that if Japan were to be presented with a chance that came only once in a thousand years, Japan would fight. I also said that if Japan were to fight, the sooner the better. This was only because I wished to prevent further conversation on the same line. However, I did not make any promise with reference to an attack on Singapore, nor did I say anything to commit myself, so you needn't worry."

9. At the time of the conclusion of the pact Mr. Matsuoka said to me:

"The Tripartite Pact may temporarily worsen Japanese-American relations, and may lead to a very dark phenomenon. In half a year, however its darkness will fade, and world peace will be more firmly established. I must pour all my wits and abilities into it for this object. I do not even dream of fighting with America, and I must not do so."

Again Mr. Matsuoka had often declared in the Diet that
the Tripartite Pact was a means to the establishment of world peace. The following happened at the time of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. The question of Japanese-American negotiations was put before a Cabinet meeting, and I was instincted to be present at the conference. However, the Home Minister, Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma spoke in detail for about 30 minutes opposing war from all angles, and said that Japan must not fight for any reason whatsoever. All of the other Ministers remained silent. Only Mr. Matsuoka spoke and said:

"I agree with Baron Hiranuma. War must be avoided at all costs." That day after Mr. Matsuoka returned to the Foreign Office he said to me in the Minister's office:

"I am in entire agreement with what Baron Hiranuma had to say today. The very fact that Baron Hiranuma, who is usually silent, should have spoken in detail against war must have been because of the importance of the matter, and because he came prepared to deeply impress all the Ministers with a thorough sentiment against war. Coming from his mouth, anti-war opinion carries much more weight than if it were voiced by someone else."

10: Since Mr. Matsuoka was well aware that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact might greatly irritate American nerves, he paid much attention to this point. He repeatedly persuaded Admiral Nomura, who was reluctant, to finally accept the post of Ambassador to America, and this was because he considered as I
heard from him that the post must be given to a man who would be welcomed in America, and that Admiral Nomura was the best person. To this Admiral Nomura he begged, that all efforts be made to improve Japanese-American relations. Again, for the same purpose he tried to dispatch Count Kabayama, who had many friends in America, to America. He tried to dispatch Mr. Toyohiko Fagawa, an American-type missionary who was considered to have the best comprehension of America, to the United States. He was very polite in his conversations with Ambassador Grew. One day (the date I have forgotten) after Ambassador Grew had returned, I asked Mr. Matsukata how the conversations went on. Mr. Matsukata answered: "Recently conversations have become somewhat difficult. Although the policy of giving absolute importance to Japanese-American friendship has not changed, at a time like this when the situation is critical, unless a strong attitude is shown, it can have no effect. At the same time, if the other party is angered, it will be disastrous, and to maintain a proper balance is difficult." So I was very careful in choosing my words."

At the end of 1940 Mr. Steinhardt, the American Ambassador to Russia, passed through Japan on his way to his post, and saw Mr. Matsukata. At this meeting, Mr. Matsukata spoke at great length of Japan's difficult position, and the necessity of Japanese-American friendship. Later in 1941, when Mr. Matsukata went to Europe to visit Russia, Germany and Italy, he repeated
similar sentiments to Mr. Steinhardt in Moscow and consulted him on the means to attain Japanese-American friendship. This I learned from Mr. Rauchka. Before his journey to Europe, he told me:

"My journey to Europe is, on the surface, in order to visit the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy, but hardly anyone knows that my hidden mission is to adjust relations with Soviet and America." At this time, he had already prepared and kept hidden a draft of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty, and was prepared for negotiations with America. On his departure he said:

"I intend to cut as short as possible my sojourn in Europe and then go to America. I intend to indicate Japan's actual situation and a concrete draft of the basis of a Japanese-American understanding, and by negotiating directly with the Secretary of State to endeavour to improve Japanese-American relations."

On another occasion he said:

"It is regrettable that American sentiment towards Japan has grown greatly tense, owing to the Tripartite Pact. However, this I anticipated at the time of the conclusion of the Pact. But this situation must not be neglected. I must go to America at any cost, and after directly bearing from the authorities America's real intentions, I must take appropriate measures."

So I spoke of my opinion and said:
"Since I believe that the tension of American sentiment toward Japan is due to the Tripartite Pact and the Chinese question, if a Japanese-American understanding is at all possible, something must be done about the Tripartite Pact. The entire withdrawal of troops from China must also be considered. If these two things are possible, I think the other questions are secondary."

To this Mr. Matsucka replied:

"I agree entirely. As you well know, the Tripartite Pact is not for the purpose of waging war. If such a situation should be created that Japan might be forced into war, the way of thinking concerning the Tripartite Pact must be fundamentally changed.

If a pact aimed at preserving Japan should become a pact leading to the destruction of Japan, drastic measures will have to be taken against the pact. Concerning the whole-scale withdrawal from China, if one were to advocate that at the present moment, it would not pass in Japan. In any case, I must first of all directly negotiate with the American authorities."

Then I asked:

"Have you confidence in your ability to influence America if you were to go there?"

Mr. Matsucka answered:

"I believe so. Americans do not indulge in intrigues nor in plots. They are fair and do not hamper themselves with what has passed or with barren logic. The reason why American diplomacy has always been so clear, is because of this. If I were to go and adequately
explain Japan's true intentions, and demonstrate Japan's sincerity, although it may be difficult to alter American opinion at one stroke, I do not think it impossible. For this, Japan must necessarily make great concessions, and I have prepared my own draft."

At that time in America, Mr. Matsucka was locked on in an extremely unfavorable light, and in my opinion I thought it might be better if someone else were to go, but Mr. Matsucka was confident that if he were to go himself there was hope that Japanese-American negotiations would be successful. Mr. Matsucka was cared for by an American missionary and spent his early years in America so he was well acquainted with American circumstances and American sentiments. In fact, when he returned from his European journey in May 1941, he said he would go in spite of the fact that his lungs were already in a bad condition and repeatedly took council with Premier Konoye. Premier Konoye was opposed to it, and Mr. Matsucka's trip to America was not realized. Soon, the third Konoye Cabinet commonly said to be a reshuffle to eliminate Matsucka came into existence, attitude of the Japanese Government at the time of the third Konoye Cabinet towards the Tripartite Pact became coal. It was rumoured that Foreign Minister Toyoda said that Japan did not exist for the Tripartite Pact, but that the Tripartite Pact existed for Japan. When Mr. Matsucka heard of this he said that it was possible that things would go so far as the abrogation of the pact.

Further he said,

"There are many instances of abrogations of newly concluded
treaties of abrogations during the effective period of treaties. I should like to know on what grounds in international law this can be justified. When I visited Mr. Matucka, who was confined to bed, as soon as I learned of the outbreak of war between America and Japan on 6 December 1941, he said:

"So it finally ended in war."

Then for a short time he maintained a sorrowful silence, and continued:

"If I had remained, I should have made all efforts to avoid war." In September 1940 when Mr. Matucka resolved to conclude the Tripartite Pact he said to me:

"I am neither pro-Anglo-American nor pro-Italian-German. I am pro-Japanese, and believe in world peace. The Tripartite Pact, the policy of Soviet-Japanese rapprochement and the Japanese-American problem, all these were because I wished to bring about world peace, and because I thought about Japan. If Japan combines with Germany and Italy at this time, the public may say that I am pro-German. In foreign countries they may say that I support aggression. No matter what they may say, I do not care. However, I am absolutely against conquest. Not only am I opposed to Japanese conquest, but I am also opposed to conquest by other countries. If the Tripartite Pact should be used as a tool of aggression, such a pact must not be allowed to exist."

- 21 -
11. The Tripartite Pact was entirely separate from the negotiations among the three powers which took place before Mr. Matsuoka’s time, and was not a continuation of the former negotiations, which took place from the summer of 1938 to about August 1939 between Japan, Germany and Italy. As was informed to the American Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington at the end of August 1939, the former negotiations were absolutely dropped and have no connections with the Tripartite Pact of 1940. Mr. Matsuoka was a man with considerable self-confidence. Mr. Matsuoka was a senior member of the Foreign Ministry and the four or five Foreign Ministers preceding him were his juniors or were absolute amateurs. So Mr. Matsuoka did not think much of the men who preceded him. Mr. Matsuoka often told me as well as other people, that the Japanese diplomacy to date was utterly incompetent, and that fundamental reforms would have to be carried out. So when he became Foreign Minister, he immediately dismissed a large number of higher diplomats including Ambassadors and Minister. Although this move was severely criticized by the public (some foreign papers called this mass dismissal a clean-out of the pro-Anglo-American school, but that was absolutely not so. Many people of pro-German tendencies were also dismissed), this measure was taken as an unavoidable step to reform diplomacy. Since that was his character, he disliked being bothered with events in the past concerning important diplomatic questions. So he never looked at the Foreign Office.
records concerning the former negotiations between the three Powers, nor did he order his subordinates to study them. At times, some persons spoke of the past negotiations, but he did not listen to them, and said that it belonged to the past and had no bearing on his diplomacy. In this manner, when Mr. Stahmer arrived in Tokyo in the autumn of 1940, at a meeting of the three persons Mr. Stahmer, Mr. Ott and Mr. Watsuoka, Mr. Watsuoka presented them with his own draft and the pact was concluded.

One of the reasons why Mr. Watsuoka conducted diplomacy on his own in the second Konoye Cabinet is due to the following circumstances: In 1940, when Prince Konoye was entrusted with the forming of the cabinet, immediately preceding the formation, a meeting known as the Big Four Conference was held for two or three days, with Konoye, Tojo, Navy Minister Yoshida and Watsuoka taking part at Prince Konoye's private residence. At this conference Mr. Watsuoka stressed that if he were to become Foreign Minister all diplomatic questions would be left to him. If other Ministers were to interfere he would not be able to accept the post. The other three leaders agreed to this. This fact was told to me by Mr. Watsuoka, and ever since, diplomacy was carried on solely by Mr. Watsuoka. These circumstances continued at least until about the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. One day at that time I saw Prince Konoye in the Japanese room at the Premier's official residence on official
business at the order of Mr. Petrov, and I remember that Prince Konorov complained about Mr. Petrov's arbitrary actions.

In this true court of April 11, 1947
At 10:00 A.M.

Shibata, SAITO, Yoshie (seal)

I, USHIBA, Nobuhiko hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At same place

Witness: (signed) USHIBA, Nobuhiko (seal)

With

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAITO, Yoshie (seal)
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance
with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I, MATSUMOTO, Shunichi, state under oath as follows:

1. I was born in 1897. My present address is Yukigaya-machi, Ota-ku,
Tokyo-to.

I entered the Foreign Office in 1921 after graduating from the Tokyo
Imperial University, Faculty of Jurisprudence. I was Director of the
Treaty Department of the Foreign Office from September 1940 until November
1942.

2. In September 1940 I was recalled from my post as the Councillor of the
Japanese Embassy in China (Nanking) to Tokyo and appointed the Director of
the Treaty Department of the Foreign Office. I was told by Foreign
Minister Mataura about matters concerning the Japanese-German negotiations
for the Tripartite Pact and was ordered by him to participate therein.

At that time a draft of the Pact had already been drawn up on the basis of
Def. Doc. # 1936

the conversations of Foreign Minister with Mr. Stahmer and Ambassador Ott. I participated thereafter until the conclusion of the Pact on 27 September 1940 in the technical redaction of the details etc. As far as I know, the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact were conducted on the Japanese side almost by Foreign Minister Matsuoka alone, and Mr. Saito, Ryooi, the Advisor to the Foreign Minister, and I advised him on technical matters.

2. Defence Document No. 1656, which is entitled "Outline of the Process of Drawing up of Various Drafts and of the Internal Procedure Pertaining to the Tripartite Pact of Japan-Germany-Italy", was compiled by me immediately after the conclusion of the pact with the purpose of preventing the scattering and loss of pertinent documents and of preserving them as official records. A limited number thereof was printed in October 1940 as an official record of the Foreign Office.

The description at the top of "1) Outline of the Process of Drawing up of Various Drafts of the Tripartite Pact of Japan-Germany-Italy and Pertaining Documents" was written by myself with the purpose of explaining the process of the drafting of various documents and their relation to each others.

On this 28th day of July, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /S/ MTSUCHOTO, Shunichi (seal)
I, UCHIDA, Fujio hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deposent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ UCHIDA, Fujio (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ MITSUOMOTO, Shunich (seal)
IN THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et

vs

ARAKI, Sadaé, et al,

Defendants.

I, Eugen Ott, after being first duly sworn on oath, do hereby depose and say that I was ambassador from Germany to Japan at some of the times when Ambassador Oshima was the Japanese representative in Germany.

THE SINGAPORE QUESTION.

I made the survey on the possibilities of a Japanese attack on Singapore in early 1941 under my own initiative and not in response to any instructions from my government. Oshima had no part in the discussions from the Japanese side.

THE TRIPARTITE PACT.

In all of the discussions leading up to the Tripartite Pact there never was one word said about aggressive or offensive action, that is by the contracting parties. The main purpose of the agreement was to prevent the entry of the United States into the war. Oshima took no part whatsoever in any of the discussions.

SUBMARINE TRANSFER.

The transfer of the two submarines was handled purely as a navy transaction. Never have I heard that the Ambassadors of either nation took any active part in the transaction. Their transfer was of no practical value to either country. The actual delivery took place after my tour of duty.

LACK OF COOPERATION.

Never at any time during my tour of duty in Japan, either as Military Attaché or as ambassador was there any real cooperation between the fighting forces of the two countries, Japan and Germany. General Marshall states facts when he says there was no collaboration, that they fought separate wars.

MATSUOKA'S VISIT TO HITLER

I was with Matsuoka on his tour of Europe and Russia in 1941. The feeling was very cool between the Japanese foreign minister and Ambassador Oshima. No conferences were attended by them together with the exception of the preliminary introductory meetings. After that Oshima attended only the social and informal occasions.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.

Since I was the ranking Germany official in Japan at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, any advance news of the event would have been brought to my attention. It came as a complete surprise to me as well as to the other members of my staff. I was officially informed hours after the occurrence. We Germans were never advised of Japanese Military or Naval plans until after the events took place.
CHINESE JAPANESE WAR.

It was the settled foreign policy of Germany while I was Military Attache and ambassador to help settle the conflict between Kiang Kai Shek and Tsoo. At times success seemed close. I spent considerable effort personally to bring Peace to the Far East by attempting conciliation. My efforts in this direction all failed. Germany cherished her friendly relations with China and valued highly her commercial possibilities. Germany was never favored over other nations in her commercial dealings with Japan, except during the World war II.

This statement was made on the day before my repatriation to Germany. Signed in Shanghai, China, on this 30th day of August, 1947.

__________________________
EUGEN OTT

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of August, 1947.

__________________________
ARTHUR R. ROSEN
Vice Consul of the United States at Shanghai, China
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: MIRATA, Yachiho

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I, MIRATA, Yachiho, hereby depose as follows.

(I) I served in the Bureau of Decorations of the Cabinet for more than nine years from February, 1928 (Showa 13) and at present occupy a high position in the Bureau next to the President.

(II) The granting of rewards comes under the charge of the Bureau of Decorations. I have personal knowledge of the rewards that were awarded after I entered the service such as those of the China Incident, and also I know of the rewards prior to the Incident in general since I investigated them as part of my duties.

(III) The extensive rewards granted as in the Manchurian and China Incidents were granted through the following procedure:

(a) First, the standing rules regarding rewards are made according to the decisions of the Cabinet meeting.

(b) Next, the Ministries concerned apply to the Bureau of Decorations for rewards within the fixed number, and at the same time have their officials in charge explain to the Bureau their reasons orally.

(c) The Bureau of Decorations on its part expresses its opinion on the above.

(d) Thus, finally, as a result of deliberation on both sides, the rewards bill is drafted.

(e) The above bill is submitted to the Rewards Conference which is composed of fifteen regular councillors (besides two members of the Imperial family) and when the Conference passes the bill, it is presented to the Prime Minister.

(f) The Prime Minister reports of it to the Throne to obtain Imperial sanction.

(g) When Imperial sanction is given, the rewards are then granted.

(IV) Even with rewards on a small scale as the time of the anti-Comintern act, the same procedure as mentioned above was used with the exception that standing rules were not made.

(V) The rewards include the grant of decorations, cups and money.
(VI) Those who were granted rewards in the Manchurian Incident total 4,926. Among them, those who rendered distinguished service (given the Order of the Golden Kite) reached 9,096; those who performed meritorious service (chiefly given the Order of the Rising Sun) numbered 1,03,593 and those who rendered services (chiefly given the Order of the Sacred Treasure), 153,881. Among those who were awarded the rewards are WAKATSUKI, Reijiro (given a set of gold cups), SHIBUIRA, Kijuro (given a set of gold cups), General UOAKI, Kazuhisa (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 2nd Class Order of the Rising Sun, 1st Class Order of the Rising Sun), MORINODA, Nori (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 2nd Class and the Order of the Rising Sun, 1st Class) and Major General TAKAHASHI, Ryukichi (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 4th Class in the first awards and the 3rd Class in the second). WAKATSUKI, SHIBUIRA and UOAKI were given a set of gold cups respectively in lieu of decorations because they had already higher class decorations.

(VII) Those who were granted rewards at the time of the anti-Comintern Pact total 49; of which 11 were given decorations and 38 were given cups. Among those who were given decorations were ANDO, Shido (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 1st Class, as Foreign Minister), MAKINO, Mitsuru (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 1st Class, as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Germany), MORINODA, Nori (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 2nd Class, as Vice-foreign Minister) and WAKATSUKI, Reijiro (given the Order of the Rising Sun, 3rd Class, as director of the Treaty Bureau in the Foreign Office). Among those who were granted silver cups were IMAIZUMI, Raizaburo (given a set of silver cups as the Minister of Justice) and INAGAKI, Michiyos (given a silver cup as the director of the Bureau of Criminal Affairs).

(VIII) Those who were granted rewards in the China Incident total 3,319,548. Among them, those who rendered A-Class distinguished services reached 3,770 and those who rendered B-Class distinguished services, 192,992 (they were both given the Orders of the Golden Kite); next, those who performed meritorious service (chiefly given the Order of the Rising Sun) reached 2,160,053 and those who rendered exceptional services (chiefly given the Order of the Sacred Treasure) reached 605,173. Among those who were granted decorations were Lieutenant General ISHIHARA, Kuni (given the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 1st Class) and Major General TAKEUCHI, Ryoichi (given the Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class, and the Order of the Rising Sun, 2nd Class).

(IX) There was no one who was granted rewards in recognition of their services in concluding the Triple Alliance on September 7th, 1907. On the other hand, 15 persons were granted rewards in recognition of their services in concluding the Anglo-Japanese Pact in 1902 (Meiji 35) and a total of 29 were given rewards for their services in concluding the French-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Pacts in 1907 (Meiji 40).

(X) Formerly, some were created peers in recognition of their meritorious services in war and in conclusion of treaties. Creation of peers, however, is in the charge of the Bureau of Peerage and Honorary in the Imperial Household Department and is not within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Decorations, so I am not in a position to speak about the matter.

On this 19th day of August, 1947

At Tokyo

Def. Doc. 2120

Deponent: MURATA, Yachiho (seal)
I, Shin, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Defendant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: Defense Counsel at the IMTFE

/s/ Shin Sakuma (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Yachiho Harata (seal)
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大正二年八月十二日
立会人
督頭
和久

(三)
從前戦争、露日戦争、西シルール役、従軍於

(四)
反し明治三十三年日英締約署名ノ役

合計二十九名デアリマシタ。
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RETURN TO ROOM 323
FILE COPY
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEponent: BABA, Shachi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance
with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF BABA, SHACHI

1. I was born at my permanent domicile, No. 64, Shibamotomachi, Asa Shinogamo,
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto City on August 18th, (the 27th year of Meiji); the present
address is 545, Tatsumi-nachi, Fujisawa City, Kanagawa Prefecture.

2. I went to Manchuria in 1936 (Showa 11) and studied the opium problem.
I became executive manager of the Hsinking Central Anti-Opium Committee
central organ for anti-opium policy in Manchoukuo) in January 1940
(Showa 15). I was given policy in Manchoukuo in January 1940 (Showa 15).
I was given the position of non-regular member of the Manchoukuo Anti-
Opium General Bureau together with the position of secretary of the
Manchoukuo Anti-Opium Society until the end of the war, and in the
former capacity served in carrying out Manchurian anti-opium policies.
In 1942 I travelled through Central, South and North China to  
investigate, according to instructions from the Manchoukuo government,  
the opium administration and general opium conditions. I was able to  
obtain materials of various kinds by which I investigated the general  
condition of opium in China. I was also present at the Manchurian and  
Chinese Liaison conference concerning this opium problem.

Concerning opium I wrote the following books:

"Outline of the History of Chinese Opium" 1940.
"The History of the Eastern Penetration of Opium" 1941
"Establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere in East Asia and  
the Opium Policy" 1943.
"The Race and Opium" 1944.

3. In 9th year of Koteiku(In 1942) I was ordered to investigate the  
condition of opium administration in North China.
I investigated the condition of opium in the provinces administered by  
the North China Political Council at that time the North China Political  
Council established the Anti-Opium General Bureau in Peiping with nine  
branches under its control and charged them with the anti-opium ad­  
ministration. Its policies were as follows:—

Application of addicts' registration system; sale of opium for the  
medical treatment of the registered addicts; medical treatment of the  
existing addicts, etc. The administration was still in a preparatory  
stage.

The opium policy in north China was similar to that of Manchoukuo  
in its principle of prohibition by gradually decreasing the amount  
of opium generally consumed. A perfect monopoly system had not yet  
been established. The whole sale buying and selling were entirely  
left to the Chinese a company named the Raw Opium Company of purely private  
private management acting as the representative organ of the monopoly.  
Nevertheless, the raw opium which the government had the Raw Opium  
Company buy up was not enough to meet the demand; the government,  
therefore, bought about 3,500,000 Tael of raw opium (the unit of opium
weight in North China is 31 grammes for one tael) every year from the Mongolian Government.

In North China many opium smokers did not register for several reasons. That is, there was no difference between the price of official opium and secretly sold opium, and those who registered had to pay a registration tax for opium lamps and opium pipes, while those who did not register could get prepared-opium without difficulty at the same price whenever they wanted to. Consequently, many did not register, thereby making the registration extremely uncertain. The number of chronic addicts of opium, by the Estimate of the North China Political Council, was thought to be not less than 3 per cent of the whole population, that is, 2,225,000.

As to Anti-opium work, especially in the line of control, one nation or one district by itself cannot accomplish the purpose. Therefore, regarding control of smuggling done in the districts of Peiping and Tientsin, North China and Manchuria, since they all had difficulties in common they frequently held liaison conferences and made common in the hope of finding a solution.

The North China Political Council ordered nine sanatoriums under the branches of the General Bureau to apply Tungkuang Medicine Treatment and distributed the medicine to other noted hospitals, official and private; thus the healing and salvation of the patients was effectively started. The Tatung coal mine in Mongolia decided to apply this method to miners, in view of the good effect Tungkuang Treatment might have in enhancing efficiency of labor, with considerable success.

As a Manchurian official connected with the policy of opium prohibition, I am well informed of Japan's policy toward China concerning opium.

The Japanese Government adopted a non-interference policy in this point of opium administration, preferring that China herself deal with matters concerning China, and took an attitude of cooperating with the Chinese Anti-Opium Policy, based upon the spirit of the International Opium
Convention. The Japanese Government maintained a strong stand in rendering indirect help to the enforcement of the opium policy in China whenever requests were made by the Chinese.

Outline of Anti-Opium Policy Adopted by Manchoukuo

When it was first established, Manchoukuo decided to forbid the use of opium and other narcotics. In November 1932, the Anti-Opium Act was promulgated as an ordinance of the State Council, and at the same time a rescript was given to the people in the name of the Premier ordering them to break their national habit of the use of opium and other narcotics.

Simultaneously with the issue of the Opium Act, the new government set about the task of the long neglected administrative readjustment which was necessary for the enforcement of the new act. The 10-year plan for the anti-opium campaign was formed and officially announced on October 12, 1937.

In the execution of this 10-year plan the Manchoukuo Government paid the utmost attention to the practical method for effecting a radical cure of the registered addicts within 10 years.

It was natural that various plans for the medical treatment of the registered addicts, which were prescribed in the enforcement plans of the 10-Year Anti-Opium Policy, required a great expense and an enormously large-scale mechanism. At the outset five anti-opium hospitals were projected, but later their number was quickly doubled and further, plans were formed to build one hospital of this kind in each of the provinces, cities, prefectures and Mongolian villages.

Thus at the end of 1941 two national hospitals and 189 minor ones, including those established respectively by provinces, cities and Mongolian villages, had been completed and they were renamed "Kangsheng-yuans". The smaller of these hospitals were equipped with 30 beds and the larger with as many as 390 or more, each addict being permitted to receive hospital treatment, as a rule, for a month.
The number of the registered addicts that had amounted to over 700,000 in 1938 yearly decreased, and in 1944, they numbered 230,923.

The Manchukuo government, with the aim of furthering this 10 year Anti-Opium Policy, in January 1940 established the Anti-Opium Bureau by putting together the Anti-Opium Section (formerly in People’s Welfare Ministry), and the Opium Section and the Opium Factory in the Monopoly Bureau. This new system, the unifying of organization and management — greatly advanced the development of the opium administration of the country.

Though slight changes occurred now and then the general system of opium administration after 1940 was as follows:—

The central bureau was the Anti Opium Bureau and it had its branches in each of the provinces, cities, prefectures and Mongolian Villages, these being in one unified system. Among the 191 hospitals established for the cure of opium addicts, those of the state establishment were managed by the Anti Opium Bureau, the others were left by the government to the management of the provinces, cities, prefectures and Mongolian villages, with direct connection with the central bureau, thereby forming an effective part of the Anti Opium organization. Opium and narcotic were to be distributed only to registered addicts to be used as medicine till the cure was finished. What differed in Manchoukuo from other countries in this point of opium control was this:—

1. None but the registered persons could buy opium.

2. The government yearly decreased the amount of opium official sale until after 1942 no more than one parcel 1 gram a day was allowed to be sold to one person.

3. The return of the opium-ashes and parcel paper was made compulsory.

As above stated, Manchoukuo made a strict limitation on the official sale of opium, using the Opium Administration Offices directly managed by the Opium Administration Divisions in each of the cities, prefectures and mongolian villages.
When Manchoukuo decided, as stated above, to institute the Anti-Opiium Campaign, the greatest problem was how to deal with the registered Opium addicts, numbering more than 700,000 in 1938. By the expenditure of amounts in managing hospitals and by fully mobilizing materials as well as people, a system planned and carried out.

With these efforts, especially with the application of the Tungkiang medical treatment, the Manchoukuo Government was accomplishing the aim of the anti-opium campaign, which seemed about impossible at the beginning. In 1944, namely in the 8th year of the ten year anti-opium campaign, the number of registered smokers was only 230,000. It was expected that in the three provinces of Tungan, Chiontao and Lungkow opium sales could be suspended at the end of 1944, as opium smokers in those provinces should number zero by that time.

At the end of the eighth year of the 10-Year Anti-Opiium Policy the Anti-Opiium Association was established as a juridical person by an Imperial Ordinance. The whole people of the state thus stood together for the development of the Anti-Opium movement by putting together the forces of educational, cultural, religious and moral organization as well as of the government.

KU TSU-HENG, the Minister of Communications, who had an enthusiastic interest in the promotion of public welfare in Manchoukuo, used to tell me as follows: "The most successful of the policies taken by the Japanese in Manchoukuo is the anti-opium policy, and this has borne remarkable results."
On this 28 day of Aug., 1947

At I.M.T.E._

DEPOSITION BABA Shachi (seal)

1, IMANARI. Yasutaro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depoent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At same place

Witness: (signed) IMANARI. Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

BABA Shachi (seal)
Def. Doc. No. 1801 and 1802-A to E

I certify that the above was prepared by the Land Survey Department from the investigations of the above investigators.

17 June 1947
Chief of the Geographical Survey bureau
of the Home Ministry

MUTO Katsuhiko (seal)

The above was signed and sealed in the presence of this witness.

The same date
Witness IDEDA Sumihisa (seal)
CERTIFICATE

1:100,000 Map of Manchuria

1. OBO-DO MIAO

Was issued by the Land Survey Department in 1935 (after revision of the print because a part of the map, the mail-road, was resurveyed by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army in 1934), based on a Russian map prepared in 1906 (rough survey, meaning that a map is prepared after basic points have been obtained through astronomical survey).

2. LAKE POIR DALAI

Same as above

3. NOR-IN-BALTA

Print made and printed in 1936 by the Land Survey Department from a map surveyed and printed in 1935 by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army.

4. IHA-BUR-FUN MIAO

Print made and printed in 1933 by the Land Survey Department from a Russian map prepared in 1906 (rough survey, meaning that a map is prepared after obtaining basic points through astronomical survey).

5. JAN-JUN MIAO

Print made and printed by the Land Survey Department from a map surveyed and prepared by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army in 1935.

6. 1:500,000 Map of Manchuria

HAILAR SAPPA

Print made in 1932 from a map compiled and prepared by the Land Survey Department with 1:100,000 map of Manchuria as material.

7. The secret numbers on the back of the map were stamped by the Land Survey Department for the purpose of placing the secret maps in order.

17 June 1947

Investigators,

Home Ministry Engineer FUJISHIRO SUZUTARÔ
Home Ministry Engineer IKEDA TOKISABURÔ
Non-Official member SATÔ SHIN-ICHI
CERTIFICATE

1:100,000 Map of Manchuria

1. OBO-DO MIÃO

Was issued by the Land Survey Department in 1935 (after revision of the print because a part of the map, the mail-road, was resurveyed by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army in 1934), based on a Russian map prepared in 1906 (rough survey, meaning that a map is prepared after basic points have been obtained through astronomical survey).

2. LAKE BOIR DALAI

Same as above

3. NOR-IN-BALTA

Print made and printed in 1936 by the Land Survey Department from a map surveyed and printed in 1935 by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army.

4. IHA-BUR-FUN MIÃO

Print made and printed in 1933 by the Land Survey Department from a Russian map prepared in 1906 (rough survey, meaning that a map is prepared after obtaining basic points through astronomical survey).

5. JAN-JUN MIÃO

Print made and printed by the Land Survey Department from a map surveyed and prepared by the Survey Unit of the Kwantung Army in 1935.

6. 1:500,000 Map of Manchuria

HAILAR SAPPA

Print made in 1932 from a map compiled and prepared by the Land Survey Department with 1:100,000 map of Manchuria as material.

7. The secret numbers on the back of the map were stamped by the Land Survey Department for the purpose of placing the secret maps in order.

17 June 1947

Investigators,

Home Ministry Engineer FUJIIHRO SUZUTAHÔ
Home Ministry Engineer IKEDA TOKISABURO
Non-Official member SATÔ SHIN-ICHI

[Handwritten notes: ILE COPY, RETURN TO ROOM 36, 1801 and 1802-1 to E]
Def. Doc. No. 1801 and 1802-A to E

I certify that the above was prepared by the Land Survey Department from the investigations of the above investigators.

17 June 1947

Chief of the Geographical Survey Bureau of the Home Ministry

MUTO Katsuhiko (seal)

The above was signed and sealed in the presence of this witness.

The same date

Witness IDEDA Sumihisa (seal)
H.G.W. Woodhead, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:

1. I have been acquainted with the former Ch'ing Emperor, sometimes known as Henry P'u-yi, for a great many years, and especially during the years that he resided in Tientsin I was a close friend, saw him often and was well acquainted with his personality and character.

2. In September 1932 I made a visit to Manchuria to study the situation. After brief visits to Dairen and Mukden I proceeded to Changchun, the new capital. I had hardly reached the hotel there when a young Chinese Foreign Office official called to say that the Chief Executive, Mr. P'u-yi, had heard of my coming, and would be pleased to receive me at 10:30 next morning. This young man, Mr. Yu, who can converse equally readily in Chinese, English, Japanese and Russian, called for me in good time and escorted me to the former Emperor's residence. After a wait of a few minutes in the official reception-room, a message was received that the Chief Executive would see me in his private apartments, to which I was immediately conducted.

3. The former Emperor greeted me with obvious pleasure, and had scarcely invited me to be seated before he remarked that on one of the last occasions on which I had seen him, in October 1930, at a private lunch in Tientsin, I had remarked that perhaps next time we met he might not be so accessible; that I might have to invoke the assistance of a Foreign Office official. "You see," he observed, "that your prophecy has been fulfilled." After I had inquired after the Empress, and he had asked for information regarding several of his former foreign friends in Tientsin, I told him that later I should like to put some formal questions to him for my newspaper articles, but asked whether first I might put some personal and unusually frank questions, as a friend. He answered that I might ask him anything that I liked.

4. I then said that it would be of interest to many of his friends to know whether he was really happy in his present position. He replied with emphasis that he was.

Was he busy?

No, he said, so busy at the moment as he was a few months ago. The administrative machinery was now better organized, and though he devoted a considerable portion of every day to State business, he was not too busy to find time to see his friends.

5. I then remarked that the general impression that prevailed in Shanghai and indeed throughout China was that he had been coerced into his present position, and that he was not a free agent.
From this report he emphatically dissented. He had, he maintained, been actuated by a double motive in accepting the office of Chief Executive. First, on account of political reasons. When the Manchu Dynasty abdicated it had been with the avowed intention of restoring the sovereignty to the people. Twenty years had elapsed since, but what had been the result? The political power had passed not into the hands of the people, but of ambitious and grasping militarists. There had been incessant civil war and disorder. The welfare of the people had been entirely disregarded. They had been tyrannized over and oppressed. China's relations with Foreign Powers had grown steadily worse. And the pledge made in the Abdication Treaty that absolute equality would be maintained between the five races of China had been flagrantly violated.

Secondly, he was actuated by personal motives. Manchuria was his ancestral home. It was only natural that he should feel greatly interested in what was happening in this territory. Moreover, every undertaking to the Manchu Dynasty contained in the Abdication Agreement had been wantonly violated. The allowance to be paid to him by the State had been cancelled. His private property had been confiscated. He had been treated with studied disrespect by the Kuomintang. And the ancestral tombs had been violated, and no serious attempt made to secure the restoration of the treasures stolen from them.

It was only natural therefore, that when trouble occurred in Manchuria he should follow developments with great attention and wonder whether he was not destined to play some part in an attempt to improve the condition of his ancestral provinces. Emmissaries of the separatist movement called upon him in Tientsin and urged him to proceed to Manchuria. And at last he felt that if he were ever to go he must go forthwith or he might find it impossible to leave.

The possibility of a restoration movement, he said, was obviously known to and feared by General Chiang Kai-shek, who offered temporarily to restore the Conditions of Favourable Treatment if he (P'u-yi) would repudiate it. He had intimated, however, that material considerations would not influence him; that the Republican Government could best fulfill its responsibilities by concerning itself with the welfare of the people, by giving them good government, and by restoring internal peace. If it had Tls. 4,000,000 (the amount of the Emperor's annual pension, as stipulated in the Abdication agreement) to spend, let it spend that sum on relieving existing poverty in China.

6. When he had decided to leave Tientsin for Manchuria he did not even take the Japanese Consul-General into his confidence.

"Then the story that you were kidnapped and sent to Port Arthur under Japanese escort on a destroyer is not true?"

Mr. P'u-yi, who understands English quite well, threw back his head and roared with laughter. "Kidnapped?" he said, "Kidnapped? No, No."

I told him that that was the version of his departure from Tientsin that was widely current and generally believed, and asked whether I might be told the actual details of his movements, adding that what he had told me up till then was confidential, but that as a matter of historical interest I should like to know exactly what happened when he left Tientsin.
Mr. P'u-yi replied that his movements had had to be kept secret for two reasons: first, because his departure from Tientsin might have been frustrated; secondly, because he would have been in considerable danger of assassination had his whereabouts been revealed.

He left Tientsin just as the trouble between the Japanese and Chinese in that city started, and traveled direct to Yinkow (Nowchwang) on the steamer Awachi Maru. He left a letter behind to be delivered to the Japanese Consul-General informing him of the departure, and asking him to afford adequate protection to the Empress (who remained in his residence in the Japanese Concession) whom she followed. From Nowchwang he proceeded to Tang Kung Tzu (the hot springs between Liaoyang and Tashihchao), where he remained only a couple of days, returning to meet his wife at Port Arthur. She also traveled on an ordinary steamer. The next few weeks were spent at that center, where he amused himself by studying the siege operations in the Russo-Japanese War and visiting the ruins of the former Russian fortifications. He and his wife then returned to Tang Kung Tzu, where they lived quietly until he proceeded to Changchun. "Then he was convinced that it was his duty to go north and assume the office of Chief Executive, he went straight through to Changchun by train. At no time, in Tientsin, in the Leased Territory, or in Manchuria, was he ever under any restraint, nor was any coercion applied to him.

7. The former Emperor emphasized that I had seen from my own experience how nonsensical the stories told about his position in Changchun were. Here we were, talking without restriction, with only a young Chinese present, who made no attempt to direct the course of conversation, and who only interpreted my remarks and questions when Mr. P'u-yi did not understand them, with no Japanese within hearing, and absolutely no restriction upon the topics discussed. Could I, he asked, really believe that he was virtually a state prisoner under such conditions?

8. I asked his views on the government of Manchoukuo, and he at once replied that he favored the adoption of the Wang Tao doctrine, based upon the teachings of Confucius. "Heaven," he said, "did not divide people into nations, but regarded them all as human beings and desired peace between them, and love. Competition and strife between nations only led to war and intense suffering. Confucius taught that governments should rule honestly, observe the golden rule toward each other, and work for humanity and peace. That crystallized the Oriental spirit. That was the spirit in which Manchoukuo had issued its declaration of independence. "We are opposed to racial and national animosities. That is why we call this the Ta Tung (Great Equal) era. We should like to have the friendliest relations with Great Britain and all the other Powers. And we believe that we can contribute towards the realization of world peace. Our domestic policy will aim at making it possible to lead peaceful and happy lives. We shall have no political parties in the new State. They only make for disharmony. We shall do our utmost to show ourselves trustworthy in our foreign relations. I hope that the people of your country (Great Britain) will understand and appreciate our attitude. We shall welcome the investment of their capital in enterprises in Manchoukuo. We shall be pleased to have them come and dwell among us. For many years I had a British tutor (Sir Reginald Johnston), and I therefore acquired some knowledge of British history and civilization and principles. Therefore I have a special interest in fostering friendly relations between Great Britain and Manchoukuo. Your Sovereign, King George, has already been acquainted with my views."
9. Mr. P'u-yi admitted the gravity of the bandit situation, but said that though recently aggravated by external influences, it was not a new problem and required all to give all the assistance in their power to eliminate this evil. In this connection, he paid a very warm tribute to General Mutô, the Chief of the Japanese delegation to Manchoukuo. Very friendly personal relations had been established between them as a result of General Mutô's recent visit to Changchun to extend his Government's formal recognition to Manchoukuo. And he felt confident that General Mutô would help to smooth over past and present difficulties.

10. Mr. P'u-yi had informed me when I arrived that he would be at my disposal until noon and that he had ordered luncheon to be prepared for me, but that owing to the fact that he was on a diet in consequence of his infected foot, he would not be able to share the meal. He handed me over, however, to his younger brother, the former Prince P'u-chia, and then bade me farewell.

After lunch he once more took me upstairs where he presented me with his latest photograph and bade me revisit him at the earliest opportunity. Almost his last remark was that perhaps I had been able to convince myself by now that he was perfectly happy in his present office.

11. About seventeen months later I again paid a brief visit to Hsinking (Changchun) to be present at the enthronement of Mr. P'u-yi as Emperor of Manchoukuo. The actual ceremony by which he was installed upon the Throne of the earlier members of his Dynasty took place during the morning of March 1, 1932. The Emperor accorded me a private interview on February 28. I found him looking well and obviously pleased at the turn of events. He conversed with me freely for a quarter of an hour, allowed me to take several snapshots of him, and in the belief that I should broadcast a description of the ceremony to Great Britain, gave me a message to the British nation. (The arrangements for the broadcast were cancelled.) As I was leaving, the Emperor placed his hand on my shoulder, saying how pleased he was to see his "old friend", and invited me to come back for a longer talk later.

Further the affiant saith not.

H.G.W. Woodhead

Colony of Hong Kong
City of Victoria
Consulate General of the United States of America

Colony of Hong Kong
City of Victoria

Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authority, this 20th day of August 1947.

W. D. Boyd
Vice-Counsel of the United States of America
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

I am KASHIWA Toku. I served in Jehol, Manchoukuo from December 1940 to February 1942 as the commander of the 9th Independent Guard Unit. The duty of the unit was guarding the railroad and maintaining order; the area under its jurisdiction was a part of Jehol Province and a part of West Heilongjiang Prov.

At first I was under direct command of the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army; but from August 1941 I came under the command of the commander of the Kwantung Defense Army. Its strength was three Independent Guard infantry battalions and the number of men was a little less than 5,000. In Jehol Province there was, besides my guard unit, a military police corps, but no other Japanese troops were stationed there.

The unit headquarters was in Chengteh; the headquarters of the battalions were in Chengteh, Chihfeng, and Kupeshkow, and each carried out its functions within its area. Each battalion was divided into smaller units which were stationed at various places. In Pingchuan, there was a small unit of about 40 or 50 men led by a company commander.

The Manchoukuo Army had a military district in Jehol Province and had its headquarters in Chengteh, and one brigade each was stationed in Chihfeng and Kupeshkow.

At that time order was well preserved except for two or three thousand soldiers of the 8th Route Army who came and went.
around the Manchu-North China border with North China as their base. In June 1941 a sweeping campaign against the 8th Route Army was staged around the Sino-Manchoukuoan Border. At this time my unit was temporarily reinforced with two battalions from the Kwantung Army, with which battalions campaign of subjugation was carried out within North China and around the border in cooperation with the North China Garrison.

As Jehol Province had opium plantations, the 8th Route Army came into the villages and sometimes did some harm to the natives in order to get opium for their military fund.

In those cases the guard unit cleaned them up with the cooperation of the Manchoukuo Army and the provincial officials. Peace and order were kept well in the Pinghuan district and force was never used as it was unnecessary. Even at the time of the cleaning up of the 8th Route Army in June 1941, was kept in normal condition. It is quite untrue that any massacre of natives happened around Pinghuan at about August 1941, and I have neither ever received any report of such an occurrence nor heard anything about it. Though it was speculatively claimed that this massacre was performed by Japanese and Manchoukuoan troops, that is quite impossible because it was my principle always to avoid having Japanese and Manchoukuo troops at the same time in the same place and I always set the areas for troop movements for both armies and required them to act separately.

On this 8th day of April, 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT /S/ KASHIWA Toku (seal)

I, ONO Kisaku, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ ONO Kisaku (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KASHIWA Toku (seal)

I, ARAKI, Sadao, make oath and say as follows:

1. Circumstances up to my acceptance of the post of War Minister

I served as the Chief of No. 1 Division of the General Staff from January 1928 to August 1928; President of the Staff College until August 1929; the Commander of the 6th Division in Kumamoto until August 1937, and Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education.

While I was in the service of those posts, I recognized from my experience in World War I and from my views on the morality of war, as well as from the basic principle in founding our army, the necessity of disassociating our army from the old Prussian style army, and so I devoted my whole hearted attention to the education and training of young men with the final object of promoting their moral standard.

The general situation in those days was by no means eventless. On the contrary, there was every sign of potential unrest. However, my view on the current problems was always different from the opinions of the leaders of Japan, including those of militarists, and I always remained unbiased to any of the movements which were opposed to each other.

It was on August 15, 1931 that I arrived in Tokyo to accept the post of the Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education. This was an advisory position to the Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.

The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident was known to me from the newspaper. I was told that the government had set up a non-expansion policy, and so I did not think much of this incident.

On the occasion of the October Incident, I happened to have been asked by War Minister MINAMI and Chief of General Staff KANAYA to subdue the trouble. I successfully discharged this task, but was informed nothing further as to the punishment of the people involved in this incident.

At that time, I was merely the Chairman of the committee
of the entrance examination of the Military Preparatory School and the Military Academy, a position which was to be occupied by the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education as was regulated in that Department, and which had nothing to do with the current problems.

2. Circumstances around my acceptance of the post of War Minister.

At the end of 1931, I was the senior member of the Vice-Minister class, and because of this, I was asked on December 13th by Mr. Tsuyoshi INUKAI to become War Minister. As was customary with the army at that time, I reported this matter to and requested direction of the Three Chiefs of Army (War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.) The opinion of the Three Chiefs was unanimous and they instructed my to accept the post. Thus I sent in my acceptance to Mr. INUKAI and became War Minister when the INUKAI Cabinet was formally organized on the same day. Mr. INUKAI at this Tribunal testified that my acceptance was made under some extraordinary circumstances, but not only was there any uncustomary procedure in connection with my acceptance, but neither my predecessor nor any person of importance at that time informed me of such circumstances.

On the following day of my acceptance of this new post and the subsequent day, War Minister MINAMI, my predecessor, Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA, and Chief of the General Staff KANAYA gave me the explanation of the state of affairs of Japan at that time, the outline of which was as follows:

(a) That since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, both the government and the army authorities strived to settle the trouble under a non-expansion policy, but that the condition in Manchuria which had been aggravated for many years in the past, was so complicated that both the Japanese civilian inhabitants in Manchuria and the Kwantung Army were still in danger. That the Government of the existing Manchurian regime had lost its grip; some of its influential personnel had absconded while the rest of them had established their own strongholds in various parts of Manchuria, and an absolute state of anarchy was revealed throughout Manchuria.

(b) That the army authorities, in view of their primary duty, was dually engaged to cope with this situation -- protection of the Japanese nationals and their rights and interests in Manchuria was one and self-defensive to insure the security of the Kwantung Army was the other. That the condition, as had been made clear by the second declaration of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet, was so aggravated that it was impracticable to return the Japanese troops to their original stations.

(c) That Chang Hao-liang, who had established in Chinchow District a stronghold for violation of peace and order in Manchuria, did not keep his promise of evacuating all
all the troops under his command from the Chinchow District, and that there was not the slightest indication of sincerer to show that some day he might fulfill this promise.

(d) That the fact that the Japanese forces from a desire for peaceful settlement had returned its troops from half way point of its campaign to Chinchow was utilized by Chang Hau-o-liang for his propaganda. He was busy propagandizing that he and his troops won the victory in this campaign and by thus instigating the fighting spirit of the troops, caused them to cross the Liao River to appear and overrun the districts as far as near Mukden.

That this very much endangered Japanese nationals and the troops at the foremost front.

(a) That while the League of Nations had not appreciated the actual situation in full, the recent councillors meeting decided to despatch a commission of enquiry and that it approved our rightful assertion of reserving our rights of pacifying bandits and other groups of turbulent elements.

The above were the outlines of the actual state of affairs explained to me by those three important people of the army, and their conclusion was that if the situation was left alone, and if it should cause any damage to the Japanese nationals or should the Kwantung Army suffer any serious damage from it, the hostility would expand all over China and would result in serious international relations.

3. Determination of government policy.

When I reported these matters to Premier INUKAI, he, in his capacity as the president of a political party, and being aware of the graveness of Japan's internal and external situations more fully than I, told me his opinion as follows:

(a) Self-defense and non-expansion should be the fundamental policy to cope with the situation, and based on this policy, the restoration of law and order and termination of hostilities in Manchuria should be immediately realized.

(b) It should be borne in mind that Chang Hau-o-liang, the violator of law and order, was the man to deal with, and as such, the theatre of action must be extremely restricted, and on no occasion should it exceed the territory under his domination.

(c) Military action may be required to save the imminent danger to the Chinchow District, but even in doing so, a request should first be made for the withdrawal of the troops under Chang's command from that district so that the root of future evil will be eliminated.

(d) To the League of Nations and other countries which were related to Manchuria by treaties, a thorough explanation should be made in order to gain their complete understanding as to the real state of affairs of Manchuria.

These opinions of the Premier were discussed at the
Cabinet meeting and were made the basic policy of the INUKAI Cabinet. In accordance with this decision, I made the necessary contact with the ministers of Finance and Navy to make preparation for the War Office to discharge its sphere of duty. This decision was also conveyed by me to the General Staff so as to request them to act accordingly.

In connection with this decision of the Cabinet, there is an allegation in Exhibit No. 187 and No. 188 to the effect that I made a plan for the occupation of the Four Eastern Provinces. This is a mistake caused by the interpretation of an incompetent interpreter and it was entirely different from the fact. I shall refer to this matter at the latter part of this statement under 28.

I have never heard, not even as a rumor, that the Premier INUKAI had the intention of petitioning for an Imperial Command to withdraw the Kwantung Army, as was testified to by Mr. Takeshi INUKAI before the Tribunal. Premier INUKAI, as clever as he was, should have known quite well that the Emperor who was an ardent observer of the Constitution would not have granted an Imperial Command for the withdrawal of troops without first having the advice of the General Staff. I shall refute this allegation by a witness who will testify to the matters concerning the Supreme Command.

There is also an allegation by the Prosecution in Chapter 1 of Appendix A of the Indictment that after the INUKAI Cabinet was formed — "The Japanese government which came into power on the 13th of December of 1931, and all subsequent Japanese governments adopted and continued this aggression and its gradual extension over other parts of China." That both the INUKAI and SAIKO Cabinets, while I was a member of them, had never made any such policy shall be fully shown by the several speeches made by the responsible members of the two Cabinets at public occasions, and several witnesses and documentary evidence which are to be submitted before the Tribunal will corroborate this.

4. Pacification of Liao-si (West of the Liao River) District

The Japanese government, in conformity with the abovementioned policy, expected a peaceful settlement of the troubles in the Chinchow District through diplomatic negotiations, but almost a month had vainly passed since the commencement of the negotiation and there was not a sign of their withdrawing from the district. On the contrary, the activities of the bandits along the River Liao coast were more intensified and at the end of December 1931, the aggravated situation reached such a stage that the Japanese government had to resort to arms to wipe out the stronghold of the bandits and the lawless mobs in order to save the Japanese nationals from danger. I communicated this decision of the government to the General Staff. In the meantime, the government made a proclamation on the 27th to clarify the situation and explained to the world the difficulties that Japan was confronted with.
On the 28th of the same month, the General Staff despatched to
Kwantung Army by this time, in view of the daily occurrence of various casualties, had taken several measures to cope with the situation, and had several times requested without response the withdrawal of Chang Sue-liang and his men from the Liao-si District.

However, the bandit troops, upon learning that Japan had decided to take a decisive measure, fled from the Chinchow District, together with the groups under Chang Sue-liang's command. Thus, a unit of Japanese troops under command of Lt. Gen. Mito made its entry into the city of Chinchow on January 3rd, 1932, without resorting to bloodshed and the Japanese nationals were relieved.

After this campaign, the army undertook the task of maintaining law and order in that locality, leaving the rest of the activities to the diplomatic authorities. However, during the month of January, the troops of the garrison forces suffered several casualties inflicted by bandits in various parts of the locality, including the annihilation of KDD Regiment at Chinchow, but the troops on the spot, observing the principle of non-expansion policy, endured it and did not take any counter stops.

5. The First Shanghai Incident.

The course of expedition and the policy of the Army.

The First Shanghai Incident was initiated when, in the middle of July 1932, a body of Chinese civilians assaulted a party of Japanese priests and either killed or wounded them. This incident induced a clash between the Japanese Navy and the Chinese 19 Route Army, and a great number of Japanese nationals in Shanghai as well as the navy itself were very much endangered.

The Navy authorities, in view of discharging their international duty in Shanghai as well as to save their own navy troops and protect Japanese nationals in that city, reported the case to the government and requested a detachment of army troops to Shanghai. The government knew the imminence of the situation and decided upon a policy of relieving the navy and protecting the Japanese nationals on the spot, and requested the army for a detachment of troops.

I consulted on this matter the Chief of the General Staff and we agreed to conform with the government policy by despatching a minimum force. The Chief of the General Staff reported the matter to the Throne and upon the approval of His Majesty, the expedition was finally decided upon.

By this time, the situation in Shanghai had become so critical that a mixed brigade was first despatched, in accordance with the request of the Navy, by a destroyer.
and this brigade was on peace time footing on account of the shortage of time. Then the UEDA Division, also in a state of being immobilized, followed the brigaded. The strength of the opponent at that time was said to be about 

In conformity with the policy of the government, I strived to settle this incident, as much as possible, in an amicable manner, and desired the Chief of General Affairs and Divisional Commander UEDA to follow this policy. This resulted in Divisional Commander's UEDA's advice to the opponent of the peaceful settlement, which will be shown in evidence in Def. Doc. No. This attempt at peaceful settlement by Divisional Commander UEDA was not duly responded to, and on the contrary, it drove him into a considerable plight.

This request for peace and subsequent hesitation on the part of Divisional Commander UEDA, in immediately resorting to action, was interpreted and propaganda by the China side as their complete victory over Japanese forces, and the propaganda induced a situation whereby the Chinese forces under the direct control of the Nanking Government joined the Canton 19th Route Army with whom the expeditionary force was confronted. Moreover, this new situation affected the situation in Manchuria and caused further aggravation of law and order there. Even the proposal made by the League of Nations to Japan served to enhance the spirit of the Chinese people. The situation became extremely serious, and the safety of more than 20,000 Japanese nationals was menaced. Thus the China's side took advantage of our aspiration for an amicable settlement and created a new situation more dangerous to Japan.

Worried with this added difficulty, the government requested the army to immediately save this situation. It was either on the 7th or 8th of February that the advance party of the army expeditionary force landed on the spot. Divisional Commander UEDA arrived there in the middle of February and this new crisis was created at the end of the same month.

On account of this renewed request from the government, my position required me to devise measures to immediately save the situation by means of close cooperation between operational tactics and diplomacy, that is to say, the measures complying with the operational request of the General Staff on one hand, and conforming with the political principle of the government on the other.

On this matter I consulted the General Staff and agreed to their appointing Colonel Binshir Obata (Lt. Gen. Obata, who became Minister of State in the Prince Kuni Cabinet immediately after the surrender) the Chief of operations Section of the General Staff. We also agreed to recommend General Shirakawa as the Supreme Commander of the Expeditionary Force as the most appropriate person with sufficient faculty who would maintain close cooperation with the local
diplomatic agent to take timely measures in terminating the hostilities. Then, in accordance with the suggestion of the General Staff, further reinforcement of two divisions was decided upon at the Cabinet meeting.

Various preparations were made for this reinforcement and at dawn of March 1st, the advance division of the expeditionary force made a surprise landing at Tsingtao, a strategic point behind the enemy. The enemy after some insignificant resistance retreated beyond the 20 kilometer line and as the retreat was in conformity with the request that the expeditionary force had previously made, Supreme Commander SHIRAKAWA immediately ordered cessation of hostility on the 3rd of March. The Chinese army followed suit on the following day.

Thus, due to the ingenious tactics of the operational force, the primary object of the expedition was achieved and the incident was settled while the main body of the reinforcements was still on board ship.

The Government and the control military authorities, hand in hand with the activities of the diplomatic authorities, endeavored to settle the whole situation upon guarantee of the Chinese side to observe law and order in the future.

The Japanese troops voluntarily withdraw at the end of March to the rear line and one and one half divisions of the expeditionary force were subsequently returned to Japan. Then, through the valuable efforts of the committees of the U.S.A., Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China, a plan for internationally security and safety in and around Shanghai was set up and a truce agreement between Japanese and Chinese troops was signed on May 5th.

By virtue of the provisions of the truce agreement (Section 3, Appendix 2), the army had the right of stationing there a certain part of its force. However, from fear that it would turn out to be the cause of future trouble and because of respect for Chinese sovereignty, and, furthermore, as the primary object of the expedition had been accomplished, it was decided upon to withdraw, at the risk of various difficulties, all the troops from China and the withdrawal was completed by the end of May.

At that time, there were opinions among the people, however, in and out of office, that the over-all withdrawal was still premature. The opinions were regarded to be well grounded in view of past experiences, because both in Manchuria and at the early stages of the Shanghai Incident, our moderate attitude in the beginning seemed to have given cause to the enemy to make propaganda that they had won the victory, and that it succeeded to some extent in deceiving the people with a result that the over-all situation was made worse on account of this.

Nevertheless, the army, in view of its aspirations for peace, carried out the over-all withdrawal. Unfortunately, while giving a good impression among a part of the learned and well-informed classes of Chinese people, the over-all withdrawal did nothing more than to spur the Chinese general public and to create amongst them a contempt for the Japanese Army. In fact, it had a harmful effect over the situation in Manchuria and gave rise to further disturbances there. I may point out here that this was the most delicate part of the policy toward China, and both the government and the army authorities had many
difficulties on this particular point.

These circumstances will be fully shown by the
government declaration, proclamations made by Divisional
Commander UÇDA and Supreme Commander SHIWA, and my several
speeches made in the capacity of War Minister concerning
the withdrawal of troops and also those made in the Diet
sessions, all of which will be tendered in evidence.

6. Protection of Japanese nationals in and around Harbin.

HSI HSIA (a member of the Monarchist Party) who
became the Governor of Kirin Province on September 30, 1931,
subsequently declared the independence of his Province.
However, after two months of this declaration, he caused some
discord with TIEO-CHAO and LI-TU of Harbin, and because of
this conflict, the general situation in and around Harbin
was thrown into confusion, threatening, at the same time,
the safety of Japanese nationals residing there.

The danger became more imminent when HSI HSIA, in
January, 1932, determined to conduct his sublegation
campaign toward the north and started fighting on the 27th.
This urgent situation compelled the Japanese nationals to
request the Kwantung Army for their rescue, and the
Koreans and Manchurians of the same district also frequently
made the same request.

In the meantime, it happened that four Japanese
were murdered, several Koreans were taken away, and about
4,000 Japanese and 2,000 Koreans were placed under extreme
danger. The Kwantung Army ordered an aerial reconnaissance
of the district, but the aircraft had to make an emergency
landing near Harbin, and the crew, who were commissioned
officers of the Kwantung Army, were murdered.

The government had taken a cautious attitude toward
this district, but as the situation became so serious
the government considered it necessary to take measures to
restore law and order in that district and to protect the
Japanese residents.

However, while the Japanese residents were to be
protected, the government made it a policy that the inter-
national relations, especially the relation with the
Soviet Union, should not be endangered. The Chief of
General Staff, in conformity with this policy, ordered
some restrictions to the Kwantung Army as to its military
actions.

The restrictions caused much difficulty to the Kwantung
Army in its operation, and a corps of the Army finally
succeeded, after considerable hardships, in reaching the
outskirts of the City of Harbin.

As the object of this campaign was to protect the
Japanese nationals in that district, and as the object was
thus accomplished, the main body of the expeditionary force
retraced its course without even entering the city of Harbin.

The explanatory speeches made by Foreign Minister
YOSITZWA on January 31, 1932, at the plenary session of the
Privy Council and the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet,
the minutes of which will be tendered in evidence, will clarity the circumstances in which this campaign was carried out.

7. Independence declaration of Manchoukoo and its r-cognition: also the attitude of the Japanese central military authorities toward it.

Soon after the restoration of law and order in Chinchow, I think it was in the beginning of January, 1932, Staff Officer INAGAKI of the Kwantung Army came to Tokyo and reported to me the situation in Manchuria, the picture of the independence movement and Commander-in-Chief HONJO’s view of the general situation.

According to the reports I received, each Province of Manchuria had declared its independence and it was in such a precarious condition that a single false step would lead the whole situation into a state of chaos where each local regime held its own views of influence. On the other hand, there was an atmosphere rapidly developing among the influential people all over Manchuria to found a new state. In fact, this aspiration was getting so irresistibly strong that it was almost impossible for the Kwantung Army, which was neither forcing a military administration nor was it provided with sufficient strength, to maintain law and order without seriously taking this new situation into consideration. In connection with this report, I further learned the following facts: That the unanimous opinion of those who were concerned in this independent movement was to have Mr. Pu-Yi as the ruler of the new state; that Commander-in-Chief HONJO’s opinion was to leave the matter to them and not to take any measure which might interfere with the zealous aspiration of the Manchurian people.

On hearing this report, I thought of the necessity of paying attention to the international problems which might arise out of Manchuria’s independence declaration. However, I reported this information to the Premier.

The Premier and known by that time what was going on in Manchuria and was of the opinion that the question of independence should be left alone, only he considered that the international problems as mentioned in the above should be studied.

The decision of the government on this problem was also to leave it alone to the Manchurian people and to make no interference with it inasmuch as the primary concern of the government was in preservation of law and order.

In the meantime the independence movement in Manchuria made further progress and then a decision for independence was reached on February 28th among the influential people of Manchuria with an additional resolution to ask Mr. Pu-Yi to become its ruler. Then, the independence was declared on March 1st, and Mr. Pu-Yi became its President on the 9th of the same month.

The Kwantung Army, whose primary duty was to secure the peace and order in Manchuria, wished that the newly born regime would respect, as it had declared, the international treaties and external regulations, and
would base its administration, internally, upon the people's will, so that an ideal nation where in the King's Way is fully observed under the harmonious collaboration of five races, a real happy land, free from all the unfortunate incidents in the past, should be realized. The attitude of the Kwantung Army was that of watching its development, but not to make any interference with it.

However, preservation of peace and order and protection of Japanese nationals, which were the main duties of Kwantung Army, had to be conducted in such a way as would correspond to the ever changing situation, and so the Kwantung Army had discussions with the new regime concerning those local matters exclusively.

These reports from the Kwantung Army to the central military authorities were reported to the government by the latter as soon as they were received. The government, in view of the actual state of affairs in Manchuria, reached the conclusion that there was no alternative but to leave to the discretion and judgment of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army the preservation of peace and order in Manchuria and decided to observe the further development of the situation.

I also followed this policy of the government and carefully watched the situation so that I should not make any mistake in the future when counter measures were to be taken.

The Foreign Office viewed this problem to be a case of a domestic split of a nation and that the independence was no infringement of international law. Under the circumstances, all that the army could do was to follow the policy of the government and devote its efforts in successfully carrying out its original duty of preserving peace and order and securing the national defense of Manchuria.

In the meantime, the new regime gradually consolidated its foundation and so the government, with a view to avoiding further disturbances in Manchuria, decided to cooperate, wherever possible, with the new regime. The government made explanation of this new policy at the 61st session of the Imperial Diet. (Def. Doc.

I have never heard that Premier INUKI dispatched Mr. KAYANO as a special envoy to the Nanking Government for a friendly understanding, as was testified to by Mr. Takeshi INUKI. Even if it were true, it must have been of a private nature. Mr. INUKI's further testimony that Premier INUKI talked over the matter with a chief of a section of the General Staff and that the chief of the section, because of this talk, was relegated to an other post is entirely wrong. Mr. INUKI did not mention the name of the Colonel, but from his testimony that the Colonel was relegated to the Commander of the R-NW Regiment and also from the testimony given by witness FUJITA, it is clear that he meant Colonel SHIGETO. Colonel SHIGETO was sent out of the central military authorities, together with other people, because of his having had some relation with the March and October Incidents, and because of this, he was made an object of the army's "purging shift" of military personnel. Witness FUJITA also gave his evidence to this effect.
I had several interviews with the Premier to discuss the Manchurian problems, but never had we any friction of opinion between us. I always dealt with the matters in accordance with the fixed policies of the government, and whenever a new problem arose, I fully discussed it with the Premier and followed his decision about it.

With regard to Premier Li's attitude toward the international problems, I never perceived in him any sign of an aggressive attitude. Not only Premier Li alone, but the Kwantung Army was eagerly wishing for the ideal progress of Manchou-Kuo and that was all that they desired for this new country. This fact has already been clarified before this Tribunal by the will of late General HUANG and other evidence.
Next I shall refer to the question of official recognition of the state of Manchukuo. Primarily this question, which was purely an international diplomatic matter, was under the charge of the Foreign Office; accordingly, the Army did not take any step in this matter and except for those problems which concerned the maintenance of peace and order and problems of national defense that might arise therefrom, I respected the opinion of the Foreign Minister and left everything to his care.

Manchukuo, since its foundation, had gradually become a subject of discussion both in and out of Japan, and the House of Representatives, on June 15th, made a resolution at its plenary session that an official recognition should be given to this new state.

The government of Japan, after careful consideration of the matter, decided to follow the views of the Foreign Office, which suggested that the new state was the result of an internal split of an independent nation and that recognition of such state which acquired its legal independence would not in any way infringe international law. Necessary procedures were then taken and the formal recognition was given on September 15th, whereupon the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol was signed and an arrangement was made for the exchange of Ambassadors.

Upon this formal recognition, the Kwantung Army was charged with the new duty of garrison and joint defense of the new state. This new additional duty meant that the entire conduct of the Kwantung Army bore an international complexion by representing the two independent countries - Japan and Manchoukuo, and so they made it their rule to confer with the Manchoukuo authorities before they took any action in connection with the national defense and maintenance of peace and order.

Thus the situation made its natural development from its formation to formal recognition, and along with this development, Japan found it necessary to determine her attitude toward this state of affairs. The government of Japan, from her desire for the sound development of Manchoukuo as her friendly neighbourer, decided to give Manchoukuo, in compliance with her request, all the necessary assistance in her power, and by doing so, to take measures to prevent activities causing disturbances in Manchoukuo.

That Japan had neither the intention of making Manchoukuo her cat's paw, nor violating international law can be easily ascertained from the speeches made by the Premier and the Foreign Minister at the Imperial Diet as well as from their answers to the interpellations at the Privy Council. This will also be seen in the speech broadcasted by Mr. Ting, Premier of Manchoukuo, on the first anniversary of Manchoukuo's foundation, in which he expressed his zealous ideal of founding a new state.

Personally I desired that Manchoukuo should develop soundly along the line as was indicated in her independence declaration toward the goal of becoming an ideal nation, and would acquire every necessary qualification for an independent country.

In the spring of 1934, Mr. Henry Pu-Yi, Emperor of Manchoukuo, visited Japan, I was given an audience with him for several hours. Mr. Pu-Yi eagerly and strongly emphasized his desire of establishing a happy land of CDO (King's Way) and at a later stage of the conversation, wrote the interpreter away and talked to me face to face by way of writing on a sheet of paper, his ambition of becoming the Emperor of all China, thereby restoring his ancestral old Chin Dynasty there.
On this occasion I dared to give him advice and said that what the Emperor should do was to cultivate the virtue of Emperorship, as he had declared when he ascended the Throne, and to become worthy of confidence both in and out of the country.

As this conversation will show, there was not the slightest indication that Mr. Henry Pu-Yi would have become a tool of the Japanese government; on the contrary, there was even a sign that he would take the initiative to induce the Japanese government in the direction he desired.

The development of Manchouko after that was not quite as it should have been. Dissatisfied with this state, I refrained from attending the 10th anniversary celebration of its foundation, and I broadcast what I had in mind about the situation. My views and belief on Manchuria had been fully expressed in my talk with Lord Lytton and others.

As was explained in my speech at the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet, Chang Hse-liaang's activities, before the formal recognition of Manchouko, of causing disturbances in Manchuria were carried out to such an extent that it compelled Japan to take measures to settle the situation.


The pacification campaign of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol was somewhat different in nature, inasmuch as Manchouko had been founded and recognized by that time, and the military action was taken to discharge the army's duty to both Japan and Manchouko. In other words, the campaign was an action fulfilling the army's duty as was provided in the Japan-Manchouko Protocol, and it was nothing but a domestic affair of Manchouko.

Pacification campaign by the Japan-Manchouko Allied Force over North Manchuria was executed because Ma Seng-shan who had once pledged his loyalty to Manchouko plotted a rebellion of Su Ping-wen in December, 1932, and Jehol at the end of February, 1933, because of a rebellion by Tan Wanglin.

In carrying out those campaigns, I drew the special attention of the General Staff to follow the government policy so that the expedition to Kholombail would not cause any bad influence over Soviet-Japan relations and warfare in Jehol would not expand itself over North Manchuria. I further requested them that their action should be based strictly on the Japan-Manchouko Protocol and utmost attention be made in bringing about the termination of hostilities. I also requested the maintenance of a very close contact between the War Office and the General Staff.

In Kholombail district, we were assisted greatly by the good will of the Soviet Union and succeeded in safely saving the Japanese residents, and the pacification was ended at that.

In the Jehol campaign, the General Staff and the Kwantung Army made it their policy to stop the advance of troops at the line of the Great Wall, even at the risk of operational disadvantage. There was once an occasion when the troops marched over the Great Wall, but they were immediately ordered to return. This action caused another attack from the enemy, but our troops in a drive
after the retreating enemy, reached the Soo River and
stopped there. Thus the policy of the government and the
central army authorities was strictly adhered to by the
troops of the Kwantung Army.

In the meantime, Chang Hau-ling actually withdrew
from all official positions and an agreement was reached,
and the Tangku Truce was signed between HO YING-CHIN
representative of the National Government and Major General
OKAMURA, Vice Chief of Staff and the representative of
the Kwantung Army. Further details of this will be given
by witnesses ENDO, SABURO AND TAKEDA, Hisashi.

11. Conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement.

In compliance with the request of Mr. HO YING-CHIN,
Deputy Chairman of the Peking Sub-committee of the National
Government Military Committee, on May 25th, 1933, cessation
of hostility was discussed between Mr. HO and Major General
OKAMURA, representative of the Kwantung Army, and the Truce
Agreement was signed on the 31st of May of the same year.
The agreement was confirmed by the governments of Japan
and Manchoukuo in due course, and thus the hostilities in
Manchuria virtually ended.

The Manchurian Incident was not primarily a war in
the sense of definition of international law. Therefore,
there was no such procedure as a peace treaty. Only an
agreement was reached between the two parties as to several
arrangements to prevent occurrence of further hostilities
in the future.

Subsequently, the members of the government of Man-
choukuo and those of China met at the Dairen Conference to
discuss practical routine matters concerning the maintenance
of friendly relations between China and Manchoukuo. Some
members of our government who were in charge of such matters
also attended the conference, but as the matter did not direct-
ly concern the relations between Manchoukuo and Japan,
I do not remember the details.

Thus the disturbances and hostilities which had been
rampantly prevailing all over Manchuria at the time of the
Wakatsuki Cabinet which had created a potential danger, such
as would induce at any time an all out clash between China
and Japan, were completely settled by me within one and half
year of my acceptance of War Ministership to the INUKAI Cab-
inet which succeeded the Wakin Taxuski Cabinet, and the mission
toward the army of terminating hostilities was fulfilled.

12. Policies I adopted after the Tangku Agreement.

My most important mission as War Minister which was set-
tling the hostilities having been thus accomplished, I de-
cided to take this opportunity to establish plans to stabilize
several internal as well as external affairs. I set up the
following three main principles and determined upon their rea-
лизation:
1. Stabilization of domestic state of affairs which had been
in absolute chaos since the beginning of the Showa Era.
2. Complete purification of the Army so as to base itself
on the principle of the foundation of the Imperial Army.
3. Improvement of foreign relations, through which to secure
peace of the world, and of the Far East in particular.

In June, 1933, when the Imperial Diet closed,
I set forth to establish a practical plan to execute these principles.

The first thing I intended to do was to purify the public mind by dispelling from Japan all the evil causes accumulated since World War I, paying at the same time special attention to the internal as well as external state of affairs and to the specific feature of Japan's national character. The best way to accomplish this task was to let the people appreciate the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor. One of the practical plans for this purpose was to petition for the grant of a general amnesty and to release both the right and left wing political criminals and other criminals with the exception of those whose crime was of particularly atrocious nature, and to give them firm warning not to repeat the same folly.

Secondly, I intended to stabilize the mind of people of the rural district and fishing villages by establishing means of relieving them from the extreme poverty in which they were at that time.

Thirdly, I thought it necessary to devise fundamental measures to settle the confusions and disturbances in political and ideological circles.

My fourth intention was to find means to secure the original character of the Imperial Army whose reason for existence was in practicing morals, and let it thoroughly understand the fundamental principles of founding the army, so that the occurrence of ominous incidents, which had been rather frequent in the past, would be prevented in the future.

Fifthly, Japan at that time was confronted with several difficult international problems. I considered it of urgent necessity to solve all of those problems by making the utmost concession that we could afford, while making full assertions on what we had to assert. What Japan needed then was to determine the minimum extent of her self-existence and protect her from being affected by the hitherto precarious state of affairs in Europe.

Under these circumstances, what should have been done before anything else was to secure peace in the Far East, and in order to do so, I determined to hold an international conference among the countries interested in Far Eastern affairs. My intention was first to establish peace in the Far East and then to pacify after thorough deliberation upon pending matters among the participants of this international conference, and then make it the corner stone on which to secure the world's peace.

The matter was, however, too grave to be decided instantaneously. I spent the whole of July and August in studying practicability of this plan as well as in preparation of preliminary matters. In September I prepared a basic suggestion for this plan, and suggested to the Premier to make a definite plan based on my suggestions, so that it may be presented for deliberation at the Imperial Diet.

Petitioning for amnesty seemed to me the most difficult problem. On this question, I gained the approval of the Navy Minister, and the suggestion was put to the Premier as an agreed opinion of both Navy and Army.

There were several objections to the amnesty to be granted to the criminals of the extreme right and extreme left wings. I maintained that however wrong they may have been, their misconduct had arisen from their passion to improve the future of their country and community.
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It was the unfortunate circumstances in which they were brought up or their narrow prejudice that had driven them to blindly rush to such an extreme ideal. They were nonetheless valuable subjects of His Majesty to whom His virtue of benevolence should equally be extended. I insisted that this was the characteristic feature of our national policy, and endeavoured to realise it.

The question having developed thus far, Premier SAITO ordered the people of the government in charge of this type of work to study the practical side of this plan, and, apart from this, he successively held conferences among the ministers who were related to the subject matter of the plan. Five Minister Conferences concerning foreign affairs and national defense were often held and other Five Minister Conferences concerning rural district problems being that they were a part of domestic political problems were also frequently held.

I attended those conferences together with Mr. MITSUKI, Minister of Railways.

Both of these conferences met more than twenty times and the gist of the plan was thoroughly discussed by the end of the year. There were several matters of which even definite plans were set up.

The basic study of the plan showed due progress and a communiqué in the form of a memorandum was given on matters concerning foreign affairs and national defense in October 1933. Some very important decisions were reached concerning rural district problems which were part of the problems for the domestic council.

My intention was to establish definite plans for all the subject matters by the end of January 1934, when the Imperial Diet was expected to be convened, and to present them to the Diet for deliberation. The government, army and Diet should seek for the stabilization of internal affairs by their respective function, and those efforts, combined with the activities of the diplomatic branch would induce the whole situation to carry the Far Eastern Peace Conference. This was my intention and I did my best for its realization.

As I devoted my whole attention after conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement to this matter, I had not much interest in other problems and even when I had some objection or different opinion on some matters, I usually let them go at that.

On the First of January, 1934, while the plan was in the midst of deliberation, I fell seriously ill and was confined to bed. However, as I most eagerly wished to execute this plan at any cost, I recommended General HAYASHI as my successor, and I resigned from the post of War Minister.

By that time, the essential portion of my plan was still being discussed, part by part by the respective Cabinet Ministers but it was not yet ready to be presented to the Cabinet meeting. Such having been the case, when I was resigning from my post, I sent to the Premier this suggestion of my plan, together with a letter, expressing all my views and beliefs, and asked him to expedite the opening of the Cabinet Meeting for this plan.

Unfortunately, not only the general situation failed to develop as I had expected but the internal conditions of the army authorities changed radically. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs I decided to avoid being materially involved in any of the official matters. My successor, General HAYASHI, after four months' tenure of office, had to resign for personal reasons and recommended me as his successor, but because of this dissatisfaction, I persistently declined its acceptance.

In the meantime, things completely turned to the worse, and after two years from the time of my resignation, the 2.26 Incident forced myself and other senior members of the army to leave active service altogether.

For two years from my resignation from the War Ministership to retirement from active service, I occupied the post of a War Counsellor, but not a single enquiry of important
nature was made to me, and so there is nothing to state about this period.

Further, this was the period when the internal condition of the army was in absolute chaos, and as I was always placed outside its central circles, I did not know the helm of military affairs at that time. All of these conditions will be shown by documentary evidence and witnesses.


Diplomatic affairs were not under the charge of the War Minister. As the War Minister, I only attended to what matters were under my charge and disposed of them in accordance with the policy determined by the government and so I did not know much of the diplomatic matters.

Decision of a diplomatic affair was usually done upon investigation and opinion of the Foreign Minister. When it had an important bearing upon other departments of the government, the Minister of such Department was consulted, and when it was sufficiently important as to be related to all Departments in a general way, it was usually discussed at the Cabinet meeting. Otherwise, most of them were disposed of by the decision of the Foreign Minister.

With regard to international treaties in connection with the Manchurian Incident, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet had already invoked the right of self-defense, and the Premier and Foreign Minister of the INUKAI Cabinet also several times declared the continuation of this right of self-defense.

I was told that our action was within the limit of action for self-defense, about which every signatory of the Non-Aggression Pact reserved the right of execution, and a prominent scholar of international law defined, "The act of self-defense is executed under protection by violence and menace is removed." Moreover, there was a reservation made by Japan on December 10th 1931 at the Council Meeting of the League of Nations, which was approved by the Council, of the right of subjugating bandit troops and lawless elements. The army acted within the extent of this right based on the policy determined by the government.

As for the problems concerning independence of Manchuria and its subsequent recognition, Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the INUKAI and SATO Cabinets gave explanations at the General Diet and the Privy Council. They said that the independence was a natural result of an internal split of a nation conducted by her own people and that the Nine Power Treaty had not provided any restriction on such action. They further said that the independence was realized upon the basis of the historical background in Manchuria. They quoted several opinions of some of the scholars of international law and said that there were several instances in which the presences of foreign troops contributed toward the realization of independence.

Those explanations convinced all other members of the cabinet and the army continued its action in conformity with this fixed policy until execution of the right of self-defense was no more required. As far as I remember, all of these details were contained in the Views of Japanese Government which were submitted to the plenary session of the League of Nations.

The relation with the League of Nations had already been considerably aggravated before the INUKAI Cabinet, perhaps due to lack of proper explanation of the situation. It was immediately prior to the formation of the INUKAI Cabinet that the League of Nations decided to dispatch its Enquiry Mission. This decision was quite satisfactory to us and the INUKAI Cabinet hoped that the Mission would
arrive at an accurate recognition of the situation based on the actual state of affairs. The army also expected that the Enquiry Mission would make an unbiased conclusion toward peace by having contact with the actual conditions on the spot in the light of the historical background.

As I have stated above, the policy of the BUNKAI Cabinet toward Manchuria was immediate restoration and subsequent maintenance of peace and order, and it aimed at improvement of international relations by giving cooperation and correct understanding to the problems among nations.

The army, also in conformity with this policy, minimized its military action and devoted its efforts in immediately bringing about the termination of the hostilities. The manner in which the army settled the Shanghai Incident was a good indication of this policy of the army and the overall withdrawal from Shanghai served to improve, more or less, Japan's international relations. Encouraged with this fact, the army continued to concentrate its efforts on this point.

The independence of Manchoukuo and its formal recognition was studied, as was stated above, by both the BUNKAI and MATSUKE Cabinets. By keeping a watch on the result of this study and on the prerequisite for peace and order in Manchuria, both cabinets followed the natural growth of this movement and when convinced of its healthy progress, decided to give it formal recognition. The army, in conformity with this policy of the government, strived to prevent actions disturbing the peace and order, which had barely been restored after several uprisings, and to discharge its new task of joint defense of the state of Manchoukuo.

With regard to the League of Nations, I knew that the government had tried to obtain its understanding by tendering to them written views of the government on the complexity of the character of the Incident and its suggestions for the means of maintaining peace in the future. When Mr. MATSUKE was dispatched by the government as its plenipotentiary, the government had decided its policy of staying with the League at all costs in order to seek a proper understanding, and I think it, MATSUKE was instructed accordingly.

The army, also in conformity with the government policy, strived to bring about a situation in which Japan could remain with the League in order to afford them a correct understanding of the problem. However, there were continued disturbances and unrest in various parts of Manchuria and before these hostilities had been settled, the resolution of the previous session of the League of Nations was reached. The hope of Japan's getting a true under-
standing from the League having been thus frustrated, Japan had no alternative but to withdraw from it in accordance with the provisions of Article I and 3 of its regulations. Nevertheless, Japan declared to the world by an Imperial Rescript and a government communique her determination of collaborating with the world. This will also be testified to by documents and witnesses.

II. My views and thoughts on foreign affairs.

While I was in office, foreign affairs did not come directly under my jurisdiction, and accordingly, I could not bring into practice my views on those matters. All I could do was to discharge the duty of the army in accordance with the fixed policy of the government. But in order to clarify the grounds on which my actions toward the international problems were based, I feel it necessary to state herewith my fundamental views on international problems and the subsequent steps that I undertook at that time.

(a) Relation with the Soviet Union.

I had been in Russia for many years and was one of those who had a fond feeling toward and a good understanding of that country. My article in the monthly magazine "Russia" correctly conveyed my true sentiment. Nevertheless, I could not advocate the world Bolshevization policy of the Third International. My opposition to this principle and measures against it was more intensified when in 1923 and 1932 members of the Communist party plotted an assault on the person of His Majesty the Emperor.

In fact, from the end of the Taisho Era (about 1923) to the earlier period of the Showa Era (about 1931), Japan was thoroughly subjected to clandestine activities of the Communist party manifested in the form of a labor conflict and other political struggles of sinister nature, and the existence of the country was endangered as it never had been before. A publication of Mr. Eshodovsky, the Soviet ambassador in Japan in 1926 and 1927, explaining the details of such activities, gave a deep warning to the world. I took it as the weakness in the ideological status of Japan, and did not take it so seriously as to consider that it strained the relationship between the Soviet and Japan.

I may say that I am not inferior to the Communist party in the passion to relieve the poor class of people, which, I understand, is one of the tenets of that party. However, my belief is that if the administration under the Emperor based on the original doctrine of this country is realized, not only the poorer class of people, but the whole people in general can enjoy better welfare without being forced to anything. This was clearly manifested in the message of one of the Emperors who said, "Should there be a single person among the whole population who is not given his proper place, we are to blame for that." I believed that neither violence nor crafty measures was required in providing welfare to the people. My opinion was that the Soviet Union believed in communism, that was their affair and we had no reason to interfere with it. Every country is entitled to follow its own policy in accordance with the internal condition of that country. This having been my conviction, my opposition to the Third International did not go as far as to advocate interference with the Soviet Union.
I felt at that time the necessity of taking self-defensive measures against the menace of eastward infiltration of the Soviet influence and of the very active policy of the Third International of bolshevising the whole world, but never had I felt the necessity of preparation of any positive military action against the Soviet Union, to say nothing of taking such action.

To cope with this menace of the Soviet Union, there may have been several researches and suggestions among the people whose duty was to deal with such matters, and I believe those in charge of the matters would have devised measures within the extent of their duty, but I have reason to believe that such measures should not have exceeded the extent of research. The research alleged by the prosecution to have been made by KARASE and KASAHARA would have been one of their opinions as members of the General Staff, but whatever it may have been, it had no relation with me. As far as I knew, no positive plan of the responsible authorities against the Soviet Union existed. On the contrary, the fact was that the army had once placed much expectation on the change of policy of the Soviet Union.

To the conclusion of that Non-Aggression Pact, I was not necessarily opposed in principle, but I seriously and carefully listened to public opinion that before signing such a pact as the Non-Aggression Pact, all the pending problems between the two countries ought to be settled upon the basis of sincerity by both parties, as otherwise, the pact was destined to fail and was not to leave cause for future trouble.

I do not admit the conclusions and the allegation tendered in evidence by the prosecution against myself. When I pointed out the obscurity of the borders of Outer Mongolia, it was not for an aggressive intention toward Soviet as it was a defensive precaution. This can be easily substantiated from the other parts of the sentence around that expression.

(b) Relation between China and Japan.

With regard to the relation between China and Japan, we have been told since we were children how eagerly our seniors of high ideals and experiences endeavored, since the MEIJI Era, to secure a firm and healthy independence for China our good and friendly neighbour, and thereby to bring happiness to the people of our friendly nation. Such expressions as NOHONANOSHI (same character and same race) and SHINGEN RIUSA (relation between lips and teeth, and wheels and axle) were often used to denote how the relation between China and Japan should be. This was how my original conception of China was formed, and I believe it was the same with all the people who had some interest in China. My article in the magazine SHINJI SHINJU entitled "To President Chiang Kai-shek and appeal to my brethren" expresses my view and conception in this matter.

I advocated that the cooperation of China and Japan should be based upon the promotion of Oriental culture which is further based on the union of eastern and western culture. I expressed this opinion of mine in 1925, when I had a chance of talking to some of the Chinese people in Shanghai who are now engaged in important tasks as leaders of that country. As for the means of bringing about perfect independence to China, I had the occasion of giving my personal suggestion to President Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1932, through the staff of the Chinese Legation in Japan.

China is destined to be our friendly neighbor. I most sincerely.
desire perfect independence for this country, but never had I dreamed of her division. This is the reason why I always quote the Outer Mongolian and Sinking problems for comparison.

I viewed the Manchurian Incident as a kind of explosion of a situation which had been brought to the bursting point by variegated historical background and the complicated state of affairs of Manchuria at that time, and the explosion resulted in the independence declaration by the people of Manchuria. In other words, it was the natural result, caused by the influence of the mass of the people, which could not have been stopped solely by the strength of a limited number of people, without first correcting its cause. If China wanted to get rid of this sinister incident, she should have devised adequate measures immediately after World War I and for a person like myself who was charged to deal with this Incident from its halfway mark, the first necessity was to put an end to the hostilities. I considered that if Manchuria should turn out to be an ideal happy land, whether politically independent or not, and gained the approval of the world, its relation with China and peace in the Far East for that matter could be somehow adjusted in the future and I dealt with this matter along this train of thought. What I really had in mind was to welcome the creation of an ideal happy land on a part of Chinese soil, in anticipation of rehabilitation of its mother land.

When I saw the Manchurian people who had been under the hard rigors of living, I could not help praying for realization of an ideal happy land of ODO (King’s Way) as had often been talked of by the leaders of Manchuria. It was not myself alone, but all the people of broader views who had the same opinion as above. The main thing was to bring peace immediately between China and Japan and let the world recognize the fact. Readjustment of relations between China and Manchoukuo could be thereafter easily accomplished.

With this view in mind, I considered as War Minister that what was required most urgently was to terminate hostilities. This was the reason why I evacuated all the Japanese troops from Shanghai, and advocated after the Tangku Truce Agreement, the opening of a Far Eastern Peace Conference. This will be proven by witness and documents.

The Marco Polo Incident occurred four years after the Tangka Truce Agreement. It would hardly be necessary to say that this Incident had no relation to the Manchurian Incident. I acceded to the request of Premier KONOITE, accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor and Education Minister in his cabinet. The object of the Premier was to let me find means to terminate the China Incident. I did my best to comply with the request of the Premier, but my power was not strong enough to bear any fruit along this line.

On the occasion of the Nanking campaign, I opposed the act of occupying the enemy capital. I thought it was detrimental to the feelings of the people of both countries in the future. This was why I denounced the occupation of that city.

It was then I thought of the poem of seven steps of Tseao Tsu-kian.

It is my belief that if the leaders of China and Japan and the leading countries of the world had a little deeper appreciation of the relations between China and Japan, the Marco Polo Incident would not have had such repercussions as it did.

It was from these same views that before the occupation of Canton and Hankow, I made my suggestions and opposed the military act against those cities. However, at that time I was not a member of the army authorities, nor was I keeping contact with the actual state of affairs and so my hopes were not fulfilled. I have never dreamed of aggression against China and
never acted accordingly. In fact, I placed my utmost importance in the cultural and spiritual unity between China and Japan.

(c) Relations with the U.S.A. and Britain.

I am not a so-called pro-Anglo-Saxon, nor am I, of course, an anti-Anglo-Saxon. I am a Japanese. I can not bear the sight of Japan being held in contempt by others or being reduced to destruction. Moreover, I am of the opinion of obeying His Majesty the Emperor and bringing about peace and welfare upon the basis of the original doctrine of Japan. I believed so and I have practiced so. This was not an opinion formed from so-called divine-inspirationism or from dogmatic ultranationalism. On the contrary, I trust it is a most humane principle agreeable to the world's omnipresent natural law. With this principle in mind, I did not try to cater to the current trend of making omnipotent Germany and Italy. Because I did not do so, I was sometimes blamed and abused as a pro-Anglo-Saxon. It has not been my practice to flatter or fawn upon others. I was sometimes unscrupulous in commenting upon what seemed to me wrong, and warned about the issue, but I was never reluctant in praising what I believed to be right. Above all, I cannot help feeling grateful throughout my life to the obligation under which I was once placed. On such an occasion, I always expressed gratitude whatever the reason for the obligation may have been. It was in this sense that I opposed the suggestion that the monument of Commodore Perry in KURIHAMA should be removed. I expressed similar types of opinions on several occasions. It was one thing I could not understand why, because of my above belief and attitude, I should have been called during the war by the opportunists and by those who were obsequious to the current trend to be an unpatriotic pro-Anglo-Saxon.

It was my consistent ideal that war should not be waged to satisfy meaningless desires. Except for some special occasions, war is not to leave behind it certain aftermaths of personal feeling. Japan had never fought against the U.S.A. or Britain. On the contrary, it was my belief that Japan had been under the obligation of those two countries for the past ten years in connection with the crisis with which Japan had been confronted. Britain in particular was our ally for many years in the past, and to the U.S.A. while we had owed her much financially, there was not the slightest friction of feeling.

There had only been a slight unpleasant feeling between the two nations in connection with the racial problem and the Washington Conference. However, even on these matters, I think there was sufficient understanding among the people of learning and fame in the U.S.A. and Japan. Furthermore I did not take it any more than as a mere political problem, in which there was not the slightest factor of danger for the relations between the two countries.

To be quite frank, the relation between the U.S.A. and Japan after the Manchurian Incident had not always been a pleasant one. Of course, each party must have had its own reason to remain so, but the main thing hinged upon sentiment and misunderstanding, and I believed it was not so deeply rooted as would completely destroy the friendly relation which had existed between the two countries.
PART III

During the time of the Manchurian Incident, I was one of those who was worried over the general situation of the world. I had had sincere faith in Britain's refined diplomacy and the U.S.A.'s power of enforcement, and upon those I placed much expectation to save the world from the deteriorated situation facing it.

I expressed my opinion to many of the well-informed people of learning and fame in both Britain and America and wanted to adjust those people the application of the sanctions of the League of Nations, and also, more importantly, to prevent the explosion of the general unrest which was then prevailing all over the world. I believed I was doing much good for the sake of world peace, and I repeatedly warned them that unless steps were taken along the line as I suggested, the situation in Europe was suggestive of a world war.

It was also from my fear of the above that I desired that those people improve the method of application of the sanctions of the League of Nations, based more upon the actual facts than anything else.

It looked to me that the U.S.A. had maintained an indifferent attitude having stayed outside the realm of the League of Nations, and therefore, was in a position to make a calm and unbiased judgment of the world's state of affairs and Britain was also, in my opinion, in the same position, because of her rich experience in dealing with important international problems. The rest of the countries were, I thought, too busy in rehabilitating the damages of World War I to do anything else.

Japan had been recognized as having the power of maintaining the security of the Far East, and so I considered that much could be contributed to the world's peace if those three countries, Japan, U.S.A. and Britain, discussed the basic policy of peace in the world without prejudice and bias.

Because of this conviction, I had deliberate discussions over the world's state of affairs since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident with Sir Lindley and other successive British Ambassadors to Japan and Major-General Pigott, British Military Attache and others. I also appealed to the learned American people to call their attention to the situation in the East. Mr. Raleigh, lecturer of the Oxford University was another person with whom I had hearty discussion, I also appealed to a group of foreigners in my speech at Karuizawa in the summer of 1934.

In these speeches and discussions, I frankly indicated the points on which I thought there should be self-reflection and reconsideration on the part of the U.S.A. and Britain. It had not been my practice to flatter, nor was it my habit to commit myself to anything unreasonable, to say nothing of the abuse of armed force.

It had been my belief that world peace could only exist if people based their conduct upon warm-heartedness and justice of natural law, restricted their selfish desires and conceded to others to the utmost to such an extent as would not impair their self-existence.

At the time when the question of importation of Siamese rice was much discussed in Japan, I insisted that we should endure some economical disadvantages to accede to the request of Siam so that we could express our appreciation of the warm friendship that Siam had shown us for many years in the past. I explained this to the people of rural districts in order to gain their understanding of the question.
When we had an occasion of negotiating with Lancashire in connection with our exportation of cotton piece goods, I insisted that we should make the best possible concession in the negotiation and should not effect any undue pressure upon Lancashire, and that all international problems should be settled from a broad point of view. This conduct of mine was always based upon the belief as I have stated above.

It was my opinion that in facing the activities of the League of Nations or fulfilling the provisions of international treaties, Japan should always stand on this belief, that by no means should she lose sight of her ultimate object in selecting means. I advocated from the same belief that those who had power should be right and those who were right should have power. The idea of power to power principle was one thing I detested most.

I believed that all of these assertions could be fully understood by Britain and America, and heartily desired that by understanding them, they would contribute to the peace of the world. I feel ashamed in being even alluded to as a person advocating world domination or aggression and expansion.

My Ideas

In 1895, I was much disturbed with an incident known as "Three Power Interference" which resulted in Japan's retrocession of Liaotung, and it caused me to join the army to defend the motherland.

I participated in the Russo-Japanese War when I was a Lieutenant. In World War I, I was with the Russian Army at the eastern front of Europe and had ample opportunities of witnessing the true nature of war among the civilized countries.

This experience affected greatly the views of war which I had had by that time, and became the second epochal period in the history of my ideology. The essence of my new ideology was that war, if inevitable, should be the war of human beings not the struggle among beasts. I came to have new ideas as to weapons, style of fighting and equipment for national defense, and with a view to lessen the war damage have made an appeal based on this idea to the people both in and out of Japan for the past twenty years.

Parallel with the above advocacy, I speculated over the basis of peace, namely, the means with which to avoid the occurrence of war. I came to the conclusion that the existing international treaties alone were not only virtually insufficient to avoid war, but they sometimes caused war, and I intended to improve this shortcoming.

There were numerous causes of war, but economic pressure, menace on self-existence, denial of the special characteristics of a nation and racial prejudice constituted their principal part and so far as they were not completely eliminated, war was unavoidable. The method of maintaining peace by way of keeping a certain balance of armament among the nations was nothing but a camouflaged peace, which could be easily broken by a miscalculation on the part of a nation over the balance of her armament and that of other nations. Once the peace was broken, the scale of equipment and installation for war and the selected arms of precision would give cause to boundless calamity. I, therefore, considered it the duty of a civilized nation to go a step forward to study the fundamental cause of war, and take every possible opportunity to propagate this idea to the people of the world.

There was another point to be considered. After World War I, a disruption took place in the world of thought dividing the whole world into three ideological circles, and each circle contested one another beyond the barrier of economy and living.
I perceived a danger of inducement to war in this conflict of thought. I drew attention of the people to the necessity of securing a fundamental ideal for establishment of peace, and in order to achieve this purpose, I advocated the amalgamation of eastern and western culture, enhancement of the spirit of mutual concession, and, in order heighten the sense of sympathy I advocated KODO (Imperial Way).

Thus, I endeavoured to harmonize the interests of the world to avoid the potential calamity, but unfortunately most of the countries of the world were indifferent to this advocacy because of their lack of recognition of this fundamental ideal and each rushed forward to expand its influence into the world according to its long entertained or newly harboured ideal.

After World War I, two world offensive movements occurred with the support of armed force, one was the World Bolshevizing Movement and the other was Nazism as a totalitarian nation. Japan's attention was drawn to this and the necessity of self-defense impressed her. I personally considered that the most effective self-defense could be carried out by promoting the sense of morality and justice.

Primarily, my views of peace or views of life do not admit of territorial expansion. Amalgamation of a nation which had its own race and history was one thing I definitely rejected. I said it was one thing to protect the land of their ancestors and it was quite another to expand it. I considered that a land other than its own could be developed as a source of raw materials under the principle of mutual help. That was why I objected to the amalgamation of Korea and although I was abroad when it took place, I sent a letter to my senior, expressing my views, and insisted that Japan should cooperate with Korea by respecting its civilization.

Such having been my views, I can clearly declare that never in my life have I entertained an idea of aggression, to say nothing of world domination.

If I may be allowed to express my views, such ambition as territorial expansion is nothing but an infantile glory which is far from permanent welfare.

With regard to Manchuria, I accepted the post of War Ministe when Manchuria was in a turmoil of disturbances. My whole-hearted attention was devoted to nothing but terminating the hostilities. As I was so deeply impressed solely with the miserable conditions in which the Manchurian people lived I took a sympathetic view in the establishment of a happy land of King's Way (KODO). Further, I was favorably impressed when, after the foundation of Manchuo, by the zealous aspiration of the Manchurian people, the leaders of that new country made Confucianism, a doctrine originated in China, their principle for creation of an ideal country. The complicated international problems of Manchuria had not slipped out of my mind, but since the independence had been declared, I wished from this sense of morality, the realization of an ideal nation.

However, as time passed, it did not develop in the way that I had hoped and several petitions and bitter criticisms of the Manchurian people reached my ears. Worried over this situation as I have stated in the above, I declined to go to Manchurin to celebrate her tenth anniversary of independence and did not attend the celebration held in Japan.

I have already stated that my views of war, nation and peace which I had had since my participation in World War I, were definitely opposed to imperialism, exclusive egoism and the coercion
control principle. My conduct was always coherent to this principle. I feared that the manner in which the powers, after World War I, dealt with Germany were portent of future trouble. Pressures which all the countries that won victory over Germany, (including Japan) imposed upon this defeated country as well as the attitude of the newly awakened Germany toward the world were quite precarious from the standpoint of world peace, and because of my aforementioned views, I expressed my desire, whenever I could, for the alleviation of such conditions.

Historically, the strained situation of Japan in the past has been continuous, but as far as I was concerned, I had my own ideal as above stated and because of this, I dissociated myself from the movements before and after my tenure of War Minister. I went my own way in accordance with my ideas, and did not take any action in concert with the people who had different views. On the other hand, I endeavored to propagate my idea of international morality and beliefs throughout the world.

15. Armament and my policy in directing the Army.

The equipment and strength of our army was so poor that it was not even as good as that of Poland. In 1921 the army authorities desired to raise the standard of armament of the entire Japanese Army to only half of that of the other powers at the time of World War I. For this purpose, a bill of approximately 460 million yen for running expenses for ten years was presented to the Diet and was duly approved. However, the payment of the whole amount was successively postponed and in 1931, which was a year before the Manchurian Incident, the sum of 360 million yen was still left unused. That is to say, not even one quarter of the original plan was accomplished.

I had my own view toward the establishment of the army and war, which which I had harbored since World War I. I believed in the necessity of modern equipment for an independent nation, but I had never dreamed of completing armament for the sake of waging war. I regarded the army as a symbol of morality and placed more importance on its spiritual element, I felt the necessity of a completion of armament, but I never considered its completion in connection with preparation for aggression. On the contrary, my opinion was just the reverse. However, I could not bring this ideal of mine into practice, having been disrupted by the Manchurian Incident.

It was also from this ideal of mine that in 1932 and 1933, I conceded the sum of 15 million yen and 10 million yen respectively from the army budget to the Navy and cooperated with the Finance Office and Navy Office. I thought it would be detrimental to the credit of Japan if the army and navy disagreed with each other for a matter of a small amount in the budget and if, because of this, the Navy Minister should resign from his post. As far as the army was concerned, serving the country under the complete harmony of the army and navy was its first moral duty and accomplishment of this mission was considered by it much more important than a monetary question of ten or fifteen million yen.

The army budgets in 1932 and 1933, excluding the budget for the Manchurian Incident, was about one hundred and seventy million yen each and there were virtually no increases in comparison with those of preceding years. On the contrary, 1933 showed some decrease. New installations and equipment which had to be provided to cope with the incident were paid by appropriating the budget of the following year. Under such circumstances, any positive preparation of war was impossible.

The army budget for the Manchurian Incident while I was War Minister was one hundred and forty or fifty million yen each for the two successive years. After the recognition of Manchukuo, the army was charged with the added task of Manchurian national defense by the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol. Also, there was some reinforcement of railway guards in compliance with the expansion of the railways to be guarded, but this did not involve any material increase of expense. In attending to the joint defense of Manchoukuo, the military installations in Manchoukuo were limited to those of a defensive nature, and nothing was undertaken by way of offensive action.

...
Establishment of railway lines, unification of communication systems and exploitation of natural resources were the reasonable necessities for a new state on her way to development; also from the necessity of maintaining law and order. It was nothing more than an ordinary step that a newly born nation should take, and Manchukuo merely did it. It is definitely wrong and groundless to accuse that Japan made Manchuria a militaristic base for aggressive war. To further support this, the military installations in Manchoukuo were limited to those of defensive nature.

As I have stated before, my view of war and view of national defense, which I had harbored since World War I, was fundamentally different from those of other people. Therefore, armaments of powers did not attract my attention and I did not approve any imperialistic policy or immoral equipment, whether militaristic, ideological or economic. The armament was consequently carried out in view of this consideration.

In the administration of military affairs, I abolished discrimination in treatment between the rich and the poor. I also denounced the system of paying money to become a cadet and equalized the opportunity in military service. Because of this change some of the college students who wanted to become cadets may have sought some preparatory military knowledge out of their desire for enlightenment. I contend that this cannot be called militarization of education.

I also established a policy which I believe to be the basic conditions for the purification of the army and intended for the improvement of the treatment of war wounded.

Since this was my principle even in armament, I can definitely say that there was not the slightest truth in the testimony of witness OUCHI that during my tenure of office as War Minister, I militarized school education.

The guiding principle in my direction of the army was first to make an army based upon morality, the principle upon which the army was founded and second to let it display its characteristics as an army which observed the Imperial Way. In order to realize this, refer to my purging in the aftermath of several disastrous incidents in the past. This was the reason why I conducted shifts of several of the military personnel. I did my best in quieting the young officers who had been dissatisfied with the situation and in the May 15 Incident, there was not one participation in it by any army officer and I am proud to say that throughout my tenure of office as War Minister, there was not a single case of any such unlawful action.

I further endeavored to eliminate the Prussian type from the army. I insisted that the troops should further the virtue of the army to such an extent that they would not cause grudge from an opponent, and to win the favor and respect of inhabitants wherever they might be stationed. Our army in those days was not ideologically confused with the Prussian army and such conception needed correction. First of all, wanted some of the members of the cabinet to understand this spirit and with it to rectify the common misconception that armament was for the sake of waging war. I determined that this must be thoroughly understood by the whole public and whenever possible expressed my views in speeches and other writings.

With regard to the strained situation of Japan, I requested the earnest reflection of the people over the current problems and urged them to place their first importance in the promotion of morality.

The real meaning of my speech entitled "Emergency Japan" which was offered in evidence by the prosecution can be proved by many other speeches bearing "emergency" in their titles. If the whole of this speech is read without prejudice, I believe the real intention of mine will be understood. The process of manufacture of this film and the impression that this film gave to the spectators will also be a good indication of the intention with which I made this speech.

All of these speeches were made with a view to introducing my moral views which I gained through my experience in World War I.
That underlines the Imperial Rescript granted by the late Emperor to the army and navy personnel is the sense of sincerity. The present Emperor showed in his Imperial Rescript granted when he receded the throne that the true principle of the foundation of Japan was based upon the spirit of benevolence. I advocated that the army should observe the principle of those Imperial Rescripts and should exert their best to discharge its duty. My intention was to enhance, by my advocacy, the virtue of benevolence of the Emperor among the people, and this was, I thought, the first step to let the troops completely become aware of the true spirit of the Imperial Army. By their efforts, I believe I succeeded, even in the slightest degree, in removing imperialistic thought from the army and also from the people and prevented them from egoistical conduct.

16. Military discipline during the Manchurian Incident.

The Manchurian Incident arose from what had been vitally important to Japan. As the ultimate object of this incident was to bring peace and welfare to both Japanese and Chinese nationals, the officers and soldiers of the Japanese Army at the front as well as the general public in Japan were sympathetic toward the Manchurians and other people on the spot. The hostilities were not of the nature of a declared war, and so all the captives were immediately released and were given assistance to engage in peaceful work. Those who were in distress were given relief funds. These facts were made clear by the report of those who inspected conditions there. There was not a single case of massacre or violence, nor was there any report made to that effect. Lord Lytton's Report admitted this fact.

The incident which was reported by the Chicago Tribune as having occurred near the Manchurian was nothing but a minor skirmish between a small squad and a body of local bandits. This was exaggerated and made the subject of propaganda as was the usual practice with the Chinese people, and the propaganda was reported by Mr. Powell and inserted in the paper as it was. This is clear by the testimony of Mr. Powell himself, and the same may be supported to some extent by the protest of the Japanese consul. The skirmish was too small to be reported to me, so I did not know of it.
17. The circumstances under which I became Cabinet Councillor in the First Konoye Cabinet.

Since my withdrawal from active service in March 1936, I had not been quite satisfied with the state of affairs and was leading a life of a retired man. During that time there was an occasion when, at the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937, I was extremely worried about the situation and suggested to Prince KONOYE my view on means of bringing about peace.

It happened in September 1937 that Prince KONOYE who was the Prime Minister at that time sent for me. When I saw him, he was very much worried about the China Incident and asked me if I had any ideas as to the means of saving the situation. It was the time when the Second Shanghai Incident had broken out and the situation was really serious.

I told him that if a frontal clash between China and Japan should take place, it would not only be against the policy of our country, but would also cause great difficulty for Japan from the operational viewpoint. I suggested that he should ask Lt. Gen. OBITA's opinion about those matters, but he told me that he had had Lt. Gen. OBITA's opinion already and that from his opinion he was more convinced of the gravity of the situation. He said that it was the reason why he came to me and wanted my unreserved opinion for saving the situation.

I told him that since the state of affairs had developed to such an extent as those existing, it would require a person with strong influence among military circles, not a retired soldier like myself, to settle the affair. I added that in any case, Prince KONOYE would require a great deal of resolution to cope with the situation.

In the meantime, Premier KONOYE set up an organization of Cabinet Councillors and about ten people including myself were appointed the Cabinet Councillors. The object of this organization was to seek suggestions to check the expansion of the incident and to settle it.

18. The functions of the Cabinet Councillors and my suggestions to the Premier.

The Cabinet Council was not organized into a regular system of a council. Its members were to make their individual suggestions to Premier KONOYE and the Council had no recognized right of resolution. The Councillors were to meet regularly once or twice a week. However, it was to hear the latest information from the government or to exchange each other's views, and not to discuss any fixed agenda.

As the KONOYE Cabinet did not place much importance in this system, the Cabinet Council was gradually reduced to a nominal existence and a Councillor was an honorary post for which no pay or other form of treatment was given. At the time when this system was established, the China Incident had considerably expanded and the troops had reached somewhere near Nanking.
I submitted my opinion to the Premier saying that to attack and subsequently occupy the capital of China would only make the whole situation more serious than ever and would create a considerable hindrance to the readjustment of China-Japan relations in the future. I suggested that peace should be sought before this campaign took place.

All the Councillors were of more or less the same opinion, and the government authorities seemed to have done their best in endeavoring to save the situation. However, what was lacking with the government authorities was a resolute determination to push through their policy, whereas the military action which was under the direction of the Supreme Command gained more influence every day and resulted in the further aggravation of the situation.

I think it was around this time that a peace negotiation was made through the good offices of Mr. Trautman, German Ambassador in China. All of the councillors were looking forward to the success of this negotiation, but the repeated efforts on the part of the Japanese government were frustrated. The Councillors did not participate in the deliberation of this peace negotiation and accordingly were not informed of its details. However, they eagerly expected the government, in an abstract manner, to accomplish this negotiation, until it proved in vain on the 16th of January.

Thus, the Councillors, whose duty from its inception had been nullified, became a mere nominal sinecure. The Councillors are charged with atrocities in Nanking, but they had neither the authority nor duty of controlling such an incident.

19. The circumstances in which I became Education Minister and the state of affairs during my tenure of office.

Prince KONOYE, from his sincere apprehension over the situation, and desiring to devise counter means against it, determined at the end of May to reshuffle his Cabinet, and selected as ministers the following members from the Cabinet Councillors. General UGAKI was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. IKEDA, Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry; and myself Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry; and myself Minister of Education. He then appointed Lt. General ITAGAKI as War Minister. I had some expectation for this renovated Cabinet, but Premier KONOYE, after the renovation made it his practice to confer on current problems only with the Five Minister Conference comprised of Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign and Finance, and other Ministers were not invited to the discussions.

At that time military operations were in progress, and as they were under control of the Supreme Command, the Cabinet had no authority to check them. Thus, while the Premier was indecisive military action gradually developed and reached as far as Wuchang, Hankow and Canton. During this time, the members of the Cabinet other than those of the Five Minister Council were not immediately informed of the latest state of affairs.
Under the circumstances, my position was merely the chief of the education administration, which was entirely outside the realm of current affairs, and all I did was to promote education and its administration.

20. My work as Minister of Education.

The Ministry of Education, as one of its fixed duties, shared with the Ministry of Home Affairs the task of keeping surveillance over the General Spiritual Mobilization Organization. Consequently, the Minister of Education had to write in magazines and make broadcasts in connection with educational matters, as part of his routine duties. The drafts of articles or broadcasts usually prepared by the staff of ministry in charge of such matter and the Minister only made them public. The work was executed along the customary line. I do not think there was anything which was planned with specific intention or departed from the customary practice.

Excerpts of some of my books were tendered to the Tribunal as prosecution evidence. To those I contend that if the whole book had been read, instead of excerpts, what I was aiming to explain would have been understood.

During the earlier period of my tenure of office as Education Minister, there were some in the Ministry who were inclined toward flattery or fanatically pleaded the true principle of the fundamental policy of our country; there were some who were inclined to agree with the Nazi ideology; on the other hand, there were still some submerged elements in the schools who followed communism.

This situation required competent persons who could regulate this confusion, and this was why I conducted personnel shifts among the Education Office Staff.

I also appointed competent people who could cope with confidence with the request from the military authorities and other government branches so that the evil practice of being obsequitous to such requests could be eliminated.

At that time, the Education Council had already been established (in 1937). This was the highest institution for the renovation of the education system and it comprised as Councillors the most prominent persons of learning and experience, both in and out of office. All the important problems of education were deliberate upon at this Council and the government policies on education were decided upon by its resolution.

The inception of the advocacy for compulsory education at the Youths School dates back to the beginning of the Taisho Era when it was then only a Supplementary School.

In 1937, the Educational Administration Council made a report, in answer to the inquiry from the government about the question of Youths School. In January 1938, at the time of my predecessor, compulsory education was already decided upon at a Cabinet meeting. Then the question was again deliberated upon by the Education Council and according to its reply in July of the same year, it was arranged that an Imperial Ordinance be issued in April 1939 for its enforcement.
This new system was to give equal opportunity of education to all people and help to develop their natural gifts. It is entirely wrong to interpret this change as militarization of education.

The education system in Japan since the MEIJI Era had been formed after the European and American lives. While the system enjoyed certain popularity among the public, it offered more opportunity to the well-to-do class of people, and those of talent and faculty from the power classes found difficulty in developing their natural gifts. I perceived that this was contrary to our original program to let everyone gain his proper place, when the Educational Council submitted its decision that education in the Youths School should be made compulsory. I took this opportunity to develop the education of the working class of youths, and to give to those who showed good result in the Youths School ample opportunity to develop their talent.

The most serious apprehension of Japan at that time was the disturbance of ideological circles. There was a time when communism spread widely among the people and once it became the tide of public opinion; then there was a time, later when people followed Nazism or Fascism. This trend gave rise to complications between the liberalism which had also existed at that time and cause a terrible state of chaos.

The several unfortunate incidents which arose from the current situation at that time were due to the disturbance of thought on the part of the people. On the other hand, the rise of the Nippon spirit tended to create a dogmatic nationalism, which from its lack of ubiquity, was apt to fall into extreme rightism and was pregnant of much danger. The cause of this defect was due to the fault of perfunctory education which had a tendency of making the people lose sight of ideological independence and lofty ideas. In order to reform this, I advocated that the imperial virtue of benevolence and tolerance, which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of our country, should be borne in mind and cultivate it as an ubiquitous character which was welcome in all the modern civilized countries of the world. Imperial admonition was my guiding principle when attending to this work, inasmuch as the imperial admonition was teaching us the basic principle of humanity with His Majesty's generosity, and I considered that that was the code that the people should observe. This principle which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of the Empire was entirely different from militarism not only was it just the contrary to militarism, but it was the one essentially required for the correction of the defect in ideological circles at that time.

21. Military Training in Schools

The history of physical exercise in military style which was eventually turned into military training dates back many years ago, but I am not going into its detail now. I had heard of some conflict between the education institutions and the military authorities with regard to military training in the schools, but neither of the parties had my sympathy, inasmuch as the whole conflict seemed to be due to their narrow views.
It was quite natural that school education placed its importance in cultivating the spirit of discipline and cooperation by training. But as the result of the training depended on the character of the person who was in charge of training, there were instances when the training was executed in excess of the above object. On the other hand, there were several cases where, on account of lack of proper understanding on the part of the school authorities, liberalism was regarded as synonymous to a sloven life and student's were left in an immature and sattisfied existence. Another fearful tendency was Commmunist ideology, which, combined with some of the political plotters caused deterioration of the student's spirit by abetting them into the habit of disdaining such virtues as discipline, moderation, cooperation and diligence, all of which were indispensable to the promotion of the culture of a nation.

During the earlier period of my Education Ministership, these fearful tendencies were gaining influence, much to my regret. There were frequent occasions when students were arrested and detained by the police on the charge of disturbing public order. These types of students were given to slandering the training in the schools as being militarization of school education. There were even among the teachers and professors who encouraged students toward such tendencies.

I changed the system of training in the schools in such a way so as to observe moderation between the above two extremes and with it I tried to promote the lofty ideals of the students.

The reformation of the system of the Youth School was an act of equalizing the right and duty of education. By the reformation, there was no increase in hours allotted for training and there was not the slightest evidence to show that the education was militarized.

Military training in the schools was a part of the school education and from the viewpoint of educational administration it should not have exceeded this category. This was my principle in coping with this training, and so any request from the army authorities which attempted to bring it out of this category met my refusal.

There were occasions when in compliance with the request of students and school authorities, the use of modern weapons was introduced in training, but this decision was an autonomous disposition of the school authorities in view of the students' request, and was not done by the request of the Education Ministry.

While I was Education Minister, I placed importance on cultivating the moral element rather than promoting the skill of combat. This moral element served to reveal the Emperor's virtue of benevolence.
That is to say, by training I taught students to cultivate their morals rather than to cultivate the habit of depending on armed force.

23. National Spirit General Mobilization

The National Spirit General Mobilization system had been established at the time of the First KONOYE Cabinet and its object was to straighten the national spirit against the state of affairs after the outbreak of the China Incident. It had been established before I became the Education Minister.

Its central executive organ was civilian comprised of people of learning, fame and experience which had been placed under the charge of the Departments of Home Affairs and Education. Its main object was the improvement of the people's daily life and spiritual restraint.

Later, there was a tendency for the policy of this central executive organ to become dogmatic. The HIRANUMA Cabinet, desiring to follow its policy properly, established a committee system with the chairman of the committee to be selected from among the cabinet ministers, to pursue a basic policy, and all the people of learning and experience both in and out of office were requested to deliberate so that the committee could submit its opinion to the government.

In my capacity of Education Minister, I was recommended to the chairmanship of this committee, but most of the actual work was handled by the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet. The committee and staff included many civilians, especially women, and deliberated on renovation and curtailment of daily living.

However, in spite of its primary objective, the discussion tended to delve into current problems, diverting from its original purpose of cultivating the fundamental character of the people in order to be worthy of associating with the modern world.

What was most urgently required under the circumstances was to ask the people to undertake a sever introspection into their daily mode of living, concentrate upon the cultivation of the spirit of endurance and improvement of their daily life, respect social morality and help them to bring about efficiency in their work.

In order to realize the above, I established a day of self-introspection. I decided that the first day of every month be called the "Serving Day" and requested the people to lead a life of restraint on this day. There was an opinion at that time that in view of the current situation, the 7th of every month, the day of the outbreak of the China Incident would be a better day for
"Servin' Day". However, my opinion was that "Servin' Day" should be disconnected with the current state of affairs. My intention was to use this day for permanently promoting the basic standard of living of the people, and in order to get the people to understand this principle, I made the first day of every month the day for self-introspection. Thus I tried to prevent everything from coming under the influence of the current situation.

I wish to add that the National Spirit General Mobilization was entirely different in nature from National General Mobilization and Student Mobilization. The National Spirit General Mobilization was merely a part of the daily life renovation movement.

24. International problems while I was the Education Minister.

My duty as Education Minister was limited mainly to education administration, and the general international problems were outside the scope of my work. I have no recollection whether such matters as Premier KONOE's declaration of the Establishment of the New Order or Foreign Minister ARITA's declaration was debated at the Cabinet Meeting.

My non-association with the international problems was more conspicuous at the time of the HIJIRUKA Cabinet; in fact, I knew nothing about those matters at that time, inasmuch as all the important problems were discussed and decided at the Five Minister Conference.

Japan-German Cultural Agreement was first proposed to me by the Foreign Office and then Japan entered into this agreement. The agreement concerned culture only and had no political significance.

Exchange of boys between Germany and Japan was planned and executed before my acceptance of the Education Ministry. The first group returned home after my assumption of office. I did not see in this party anything more than an ordinary social visit of a tourist party. I wanted to send a similar party not to Germany alone, but to all other civilized countries, but could not realize it.

The Khasan and Nomonhan Incidents were reported to the Cabinet Meeting as being mere skirmishes between the border garrisons of both countries. The Education Minister was not concerned in the disposal of such incidents. Only one thing was clear that the government desired an amicable settlement and the Army acted from the beginning to end in conformity with this policy. That was why those incidents did not become serious subjects of discussion at the Cabinet Meeting.

I did not know anything about the Tripartite Pact and the Wang-Chin-wei government. I did not even know how they were discussed or made. As for the stationing of troops in French Indo-China and the problems concerning
the Lesser Southern Group of Islands and Hainan Island, I had not the slightest idea of what was going on.

25. Cabinet Councillor at the ABE and YONAI Cabinets.

It was quite a long time after the formation of the ABE Cabinet that I was asked to become a Councillor of that Cabinet. (I think it was in December 1939). I had known that a Cabinet Councillor was merely a nominal post and that I could not be of any material service to that Cabinet, so I first declined to accept it but the Premier was so persistent that I had to accept it after all. The ABE Cabinet resigned en bloc after two months of my acceptance of this post, and so I did not even have a chance of talking to the Premier.

When the YONAI Cabinet was formed, I was asked to become its Home Minister. However, my view was as I have stated above, and furthermore, the state of affairs was so aggravated at that time that I considered it was impossible for anyone except those who held strong influence over the military authorities, to exercise an effective administration to cope with the situation, and so I refused to accept it.

Then I was asked to become its Cabinet Councillor, but as my view was unchanged since the ABE Cabinet, again I declined to accept it. But when I was persistently asked by him to list my name among the Councillors only for nominal purpose, I could not very well refuse it and became a Cabinet Councillor.

As my assumption of the post had taken place under such circumstances, I remained its nominal member and actually did not do any work. I did not even know what was going on in the cabinet. It was, however, conceivable that both the ABE and YONAI Cabinets were opposed to the Tripartite Pact and that they were eager to put an end to the China Incident.

26. My attitude toward the Second KONOYE Cabinet.

It was in September 1940, about two months after the formation of the Second KONOYE Cabinet, that Mr. Tonita, Chief Cabinet Secretary unexpectedly visited me and asked me to become a Cabinet Councillor of the Second KONOYE Cabinet.

I had been told that the establishment of the Grand Rule Assistance Association and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact were going to be disclosed shortly. These were the two important domestic and foreign problems, over which I had had serious apprehensions for some time in the past. Since those two problems were to be realized, it meant that my apprehension could not remain mere apprehension, but developed into something very serious. I decided that I could not assist the Cabinet which was to commit these mistakes. In fact, the things were so serious that I thought I had to make a very careful consideration about it. I confided these considerations to Mr. Tonita and told him that I could not accede to his request.
On the evening of the same day, Prince KONOYE visited me at my house and repeated his request. We had a hot discussion for more than five hours. I explained to him that the state of affairs at that time indicated very grave consequences and I did not accept his request.

From March 1936 to October 15th, 1937, from September 1939 to November, 1939 and after July 1940, I was not in any official position and no public activity was undertaken by me during those periods. The incidents such as the Anti-Comintern Pact, outbreak of the China Incident, Stationing of troops in French Indo-China, Tripartite Pact and the Pacific War occurred during those periods, and so I do not think it necessary for me to state anything about those incidents.
state of affairs. The interpreters themselves seemed to have conscientiously admitted their incompetence.

As I felt uneasy of this situation, I suggested that I should write the outline, if not the details, of what were asked of me. I said that if the prosecutors were to make interrogations based on my written statement, it would not only save considerable time, but also would help to convey my idea accurately and correctly.

This suggestion was duly agreed to by the prosecution and although I had not much time to elaborate on its contents, I made a statement concerning the settlement of the Manchurian Incident after my acceptance of the post of War Minister, and also, in answer to the question of the prosecution regarding the movement of young officers, I made another statement concerning the situation of Japan at the time of the Incident and the general outline of how I acted in it. The former was handed over to Mr. Hyder and the latter to Colonel Morrow, and I asked them to let me read the English translation of those two statements when it was ready.

I think this took place on or about 11th or 12th of February 1946. There is a remark in Exhibit No. 187-C, as having been said by the prosecutor, "I will bring you a copy of this translation," and also as my statement, "All of these are written in the document that I gave you," refer to this conversation.

However, much to my anxiety, the translation was not shown to me, and the interrogation of the prosecutors continued. Of course the interrogation, which was carried out in the same manner as before, filled me with apprehension, but since I had already presented my written statement, it did not worry me too much. I only waited for the time when a proper interrogation based on my written statement would take place.
After the commencement of this trial, the translation of the documents in question was handed to me through my defense counsel, and the prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the record of my interrogation in evidence. On that occasion, my counsel tried to explain to the Tribunal the circumstances in which the interrogation was carried out, but my impression was that the explanation was not properly understood.

My counsel subsequently tried to take every opportunity to explain this matter to the Tribunal. He once tendered a copy of this translation in evidence under a general phase, but it was not admitted on the ground that it should be submitted under the individual phase. (document)

I contend that the written statement that I made at the Sugamo Prison is indispensable to the record of my interrogation and that they should be read together. I further suggest that even in that written statement, there is a slight mistake which occurred through misinterpretation of prosecutor's question.

3. Such being the case, the record of my interrogation contained several important mistakes and, furthermore, the contents are not consistent as a Japanese sentence, some of which, I shall point out in the following:

- 40 -
1. The allegation that during the Manchurian Incident, I established a plan for occupation of Manchuria. (Exhibit No. 188-A, 188-B, 188-C, among which 188-C is slightly better, but the other two do not make sense.)

This allegation is entirely different from the fact. That this allegation is wrong can easily be checked by comparing the date of my interrogation, my written answer to the prosecutors and Exhibit No. 188-A, 188-B and 188-C.

The real state of affairs at that time has been fully explained in my present statement, and the statement will be supported by the evidence which has been submitted by this time and also by those which will be submitted in the future.

2. The allegation makes us believe as if the Privy Council was the party which decided the national policy. That this is wrong is quite clear even from common sense.

3. It is also a great mistake, as can easily be ascertained, in the allegation that the War Minister dictated orders to the Chief of General Staff for the dispatch of troops.

4. The date when the INUKAI Cabinet decided the outline of its Manchurian policy was not the 17th of December. This mistake arose when the Prosecutor insisted that the plenary session of the Privy Council for the deliberation of "Issuance of Bond to cover the Emergency Expense to deal with the Manchurian Incident" was on that date.

5. My statement concerning the basic principle of dealing with the Incident was confused by the interpreter with my statement concerning the fact. By this I mean our conversation relative to whether or not the document in question is still kept, regulation of Cabinet meeting, whether or not attendance at the Cabinet meeting was compulsory.
6. The allegation is that I stated that the sovereignty over Manchuria rests with China. It may be so from general conception based on a map, but the fact was different, and my statement to that effect was mistaken as above shown.

7. The allegation that I directed the independence declaration of Manchuria and its subsequent recognition is entirely mistaken. This will be clarified by the allusion to the same in this statement as well as by other evidence which is to be tendered.

8. Conversations concerning the responsibility of Cabinet members, the declaration of the Foreign Minister, those who were responsible for the China Incident, and the circumstances in which I accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor were only partially recorded, and because of this, the record failed to convey the real meaning and is apt to mislead the readers. This will be clarified by documentary evidence and witnesses.

9. The extent of authority of the Supreme Command, which was in charge of the expedition, and that of the government was not thoroughly expressed in the record of my interrogation.

   I merely stated an instance to show that in ordinary times, the government policy is shown to the Supreme Command by the government in order to make it a basis for the former to decide upon its movement, but by this I did not mean to specifically state the fundamental power and authority of those two organs.

   When the warfare was started, or when the Supreme Command deemed it necessary from national defensive point of view, it was entitled to make a direct access to the Throne, and so it cannot be said that the dispatch of troops was done only when it was agreed to by the government.
2. Further refutation to other evidence of the Prosecution.

a) The Motion Picture "Emergency Japan."

"Emergency Japan" was the title of my speech which I made, in compliance with the request of the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper, on the subject of Emergency.

It was the time when Japan was unfortunate to have to withdraw from the League of Nations. An air of uneasiness prevailed throughout the country, and there was utter confusion both politically and ideologically.

I had an idea of my own, with which I wanted to appeal to my fellow compatriots. My afore-mentioned speech was to restrain the people from corrupt customs and from habits which prevailed throughout the country, and to encourage them to further their recognition of the international relations, and, by doing so, to quiet the people's mind which was apt to run to extremes.

I advocated in this speech that the real object of national defense is not in waging war, but in protecting and securing morals, and justice; that the troops of Japan should not make it their first object to blindly resort to armed force, but that they should place the first importance in securing morals, and thus I requested the self-reflection of the people over the circumstances in which they were, in order to enhance their culture.
I was not concerned in any way in the manufacture of this film. 

I trust the section of the War Office in charge gave necessary warning to the manufacturers to be very careful not to provoke international feeling by this film. Thereabove intention of mine was clearly manifested in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th and 12th reels of this film.

I have used this expression of emergency on several other occasions and other documentary evidence bearing this title of emergency will clarify what I meant by this expression.

I made a speech in the summer of 1933 in which I said, "what is needed by the people of emergency Japan is the watchword, don't reject others, don't abuse others, don't blame others, but cultivate your character." I also told the younger generations of Japan the state of mind that they should have, "don't be satisfied by finding yourself alone contented. Cooperate with and assist others in bringing about peace and welfare of the people. Don't criticize to fault of others. Be generous and broad minded. The peace of the world and your own welfare will be realized by observing the above. Be kind to foreigners and take into your consideration the welfare of the foreign countries. Let us teach the world the path of humanity to reach world peace."

I advocated these principles in connection with the expression "Emergency" and I tried to introduce this principle into the film when it was manufactured in dealing with the subject of the fundamental principle of the Japanese troops. By this I intended to show the aspiration of Japan of cooperating with the world in realizing peace on earth.
There were some minor points which, due to technical reasons and because of the intention of the manufacturer to cater to the taste of the lower standard of people, were not quite up to my original intention, but as a whole, I considered that the film was faultless. I never heard from any one that the film made any novel impression on the spectators. (b)

(b) My articles in "Mombu Jiho" while I was the Education Minister and my speeches and broadcasts that I made during that period were nothing but the routine work of an Education Minister, and they were not delivered in connection with any Incident in particular. The Prosecution depicted several words as being provocative, but I contend that the Incident was going on at that time and expression of that kind was quite common with the general public and there was nothing strange in that. Those speeches and articles were prepared in such a way that one can really appreciate my purported principle only when he reads through the whole text. I never considered them as giving encouragement to the expansion of the Incident or instigating aggression. Lastly, as can be seen from what I have explained, I do not believe that I conspired with anyone to commit nor did I commit myself personally, directly or indirectly any of the crimes charged by the prosecution. On the contrary I did every thing in my power to avoid war and the tragic consequences in which Japan finds herself today.

On this 25th day of August, 1947
At War Ministry.

DEPONENT ARAKI, Sadno (seal)

I, SUGAWARA, Yutaka, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence
of this witness.

On the same date
At War Ministry.

Witness: (signed) SUGAWARA, Yutaka (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

APAKI, Isadao (seal)
On December 13, 1931 I was appointed War Minister when I considered it most important to stabilize the situation by mapping out a general plan for the solution of various complicated problems which then existed both inside and outside this country.

At that time, battles were being fought covering an extensive area in Manchuria. In northern Manchuria disturbances were once subdued, but owing to Mr. Chan Shan's revolt the region was again thrown into scenes of war, and our army had already occupied Chichikewu. Should the state of affairs have been left as it was, there was no telling how far the war disaster might have extended. Strategically speaking, our army was at war with Chen Hsin Liang's troops which were really powerful, and any slight error on the part of our army might have brought about an annihilation. Prior to this we had had bitter experiences of humiliation at Nikolayevsk, Chinhau, and Mukden, though matters were a little different in the last named place. In order not to repeat a similar blunder, and at the same time to avoid an all-round clash between Japan and China and also to limit disaster to the least possible extent, the affair had to be dealt with promptly and decisively as the disaster already had reached far by that time; otherwise, I judged, it would go beyond control. In view of the fact that this incident had developed rather unplanned in the past it was necessary to make the following plan:

I consulted the Premier, Finance Minister and the Chief Secretary and it was decided to restore public order, without delay, in the Liausi District which had been left in suspense and obscurity and at the same time to pacify the bandits who had still remained there disturbing public order.

Because it was the time when the Diet was not in session, the necessary expense was decided to be drawn on the Emergency Expense account. When the Cabinet action was taken on this matter, necessary steps were also taken through the Privy Council and completed. It was some time between the 10th and the 20th of December.

The above mentioned plan was as follows:

1. Aim: To restore public peace in Manchuria promptly.

2. The opponent: The Chiefs of the Four East Provinces who were responsible for having put the land into disorder.

3. Area: Consequently the Four East Provinces under the control of Mr. Chiang.
In the Privy Council the matter was discussed and two or three advisors who were present asked questions and after answering them this was approved.

Especially Advisor Egi said that the matter had been set forth logically consistent and clearly, and furthermore he encouraged me to go on with this plan and try to restore public peace at once -- as I remember. Thus the proposed expense (30,000,000 yen or 50,000,000 yen) was approved for payment. Immediately necessary procedures were taken and the Supreme Command Department actually started on operation. In these days Chiang Hsin Liang seemed to be at Chin Chou in Liausi district, and then he moved to Jehol.

In order to avoid an extension of the war disaster, I decided to limit the force to a minimum and to move the troops slowly, waiting for Mr. Chang's reconsideration; so I did not give a real mobilization order to the troops on the field. However, the matter did not get any better. I suppressed our army force from going to a positive action till spring the following year. Also we went to the policy not to go beyond the boundary of the last province, under any circumstance, and stay within the line of the Great Wall. Although after the Jehol operation, the troops twice advanced beyond the Great Wall for operation, yet the Assistant Chief of the General Staff made an urgent trip to the field at the command of the Emperor and ordered them to retreat and stay within the Great Wall line. (This is the original sentence and this is changed later with pencil as follows:) Although after the Jehol operation, the troops twice advanced beyond the Great Wall for operation, yet it was decided that the Assistant Chief of the General Staff would make an urgent trip to the field at the command of the Emperor and order them to retreat and stay within the Great Wall line. However, the matter was settled before he left.

(The concluding sentence of this passage reads):

"That was about March 1933."

Notwithstanding the difficulty involved in these two retreats from the viewpoint of using forces, we dared to do it. During this time some army groups were sent out to Shanghai, owing to the Shanghai Incident, and after the fighting came to an end, part of them were authorized to garrison while the armistice treaty was worked on.

However, so that any possible future mishaps might be avoided we had all the groups withdrawn, and part of them went to Manchuria to make a change in the front line.

Soon after this, in May, an armistice treaty was concluded at Taku between Japan and China and thus the fighting i.e. army operation of the Manchurian Incident was brought to an end. Then it was considered necessary to settle
general problems through diplomatic procedure and we waited for such activities.

Unfortunately, our relationship with the League of Nations had not yet been adjusted by that time, but diplomatic relations had been kept on as before, so I believed there was still room left for such. The difference in opinion then between the League and Japan are clearly stated in our Government explanation and declaration, therefore, I shall not give any details here. After all the difference lay in the viewpoints of the two, i.e., one was looking things at by rationalizing and the other standing on the actual situation.

Now in June 1935, Japan and China exchanged new ambassadors. Our Ambassador Hayashi went to China with a national (diplomatic) letter to Mr. Lin Sen, the head of China Ministry and for the time being friendly relationship between the two countries was recovered. I thought matters had reached a stage where diplomatic activities play the main part, so international peaceful relationship was expected to be favorably re-established.

In the end of 1936, there happened the Hsing Kai Shok, Chiang K’ai Shek was imprisoned by Chiang Hsui Liang and forced to declare war against Japan --- so I hear. Also I hear that Chiang K’ai Shek came secretly to our country and had visits with Mr. Hayama Mitsuru and other old friends of his, but I’m not sure about the truth of it.
DIVISIONAL COMMANDER UEDA'S STATEMENT
(Feb. 18, 1932)

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI INCIDENT (P. 83)

It is my erdent wish to accomplish my duty by the most, effective means
and I notify your army of the following articles.

1. Your army is to stop fighting at once, complete the withdrawal of the
front line troops from the present front at 0700 February, 20th. With-
drawal must be completed by 1700 February 20th, from the area (including
the SHANGHAI Fort) which is 20 kilometers north of the settlement
borderline, and which is a line connecting the west bank of the HUANGFU
River and the northwest edge of the settlement, extending through FENG
HOTUEN, CHOWCHIACHICHEN and HUJUNCHEN, and which connects the east
bank of the HUANGFU River and LANJU, CHANG-CHIA-LOW-CHEN.
Furthermore fortresses and other military facilities within the said area
must be withdrawn, and must not be re-established.

2. The Japanese army will not shell, bomb, nor pursue your army after your
army commences to withdraw. However, reconnaissance by planes
will not be restricted. After the withdrawal of your army, the Japanese
army will hold only the area in the HUNUKIU Park, including the road
area of the municipal Police Office and the area around the HUNUKIU Park.
軍は設え攻めの手段を以て任務を達成せんとを勧告し、希望を寄り、軍に

第一線の撤退を完了し二月二十五日午後五時半迄に鴨湖の西岸より且

軍は設え攻めの手段を以て任務を達成せんとを勧告し、希望を寄り、軍に

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上海派遣軍を指揮し、侵略海軍と対峙し、上海近郊に駐留する常備軍民を保護せんとし、凡ゆる努力を遂したるも、その中間をく、遂に第九師団の武力行使となるや、

日本は當初の目的達成上必要なる兵力を増派するに及ばず、若し支那側に於て断然止めに至らざるべし。又政府一般に民衆に対しては務も絶時軍事行動を

昭和七年三月一日

上海派遣軍司令官

白川

昭和九年三月一日
March 1, 1932

Diplomatic History of the Shanghai Incident.

I have just arrived here today, to take command of the Shanghai expeditionary army in order to protect our people residing in the Shanghai area in cooperation with the Navy.

Though Japan has made every effort to settle the matter by peaceful means, it has been all in vain, and now that the 9th division has taken arms at last, the Chinese are going to resist us with heavier preparations and a larger force. Thus being the case, Japan is obliged to the increase in her forces necessary to accomplish her primary purpose. We, however, don't want to fight and to complicate the matter any more. If the Chinese accept our demands faithfully and evacuate their forces immediately, we shall not hesitate to cease military action. And it is obvious that we shall be faithful neighbors toward the common Chinese people and maintain harmony with all other countries concerned while respecting their rights and interests.

On the occasion of my arrival in the Shanghai area, satisfying the Imperial order, I intend to do my best yet to solve this incident, in view
DIVISIONAL COMMANDER UEDA'S STATEMENT
(Feb. 18, 1932)

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI INCIDENT (P. 83)

It is my ardent wish to accomplish my duty by the most, effective means
and I notify your army of the following articles.

1. Your army is to stop fighting at once, complete the withdrawal of the
front line troops from the present front at 0700 February, 20th. With-
drawal must be completed by 1700 February 20th, from the area (including
the SHIHJELIN Fort) which is 20 kilometers north of the settlement
borderline, and which is a line connecting the west bank of the HUANGPU
River and the northwest edge of the settlement, extending through FENG
HOTUCHEN, CHOWCHIAUCHEN and PUSUNCHEN, and which connects the east
bank of the HUANGPU River and LANJLJU and CHANGCHIALOWCHEN.
Furthermore fortresses and other military facilities within the said area
must be withdrawn, and must not be re-established.

2. The Japanese army will not shell, bomb, nor pursue your army after your
army commences to withdraw. However, reconnaissance by planes
will not be restricted. After the withdrawal of your army, the Japanese
army will not only its area in the HUN KIU district, including the road
area of the municipal Police Office and the area around the HUNKIU Park.

RETURN TO ROOM 361
3. After the front line withdrawal of your army is completed, the Japanese
Army will dispatch investigators with guards to the withdrawal zone, in
order to ascertain its execution. Those investigators will be recognized
by bearing the Japanese Flag.

4. Your army must thoroughly protect the lives and properties of Japanese
nationals residing in the Shanghai area outside of the said withdrawal
zone. If the protection of those people is not complete, the Japanese
will take appropriate steps. The most effective prohibitive measures
will also be taken against guerrillas.

5. Separate negotiations will be made concerning the protection of foreigners
in the Shanghai area (including the withdrawal zone).

6. As for prohibiting anti-Japanese movements, you must carry out strictly
the promise which Mayor WU made to Consul-General MURAI on January 28.
The Japanese diplomatic official will probably negotiate separately
about this item with your Chief Administrator, Shanghai. If all the
aforementioned items are not carried out, the Japanese Army will be
obliged to take free actions against your army, and all the
responsibilities arising as a result will be borne by you.

2100 hours, Feb. 18, 1932.

To General TSAI TING KAI, the Commanding Officer of the 19th Route Army.

From KONISHI, the Commanding Officer of the Japanese Forces.
本職は設正の手段を以て任務を達成せんとを激烈に希望し象に貴軍に

絵田部隊長曉明（一九三一年）

上海学倉外交史（第十六頁）

對し左の各校を通告す。

日本軍は澤軍撤退開始後に於いて خط維持及び追撃を行はず。但し撤
退期の逮捕は此の限りに非ず。又澤軍撤退後は日本軍は撤退に於て速
くの工務局道路地獄に虹口公国回復を含む地域を保持す。

近の陸軍第一師撤退完了後日本軍はその実行を確保する為警備兵を有する

調査員を撤退地域に派遣すべし。該調査員は日本政府を隔海外間で就任

1
Diplomatic History of the Shanghai Incident.

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On the occasion of my arrival in the Shanghai area commanding the Imperial army, I am to do my best effort to clear this incident, in view
Def. Doc. 21099-

of the objective for which our army was sent, and to limit it as much as possible and settle it quickly in order to protect our people fully and at the same time to restore peaceful order to East Asia.

1932. March 1

Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army

Yoshinori
全日本国民に告ぐ
（元日本政府よりの挨拶）

東亜の諸国に白色人類圧迫の対抗としてある。東亜の諸国に白色人類圧迫の対抗としてある。東亜の諸国に白色人類圧迫の対抗としてある。東亜の諸国に白色人類圧迫の対抗としてある。東亜の諸国に白色人類圧迫の対抗としてある。東亜の諸国に白色人類圧迫の対抗としてある。東亜の諸国に白色人類圧迫の対抗としてある。
His Excellency the Premier,  
Viscount Minoru SHITO.  

20th January, 1934  

Your Excellency,  

It is a matter of great congratulation for the Empire that Your Excellency and the members of the Cabinet are all in good health and are performing the important mission of being advisors to the Imperial Throne in order to cope with the present critical situation of our country. At this grave moment I feel ill a fact, which fills me with trepidation concerning His Majesty; it also makes me ashamed of myself before Your Excellency and to the members of the Cabinet who are rendering important service as advisors to the Imperial Throne. I further feel ashamed of myself before all the people of this country.

Please accept my heartfelt gratitude for the valuable consideration that Your Excellency has extended to me while I was confined to bed. Fortunately, I am recovering day by day, and since yesterday I am permitted to meet a limited number of visitors. At present I am not conscious of any unusual symptoms. In fact, I feel I am greatly recovering my physical strength every day; but the doctor in attendance has advised me to take another four weeks rest cure, much to my disappointment.

In view of the present state of affairs, I am not inclined to idle my time away, nor so when I consider the importance of the coming session of the Diet where several important military problems, including the Military Budget Bill as the most conspicuous issue, are to be debated. This very important Diet Session which deals with the outstanding problems of the day am I unable to attend -unable, at least, with the present condition of my health, for the former half of the session of the House of Representatives when the deliberation on the Budget Bill is to take place; I feel I am neglecting my duty as an advisor to the Throne.
on one hand, and as a Cabinet Minister to cope with the
domestic nature of the coming Diet on the other, and so
while appreciating the sympathetic consideration extended
to me by Your Excellency, by members of the Cabinet, by the
members of the Diet and others, I am not disposed to stay
in my post under the circumstances, and, furthermore, I
consider that the most proper way for me to deal with the
important session of the Diet under the present emergency
situation would be to recommend a suitable person to take
over my post and let him fulfill the task of adviser to the
Imperial Throne. In these circumstances, I now solicit
that Your Excellency will kindly accept my resignation and
will submit the same to the Throne.

In tendering my resignation, I feel exceedingly
sorry for Finance Minister TAIKAISHI and Home Minister
YAMAMOTO, who, despite their advanced ages and not too
good health, exert their utmost day and night to achieve
their mission as Ministers of State. I offer my most profound
apology to these gentlemen;

Next I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to those
who, since the Ito Cabinet, have been my fellow Cabinet
members for the past two years and also to those who have
been with me in the present cabinet for the past one and
half years; all of these gentlemen have kindly supported
me through the various difficult problems that I was
confronted with during those periods. I sincerely pray for
their very good health and their successful activities
in the future.

The present situation of Japan, both internally and
externally, may appear in different ways to those who
look at it from different angles, but if I may be allowed
to tender my own appreciation, I firmly believe that this
is not an emergency situation from a mere phraseological
point of view, but a truly critical juncture at which the
fate of our Empire is solely at stake. Opinions seem
to differ among the general public as to whether or not
a crisis in Japan will result, but real important affairs
of a State are apt to arise without even a day's notice and
my humble opinion is that a nation must be ready at all
times, morally and materially, to avoid any possible
portentous trouble and to secure a basis for her further
development. This precaution, I may add, has been
necessary throughout all ages.

From this viewpoint, I am not inclined to believe
that we can afford to take a rose-coloured view of things.
In fact, the potential danger of a nation is often made
an actual one when people try to avoid tackling difficult
problems and seek to comfort themselves by taking a light
view of matters. Ill-informed though I am, this is how
I feel when I trace back the history of the varied fortune
of races.

I do not believe it a far-fetched opinion or an
intentionally created pessimism if we forecast unseen
difficulties in the immediate future of our country. On
the contrary, I trust this is the very moment when
national unity is most urgently required to bring about the
prosperity of the Empire.

To cope with this important situation, I have in
past already expressed my views on various occasions,
including that of the Five Minister Conference. However, as
I regard it as a question of vital importance, I take the
liberty of making my further suggestion, though it may
partially overlap what I said before, under a separate
cover and solicit Your Excellency's valuable consideration
over the future of Japan and that you kindly put it into
practice.

It has not entirely slipped my notice that some
people are filled with misgivings concerning the attitude of the military authorities toward international problems. To this I may say that our attitude has been consistent and rigid in the past, and will remain so in the future, vis-a-vis those whose ideology and views on national polity are not reconcilable with the character of the national polity of our Empire. However, with my poor knowledge of international relations and also in an endeavour to maintain as close contact as possible with the relative branches of government authorities, I have been exerting whatever little ear service I could toward presenting our position among the powers and their confidence in us, explaining to them wherever possible the principle of the foundation of our Empire in connection with the national policies and principles of the present. My intention in doing so has been to seek either implicitly or explicitly for friends among the powers so that the Empire may not be reduced to a state of international isolation. I hope that Your Excellency will render your assistance in realizing closer relations between the foreign and military authorities, with whose cooperation, I can may maintain her present superior position among the international communities, and her rightful claim may be duly complied with.

I am afraid I have not expressed myself quite clearly, on account of my being confined to bed, but I hope Your Excellency will kindly surmise what I intended to say, and will adopt my humble suggestions.

There are some more matters that I should very much like to allude to, but I have already exhausted myself and am not able to continue any further. Please accept my apology for having had to dictate this letter to another person instead of writing it myself.

Before I close, I wish to tender again my profound gratitude to Your Excellency and the members of the Cabinet, who have given me the most valuable guidance and direction in various matters. My sincere wish is that Your Excellency will be very careful of your health and will accomplish your great mission as adviser to the Imperial Throne.

I shall have the pleasure of expressing further views of mine when I had the honour of personally seeing you upon recovery from my illness.

Kindly give my best regards to all the members of Your Excellency's Cabinet.

I remain, Your Excellency,
Your obedient servant

Sgd
Sadao ARAKI
CERTIFICATE

(A) A letter of Sadao ARAKI dated 20th January 1934, addressed to His Excellency the Premier Viscount Minoru SAITO.

(B) Top Secret No. 20 - Basic Suggestions for Emergency Policy.

This is to certify that (A) mentioned in the above is a copy of a letter which War Minister ARAKI dictated to me, who was then his secretary, on January 20th when he was confined to bed. When this letter was dictated to me, I had it transcribed by a clerk and together with a copy of (B) mentioned in the above, which was completed in October of the previous year, it was handed over to Lieutenant-General Heisuke YANAGAWA, Vice-Minister of War, who, as an emissary of War Minister ARAKI presented them to Premier SAITO. I further certify that these are the true copies of the above-mentioned documents and that I have kept them in my hands since then until today.

Dated on August 1st, 1946

At No. 1252, 5-chome, Nishi Nakanobu, Ebara-ku, TOKYO.

Signed
Masami MAEDA
It is a matter of urgency at present to inspire the
people with the moral sense of our Empire and to reveal
at home and abroad the essential qualities of its
culture by means of perfecting its national power based
on nation wide harmony, and moreover, to aim at
strengthening the recognition of our national
structure and furthering the peace and security of our
national life internally, and to expedite the establishment
of peace in East Asia and the Pacific externally.

Due to the international crises marking the 10th year
of Showa (1935) and to the general tendency toward renova­
tion running high among the jurisdictional courts and
also among other circles, several unfavourable social
trends are expected to be revealed in the proceeding
of trials and in other aspects of social life, especially
in public speeches, etc., and these are liable to produce
general unrest among the people and among rural
communities in particular.

Combined with the disturbance in educational circles
and the unrest in the labor field will be aggravated and
there is a fear that some, if not all of the army and navy
personnel may be influenced by these unfavourable
conditions and be led into restlessness.

The general situation at present seems to be in
apparent tranquility, but it is my opinion that it would
be impossible for the government to tide over the real
difficult situation, both internal and external, unless
means are devised completely to dispel the prevailing
unrest in public feeling.

Now that these tendencies have gathered strength
discord and unrest refuse to be driven away by any
ordinary or mediocre measures.

I really think the affairs of state of Japan should
be a matter of religious service. The fundamental aims
should be to enable the people to live in peace &
contentment by observing such virtues as due worship of
gods, intimacy between the sovereign and his subjects
and perfect harmony between the high and the low.
Therefore, we should make it our noble cause to act in
observance of various virtues peculiar to our Empire and
to reject both Communism and Fascism. Government means
 ajustment of tendencies as well; a tendency should be
adjusted after it is taken into consideration, and then
directed so that it may take a proper course. Natural
tendencies do not always take reasonable courses but
sometimes go astray; therefore those in a position
to govern must devote themselves to assisting in the
Emperor's rule, in conformity with nature and by
transcending reason, so as to bring about the
development of our national power and let the people
live a peaceful life. This is the true way to govern.

Since these tendencies have already gathered strength
and the crisis of our country is impending, we must,
acting upon the fundamental principle mentioned above,
be prompt in judging where this trend will lead us to. We
must sacrifice ourselves in order to render allegiance
and assistance to the Emperor in compliance with the
source of our government which aims at worship of gods,
intimacy between the sovereign and his subjects and
perfect harmony between the high and the low. Since
appeal to His Majesty's benevolence and then to transgress
His Imperial virtues, would constitute an act certain
deserving our inevitable death, we must petition His
majesty to grant amnesty to our brethren for their past
crimes. Thus we may purify this bewildered phase of life
and drive the offenders to devote themselves to a new
way of living in expiation of their sin. Hence we can
affect a complete change of public feeling, and further­
more, without scruple, we must carry out a large scale
reform in diverse fields of government. For this
purpose we shall have to request the Imperial decision
so that the people may be informed on the boundless august
plan, and shall have to adjust this tendency which is apt
to be distorted, on this the eve of the national
crisis and thereby consolidate the basis of our Empire
which is destined to be everlasting and noble. Thus
establishing the basis of development of our national
power, we must thoroughly discharge at this juncture,
our great duty of being of assistance to the
Imperial Throne.

According to the purport stated above, I hereby
suggest the following policy.

Policy

Petitioning the Emperor to exercise the Imperial
prerogative in accordance with the provisions of Article
XVI of the Constitution, we must, first of all, refresh
public feeling and stir up popular sentiment by allow­
ing our people to enjoy universally the boundless Imperial
favours; whereby, next, we must urge the people to enter
into the general spiritual mobilization to start our life
call over.

We must make clear at home and abroad the great cause
of our Empire and must strive with all the power of the
nation, the power of unity, for the materialization and
enforcement of various rules of government which are
based on this great cause.

Thus we make it our fundamental principle to lay the
basis of the prosperity of our Empire, by internally
emphasizing the immutability of our national structure and
securing the safety and soundness of our national life,
and by externally securing the peace in East Asia and the
Pacific.

Acting on the foregoing policy, the following
provisions must be enacted.

1. The Revival of Public Feeling. We must revive
public feeling, and with bright liveliness, by expelling
all the pest gloomy mud-flingings, we shall lead the people
to national unity. In order to attain this effect we
should, according to the Imperial prerogative provided
for in Article XVI of the Constitution, petition the
Emperor for a general amnesty for various political
criminals and other offenders in connection with them,
which ought to be properly restricted to a certain limit
in compliance with His Majesty's most benignant will, and with
due consideration of offences committed, their
respective characters and their future activities,
regardless of their past whether they belonged to the right
wing or to the left. And at the same time, by petitioning
the Emperor to issue an Imperial rescript, we must unity
public feeling in the sole cause of assistance of the
Imperial scheme and thus put the people's mind at rest;
moreover we should lead the people, and together, devote
ourselves to the cause of assistance and loyalty, and hereby
pave the way to national revival and prosperity.

This article is to be put into operation first of all
as the fundamental principle for the enforcement of our
national policy. By such means we can awaken the whole
national from the gloomy atmosphere, in which our people
indulged in conventionality and were unable to effect
way of living in expiation of their sin. Hereby we can
offset a complete change of public feeling, and furthe-
more, without scruple, we must carry out a large scale
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as the fundamental principle for the enforcement of our
national policy. By such means we can awaken the whole
national from the gloomy atmosphere, in which our people
indulged in conventionalism and were unable to effect
central and local administrations as well as to promote the prosperity of our rural communities and to stabilize our middle-class, all of which are partly the most urgent steps, to say nothing of general reforms in politics, economics, finance, education and armament. Thus, by taking such steps, we should establish the basis for general national spiritual mobilization and encourage its progress.

I have given in the foregoing only an outline of my suggested emergency policies. It is requested that the competent branches of government authorities should lay down their practical plans in conformity with the above, and those of importance should be passed by Cabinet channels, while those of less importance should be enforced forthwith.
I should like to give an outline concerning the matters of the moment that are chiefly in my charge. The Anti-Japanese movement in China, which has been a great hindrance to permanent peace in the Orient and one of the most deplorable occurrences, has precipitately enlivened its activities of later years and the privileged rights of our country have not only been entirely ignored by the Manchurian authorities, but also great pressure has come to be laid on Japanese and Korean residents, until their insolence resulted in the slaughter of these people. This serious situation culminated in the murder of Japanese army officers. Our countrymen, as well as those living in Manchuria, that have tolerated those outrages with patience, have come to stand face to face with the imminent danger. This state of things has grown worse, and challenged by the riotous act of violence inflicted by Chinese soldiers under command of WANG I-CHE in the vicinity of
Def. Doc. No. 1932

FEITAIYING near MUKDEN, the Japanese troops have been forced
to rise against their will for their own self-defense.

Since then, the Japanese army has faced with minor forces
the outnumbering enemy, making continuous operation night and
day and getting over various difficulties. On the other hand,
as we have just received here in the assembly an encouragement
resolution, we have met with such an enthusiastic support,
born of nation-wide public wrath, as not experienced for many
years. Thus in unity of the people many international crises
have been faced with and borne through.

The Japanese Army, in half a year, have repulsed frequent
attacks of ex-soldier bandits, mounted bandits and Chinese
plain-clothes soldiers. At present, the Japanese forces now
staying in Manchuria number less than 30,000 and are stationed
in the vast area of Manchuria and Mongolia more than two times
and a half as large as our empire and are directly charged
with protection of the lives and properties of the 1,000,000
Japanese and Korean residents and indirectly with the preserva-
tion of peace and welfare of the 30,000,000 inhabitants. The
soldiers have fulfilled their duty with unfailing rectitude
to take up their stand on the life-line of national defence and
safeguarded national security.

I consider the honorable members are already well aware of
such information.
At the time of the outbreak of the Incident, the Japanese Army forces were formed of the 2nd Division and the Independent Garrison numbering only 10,400 with the inclusion of those troops scattered in various localities. The forces in and about Mukden were only 4,000 strong at the time of the Incident. On the contrary, the Chinese army numbered approximately 220,000 in total and the forces stationed near Mukden were no less than 14,000. In consideration of this situation, at the outbreak of the conflict, the dispatch of a mixed brigade from Korea has been decided on and as is well known, other troops have been despatched from home and Korea to meet the requirement of various critical moments. In this manner, the minor Japanese forces have stripped Manchuria of the menace near LIAOHSI and swept away all disturbances in North Manchuria. Bandits have not merely been suppressed, but also they have been pacified with a view to the least casualties on the part of the Japanese Army. These endeavors have resulted in the present rest. On closer observation, however, the circumstances admit of no optimism and the authorities concerned are now in hasty endeavours for measures to cope with the situation. It is a matter of course that we hope for the preservation of external peace in Manchuria and her development even from the standpoint of our own national defence and needless to say, for this purpose, the prevailing condition necessitates the
existence of the present strength of the forces, and the more, if possible. The respective authorities are now engaged in the examination of this case. Concerning the state of things in SHANGHAI and its vicinity, the Army perceived the necessity of taking up measures with deliberation, judging from its peculiar character different in its nature from the disturbances in Manchuria and watched further development, but at the end of February, to meet the need of the emergency, it was decided by the Cabinet council to send a brigade from Kyushu and a division reinforced to a certain degree on a program designed by the Supreme Command. In view of the specially complicated situation of SHANGHAI, the Army authorities wished for the immediate solution of the problem without any bloodshed from the start and repeatedly carried on negotiations with the Chinese authorities, which showed no sincerity and replied with bombardment. It is a matter of great regret that these circumstances compelled us to exchange fire.

The Chinese army reinforced their strength with the guards under the command of CHIANG KAI-SHEK in addition to the 19th Route of CANTON then in active position, the whole strength totalling 6 divisions, threatened to take the offensive. Therefore, in accordance with our prepared plan, two Japanese divisions and adjunct troops required for the area have been despatched and early this month, with one blow, have irretrievably defeated the main body of the enemy. At present the
Def. Doc. No. 1882

Japanese forces are assembled in a certain limited area in a state of suspension of hostilities with a view to restoring peace. In perfect harmony with the fundamental policies of the Imperial Government and in co-operative operations with the Navy, the Japanese Army in due consideration of the situation of the time has succeeded in the attainment of its object, evading the full-scale conflict between Japan and China. The object of sending our troops to the SHANGHAI area is the protection of the Japanese residents and the preservation of peace in the International Settlement. Consequently, so long as China does not menace with a large-scale offensive, the Japanese Army authorities have decided, acting on the intention of the Supreme Command, to withdraw the forces of their own accord. In the middle of this month, the 11th Division and the 24th mixed brigade have been given instructions for evacuation and stand-by at home and they are now under transportation. The above-mentioned is the outline of the important military affairs of which I am in charge. In view of the present conditions, at home and abroad, careful examination of the nature and development of the Incident shows that it is not only incomparable in its gravity and seriousness with our expedition to Siberia or with the Manchurian Incident, but also it may be said to in its importance even the Russo-Japanese War. It is simply natural that the morale of our soldiers and
Def. Doc. No. 1892

the nation has been enhanced as a result. It is our earnest desire to safeguard the security of the nation and the peace and welfare of the people by virtue of our loyalty to the country, unselphish devotion and exertion, and our strong unity and thus to see the glorious conclusion. The harmonious cooperation of the army and the Navy demonstrated during the latest operations, in the excellence of which the Army may well take pride, is unrivalled in history and it should be particularly stated that it is worth our special attention. What with the august virtue of His Majesty and god's grace, and what with the unrivalled devotion and loyalty of the soldiers, it has been clarified that the Army deserves the high regard of the countries of the world and that it can take its resolute stand on the unanimous support of the people. It is a matter of congratulation that the new dawning light of peace is now being noticed in the Orient. Impressed with the growing importance of the responsibilities, the authorities concerned are all determined, in consideration of our national structure, to tide over the crises by united efforts, to secure national defence to exalt the Imperial prestige abroad, to extend national virtues at home for the well-being of all the people, to abide by the KODO (The Imperial Way), instead
of hereby, to make contribution toward perfect peace of the empire, and to redouble our efforts for the fulfillment of our heavy responsibilities of guarding and maintaining Our Imperial Throne.
Def. Dec. $1882

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY


Certified at Tokyo, on this 30 day of June, 1947

/S/ MIYASAKA, Kanko (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ YAMADA, Itaru (seal)
The Chief of shorthand Section

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
I should like to give an outline concerning the matters of the moment that are chiefly in my charge. The Anti-Japanese movement in China, which has been a great hindrance to permanent peace in the Orient and one of the most deplorable occurrences, has precipitately enlivened its activities of later years and the privileged rights of our country have not only been entirely ignored by the Manchurian authorities, but also great pressure has come to be laid on Japanese and Korean residents, until their insolence resulted in the slaughter of these people. This serious situation culminated in the murder of Japanese army officers. Our countrymen, as well as those living in Manchuria, that have tolerated these outrages with patience, have come to stand face to face with the imminent danger. This state of things has grown worse, and challenged by the riotous act of violence inflicted by Chinese soldiers under command of WANG I-CHE in the vicinity of
PEITAIYING near MUKDEN, the Japanese troops have been forced to rise against their will for their own self-defense.

Since then, the Japanese army has faced with minor forces the outnumbering enemy, making continuous operation night and day and getting over various difficulties. On the other hand, as we have just received here in the assembly an encouraging resolution, we have met with such an enthusiastic support, born of nation-wide public wrath, as not experienced for many years. Thus in unity of the people many international crises have been faced with and borne through.

The Japanese Army, in half a year, have repulsed frequent attacks of ex-soldier bandits, mounted bandits and Chinese plain-clothes soldiers. At present, the Japanese forces now staying in Manchuria number less than 30,000 and are stationed in the vast area of Manchuria and Mongolia more than two times and a half as large as our empire and are directly charged with protection of the lives and properties of the 1,000,000 Japanese and Korean residents and indirectly with the preservation of peace and welfare of the 30,000,000 inhabitants. The soldiers have fulfilled their duty with unflagging rectitude to take up their stand on the life-line of national defense and safeguarded national security.

I consider the honorable members are already well aware of such information.
At the time of the outbreak of the Incident, the Japanese Army forces were formed of the 2nd Division and the Independent Garrison numbering only 10,400 with the inclusion of those troops scattered in various localities. The forces in and about Mukden were only 4,000 strong at the time of the Incident. On the contrary, the Chinese army numbered approximately 220,000 in total and the forces stationed near Mukden were no less than 14,000. In consideration of this situation, at the outbreak of the conflict, the dispatch of a mixed brigade from Korea has been decided on and as is well known, other troops have been dispatched from home and Korea to meet the requirement of various critical moments. In this manner, the minor Japanese forces have stripped Manchuria of the menace near LIAOESI and swept away all disturbances in North Manchuria. Bandits have not merely been suppressed, but also they have been pacified with a view to the least casualties on the part of the Japanese Army. Those endeavors have resulted in the present rest. On closer observation, however, the circumstances admit of no optimism and the authorities concerned are now in hasty endeavors for measures to cope with the situation. It is a matter of course that we hope for the preservation of eternal peace in Manchuria and her development even from the standpoint of our own national defense and needless to say, for this purpose, the prevailing condition necessitates the
existence of the present strength of the forces, and the more, if possible. The respective authorities are now engaged in the examination of this case. Concerning the state of things in SHANGHAI and its vicinity, the Army perceived the necessity of taking up measures with deliberation, judging from its peculiar character different in its nature from the disturbances in Manchuria and watched further development, but at the end of February, to meet the need of the emergency, it was decided by the Cabinet council to send a brigade from Kyushu and a division reinforced to a certain degree on a program designed by the Supremo Command. In view of the specially complicated situation of SHANGHAI, the Army authorities wished for the immediate solution of the problem without any bloodshed from the start and repeatedly carried on negotiations with the Chinese authorities, which showed no sincerity and replied with bombardment. It is a matter of great regret that these circumstances compelled us to exchange fire.

The Chinese army reinforced their strength with the guards under the command of CHIANG KAI-SHEK in addition to the 19th Route of CANTON then in active position, the whole strength totalling 6 divisions, threatened to take the offensive. Therefore, in accordance with our prepared plan, two Japanese divisions and adjunct troops required for the area have been despatched and early this month, with one blow, have irretrievably defeated the main body of the enemy. At present the
Japanese forces are assembled in a certain limited area in a state of suspension of hostilities with a view to restoring peace. In perfect harmony with the fundamental policies of the Imperial Government and in co-operative operations with the Navy, the Japanese army in due consideration of the situation of the time has succeeded in the attainment of its object, evading the full-scale conflict between Japan and China. The object of sending our troops to the SHANGHAI area is the protection of the Japanese residents and the preservation of peace in the International Settlement. Consequently, so long as China does not menace with a large-scale offensive, the Japanese army authorities have decided, acting on the intention of the Supreme Command, to withdraw the forces of their own accord. In the middle of this month, the 11th Division and the 24th mixed brigade have been given instructions for evacuation and stand-by at home and they are now under transportation. The above-mentioned is the outline of the important military affairs of which I am in charge. In view of the present conditions, at home and abroad, careful examination of the nature and development of the Incident shows that it is not only incomparable in its gravity and seriousness with our expedition to Siberia or with the Manchurian Incident, but also it may be said to be in its importance even the Russo-Japanese War. It is simply natural that the morale of our soldiers and
the nation has been enhanced as a result. It is our earnest desire to safeguard the security of the nation and the peace and welfare of the people by virtue of our loyalty to the country, unselfish devotion and exertion, and our strong unity and thus to see the glorious conclusion. The harmonious cooperation of the army and the Navy demonstrated during the latest operations, in the excellence of which the Army may well take pride, is unrivalled in history and it should be particularly stated that it is worth our special attention. What with the august virtue of His Majesty and God's grace, and what with the unrivalled devotion and loyalty of the soldiers, it has been clarified that the Army deserves the high regard of the countries of the world and that it can take its resolute stand on the unanimous support of the people. It is a matter of congratulation that the new dawning light of peace is now being noticed in the Orient. Impressed with the growing importance of the responsibilities, the authorities concerned are all determined, in consideration of our national structure, to tide over the crises by united efforts, to secure national defense to exalt the Imperial prestige abroad, to extend national virtues at home for the well-being of all the people, to abide by the KODO (The Imperial Way), instead
of hereby, to make contribution toward perfect peace of the empire, and to redouble our efforts for the fulfillment of our heavy responsibilities of guarding and maintaining Our Imperial Throne.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY


Certified at Tokyo, on this 30 day of June, 1947

/S/ MIYASAKA, Kanko (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereon in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ YAMADA, Itaru (seal)
The Chief of shorthand Section
文書出所記

【三号】

自分宮坂完孝
参議院庶務課長

三月二十四日
日本館

服部

貴族院議院連絡課長

昭和二十二年六月三十日
於東京

宮坂

完

到

9
.t 8.00 p.m. on July 11 Cheng Tsu-chung and Cheng Yung-jung, representatives of the Chinese 29th army signed and handed the following conditions to Col. HATSUI, chief of our Peiping Special Mission as a means to effect a local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Our army still adheres to the principle of non-aggrandizement of the Incident and is keeping a strict watch on the manner in which the Chinese are fulfilling the agreement being always prepared for emergencies. However, it is a matter of profound regret that frequent provocative actions on the part of the Chinese army such as shooting at our guard units, unlawful entry into the village of Marco Polo Bridge etc. are happening even after the conclusion of the agreement. In view of the above circumstances it is clear that the sole responsibility would rest with the Chinese side even if the Incident be aggrandized.

Full text of the solutions for the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (The so-called local agreement)

(1) Representatives of the 29th Army hereby express their regret to the Japanese Army and announce their intention to punish those who are responsible for the Incident and to assume the responsibility for preventing future occurrences of similar incidents.
(2) The Chinese army is stationed too near the Japanese garrison in Feng-Tai, which is apt to give rise to frictions. Therefore no Chinese troops shall be stationed within the wall of Marco Polo Bridge and Lung Wang Miao. Peace and order in the district shall be maintained by the Peace Preservation corps.

(3) In view of the part played in the present Incident by various anti-Japanese groups such as the so-called Blue Shirt Society, the Communists and others, appropriate measures shall be taken to control them. Every item enumerated above is accepted by us.

July 10, the 12th year of Shona (1937)

(signed) Chang Tsu-chung

(signed) Chang Yun-jung
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by Nakajima, Suso o, consisting of 534 pages and entitled "China Memories Continued" is a book which was bought in 1942 Sept. at Tokyo, and which has been thenceforth in my custody.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 11 day of April, 1947

Ori R. Shindo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: Shindo, Yasuo (seal)
I, ISHIWATA, Sotero, make oath and say as follows:

My address is No. 455 Suijo-machi, Sotogaya-ku, Tokyo.

From January until August 1939 and from February 1944 until February 1945, I was Minister of Finance; from January until July 1940 and from February until April 1945, I was Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; from April until October 1941, I was Chief of the General Affairs in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association; and from June 1945 until January 1946, I was Minister of the Imperial Household.

In July 1941 while I was Chief of the General Affairs in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (my resignation of the office was effected by the appearance of the TOJO Cabinet) I was requested by the Kokumin Press people to have a table talk with a certain person who would be chosen by me as the most suitable of the several persons suggested by them.

I replied to them that General ARAKI was the best partner to talk with if he would accept it, because I knew him to have an intention of non-expansion of the China Incident and also I know him not to agree to the Italo-German-Japanese Alliance, which intentions he expressed to me many times.

I understood that their idea was to make my talk a feature with General ARAKI's opinion inserted at several points.

About the end of July, I remember, we five, that is, General ARAKI and I, two from the Kokumin Press and a scribe (he did not take down in shorthand), met together at the Hokusui, a restaurant in Akasaka, sometime around six o'clock in the evening.

Most of the talk which lasted two hours was occupied by General ARAKI, I remember, who told his reminiscences at the time of the Siberian Expedition more than two decades before, when he was a field soldier. Most of it I heard for the first time and was much interested. The journalists, however, were much puzzled because it was not a conversation and could not be made an intended article.
Therefore they asked me later to agree to their making an article of their own composition out of the talk.

So I replied that it might be inevitable to alter the talk but that they must be very careful not to create a story from it lest it should cause any trouble.

But the article published in the paper was far different from the talk which we had that evening; my talk was increased much more than I did and General ARAKI's was omitted more than half.

Besides the dictation done at that evening was not very good and I remember that many parts of that article in the paper were not clear to me.

Especially on that evening General ARAKI compared the situation at the time of the Siberian Expedition with that of the current time (1941) and deplored the government for not having any definite policy of unifying the Army and the Navy, and then he worried deeply over the future of the nation.

So far as I remember, the gist of his opinion was that the government should act under principles based on the great cause of justice and make final decision in carrying out the schemes planned by the Army and the Navy without their interference.

But an article could not be permitted to appear in the newspapers stating ill of the Army and the Navy and the government under the circumstances of that time (1941) therefore any opinion conflicting with them was stuck out or shaded off by the editors. Consequently the article in the paper resulted in an incoherence.

General ARAKI after he resigned from the post of Minister of Education in the HIRANUMA Cabinet in 1939, I observed conspicuously refrained from facing the public and was noted as a recluse from current events of the time. At the same time, the Army authorities were opposed to him.

In the HIRANUMA Cabinet, Mr. ARAKI and I were Cabinet colleagues, I being Minister of Finance. At that time the Five Ministers Conference discussed current problems, chiefly foreign issues, and made decisions. Therefore, Minister of Education ARAKI did not participate in it at all. As to the NONONIWA Incident, even I was reported after its occurrence.

When the YONAI Cabinet was being formed, I made an earnest appeal to General ARAKI to take the office of the Minister of Home Affairs by order of Admiral YONAI, as the General was considered a man of self-respect, but he declined it on the grounds that he could not render any service as the currents of the time were against him.
As the situation at the time of the table talk was more critical than the time when the YON'I Cabinet was formed, General ARAKI's gravest anxiety with which he thought why the government did not establish a strong policy to suppress the Army and the Navy and work out a plan for the security of the nation, was manifested on the pretext of his old story of the Siberian Expedition, as far as I can recollect.

Under the various circumstances mentioned before, the article that appeared in the paper was much distorted and confusing and did not depict what General ARAKI's talk actually was.

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ISHIWATA, Sotaro

Subscribed and sworn to before the undersigned officer by ISHIWATA, Sotaro, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this ______ day of August 1947.
DEF. DOC. #1956

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: ARITA Hachiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

AFFIDAVIT

ARITA, Hachiro.

1. My career:
   Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs to the SAITO Cabinet.
   Minister of Foreign Affairs to the First KONOE Cabinet.
   Minister of Foreign Affairs to the HIRANUMA Cabinet.
   Minister of Foreign Affairs to the YONAI Cabinet.

2. Relations to Mr. ARAKI:
   During the time of the SAITO Cabinet when Mr. ARAKI was Minister of War, I was Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and at the time of both the First KONOE Cabinet and the HIRANUMA Cabinet I was a Cabinet Minister with Mr. ARAKI who took the office of the Minister of Education. During the YONAI Cabinet Mr. ARAKI was Cabinet Councillor, and I was Minister of Foreign Affairs. After that both of us did not take any public office, but we met often at private parties.
3. Five Ministers' Conference and Mr. ARAKI.

It was in the later period of the Cabinet that I took the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs to the First KOME Cabinet.

This Cabinet held Five Ministers' Conference, consisting of Prime Minister, War, Naval, Foreign and Financial Ministers for the purpose of debating on the important affairs of the situation; for instance, the problem of an reinforcement of the Anti-Comintern Agreement Pact (or the so-called Tripartite Alliance) was discussed at one of these conferences. But Mr. ARAKI of course did not attend the Five Ministers' Conference, because he was Minister of Education.

4. Mr. ARAKI occupied the office of the Chairman of the Committee of the General Spiritual Mobilization, because his official position of Minister of Education was closely connected with the national spiritual field, and so far as I remember he was appointed in the same way as ex officio.

5. Mr. ARAKI and Japan-German Cultural Agreement:

Japan had entered into a cultural agreement with Germany and Italy, and this kind of agreement was intended to be concluded but with as many other countries as possible. Therefore Japan entered into a cultural agreement with Hungary, Brazil and Spain besides the above mentioned countries.

Although there was not an existing agreement, Japan carried out the various culture exchanges with Poland, Portugal, Argentina and Belgium.
As for the United States of America, Japan held an old Japanese fine arts exhibition in the International Exhibition at San Francisco. As those agreements were cultural problems arising at culture exchange in the world, as to the conclusion of an agreement and its enforcement the Foreign Office always conferred with the Ministry of Education. The business mainly consists of exhibition of fine arts and industrial arts and exchange of students and professors.

Mr. ARAKI, Minister of Education, insisted on an exchange of culture of the wide world, emphasizing that it should not be limited to Germany and Italy only and the Foreign Office had the same opinion with him.

6. Mr. ARAKI and the Tripartite Alliance:

I heard many times at several private meetings that Mr. ARAKI had disagreed to the Tripartite Alliance and various kinds of control.

At the resignation of the HIRANUMA Cabinet due to Tripartite Alliance issue, Mr. ARAKI was considered one of the most agreeable successors to the head of the following cabinet, together with General ABE, Nobuyuki and Mr. IKEDA, Seihin. One of the principal reasons that Mr. ARAKI was pointed out as prospective successor, was that he had such an opinion regarding the Tripartite Alliance as I stated above.

On this 22 day of March, 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT ARITA Hachiro (seal)

I, SUGIURA Kunitake hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

Witness: (signed) SUGIURA Kunitake (seal)
Q.TH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Hachiro (seal)
自分様我國行動ハルル方式＝従と先々別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ為シタル上ノ如ク

供述者
木村貞夫
渡辺太郎
私は昭和十六年七月に大政翼賛会事務総長（近衛内閣総理大臣と共に行へ）をしたときに、当時同民新聞社から会頭として、三名を会頭として会議を開いて、大将が承諾するのは結局は居たので私に対しての対話の相手にし、私をも含めて居るのも同大将が承諾するならば結局だと答へたと述べたのである。私は常務の意見を陥落にはさす計画でありました。

七月に同大将は私に同民新聞社の社員が二人をつれて私に話をきく人が一人（速習法ではなかった）関係で居ました。

私が読む面では二十数年前のシベリア出兵時荒木大将の佐官時代の慣例話で居ったと話していた。

住所は東京都世田谷区宮 orangesであります。

住所は東京都世田谷区成城町四五五番地であります。

住所は東京都世田谷区成城町四五五番地であります。
日の出

其他

Lef Do No. 2139
I, YOKOMIZO, Mitsuteru, make oath and say as follows:

I am living at the home of TOYAMA, 221 Tsukimidei, Hodagaya-ku, City of Yokohama.

A brief sketch of my personal history is as follows: I was a full-time secretary of the Cabinet from May 1927 (the second Year of Showa) to July 1936 (the eleventh Year of Showa), Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet from September 1937 (the Twelfth Year), Governor of Okayama Prefecture from February 1940 (the Fifteenth Year), Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture from June 1942 (the Seventeenth Year), and retired from that office in August 1944 (the Nineteenth Year).

I was acquainted with Mr. ARAKI since he became a member of the KUKAI Cabinet, and especially when he became Chairman of the National Spiritual Mobilization Committee, I worked under him as the Chief Secretary.

The National Spiritual Mobilization Movement was started at the time when the China Incident, during the period of the first KONOYE Cabinet, did not seem to be settled easily and appeared as though it would last for a long period. It was then feared that such situation might induce spiritual slackness or degradation of the people. The Education Ministry, therefore, planned a national movement before Minister of Education ARAKI assumed his post, but since it was related to every ministry by its nature that later the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet assumed the office of liaison and adjustment. Namely, the movement was originated to animate the national spirit, to elevate the consciousness and culture of the people, and thus to materialize its aim in practical life. Accordingly, an organization called the Central League of National Spiritual Mobilization was set up and it became the central agency of various civilian organizations and also served as a liaison and adjustment agency as well as a driving force of the movement. On the other hand, the Intelligence Bureau of the
Cabinet acted as a liaison agency among the various ministries.

However, viewing from its historical development, the movement was liable to fall into open criticism of being bureaucratic and self-righteous. It was decided, therefore, that its fundamental policy will be decided upon unanimously by both the officials and people of various fields and for that purpose a committee on the National Spiritual Mobilization was organized under the direct supervision of the Cabinet. Hence, it was the democratization of this movement.

Members of the Committee included the people from various fields such as government officials, political, academic and civilian circles, and by giving special attention to the women's standpoint, it was decided to include women among them and a minister of state was to be chosen for its chairman. Therefore, it was thought appropriate to appoint one of the Ministers either of Home Affairs or of Education and Mr. ARAKI, then Minister of Education and an exceeding idealist, was appointed for the post. The Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet was to be in charge of the general affairs of this Committee, and naturally I was made its Chief Secretary. Although members of various committees hitherto included officials and peoples of various fields, their leaders were chosen chiefly from government officials. This Committee, however, appointed many civilians for its leaders in accordance with Mr. ARAKI's opinion, and it should be noted that this has contributed much toward its democratization.

This committee had often met and discussed the fundamental policy of the movement, and policies were always based upon the resolution adopted by the entire members of the committee.

Further, in carrying these policies into effect, its charge was transferred to the Central League of the National Spiritual Mobilization, thereby accelerating the realization of such policies which are put into practice through various civilian organizations. Thus it will be seen that the Committee functions as a wedge between the government offices and civilians, and further the importance was placed on the everyday life of the people.

In my dealings with Mr. ARAKI, he was a man of sincerity itself, and one who never was unreasonable. Even after he became the Chairman, he had always allowed all the members to exhaustively discuss problems and he was not led to a decision easily, so much so that I even became impatient about his method. He never coerced his opinion upon anyone but paid due respect for opinions of the members of the Committee. Moreover, he took notice of the fact that the
the Committee was often inclined to subject its opinions along the lines of current situations, that he even endeavored to pay attention to the elevation of the cultural level of the people to the utmost and reflect it on the everyday life and frequently advocated cheerful manners of living. However, when there was an argument on deciding July 7th, the day when the China Incident broke out, as the Day of Self-Examination for the people, a few members of the Committee contended strongly for it but the Chairman was of the opinion that it would stress merely the interest of the situation as such and that it would not quite agree with the purpose of fundamentally healthful development of national spirit. He thought, rather of deciding the first day of every month with due respect to the traditional Japanese custom as a day of self-examination and practice and designating it as the Service Day. As the members of the Committee agreed to it and by so deciding, it was avoided in allowing themselves to take advantage of the current situation.

The Chairman paid exceedingly scrupulous attention concerning such point.

Minister of Education ARAKI resigned several months after that and thus the discussion on this subject was not completed while he was its Chairman.

Next I shall relate about the documents discussed at the Cabinet Meetings.

I was the Chief of General Affairs of the Cabinet Secretariat at the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets, to both of which Mr. ARAKI was War Minister, and so I was responsible for keeping in record the documents discussed at the Cabinet Meetings and subsequently passed to the Secretariat for safe keeping. The decision at the Cabinet Meetings was not necessarily done on documents, a considerable part of it was done verbally. Moreover, quite a number of documents on which decision had been made at the meeting was not given to the Secretariat for safe keeping. It was not a customary practice to make record of the Cabinet Meetings.

YOKOMIZO, Mitsuteru

Subscribed and sworn to before the under-signed officer by the above-named YOKOMIZO, Mitsuteru, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this ______ day of August 1947.
三島末氏という名の会ığıになったのは、大潭内を訪れたとき、後に同氏が平沼内村に寄って同民奉公総員足を長としていた。

三島末氏に会ったのは、大潭内を訪れたとき、後に同氏が平沼内村に寄って同民奉公総員足を長としていた。
從って民間に国民精神総動員中心同盟という団体が設置されて民間各方面の
中心点をつって連絡網をと簡単の議題に於ける一方内閣機関等は、各省間の連絡局
に沿ったわけであります。然し、その後の議題を重要な立場からと広範囲に
広める目的があるので平時内閣の際に関東の地方に開設されるたびに
会合すること、し共に内閣に国民精神総動員審議員を設置することと
して、は、この連絡の民主化をいつつといつてよいと思います。審議員には官費
各界の人々を編成し遂に婦人の立場を尊重して婦人から合の意見長には
同省大臣を以て之に充つることになりました。前藤氏の就任を見るのが困難であるといふ事になり結局當時の同省大臣であり非を
就任されるのが近切であると見えたのでありました。此の審議員の職務は、内閣機関等が発することとあったので自然内閣機関長の
従来の審議員は行員に居る各方面の人々に聞かしめるが故に官吏のみで占
の意見で務め、日本に多数の民自人を入手、民主化の実を遂げるに資した事は注目に值する事があたとおりです。この会議は何回か合して開催のため、方針を決定し、同様の委員が

自国、委員会は関係団体、同国団体のくびであります。

したがって、関係団体の会合で方針が決定されたので、関係団体の一元化に成功したことを歓迎した。
るしくりに一際かな生活を送る必要を思い止めますことを考えました。この理由を全てに相談しました。数日後に、公務の都合により、再度この件について相談したいと思います。
抑え目門の決定は必ずしも合意によるばかりでなく、口承によるものも相当多くあります。

又関係については内閣官房で線銘を作りません。
I, TΟΙΤΖ, Kenji, make oath and say as follows:

I was Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Second and Third KONCI Cabinets.

In the summer of 1940, some time after the formation of the Second KONCI Cabinet, I went to General ARAKI by order of Premier KONCI, to ask him to be a Cabinet Councillor, but he declined the offer.

There were two reasons why General ARAKI declined the post of Cabinet Councillor. First, he opposed the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Secondly, he opposed the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.

General ARAKI's opposition against the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was based on the following ground: The prevailing political parties' attitude could not always be approved. But the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was said to aim at establishing one party for the whole nation rejecting co-existence of different political parties. Probably it would lead to despotic autocracy, depriving every one of his freedom to express his own opinion. It would be against the spirit of the Constitution and Emperor HIJI's intentions when he declared that all measures of government should be decided by public opinion. It would be a system contrary to the structure of the state and the august will of the Emperor. That was his reason for opposition. Later it was clarified that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was not a political but a public association. But at that time that was not clear to the public. So was his opinion.

He opposed the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy from his original ideological standpoint that most of the Japanese leaders not only overestimated the real strength of Germany but it also confounded the idea of our KIDO, (The Imperial Way), with that of the German totalitarianism, and therefore that the alliance was misleading in clarification of Japan's real standpoint. Moreover, he absolutely opposed it from his professional military standpoint that it would lead to aggravating the feelings of America and Britain toward Japan with the resultant difficulty of settling the China Incident so much so that it might probably become inevitable for Japan to wage war against America and England.
He stated the Imperial Rule Assistance Association as a domestic problem and the Tripartite Alliance as an international problem were both extremely important for Japan. Conferences for settling these problems ought to have been conducted with utmost prudence. But as they had already been conducted, his opinion could not be acted upon any longer. Therefore, he said the post of a Cabinet Councillor was meaningless.

"Premier KONOE's opinion is in fact the same as yours," I said to him after hearing his opinions mentioned above, "Though there are some who want to found the Imperial Rule Assistance Association on totalitarianism like Nazism, the Premier rejects it because it might be a revival of the Shogunate, contrary to the national structure of Japan. For the purpose of settling the China Incident at the earliest date possible, however, not existent political parties but a nationwide organization is necessary to suppress the Army. Such a national organization the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is aiming at. The Premier is far from considering the Tripartite Alliance as a means to hostilities against America and Britain as some people do. He fundamentally agrees with you, General ARAI, as he has an ardent desire to settle the China Incident as soon as possible. Therefore, we earnestly ask you to accept the post of Cabinet Councillor by all means."

After all my efforts in negotiation, he said he was not self-confident, under the prevailing objective circumstances, and could not be persuaded to accept the post. From that time on public association between Prince KONOE and General ARAI was discontinued for the time being, though private intercourse continued, I remember.

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Subscribed and sworn to before the undersigned officer by the above-named TOSHI, Kenji, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this ______ day of August 1914.
因为图像是黑白色且分辨率低，无法提供自然文本。
Dec 1914.

[Handwritten text not legible]
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWEARING DEPOSITION (TRANSLATION)

Deponent: NAKAJIMA, Torakichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am NAKAJIMA, Torakichi. I live in No. 909, 2-Chome, Kamikitazawa-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

2. I am an ex-lieutenant-general, and served as to Prince

3. As regards relation with General ARAKI, I was a major-general attached in the headquarters of the 6th Division at KUMAMOTO when he was Commander of the Division from 1929 to 1931. Thus, we both were in the place while in KUMAMOTO. Since then we were on intimate terms in Tokyo. Moreover, we were class mates as students in the military Academy, I am therefore, one of those who know what kind of a man he is as a public and private man.

4. While in the 6th Division, I was in charge of the work on reservists, schools and the local affairs I am therefore
well conversant with his way of thinking and of doing things as well as his educational method as a division commander.

5. The fundamental of his military educational policy can be expressed in this one phrase "to make the army manifest the Emperor's virtue."

6. The general also used to tell officers attached to various universities, high schools, colleges and middle-schools that the education of students and pupils should not be training for war, but should be directed to guiding youngsters to develop their innate traits so as to turn out good citizens useful for the society, that is to say citizens punctually sound in health and bright minded. To say emphatically, one of the characteristics of his addresses to the attached officers was his strong appeal to them to let deans, principals and faculties of colleges and schools, in which they were attached, have a clear understanding of the fact that the Japanese army was not an army of militarism, of imperialism, particularly of the Prussian type but an army which was talking into it the benevolent heart of the emperor, the real image of the Japanese army. He said it was the major mission of the attached officers. He also used to tell them that the attached officers should be obedient to the school regulations and show examples of good behaviour. In selecting attached officers I was always ordered by him to pick up men of a harmonious mind rather than strong-willed or bullish man.
7. He always told me that the young officers of the Japanese Army should not be the Prussian type but that they must always carry the character of the Imperial Army which embodies in it. -- His Majesty's heart.

9. One of my great reminiscences is what he said on one occasion during my four days stay with the general at KUMAMOTO for the purpose of attending the special great manoeuvres which was held in the neighborhood of KUMAMOTO in November 1931. In that year both the General and myself were no longer in the 6th Division. At the time of the manoeuvres he was the chief of the headquarters of the Department of Military Education.

He said, "The army should be such as, even victorious, will not buy bitter feeling from the enemy and will be loved by the inhabitants in where it stays."

He was emphatic on it even while he was the Commander of the 6th Division. Now he saw in the course of this maneuver forms being devastated as soldiers and wagons trotted on their mercilessly. Pointing at that scene with his finger he sighed, "Despite my great effort in matters of education while in the 6th Division, cannot it bear any fruit yet?"
9. In Dec. of 1931 General ARAI was appointed War Minister. As I was then living in TOKYO, I often called on him to hear him speak on various questions. He was then very much worrying over the Manchurian Incident. He said that there was a danger of it developing into an all out clash between Japan and China, if we should leave it to take its own course and as the League of Nations failed to grasp the truth of the situation because of one-sided propaganda of the Chinese, I for myself—should do my best to put an end to the armed fighting now going on, and to prevent the danger of an all out clash between Japan and China. He then said to the effect that after that he would endeavor to see the League of Nations and the other Powers brought together to take the right cognizance of the situation.

10. He was also absolutely against Japan's seceding from the League of Nations. When I met him after Japan's succession, he said that at the Cabinet meeting a provision had been made for a non-withdrawal from the League but as a result of the proceedings of the Conference at Geneva withdrawal became a matter of necessity, politics is a really difficult thing, complained he.

11. In May 1930 I called on the General shortly after the Tang-ku Treaty was signed. He was very cheerful and treated me with dinner. While dining, and having the meal with me, he
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... told me joyfully. "I think I have troubled you a good deal about the Manchurian Incident. I am, however, glad to say that it has been settled."

12. In January of 1934 he caught pneumonia. As his condition became quite serious he resigned his post as War Minister and became a patient in the sanatorium at Atami. I went to the sanatorium to inquire of his condition. He said: I am very sorry that I became ill at a very important moment. We are already out of the League. What I wished to do was to hold the opening of a Far Eastern conference in order to restore our cooperation with the Powers, but I became ill and found it impossible to take an active step in the Diet and elsewhere. This was the reason why I resigned, but I have my plans presented before the Prime Minister Saito and other ministers by letter, and as for the army since Hatajii, my successor, pledged to carry it out, I think that it will be realized.

13. He was completely recovered and returned to Tokyo after a few months' rest when I called on him; he was in ill humour. He sighed greatly because he could see no trace of any effort that had been paid for the realization of what he had earnestly requested to the Premier and other Ministers.
He said: "they were discussing only minor question. They took no interest in the work of getting a world-wide understanding for the peace of the Orient."

14. After the Feb. 26 affair he retired from the active service. Since then he was leading a quiet life confined in his residence and spending most of his time in reading. Meanwhile, with much concern he was only looking at the situation of the country which was being led by an extreme movement.

15. When the China Incident broke out, Premier KONOЕ recommended the General as the Education minister so as to let him serve as the fire-extinguisher just as at the time of the Anhelurian Incident. But as the Education Minister, unlike the War Minister, had no power over acts of the Army he could not do anything with the matter, though with all his efforts. I heard him murmuring: "As the Education Minister I can do nothing with the matter."

I went to his official residence at NAGATA-CHO for congratulation as he became Minister of Education and learned it.

16. At the time of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy as well as the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association he was opposed strongly to both of these. He told me that he had been approached by Prince KONOЕ with the post of a State Councillor, but he had declined it saying that he would not accept in such a situation even to become a State councillor.
1. The general on many occasions warned us against mistaken liberalism, communism and totalitarianism. He firmly told us that we could make contributions toward world peace by perfect realization of the true way of Japan (the basis of which was the Imperial Spirit of Benevolence). He was opposed to conquering or amalgamation of any other country or race. For instance, he was opposed to Japan's amalgamation of Korea. At that time he was in Russia and wrote a letter of opposition to Gen. YTSUNOMIYA, one of his intimate seniors, national structure or racial spirit of long standing should be respected and not violated. Especially we have never fought Anglo-Saxon, against which war should be avoided by any means, so he told us.

2. During the Pacific War opinion was prevailing that the Command of Commodore Perry at KURRIKAWA should be withdrawn. I went and asked the general if it would be inevitable for unity of public opinion. Suddenly he became serious and said. 'I am surprised that even you should say such a thing. The strong point of Japan is to have a sense of gratitude. We cannot deny that we owe much to America since the opening of our country to foreign trade. Though there have been some issues, unfortunately the or sent war has broken out. But favors once received cannot be forgotten. Otherwise, where is Japan's strong point?
I, as minister of War, opposed that of Lancashire cotton industry and opposition against import of Siamese hotly debated. I was chatting with several visitors about them. I remember he strongly opined that it would be immoral to be ungrateful to the former benefactors in our need now that we didn't want their help any more.

On this 25th day of Aug., 1947
at Tokyo.

DEponent HAKAJIMA, Torakichi (seal)

I, HASUO, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at the same place.

Witness: (signed) HASUO, Koma (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

HAKAJIMA, Torakichi (seal)
The Meeting opened at 10:30, January 30 (Saturday) 1932, in presence of His Majesty the Emperor.

Members present: Chairman: KURATOMI
Vice-Chairman: HIRANUMA

Ministers: Prime Minister: IMUKAI (4)
Minister of Finance: TAKAHASHI (5)
Minister of Navy: OSUMI (6)
Minister of Railways: TAKAHAMA (7)
Minister of Justice: SUZUKI (9)
Minister of War: ARAKI (11)
Minister of Education: HATOKUMA (12)
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry: YAMAMOTO (13)
Minister of Commerce and Industry: MAEDA (14)
Minister of Overseas Affairs: HATA (15)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: YOSHIKADA (16)

Councillors: KANSEI (19), KUBOTA (20), TOMI (21), ISHIHARA (22), YAMADA (23), MURAI (24), BAI (25), SAKURAI (26), ARAI (27), KAWAI (28), KAMATA (30), SUZUKI (31), ISHI (32), MIZUMOTO (33), YAMADA (35), ARIMA (36), KANO (37), KUBOTA (38), KURIMOTO (39), MOTO (40)

Members Absent: Imperial Family: Prince YASHITSU (1), Prince YOSHIHITO (2), Prince NOBUNAGA
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Ministries: Minister of Home Affairs NAKASHI (3)
Minister of Communication MITSUCHI (10)

Councillors: ITO (18), ICHIHARA (29), OKAMURA (34)

Commissioners: President of the Legislation Bureau SHIMADA,
Councillor of the Legislation Bureau KUROSAKI,
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs NADEI,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs MATSUMIYA,
Vice-Minister of Finance KURAGA,
Chief of the Financing Bureau of the Finance Ministry TAMIYA,
Chief of the Accounts Bureau of the Finance Ministry FUJII,
Vice-Minister of War SUGIYAMA,
Intendant-colonel OOUCHI,
Paymaster Vice-admiral KATO,
Paymaster-captain ARAKI,
Reporter Chairman of Investigation Committee KANZAKO

Chief Secretary: Chief Secretary FUTAGAMI

Secretaries: Secretary HOIKE, Secretary MUTO

Chairman (KURAIBA): The meeting is opened. I hope you have no objection to the fact that the usual procedure was not adopted to open today's meeting on account of a request made by the Cabinet. The following two bills are brought up en bloc for deliberation:

(1) Partial suspension of the transfer of the sinking-fund for the year 1931.
(2) Issuance of bonds to defray the expenses due to the Manchurian Incident.

We shall begin the First Reading, but omitting reading the text. The report of the Chairman of the Investigation Committee is requested.

Reporter (KANEDO): I shall respectfully report on our findings. As regards the bills on the partial suspension of the transfer of the sinking-fund in the year 1931 as well as the issuance of bonds to defray the expenses due to the Manchurian Incident, referred to the Privy Council for deliberation, my colleagues and myself, having been appointed members of the Investigations' Committee, have held committee meetings on the 27th and the 23th of this month, the committee heard the explanations of the ministers of state and the officials concerned and thoroughly examined the matters on hand. The gist of the bills is as follows:

(1) "Partial suspension of the transfer of the sinking-fund in the year 1931".

The general account budget, being brought to effect during the year 1931, is expected to show a deficit of ¥ 64,000,000, going into what is commonly called the "red" to that amount. The government, having studied the means of replenishing the shortage, proposes to meet it with the following funds: about ¥ 20,000,000, by raising the uncalled past of the bonds, provided for us the Earthquake Damage Bond Law, the Telephone Enterprises Bond Law and the Roads' Bond Law, and (2) ¥ 40,000,000, by stopping the transfer of part of the sinking-fund, which was to be originally transferred from the general to the special
account for such fund under the Sinking-fund Special Account Law.

But in connection with the latter, it was necessary to make a provision especially applying to Article 2 par. 2 of the Sinking-fund Special Account Law, which stipulates that the amount to be appropriated for the sinking-fund shall be more than 1.16% of the total amount of Bonds at the beginning of the preceding year but shall not be less than ¥ 30,000,000. A bill was therefore introduced in the last session of the Diet, but on account of the dissolution of the House of Representatives, it failed to come to the vote. In consequence, the government proposes to issue, in conformity with Art. 3. par 1 of the Imperial Contribution, an Urgent Imperial Ordinance having the same effect as the above-mentioned bill. The said ordinance shall provide that the transfer of the sinking-fund for the year 1931 under Article 2 of the Sinking-fund, Special Account Law may be suspended within the limit of ¥ 44,000,000.

(2) Issuance of bonds to defray the expenses due to the Manchurian Incident.

Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on September 18, last year, the necessary expenses have been met by the revival of the curtailed amount of the working budget and also by appropriations from the second reserve fund. The total sum expended by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War and, Navy has already amounted to ¥ 9,650,000.

But in order to cope with the progress of events, the Cabinet estimated the further expenses at
and decided to issue bonds as a source of revenue. The cabinet had recently presented a bill and a budget bill in this connection to the last session of the Imperial Diet but these likewise failed to be voted. However the competent authorities, considering that the appropriation of such expenses is so urgent that it cannot be delayed till the convening of a new Imperial Diet following the coming general election of the members of the House of Representatives, the government wishes urgently to promulgate this Imperial Ordinance as a financial urgent measure under Article 70 par. 1 of the Imperial Constitution. The gist of this ordinance is the same as the stipulations of the above-mentioned bill and budget bill, providing that the government may issue bonds or make loans up to ¥20,910,000 to cover the Manchurian Incident expenses; should it become necessary to cover the difference between the price of issue of the bonds, the government will be empowered to issue further bonds or make loans beyond such limitation.

In short the purport of the first of these two ordinances is to provide for a legal exception in the form of an Imperial Ordinance in accordance with 1, Art. 8, par. 1 of the constitution by suspending partially the transfer of the sinking-fund from the general, to the special account as it is necessary to reduce expenditure in order to make up the deficit of revenue in the general account of the current
The second of the ordinances aims at issuing bonds to cover the Manchurian Incident expenses, as an urgent financial measure under article 70, par 1 of the Constitution. Both measures must be recognized as really urgent and inevitable. So far as the latter is concerned, it must be said that it is in strict accordance with the provisions of the constitution, for it is obviously impossible to convene the Imperial Diet immediately, owing to the dissolution of the House of Representatives. The Investigation committee has therefore unanimously approved the unconditional acceptance of both measures. We hereby have the honour of submitting our findings as above, No. 23 (KURODA): I think it is really inevitable to present these measures for consideration on account of the shortage in revenue for the year 1931. Our relations with China will become more and more complicated in future, and further expenditure, above the present ¥ 20,000,000, may be necessary. In view of such a grave financial situation, I cannot but wish that the authorities should face such exigencies with the utmost care. As to whether it is possible to call the Diet or not, although personally I do not think it impossible, considering that the competent authorities have amply studied the question, I shall trust them and for the present second their proposal.

No. 22 (ISHIGURO): For what period are these ¥ 20,910,000 required?

No. 5 (TAKAHASHI): It is the amount required for the budgetary year 1931. However, in view of the changing situation in Manchuria and Mongolia together with the outbreak of another incident in Shanghai, the necessary expenses tend to increase from day to day. Therefore it
must not be understood that this budget is meant to cover the whole amount of expenditure for the year 1931.

No. 22 (ISHIIRO): Is the number of the expeditionary forces calculated as of the present?

No. 6 (OSAWA): The sum of ¥3,340,000 requested by the Navy is the amount of expenses required up to the end of March, based on the situation as of January 20. But more ships and men having been dispatched since then, I expect it will be necessary to take other measures.

No. 11 (ARAKI): The amount requested by the Army is, as in the case of the Navy, for the present fiscal year, calculated on the basis of the situation as of January 20. But, the needs that may arise with the development of the Manchurian Incident, will have to be faced in the future.

No. 16 (YOSHIWA): The amount requested by the Foreign Ministry for the year 1931 is a supplementary demand based on conditions at that time and covering the period up to the end of March, in the same manner as stated by the War and Navy Ministers.

No. 32 (ISHII): Since the Cabinet has asked for deliberation on this important matter, I thought it would explain its general policy toward this affair and also the objectives and the scope of the action undertaken, but as this is not forth coming I should like to ask some questions necessary to the deliberation of the present proposals.

The scope of the expenditure is not made clear either in the bill or in the report of the Chairman of the Investigation Committee. Are the expenses for the Shanghai incident included within the scope of
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this ordinance?

They seem to be so, if we consider the explanation given by the Navy
Minister who mentioned the ordering out of warships, etc., but for
cautions sake, I should like to question him on this point. Again,
a sum of ¥30,000,000 is requested by the Foreign Ministry. This
Ministry, up to now, has not taken any action, and the people have
been exceedingly impatient of its inactivity; however they will cer-
tainly feel much reassured when they will learn of this appropriation.
They should be further relieved to hear explanations concerning the
items of expenditure.

Next, I would like to hear the policy of the new cabinet as to
the object, the extent and the scope of our action in Manchuria and
China. According to the declarations made by the last cabinet to the
council of the League of Nations and others, the objectives of the action
of the Imperial army are the protection of our country's rights and
interests in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as of the lives and prop-
erties of Japanese nationals there. This objective must be carried
out by all means. Our Empire once made Russia and the U. S. A.
recognize those rights and interests and obtained written assurances in
this connection, but these were abandoned by the Cabinet in power in
1931 in the course of negotiations with the U. S. government. Why did
that then cabinet do so? I recall it was a SEIYUKAI Cabinet, and so
I would like to hear the policy of the present cabinet in this matter.
Has the cabinet resolved to protect our special rights and interests in
Manchuria, even if it means making a scrap of paper of the joint state-
ment of Japan and the U. S.? Please give me an explanation on this
point.

Next, the Commander of the Kwantung Army issued a statement last autumn to the effect that the aim of the action of the Imperial army was to establish in Manchuria, a Land of bounty for both Manchurians and foreigners. This is indeed a thing to be welcomed. But what I wish to know is whether the Empire intends to wait for the birth of an independent local government and then recognize and protect it, or whether we intend to make such plans and establish it directly ourselves? The necessary expenses will vary greatly according to the policy adopted.

It might be that Japan's whole possessions would not suffice to meet the expenses. Therefore, I would like to hear the policy of the present government on the establishment of a local government.

Next, I would like to hear explanations on the scope of the action undertaken by the Imperial government. Manchuria has natural geographic boundaries on both the east and the west but none on the south and the north. In the past, there existed a special agreement between Japan and Russia as regards the non-violation of their respective interests in North Manchuria. But according to recent press news, our country has dispatched troops to Harbin, and if this is true, North Manchuria apparently comes within the sphere of action of our government and army. Will the government include these regions in the "so-called Special Areas", regardless of the agreement with Russia?

According to the explanations given by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on September 18 last year, he had no information concerning situation till September 24
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That, in these days when means of communications have so greatly been
developed the Foreign office should not know anything for a week,
clearly proves that there was a great lack of understanding between
the military and diplomatic authorities. Is there any such lack of
understanding between the two, even now? Under the former cabinet it
was rumoured that the foreign office was led by the military authorities
who were in turn lead by the military abroad. I am glad to hear that
the present Minister of War is capable of fully controlling these front
line military. Will it not again happen that these men, not paying
any attention to the orders of the central government, would act on
their own initiative? May I trouble the Minister of War to reply to
this question?

No. 11 (ARAKI): I will answer your question as regards the actions of
the army. In the declaration of the Commander of the Kwantung Army
made at the beginning of the Manchurian Incident, there was a portion
stating that Japan would turn Manchuria into a Land of Bounty. In view
of the circumstances prevailing at the time, this statement was made as a
means to calm the population. It would therefore be improper to conclude
that it defines the objectives of the army. However, I have sent a
warning for the future to the Commander of the Kwantung army. The cause
of the Manchurian Incident is primarily due to Chang Huaen-liang's
inability to maintain friendly relations with the Japanese forces.
Therefore, the action of the Imperial army must naturally extend to the
limits to which Chang formerly exercised his influence. As to the
action of the army, there are rumours that the front line forces are
not submitting to any control and are acting at their own discretion.

However, once we have resorted to measures of self-protection, we are obliged to take the initiative in order to attain our objectives and maintain the prestige of the Imperial forces. In the course of such action, there may be acts which give the impression of being excessive, but I beg you will give your most sympathetic consideration to tactical acts related to the operational command. As to relations with the diplomatic authority, these are most amicable and smooth.

No. 16 (Yoshizawa): I shall explain the contents of the budget requested by the Foreign Office. Although the total amount of our requests is ¥3,050,000, necessary expenses have been met twice, in November and in December of last year, by expenditure from the second reserve fund.

The amounts requested this time include: (1) police expenses in Manchuria, including the wages etc. of the police force, (2) relief expenses to provide for food, ship transportation etc. for Japanese nationals who have taken refuge in our consulates in South China, (3) telegraphic communication expenses needed for the classification of the incident to the League of Nations and governments concerned, and (4) secret funds and miscellaneous expenses; all these expenses are required in connection with the Manchurian Incident.

My conviction is that the first objective of our action in Manchuria is the maintenance of peace and tranquillity, this being our fundamental policy toward Manchuria. Of course it is very difficult to maintain perfect order over such an extensive banditry-ridden land, where even the ordinary people often turn bandits. But, in my opinion,
the peace of that region is an absolute necessity to our Empire. Our
second objective is the protection of our rights and interests. In
this connection, it is also necessary to bear in mind the history
of Manchuria. The action of our government in the past has been based
on this principle, and that will also hold true in future.

As to the views of the Cabinet concerning the action of a new
government, this matter originated among the Chinese themselves in
Manchuria. It is natural that it is of deep concern to Japan and
therefore we are carefully considering our policy regarding this
matter.

Next, to say a few words concerning the scope and extent of Japan's
action, I should like to state that in the past there was a secret
Russo-Japanese agreement, establishing a boundary line to the exercise
of influence of both nations, but the said agreement became void
as a result of the Russian revolution. In consequence we consider that
it has no binding power today. However, as you are all aware, Russia
has great interests in the Far East. As to the dispatch of troops to
Kwantung, this, as the Minister of War has stated, was done by the
Kwantung army as a temporary measure to protect the lives and properties
of the Japanese in North Manchuria, which were endangered by bandits,
and I am consider that what further steps should be taken must be
decided according to the future situation. In short, Japan's acts
are based on the maintenance of order and the protection of our rights
and interests in Manchuria. We shall send troops even to the North
Manchurian area whenever Japanese lives and properties there are placed
in pressing peril, but we are giving careful consideration to the 
relations with Russia.

Chairman (KURATOMI): As no one seems to desire to speak further, I 
will omit the second and subsequent Readings, and place the matter to 
be voted on at once. Those who second the bill please stand up. 
(Unanimously approved)

Chairman (KURATOMI): The meeting is adjourned.

His majesty the Emperor left the room.

(Adjourned at 11:40 a. m.)

Chairman: (signed) Baron KURATOMI, Yuzaburo
Secretary-general: (signed) FUTAGA, Heiji
Secretaries: (signed) HODZIE, Suco

(signed) KUTO, Morio

Report of the Minister of the Navy on the China Incident made 
in the Imperial Palace, at 11:40 on January 30 (Saturday), 1932

Members present: Chairman KURATOMI
Vice-chairman HIYANUMA

Ministers: Prime Minister INUKAI
Minister of Finance FUKAHASHI
Minister of the Navy OSUMI
Minister of Railways TAKAMATSUBO
Minister of Home Affairs SUZUKI
Min. of War ARAKI
Minister of Education H. TOMIYAMA
At the conference held on 11th of this month, the Cabinet decided upon a policy to make the young men's school a compulsory course of education for the young men of this country. Concerning this question, the Temporary Education Committee organized in 1917 already adopted a report recommending the Government to take steps as soon as possible to make a part or all of the supplementary technical schools a compulsory course in national education. Recently again in 1935 the Educational Administration Council, which deliberated on the General Plan of Young Men's School, adopted in its report to the Government a side decision for making the young men's school a compulsory course.

Inasmuch as however, the young men's school is an important institution of education, we expect that the Council will fully discuss all problems concerning it, such as its organization, its curriculum, the advisability of young women's school as compulsory institution, etc. The results of such discussions will be respected and followed by the Government.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Secretary of the Education Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 118 pages and entitled "Proceeding the Education Council" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (Former Investigation Division, Education Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo, Investigation Bureau Education Ministry.

On this 23rd day of August, 1947

/S/ SAWADA, Tatsuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
On the same date

Witness; /S/ ITO, Ryōji (seal)

Secretary, Education Ministry.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

RAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: AIZAWA, Makoto.

I, AIZAWA, Makoto, of lawful age, being first duly sworn, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, desire to make the following statement of my own free will and accord.

From April, 1933, until March, 1936, I was employed as a civilian by the Mukden Army and was attached to the Mukden Army Special Service Organ. During part of my tenure, specifically from December, 1933, until March, 1936, when I resigned, DOHINARA, Nonji, was the Chief of the Mukden Special Service Organ. During his tenure of office General DOHINARA had as his assistants, in the order named, Majors IMI, Tokeo; TAJI, Hikotaro; and T.NIHARA, Nakaj.
I have been asked if I knew what the original duties of the organ for which I worked were supposed to be. I cannot answer this question for the reason that the specific duties were set forth in instructions issued to the Chief of the Special Service Organs from the army Commander and were given to the Chief of our organ by the commander of the Kwantung army and were, in accordance with the common practice of Armies, considered either confidential or secret and the information contained in such orders was not generally disseminated among the employees, especially civilian employees. Consequently, I, being a civilian employee, have no personal knowledge of the orders, but I do know generally what they contained because of the functions we carried out and the duties we were expected to perform.

Generally the duties were similar to those of the press section of the Kwantung army. They consisted of announcing to the press news from the fronts communicated to the organ by Japanese troops, which were in action in various places. For example, the Jehol operation. There were four clerks, and they were kept busy for the most part decoding telegrams which contained matters for press releases. My specific duties were to translate radio broadcasts received from China and to assist in deciphering coded telegrams. After the end of the Jehol operation, that is, from the time of the arrival of Gener
DOHINRÅ, our duties were somewhat modified. This came about because the supply of news to the press which constituted the bulk of our work had been curtailed at that time. Our duties consisted of collection of information, issuance of press releases. We were mainly concerned in those days with the collection of information regarding political movements and the state of the public in Fengtien, Jehol Provinces and Inner Mongolia.

The Mukden Special Service Organ had a branch in Dairen, which gathered information from China sources, useful for reference in our relations with Manchukuo and with the progress of Manchukuo. It compiled information concerning movements of the Japanese in Manchukuo and especially in the South Manchuria Railroad circles. The reason for our supervision and guidance of persons of Japanese extract who were in the employ of the Manchukuo Government was to see that they did not act overbearingly or go to extremes in their conduct, which they were some times inclined to do. We compiled and kept a very complete list of the personal conduct of the principal Japanese officials who thus fell under the jurisdiction of the Mukden Special Service Organ. General DOHINRÅ was always insistent that such persons conduct themselves properly. While the officials of the South Manchurian Railroad were not employees specifically of the Manchurian Government, it was, nevertheless, very necessary.
to check their actions and to keep them within the strict limits of their official activities with the railroad and not permit any interference with the inner political situation in Manchukuo.

I have been asked if the Special Service Organ, of which I was an employee, as previously stated, had anything to do with matters relating to opium. I have already related the activities of the Organ and I can definitely state that at no time while I was connected with the Organ, or while General DOHARA was connected with the Organ, did it ever have anything at any time to do with opium. Of this I am positive.

I have not been asked this question, but I should like to state that the Special Service Organ was not a large organization, as I know many people believe. It consisted only of the head of the organization, his assistant and four clerks, of which I was one. I therefore, know of my own personal knowledge everything that went on within the Organ. This was possibly because of its small size.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 13 day of August, 1947.

At Tokyo,

Alzawa, Makoto (seal)
I, Kinjiro Ohta, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deposent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at Tokyo

Witness: /S/ Kinjiro Ohta (seal)

Oath:

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Makoto Aizawa (seal)
この文書は日本語です。内容は理解が難しいですが、以下の文を示しています。

「この文書は日本語です。内容は理解が難しいですが、以下の文を示しています。」


[Handwritten text in Chinese]

Page 20098


[Signature]
良心に従ひ尽に資す述べ何事ナモ默秘ヒズ又何事ナモ附加ヒザルコトナ何フ
署名

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謹

7
Ex 7177-A

No. 1

Doe 1763-B

[Resident Consultation]

奉行第四号

昭和九年八月三日

奉行

[Signature]

[Stamp]
(Politics)
The Present Political Situation in China.

Distributions to:
Nineteen to Army, two to Vice Chief of General Staff.
Two to Vice Minister.

The Main Points of the Letter from KOKUO SUZUKI (Received on Aug. 27)
The said person returned to TIEN TSIN recently after a three weeks trip to the southern area visiting various places.

I. Brief description of the interview with Mr. WANG and Mr. HUANG.
A. Immediate problems.

As a result of the agreement made by Yin Tung with Major-General OKAMURA in Dairen regarding the present North China problem, considerations are being made to carry out various measures based upon spirit of the aforementioned agreement when HUANG-Fu returns to his post. Mr. HUANG has been greatly misunderstood by the people due to his efforts to bring about smooth relations between JAPAN and CHINA. Therefore I hope the Japanese will be more considerate of Mr. HUANG's honor.

III. One or two points of observations of the public.

1. The very mention of the names of Major-Generals DOHIHAPA and TAGAKI is enough to make the people turn pale in South China.

   In South China to hear the names of Major Generals DOHIHAPA and TAGAKI is something like 'mention a tiger and the people turn pale'.

2. The weather is exceedingly hot in South-China this year, and not only are the crops practically all withered, but the rivers in various places have practically dried up, and the harvest in the autumn will be extremely difficult.

3. The ill-feeling in South-China toward JAPAN is very deep rooted and it seems that it cannot be wiped out as easily as it was in North-China.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kaneo Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Document Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 28 Aug. 1934, and described as follows: "(Political) Current Political Situation in China (General)" FROM: DOIHARA, Kuni, Chief of the Army Special Mission at Mukden. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 2d day of Aug. 1947 /s/ Kaneo Ishibashi /seal/ Signature of Official

Witness: Shinji Kobayashi /seal/ Non-regular of the Archives and Document Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau. Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larrich, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2d day of April, 1947 /s/ Richard H. Larrich NAME

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

v-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Defendant: KUWAJIMA, Kazuo

I, KUWAJIMA, Kazuo, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs of my country, depose as follows:

My name is KUWAJIMA, Kazuo, and I was graduated from the Waseda University in 1906. In 1911 I passed the diplomatic service examination, entering the diplomatic service in the same year, and was still in the service in 1931, at which time I was Consul General at Tientsin. I held such posts prior to and at the time of the Manchurian Incident.

As Consul General I collected certain information concerning the accused DOHIHARA, Kenji, considered to be in connection with his actions with reference to the Manchurian Incident, and wired such information to the then Foreign Minister SHIDENKA, or to the Chief of the Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Some of these wires were introduced in evidence by the prosecution as Exhibits 287, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 300 and 304 etc. In connection with sending these wires, and similar wires, I have been asked concerning the method I employed in securing the information therein contained.

In order to fully understand the situation, it is necessary for me to explain that there was disagreement and friction between the Foreign Office and the Kwantung Army regarding Henry Ru-Yi's coming out of retirement. This army was acting independently of the Foreign Ministry and we received no official information from the Kwantung Army as to the activities of any of its members; and had no means by which I could do so. It may be possible that the Foreign Ministry was receiving such information, but as to that, I cannot say.
I, as Consul General, was far too busy to conduct any personal investigation of the actions of DOHILARA and had to depend upon my subordinates to collect what information they could. They secured information from whatever sources were available, such as newspaper articles, conversations held with various people, both Chinese and Japanese, rumor, in short, any information which might tend to throw any light whatever upon the activities, in this instance, of General DOHILARA. All this information was reported to me and I then sifted the information, and then drew my own conclusions. The conclusions which I drew comprised the contents of the telegrams which were introduced in evidence by the prosecution as having been sent from me to the Foreign Minister, or the Bureau of Foreign Ministry.

This was the only source of information I had, and with the great mass of information, it was quite impossible to check the authenticity of its source. I had to do the best I could under the circumstances as I had no further personal information.

As for my personal contact with the accused DOHILARA, I recall that I met him on two occasions, at which time we exchanged merely social conversation. I was most favorably impressed by his personality. General DOHILARA impressed me as a typical military man.

On this 12 day of May, 1947.

At Tokyo

Deponent /S/ Kazuo Kuwajima (seal)

I, Kinjiro Ohta, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thoroto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness /S/ Kinjiro Ohta (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro, of lawful age, being first duly sworn, in accordance with the customs of my country, depose as follows:

I have been asked if I am acquainted with the accused, DOHIHARA, Kenji, and if I were familiar with his activities during the time immediately preceding and following the Mukden Incident. Also, I have been asked if I am acquainted with one General Ching Teh-Chen, a Chinese general who was a witness for the prosecution, and as to whether I ever had a conversation with him concerning the accused DOHIHARA at Chungshan Park in Peking. I do have knowledge of these facts and desire to make the following statement concerning them.

From December, 1928, until October, 1931, I served under General Chang Hsueh-Liang of Manchuria as a military advisor. For about eight months in the beginning; that is, from December 1928, I was assistant to General DOHIHARA, who was for that period of time military advisor to Gen. Chang Hsueh-Liang. During that period of time I became well and personally acquainted with him, knew his policies and often discussed them with him. On many occasions he emphasized that the secret of friendly relations between Japan and China was for the Japanese to study more deeply the state of affairs in China and to carry on friendly relations between the two peoples in good faith, discarding the Japanese superiority complex, and to refrain absolutely from enforcing our will by unilateral force.
In my association with General DOHIHARA, I came to learn that he was sincere in his efforts and firmly believed in dealing with the utmost sincerity with anything and everything that called for his attention. He is good natured and studious, and I can state as a fact that it is no mere coincidence that he should have held such high educational posts as President of the Military Academy and Inspector General of Military Education. Not only did General DOHIHARA advocate his policies, but in territories under his command he required a strict observance of those policies. I know this to be a positive fact because in January, 1938, I accompanied Lt. Gen. Umezu, Yoshijiro, the then Vice Minister of War, on a tour of inspection of the battle lines of North China. On this tour we visited Tsouhsieng, which was the headquarters of General DOHIHARA. I was greatly surprised to learn that tranquility prevailed throughout the city and that it was at the height of prosperity. It was hard for me to realize that this was actually the base of military operations nearest the front line of battle.

In 1937, prior to the tour of inspection which I have just mentioned and at the time of the occurrence of the China Incident, General DOHIHARA was Commander of the 14th Division at Utsunomiya, Japan, and was ordered to go to North China. It is a fact that the masses of the people of North China were deeply impressed by his policy and actually crowded to areas under his control because they knew they would be able to pursue their callings in peace and contentment, without undue interference from the Japanese military. Our inspection tour confirmed everything we had heard concerning the situation in the territories under the command of General DOHIHARA.

On September 9, 1931, immediately prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, by order of General Chang Hseuh-Liang I was sent to Tokyo in connection with the murder of Captain Nakamura, Shintaro, and returned to Peking on September 24th of the same month. While I was in Tokyo, Gen. DOHIHARA was there to make his report as Chief of the special military organ at Mukden on the progress being made in the Captain Nakamura case. I met him and talked with him in Tokyo on September 14th.

During the presentation of the prosecution's case, General Ching Ten-Chin, with whom I am well and personally acquainted, appeared before this Tribunal as a prosecution witness and testified that five days before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident General Ching met a friend of
Def. Doc. No. 2087

his by the name of SHIBAYAMA, who was also a mutual friend of the defendant DOHIHARA, in Chungshan Park in Peking. At this meeting General Ching stated that the Shibayama with whom he conversed said in substance: "DOHIHARA is about to go to Manchuria to embark on some big project." General Ching has always been friendly with me and I have been friendly with him and consider him as my friend, and while he was in Tokyo, and after his testimony, I was contacted by him and he stated that he had used my name before the Tribunal and also told me in what connection. I was surprised at the General's carelessness in using my name in such connection because I know that I am the only Shibayama who is a friend of both General Ching and General DOHIHARA.

As shown by my previous statements concerning my whereabouts on the date referred to by General Ching, it would have been quite impossible for me to have discussed General DOHIHARA at that time and place, and, in fact, I have never at any time told General Ching anything about the foregoing affair, much less mentioned the name of General DOHIHARA in connection therewith. In his conversation with me General Ching told me he had used my family name, Shibayama, but not my given name.

Due to the fact that I was engaged in work in the Captain NAKAMURA case, and I know General DOHIHARA was spending most of his time on the case, and knowing his whereabouts just prior to the outbreak of the Mukden Incident in September, 1931, I was very greatly surprised to learn that anyone could seriously consider he had any connection with it.

On this 15th day of August, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro (seal)

I, OHTA, Kinjiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ OHTA, Kinjiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro (seal)

- 3 -
A-10
Japanesse Consulate
Changchun
May 3, 1932.

RECORD OF INTERVIEW

with

MAJOR GENERAL DOIHARA,

FORMERLY OF SPECIAL SERVICE,

Kwantung Army.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
RECORD OF INTERVIEW

With

MAJOR GENERAL DOIHARA,

FORMERLY OF SPECIAL SERVICE,

KWANTUN ARMY

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Gen. Doihara began by explaining that he left Harbin on the 1st of May, and on hearing that the Commission was at Changchun he was anxious to have an opportunity of meeting it.

Lord Lytton: We should like first of all to congratulate the General on his promotion.

Gen. Doihara: Thank you very much.

Lord Lytton: We are very glad to have the chance of meeting you. We understand that you have just come back from Harbin.

Gen. Doihara: Yes.

Lord Lytton: What are the conditions there?

Gen. Doihara: After the troubles on February 5th, conditions have become quieter and the entire population is now following its business as usual. But near the town and surrounding the city some difficulties are being caused by
disturbances, scattered bandits, etc. Some of the country districts have been affected by the disturbances. The bandits are mostly in small groups of 100-500, but larger groups of from 2000-3000 are also in evidence and are equipped with arms.

Lord Lytton: Is that all the General wishes to say?

Gen. Doihara: Yes.

Lord Lytton: We understand the General has had a very long experience in China and is a great authority on the subject, and has played a very prominent part in recent events, and we should be glad to hear from him anything which he can tell us regarding present conditions in Manchuria and of the causes which gave rise to the events in which he played such a prominent part.

Gen. Doihara: Any specific points?

Lord Lytton: We would like to follow the story out. We understand the General took over the civil administration at Mukden immediately after the events of September 18th. Would he please describe conditions at that time, state what steps he took, etc?

General Doihara: At the time of the outburst in Mukden I was assigned to other duties in Tokyo and was on my way to Mukden. I had the first news of the incident near Antung, as I arrived in Mukden the following day. When I arrived in the city the major military conditions which had broken out
during the night were practically over. Some small parties were in pursuit of the fleeing troops. It was the time just when the Headquarters staff was arriving in the city from Port Arthur, and I was assigned to the duties of the intelligence service in those special conditions. It is a military intelligence service for publicity work, and I was appointed chief of the section.

The conditions following that incident became hopeless because of the disintegration and disorganization of the civil authorities in the city. Then the military authorities took action and induced some of the Japanese local leaders to engage in planning something for Municipal affairs, but it was difficult to coordinate those leaders to function properly, and I was requested by those leaders and by our Headquarters to take charge of organizing the work and devoting my services to municipal activities.

For about a month the municipal temporary authorities functioned until the time when the Chinese leaders of the city returned and organized a committee for the preservation of peace and order, and while I was in the office my work was chiefly directed towards the restoration of peace and order and to inducing a feeling of security and getting rid of bad anxieties on the part of the population of the city, and also carrying on relief work necessitated by the incidents.
After the committee organized began to function, the entire force of our work was turned over to that committee, and Dr. Chao was appointed Mayor of the city.

Lord Lytton: I expect the General is much too modest in regard to his activities, for I understand that at the end of a month everything was brought back to peaceful conditions and he felt that he could then hand matters over to someone else.

Gen. Delheras: Well, perhaps I contributed a very modest part to the restoration of peace and order and gave a feeling of security to the people. During my service there the financial conditions gradually recovered, banks began to function almost normally, and the Mawdon-Hirin Railway began to function as before. General conditions were restored to normal and our staff, in cooperation with the committee organized for the preservation of peace and order, worked to standardize conditions in the city, and discovered they were able to take care of the affairs of the municipality. We turned over all the duties to them.

We observed that many leaders in the city had fled, as well as almost 50,000 of the population, after the incident, but by the 20th of October, as conditions became more normal, many of them returned, which was an indication of the return of normal conditions in the city.
Then the conditions in Northern China gradually began to cause us to take notice, because there were many factions remaining and other agents instigated and utilized by Chang Hau-chiang's forces causing disturbances in that region. Then, from a strategical point of view, it was necessary that we should establish contact with forces stationed in Tientsin, and so our Kwantung Army was placed on that duty and went to Tientsin.

On the 27th of October I arrived in Tientsin and remained there until the end of November, when I went to the Tokyo office to report on my activities.

I submitted a full report concerning conditions in Manchuria and North China to my headquarters in Tokyo, after which I was sent back to Mukden and arrived there on the 1st of January. On the 12th of January I was sent to Tientsin again, where I remained for a weak, and then returned to Mukden.

We have a small office in Harbin. On the 26th of January I was appointed to proceed to Harbin to take charge of that office. I arrived there on the 27th of January. Fighting was occurring between two Kirin forces, one led by Hai Haia of Kirin, which moved northward and came in conflict.
with forces under Generals Ting, Chao, and Li Tu. Fighting continued for about ten days around Harbin.

The fighting between these two opposing forces caused much anxiety to the Japanese residents, particularly in that section which was involved. At the same time there were many Koreans residing in that district who were terrified, being exposed to the danger of massacre. The citizens of Harbin, also, especially the Chinese merchant element, and other elements in the city, sent many repeated requests for the Japanese army to safeguard their lives and property, and at the same time Japanese residents sent repeated requests for Japanese troops to come for the same purpose. These were the conditions created by the disturbances. The Japanese were in a very difficult position, being surrounded by anti-Kirin forces who were antagonistic to them.

Japanese forces were sent out to protect lives and property of their nationals, and met with opposition from forces of Generals Ting and Li. Finally, after fighting, the Chinese forces were completely disorganized and fled to the north, but fortunately no fighting took place in the city; consequently, the 4000 Japanese residents were safe, and not much difficulty was encountered from Russian residents in the city, or others.
Lord Lytton: I should like to ask at what moment in the time the General has been telling us about November to January — did he first become aware of any local desire for a new State?

Gen. Drihar: In the first part of February in the Kirin province the movement was first noticeable, and proclamations of independence were issued first in Kirin, then in Heilungkiang province.

Towards the end of February manifestos were issued in different provinces, and a new administrative committee was formed by leaders of different provinces and the special district of Harbin. Governors Hai Hsin and Tsang Shih-ying of Kirin and Fongtien provinces, Chang Ching-hui of Harbin special district, and General He of Heilungkiang province, got together and organized an administrative committee of the North-Eastern provinces.

Of course, those are my observations, but there were different autonomous governments declared in different parts of Manchuria. I presume the leaders got together and united with different autonomous provinces into one central form of administrative organization, formulating a plan for establishing a new unified government.
Lord Lyttelton: When had the idea first expressed itself of securing the late Emperor as head of the new State?

Gen. Deihara: About the 10th and 11th of November conditions in Tientsin were such that his personal safety was endangered and he secretly left the city for Manchuria. That was my understanding of the situation then. I have had the acquaintance of Mr. Pu Yi for a long time. I remember I paid a visit to his place at the end of October. At that time he was receiving many threatening and blackmailing letters, and he also received a packet containing gifts, which really contained a bomb, and those things showed that his personal safety was in extreme danger, and that, I suppose, was one of the chief reasons for his flight from the city of Tientsin. The bomb was sent in the early part of October, but he intimated to me that he was in a very nervous condition when I met him.

Lord Lyttelton: Did the General have any subsequent negotiations with him regarding acceptance of this new post?

Gen. Deihara: I had nothing to do with his acceptance or his coming to Manchuria. As I explained I was engaged on other duties elsewhere and the first time I met him since that time was yesterday to say goodbye to him. That was the first time since leaving Tientsin on the 30th of October.
Lord Lytton: I asked this question because we were told in China that the General had kidnapped Pu Yi, brought him over as a prisoner to Manchuria, and kept him till he was ready to go into the new government.

Gen. Doihara: Entirely incorrect. I met him on the 30th of October and I talked with him in a casual way, and to a certain extent I tried to comfort him in the circumstances; and up to yesterday that was all I had seen of him.

Lord Lytton: And was nothing mentioned then about his becoming head of the new State?

Gen. Doihara: We discussed his danger and his personal safety but nothing about his coming to Manchuria.

Lord Lytton: And the General had no discussions with him about the matter when he was living in Manchuria?

Gen. Doihara: No communication whatever. I had no occasion to meet him because I was first stationed in Nukden then in Tientsin, then back in Harbin. It is unfortunate that you should have all this incorrect information; it seems to be propaganda and not in accordance with the true facts.

Since going to Harbin I had a somewhat similar experience myself. Mr. Hanson, the United States Consul-General, held the same opinion that the Chinese did. He seemed to think I was a pirate chief but gradually we became friends and he discovered that I am very far from what he thought I was.
Lord Lytton: Not a pirate - only an ex-mayor?

Count Aldrovandi: What kind of treatment did the young Emperor receive when he was in Tientsin?

Gen. Dohara: He lived in the Japanese concession in Tientsin and occupied a house previously owned by a former Minister to Japan. He was not very well blessed with this world's goods.

Count Aldrovandi: Yes, but he was threatened in Tientsin. What kind of threats did he receive? Did they indicate what would happen? What did they mean?

Gen. Dohara: General ordinary blackmailing letters such as one finds almost anywhere, threatening his life if he stopped out of the city, etc., and his personal safety was in danger; they indicated, if I remember rightly, that some plain-clothes agents might be sent to assassinate him.

Lord Lytton: But we do not understand why he was threatened, or by whom.

Gen. Dohara: In case he should return to Mukden for instance, these blackmailers were sent to keep him from moving out of the city.

Lord Lytton: The Chinese were trying to prevent him, because he had been Emperor, from trying to regain political power.
Gen. Deihara: Yes. He was suspected of some political move engineered by him or by his supporters.

Count Aldrevandi: Already in October?

Gen. Deihara: Yes. Those reports were appearing in the newspapers, too, already in October.

Gen. McCoy: Has the General in view of his going about the country and knowing everyone so well and knowing that we come here to investigate conditions any suggestions to give us for collecting the proper facts in places like Harbin, by seeing any particular people, not only Chinese and Japanese but other people in Harbin whom he thinks we might usefully meet so as to get an interpretation of those rumours and stories?

Gen. Deihara: The Mayor of Harbin, Mr. Pao, is a member of the reception committee of your mission who will be one of the able men there who could interpret the conditions there.

Gen. McCoy: The Chinese told us that he was imprisoned in Mukden and that the General took him up there and made him Mayor. What are the real facts?

Gen. Deihara: Such is not the case at all. The year before last Mr. Pao, for no reason, was arrested by Marshall Chang and imprisoned for almost one year. After the incident he was still in prison and I gave my assistance in releasing
him because I know there was no reason why he should be in
prison. Ever since that time he became a good friend of
mine and I discovered his unusual character and ability and
introduced him to the Governor of the Special District,
General Chang Ching-hui, who also realized his ability and
he was induced to accept the Mayoralty of Harbin. It was not
I who made him Mayor.

Lord Lytton: When was he released?

Gen. Delhara: I think it was in the early part of October.

Gen. McCoy: Why was he put in prison by the Young Marshall?

Political offences or what?

Gen. Delhara: I presume it must have been for political
reasons. He himself does not know the cause of his imprisonment.
How he came to be arrested and imprisoned he does not know,
though he had something to do with political intrigues in
Mukden at the time.

Then the President of the Chinese Eastern Railway,
Mr. Li, might be of some use for information.

General Ting was at first a good friend of mine and I
assured him that his life and property would be well protected,
but somehow he is still in fear and does not come forth as
I urged him to do. Another General, Li, has now disappeared.
We have invited him to come to us and reach some understanding.

-12-
General: Does the General think conditions are getting better now, or worse?

General: Conditions in the northern part of Manchuria are far from peaceful. There are many elements, especially bandits, who are against the Manchukuo Government. They constitute disturbing factors, but I do not feel that they are an extreme danger.

General: What has become of the notorious General Ma? I read that he was in prison.

General: He went towards Heihce to suppress an anti-Ma force, and then he said he would take a rest because of his illness, and since then we have had no news of him. He is, in fact, sickly. I remember him attending a committee meeting when he was quite ill. He has a very poor stomach and suffers from intestinal disorder. At the time when the administrative committee of the North-Eastern Provinces was organized he was one of its most earnest leaders. I remember attending the installation ceremony of General Ma as Governor of the Province in Tsitsihar. It went off very well. He gave an address and also sent out a manifesto stating that he was taking up the office for the benefit of the entire population. He was thus very earnest.
Then he went to the North near Heihe in the early part of April, and has not shown up since. We do not know what has become of him.
I, J. R. Lovell, Colonel, General Staff Corps, United States Army, Deputy Director of Intelligence for Research, War Department General Staff, hereby certify:

1. I am the officer in charge of Military Intelligence Service Library of the United States War Department.

2. Set no. 1 of "Military Narrative of the Travels and Work of the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry" consisting of: (a) Narrative, (b) Annex A - Interview, (c) Annex B - Photograph has been in the files of the Military Intelligence Service Library until this date, said being received by the Library from the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Service of the United States Army.

3. Several packages of Documents, letters and reports on the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry were also received from the Far Eastern Section and have been in the Military Intelligence Service Library until this date.

4. On the 1st day of March 1946 the above mentioned set No. 1 of the "Military Narrative of the Travels and Work of the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry", and the packages of documents, letters and reports mentioned in paragraph 3 above were turned over to Captain Edgar G. Boodekor, Judge Advocate General's Department, Army of the United States as the representative of Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel, International Prosecution Section, GHQ-SCAP, APO. 500 Tokyo, 9 Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

J. R. Lovell
Colonel, GSC
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al,

SWORN DEPOSITION

Defendant YAZAKI, Kanju

YAZAKI, Kanju, being first duly sworn in accordance with the practice in Japan, deposes and states as follows:

That my name is YAZAKI, Kanju, and that I was a professional army officer and held the rank of Lieutenant General at the termination of hostilities between the Allied Nations and Japan. That during my life as an Army officer I became well and personally acquainted with one DOHIHARA, Kenji, who is now one of the accused on trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. My acquaintance with the former General DOHIHARA covers a number of years and I have been intimately acquainted with him since the time I was a Captain.

Prior to the China Incident and during the month of March, 1937, the accused DOHIHARA was appointed Commander of the 14th Division of the Japanese Army, which was then stationed in Utsunomiya, on the Island of Honshu, in Japan,
which was its permanent station. At the outbreak of the China Incident in July, 1937, the accused, DOHIHARA, was still the commander of the 14th Division and I was then a Lieutenant Colonel on his staff. In August we were ordered to North China, where we were engaged in military operations in the region along the Peking-Hankow Railroad, where I continued to serve as his staff officer.

At the time the China affair broke, General DOHIHARA deeply regretted that it had come about and when we were departing to North China under our mobilization orders he gave us instructions and orders, which were later repeated on the battle field, in which he emphasized that the China Affair was not a war of aggression but was aimed ultimately at cooperation between Japan and China. He especially enjoined us that rigid enforcement of regulations and orders pertaining to the protection of the Chinese people would be had. During operations and on the battle field Divisional Commander DOHIHARA gave his primary attention to purely strategic matters and, of necessity, left the details to his subordinates. However, he never lost sight of his duty as an officer to his subordinates and never hesitated to assist them personally in the discharge of their duties, whether they were important or trifling, when it came to the protection of the Chinese
people. He used to pay minute attention to duties concerning the Chinese people to avoid injury or oppression on non-combatants.

In order to illustrate my point, I would like to cite some examples which I have personally seen.

Once during operations on the river Yungting-ho, his men had decided to use a Chinese farmer’s house to set up a command post for General DOHIHARA. However, when this was called to the attention of General DOHIHARA, he noticed there were Chinese women and children taking refuge in the house, and forbade his subordinates to enter. He had his office located in front of the house where he, his staff officers and subordinates camped in the open air and attended to their business.

Again near Paoting he observed some of his men burning firewood which belonged to Chinese farmers, which they had appropriated in order to warm themselves. General DOHIHARA immediately rode to the spot on horseback, scolded them soundly and made them stop at once.

Again, near Paoting General DOHIHARA saw a Japanese soldier on the march having a Chinese carry his knapsack, and immediately reprimanded the soldier. The soldier stated that he had employed the Chinese and had promised to pay him for the work. In order to be fair General DOHIHARA ordered
the Japanese soldier to renegotiate with the Chinese in his presence and when it became clear that the soldier could not speak the Chinese language, the General ordered that the soldier immediately relieve the Chinese of the knapsack and cautioned his severely concerning his future conduct in such matters.

Many such instances could be set forth. However, I mention these three only to show that even in matters which might be considered as trifling, General DOHIHARA did not permit the abuse of civilians and non-combatants. I have heard his subordinates on more than one occasion state in substance, "Our Divisional Commander loves the Chinese better than the Japanese soldiers."

General DOHIHARA had a high regard for the Chinese people and for non-combatants, as such. I have never known an occasion when the Chinese general public in any jurisdiction under the command of General DOHIHARA were not settled and peaceful towards the Japanese forces under his command. They continued in their business operations without interruption and their stores and merchandising establishments continued to prosper. It was not uncommon for the Chinese to assist the Japanese soldiers voluntarily in drawing water, preparing meals, cleaning houses, carrying goods and other
such daily routine matters. In fact, their regard for General DOHARA was such that they would inform him of any bandit attack which they anticipated.

In camp, whenever there was time to spare, it was the custom of General DOHARA to assemble his subordinates and explain to them about the urgent necessity of maintaining friendship between the Japanese and Chinese people. I remember many of his talks extremely well as they left a deep impression upon me. For example, the following are a few samples of what could be expected in those talks:

1. "Sino-Japanese cooperation is of great significance if we are to have peace in East Asia. In order to realize the cooperation which we desire between Japan and China, the Japanese must first study China more profoundly and reach a better understanding of the Chinese people themselves. In order to know the Chinese, we must, with sincerity, associate with them."

2. "The Chinese are peace-loving and gentle people, if you approach them with understanding and courtesy. They are willing to understand whatever you speak. You must not assume a violent or oppressive attitude towards them at any time."

3. "If, in our association with the Chinese people, they do not accept our opinion, it is necessary for us to reflect on ourselves instead of blaming them for the lack of
understand, on their part."

Not only did General DOHIHIRA often speak in the manner which I have just related, but he endeavored to execute his own views and to place them in practice. It was not a matter of mere words with him, but also a sincere attitude on his part, and he was known throughout the Division for his sincerity to his ideals and teachings.

All I have stated is just by way of illustration of the attitude of General DOHIHIRA, and his behavior in camp and on the battle fields. He was constantly instructing and advising not only his staff officers, but all of his subordinate officers and men and we found his instructions and admonitions to be of great value in carefully dealing with the Chinese people.

As I knew him well General DOHIHIRA often confided in me; both by his behavior and his speech I knew he held an opinion opposed to the China Affair from the very beginning. However, as an Army officer, he had no choice except to obey the orders of his superiors, but even in camp, to his intimates, he always deplored the China Affair.

In the 18th year of Showa, February, 1938, due to illness, I was returned to Japan and served with the basic echelon of the 14th Division at Utsunomiya. After my return I continued to
Doc. No. 2053

Having correspondence with General DOHIHARA and one of the letters which I received was under date of April 22, 1939. This letter was safe handed (carried by messenger) from the North China fronts and I still have it in my possession. In this letter he states:

"Our state has no basic strategic principle established for the affairs and seems to be operationally very decayed by the opponent and is, as it were, leading a hand to mouth existence. Moreover, without strengthening the scaffold on which she stands, she supports both the North and the Central China new Regimes, which are just like castles on the sand, and unconscious of the urgent need of consolidating the foundation. tries to arrange mere formalities of these Governments. I am greatly disappointed at this attitude of our State, and am very much concerned about it. I have no intention to rejoice in giving a big talk which is of no use. I beg you to explain, whenever you may have a chance, to the authorities with regard to the above-mentioned points and call for their reflection ..."

By way of explanation, the North regime refund to was Wang Ko-nin's temporary government, and the Central China Government was Liang Hung-chih's restoration government. Knowing General DOHIHARA as I had, I know this letter was but another of his protests against the entire China Affair, I realized that he knew his views were shared by me and that he expected me, wherever possible, to assist him.

General DOHIHARA, from young manhood onward through his career cherished an ideal for enhancement of friendly relations between Japan and China, and while he was in the Army College he made a special study of the Chinese language and of the
history of China. After graduation he was appointed a member of the General Staff and was sent to China, where he stayed for many years. His name became well known, even to the Chinese civilians. During his years in China and Manchuria he served on two occasions as Chief of the Special Services Organization at Mukden. This organization was primarily for the purpose of gathering military information and intelligence. Whenever trouble arose between Japan and China, I know personally that much was published about the organization and its members which was based on rumor, conjecture and propaganda, which had no foundation whatever in fact. I know that because of the prominence of DOHIHARA's name in matters concerning China that he was connected with many incidents in which he did not and could not have participated.

Knowing General DOHIHARA as I do intimately, over a period of years, I know not only from his many conversations with me, but by his actual behavior that he was opposed to the China Affair from the beginning and that he never changed his attitude. He has often expressed his great regret to me that there could not be peaceful cooperation between Japan and China, which he had cherished as a lifelong ambition. He was particularly regretful moreover that the China Affair was eventually extended to the Greater East Asiatic War.

I desire to further state that I have personal knowledge of everything I have stated in this affidavit.
Def Doc No. 2053

On this 13th day of June, 1947
At Tokyo

DEponent: YAZAKI, KANJU
(seal)

I, OHTA, KINJIRO hereby certify that the above statement
was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal
thereon in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) OHTA, KINJIRO
(seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YAZAKI, KANJU
(seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF

WATASE, Ryosuke

WATASE, Ryosuke, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs observed in his nation, deposes and states as follows:

That at the present time I am employed by the Tokyo Mainichi Press as a member of their staff, as Chief of the Investigation Board of the Editor Bureau. I have been asked if I am acquainted with the accused DOHIHARA, Konji, and if I were familiar with his activities immediately following the Mukouchiao Incident of 7 July 1937 (12th year of Showa).

At that time I held the post of Vice Chief of the Political Department of the Osaka Mainichi Press and shortly after July 7, 1937, to be exact on July 14, 1937, I arrived at Hientsin. The Chinn Incident had not been settled locally and, as I recall, one of the objects then in mind was for the Army to advance towards Peouting. The operation was under the direct command of Lt. Gen. KATSUKI, Kiyoshi, who initiated the actions and was in active command of the offensive operations. As I recall, there were three divisions, one under the command of Gen. TANI, Hisao, who took the central offensive along the Ching-Han line. This was the 6th Division. Lt. Gen. KAWAGISHI, Bunzaiburo was on the right of the border between Hope and Shanhai Provinces, while Lt. Gen. DOHIHARA moved on the left in the direction of Ruian and Wanching, moving almost southward Peouting.

I was attached to the correspondant work with the Tani unit and consequently on the march to Peouting I was not in a position to observe General DOHIHARA. However, our move was successful and without encountering any major opposition we, that is the Tani unit, entered into the fortress of Peouting on September 24, 1937. The unit under the command of General DOHIHARA entered the following day. As soon as I learned General DOHIHARA had arrived I went to visit him at his command headquarters, where I held a conversation lasting over a period of approximately two...
hours. We had many interruptions but I would state that I talked with him during that period of time at least one hour. I found him very cooperative, frank and perfectly willing to answer my questions. As nearly as questions, told me that apparently because of the action of Japan, there was little choice except to continue an offensive; that after the initial stop had been taken it was foolish to hope that the attack on Pouting would conclude Japan's action against China; that the original incident, regrettable as it was, had aroused the Japanese to the point where further action unquestionably would have to be taken. He told me that the National Government would certainly continue to resist and that the only alternative was for the Japanese Army to withdraw of its own accord, and it did not appear that any such action would be taken by those in command. When asked how far he believed Japan would have to advance, he answered in substance, that since such conditions had come to pass as I, as a correspondent, had observed, that Japan has no way but to continue to attack, because the Chinese territory is boundless and it was impossible for him to state how far he believed Japanese forces would be required to go. He said there were many great difficulties before the Japanese and that no hasty judgment could be formed. However, he did state that the Chinese public, as distinguished from the Central Government, could not be considered as onomia of Japan and that to consider them as such would be a great mistake. Believing such to be true, he had placed rigid discipline on his troops with references to the treatment of Chinese civilians; that he had warned his forces not to harass the Chinese public or non-belligerents, and that especially in time of battle his subordinates were not to injure the general feeling of the Chinese public. He stated that it was his policy to strictly punish, by military discipline, those who conducted themselves in any manner so as to harass the peaceful general public under any situation that was not absolutely necessary, in order to safeguard their own lives and property. He stated that this policy would be put in practice within his jurisdiction because Japan should never cause the general Chinese public to become her enemy. In short, General DOHIHARA was deeply worried about the future of the Sino-Japanese war, was willing to talk about it, and displayed, by his actions, his feelings in the matter. He was genuinely concerned over the enormous damage which would inevitably result to the Chinese public.
I was particularly impressed with the fact that General DOHIHARA did not display a single sign of pleasure as a result of the victorious attack on Peking. On the contrary, I observed his deep worry about the future as caused by the incident. At the same time, after my interview with General DOHIHARA, I felt that I had come closer in touch with the real nature of the Sino-Japanese war than ever before. I came to seriously consider that Japan had now reached the moment when she must reconsider the then current situation. General DOHIHARA's interview had a profound effect upon my understanding of Sino-Japanese relations.

Subsequently I was not attached to General DOHIHARA's unit but I had many friends who were, and while I did not question his sincerity, I was interested to see whether he would continue the policy towards the Chinese to which he had outlined. I had many friends who were in General DOHIHARA's unit from time to time and in my observations with them they verified that not only did he carry out the policy, but as a matter of fact so strict was he with reference to his subordinates in carrying out the policy which he had outlined that there was often some dissatisfaction among his troops, and that they sometimes openly stated to the correspondents that it appeared as though General DOHIHARA loved the Chinese more than he did his own soldiers, and that he might treat them a little more liberally, especially in war time. It is true there was dissatisfaction with General DOHIHARA's troops and that it was generally attributed to the strict control which he exercised with reference to the treatment of non-combatants. It is also a fact that this strictness on the part of General DOHIHARA became widely known among the Chinese public and it is also a fact that they would remain in their homes when General DOHIHARA made an advance into their territory. As a result of that treatment, it is also true that the Chinese public supplied provisions and labor and other wise assisted General DOHIHARA's unit.
On this 19 day of August 1947

At Tokyo

DEMONENT Ryosuke MATSUI (seal)

I, Kinjiro OHTO, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depose, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) Kinjiro OHTO (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Ryosuke MATSUI (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE Far EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs.

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: FUHATA Hiroshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I, FUHATA Hiroshi, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs in my country, depose and state as follows:

My name is FUHATA Hiroshi. During the recent war I held many positions as Staff Officer of various armies. I was appointed Staff Officer of the 15th Army on January 19, 1943, Staff Officer of the Burma Area Army on March 12, 1943, Staff Officer of the 7th Area Army on July 14, 1944, Staff Officer of the 1st General Army on April 6, 1945, and Staff Officer of the 12th Area Army on June 15, 1945.

I have been asked what I know concerning the organization, command responsibility and command channels, especially of the 7th Area Army, with which army I served as Staff Officer from July, 1944, until April, 1945. The 7th Area Army was organized April 23, 1944, under the Southern General Army and its first Commander-in-Chief was the accused DEFUHATA Kenji, who held this post from April, 1944, until April, 1945, when the command was taken over by General ITAZAKI, who held the post from April, 1945, until August, 1945. The command jurisdiction of the 7th Area Army was Malaya, Sumatra, Java and British Borneo. Borneo was divided into a British area and a Dutch area. In the beginning the army was charged with the preservation of peace in the British area and the Navy was charged with that in the Dutch area. Consequently the Army had no jurisdiction whatsoever over the Dutch area.

The Borneo garrison, a component of the 7th Area Army, was the unit directly responsible. However, repeated attacks in New Guinea by Allied forces gave cause for increasing alarm and, in fact, they reconquered most parts of New Guinea. The need for general reorganization became evident in urgency and the Borneo garrison was withdrawn into the 7th Army and at the same time was withdrawn.
from the command of the 7th Area Army and placed under the
direct command of the Southern Army. Consequently the com-
mander of the 7th Area Army had no further responsibility and
no direct command whatsoever over its operations and actions.
This move resulted, of course, in the removal of all things
relating to British Borneo from the command of the 7th Area
Army as of August, 1944.

Moreover, at no time was any prisoner of war camp located
within the territorial jurisdiction of the 7th Area Army
ever under its control. They were always under the direct
control of the Southern army, which was a superior command
to that of the 7th Area Army. The Commander-in-Chief of the
Southern Army, Marshal Torauchi, controlled the administra-
tion of those camps and placed the responsibility for each
camp directly upon the camp commander. Consequently, in
areas such as the territorial jurisdiction covered by the 7th
Area army, the intermediate commanders and no responsibilit
whatsoever in respect to the administration of prisoners of
war, and were no authorized to, and could not issue any order
concerning them. Their only responsibility was a functional
responsibility and not one of administration. Their duty
was limited strictly to security; to guard the camps of
prisoners of war, or take measures where necessary to safeguard
them from enemy attack. They had no voice whatsoever in the
administration of the camps or in the treatment of the
prisoners of war. Perhaps I have not made myself clear in
referring to intermediate commanders. In this particular
instance I am speaking with reference to security channels
only and have no reference whatsoever to command channels.
In the chain of security command there is first, the com-
mmander-in-Chief of the Southern Army, the Commander of the Area Army,
and the Commander of a subordinate army or garrison. The
intermediate commander to whom I have reference would be the
commander of the army and not the commander of the Area Army.
In order to clarify this affidavit, I have prepared a chart
showing command channels and security channels only. This
chart, which I incorporate as a part of my affidavit, clearly
depicts the two channels to which I have made reference.
The situation then boils down to this proposition. Full
responsibility for the administration and treatment of prisoners
of war was under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Southern Army. Security of prisoner of war camps was
the direct responsibility of the army or garrison commander,
as the case might be. The Area Army commander had no respon-
sibility or authority whatsoever. The Commander-in-Chief
of the Southern Army, in addition to reserving to himself the
direct administration thereof and the treatment of the prisoners of war, also reserved to his command ship transportation and naval units and army aerial units, including air field service. These units and services, in addition to that of the prisoner of war camps, even if located within the territorial jurisdiction covered by an Area Army, were not in any manner subject to any command function of any kind exercised by the Commander of the Area Army.

On this 16 day of April, 1947.

At Tokyo.

DEПОNENT /s/ Kuta, Hiroshi (seal)

I, Kuto, Takahisa hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date.

at Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ Futa, Takahira (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Futa, Hiroshi (seal)
I, HATTORI, Takushiro, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs in my country, depose and state as follows:

My name is HATTORI, Takushiro, and I now reside in the City of Tokyo. I am an ex-Colonel of the Japanese army and at the time of the Nanma Incident I was a Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army. I have been asked if I know whether or not the accused DOHIN, Konji, was in any manner concerned with the Nanma Incident. I do know and can state as a positive fact that he was in no manner concerned with the Incident. I held the post of Attaché to the General Staff from June, 1933, and was appointed Commander of the 5th Army on May 19, 1939, which post he held until he was appointed as a Supreme War Counsellor on September 25, 1939. The Nanma Incident occurred on the 12th of May, 1939, just a few days before General DOHIN, Konji, became commander of the 5th Army. The headquarters of the 5th Army was established at Tung-an in Eastern Manchuria and its primary function was the defense of that immediate area.
As a Staff Officer in the Manchurian Army I knew that the creation of the 5th Army, of which General DOHIHARA was the first commander, had nothing to do with the Nomonhan Incident. The 5th army had, as subordinate units, the 11th and 24th Divisions, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade and the Putau Border Garrison. None of these units participated in any manner in the Nomonhan Incident, which was going on and continued to go on for a short time after General DOHIHARA's appointment as commander of the 5th army. I know that General DOHIHARA was never transferred to an area that had any connection whatsoever with the Nomonhan Incident, but confined his military duties to defense in the Tungchuan area.

Confusion may have arisen as to the participation of the 5th Army in the Nomonhan Incident because after it developed, the Commanding General of the Manchurian Army withdrew machine gun units, mortar corps and other such units from each army in Manchuria and added them to the 6th Army, or the 23rd Division, which was then fighting at Nomonhan. Units were taken from the 5th Army as well as from other available sources, but General DOHIHARA was not officially concerned in any manner with the withdrawal of such units from his command and did not, and could not have, issued the orders for such withdrawal. Toward the end of the Incident the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which I have mentioned as one of
the units under the 5th Army, was withdrawn from the command of
the 5th Army for the purpose of adding to the Nomonhan military
strength, but before this unit could be added, the Incident
was concluded and the brigade never participated in the fighting.
I know that the withdrawal of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade from the
5th Army was not upon the order of General DOHIHARA, nor was he
in any way responsible for it. The orders were issued by higher
authority.

Knowing the situation that then existed, as well as I do,
and knowing the command responsibility of the various persons
concerned, I can state as a positive fact that General DOHIHARA
was in no manner concerned in the Nomonhan Incident.

On this 25 day of August, 1947

At Tokyo

I, KINJIRO OHMA hereby certify that the above statement was
sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto
in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness : (signed) KINJIRO OHMA (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/3/ Makushiro Hattori (seal)
言へハソレハ職務上ノ責任デアリ行上ノ責任デハナイデアリマス。

彼等ノ任務ハ彼等ノ職務ヲ備セテラレテルマシテ、詰テハ処断ヲ為シテルノデアリマス。

彼等ノ署名ヲ雑々カラヲ防シルヲ詰メノ必要措置ヲ講スルコトニ喫ナレテキタ。
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【7】
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

RAKI, Sadan, et al.

I, KIMABE, Torashiro, of lawful age, having been duly sworn on oath, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, make the following statement, of my own free will and accord:

I first became acquainted with the accused DOHIIJIA, Iss., in 1934, at which time he was Chief of the Special Service Organ in Mukden, Manchuria. At that time I held the post of Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army. I held this post from August, 1934, until March, 1936. During this period my work often brought me in contact with General DOHIIJIA and I became familiar with the methods he used in the administration of his official affairs and also became intimately acquainted with him from a personal standpoint and learned his viewpoints with reference to the relationship of Japan and China. I observed that he administered his official duties in a sincere manner and did not tend to enlarge or to detract from facts which were dealt with in his official reports. He did not hesitate to speak his mind with regard to his personal feelings as to the conduct of the Japanese toward the Chinese people. On one occasion we asked him to deliver a speech on this subject, which was entitled "How to Act with the Chinese People." This speech was to be delivered to the junior officers and I distinctly recall his words to this very day, when he summed up his lecture with the following words:

- 1 -
"There is no distinction whatsoever between the Japanese people and the Chinese. The most important and best way to meet people so that you can convey your thoughts fully is to be sincere." He felt, and often expressed such opinion to me, that the best interests of Japan and China lay in a mutual understanding of the people of those nations of each other. He did not believe that war between the two nations could settle any issues. On the contrary, he believed it would drive the peoples of those nations further apart. I personally know that he was opposed to the outbreak of war, or to a show of force by arms against China.

When General DOHINARA was Inspector General of the Army Air Force, I served under him as Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Army Air Force. He was my immediate superior officer. During this period of time I became very familiar with the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General of the Army Air Force, and desire to make the following observation with reference thereto:

The Inspector General of the Army Air Force was under the direct command of the Emperor and was subordinate only to the Minister of War, insofar as his duties were concerned. The Inspector General of the Army Air Force was in charge of the technical education, which was his primary duty, and although the Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters was subordinate to the Minister of War with reference to maintenance, supply, etc., neither of them had authority to participate or to advise in operational matters, and were precluded from participating in the preparation or planning of any operational mission with reference
to armed forces in the field or in war. I have mentioned the Inspector General of the Army Air Force and the Chief of the Army Air Force Command Headquarters, which were two distinct posts. In order to clearly show General DOHISHARA's position, I feel it best to explain the command relationship between these two posts, both of which General DOHISHARA held simultaneously.

As Inspector General of the Army Air Force, which was concerned only with technical educational matters and had nothing to do with planning and operational matters, General DOHISHARA was under the direct command of the Emperor. As Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters, the chain of command went from the Emperor through the War Ministry, then to General DOHISHARA as Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters. In this position he did have some duties with reference to Air Corps supply, but did not participate in planning and operational matters.

At the time General DOHISHARA was Inspector General of Military Education, I did not serve under him, but because of the close connection which I formerly had with that office, I am fully acquainted with its operations and responsibilities. The Inspector General of Military Education was responsible for the administration of the various technical schools and Army Service Schools generally, and the educational matter of the Army, with the exception of technical matters pertaining to aviation. However, he had no authority, and as a matter of practice did not take part in any planning or operational matter, and had absolutely no voice in any decision with reference to planning and operation of the Army in the field.
Because of my many experiences in the Army, I am fully acquainted with the Supreme War Council, of which General DOHIHARA was at one time a member. The Supreme War Council is more of an honorary position than an actual integral part of the Army Command, and was simply a military inquiry organ, whose duty was to respond to the Emperor's questions on important military problems. It had little or no practical authority and was, in fact, an organ which received reports on general affairs and the current military situation from various Army leaders in the central or main commands.

From my observations of General DOHIHARA, I know he cared little for civilian politics and that he considered himself strictly as an Army man, and as such did not feel that he should engage in politics. He has often expressed this thought to me and advised me not to engage in civilian politics. While he was Chief of the Air Command Headquarters, I know of occasions where he was required to deal with various civilian aircraft industry problems, involving political significance. When these matters came up, he merely clarified the position of the Army, its objects and expectations and left all concrete measures entirely in the hands of the industrialists and refused to engage in politics with them. I have never known him to offer them a hand for the sake of political artifice. On the contrary, he remained aloof almost in the extreme.

I have been asked if I knew anything of General DOHIHARA's views on the Pacific war. With respect to this I wish to state that General DOHIHARA assumed his post as Inspector General of the Army Air Forces and Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters six months prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific war, at which time, as previously stated, I was
appointed his assistant as head of the General Affairs Section. General
DOHIHARA discussed the problems with me on many occasions and from those
discussions I know he had scarcely any knowledge up to the outbreak of
the war of the various essential problems of political and military
significance in our country. The reason I dare say this is that finally,
and just before the outbreak of the war, when I asked General DOHIHARA
a few questions concerning what appeared to me to be a strained and gloomy
prospect, he did not have the slightest idea whatever as to the import
of my questioning, and instead asked me what it was all about. After dis­
cussing the problems, he ordered me to get information from the War Ministry
and the General Staff Headquarters so that he would have the knowledge
which he deemed necessary to the discharge of his duties.

I have also been asked about the decoration which General DOHIHARA
received from Germany. This was received by General DOHIHARA during the
time he was Inspector General of the Army Air Force, and as his subordinate
I was present at the time he received it. As I recall, he was decorated
with the Grand Cross by the German Government. I know personally that
General DOHIHARA had never undertaken any political action, or, for that
matter, any action of any kind to strengthen or enlarge the triple alliance
between Japan, Germany and Italy, and we were surprised that he received the
medal. The only reason that we could attribute at that time for him having
received the medal was due to the fact that he was the head of the Department.
I distinctly remember that the General himself uttered words of surprise
upon receiving the decoration.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of November, 1947.

Kihara, Toruširo (seal)

On the same date at the same place.

Witness: (signed) OTA, Kimihiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kihara, Toruširo (seal)
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）十二月十五日
於東京

立合人
太田
金次郎

同日於同所
Sworn Deposition
Deponent: TATSUMI, Yeiichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I, TATSUMI, Yeiichi, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the custom in my country, depose as follows:

I have been asked if I know anything about Gen. DOHIHARA's attitude towards prisoners of war during the time he was Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army of Japan, which position he held from May, 1943, until March, 1944. I have also been asked if I know anything concerning the control of prisoners of war in the Tokyo area during that period of time. I served as Chief of Staff to Gen. DOHIHARA for the entire period of time that he was in command of the Eastern Area Army and consequently am familiar with his policies and with the system for the control of prisoners of war in the Tokyo area.
The main function of the Eastern Area Army was the defense of Tokyo and adjacent territory, which was by far the most important place of defense of Japan proper. As Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army Gen. DOHIHARA had under his direct command several divisions, air defense units, hospitals and other special units. In short, there were literally hundreds of separate units under his command.

With reference to the handling of prisoners of war detachments throughout the main islands of Japan and occupied territories, there was a special arrangement. There had been established for the purpose of dealing with the affairs of prisoners of war two separate bureaus, one known as the prisoner of War Information Bureau, and the other as the Prisoner of War Control Bureau. The Chief of both of these units was the same person, and both organizations were set up directly under the Minister of War. All complaints received from foreign nations, and other outside sources, were routed to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau just mentioned. In addition to these two bureaus, there was set up in the City of Tokyo an area office for the centralized control of prisoner of war detachments within the territorial jurisdiction of the Eastern Area Army. This main office was in the official chain of command under the Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army. Its branches and detachments numbered about twenty with a total of some 4,000 prisoners. The Prisoner of War Control Bureau and the Prisoner of War Information Bureau just referred to were in no manner or wise connected with...
connected with the command of the Eastern Area Army, and the Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army had no control whatsoever over these two organizations. However, in accordance with the orders of the Minister of War, or upon his own initiative, the Chief of those two bureaus directed the Chiefs of the prisoner of war camps throughout Japan in regard to the control of the prisoners of war, and he or his subordinate officers often paid visits to the various branches and detachments scattered throughout the various parts of Japan for the purpose of observation and inspection or for the purpose of giving directions to them. As explained, the Commander of the Eastern Area Army, according to the official chain of command, was responsible for the control and administration of prisoners of war within his territorial jurisdiction. However, in actual practice the activities of the prisoner of War Control Bureau and Prisoner of War Information Bureau operated to relieve the administrative responsibility for prisoners of war from him, which permitted him to devote much more time to the manifold duties which he had to perform.

I know personally that during the time Gen. DOHIHARA was Commander of the Eastern Area Army he never received a single complaint, either from his superior officers or from his subordinate officers, with reference to the mistreatment of prisoners of war. I do not mean he did not receive any reports on prisoners of war, because he did receive a monthly report on general conditions, but they did not refer to the mistreatment of prisoners of war.
I know that despite the many duties which Gen. DOHIHARA was compelled to perform he was interested in the welfare of prisoners of war and would take occasion to visit the camps under his control. On one visit to the Ncotsu camp Gen. DOHIHARA learned that the camp was not adequately provided with skilled medical care, and that in an emergency it had to depend upon securing the services of doctors from cities as far away as Shibota. Despite the fact that there were many units and detachments of the Japanese Army, and many civilian communities, as devoid of medical attention as this prisoner of war camp, Gen. DOHIHARA managed to make special arrangements to provide the camp with medical care by Army physicians stationed at the Base Hospital at Tekata, only a short distance away.

The policy with reference to the handling of prisoners of war was forwarded to the Commander of the Eastern Area Army over the signature of the Minister of War for his compliance and was not formulated by such commanding officer.

On this 15 day of Jun, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent /S/ Yojiichi, Tatsumi

I, Kinjiro Ohta, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,

At Tokyo

Witness: /S/ Kinjiro Ohta (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Yeiichi Tatsumi (seal)
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注：以上信息仅供参考，具体数据请以官方公告为准。
## List of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro's Articles

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Excerpt from
Exhibit 734

The Special Secret Report From Turkey
No. 5
15 Nov. 1929

Sender: Artillery Major HISHIMOTO, Kingoro,
Military Attaché to the Imperial Japanese Embassy in Turkey.

To: The assistant-chief of the army general staff, OKIMOTO, Henichiro.

Title: Situation in the Caucasus and its strategic use for the purpose of sabotage activities.

Now in relation to how advantage can be taken of these countries strategically, the following points should be borne in mind subject to change, of course, with the then existing world situation:

1. We must recognize that England after her expedition into the Caucasus following the Russian revolution, is greatly desirous of holding on to Bakuh's oil. And it is necessary to take advantage of this fact. However, in the event of Russo-Japanese trouble she cannot very well make any movement in the Caucasus against Russia without sufficient reason. But it is possible for England and
Japan to jointly act and encourage both Turkey and Persia's
striving for territory in the Caucasus and use these two countries
as tools to work upon the Muslim state in the Caucasus.

In any event it is most essential to continue to maintain
good relations with England in case trouble should arise between
Russia and Japan.
Notice:

Exhibit 3192 to be corrected in accordance with language Board decision, as shown on Court Record 28 282.

Doc. Div.
Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. At the time of the termination of the war I was a colonel in the army. Now I am taking charge of ships engaged in repatriation work.

2. I know Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro very well.

3. In August, 1937, when Colonel HASHIMOTO was called up by the army and became the regimental commander of the 13th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, I was then appointed to be a battalion commander under his command. From that time till he returned to Japan in April, 1939, from Hankow (China) I was always with him.

4. When he arrived at the point about 8 miles (3 RI) west of Wuhu on December 11, 1937, Colonel HASHIMOTO received the following order from Commanding General YAMAGAWA and thereupon returned to Wuhu immediately:

"Unit Commander HASHIMOTO shall command his regiment together with one field artillery battalion and one infantry battalion and attack at the point near Wuhu ships which are carrying Chinese soldiers and sailing up on the Yangtze."

This order came about 2 A.M.
5. Colonel HASHIXTO's order then to me was, "Major CBATA shall command his own unit together with one artillery battalion and occupy a position at the wharf of Wuhu and attack the fleeing Chinese fleet." This order came about 5 A.M.

6. By order of Colonel HASHIXTO, Lt. NAHABURA was to advance to a point about 2,000 meters downstream and to wave a handkerchief whenever he saw the fleeing enemy ships by telescope. When I saw the handkerchief waved by Lt. NAHABURA I was to fire upon these ships.

7. It was still before dawn and not yet light; Lt. NAHABURA waved the handkerchief. I saw through the telescope a fleet of 5 or 6 ships all gathered and anchored about 50 meters apart. I instantly began firing upon this fleet. The distance was about 4,000 meters.

8. Even after the dawn it was very difficult to see the ships clearly because of deep fog on that day, which was very typical on the Yangtse. I could only discern ships loaded with Chinese soldiers.

9. Then we fired twenty or thirty shells, one of the ships put out a black smoke screen. After covering was completed by the smoke screen, one ship sailed toward us.

10. Seeing the ship coming toward us, we thought they were about to surrender, so we stopped the shelling upon them entirely. As the ship neared its hull became clear. When it came within 3,000 meters, we first discovered then it was not a Chinese army ship. At first it was not the distance but the heavy fog which made it difficult for us to tell these were not Chinese army ships.

11. After ceasing fire and while waiting for the ship to reach the wharf, we then found out by its flag that it was a
British ship and it had received two direct hits.

12. A rear admiral wearing staff officer insignia, the captain of the ship, his executive officer, and one other officer came ashore and asked us to meet for negotiations.

13. From our side Colonel HASHIYOTO, Lt. KIKURA, and I, together with one interpreter, took part in this negotiation. The first question they asked was why we had fired upon them. To this Colonel HASHIYOTO instantly replied, "we fired upon the ships because they were loaded with Chinese soldiers. Their next question was why we had fired on British ships. Colonel HASHIYOTO again instantly answered, "Due to the heavy fog we were not able to see and tell they were British ships."

14. Since one death had resulted from the shelling, the captain of the British ship asked us to attend the funeral service. We sent one representative to this funeral service. This was held at the public hall.

15. This British ship was the "Ladybird". Later I learned that the matter of the Ladybird incident was taken up through diplomatic negotiations, but as to its details I know nothing.

16. Colonel HASHIYOTO on the Hashimoto forces had no connection whatsoever with the sinking of the American ship "Fenay". We, the Hashimoto force, had never seen the "Fenay".

17. The Hashimoto force was stopped at Wuhu, 14 or 15 "RI" (about 37 miles) from Nanking. Shortly after the fall of Nanking this force was ordered to advance to Hangchow and therefore never participated in the attack on Nanking nor did it enter into Nanking, or its vicinity.

18. The Hashimoto force did not attack Hankow nor did it enter Hankow or its vicinity.
19. The Huchimoto force did not attack Canton (Kuan-Tung) nor did it enter Canton or its vicinity.

At the place of Dr. Itsuro Hayashi, No. 877, 3-Chome, Kami-Kita-Zama-Machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo, on this 11th day of January, 1947.

Signed and sealed: CBAT, Minoru

I hereby certify that the above said person has duly sworn, subscribed and sealed thereto on before me.

On the same date and place.

Witness: signed and sealed: Hayashi, Itsuro

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Teshio, I[signd and sealed]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

v.

Havl, et al., et al

I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and mentioning nothing.

/\


FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
1. At present I am a priest of the Shinji Kon sect living in Shizuoka Prefecture and also engaged in the work of helping children orphaned by the war.

2. I became a member of the Dai-Nihon Shinshui in April, 1930. While the president was away on active military duty, I was elected advisor to the society. When he returned in April 1939, I was re-elected for another term. The society was dissolved in October 1940.

3. The purposes of the Dai-Nihon Shinshui were to abolish the established parties and to accomplish domestic reform since the general public feeling at that time was that these parties and the military, in collusion with selfishly appropriated to themselves the government to such extent that extreme corruption was rampant everywhere and the only ones whom the public could trust were the military and the judiciary. The Dai-Nihon Shinshui absolutely did not have aggressive war as its objective.

4. The membership in the Dai-Nihon Shinshui fluctuated somewhat but it never reached 20,000. It never included a single military man on the active list or a single influential government official.

5. The expenses of the Dai-Nihon Shinshui were met by the ¥ 1 yearly membership fee and the ¥ 1 entrance fee paid in by each member of the society. The society never received any financial aid from the military or any other source.

6. The "Taiyo Dai Nihon", which is the official news organ of the society, was not circulated outside of its membership.

7. The Dai-Nihon Shinshui, a thought organization, was formed upon the dissolution of the Dai-Nihon Shinshui out of a portion of the latter's membership.

8. The Dai-Nihon Shinshui had as its objectives the guidance of the thought of Japanese youth and the encouragement of increasing the rice production. This increase was to be based on the OINOU system. Aggressive war was absolutely no part of the society's objectives.

9. The membership of the Dai-Nihon Shinshui was about 5,000. It never included a single military man on the active list nor a single influential government official.

- 1 -
10. The expenses of the L.I.N.H.O. were not by the ¥1 yearly membership fee and the ¥1 entrance fee paid in by each member. The society never received any financial aid from the military or from any other source.

11. The L.I.N.H.O. took over the management of the official news organ of the L.I.N.H.O. - the "Taiyo und Nippon". After the transfer of management to the L.I.N.H.O. every effort was made to publish articles concerning increasing rice production. This also was not circulated outside the membership.

12. I have not been connected with the L.I.H.

13. In September 1944 at the time of the dissolution of the L.I.N.H.O. and I joined the Imperial Rule Youth Association. Its membership never included a single military man on the active list nor a single influential government official. I was at the time of my joining the association on the general affairs committee and in November 1944, I became Chief of the Guidance Branch.

14. The activity of the L.I.H. was principally the encouragement of an increase in wheat production. The activity of the L.I.H. was absolutely not directed toward aggressive war.

15. The books of Hino, Inaguro - "Advice to Youth", "The Second Creation", "The Inevitable Revolution", "How to Abolish the World", "The Declaration of Hachinoto, Inaguro" and his essays in the "Taiyo und Nippon" were all written after he gave up his military career and had become an ordinary civilian and are entirely his own opinions. Furthermore, all these opinions totally devoid of connection, not only with the military, but with any other persons. They are productions totally devoid of connection not only with the military but with any other persons.

16. The above mentioned books are all reproductions of the essays appearing in the "Taiyo und Nippon".

17. All the speeches which Hino and Inaguro made at the meetings of the L.I.N.H.O. and L.I.N.H.O. were entirely expressions of his own opinions as a civilian and had absolutely no connection with not only the military but with any other persons.
At ...G.O.L...ChI, T...T...-GUN, o...o...-AIN on this 5th day of February, 1947.


we hereby certify that the above said person has duly sworn, subscribed and sealed thereto on before us.

On the same date and place.

witnesses
/s/ ...IY...HI, itsuro
/s/ ...h...a...h...d...HI
/s/ ...N...A...H...K...A...HI, Kunji
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Defendant: SUZUKI, Takeshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My last rank as an army officer was that of Colonel.

2. In August 1934 (9th year of Showa) I sponsored a farewell-party at Akebonoso Restaurant for Major General Hideki TOJO, who was to be transferred to become Commanding General of the Kurume Brigade.

3. The sponsors of this party were GONDO, Masanori, a section chief of the Military Academy, AMANO, Isamu, an instructor at the Military Academy, and I, then serving in the first section of the Army General Staff.

4. The ones who gathered at this party were selected only from among those officers who were serving either in the Army General Staff, War Ministry, Department of Military Training or Military Academy and were in the good graces of Major General TOJO. I did not send out an invitation to Mr. HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, who was then attached to Mishima Regiment and who was not serving in any one of the above mentioned four groups.

Further I was not aware of any particular friendly relationship between him and Major General TOJO that would call for his being specially singled out for invitation. For these reasons he was not present at the party.

5. At no time other than at the above mentioned party did I ever act as sponsor of a party at the Akebonoso
Def. Doc. No. 2130

Restaurant.

On this 14th day of January, 1947.

At No. 45, Umemachi, Nakano-ku, Tokyo

DEPONENT: /S/ SUZUKI, Takashi (seal)

I, IWAMA, Kohei, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date and at the same place.

WITNESS: /S/ IWAMA, Kohei (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SUZUKI, Takashi (Signed and seal)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: HASHIMOTO, Kingoro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. I commenced my army service when commissioned an artillery second lieutenant in Dec. 1911. In Aug. 1934 I was appointed artillery colonel and became commander of the second heavy field artillery regiment at MISHIMA. I was transferred to the reserve list in Aug. 1936.

2. I was again called up to the colors in Aug. 1937 and dispatched to the north end to middle China as a heavy artillery regimental commander till in Apr. 1939 I was again restored to the reserve list.

3. Except for the above two periods of active duty I have never been in government service and have been at all other times a simple ordinary civilian.

4. Neither has any official position, which I have occupied been sufficiently important to have entitled me to take part in any planning, preparing or conspiring in relation to the Manchurian Incident, the China Incident or the Pacific War, nor did I as a matter of fact participate in any planning, preparing or conspiring in regard to these incidents or war.

5. I have never been on friendly terms with any of the defendants. As a matter of fact, at the time of the so-called October Incident I was severely reprimanded by Lt. Gen. ARAKI and confined by order of War Minister MINAMI.
6. My publications "Messages to Young Men", "The Inevitability of Renovation", "The Road to the Reconstruction of the World", "The Second Creation" and essays which appeared in the magazine "Taiyo Dai-Nippon" were all written and published when I was an ordinary civilian. In these publications and essays were described only my personal opinions as an ordinary civilian and they did not represent any plan or conspiracy worked out in cooperation with any other party.

7. While a civilian I made some public speeches, but these conveyed only my personal convictions arrived at independently and not through any plan or conspiracy with any other persons.

8. In Sept. 1927, I was appointed Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Turkey and served there till Jan. 1930. During that period - on 15 Nov. 1929 - I sent to deputy chief of staff OKAJIYOSUKE, Renichiro a report bearing the title of "Situation in the Caucasus and its Strategic Utilization". This report was made in the course of the performance of a military attache's routine duty. In this report the phrases "Subject to change, of course, with the existing world situation" and "in case trouble should arise between Russia and Japan" appear. These phrases should be interpreted to mean that "our attitude has to be altered in accordance with changes in international relations" and "if, unfortunately, a war should break out between Japan and Russia".

It is obvious not only from this report, but from an examination of any and all other evidence that I have never plotted, prepared or conspired with others to wage an aggressive war against Russia.

9. In Oct. 1930 I inaugurated with a view to national reform a study and discussion group called "Sakurakai" or the "Cherry-Blossom Society" whose members consisted of officers under the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
"Sekurakai" or the "Cherry Blossom Society" was not a secret society, had no regulations and no fees were charged. The society had no connection with the Kwantung Army or its officers.

Discussions were not held relative to the Manchurian Problem nor did the society have any connection with the Manchurian Incident.

10. I did not form any research group on Manchu-Mongolia issues nor did I join or back incognito any such group. I have never even heard of the existence of such a group.

11. In March 1931, I participated in the so-called March Incident plotted by Doctor OKAWA, Shumei with the aim to organize a cabinet headed by General UGAKI, Kazushige for the cause of national reform, but the plan was not realized because of the General's disapproval.

The Incident was not linked with the Manchurian Incident.

12. I thought up the so-called October Incident in Oct. 1931 to bring about a cabinet headed by Lieut. General ARAKI for the purpose of national reform and urged him to accept. But, on the contrary, he severely reprimanded me and at the order of War Minister MINAMI I was arrested by the Military Police. After 25 days heavy confinement, I was relegated to the position of a regimental officer of the Himeji Regiment. This incident had no connection whatsoever with the Manchurian Incident. It was first thought out in the course of a conversation with Captain CHO, Isamu in the beginning of October of the same year, after he returned to Tokyo from Peking. It never materialized. No civilians joined the October Incident. Mr. KICISO, Kuniaki was not related in any way to this incident.

13. I have never had a chance to talk with Mr. TANAKA, Ryukichi concerning the Manchurian Incident.

In August 1934 I was the commander of the heavy field artillery regiment at Michima City. I knew nothing of the meeting
sponsored by SUZUKI, Takeshi at the Akubonoso restaurant. I have never been there, nor do I know anything of its whereabouts.

14. In April 1931 as chief of the Russian Section of the Second Department of the General Staff at the meeting for "Estimation of Situation" I advanced the following opinion, to wit: That Army Gen. Headquarters should recommend that the government take a firm attitude toward settling the hundreds of pending questions in Manchuria. Other than this, I had nothing to do with the Manchurian Incident or the founding of Manchukuo.

15. At the time of the Marco-Polo Bridge Incident of July 1937, I was living in Tokyo as a reserve officer on inactive duty and had nothing to do with the incident.

16. While I was at the front, pursuant to the order of Commanding General of the Army YANAGAWA, at Wuhu I fired at ships fleeing from Nanking which were carrying retreating Chinese soldiers. Unfortunately, on that occasion the British Gun Boat "Lady Bird" which was among the Chinese ships was struck and an incident was created. But the fact that the shooting was by mistake due to the dense fog which made me take it for a Chinese ship was brought to light and I was set free from any responsibility.

17. I have had nothing to do with the "Panay Incident".

18. Neither I nor the forces under my command have ever been at Nanking, Hankow or Canton. I have neither ill treated POW's, nor committed inhuman acts against any persons. Neither have I permitted others under my authority to do such acts. I have never been in a position wherein I could have performed such acts.

19. After I left active service, I founded in Oct. 1936 with a view to national reform the Great Japan Youth Party of which no soldier on active duty nor any distinguished personages were members.
The party was supported by 1 yen per capita entrance fee and 1 yen per capita annual membership fee paid in by a little less than 20,000 members. It was never subsidized by the army or from any other quarter. It did not aim at aggressive war.

20. After the dissolution of the said party in October 1940, I established the Great Japan Loyalty Society (DAI-NIPPON SHIHO-KAI), consisting of some of the members of the former. No soldiers on active duty nor any distinguished personages were among its members. This society was maintained by about 5,000 members' entrance fees at 2 yen per capita and an annual membership fee of 1 yen per capita and was not subsidized by the army or from any other quarter. This society did not aim at aggressive war. It was dissolved in September 1944.

21. "TAIYO DAI-NIPPON" was the official publication of the Great Japan Youth Party and then of the Great Japan Loyalty Society after the former's dissolution. Its circulation was limited to its members.

22. In the fall of 1940, I was appointed a director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), formed by KONOYE, Fumimaro, from which I resigned in February 1941. The said association's object was the practice of the "Way of the Subject". It was not a body which was formed with aggressive war as its aim nor did it work toward such an end.

23. In September 1944, I was appointed headquarters director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Adult Association which was a part of the IRAA, but I resigned in February 1945. After joining this association my only work was the barley crop increase campaign. The association was not a body which was formed with aggressive war as its aim nor did it work toward such an end.

On this 5 day of September, 1947.

At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Ichigaya, Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ HASHIMOTO, Kingoro (Seal)
I, HAYASHI, Itsuro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,
at the same place.

Witness: /s/ HAYASHI, Itsuro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HASHIMOTO, Kin'oro (seal)
私ノ著書並ニ論文ハ民間人トテノ私個人ノ意見ヲ記述シタモノデ
アリ為シテ他ノ如ノナルトモ計画又ハ謀議シタモノデハアリマス。私ノ著書並ニ論文ハ民間人トテノ私個人ノ意見ヲ記述シタモノデ
アリ為シテ他ノ如ノナルトモ計画又ハ謀議シタモノデハアリマス。
造二関と国共合作の為、関東軍がソ連軍を攻撃。関東軍がソ連軍の進撃を阻止するため、関東軍とソ連軍が激しい戦闘を繰り広げた。この戦いは、日本とソ連の関係を深刻に変えるものとなった。

三月事件に、関東軍がソ連軍の間接攻撃を阻止するため、関東軍とソ連軍が激しい戦闘を繰り広げた。この戦いは、日本とソ連の関係を深刻に変えるものとなった。
昭和九年（一九三四年）八月ニハ私ハ三島ノ野戦重砲兵・防具隊長ヲ致
マミトレレハ私のケツニナルノ事トナツテ開イタ防具ノ会合ハ全然知リマセム

昭和六年（一九三一年）ニハ私ハ参謀本部第二部ノ露西亜班長ヲ致

－出征中柳川軍司令部ノ命令ヲ依リ撃破解処スルヲ為シタラリマシタナトノ件ニ

東京ニ在住シテ居リマシタニハ同年ニ四月ニハ参謀本部ハ政府ニ對ハ者ノ事ヲ為ハシテ

私ハ同省中ニ於テ実施数百ノ事件ニ及ブラリマシテ居リマシタニハ同年ニハ全然関係ヲ

於テ私ノ意見トシテ参謀本部ハ政府ニ對ハ者ヲ為ハントニ於テ全然関係ヲ

為シタラリマシタニハ同年ニ四月ニハ参謀本部ハ政府ニ對ハ者ヲ為ハントニ於テ全然関係ヲ

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為シタラリマシタニハ同年ニハ参謀本部ハ政府ニ對ハ者ヲ為ハントニ於テ全然関係ヲ

為シタラリマシタニハ同年ニハ参謀本部ハ政府ニ對ハ者ヲ為ハントニ於テ全然関係ヲ
良心ニ従シ属質ヲ述ヘ何事ヲモ黙秘セス又何事ヲモ附加ヲサルコトヲ

署名捺印
橋本
欣五郎
I was the War Minisiter of the Kiyoura, Kato, Wakatsuki, and Hamaguchi Cabinets. When I was the War Minisiter in the Kato Cabinet (1926 - 1928) I carried out the readjustment of the numerical strength of the Japanese Army. My plan met with the severest opposition in certain army circles but in the face of this great opposition I succeeded in pushing through the plan. At that time, General Hata, then a colonel was Chief of the Second Section (Operational Section) of the General Staff, which Section was responsible for the execution of my program. It was in this Section that the work, the plans, and the operations for my readjustment program had to be carried out. Hata supported me wholeheartedly and earnestly worked for the success of the plan. In the Japanese Army, the Section Chiefs did most of the work and were of the utmost importance in this sense as they were the driving force of all programs which had to pass through their sections. Without the earnest support and the extraordinary endeavors of General Hata, however hard I may have tried to realize the plan, the readjustment plan could not have been accomplished at that time.

Then, in 1937, I tried under command of the Emperor to form a Cabinet, I met with the strongest opposition from a part of the army circles. This opposition came as a result of the antipathy which still existed against me because of my execution of the readjustment plan when I had previously been War Minisiter. The Three Chiefs' Council according to tradition recommended three candidates as War Minisiter for my Cabinet but each of those candidates submitted to me a note stating that he declined to act in such a capacity under my premiership. So I proposed to recommend one who would desire to work in my Cabinet and one who I knew would support me and my policies as my War Minisiter. As a matter of fact, there were hundreds of generals in the Japanese Army eligible to become War Minisiter and the number was not necessarily limited only to three. I tried to offer my own recommendation for the person when I desired to be my War Minisiter but the Three Chiefs' Council would not allow me to make any nomination for this post, saying that under the circumstances, there was no suitable candidate to be my War Minisiter. As a result, I was unable to form a Cabinet. Had I been allowed to name my preference for a War Minisiter, I would have nominated and asked for General Hata, Shunroku, who was one of the candidates I had in mind.

When the Yonai Cabinet resigned, I heard a rumor that the army had forced Hata to resign from the Cabinet in order to force the Yonai Cabinet out of office. I think that the nature of that action, the way Hata was overthrown and kicked out of the Cabinet was in the same nature as when in a previous year I had tried and failed to form a Cabinet because of being boycotted by the army. Because he had so earnestly cooperated with my army readjustment program when I was War Minisiter, he had incurred a strong antipathy in certain army circles and this antipathy followed him throughout his career. In all my years of knowing General Hata, I came to respect him greatly because of the manner in which he became Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor and later War Minisiter, because he always adhered strictly to military traditions, refrained from engaging in politics at any time, never went to one extreme or the other, but always followed the middle road as a true soldier.
Onco in 1944 when I went to China trying to bring about peace between China and Japan, Hata learned of my arrival in China and he sent me a letter encouraging me in my efforts to bring about peace between the two countries. It was over thus. Hata, while a military man, in all the years I know him always strove earnestly to maintain peace and I think he was most greatly distressed when the war did break out.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

UZKI, Kazushigo (Seal)

On this 24th day of August, 1947, at Izu, Nagaoka

Deponent: UZKI, Kazushigo (Seal)

I, KOKUBU, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On this same date,
at Izu, Nagaoka

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (Seal)
Q. When the Doolittle fliers were captured, who captured them?
A. Two aircraft landed in China, one in the area of the 13th Army and one in the area of the 11th Army, and when this was reported the order was given by the Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo to send those fliers to Tokyo immediately.

Q. Did they all go to Tokyo together, those caught by the 11th Army and the 13th Army?
A. All together, at the same time.

Q. Did they all come back to China together?
A. Yes.

Q. When they came back to China from Tokyo, where were they sent?
A. Shanghai.

Q. When the fliers were brought back to Shanghai, did any orders come with them as to what should be done?
A. The order was that those fliers were to be tried by the China Expeditionary Force, which did not mean China Expeditionary Force Headquarters.

Q. What did the order state?
A. The order was in two parts. One part stated that a new military law for the treatment of fliers who raided Japanese areas had been created and ordered us to post the new law in accordance with a copy that was attached to the order. The second part ordered that the fliers be tried by military court in accordance with the new military law which was contained in the first part of the order.

Q. When was the order notifying you of the creation of the new military law received?
A. 28 July 1942.

Q. Then what happened?
A. General Hata was opposed to trying the fliers by military law, instead, he wanted to treat them as prisoners of war. He stated to his Chief of Staff, and I heard this because I was sitting there at the time, that it was his intention to give the fliers as generous consideration as possible. He stated that if Tokyo insisted that the fliers be tried under the new military law, he, Hata, would give them the least possible or the most generous possible decision at the trial. He stated that if there were any slightest extenuating circumstances to be taken into
consideration, he would take them into consideration and pass them as light a sentence as possible. He stated it was his intention to treat the fliers generously.

Q. What happened next?

A. Since the China Expeditionary Force Headquarters did not have any military court in its organisation and since Tokyo had sent the fliers directly to Shanghai, it was decided that the trial, if it had to be held, would be held by the 13th Army whose headquarters were in Shanghai. Because General Hata opposed the idea of trying the American fliers by a military court, instead of ordering the 13th Army to proceed with the trial, he ordered the 13th Army to investigate whether or not the fliers would be tried by military law or could be treated as prisoners of war.

Q. Then what happened?

A. Later I found out that the 13th Army decided that there was not enough evidence to try the fliers by military court and requested directly of Tokyo, not through our headquarters, more evidence against the fliers. It did this through the Shanghai office of the Kompai. This I learned after the trial when during one of my trips between Hankou and Shanghai I saw this document in Shanghai.

Q. Did General Hata ever himself or your headquarters receive any answer from the 13th Army saying that the evidence was not sufficient to hold a trial.

A. No.

Q. What happened next?

A. When General Hata expressed his intention of generous treatment of the fliers to Lt. General Ushirogu, his Chief of Staff, Lt. General Ushirogu on the same day wrote a letter to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo, General Tanabe, stating the intentions of General Hata and as the intentions of the Tokyo Central Authorities. The letter was forwarded to Tokyo by messenger on an airplane the very same day.

Q. Then what happened?

A. As a result of the letter sent by Lt. General Ushirogu to the Tokyo Central Authorities stating the intentions of General Hata, Colonel Arisue came all the way from Tokyo as emissary from the Chief of the General Staff and expressed the wishes of the Chief of the General Staff, which were: To carry out the trial in a very strict manner, and that punishment must be very strict. As a matter of fact, the Chief of the General Staff was expecting the death sentence. Further, it was the order of the Chief of the General Staff that the decision of the trial be forwarded to Tokyo immediately for action by Tokyo. The execution of the sentence should be stayed until the decision was forwarded from Tokyo after action was taken in Tokyo on the decision of the trial. Further, after execution of sentence, no announcement was to be made by the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters, but all announcements relative to the trial, sentence and execution of sentence, would be made by Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo. In this connection, General Hata stated to Colonel Arisue that because of the seriousness and the importance of the matter, he wanted the orders from Tokyo in writing. Colonel Arisue retorted that because of the seriousness of the matter the Chief of the General Staff had decided to forward the orders not in writing but by his personal emissary, Colonel Arisue himself, and that there was no more reliable way of conveying these orders than by the use of high ranking officer courier.
Q. After General Hata forwarded the orders of Tokyo that the fliers should be tried, what further action did he take with relation to the trial?

A. No further action.

Q. Did he appoint the members of the tribunal?

A. No.

Q. Did he appoint the prosecutor?

A. No.

Q. Did he appoint the defense counsel?

A. No.

Q. Did he make any appointments for any position with regard to the court or any of its members?

A. No, this was not within his province. The trial was to be held by the 13th Army, which had its headquarters in Shanghai, the place to which the fliers had been delivered from Tokyo. With the arrival of Colonel Arisue with a complete set of orders from Tokyo that they were to be tried by military court, which military court did not exist in the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Force which was located in Hankou, control of all matters in the trial was out of our hands. As the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Force, we were now the channel through which all orders relative to the trial would pass and would be forwarded on to the 13th Army in Shanghai.

Q. Did Hata make known to the 13th Army his intention to treat the fliers generously?

A. No, because he had already been told by the emissary of the Chief of the General Staff what the intentions and desires were of the Chief of the General Staff. Hata as a subordinate could not make any recommendations of his own. If no orders had been received from Tokyo as to the intentions and desires of the General Staff, then General Hata as the highest authority of the Japanese Army in China would have been permitted to express his desires to the 13th Army. But since he had been told directly by the emissary of the High Command, Colonel Arisue, what the Tokyo authorities desired, he had to control his own desires as to their treatment or the demands to be made for sentence. However, General Hata still did not give up his hopes of giving the fliers a light sentence because there was still the order to forward to Tokyo immediately the decision of the trial. Then again, the execution of sentence was to be stayed until the decision of Tokyo was made known. On these two points General Hata thought Tokyo would consider the matter carefully and might mitigate the sentence or might do something different after their minute consideration of the entire case, so General Hata put every expectation on the further decision of the Tokyo people.

Q. Why didn’t General Hata, when he received the decision from Shanghai and then forwarded it to Tokyo as per instructions, make any recommendation to Tokyo to treat these people generously?

A. Since it had been ordered that the final decision would be made in Tokyo, General Hata could not suggest nor was it permissible for General Hata to suggest again and again to his superiors in Tokyo what they should do or to offer his recommendations. His intentions of treating the fliers in a generous manner had already been communicated to Tokyo through his Chief of Staff and that was the reason why Tokyo had dispatched Colonel Arisue as emissary of the General Staff direct to Hata to notify him of
4. The contrary intentions of the Tokyo central authorities. General Hata had good reason to expect, since he knew that his personal intentions were known to the General Staff and since they had ordered that execution of sentence be stayed until further order should be given by Tokyo they would mitigate the sentences. Indeed, he was correct in this because later the decision came from Tokyo saving the lives of five of the fliers.

5. How had General Hata's intentions to treat these fliers in a fair manner become known to Tokyo?

When General Hata had disclosed his intentions to his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Ushirogu, Lieutenant General Ushirogu had reported it to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo and had asked the intentions and desires of the General Staff. That is how the intentions of General Hata became known to the General Staff and as a result of this knowledge, Colonel Arisue was dispatched to Nanking to give the orders and the desires of the Chief of the General Staff for the conduct of the trial to General Hata.

7. Now at any time did General Hata express if he had his way what his decision would be?

I only know that one day he told the Commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General Sawada that, "I do not know whether you like the sentence of the Tribunal or not, but that is a matter beyond my control. I can do nothing about it", by which he expressed his disapproval of the decision.

2. When the fliers were tried by military court under the newly promulgated military law promulgated by Tokyo and ordered posted in China, what decision was open to the court to make?

It could find the fliers guilty or it could acquit them.

Q. At any time during the entire proceedings was General Hata as Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces in China permitted or authorized to exercise any discretion in the setting up of the Tribunal, its members, recommendation to them of a decision?

No. With the arrival of Colonel Arisue, the entire matter was handled directly in accordance with orders from Tokyo and in the same manner as if the trial had been held in Tokyo. The only difference was that Tokyo had sent the fliers back to Shanghai and had ordered the trial held there. Everything, including decision to hold the trial, the law under which the trial was to be held, the review of the sentence of the tribunal, the time as to the execution of the sentences and even the announcement of the trial and its sentence and the execution of the sentence were all handled by Tokyo. At no time were we permitted or were we in any position to alter or change any of those decisions or to offer our own recommendations. From the very beginning after the fliers were captured by the 11th Army and the 13th Army, Tokyo assumed control of the entire matter. They were ordered to Tokyo for questioning and examination and then when that was finished the fliers were returned to Shanghai and the order arrived that their trial should be held in China.

Q. At any time from the very beginning until it was all over, was there anything that General Hata could have done to alter the chain of events as they took place?

Neither General Hata, nor anyone else in his position could have made the slightest change in the whole event.
1. I was born on 1st of January 1898 at 3218 Nagotonura, Jinsokigan, Hiroshima Prefecture, and now living at 912 Oishinbashi Norimaku, Tokyo.

2. Gist of personal history is as follows:

May 1918  Graduated Military Academy
December 1918 Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant
March 1941  Member of Staff of China Expeditionary Forces.
March 1943  Director of Reserve Officer's Training School.
July 1945  Vice-Chief of Staff of Central Army, Japan, till termination of war.

3. From March 1941 to March 1943, I was a member of staff of the China Expeditionary Forces and Section Chief of the First Department of Military Staff Office. Referring to the Doolittle Airplane Incident, my Section handled the case because it was an affair concerning the Supreme Command and so I am very conversant with this case.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

MIYAIIO, Hisatoshi (Seal)

On the 11th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo

Dependent: MIYAIIO, Hisatoshi (Seal)

I, IMANARI, Taitaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: IMANARI, Taitaro (Seal)
Notice:

Exhibit 3198 to be corrected in accordance with Language Board decision, as shown on Court Record 29877.

Doc. Div.
I was a member of various Japanese Governments over a period of years and since 1937 I held the following positions:

1. Navy Minister for the Cabinets of HAYASHI, KONO (1st Cabinet), HIRANUMA and SUZUKI.
   
2. Prime Minister from January 16, 1940, to July 21, 1940.

When the Incident of the Marco Polo Bridge broke out on July 7, 1937, I was the Navy Minister in the 1st Kono Cabinet. Just at this time General Hata was the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces on the Island of Formosa (Taiwan) and it is needless to say that neither the forces in Formosa, nor General Hata had any connection whatsoever with this Incident either in its beginning or later. It was not until February 1938 that General Hata first went to China, when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Central China.

During the period from January 16, 1940, to July 21, 1940, when I was the Prime Minister, General Hata Shunroku was the War Minister at the time. With respect to the Tri-Partite Pact with the Axis countries, my Cabinet was completely opposed to it and for this reason this question did not even once come up in our Cabinet conferences.

It appeared that there was an atmosphere and a feeling in army circles to make good use of Germany in settling the China Incident, but in my Cabinet, no attention was paid to this at all. The Cabinet was simply disregarding such a possibility.

Coming to this question and to General Hata who was my War Minister, he earnestly cooperated with my Cabinet’s policy and, of course, naturally was opposed to the Pact. And so, as my Cabinet opposed and excluded such a pact with Germany and also because it was not pro-German, a desire to overthrow my Cabinet came into being.

Those who opposed my Cabinet were endeavoring to kill two birds with one stone; that is, to have General Hata, who was opposed to the Tri-Partite Pact, resign from the government and simultaneously to overthrow the Cabinet. Eventually, their plan was carried out and their objective was obtained—two birds killed with one stone. When General Hata resigned, I believed and felt that his resignation was not of his own free will but that he was forced to resign by elements he was powerless to fight and today I am more convinced than ever that my beliefs then were correct.

I asked Hata to recommend someone to be the next War Minister. Hata immediately went out saying that the successor would be decided in the Three Chief’s Conference. This Conference was composed of the Chief of Staff, the Inspector General of Military Education, and the War Minister. It was their duty to name the new War Minister. He returned in the evening, looking very worried and said there was no man who would be the successor to the post. His face looked very pensive because he was conscious that this lack of the successor would become the cause of the fall of the Cabinet—consequently he
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himself would be the cause. I read this feeling in his face, and after the
general resignation of the Cabinet, called Hata to my room and said, as nearly
as I can remember: "I can understand your situation - you have suffered very
much. As for me, however, I do not blame you at all. I understand. Take it
easy and do not worry." I shook his hand and Hata smiled a sad smile - a
smile of resignation, peculiar to a Japanese. His situation was indeed a
pitiful one.

General Hata, as far as I know, never was a member of any clique,
association, brotherhood, society or other jingoistic or ultra-militaristic
group either in the army or in politics. In fact, Hata at all times solemnly
avoided politics. He was first and last a soldier, a conservative soldier, and
diligently devoted himself to his duty always in accordance with army regu-
lations, never according to political considerations.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YOKAI, Mitsumasa (Seal)

On the 7th day of August, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: YOKAI, Mitsumasa (Seal)

I, IMARI, Taitaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn
to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence
of this Witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo

Witness: IMARI, Taitaro (Seal)
Article published on p. 2 July 17, 1940, TOKYO ASAHI SHIMBUN/

Liquidation of YONAI-ARITA's Diplomatic Policy.

Peculiarity of the present Change of Government.

It was January 16 of this year when Admiral YONAI took the office of premiership succeeding the ABE Government, which soon fell in the beginning of this year amid bitter criticisms of the whole nation as the result of successive mal-administrations. Since then, the YONAI Cabinet has successfully weathered the 75th Imperial Diet; on July 16, after full half an year of diligent work, it had to resign. When the Imperial Mandate was issued to Admiral YONAI to form a Cabinet, everybody was surprised, and attention was directed toward Admiral YONAI to see how he would break the difficult situation as a "trump-card of YUASA, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal."

Prediction comes true after half an year.

In the analytical criticism published in this column immediately after the establishment of the YONAI Cabinet, under the title "Characteristics of the YONAI Cabinet", we find the following paragraph:

"It is a fact that the people feel something unaccountable in the formation of the new Cabinet; but as it is a feeling, it cannot be helped. Therefore the future of the YONAI Cabinet can be said to be determined by whether it would eliminate this unaccountable feeling through its action, and also how the friction with the reform party would be minimized. And also as the characteristic of the YONAI Cabinet, we must point out the diplomatic policy. The YONAI-ARITA diplomacy has long been criticised as being pro-BRITISH and pro-AMERICAN by some people. It cannot be denied that the whole YONAI Cabinet appeared as being representative of the status quo."

Thus we indicated, but this prediction has come true half an year later. Criticisms and attacks against the ARITA diplomacy were made by some members of the reform party in the Imperial Diet, but the changes of diplomatic policy to meet the sudden developments of the EUROPEAN war is beyond the scope of mere discussions and must be immediately put into practice. It has finally become a grave political question
whether the YONAI-ARITA diplomacy, namely, the foreign policy of the present cabinet can actually assume the attitude of meeting these sudden changes.

Premier YONAI and Foreign Minister ARITA have once come to the conclusion of taking diplomatic policy of breaking the status quo in facing the present grave diplomatic turning point, but judging from the past characteristics and records of both YONAI and ARITA, it is concluded that it is impossible to expect an active development in diplomacy. It has been brought to light that the characteristic of the present Cabinet is basically incompatible with the views of the military circle.

Demand for a Big Change in Foreign Policy

The surging tendency of the new age which was caused by German-Italian Axis, control of Europe inevitably must exert big influence on Japan's position in Orient. The fiery demands for a big change in Japan's foreign policy which has flared up within the Army circle, has combined with the widespread movement of the political circle which is trying to support a new political body with Prince KONOYE as the key man. It thus appeared as the motive power for the downfall of the YONAI Cabinet. The YONAI Cabinet has been forced to retreat after being attacked thoroughly by the strong propelling power representing the Army. Moreover, this tendency spurred the movement of establishing a new political organization, and menaced from the rear the existence of the Cabinet, by making connections with the military circle. However, the resignation of YONAI's Cabinet has already become a question of time due to such confused situations in political circle. One of the problems which stimulated the above-said situation was that of the replacement of the president of the Privy Council in connection with Prince KONOYE's recent resignation as the president of the Privy Council. Baron HIRANUMA, Kichiro, who now belongs to the party campaigning for the establishment of a new political organization, became a candidate for the Presidency of the Privy Council through the recommendation of Prince KONOYE. But Premier YONAI did not accept it and forcefully carried out the promotion Vice-President HARA. This greatly stimulated the bloc of new political organization, and since then their opposition to the YONAI Cabinet has become conspicuously stronger. The direct cause for the collapse of the YONAI Cabinet under such circumstances was War Minister H.T.'s strong attack.

Therefore, the peculiarity of the present cabinet change is not due to deadlocks in various domestic issues as seen in
In the case of the ABÉ Cabinet. It must be said that through the total resignation of the YONAI Cabinet, they threw off the burden which the YONAI Cabinet which stands for status quo could by no means bear, in facing the epoch-making turning point of domestic and international scale. In other words, it must be said that the radical domestic and foreign policy which is represented by the Army, destroyed with one stroke the present Cabinet which stands for status quo.

Cabinet Change Has Big Significance.

From such observations, careful attention must be paid to the fact that the significance and characteristics of this cabinet change are politically and ideologically very important, and that this cabinet change has deep complications never before seen in previous cabinet changes. The fact that the Army has exposed its whole attitude in politics in the present foreign policy should be sufficient to make us fully aware of the present political situation. We will therefore trace the course of events leading up to the present Cabinet change, with emphasis on the Army's movements. In order to meet the tense international situation which accompanied sudden changes in the European War, the Army has previously recognized the urgent necessity of reforming the foreign policy and establishing a domestic political organization, and thus settle completely the China Incident. Studies were being carried out in sections and bureaus concerned, for its realization. The Army's demands suddenly came to the surface when they took advantage of the case of Foreign Minister ARITA's broadcast of June 29th.

In other words, although Foreign Minister ARITA stressed "the establishment of the East Asia Autonomy sphere", he did not show any sign of liquidating the principle of depending on Britain and the U.S., and of advancing the policy of breaking the status quo between Japan, Germany and Italy, as actual diplomatic measures. Therefore, the dissatisfaction of the Army only increased. The recent conflict between the War Ministry following matter, and the Foreign Ministry in connection with Foreign Minister ARITA's radio broadcast, was due to these circumstances. The trouble between the Army and the Foreign Ministry arose due to the charge that misinformation was broadcast from the Foreign Ministry to the effect that the broadcast was lukewarm and did not mention the strengthening of relations between Japan, Germany and Italy because the Army was not in favor of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis. The problem was finally settled completely during the meeting between the War Minister and the Foreign Minister, and at a single glance, it seemed that the tension surrounding the cabinet change had been alleviated.
Prince KONOE's appearance Expected.

However, the essence of the problem has not been settled. Due to their contention that even if the foreign policy is changed, it would be impossible for the Yonai-Arité alliance to carry out the changed diplomacy and that the change would only represent a "shift" in form, the military circle strongly continued to demand the immediate establishment of the new political organization with the resignation of the Yonai Cabinet, and the promotion of the changed policy by the new organization. Thus the movement for the appearance of Prince KONOE who is the leader of the new political organization, grew stronger.

In view of the situation within the department, War Minister K., after having an interview with Prime Minister Terauchi and SUGIYAMA, old military senior heads, on the 7th and 8th, decided generally on measures to be taken as the War Minister. And on the 9th he met the Premier in the Cabinet meeting and indirectly expressed his intentions by saying, "How about thinking about cooperating with the new domestic organization?" To this statement by the War Minister, Premier YONAI replied, "With the domestic situation as it is, perhaps I may have to think about it," and thus expressed agreement for the time being.

War Minister Presents a Strong Vote

Subsequently, on the 11th, IITO, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, called on ISHII-TA, Cabinet Secretary General, explained to the latter in detail the intention of the Army, amplifying the intention of the War Minister. Later, War Minister H., on the evening of the 11th, presented to Premier YONAI an important advice in writing. The note was very clear, and the content is as follows:

"The present conditions are such that we are now facing the greatest transitional phase of world situation, and the strengthening of the domestic organization, and the reformation of the foreign policy have become the most pressing of all our work. However, the government is doing nothing, and it seems that it is idly losing an opportunity which will never come again. In this way it is even blocking the complete settlement of the Incident. Therefore, at this time, in order to give the people's minds a change, and promote the establishment of the new organization, from a broad point of view, how about deciding to have the Cabinet resign?"

The foregoing had an effect of a dagger pointing at the heart of the present Cabinet. On the following day, the 15th, War Minister H. had consultations also with Prince KONOE, the Chief of the Army General Staff. As a result, War Minister
made a final decision. Premier YONAI, however, had an altogether different view from the army as regards the situation, and with the intention of taking charge of the political situation with the present organization to the last, made the following demand on the 16th at 9:50 a.m. at the Cabinet meeting when he met the War Minister:

"My views are absolutely opposite from those of the War Minister. There is no need for a new organization. As long as you cannot agree with my views, I want you to tender your resignation, and want you to recommend the succeeding War Minister."

Thereupon War Minister HATA tendered the resignation which had already been prepared, and returned to the Official Residence of the War Minister for the time being. He then opened the conference of the Three Army Chiefs (T.N. RIKUGUN S&N CHOKAN) and the Conference of Supreme War Councillors in succession. After deliberations, the War Minister again returned to the Premier's Official Residence at 3:30 p.m., and met the Premier and made a clear cut reply as follows:

"I conferred with the three army chiefs, recommended the succeeding war minister and negotiated for their acceptance, but under the present circumstances, they had no mind to accept it. The entire army is absolutely opposed to your views."

Thus the lifeline of the present cabinet was severed, and the YONAI Cabinet resigned a half year after its formation. When the peculiarity of present cabinet change was made under such circumstances, in such state of affairs, it is not hard to imagine that the political situation after the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet will advance towards the development of a new organization.
无
近衛公は特選任し、井上護相が内閣を形成した。この内閣は、不況の影響を受けた経済問題に対処するために設立されたものである。不況の状況は急速に悪化し、内閣はその対応を模索していた。しかし、この時期の政治は複雑で、内閣の存在意義は問われていた。
I have held the portfolio of Foreign Minister in four cabinets: Hirotai, April 1936 to February 1937; 1st Konoye; October 1938 to January 1939; Hiiruma, January 1939 to August 1939; and, Yonai, January 1940 to July 1940.

The Yonai Cabinet was opposed to the Tri-Partite Pact because we were opposed to any entanglements with Germany. Such being the case, the Tri-Partite Pact was never, during the life of the Yonai Cabinet, put on the agenda for discussion by the Ministers of the Cabinet.

General Hata was the War Minister in the Yonai Cabinet and throughout his tenure in office he was in full accord with the policy of the Cabinet and cooperated fully with it. In fact, I know General Hata opposed the Tri-Partite Pact from the days when it first was being discussed in Japan. When I was Foreign Minister in the Hiranuma Cabinet, I had occasion to have an audience with the Emperor. While waiting to be received, I met General Hata, who was then Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty. We conversed informally and the subject of the Tri-Partite Pact came up. General Hata stated it appeared the Emperor objected to the proposed pact and that he himself was strongly opposed to it. He made it clear to me that besides his personal opposition to any alliance with the Germans, he also opposed the Pact on the grounds that it would be no benefit to Japan in signing a pact which would work against the interests of our country and which would antagonize the Anglo-Saxon countries.

When Hata resigned as War Minister, in the Yonai Cabinet, I believed there must have been some superior power that forced him to resign his portfolio. The cooperative attitude taken by Hata in the Yonai Cabinet leads me to believe, even today, that his resignation was against his will.

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)

On this 11th day of August, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)

I, HORICHI, Hyogo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,

at Tokyo
Notice:

Exhibit 3202 to be corrected in accordance with language corrections of Board decision as shown on Court record 23 Sept. 47

Doc. Div.
AFFIDAVIT OF

ITODA, KENGO

1. I was born on April 22, 1891, at my permanent domicile, No. 2609 Koohi Village, Hotaku District, Kumamoto Prefecture and I am now residing at No. 22 Shioimiokamochi, Chiba City.

2. The outline of my personal history is as follows:

   Graduated from the Military Academy in the year of 1912 and attached to the 55th Infantry Regiment.
   
   Graduated from the Military Staff College in November, 1920.
   
   Appointed Director of the Second Department of Military Education in July, 1938.
   
   October, 1939, appointed Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau.
   
   April, 1942, appointed Vice-Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces.
   
   August, 1942, promoted to Lieutenant-General.
   
   December, 1942, appointed Chief of the Fourteenth Division.
   
   October, 1943, appointed Departmental Head of Military Education.
   
   April, 1945, appointed Commander of the 51st Army, and remained in that post up to the close of the war.

3. Then I was Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, I used the most scrupulous care and attention in recommending the man to succeed General Hata as War Minister. As Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, it was my duty to recommend the man who should be the next War Minister as well as recommending to the War Minister the names of those who should be appointed to the various positions in the War Ministry and in the Army. I took into full consideration the views prevalent in the various bureaus of the War Ministry; I consulted with and took into consideration the wishes of the General Staff, and I consulted fully with the Vice-Minister of War, General Anami. After all these consultations and after a thorough-going study and a careful weighing of all the surrounding circumstances, I decided it best to recommend Lt. General Tojo as the succeeding War Minister. I then notified General Hata of my decision. There were others who were considered for the position of the new war minister, but they were already in important positions and they could not be easily recommended as the new war minister because it would have been difficult to effect a sudden change from their old positions to the new position of War Minister.
Lt. General Tojo, on the other hand was in Tokyo, holding the position of Inspector General of the Air Force, and he had formerly been Chief of the Military Service Bureau and also of the Consolidation Bureau. Further, he had once been the Vice-Minister of War in the Hiranuma Cabinet. I considered him as the fittest person because of his background to succeed to the position of the Minster. In accordance with my recommendation, General Hata then submitted General Tojo to the Three Chiefs Conference held on 18 July 1940. His nomination was adopted in due course by the Three Chiefs Conference. By coincidence of General Tojo, and General Hata's submitting the name of General Tojo to the Three Chiefs Conference was in accordance with the standing procedure for such matters in the War Ministry. As a matter of fact, neither General Hata nor I had any personal relations with Lt. General Tojo in the past nor any private intercourse with him.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

NODA Kongo (Seal)

On this 8 day of August, 1947, at Tokyo.

Deponent: NODA Kongo (Seal)

I, IMAHARI, Yasutarō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: IMAHARI, Yasutarō (Seal)
Personal History

1. I was born on November 25, 1888, in the city of Nagoya, and am living at 2 3 Chome Kasaimachi, Higashi-ku, Nagoya City.

2. The gist of my personal history is as follows:
   a. 1909 - Graduated Military Academy
   b. August 1937 - Promoted Maj. Gen.; Director of Junior Military Academy
   c. November 1938 - Chief of Personnel Affairs, War Ministry
   d. October 1939 - Promoted Lt. Gen.
   e. November 1939 - Appointed Commander of 110th Div. stationed in North China.
   f. August 1942 - Discharged

3. I was Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau in the War Ministry from November 1938 to October 1939. In September 1939, I recommended Major General Muto as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to General Hata who was then the War Minister, as the proper person to be appointed to that position. I made this recommendation in accordance with my duties as Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau. It is the duty of the Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau to make recommendations to the War Minister for the appointment of officers to the various positions in the army.

   I made this recommendation after Lt. General Iachijiri, the out-going Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau had recommended General Muto as his successor and after I myself had fully considered the opinions of the Military Affairs Bureau and the Personnel Affairs Bureau. In accordance with the regular military procedure in such matters, War Minister Hata then submitted the name of Major General Muto to the Three Chiefs Council. Major General Muto was then designated to the position as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau by the Three Chiefs Council.

   General Hata always followed the regular military procedure in all matters affecting the War Ministry and he accepted my recommendation of General Muto without question and did his duty and submitted his name to the Three Chiefs Conference. My recommendation of Major General Muto, General Hata's acceptance of that recommendation, and his presentation of General Muto to the Three Chiefs Conference and the acceptance by the Three Chiefs Conference of the recommendation of General Muto were all in accordance with regular procedure in such matters in the War Ministry.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

INUMA, Mamoru (Seal)

On this 15th day of July, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: INUMA, Mamoru (Seal)

I, INAMARI, Taitaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: INAMARI, Taitaro (Seal)
1. I was born on April 22, 1891, at my permanent domicile, No. 2609 Kochi Village, Kotaku District, Kumamoto Prefecture and I am now residing at No. 22 Shiomigaoka Machi, Chiba City.

2. The outline of my personal history is as follows:

   Graduated from the Military Academy in 1912 and attached to the 55th Infantry Regiment.

   Graduated from the Military Staff College in November 1920.


   October 1939, appointed Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau.

   April, 1941, appointed Vice-Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces.

   August 1941, promoted to Lieutenant General.

   December 1942, appointed Commander of the Fourteenth Division.

   October 1943, appointed Chief of the Office of the Inspectorate General of Military Training.

   April 1945, appointed Commander of the 51st Army, and remained in that post up to the close of the war.

3. After the resignation of the Yonai Cabinet, as I was Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, I used the most scrupulous care and attention in recommending the man to succeed General Hata as War Minister. (Sentence deleted—LAB) Language Arbitration Board. I took into full consideration the views prevalent in the various bureaus of the War Ministry and the wishes of the General Staff, and I consulted fully with the Vice-Minister of War, General Anami. After all these consultations and after a thorough-going study I decided that under the then existing circumstances.
Lieutenant General Tojo was suitable and I, as Chief of the Personnel Bureau, recommended him to War Minister Hata as the succeeding War Minister. There were others who were considered for the position of new War Minister, but they were already in other important positions and it was difficult to affect a speedy transfer.

Lt. General Tojo, on the other hand was in Tokyo, holding the position of Inspector-General of the Air Force, and he had formerly been Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and of the Maintenance Bureau. Further, he had once been the Vice-Minister of War in the Hiranuma Cabinet. I considered him a suitable military administrator and it was the feeling in Army circles that no one except Lt. General Tojo would do, so under these circumstances, I recommended him as the succeeding War Minister. In accordance with this recommendation, General Hata submitted the name of General Tojo to the Three Chiefs Conference held on 18 July 1940. The Three Chiefs after conference were unanimous in recommending Lt. General Tojo as succeeding War Minister. My recommendation of General Tojo, and General Hata's submitting the name of General Tojo to the Three Chiefs Conference was in accordance with the standing procedure for such matters in the War Ministry. As a matter of fact, neither War Minister Hata nor I had any personal relations with Lt. General Tojo in the past nor any intimate relations with him.
Exhibit 3198 (Def. Doc. 2044) RP 28,918 line 4
delete from "but in my" to the end of the page and sub-
sstitute "but my Cabinet completely disregarded such a thing.

"War Minister Hata fully understood and whole-heartedly
cooperated in this policy of my Cabinet.

"However a conspiracy arose to overthrow my Cabinet.
A good plan for the conspirators was to have General Hata,
who was opposed to the Tripartite Pact, resign, thus
overthrow the Cabinet and kill two birds with one stone.
Finally this plan was carried out. When I received General
Hata's resignation, I believed that he was forced to resign,
not of his own will, but through outside forces. I am
today still convinced that this was so."

PP 28,919, line 1, before "I asked" insert "On the
13th of July 1940".
Line 12, delete from "consequently" to the end of
the next paragraph and substitute "and he felt the
responsibility. Knowing General Hata's feelings, after
the resignation of the Cabinet en bloc, I called him into
my room and shaking his hand said, in general, 'I can under­
stand your feelings. You have suffered much. 'I do not
blame you.' He smiled sadly. His situation was indeed
pitiful.

"General Hata, as far as I know, was never connect­
cd with any clique, associt on or organization while in
the Army or in politics. He, of course, never belonged
to any aggressive or ultra-militaristic organization.
In fact he scrupulously avoided politics."

Language arbitration Board
I was the Navy Minister for the Second and Third Kono Cabinets.

In or about September 1941, Lt. General Ushinogu, Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces, called upon me at the Navy Minister's Office as a messenger dispatched from General Hata, Shunroku, the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces, with the following message from General Hata:

Recently, relations between America and Japan have been deteriorating. America is opposed to Japan's stationing her troops in China. I believe that in order to avoid a clash with America, we must withdraw all our troops from China. I heartily request you to do your utmost as Navy Minister to prevent a conflict between America and Japan.

RETURN TO ROOM 361

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

OKIWA, Koshiro (Seal)

On the 19th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: OKIWA, Koshiro (Seal)

I, KANZAKI, Masayoshi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thence in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: KANZAKI, Masayoshi (Seal)
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

SUPPLEMENTARY ORDER OF PROOF

HATA, Shunroku - Individual Phase

Dr. Kanzaki, I'sayoshi - Aristides G. Lazarus

Document No. 2605  Oikawa
From October 1939 to November 1940, I was Vice Chief of the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff during this time was H.I.H. Prince Kenin.

In 1940, because of Germany's extraordinary victories in Europe, her fame spread through all of Japan and soon the view became predominant in Army circles that Japan should use Germany's power and influence to bring the China Incident to a favorable solution. The Army was desirous of peace with China and so was War Minister General Hata. He always insisted that it was most urgent to bring an end to the China Incident. The question was, how was the Incident to be settled. It was Hata's contention that the best way to secure peace with China was to reduce the strength of the Japanese troops in China. As his first step in this direction, he sought to decrease, in drawing up the Army budget for the year 1940, the number of Japanese troops in China from 900,000 to 500,000. The General Staff was completely opposed to such an amount of reduction and said it was impossible. The matter was then taken up and discussed between the War Minister and the General Staff and eventually the number of troops was decreased to between 600,000 and 650,000.

Towards the end of June 1940, while I was in China for inspection of the operations, I was called back to Tokyo by an urgent telegram. I returned to find that the Cabinet, contrary to the general desire of the Army, was against entering into any close connections with Germany and that its policy was running contrary to the prevailing opinion of the Army. It was the ardent desire of Prince Kenin, Chief of the General Staff, to attain a solution of the Incident through use of Germany and it was about the beginning of July 1940 that he told me that he intended to accelerate peace with China through the mediations of Germany and that he intended to use the War Minister to break the deadlock between the Army and the Cabinet. So, he ordered me to consult with the officials in the War Ministry, with these ends in view. Accordingly, I called on the Vice Minister of War, Lt. Gen. Anami and we discussed the matter between the two of us. The Vice Minister said finally that as long as the Chief of Staff did not modify his view of using Germany to accelerate peace with China, there was no alternative but to change the present Cabinet; that in view of the character of the present Cabinet, it was impossible to comply with the Chief of Staff's objective even if some changes were made among its members. When I asked the Vice Minister if that was also the opinion of the War Minister, he informed me that that was not the opinion of General Hata, but that was the opinion
of the Vice Minister and the man below him in the War Ministry. I pointed out that the matter was of extreme importance as the opinion of the Army in general and that of the Cabinet were in opposition to each other and that we had better meet again after I had once more consulted with the Chief of the General Staff and then I parted with him.

The Chief of General Staff, having heard my report stated that since his opinion represented that of the majority of the Army and that according to the Vice Minister there was no other way but a change of Cabinet, we must do our utmost to follow that method and that he was truly sorry for the War Minister that such an extreme measure had to be taken, but one must bear this for the good of the country in such a vital national affair. I again called on the Vice Minister, stated the decision of the Chief of the General Staff and learned that Anami had not changed his views since our previous meeting. Some days later by the orders of Prince Kanin, I wrote a letter which in substance stated as follows:

It is most urgent for Japan to end the China Incident as soon as possible. In order to achieve this it is absolutely necessary to use the influence and power of Germany. From my observation of the attitude of the present Cabinet, I believe it is unable to tide over this present difficult situation. So, at this moment it is necessary to establish a new and stronger Cabinet with the whole nation behind it, which will not waver but will carry out policies with a firm hand. With reference to the above, I demand the War Minister to take action in a manner appropriate to the situation.

The language used in the letter is the polite form of language generally used among high-ranking officers in the Military and in all government departments. Although the word "resign" itself is not used, the letter actually required the War Minister to resign. The letter was sealed and signed by Prince Kanin and he ordered me to deliver it to War Minister Hata. I did so. In this way, General Hata received the letter and I am not quite sure but it might be the following day or the day after that General Hata submitted his resignation, and then the Yonai Cabinet resigned en bloc.

H.I.H. Prince Kanin, besides being the Chief of the General Staff, was a member of the Emperor's Household and a Father of the Army, in age, rank, experience etc., and it was quite natural that General Hata, although War Minister, nevertheless, as a loyal subject of the Emperor, was compelled to obey his strong demand.

From the beginning, the Yonai Cabinet had been a conservative one and it was opposed to the idea of cooperation and ties with Germany and to the use of Germany in the settlement of the China Incident. Hence a majority of the Army branded the Yonai Cabinet as too weak to settle the China Incident and as lacking in ability to settle the general situation. The intention of overthrowing the Yonai Cabinet and the plan to effect peace by using Germany was predominant in the Army. Besides, War Minister Hata was one of the supporters of the Yonai Cabinet Policy. Hence
the consensus of opinion in military circles was that Hitler was not useful in accelerating the attempts at closer ties with Germany and the subsequent use of the power of Germany to effect peace with China and that he lacked the desire to do so and a change in War Ministers was being strongly urged. Indeed, this consensus of opinion of military circles was reflected in the decision of the Chief of the General Staff and this decision was conveyed to Hitler by means of the letter which I delivered to him and which forced him to resign his post.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SADADA, Shigero (Seal)

On this 20th day of August, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: SADADA, Shigero (Seal)

I, KOKUBU, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (Seal)
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

IRAKI, Sadao, ET AL

Certificate of
FIRST DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU

I am the Section Chief of Documents in the First Demobilization Bureau and hereby certify that after searching for the letter which was sent in July 1940 from Chief of General Staff Prince Kanin to War Minister Hat, Shunroku, it could not be found in the files of the First Demobilization Bureau.

Date 23 September 1947
at Tokyo

/s/ IYUKI, Yozo (Seal)
Section Chief of Documents
First Demobilization Bureau

I hereby certify that this was signed and sealed before me.

23 September 1947
at Tokyo

Witness: IYUKI, Taitaro (Seal)
自分が第十一復員局文書課長ノ職ニ於テル於ルヲ以テ、昭和十五年七月ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長ニ於テ調査ノ結果第一復員局ノ文書課長
Sworn Statement of
KANZAKI, Hasayoshi

Ever since Hata, Shunroku was arraigned, I have been his Chief Counsel.

In order to obtain the letter demanding the resignation which was sent from the Chief of General Staff, Prince Kan’in, to War Minister Hata, Shunroku, in July 1940, I, since spring 1946, have requested the First Demobilization Bureau to take all measures possible to search for the letter but it could not be discovered. Further, with the assistance of Mrs. Hata and her son Shunpaachi, I have searched Hata, Shunroku’s house with the utmost of my power several times, but I could not discover it.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KANZAKI, Hasayoshi (Seal)

On this 22nd day of September, 1947, at Tokyo

Dependent: KANZAKI, Hasayoshi (Seal)

I, KOHUBU, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo

Witness: KOHUBU, Tomoharu (Seal)
At the time of the raid on Tokyo by the American fliers in April of 1942, I was Chief of the Military Service Section of the War Ministry. Because during the raid school children had been shot and non-military areas had been bombed, there were different opinions as to the treatment to be given fliers who became prisoners. The General Staff in Tokyo decided that all decisions as to the trial and treatment of the captured fliers should be exclusively within the province of the General Staff itself. Hence, as soon as the fliers were captured in China, the General Staff ordered their immediate delivery to Tokyo. All relative investigations were made in Tokyo and preparations were made to hold the trial of the fliers in Tokyo. However, as to the treatment to be given the fliers, there developed two different opinions. One opinion was supported by the General Staff and the other by the War Ministry. Because of those conflicting opinions the General Staff suddenly gave up its intention to hold the trial in Tokyo and ordered that the trial be held in China and an order to that effect was forwarded to the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters and the fliers themselves were sent to Shanghai.

In these days there wasn't any regulations that fliers could be tried by a military court and so in Tokyo a new military law as to the treatment of fliers who raided the Japanese homeland and the area under its control was promulgated and a copy of the new military law was forwarded to the China Expeditionary Force to order that the same law would be in effect in the areas controlled by the Japanese armies in China also. In the same order containing the information about the new military law just promulgated, was contained an order to Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China that the fliers would be tried under this law in China. The fliers were then flown to Shanghai which was the Headquarters of the 13th Army. Because there was no military court set up in the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Forces at Nanking, the trial was to be held by the 13th Army at its headquarters in Shanghai.

Then the decision was announced that the fliers would be tried by the newly promulgated military law. I protested this decision to General Tanabe, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, and stated to him that I had written the fliers should be treated as prisoners of war. General Tanabe cited the law that had passed with me and said that so but that he had just received a letter from General Ushirogu, General Hara's Chief of Staff, stating that General Hara took that opinion himself, that he, Tanabe, desired to treat the fliers as prisoners of war. General Tanabe then stated that nothing could be done about the matter because the General Staff had already made the decision that the fliers must be tried by military law.

According to the practice of the Japanese army, the sort of letter that Ushirogu wrote to Tanabe was never written by the commander himself but it was always written by the Chief of Staff and when the Chief of Staff expresses anything in the official letter that is the expression of the intentions of the Commander in Chief himself, not the opinion of the Chief of Staff. That was the practice in the Japanese army and such a letter is never addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, always to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. That, too, was the practice of the Japanese army. Therefore, when I learned that Ushirogu had written a
latter containing the views of Hata and the letter was addressed to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. I knew that it was an official letter in the usual practice of the Japanese army informing the General Staff of the position and the opinion of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army in China, General Hata.

As a result of the receipt of this letter from General Ushirogu stating the position of General Hata with reference to the fliors, Colonel Arisue was dispatched from Tokyo by the General Staff to Hata to give Hata the orders and the desires of the General Staff. The General Staff in Tokyo was afraid that Hata would not carry out the instructions of putting the fliors to trial and Colonel Arisue was sent to Hata to notify Hata that he was to do as he was ordered and that no theory or logic on his part with reference to this case would be accepted by Tokyo. Moreover, there was another apprehension among the members of the General Staff that even if the China Expeditionary Force tried these fliors, they might have found a decision of not guilty and that Hata would then have released them after trial and this the General Staff feared.

Thus, as the matter stood, all orders and directives with reference to the trial were issued by the General Staff in Tokyo and the trial was held by the 13th Army in China. Hence, in this trial, General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army merely acted as a channel through which were transmitted the orders of the General Staff in Tokyo to the 13th Army where the trial was being held. There was absolutely no room left whatsoever for the use of any discretion or judgment on the part of the members of the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Force with reference to this trial.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TAKAKI, Ryukichi (Seal)

On this 10th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo

Doponent: TAKAKI, Ryukichi (Seal)

I, HAMAKI, Taitaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Doponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo

Witness: HAMAKI, Taitaro (Seal)
My name is Charles Nelson Spinks. I am presently employed as a War Department civilian employee in Tokyo. In the autumn of 1945 I was a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Naval Reserve and was in Tokyo as Chief of the Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

I understand and speak Japanese and was present at several of the interviews between Japanese and the Bombing Survey. Our purpose was to find out the effects of warfare on the Japanese economy and industry, particularly the effects of aerial bombing. We found that many of the Japanese whom we interviewed were reluctant to talk to us since they did not know our purpose and thought we might be investigating war criminal responsibility. It was necessary, therefore, to put them at their ease and reassure them that this was not our purpose and that we wanted information for Bombing Survey purposes only.

I cannot say whether or not any of the Japanese interviewed were made positive promises or assurances that the interviews would not be used against them in any war crimes prosecution, although they might well have gotten that impression from the preliminary remarks I witnessed. One of our members usually had a preliminary conversation with the interviewee to put him at ease and explain our aim so that he would speak freely during the interview. Certainly we exerted whatever efforts were necessary in the circumstances to allay suspicion and overcome any reluctance to give us the information we desired.

I was present at the interviews with HOSHINO, Naoki, during November, 1945. HOSHINO was not placed under oath and the interrogations were conducted in a friendly and informal atmosphere. The only interpreter was a missionary, much overworked, whose Japanese was good, although he often needed help from me in translating technical terms. I have been shown by counsel Exhibit No. 454 for identification, which is a transcript of the Bombing Survey interviews with HOSHINO in November, 1945. I would say that this transcript is accurate so far as the questions put to HOSHINO are concerned. It does not, however, contain the preliminary remarks at the beginning of the interviews, nor does it contain an exact or full record of HOSHINO's answers to the questions.
When asked a question, HOSHINO often spoke for several minutes at a time, sometimes as long as five minutes, before his remarks were translated. I could not always follow him or retain the full substance of his longer replies, and the same was true of the interpreter. In such cases the interpreter translated as much as he could remember, or gave the gist of the answer to the stenographer. Sometimes we had to go over the answers after the interview in order to edit them, correct passages, or fill in portions which had been missed, or where the exact words or sentences had been forgotten. I recall that several times during the interview HOSHINO attempted to make corrections, but so far as I know HOSHINO was not shown the final transcripts after editing and corrections were made following the interviews.

There was only one stenographer to record the interviews. Neither the interpreter nor the stenographer was sworn.

At Tokyo, Japan, this 15th day of September, 1947.

/S/ CHARLES NELSON SPINKS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of September, 1947.

/S/ B. A. HARGADON
1st Lt., Inf.
Personnel Officer
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

AKIKI Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCIS R. MILLARD

I, Francis R. Millard, am an American Missionary to Japan, residing at number 171 Yanuma, 1 Chome, Suginami-ku, Tokyo.

I was formerly connected with the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, serving in Japan with that organization as an interpreter after the war. I was the only interpreter during the interviews held with Naoki Hoshino on the 19, 22 and 28 of November, 1945.

Before the first of those interviews I was instructed, as was our practice, to talk with Hoshino and put him at his ease, explaining to him that the only purpose of the Bombing Survey was to get general information on the economic effects of the war on Japan, and to reassure him that the interview had no connection with any war crime prosecution purposes nor the fixing of individual responsibility. It had been discovered that such assurance was considered necessary in order to get from the Japanese the information we needed. This I did.

Neither I nor the stenographer was sworn. For the purposes of the Bombing Survey, it was sufficient if we took down the gist of the conversation rather than a verbatim record, in order to get the broad, overall picture.

I have been shown Exhibit No. 454 for identification, which is a copy of the interviews we had with Mr. Hoshino. As far as the questions put to him go, it appears to be a verbatim record. As to the answers, however, the words are in many cases my own, or the answers are condensations of what Hoshino said. He often spoke continuously for several minutes in response to a question and I gave no running translation. From time to time I received help on technical terms, particularly from one of the observers at the interviews who spoke Japanese. I had been away from Japan for several years and found such technical assistance necessary.

This document does not show the statements made to Hoshino before the formal interview, and, as I recall, is not a complete record of the conversation in other respects. Hoshino understood some English and suggested corrections from time to time, although I cannot say whether or not all corrections were actually made. Neither Hoshino nor I got a chance to read the transcript afterwards and, in fact, I never saw it until it was recently shown to me.

/s/ Francis R. Millard

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of September 1947.

/s/ Bernard E. Hargadon
1st Lt. Inf.

Petitional Officer
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I, ISHIWATA, Sotaro, have the following career:

May, 1916, Graduated from the English Law Department of the Imperial University.

May, 1916, Joined the Finance Ministry.

July, 1918, Appointed Chief of a taxation office.

July, 1921, Appointed Secretary of the revenue superintendent bureau, (first in Osaka and later in Tokyo).

December, 1924, Appointed Secretary of the Finance Ministry, (attached to the Revenue Bureau).

May, 1931, Appointed Chief of the National Taxes Section of the Revenue Bureau, Finance Ministry.

June, 1934, Concurrently appointed Chief of the Private Secretariat Section.

December, 1934, Appointed Director of the Revenue Bureau of the Finance Ministry.

March, 1936, Appointed Investigator of the Cabinet.

February, 1937, Appointed Director of the Revenue Bureau of the Finance Ministry.

June, 1937, Appointed Vice Minister of Finance.

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August, 1939, Resigned.

January, 1940, Appointed Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, (in the Yulal Cabinet).

July, 1940, Resigned.

January, 1944, Appointed Minister of Finance (in the TOJO cabinet) and remained in the office (in the KOISO Cabinet).

February, 1945, Appointed State Minister and concurrently Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.

April, 1945, Resigned.

June, 1945, Appointed Minister of the Imperial Household.

January, 1946, Resigned.

Mr. HOSHINO was a junior student at the Tokyo Imperial University one year behind me. After he entered the Finance Ministry, he was my colleague in the Revenue Bureau of the Ministry as well as in the Osaka Income Inspection Bureau for many years. I was particularly intimate with him so that even on his personal affairs he asked my advice without reserve.

In June, 1932, the Manchurian government asked the Finance Ministry to send the former a person appropriate to assist its Department of Finance in the execution of its affairs. Finance Minister TAKEUCHI thought it imperative that a man of excellent ability should be sent. After consulting Mr. KOISO, Vice-Minister of Finance and Mr. OGO, Ryuta, Chief of the Personal Secretariat Section, he selected Mr. HOSHINO. Hence it may be said that the nomination of Mr. HOSHINO was originated from the instruction of the Finance Ministry authorities. Mr. HOSHINO, when approached by Mr. OGO in this regard, however, strongly refused this offer because of the illness of his father (HOSHINO, Kote, a well-known Christian minister in Japan) and some other family circumstances. In accordance with the request of Chief OGO of the Personal Secretariat Section to urge Mr. HOSHINO to accept his post, I called at Mr. HOSHINO's residence and, having an interview with some members of his family as well as him, I persuaded him to take the government offer. At last Mr. HOSHINO made up his mind to accept the offer. In July he resigned his post in the Finance Ministry, and went over to Manchukuo to enter the civil service of the Manchukuo government.

Through my official negotiations with Mr. HOSHINO, which were carried on in the Finance Ministry and according to my experience during my trip to Manchukuo, I knew that Mr. HOSHINO, after taking his post in the Manchukuo government, had wholeheartedly exerted himself to promote the welfare of the people of Manchukuo. As far as I can remember, whenever he regarded any Japanese policy toward Manchukuo as adverse to the interests of the people of Manchukuo, he did everything in his power to prevent it from being carried out. At one time he persistently insisted that, in the interests of the people of Manchukuo, Japan relinquish special rights and interests she had enjoyed so far. In order to realize his projected plan, he frequently visited the Finance Ministry, presenting many a demand to it. In 1935, for example, he
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sharply criticized controversial issues, such as the raising of tariffs on agricultural products of Manchukuo and the prohibition of the importation of apples produced in Manchukuo, and urged the Finance Ministry to bring the issues to a conclusion as it saw fit. In addition, he stressed the necessity of relinquishing extraterritorial rights and the executive powers vested in the railway zone authorities. At one time he visited the Finance Ministry and insisted that, in the event of the relinquishment of these, the Japanese installations be transferred to Manchukuo at prices as cheap as possible and especially public facilities be transferred without compensation. Such an attitude as his led some persons to criticize him as laying too much stress on the interests of Manchukuo at the expense of those of Japan.

I do not know well the circumstances under which Mr. HOSHINO took part in the Second KONOYE Cabinet. However, immediately after the general resignation of the YONAI Cabinet took place, Prince KONOYE rang me up, asking for my opinion as to the advisability of appointing Mr. HOSHINO as Director of the Cabinet Planning Board. In reply to it, I said that I considered him to be fit for the post in view of his practical experience in that line of business.

/s/ ISHIWATA, Sotaro
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ ISHIWATA, Sotero (seal)
Def. Doc. No. 2526

Exh. No. 3210

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

Nakai, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition. (Translation)

Deponent: MATSUJI, Tamotsu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance
with the procedure followed in our country I hereby depose as follows.

I, MATSUJI, Tamotsu, live at No. 1731, Chō-me, Yukaawa Chō, Setagaya
ward, Tokyo.

I occupied the following positions in Yamchuko:


2. April, 1935: the Chief of the Secretariat in the General
   Affairs Board.

   Affairs Board.


5. May, 1940: the Vice-chief of the General Affairs Board.


7. October, 1944: the President of the "Daidō-gakuen (T.N. a mind
   of school" College.

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As shown in my public career described above, I attended the business of the General Affairs Board as, alternately, the Chief of the Secretariat, the Chief of the Legislative and the Vice-Chief of the General Affairs Board, directly under HOSHINO, Naoki, the Chief of the General Affairs Board.

(1) The Chief of the General Affairs Board in Manchukuo is the one who renders assistance to the premier and who exercises general control over the business of the General Affairs Board which comes under the premier's direct superintendence. He is, therefore, not competent to decide state affairs. Even the decision of routine matters of the General Affairs Board, with the exception of trifling ones entrusted in him only by the law such as the appointment and dismissal, reward and punishment of those below the clerical staff of the Board, was made by the premier himself and not at the discretion of the chief of the General Affairs Board.

(2) At the end of 1936 Chief of the General Affairs Board ODATE resigned his post and Mr. HOSHINO was appointed to the post as his successor. The reasons why he assumed that post were as follows:

Firstly, as about five years had passed since Manchukuo was founded, it was deemed suitable to appoint some one to the post of Chief of the General Affairs Board from those who were in actual service in Manchukuo rather than the usual out-of-date practice of selecting a person from Japanese officials from Japan.
Secondly, Manchukuo had passed into the period of economic construction from that of peace first and became in need of an able financier and economist who should take the lead of the Board and render assistance to the premier. It was, therefore, in the light of the need mentioned above that Mr. Hoshino, who, of all the government officials in Manchukuo, had been connected with the state finance and economy, was newly appointed Chief of the General Affairs Board on the recommendation of his predecessor and the Premier.

(3) All the preceding chiefs of the General Affairs Board had duly observed the limits of their office, and Chief of the General Affairs Board Hoshino especially attended to his business, in obedience to Premier Chao's direction and decision, rigidly within the limits of his duty. It was a matter of course that, as far as I knew, he had never decided anything on behalf of the premier.

(4) Under Chief Hoshino, two assistant chiefs, one Japanese and the other Manchurian, jointly took charge of the affairs. For important items of state affairs, however, Mr. Hoshino used to call up two assistant chiefs, namely myself and Mr. Ku Tzu-hsiang, the Manchurian Assistant Chief, and to deliberate on the matter for decision. There were no important matters that were decided without consultation with the Manchurian Assistant Chief.

(5) Chief Hoshino had due regard for the opinions of Manchurians, especially those of youthful Manchurian officials, and he was ever mindful of the promotion of superior Manchurian officials. Accordingly,
important posts at the General Affairs Board such as the Private Secretary of the Chief of the Board, the Assistant Chief of the Board, the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, the Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Secretariat, etc. which had hitherto been occupied by the Japanese officials were replaced by the Manchurian officials in rapid succession. He held Manchurians in such regard that the accusation that the Chief HOSHINO over-valued the intentions of Manchurians was voiced in some Japanese quarters.

(6) With regard to the salaries for officials of the Sennin and Inin ranks (similar to the Japanese Sonin and Hannin ranks, respectively), there had hitherto been some discrimination between the Japanese and the Manchurians. This was due to an allowance, the sum equivalent to between 40 to 80% of salaries, which had been additionally paid to the Japanese officials. This was because of the high cost of living of Japanese compared with Manchurians, as there was a difference between them in their ways of living. In 1938, Chief HOSHINO removed this discrimination and gave equal treatment to both Japanese and Manchurians.

(7) As a matter of course, there never was a case in which the Kwantung Army dictated to the General Affairs Board, although the wishes of the Army were laid before the Board sometimes. On such occasions Chief HOSHINO took the necessary measures under the direction of the respective authorities after consulting with the government organs concerned as well as the Prime Minister. Even the wishes of the Kwantung Army laid before the Board, if they were considered not to...
be appropriate, were not followed. For instance, when the renovation of
the administrative organization was effected in June, 1937, and the
Department of Public Peace was formed amalgamating the Department
of Military Affairs and the Bureau of Police Affairs in the Department
of People's Welfare, a proposal was submitted by the Kwantung Army
to have a man from the Military ranks appointed as Vice Minister of
the new department. Against this, Chief HOSHINO first consulted us
and recommended Mr. SUSUKIDA, Yoshiito, of the civil officials as
the candidate, disregarding the desire of the Kwantung Army.
Eventually he was appointed as the vice minister.

Notwithstanding the fact that Chief of General Affairs HOSHINO
not only was all the time paying attention to the stabilization of
the national life of the Manchurian people but also to elevating their
economic life, he was always concerned about their afflictions and so
assumed a cautious attitude, for commodities gradually became more
scarce and consequently economic control stricter, by degrees, as
a result of the European war and subsequent to the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese Incident, half a year after assuming his office.
Such being the case, he was usually making efforts to negotiate with
the Japanese government and others, so that Manchukuo might sell the
food, as well as other goods that were exported from her, as clearly
as possible on the one hand, while on the other she might as profitably
and abundantly as possible purchase the necessaries of life and other
commodities that were imported into the country. Furthermore, there
were instance such as in the case of salt, the most necessary food
ingredient for the populace, where the government even reduced prices
and distributed it to the people, although other prices were going
up step by step.

On this 3rd of September, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ MATSUI, Tamotsu (seal)

I, hereby certify that above deposition was duly sworn by
the Deponent who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the
presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: /S/ VISITA, Yasao (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ MATSUI, Tamotsu (seal)
第二条 沿革

政治経済の変化と沿革について

第三条 沿革

政治経済の変化と沿革について

第四条 沿革

政治経済の変化と沿革について

第五条 沿革

政治経済の変化と沿革について

第六条 沿革

政治経済の変化と沿革について

第七条 沿革

政治経済の変化と沿革について

第八条 沿革

政治経済の変化と沿革について
TJAKURA, Tadashi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

I, T. K. KURU, Tadashi, was born on February 18, the 36th year of Kaei (1903) and at present I am living at No. 57, Otakamakacho, Kosakaizaka, Bunkyo, Tokyo. In the 3rd year of Showa (1928) I was employed by the Kwantung Provincial Government and was made successively Secretary of the Financial Department, Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Monopoly Bureau and Secretary of the Archives Section. In the 6th year of Showa (1933) I left the Kwantung Provincial Government and joined the Manchurian Government, first as Chief of the Intendance Section of the Civil Administration Department. In November, the 10th year of Showa (1935) I was transferred to the post of Councilor of the Planning Board of the General Affairs Office. I served at the Planning Board until February, the 10th year of Showa (1937) and in the same month I was made Head of the Development Office of the General Development Bureau of the Agricultural Development Department. Next, in October, the 10th year of Showa (1941) I was appointed Chief Official in Charge of the Agricultural Products of the Agricultural Development Department, but in July, the 12th year of Showa (1943) I was appointed Chief of the Planning Board of the Supreme General Affairs Office and in May, the 20th year of Showa (1945), when the Planning Bureau was newly established, I was made Vice Chief of the said Bureau, which post I held until the end of the war.

In the Manchurian Government, in the 4th year of Kangte, namely on October 12, 1937, decided on the so-called 10 year program of opium prohibition. I, at that time as Councilor of the Planning Board, assumed responsibility for drafting the said program, together with my colleague, Yung Shan-Chi.

The Manchurian Government from the early period after its founding had been earnestly planning for eradication of the evil custom of smoking or eating opium, and, as a means first established a monopoly system for opium and administered the production, delivery and consumption of opium, thus adopting a policy for a decisive curtailment of opium consumption.

Mr. Kashino, in the 3rd year of Kangte, namely in December 1936, was transferred from his position as Chief of the Financial Department to Chief of the General Affairs Board. At that time the opium monopoly was already gaining impetus and was efficiently enforced. Mr. Kashino, however, as soon as he was made Chief of the General Affairs Board, called together many representative and serious Manchurian-born, young officials belonging to various departments and had them conduct free discussions relating to the problem of the opium policy. This discussion was continued in earnest for several months and its conclusion was that Manchoukuo had already reached a mature stage to enforce a positive prohibition policy. Most of the said young officials agreed that various necessary measures should be courageously taken as rapidly as possible for the drastic eradication of opium addicts. The free discussion by these native-born young officials created a considerably great sensation at that time in Manchuria and attracted the attention of the general public. In fact, among the Japanese-born officials there was a loud voice criticising Mr. Kashino's attitude
as currying favour with native-born officials. Mr. Hoshino, however, as soon as the report on the conclusion reached by those Manchurian-born officials was received, ordered us to map out, in collaboration with the various related departments, a program on the basis of the said report, to be enforced by the government.

It is, however, not easy to eliminate completely the number of those poisoned by opium, who were estimated at more than 1,000,000 at the beginning of the national establishment of Manchukuo, under very adverse conditions. It was the conclusion of the study of the persons in charge of practical opium work that even if every steel measure was taken, under these adverse conditions it would take as long as 20 years. Meanwhile, most of the prominent people and notables were expressing outwardly their approval of the prohibition policy, but they were secretly expressing their opposition against the drastic method, alleging that it was impossible. Then I informed Mr. Hoshino of these matters and told him that it would take 20 years to achieve complete prohibition. Mr. Hoshino immediately insisted upon the 10 year plan, and said that there is a will, there is a way, and the fruits could not be born unless we endeavored to achieve the high objective. He admonished me that when the Manchurian youths were about to march on towards the ideal with fervor, the Japanese party should rejoice over the sincere enthusiasm of the Manchurian party and do our utmost in aiding them, rather than to worry ourselves in anticipation whether the goal was possible or not.

Furthermore, Mr. Hoshino said to the persons in the accounting section as follows: "If the opium monopoly profit is appropriated as a source of revenue of the general annual expenditures, prohibition will become difficult from the financial aspect. If it is used for the expenses of the prohibition policy, finances will not be affected even if the prohibition is carried out. At this time, therefore, make the necessary plans for prohibition without stinting the expenses. Don't worry about the decrease in the revenue due to the prohibition. There is no necessity that the opium revenue be used for the general expenses."

Thus, the draft, which I and Yung Shan-Chi wrote, based on the assertion of the Manchurian youth bureaucrats, came to be decided at last by the cabinet meeting, through the conferences and negotiations with each department concerned. This plan was put into effect in and after January, 1938. The central force that propelled this project during these periods was in fact nobody but Mr. Hoshino and a group of Manchurian youth bureaucrats. Although the decision on this prohibition policy, including a drastic article that those governmental and public officials as well as the members of the special companies who did not refrain from opium smoking within a fixed period be dismissed, was a great menace to them in which most of the high ranks were included, it was realized. The prudent persons among them were willing to take leave and undergo the treatment, one after another. Thus, the improvement at the beginning among the leading class was effected to a remarkable extent.

At the same time, the Government gave special consideration to regional prohibition in towns and cities. In towns and cities they made special efforts at registration, controlled relief, propaganda, etc., and the results in this field were also rapidly improved.

Thus, the number of the registered opium addicts immediately before the end of war was reduced to something over 200,000.

To cite an instance, you could hardly see an addict in Hariong in 1944, so much so that all the sanatoriums there turned into lodging-houses for laborers.

Mr. Hoshino, at the outset of the foundation of Manchukuo, devoted himself to as well as contributed much towards the unification of the monetary system, the rationalization of establishment of both finance and economy and the abolition of extraterritoriality during the period from 1936 to 1937.
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Thus, the number of the registered opium addicts immediately before the end of war was reduced to something over 300,000.

To cite an instance, you could hardly see an addict in Harbin in 1944, so much so that all the sanatoriums there turned into lodging-houses for laborers.

Mr. Hoshino, at the outset of the foundation of Manchukuo, devoted himself to as well as contributed much towards the unification of the monetary system, the rationalization and establishment of both finance and economy and the abolition of extraterritoriality during the period from 1936 to 1937.
In spite of the fact that prior to and after the establishment of Nanchofu, both the system and organization of her finances were at the extremity of chaos, Mr. Hoshino, who was then the Chief of General Affairs of the Finance Department, succeeded in raising them on short notice by means of his timely guidance and encouragement for his colleagues and men.

Though unification of the monetary system had been reported as particularly difficult, yet his strenuous efforts and enthusiasm led to success and monetary stability in August, 1835, less than three years after the foundation of the state.

The basis of the general economic development of Nanchofu being formed by this, remarkable effects were brought about upon the stabilization and elevation of the living of the Nanchofu people at large and the prosperity of the personal economy.

Before that time Nanchofu finances were extremely disordered, utter; looking in fairness, with a most primitive financial system. The people at large were groaning under the burden of extremely heavy taxes. As an effective remedy for it, first the taxation system was reformed, aimed at the reduction of taxes of the people and the fairer taxation. The accounting system and financial organization were made up-to-date as well as fair and just, with the result that Nanchofu took her first step to present the appearance of a modern state and to have the substance as well. This was also generally attributed to Mr. Hoshino's great enthusiasm and continuous efforts.

As to the abolition of extraterritoriality in Nanchofu, Mr. Hoshino harbored a most positive view. On this matter of abrogation of our extraterritoriality in Nanchofu, Japan did not necessarily agree with Nanchofu about the time and method of its execution. Especially, most Japanese residents in Nanchofu who had much concern in the matter expressed the opinion that the time was still immature, which, reflecting upon the Nanchofu at large, gave rise in some circles of the governmental authorities to a view that they should take a cautious attitude toward it. However, Mr. Hoshino, Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Finance Department at the time (later he became Vice-Chief of the Finance Department) strongly advocated the prompt abrogation of extraterritoriality with a view to the sound development of Nanchofu and the impartial sharing of responsibility by the peoples of both Japan and Nanchofu, and he made efforts in persuading and negotiating with the authorities concerned. As a consequence, "The Treaty concerning the residence of the Japanese nationals in Nanchofu and the taxes in Nanchofu", was first of all concluded in July 1836 (Kotoku 3). This treaty was of such a nature as to greatly increase the impost of taxes upon the Japanese residents. Moreover, as I have said before, there existed much opposition and the argument for the promptness of time for this procedure among the Japanese people on the spot. However, it was highly attributable to Mr. Hoshino's sincere and zealous efforts that, despite such circumstances, the extraterritoriality was abolished upon the understanding which was brought about by his persuasion of the discontented Japanese residents.

Then Mr. Hoshino took office as Director of the General Affairs Office. He exerted more strenuous efforts than ever to realize a complete abrogation of extraterritoriality and a complete transfer of the executive powers vested in the South Nanchofu Railway Zone Authorities. Even so far as these issues were concerned, he had many difficulties to encounter. Particularly as to the abrogation of judicial powers, many people in Japan held that it was still premature on the ground that the various systems and the executive and criminal facilities of Nanchofu were not completed as yet. While Mr. Hoshino went to Japan and conferred with and negotiated with high government officials in order to overcome these difficulties, he took every occasion to persuade Japanese authorities at the spot to agree to his projected plan. There were cases where various authorities in charge of general affairs were deducted in their negotiations because of their division of opinion. On every such occasion, Mr. Hoshino passed his own judgment on any matter from a broad point of view for the purpose of bringing negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion.
Thus, "The Treaty concerning the Abrogation of Extraterritoriality in Manchuria and the Transfer of the Executive Powers Vested in the South Manchurian Railway Company Zone Authorities" was put into effect as of December 1 of the same year. At that time, there arose a question as to whether the treaty should be put into effect as of December 1; some officials of the Manchukuo government suggested that it be enforced rather as of January 1 of the following year in view of the necessity of making preparations for the enforcement of the treaty and the like. As far as I can remember, Mr. Hoshino, opining that it had better be enforced as soon as possible, decided on the date of enforcement as of December 1.

The abrogation of extraterritoriality resulted in abolishing the long-standing discriminative treatment between the Japanese and the Manchurians and in contributing greatly to the economic development of Manchuria, not to mention the favorable psychological effect it had upon the Manchurians.
I, Tadashi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

Deponent: TADASHI, Tadashi (Seal)

Witness: I. TSUDA, Iwao (Seal)
28 January 1946, page 12

Q. What was the question about the extraterritorial rights that you referred to back a little while ago?
A. This extraterritorial right was enjoyed by almost all nations at one time, including the Japanese. Following the influx of Japanese colonists into Manchukuo it was realized that the freedom of taxation enjoyed by them would create inequality and an unfair state of affairs for the Chinese. And it was deemed necessary that this extraterritoriality should be abolished to equalize the situation. In the railway zone both Chinese and Japanese were not subject to taxation and this also was a situation that had to be remedied.

Q. You conducted the negotiations with the head of the Army, General UEDA, yourself, did you?
A. I was one of those who conferred with General UEDA.

Q. And who were the others?
A. Mr. Ohashi, Vice Foreign Minister, was another who conferred with General UEDA.

Q. And you and the Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. Ohashi, suggested a plan for working this out, did you? If so, what was the plan?
A. This was not exactly a plan, but a recommendation to be forwarded to the Japanese Government that steps be taken for the abolition of extraterritoriality in the railway zone.

Q. What action did they take on that recommendation? That is the Japanese Government.
A. Late in 1936 or early in 1937 as a result of the Japan-Manchukuo Treaty, the desired result was obtained.

Page 13

Q. Was it necessary to take up with the head of the Kwantung Army all bond issues which were issued by Manchukuo? I am limiting it to this period of 1932 to 1936.
A. It was not necessary to refer such matters to the Kwantung Army, but support was usually requested from this source.

Q. Were there any cases that you remember over the period of 1932 to 1934 in which the Army, or the head of the Kwantung Army refused to give support?
A. No.

In 1935 bonds to the value of 140,000,000 yen were issued for the purchase of the North Manchuria Railway from the Soviet Government, at which time I came to Japan several times in connection with the flotation of these bonds.

Q. And did you get the approval of the Kwantung Army in that case, too?
A. It was not necessary for me to obtain the approval of the Kwantung Army. Rather than approval, it was the moral support as stated previously.
26 January 1946, page 14

Q. Did the Bureau take any action towards interesting people in making investments in Manchukuo during this period 1932 to 1936? I mean did they take any action towards interesting people in developing industry in Manchukuo?

A. Great efforts were made to sell shares of newly established companies amongst the population in Manchukuo.

Q. Was it your department so far as the Manchukuo government was concerned that had charge of that during the period 1932 to 1936?

A. This department was mainly concerned in a sort of sales campaign to have these shares held by as many people as possible.

31 January 1946, page 17

Q. From Proc. Ex. No. 453-A, page 12. What was the reason that the Kwantung Army made any objection to the Zaibatsu making investments in Manchukuo?

A. The army in general did not oppose the Zaibatsu but there existed such an atmosphere among the Kwantung officers. The Kwantung officers believed that since the Zaibatsu monopolized industry in Japan such should not happen to the industries in Manchukuo. Therefore, the opposition on the part of the army.

Q. How did you feel about it, Mr. Hoshino?

A. Since I did not believe that the Zaibatsu monopolized industry in Japan I felt that anyone could go into Manchukuo and make investments in industry.

Page 19

Q. Did the Chinese incident come as a surprise to you?

A. It was a surprise to me.

4 February 1946, page 3

Q. Was General HONJO in Manchuria when you went there?

A. Yes.

Q. State what conversations you had with him about the Manchurian incident in September 1931?

A. I have never talked with General HONJO concerning the Manchurian incident.

Q. Did you ever talk with General ITAGAKI?

A. I have never talked with General ITAGAKI concerning the Manchurian incident.

7 February 1946, page 18

Q. Did you become a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association?

A. Well not in any particular sense but as a member of the Cabinet. I was an advisor of the society. All the Cabinet Ministers were.

Q. You were an officer of that association?

A. No.

Q. Were you on the Board of Directors or any permanent committee?

A. Yes, I was a member of the committee. I was called upon to become a member of a committee to study health matters after my resignation. It was for the study of tuberculosis.
Q. So that is all you did with that association?
A. Yes, that is all.

Page 19

Q. In the spring of 1940, did MATSUOKA go to Germany and Italy?
A. Yes.

Q. And what was the result of his trip to Germany?
A. I had resigned when MATSUOKA came back so I didn't hear - I don't know the details or the secret details. But the most important result of the trip as a whole was the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Non-Aggression.

Q. And that was signed about the middle of April?
A. Yes.

And was it considered at the Cabinet meeting at which you were present?
A. No, I didn't attend such a Cabinet meeting. I had already resigned in April and since I was traveling during March I did not attend any of the Cabinet meetings.

26 February 1946, page 5

Q. Now, Mr. Hoshino, you stated that you were president of the Planning Board until April 1941. What did you do after that?
A. For half a year thereafter I was doing no special job. I was visiting various parts of the country.

Q. And what were the visits? Of a business or of a pleasure nature?
A. It was mostly private trips, except at one time I did make a speech in regard to certain Chuchiku savings. I had been in Manchuria for a number of years and therefore I made this trip to see the condition of the country.

Q. What was the reason for the collapse of the Third Konoye Cabinet, Mr. Hoshino?
A. I did not know at that time the reason for I had been out on many trips since between August and October, however, afterward I did hear that the Konoye Cabinet collapsed because there was internal friction.

Page 6

Q. How did you happen to become Secretary of the Cabinet, Mr. Hoshino?
A. There was no special reason except that I had been requested to become the Cabinet Secretary on the 17th by Tojo. At that time I had already purchased a ticket in anticipation of going to Korea.

Q. You and General TOJO were old friends, were you not, Mr. Hoshino?
A. I would not say exactly old friends, however, Tojo was in Manchuria for about two years at the time I was and that is how I came to know him and also when Tojo was the Minister of War and I was on the Cabinet Planning Board.
26 February 1946, page 6

Q. Who appointed you as president of the Cabinet Planning Board originally?
A. Prince Konoye.

Q. Did you, as Secretary, attend all of the meetings of the Cabinet, Mr. Hoshino?
A. I did not attend as a Cabinet member, however, I did sit in on the meetings. There also were two other persons that sat in on this conference. The legislative and the intelligence members sat in on these conferences.

Q. As Secretary of the Cabinet Board, did you have a vote on any of the questions presented there?
A. No, no rights for a vote.

7 February 1946, page 16

Q. Did you keep notes of the Cabinet meetings during TOJO's regime?
A. No.

Q. Did anybody else in the Cabinet keep any notes, or minutes, or memorandum?
A. No, the president of the Information Bureau gave whatever information there was to the newspapers.

26 February 1946, page 8

Q. From Pros. Ex. No. 2225, page 15. I am advised, Mr. Hoshino, that you were the closest man in the Cabinet to General TOJO. How about that?
A. As the Chief Secretary, I was the closest to TOJO, however, I can not say that I was the closest advisor.

Q. I am advised that you also were a strong supporter of TOJO's war policy. Is that not correct?
A. I have not been asked of any advice by TOJO previous to the war, nor have I given any. I have just carried out instructions as a secretary.

7 February 1946, page 26

Q. Did the Prime Minister say anything? [At Imperial Conference of 1 December 1944]
A. He explained the situation as it was.

Q. What did he explain? A. I don't remember exactly what was said.

Q. What was it in substance?
A. Roughly that if the negotiations did not succeed during the beginning of December, there would be war.

11 February 1946, page 14

Q. Were you present at this Imperial Conference?
A. Yes, I was but not as a member.
7 February 1946, page 28

Q. Did you make any suggestions? [At Privy Council meeting of 8 December 1941]
A. I was not permitted to express anything.

11 February 1946, page 13

Q. Was the Chief of the Information Board present at the meeting of the Privy Council?
A. I believe he was present though I cannot say definitely that he was. As the Chief of the Cabinet Information Board and myself as well are not members we would not have to attend the meetings except those that pertained to our duties so that possibly he may have attended this. If they were all ministers it would be compulsory, more or less, to attend these meetings, but as these people are merely in line of duty only and not as a member I would not be able to say definitely that they were.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Dependant: MURAKAMI, Kyoichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet, and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

Personal History

Birth Place: Tottori Prefecture.

Latter educational career: Graduated from the Law College of the Tokyo Imperial University in July, 1907.

Summary of official career: July, 1907, appointed clerk of the Ministry of Communications.
February, 1908, was appointed Secretary of Communications.
July, 1910, was appointed Senior Secretary of Communications.
June, 1911, was appointed Councillor of the Ministry of Communications.
September of the same year was appointed Confidential Secretary of the Minister of Communications.
November, 1916, was appointed Senior Secretary of the Privy Council.
April, 1927, was appointed concurrently Judge of the Court of Administrative Litigation.
June, 1934, was appointed Secretary General of the Privy Council.
August, 1939, resigned from the post at my own request.

1. Those who held the seats in the Privy Council were the President and Vice-President of the Privy Council, Privy Councillors, Prime Minister and State Ministers who were ministers of the respective ministries. Besides the above, the adult Imperial Princes of the Blood resident in Tokyo were also to attend meetings of the Council by Imperial order. The Princes, however, had never been present until I was relieved of office at the Privy Council, although they attended at the beginning when the institution of the Council was set up.
A State Minister, aside from the Prime Minister or a minister of a department, that is to say, a minister without portfolio, had no seat at the Privy Council.

Assistants of the Prime Minister and ministers of the departments, officials of the Cabinet and the Ministries were allowed to attend the Privy Council in order to assist the ministers in answering questions in the meeting. Ministers without portfolio often attended as "explainers" also. There was no limit to the number of "explainers", so they numbered at times more than ten. The "explainers" were, as occasion demanded, able when called upon and with the approval of the President, to supplement the explanation of the minister in charge. In fact, there were many occasions on which the "explainers" spoke.

2. The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was composed of several members who were nominated by the President of the Privy Council from among the Vice President of the Council and the Councillors. It was their duty to deliberate over the bills entrusted to them and to report the result of their deliberations to the President. The Committee, at its meeting used to make inquiries of the cabinet and the ministers concerned about the matter under discussion and get their replies. And to the inquiries, the minister concerned, as a general rule, had to make his reply. On behalf of the minister, however, his subordinate officials frequently made replies. These assistant officials were all called "explainers".

No shorthand whatever was used at the Privy Council. The record of proceedings was made in accordance with the provisions in the Privy Council Regulations and Regulations for Privy Council Procedure but it was merely the record of minutes of the proceedings written by the senior secretaries and not the exact record of all utterances of all members who spoke.

As for how to take notes of proceedings of the Investigation Committee meeting, there were no legal regulations in connection therewith, so that the gist of proceedings was recorded by the senior secretary for his keeping for reference. This practice was continued for a fairly long time; simply recording the subject, list of members present, summary of the proceedings, etc. In about 1921, however, there was a particularly diligent senior secretary and through his efforts, comparatively detailed notes of proceedings describing the gist of the utterance of each member came to be taken. But these were not the official records legally called for, so the records were sometimes precise and sometimes not, according to the judgment of the secretary in charge or the circumstances relative to the occasion. Sometimes it occurred that only a part of an utterance had been taken down.

In no notes of the proceedings mentioned above, were there any which were shown to state ministers or "explainers" present for confirmation.

On this 28th day of July, 1947.
At Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.

Deponent /s/ MURAKAMI, Kyoichi (seal)
Def. Doc. 2073 (Revised)

I, URIGITA Masao, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: /s/ Urigita, Masao (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ MURAKAMI Kyoichi (seal)
三・関係文書の作成
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF

OBATA, Tadayoshi

I, Tadayoshi OBATA, having first been duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet, and in accordance with the procedure, followed in my country, hereby depose as follows:

I reside at 42 Kitayanacho, Tenno-ku, Osaka. I was graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University in 1917, and secured a position with the Sumitomo Company, later becoming executive director of the Sumitomo Electric Wire and Cable Works at Osaka. In August, 1940, I was appointed Vice President of the Planning Board, but resigned in April, 1941. In April, 1945, I was appointed Governor of Aichi Prefecture. In June, 1945, I was appointed Governor General of the Tokai and Hokuriku District.

During the period from 1932 to 1940 I had occasion to make a number of trips to Manchuria and to spend considerable time there in connection with business. At that time I often saw Mr. HOSHINO, Naoki, who was then in the Government of Manchukuo, first in the Finance Ministry and later as Chief of the General Affairs Board.

In the first years in Manchukuo it was difficult for Japanese or other business men to do business there, but it became much easier after Mr. HOSHINO assumed the position of Chief of General Affairs Board. For one thing, some of the young officers and young officials in Manchukuo did not welcome outside business men, particularly in the early days of the new state. Mr. HOSHINO tried to decrease this feeling, although this was a difficult thing to do. There was no discrimination between Japanese and other foreign business men in Manchuria. The same regulations applied to both.

Mr. HOSHINO welcomed foreign capital which was sincerely interested in building up Manchuria and was not aiming only at speculative purposes. I had a plan to start an automobile industry there with a Japanese company and the General Motors Corporation from the United States. I suggested this and Mr. HOSHINO agreed with the idea. I told him American capital was necessary for Manchuria and he agreed with me. Later on Mr. Aikawa came in to Manchukuo and set up the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation. One of the inducements offered by Mr. Aikawa was his ability to get in foreign capital, particularly American capital and technique. The Manchurian authorities, however, were strict in their requirement that any corporation coming in would have to be incorporated under the laws of Manchukuo, regardless of where the corporation came from. I know about this because I tried to set up a branch of Sumitomo there but could not do so, and had to establish a new company -- a Manchukuo corporation.
Defense Doc. 2592

It was Mr. HOSHINO's idea to develop all industry in the country, particularly agriculture, in order to lay a solid foundation for the country's economy and the people's welfare. He was interested in developing both light and heavy industry, especially the automotive industry, since Manchukuo was a vast country and had insufficient rail transportation. Trucks were particularly necessary for the agricultural development which he wanted to see take place.

Mr. HOSHINO was anxious for Manchukuo to grow as an independent state generally. The China Incident was a disappointment to him and he wanted it terminated as soon as possible. While he was Chief of the General Affairs Board, he told me there were too many Japanese officials in Manchukuo and that the native Manchurians should play a greater part in government and economic activities. He tried to reduce the number of Japanese officials. He said that if Manchukuo needed technical help, the Japanese should assist, provided they became Manchurian citizens and acted as such, not as Japanese.

Concerning Mr. HOSHINO's relations with the Kwantung Army, it should be said that the reason he was able to get along with them was primarily because he was sincerely interested in building up Manchukuo. He conscientiously discharged his duties in the same way, far more so than most of the other Japanese officials there. The Kwantung Army officers, were for the most part, sincere and in the early days of Manchukuo I had the impression that they were the most capable and most idealistic officers of any part of the Japanese Army. This tradition of capability and sincerity continued, and so Mr. HOSHINO's attitude was respected.

On July 22, 1940, Mr. HOSHINO was appointed President of the Planning Board and Minister Without Portfolio in Prince KONOYE's Second Cabinet, and I was appointed Vice President of the Board in August of that year. The reason I was brought into the Planning Board was to analyze, from a business man's point of view, the various production figures in the impractical plans then being used. Mr. HOSHINO and I soon found out how impractical most of these plans were. It was a difficult position to be in for the China war was constantly expanding, with no termination in sight, and the United States soon began to ban certain exports to Japan. This added greatly to our economic difficulties and so we had to shift plans in order for Japan to meet her needs with what she had. The Planning Board could make plans and recommendations only. The final decision was always made by the Cabinet and executed by the various ministries.

The Planning Board had, as part of its business, formerly made plans and for the allocation of the foreign exchange which Japan obtained by her exports, but our foreign exchange shrank rapidly. Since Japan could not get new materials, the Board had to devise new means of getting by with what was available and so it turned to the plan for the Expansion of Productive Power, which had been set up in January, 1939. Counsel has shown me Exhibit 842 and this document contains that plan. This was another impractical plan which we had to constantly revise in the face of changing circumstances. The changes were made necessary primarily by the fact that production was decreasing as our supplies of steel scrap, oil, machine tools, aluminum and other items from the United States were diminishing. Accordingly, it was necessary to find new sources of those raw materials and products, and the plan for Expansion of Productive Power was the only way to do it. Japan was weak economically and the Planning Board had to devise some means of meeting the
demands put on it by the Army, Navy and civilian sources.

Japan was still importing some materials from the United States and the Netherlands East Indies, but these were insufficient for her current needs. What it was planned to receive from them, or any other sources, was the normal amount of peacetime imports and all the planning was based on a continuation of such imports only. The only purpose which was considered in making plans was that point on in China, and neither Mr. HOSHIINO nor I knew how much the Army and Navy required for use there. The uses to which they put the materials they demanded were kept entirely secret. If we had had in mind any future war, such as the Pacific War, in making these plans, these plans would have been of a very different nature from the ones we followed. The object of the Plan for Expansion of Productive Power was to turn out producers' goods for those most necessary items cut off from Japan by the export bans of foreign countries, and to attempt to balance the industries. The heavy industry in Japan was far inferior to the light industry and needed a great deal of developing to bring the economy into another meaningful and balanced relationship. By the Plan for Expansion of Productive Power the direct purpose was not to increase the amount of steel and other items, but the ability to produce them. The end of the plan was set for March of 1942, but we knew no definite amount could be realized by that time. At that time there was no particular division of the Planning Board having sole charge of this Plan so it was to be handled temporarily by the Fifth Division, which had formerly made allocations of foreign exchange and other funds which had dwindled so much.

As I said before, at this time the demands of the Army and Navy were very great. However, Mr. HOSHIINO and I tried to cut down the military allocations in favor of civilian goods and the Plan for Expansion of Productive Power. The Army and Navy got first priority but we always succeeded in reducing the allocations which they demanded by a large per cent and they never actually got the full allocation because of material shortages. There was a great deal of difficulty and argument over these allocations and although they were supposed to be decided by April of each year, I remember when I joined the Planning Board that the allocation had already been deferred from April to early in July, and when I resigned in April of the next year, the authorities concerned had been able to reach no agreement on allocations for the 1941 fiscal year.

Next I shall speak about the new economic structure. Counsel has shown me Exhibit 865 which contains the plan. The detailed plan was prepared by some of the young officials of the Planning Board. Mr. HOSHIINO took this plan in the autumn of 1940 and presented it to the Economic Ministers of the Cabinet. They expressed considerable opposition to the plan, especially Mr. Kobayashi, the Minister of Commerce and Industry. Mr. HOSHIINO agreed that it should be changed. The Economic Ministers of the Cabinet wanted the plan changed so that it would be more in favor of a laissez-faire economy. For instance, the original plan provided that large economic organizations were to take over all industries and run them efficiently, weeding out the small and inefficient business concerns. Mr. Kobayashi wanted the government to help the small business men instead, and Mr. HOSHIINO agreed with him. I do not have a copy of the original plan and I do not know where one can be found, since it was not adopted. I shall relate some of the changes made by Mr. HOSHIINO and the other Economic Ministers, as I remember them, after many negotiations.
1. There were added to the original plan the words, "to stabilize the welfare and well-being of the people", or words to that effect, to the plans set out in the plan. This was to act as a check on the too great emphasis on a synthetic and planned economy and was a check on any radical change, being more in favor of maintenance of the status quo.

2. In paragraph 3 of Section II, the plan originally read: "enterprise must be separated or combined" instead of "may be separated or combined." I have underlined the work in the original plan which was changed.

3. In paragraph 4 of Section II the original plan read: "medium and small enterprises shall be adjusted and unified."

4. In Section III, entitled, "Economic Organizations", paragraph (a) (2) originally read: "economic organizations shall be operated under the guidance of the one-leader principle." In short, the final plan on which Mr. Kobayashi and Mr. HOSHI NO concurred was a reversal of the original plan in many points.

After these changes had been made by Mr. HOSHI NO and the other Economic Ministers of the Cabinet, the plan became substantially as it stands now and was finally approved by the Cabinet. The Planning Board had nothing to do with the execution of the plan which had to be done by the Commerce and Industry Ministry. The new economic plan looked to a partial transfer of control of industry from the government to the businessmen of the control associations so that under the plan there would be less government control than formerly.

The Planning Board's aim under the more and more difficult conditions of the time, was a self-sufficient economy for Japan, pointing to a bise economy relationship with Manchukuo and China. Japan was to be the center of the highly developed industry because it was more advanced in those lines. Manchukuo and China would emphasize the raw material and basic industries. The industries in North China and Manchukuo were included in the planning because these had been included in the economic plans for the past several years, being already integrated with the Japanese economy. Japan, China and Manchukuo under the circumstances then prevailing, from the point of view of natural resources and production techniques, are interdependent and they did not seem to be prosperous without each other's cooperation.

Next I shall speak about the population policy, which is also contained in Exhibit 865. At this time the percentage of population increase in Japan was declining due to the change in social conditions in Japan and the war in China. In its execution the plan presupposed a state of peace and was aimed at the year 1960. Its real effects would not have been seen until that time. Furthermore, one of its immediate effects would be a decrease in the labor supply, since the plan aimed at the encouragement of marriage and restriction of employment of women over twenty years of age, and this meant a decreasing number of women laborers in the factories. It was a paper plan, which was very visionary.

The plan was prepared in the Welfare Ministry and was to be carried out by that Ministry. At that time it was the custom for such plans to be explained by the Planning Board, wherever they might have been proposed. Mr. HOSHI NO did not show much interest in the population plan, although I believe he gave some explanation of it, nor did he express any opinion on it.
Mr. HOSHINO gave his resignation to Prince KONOYE in early April of 1941. Five days later, in accordance with the usual custom, I tendered my resignation to the new President of the Planning Board and it was accepted.

Dated this 19th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ Tadayoshi OBATA (seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above mentioned date and place.

Witness: /s/ Maseo MIGITA (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Tadayoshi OBATA (seal)
Speech of Mr. HOSHIRO, Haoki  
(Chief of General Affairs, State Affairs Board, Manchukuo)  
3rd December, 1938

"Gentlemen, it is indeed a matter for congratulation to us that, as the main result of the present incident, the spirit of harmony and cooperation is overflowing among the countries and peoples in East Asia and the atmosphere of talking together of construction of a new world is fast spreading among them.

"This meeting of ours, which is a round table economic conference of Japan, Manchukuo and China, proves to be an excellent example for which I cannot but express my heart-felt gratification.

"However, when we calmly reflect upon the direct cause of the present incident, whatever it may have been, we cannot but reach the conclusion that the most fundamental cause lay in the fact that we Asiatic nations had not thoroughly understood the spirit of good-neighborliness and harmonious cooperation or did not quite satisfactorily grasp the idea of East Asia for East Asiatic peoples.

"I firmly believe that such a state of affairs would never have been brought about had each and every one of us, irrespective of age or sex, or rank, been imbued by the spirit of good-neighborliness and harmonious cooperation and had grasped the unshaken conviction of East Asia for East Asiatic peoples.

"It is, however, useless to talk over the past. The invincible armies of justice have been sent forward and the stubborn and refractory elements have already been swept from out of East Asia.

"What we ought to do today is to establish a world of new ideals in this East Asia which has been restored to our hands. The situation has, of course, not yet reached the stage of solution. Although suppressed in local regions, these stubborn and outrageous elements, not awoken from their prejudiced silly dreams, are still keeping on reviving, assisted persistently by those crafty and cunning fellows.

"That is why we are not allowed to have a day of idleness or a moment of ease in our course of constructing new East Asia.

"The incident has now entered upon the so-called stage of long term construction when we should set ourselves up against the protracted war of attrition as planned by them by, on the one hand,
pushing same (T.N. construction of New East Asia) ahead without slackening our punitive measures against them and, on the other hand, by diligently concentrating our efforts towards the task of construction and management. /T.N. can also imply "administration" or "exploitation"/.

"And, I think, to establish firmly the first stage of the administration of a new East Asia, by overcoming all difficulties encountered in the course of a long-term construction war, is precisely how many souls can be compensated for their precious sacrifices for the regeneration of East Asia, and how the present incident's significance as a sacred war will be heightened throughout the entire world.

"Looking back upon East Asia in the past, although it occupies an area equivalent to a little less than one-tenth of the total land area of the world and has a population reaching a little over one-fourth of the world's total population, it seems to have been vainly wandering in the dark.

"However, the trend of the Orient to restore her proper position in world civilization is now at its climax, driving away the evil clouds of many years.

"The bell for the awakening of East Asia was sounded, I think, long ago in the Meiji Restoration of the Japanese Empire. And its first step realized on the continent was the Manchurian Incident, the recent China Incident being a development and expansion thereof.

"In consequence of this, there was first the establishment of Manchukuo, and now the establishment of the governments, each new and strong, in North China, Central China, and on the Mongolian Border.

"Here we see the revelation of God and hear the voice of Heaven.

"Construction of a new East Asia ---- this indeed is truly the great duty imposed upon us, the people of East Asia, we must advance towards its fulfilment with the determination to engage ourselves bravely in this duty by staking our eternal lives and honor.

"In other words, the various races, in mutual cooperation and harmony, must awaken themselves to the realization that they are a single organic body of the peoples of East Asia, take full cognizance of the fact that they are the peoples of East Asia, and flatly reject the idea of conflict, blind obedience, exploitation and being exploited which are based on egoistic and utilitarian demands which are, in turn, the most basic evils of the present world. Furthermore, they must put their whole heart and soul in the realization, by themselves, of the ideal world of mutual harmony and pleasure based on the exaltation of the morals of the East.
Thus, the confusion of the past will be swept away and East Asia would exert a strong pressure upon the evils of the world. In this way, the flower of morality of the East based on the firm unification of the races will flourish gloriously forever.

This is by no means a futile and self-intoxicated fantasy. It is easily conceivable from the experience undergone by Manchukuo in the course of her development.

However, there is a point to which we must pay special attention. It seems that the present international situation is critical and its prospect is very difficult to foresee.

Therefore, in the promotion of this protracted constructive war in which each state must stand on a very firm base, it is necessary that we be prepared and determined so that any changes confronted at any time can be met with a bold attitude.

In other words, long-term construction must be planned most carefully and minutely in all phases so as most soundly to achieve the desired result.

Now when this is viewed as an actual problem, it is required at the present first stage of long-term construction that the various attempts at long-term construction be, in addition, measures fully sufficient to cope with the present critical international situation. Accordingly, the most realistic and effective construction policy at the present stage must be to mobilize the economic power existing in the various regions of East Asia, to synthesize and organize this, and thereby endeavor to surmount the present critical situation.

When considered in this way, the function to be performed by our Manchukuo at the present stage of long-term construction is naturally clear, and we keenly feel that this is extremely important. The fact that our Manchukuo, born at the first stage of East Asia's new life, can at the very start of its /TN: i.e. East Asia's/ regular construction bear one half of that grave responsibility tells us most consisely and frankly of the growth of Manchukuo, for which we all cannot help expressing our hearty joy.

Regarding the state of affairs before the founding of Manchukuo, I think I need not tell you, but even after its foundation, pessimistic views were apt to be observed here and there concerning the natural resources in Manchukuo. These rumors, however, have completely disappeared before the undeniable fact today. With regard to iron ore, coal, magnesium, aluminum and other staple mineral resources indispensable to development of heavy industry which may be considered as a barometer of national power for modern countries, we have attained to the stage in
which we may well show off to the world the quality and quantity of these
important mineral resources. As a matter of fact, we have already contri­
buted a great deal to the intensification of economic power of our friendly
nation.

"As for power source which is important for the development of mining
industry, it was believed in the past that there was no water power source
in Manchukuo. This belief has entirely been contradicted, and today, a
large scale water power plan, one of the largest in the world, is steadily
being carried out here and there.

"In like manner, we can see a fruitful result for our effort to
develop agriculture, livestock raising and forestry as well.

"Such a remarkable progress of industry and economy of Manchukuo —
s aspect of so fast and steady development which is even considered one of
the wonders of the twentieth century — is indeed a precious guide-post
to the new birth of East Asia. At the same time, I believe, it will con­
tribute a good deal in the future to the development of industry in the
whole area of the New East Asia. When I think of the future so promising,
my heart is filled with such emotions that cannot be expressed in mere words.

"This is unmistakably an unshakable pyramid of Japan-Manchukuo union
as well as racial cooperation and harmony.

"I wonder what kind of aspect another pyramid will present before
our eyes when it is built up before long by the hands of awakened peoples
in East Asia — through their inseparable cooperative efforts, at the
second stage when the construction of East Asia has entered into its
actual course. For the present we can only say that we can do nothing
but earnestly look forward to it.

"East Asia is now displaying youthful and lively activities of this
everlasting life before our new solemn pledge. Thousands of years ago,
our forefathers left for us those glorious cultural inheritances which
will never be forgotten in the world history. We who are the most right­
ful inheritors of these inheritances should exert ourselves for the new
birth of a more glorious culture in East Asia. We firmly believe that
the construction of the new East Asia and new birth of fresh East Asiatic
culture should be established upon our unified strength.

"A big task of round-table economic conference among Japan, Manchukuo
and China has been undertaken lately. And especially today we are having
its final meeting here in Harbin, the capital of Manchukuo.

"I consider that it affords us a precious opportunity in the con­
struction of the new Orient that the men who are responsible for the
economic affairs of the newly risen governments in various parts of the
Orient have been able to gather together in the same room and have dis­
cussions heart to heart for the sake of the economic construction of the
new spirit, and it is my utmost honor and pleasure that I have been able to express my sincere thoughts to you all who are present:"

"All those present in this hall representing the various circles are requested to discuss fully so as to carry this round-table conference to perfection, as well as to greatly contribute to the attainment of our common ideals."
昭和十一年

日経経済新聞社

赤城野道樹

は今次事業の最大の成功を果たし、東亜の諸邦、諸民族の間に益々
協同の精神を持ち上げ、新天地建設の機運を動き出すことができた。願
り申し上げました。今後の一日も一日と新しい変革を進めていかなければ
なりません。第1号

事業の成功は、私たちは、私共の共産党の精神の徹底にあります。東亜人
の精神の基盤、東亜人精神の基盤である。この理由であると論断されて
得ないのです。
No. 3  25/4

[手写内容，难以辨认]
これは近衛公が荒谷に口授した次の文の多数の文書に、同様のものであります。

右は一九四七年七月廿四日余の面前に於て宣誓誓名せしものなり。

行政部　歩兵中尉
バーナード・エー・ハーガドン
2
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

My name is USHIBA, Tomohiko. I reside at No. 79 Iriuda in the city of Odawara. I have previously testified in this case on two occasions concerning the writings of Prince KONOYE, for whom I acted as Private Secretary.

I have been shown Defense Document No. 1930 entitled, "The Change of Cabinet Ministers Related to Economic Affairs". I recognize this document to be in the handwriting of ARAYA, Shigeki, Prince KONOYE's Secretary to whom he habitually dictated the day's happenings in the Cabinet business. It is similar to numbers of other documents of that nature dictated to ARAYA by Prince Konoye.

/S/ Tomo. Ushiba
USHIBA, Tomohiko

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 24th day of July, 1947.

/S/ Bernard A. Hargadon
Bernard A. Hargadon, 1st Lt. Inf. Administrative and Personnel Officer
The Change of Cabinet Ministers Related to Economic Affairs (Apr. 3, 4)

After the Diet session, the reshuffling of the Cabinet became recognized generally as a matter of common sense. It was said that the Cabinet Ministers related to economic affairs were the weak point. The fact was that even if a conference of Cabinet Ministers related to economic affairs were held, there would have been no one capable of putting the matter into shape. Since Mr. HIRANO, Minister of Home Affairs and I were not well-versed in economic affairs, and since there was no alternative but to select a suitable person from the outside, I, after consulting with the Minister of Home Affairs, had to decide on whom to select. Mr. Seihin IKEDA was thought to be the proper choice, but he could not be very well drafted because there were strong objections to him by the reformists. Mr. Masatsune OGURA of Osaka became the next topic of our conversation.

When Mr. OGURA came to Tokyo, Mr. HIRANO, Minister of Home Affairs, and I broached the subject to him but he did not readily consent.

Finally Mr. OGURA consented, but upon being consulted in regard to the changes of other Cabinet Ministers related to economic affairs, he wanted the changes made simultaneously with his appointment to the Cabinet post. After all, if he alone entered the Cabinet ahead of the others, he would have had to perform the task of dismissing the govt. Ministers. This he did not like to do, whereas I wanted to have Mr. OGURA perform this duty.

Pertaining to the change of other Cabinet Ministers related to economic affairs, Mr. IKEDA held the opinion that the Finance Minister too must be replaced. Accordingly, Mr. Yadenji NAKAJIMA was suggested for this post. On the other hand, Mr. OGURA claimed that there was no necessity to change the Finance Minister, adding that NAKAJIMA especially was not acceptable.

Candidates for Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. OGURA suggested KITAMURA and NAKAGURA and if necessary FUJIMURA. The following names were subjected for President of the Planning Board; Teiichi SUZUKI, Tatsuo YAMADA, HARA, OKI and DOI.

With that Mr. OGURA returned to Osaka. March 30 issue of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Newspaper reported on the conference between OGURA and HIRANO and also on OGURA's entrance into the Cabinet. On the following day, the 31st, with the change in the staff of the JUKITOMO Honsha, Mr. OGURA's retirement as general director was announced. Under the circumstances it became urgent to make an announcement. I had the Ministers of War and Navy come to my OCHIKUBO residence. I told them about Mr. OGURA's entrance into the Cabinet and received their support. After both Ministers had left, I telephoned Mr. OGURA of Osaka. Upon discussing his independent entrance to the Cabinet, he still maintained that he would be distressed if he were not appointed together with the others. He stated that he would arrive in Tokyo the following morning and discuss the matter then.
However, Kamesaburo YAMASHITA called on this day. Since I knew that he had a voice in regard to OGURA, I told him about the negotiations with OGURA so far. I stated that unless OGURA entered independently it would be distressing, and requested him to persuade MR. OGURA to do so. He agreed. Since the position of MR. OGURA would be raised a grade thereby, he would persuade and make OGURA accept. ...and after negotiating with MR. OGURA over long-distance telephone that night, I also phoned MR. YAMASHITA.

MR. OGURA, who left Osaka on the morning of 1 April, arrived at Tokyo station at 17:20 o'clock and went to his residence in OKUBO. There MR. YAMASHITA called and conveyed my wishes.

At 20:00 o'clock that night, MR. OGURA visited me and consented to enter the Cabinet alone. He left at 21:00 that night. He said that he changed his mind, but the persuasion of MR. YAMASHITA seemed to have had considerable effect. ...after MR. OGURA left, I met with newspaper reporters and told them that this reconstruction was an independent thing. The newspaper apparently construed it to mean that the problem of the change of Cabinet Ministers relating to economic affairs had been settled for the time being. Accordingly the subsequent change in the Minister of Commerce and the President of the Planning Board was a complete surprise.

On April 2, I made a confidential report to the Emperor and at 14:30 o'clock of the same day the investiture of OGURA as Minister of State was held by His Majesty. OGURA left that night for Osaka for the purpose of reporting on his recent appointment at the Imperial Mausoleum. When I conferred with OGURA as to the possible choice of Teiichi SUZUKI as President of the Planning Board, which position must be filled by a person who knows about the commodity mobilization plan and also the inner workings of the Army and who must be a forceful person, he expressed his approval.

At 20:30 o'clock of the 2nd, the day of MR. OGURA's investiture, I called Lt. Gen. SUZUKI to my OKUBO residence and proposed his appointment to the presidency of the Planning Board. Lt. Gen. SUZUKI replied it would be all right with him, but the Navy might object. ...asserting that the balance of power between the Army and Navy would surely become a problem, he said he could not decide this matter himself and showed some disapproval. His point of view was indeed justified.

On hearing this, a thought suddenly occurred to me. Then I should select the Minister of Commerce from the Navy and appoint Vice Navy Minister TOYODA as Minister of Commerce and Industry. This was the sudden thought which occurred to me from hearing Lt. Gen. SUZUKI's story. To be sure, I had the following preliminary data showing that Vice Navy Minister TOYODA was qualified for the suggested post:

1. The story that Vice Minister TOYODA, at the conference of Vice Ministers, once argued down the Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry on the problem of iron and coal.

2. According to Baron Bunkichi ITO, MR. KACHISABURO KIRA had Vice Minister TOYODA in mind as his successor for the post of the President of the Ippon Iron Manufacturing Company. On top of the fact that MR. TOYODA was not altogether an amateur in commercial and industrial administration, his appointment as the Minister of Commerce would make the following matters possible:
(1) The character of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry as a Munitions Ministry would become clear. This, together with the Planning Board headed by President SUZUKI would mark an advance toward the perfection of the national defense structure.

(2) The balance of power between the Army and Navy would be maintained.

(3) As for Mr. AOKUJU, Minister of Commerce, he would lose face if he were replaced by a businessman or a young bureaucrat. (Actually there were no suitable persons among the businessmen and bureaucrats.) However, if his successor came from the military, looking at it entirely from the demand for transformation of the ministry into a munitions ministry, the matter of prestige for him would be dissolved. These and many other things could be enumerated. When I mentioned this to Lt. Gen. SUZUKI, he said this was a capital idea and said he would also mention it to the War Minister. He left me at 23:30 o'clock that night.

When leaving me Lt. Gen. SUZUKI said that should the topic of the conversation leak out, he would, if questioned by newspapermen on tonight's interview, tell them that we discussed various matters pertaining to the East Asia Bureau of the Yokusenkei (Imperial Rule Assistance Association.)

On April 3, when I met Navy Minister CIKA' in the waiting room of the Imperial Sanctuary on Emperor JULIUS Day, I discussed this matter with him. The Navy Minister endorsed this as excellent and said that since War Minister TOJO was not there, after conferring with the War Minister, he would again speak about it to me.

After that, upon relating this to KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in the same waiting room of the Imperial Sanctuary, he also endorsed it.

That day about 14:20 o'clock the private secretary of the Navy Minister informed me on the telephone that both the War Minister and Navy Minister would soon call at my OGUKUBO residence. Both Ministers arrived at 14:40 o'clock and gave me their replies of endorsement. On this occasion War Minister TOJO suggested that Lt. Gen. SUZUKI be placed on the reserve list and appointed not only as President of the Planning Board but also hold the additional office of Minister of State without Portfolio. I agreed to this suggestion. OGIKUBO also stated that Vice Admiral TOYODA would be placed on the reserve list.

After both the War Minister and the Navy Minister had left at 15:30 o'clock, I telephoned to the Osaka residence of Mr. OGURA, Minister of State without Portfolio, but he was absent, for he had not yet returned from his visit to the Imperial Mausoleum. After a while, at 18:45 of the same day, there was a telephone call from Mr. OGURA and I talked to him about the appointments of Lt. Gen. SUZUKI and Vice Admiral TOYODA. When I asked for his opinion, Mr. OGURA also heartily endorsed this. Then I reported by telephone the progress of the discussions so far, together with the support of Mr. OGURA, to KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. GIKUYU, newly Minister of State, and War Minister TOJO.
That night at 23:10, I called Navy Minister OIKAWA by phone and found out that when the Navy Minister conferred with Vice Minister TOYODA at 20:00 that night, the Vice Minister was much reluctant and requested time to ponder over it.

On the morning of April 4, OKA, chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs of the Naval Ministry, came to make an interim report, informing me that it was still difficult to realize. So I requested that the Navy Minister try once more to persuade Mr. TOYODA.

However, Navy Minister OIKAWA reported to me just prior to the Cabinet conference that, although everything would be all right, he wanted the Premier to speak in person. Accordingly, at 11:30 of the same day, I had Vice Minister TOYODA come to my official residence. Although I spoke to him in person, he did not reply in the affirmative, saying that he had no confidence in his ability to hold the post. He wanted to have another day to think it over. Lest the story might leak if another day were taken, I asked him to give me a reply by 18:00 that night.

When the War and Navy Ministers called on me later, they asked me about Mr. TOYODA's reply. When I related the aforementioned matter, the War Minister wanted an answer by 15:00, saying 18:00 would be too late. Since the Navy had already obtained the consent of Lt. Gen SUZUMI, and had begun the necessary procedure, there was a fear of leakage and therefore wanted the Navy to expedite the matter. Of course, it was better for me to have it settled as soon as possible, so we decided to have the Navy Minister persuade Mr. TOYODA once more. I summoned KISHINO, Minister of Home Affairs and requested that he too meet to persuade Vice Minister TOYODA.

As a result, at 15:00 of the same day, Navy Minister OIKAWA and Vice Minister TOYODA came to my official residence together. The reply of consent was finally obtained. At that time the Navy Minister said that he would recommend the promotion of Vice Minister TOYODA to full admiral. I had heard that the Vice Minister was due for promotion to full admiral that autumn. It seems that since Mr. TOYODA desired much to remain in active service, it was arranged to have him put on the reserve list in exchange for his promotion to full admiral.

Since Mr. TOYODA consented, I called and told KISHINO, President of the Planning Board. He had been already informed beforehand by Mr. TOJO. It was quickly settled. On the part of Minister of Commerce and Industry MOKUYASHI, various rumors were circulated among the people. Since there were rumors that he might refuse to resign, I had Mr. KIRA come to the Japanese room of my residence and told him the state of things so far and had him go to Minister of Commerce and Industry MOKUYASHI.

Upon hearing that his successor was Vice Minister TOYODA of the Navy, Mr. MOKUYASHI gladly entrusted his resignation to Mr. KIRA, explaining that the choice suited him, although he would not consent if the choice were Mr. FUJIMI. The matter was settled in about 20 minutes and Mr. KIRA returned.

Accordingly, after inquiring as to the convenience of the Imperial Court, I went to the Imperial Palace at 17:30 and un-officially reported to His Majesty the proposed appointments.
Having received the Imperial sanction, I announced this at once. At 20:00 of the same day, the investiture ceremony for Mr. TOYODA as Minister of Commerce and Industry and Mr. SUZUKI as President of the Planning Council was held.

Supplementary News

Since this reorganization was effected in absolute secrecy, the public was completely surprised when the announcement was made.

It was because it had materialized in such a short time. Another reason was, with the appointment of Mr. OGURA as Minister without portfolio, the supposition became stronger that the change of the Minister of Commerce and Industry, President of the Planning Council and others would be executed gradually in accordance with Mr. OGURA’s opinion. Due to the fact that April 3 was a press holiday, the attention of the press was not as sharp as it was on other days. This also had some influence.

I understand that when the announcement was made after the Prime Minister met in private with the Emperor, the newspaper reporters said, "We were beaten". It was exactly so.

On the morning of the fourth, Gen. Tsukimi KUDO, who was an investigator of the Planning Council and became the section chief under new President SUZUKI, came to Mr. TEBE, Chief of General Affairs Section of the Cabinet, and indignantly said, "President KOSHDNO is willing to resign. Why should persons like LOB.YASHI be allowed to stay in office to dilly dally. Under the circumstances there is no alternative but to dismiss him." I wonder what kind of face Mr. KOSHINO had, when he heard the announcement in the afternoon.

When private secretary TAKAHASHI was sick in bed, in the afternoon of the 3rd, there was a phone call from the private secretary of the Navy Minister, indicating that the Mr. and the Navy Ministers would like to call on the Premier. He suggested that inquiry be made directly to my own residence. In the evening of the next day, the fourth, Mr. TAKAHASHI heard the sound of bells with shouts of newspaper extras. "While he was wondering what it could be about, he received a phone call from USHIBA, another private secretary, informing him about the Cabinet reorganization. Surprised by this report, he recalled the phone call of the previous day.

Struck with admiration by the brilliant achievement of the reorganization, which they characterized as a stroke of genius, all the newspapers expressed approval of this reorganization and are placing great expectations in the future.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
- vs -
ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Doponont: OSHIMA, Hiroo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, OSHIMA, Hiroo, have set forth my career as below:

After graduating from the Law Course of the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1930, since April 1931 I served in the Home Ministry, Niigata, Shimane and Fukuoka Prefectural Offices and the Metropolitan Police Board in succession.

From November 1934 I served in the Department of Civil Affairs in Manchukuo, and since November 1936 served in the Bureau of Peace in the Home Ministry and Toyama Prefecture in Japan.

In October 1940 I was appointed a Staff member of the Total War Research Institute.

In July, 1943 I was appointed the Bureau Chief in the Ministry of "Welfare, and November 1943 was appointed a secretary of the Cabinet.
In July 1944 I was appointed the Governor of Aomori Prefecture.

In April 1945 I was appointed the Chief of the Custody Bureau in the Home Ministry, and relieved of the post in January 1946.

1. Around the middle of September of 1940 when I was one of the section chiefs of the Home Ministry, I was asked by the authorities dealing with personnel in the same ministry if I would go to the Total War Research Institute which was to be opened soon, and I gave them my consent.

2. The aim and the business of the Institute were just as provided for in the Imperial Ordinance concerning the Total War Research Institute; however, as I understood then its chief business was rather for the education of the younger people so as to do away with sectionalism then prevailing among government offices and civilian organizations. The idea for the Institute had originated with the 1st Kono and Yonai Cabinet, but its realization did not occur until Kono's 2nd Cabinet.

3. The Institute was to be opened on October 1st, however, since my duty was to do miscellaneous business, I went to its office for preparation beforehand. It had no office of its own yet, and rented a small room in the Houses of Parliament Building without any desks, chairs or other business facilities. I had to arrange with some other offices for the use of furniture necessary for business.
4. On the 1st of October, the opening day of the Institute, we for the first time met with Mr. Hoshino, the acting president of the Institution, but he did not say anything other than that he would leave all matters to us. At that time, the staff of the Institution consisted of seven including myself and we were to start the work in this rented office with a clerk, a typist and a telephone operator. However, being without any order or instruction from the Prime Minister, under whose administration the Institute was placed or Mr. Hoshino, the acting president, we, the staff members had to study by ourselves what kind of work should be carried on.

5. At the end of October of 1940 the office was removed from the Houses of Parliament Building to one of the houses belonging to the Cabinet, but we were to share this house with other offices for some time. From April 1941, about 35 students entered the Institution, and in a converted lecture room in this house the lectures were begun. But as the house became too small, a new building was erected.

6. As I recollect, the budget of the Institute for the first year of its opening was yen 160,000, which was to be spent in paying Institute personnel and office expenditures. There was no estimate of expenditures for the work of the Institute.

7. As the Institute did not, for practical purposes, operate until January of 1941 when Lt. G. Iimura became president, we had
no business on which to report to Mr. Hoshino. During this period he did not visit the Institution at all, gave us no order, instruction or suggestion concerning it, and showed no interest in the work of the Institute. Being embarrassed at such a situation, I had to go to his office twice to ask him for information as to when the president would be selected.

3. About May or June of 1941 Mr. Hoshino was selected by the Institution as one of the councillors which consisted of 15 or 16 persons; however the position of councillor was really nominal and honorary, having no practical work in relation to the Institute, and Mr. Hoshino as such gave us neither instruction nor suggestion.

4. Lt. G. Iimura was formally appointed the president of the Institution in January 1941; however, he had arrived in Tokyo in November with an informal order to be the future president, and, with the request of the staff of the Institute, he advised us and took over practical leadership. With this, the works of the Institute began to be in a little more concrete shape.

In other words, he started to draft various plans and to make preparations for education. The adoption of the system of the total maneuver in education was one of the plans thus framed under his guidance at this time.

As I was told, the circumstance under which Lt. G. Iimura was picked as the president was that he was well qualified as an educator of young students and had an even temperament. As the president, he proved to be a good educator as we had expected. He once said to me jokingly of his disappointment in holding such a second-rate position.
10. As for the students of the Institute, we admitted from one to four from each Department of the Government proportionately to the number of officials therein, and we also took six or seven from business organizations. There were some taken from the press among the latter.

11. The Institute personnel were reduced on account of the policy of the simplification of administration at the end of 1942 during the Pacific War, and the Institute for practical purposes, ceased to operate at the end of 1943 when the third group of students finished their course.

On this 3 day of Sept., 1947

At I.M.T.F.L.

DEPOSITION OSHIMA Hiroo (seal)

I, MIGITa, Masao hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) MIGITa, Masao (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

OSHIMA Hiroo (seal)
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

In March, 1937 (Shows 12) I graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University. Immediately after that I found work in the Ministry of Finance.

In July, 1940 (Shows 15) when Mr. HOSHINO, Naoki, took office as president of the Planning Board, I was appointed as secretary to the president. From then until April of the following year, when Mr. HOSHINO resigned from the post of president of the Planning Board, I worked closest to him and then I returned to the Ministry of Finance. I am now working at the Accountants' Bureau.

Even after resigning from my post as his secretary, at the request of Mr. HOSHINO, I almost always lived at his private house, and took charge of the transaction of his miscellaneous business, collection of materials for his speeches and his discussions, arrangement of his manuscripts, etc. and whatnot.

Now I will state below what I know directly or from those who were with him about the movements of Mr. HOSHINO during the period between his resignation from the post of president of the Planning Board of the Kongo Cabinet, in April, 1941 (Shows 16) and his inauguration as Chief Secretary of the Tojo Cabinet, in October of the same year.

After his retirement from his office as president of the Planning Board, Mr. HOSHINO spent his days chiefly in reading books, exercises and travels to the provinces.

Those who visited him most frequently at that time were Mr. ISHIMATA, Sotaro, Mr. IRIMOTO, Takeo and Mr. OKATA, Tadayoshi, Mr. HOSHINO's intimate friends since his school days. These men visited him as companions in conversations and amusements. Besides these people, Mr. KAWAI, Yoshinori, Mr. TAKAMACHI, Tokuji, and Mr. IDE, Norimichi, a painter, came to his house to play...
tennis with him. These were about all who ever visited him during the period and no visit or contact ever made by any of the so-called professional politicians. His life was that of unemployment to the letter.

Mr. HOSHINO visited Mr. TOJO only once. Immediately after his resignation, he dropped in the official residence of the War Minister for a courtesy call regarding the resignation. He has never visited Mr. TOJO since then, nor has he ever seen Mr. TOJO at any place outside their homes, nor has he ever talked with Mr. TOJO on the telephone.

As for his local trips it was as he said when he resigned as the President of the Planning Board that "because of my being away in Manchuria for so long a period there is a necessity hereafter to look about the actual conditions in every field more frequently than ever." Starting with the trip for Kansai area in April 1941, he made such long trips as going to Hokkaido, Aomono-shidate and Fukuchiyama areas, Shikoku and Okayama areas, Yoshida area, Tottori area and Kobe, Nagoya, Kyoto and so on, which were more often interrupted by short trips such as to Oshima, Gunma Prefecture and the like; so much so that he could hardly find time to rest at his home in Tokyo. Except for the initial trip to Kansai area on which I accompanied him, his trips were as a rule with his daughter or his other family members.

In October he planned to come back to Tokyo, after going to Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya areas, in order to attend the discussion meeting sponsored by the "Oriental Economist Publishing Co., Ltd," and from the 19th of the same month on, to go to the Northern part of Kyushu and Korea. The previous consultations concerning the date of his start, etc., with Mr. DATE, Muneaki (then serving at the Finance Ministry) who was to go with him, had been already completed. Making use of the few days of his stay in Tokyo, he went on 19 October to the Kabuki Theater together with his family. Just then, around five o'clock PM, at the entrance of the Kabuki Theater, he read an extra reporting "The Imperial Order came for Mr. TOJO", and Mr. HOSHINO for the first time knew the fact. With only the observation, "Mr. TOJO will have hardships", he continued seeing the Kabuki Play. Then unexpectedly before eight o'clock PM he was called out by loud speaker, and was told to go to General TOJO's residence.

On this account he was obliged to hurriedly cancel his prearranged trips after the 19th.

On this 13 day of September, 1947.

At Tokyo.

/s/ MURAKAMI, Hajimu
OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ MURAKAMI, Hajimu

On this 13th day of September 1947
At Tokyo

DEPOSITION: MURAKAMI, Hajimu (seal)

I, Resuke MATSUDA, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) Resuke LATSUDA (seal)
Organization on the Offices and Officials attached to the Cabinet
(1st, October, 1941)
Imperial Ordinance No. 307
December 20, 1924

We sanction the revision of the cabinet's official organization and it is hereby promulgated.

The Organization of the Offices and Officials attached to the Cabinet.

Article 1.
The Cabinet Secretariat and the following three bureaux shall be established in the Cabinet.
   The Pension Bureau
   The statistics Bureau
   The Printing Bureau

Article 2.
The Cabinet Secretariat shall take charge of the following business.
   1. Matters concerning the promulgation of Imperial
edicts and decrees, laws and ordinances.


3. Matters concerning the Examination, drafting, receipt and dispatch of official documents.

4. Matters concerning the appointment, promotion, resignation and status of officials.

5. Matter concerning the Personal history of higher officials of every office.

6. Matters concerning the custody of official seals.

7. Matters concerning the editing and preservation of official documents.

8. Matters pertaining to fiscal accounts of the Cabinet.

9. Matters pertaining to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and general matters concerning the movement to assist the Imperial Rule.

Article 3.

The Pension Bureau shall take charge of the following business:

1. Matters pertaining to the adjudication of the rights to receive pensions.

2. Adjudication on pension reports.
Def. Doc. # 2144

4. Matters pertaining to the pension treasury.

Article 4.
(repealed)

Article 5.
The Statistics Bureau shall take charge of the following business:
1. Consolidation of statistics of every administrative department.
2. Superintendence of international statistical business.
3. Statistics on population, labour and other basic status of the nations, which do not belong to any administrative department.
5. Matters pertaining to the training of statistical officials and the summoning and meetings of the chief statistical officials of every administrative office.

Besides the previously mentioned, the Statistics Bureau may make graph charts of the statistics proposed, in compliance with requests of every administrative office, public bodies, corporation or foundations aimed at public welfare.
Article 6.

The Printing Bureau shall take charge of the following business:

1. The Editing and sale of the Official Gazette, compendium of laws and ordinances, list of government officials and other books.

2. Matters pertaining to the printing of the Official Gazette and other books.

3. Manufacture of stamps, postage stamps, bills and other printed matters.

4. Matters pertaining to paper manufactures.

Article 7.

The following officials shall be established in the cabinet:

Chief Secretary -- Chokunin rank
Chief of the Pension Bureau -- Chokunin rank
Chief of the Statistics Bureau -- Chokunin rank
Chief of the Printing Bureau -- Chokunin rank
Four Secretaries in full service -- Sonin rank
Two Procurators in full service -- Sonin rank
Two Secretaries to the Prime Minister in full service -- Sonin rank
Two Secretaries to the Pension Bureau in full service -- Sonin rank
Two Secretaries to the Statistics Bureau in full service -- Sonin rank
Four Statistical Officials to the Statistics Bureau in full service -- Sonin rank
Three Secretaries to the Printing Bureau in full service -- Sonin rank
Six Procurators to the Printing Bureau in full service -- Sonin rank
Twenty-three Technicians to the Printing Bureau in full service -- Sonin rank
Ten Probational Statistical Officials in the Statistics Bureau, in full service -- Hannin rank
One hundred and ninety Subordinate Officials in full service -- Hannin rank
One hundred and eighty-eight Assistant Technicians in full service -- Hannin rank

Article 8.
In addition to the officials mentioned Article 7, there shall be in the Pension Bureau medical advisers, their member will be designated as three persons one of whom will be a standing medical advisor.

The medical advisors shall be appointed by the cabinet upon the request of the Prime Minister.

The medical advisors shall be treated as Imperial
appointees or Imperially approved officials; however, those who are in regular government service will be treated as such.

Article 9.

The Chief Secretary shall assist the Prime Minister, take charge of confidential documents, manage the general affairs of the cabinet, superintend officials in the Secretariat and himself handle the appointment, promotion and resignation of officials of Hannin and inferior ranks.

Article 10.

Every bureau chief shall take charge of the business of their bureaux under the direction of the Prime Minister.

Article 11.

The secretary and procurator shall take charge of the business of the cabinet secretariat under the direction of the authorities.

Article 12.

The Secretary to the Prime Minister shall take charge of secret business under the directions of the Prime Minister.

Article 13.

The secretaries, administrators, and procurators of every bureau shall take charge of the business matters of
Def. Doc. # 2144

every bureau under the direction of the authorities.

Article 14.

The medical advisor to the Pension Bureau shall investigate medical matters with regard to pensions in compliance with the inquiry of the Chief of the Pension Bureau.

Article 15.

The statistical officials to the Statistics Bureau shall take charge of statistics under the direction of the authorities.

Article 16.

The technicians of the Printing Bureau shall take charge of technical matters under the direction of the authorities.

Article 17.

The assistant statistical officials to the Statistics Bureau shall be engaged in statistics under the directions of the authorities.

Article 18.

Subordinate officials shall be engaged in general affairs under the direction of the authorities.
Article 19.

The assistant technicians shall be engaged in technical affairs under the direction of the authorities.

Article 20.

The secretaries to the state minister and subordinate officials, not exceeding three persons and 6 persons in full service respectively may be installed in the cabinet as officials attached to the state minister as prescribed in Article 10 of the Cabinet Ordinance.

The secretary to the state minister shall be an Imperially approved official and shall take charge of secret business matters under the direction of the state minister.

The subordinate officials, prescribed in clause 1, shall be under the direction of the state minister or his secretary in respect to their duties.

Appendix

This ordinance shall take effect from the date of promulgation.

The Colonization administration Bureau Organization, the Statistics Bureau Organization, Printing Bureau Organization and Imperial Ordinance No. 49 in 1894 are hereby abrogated.
Appendix

(Imperial Ordinance No. 845, 1940)

This Ordinance shall take effect from the date of promulgation.

In Article 14 of the Ordinance on Pay for higher officials "the secretary to the State Minister" shall be included after "members of the Total War Research Institute."
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, SATO, Asao, who occupy the post of Commissioner to the Cabinet, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Organization on the Offices and Officials to the Cabinet" is an exact and true copy of official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Cabinet).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 21st day of August, 1947

/S/ SATO, Asao (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ NARUSHIMA, Masanori (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et

AFFIDAVIT OF

INADA, Shuichii

I, INADA, Shuichii, having been duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet in accordance with the custom followed in my country, hereby depose and state as follows:

I was Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Cabinet Secretariat from November 1937 until April 1945. Thus I was in this position when Mr. HOSHIRO, Taichi, was president of the Fleming Board and Minister Without Portfolio in the Second KONOYE Cabinet in 1940, and sometime later, after his appointment as Chief Secretary of the TOJO Cabinet in October 1941, I served under him. One of my duties was to be in charge of the documents filed in the Cabinet Secretariat.

Next, I shall speak about the matter of how "explainers" attend the Privy Council meeting. In my position with the Cabinet Secretariat I used to receive notices from the Secretary of the Privy Council to arrange to send the minimum number of explainers necessary to attend a particular meeting of the Privy Council. I would then notify the various ministers to this effect and they in turn would decide on and issue orders to their subordinates as to who would attend the meeting as explainers to assist them.

About six o'clock in the evening of the day when General TOJO was appointed by the Emperor to form a cabinet in October 1941, as I recall, I was requested to see him quite suddenly. When I visited him at the official residence of the War Minister, Colonel Akamatsu, who later became the secretary to the Premier, was also there waiting for me. General TOJO said to me that, being appointed as Prime Minister, he had to select someone as Chief Secretary to the Cabinet. However, he was not familiar with the affairs of the civil service and he wanted me to state frankly my opinion on what kind of person could be deemed proper for the post of Chief Secretary, and who would be most fitting to discharge the secretarial business from the point of view of those of us in the Cabinet Secretariat who would be under him. I first hesitated to answer but, being rather pressed by Colonel Akamatsu for my unreserved opinion, I stated my general opinion to the following effect: The Chief Secretary should be first, a man of ability without being autocratic and second, should have a good record in the civil service. General TOJO then gave me the names of some persons, one of whom was Mr. HOSHIRO. He asked me if we, the
secretariat, could discharge our business smoothly under him. I replied that Mr. HOSHINO had had much experience in official business so that I thought him the proper person for the post and that we of the Secretariat could work well under him. General TOJO then asked me concerning the procedure to be followed in forming a cabinet, after which he thanked me for my opinion and I left. The next day I learned that Mr. HOSHINO had been appointed Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. After his appointment, Mr. HOSHINO told me that all he had been doing after resigning from the KONOYE Cabinet in April 1941 and until just before his recent appointment was to travel around Japan.

It was part of the prescribed duties of the Chief Cabinet Secretary to have Imperial Rescripts prepared in the Secretariat. Accordingly, during the latter part of November 1941, Mr. HOSHINO ordered me to prepare an Imperial Rescript to be issued in the event the negotiations with the United States should be successful, and another Imperial Rescript proclaiming a state of war with the United States and Great Britain. The former was listed on a memorandum which Mr. HOSHINO gave me saying, "This should also be prepared as it may be necessary." The memorandum was written in pencil in Mr. HOSHINO's handwriting, containing five items listing things to be done in the event the negotiations with the United States were successful, and read: "Measures to be taken in case Japan should suffer great hardship -- (1) Request the Emperor to proclaim Imperial Decree -- Settle the People's Minds and Retention of the National Power." This is as much as I remember of what I read. The memorandum was then typed and I returned it to Mr. HOSHINO. The memorandum was placed in the Secretariat files and was later destroyed by fire as I heard during an air raid in 1945.

After receiving this memorandum from Mr. HOSHINO I began drafting the Imperial Rescript. I showed the draft Rescript for peace to Mr. HOSHINO early in December, I believe it was, after he had told me to hurry the preparation of it. After looking it over, he did not approve the draft but returned it to me for reconsideration. It was my intention at the time to revise the draft and resubmit it, but the press of other business was too great and it remained in a pending status until after the outbreak of the Pacific war. If this draft had been needed for actual use, the normal course would have been to revise it several times until the Rescript was satisfactory.

I cannot remember now the exact contents of this draft of the Imperial Rescript for peace. However, its general purport was that Japan would be put in a very difficult position but that the Japanese people should endeavor to maintain the national strength and keep friendly relations with the other nations of the world. This draft was, of course, never used. After the outbreak of hostilities I destroyed the only two copies of the draft which had been made, i.e., the one in my own handwriting and the other which I had shown Mr. HOSHINO but which he had returned to me. This destruction was done since it was recognized that there was no further need for the drafts and also because it was a practice in the Cabinet Secretariat that, inasmuch as Imperial Rescripts are issued from the Throne, all preparatory drafts had to be burned.

On this 16th day of September 1947
At Tokyo.

DEponent: /s/ IOKADA, Shuichi (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ INADA, Shuichi (seal)

I, MIGITA, Masao, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.
On the same date at Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ MIGITA, Masao (seal)
自分発の写しハルル方式ニ従ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ為シタル上

FILL COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
ただし、この文書は日本語で書かれているため、自然なテキストの読み取りは困難です。画像を拡大してより詳細な読み取りをお試しください。
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）九月十六日
於東京

立

田　政

夫
The Regulations of the Decoration Conference

Imperial Ordinance No. 115
26th Year of Meiji 1893

Article I. For the purpose of deliberating on the propriety of the grant and deprivation of the ranks, decorations and annuities a Decoration Conference shall be established in the Bureau of Decoration.

Article II. The Decoration Conference shall be consisted of the chief of the Bureau of Decoration and Gijōken, (the Councillors).

Article III. The chair of the Decoration Conference shall be taken by the Chief of the Bureau of the Decoration. If the Chief is unable to do so the senior Gijōken (Councillor) shall take his place.

Article IV. Number of Gijōken (Councillors) shall be less than fifteen. They shall be elected from persons having the decoration of the first order and shall be given Chokumia rank.

Article V. Besides persons provided for in the preceding articles, Gijōken may be elected from among members of the Imperial Household.
Article VI. The advice on the grant and deprival of the ranks decorations and annuities may not be tendered to the Throne unless the matter passed in the conference of more than eight Gijoken (Councillors).

Article VII. The resolution in the Conference of Gijoken (Councillors) shall be passed by majority of votes. In case of equality of votes the chairman's decision shall prevail.

Article VIII. The business of the Decoration Conference shall be handled by the Chief of the Bureau of Decoration.

Annex

Article IX. This ordinance shall come into force from the 10th day of November of the 26th Year of Meiji (1893).
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, [NAME], Yachiho, who occupy the post of Chief of General Affairs Section of the Bureau of Decoration, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled 'The Regulation of the Decoration Conference' is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Bureau of Decoration),
certified at Tokyo,
on this 25th day of August, 1947

/S/ [Signature]
Chief of General Affairs Section of the Bureau of Decoration

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ [Signature]
At my conference today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Arita handed me the following message which the Prime Minister requested me to deliver personally to the Secretary of State on my forthcoming visit to Washington in the hope that the message may also be brought to the attention of the President:

At present there is a serious antagonism among the nations of Europe and no one can assure that there will be no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war is to break out, its consequences would be practically beyond our imagination and the indescribable sufferings of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete
destruction of civilization would ensue. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary for us to exert our effort to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe, and, I believe, that is the duty mainly incumbent on the United States and Japan since these two Powers are situated outside the scope of European conflict.

Then what are the causes of this antagonism in Europe? There may be contentions on both sides but on cool scrutiny of the European situations since the World War we come to the conclusion that, although Germany and Italy may be advised to be more patient, Great Britain and France also have a great deal to reconsider.

Undoubtedly the intention of the United States Government is to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe and thus to save Europe from the misery of war. Similarly, it is the ardent wish of Japan that nations should have their own proper places in the world and thus the true world peace might be established and maintained. I, for myself, am doing my utmost to realise this ideal, and on this point, I believe, will be found the possibility of much closer co-operation between Japan and America as well as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations.

OREW

RR:WWC
CONFIDENTIAL -- FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 1767

Eugene H. Dooman, Esquire,
American Charge d'Affaires ad interim,

Tokyo.

Sir:

Reference is made to the Embassy's telegram no. 234, May 18, 5 p.m., in which there is given the text of a message from the Prime Minister which was handed to Ambassador Grew by the Minister for Foreign Affairs with the request that Mr. Grew deliver the message personally to me. There is enclosed a reply to this message.

The Department desires to be consulted by telegraph with regard to the question of the time when the reply should be delivered. Therefore, before arranging to call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of handing the reply to him for transmission to the Prime Minister, please telegraph your opinion whether an opportune time for presentation of the reply has arrived, offering also such comments or suggestions as may occur to you with regard to the text of the proposed reply.

When you deliver the reply, the Department desires that you inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it
is requested that the reply be regarded as strictly confidential and not for publication.

Very truly yours,

Enclosure:
Reply to Prime Minister.

On his return to Washington Ambassador Grew delivered to me personally the message which Your Excellency was so good as to place in his hands through the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have read with unusual interest the expressions of Your Excellency's concern at the existence among the nations of Europe of antagonism which may lead to open conflict, and of Your Excellency's concern as to what the consequences might be to millions of people and to civilization should such antagonism lead to an outbreak of war. In this situation Your Excellency sees it as the duty of the Governments of our two countries, owing to their situation "outside the scope of European conflict" to exert efforts to prevent the occurrence of the casualty envisaged.

I have carefully noted also the statement pertaining to the causes of strained relations in the
is requested that the reply be regarded as strictly confidential and not for publication.

Very truly yours,

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Reply to Prime Minister.

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I have carefully noted also the statement pertaining to the causes of strained relations in the
European situation, the interest of my Government in the preservation of peace, and finally the "ardent wish of Japan" that the relations of nations might be so arranged that true world peace would be established and maintained.

Your Excellency will have no doubt, in the light of the published utterances of the President and myself and of the principles we have advocated and supported, that the Government of the United States wholeheartedly desires to see established and maintained upon the basis of fair dealing and fair play between and among nations a condition of true world peace. With especial reference to the situation in Europe, Your Excellency will be apprised of the recent earnest efforts of this Government: the President's identical messages sent on September 26, 1938, to the heads of several European governments which had reached an alarming crisis in their relations; identical messages addressed on April 14, 1939, by the President and myself respectively to the Chancellor of the German Reich and to the Premier of Italy with regard to the possible removal of the pervading threat or fear of a European war.

It would be most gratifying to me, and I may also speak for the President, if there could be found ways for the use of your Government's influence toward discouraging among European governments, especially those
governments with which your Government may have special relations, the taking of any action, or the pursuance of any policy, that might endanger the general peace. I am confident that any such contribution as this would constitute a high service to those great sections of humanity which live in fear of the devastation of war.

In further reference to Your Excellency's expressed desire to see a true world peace established and maintained, I venture to observe, in a spirit of frankness which I trust will not be misunderstood, that this objective is made the more remote by the existence and the continuance of armed conflict and consequent political disturbances in the Far East today. Just as the unfolding of events in the European sphere have their repercussions in the Far East, so, it appears, the prolongation of abnormal conditions in the Far East contribute to causes of unrest in Europe. American opinion is therefore perturbed by the trend of events in the Far East, especially with regard to the methods of Japan in relations with China.

If, therefore, it should prove impracticable or inexpedient to make effective contribution at once to the settlement of problems arising in the European area, there nevertheless would be urgent need for the exertion of efforts in connection with disturbed conditions in
other geographical areas, especially by those nations which may unhappily now be engaged in armed conflict. It is my view that each peaceful settlement, in whatever geographical sphere, constitutes a stabilizing element and an important step toward improvement in the general world situation.

Your Excellency may be assured of the genuine desire of the President and myself to do all within our power to convert into practical results those principles and hopes to which we have frequently given expression in connection with the foreign relations of the Government of the United States. While this Government does not perceive any practicable steps which it might usefully take at this time in addition to those already taken, this Government is sincerely interested in the suggestion contained in Your Excellency's message, and in giving further consideration to that suggestion would be pleased to have such further information as Your Excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making more definitive Your Excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe.
From Tokyo
Dated August 8, 1939
Received 9:38 A.M.

Secretary of State
Washington
393, August 8, 1 P.M.
Strictly Confidential
Our 389, August 5, 9 P.M.

One. The Prime Minister's personal advisor called on me at nine o'clock this morning. He said that he had just seen the Prime Minister who had expressed desire to receive as soon as possible the Secretary's reply. I told Mr. Fujii that I had been in a position since yesterday to deliver the reply to the Foreign Office but that I had informed the Department that in view of internal Japanese political development I was inclined to withhold action for the present. I added however that as the Prime Minister had expressed desire to have the reply as soon as possible I would deliver it at once to the Foreign Office. I asked Fujii to call again at noon. I thereupon delivered the reply in person to Iihizawa.
-2- #393 August 8, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

who received the document without comment for delivery
to the Foreign Minister. Upon my return from the Foreign
Office Fujii called again. I gave him a copy of the reply
and said that it included, for the reasons specified in
paragraph one of the Department's 242, August 4, 3 p.m.,
indication of the Secretary's reaction of the Prime
Minister's confidential views.

Two. Fujii's comment was that the reply seemed
to be addressed to the Prime Minister's written message
and looked at in that light, would he thought be well
received by his principal. He said that he would see
the Prime Minister again this evening after the five
minister conference (called to discuss the alliance with
Germany and Italy).

Three. I marked the reply strictly confidential
and told both Yoshizawa and Fujii that it was not (repeat
not) to be published.
Tokyo, June 7, 1939.

No. 3936

SUBJECT: JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

I had the honor in my telegram no. 245, May 26, 8 p.m., to present an analysis of certain trends in Japanese thought with regard to foreign policy in relation to the situation now developing in Europe. I observed that there
were elements in Japan - not to be confused with certain congenial, but withal ineffectual, persons educated abroad who have been telling us that reaction to Japan's China policy was "just around the corner" - who realized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the maintenance by Japan of neutrality between the democratic and totalitarian camps would afford Japan little security, and that national security could be assured in the long run only by liquidating the conflict with China. I was not unaware of the need for resting an observation of this nature on a reasonably firm basis, and it is my purpose in this despatch to lay before the Department the circumstances, some of personal knowledge and the others which derive by deduction, on which my view was based. As there is no discussion in the press or in any other public forum of the question whether or not Japan should align itself with Germany and Italy - indeed, any reference by the press to this question is officially interdicted - information with regard to thought trends has come to me largely by word of mouth.

The first conversation which needs to be recorded took place on May 16, at a luncheon which was given in honor of the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew by a Japanese who, while holding no official position, is a close friend and confident of high officials of the Court and of Prince Konoye, Minister
without Portfolio, and Marquis Kido, Minister of the Interior. He is in a position to exercise through various contacts considerable influence on the Government. As we left the table, our host drew the Ambassador and me into another room and talked substantially along the following lines:

Although the Japanese Government has decided not to conclude a military alliance with Germany and Italy, there was being exerted on the Government, not only by Germany and Italy but by reactionary groups in Japan, strong pressure toward entering into some arrangement with the latter countries which would reaffirm the solidarity among the nations whose policies were opposed by the democratic nations. The groups to which he belonged had succeeded in defeating the proposal to conclude the alliance and are now doing their best to defeat the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact", or at least to prevent it from becoming a political link with Germany and Italy; but it was difficult to meet the argument of those who had advocated the alliance and are now favoring close association with Germany and Italy, that Japan cannot afford to be isolated. Germany and Italy are urging Japan "to come over to their side", while the democratic nations are turning to Japan a very cold shoulder. If, therefore, the democratic nations,
especially the United States, could indicate to Japan that restoration of good relations with Japan is desired and that the way is open for Japan to align herself with the democratic nations, but not against the totalitarian states, those Japanese who are working for precisely those objectives would have their hand gently strengthened.

The Ambassador said that he was very much interested in the views just expressed, but that it must be obvious that the restoration of peace and good relations between Japan and China must be a condition precedent to the restoration of good relations between Japan and the United States and other democratic nations. He could not, therefore, recommend that his Government give any gesture of welcome to Japan unless he were first satisfied that the terms of peace with China which Japan had in view could be reconciled with China's peace terms and would meet with the approval of the American Government.

Our host then talked very vaguely about the readiness of Japan to withdraw from central and South China, but when asked to give specifications he replied that a full statement on Japanese peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He undertook to report the conversation to Mr. Arita, and to suggest to Mr. Arita that he give the Ambassador a precise explanation of
Japanese objectives in China during the conversation which the Ambassador had arranged to have with Mr. Arita on May 18th.

Mr. and Mrs. Arita were entertaining the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew at luncheon on May 17, and Mr. Grew prearranged with me that I should endeavor during the luncheon party to ascertain from Mr. Arita whether our host of the previous day had consulted him. I accordingly took advantage of a favorable opportunity to engage Mr. Arita in conversation. I found that he was quite familiar with the discussion of the previous day. He said that there had been a suggestion that he give Mr. Grew an assurance that Japan would withhold any action to "strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact" until Mr. Grew returned to Washington and had an opportunity to discuss with his Government the possibility of making to Japan some "gesture of welcome". Mr. Arita said that there was no important opinion in the country unfavorable to the measure which had been proposed to combat communistic activities, and that, if the time became ripe for the conclusion of the agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy, the Japanese Government intended to proceed with it. He could, however, assure Mr. Grew that the agreement would contain no military, political or economic clauses; but with this proviso - if it were found that these activities were being instigated by the Soviet Government, the counter-measures
proposed would have to be directed against that Government.

Mr. Arita then passed on to the negotiations between the Soviet and British Governments concerning the "common front against aggression". He said that Japan is very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, but that Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that, whether Japan liked it or not, its policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other. The British Ambassador had, he said, given him definite assurances that the arrangement under discussion by the British and Soviet Governments would specifically be made inapplicable, but he (Mr. Arita) replied that any arrangement which formed the basis for the close collaboration contemplated by Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union in respect of their common interests in Europe would be bound to bring about similar collaboration among them in the conduct of their policies in the Far East. He delivered himself at some length and with considerable show of heat over Sir Robert Craigie's insistence that the assurances given Mr. Arita should dissolve any Japanese anxiety with regard to the effective scope of the proposed arrangement. Mr. Arita concluded the conversation with me with the observation that decision over Japan's attitude vis-a-vis the situation developing in Europe would have to
be withheld until results of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were known.

A full account of the Ambassador’s conversation on May 18 will be found in his telegram No. 235, May 18, 7 p.m.

The impressions which the Ambassador and I had formed of Mr. Arita’s views as expressed in the conversations of May 17 and 18 agreed in every respect. It seemed to us that Mr. Arita, far from indicating any eagerness to find a way to approach the democratic nations, was preoccupied with the effects on the Far East of the establishment of the "front against aggression" and was not in a conciliatory mood. The Ambassador came, therefore, to the conclusion, as I did, that there was no justification for believing that desire to bring Japan into line with the democratic nations as against the totalitarian nations animated the Japanese Government as such.

Whether by accident or by design, I was approached on the same day, May 18, by a Japanese hitherto unknown to me but who had made the acquaintance of the Ambassador as a fellow passenger during a voyage across the Pacific, with the suggestion that I have a "chat", as he put it, with the Prime Minister. I asked the gentleman to call again, as I wished to consider the matter. I informed the Ambassador of the call and of the suggestion that I have a talk with the Prime Minister. Mr. Grew said that he had
formed a favorable impression of Mr. Fujii, the person who had called on me, and that he saw no reason why I should not return a favorable reply. When Mr. Fujii called again, I said that I would be glad to have an opportunity to make the acquaintance of the Prime Minister, but that I had heard rumors of the possibility of a change of government and wondered, therefore, whether a call at that time would be opportune. Returning on the following day, Mr. Fujii brought an invitation from Baron Hiranuma to dinner on May 23, when he intended to explain his purpose in sending through Mr. Grew his message to the Secretary, and word to the effect that no change in the government was impending. I accepted the invitation. Mr. Fujii then emphasized the importance of keeping a profound secret the forthcoming talk. He said that Baron Hiranuma’s political position was reasonably secure, but that the alignment of factions within the Government over European policy was so delicate as to require that the Prime Minister act very cautiously.

Mr. Fujii called for me on the evening of May 23. As we went in my car, which bears an Embassy license tag, Mr. Fujii proposed that we alight some distance from the Prime Minister’s private residence and go the rest of the way on foot; we did. At the gate of the residence there stood a number of policemen, who, although obviously
surprised by seeing a foreigner, made no attempt to stop me. The servants were prepared for my visit, but I have reason to believe that they, as well as two female relations of the Prime Minister's who served us later at dinner, and no knowledge whatever of my identity. It might be added that the residence, which is situated in the suburbs, is small and quite unpretentious and would barely grace a small tradesman. These details, while inconsequential, may perhaps reflect my impressions at the moment.

Baron Hiranuma received me very courteously. He said that he unfortunately had few opportunities to meet foreigners and thus to receive at first hand the impressions of foreigners with regard to conditions in various parts of the world. The situation in Europe was, in his view, a delicate one, and he felt confident that he could obtain from an American a more objective appraisal of that situation than he would be likely to procure from an European.

I expressed regret that I was not in a position to give him any information other than that which was public knowledge. There then ensued a colloquy on the situation in Europe, during which Baron Hiranuma displayed knowledge not only of a factual nature but of political trends in
Europe which surprised me. One of the points brought out which, in his view, made for danger in Europe was that Chancellor Hitler - with the objectives which he has in mind for Germany to achieve - provides an issue around which all elements in Great Britain can rally; the imperialists, who do not propose to tolerate a Germany which can pretend to equality with Great Britain; the industrialists, who fear German commercial competition; and, finally, the Jews, radicals and even the Germanophiles, who, vie with each other in their hatred of Hitler.

Baron Hiranuma then said that the possibility of a war arising in Europe was one which he contemplated with horror. It would inevitably result in the total destruction of civilization, as no nation, however remote from the seat of war, would hope to escape the eventual consequences even though it might be fortunate to avoid direct involvement. He had publicly stated on several occasions that Japan could never be a democracy or a totalitarian state, and that Japan could make its greatest contribution by bringing together in harmonious and peaceful relations the two groups of nations. There were, he continued, elements in Japan which considered that Japan could not afford to maintain a condition of isolation and that her security demanded that she enter into "special relations" with Germany and Italy. He was insisting, however, that Japan follow what he termed "moral diplomacy". A nation's
existence was not to be measured by decades, and it was essential, therefore, that statesmen charged with the destinies of national fix their attention on long term objective rather than on gaining favorable tactical positions, which were after all, ephemeral. The most important of these objectives was a stabilized peace to replace interludes of preparation for the next war. Japan, like the United States, was not directly involved in the troubles of Europe; and it was his thought that these two nations, which were the only Great Powers situated outside of Europe, were in a position to exercise a moderating influence on Europe. To exercise that influence was a duty which they owed their own peoples, for the downfall of Europe would inevitably bring with it the downfall of the rest of the world. In his opinion, the first step which had to be taken was to check the tendency toward the division of Europe into two politically hostile camps. He wondered whether the views of the American Government were responsive to those which he had expressed in his message to the Secretary.

I said that the American Government had taken a lead, in respect of both time and emphasis. In making known discord fact that nations are today interdependent and that discord between any nations is a matter of concern to all others. His message to the Secretary did not, I said, contain any definitive suggestion as to how the United States and Japan
might proceed toward averting war in Europe. The principal difficulty, in my opinion, in the way of the collaboration which he had suggested in talking to me was Japan's policies and actions in China. I felt certain that the American Government would, in other more happy circumstances, have welcomed Japanese cooperation toward alleviating the threat to peace in Europe which, the great majority of Americans believed, arises from the policies and actions of Germany and Italy; and I doubted whether the American people would favor collaboration with a nation which it believed to be following in the Far East precisely those policies and actions that are considered to be the root of the trouble in Europe. I also said that the American people have laid before them nearly every day reports of bombings of American property and of other instances of violations of American rights and interests in China. The Foreign Office was trying to exculpate the Japanese military authorities by pleading military necessity or inadvertence, but enough had happened to justify belief that the the Japanese authorities, in China at least, were systematically and deliberately trying to expel American and other foreign interests from China. The views of the American people in these respects were, I said, very definitely formed. I could not but feel, therefore, that the adjustment of the conflict in China on terms satisfactory to all concerned would have to be a condition precedent to that degree of
collaboration between the United States and Japan which could reasonably be expected to bring about the desired results in Europe.

The Prime Minister observed that he was well aware of the state of feeling which prevailed in the United States against Japan. The American people had assumed that Japan had deliberately provoked the conflict in China with a view to seizing the more populated and productive parts of that country, but he felt confident that the American Government realized that it had not been the original intention or desire of Japan to do anything more than to protect its rights in North China. It was also supposed by Americans that Japan intended to close the Open Door in China; and to his regret the actions of the Japanese authorities in China were not entirely reconcilable with the desire of the Japanese Government to respect foreign rights and interests in China. But he wondered whether the American Government realized that the Japanese people labored under a very real feeling of grievance against the Occidental Powers, especially Great Britain. When the Great War broke out, Japan was an ally of Great Britain. There were no legal obligations on Japan to support her ally, but she conceived that she had a moral obligation to do so. She accordingly declared war against Germany, her navy undertook operations against the German
fleet in the Pacific, her merchant marine cooperated in various ways, and finally her military forces eliminated Germany from Shantung. "The only thanks we got from Great Britain", continued Baron Hiranuma, "was the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired Japan to support Great Britain." Again, the rights which Japan had acquired in Manchuria as a result of her war with Russia and later by agreement with China were essential to Japan; nevertheless, the efforts of China to prejudice those rights were regarded by Great Britain and the United States with complacency, if not with benevolence; China took courage to persist, with the result that Japan had to resort to force in 1931 to protect those rights. Finally, the Japanese people came to the conclusion that the Nine Power Treaty and the Naval Treaties operated, not to stabilize peace in the Far East, but to bind Japan against safeguarding her interests in China. So long as the Japanese people felt that it had just cause for grievance, it was politically impossible for his government or any government which would succeed him to bring about complete equality of opportunity in China for all nations.

The Japanese people, Baron Hiranuma continued, have considerable sympathy for Germany and Italy, as they conceive these countries to be in many important respects in the same position as Japan. It was not to be expected
that Germany would have permitted herself to remain under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, nor that Italy would have been content to be dependent on other nations for supplied of raw materials. At the same time, the consequences of efforts on their part to redress their grievances by force, or of the stubborn refusal of the democratic nations to offer to correct these grievances could not possible to confined to the protagonists in the European quarrel but would have to be shared by other nations. He referred to my observation that the settlement of the China conflict would probably have to be a condition precedent to joint American-Japanese efforts to moderate the situation in Europe. If that were to be the view of the American Government, any hope of proceeding along the course which he had in mind would have to be abandoned. The objectives which Japan has had in China are essential for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes, closing of markets to foreign competition, and lack of free access to raw materials, and so long as such conditions exist any moderation or her objectives in China and, therefore, of her peace terms, could not be considered. Nevertheless if conditions could be brought about which would assure to all nations markets for the world's goods on the basis of quality and price and supplies of the materials which they needed, the importance to Japan of
securing a market and sources of raw materials in China would greatly diminish; and by the same token there would not be the urge that there now is on Germany and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker and smaller nations.

Baron Hiranuma stated that the conditions which brought about the situations in the Far East and Europe are not local but universal in character, and that neither situation could be settled in a manner calculated to bring about a stabilized peace unless the conditions which brought them about were corrected.

Baron Hiranuma said that the belief was widely held abroad that Japan was considering a military alliance with Germany and Italy. He had endeavored to explain frankly the basis of Japanese sympathy for Germany and Italy, and he could say quite definitely that the basis of what appeared to be a concerting of Japanese policy with that of Germany and Italy lay in the fact that all three countries are in the same economic strategic position. He personally was of the opinion that Japan, whose government would for all time come rest on the sanctity of the Imperial Family, could not tie itself by special relations to any foreign government whose stability depended on the continued existence and political prestige of one individual. There were both in Germany and Italy political currents
flowing beneath the surface which, in his view, would gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrangement, such as an alliance, which Japan might make with whose countries. Hidden dissident elements would be certain to make themselves felt in time of war and thus are to be reckoned as a threat to the success of German and Italian arms.

At this point we were interrupted by notice that dinner was served. The conversation during dinner was not in any way pertinent to the subject of this despatch, being confined to discussions of points in Chinese philosophy, personal reminiscences, and so on, the Prime Minister discoursing in a most interesting manner.

Returning to his study, the Prime Minister said that he wished to draw together the various threads of our conversations, as follows:

The United States and Japan were the only powers which could help to prevent the crystallization of the trend toward the division of Europe into armed camps. There can, however, be no confident hope that a permanent peace can be established until the world-wide economic and political conditions which bring about unrest in Europe and in the Far East can be corrected; and if an international conference can be called to solve the problems which create unrest, Japan would be prepared to agree to
the inclusion of the Far Eastern situation among the problems to be discussed. Before any call for such a conference could be issued, Great Britain and France, and Germany and Italy, would have to be sounded out. If the President were prepared to make a confidential approach to the European democracies; he would be glad to approach Germany and Italy; and, if there were returned favorable reply by these nations; he would be glad to have the President call the conference under such conditions as might be agreed upon after discussion through normal diplomatic channels.

I wish to make it clear, before setting forth certain conclusion which I draw from these conversations, that I do not put forward the views of those Japanese - even though they be persons of great importance and influence - who harbor hopes of restoring good relations with the democratic nations, as being necessarily the views of the Japanese Government. These are, however, the views of a powerful element in the Government; they may prevail or they may not, but they cannot be ignored.

Any observer who is in any way sensitive to things not seen would, if he were in Tokyo today, become aware of the groping for security against the gathering storm in Europe. I should perhaps add parenthetically that the
European situation today has assumed primary proportions, and that it would be visionary to suppose that the present confusion concerning the course which Japan should follow is due to despondence over the apparently ineffectual hostilities in China. The Army and other elements which have thus far controlled China policy have assumed that the Far Eastern conflict could be permanently and completely insulated against repercussions from situations elsewhere, as they did not look to American and other occidental armed intervention in that conflict. Although reference has been made in the Embassy's telegrams to the effects of the President's message to Chancellor Hitler, I do not believe that I could, by further reference to that message, exaggerate the impulse which it had toward persuading the Japanese Government to realize that there may be grave danger of involvement with the United States "not directly across the Pacific but by way of Europe", as one Japanese put it to me. I should, however, place that observation in proper perspective. A threat by the United States to eject Japan from China would, I am confident, be resisted. But if war were to break out in Europe with the United States participating on the side of Great Britain and France, the outcome in the view of those Japanese who think along rational lines would admit of no doubt. With Germany and Italy crushed, the prospect of confronting the
victors would not be a palatable one to Japan.

There are, therefore, in the situation which seems to be developing but two courses for Japan to follow - either to go over unreservedly to the totalitarian side, or to restore good relations with those nations which, in the opinion of one element of the Japanese Government, would be the victors. True, in rejecting the proposal to join Germany and Italy in an alliance, Japan provisionally chose a third course - neutrality. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether there are many Japanese who confidently believe that neutrality would afford security. The arguments of those who believe in the superior power of Germany and Italy are obvious and simple: Japan has only to associate herself with those countries and wait for the European war to pick China like a ripe plum. But, for those Japanese who have other views concerning the power of Germany and Italy, there is but one way by which Japan's security can be safeguarded, and that is to bring the conflict with China to an end on some reasonable terms. Here again I wish to make it clear that the desire for a settlement of the conflict does not derive from moral regeneration but from realization of stark facts.

In concluding this despatch, which is already unconscionably long, I wish briefly to allude to the
discrepancy between the attitude of the Prime Minister as indicated in his conversation with me and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose preoccupation over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations has already been mentioned. It is obvious that the desire of the Prime Minister for American collaboration to bring about peace in Europe (and in the Far East) cannot be reconciled with the readiness, which is almost an eagerness, on the part of the Foreign Minister to meet a fancied threat from Great Britain. These two points of view reflect conflicting policies, and which of these policies will prevail may perhaps be decided by events of the next few days.

Respectfully yours,

/\ Eugene H. Dooman
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

EHD;C
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TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (TOKYO TRIALS).

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